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Pt. 2



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STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Res. 231

A RESOLUTION TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER THERE ARE
EMPLOYEES IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
DISLOYAL TO THE UNITED STATES

PART 2

APPENDIX

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



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A4
1950
pt. 2

UNITED STATES
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WASHINGTON : 1950



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APPENDIX

EXHIBIT No. 1

[Daily Worker, February 21, 1940]

SIGNERS OF PROTEST

The following outstanding Americans, writers, poets, playwrights, educators, judges, critics, and public officials signed the letter to President Roosevelt and Attorney General Jackson protesting the attacks upon the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and condemning the war hysteria now being whipped up by the Roosevelt administration:

Elliot Paul	S. L. M. Barlow	Dr. W. B. Cannon
Ernest Hemingway	Marguerite Zorach	Reuben Ottenberg
Jay Allen	William Zorach	C. Fayette Taylor
Vincent Sheenan	Prof. H. P. Fairchild	Countee Cullen
Paul Robeson	Kyle Crichton	Harvey O'Connor
John T. Bernard	Anna Louise Strong	Hon. Paul J. Kern
Louis B. Boudin	S. John Block	Nora Benjamin
Z. Chaffee, Jr.	Anita Block	Bennett Cerf
Muriel Draper	Dr. E. M. Bluestone	Dorothy Brewster
Quenten Reynolds	Arthur Kober	Florina Lasker
George Marshall	George H. Stover	Stuart Davis
Elizabeth Dublin Marshall	Dr. Charles C. Webber	Clifford McAvoy
Gardner Jackson	Frances B. Grant	Charles Belous
Alfred Kreymborg	Hortense M. Fagley	Max Cleeber
Charles H. Houston	Alfred W. Bingham	William Gropper
Dashiell Hammett	Carl H. Levy	Arnold Donawa
Prof. Horace M. Kallen	Mary Heaton Vorse	Brand Blanshard
Ralph Roeder	Louis Weisner	Dr. Max Yergan
Evelyn Adler	Edward L. Israel	Prof. Vida D. Scudder
George Seldes	Lillian Hellman	Isabel Walker Soule
B. W. Huebsch	Louis F. McCabe	Thomas E. Benner
Hon. Vito Marcantonio	Arthur Emptage	Ephraim Cross
Bernard Denzer	C. D. Stevens	John F. Shepard
J. A. MacCallum	Bonnie Bird	Langston Hughes
James L. Brewer	Melvin Rader	Morris Watson
Hon. Dorothy Kenyon	Ralph Gundlach	Bertha C. Reynolds
Rev. Donald G. Lothrop	William H. Morris	Louis Untermeyer
Arthur La Sueur	T. Addis	Esther A. Untermeyer
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Aaron Copland	Ada B. Taft	Howard Y. Williams
Hon. Stanley Isaacs	Jean Starr Untermeyer	Lester Cohen
Prof. Harold C. Urey	E. A. Ross	Edward Lamb
James Thurber	F. O. Matthiessen	Tom Mooney
Dr. Walter Briehl	Dr. George Barsky	Rev. William Lloyd Imes
Robert W. Dunn	Belle Zeller	L. Eloesser
Alexander Lehrman	Van Wyck Brooks	Dr. Harry Ward
Malcolm Cowley	Herman Shumlin	Prof. Walter Rauten-
Marc Blitzstein	Prof. Robert S. Lynd	strauch
Walter E. Hager	Mervyn Rathborne	Hon. James H. Wolfe
Albert Maltz	Kirtley F. Mather	Eda Lou Walton
Margaret Lamont	Lawrence S. Kubie	Prof. Newton Arvin
Dr. Ernest P. Boas	James Waterman Wise	
Prof. Goodwin Watson	Irwin Shaw	

EXHIBIT No. 2

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF AMERICAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP, INC.,
New York, N. Y., November 16, 1948.

DEAR FRIEND: On Monday evening, December 13, the Very Reverend Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury, and foremost leader in the democratic movement for world peace, speaks at Madison Square Garden. This eminent churchman, who will climax a month's tour of the United States with this rally, will present his impressions of the American peace movement as it relates to the peace forces of England and the continent. He will also report on his recent observations of conditions in eastern Europe and his personal conversations with the leaders of the new democracies.

We feel it is a rare privilege, indeed, for us to be able to present the Dean in the first significant rally to follow the elections. We know you will appreciate the importance of forcefully demonstrating, particularly before the new congressional session, the people's will for peace through cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union.

The Ambassador from the Soviet Union, His Excellency Mr. Alexander S. Panyushkin, will address the meeting. The meeting will also feature Paul Robeson, other well-known speakers and a program of entertainment.

As you may recollect, thousands were turned away from the Garden on the occasion of the Dean's last visit here in 1945. Thus, to insure you proper accommodations, we are enclosing an advance ticket order blank.

Won't you plan now to attend this rally for peace and reserve seats for yourself and your friends?

Cordially yours,

RICHARD MORFORD, *Executive Director.*

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enc.

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EXHIBIT No. 3

This exhibit was not received by the reporter and was described by Senator McCarthy as "a cordial invitation to attend a dinner and presentation of the first annual award of the American-Russian Institute to President Franklin Roosevelt for 'Furthering American-Soviet Relations' " (transcript, p. 26).

EXHIBIT No. 4

Executive Secretary. Prof. DONALD MCCONNELL

Secretary on Latin America, Dr. DAVID EFRON

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 Roy Wilkins
 Dr. Max Winkler
 Dr. Stephen S. Wise
 Max Yergan

CONFERENCE ON PAN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

Executive Offices: 156 Fifth Avenue, New York

Telephone: Watkins 9-0420

DECEMBER 10-11, 1938, HOTEL WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON, D. C.

NOVEMBER 16, 1938.

DEAR FRIENDS: Enclosed you will find a Call to the Conference on Pan-American Democracy to be held in Washington on December tenth and eleventh.

On behalf of the Committee of Sponsors may I urge that your organization make every effort to participate? The problem is a pressing one and the need for some solution immediate.

We understand your organization has a very real concern with the inroads that fascism is making in this hemisphere, and we believe you can make a valu-

able contribution to our conference. If you can send representatives, please inform us at once.

We are looking forward to meeting them in Washington.

Sincerely yours,

DONALD MCCONNELL.

Delegates: Bernard Stern, Harry Lamberton, William Phillips.

DM: EAL.

UOPWA.

EXHIBIT No. 5

Trustees

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Joseph Brodsky
Heywood Broun
Edwin B. Burgum
Malcolm Cowley
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Benjamin J. Davis, Jr.
Robert W. Dunn
Osmond K. Fraenkel
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Alfred Hirsch
Charles Krumbein
Corliss Lamont
Leroy Peterson
Abraham Unger
James Waterman Wise
Le Roy Bowman

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Chairman: PAUL P. CROSBIE

Secretary: JAMES LECHAY

POLITICAL PRISONERS BAIL FUND COMMITTEE

NEW YORK CITY

154 Nassau Street, Room 1200

BEekman 3-8576

JANUARY 18, 1935.

DEAR FRIEND: After reading the enclosed manifesto, we believe that you will be with us and one of us. We therefore urge you to act. Of primary importance to the large success of the Bail Fund is *your attendance* at the committee's first invited guest meeting (ticket enclosed).

This meeting will be held on Thursday, January 31st, at 8.30, in the Orozco Room of the New School for Social Research. Here the Bail Fund will be fully explained. There will be a talk by John Spivak and short talks by Roger Baldwin, Corliss Lamont and Heywood Broun. Also some words by Angelo Herndon and two other outstanding victims of the present deplorable bail situation.

Again we say, if you are with us in our purpose, do not fail to come to this meeting. Should this be impossible, however, will you avail yourself of the enclosed form in order to make closer contact with us.

Sincerely,

THE POLITICAL PRISONERS BAIL FUND COMMITTEE.

A common bail fund for those arrested in the struggle of the working class, for the rights of oppressed minorities, in the fight against war and fascism

EXHIBIT No. 6

AN OPEN LETTER TO GOVERNOR THOMAS E. DEWEY

[New York Times, October 9, 1944]

It has been well said, "By their deeds you shall know them."

There is a deed crying to be done in the State of New York today. A deed of simple justice, humanity, and fair play.

It is in your power and yours alone to do this act.

We ask you to grant a pardon to Morris U. Schappes.

We ask you to do this because the continued imprisonment of this teacher and scholar can only be interpreted by many thoughtful Americans as political persecution.

Morris U. Schappes has passed 11 months of an 18- to 24-month sentence arising from the 1940 Rapp-Coudert investigation of subversive activity in the New York City schools. Morris Schappes told the committee he had been a Communist. They demanded the names of all the Communists at City College. Morris Schappes named three others, who, with himself, were known as Communists. He said he knew no others. The committee said there were over 40, not 4, as Morris Schappes testified. They called Morris Schappes a perjurer. He was convicted.

This was the crime!

Even the most exacting will concede that Morris Schappes, whom even his enemies never accused of harming or even desiring to harm a single human being, has suffered enough.

We are engaged in a war against the barbarian who would impose the philosophy that an individual life is cheap. We are affirming in terrible battle that a single life is precious. We say further, Mr. Governor, that 2 years of a good man's life are precious and not to be taken away lightly.

The last years of agony have taught us that the conscience must never sleep. What is done to the least of us is the concern of all. That is why we cannot in good conscience fail to raise our voice against this injustice in our midst.

That is why we appeal to you, Mr. Governor.

To you and you alone American justice provides power above and beyond the Courts—the power of the chief executive to pardon.

We ask you to use this power to pardon Morris U. Schappes.

The deed would find favor in the eyes of the people, who love justice.

- Prof. Thomas Addis, Stanford Univ.
 Rabbi David Aronson (Del. Am. Jewish Congress), Minneapolis, Minn.
 Rabbi Aaron Ashinsky (Del. Am. Jewish Congress), Pittsburgh, Pa.
 State Senator W. P. Atkinson, Seattle, Wash.
 Prof. Frank Baker, Pres. State Teachers College, Milwaukee, Wis.
 Rev. Lee H. Ball, Lake Mahopac, N. Y.
 Prof. Francis M. Barbour, S. Illinois State Teachers College, Carbondale, Ill.
 Prof. Fred A. Barnes, Cornell Univ., Ithaca, N. Y.
 Prof. Marion Bauer, New York Univ.
 Rev. Robert Baxter, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.
 Prof. Jos. W. Beach, Dept. of English, University of Minnesota.
 Wm. Rose Benet, writer.
 Rabbi Solomon Bersel, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Prof. Dorothy Bethurum, Connecticut College, New London, Conn.
 Rev. Lyndon S. Beardslee, Westboro, Mass.
 Rev. Archie B. Bedford, Syracuse, N. Y.
 Bishop W. Y. Bell, Halsey Institute.
 Dr. W. A. J. Bellrock, Pres. N. A. A. C. P., Chickasha, Oklahoma.
 Father Benedict, Church of the Crucifix, New York City.
 Milly Brandt, Legislative Chairman, Women's Div.; Am. Jewish Congress.
 Prof. Ray O. Billington, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 Prof. Raymond T. Birge, Chairman, Dept. of Physics, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, Calif.
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 Rabbi Maurice J. Bloom, Temple Beth Jacob, Newburn, N. Y.
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 Rev. Lester L. Boobar, Bangor, Maine.
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 Rev. Robert Evans Browning, Vicar Chapel of the Redeemer, Maryland.

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 Edwin T. Buchrer, Editor, Journal of Liberal Religion.
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 Rev. Bates G. Burt, Rector, Pontiac, Mich.
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 Witter, Bynner, poet.
 Rev. Fred L. Cairns, Needham, Mass.
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 Rev. Kieth Connings, Detroit, Mich.
 Rabbi Jonah E. Caplan, Cong. Beth El, Long Island.
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 Rev. Ruthven S. Chalmers, Boonville, N. Y.
 Alvin B. Christman, State Director, Penn. Farmers Union, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Rev. Merrill F. Clarks, New Canaan, Conn.
 Rabbi Henry Cohen, Galveston, Texas.
 Chas. H. Collins, Exec. Secy., Negro Labor Victory Com.
 Aaron Copland, composer.
 Prof. Fred A. Courts, Univ. of Missouri.
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 Prof. Philip W. L. Cox, N. Y. Univ.
 Rev. Chas. E. Crak Jr., Pastor, Emmanuel Episcopal Church, Louisville, Ky.
 Rev. Frank B. Crandall, Salem, Mass.
 Abraham Cronbach, Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, Ohio.
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 Margaret Cross, Director, Georgetown House, Washington, D. C.
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 Albert Deutsch, columnist.
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 Rev. Arthur Dumper, Dean of Trinity Cathedral (retired), Newark, N. J.
 Roscoe Dungee, Publisher, Black Dispatch.
 Will Durant, writer.
 Dr. Sherwood Eddy.
 Rev. J. Earl Edwards, Queens Village, New York.
 Prof. Ruth Emerson, Dept. Medical Social Work, Director Social Service Dept., Univ. of Chicago.
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 Henry Epstein (former), Solicitor-Gen'l, New York State.
 Katherine Ets, Asst. Librarian, Nat'l City Bank, N. Y. C.
 Jane Evans, Nat'l Fed. of Templehood Sisters, Dir. Nat'l Peace Conference.
 Rev. John W. Findley, Univ. Presbyterian Church, Purdue University, Ind.
 Rev. Judson E. Fiebigler, Utica, N. Y.
 Rev. Arthur W. Farnum, St. Mary's Parish, Asheville, N. C.
 Prof. Henry P. Fairchild, New York University.
 Dorothy Canfield Fisher, writer.
 Mrs. Mitchell Follansbee, League of Women Voters, Evanston, Ill.
 Prof. Frances A. Foster, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.
 Waldo Frank, writer.
 Elizabeth P. Frasier, Religious Educator, Protestant Episcopal Church, Phila., Pa.
 Rev. Stephen V. Fritchman, Boston, Mass.
 Rev. J. Shubert Frye, Syracuse, N. Y.
 Prof. Wendell Furry, Harvard Univ.
 Rev. Lee Alvin Gates, Pastor, South Presbyterian Church, Buffalo, N. Y.
 Eustace Gay, Editor, "Philadelphia Tribune."
 Rev. Palfrey Perkins, Kings Chapel, Boston, Mass.
 Wm. I. Gibson, Managing Editor, Afro-American Newspapers.
 Rev. Carlyle Glams, Editor, The Presbyterian Tribune, Utica, N. Y.
 Leonard E. Golditch, Attorney, Chairman, Nat'l Council to Combat Anti-Semitism.

- Sol Goldman (Del. to Amer. Jewish Congress), Progressive Order of the West, Rabbi Solomon Goldman, Zionist Org. of America, Chicago, Ill.
- Prof. Erwin B. Goodenough, Dept. History & Region, Yale University.
- Prof. Everett W. Goodhue, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.
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- Lucius C. Harper, Exec. Editor, The Chicago Defender.
- Mrs. Anton S. Harrington, Farmers Union, Schoharie Co. Com., N. Y.
- M. Lafayette Harris, Pres., Philander Smith College, Little Rock, Ark.
- Wm. Harrison, Assoc. Editor, Boston Chronicle.
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- Mattie Hunter, Nat'l Council of Negro Women.
- Joseph Hyman, Jewish Federation, Indianapolis, Ind.
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- Sam Jaffee, actor.
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- Prof. Raymond Kennedy, Dept. of Sociology, Yale University.
- Rockwell, Kent, artist.
- Judge Dorothy Kenyon, New York.
- Freda Kirchway, Editor, "The Nation".
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- Prof. Walter Landauer, Univ. of Conn.
- Paula Laurence, actress.
- John Howard Lawson, screen writer, Hollywood.
- Canada Lee, actor.
- Prof. Paul Lehman, Biblical History, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass.
- Ray Lev, pianist.
- Prof. Norman Levinson, Mass. Inst. of Technology.
- Rabbi Israel Herbert Levinthal, D. D.; D. H. L., B'klyn Jewish Center.
- Rabbi Benj. A. Lichter, Cong. B'nai Israel, Pittsburgh, Pa.
- Louis Lipsky, Amer. Jewish Conference & Del. to Amer. Jewish Congress.
- Rabbi Emmanuel Lederman, Denver, Colorado.
- Frank Marshall Louis, Assoc. Negro Press.
- Rev. Moses B. Lovell, B'klyn, N. Y.
- Rev. Sidney Lovell, Chaplain, Yale Univ.
- Harry L. Lurie, Former Dir. Council Jewish Fed. & Welfare Funds, New York City.
- Florence H. Lascomb, Civil Liberties Union, Cambridge, Mass.
- Rev. Dr. John A. McCallum, Philadelphia, Pa.
- Bishop Francis J. McConnell, Lucasville, Ohio.
- James H. McGill, McGill Mfg. Co., Valparaiso, Ind.
- Rev. Chas. F. MacLennan, Cleveland, Ohio.
- John T. McManus, Movie Critic, New York City.
- Rev. Walter Henry MacPherson, S. T. A., Past Pres. of the Universalist Church of America.
- Prof. W. H. Mainwaring, Emeritus, Stanford Univ., Calif.

- Rabbi Jerome Malino, Danbury, Conn.
 Albert Maltz, writer, Hollywood.
 Rep. Vito Marcantonio, Congressman, N. Y. C.
 George Marshall, Nat'l. Fed. of Constitutional Liberties, N. Y. C.
 George Matis, Farmers Union, St. Johnsville, N. Y.
 Prof. F. O. Matthieson, Harvard Univ.
 Rev. Wm. H. Melish, Church of the Holy Trinity, N. Y. C.
 Rev. Harry C. Mesine, Buffalo, N. Y.
 Rabbi Israel Miller, Bronx, N. Y.
 Erin O'Brien-Moore, actress.
 Julian Morgenstern, President, Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, Ohio.
 Prof. Margaret S. Morris, Pembroke College in Brown Univ., Providence, R. I.
 Prof. H. Nethercot, Northwestern Univ.
 Prof. Robt. H. Nichols, Union Theological Seminary.
 Rev. Chas. C. Noble, Syracuse, N. Y.
 Mrs. Josephine Nordstrand, Exec. Secy. Wisconsin State Conf. on Soc. Leg.
 Senator Stanley Nowak, Michigan, 21st District.
 Rev. Delos O'Brien, Wilmington, Delaware.
 Judge Patric H. O'Brien, Detroit, Mich.
 Sono Osato, dancer.
 H. A. Overstreet, Prof. Emeritus, C. C. N. Y.
 Ruth H. Page, Stowe College Alumni, St. Louis, Mo.
 Rev. George L. Paine, Cambridge, Mass.
 State Rep. Wm. J. Pennock, Pres. Washington Pension Union, Seattle, Wash.
 Angeline E. Phillips, Recording Secy. Community Church, Berks Co., Pa.
 Harriet Ida Pickens, Nat'l. Bus. & Prof. Council, Y. W. C. A., N. Y. C.
 Martin Popper, Nat'l. Lawyers Guild, N. Y. C.
 Elizabeth L. Porter, Case Supervisor, Family Service Soc., New Orleans, La.
 Prof. Kenneth W. Porter, Vassar College.
 Rev. Edwin McNeill Poteal, Rochester, N. Y.
 Dr. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Editor "Peoples Voice," Congressional Nominee.
 Rev. Irving E. Putnam, Association of Wesley Methodist Churches, Minneapolis, Minn.
 Michael J. Quill, N. Y. C. Councilman, Pres. Transport Workers Union.
 Senator Thomas C. Robbins, 35th District, Seattle, Wash.
 Prof. Walter Rautenstrauch, Columbia University.
 Rev. Daniel Lyman Didont, Phila., Pa.
 Mary W. Rittenhouse, B'klyn Bureau of Charities, N. Y. C.
 Paul Robeson, actor, singer.
 Dr. Henry B. Robins, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, Rochester, N. Y.
 Earl Robinson, composer, Hollywood.
 Sol S. Rodin, Secy., Brith Achim Assoc., Edwin A. Rurit, Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell Univ., Ithaca, N. Y.
 Prof. George Sarton, Harvard Univ.
 Col. Wm. Jay Schieffelin.
 Prof. Margaret Schlauch, N. Y. U.
 Helen S. Sellers, Member of Conn. House of Rep. (1941-42).
 Rabbi Max Shapiro, Miami, Fla.
 Rev. Arthur Shenefelt, Norwood, Ohio.
 Prof. John F. Shepard, Pres. Civil Rights Fed., Detroit, Mich.
 Dr. Guy Emery Shipley, Editor, The Churchman.
 Prof. George H. Shull, Princeton Univ., Princeton, N. J.
 Eva Smill, Exec. Secy., Family Service Soc., New Orleans, La.
 Mason Smith, Editor, "The Interracial Review".
 Rev. F. Hastings Smyth, Superior, The Society of the Catholic Commonwealth, Cambridge, Mass.
 Mrs. Samuel Spiegel, Nat'l Women's League of United Synagogues.
 Prof. Bertha K. Stavrianos, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.
 J. Stanley Stevens, Chaplain, U. S. N. R.
 Donald Ogden Stewart, writer, Hollywood.
 Prof. Dirk J. Struik, Mass. Inst. of Technology.
 Rev. Harold C. Swezy, Church of Holy Apostle, N. Y. C.
 Prof. Jessie M. Tatlock, Mt. Holyoke, College.
 Prof. Alva Taylor, Secy., Southern Conf. for Human Welfare, Nashville, Tenn.
 Janet Thornton, Director, Social Service, Presbyterian Hospital, N. Y. C.
 Rev. Joseph H. Titus, Jamaica, N. Y.
 Rep. Nicholas Tomassetti, Rep. from New Britain to Conn. General Assembly.
 Judge Edward V. Totten.
 Rabbia Joshua Trachtenberg.
 Jim Tully, writer.
 Mark Van Doren, writer.
 John Van Druten, playwright.
 Pierre Van Paassen, writer, journalist.
 Oswald Garrison Villard, writer.
 Prof. Eda Lou Walton, N. Y. University.
 Rabbi Juda Washer, New Kensington, Pa.
 Prof. Harry F. Ward, Union Theological Seminary.
 M. Moran Weston, Chairman, N. Y. State Civil Liberties, Dept. N. Y. State Elks Assoc.
 Prof. F. W. Weymouth, Stanford Univ.
 Prof. Philip E. Wheelwright, Dartmouth College.

Prof. George F. Whicher, Amherst College.	Dr. Abraham Wolfson, Pres., Jewish Social Service Bureau, Newark, N. J.
Rev. John C. White, Bishop of Springfield, Illinois.	Prof. Theresa Wolfson, B'klyn College.
Doxy Wilkerson, Exec. Editor "Peoples Voice".	Prof. Thomas Woody, Prof. of Education, Univ. of Pa., Phila., Pa.
Robt. Wilkerson, Exec. Secy., Negro Welfare Assn., Anderson, Ind.	Mary E. Woolley, President Emerita, Mt. Holyoke College.
Rev. C. Lawson Williard Jr., Trinity Episcopal Church, New Haven, Conn.	Prof. Henry N. Wrieman, Prof. of Philosophy of Religion, Univ. of Chicago.
Rev. David Rhys Williams, Rochester, N. Y.	Prof. Paul Thomas Young, Univ. of Illinois.
Rabbi Samuel Wohl, Cincinnati, Ohio.	Rabbi S. M. Zampowsky, Cleveland, Ohio.
	Wm. Zorach, sculptor.

Organizations listed for identification purposes. 500 names unlisted for reasons of space.

EXHIBIT No. 7

[Daily Worker, February 10, 1938]

LEADING CITIZENS LAUD ISAACS' STAND ON GERSON

Condemning the "witch-hunting campaign" organized against Borough President Stanley M. Isaacs for his appointment of S. W. Gerson, former Daily Worker reporter as an assistant on his staff, 47 prominent citizens last night signed a letter to the Borough President supporting him in his determination to appoint competent persons to office.

The letter, released for publication by Tom Cassidy, vice president of the American Newspaper Guild and Daily News staff writer, carries the names of outstanding liberals, trade-unionists, educators, and clergymen.

The text of the letter and names of the signers follow:

Dear Mr. Isaacs:

We, the undersigned, citizens of different shades of opinion, emphatically condemn the witch-hunting campaign organized against you for the appointment of Simon W. Gerson to your staff.

We look upon the current inspired agitation against you—which bears the earmarks of some of the propaganda so discredited and overwhelmingly repudiated in the last election—as a threat to the whole merit system in public service. It is the first step which leads to the institution of political qualifications within the entire city service. If the present agitation is successful, the next logical step is the institution of a system of political discrimination within the Civil Service system. How far is that from the malodorous method of choosing public servants from political clubhouse backrooms?

We urge you to stand firm against this attempt to attack appointments on the merit basis. We support you—as do thousands of liberal though inarticulate citizens—in your determination to maintain your right to appoint competent persons to office, irrespective of political outlook, a right won by the citizens of New York only after years of struggle against corrupt political influence.

Sincerely yours,

Daniel Allen, Regional Director, State, County, and Municipal Employes Assn.; Recorder John K. Ackley, City College of New York; Dr. Helen Adams, Hunter College; William Albertson, Secretary, Local 16, Waiters and Waitresses Union; Prof. Edwin B. Burgum, Washington Square College, N. Y. U.; Prof. Theodore Brameld, Adelphi College; Samuel Berland, Mgr., Laundry Workers Union; Michael J. Quill, City Councilman; Dr. Harry F. Ward, Union Theological Seminary; Rev. Bradford Young; Rev. William B. Spofford; Rev. Lawson Willard, Jr., Past County Chaplain, American Legion, Queens County; Rev. A. Clayton Powell, Jr.; Miss Helen Murray, Associate Secretary, Methodist Federation of Social Service; Samuel A. Robbins, Chairman, Council of U. S. Veterans and American Legionnaire; Dorothy Kenyon, Consumers Union; Vito Marcantonio, former Congressman; Tom Cassidy, Vice-President Newspaper Guild; Carl Randau, President, Newspaper Guild; Austin Hogan, President, N. Y. Local Transport Workers Union; Alexander Hoffman, Manager, Cleaners and Dyers Union; George Wishnack, Coordinator, International Ladies Garment Workers Union; Ashley Patten, Executive Secretary, Pullman Porters; Louis Weinstock, Secretary-Treasurer, District Council 9, Painters and Decorators; David Freed, Secretary, Local 802, American Federation of Musicians; Eugene P. Connolly, Organizer, Transport Workers Union; Jonathan Eddy, Executive Vice-President Newspaper Guild; Victor Pasche, Secretary-Treasurer, Newspaper Guild; Mervyn Rathborne, President, American Communications Association; Harry Gewirtzman, Manager, Pocket-Book Workers Union; Samuel Kramberg, Local 302, Hotel and Restaurant Workers Alliance; Irving Potash, Manager, Joint Council Furriers Union; Ben Golden, Labor Arbitrator; Vera Montgomery, Editor and Publisher, Yorkville Advance; Prof. John L. Childs, Teachers College; Prof. Robert K. Speer, Washington Square College; Dr. John McAlpin Miller, Long Island University; Dr. John T. Thirwall, City College of New York; Prof. Margaret Schlauch, New York University; Prof. Lyman R. Bradley, New York University; Prof. Beryl Parker, New York University; Prof. V. J. McGill, Hunter College; Prof. Howard Selam, Brooklyn College; Malcolm Cowley, Editor, New Republic; Eda Lou Walton, poet and critic; Dr. Charles A. Hendley, President, Teachers Union; Julia Church Kolar, Executive Board Member, Descendants of the American Revolution.

EXHIBIT No. 8

LEAGUE OF WOMEN SHOPPERS,

NEW YORK

(Photostat not legible—retained in subcommittee files.)

EXHIBIT No. 9

Chairman: WILLIAM E. DODD, JR.

Treasurer: S. D. DOUGLAS

Executive Secretary: LEONARD S. BELLER

Advisers on Anti-Nazi Literature: PRINCE HUBERTUS ZU LOEWENSTEIN

(German Catholic Leader)

Dr. KURT ROSENFELD (Former Minister of Justice in Prussia)

Sponsors

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Harriet Stanton Blatch
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Malcolm Cowley
Kate Crane-Gartz
Dr. Walter Damrosch
Prof. John Dewey

Dr. John Lovejoy Elliott
Dr. H. C. Engelbrecht
Martha Graham
Prof. Albert Guerard
Prof. Alice Hamilton
Moss Hart
I. A. Hirschmann
Rockwell Kent
Dorothy Kenyon
Prof. Wm. H. Kilpatrick
Freda Kirchwey
Justice Anna M. Kross

Judge S. D. Levy
Prof. Eduard C. Landsman
Prof. R. M. MacIver
Annie Nathan Meyer
Lewis Mumford
Dr. Henry Neumann
Prof. Fredrick L. Schuman
R. ——— S. ———
Dr. ——— Philip Silver
——— Van Doren
Lillian D. Wald

AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR ANTI-NAZI LITERATURE

Suite 302—20 Vesey Street

NEW YORK CITY

REctor 2-5867

Cable Address: LITCOM

MARCH 24, 1939.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
New York City

GENTLEMEN: May we have your opinion on the enclosed bill. We would appreciate a prompt reply.

Thanking you for your cooperation, we are

Sincerely yours,

LEONARD S. BELLER, *Executive Secretary.*

LB: EL.

EXHIBIT No. 10

AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRACY AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM,
New York City, January 17, 1940.

HON. MARTIN DIES,
House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CONGRESSMAN: On the basis of a careful analysis of the proceedings and releases of the Dies Committee, copy of which I am enclosing, the American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom has come to the conclusion that the further existence of the Dies Committee would constitute a serious threat to intellectual freedom and civil rights in the United States. In our analysis we present thorough documentation to substantiate this contention.

We have also submitted to the Speaker of the House petitions urging the discontinuance of the Dies Committee, signed by 5,672 American citizens, largely from the academic and related fields. Further signatures will be transmitted this week. Among the signers of this petition are twelve college presidents, six college deans, and many other leaders of American culture and professional life. I am enclosing a copy of the petition blank and a list of the outstanding signatories for your consideration.

Respectfully yours,

FRANZ BOSS, *National Chairman.*

AMONG THE SIGNATORIES TO THE PETITION SPONSORED BY AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRACY AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM TO DISCONTINUE THE DIES COMMITTEE

Frank E. Baker, President, Milwaukee State Teachers College
Rufus E. Clement, President, Atlanta University
Clarence M. Dykstra, President, University of Wisconsin

AMONG THE SIGNATORIES TO THE PETITION SPONSORED BY AMERICAN COMMITTEE
FOR DEMOCRACY AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM TO DISCONTINUE THE DIES
COMMITTEE—Continued

William Alfred Eddy, President, Hobart and William Smith Colleges
Guy Stanton Ford, President, University of Minnesota
George Willard Frasier, President, Colorado State College of Education
Ralph K. Hickok, President, Western College
Raymond A. Kent, President, University of Louisville
Frank Kingdon, President, University of Newark
William A. Neilson, Former President, Smith College
Walter Dill Scott, Former President, Northwestern University
Mary E. Woolley, Former President, Mt. Holyoke College
Harold C. Urey, Nobel laureate in chemistry, Columbia
John Dewey, Professor emeritus of Philosophy
Charles A. Beard, Former President, American Historical Association
J. McKeen Cattell, Editor, "Science"
Francis J. McConnell, Bishop, Methodist Church
Paul U. Kellogg, Editor, "Survey Graphic"
Olin Downes, Music Critic, "The New York Times"
Jonathan Daniels, Editor, "Raleigh News & Observer"
Paul Robeson, Singer and actor
Zachariah Chafee, Jr., Professor, Harvard University
Paul J. Kern, President, Municipal Civil Service Commission of N. Y. C.
Charlotte Carr, Head, Hull House, Chicago
Edith Abbott, Dean, University of Chicago School of Social Service
Ned H. Dearborn, Dean, New York University
Christian Gauss, Dean, Princeton University
Malcolm S. McLean, Dean, University of Minnesota
Frank L. Mott, Dean, University of Iowa
Carl Wittke, Dean, Oberlin College
Mary Antin, Author
Joseph Warren Peach, Author
Van Wyck Brooks, Author
Lillian Hellman, Author
Lucy Haynes Irwin, Author
Emil Lengyel, Author
Elmer Rice, Author
Ralph Roeder, Author
William Carlos Williams, Author
Henry Pratt Fairchild, Professor, New York University
Randolph B. Smith, Director, Cooperative School for Teachers
Sophronisha P. Breckenridge, Former President, American Association of Schools
of Social Work
Comfort A. Adams, Former President, American Institute of Electrical Engineers
Oswald Veblen, Former President, American Mathematical Society
John P. Peters, Secretary, Committee of Physicians for Improvement of Medical
Care
A. M. Schlesinger, Vice-President, American Historical Association
W. H. Malisoff, Editor, "Philosophy of Science"
Ellsworth Huntington, Professor, Yale University
Edward C. Tolman, Professor, University of California
George P. Adams, Professor, University of California
Ralph Linton, Editor, "The American Anthropologist"
W. A. Oldfather, Former President, American Philological Association
Walter R. Hager, Secretary, Teachers College, Columbia University
John F. Fulton, Yale Medical School
Ralph Barton Perry, Author, Pulitzer Prize biography of William James
Clyde Eagleton, Professor, New York University
Karl Menninger, Director, Psychiatric Clinic, Topeka, Kansas
Robert S. Lynd, Professor, Columbia University
Fred L. Redeker, Secretary, Progressive Education Association
Halford E. Luccock, Professor, Yale Divinity School
Alice Hamilton, Professor emeritus, Harvard Medical School
Vida D. Scudder, Professor, Wellesley College
Eugene W. Lyman, Professor, Union Theological Seminary
D. W. Prall, Professor, Harvard University

AMONG THE SIGNATORIES TO THE PETITION SPONSORED BY AMERICAN COMMITTEE
FOR DEMOCRACY AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM TO DISCONTINUE THE DIES
COMMITTEE—Continued

A. J. Carlson, Former President, American Physiological Society
Paul F. Gemmill, Professor, University of Pennsylvania
Edgar Dale, Professor, Ohio State University
Lester Dix, Principal, Lincoln School
V. T. Thayer, Educational Director, Ethical Culture Schools
Harry J. Carman, Professor, Columbia University.
Gortwin Watson, Professor, Columbia University.
L. G. Barth, Professor, Columbia University.
Dorothy Douglas, Professor, Smith College.
Frank H. Hankins, Professor, Smith College.
Hadley Contril, Professor, Princeton University.
Roy Dickinson Welch, Professor, Princeton University.
Hirtley F. Mather, Director, Harvard University, Summer School.
Morris R. Cohen, Professor, College of the City of New York.
Harry A. Overstreet, Professor, College of the City of New York.
Jerome Davis, Former President, American Federation of Teachers.
Robert Iglehart, Vice President, American Federation of Teachers.
Alonzo F. Myers, President, New York College Teachers Union.
Max Lerner, Professor, Williams College.
Jesse H. Holmes, Professor, Swarthmore College.
George Soule, Editor, "The New Republic".
Malcolm Cowley, Editor, "The New Republic".
Freda Kirchwey, Editor, "The Nation".
Maxwell S. Stewart, Editor, "The Nation".
Victor Weybright, Editor, "Survey Graphic".
Frank C. Bancroft, Editor, "Social Work Today".
Dashiell Hammett, Author.
Leone Zugsmith, Author.
Arthur Koher, Author.
Countee Cullen, Poet.
Matthew Josephson, Author.
Joan Starr Untermeyer, Poet.
Alfred Kreyenborg, Author.
Donald Ogden Stewart, President, League of American Writers.
Lewis Mumford, Author.
Herman Shumlin, Producer.
W. W. Norton, Publisher.
Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Past President, Explorers Club.
Mario Romaet-Rosenoff, Musician.
Aaron Copland, Composer.
Lehman Engel, Musician.
Rockwell Kent, Artist.
Morris Carnovsky, Actor.
Oliver D. Fargo, Author
Philip Loeb, Actor
Max Yergan, Secretary, International Institute for African Affairs
Charles Bolous, Former Councilman, New York City
Dorothy Kenyon, Former Justice, New York City
Hugh DeLacy, Councilman, Seattle
Justino Miso Polier, Justice, New York City
Nicholas Tomassetti, Representative, Connecticut
William Lloyd Imes, Reverend, New York City
John Howard Lathrop, Reverend, Brooklyn, New York
Mary Van Klooek, Russell Sage Foundation
Mrs. Rachel Davis-Dubois, Service Bureau for Intercultural Education
Dr. Bernard Glueck, Psychiatrist
John B. Andrews, Secretary, American Association for Labor Legislation
J. F. Dashiell, Professor, University of North Carolina
Edward A. Ross, Professor emeritus, University of Wisconsin
W. H. Manwaring, Professor emeritus, Columbia University
Willystine Goodsell, Professor emeritus, Teachers College, Columbia University
Mitchell Franklin, Professor, Tulane University

AMONG THE SIGNATORIES TO THE PETITION SPONSORED BY AMERICAN COMMITTEE
FOR DEMOCRACY AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM TO DISCONTINUE THE DIES
COMMITTEE—Continued

Harry Elmer Barnes, Historian and Journalist
Edwin G. Boring, Professor, Harvard University
Rev. Alfred W. Swan, Madison, Wisconsin
Sera Bard Field, Poet
Charles Erskine Scott Wood, Writer
S. Stephenson Smith, Professor, University of Oregon
James B. Carey, Secretary, C. I. O.
Charles William Taussig, Chairman, National Advisory Committee
Martha Dodd, Writer
William E. Dodd, Former Ambassador to Germany
George Seldes, Author
C. E. Ficken, Dean, Macalester College

EXHIBIT No. 11

JAMES WATERMAN WISE, *Chairman*
SARAH JACKSON SMITH, *Secretary-Treasurer*

ISOBEL WALKER SOULE, *Executive Secretary*

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Stella Adler
Helen Alfred
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Lawrence Hosie
Grace Hutchins

John Paul Jones
Dorothy Kenyon
Freda Kirchwey
Harry W. Laidler
Margaret I. Lamont
Grace Lumpkin
Vito Marcantonio
Reinhold Niebuhr
Clifford Odets

Evelyn Preston
Margaret Schlauch
Sarah Jackson Smith
Isobel Walker Soule
Robert Speer
Eda Lou Walton
Bertha Pool Weyl
James Waterman Wise
Theresa Wolfson

CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO AID STRIKING SEAMEN

227 West 22nd Street

NEW YORK CITY

CHelsea 2-9786

JANUARY 28, 1937.

DEAR FRIEND: The East Coast Seamen have called off the strike. They have won some concessions. This decision will help the West Coast Seamen bring their strike to a more successful end. This action has been commended by the N. L. R. B. Hearings are being continued by them.

Now, the seamen are trying to get their jobs back. Many are already on the high seas, while others here are carrying on the fight against discrimination, lockout, blacklist and the Copeland Bill. These men are still without shelter, food and clothing. In addition to the East Coast men, about 1,000 Pacific Coast strikers who struck when their vessels reached Eastern shores, are without resources.

These men are entirely dependent on our Soup Kitchen at 338 W. 25th St. for food. Debts for gas, electricity, and other essentials threaten its existence.

You have shown your warm-hearted interest in the men by your contributions during the strike. We appeal to you now—to help these men who conducted an heroic, epoch-making battle for 84 long, cold winter days. Many of these men are ill due to exposure and undernourishment.

All we ask you to do is send a small contribution of, say, one, two or five dollars, to tide over a difficult back-to-work period.

Won't you give your answer today? Please do take out your pen and write your check as soon as you read this letter.

Very sincerely yours,

Secretary, Citizens' Committee to Aid Striking Seamen.

EXHIBIT No. 12

Executive Committee :

Dr. Worthy M. Tippy,
Honorary President
Prof. Henry Pratt Fair-
child, President
Gardner Jackson, Vice
President
Robert K. Speer, Treas-
urer
Samuel J. Rodman, Sec-
retary
Edward K. Kern, Direc-
tor of Activities
Algernon Black
Hadley Cantril
Ned H. Dearborn
Dr. Sidney E. Goldstein
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Rita Hoehheimer
A. J. Isserman
Spurgeon Keeny
Clyde Miller
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Etta Schneider
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Dr. A. A. Brill
Heywood Brown
Senator Arthur Capper
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Humphrey Cobb
Olin Downes
William E. Dodd
Theodore Dreiser
Walter Prichard Eaton
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Abraham Flexner
Osmond K. Fraenkel
Edwin Franko Goldman
Rev. Ernest G. Guthrie
Dashiell Hammett
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Dorothy Kenyon
Paul J. Kern
Freda Kirchwey
Fritz Lang
Robert D. Leigh
Irene Lewisohn
Robert Morss Lovett
Thomas Mann
Fredric March
Philip Merivale
Dudley Murphy
W. W. Norton
Lee Pressman
Will Rogers, Jr.
Alex Rose
John Rothschild
Wm. J. Schieffelin
Viola Brothers Shore
Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
Rexford G. Tugwell
Lillian D. Wald
Walter White
Mary E. Woolley

FILM AUDIENCES FOR DEMOCRACY

342 Madison Ave.

NEW YORK CITY

Phone VAnDerbilt 6-3660

OCTOBER 20, 1939.

Mr. VICTOR RIESEL,

*Managing Editor, The New Leader Publishing Association,**New York City.*

DEAR MR. RIESEL: Mr. Kern requests me to say that he is speaking more or less extemporaneously from a handful of notes at the Rand School, Monday.

If you wish to have your stenographer cover that it is agreeable to Mr. Kern.

Yours truly,

FLEET MUNSON.

TO ENCOURAGE films that uphold American democracy, civil liberties, and peace; that promote better understanding and improve neighborly relations between racial and religious groups; that present an accurate, undistorted as well as a socially useful portrayal of the contemporary scene. TO OPPOSE all totalitarian trends, attacks on labor, and films contrary to the principles of the Bill of Rights

EXHIBIT No. 13

Vol. 1, No. 2

April 1939

FILMS FOR DEMOCRACY

NEW YORK CITY

A nonprofit membership organization dedicated to encouraging the production and distribution of truthful, fearless films which safeguard and strengthen American Democracy.

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Dr. Henry Pratt Fair-
child

Vice President :

Gardner Jackson

Treasurer :

Dr. Robert K. Speer

Secretary :

Samuel J. Rodman

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Hadley Cantril
Ned H. Dearborn
Helen Hall
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Clyde Miller
Dudley Nichols
Louise Pearson
Mark Starr
Mrs. Joseph L. White

Advisory Board :

Sherwood Anderson
James W. Angell
Louis Adamic
Thurman Arnold
Vicki Baum
William B. Benet
Franz Boas
Louis Bromfield

Advisory board—Con.	Advisory board—Con.	Advisory board—Con.
James L. Brewer	Rev. Ernest G. Guthrie	Fredric March
A. A. Brill	Dashiell Hammett	Thomas Mann
Heywood Broun	Lillian Hellman	Philip Merivale
Senator Arthur Capper	Jesse H. Holmes	Dudley Murphy
Marce Connelly	Mrs. Sheppard Homans	W. W. Norton
Humphrey Cobb	William K. Howard	Lee Pressman
Olin Downes	Mrs. Harold L. Ickes	John Rothschild
William E. Dodd	Rex Ingram	Will Rogers, Jr.
Theodore Dreiser	Stanley M. Isaacs	Wm. J. Schieffelin
Walter Prichard Eaton	Horace M. Kallen	Viola Brothers Shore
Dorothy Canfield Fisher	Dorothy Kenyon	Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
Abraham Flexner	Freda Kirchwey	Rexford G. Tugwell
Osmond K. Fraenkel	Fritz Lang	Lillian D. Wald
Edwin Franko Goldman	Robert D. Leigh	Walter F. Wagner
	Irene Lewisohn	Walter White
	Robert Morss Lovett	Mary E. Woolley

EXHIBIT No. 14

PROGRAM OF THE GREATER NEW YORK EMERGENCY CONFERENCE
ON INALIENABLE RIGHTS

Monday, February 12, 1940, at Two West Sixty-fourth Street, New York City,
the Meeting House of the Society for Ethical Culture

Organized antidemocratic forces are threatening the security and freedom of human personality and the rights of minority groups here in the United States. They are dividing, confusing, and weakening those who wish to maintain our free democratic institutions. Such forces of oppression and fear, growing stronger because of the war in Europe, must not be permitted to overwhelm us. Never before have our constitutional liberties been under such concerted attack. At this moment we have a special responsibility as a united people to meet our danger and protect our rights. There are literally thousands of nonpolitical organizations in the City of New York which are vitally concerned with the maintenance of the Bill of Rights, with minority and neighborhood relations, and with antidemocratic legislation. This Conference is for them.

ROBERT W. SEARLE, *Chairman*.

9:30 a. m.—Registration of delegates and visitors

11 a. m.—General session

Presiding Chairman: DR. MAX YERGAN, Director, International
Committee on African Affairs

12:30 to 2 p. m.—Luncheon interval

2-5 p. m.—Panel discussions—Announcement of panel chairmen and speakers
on page 2

5-8 p. m.—Dinner interval

8 p. m.—General session—*Presiding Chairman:* DR. FRANK KINGDON, President,
University of Newark
Reports of panel discussions
Selection of Continuations Committee

Speakers:

DR. JOHN ELLIOTT, Senior Leader, Society of Ethical Culture

CONGRESSMAN JOHN M. COFFEE

DR. MARY E. WOOLLEY, President Emeritus of Mt. Holyoke College

PROFESSOR K. N. LLEWELLYN, Columbia Law School

ROGER N. BALDWIN, Director, American Civil Liberties Union

SAMUEL L. M. BARLOW, National Emergency Conference for Democratic
Rights

OTHER SPEAKERS TO BE ANNOUNCED

GREATER NEW YORK EMERGENCY CONFERENCE ON INALIENABLE RIGHTS
Room 508, 2 West 43rd Street, New York City

PANELS

PANEL I—"FOREIGN BORN"

1. How to focus our energies the better to preserve the rights of the foreign born.
2. How the foreign-language and foreign-born groups can unite to preserve and enlarge democracy for themselves and for all Americans.
3. How to bring before the foreign born their duties and privileges as Americans.
4. How to disseminate and coordinate the best in both foreign and American cultures that both may gain in understanding.

Chairman of Panel: Dr. Frank Kingdon, President, University of Newark.

Panel Speakers: Dr. Gerald F. Machacek, President, United Czechoslovak American Societies.

Erwin H. Klaus, Editor, The German-American.

Younghill Kaug, New York University.

Edward Corsi, Deputy Commissioner, Department of Public Welfare.

Vilhjalmur Stefansson.

Irving Novick, Acting Secretary, American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born.

M. Garriga, Int'l Vice President, Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union.

Nathaniel Phillips, President, National League for American Citizenship.

Dr. Emil Lengyel.

PANEL II—"THE CHURCH AND THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY"

1. What Democracy means to Religion.
2. What Religion means to Democracy.
3. What are the official attitudes of the Religious Bodies toward all phases of Discrimination.
4. What is involved in freedom of speech for the clergy.
5. What is the Responsibility of the Church in the face of attacks upon Minorities.
6. What practical methods are available to the Church.

Chairman of Panel: Rev. Lorenzo H. King, St. Mark's Methodist Church.

Panel Speakers: Dr. Emanuel Chapman, Fordham University.

Rev. A. J. Muste, American Labor Temple.

Rabbi William F. Rosenblum, Exec. Committee member, New York Board of Jewish Ministers.

Rev. John Paul Jones, Union Church of Bay Ridge.

Dr. Theodore F. Savage, President, the Greater New York Federation of Churches.

Rabbi David DeSola Pool, Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue.

PANEL III—"LABOR AND DEMOCRACY"

1. Labor's Civil Rights.
2. Congressional Investigating Committees
 - a. Dies Committee—its methods, procedure and objectives.
 - b. The Smith Committee—its methods, procedure and objectives.
 - c. The LaFollette Committee—comparison of procedure with that of other Congressional investigating committees.
3. Legislation and the Trade Union Movement
 - a. Analysis of the Alien Bills.
 - b. Criminal Syndicalism Laws.
 - c. The application of the Sherman Anti-trust Act.
 - d. The Wages and Hours Law.

Chairman of Panel: Leo Huberman.

Panel Speakers: Merle Vincent, General Solicitor, Wages and Hours Administration.

Elmer Brown, President, Typographical Union, Local No. 6, A. F. of L.
Nathan Green.

Gardner Jackson, Labor's Non-Partisan League.

Manning Johnson, Business Agent, Cafeteria Employees' Union, A. F. of L.
Other speakers to be announced.

PANEL IV—"ORGANIZING OUR NEIGHBORHOODS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION"

1. Actual experiences of violations of civil liberties in neighborhoods.
2. Pending Legislation against Civil Liberties.
3. What the Neighborhoods are accomplishing. Legislative conferences; citizens' rights groups; neighborhood papers; the financing of neighborhood groups.
4. Practical steps to be taken to further organization in the neighborhoods.

Chairman of Panel: Dean Ned H. Dearborn, New York University.

Panel Speakers: Hon. Stanley M. Isaacs.

Hon. Vito Marcantonio.

Dr. Leonard Covello, Principal, Benjamin Franklin High School.

Thomas E. Stone, Executive Director, New York City Coordinating Committee for Democratic Action.

Lester Granger, Secretary, Committee on Negro Welfare, Welfare Council of New York.

PANEL V—"EDUCATION AS BASIS FOR TOLERANCE AND DEMOCRACY"

1. Personal Experiences Dealing with:

- a. Minority Discrimination in Our Schools.
- b. Student Organization and Relations.
- c. Faculty Organization and Relation.

2. Education and Propaganda.

3. Legislative Threats to Our Educational System.

4. What Has Been Done to Counteract Antidemocratic Tendencies in the Field of Education.

5. Practical Steps That Must Be Taken To Preserve Academic Freedom.

Chairman of Panel: Professor Walter Rautenstrauch, Columbia University.

Panel Speakers: Dr. Charles H. Fisher, former president, Western Washington College of Education.

Dr. Benjamin Harrow, College of the City of New York.

Prof. Robert K. Speer, New York University.

Dr. Bella V. Dodd, Legislative Representative, New York, State Federation of Teachers' Union.

William A. Hamm, Asst. Superintendent of Schools.

Prof. Doxey R. Wilkerson, Howard University.

This program, containing the names of the speakers, is a supplement to the original Call to the Conference issued January 3, 1940. Those organizations which have not as yet signified their intention of sending delegates, are urged to do so, by filling out and mailing without delay the Application for Credential printed below.

Discussion will be limited to domestic problems related to civil rights, minority, and neighborhood relations and to antidemocratic legislation, with special emphasis upon these problems in New York City.

The main purpose of the discussion in each Panel will be to determine the best and most fruitful methods of coping with the dangers threatening the civil rights and security of citizens in their neighborhoods and in the legislative assemblies of the state and nation, and what program of action can be developed by churches, schools, labor unions, settlements, fraternal orders and other organizations to meet these threats.

No resolutions will be entertained by the chairmen of the panels or of the general meetings.

Before adjournment of the panel meetings the delegates in each panel will nominate representatives from their respective panels for membership on the

Continuations Committee, which will be empowered by the Conference to devise means of continuing the work of the Conference.

Guest tickets are available for interested individuals. The charge for these tickets is \$1.

APPLICATION FOR CREDENTIAL

GREATER NEW YORK EMERGENCY CONFERENCE ON INALIENABLE RIGHTS

2 West 43rd Street, Room 508, New York City

PENNSYLVANIA 6-7948

Name or Organization-----
 Address-----
 Number of members-----

Our organization will cooperate with the Greater New York Emergency Conference on Inalienable Rights through (check participation desired).

- 1. Organizational sponsorship and participation.
 -----2. Organizational participation not involving sponsorship.
 -----3. Individual observer.

We shall be represented by the following delegates or observers. (An organization may signify immediately its desire to sponsor or participate, and later register the names of its delegates or observers.)

Name of Delegate or Observer-----
 Address-----City-----
 Name of Delegate or Observer-----
 Address-----City-----

Registration Fee: \$1 per delegate or observer, with the exception of youth groups which will be charged \$.50

(Signed) Name-----
 Office-----

Each organization is entitled to two delegates or to two observers.
 Contributions for the support of this conference are cordially invited.

GREATER NEW YORK EMERGENCY CONFERENCE ON INALIENABLE RIGHTS

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EXHIBIT No. 15

[From the New York Times, Tuesday, January 31, 1939. Advertisement]

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES

While you read this message, a major human tragedy is taking place. A question of the greatest importance to our country and to the entire world is being decided.

A brave nation is fighting against terrible odds, not only for its own independence and freedom, but for the very life of democracy everywhere.

The whole world knows now that the "Franco Revolt" is in reality an invasion. Hitler and Mussolini are bent on destroying the Spanish Republic, and with its destruction gaining vastly increased power in the campaign against the democracies. They have set out to replace a hopeful young republic with a dictatorship patterned on the Nazi and Fascist models. In the Italian and German press the fall of Barcelona was hailed as a "great victory."

With indescribable brutality and complete disregard for world opinion, they have warred against both the armies and the women and children of Spain. It is clear that they intend to use Spain as a means of crippling French and British democracy, and as a powerful springboard to South and Central America, where their agents have for years been busy spreading propaganda against democracy and for fascism.

If Franco, Hitler and Mussolini win in Spain, the fascist penetration of the Western Hemisphere will be immensely strengthened. This will mean a greatly increased defense problem for the United States.

It must not be allowed to happen! Democracy cannot permit unending aggression against it. "Appeasement" has failed. China, Ethiopia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Spain witness its failure.

What can our country do? The American people want peace. They abhor aggression and warring dictatorships. They are committed to the democratic way of life.

The hard fact is that by our embargo against Spain we are giving aid to Hitler and Mussolini and all they stand for. Our embargo is helping to destroy a republic which stands as a powerful bulwark against the fascist plans. If that republic is destroyed, much of the responsibility will be ours.

The signers of this letter believe that Mr. Henry L. Stimson, former United States Secretary of State, is right when he says:

"If this Loyalist Government is overthrown, it is evident that its defeat will be solely due to the fact that it has been deprived of its right to buy from us and other friendly nations the munitions necessary for its defense."

To the plea that the United States must remain neutral, we can only reply that an embargo which permits aid to aggressors and denies it to the victim is flagrantly unneutral. In the words of President Roosevelt to the 76th Congress, "we have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly—may actually give aid to the aggressor and deny it to the victim." A policy which places a friendly, recognized, democratically-elected government on the same plane with the foreign-aided insurrectionist cannot, by any canon of law or tradition, be called neutrality. The embargo, as our most distinguished lawyers and historians have insisted, is a clear violation of international law.

We submit to our fellow Americans and to our government that every obligation of peace, of freedom, of justice, of self-interest, calls upon us to:

LIFT THE EMBARGO—WITHOUT DELAY

It is not too late. The Spanish Republic still lives. Its people, who still control Central Spain with Valencia and iron-willed Madrid, have no intention of surrendering. A simple act of justice on the part of The United States of America can still turn the tide in favor of democracy.

We who have signed this letter want to hear the cheer of hope and new courage that will go up in every land, including our own, when the word goes out that The United States has lifted the embargo against Spain.

American public opinion has given our government a clear mandate to act. More than 76 per cent of public opinion, according to the Gallup poll, supports the Spanish Republic.

In the name of American fair play and of all our best traditions—

In the name of world peace and of democracy—

LIFT THE EMBARGO—NOW

(Signed) Ernest Sutherland Bates, Robert Benchley, Mare Blitzstein, Franz Boas, Mrs. Louis D. Brandeis, Louis Bromfield, Van Wyck Brooks, Matthew J. Burns, Henry Seidel Canby, Walter B. Cannon, M. D., Carrie Chapman Catt, Albert Sprague Coolidge, William E. Dodd, Sherwood Eddy, Edna Ferber, Christian Gauss, Roswell G. Ham, Dashiell Hammett, Henry T. Hunt, Edward L. Israel, Paul Kellogg, Rockwell Kent, John A. Kingsbury, Emil Lengyel, Oscar E. Maurer, Edna St. Vincent Millay, Henry Morgenthau, William Allen Neilson, Marion Edwards Park, Dorothy Parker, Charles Edward Russell, Alfred K. Stern, Paul H. Todd, Harold C. Urey, Mary E. Wolley.

THESE EMINENT AMERICANS HAVE URGED THAT THE SPANISH EMBARGO BE LIFTED

Bishop Julius W. Atwood	Rev. Francis J. McConnell	Mary K. Simkhovitch
Rev. W. Russell Bowie	Bishop Edward L. Parsons	Judge Milton E. Gibbs
Bishop Chauncey B. Brewster	Rev. Harold C. Phillips	Judge Robert W. Kenny
Rev. Hugh Elmer Brown	Rev. Daniel A. Poling	Judge Arthur Le Sueur
Rev. Raymond Calkins	Rev. Julius S. Seebach	Justice Justine Wise Polier
Bishop Ralph S. Cushman	Rabbi Stephen S. Wise	Justice James H. Wolfe
Bishop Charles K. Gilbert	Helen Hall	Hon. Charles Belous
Rev. Charles W. Gilkey	Linton B. Swift	Hon. Smith W. Brookhart
Rev. William E. Gilroy	Helen M. Harris	Prof. Leslie H. Buckler
Rev. L. O. Hartman	Elsie Voorhees Jones	Prof. Michael N. Chanalls
Rev. Ivan Lee Holt	Jessie Binford	Hon. Stanley M. Isaacs
Rev. Moses R. Lovett	Owen R. Lovejoy	Hon. Paul J. Kern
Rev. Halford E. Luccock	Mary Van Kleeck	Hon. Nathan R. Margold

1506 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION

THESE EMINENT AMERICANS HAVE URGED THAT THE SPANISH EMBARGO BE LIFTED—con.

Arthur Garfield Hays	Lawrence Tibbett	Brooks Atkinson
Dorothy Kenyon	Efrem Zimbalist	Stephen Vincent Benet
Louis F. McCabe	Ernest Hemingway	Pearl S. Buck
Harold Riegelman	Theodore Dreiser	Vincent Sheean
Frank P. Walsh	William Rose Benet	Dorothy Thompson
Dean Francis M. Shea	Margaret Cullen Banning	Robert C. Clothier
Natalie Bodanya	Countee Cullen	Ada L. Comstock
John Alden Carpenter	R. L. Duffus	Henry Pratt Fairchild
Elizabeth Sprague Coolidge	Dorothy Caufield Fischer	Vida D. Scudder
Walter Damrosch	Alfred Kreymborg	Harold G. Urey
Olin Downes	Upton Sinclair	Harry F. Ward
Jessica Dragonette	John Steinbeck	Henry L. Stimson
Rosina Lhevinne	Louis Adamic	Margaret Bourke-White
Josef Lhevinne	Harry Elmer Barnes	George Biddle
Yehudi Menuhin	Charles A. Beard	Lewis Mumford
Alexander Smallens	Sherwood Anderson	John Dewey
Sigmund Spaeth	Franklin P. Adams	Daniel L. Marsh
	Maxwell Anderson	A. F. Whitney

THEY SWEEPED BACK NAPOLEON; THE INVADERS OF 1939 WILL FOLLOW—IF THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED

ACT NOW! CUT OUT THIS COUPON

Capitol, Washington, D. C.

Joining with millions of other Americans of all political and religious faith, I urgently request that the Embargo against Republican Spain be lifted now so that world peace and democracy may be preserved.

Name _____

Street Address _____

City _____ State _____

Fill in name of your Senator or Representative and mail to Brig. Gen. H. C. Newcomer, chairman, Washington Committee to Lift Spanish Embargo, room 100, 1410 M. Street NW., Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT No. 16

Hon. Paul J. Kern, chairman; Honorary vice chairmen: Hon. Henry T. Hunt, Washington, D. C.; Judge Robert W. Kenny, Los Angeles; Prof. Malcolm Sharp, University of Chicago.	John P. Davis, Washington, D. C.	Mark M. Litchman, Seattle
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W. A. Combs, Houston	Arthur Garfield Hays, New York	Walter H. Pollak, New York
Paul Coughlin, Seattle	Charles H. Houston, New York	Leo Pressman, Pittsburgh
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	Dorothy Kenyon, New York	
	Judge Arthur Le Sueur, Minneapolis	

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Washington, D. C.
Hon. Lester Wm. Roth,
Los Angeles
Harry Sacher,
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Robert J. Silberstein,
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Howard University
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Ruth Weyand, Chicago
Carlo Whitehead, Denver
Justice James H. Wolfe,
Salt Lake City

(Partial list)

LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH SPAIN

150 Broadway

NEW YORK, N. Y.

REctor 2-8762

MARCH 5, 1938.

A. MARK LEVIEN, ESQ.,
21 E. 40th St., New York City.

DEAR SIR: We send you a Petition and Memorandum of Law on the Embargo against Spain.

The eminent members of the bar and teachers of law who sponsor and endorse the Petition and Memorandum firmly believe that the Embargo is legally untenable and that it constitutes a violation of fundamental principles of international law and an abandonment and reversal of traditional foreign policy of the United States.

We urge you to join with us in requesting the reconsideration by the President and the Congress of the policy of our government towards the republican government of Spain.

We invite you to sign the Petition and secure the signatures of your colleagues and friends in the profession. The matter is urgent and the prompt return of the enclosed petition, duly signed, is earnestly requested.

Respectfully yours,

PAUL J. KERN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 17

Seventy organizations—settlement houses, consumers cooperatives, trade-unions, and others—sponsor the committee

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Vice Chairmen:
Meyer Perednock
Winnifred Freeler
Rose Nelson
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MILK CONSUMERS PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE

Founded by Dr. CAROLINE WHITNEY

An Organization to Represent Consumer Interests

215 Fourth Avenue

GRAMercy 5-4066

Chairman, Caroline Whitney Memorial Fund: ELINOR MERRELL

APRIL 23, 1940.

Hon. JOHN J. DEMPSEY,

*Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities,
House Office Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SIR: As chairman of the Milk Consumers Protective Committee, I was one of those consulted by Consumers Union in their preparation of a letter and statement which they recently sent to you asking for a thorough investigation

by your committee of the circumstances surrounding the preparation and release of the report on "Communist Work in Consumer Organizations."

The facts and questionable circumstances indicating a conspiratorial relationship between your committee's special investigator and an officer of Hearst's Magazines, Inc., are indeed, shocking. I urge that you make a thorough investigation of these disclosures. I do so not only as chairman of one of the organizations attacked in the report, but also as a citizen. Such unorthodox procedure on the part of a government body is contrary to our democratic traditions.

Respectfully,

ASHE INGERSOLL, *Chairman.*

AI: RS.

EXHIBIT No. 18

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCARTHY ON HALDORE HANSON

The next case is that of Haldore Hanson.

This man occupies one of the most strategically important offices in the entire State Department.

It is my understanding that he joined the Department of State in February 1942, and is recognized in the Department as a specialist and expert on Chinese Affairs.

Hanson, now Executive Director of the Secretariat of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, will head up a Technical Cooperation Projects Staff of the new Point 4 Program for aid to under developed areas which will have charge of the expenditures of hundreds of millions of dollars of our taxpayers' money over all the world. (Source: Department of State Departmental Announcements 41, dated February 21, 1950.)

The pro-Communist proclivities of Mr. Hanson go back to September 1938.

Hanson was a contributor to *Pacific Affairs*, the official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations, whose staff was headed by millionaire Frederick Vanderbilt Field, an admitted Communist. Field has devoted his entire fortune to the Communist cause.

It is important that the committee keep in mind that Mr. Hanson also wrote for the magazine *Amerasia*, of which Philip Jacob Jaffe was managing editor.

Jaffe was arrested, indicted, and found guilty of having been in illegal possession of several hundred secret documents from the State, Navy, War, and other Government Department files.

Mr. Chairman, I have before me a document entitled "Department of State, Departmental Announcement 41." The heading is "Establishment of the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development." Then in parenthesis, by way of explanation of this rather high-sounding name, we find "Point Four Program."

The first paragraph of the order reads as follows:

"1. Effective immediately there is established under the direction of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs of the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development (TCOD)."

On page 4 we find that the chief of this Technical Cooperations Project Staff is one Haldore Hanson.

Paragraph 2 on Page 1 sets forth the following responsibilities of Hanson's division:

"The Interim Office is assigned general responsibility within the Department for (a) securing effective administration of programs involving technical assistance to economically underdeveloped areas and (b) directing the planning in preparation for the Technical Cooperation and Economic Development (Point Four) Program. In carrying out its responsibilities the Interim Office will rely upon the regional bureaus, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, and other components of Economic Affairs area for participation in the technical assistance programs as specified below, and upon the central administrative offices of the Administrative area for the performance of service functions."

From this it would appear that his division will have a tremendous amount of power and control over the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars which the President proposes to spend under his Point Four Program, or what he has referred to as the "Bold New Plan."

Hanson's appointment is not made by the President, but by the State Department and is not subject to any Senate confirmation. Therefore, it would seem

rather important to examine the background and the philosophy of this young man.

The State Department Biographical Register gives what would on its face seem to be a chronological story of an increasingly successful young man. It shows that he graduated from college, for example, in 1934 at the age of 22; that he was a teacher in Chinese colleges from 1934 to 1937; and then a press correspondent in China from 1936 to 1939; a staff writer from 1938 to 1942; then in 1942 he got a job in the State Department at \$4,600 a year; that in 1944 he was listed as a specialist in Chinese affairs at \$5,600; that in 1945 he was made Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State at \$6,500; that in May of 1948 he was made assistant chief of the area division number 3; that on June 28, 1948, he was made acting chief for the Far Eastern Area, Public Affairs Overseas Program Staff; that on November 14, 1948, he was made Executive Director of the Secretariat of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation. There is certainly nothing unusual about this biography. Nothing there to indicate that this man might be dangerous in the State Department as Chief for the Far Eastern Area Public Affairs, Overseas Program Staff, during a time when the Communists were taking over China. However, much is left out of this biography. It does not show, for example, that this young man was running a Communist magazine in Peiping when the Japanese-Chinese war broke out. It does not show, for example, that he spent several years with the Communist armies in China, writing stories and taking pictures which the Chinese Communists helped him smuggle out of the country. Nor does this biography show that this man, after his return from China, wrote a book—a book which sets forth his pro-Communist answer to the problems of Asia as clearly as Hitler's *Mein Kampf* set forth his solutions for the problems of Europe.

Nothing that he has said or done since would indicate that he repudiates a single line of that book.

This man clearly believes that the Communists in China stand for everything that is great and good. His is not the picture of a mercenary trying to sell his country out for thirty pieces of silver. In reading his book, you are impressed with the fact that he firmly believes the Communist leaders in China are great and good men and that all of Asia would benefit by being communized.

Take, for example, what he had to say about Mao Tse-tung, the head of the Communist Party at that time and now the Communist ruler of China, and Chu Teh, commander in chief of the 8th Route Communist Army, and according to Life magazine of January 23, 1950, Number Two man in prestige to Mao Tse-Tung.

In Chapter 23, entitled "Political Utopia on Mt. Wut'ai", in describing a meeting with an American Major Carlson, here is what he had to say:

"We stayed up till midnight exchanging notes on guerrilla armies, the farm unions, and the progress of the war. I was particularly interested in the Communist leaders whom Carlson had just visited and whom I was about to meet. Mao Tse-Tung, the head of the Communist Party, Carlson characterized as 'the most selfless man I ever met, a social dreamer, a genius living fifty years ahead of his time.' And Chu Teh, commander in chief of the 8th Route Army was 'the prince of generals, a man with the humility of Lincoln, the tenacity of Grant, and the kindness of Robert E. Lee.'"

For a man slated a chief of the bureau which may have the job of spending hundreds of millions of dollars throughout the world this indicates, to say the least, a disturbing amount of hero worship for the number one and number two Communist leaders in the Far East today.

On page 349, he condemns the right wing groups in the Chinese Government for "fighting against the Democratic revolution as proposed by Mao Tse Tung and the Communists."

On the same page he points out that anti-Red officials within the government were making indirect attacks upon the Communists and that "leaders of the Communist youth corps were arrested by military officers at Hankow. I myself was the victim of one of these incidents and found that local officials were the instigators."

From Hanson's book it appears that the Nationalist government knew of his close collaboration with the Communist Army. For example, on page 350, we find that his passport was seized by the police in Sian when they found that he was traveling from Communist guerrilla territory to the Communist headquarters. He states that the man responsible "for this illegal action was governor Ching Ting-Wen—one of the most rabid anti-Red officials in China. The governor's purpose was merely to suppress news about the Communists."

Before quoting further from this book written by Mr. Hanson, it might be well to give a clearer picture of the job which Secretary Acheson has picked out for him. The State Department document lists some of the duties of his bureau as follows:

1. Developing over-all policies for the program.
2. Formulating general program plans and issuing planning directives.
3. Coordinating specific program plans developed by the regional bureaus and making necessary adjustments.
4. Approving projects, determining action agencies, and allocating funds for U. S. bilateral programs.
5. Directing negotiations and relationships with intergovernmental agencies and with other U. S. agencies participating in the coordinated program or otherwise carrying on technical assistance activities.

1. Initiating and developing plans for technical assistance programs for individual countries or groups of countries within their respective regions.

2. Reviewing program proposals affecting their regions which originate from any other source.

3. Negotiating and communicating with foreign governments.

4. Directing State Department personnel assigned abroad to coordinate and give administrative and program support to bilateral programs.

5. Continuously evaluating programs and projects within regions.

6. Proposing program changes.

7. Initiating instructions to the field carrying out their responsibilities and reviewing all other instructions concerned with technical assistance programs.

This gives you some idea of the tremendous powers of the agency in which Mr. Hanson is a top flight official.

Let us go back to Hanson's writings:

All through the book he shows that not only did he have complete confidence in the Communist leaders but that they also had complete confidence in him. On page 256 he refers to how Communist generals Nie and Lu Chen-Tsao acted as his couriers, smuggling packets of films and news stories for him with the aid of Communist guerrilla spies into Peiping.

In this connection I might say that he very frankly points out that the Communists do not tolerate anyone who is not completely on their side. Hanson makes it very clear all through the book that he is not only on the Communist side, but that he has the attitude of a hero worshiper for the Chinese Communist leaders.

His respect and liking for the Communist leaders permeates almost every chapter of the book. For example, on page 284 and page 285, he tells about how some ragged waifs whom he had gathered into his sleeping quarters regarded Mao Tse Tung and Chu Ted as "Gods." He then goes on to tell about their favorite Communist General, Holung, and states that they convinced him that Holung was a very extraordinary man whom they described as "big as a Shan-tungese, heavy as a restaurant cook but quick as a cat in battle." He then goes on to describe on page 285 how, when he met General Holung, he found him to be much as the hero-worshipping boys had described him. "He is," said Hanson, "a living picture of Rhett Butler from the pages of *Gone With the Wind*."

This praise of Chinese Communist leaders—goes on page after page. On page 278, he describes Communist General P'eng as the most rigid disciplinarian and "the most persistent student of world affairs."

In Chapter 26, he speaks with apparent bated breath of the "Brain Trust" of Communist leaders who were immortalized by Edgar Snow in his *Red Star Over China*.

On page 295 in referring to two other Communist generals, he says: "Should this book ever fall into Communist hands, I must record that those two lonely men made excellent company during my three weeks in Yen-an."

After describing in complimentary manner this university and the students, on page 296 he says, "Every cadet divides his time between political and military subjects. On the one hand he listens to lectures on Marxian philosophy, the history of the Chinese Revolution, the technique of leading a mass movement; on the other hand he studies guerrilla tactics, the use of military maps, and the organization of a military labor corps."

On page 297 he points out that no tuition is charged at the academy and that each student is supplied with uniform, books, and food, plus a pocket allowance, and then has this to say: "Some recent visitors to Yen-an have spread a report that the academies are supported by Russian rubles—a thin piece of gossip. I

was told by several Chinese leaders, including Mao Tse-Tung, that the largest contributions came from American sympathizers in New York."

On page 297 and 298, Hanson relates that in talking to one of the Nationalist war lords, "I suggested that he could learn a great deal from the Communists about discipline and integrity of leadership."

On page 303, Hanson has this to say, "My attitude toward Communist China's leaders was a mixture of respect for their personal integrity and a resentment of their suspiciousness. They impressed me as a group of hard-headed, straight-shooting realists."

After an interview with Mao Tse Tung he states, "I left with the feeling that he was the least pretentious man in Yenan and the most admired. He is a completely selfless man."

Following is Hanson's description of how the Reds took over. I quote from page 102:

"Whenever a village was occupied for the first time, the Reds arrested the landlords and tax collectors, held a public tribunal, executed a few and intimidated the others, then redistributed the land as fairly as possible."

In Chapter 28, in comparing the Communists to Chiang Kai-shek's troops, Hanson had this to say:

"I left Yenan with only one conviction about the Communists; that they were fighting against the Japanese more wholeheartedly than any other group in China."

He then goes on to condemn "Red baiting" officials in Chungking.

On page 312 of his book, Hanson quotes a Communist editor as stating as follows:

"Our relationship to the U. S. S. R. is no different than that of the American Communist Party. We respect the work of Russia's leaders and profit by their experience wherever we can, but the problems of China are not the same as those of Russia. We plan our program from a Chinese point of view."

Hanson then adds, "The explanation seemed logical enough to me."

In connection with Hanson's position as Chief of the Technical Cooperation Projects Staff, in charge of Truman's Point Four Program, the following on pages 312 and 313 of his book would seem especially significant. He quotes Mao Tse Tung as follows: "China cannot reconstruct its industry and commerce without the aid of British and American capital."

Can there be much doubt as to whether the Communists or the anti-Communist forces in Asia will receive aid under the Point Four Program with Hanson in charge?

Gentlemen, here is a man with a mission—a mission to communize the world—a man whose energy and intelligence coupled with a burning all-consuming mission has raised him by his own bootstraps from a penniless operator of a Leftist magazine in Peiping in the middle thirties to one of the architects of our foreign policy in the State Department today—a man who, according to State Department announcement No. 41 will be largely in charge of the spending of hundreds of millions of dollars in such areas of the world and for such purposes as he decides.

Gentlemen, if Secretary Acheson gets away with his plan to put this man to a great extent in charge of the proposed Point Four Program, it will, in my opinion, lend tremendous impetus to the tempo at which Communism is engulfing the world.

On page 32 of his book, Hanson justifies "The Chinese Communists chopping off the heads of landlords—all of which is true," because of "hungry farmers." That the farmers are still hungry after the landlords' heads have been removed apparently never occurred to him.

On page 31 he explained that it took him some time to appreciate the appalling problems which the Chinese Communists were attempting to solve.

In Chapter 4 of Hanson's book, he presents the stock Communists' arguments for the so-called Stalin-Hitler Pact of 1939.

Secretary Acheson is now putting Hanson in the position to help the Communists solve the "appalling problems" in other areas of the world with hundreds of millions or billions of American dollars.

The obvious area in which this man will start using American money to help the Communists solve the people's problem will be Indo-China and India.

It should be pointed out that this case was brought to the attention of State Department officials as long ago as May 14, 1947. At that time, the Honorable Fred Busbey, on the floor of the House discussed this man's affinity for the Communist cause in China.

EXHIBIT No. 19

[Department of State. Departmental Announcement 41]

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERIM OFFICE FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (POINT FOUR PROGRAM)

1. Effective immediately there is established under the direction of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs [the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development (TCD)].

2. The Interim Office is assigned general responsibility within the Department for (a) securing effective administration of programs involving technical assistance to economically underdeveloped areas and (b) directing the planning in preparation for the Technical Cooperation and Economic Development (Point Four) Program. In carrying out its responsibilities the Interim Office will rely upon the regional bureaus, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, and other components of Economic Affairs area for participation in the technical assistance programs as specified below, and upon the central administrative offices of the Administrative area for the performance of service functions.

3. The Interim Office has specific action responsibility for:

- (a) Developing over-all policies for the program.
- (b) Formulating general program plans and issuing planning directives.
- (c) Coordinating specific program plans developed by the regional bureaus and making necessary adjustments.
- (d) Approving projects, determining action agencies, and allocating funds for U. S. bilateral programs.
- (e) Directing negotiations and relationships with intergovernmental agencies and with other U. S. agencies participating in the coordinated program or otherwise carrying on technical assistance activities.
- (f) Reviewing instructions to the field.

4. The Interim Office will coordinate the development of operating policies governing administrative problems generally applicable to technical assistance programs such as utilization of available specialized personnel, conditions of employment, and utilization of training facilities.

5. The regional bureaus have responsibility with respect to technical assistance programs for:

- (a) Initiating and developing plans for technical assistance programs for individual countries or groups of countries within their respective regions.
- (b) Reviewing program proposals affecting their regions which originate from any other source.
- (c) Negotiating and communicating with foreign governments.
- (d) Directing State Department personnel assigned abroad to coordinate, and give administrative and program support to, bilateral programs.
- (e) Continuously evaluating programs and projects within regions.
- (f) Proposing program changes.
- (g) Initiating instructions to the field carrying out their responsibilities, and reviewing all other instructions concerned with technical assistance programs.

Responsibilities previously assigned to the regional bureaus in connection with the Philippine Rehabilitation Program, Economic Cooperation Administration Aid programs, and existing programs in Germany and Japan are not affected by this announcement except for paragraph 4 above which will apply where circumstances require.

6. The Bureau of United Nations Affairs has:

- (a) Action responsibility for:
 - 1. Developing the U. S. position concerning the international organizational machinery to be used in connection with technical assistance activities;
 - 2. Developing the U. S. position concerning the relative proportions of contributions to be made by the U. S. and by other countries to the special technical assistance accounts of international organizations;
 - 3. Coordinating negotiations involving such accounts.
- (b) Advisory responsibility concerning:
 - 1. The character and scope of technical cooperation programs undertaken by international organizations;
 - 2. The amounts of U. S. contributions to the special technical assistance accounts of international organizations;
 - 3. U. S. positions on program allocations from such accounts by international organizations.

The Bureau of United Nations Affairs maintains general contact with international organizations in line with its over-all responsibilities and arranges for direct contact between the United Nations and the participating specialized agencies and the Interim Office of Technical Cooperation and Development or U. S. agencies on operating program matters as requested by the Interim Office. The Bureau for Inter-American Affairs makes corresponding arrangements with respect to intergovernmental arrangements of the American states.

7. The following have such responsibilities in connection with technical assistance programs as are in accord with their general responsibilities set forth in the Organization Manual of the Department.

(a) The Office of Financial and Development Policy with respect to the International Bank and Monetary Fund.

(b) The Office of Transport and Communications Policy with respect to the International Telecommunication Union and the International Civil Aviation Organization.

(c) The UNESCO Relations Staff with respect to UNESCO.

8. Responsibility for the administration of the Department's scientific and technical exchange activities under the U. S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, and under the Act of August 9, 1939, authorizing the President to render closer and more effective the relationship between the American Republics, insofar as these activities are directly related to specific economic development projects, is transferred from the Office of Educational Exchange to the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development. Activities which are not so related remain the responsibility of the Office of Educational Exchange. The functions, personnel, and records of the Secretariat of the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation are transferred from the Office of Education Exchange to the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development, except for the editorial functions connected with the publication of "The Record" and the corresponding personnel and records, which remain in the Office of Educational Exchange.

9. The Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs will become the Department's representative on, and the Chairman of, the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, in place of the Assistance Secretary for Public Affairs. He will also serve as Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance. The Director of the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development will serve as Vice Chairman of both committees.

10. The other offices under the Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs advise the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development on the economic feasibility and desirability of projects and programs, from the standpoint of their respective specialized interests; make or arrange for such economic studies and analyses as the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development may require; and maintain liaison with U. S. and international agencies and with private organizations on matters within their respective fields of interest as necessary in the planning and operation of the technical assistance programs.

11. The Director will become a member of the Board of Directors of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development responsibilities enumerated under 3 and other paragraphs above apply in full to technical assistance activities, present and future, carried on by the Institute. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs exercises all responsibilities listed under paragraph 5 above with respect to the Institute's program. The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs are jointly responsible for developing such working arrangements as are necessary to insure the administration of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs as a constituent part of a coordinated technical assistance program.

12. The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development consists of the following organizational units under the supervision of the designated officers:

Director: Leslie A. Wheeler, Ext. 3871.

Technical Cooperation Projects Staff, Chief: Haldore Hanson, Ext. 3011, 5012.

Technical Cooperation Policy Staff, Chief: Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., Ext. 4571, 4572.

Technical Cooperation Management Staff: Richard R. Brown, Director of Executive Staff, E. Ext. 2155.

(February 21, 1950.)

EXHIBIT No. 20

SENATOR MCCARTHY'S STATEMENT ON MRS. ESTHER CAUKIN BRUNAUER

I should now like to take up the case of Esther Caukin Brunauer, Assistant Director of Policy Liaison, UNESCO Relations Staff, Department of State, as a salary of \$9,706 a year according to the current Federal Register.

I urgently request that this committee give serious consideration to the details of this case and act immediately to ascertain the facts.

Mrs. Brunauer was for many years Executive Secretary of the American Association of University Women.

Mrs. Brunauer was instrumental in committing this organization to the support of various front enterprises, particularly in the so-called consumer field. One such instance of this activity was reported in the New York Times of April 27, 1943. In that case the American Association of University Women joined with Consumers Union, The League of Women Shoppers, and other completely Communist controlled fronts. I have explained to the committee that these organizations have been declared subversive by various governmental agencies.

Exhibit R indicates that Mrs. Brunauer presided at a Washington meeting of the American Friends of the Soviet Union. This organization has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General of the United States, the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the California Committee on Un-American Activities. The principal speaker at this meeting was Myra Page, long an avowed leader of the Communist Party and frequent writer for the Daily Worker and other Communist periodicals.

Certainly this committee has no doubts as to the domination by the Communist Party of the American Youth Congress. It has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General and other governmental agencies.

Exhibit S shows Esther Caukin Brunauer was a signer of the call to the annual meeting of the American Youth Congress in 1938.

Esther Brunauer is the wife of Stephen Brunauer, a Hungarian by birth. He is a scientist who has had the rank of Commander in the United States Navy and his scientific work has involved some of the topmost defense secrets which the armed forces of his country possess.

I think it highly important that this committee immediately, in accordance with their mandate from the Senate, obtain the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval Intelligence, and the State Department on the activities of Stephan Brunauer, the husband of this ranking official of the State Department.

I ask that the committee immediately seek to learn whether or not Stephan Brunauer has

1. Been the subject of a constant investigation by government agencies over a period of ten years.

2. A close friend and collaborator of Noel Field, known Communist who recently and mysteriously disappeared behind the Iron Curtain.

3. He has admitted to associates that he was a member of the Communist party.

I am reluctant to go any further into this case but I am prepared to produce competent witnesses who will testify to the importance of immediate action in this matter.

It can be readily shown that at least three government agencies have been sifting the activities of a small group of people whose work seriously threatens the security of the country.

Certainly the Communist front activities of Mrs. Brunauer are sufficient to seriously question her security status.

EXHIBIT No. 21

"WHO RULES IN SOVIET RUSSIA?"

A LECTURE BY MYRA PAGE, AUTHOR—EDUCATOR—LECTURER, TYPOGRAPHICAL TEMPLE, 423 G STREET, N. W., THURSDAY, JUNE 11TH, 1936, 8:30 P. M. DR. ESTHER BRUNAUER, WILL PRESIDE

"A timely and interesting discussion on a much debated subject by a well-known American writer, who has spent 2 years in The Soviet Union. Myra Page is the author of several books. Her most recent one is "Moscow Yankee." She

is an instructor at Commonwealth College in Arkansas. Formerly on the staff of the "Moscow Daily News," she is a contributor to the "Nation," "New Republic," and other American periodicals and is on the Editorial staff of the Magazine "Soviet Russia Today."

ADMISSION 35 CENTS. AUSPICES A. F. S. U.

EXHIBIT No. 22

CALLING THE CONGRESS OF YOUTH

We the undersigned* urged the organizations of youth and the agencies serving youth to respond to this CALL to the CONGRESS OF YOUTH. We take the initiative in calling the young people of America together to give them an opportunity to consider their mutual problems and train themselves for self-government by practicing citizenship.

John P. Davis, National Negro Congress.
Courtenay Dinwiddie, National Child Labor Committee.

Dorothy Canfield Fisher.

W. P. Freeman, Order of Rainbow Girls.

T. Arnold Hill, National Urban League.
Chas Kimball, League of Nations Association.

Mrs. Elgerton Parsons, Pan-Pacific Women's Association.

Leland Rex Robinson, League of Nations Association.

Lester F. Scott, Camp Fire Girls.

George N. Shuster, Commonweal.

George Soule, editor, the New Republic.
Monroe Smith, American Youth Hostels Association.

Oswald Garrison Villard, the Nation.

C. W. Warbasse, Cooperative League of the U. S. A.

Richard Welling, National Self-Government Committee.

Max Yergan, International Committee on African Affairs.

WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION

Mary McLeod Bethune, National Council of Negro Women.

Esther Caukin Brunauer, American Association of University Women.

Hannah Clothier Hull, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

Lena Madesin Phillips, International Federation of Business and Professional Women.

Josephine Schain, National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War.

HEALTH

Dr. Reginald M. Atwater, American Public Health Association.

Dr. Kendall Emerson, National Tuberculosis Association.

Dr. Edward Hume, Christian Medical Council for Overseas Work.

E. D. Mitchell, Journal of Health and Physical Education.

William F. Snow, American Social Hygiene Association.

EDUCATION

LeRoy E. Bowman.

William H. Bristow, National Congress of Parents and Teachers.

Mrs. H. R. Butler, National Congress of Colored Parents and Teachers.

President W. W. Comfort, Haverford College.

President Donald J. Cowling, Carleton College.

President John W. Davis, West Virginia State College.

Edgar J. Fisher, Institute of International Education.

Robert Morss Lovett, University of Chicago.

President Henry Noble MacCracken, Vassar College.

Acting President Nelson P. Mead, College of the City of New York.

Ordway Tead, Board of Education, New York.

Irma E. Voight, National Association of Deans of Women.

Mary E. Woolley, president emeritus, Mount Holyoke College.

*The signers are issuing this Call, not as the official representatives of their organizations, but in their personal capacities as individuals deeply concerned with the role of young people in the United States.

TRADE UNION

Luigi Antoninni, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union.
 Heywood Broun, American Newspaper Guild.
 Redmond Burr, Order of Railway Telegraphers.
 Jerome Davis, American Federation of Teachers.
 Frank Gillmore, Associated Actors and Artists of America.
 J. B. S. Hardman, editor, the Advance, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America.
 Gardner Jackson, Labor's Nonpartisan League.
 Spencer Miller, Jr., Workers Education Bureau of America.
 Philip Murray, Steel Workers Organizing Committee.
 A. Philip Randolph, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.
 Reid Robinson, International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.
 Rose Schneiderman, Women's Trade Union League.
 A. F. Whitney, Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen.

SOCIAL SERVICE

Lucy P. Carner, Council of Social Agencies of Chicago.
 Charlotte Carr, Hull House.
 Hazel E. Foster, Association of Church Social Workers.
 Helen Hall, National Federation of Settlements.
 Fred K. Hoehler, American Public Welfare Association.
 Howard R. Knight, National Conference of Social Work.
 Eduard C. Lindeman, New York School of Social Work.
 Francis H. McLean, Family Welfare Association of America.
 Lillie M. Peck, National Federation of Settlements.
 Mary K. Simkhovitch, Greenwich House.
 Lillian D. Wald, Henry Street Settlement House.

GOVERNMENT

Ruth O. Blakeslee, Social Security Board.
 C. A. Bottolfson, Governor of Idaho.
 Arnold B. Cammerer, National Parks Service.
 Arthur Capper, U. S. Senator from Kansas.
 John M. Coffee, U. S. Representative from Washington.
 L. D. Dickenson, Governor of Michigan.

GOVERNMENT—continued

Matthew A. Dunn, U. S. Representative from Pennsylvania.
 James A. Farley, U. S. Postmaster General.
 Thomas F. Ford, U. S. Representative from California.
 Frank W. Fries, U. S. Representative from Illinois.
 Lee E. Geyer, U. S. Representative from California.
 Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior.
 Ed. V. Izak, U. S. Representative from California.
 R. T. Jones, Governor of Arizona.
 Marvel M. Logan, U. S. Senator from Kentucky.
 Robert Marshall, United States Forestry Service.
 John Moses, Governor of North Dakota.
 James E. Murray, U. S. Senator from Montana.
 Culbert L. Olson, Governor of California.
 Robert F. Wagner, U. S. Senator from New York.
 C. W. Warburton, U. S. Department of Agriculture.
 M. L. Wilson, Under Secretary of Agriculture.

RELIGIOUS

Henry A. Atkinson, World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Churches.
 Naomi Brodie, Junior Hadassah.
 Mrs. Samuel McCrea Cavert, Young Women's Christian Association.
 Samuel M. Cohen, Young People's League of the United Synagogue of America.
 Bishop Ralph S. Cushman, Methodist Episcopal Church.
 Robert C. Dexter, American Unitarian Association.
 Mrs. Kendall Emerson, Young Women's Christian Association.
 Frederick L. Fagley, General Council of the Congregational and Christian Churches.
 Stephen H. Fritchman, Unitarian Youth Commission.
 William E. Gardner, National Young People's Christian Union of the Universalist Church.
 Philip B. Heller, American Jewish Congress.
 Rufus M. Jones, American Friends Service Committee.
 Caroline B. Lourie, National Council of Jewish Juniors.
 Louise Meyerovitz, Young Judea.
 J. Carrell Morris, Christian Youth Council of North America.

RELIGIOUS—continued

Helen Morton, National Intercollegiate Christian Council.	Katherine Terrill, Council for Social Action, Congregation and Christian Church.
Reverend A. Clayton Powell, Jr., Abyssinian Baptist Church.	Jay A. Urice, Young Men's Christian Association.
Henrietta Roelofs, Young Women's Christian Association.	Charles C. Webber, Methodist Federation for Social Service.
Carl C. Seitter, National Council of Methodist Youth.	Bishop Herbert Welch, Methodist Episcopal Church.

NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Support of—

Thomas-Larrabee Federal Aid to Education Bill.
Wagner Health Bill.
Bloom Neutrality Act Revision Bill.
Pittman Resolution embargoing violators of Nine-Power Treaty.
Wagner-Van Nuys Anti-Lynching Bill.
Mitchell Bill barring discrimination on interstate carriers.
Wagner Labor Relations Act without amendment.
Wagner-Rogers Child Refugee Bill.
Amendments to Social Security Act extending benefits to migratory, agricultural and domestic workers.
Pensions of \$60 per month at age 60.
Extension of Federal Farm Loans.
Placement of C. C. C. under civilian control and extension of educational program.
Expansion of N. Y. A. and W. P. A.

Ratification of—

Child Labor Amendment.

Repeal of—

Oriental Exclusion Act.

Opposition to—

Smith Omnibus Bill and others directed at curtailment of civil liberties.

OFFICERS ELECTED

The Nominations Committee, elected at the Congress, presented a slate of Officers, made up from nominations received from organizations and State Delegation meetings, to the Joint Session of Senate and House. At the Session, declinations, substitutions, and nominations were accepted from the floor and a final ballot distributed for the vote resulting in the election of the following Officers:

Chairman—Jack McMichael, National Intercollegiate Christian Council.

Vice-Chairmen:

J. Carrel Morris, Christian Youth Council of North America.
James B. Carey, United Electric, Radio and Machine Workers of America.
Mary Jeanne McKay, National Student Federation of America.
Louise Meyerovitz, Young Judea.
Edward E. Strong, National Negro Congress, Youth Section.
James V. Krakora, Czechoslovak Society of America.
(Representative of farm organization to be named later).

Regional representatives:

New England: Alexander Karanikas, Massachusetts Youth Congress.
Middle Atlantic: Michael Gravino, New York State Youth Council.
East Central: Myrtle Powell, Pittsburgh Y. W. C. A.
South: Thelma Dale, Southern Negro Youth Congress.

Miss Jimmy Woodward, Y. W. C. A., Randolph-Macon College.

South West: Wynard Norman, Oklahoma City Youth Assembly.

West Central: Harlan Crippen, Minnesota Youth Assembly.

West Coast and Rocky Mountain: Clara Walldow, California Youth Legislature.

Puerto Rico: Julia Rivera.

Treasurer: Harriet Pickens, Business and Professional Council, Y. W. C. A.
Executive Secretary: Joseph Cadden.

Representatives-at-Large:

Clarence Carter, Connecticut Conference of Youth.

Daniel J. Spooner, Young Peoples League of the United Synagogue of America.

Howard Ennes, Washington, D. C., Youth Council.

Joseph Lash, American Student Union.

Margeret Day, National Federation of Settlements.

Josiah R. Bartlett, Social Action Committee, Union Theological Seminary.

(Representatives of Industrial Council, Y. W. C. A. and an A. F. of L. Union to be named later.)

Elected Officers listed above constitute the Cabinet of the American Youth Congress.

The Cabinet, meeting on July 5, made the following appointments:

Administrative Secretary—Frances M. Williams.

Legislative Director—Abbott Simon.

CREDENTIALS REPORT

Presented by the Chairman of the Credentials Committee, Roy Lancaster of the Gas By-Product, Coke and Chemical Workers.

736 Senators and Representatives representing organizations with a total membership of 4,697,915 (after subtraction for duplication) are accredited at the Congress of Youth. Of these, 96 are Senators delegated by 63 different national organizations; 640 are Representatives from 450 organizations.

Representation of women is approximately two-thirds that of men. The youngest delegate is 14 years old and the median age is 22.

EXHIBIT No. 23

[From the New York Times, Thursday, March 16, 1939]

NEW PEACE GROUP IS ORGANIZED HERE—17 LEADERS OF VARIOUS U. S. ORGANIZATIONS JOIN IN DRIVE FOR COOPERATIVE PROGRAM—OPPOSE ISOLATION POLICY—REVISION OF NEUTRALITY ACT TO BE SOUGHT—EICHELBERGER IS ELECTED CHAIRMAN

A new peace organization to campaign for international cooperation under the leadership of the United States, as distinguished from isolation, was started here yesterday under the name of the American Union for Concerted Peace Efforts.

In launching it, seventeen leaders of national organizations declared their conviction that the only road to peace for the United States and the world was a vigorous three-point foreign policy: "To oppose aggression, to promote justice between nations, to develop adequate peace machinery."

The new peace union likewise announced plans for a Conference of One Hundred to be held in Washington on April 15 and 16 to bring together leaders of organized public opinion.

EICHELBERGER IS CHAIRMAN

Clark M. Eichelberger, national director of the League of Nations Association, who was elected chairman of the executive committee of the new peace body, said yesterday it would emphasize a campaign to support the revision of our present Neutrality Act along the lines of the amendment recently introduced by Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah.

This amendment would have the practical effect of giving the President and Congress an opportunity to decide who was the aggressor and to withhold the economic resources of the United States from the aggressor while continuing to supply aid to the victim.

"World cooperation alone can protect American interests," said the statement of principles announcing the new group. "Consequently we support the leadership of the United States in the cooperative use of its moral, diplomatic, and economic power to find ways short of war to let the aggressor know that he can go no further."

Henry A. Atkinson, general secretary of the World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Church and Church Peace Union, is vice chairman of the new peace union; Edgar J. Fisher, assistant director of the Institute of International Education, is treasurer; and William W. Hinckley, chairman of the National Council of the American Youth Congress, is secretary.

OTHERS ON THE COUNCIL

Other members of the executive committee are:

Vera W. Beggs, chairman of international relations, General Federation of Women's Clubs.

Esther Caukin Brannauer, associate in international education, American Association of University Women.

Charles G. Fenwick, Professor of International Law, Bryn Mawr College.

Margaret Forsyth, chairman, women's committee, American League for Peace and Democracy.

Emily J. Hickman, chairman, international section, public affairs committee, National Board, YWCA.

Alves Long, former chairman, department of international relations, General Federation of Women's Clubs.

Rhoda McCulloch, editor of Women's Press, published by the National Board of the YWCA.

Marion M. Miller, executive secretary, National Council of Jewish Women.

Hugh Moore of Easton, Pa.

Josephine Schain, chairman, National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War.

James T. Shotwell, president, League of Nations Association.

Mary E. Woolley, chairman, international relations committee, American Association of University Women.

EXHIBIT No. 24

[From the New York Times, December 3, 1938]

PEACE GROUP SEEKS AGGRESSOR CURES—COMMITTEE STARTS CAMPAIGN FOR AN AMENDMENT TO OUR NEUTRALITY STATUTE—WOULD AID VICTIM STATES—PRESENT ACT ASSAILED AS NOT BEING NEUTRAL AND DANGER TO PEACE OF THIS COUNTRY

The Committee for Concerted Peace Efforts, composed of leaders of fifteen national organizations interested in world peace, started a campaign yesterday for an amendment to the United States Neutrality Act so this country can "determine the aggressor and apply embargoes to that State only and not to its innocent victim." The committee's statement, it announced, had been signed by the entire membership.

The statement called on the American people to write to their Members of Congress urging "an amendment which will distinguish between aggressor and victim; which will stop shipments of munitions and raw materials to aggressors." The present act, according to the statement "is not neutral" and "encourages aggression and rebellion," "is un-American," and "endangers the peace of the United States."

The committee asserted that "if these changes were made and the act invoked Japan could no longer secure from us the 54 percent of the essential war supplies she must purchase from abroad in order to continue her war in China." The act, said the committee, should provide that "whenever the President finds that war exists between nations, in violation of the Kellogg Pact or any other treaty to which the United States is a party" he shall consult with other States at peace, determine the aggressor and apply the embargo.

The membership of the committee, as made public yesterday, follows:

Clark M. Eichelberger, national director, League of Nations Association, and chairman, Committee for Concerted Peace Efforts.

Henry A. Atkinson, general secretary, World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Churches and Church Peace Union.

Edgar J. Fisher, assistant director, Institute of International Education.

William W. Hinckley, chairman, National Council, American Youth Congress.

Mrs. Vera W. Beggs, chairman, International Relations of General Federation of Women's Clubs.

Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer, associate in international education, American Association of University Women.
 Charles G. Fenwick, president, Catholic Association for International Peace.
 Mrs. Margaret Forsyth, chairman, women's committee, American League for Peace and Democracy.
 Dr. Emily J. Hickman, chairman, international section, public affairs committee, national board, Y. W. C. A.
 Miss Alves Long, former chairman, department of international relations, General Federation of Women's Clubs.
 Mrs. Marion M. Miller, executive secretary, National Council of Jewish Women.
 Miss Henrietta Roelofs, executive of public affairs committee, National Board of Young Women's Christian Association.
 Miss Josephine Schain, chairman, national committee on the Cause and Cure of War.
 James T. Shotwell, president, League of Nations Association.
 Dr. Mary E. Woolley, chairman, international relations committee, American Association of University Women.

EXHIBIT No. 25

PROCEEDINGS—CONGRESS OF YOUTH, JULY 1-5, 1939, NEW YORK CITY

CALLING THE CONGRESS OF YOUTH

We the Undersigned* urge the organization of youth and the agencies serving youth to respond to this CALL TO THE CONGRESS OF YOUTH. We take the initiative in calling the young people of America together to give them an opportunity to consider their mutual problems and train themselves for self-government by practicing citizenship.

John P. Davis, National Negro Congress
 Courtenay Dinwiddie, National Child Labor Committee

Dorothy Canfield Fisher

W. P. Freeman, Order of Rainbow for Girls

T. Arnold Hill, National Urban League
 Chase Kimball, League of Nations Associations

Mrs. Edgerton Parsons, Pan-Pacific Women's Association

Leland Rex Robinson, League of Nations Association

Lester F. Scott, Camp Fire Girls

George N. Shuster, "Commonweal"

George Soule, Editor, "The New Republic"

Monroe Smith, American Youth Hostels Association

Oswald Garrison Villard, "The Nation"

C. W. Warbasse, Cooperative League of the U. S. A.

Richard Welling, National Self-Government Committee

Max Yergan, International Committee on African Affairs

WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS

Mary McLeod Bethune, National Council of Negro Women

Esther Caukin Brunauer, American Association of University Women

Hannah Clothier Hull, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS—continued

Lena Madesin Phillips, International Federation of Business and Professional Women

Josephine Schain, National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War

HEALTH

Dr. Reginald M. Atwater, American Public Health Association

Dr. Kendall Emerson, National Tuberculosis Association

Dr. Edward Hume, Christian Medical Council for Overseas Work

E. D. Mitchell, Journal of Health and Physical Education

William F. Snow, American Social Hygiene Association

EDUCATION

LeRoy E. Bowman

William H. Bristow, National Congress of Parents and Teachers

Mrs. H. R. Butler, National Congress of Colored Parents and Teachers

President W. W. Comfort, Haverford College

President Donald J. Cowling, Carleton College

President John W. Davis, West Virginia State College

Edgar J. Fisher, Institute of International Education

EDUCATION—continued

Robert Morss Lovett, University of Chicago
 President Henry Noble MacCracken, Vassar College
 Acting President Nelson P. Mead, College of the City of New York
 Ordway Tead, Board of Education, New York
 Irma E. Voight, National Association of Deans of Women
 Mary E. Woolley, President Emeritus, Mount Holyoke College

TRADE-UNION

Luigi Antonini, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union
 Heywood Broun, American Newspaper Guild
 Redmond Burr, Order of Railway Telegraphers
 Jerome Davis, American Federation of Teachers
 Frank Gillmore, Associated Actors and Artists of America
 J. B. S. Hardman, Editor, "The Advance," Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
 Gardner Jackson, Labor's Non-Partisan League
 Spencer Miller, Jr., Workers Education Bureau of America
 Philip Murray, Steel Workers Organizing Committee
 A. Philip Randolph, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters
 Reid Robinson, International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers
 Rose Schneiderman, Women's Trade Union League
 A. F. Whitney, Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen

SOCIAL SERVICE

Lucy P. Carner, Council of Social Agencies of Chicago
 Charlotte Carr, Hull House
 Hazel E. Foster, Association of Church Social Workers
 Helen Hall, National Federation of Settlements
 Fred K. Hoehler, American Public Welfare Association
 Howard R. Knight, National Conference of Social Work
 Eduard C. Lindeman, New York School of Social Work
 Francis H. McLean, Family Welfare Association of America
 Lillie M. Peck, National Federation of Settlements
 Mary K. Simkhovitch, Greenwich House
 Lillian D. Wald, Henry Street Settlement House

GOVERNMENT

Ruth O. Blakeslee, Social Security Board
 C. A. Bottolfsen, Governor of Idaho
 Arnold B. Cammerer, National Park Service
 Arthur Capper, U. S. Senator from Kansas
 John M. Coffee, U. S. Representative from Washington
 L. D. Dickenson, Governor of Michigan
 Matthew A. Dunn, U. S. Representative from Pennsylvania
 James A. Farley, U. S. Postmaster General
 Thomas F. Ford, U. S. Representative from California
 Frank W. Fries, U. S. Representative from Illinois
 Lee E. Geyer, U. S. Representative from California
 Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior
 Ed. V. Izak, U. S. Representative from California
 R. T. Jones, Governor of Arizona
 Marvel M. Logan, U. S. Senator from Kentucky
 Robert Marshall, United States Forestry Service
 John Moses, Governor of North Dakota
 James E. Murray, U. S. Senator from Montana
 Culbert L. Olson, Governor of California
 Robert F. Wagner, U. S. Senator from New York
 C. W. Warburton, U. S. Department of Agriculture
 M. L. Wilson, Under Secretary of Agriculture

RELIGIOUS

Henry A. Atkinson, World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Churches
 Naomi Brodie, Junior Hadassah
 Mrs. Samuel McCrea Cavert, Young Women's Christian Association
 Samuel M. Cohen, Young People's League of the United Synagogue of America
 Bishop Ralph S. Cushman, Methodist Episcopal Church
 Robert C. Dexter, American Unitarian Association
 Mrs. Kendall Emerson, Young Women's Christian Association
 Frederick L. Fagley, General Council of the Congregational and Christian Churches
 Stephen H. Fritchman, Unitarian Youth Commission
 William E. Gardner, National Young People's Christian Union of the Universalist Church

RELIGIOUS—continued

Philip B. Heller, American Jewish Congress	Henrietta Roelofs, Young Women's Christian Association
Rufus M. Jones, American Friends Service Committee	Carl C. Seitter, National Council of Methodist Youth
Caroline B. Lourie, National Council of Jewish Juniors	Katherine Terrill, Council for Social Action, Congregation and Christian Church
Louise Meyerovitz, Young Judea	Jay A. Urice, Young Men's Christian Association
J. Carrel Morris, Christian Youth Council of North America	Charles C. Webber, Methodist Federation for Social Service
Helen Morton, National Intercollegiate Christian Council	Bishop Herbert Welch, Methodist Episcopal Church
Reverend A. Clayton Powell, Jr., Abyssinian Baptist Church	

NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Support of—

Thomas-Larrabee Federal Aid to Education Bill.
 Wagner Health Bill.
 Bloom Neutrality Act Revision Bill.
 Pittman Resolution embargoing violators of Nine-Power Treaty.
 Wagner-Van Nuys Anti-Lynching Bill.
 Mitchell Bill barring discrimination on interstate carriers.
 Wagner Labor Relations Act without amendment.
 Wagner-Rogers Child Refugee Bill.
 Amendments to Social Security Act extending benefits to migratory, agricultural and domestic workers.
 Pensions of \$60 per month at age of 60.
 Extension of Federal Farm Loans.
 Placement of C. C. C. under civilian control and extension of educational program.
 Expansion of N. Y. A. and W. P. A.

Ratification of—

Child Labor Amendment.

Repeal of—

Oriental Exclusion Act.

Opposition to—

Smith Omnibus Bill and others directed at curtailment of civil liberties.

OFFICERS ELECTED

The Nominations Committee, elected at the Congress, presented a slate of Officers, made up from nominations received from organizations and State Delegation meetings, to the Joint Session of Senate and House. At the Session, declinations, substitutions, and nominations were accepted from the floor and a final ballot distributed for the vote resulting in the election of the following Officers:

Chairman: Jack McMichael, National Intercollegiate Christian Council.

Vice Chairman: J. Carrel Morris, Christian Youth Council of North America.

James B. Carey, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America.

Mary Jeanne McKay, National Student Federation of America.

Louise Meyerovitz, Young Judea.

Edward E. Strong, National Negro Congress, Young Section.

James V. Krakora, Czechoslovak Society of America.

(Representative of farm organization to be named later.)

Regional representatives:

New England—Alexander Karanikas, Massachusetts Youth Congress.

Middle Atlantic—Michael Gravino, New York State Youth Council.

East Central—Myrtle Powell, Pittsburgh Y. W. C. A.

South—Thelma Dale, Southern Negro Youth Congress.

Miss Jimmy Woodward, Y. W. C. A., Randolph-Macon College.

*The signers are issuing this call, not as the official representatives of their organizations, but in their personal capacities as individuals deeply concerned with the role of young people in the United States.

OFFICERS ELECTED—continued

South West—Wynard Norman, Oklahoma City Youth Assembly.

West Central—Harlan Crippen, Minnesota Youth Assembly.

West Coast and Rocky Mountain—Clara Walldow, California Youth Legislature.

Puerto Rico—Julia Rivera.

Treasurer—Harriet Pickens, Business and Professional Council, Y. W. C. A.

Executive Secretary—Joseph Cadden.

Representatives at Large:

Clarence Carter, Connecticut Conference of Youth.

Daniel J. Spooner, Young Peoples League of the United Synagogue of America.

Howard Ennes, Washington, D. C., Youth Council.

Joseph Lash, American Student Union.

Margaret Day, National Federation of Settlements.

Josiah R. Bartlett, Social Action Committee, Union Theological Seminary.

(Representatives of Industrial Council, Y. W. C. A., and an A. F. of L. Union to be named later.)

Elected Officers listed above constitute the Cabinet of the American Youth Congress.

The Cabinet, meeting on July 5, made the following appointments:

Administrative Secretary—Frances M. Williams.

Legislative Director, Abbott Simon.

CREDENTIALS REPORT

Presented by the Chairman of the Credentials Committee, Roy Lancaster, of the Gas By-Product, Coke and Chemical Workers

736 Senators and Representatives representing organizations with a total membership of 4,697,915 (after subtraction for duplication) are accredited at the Congress of Youth. Of these, 96 are Senators delegated by 63 different national organizations; 640 are Representatives from 450 organizations.

Representation of women is approximately two-thirds that of men. The youngest delegate is 14 years old and the median age is 22.

EXHIBIT No. 26

SENATOR MCCARTHY'S STATEMENT ON OWEN J. LATTIMORE

The State Department, with great frequency, utilizes the services of a large group of individuals in diverse fields as "consultants."

One of its most regular performers in this field is the man I wish to discuss next. He is Owen J. Lattimore.

Lattimore was not only a consultant, but one of the principal architects of our far eastern policy. This man is one of the State Department's outstanding experts on problems dealing with the Far East and has been for a number of years.

Lattimore is currently employed as a director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, located at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. He has held numerous positions with the State Department, among them a 6-month period in 1941 as the political adviser of President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. He was a Deputy Director in charge of the Pacific Branch of the Office of War Information and in June of 1944, he, with John Carter Vincent, later to head the Far Eastern Bureau of the State Department, accompanied Henry Wallace on a diplomatic tour of Siberia and Free China.

Recently Lattimore completed a State Department mission to India and it is understood that he is now a consultant in the Department. While the State Department will tell you that he is not on the payroll as of today, the point is he is still considered by the Department as one of its top advisers and is put on and off the payroll as consultant apparently at will, and is apparently one of the top men in developing our Asiatic program.

This man's record as a pro-Communist goes back many years.

I hand the committee a letter, dated December 19, 1940, on the letterhead of Amerasia. Again we have the familiar name of Frederick V. Field, Communist

chairman of the editorial board. Equally familiar is the name of Jbhillip J. Jaffe, managing editor of the magazine, who was indicted and convicted for having illegal possession of secret State Department documents. The committee will note that there follows a list of eight members of the board of this pro-Communist magazine. It will also observe that 50 percent of the editorial board of this magazine, whose editor was convicted of possessing State Department secret documents illegally, have been or are now highly placed officials of the Department of State of the United States.

Their names are T. A. Bisson, Owen Lattimore, David H. Popper, and William T. Stone.

In the June 6, 1946, issue of the Washington Times-Herald there appears an article, entitled "How Come?" written by Mr. Frank C. Waldrop, editorial director of that newspaper.

Shortly, I shall read that article into the record, but I should like to mention in passing that of the 57 instructors in the orientation conference and training programs for personnel of the Foreign Service and the Department of State, all but three were Government officials. Those three were Dr. Edward C. Acheson, Director of the school of foreign service and brother of the present Secretary of State; Prof. Owen Lattimore of Johns Hopkins University and Prof. Frederick L. Schuman, of Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.

But more of this gentleman later.

When Mr. Waldrop asked, "How Come?" he was getting closer to a sordid picture than he imagined.

Here is what he had to say:

"Herewith an item that may be of interest to Secretary of State Jimmy Byrnes who is doing his level best these days to cope with J. Stalin's bucking broncos of the Kremlin.

"Whether he finds it interesting or not, he certainly could with profit ask a few questions about a project in his own shop going by the title of the 'Orientation Conferences and Training Programs for Personnel of the Foreign Service and the Department of State.'

"The writer of this piece sat in, uninvited, yesterday on one of those training projects and found it nothing more or less than an example to diplomats on how to needle a man whose back is turned—in this case Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

"To begin at the beginning, the State Department has a 'division of training services' which has the very valuable assignment of making better diplomats of the departmental forces.

"As a part of this, there are scheduled for every workday from Monday through Friday all this month, a series of lectures by supposed experts on subjects of importance in diplomacy.

"(Don't give up. It concerns You too, because the State Department is supposed to look out for the interests of the United States between wars and you live here.)

"Of 57 instructors listed to give the developing diplomats the real dope on their business, all but three are Government officials.

"The three exceptions are: Dr. Edward C. Acheson, director of the school of foreign service at the George Washington University here and brother of Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson; Prof. Owen Lattimore, of Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and Prof. Frederick L. Schuman of Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.

"Lattimore is a bosom pal of Henry Wallace, the great mind of the ages now trying to decide whether he can best save the world by staying on in Truman's Cabinet to bore from within or by resigning to bore from without.

"Lattimore also hangs out with other persons less well known, to an extent that ought to give J. Byrnes some pause.

"Just an item: He was formerly on the editorial board of Amerasia, the pro-Soviet magazine that got caught in possession of confidential State Department documents in 1944 with result that an editor and a State Department employee were convicted and fined.

"Lattimore also has described Stalin's blood purges of 1936-39 as 'a triumph for democracy,' and that, friends, is just a slight sample.

"He's clever, but you invariably find him in all those old familiar places when you check up. Consider his performance of yesterday.

"Most people have the impression that on the record and the evidence the welfare of the United States is better looked after in Japan with Gen. Douglas

MacArthur in sole command, than in Germany where a four-cornered quarrel over the remains grows worse and worse.

"To all of this, Dr. Lattimore yesterday issued an hour-long 'na-a-a-a-h, it's lousy.' His line is that the Japs have outsmarted MacArthur in that they are holding onto a 'conservative' agricultural policy and occasionally rescue one of their industrialists, bankers and so forth from the hangman's rope.

"Match that up, citizens, with what you've been hearing from Moscow, if you bother to listen. And match up with it the realization that such a thought is the best offered our State Department help as expert inside dope on the Far East.

"How come the State Department has to drag in Owen Lattimore to tell what's what in the Orient? Hasn't the Department got anybody on its own staff who knows something?

"And as for the baby lined up for June 19—that F. L. Schuman—he's all too well known around here, especially to people who have read the record of the Dies committee.

"But if you don't already know what he is, you can get him completely in a flash by turning to page 582 of his latest book, 'Soviet Politics At Home and Abroad,' wherein he states:

"The Russian adventure marks a long forward stride toward human mastery of man's fate. * * *

"That is how the State Department's expert instructor on U. S. Soviet relations sums up Stalin's behavior and the almost 28 bloody years of Communist dictatorship in Russia.

"No wonder State Department secret documents leak. No wonder Jimmy Byrnes goes to conferences with Molotov and comes staggering home asking who touched off the blast!

"This writer plans to sit in on Schuman's June 19 performance, if it comes off, and will try to report on same in this space. That is, of course, if they don't lock the door first."

Thus we have the officials of the State Department again warned of a man who by any "yardstick of loyalty" could not possibly be a good security risk.

Mr. Lattimore himself is a prolific writer and there is no lack of material for the committee to ascertain exactly where this man stands in the political scheme of things.

The Reverend James F. Kearney, S. J., writing in the Columbia magazine of September 1949, gives more first-hand information of great value to the committee. This magazine is published by the Knights of Columbus, the most prominent order of Catholic laymen in America.

Here is what Reverend Kearney wrote:

"Who or what has so vitiated the opinion of intelligent Americans on the China question? Until recently, despite the dust that has been deliberately thrown in American eyes by pink correspondents, the question could be stated so clearly and simply that grammar school students could grasp it. Having explained it to grammar students, I know. Here it is, expressed in monosyllabic words: "If the Reds win out there, we lose. If they lose, we win. Well, for all practical purposes, the Red have now won, and in consequence we and the Chinese have lost. For communism it is the greatest triumph since the Russian Revolution; for us, though few Americans yet fully realize it, it is perhaps the greatest disaster in our history; and the end is not yet. Who is responsible? It wasn't a one-man job; short-sighted Chinese officials contributed 50 percent. There are those who believe, though, that no Americans deserve more credit for this Russian triumph and Sino-American disaster than Owen Lattimore and a small group of his followers.

"Owen Lattimore, confidant of two United States Presidents, adviser to our State Department, author of 10 books about the Far East, where he has 25 years of travel and study to his credit, was born in Washington, D. C., but after a few months was taken to North China. At 12 he went to study in Switzerland, then in England, and returned to China as a newsman before taking up exploration, particularly in Manchuria and Mongolia. He then studied in Peiping, first on a fellowship from the Harvard Yenching Foundation and later on a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation fellowship, knows the Chinese, Mongolian, and Russian languages well.

"Returning to the United States at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, a year later he became director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations of Johns Hopkins University, a post he still holds. In 1941 he was for 6 months President Roosevelt's political adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, then returned to the States to enter the OWI, becoming Deputy

Director to the Overseas Branch in Charge of Pacific Operations. In June 1944, he and J. Carter Vincent, later to head the Far Eastern Bureau of the State Department, accompanied Henry Wallace of the State Department on a diplomatic tour of Siberia and Free China.

"So high does Owen Lattimore stand in Washington that it is said that only two books on President Truman's desk when he announced Japan's surrender were newsmen John Gunther's *Inside Asia* and Lattimore's *Solution in Asia*. Lattimore was next named special economic adviser to Edwin V. Pauley, head of the postwar economic mission to Tokyo. Though not an authority on Japan, he did not hesitate to criticize former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's plan, adopted by MacArthur, to govern the Japanese people through the Emperor. He believed that the Emperor and all his male heirs should be interned in China and a republic set up in Japan.

"In this thoroughly distinguished orientalist's career there are many disturbing features. For example, in former Red Louis Budenz' March 19, 1949, *Collier's* article, entitled 'The Menace of Red China,' we read 'Most Americans, during World War II, fell for the Moscow line that the Chinese Communists were not really Communists * * * but agrarian reformers * * * That is just what Moscow wanted Americans to believe. Even many naive Government officials fell for it. * * * This deception of United States officials and public was the result of a planned campaign; I helped to plan it. * * * The number one end was a Chinese coalition government in which Chiang would accept the agrarian reformers—at the insistence of the United States. * * * We could work through legitimate Far East organizations and writers that were recognized as Oriental authorities. Frederick V. Field emphasized use of the Institute of Pacific Relations. * * * The agrarian reformers' idea started from there. It took root in leading Far East cultural groups in the United States, spread to certain policy-making circles in the State Department and broke into prominent position in the American press. * * * The Communists were successful in impressing their views on the United States State Department simply by planting articles with the proper slant in such magazines as *Far Eastern Survey*, *Pacific Affairs*, and *Amerasia*. Both *Far Eastern Survey* and *Pacific Affairs* are publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This is not a Communist organization.'"

(Apparently the writer did not realize that this organization had been cited as a Communist front by the California Committee on Un-American Activities. 1948 Report, page 168.)

"Where does Mr. Lattimore come in? From 1934 to 1941 he was editor of *Pacific Affairs*. Freda Utley mentions him in two of her books. In her *Last Chance in China* she tells how Moscow, where she then worked as a Communist, was able to help its friends and discomfit its enemies in the Far East thanks to the Institute of Pacific Relations, and that Mr. Lattimore was among those Americans who came to Moscow for help and advice (p. 193). In her *Lost Illusion* (p. 194) she refers to the same 1936 Moscow meeting: 'The whole staff of our Pacific Ocean cabinet had an all-day session at the institute with E. C. Carter, Owen Lattimore, and Harriet Moore, leading lights of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I was a little surprised at the time that these Americans should defer so often and so completely to the Russian viewpoint. * * * Owen Lattimore found it difficult at first to submit to the discipline required of the Friends of the Soviet Union. He told me a few months later in London how he had almost lost his position as editor of *Pacific Affairs* because he had published an article by the Trotskyist Harold Isaacs. In later years in the United States it did not astonish me to find the Institute of Pacific Relations following the same general lines as the *Daily Worker* in regard to China and Japan.'

"Henry Wallace never claimed to be an expert on the Far East. How much if any, of his report after returning from the Siberia-China visit was written or suggested by the oriental expert, Mr. Lattimore, I do not know. One thing emerges, however: after their return, the American policy which has proved so disastrous for both Chinese and American interests and so helpful to Russia was put into effect and is still being pursued. Lattimore's *Solution in Asia* was described by one reviewer as 'an appeal to Chiang Kai-shek to free himself from the galling yoke (of the Kuomintang) and to set free the democratic forces which have proved effective in northwestern China,' i. e., the Chinese Reds. That book is again referred to in an article by ex-Communist Max Eastman and J. B. Powell in a June 1945 *Reader's Digest* article, *The Fate of the World Is at Stake in China*, wherein they blast the deception 'that Russia is

a democracy and that the Chinese can therefore safely be left to Russian influence.' Owen Lattimore is perhaps the most subtle evangelist of this erroneous conception.

"Mr. Lattimore praised the net result of the Moscow trials and the blood purge by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 1936-39 as 'a triumph for democracy.' He now urges our Government, in Solution in Asia, to accept cheerfully the spread of the Soviet form of democracy in Central Asia. His publishers thus indicate the drift of his book: 'He (Mr. Lattimore) shows that all the *Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the Russian border*, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism.' Does that sound as if Mr. Lattimore, a top adviser on our far-eastern affairs, is on our team?

"The same article continues with a prophecy which has just about come true: 'If Russian dictatorship spreads its tentacles across China the cause of democracy (i. e., United States style) in Asia is lost. As is well known, these tentacles need not include invading Soviet troops, but only the native Communist parties now giving allegiance to the Soviet Union and taking their directives from Moscow. When these Communist Parties get control of a neighboring state the Moscow dictatorship and its fellow travelers call that a friendly government. It is by means of these Communist-controlled friendly governments—not by Soviet military conquest—that Russian power and totalitarian tyranny is spreading from the Soviet Union, in Asia as in Europe.

"That is perhaps good background for the current slogan of Mr. Lattimore and his loyal followers, *Edgar Snow, Ted White, Richard Lauterbach, Harvard's Fairbanks*, and many an ex-OWI man—that there's nothing much for America to worry about because Mao Tse-tung's communism is a nationalist movement. A moment's reflection should make it clear that the very last thing a real Chinese nationalist would do would be to swallow hook, line, and sinker the doctrine of Karl Marx, a German Jew, who besides being a foreigner has a system that goes counter to every Chinese instinct and every tradition in the Chinese concept of society.

"This recalls an incident a Belgian priest related to me in Shanghai a year and a half ago. He had become a Chinese citizen, and when the Chinese Reds occupied his church in North China they followed the usual custom (which is probably news to Mr. Lattimore) of putting up the pictures of Marx and Stalin in the place of honor above the high altar, with those of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh below. A Chinese Red then told the priest flatly, 'We are going to get rid of absolutely all foreign influence in China. Our policy is China for the Chinese.' I can imagine Mr. Lattimore saying, 'Just what I told you.' But the Belgian-Chinese replied, 'And those two foreign gentlemen up there, Marx and Stalin? When did they become Chinese citizens?' The Red slunk silently away.

"If anyone is still puzzled by the contention that Chinese Marxists are primarily nationalists, a glance at the Communist Manifesto will clear matters up. 'Though not in substance, yet in form,' we read there, 'the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.' That, I believe, shows us what is back of the present national slogan our United States pinks apply to China's Reds. It's not authentic nationalism, of course, as the Manifesto explains later: 'The Communists are reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality. The workingmen have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got.'

"The spurious nature of the nationalism of Mao Tse-tung was admitted by Mr. Lattimore himself, perhaps unintentionally, in a tape-recorded speech he gave in San Francisco, December 7, 1948: 'The Chinese Communists never made any bones about the fact that they are Marxists. They are Marxist Communists in their international relations. They never question the Russian line. They follow every twist and turn of it.' That is an important admission by Mr. Lattimore, since so many of his followers have been trying to tell us there is no Moscow control over China's Reds. If they follow every twist and turn of the Moscow line they are evidently not Chinese nationalists as we understand the term, but pseudo-nationalists.

"A. T. Steele and Andrew Roth of the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *Nation*, respectively, after getting out of Red Peiping recently, declared that the Chinese Red leaders are in every sense of the word Communists who stand squarely and faithfully for the Moscow Party line, and will join the Kremlin in the coming world war III against the imperialist powers, particularly Amer-

ica. They likewise agree that while Mao might possibly become an extreme nationalist at some future date, another Tito, there is absolutely no evidence that this is a factor to be seriously reckoned with for a long time, Mr. Lattimore to the contrary notwithstanding. Spencer Moosa, latest newsman out of Peiping, confirms their statements. The very first movie put on by the Reds in the auditorium of the Catholic University in Peiping after they moved in this year was the *Life of Stalin*. Need we say it was not anti-Russian? And so, instance after instance shows the very close connection between Moscow and Chinese Communism that has been witnessed throughout the last 28 years *by intelligent observers who have lived in Red China—where Mr. Lattimore has never lived.*

"To the average American, whom pro-Red propaganda is intended to victimize, it seems quite natural that Mao Tse-tung, a native of China who has never visited Moscow, should think first of China's instead of Russia's interests. Yet how many native-born Americans are there who, once they join the party, think nothing of selling out their country and its secrets to the Kremlin? Such is the strange mesmerism exercised by their Moscow masters. It is, then, no harder to understand Mao's utter devotion to the party line than it is to understand that of Foster, or Dennis, or Earl Browder. After all, remember, a real Communist has no country. And surely Mao has proved he is a 100-percent Communist. Let's not be deceived any longer, then, *by this fake nationalism of China's Reds, which is the central thesis of Mr. Lattimore's recent book, The Situation in Asia.*

"If a man who had written 10 volumes about Africa, and thereby won a name for himself as an authority, should nevertheless maintain that the Negroes in Africa aren't really black but white, it would be a cause for wonder. Mr. Owen Lattimore, who has written 10 books on Asia and is called the best informed American on Asiatic affairs living today, is doubtless well-informed on many Asiatic matters but unfortunately, if we are to take his written words as an index of his knowledge of China's Reds, he is very badly misinformed about the true color of that most important body of individuals and their whole way of acting. Which reminds me of a recent conversation with one of Mr. Lattimore's OWI boys who had just returned from a 3-years' correspondent assignment in China. I asked him why it was that practically all our foreign newsmen, though supposedly educated in the American tradition of fair play, spoke entirely of corruption in the Chiang regime but said nothing about the corruption in the Mao regime. And this man, who was being paid for giving his American readers an honest picture of conditions in the vital Far East, answered, *Because there is no corruption in the Red regime!* I laughed at him for wasting his 3 years in the Orient and passed him an article showing that not only is the Red regime corrupt, but from every conceivable American standpoint it is conservatively 10 times more corrupt than its corrupt opposite number.

"It is probably of such men that Mr. Lattimore, in his book *Situation in China* (p. 177), writes: 'Hitherto American observers who have been acutely conscious of secret police activities in Kuomintang China have had nothing comparable to report from Communist China.' The reason is that these official observers were allowed the freedom to observe the limited activities of KMT secret police, while they weren't even permitted to enter Red China. Had they wished, though, they could have learned a lot from people, some of them Americans, who had lived in Red China. They would have heard, for instance, about the '*T'ing chuang hui*,' or eavesdropper corps, who after killing off all watchdogs, creep up at night, next to the wall or on the flat roofs of North China homes, to hear what is being said inside the family about the Communists. Children are rewarded for spying on their parents and, if anyone is believed to be guilty of anti-Communist remarks, a terror gang swoops down at midnight and the chances are the unfortunate victim will be discovered next morning buried alive outside his home. This sort of secret police and terrorism combined has been so universal in Red China that if Mr. Lattimore doesn't know about it he knows extremely little of Chinese Communism.

"As far back as 1945 the predominant sentiment everywhere in Red areas was fear, universal fear, fear at every instant, according to an official report of a Frenchman, a former university professor from Tientsin who spent the years from 1941 to 1945 in Red territory, and had been haled before both Japanese and Red tribunals. 'It is not terror,' he says, 'for terror is a fear which shows itself exteriorly. Here one must not allow his fear to be seen; he must appear satisfied and approve everything that is said and done. It is a hidden fear, but a creeping, paralyzing fear. The people keep quiet. They do

not criticize; they avoid passing out any news. They are afraid of their neighbor, who may denounce them. They are afraid of the Reds who might hear and imprison them. When the Reds impose a tax, it is paid without a word. If they requisition anyone for public work, the work is done carefully and rapidly, without need of any blows and curses as in the time of the Japanese, and wonderful to say, without any need of supervision. (This is amazing to anyone who knows the easy-going Chinese character.) I have witnessed groups of workers along the big highways built by the Japanese, doing exactly the same kind of work they did for the Japanese, but how different their attitude! There was no foreman there to supervise, and yet everything was done carefully, with hardly a word, without the least bit of joking.⁷ Mr. Lattimore, with his lack of background, might interpret this as a sign of enthusiasm for the Red masters. But the report states simply, 'They were afraid.'

"What was true in 1945 in Red areas is also true today according to the very latest 1949 reports that have filtered through the *Bamboo Curtain*: 'There isn't too much suffering from hunger in the city, but it is impossible to lay up any reserves. The Communists search every house methodically and confiscate any surplus. Anyone who complains or criticizes then disappears mysteriously, buried alive, it is said. No one dares say a word, even to his best friend. In the country districts conditions are terrible. The Reds take everything; grain, livestock, clothing, tools, and now all are being mobilised for army service. Famine reigns everywhere together with fear. The people endure this with clenched teeth, but when asked how things are going always answer, "Everything is going well." They had better.'

"These reports come from reliable people who were there and know what they are talking about, and who ridicule the fairy tales Mr. Lattimore from his distant and comfortable chair in Johns Hopkins spins for eager young Americans who believe he is an authority on China's Reds. What, for example, could be further from the truth than this statement in *The Situation in China*, page 160: '*In China it may be conceded*' (not by anyone who knows the situation, though, if I may interrupt) '*that the Communists hold the confidence of the people to such an extent that they can probably do more by persuasion, with less resort to coercion, than any previous revolutionaries in history.* But the Communists cannot indulge in experiments which the people do not accept, because the armed and organized peasants, would be able to resist them just as they have hitherto resisted the return of the landlords.' Sheer nonsense! The only real landlords left in Red areas are the Red leaders themselves, and the people know enough not to try to resist these ruthless masters. For some reason, no one seems to relish being buried alive; and so the Communists can indulge in absolutely any experiment they choose without the slightest open resistance from the peasants, who are merely awaiting patiently for better days.

"Since Mr. Lattimore is patently in error on so many vital points connected with the China Red question, it becomes more and more strange that his advice on Red China should be followed almost slavishly by the United States State Department. It has already brought China to disaster and may, if we continue to follow it, also ruin America. It might be well to consider what advice he has given for future United States policy so we shall know what a new litany of Lattimore disasters awaits us.

"He has a chapter on Japan in his '*Situation in Asia*' and, though he admits General MacArthur is a first-class administrator, he dislikes his 'fatherly mysticism' and 'old-line Republicanism', hints it would have been wiser to give the Russians more say, considers the present policy as pseudo-realistic and bound to fail. 'It's likely to blow up in our faces, like a humiliating stink bomb', damaging MacArthur's reputation in the end. He doesn't like keeping the Emperor, nor the type of democracy MacArthur is giving, apparently preferring for Japan the totalitarian type Mao Tse-tung is employing in China. Mr. Lattimore doesn't like to see Japan make a bulwark against Russian expansion, and believes that since she is possessed of the most advanced technical and managerial 'know-how' in Asia she will eventually make her own terms with both Russia and China, without consulting the U. S.

"The Japanese, watching America's failure to control the situation in China through the Kuomintang, have been giggling in their kimono sleeves. In a queer way it has helped to restore their self-respect for their own failure on the continent.' He sees no future for Japan apart from the future of Asia, since she needs the iron and coal of Manchuria and the markets of China.

"In this he is probably right; that is why it was always to America's vital interest to see that the Open Door policy and the territorial integrity of China

were preserved, though this adviser to our State Department did not think them very important. He considers East Asia now definitely out of control by either Russia or America, stating that it forms a group of 'third countries,' which seem to resemble Nippon's ill-fated East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. He believes Japan, then, will come to terms both with Communist Russia and Communist China, and will end up by being more anti-American than anti-Russian. If we had only adopted his plan for a Japanese 'democracy' right after the war, what a deal of trouble we would have saved!

"What, now, are his plans for the mainland? He was long in favor of a Chiang coalition with the Reds, and blames our 80th Congress for spoiling that. The result is now Communist control—which of course would have eventuated just as well had his original coalition idea gone through. We mustn't lay down our own conditions for dealing with a Red China, he says, or we shall spoil our favorable position with the Chinese. Has he never heard how Mao's Reds detest Americans, and hold half a dozen U. S. consuls under house arrest? 'We must at all costs avoid the appearance of wanting to punish the Chinese people for having a government which we didn't approve for them in advance.' As if the Chinese were really anxious for a puppet Red regime. We must not support any rump government, for that would be dividing China. We must extend credits to poor Red China and help build it up by trade and American engineering 'know-how' as *'Ford Motors and General Electric did in Russia in the period between wars'*. But let's not lay down any conditions for our aid, by insisting that Red China be hostile to Red Russia.

"And if all that isn't enough to make *Uncle Sam suspect that Owen Lattimore is making a fool out of him in the interests of world Communism*, the expert goes much further: 'The new government of China will claim China's Big Five position in the United Nations, including the right of veto. By the use of our own veto we could delay China in moving into this position', but of course it would be unfair to deprive Russia of another vote, especially since Russia has had nothing whatsoever to do with imposing Communism on China! See now why the pinks are so strong on their insistence that the Red movement in China is purely nationalistic? And another vote for Mother Russia?

"Let's take Outer Mongolia, that voted unanimously to be annexed to Russia in 1945—each voter being required to sign his name on his ballot. 'Mongolia,' he says, 'is between a Communist-ruled Russia and a Communist-controlled China. It would be an advantage to American policy to be able to emphasize that there is a country occupying 600,000 square miles of territory * * * inhabited by people who are neither Chinese nor Russians. It is impossible to make use of this advantage unless the separation of Outer Mongolia is emphasized by membership in the United Nations. * * * It is true that Mongolia as a member of the United Nations would mean another vote for Russia; but would this be a greater disadvantage than our present complete lack of access to this key country between China and Russia?' (p. 226.)

"Yes, Mr. Lattimore, it would. Considering that the whole United States had but one vote in the United Nations, while Russia started out with three, it is simply wonderful of Owen Lattimore to give a couple more Far East satellite votes to our 'cold war' enemy. Since he is one of the chief advisers to our Far Eastern State Department Bureau, is it any wonder that disaster has been piled on disaster in Asia for Americans while world Communism engages in frenzied applause? If Mr. Lattimore is permitted to turn over one Far Eastern vote after another to Russia, Moscow will soon dominate the United Nations, and then can safely discard the veto. Why should one man, whose writings show he has no knowledge of the character of China's Reds, be allowed to go on unchallenged promoting chaos and ruining Christianity in Asia? True, he doesn't say he wants a Red Asia; but the publisher of his 'Situation in Asia' indicates his intentions when on the jacket of the book they print a map of Lattimore's Asia, including Japan, Sakhalin, all of China, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Siam, Burma, Malaya and India, in nice Soviet Red."

It is uncanny how these State Department policy makers are drawn together time after time in an organization or group or project of pro-Soviet nature.

I now hand the committee a booklet setting forth the officers and trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It will be noted that Mr. Lattimore is a trustee.

The familiar pattern starts again with Messrs. Lattimore, Hanson, Bisson, and Jessup.

In the Institute of Pacific Relations, we have such pro-Communists as: Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Philip Jaffe, Kate L. Mitchell, Andrew Roth, Nym Wales.

The Attorney General of the United States has declared the American Peace Mobilization to be a subversive organization and the House Un-American Activities Committee has placed the same stamp of infamy on the Washington Committee for Aid to China.

The American Peace Mobilization was short-lived. It existed during the days of the Stalin-Hitler Pact and was liquidated by the Communists on the very day that Hitler invaded the Soviet Union.

Frederick Vanderbilt Field, one of the country's top Communists, was Executive Secretary of the American Peace Mobilization on Tuesday evening, February 11, 1941, also.

On that date, the Washington Committee for Aid to China, held a meeting at 16th and "O" Streets, N. W., Washington.

At the time this meeting was held, President Roosevelt was under the most savage attack of his career by Frederick Vanderbilt Field and his American Peace Mobilization.

The Senators may recall that this was the occasion when the American Peace Mobilization organized and carried out a twenty-four hour picket line around the White House. The pickets carried placards denouncing Roosevelt as a war-mongering tool of Wall Street.

On June 21, 1941, the American Peace Mobilization pickets were still surrounding the White House. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on the morning of June 22, the pickets were withdrawn within an hour. The party line had changed in a matter of minutes and the American Peace Mobilization then became the American People's Mobilization, urging the immediate entrance of the United States into the war.

Again, associated with Frederick Vanderbilt Field, we have Owen Lattimore as the principal speaker at the above meeting on the evening of February 11, 1941, with only two other speakers: One of them was Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Here again we have the old familiar pattern of a member of the important policy-making group of the State Department collaborating with known Communists under the sponsorship of organizations officially declared subversive.

I hand you an exhibit of the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights, Exhibit 30. On April 21, 1943, the House Committee on Appropriations issued a report citing this organization as "subversive and un-American." On March 29, the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities cited it as a Communist front.

On September 2, 1947, on page 12 of its Report No. 1115, the Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities said, "It will be remembered that during the days of the infamous Soviet-Nazi pact, the Communists built a protective organization known as the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights, which culminated in the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties."

In its 1948 report on pages 112 and 327, the California Committee on Un-American Activities, after citing it as a Communist-front organization, defending Communists, had this to say: "After the dissolution of the American League for Peace and Democracy in February, 1940, the Communist Party frantically organized a new series of front organizations. The National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights was one of the new fronts and it was filled from top to bottom with veteran Communist Party-liners."

The Maryland Association for Democratic Rights was an affiliate of the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights. At a conference of this organization in Baltimore early in 1944, we have as sponsors, Mr. Owen Lattimore and his wife.

Once again we have a policy-making State Department and attaché collaborating with those who have sworn to destroy the nation by force and violence.

I find it impossible to visualize this sort of a good security risk under the "yardstick of loyalty" outlined by Secretary of State Acheson.

I hand the committee an exhibit of the Writers' Congress of 1943, 31.

On December 4, 1947, and on September 21, 1948, the then Attorney General Tom Clark in letters to the Loyalty Review Board, cited the Hollywood Writers' Mobilization as subversive and Communistic. In its 1945 report on page 130, the California Committee on Un-American Affairs described this organization as one "whose true purpose" was "the creation of a clearing house for Communist propaganda."

On October 1, 2 and 3 of 1943, the Writers' Congress and the Hollywood Writers' Mobilization held a meeting on the University of California-LA campus in Westwood. Appearing as the representative of the Office of War Information was Mr. Owen Lattimore.

Here again we have Mr. Lattimore involved as a principal in an organization declared Un-American by the Attorney General of the United States.

In the magazine "Pacific Affairs" of September 1938, Owen Lattimore described the Moscow purge trials as "a triumph for Democracy."

In his book entitled "Solution in Asia," Owen Lattimore declares that among the people of Asia, the Soviet Union has "a great power of attraction * * *. It stands for Democracy."

I submit that the background of Mr. Lattimore, his close collaboration and affiliation with numerous Communist organizations; his friendship and close cooperation with pro-Communist individuals, leaves absolutely no doubt that he is an extremely bad security risk under Secretary of State Acheson's "yardstick of Loyalty" and in fact, his wide knowledge of Far Eastern Affairs and his affinity for the Soviet cause in that area, might well have already done this nation incalculable and irreparable harm.

So much for Mr. Lattimore.

EXHIBIT No. 27

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AMERASIA

A REVIEW OF AMERICA AND THE FAR EAST
NEW YORK

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Telephone: PLaza 3-4700

DECEMBER 19, 1940.

HORACE W. TRUESDELL,

Washington Committee for Aid to China,

1410 H Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. TRUESDELL: We are of course very sorry that a simple, factual, practically statistical article should have caused so much difficulty among individuals. You ask me to explain what happened. By this time the whole thing is so involved that it would take 20,000 words to explain it. Some day when I see you—I hope soon—I can show you our complete file of correspondence on it from which you will see that it was impossible for me, as it is today, to judge the merits of any particular person's claims. But what we are immediately interested in is that such matters should not become the subject of discussion in the magazine, having, as it does, such an important function to play in the Far Eastern world. We feel that it would be indistinctly bad taste, not only for the magazine but for the individuals involved, to have such explanations published, even if I knew what to publish. Of course we are not publishing any reprint of the article, as both you and Mr. Hu requested.

I suggest that sometime when I am in Washington that all of us have a session together and try our best to solve the mystery so we may avoid such conflicts in the future.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP J. JAFFE.

pjj:hs

EXHIBIT No. 28

[From the Washington (D. C.) Times-Herald, June 6, 1946]

How COME?

(By Frank C. Waldrop)

Herewith an item that may be of interest to Secretary of State Jimmy Byrnes who is doing his level best these days to cope with J. Stalin's bucking broncos of the Kremlin.

Whether he finds it interesting or not, he certainly could with profit ask a few questions about a project in his own shop going by the title of the "Orientation

Conferences and Training Programs for Personnel of the Foreign Service and the Department of State."

The writer of this piece sat in, uninvited, yesterday on one of those training projects and found it nothing more or less than an example to diplomats on how to needle a man whose back is turned—in this case Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

To begin at the beginning, the State Department has a "division of training services" which has the very valuable assignment of making better diplomats of the departmental forces.

As a part of this, there are scheduled for every work day from Monday through Friday all this month, a series of lectures by supposed experts on subjects of importance in diplomacy.

[Don't give up. It concerns you, too, because the State Department is supposed to look out for the interests of the United States between wars and you live here.]

Of 57 instructors listed to give the developing diplomats the real dope on their business, all but three are Government officials.

The three exceptions are: Dr. Edward C. Acheson, director of the school of foreign service at the George Washington University here and brother of Under-secretary of State Dean Acheson; Prof. Owen Lattimore, of Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and Prof. Frederick L. Schuman of Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.

Lattimore is a bosom pal of Henry Wallace, the great mind of the ages now trying to decide whether he can best save the world by staying on in Truman's Cabinet to bore from within or by resigning to bore from without.

Lattimore also hangs out with other persons less well known, to an extent that ought to give J. Byrnes some pause.

Just an item: He was formerly on the editorial board of "Amerasia," the pro-Soviet magazine that got caught in possession of confidential State Department documents in 1944 with result that an editor and a State Department employee were convicted and fined.

Lattimore also has described Stalin's blood purges of 1936-39 as "a triumph for democracy," and that, friends, is just a slight sample.

He's clever, but you invariably find him in all those old familiar places when you check up. Consider his performance of yesterday.

Most people have the impression that on the record and the evidence the welfare of the United States is better looked after in Japan with Gen. Douglas MacArthur in sole command, than in Germany where a four-cornered quarrel over the remains grows worse and worse.

To all of this, Dr. Lattimore yesterday issued an hour-long "na-a-a-a-ah, it's lousy." His line is that the Japs have outsmarted MacArthur in that they are holding onto a "conservative" agricultural policy and occasionally rescue one of their industrialists, bankers, and so forth from the hangman's rope.

Match that up, citizens, with what you've been hearing from Moscow, if you bother to listen. And match up with it the realization that such a thought is the best offered our State Department help as expert inside dope on the Far East.

How come the State Department has to drag in Owen Lattimore to tell what's what in the Orient? Hasn't the department got anybody on its own staff who knows something?

And as for the baby lined up for June 19—that F. L. Schuman—he's all too well known around here, especially to people who have read the records of the Dies committee.

But if you don't already know what he is, you can get him completely in a flash by turning to Page 582 of his latest book, "Soviet Politics At Home and Abroad," wherein he states:

"The Russian adventure marks a long forward stride toward human mastery of man's fate * * *."

That is how the State Department's expert instructor on U. S.-Soviet relations sums up Stalin's behavior and the almost 28 bloody years of Communist dictatorship in Russia.

No wonder State Department secret documents leak. No wonder Jimmy Byrnes goes to conferences with Molotov and comes staggering home asking who touched off the blast!

This writer plans to sit in on Schuman's June 19 performance, if it comes off, and will try to report on same in this space. That is, of course, if they don't lock the door first.

EXHIBIT No. 29

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is one of ten national councils in as many countries of the world. The Institute is a nonpartisan, private, research association supported by business corporations, by its members, and by Foundation grants. Its chief purpose is to provide Americans with the facts about economic, political and social developments in the Far East. It takes on stand on public policy, but through its publications and meetings provides an impartial forum within which Far Eastern specialists, who represent many points of view, may analyze issues frankly.

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In 1943, the Rockefeller Foundation Report called the Institute of Pacific Relations " * * * the most important single source of independent studies of the problems of the Pacific Area and the Far East."

In 1945 the United States Navy awarded its Certificate of Achievement to the American Council of the IPR "in recognition of exceptional accomplishment in behalf of the United States Navy and of meritorious contribution to the national war effort."

EXHIBIT No. 30

PROGRAM

Friday evening, June 14

Opening Meeting----- 8:30 p. m.
"Democratic Rights and National Defense"

Speakers:

Josephine Truslow Adams, Swarthmore College.

Walter White, Secretary, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Alfred K. Stern, Chairman, National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights.

Labor Speaker (to be announced).

Saturday afternoon, June 15

Registration----- 1:00 p. m.
General Session----- 1:30-2:00 p. m.

Presiding Chairman: Rev. Theodore P. Ferris, Temporary Vice-Chairman Maryland Association for Democratic Rights.

Address: Samuel L. M. Barlow, National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights.

Round Table Discussions----- 2:00-4:00 p. m.

Round Table I. Democratic Rights and Labor.

Issues involved: National Defense and Civil Liberties; the industrial mobilization plan; legislation and trade unions; anti-trust prosecutions.

Round Table II. Democratic Rights and Minorities.

Issues involved: The attack upon the foreign born; Discrimination against the Negro; the anti-lynching Bill; anti-Semitism; civil rights of political minorities; intellectual freedom in the schools.

Saturday afternoon, June 15—Continued

Round Table III. Democratic Rights and the Church.

Issues involved: The Church and intolerance; religion in a democratic society; freedom of speech for the clergy; the responsibility of the Church in the face of attacks upon minorities.

(Chairman and Discussants of Round Tables to be announced).

Business Session----- 4:00-5:30 p. m.

Presiding Chairman: Rev. Theodore P. Ferris.

Reports by the Chairmen of Round Tables, with recommendations for action.

Election of Officers and Continuations Committee.

MARYLAND ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS

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Maizie Rappaport
Leon Rubenstein
Dr. Leon Sachs
C. A. B. Shreve
Dr. Henry E. Sigerist
H. Bowen Smith
William Smith
Wm. F. Stark
Arthur K. Taylor

In order to facilitate arrangements for the Conference, please return this blank to the address below as soon as possible

REGISTRATION BLANK

**MARYLAND ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS,
19 Medical Arts Building, Baltimore, Md.**

Name -----

Address -----

Please check your basis of participation in the Conference:

Individual-----

Representative of an organization-----

Organization-----

Total membership of organization-----

(Each organization is entitled to at least two delegates. Organizations having more than 100 members are entitled to one delegate for every additional 100 members.)

Registration Fee enclosed: 25c per delegate.

EXHIBIT No. 31

WRITERS CONGRESS—1943

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, L. A. CAMPUS, WESTWOOD. JOINT AUSPICES, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HOLLYWOOD WRITERS MOBILIZATION, FRIDAY, SATURDAY, SUNDAY, OCTOBER 1, 2, 3

WRITERS IN WARTIME

Writers face tremendous and urgent tasks in relation to the war. The spoken and written word and the image on the screen are of crucial importance in developing civilian and military morale, in bringing the promise of victory to the countries under Axis tyranny, in cementing the unity of the United Nations, in clarifying the conditions for a just and lasting peace. In this second year of the conflict, the effective use of word and image is vital to the winning of the war.

Believing that this places a direct responsibility on all writers, and seeking to find ways and means by which the writer can understand and fulfill his obligations, the University of California and the Hollywood Writers Mobilization will hold a Congress of professional writers for the achievement of the following purposes:

To analyze propaganda techniques as weapons of victory; to sharpen the creative skill of writers by pooling their creative experience and knowledge; to investigate the most effective use of new media of expression; to strengthen firm and continuous cultural understanding among the United Nations; to mobilize the entire writing profession in a program of action for the free world of tomorrow.

Opening session, Friday evening, 8:15 p. m., October 1, 1943

ROYCE HALL, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Welcome-----Robert G. Sproul, President, University of California
 Reading of message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt
 The Writers Congress-----Marc Connelly, Ralph Freud
 Robert Rossen, Chairman

GREETINGS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS

Thomas Baird-----Great Britain Yu Shan Han-----China
 Phyllis Bentley-----Great Britain Mikhail Kalatosov-----U. S. S. R.
 Nehemias Gueiros, Enrique de Lozada, Jose Ramos, Hernane Tavares de Sa,
 South America

SPEAKERS

Lieut. Col. Evans Carlson, United States Marine Corps
 Y. Frank Freeman, Motion Picture Producers Association
 Owen Lattimore, Office of War Information
 Col. Carlos Romulo, the Philippines
 Walter White, N. A. A. C. P.

GUESTS

James Cagney	Thomas Mann	Kenneth Thomson
Theodore Dreiser	Elliott Paul	Walter Wanger
D. D. Durr	Capt. Paul Perigord	Jack L. Warner
Lion Feuchtwanger	Calvin J. Smith	Col. Darryl F. Zanuck

A Cappella Choir—Director, Ray Moremen

Saturday Morning, 10 a. m. to 12:30 p. m., October 2, 1943

A panel discussion is a general sociological and psychological approach to a subject. A seminar treats the subject in relation to a specific, technical craft. Location of sessions will be posted at Royce Hall, Friday evening, October 1st.

SEMINARS

The feature film

First Session: Dore Schary, Chairman; Sidney Buchman; William Dozier; Talbot Jennings; Col. Darryl F. Zanuck.

Treatment of the war in motion pictures. Responsibilities, accomplishments, challenges to be met. Survey of war films made and to be made. Trends in the story market. Indications for the future.

Radio news and analysis

Fox Case, Chairman; Harry W. Flannery; Sam Hayes; Chet Huntley; Clinton Jones; Hubbard Keavy; Nelson Pringle; Wallace Sterling.

Methods employed in assembling, rewriting, and airing the news. An actual radio news program prepared and broadcast before the audience of the seminar.

The role of the press

First Session: John Cohee, Chairman; Alexander Kaun; Robert C. Miller. War coverage. The war correspondent. Covering the home front. The labor press. The future functioning of the press in the war effort.

Song writing in war

Arthur Schwartz, Chairman; Ira Gershwin; Oscar Hammerstein, II; E. Y. Harburg; Leo Robin; Earl Robinson.

The contribution of the song to the war effort. The role of the writer. Goals to reach.

Radio television

Lewis Allen Weiss, Chairman; Klaus Landsberg; Gilbert Seldes.

The challenge of a new medium. Present status. The transition period. The writer in relation to television. Technical and economic implications.

Humor and the war

A. S. Burrows; Carroll Carroll; Cornwall Jackson; Phil Leslie; Leonard Levinson; Sam Moore; Don Quinn; Frederic Rinaldo; Melville Shavelson. Humor in relation to the morale of the soldier and the civilian.

Saturday Afternoon, 2 to 5 p. m., October 2, 1943

PANELS

The nature of the enemy

John Wexley, Chairman; Lion Feuchtwanger; David Hanna; Mikhail Kalatsov; Dudley Nichols; Col. Carlos Romulo; Virginia Wright.

Treatment of the Enemy in films, books and radio. Survey and comparisons of Enemy types. The writer probes the Nazi "mind." How should Japan's racist political philosophy be treated by the writer? The key question: How closely are the German and Japanese people to be identified with their rulers?

The American scene

Robert Rossen, Chairman; Howard Estabrook; Franklin Fearing; James Felton; Bernard Gordon; Milton Merlin; Carleton F. Morse; Nat Wolff.

Tensions and dislocations at home. The family under constantly changing social and economic conditions. The psychological factors which underlie creative writing in relation to the home front.

Indoctrination and training film

Capt. Bernard Vorhaus, Chairman; Thomas Baird; Lt. Col. Owen Crump; Lt. Col. Evans Carlson; Maj. Harrison Jacobs; Lt. Com. J. C. Hutchinson.

The function of the training film. Reports on visual orientation courses. Showing of motion pictures exemplifying work of all branches of service.

Saturday Evening, 7:30 to 10:30 P. M., October 2, 1943

PANELS

Minority groups

Leonard Bloom, Chairman; Charlotta Bass; Carlos Bulosan; John Collier; Harry Hoijer; Carey McWilliams; Samuel Ornitz; Dalton Trumbo; Walter White.

Historical and scientific background of the minority problems . . . The writer's treatment of the question. The Negro: Case history of a minority group.

Pan-American affairs

Ralph Beals, Chairman; Nehemias Gueiros; Enrique de Lozada; Jose Ramos; Hernane Tavares de Sa.

Inter-American relations in their sociological, political, and economic aspects. Educational and linguistic problems defined and examined.

Propaganda analysis

John B. Hughes, Chairman; Lyman Bryson; Gordon Kahn; Paul Lazarsfeld; W. E. Oliver; Charles Seipmann; Frances Wilder.

Propaganda techniques in relation to the American scene . . . The writer's influence is strengthening the home front.

Problems of peace

Gordon S. Watkins, *Chairman*; Phyllis Bentley; Yu Shan Han; Vladimir Pozner; Robert Riskin.

Postwar internal planning. Postwar international cooperation . . . Cultural understanding among nations . . . The writer and his new audience.

Sunday Morning, 10 a. m. to 12:30 p. m., October 3, 1943

SEMINARS

Writers in exile

Phyllis Bentley, *Chairman*; Gustave Arlt; Lion Feuchtwanger; Thomas Mann; Alexis Minotis; Capt. Paul Perigord.

The exiled writer's relation to his home country. His creative and economic problems . . . His return to his home country in the postwar world.

The role of the press

Second Session; Hobart Montee; Morris Watson.

War coverage . . . The war correspondent . . . Covering the home front . . . The labor press . . . The future functioning of the press in the war effort.

Short-wave radio

Glan Heisch, *Chairman*; John Burton; E. T. Buck Harris; Lt. Col. Tom Lewis; Larry Rhine.

Short-wave radio programs for our troops abroad . . . Propaganda uses . . . Actual illustrations of psychological warfare broadcasts by radio Tokyo . . . and by U. S. stations.

The documentary film

Leo Hurwitz, *Chairman*; Thomas Baird; James Wong Howe; Joris Ivens; Kenneth Macgowan; Sgt. Ben Maddow; Arthur Mayer.

The morale film . . . Wartime documentaries in commercial theaters . . . Comparison of work accomplished in various United Nations.

Music and the war

Lou Cooper; Hanns Eisler; Gerald Strang.

Music as an integral element of film and radio . . . The demands placed upon music by the war.

Sunday Afternoon, 2 to 5 p. m., October 3, 1943

SEMINARS

The feature film

Second Session: Thomas Baird; Thomas Chapman; Jorge Delano, Sr.; Mikhail Kalatosov; Robert Rossen.

The United Nations. Speakers from the British and Russian film industries. A comparative survey. Concrete proposals for more effective screen writing in terms of content and technique.

The animated cartoon

Phil Eastman, John Hubley, Karl van Lueven.

The unique position of the animated cartoon among war films . . . New opportunities for the writer and for the artist . . . Social and educational aspects.

Creative radio

Paul Franklin, *Chairman*; Hector Chevigny, Norman Corwin, Randal MacDougall, Arch Oboler, Jack Runyon, Bernard Schoenfeld.

The radio dramatist in wartime . . . The commercial writer . . . Documentary radio . . . Evaluation of current tendencies . . . The future of creative radio writing.

Publicity and the war

Cecil Carl, *Chairman*.

The role of the motion picture publicist . . . Exploitation and advertising in the war effort.

*Sunday Evening, 7:30 to 10:30 p. m., October 3, 1943*CONCLUDING SESSION: ROYCE HALL—REPORTS FROM PANELS AND SEMINARS;
RESOLUTIONS—PROGRAM OF ACTION

(Meals will be served on the Campus at nominal prices)

COMMITTEES OF THE WRITERS CONGRESS

CO-CHAIRMEN

Marc Connelly; Ralph Freud

TREASURER

Francis Edwards Faragoh

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Gustave Arlt	Francis H. Harmon	Carl Sandburg
Sidney Buchman	John B. Hughes	Dore Schary
Fox Case	Joris Ivens	Arthur Schwartz
Marc Connelly	Stephen Longstreet	Robert G. Sproul
Jean Dalrymple	Alfred E. Longueil	Rex Stout
William Dozier	Kenneth Macgowan	Lamar Trotti
Charles Einfeld	Mary C. McCall, Jr.	Walter Wanger
Franklin Fearing	William Morris, Jr.	Jack L. Warner
Y. Frank Freeman	Dudley Nichols	Walter White
Ralph Freud	Mark Sandrich	Col. Darryl F. Zanuck

GENERAL COMMITTEE

Gustave Arlt	Howard Koch	Arch Oboler
Bill Blowitz	John Howard Lawson	W. E. Oliver
Richard Collins	Melvin Levy	H. R. Reynolds
Franklin Fearing	Alfred E. Longueil	Allen Rivkin
Paul Franklin	Milton Merlin	Robert Rossen
Sheridan Gibney	Josef Mischel	Zachary Schwartz
Talbot Jennings	Sam Moore	

Publicity direction, Vic Shapiro and staff; executive secretary, Jane Mead

COMMITTEES ON PANELS AND SEMINARS

<i>Minority groups</i>	<i>Propaganda analysis</i>	<i>Problems of peace—Con.</i>
Ring Lardner, Jr., Chair- man	Franklin Fearing, Chair- man	Sheridan Gibney
Charles Brackett	Ben Barzman	Richard Hocking
Edward Dymtryk	Sidney Carroll	Sgt. Bob Lee
Everett Freeman	John Houseman	Milton Merlin
Don Hartman	John B. Hughes	Hugh Miller
Harry Hoijer	Sidney James	W. E. Oliver
Robert Josephs	H. R. Reynolds	Caroline Pratt
Carey McWilliams	Cameron Shipp	Hans Reichenbach
David Robison	Frances Wilder	Paul Trivers
Frank Tuttle		<i>Pan-American affairs</i>
<i>Nature of the enemy</i>	<i>American scene</i>	Louis Solomon, Chairman
John Wexley, Chairman	Robert Rossen, Chairman	Irwin Braun
Frances Goodrich	Edward Chodorov	J. Robert Bren
Albert Hackett	Howard Estabrook	Enrique de Lozada
David Hertz	Franklin Fearing	Hernane Tavares de Sa
Dan James	F. Hugh Herbert	Gerald Smith
Ennmett Lavery	<i>Problems of peace</i>	Guy Endore
Stephen Longstreet	Melvin Levy, Chairman	Manuel Gonzales
Marva Ross	Bill Blowitz	Jackson Leichter
Allan Scott	George Corey	Kenneth Macgowan
		Joan Madison

COMMITTEES ON PANELS AND SEMINARS—continued

<i>Pan-American affairs—</i> Continued	<i>Creative radio—Con.</i>	<i>Humor and the war—Con.</i>
H. R. Reynolds	Sam Moore	Melvin Frank
Allen Rivkin	Wendell Williams	Leonard Levinson
Waldo Salt	<i>Radio news and analysis</i>	Phil Leslie
Leo Townsend	Fox Case, Chairman	Sam Moore
Marion Zeitlin	<i>Radio shortwave</i>	Norman Panama
<i>Feature film</i>	Glan Heisch, Chairman	Don Quinn
Richard Collins, Chair-	Georgia Backus	Frederic Rinaldo
man	<i>Publicity and war</i>	Fred Saidy
William Dozier	Tom Alfred	Melville Shavelson
Talbot Jennings	Bill Blowitz	<i>Arrangements</i>
Fay Kanin	Cecil Carle	Francis Edwards Fara-
Michael Kanin	Lou Harris	goh, Chairman
Howard Koch	<i>Role of press</i>	Milton Merlin, Vice-
Dudley Nichols	II. R. Reynolds, Chairman	Chairman
Maurice Rapf	Charles Cosgrove	Gustav Arlt
Meta Reis	Donald MacDonald	Fox Case
Dore Scharly	John Maloney	Franklin Fearing
Lamar Trotti	W. E. Oliver	Ralph Freud
<i>Documentary film</i>	Robert Tonge	Fred Grable
Joris Ivens, Chairman	<i>Writers in exile</i>	Hy Kraft
Bernard Gordon	Josef Mischel, Chairman	John Howard Lawson
Ian Hunter	Gustave Arlt	Stephen Longstreet
Jay Leyda	Kurt Neumann	Alfred E. Longueil
<i>Training films</i>	<i>Song writing in war</i>	Melvin Levy
Capt. Bernard Vorhaus,	Earl Robinson, Chairman	Mrs. Robert Rossen
Chairman	Leo Robin	Herman Rotsten
Lt. Commander J. C. Hut-	Arthur Schwartz	Adrian Scott
chinson	<i>Music and the war</i>	Jack Stanley
Major Harrison Jacobs	Carroll Hollister, Chair-	Mrs. William Wyler
Lt. Fanning Hearon	man	<i>Publicity</i>
Sgt. Stanley Rubin	Mischa Altman	Bill Blowitz
Corp. Alex Greenberg	Florence Byrens	John Clark
Henry Blankfort, Jr.	Sol Kaplan	John Flinn
Edgar Peterson	Gale Kubik	Chandler Harris
<i>Animated cartoon</i>	Lydia Marcus	Jerry Hoffman
Zachary Schwartz, Chair-	Earl Robinson	Leonard Neubauer
man	Gerald Strang	George Thomas, Jr.
Graham Heid	Cyril Towbin	<i>Tickets</i>
Winston Hibler	<i>Humor and the war</i>	Jane Murfin, Chairman
Sgt. John Hubley	Stanley Roberts, Chair-	Harold Buchman
William King	man	Earl Felton
Karl Van Leuven	A. S. Burrows	Robert E. Kent
Norman Wright	Julius Epstein	Lewis Meltzer
<i>Creative radio</i>		Ann Roth Morgan
Arch Oboler, Chairman		Frank Partos
Bernard Schoenfeld		Marguerite Roberts
		Stanley Roberts
		Richard Weil

GUILDS PARTICIPATING IN THE HOLLYWOOD WRITERS MOBILIZATION

Robert Rossen, Chairman
 Paul Franklin, Vice Chairman
 Pauline Lauber Finn, Executive Secretary

Screen Writers Guild
 Radio Writers Guild
 Screen Publicists Guild
 Screen Readers Guild

Screen Cartoonists Guild
 American Newspaper Guild
 Independent Publicists Assn.
 Song Writers Protective Association

1655 NORTH CHEROKEE, HOLLYWOOD 28, CALIFORNIA

EXHIBIT No. 32

SENATOR MCCARTHY'S STATEMENT ON GUSTAVO DURAN

The Committee will recall that the name of Gustavo Duran was first mentioned by me as a possible bad security risk in a speech which I made in Reno, Nevada.

At that time I said: "Now, let's see what happens when individuals with Communist connections are forced out of the State Department. Gustavo Duran, who was labeled as (I quote) 'a notorious international Communist,' was made assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American Affairs. He was taken into the State Department from his job as a lieutenant colonel in the Communist International Brigade. Finally, after intense congressional pressure and criticism, he resigned in 1946 from the State Department—and ladies and gentlemen, where do you think he is now? He took over a high-salaried job as Chief of Cultural Activities Section in the Office of the Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations."

This statement was promptly ridiculed by the Secretary of State who—through Mr. Penrifo—merely said that this man Duran was no longer an employee of the State Department, but had been in the auxiliary foreign service from January 1943 until September 1945, and thereafter until October 4, 1946, in the Department. Mr. Penrifo added that Duran had voluntarily resigned from the State Department on October 4, 1946.

One of the important facts that the Secretary overlooked in making this press release is that this man is still, as of today, a high salaried official in the United Nations. On March 8th my office phoned the office of Trygve Lie to find out exactly what type of work he was doing. My office was advised that information could not be given to me. The State Department advised me that Duran is now Chief of the Cultural Activities Section of the Department of Social Affairs, United Nations.

I was surprised to find that the Permanent Secretary of the United Nations felt he could not give to a United States Senator the information as to what this man was doing. However, since that time I have had the matter checked in New York and am informed he is actually with the International Refugee Organization, engaged in work having to do with screening refugees coming into this country. The financial contribution which the United States makes toward the running of this United Nations' agency amount to 45.57 percent. (Senate Report 1274, 81st Congress, 2d Session, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, prepared by Subcommittee on Relations with International Organizations.)

At the time that Acheson's man attempted to ridicule my statement, he either did not know the facts in the case or he was covering up the information which is in the files and which should have been known to him.

This information, which I shall document for the committee, was known or was available to the State Department. It shows that Duran was (1) well-known for his rabid Communist beliefs and activities, (2) that he was active in secret Soviet operations in the Spanish Republican Army, (3) that a highly confidential report was sent to the State Department by the Military Attaché at the American Embassy in Madrid which according to all existing rules called for Duran's immediate dismissal—unless the facts were proven to be wrong. Originally, I understand it was claimed that this was a case of mistaken identity. That claim, I believe, has been subsequently dropped in view of the fact that our intelligence produced pictures of him in the uniform that he wore at the time he was the regional head of SIM, which was the Spanish Counterpart of the Russian NKVD or OGPU. I now hand the committee one of those pictures.

At the time this intelligence report reached the State Department, Duran was a highly placed official in a confidential capacity with the State Department in South America.

When the American people read the carefully prepared statement put out by the Secretary of State's office in regard to the Duran statement, they were entitled to rely upon it as being the truth. Unfortunately, anyone who believed that statement got a completely erroneous impression of the actual facts.

Whichever way you wish to interpret this situation I submit to the Committee that it is typical of the carelessness of the top executives of the State Department of this country. The situation I have just discussed is typical of the type of news releases emanating from the State Department; it is typical of the half truths we hear in answer to the information which I have been developing in regard to the bad security risks in that Department.

I now submit to the committee the Intelligence Report just referred to in its entirety. It will be noted the State Department received a copy of it. There are certain matters discussed in this report which I do not feel should be made public until the committee has had a chance to thoroughly look into them. I have, therefore, deleted these sections from the copies being handed to the press and will not read them into the record at this time. The entire report, however, with nothing deleted is being handed to each of the members of the committee.

B. I. D. No. 7232.

Report No. R-290/46.

CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT FOR GENERAL USE BY ANY U. S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

JUNE 4, 1946.

From: Military Attaché, American Embassy, Madrid, Spain.

Source: Spanish Army Central General Staff. B-3.

Area Reported On: Spain.

Who's Who: Gustavo DURAN.

Following is the report given the Military Attaché by the A. C. of S., G-2, Spanish Central General Staff. After the M/A asked whether DURAN was known:

1. "Gustavo DURAN came to Madrid for the first time in the nineteen twenties from the Canary Island, in the company of another Canarian, a painter called Nestor, who was registered by the Spanish police for the same reasons as Duran * * *. As a friend of Nester, Gustavo Duran became employed as a pianist in the company of Antonia Merce the 'Argentinita' and went to Berlin to participate in that capacity in dance shows. However, his * * * caused him to incur the fury of the Berlin police, which finally ousted him from Germany.

2. "Similar trouble happened to him in other European capitals. His * * * grew to the limit in Paris, which was the preferred center for his activities some years before the advent of the Spanish Republic in 1931, while he was under the protection of his friend Nestor, the painter, who was well known in certain Parisian quarters. About that time the Soviets entrusted Gustavo Duran with some missions and finally appointed him their agent.

3. "Upon the proclamation of the Spanish Republic, the 'Porcelana' (as he was nicknamed) returned to Madrid. His identity papers indicated that he was the representative of the Paramount Film Co. However, his true mission was service of the GPU. Duran was greatly successful in his activities due to the political protection he enjoyed. He soon became one of the leading members of the Youths of the Communist Party and greatly contributed to the merger of the Communist Youths with the youths of the Spanish Labor Party, thus giving birth to the JSU ('Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas'—United Socialist Youths), of fateful remembrance, since this organization committed the most cold-blooded crimes before 18 July 1936 (date of the military uprising) and during the Red revolution which ensued.

4. "During the republican regime (1931-1936) Duran continued practising his * * *. Together with other 'close' friends of his and some young pro-Communist poets, among whom Alberty was noted, Duran succeeded in becoming notorious. All them were his tools and all them were made into active Communists. In Duran's home located * * *, such meetings took place that the police had to interfere frequently, thus giving occasion to complete his record as * * * in the files of the General Directorate of Security. This record as * * * was probably removed by his friend Serrano Poncela, who was the Chief of the 'Red' Police during the months of October and November 1936 in Madrid and political reporter of 'Mundo Obrero' (a Communist newspaper) and Chief of the JSU Duran's release from his frequent imprisonments for * * * conduct was due to his powerful political protectors, who blindly obeyed orders from the Soviet political police.

5. "Upon the national uprising (beginning of Civil War) Gustavo Duran took over the nearest convent to his house, called 'las Siervas de Maria,' located at the old Chamberi Plaza. He was there the 'responsable', or chief. He was afflicted there with typhoid fever during the month of August 1936.

The "Cause General" (General Judicial Proceedings) has information about the crimes perpetrated by the militia under the command of Duran's "chocho" (illegal prison). He was one of the principal leaders of the popular militia created by the Communists. He was a personal friend of Lister and Modesto (commanders of Red brigades, now Generals in the Russian Army) and soon

became captain, major and lieutenant colonel of the "Red" Army. He belonged to the General staff of the "Red" forces which directed the "brilliant" withdrawals of Talavera de la Reina, Maqueda, Toledo, etc.

6. "When the international brigades were brought into the Madrid and Aranjuez fronts, Gustavo Duran formed part of the High Russian General Staff, with headquarters at Tarancon and its vicinity, where they left sad and hideous recollections.

7. "After Tarancon we (the Spanish Intelligence Service) lost track of Duran. It appears that he went to Moscow with a delegation of male and female members of the "Red" Army. It appears that later he was for some time in Paris.

8. "And now he is in Washington as a collaborator of Spruille Braden, Chief of a Section of the State Department."

9. M. A. Comment: A very reliable Spaniard who is anti-Franco in sympathies but is middle of the road republican and extremely pro-U. S. and democratic in his views states that he knows personally that DURAN as commander officer of an international brigade in a small town not far from Madrid ordered the execution of the town electrician and another man who was a mason, neither of whom has committed any act for which they should have suffered this execution.

1332 WENDELL G. JOHNSON,
Colonel, G. S. C., Military Attaché.

The Honorable Kenneth S. Wherry wrote to the State Department on August 2, 1946, demanding the immediate discharge of Duran. I now submit this letter:

AUGUST 2, 1946.

The Honorable JAMES F. BYRNES,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SECRETARY: As a member of the Appropriation Committee, on April 18, 1946, I asked for investigation of certain persons holding positions of trust and responsibility in your Department.

It was my purpose then and is now to withhold appropriations that finance the salaries and activities of anyone in the State Department whose allegiance apparently is to some other country rather than to the United States.

You will recall, Mr. Secretary, that when you appeared I questioned you about some of these officials and among them was a Gustavo Duran. This was just prior to the Carter Glass funeral. At that time you stated there was a question of identity of Gustavo Duran. You stated further an investigation had revealed that he was some other person than the man in the State Department, who has been an assistant to Spruille Braden.

It has now come to my knowledge there exists an extensively military intelligence report on this man, Gustavo Duran, and I am reliably informed that several copies of this report have been delivered to the State Department.

I am now making this formal request upon you in my official capacity as a United States Senator, and as a member of the State Department Subcommittee on Appropriations, that on the basis of this report you immediately discharge Gustavo Duran.

Cordially yours,

KENNETH S. WHERRY.

KSW: emm

After Senator Wherry wrote this letter to the State Department, demanding the immediate discharge of Duran, he received on September 14, 1946, the following letter from Mr. Donald Russell, the Assistant Secretary of State.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, September 14, 1946.

The Honorable KENNETH S. WHERRY,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I am in receipt of your recent inquiry about the security investigation by the Department of Mr. Gustavo Duran. As you know, the Department has a Security Committee which confines itself to reviewing security investigations and to making recommendations based thereon. Of course, this committee has nothing to do with reviewing the qualifications or competency of the person reviewed for a position in the Department other than as security is involved. I have added this because from our conversation I would assume that you seriously question the qualifications of Mr. Duran for employment, as distinguished from security consideration. That phase of Mr. Duran's employment is not within the scope of the Security Committee.

After reviewing the entire record on Mr. Duran as procured from all available sources, the Security Committee recommended favorably on Mr. Duran. I have carefully gone over the record before the Security Committee and I have approved their recommendation.

While I recognize that the above conclusions are at variance with your own feelings, I have to do my duty as I see it and I hope that you will recognize that I have attempted to exercise my judgment faithfully and honestly.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

(S) DONALD RUSSELL.

When Mr. Russell wrote this letter on September 14, 1946, he had in his files the top secret report from the Military Attaché in Madrid, which I have already referred to, outlining in detail the facts I have given on Duran.

What was the mysterious power in the possession of Duran that enabled him to continue to serve as a confidential assistant to Spruille Braden, the then head of the State Department's South American affairs?

Why was this man permitted voluntarily to resign in the face of these grave charges?

Mr. Duran obviously had powerful friends and one of his greatest champions was his immediate chief, Spruille Braden.

I now show the Committee a copy of a letter marked "secret" and dated December 21, 1943, in Havana.

HABANA, December 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ

Mr. Gustavo Duran was recommended to me in the first instance by a friend of unimpeachable patriotism and integrity. He was recommended for a specific objective requiring a person of highly specialized qualifications; his duties were to be concerned with protecting United States interests through confidential surveillance over Falangist activities in Cuba.

As to Mr. Duran's background, he is a naturalized American citizen born and educated in Spain. He is of good family, and in his youth was particularly interested in the arts. When the Spanish Civil War began in July 1936, he gave up everything to fight on the side of the Loyalists and from a somewhat dilettante but brilliant young man, turned into a vital force for the Republican cause. His military record was reportedly brilliant. He was further described to me as being a man whose hatred for the Fascists, and his deep devotion to liberal principles, are not open to debate. A close association with him during a period of over a year fully support this description.

Mr. Duran arrived in Habana in November 1942 on the payroll of the Pan American Union and was to transfer to the staff of the CIAA on February 1, 1943. Instead, I urgently recommended his employment as an Auxiliary Foreign Service Office in a telegram from which I quote the following:

"I regard Duran as eminently qualified for the work he is performing and I have the highest estimation for his intelligence and character as well as for his complete loyalty and discretion. He has already proven of very great value to this Embassy and I anticipate that his usefulness will increase as he becomes more familiar with conditions in Cuba. I consider that his continuance here is particularly desirable at the present time when our relations with Spain are of such vital importance."

Mr. Duran has now served as one of my immediate associates for more than a year. His work has been excellent and outstandingly useful to the United States Government. From my personal knowledge based on close association, Mr. Duran is not a Communist but a liberal of the highest type. I consider him an unusually worthy, patriotic, and honorable American citizen, who shows great promise as a United States Government official capable of high responsibility.

SPRUILLE BRADEN.

Mr. Braden describes Mr. Duran as one recommended to him by a friend of unimpeachable integrity.

He set forth in his letter that Duran was a naturalized citizen, born and educated in Spain, of good family and in his youth was particularly "interested in the arts." Braden said that from 1936 Duran gave up everything to fight

on the side of the Spanish Loyalists and said he "urgently recommended his employment as an Auxiliary Foreign Service officer."

Following Senator Wherry's letter to the State Department of August 1946, in which the Senator maintained that this man was such a bad security risk that he should be discharged, we find that he was permitted to resign on October 4, 1946.

In view of the grave charges made by Senator Wherry and the unusual attitude of the State Department in permitting this man's resignation, it would be interesting to know what, if any, investigation was made by State Department officials as to his conduct while in a responsible, confidential capacity in the Department.

But Duran's friends in the State Department did not turn their backs on him.

After his resignation, Duran almost immediately was employed as a representative of the International Refugee Organization of the United Nations. He was employed there as of yesterday.

I have received a confidential report that Duran was recommended for his UN position by a member of the present Presidential Cabinet. It has also been reported to me that Duran is the brother-in-law of Michael Straight, the owner and publisher of a pro-Communist magazine called the New Republic.

Here again it is certainly pertinent to inquire where this man got his power, what he did while in the State Department, and possibly, of equal importance, is what he did not do.

To complete this picture, I attach hereto copies of the following documents:

(1) Report from Edward J. Ruff, Assistant U. S. Military Attaché in the Dominican Republic, addressed to the American Intelligence Service dated December 30, 1943.

(2) Excerpt from the book, Why and How I Left Defense Ministry in the Intrigue of Russia in Spain, by Idalicio Prieto, former Minister of Defense for the Spanish Republican cause.

(3) A list of reference material for the committee's use in further checking into the background and activities of this man who is now with IRO, screening refugees coming into the United States.

DECEMBER 30, 1943.

REPORT FROM EDWARD J. RUFF, ASSISTANT U. S. MILITARY ATTACHÉ IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ADDRESSED TO THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

I want to take this opportunity to clarify my position in connection with Report No. 428, dated 13 December 1943, subject: Gustavo DURAN. Alleged Communist Employee of the CIAA, Havana. As you know, this office received a cable from the Military Attaché, Havana, requesting that dissemination of this report to be held up on the grounds that it was "absolutely incorrect." A few days ago we received letter No. 7967 from Lt. Col. Brown, written by Ambassador Braden concerning this individual. Both these communications corroborated information which we had regarding Duran and I cannot see on the basis of their reports how our report can be branded as "absolutely incorrect." Our only statement in the report on Duran is that he was a member of the Communist Party in Spain. From further reports received, this information can now be evaluated as A-1. For your own knowledge, the information on Duran was submitted by a Spanish refugee who also served as a Lt. Colonel in the Spanish Republican Army and had served on Duran's promotion board in Spain, which board was charged with considering recommendations for promotion of Spanish Republican Officers. As our source was actually sitting on the Board at the time that Duran's recommendation for promotion came through, he himself saw all Duran's papers and letters of recommendation, and had access to complete information regarding Duran's background.

He states, dogmatically, that the records showed Duran to be a member of the Spanish Communist Party. Our source had previously made available to us the information agreeing with that sent to us by Military Attaché, Havana, except the statement that Duran entered the Army as a private. According to our Agent, Duran was commissioned directly from civilian life and given the rank of Major in the Militia. Later when the Militia became part of the Spanish Republican Army, he was made a Major in the Army. The only additional information we had, and which we did not mention in the report as it was not believed pertinent, was the reported fact that Duran is a homosexual. I do not question Duran's interest in the arts, his culture, or intelligence. However, we

only stated in our report that Duran was a member of the Communist Party, and that we did not know whether he is still a member of the Communist Party. I, myself, am convinced that Duran was a Communist and consider Ambassador Barden's statement that he is a "liberal of the highest type" to be a euphemism. Under the circumstances, I believed the reliability of our report still remains as originally submitted.

The Ambassador here is inclined to concur in my report on Duran, but has asked that no further official correspondence on the subject be sent up. Hence this personal letter from me.

Sincerely,

EDWARD J. RUFF,

1st Lt., A. G. D., Assistant Military Attaché.

EXCERPT FROM THE BOOK, WHY AND HOW I LEFT DEFENSE MINISTRY IN THE INTRIGUE OF RUSSIA IN SPAIN, BY INDALICIO PRIETO, FORMER MINISTER OF DEFENSE FOR THE SPANISH REPUBLIC CAUSE

It is true that I have had certain incidents with the Russians. Certain Russian technicians proposed to me in Valencia, that a service of Military Investigations should be created. This was the Spanish counterpart of the NKVD. I confess that I opposed the project. But because of insistent pressure, I created the SIM. I was especially concerned with choosing a chief, until I gave it to an intimate friend of mine, who had just come from France, where he was with his family. In entrusting him with the task, I gave him these instructions:

"You are going to form the SIM, carefully, with elements of all groups of the Popular Front. Your only charges will be these two: Do not permit the new organization to be converted into an instrument of the Communists and do not permit Russian technicians to gain control. Listen to the advice of these technicians and follow their orientations, which can be very useful to you, but control must always be in your hands and in that of the Government, and of no one else."

I showed little tact in the selection of that comrade. A Republican named Sayagues came in fact to be the chief of SIM. Regional chiefs of the SIM were designated and they proposed to me a certain Gustavo Duran for the Madrid zone. It was not concealed from me that the person proposed was a Communist (Duran). I knew this, but in spite of that, he was appointed by me. In the decree creating the SIM of August 1937—a decree which I myself drew up, because I did not wish to follow in a slavish manner the project which was handed me—there is an article by virtue of which the appointment of all agents of the SIM rests exclusive with the Minister of National Defense. This was a guarantee which temporarily I wish to establish. No one could be an agent of the SIM who was not in possession of the memorandum book which bore duplicate the signature of the minister. Duran having been appointed chief of the demarcation of the army of the center, of his own accord and without power to do so, appointed the agents who were under his orders, which to the number of some hundreds, were Communists and only four or five were Socialists. I faced an intolerable situation, wherefore alleging, and with reason, that I lacked commanders in the army. I ordered that all military chiefs who were not in particular positions in the army should return to their former positions and thus Major Duran had to return to his military function. Because of Duran's leaving the SIM I received a visit from a Russian technician, of these services, who said to me:

"RUSSIAN AGENT. I have come to speak to you about the dismissal of Duran. What happened?"

"PRIETO. Nothing special, I lacked commanders in the army and ordered Duran to return to it.

"RUSSIAN AGENT. No. You discharged him because he appointed Communists as agents in Madrid.

"PRIETO. That is also sufficient reason, because Duran absolutely lacked authority to make appointments.

"RUSSIAN AGENT. Why did he not have the power to appoint agents?"

"PRIETO. Because by virtue of the decree creating the SIM that power is reserved exclusively to the Minister."

I read the decree and before the evidence of my statement my visitor alleged:

"RUSSIAN AGENT. Duran could make temporary appointments.

"PRIETO. Neither actual nor temporary. Here in Spain, moreover, the temporary is converted into the definitive.

"RUSSIAN AGENT. Be that as it may, I come to ask you to immediately restore Major Duran as chief of the SIM in Madrid.

"PRIETO. I am very sorry, but I cannot consent.

"RUSSIAN AGENT. If you do not restore Duran, my relations with you are broken.

"PRIETO. I am sorry, but Major Duran will go to the front of his division and will not return to the SIM. Your attitude is unjustified and I cannot yield to it." I did not yield as a matter of fact, and my relations with the Russian technician, through his own wish, were absolutely cut off. I have not seen him since that scene.

EXHIBIT No. 33

HABANA, December 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ

Mr. Gustavo Duran was recommended to me in the first instance by a friend of unimpeachable patriotism and integrity. He was recommended for a specific objective requiring a person of highly specialized qualifications; his duties were to be concerned with protecting United States interests through confidential surveillance over Falangist activities in Cuba.

As to Mr. Duran's background, he is a naturalized American citizen, born and educated in Spain. He is of good family, and in his youth was particularly interested in the arts. When the Spanish Civil War began in July 1936, he gave up everything to fight on the side of the Loyalists, and from a somewhat dilettante but brilliant young man, turned into a vital force for the Republican cause. His military record was reportedly brilliant. He was further described to me as being a man whose hatred for the Fascists, and his deep devotion to liberal principles, are not open to debate. A close association with him during a period of over a year fully supports this description.

Mr. Duran arrived in Habana in November 1942 on the payroll of the Pan American Union and was to transfer to the staff of the C. I. A. A. on February 1, 1943. Instead, I urgently recommended his employment as an Auxiliary Foreign Service Officer in a telegram from which I quote the following:

"I regard Duran as eminently qualified for the work he is performing and I have the highest estimation for his intelligence and character as well as for his complete loyalty and discretion. He has already proven of very great value to this Embassy and I anticipate that his usefulness will increase as he becomes more familiar with conditions in Cuba. I consider that his continuance here is particularly desirable at the present time when our relations with Spain are of such vital importance."

Mr. Duran has now served as one of my immediate assistants for more than a year. His work has been excellent and outstandingly useful to the United States Government. From my personal knowledge based on close association, Mr. Duran is not a Communist but a liberal of the highest type. I consider him an unusually worthy, patriotic and honorable American citizen, who shows great promise as a United States Government official capable of high responsibility.

SPRUILLE BRADEN.

EXHIBIT No. 34

DECEMBER 30, 1943.

REPORT FROM EDWARD J. RUFF, ASSISTANT U. S. MILITARY ATTACHÉ IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ADDRESSED TO THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

I want to take this opportunity to clarify my position in connection with Report No. 428, dated 13 December 1943, subject: GUSTAVO DURAN, Alleged Communist Employee of the CIAA, Havana. As you know, this officer received a cable from the Military Attaché, Havana, requesting that disseminations of this report be held up on the grounds that it was "absolutely incorrect." A few days ago we received letter No. 7967 from Lt. Col. Brown, written by Ambassador Braden concerning this individual. Both these communications corroborated

information which we had regarding Duran and I cannot see on the basis of their reports how our report can be branded as "absolutely incorrect." Our only statement in the report on Duran is that he was a member of the Communist Party in Spain. From further reports received, this information can now be evaluated as A-1. For your own knowledge, the information on Duran was submitted by a Spanish refugee who also served as a Lt. Colonel in the Spanish Republican Army and had served on Duran's promotion board in Spain, which board was charged with considering recommendations for promotion of Spanish Republican Officers. As our source was actually sitting on the board at the time that Duran's recommendation for promotion came through, he himself saw all Duran's papers and letters of recommendation, and had access to complete information regarding Duran's background.

He states, dogmatically, that the records showed Duran to be a member of the Spanish Communist Party. Our source had previously made available to us the information agreeing with that sent to us by Military Attaché, Havana, except the statement that Duran entered the Army as a private. According to our Agent, Duran was commissioned directly from civilian life and given the rank of Major in the Militia. Later when the Militia became part of the Spanish Republican Army, he was made a Major in the Army. The only additional information we had, and which we did not mention in the report as it was not believed pertinent, was the reported fact that Duran is a homosexual. I do not question Duran's interest in the arts, his culture, or intelligence. However, we only stated in our report that Duran was a member of the Communist Party, and that we did not know whether he is still a member of the Communist Party. I, myself, am convinced that Duran was a Communist and consider Ambassador Braden's statement that he is a "liberal of the highest type" to be a euphemism. Under the circumstances, I believed the reliability of our report still remains as originally submitted.

The Ambassador here is inclined to concur in my report on Duran, but has asked that no further official correspondence on the subject be sent up. Hence this personal letter from me.

Sincerely,

EDWARD J. RUFF,
1st Lt., A. G. D., Assistant Military Attaché.

EXHIBIT 35

SENATOR MCCARTHY'S STATEMENT ON JOHN STEWART SERVICE

This case is that of John Stewart Service.

This man is a foreign service officer of the Department of State and at the moment is in Calcutta, India, where he is helping determine the all-important policy of our Government toward India.

The name of John Stewart Service is not new to the men in the Government who must pass on a governmental employee's fitness as a security risk.

When Mr. Peurifoy testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee, he said that Service had been cleared four different times.

It is my understanding that the number has now risen to five and I earnestly request that this committee ascertain immediately if Service was not considered as a bad security risk by the Loyalty Appeal Board of the Civil Service Commission, in a post-audit decision, handed down on March 3 of this year.

I understand that this board returned the file of Mr. Service to the State Department with the report that they did not feel that they could give him clearance and requested that a new board be appointed for the consideration of this case.

To indicate to the committee the importance of this man's position as a security risk to the Government, I think it should be noted that he is one of the dozen top policy makers in the entire Department of State on Far Eastern policy.

He is one of the small, potent group of "untouchables" who year after year formulate and carry out the plans for the Department of State and its dealings with foreign nations; particularly, those in the Far East.

The Communist affiliations of Service are well known.

His background is crystal clear.

He was a friend and associate of Frederick Vanderbilt Field, the Communist Chairman of the Editorial Board of the infamous *Amerasia*.

Half of the Editorial Board of this magazine were pro-Communist members of the State Department and the committee is in possession of these names.

On June 6, 1945, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, after an exceedingly painstaking and careful investigation covering months, arrested Philip J. Jaffe, Kate Louise Mitchell, editor and coeditor of Amerasia, Andrew Roth, a lieutenant in the United States Naval Reserve stationed in Washington; Emanuel Sigurd Larsen and John Stewart Service, who were employees of the State Department (this is the same John S. Service to whom I have just referred and who is presently representing the State Department in Calcutta, India); Mark Julius Gayn, a magazine writer of New York City, who is about to leave for Russia. They were arrested on charges of espionage in connection with the theft of the following Government records:

360 classified documents from the State Department, including some top secret and confidential classification;

163 prepared by ONI.

42 prepared by MID.

58 prepared by OWI.

9 from the files of the War Department.

Some of the important documents picked up by the FBI at the time of the arrest were as follows:

First: One document marked "secret" and obviously originating in the Navy Department dealt with the schedule and targets for the bombing of Japan. This particular document was known to be in the possession of Phillip Jaffe, one of the defendants, during the early spring of 1945 and before the program had been effected. That information in the hands of our enemies could have cost us many precious American lives.

Second: Another document, also marked "top secret" and likewise originating in the Navy Department, dealt with the disposition of the Japanese Fleet subsequent to the major naval battle of October 1944, and gave the location and class of each Japanese warship. What conceivable reason or excuse could there be for these people, or anyone else without authority to have that information in their possession and at the same time claim freedom of the press? That was the excuse they offered. They stole this document for no good purpose.

Third: Another document stolen from the Office of Postal and Telegraph Censorship, was a secret report on the Far East and so stamped as to leave no doubt in anybody's mind that the mere possession of it by an unauthorized person was a clear violation of the Espionage Act. This was not an antiquated paper but of current and vital interest to our Government and the Nation's welfare.

Fourth: Another document stolen was from the Office of Military Intelligence and consisted of 22 pages containing information obtained from Japanese prisoners of war.

Fifth: Another stolen document, particularly illuminating and of present great importance to our policy in China, was a lengthy detailed report showing complete disposition of the units in the army of Chiang Kai-shek, where located, how placed, under whose command, naming the units, division by division, and showing their military strength.

Many of the stolen documents bear an imprint which reads as follows:

"This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 United States Code 31-32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

Despite the very small circulation of 1,700 copies of this magazine it had a large photocopying department. According to Congressman Dondero, who sponsored the resolution for the investigation of the grand jury, this department was working through the night, in the small hours of morning, and even on Sundays. It could reproduce the stolen documents—and undoubtedly did—and distribute them into channels to serve subversive purposes, even into clenched fists raised to destroy our Government.

In June 1944 Amerasia commenced attacks upon Joseph C. Grew, who had during his stay in the State Department rather vigorously opposed the clique which favored scuttling Chiang Kai-shek and allowing the Communist element in China to take over.

Larsen, one of the codefendants in this case subsequently wrote a lengthy report on this matter. I would like to quote briefly from parts of that report:

"Behind the now famous State Department Espionage Case, involving the arrest of six persons of whom I was one, an arrest which shocked the Nation on

June 7, 1945, is the story of a highly organized campaign to switch American policy in the Far East from its long tested course to the Soviet line. It is a story which has never been told before in full. Many sensational though little explained developments, such as the General Stilwell Affair, the resignation of Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew and Ambassador Patrick Hurley and the emergence of a pro-Soviet bloc in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, are interlaced with the Case of the Six, as the episode became known. * * *

"It is the mysterious whitewash of the chief actors of the Espionage Case which the Congress has directed the Hobbs committee to investigate. But from behind that whitewash there emerges the pattern of a major operation performed upon Uncle Sam without his being conscious of it. That operation vitally affects our main ramparts in the Pacific. In consequence of this operation General Marshall was sent on a foredoomed mission to China designed to promote Soviet expansion on our Asiatic frontier. It was a mission which could not but come to grief and which may yet bring untold sorrow to the American people.

"How did it happen that the United States began to turn in 1944 upon its loyal ally, the Chiang Kai-shek Government, which had for 7 years fought Japan, and to assume the sponsorship of the rebel Communist regime which collaborated with the Japanese during the period of the Stalin-Hitler Pact? How did it come to pass that Washington since 1944 has been seeking to foist Communist members upon the sole recognized and legitimate government of China, a maneuver equivalent to an attempt by a powerful China to introduce Earl Browder and William Z. Foster into key positions in the United States Government? How did it transpire that our top-ranking military leader, General Marshall, should have promoted an agreement in China under which American officers would be training and equipping rebel Chinese Communist units at the very time when they were ambushing our marines and when Communists the world over were waging a war of nerves upon the United States?

"Whose was the hand which forced the sensational resignation of Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew and his replacement by Dean Acheson? And was the same hand responsible for driving Ambassador Patrick Hurley into a blind alley and retirement?"

In describing the arrest, Larsen had this to say about his arrival at the office of the United States Commissioner:

"There I found myself sitting next to John Stewart Service, a leading figure in the pro-Soviet group in the China Section of the State Department, and to Lieutenant Andrew Roth, liaison officer between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the State Department, whom I also knew as an adherent of pro-Soviet policies. Both of them were arrested separately the same night in Washington."

Larsen then goes on to describe John Stewart Service, John P. Davies, Jr., and John Carter Vincent as the pro-Soviet group in the China Section whose views were reflected by Amerasia and whose members were in close touch with Jaffe and Roth. In connection with this, it will be remembered that John Service, as Stilwell's political adviser, accompanied a highly secret military mission to Yenan. Upon the return of this mission, you will recall that Stilwell demanded that Chiang Kai-shek allow him to equip and arm some 300,000 Communists. Chiang Kai-shek objected on the grounds that this was part of a Soviet plot to build up the rebel forces to the extent that they would control China. Chiang Kai-shek promptly requested the recall of Stilwell and President Roosevelt relieved Stilwell of his command. It was at this time that Service submitted his Report No. 40 to the State Department, which, according to Hurley, was a plan for the removal of support from the Chiang-Kai-shek government with the end result that the Communists would take over.

The espionage cases apparently had their origin when a British Intelligence Unit called attention to material being published in Amerasia which was embarrassing its investigations.

Preliminary investigations conducted at that time by OSS disclosed classified State Department material in the possession of Jaffe and Mitchell. The FBI then took over and reported that in the course of its quest it was found that John Stewart Service was in communication from China with Jaffe. The substance of some of Service's confidential messages to the State Department reached the offices of Amerasia in New York before they arrived in Washington. One of the papers found in Jaffe's possession was Document # 58, one of Service's secret reports entitled: "Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek—Decline of his Prestige and Criticism of and Opposition to his Leadership."

In the course of the FBI investigation Amerasia was revealed as the center of a group of active enthusiastic Communists or fellow travelers. To give you a

better picture of Amerasia, it perhaps should be mentioned here that Owen Lattimore was formerly an editor of Amerasia, and Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a writer for the Daily Worker, was the magazine head. Mr. Jaffe incidentally was naturalized in 1923 and served as a contributing editor of the Defender, a monthly magazine of International Labor Defense, a Communist organization, in 1933. From 1934 to 1936 he had been a member of the editorial board of China Today, which was a publication of the pro-Soviet American Friends of the Chinese People. At that time he operated under the alias of J. W. Philips. Under the name of J. W. Philips, he presided in 1935 over a banquet at which Earl Browder was a speaker. He also lectured at the Jefferson School of Social Science, an avowed Communist Party institution. He was also a member of the Board of Directors of the National Council of American Soviet Friendship. The New York Times, subsequent to his arrest, referred to him as an active supporter of pro-Communist and pro-Soviet movements for a number of years.

According to an article in Plain Talk magazine Jaffe has been a liberal contributor to pro-Soviet causes and that on one occasion he reserved two tables at a hotel banquet held to launch a pro-Communist China front in the name of "The fifth floor, 35 East 12th Street," which happens to be the National Headquarters of the Communist Party.

I realize that this history of Jaffe's activities is unnecessary for most of the members of this investigating body, but I feel that the record should be complete so that anyone who reads it will understand the background of the individual to whom his four codefendants had been delivering secret State and War Department material. His coeditor, Miss Mitchell, gave a party for John S. Service when he returned from China. Service had previously attended a special press conference held by the Institute of Pacific Relations, in which he supported the position of the Chinese Communists.

Larsen had this to say about his codefendants:

"I knew Jaffe and his group as the editor of a magazine which had almost semiofficial standing among the left wingers in the State Department."

The night Kate Mitchell was arrested, she had in her possession according to Congressman Dondero, a highly confidential document entitled: "Plan of Battle Operations for Soldiers," a paper of such importance that Army Officers were subject to court martial if they lost their copies.

Congressman Frank Fellows, a member of the Committee on the Judiciary which investigated the grand jury which failed to indict Service, wrote a minority report in which he stated:

"The author of the resolution under which this committee assumed jurisdiction stated upon the floor of the House, 'The President authorized the arrest to be made and the arrests were forbidden by the State Department'."

Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew very urgently insisted upon a prosecution of the six individuals who were picked up by the FBI on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage. He thereupon immediately became a target in a campaign of vilification as the culprit in the case rather than the six who had been picked up by the FBI.

Lieutenant Roth wrote a series of articles for a New York paper and published a book in which he vigorously attacked Grew for his opposition to the Communist sympathizers in the State Department insofar as the far eastern policy was concerned.

Under Secretary Grew, after a lifetime in the diplomatic service, resigned and President Truman announced that Dean Acheson would take over the post of Under Secretary of State. * * *

"During my conference with Mr. Jaffe in October" Larsen said, "he dropped a remark which one could never forget, 'Well we've suffered a lot', he said, but anyhow we got Grew out'."

In regard to the legal handling of this case, the following is found in Plain Talk in an article by Larsen:

"While public attention was largely focused upon extraneous issues, the Espionage Case itself was following a special course behind the scenes. It appeared that Kate Mitchell had an influential uncle in Buffalo, a reputable attorney by the name of James M. Mitchell, former president of the New York State Bar Association. Mr. Mitchell was a member of a very influential law firm in Buffalo, Kenefick, Cooke, Mitchell, Bass & Letchworth. The New York City correspondents of that law firm include the most redoubtable Col. Joseph M. Hartfield, extremely well known and extremely influential in Government

circles in Washington. Colonel Hartfield, who is regarded by some as one of the most powerful political lawyers in the country, made at least four trips to Washington where he called on top officials of the Department of Justice in the matter.

In that connection I would like to quote again from Congressman Dondero's talk on the House floor, in which he stated:

"I have heretofore charged and reiterate now that the court before whom these cases were brought was not fully informed of the facts. A summary of the court proceedings has been furnished to me, which shows no evidence or exhibit obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation presented to the court. Jaffe's counsel told the court that Jaffe had no intention of harming the Government, and United States Attorney Hitchcock told the court there was no element of disloyalty in connection with the case. If that is the fact, may I respectfully ask what purpose did these individuals have in mind in stealing these particular files?

Had this same thing happened in certain other governments, these people would undoubtedly have been summarily shot, without a trial. Let us not forget we were still at war with Germany and Japan when these files were stolen, and Jaffe, in whose possession they were found, had been for more than 10 years a leader and heavy financial supporter of Communist propaganda causes, according to the FBI."

As I stated above, after the Grand Jury failed to indict Mitchell, Service, and Roth, the House passed a resolution in which it directed the Committee on the Judiciary:

"to make a thorough investigation of all the circumstances with respect to the disposition of the charges of espionage and the possession of documents stolen from secret Government files which were made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 'against Philip J. Jaffe, Kate L. Mitchell, John Stewart Service, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, Andrew Roth, and Mark Gayn,' and to report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House, if the House is not in session) as soon as practicable during the present Congress, the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems necessary."

This committee then confirmed a report of a theft of a vast number of documents from the State, War, and Navy Departments, which ranged in classification all the way from top secret to confidential. This committee report indicates that a number of the members of the Grand Jury voted for the indictment of Service and Mitchell on the espionage charges, but that the required number of 12 did not so vote.

It will be noted that the committee was not appointed for the purpose of passing upon the guilt or innocence of the espionage suspects, but was appointed for the purpose of investigating the way that the case was handled and to make recommendations. The committee did not in any way question the theft of the documents. However, it seemed to place a great deal of stress upon the fact that the documents might not be admissible in evidence because of the method of obtaining them.

For example, on page five, the report states as follows:

"4. Many of the identifiable documents might have had their evidential value destroyed by reason of the possibility of the court's sustaining the defendants' motions attacking the warrants of arrest.

"VI. Judicial decisions require scrupulous care to see that searches and seizures are reasonable. While search and seizure on arrest may be made without a search warrant, yet this is not so unless the warrant of arrest issued after 'probable cause' of guilt had been established by legal evidence."

On page six, the following statement is made:

"If the warrant for arrest was not issued on 'probable cause' substantiated by facts, the evidence disclosed as a result of the search and seizure incident to the arrest based on such a warrant would be subject to suppression and, therefore, not usable as evidence of the crime for which arrest was made."

While I have not seen any testimony of any of the Grand Jurors, and do not know what it is available, this would seem to indicate that the committee felt that the Grand Jury was disturbed, not so much by the question of guilt or innocence of the defendants, but by the question as to whether or not the guilt or innocence could be proven they apparently feel that much of the material

would not be admissible because of the method of search and seizure. The following comment will be noted on page seven of the committee report:

"Most of the items seized at Jaffe's office were typewritten copies. Some of such copies were proved to have been typed in one of the Government departments. It may be fairly inferred that the originals of such copies were never removed but that copies were made at the department or agency where the original reposed."

This makes it very clear that the committee felt making copies of secret documents and then delivering the copies to unauthorized persons placed the crime in a different class from the delivery of the originals. It is rather difficult to understand this reasoning in view of the fact that photostats or copies of an important secret document would normally be of as much value to an enemy power as the originals. The committee further pointed out that additional reason for not finding the Grand Jury at fault is because any of the six can still be further prosecuted on the charge of espionage. The Majority Report makes some excellent recommendations, which the Secretary of State might well read. I especially call his attention to recommendations one, two and three on page nine, which read as follows:

"1. That the head of every department and agency of our Government see to it that more—much more—care be exercised in personnel procurement. That all those considered for Government positions in every echelon be investigated so thoroughly as to insure that no one be employed unless absolute certainty has been attained that nothing in background, present attitude, or affiliations raises any reasonable doubt of loyalty and patriotic devotion to the United States of America.

"2. That the watchword and motivating principle of Government employment must be: None but the best. For the fewer, the better, unless above question.

"3. That each and every present employee who fails to measure up to the highest standard should be discharged. No house divided against itself can stand."

One of the members of the six-man committee, Congressman Hancock, was prevented by illness from participating in the report. Two of the members of the committee wrote dissenting opinions, which meant that the decision to absolve the Grand Jury of responsibility was made by a 3-2 decision.

Congressman Fellows in his dissenting opinion made the following statement:

"Jaffe either took these documents himself, or his confederates took them for him. And two of the documents found were 'Top Secret' so marked and so designated. I can see no point in arguing that these papers may not have been of much value. The thieves thought they were. The Government agencies so adjudged them. And the facts show that the defendants could have had their choice of any documents they wished; they were given no protection so far as the State Department was concerned."

This transaction, or rather a series of transactions involved, embraces the unlawful removal of "top secret," "secret," "confidential," and "restricted" files from the Department of State, in our National Government. This is a very serious offense. In time of war, this is a most serious offense. When war is in progress, or even in time of peace, it is of little or no concern whether the files removed were "Originals" or "copies," the fact that "information" of either or any classification was removed from the secret files in the Department of State and was delivered to any individual, or group of individuals, who had no lawful right to receive the same, is the essence of the offense. When that very secret information was thus unlawfully revealed to others, no matter how the same was imparted to Mr. Jaffe, whether by an original, or by copy, or by any other method, the real damage has been done.

There should not be any attempt made in the report to either minimize or acquit anyone from the magnitude of the act or acts committed. The report filed appears to be at least an attempt to either minimize or completely justify some of the unlawful acts which were undoubtedly committed.

All those who participated in any way in the removal, or attempted removal, of these documents from the Department of State—or who copied such reports and thereafter delivered such copies to Mr. Jaffe, or to any other person, not lawfully entitled to receive the same, should be prosecuted, and all those participating, in any degree in the unlawful acts under investigation, should be immediately

discharged from their positions in our Government. The report should speak strongly and without any reservation upon that subject.

The questions here involved are so grave and the offenses so great, that no effort should be made to protect or defend those who so offended, but the report should be made both firm and strong—to speak the truth—but to place the blame where the same rightfully belongs.

This is but a small portion of the pertinent background of Service, but certainly, beyond doubt, it forever excludes this man as a security risk by whatever yardstick it is measured.

Again we have a known associate and collaborator with Communists and pro-Communists, a man high in the State Department consorting with admitted espionage agents, and I wish to say to this committee what I said on the floor of the Senate on February 20, 1950.

When Chiang Kai-shek was fighting our war, the State Department had in China a young man named John S. Service. His task, obviously, was not to work for the communization of China. Strangely, however, he sent official reports back to the State Department urging that we torpedo our ally Chiang Kai-shek and stating, in effect, that communism was the best hope of China.

Later this man—John Service—was picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for turning over to the Communists secret State Department information. Strangely, however, he was never prosecuted. However, Joseph Grew, the Under Secretary of State, who insisted on his prosecution, was forced to resign. Two days after Grew's successor, Dean Acheson, took over as Under Secretary of State, this man—John Service—who had been picked up by the FBI and who had previously urged that communism was the best hope of China, was not only reinstated in the State Department but promoted. And finally, under Acheson, placed in charge of all placements and promotions.

Mr. Chairman, today this man, John S. Service, is a ranking officer in the policy-making group of "untouchables" on duty in Calcutta, India, one of the most strategically important listening posts in the world today and since the fall of China the most important new front of the cold war.

Five times this man has been investigated as to his loyalty and his acceptance as a security risk to the Nation.

What possible reason could there have been for even a second investigation of his record.

He was not an acceptable security risk under Mr. Acheson's "yardstick of loyalty" the day he entered the Government.

He is not a sound security risk today.

EXHIBIT No. 49

PLOT TO WRECK LABOR PARTY EXPOSED

The plot to turn the American Labor Party into a "front" for the Communist Party has been exposed by Charles Belous, who was secretary of the opposition. On February 13, 1940, Belous resigned from this group which calls itself the "Progressive Committee to Rebuild the A. L. P."

On April 2nd primary elections will be held throughout the State for party positions in the American Labor Party. Members of the State Committee of the Labor Party and delegates to the Presidential Convention will be elected.

For the first time since the organization of the Labor Party there is an organized movement which has named candidates in opposition to the candidates which have the endorsement and support of the leadership and founders of the American Labor Party.

Belous has exposed the vicious conspiracy of this opposition group. It is up to the enrolled voters of the American Labor Party to do the rest. Join with other members of the Labor Party and vote right on Primary Day—April 2nd.

READ THE STATEMENTS OF A MAN WHO KNOWS THE FACTS

[From the New York Post, Wednesday, February 14, 1940]

BELOUS QUITS ALP GROUP OVER 'RED TIE'—SAYS "PROGRESSIVE COMMITTEE" IS TOOL OF COMMUNISTS

Former Councilman Charles Belous resigned today as secretary of the Progressive Committee to Reorganize the American Labor Party, and charged it was

being used by the Communist Party in an effort to assure control of the ALP.

"It is clear that the Communists are conducting a knock-down and drag-out fight to take over leadership of the ALP and make it a front organization," Belous said at his home, 28-29 Forty-first Av., Long Island City.

CALLED NEW DEAL FOES

The Progressive Committee, headed by Morris Watson and with Eugene P. Connolly and Hyman Glickstein as moving spirits, is attempting to organize a State-wide fight against the present ALP leadership in the April primary, when a new State Committee will be elected.

Belous said it was the Watson group's opposition to President Roosevelt and the New Deal which finally convinced him that its aims went far beyond a mere change in ALP leadership.

"In the election of a successor to Congressman Sirovich," he said, "I was amazed to find a group I was aligned with that was supposed to be supporting the New Deal, openly fighting the election of Edelstein, the Democratic candidate."

Glickstein, attorney for the Watson committee, joined with Kenneth F. Simpson, GOP county leader, in a successful court action to void the nomination of Edelstein by the ALP.

Belous said he had realized from the start that there were Communists in the insurgent ALP movement, but that he had been "willing to work along with them" for the common immediate objective of ousting the present ALP leadership.

FINDS REAL AIM

Later events convinced him, he said, that the real aim of the Communists went much further, being no less than to make the ALP the tail of the Communist Party kite.

He said that although he was secretary of the committee he had not been consulted in formation of many of its policies.

When the committee was first organized last December, he said, Prof. Herman Gray of N. Y. U. and other recognized liberals were "supposed to be connected with it, but they pulled away."

Belous, center of numerous political fights in Queens where he once headed the City Fusion Party, said he was going to "take a rest from politics and try to earn a living as an honest lawyer."

SEES MORE QUITTING

"Quite a few others in Queens who were in the same position that I was are going to follow suit in resigning from the committee," he said. The ALP, it was learned, probably will drop the charges of disloyalty on which it has been seeking expulsion of Belous from the party.

In a formal statement announcing his resignation, as secretary of the Progressive Committee, the former Councilman said as a member of the group he had found himself forced to condone and even justify Nazi atrocities and suppress "deep-felt sympathies for Poland and Finland."

Even more significantly, he said, he was expected to "join with the Garners and Coughlins and Dieses and O'Connors to criticize" President Roosevelt and for the defeat of New Deal candidates and policies.

[From the Daily News, Wednesday, February 14, 1940]

BELOUS DISAVOWS PRO-REDS IN A. L. P.

(By Lowell Limpus)

Denouncing "the complete sell-out and abandonment of one of the most sympathetic Presidents that labor and the common man have had since Lincoln," former Councilman Charles Belous last night repudiated the faction which has been opposing the American Labor Party's purge of Communists.

The former Queens legislator intimated that the Reds themselves are behind the movement and declared that they are now blasting away at President Roosevelt with all their political artillery.

RESIGNED POST

Belous, who was just squeezed out of office by the last P. R. count, charged that the Communists are not only demanding opposition to the New Deal in return for their support but that they also tried to make him justify Hitler and the Nazis. As a result he resigned as secretary of the "Progressive Committee to Rebuild the American Labor Party."

In a public statement, Belous told how the rebel faction insisted that "I suppress my deep-felt symphathies for Finland and Poland" and revise his attitude toward nazism. "Suddenly I must condone its atrocities, and even justify them," he said. And the final straw came when he was told that he "must now work for the defeat of New Deal candidates and policies."

Although he didn't specify directly, there was no doubt about the group to which the former councilman was pointing. "When I find my thoughts and acts limited by strange logic and argument," he said, "one suspects something more than a mere tolerant attitude toward all minorities, including Communists."

GIVING UP LIBERTIES

Belous announced he was withdrawing from Labor Party activities although he would remain a member. Political observers generally believe that he lost his Queens seat at the last election because he was reputed to be too close to the Communists, although he specifically denied the charge during the campaign. Originally a Fusion Party candidate, he switched to the American Labor Party but was nosed out by Republican John Christensen.

ISSUED BY

LIBERAL AND LABOR COMMITTEE TO SAFEGUARD THE AMERICAN LABOR PARTY

FIGHT THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE THE LABOR PARTY

State Headquarters: Hotel Claridge, 44th Street & Broadway, New York
Paul Blanshard, Chairman; Frederick F. Umhey, Treasurer

VICE CHAIRMEN

Luigi Antonini
George S. Counts
Morris L. Ernst
Douglas P. Falconer
Grace Gosselin

Adolph Held
Louis Hollander
John Haynes Holmes
Arthur Huggins
Alexander Kahn

Dorothy Kenyon
Harry W. Laidler
A. Philip Randolph
Alex Rose

EXHIBIT No. 50

OCTOBER 10, 1939.

Mr. ALEX ROSE,

*State Secretary, American Labor Party,
151 West Fortieth Street, New York City.*

MY DEAR MR. ROSE: I have just received your letter dated October 6th which in tone suggests a pistol being put to my head. My impulse under such circumstances is to dare the damn fool to shoot. Particularly where as in this case my views, and especially my loathing of all dictatorships, are so much a matter of common knowledge that you certainly cannot claim to be in the dark about them.

However, I realize that you are probably acting for what you consider compelling reasons of party strategy and are at least trying to treat all candidates alike. That being the case let me be magnanimous and answer your questions as best I can. But remember, please, that I am running for Judge of the Municipal Court, not for United States Senator, and so my opinions on international affairs are not worth the paper they're written on.

However, here they are:

First, I regard with horror and loathing the Hitler-Stalin pact.

Second, I agree with you that any fusing of the brown and red dictatorships is a treacherous blow to world civilization.

Third, I also agree, insofar as I understand them, with the President's proposed changes in our present neutrality law. But frankly I have been far too busy lately trying to be as good a Judge as possible to have given such legislation the careful study it requires.

Fourth, it is not easy for me to be neutral when I think of either Hitler or Stalin but I try not to lose my head and I continue to believe in the traditional American civil liberties. Above all I hope that we may keep at peace and still preserve American democracy.

Fifth, it goes without saying (or I should have thought it did) that I am not a Communist or anything even remotely resembling one. I am just an old-fashioned believer in democracy who gets awfully weary sometimes of all its ructions but would never, never give it up.

Sixth, my original subscription to the Constitution and platform of the American Labor Party remains unchanged and requires no reaffirmation.

In conclusion may I remind you that I am running to succeed myself as Judge of the Municipal Court on a platform of clean government and an independent nonpartisan judiciary and that the American Labor Party has approved this platform by its indorsement of my candidacy?

Very truly yours,

(Signed) DOROTHY KENYON.

EXHIBIT No. 51

[From the New York Times, May 26, 1941. Advertisement]

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

MR. PRESIDENT:

We await your address on May 27 in the belief that you will tell what we must do to insure the security of the United States by hastening the defeat of the aggressors. We pledge to you our loyal support in the performance of this historic task.

Some of us have been your political adherents, some your opponents, but all of us are united on this firm basis: we are Americans, you are our elected President. We acknowledge the eternal truth of that fine old American principle that political differences end at the water's edge. It is at the water's edge that our people now stand, facing to eastward and westward the frightful reality of world war and world revolution.

We have prayed that we might be spared from involvement in the war. But we cannot close our eyes to the wholesale murder of liberty. Most of all we cannot ignore the threats to our own security uttered and progressively enforced by those tyrants who are dedicated to the proposition that democracy must die.

The dictators have extended their world war and world revolution from continent to continent—farther and farther out into the Atlantic Ocean—nearer and nearer to the lifeline of the Western Hemisphere. With their propagandists and saboteurs they have begun their invasion of this hemisphere.

The challenge is inescapable. We cannot meet it with mere words nor with mere dollars. We know that strong action, even armed action, entailing greater sacrifices will be required of us.

With firm determination to carry through at whatever cost the policies necessary to defeat tyranny, we await the facts and leadership which the Commander-in-Chief alone can give. We repeat to you, Mr. President, the final words of the Declaration of Independence: "With a firm reliance on the protection of Divine

Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor."

Respectfully submitted.

Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, Washington, D. C.; Lewis W. Douglas, Phoenix, Ariz.; Henry A. Abbot, Lexington, Ky.; Louis Adamic, Milford, N. J.; Allen D. Albert, Paris, Ill.; Paul Shipman Andrews, Syracuse, N. Y.; James R. Angell, New Haven, Conn.; Luigi Antonini, New York, N. Y.; Frank Aydelotte, Princeton, N. J.; Carl E. Bailey, Little Rock, Ark.; Margaret Culkin Banning, Tryon, N. C.; Stringfellow Barr, Annapolis, Md.; David P. Barrows, San Francisco, Calif.; Kemp D. Battle, Rocky Mount, N. C.; James Phinney Baxter, Williamstown, Mass.; Anita McCormick Blaine, Chicago, Ill.; Henry Breckenridge, Chevy Chase, Md.; Van Wyck Brooks, Westport Conn.; Thomas E. Burke, Washington, D. C.; Henry Seidel Canby, New York, N. Y.; Oliver C. Carmichael, Nashville, Tenn.; Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, New Rochelle, N. Y.; Mary Ellen Chase, Northampton, Mass.; Rufus E. Clement, Atlanta, Ga.; Pierce Cline, Shreveport, La.; Robert C. Clothier, New Brunswick, N. J.; Ada L. Comstock, Cambridge, Mass.; Karl T. Compton, Boston, Mass.; George Creel, San Francisco, Calif.; Virginius Dabny, Richmond, Va.; Russell Davenport, Holyoke, Mass.; J. Lionberger Davis, St. Louis, Mo.; Monroe E. Deutsch, Berkeley, Calif.; Mark Ethridge, Louisville, Ky.; Silas Evans, Ripon, Wis.; Marshall Field, New York, N. Y.; Harry M. Fisher, Chicago, Ill.; Alvan T. Fuller, Boston, Mass.; Harry David Gideonse, Brooklyn, N. Y.; Mary B. Gilson, Chicago, Ill.; Virginia C. Gildersleeve, New York, N. Y.; Frank P. Graham, Chapel Hill, N. C.; Helen Hayes, Nyack, N. Y.; Arthur Garfield Hayes, New York, N. Y.; Henry W. Hobson, Cincinnati, Ohio; Hamilton Holt, Winter Park, Fla.; Mirian Hopkins, Hollywood, Calif.; Rupert Hughes, Los Angeles, Calif.; M. Ashby Jones, Atlanta, Ga.; Dorothy Kenyon, New York, N. Y.; William Draper Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa.; Larry S. MacPhail, Brooklyn, N. Y.; Maury Maverick, San Antonio, Texas; Francis E. McMahon, South Bend, Ind.; Joseph C. Menendez, New Orleans, La.; Robert A. Millikan, Pasadena, Calif.; Christopher Morley, Roslyn, N. Y.; Mrs. Dwight Morrow, Englewood, N. J.; Paul Scott Mowrer, Chicago, Ill.; Francis P. Murphy, Nashua, N. H.; Mrs. Burton W. Musser, Salt Lake City, Utah; Joseph Padway, Milwaukee, Wis.; Ferdinand Pecora, New York, N. Y.; William Lyon Phelps, New Haven, Conn.; H. H. Pike, Jr., New York, N. Y.; Gifford Pinchot, Washington, D. C.; Charles Poletti, Albany, N. Y.; Mrs. Frances F. C. Preston, Princeton, N. J.; Henry F. Pringle, New York, N. Y.; A. Philip Randolph, New York, N. Y.; Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt, New York, N. Y.; Chester H. Rowell, San Francisco, Calif.; Cornelius D. Scully, Pittsburgh, Pa.; Robert E. Speer, Lakeville, Conn.; Charles P. Taft, Cincinnati, Ohio; Henry W. Toll, Denver, Colo.; William L. White, New York, N. Y.; Stephen S. Wise, New York, N. Y.; and more than 3,000 others, representative of a cross section of the nation's life.

You Can Share in this Expression of faith in the President's leadership. Telegraph him today that you do. Simply Say: ADD MY NAME TO THE LIST OF THOSE WHO PLEGE YOU THEIR SUPPORT IN THE HARRIMAN-DOUGLAS LETTER.

COMMITTEE TO DEFEND AMERICA BY AIDING THE ALLIES

National Headquarters, 8 West 40th Street, New York City

EXHIBIT No. 52

EUROPEAN SECTION, USSR TRANSMITTERS, OVERSEAS & FAR EAST SERVICE

JANUARY 6, 1949.

RUSSIA HAS "FREEST WOMEN ON EARTH"

Moscow, Soviet Far Eastern Service, in English to India, January 5, 1949,
6:30 a. m. EST—L.

(Talk by Maria Sharikova, Assistant Chairman of the Moscow Soviet on the
Rights of Women)

(Summary with quotations)

The author began by saying that the U. S. representative in the U. N. Committee on the Rights of Women, Dorothy Kenyon, in endeavoring to conceal her reactionary stand has engaged in slandering the Soviet people, in particular Soviet women. In a radio broadcast over the Voice of America she talks a lot of irresponsible drivel attempting to deny the political, economic, and social equality enjoyed by the women of the USSR, at the same time painting a glowing picture of the position of women in Britain and the United States, when she knows full well what their position really is. "I am shocked at this shameful downright lie, completely unsupported by the tiniest fact." As it happens, Dorothy Kenyon could not quote facts for that would at once disprove her assertions.

Sharikova goes on to claim that the respect in which Soviet women are held was attested by the welcome given to the USSR delegation at the International Federation of Democratic Women. She outlines her own rise from the post of a village schoolmistress before the Revolution to that she holds at present and gives examples of other women in public positions. Is there any country in the world, she asks, where women can develop politically and play such an imposing role in the life of the State?

In the USSR whatever jobs women do they feel they are all the equal masters of their country, contributing to the work of the organs of the Soviet State. Dorothy Kenyon ignores such facts as these and tries to imply that women in the USSR get only the heavy work, but in the USSR women at work are protected by labor laws, unlike in the United States "where women workers and office clerks are completely dependent on the likes and dislikes of their employers." Women doing the same work as men get 30 to 40 percent less pay, as is the case also in Britain.

Dorothy Kenyon keeps quiet about this, just as she keeps quiet about the disgraceful part played by the capitalists of the United States and Britain in exploiting female labor in the colonial and dependent countries. The commentator describes the woes of the exploited women in the colonial countries of Asia and Africa quoting from the speech of a United States progressive delegate to the International Federation of Democratic Women to illustrate the conditions of slavery in which they live.

After quoting more facts and figures illustrating the part played by women in the U. S. S. R., Sharikova declares that instead of defending women in the UN, Dorothy Kenyon had engaged in slandering the "freest women on earth, the women of the U. S. S. R." However, as any of the thousands of visitors to the U. S. S. R. can witness, "the slander indulged in by Dorothy Kenyon can hoodwink no one."

ECONOMY OF SOVIET ZONE FLOURISHING

Moscow, Soviet Overseas Service, in English to North America, December 30, 1948, 9:00 p. m., EST—L.

(Commentary by Khalamov: "The Economic Situation in the Soviet Zone of
Germany

[Text]

"We know from recent history that fascist Germany was a kingdom of financial and industrial monopolies, and Prussian Junkerdom the bosses that constituted the backbone of predatory German imperialism. It was financial bigwigs and such commanders of Ruhr-Wesphalian industry as Krupp and Thyssen who

summoned Hitler to power. Their aggressive idea of creating a peace-abiding and democratic Germany is unreal and illusory.

"Yet German monopolies and Junker landed property rights have been done away with only in the Soviet Zone. This problem has been successfully solved in the Soviet Zone with due consideration for insuring a stable peace and universal security and with the active participation of broad democratic sections of the population.

SUCCESS OF SOVIET LAND REFORM

"Only 4 months after the collapse of the Nazi regime, at the demand of the German people, primarily the working peasantry, a democratic land reform was successfully carried out in the Soviet Zone. This did away with Junkerdom, that bulwark of German imperialism and aggression * * *

EXHIBIT No. 53

[From the New York Times, February 16, 1946]

URGE BOMB-MAKING VACATION—COLUMBIA PROFESSORS ASK DECLARATION TO AID UNO COMMISSION

To the EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

In view of the establishment of the UNO Commission on the Atomic Bomb, we would like to suggest a declaration of policy of the following nature by the President of the United States, in order that the discussions of the UNO Commission may proceed in an atmosphere of full good faith and of confidence in their successful outcome for international peace:

1. The United States will at once stop the production of bombs from material currently produced. This includes the preparation of sub-assemblies and all other procedures involved in the fabrication of bombs.

2. For one year, which would seem to be a reasonable time for the commission to mature its plans and to secure action on them by the Governments concerned, we will stop accumulating purified plutonium and uranium-235, which are the essential ingredients of atomic bombs. The plants which produce these materials will be kept merely in a stand-by condition. For this purpose they will run at the minimum rate compatible with maintaining them in good order, but they will not accumulate the resulting purified and fissionable products. As produced, these will be eliminated by appropriate means, such as dumping them into the ocean or returning them to their original mixture.

3. We are prepared to have the disposition of our present stockpile of bombs considered as one of the items in an agreement to be entered into by us and the other Governments.

L. C. Dunn, Irwin Edman, A. P. Evans, Selig Hecht, P. C. Jessup,
R. M. MacIver, Edgar Miller, F. C. Mills, George B. Pegram,
I. I. Rabi, Jan Schilt, C. S. Shoup.

NEW YORK, Feb. 13, 1946.

The signers of the foregoing letter are, respectively, professors of zoology, philosophy, history, biophysics, public law, sociology, biochemistry, economics, graduate faculties (dean), physics, astronomy and economics.

EXHIBIT No. 54

AMBASSADOR AT LARGE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 24, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: In connection with my testimony on March 20, 1950, before your Committee, I was asked by Senator Hickenlooper as to the precise date of a Round Table discussion which was attended by Mr. Owen Lattimore and in which I saw Mr. Lattimore. I stated in my testimony that I

believed that this meeting was in December. Upon consulting the files of the Department, I find that the meeting was on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949.

I am enclosing a list of all the persons who attended this meeting.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP.

(Enclosure.)

LIST OF CONSULTANTS

Joseph W. Ballentine, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.
 Bernard Brodie, Department of International Relations, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
 Claude A. Buss, Director of Studies, Army War College, Washington, D. C.
 Kenneth Colegrove, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.
 Arthur G. Coons, President, Occidental College, Los Angeles, California.
 John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, New York.
 John K. Fairbank, Committee on International and Regional Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
 William R. Herod, President, International General Electric Company, New York, New York.
 Arthur N. Holcombe, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
 Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer and Graves, Spokane, Wash.
 Owen Lattimore, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.
 Ernest B. MacNaughton, Chairman of the Board, First National Bank, Portland, Oregon.
 George C. Marshall, President, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.
 J. Morden Murphy, Assistant Vice President, Bankers Trust Company, New York, New York.
 Nathaniel Peffer, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia University, New York, New York.
 Harold S. Quigley, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
 Edwin O. Reischauer, Department of Far Eastern Languages, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
 William S. Robertson, President, American and Foreign Power Company, New York, New York.
 John D. Rockefeller III, President, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York, New York.
 Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, New York.
 Eugene Staley, Executive Director, World Affairs Council of Northern California, San Francisco, California.
 Harold Stassen, President, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
 Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
 George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
 Harold M. Vinacke, Department of Political Science, University of Cincinnati, Ohio.

EXHIBIT No. 55

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS—ESTHER CAUKIN BRUNAUER

Guidance materials for study groups in international relations of the American Association of University Women, including syllabi and bibliographies on American foreign policy, European politics, Far Eastern affairs, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Central and Eastern Europe and the United Nations; also the *International Problem-of-the-Month Series* (1935-1943), and the *Front Page* (1943-44) brief guides to the study of contemporary international affairs. *The Peace Proposals of Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918*. Ph. D. dissertation, 1927. Bound manuscript on deposit in the Hoover Library and the Stanford University Library; abstract published by the Stanford University Press in 1927.

- Definitions of the Monroe Doctrine*, published by the American Association of University Women, about 1929.
- An Outline of War*, written at the request of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, about 1935.
- The Peace Proposals of December 1916–January 1917, *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. IV, No. 4, December 1932.
- National Defense: Institutions, Concepts, Policies*, published by the Women's Press of the Young Women's Christian Association, 1937.
- Statements before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-sixth Congress, First Session on Present Neutrality Law (Public Res. No. 27); published by the U. S. Government Printing Office, 1939.
- Building the New World Order*, published by the American Association of University Women in the International Relations Pamphlet Series, December 1939. (This was used as the textbook for the League of Nations Association High School Examination contest in 1940.)
- Has America Forgotten? Myths and Facts about World Wars I and II*, with an introduction by James T. Shotwell. Published by the American Council on Public Affairs, Washington, 1941. (pamphlet)
- Facing the Nazi Menace, *Vital Issues*, June 1941.
- Power Politics and Democracy, *The Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1941.
- The Development of International Attitudes, in collaboration with Daniel Prescott, in *International Understanding Through Public School Curriculum*, Part II of the Thirty-sixth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education.
- The United States in the Transition to the New World Order, a monograph for the *Second Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace*, April 1942.
- Further Thoughts on Germany, *World Affairs* (published by the American Peace Society), September 1942.
- The United Nations, *Junior Red Cross Journal*, September 1942.
- Religion and the Free World, *Junior Red Cross Journal*, December 1942.
- Frontiers of the Future, *Junior Red Cross Journal*, March 1943.
- The Stake of the United States in International Organization, a chapter in a textbook, *Citizens of a New World*, published by the National Council of the Social Studies, 1944.
- UNESCO to Date, *United States National Commission for UNESCO, Report on the First Meeting, September 1946*; Department of State Publication 2726, 1947.

EXHIBIT No. 56

KANSAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED SCIENCE,

Manhattan, March 22, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I have known Dr. Esther C. Brunauer since October 1946, and I am certain that she is loyal to the Constitution, laws and ideals of the United States.

My knowledge of Mrs. Brunauer is based on an official relationship that has prevailed periodically since November 1946, when I attended the General Conference of UNESCO in Paris as a delegate, and Mrs. Brunauer attended as a member of the staff of the State Department. This same relationship existed at subsequent General Conferences of UNESCO. Of course between the international meetings, my work as chairman of the United States National Commission brought me in touch with Dr. Brunauer and her work in Washington, D. C.

I would say that the present ideological warfare in the world is Dr. Brunauer's chief concern, and in this she is constantly working to uphold United States policy, as well as the democratic philosophy generally, and to defeat the devious and clever tactics of the Russians and their satellites. At the Mexico City conference in 1947, for example, she spent a full month in counteracting the efforts of the Russian-dominated Polish delegation to pin the tag of "war-monger" on the Western democracies, and especially on the United States. She worked with devotion, precision, and effect. She was completely sincere in all she did.

I could cite many similar examples which have proved to me that it is erroneous and un-American to refer to Dr. Brunauer as a Communist sympathizer.
Sincerely yours,

MILTON S. EISENHOWER.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 24, 1950.

Re Esther and Stephen Brunauer.

HON. MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
*Chairman, Special Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I was considerably startled to read that Mr. and Mrs. Brunauer had been accused of Communist leanings and disloyalty before your subcommittee.

As you may perhaps recall, I helped as a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee in the Eightieth Congress to initiate investigations which I believe assisted the State Department in eliminating employees who had demonstrated Communist leanings or were shown to be poor security risks. I am as anxious as anyone to rid our Government of any employees whose loyalty is doubtful. However, erroneous accusations, even though made in good faith, hurt that objective more than they help it.

I am convinced the accusations against the Brunauers are completely erroneous.

I first met the Brunauers in 1943, and Mrs. Ball and I have known both of them intimately since 1945. We live only a few blocks apart here in Washington and have spent many evenings together. Our conversations inevitably have dealt at length with politics, with international problems and issues and with the so-called cold war.

In all of our many hours of conversation, neither Esther nor Stephen has ever revealed the slightest indication of Communist attitudes. On the contrary, both of them are most strongly opposed to the ideology and practices of communism. As you know, Stephen Brunauer was born in Hungary and spent his youth there. Many of his boyhood friends have been victims of Communist dictatorship. He is perhaps the most violently anti-Communist person I know.

I have no hesitation in vouching for the complete loyalty of Stephen and Esther Brunauer to the United States and to our way of life.

With best regards,
Yours sincerely,

JOSEPH H. BALL.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS,
Washington 6, D. C.

HONORABLE MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: It is my well-considered opinion that Esther Caukin Brunauer and her husband, Dr. Stephen Brunauer are loyal Americans and definitely are not poor security risks.

Mrs. Brunauer took her graduate work at Stanford University under my direction and I have kept in close touch with her ever since. I have the highest regard for her character, intellectual integrity, and devotion to all ideals for which America stands. Her brilliant work as a research student in the Hoover Library is a matter of record. For years she occupied an important part in the American Association of University Women and has I know been considered for a number of academic positions.

As examples may I cite first her efforts to place Hungarian diplomats in this country who refused to accept Communist Hungary and resigned from the diplomatic service. Second, the excellent talk which she gave on UNESCO at the annual meeting of this association in Boston. Third, a long conversation which I had with her in August 1947 when she was visiting Los Angeles.

The allegations made against Mrs. Brunauer I regard as baseless, appalling, and not to be left unanswered.

Very sincerely yours,

RALPH H. LUTZ

NEW YORK, N. Y., *March 23, 1950.*

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I am suffering from such a sense of outrage because of Senator McCarthy's attacks on Esther Brunauer's loyalty that I am almost speechless—I can only recite certain facts. I have known Mrs. Brunauer since 1942 when she was interim chairman of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, a group organized by the great woman suffrage leader Carrie Chapman Catt, a generation ago. Mrs. Brunauer and I worked together for the Women's Action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace when we supported the United Nations. I have known Mrs. Brunauer always as an able statesman and as an objective, farsighted hate-free thinker and it goes without say—as a most loyal and useful citizen of the United States. If an inflamed mind with the power to injure her and limit or destroy her usefulness can see in her calm and philosophical approach to great problems anything evil or subversive, our democracy is indeed in a bad way.

Yours sincerely,

(S) VERA B. WHITEHOME
(Mrs. Norman deR. Whitehome).

NOANK, CONN., *March 25, 1950.*

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I am the Dean of Pembroke College in Brown University on leave of absence for this year and retiring in June 1950. From 1937–1941 I was National President of the American Association of University Women, and during those years I worked somewhat closely with Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer who was the Associate in International Relations for the National AAUW.

I am happy to testify to my strong convictions that Mrs. Brunauer is a loyal and devoted citizen. She is also extremely able. Her programs for the use of International Relations study groups in the AAUW were outstandingly good and in every case were permeated by a rare understanding of the problems of the United States in those difficult years. In that field alone Mrs. Brunauer did much to rally the loyal support of the large membership of the Association for the critical problems our country was facing at that time.

Mrs. Brunauer was also a representative of the American Association of University Women at its international Conferences, several of which I also attended, and her friendly spirit and great ability did much to make those Conferences successful. I believe firmly that international understanding comes in large measure from personal relationships among groups of different nations, so her work in that field seemed to me of unusual value. The U. S. S. R. never had representation at any of those Conferences.

I have not followed Mrs. Brunauer's career closely in recent years, but I am fully convinced from my own personal knowledge that she is not only a woman of unquestionable reliability and loyalty to her country, but that she must be a great asset to any department which has had the good fortune to enlist her services.

Sincerely yours,

MARGARET S. MORRIS.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 22, 1950.*

Senator MILLARD TYDINGS,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I first met Mrs. Esther Brunauer through a mutual friend in Baltimore, either in 1934 or 1935, and have known her and her husband on a social basis since that time. Never have I had occasion to have any but the highest regard for both Dr. and Mrs. Brunauer's qualities of character and intellect. As a psychiatrist, and thus specifically accustomed to evaluating personalities, I would be very much astonished if either of them (I know Mrs. Brunauer better than I do her husband), had anything except entire loyalty for the principles of American democracy.

Trusting that the charges which have recently been made concerning Dr. and Mrs. Brunauer will be proven conclusively to be wholly without foundation.

Respectfully yours,

KATHERINE K. RICE, M. D.

VASSAR COLLEGE,
Poughkeepsie, N. Y., March 25, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I feel compelled to write a vigorous protest to the statements attributed to Senator McCarthy about Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer. I have known Mrs. Brunauer since the late twenties when she accepted a position with the American Association of University Women. As a member of the International Relations Committee of the American Association of University Women, serving under the chairmanship of the late President Mary Woolley of Mount Holyoke College, I was closely associated with Mrs. Brunauer. Subsequently, I have followed her work with the greatest respect and interest. Never have I heard her express any sentiment which by any stretch of the imagination could be regarded as disloyal to her Government or as sympathetic to the ideology of communism. Quite the contrary is true. Mrs. Brunauer has repeatedly spoken to groups of American college women, and every time I have heard her I have been impressed with her devotion to the American ideal.

Mrs. Brunauer's position with the American Association of University Women was that of Staff Associate for the Committee on International Relations. She was not in the consumer field, nor was she Executive Secretary of the Association as reported by the press.

I have a profound confidence in Mrs. Brunauer's integrity and in her loyalty. She is a citizen of whom America can be proud.

I also have great regard for your leadership, and it is my hope that you and the members of your committee will refute the unjust and unwarranted charges made against this citizen of our country.

Yours very truly,

SARAH GIBSON BLANDING.

ROCHESTER, N. Y., *March 24, 1950.*

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: In connection with the charges leveled by Senator McCarthy against Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer, I should like to offer my testimony on her behalf.

I came to this country in 1937 and was naturalized in 1943; since 1937 I have been employed as a research chemist by the Eastman Kodak Co. My entry into the United States was made possible by an affidavit given by Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer and her husband, Dr. Stephen Brunauer. Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer was at that time an Associate for International Relations in the American Association for University Women, and she generously offered her affidavit to me as to a former recipient of an International Fellowship from that Association.

During the first few months of my stay in the United States I spent most of the time in Washington and became closely acquainted with Dr. Esther Brunauer, a privilege which I highly esteem, for I found her a rare person with the highest code of personal conduct. Through her, I became aware of the ideas which are the foundation of this country; her interpretation made me understand and love it. After I left Washington we could only meet occasionally, but as friends we felt the need to discuss vital issues even on these occasions. I vividly recall Dr. Brunauer's passionate devotion to this country, her high hopes when the United Nations were founded, and later her distress over the obstructionist policy of the Soviet Union.

In the light of my personal experience, it seems more than absurd that Dr. Brunauer should have been made the target of such charges as were made by Senator McCarthy—indeed, quite unforgivable.

Respectfully yours,

GERTRUDE KOENFELD.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 24, 1950.*

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: Shortly after Senator McCarthy had named Dr. Esther Brunauer as a poor security risk I wrote Dr. Brunauer and said that if I

could be of any help in this matter for her to let me know. Dr. Brunauer has told me that a letter addressed to you could be of some help and that is why I am writing.

The reason I offered to be of help to Dr. Brunauer is that I have known her for some time and do not feel that the charge against her is justified. I first met her early in February 1946 when I started work for the Department of State. I saw quite a lot of her for the next two and a half years since her assignment was connected with UNESCO and the work that I did was connected with UNESCO also. For a few months we were in the same division in the Department of State; after that she transferred to the newly established UNESCO relations staff whereas I remained in the Office of International Affairs. My meetings with Dr. Brunauer, dealing as they did with UNESCO, covered a wide range of subjects. It was quite obvious to me that Dr. Brunauer's views were entirely orthodox. It is easy enough in conversations such as we had to spot a person who is a "pink" and I am convinced that Dr. Brunauer was neither pink nor any other reddish color.

I never saw Dr. Brunauer associate with persons of extreme leftish or communistic sympathies and I would doubt very much that she had any such associations.

It is true that a person can be a Communist and even his best friends will not know it. However, this is something that happens very, very seldom. Ordinarily, a Communist can be spotted quite easily by his views on certain key subjects, by his mannerisms and by his actions.

I can say without any doubt whatsoever that there was nothing that Dr. Brunauer did or said during the time that I have known her professionally and socially that gives me the least reason to doubt her loyalty and I conclude that she is loyal and should be allowed to continue in her very useful Government career undisturbed by further accusations which appear to be groundless.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES P. HENDRICK.

ARLINGTON, VA., March 24, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: May I take this opportunity to assure you of my absolute faith in the loyalty and patriotism of Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer.

I had the privilege of working directly under Dr. Brunauer at the American Association of University Women from September 1, 1929, until January 1, 1941. For about 10 years of that time I was her private secretary. During that time I was, of course, very closely associated with her. I cannot imagine anyone less deserving of the accusations made by Senator McCarthy.

One of my duties as Dr. Brunauer's secretary was the stenciling for duplication or preparing for the printer of all material which she wrote during that time. I feel sure that if you will check this material, which will be on file at the American Association of University Women, you will agree with me that it clearly indicates that the writer did not believe in communism nor in any of its ramifications.

Throughout my association with Dr. Brunauer it was quite evident that she was working wholeheartedly and tirelessly for the promotion of an international policy which would benefit the United States. There again an examination of her writings at the AAUW would bear out my belief. A check of the international items of the legislative program of that organization, which she supported by written material and speeches, would shed further light on her loyalty to the best interests of her country.

I would like also to say that I considered Dr. Brunauer a personal friend of mine and have only the highest regard for her loyalty, her integrity, her honesty—in fact for her character as a whole.

I would be more than happy to give you any further information you might wish about my associations with Dr. Brunauer.

Yours very sincerely,

HELEN ALLEY
(Mrs. W. G. Alley).

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 23, 1950.

HON. MILLARD E. TYDINGS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I understand that the Senate Foreign Relations Investigating Subcommittee is giving Dr. Esther Brunauer (and her husband Dr. Stephen Brunauer) an opportunity to appear before it in reply to the charges made by Senator McCarthy.

I am sure that you and the members of your committee can be relied upon to give fair and thoughtful consideration to the material which will be presented to you at that time. It is a very serious responsibility which has been placed upon your committee. It is essential that persons with responsibility in the Government have complete loyalty to our Government, but it is equally important that the Government should not lose the services of able and loyal citizens.

I have known Dr. Esther Brunauer personally since 1946 and have known of her work as the associate in international relations of the American Association of University Women prior to that time. Since 1946 we have worked together within the Washington Branch of the AAUW and I have had frequent occasion for contact with her. She is a thoughtful, well-balanced and mature woman. From our talks I know that she has a deep faith in the democratic process. I am convinced that she has no sympathy whatsoever with totalitarianism, either of the right or the left. Furthermore, she is sufficiently astute that it would be quite impossible for her to be used by persons with such sympathies.

I have not known Dr. Brunauer's work directly, since my own position as Director of the Statistics Branch in the Public Housing Administration does not bring me into contact with the Department of State. However, since the AAUW is an organization seriously concerned with education in its broadest sense, our contacts have not been of a frivolous nature, but have been concerned with the development of the program and policies of that organization.

I trust that your committee will take prompt action to clear Dr. Brunauer's name so that she can continue to serve in the Department of State.

In addition, I would like to call your attention to the incorrect statements made about Dr. Brunauer's activities in the AAUW. Laying aside any debate as to whether activity on consumer problems should be considered indicative of sympathy with communism, I would like to point out that Dr. Brunauer had no part in developing organization activity in that area, but was concerned solely with international questions.

I have made no reference to Dr. Stephen Brunauer only because I am not personally acquainted with him.

Respectfully yours,

RUTH LOIS LYONS.

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER,
SOCIAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION,
Denver, Colo., March 24, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I was both shocked and angered by Senator McCarthy's attack upon Mrs. Esther Cankin Brunauer. I have known Mrs. Brunauer since the time when she completed her Doctor's degree at Stanford University and became the international relations specialist for the American Association of University Women. While she was serving in that capacity I met her several times, read her publications, and heard her speak before groups of university women. The impression inevitably formed was of a woman devoted to America, with a scholarly mind, extraordinarily well informed about world affairs, and meticulous in documenting what she said and wrote. In other words, here was a woman of the finest moral and intellectual integrity.

In more recent years, I have had the opportunity to observe at first hand Dr. Brunauer's activities in the Department of State. I was appointed by the National Commission for UNESCO as Chairman of its Committee on Secretariat in the Department of State, and in this capacity was required to analyze Dr. Brunauer's activities as a member of the UNESCO Relations Staff. The impressions formed in earlier years, set forth above, were reinforced by my study

of her services in the Department of State. I found her to be extremely conscientious, a tireless worker, and utterly loyal to our Government.

I am convinced that Senator McCarthy has done a grave injury to Mrs. Brunauer, and I hope that he or your committee will take appropriate steps to clear her name before the American public.

Sincerely,

BEN M. CHERRINGTON.

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
New York, N. Y., March 23, 1950.

Hon. MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I have recently read in the newspapers the accusations made by Senator McCarthy concerning Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer of the Department of State. These accusations seem to me irresponsible and unjust. As a loyal citizen of the United States I am venturing to write you this letter in defense of a person whom I feel is unjustly accused.

I have known Mrs. Brunauer for quite a number of years and was familiar with her work for the American Association of University Women before she joined the staff of the Department of State. During 1946 I was closely associated with her when she was the United States member of the Preparatory Commission for UNESCO and I was a Deputy Secretary-General on the staff of the Preparatory Commission. During that period I was working in London and Paris. Mrs. Brunauer was frequently there sitting with the Preparatory Commission. I had many close conferences with her concerning the policy of the United States respecting the development of UNESCO. In her work at the Preparatory Commission and in all my conversations with her, I know that she was a staunch defender of the American system. In the negotiations of the Preparatory Commission she consistently opposed the plans of Communist sympathizers. She as much as any other single person is responsible for the development of UNESCO along lines consistent with American policies.

Since 1947 I have been a member of the National Commission for UNESCO and its Executive Committee. In that capacity I have seen Mrs. Brunauer at work in the Department of State and have cooperated with her on various matters concerning cultural relations between nations. I can testify that at no time has there ever been the slightest evidence of disloyalty on her part. On the contrary, she has been alert and able at defending and advancing the democratic causes to which the United States and the western world are committed.

The attack on her is unjust and can only have the effect of weakening American prestige abroad and reducing the morale of the American civil service. I hope very much that an opportunity may be given Mrs. Brunauer for complete clearance of her good name.

Sincerely yours,

HOWARD E. WILSON.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CLEARING HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., March 23, 1950.

To Whom It May Concern:

I have known Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer since October 1945. I met her then in connection with the United States Delegation to the London Conference early in November 1945, to draft the charter of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. I was one of the advisers to the Delegation, and she was an expert for the Department of State. I saw a great deal of her in London and worked with her there on the official work of the Delegation. I have seen her since on two or three occasions in connection with meetings of the United States Commission for UNESCO, of which I was formerly a member, and on one occasion I visited her home.

I have every reason to consider Mrs. Brunauer a very faithful, conscientious, and able member of the State Department's permanent staff. She was highly regarded by our Commission to London and by everyone I have ever spoken to about her. No question of her loyalty or reliability has ever been raised in my presence, nor have I ever had any reason to doubt them. I have always

considered her to be a fine example of the American career woman in the Department of State, and a person in whose loyalty and integrity complete confidence can be placed.

Sincerely yours,

HERBERT EMMERICH.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 23, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: As a Maryland voter and constituent of yours, let me first salute you for the excellent job you are doing as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Investigating Subcommittee. The whole Nation has confidence in your integrity and fairness.

The purpose of this letter is to tell you and the other members of the subcommittee of my shock and utter incredulity over Senator McCarthy's charges that my friend, Esther Cankin Brunauer, was of questionable loyalty and a poor security risk. I have known her personally for many years—since the middle thirties at least. My husband, Raymond Clapper, who, as you will remember, was killed in World War II during the Marshall Island invasion, was also a great admirer of her clear, brilliant intellect. If he were alive today I am sure he would join me in vouching for Esther Brunauer's loyalty to the United States and her hatred of all subversive activities. It is simply preposterous for anyone who has known her to believe any such irresponsible nonsense as Senator McCarthy is suggesting.

Esther Brunauer was associated with the AAUW for seventeen years, 1927 to 1944 in their Department of international education. Neither the organization nor the subject of international education could possibly be considered questionable. Since 1944, Esther Brunauer has been in the Department of State as Assistant Director for Policy Liaison UNESCO Relations Staff. (Incidentally, just let me point out that Senator McCarthy's staff work must be inaccurate and sloppy. He referred to Mrs. Brunauer's work as concerned with internal security.)

In one of my regular weekly radio broadcasts over Station WCFM (March 16) I said:

"It is nauseating to listen to Senator McCarthy insinuating names such as those of Esther Brunauer, John Carter Vincent and John Davies into the Senate hearings. I can speak from personal knowledge of these three in particular. They happen to be almost lifetime friends of mine, about whose patriotism I would vouch any day. These attacks smack too much of the kind of thing Hitler as well as Stalin did so well. They create suspicion, hysteria and chaos—just what the Commies want."

I know of no franker way to voice my confidence in Esther Brunauer than I did in that broadcast.

Cordially,

OLIVE CLAPPER,
(Mrs. Raymond Clapper).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY,
Chicago, Ill., March 23, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I have learned with surprise that Senator McCarthy has testified concerning Mrs. Esther Cankin Brunauer before your subcommittee alleging that she is a person of questionable loyalty and a poor security risk. Since I have known Mrs. Brunauer for a number of years and have worked in close relations with her under circumstances which would give me grounds to judge the loyalty of her attitude, actions, and statements, I think it my duty to write to you concerning my judgment of Mrs. Brunauer's loyalty to the United States.

I have known Mrs. Brunauer since 1945. I was adviser to the United States Delegation to the General Conference of UNESCO in Paris in 1946, in Mexico City in 1947, and in Beirut in 1948, and was acting counsellor on UNESCO affairs attached to the Embassy in Paris in 1947. I had repeated opportunities to see Mrs. Brunauer at work. I have served on committees with her, I have been

present with her at sessions of the General Conference of UNESCO and its subcommittees, and I have conferred with her and corresponded with her on particular items of the UNESCO program and the United States policy with respect to that program. The members of a delegation learn a great deal about each other, particularly when the meetings extend to four or five weeks; and five years of acquaintance, a good part of them in close association of work and interest in an international agency like UNESCO, would afford numerous opportunities to learn about Mrs. Brunauer's basic attitudes and loyalty. In all the period of my acquaintance with Mrs. Brunauer I have never seen or heard her do or say anything disloyal to the United States. She has been an assiduous and an intelligent worker for the interests of the United States in the conferences in which I have seen her participate, and far from being a matter of question, her insight into and her adherence to the principles of the American way of life have seemed to be conspicuous in her work in the Department of State.

Yours sincerely,

RICHARD P. McKEON.

COTTEY COLLEGE,
Nevada, Mo., March 23, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
The United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I have known Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer over a period of almost twenty years and have been well acquainted with both her thought and the expression of that thought in her career as a leader in education and in public office.

Dr. Brunauer's loyalty to all which is constructive and fine in American life and in the American tradition is not to be questioned, and I am shocked that such an implication as Senator McCarthy made about her in his statement to the Subcommittee on Monday, March 13, should ever have been voiced. I am convinced that it is altogether without basis. The integrity and the loyalty of Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer are supported by her long record of conscientious, conservative, and intelligent service.

I should like to add that I am deeply troubled also by the irreparable harm which is done to persons in public careers by such unwarranted expressions as that of Senator McCarthy.

Very sincerely yours,

BLANCHE H. DOW, *President.*

ARLINGTON, VA., March 21, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I have learned of the charges made about March 13, 1950, that Dr. Stephen Brunauer and his wife, Dr. Esther Brunauer, are believed to be Communists or to have Communist affiliations.

I wish to take this opportunity to say that I have known Dr. and Mrs. Brunauer for over ten years and have always regarded them as American citizens completely loyal to the United States. I have never had the slightest reason for believing that either of them have any Communist leanings or affiliations and on the contrary have always understood that they are, as other loyal Americans, entirely opposed to Communism.

I may add as bearing on my statement that I have been connected with the Foreign Service and the State Department for thirty-three years and am at present Assistant Chief of the Visa Division. I have an English and Scotch family background going back to the Mayflower and early Colonial days and would not hesitate to divulge any derogatory information which might come to my attention.

I am glad to say that I have complete confidence in the loyalty of Dr. Brunauer and Mrs. Brunauer.

Sincerely yours,

ELIOT B. COULTER.

AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION,
Washington, D. C., March 21, 1950.

Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I have noted the statements in the newspapers emanating from Senator McCarthy reflecting upon the loyalty of Mrs. Esther Caukin

Brunauer. I wish to take this occasion to inform you and other members of the Committee that I have known Mrs. Brunauer over a period of approximately 15 years. This acquaintanceship covers the period when she was a member of the staff of the American Association of University Women and the period of her service in the Department of State beginning in March 1944.

In the course of my contacts with Mrs. Brunauer, I have had occasion to be acquainted with the nature of her work at the American Association of University Women and more particularly since she has been in the employ of the United States Department of State. As President of the American Council on Education I have had many and frequent contacts with her particularly in connection with the work of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

During all of this time I have admired the earnest self-sacrificing zeal with which she has pursued her work as a Federal employee. She has the respect and confidence of her associates, who, so far as I know, have never in any way questioned her loyalty and devotion to the principles of our Government. I am making this statement entirely without reservation.

Parenthetically, may I say that the character of the investigation which so far has resulted from Senator McCarthy's charges seems to me to reflect very unwisely upon innocent people and especially to injure the effectiveness of our diplomatic relationships in this exceedingly critical period of our history. It seems to me that we have thoroughly normal channels, well established, for testing the loyalty of government employees. I believe the present hearings have performed no useful service and on the other hand have been injurious to the character of innocent people and in our effectiveness in foreign relations.

Yours very sincerely,

GEORGE F. ZOOK, *President.*

THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Chicago, Ill., March 21, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: As you are interested in obtaining all possible information about those members of the Department of State who have been attacked as "Communists" or as "poor security risks" by Senator McCarthy, I should like to send you my unconditional endorsement of Esther Brunauer.

I worked with Mrs. Brunauer when she was Associate in International Education of the American Association of University Women, and in the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War. At that time I was Chairman of Foreign Policy for the National League of Women Voters and frequently discussed international relations with her. Since the establishment of the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO I have been associated with her at Commission meetings, committee meetings and at the General Conference in Paris, Mexico City and Beirut where I was a member of the U. S. Delegation.

I have never known a more devoted public servant than Mrs. Brunauer. She is careful, conscientious and loyal.

I hope that your Committee will speedily prove to your own satisfaction and that of the public that Mrs. Brunauer is a dependable and valuable member of the Department of State.

Sincerely yours,

LOUISE LEONARD WRIGHT.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
Stanford, Calif., March 21, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: May I bring to your attention a statement in behalf of Esther Cankin Brunauer, who has been accused by Senator McCarthy as one of the officials of the Department of State whose loyalty is questionable?

I have known Mrs. Brunauer for some twenty-five years. I first became acquainted with her at Stanford University where she studied with me as a graduate student. Her work was so outstanding that I recommended her highly

for a position as instructor at Scripps College. Before the decision was made she was offered a position with the American Association of University Women in Washington, D. C., which I felt would offer her greater possibilities so I urged her to accept it.

I have kept in touch with her and her work ever since that time. While working in the Department of State as head of the War History Unit, I had occasion to consider her work and found that she was doing a very excellent job. Later while I was writing a book on the history of the Department of State—which has recently been published by Macmillan—I again studied her work and that of the division to which she was attached and found both most satisfactory. Owing to the limitations of space and the cost of publication, I was compelled to eliminate from the manuscript the brief but praiseworthy evaluation which I gave of Mrs. Brunauer and her work.

I feel qualified to state categorically and unreservedly that I regard Esther Caukin Brunauer as the highest type of public servant, one who can be depended upon to serve her country to the best of her ability and with wholehearted loyalty and devotion.

Sincerely yours,

GRAHAM H. STUART.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 23, 1950.

HON. MILLARD TYDINGS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: For nine years Dr. Esther Brunauer has been known to me as the intelligent and loving mother of two little girls.

During the nine years I have been in the Brunauer home at irregular hours of the day and night and have never seen anything which would lead me to suspect otherwise than a typical home life, composed of Mr. Brunauer, Mrs. Brunauer, Sr., and the children.

I have been wondering how there could be much else than a typical home life in the Brunauer house without my knowing it, as Mrs. Brunauer, Sr., and the children are the type who tell all the family activities to the Doctor. I usually have had a good account of Dr. Brunauer's activities. Also the children show the result of much time spent upon them by the parents.

There has never been an accident or sudden illness during the nine years, when I was not able to immediately locate Dr. Brunauer. Both Dr. Brunauer and Mr. Brunauer seem to spend a lot of time with the family, and appear to enjoy home life and their children.

Sincerely,

MARGARET MARY NICHOLSON.

DIXIE CUP Co.,
March 21, 1950.

Re: Esther Caukin Brunauer.

HON. MILLARD TYDINGS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: I have been associated with Esther Brunauer in various undertakings for a decade or more. To me she has been the ideal among women consecrated to the interests of their country.

I remember at the San Francisco Conference, where I served as a Consultant, that she had her young children along, due to the fact that she had no one to leave them with in Washington. Most women would have said it was impossible to attend the Conference because of the children—but not Esther Brunauer.

She has worked with me in projects of the League of Nations, the United Nations Association, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, etc., etc.

My observation of her from first to last leads me to conclude that we need more—not fewer—women in American public life like Esther Brunauer.

Very truly yours,

HUGH MOORE.

NEW YORK, N. Y., March 21, 1950.

HONORABLE MILLARD TYDINGS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: As a life-long Republican, I have been deeply shocked by Senator McCarthy's current accusations, particularly against Dorothy Kenyon and Esther Brunauer, both of whom are well known to me personally.

Esther Brunauer I count as a friend of many years' standing. We served together for almost 20 years, beginning in 1927, on the *Committee on Selections for Oxford University* of the American Association of University Women. Dr. Brunauer was the very able and highly respected secretary of the committee, upon whose sound judgment and careful, scholarly approach to questions the other members constantly relied.

It is inconceivable that anyone with her fine intelligence, knowledge of history, mental and emotional poise should have Communist leanings or be the dupe of Communist agitators.

Throughout the years I have known her, I have never heard Esther Brunauer express any remotely questionable opinions.

If loyal, competent Government officials are to be branded as renegades, without proper redress, no matter how unfounded the charges, we shall inevitably lose the benefit of their services, and the country will suffer immeasurably.

Sincerely yours,

MARGERY B. LOENGARD.

THE WASHINGTON POST,
Washington, D. C., March 21, 1950.

HON. MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I am writing you in behalf of Dr. Esther C. Brunauer, of the State Department, a valued friend of mine, who in my opinion has been falsely and irresponsibly accused by Senator McCarthy of disloyalty to her Government.

As an editorial-page columnist for the Washington Post, I have known Dr. Brunauer personally and professionally for nearly 5 years. Before that I was generally familiar with her activities as international relations secretary for the American Association of University Women.

From the time that Dr. Brunauer was appointed a consultant for the London meeting to draft a constitution for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, on through her successive service with UNESCO, including her representation of this country with the rank of Minister at the first general conference of UNESCO in Paris, November 1946, I have frequently met with her to discuss the aims and purposes of her work. I have always found her strongly devoted to the freedom of knowledge and free exchange of ideas for which UNESCO stands. What is more, all her attitudes, utterances, conduct have always expressed a devotion to the ideals on which the American Government rests.

Dr. Brunauer's associates, insofar as I have known them, have been definitely anti-Communist. Personally I consider her reliability and honor beyond question. It is incredible and inconceivable that she should be accused of disloyalty.

Yours sincerely,

MALVINA LINDSAY.

AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION,
Washington, D. C., March 22, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR SIR: This letter is addressed to you and your associates in the Government of the United States as an expression of greatest personal confidence in the loyalty and integrity of Dr. Esther Calkin Brunauer of the Department of State.

I have personally known Dr. Brunauer for a period of 14 years. She is most highly respected among university women, in both this country and others, as a woman who, in her writings, public addresses, activities in organizations, and in her capacity as a national and international conference consultant, has steadfastly served to build up the best interests of democracy.

Dr. Brunauer's leadership activities have at no time been other than consistent with the welfare of this country. It would be impossible for her, by the very nature of her interests and of her character, to be other than a person of highest reliability and good faith.

My closest association with Dr. Brunauer have been in the work of the American Association of University Women, an educational organization which, in all its activities, is soundly American. From 1936 to 1944, while Dr. Brunauer was Associate in International Relations on the Headquarters Staff of the American

Association of University Women and while I was on the faculty in psychology at the Pennsylvania State College, I served also as AAUW State president for Pennsylvania. During that period, I closely followed the work and leadership of Dr. Brunauer. Her loyalty to her country, then and now, is a matter of established record and dependability.

The Government of the United States is fortunate to have on the Staff of its Department of State a woman of the caliber and integrity of Dr. Brunauer.

Very truly yours,

(MRS.) HELEN K. KNANDEL,
Educational Consultant, Traffic Engineering & Safety Department.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 21, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I want very much to express to you my deep conviction as to the loyalty to our country of Esther Caukin Brunauer which has been questioned by Senator McCarthy before your subcommittee.

I have known Mrs. Brunauer since 1925 when L was a freshman at Stanford University in California. She was then a graduate assistant to my professor of European history, Dr. Ralph Lutz. Dr. Lutz, as you may know, has been for many years associated with former President Hoover in the work of the Hoover War Library at Stanford. I know that Dr. Brunauer is held in the highest esteem by the faculty under whom she worked at Stanford for her doctorate.

My friendship with her continued when I came to live in Washington in 1930. Since that time I have had regular contact with her, sometimes in various organization activities: The American Association of University Women; the Committee on the Cause and Cure of War headed by Carrie Chapman Catt; the Committee on the Organization of Peace, headed by Dr. James T. Shotwell, and sometimes in purely social gatherings.

I have always considered her contribution to popular discussion of public affairs of the highest quality. She has been one of those professionally trained women who has accepted the responsibility of citizenship—to help people generally become informed about public issues in order that they may act on informed judgments. To me there is no greater contribution to the democratic way of life.

I have also known her husband, Stephen Brunauer, since the time of their marriage, primarily in a social capacity. I have had no grounds *whatsoever* to question his loyalty to this, his adopted country. Contrariwise, I have always respected his defense of free institutions and his service to the cause of freedom during the last war. I know, too, that members of his family have suffered in Hungary at the hands of both Fascists and Communists.

If there is anything else that you think I might do to help clear the names of Mr. and Mrs. Brunauer before your committee, I would be most happy to be called upon.

Yours sincerely,

ANNE HARTWELL JOHNSTONE.

P. S.—I should identify myself as a housewife and mother of two daughters. I am currently a Director of the League of Women Voters of the United States. I am married to William C. Johnstone, for 20 years associated with George Washington University and now Director of the Office of Educational Exchange, Department of State—A. H. J.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS,

Washington, D. C., March 22, 1950.

Honorable MILLARD E. TYDINGS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: This letter is in reference to Esther Caukin Brunauer.

I have known Dr. Brunauer for the past twelve years. I have known her in special reference to her work in the State Department. The American Association of University Professors, of which I am the General Secretary, has always been interested in the programs of the State Department concerned with higher education and cultural affairs, and representatives of this Association frequently

confer with members of the Professional Staff of the State Department in reference to higher education and cultural affairs. I have participated in a number of conferences with Dr. Brunauer and others of the State Department. I regard Dr. Brunauer as an able scholarly woman and as a loyal American.

At the Thirty-third Annual Meeting of this Association, which was held in Boston, Massachusetts, on February 22-23, 1947, Dr. Brunauer was a participant on the program. She spoke on the general subject: "UNESCO: Its Background and Its Role in Building for Peace." Also participating in this meeting and speaking on this subject was Mr. Charles A. Thomson, Executive Secretary of the United States National Commission for UNESCO. Both Dr. Brunauer and Mr. Thomson contributed immeasurably to the success of the meeting and to the consideration of the significant subject on which they spoke.

I have had occasion to work with Dr. Brunauer in other connections. When members of the Staff of the Hungarian Embassy resigned from that Embassy at the time the Soviets took over the Government of Hungary, Dr. Brunauer sought the help of this Association in finding academic positions for some of these persons and our joint efforts resulted in the placement of some of them. This is but a small bit of evidence, but very good evidence, that Dr. Brunauer is not only not a communist but is not in any way sympathetic with communist regimes.

There has never been and there is not now any doubt in my mind concerning Dr. Brunauer's complete loyalty to the Government of the United States.

Very sincerely yours,

RALPH E. HIMSTEAD.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 22, 1950.

HON. MILLARD TYDINGS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I recently read in the newspaper about my patient Mrs. Esther C. Brunauer and I feel it is my duty to make some statements about my experiences with her.

I am an Obstetrician and I delivered Mrs. Brunauer three times: on July 31, 1934, October 24, 1938, and on May 11, 1942. She first came to me on January 10, 1934, and at that time she was about 2½ months pregnant. She came to my office frequently for prenatal care. I delivered her the first time after a 28-hour labor. I came in contact with her many, many times. Similarly with the second and third pregnancies. I came in close contact with her on numerous occasions.

As she is highly intelligent and quite an interesting person I discussed with her various topics aside from our Doctor-patient relationship. I can honestly and conscientiously say that she had never made any remark that would reflect upon her loyalty to our form of government or Constitution of the United States. In my estimation she always was a valuable asset to the community and our country. If necessary, I am willing to state these facts under oath.

I never heard her make any remark favoring any subversive movement or foreign "ism." In other words, in my estimation she is a good American citizen as anyone I ever met. I saw her last in my office on September 11, 1947, and at that time her conduct was no different than at any time before.

Respectfully yours,

H. HERTZBERG, M. D.

SANTA MONICA, CALIF., March 21, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: For the past twenty years, in various capacities in relation to the American Association of University Women—as member of the National Board of Directors, Regional Vice President, Director of the South Pacific Section, etc.—I have been in active contact with Mrs. Esther Caukin Brunauer. During that time I have had ample opportunity to observe the character of her work, the facets of her personality, and the nature of her relationships with various groups. These have been consistently straightforward and unimpeachably constructive.

Furthermore, I have read with care and attention, as they appeared, a good number of the pamphlets and brochures which Mrs. Brunauer brought out dur-

ing her distinguished service with the American Association of University Women.

Although my home is on the West Coast, I have frequently been in Washington, particularly during the war, when I served on the seven-woman Advisory Council set up by the Navy Department. During that period I was in fairly continuous touch with Mrs. Brunauer, as also during the San Francisco Conference, where I was a consultant to the American Delegation, representing the American Association of University Women.

Throughout these two decades I have never heard, and I think, until Senator McCarthy included Mrs. Brunauer in his sweeping challenge, no one of my acquaintance had ever heard her integrity or her deep loyalty to her country questioned.

Mr. Brunauer I have known for a much shorter period, but always with the sense of his unflinching integrity. Mrs. Brunauer is a woman who, with her husband, has quietly, unostentatiously kept her home, raised her family, and served her country. Few have maintained a more honorable or a more truly American record.

Sincerely yours,

(Mrs. M. W.) GLADYS MURPHY GRAHAM.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 21, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I am writing to you because I should like to go on record regarding the loyalty of Esther Caukin Brunauer. I am now serving on the Policy Planning Staff and have been with the Department of State for seven years. Prior to that time I was instructor in government and sociology at Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts.

I have known Mrs. Brunauer since I worked with her in the Department of State in preparation for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944. I was closely associated with her in these preparations and during the San Francisco Conference on International Organization in 1945. Subsequently, I have worked with her in connection with the development of American policy in the United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization (UNESCO), and she and I worked closely together on the Delegation to the Mexico Conference of UNESCO in 1947. These associations resulted in my knowing Mrs. Brunauer intimately and in having a very full insight into her thinking.

I want you to know that anyone who knows her as well as I do can have no doubt whatsoever as to her complete integrity and loyalty as an American. In all my experience with her I have never found her to depart in her thinking from basic American principles of democracy, and her devoted and energetic action on behalf of those principles in her government work testify to her complete sincerity. She is a person of great character and deep convictions, and those convictions are unqualifiedly dedicated to promoting our national interest.

I did not want to let this opportunity pass to add this word on behalf of one of our most useful and most highly regarded government servants.

Sincerely yours,

DOROTHY FOSDICK.

THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA,
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY,
Athens, Ga., March 23, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I am addressing you in regard to Esther Caukin Brunauer, whose loyalty and fitness for service in the State Department have been questioned by Senator McCarthy.

The charges made against Miss Brunauer seem to me to be fantastic, utterly without basis of evidence, from the knowledge I have of Miss Brunauer. She has been known to me for many years, earlier in connection with her executive position in the Association of University Women, and more recently in connection with the United States Delegation to London, in 1945, to establish the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

In April 1944, I was appointed by Secretary of State Hull under the Roosevelt Administration as a member of the Commission headed by Representative, now Senator, Fullbright, to London for consultation with the Allied Ministers of Education as to the uses of education as an instrument of peace after the war. Miss Brunauer of the State Department prepared much of the material which gave helpful information to the American Commission during our labors in London during the month of April 1944.

In November 1945, under President Truman's Administration, I was again appointed as a Delegate on the Commission of the United States to London to the constituent assembly which set up the charter for UNESCO. On this Commission Miss Brunauer served as an Expert Adviser from the State Department.

For the month of November 1945, I worked in daily consultation with Miss Brunauer. During that period, in thrashing out all sorts of questions which our delegates had to consider, never did I hear a word from Miss Brunauer, either in official or unofficial dealings, which would reveal even the slightest Communist or pro-Communist leanings. Nor have I ever heard in general rumor even the faintest whisper to suggest that Miss Brunauer might be a Red, or even a Pink.

The strong impression I had, and still have, of Miss Brunauer is one of steady admiration for her clarity of thinking and for her expert, accurate knowledge of American international affairs. I had and have complete faith in her high sense of patriotism and complete loyalty to this country. I shall be glad if my word of testimony can help to right the grievous wrong against Miss Brunauer in the charges which appear to me false and entirely without evidence to support them.

Sincerely yours,

C. MILDRED THOMPSON,
Emeritus Dean and Professor of History, Vassar.
At Present, Professor of History, University of Georgia.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 22, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: Immediately upon learning that Esther Caukin Brunauer's name had been mentioned in connection with the investigation of the loyalty of State Department employees, I wish to convey to the committee in some form, any information which I may have which would be of use, however slight, in the attempt to arrive at a true picture of the situation.

I have known Dr. Brunauer for a period of approximately 15 years and during much of that time I have worked with her on matters of broad public interest particularly in the field of economics. I have known her and her husband socially and have had many pleasant talks on matters of national concern. During these years I have never had the slightest reason to question the complete loyalty and patriotism of Dr. Brunauer. I feel I have a reasonably clear understanding of her attitudes and political views and have reason to think that they are very close to my own. While I am not in a position to judge what information would be of use to your committee, I should like to make this general statement and if you should desire it, would attempt to add more specific information if I had some indication of what would be useful.

Very sincerely yours,

ELEANOR LANSING DULLES.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 21, 1950.*

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: For many years Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer has been intimately connected with the American Association of University Women. She is at present an advisor on the Board of the Washington Branch of the American Association of University Women.

There is no one whose sound advice and good judgment I value more than Dr. Brunauer's. She is a person of excellent ability and of great integrity. She is a great humanitarian and a loyal American.

I sincerely hope that your committee will speedily correct the misinformation used by Senator McCarthy.

Sincerely yours,

(Mrs. A. J.) RUTH S. BRUMBAUGH,
President, Washington Branch, American Association of University Women.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 21, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I am writing you about Dr. Esther Brunauer, who, according to recent press releases, was among those whose loyalty to the Government of the United States was questioned by Senator McCarthy.

It has been my privilege during the last three or four years to work fairly closely with Dr. Brunauer on matters relating to UNESCO. At no time have I known her to make a statement or to take a position that would lead one to doubt her loyalty to our Government. When questions of policy have arisen that required a definite position to be taken there was never any uncertainty that she stood solidly for the American form of government.

It is indeed to be regretted that any Member of the Congress should resort to measures resembling those employed by the forms of government of which we so heartily disapprove.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. BRUMBAUGH.

ARLINGTON, VA., March 27, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SENATOR: I should like to comment on the recent charges that Dr. Esther Caulkin Brunauer is a bad security risk.

I served as Dr. Brunauer's secretary for a period of two years from the time of my appointment in the Department of State on January 24, 1947. I was not acquainted with her prior to this assignment, and have not been officially associated with her since January 1949, when I was transferred to another Division within the Department. I assure you that this letter is purely voluntary on my part.

During the two years of my association with her I came to know her intimately and to discover that she is a truly great woman and in equal measure a great American. Patriotism, with Dr. Brunauer, is not something she tucks away for special occasions as most of us do. It is the essence of her daily thinking and motivates her daily life.

When, three years ago, Representative Busbey charged her with disloyalty to her country I assisted in her preparation of a categorical denial of the charges. I therefore am familiar with the exact charges and with the exact rebuttals. It was my observation that the charges were completely disproved by the facts presented. The denial was accepted by the Senate and published in the *Congressional Record* in July 1947. It is, therefore, difficult to understand how these disproved charges can now be used against her.

Dr. Brunauer prepared herself to take a responsible part in the international affairs of her Government by many years of study both here and abroad. She continues to take a scholarly approach to every aspect of her work of relating the policy of United States representation in UNESCO to the total American foreign policy.

The esteem and honor which is accorded her name were earned by twenty years of constructive work in the interests of her country. I know how she operates. She is modest. She seeks no personal acclaim. She is concerned only with the ultimate goal of mutual understanding and peace among the nations of the world. Were she a person of lesser stature, her idealistic approach might seem naive, but her sincerity often leaves others abashed. As her secretary I realize the depth of her sincerity and her content in making her contribution. Many join me in the opinion that she is making a greater individual contribution than any woman in America.

I was working daily with her at the time when the Hungarian Government was taken over by the Communists. I was familiar, through her, with the

names and identities of the outstanding Hungarian figures in that event. I was a witness to the strain Dr. Brunauer and her husband were under during those critical days in Hungary. I was a witness to the grief they shared when the coup was complete and many of their friends in Hungary, who had held out to the end, succumbed to the pressure of communism. And I was a witness to their sympathetic attitude towards those members of the Hungarian Embassy staff in Washington who resigned their posts. It was abundantly clear which side the Brunauers were on.

The recent charges against Dr. Brunauer can very easily be disproved. No one who has ever been closely associated with her gives the smallest credence to the charges. However, the general public has no basis on which to form an opinion. It is hoped that the same spotlight can be turned on clearing her as was turned on accusing her—in simple justice—and in recompense for the unwarranted injury done her.

Sincerely yours,

(Mrs.) EIRE STEVENS.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 27, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD E. TYDINGS,

Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I have known Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer, and her mother, and her father for thirty-three years. Both the charges which have been made against her publicly before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and the circumstances under which they have been made shock me deeply.

Because there exists in the Executive Branch of the Government an adequate procedure for determining whether any employee is fit for and worthy of employment by the Government in a particular position, it should be unnecessary for any individual to speak in behalf of another individual who is employed by the Government. I have confidence in and respect for those procedures. By the use of them, it has been determined that Dr. Esther Brunauer is worthy of employment by the Federal Government in the position of responsibility and trust which she now occupies.

Nevertheless, and in spite of the application of those procedures, and the availability of other confidential procedures in the Government for ascertaining facts, for making determination of who may be or may have become undesirable, it has been charged publicly, in the Senate of the United States that Dr. Brunauer is not a proper person for such employment. This is a very serious matter and, yet, mere unsubstantiated assertions have been made about her. Resort has been made to anonymous allegations, malicious assertions, hearsay, gossip, and innuendo. Inaccurate and untrue statements have been made about her. The attack upon her is defamatory to her reputation and good name. But because it has been made within the areas of privileged communications to the Senate, and of the immunities of Members of the Senate, Dr. Esther Brunauer is deprived of the protection of fundamental legal procedures, of the right to defend her good name in court, and of obtaining remedies for injury to her name and reputation.

The very procedures in the Executive Branch of the Government which exist to protect both the Government and the individual, procedures involving the safeguarding of privacy, the right to present evidence and to obtain hearings, appeals and reviews, all of these are set to naught and nullified by the circumstances under which attacks have been made upon Dr. Esther Brunauer.

I deeply deplore those circumstances. But since they exist, it becomes necessary for those who know Dr. Brunauer to state publicly the facts about her which they know, and their opinion of her. Therefore, I desire to make the following statement:

Esther Caukin, now Mrs. Stephen Brunauer, is the daughter of Grace Blackwell Caukin and Ray Caukin, and was born in California. Her ancestors on both sides fought in the American War for Independence. Her ancestors were of English, Irish, French, and Dutch stock. On her mother's side, her ancestors settled in Connecticut in 1630. Her great grandfather, Ed. Riley, settled in San Francisco in 1858. He was Boston Irish.

Her father, Ray Caukin, served in the Army, in the Signal Corps, in World War I. He is a member of the American Legion, a past commander. He was a United States Post Master in Sierra Madre, California, and is now retired.

Her mother, Grace Blackwell Caukin, was a leader in the Woman's Suffrage movement in California; was Secretary of the California Woodrow Wilson Campaign Committee; and was executive secretary, at one time, of the California Democratic State Central Committee.

Both of her parents are living. They are splendid Americans, and solid citizens.

I attended the San Francisco Girls High School with Esther Caukin Brunauer, where we became close friends. We participated together in certain school activities, and attended certain classes together. I know her character and her attitudes very well, from long acquaintance. We have kept in touch with each other from the time of our youth. From 1933 to the present, I have known Dr. Brunauer closely in Washington, D. C.

From the time I first knew Esther Brunauer in 1917 until now, she has made a record for which she deserves the highest commendation and respect; she had the highest record in her class in high school; she received scholarships in Mills College, California, and at Stanford University. At Mills College she won the Senior Class Prize for Scholarship, and there she founded The Honor Society (the equivalent of Phi Beta Kappa), and was the vice president of the Associated Students.

At Mills College she attracted the friendship of the President of the College, the late Dr. Auralia Henry Reinhardt. At Stanford University she was a protégé of the late Dr. David Starr Jordan, Chancellor of Stanford. Later, she became a friend of the late Carrie Chapman Catt. Throughout her life, she has enjoyed the friendship and high regard of leaders in the field of education, and in public life, and of good and reputable people.

A distinguished scholar of history and international relations—A. B., 1924, Mills College; M. A., 1925, and Ph. D., 1927, Stanford University—she became a member of the staff in Washington, D. C., of the American Association of University Women, in 1927, where she was director of its International Relations Section, directing research and study programs for members of the Association, and acting as its representative to the International Federation of University Women. She held this post for seventeen years, until March 1944, when she received an appointment in the State Department, Division of International Security and Organization. She is still employed in the State Department. She has, therefore, held only two jobs in twenty-three years, which is evidence of both competence, trustworthiness, and faithfulness.

She married Stephen Brunauer in 1931. I have a high opinion of him. She has had three children, two of which are living. She has been as competent in her home as she has been in her professional work. She is a devoted wife and mother. Her two daughters are well reared and well cared for, and all that parents wish their children to be.

Esther Caukin Brunauer has certain traits of character which are predominant: She is loyal, sincere, honest, thorough, and possessed of good judgment. She has devoted herself to her family and to her professional work all of her life. She has concentrated upon her professional work to the exclusion of varied and miscellaneous pursuits; and she has not been a joiner of organizations. Because her professional work took her into the study of international problems, in which she acquired a high professional reputation, she was chosen to serve on the National Committee of the Cause and Cure of War. That national committee was made up of representatives of about eleven national women's organizations, and she was one of the representatives of the American Association of University Women. She was chairman of a very important committee of the Committee of the Cause and Cure of War, a committee appointed in 1936 to make a study of our national defense. This committee reported its findings in a printed pamphlet, and its findings created substantial public support of the program of the Army for strengthening the United States military organization.

Dr. Esther Brunauer has belonged to very few organizations, most of them professional; and none of the few she joined have ever been put on any list of subversive or Communist "front" organizations.

People sometimes are judged by their associates. In my long acquaintance and friendship with Esther Brunauer, I have observed that her associations, contacts, and friendships have always been with persons who are respected and honored.

What people think, say, and write is often an index of their points of view. I can say unequivocally that Esther Brunauer thinks, talks and acts in accordance with the highest concepts of a loyal, American citizen, and a Christian. She is not and never has been a faddist, a soft-headed or a soft-hearted "sympathizer,"

a believer in any of the ideologies of advocates of un- or non-democratic political or social systems. She is not a Communist "sympathizer" or "fellow-traveler." She is not and never has been a Communist, or a Fascist, or anything other than a real American and democratic citizen.

I know of nothing in the record of Esther Brunauer which would provide a basis for questioning her loyalty to her country, or her fitness for any position of confidence and trust in any department of the Government, or anywhere else. I have complete faith in her. I respect and admire her.

My opinion of Dr. Esther Brunauer is as follows: She is a loyal citizen of the United States. She is a real American. She is an honorable woman, possessed of the highest character and integrity in every respect—intellectually, morally, and spiritually. She is possessed of keen intellect, sound judgment, strength of character, and outstanding ability.

A great many women in the State of California, and throughout the United States, are very proud of Esther Brunauer. Her story, her life, and her achievements have been what we consider the best of womanhood that can be produced in our country. I resent deeply (and I know that I speak for many women) the irresponsible charges and insinuations which have been lodged against her. They are preposterous, scurrilous, and outrageous.

Esther Brunauer, an honorable and distinguished woman, a leader among women, and a competent and loyal public servant, has been unjustly humiliated before a committee of the United States Senate, and before the public. I am confident that the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate will find no merit whatsoever in the allegations which have been made against her. And when that conclusion becomes evident, I sincerely hope, Senator Tydings, that your Committee will publicly absolve Esther Brunauer from the charges which have been made, so that in that way, there may be restored to her, as far as possible, the full confidence and eminent status which she enjoyed before this extremely unfortunate incident occurred, and so that she may be completely vindicated.

Respectfully yours,

Marion J. Harron.
(Judge) MARION J. HARRON.

EXHIBIT No. 57

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN
National Headquarters, 1634 Eye Street, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

STATEMENT REGARDING THE WORK OF MRS. ESTHER CAUKIN BRUNAUER AS A MEMBER OF THE STAFF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, 1927-44, ANNEXED TO THE LETTER OF MARCH 22, 1950, ADDRESSED TO SENATOR MILLARD E. TYDINGS, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ASSIGNED TO INVESTIGATE CHARGES OF DISLOYALTY AMONG EMPLOYEES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(Prepared by the General Director of the American Association of University Women)

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy is reported to have said that Mrs. Esther Caikin Brunauer was for many years executive secretary of the American Association of University Women; and further, that she was instrumental in "committing this organization to the support of various front enterprises, particularly in the so-called consumer field." Both these statements will be shown to be untrue.

* THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN

Organization and purpose.—The American Association of University Women was organized in Boston in 1882 for the purpose of uniting the alumnae of different colleges and universities for "practical educational work." It is an educational organization, composed of women graduates of approved institutions; at the present time its membership numbers approximately 110,000 women, graduates of 271 colleges and universities. The purpose and policies of the Association are promoted through the joint efforts of its members, organized into local branches in every state. At present there are 1,157 branches, repre-

senting a cross section of women graduates of colleges and universities of the highest standing. The policies of the Association are voted by delegates representing the membership in the biennial convention of the Association, and are carried out by appropriate committees.

A major activity of the Association in its various branches is an extensive program of adult education. This program represents a sense of responsibility on the part of the women college graduates who make up the Association to be informed themselves, to cultivate intelligent public opinion on major issues, and to take action on the basis of a study of the facts.

Professional staff.—For each of the Association's committees there is a professional staff member at the national Headquarters, who carries on research and study and directs and counsels the membership in cooperating toward the Association's objectives in the field which she represents. The staff associates carry out the policies voted by the convention and developed by the national committees and the national Board of Directors. Staff members do not make policy.

In 1927 Mrs. Brunauer was appointed as a staff associate at national Headquarters for the Committee on International Relations, a position which she occupied continuously until March 7, 1944. During that time her work was confined solely to international education and international relations.

AAUW CONSUMER ACTIVITIES

The statement of Senator McCarthy that Mrs. Brunauer was "instrumental in committing this organization to the support of various front enterprises, particularly in the so-called consumer field," is completely at variance with the facts. Mrs. Brunauer had nothing whatever to do with the Association's consumer program. While the consumer activities of the Association are therefore not involved in this investigation, since this program has been attacked by Senator McCarthy, I wish to state emphatically that the consumer program of the American Association of University Women could not by any stretch of the imagination nor in any particular be considered a "communist front" activity.

Senator McCarthy has referred specifically to an instance reported in the New York Times for April 27, 1943. We find no reference to the American Association of University Women in the New York Times of that date; we do find an item in the Times of April 26 to which Senator McCarthy probably refers. This item states that a request, signed by 15 organizations, was presented to Price Administrator Prentiss M. Brown, urging that grade labeling of canned fruits and vegetables be required as a feature of price control, in order that price maintenance should not be defeated by a lowering of quality. In this suggestion the Association was joined by the American Home Economics Association, the Young Women's Christian Association, the National Council of Jewish Women, and other reputable organizations. To imply that a request for information to enable housewives to know what they are buying is a "front enterprise" is manifestly absurd.

MRS. BRUNAUER'S RECORD

But as I have stated, Mrs. Brunauer had nothing to do with the above or any other consumer activity of the Association. Her responsibility was to help in carrying out the objectives of the Association's Committee on International Relations, which were: (1) "to foster closer international relationships among university women throughout the world," and (2) "to assist in building up an informed, vigorous American foreign policy."

Mrs. Brunauer gave wholehearted cooperation and leadership in the carrying out of both these purposes—and both are completely alien to the communist philosophy. As international relations associate, she devoted much time and effort to the International Federation of University Women, an organization which the university women of the U. S. S. R. never joined, although the way was open.

To the second purpose, the "building of an informed, vigorous opinion on American foreign policy," Mrs. Brunauer contributed continuously and effectively. She prepared, or arranged to have prepared, materials to assist local groups in studying international issues objectively—a purpose entirely at variance with the propaganda tactics of communism. By her honest, objective, and scholarly approach to controversial questions, she did much to develop the techniques and standards which have given the Association a place of leadership in the adult

education field. The Association benefited greatly by her knowledge, integrity, good sense, intelligence, and logical thinking.

While Mrs. Brunauer's whole record as an AAUW staff member exemplified the best traditions of American democracy, I wish to call the attention of your Committee particularly to the part she played in the Association's international activities in the critical period of 1939-41. This was the period of the Nazi-U. S. S. R. friendship pact, when communists in the United States were violently isolationists and anti-British. At this time, the American Association of University Women was following the opposite line. Some instances of the Association's activities which were in direct contradiction to the policies advocated by communists may be cited:

(1) In the summer of 1940, the Association appealed to its members for homes for British children who might be sent to the United States for safety; more than 3,000 members offered their homes.

(2) In September 1940, the Association cabled £1,000 to the British Association of University Women for war relief.

(3) In September 1940, the Association cabled \$2,000 to the University Women of Finland, a country then suffering from the effects of Russian aggression.

(4) On January 1, 1941, a letter which Dr. Brunauer helped to draft, which was signed by the Headquarters staff, was sent to all AAUW branches and State divisions, urging them to promote public discussion of aid to Britain, and asking that branches and members individually communicate their opinions on this issue to their Congressmen.

(5) As a preliminary to the 1941 convention, an inquiry was sent to all branches asking their opinions as to the extent of aid this government should give to those resisting the Axis powers, and encouraging study of the question.

(6) On May 8, 1941 (while the Stalin-Hitler pact was still in effect and communists were demanding, "Keep us out of war!") the American Association of University Women in its biennial convention voted:

(a) Recognition of a common cause with all nations resisting totalitarian aggression and the furnishing of whatever aid we can give to make this resistance effective.

(b) Development of a closer international collaboration to be begun now among the people resisting the Axis powers, and expanded as rapidly as possible into suitable international institutions.

(The Association was, as far as I know, the first of the large women's organizations to advocate such a step, and the convention delegates voted in full understanding that military aid might be involved.)

(7) Immediately after this convention action, Mrs. Brunauer quickly furnished AAUW branch and state international relations chairman with study materials on how to make U. S. aid effective, urged continuous study of the crisis in American foreign policy, and transmitted the convention request that members communicate their opinions to members of Congress.

In these activities—all in direct opposition to the "party line" of that time—Mrs. Brunauer was not a passive or reluctant participant; she was a leading spirit in promoting all of them. Indeed, some members criticized her for too openly favoring aid to Britain before this country entered the war.

Senator McCarthy is reported to have accused Mrs. Brunauer of being "instrumental in committing this organization [the American Association of University Women] to the support of various 'front' enterprises." As I have stated, Mrs. Brunauer had nothing to do with the particular enterprise which Senator McCarthy cited. But it is true that she was instrumental in carrying out other enterprises, outlined above—enterprises undertaken for the preservation of democracy and directly in opposition to the policies advocated by communists and communist sympathizers.

MARCH 22, 1950.

EXHIBIT No. 58

STATEMENT OF DUTIES OF HALDORE HANSON WITH DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1942 TO DATE

I. FEBRUARY 1942-DECEMBER 1944: DIVISIONAL ASSISTANT, DIVISION OF CULTURAL COOPERATION

This was principally a recruiting job, arising out of the program of wartime aid to China, and involving the recruiting of American civilian technicians for service in China, including engineers, agricultural experts, and health specialists.

II. DECEMBER 1944-SEPTEMBER 1947: EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

I served as Executive Assistant under two Assistant Secretaries, covering a period of two and one-half years. I was responsible for their correspondence and visitors, and the management of their office.

During this period, I had the special assignment of drafting the legislation authorizing the United States Information and Educational Exchange Program. I worked with congressional committees for three years on this legislation which is now known as the Smith-Mundt Act (or Public Law 402, 80th Congress). Incidental to this legislative work, I represented the Department of State in hearings on Senator Mundt's resolution for an International Office of Education, the bill authorizing United States participation in UNESCO, and Senator Fulbright's legislation establishing scholarship funds from surplus property proceeds.

III. SEPTEMBER 1947-NOVEMBER 1948: ACTING CHIEF, FAR EAST BRANCH, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OVERSEAS PROGRAM STAFF

The Program Staff was an organization under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. The Far East Branch was responsible for recruiting the overseas staff for five countries in the Far East, and for advising the Media Divisions (such as the Divisions for Broadcasting, Press, Libraries) regarding public attitudes of the various peoples in the Far East. During this period I made an inspection trip to all of our information posts in the Far East.

IV. NOVEMBER 1948 TO DATE: EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL COOPERATION

This Committee has for ten years conducted a program of technical cooperation with Latin America, providing technical training and technical advisors to foreign governments in such fields as agriculture, health, education, and engineering. Recently, under authority of the Smith-Mundt Act, the Committee has expanded its activities on a small scale to Asia and Africa.

I spent much of the year 1949 in travelling away from Washington. During the months of January through March, I was on an inspection trip of our present technical activities in Latin America. During July and August I served as advisor to Assistant Secretary Thorp at the meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Council in Geneva, Switzerland. This Council was drafting the United Nations resolution on technical assistance. During September and October, I was an advisor on the American delegation to the United States General Assembly which was reviewing the same resolution. In November, I was an advisor to the American delegation at the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization which met in Washington. Again my assignment concerned a resolution on technical assistance.

In December 1949, my office and staff here transferred from the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, in preparation for the Point IV Program. My staff is part of a new office in the Department entitled the "Interim Office of Technical Cooperation and Development." The duties of the Interim Office and the responsibilities of the other offices of the Department in relation to this Program are set forth in Departmental Announcement 41, a copy of which is attached.

Department of State

Departmental Announcement 41

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERIM OFFICE FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (POINT FOUR PROGRAM)

1. Effective immediately there is established under the direction of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development (TCD).

2. The Interim Office is assigned general responsibility within the Department for (a) securing effective administration of programs involving technical assistance to economically underdeveloped areas and (b) directing the planning in preparation for the Technical Cooperation and Economic Development (Point Four) Program. In carrying out its responsibilities the Interim Office will rely upon the regional bureaus, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, and other components of Economic Affairs area for participation in the technical assistance

programs as specified below, and upon the central administrative offices of the Administrative area for the performance of service functions.

3. The Interim Office has specific action responsibility for :

- (a) Developing over-all policies for the program.
- (b) Formulating general program plans and issuing planning directives.
- (c) Coordinating specific program plans developed by the regional bureaus and making necessary adjustments.
- (d) Approving projects, determining action agencies, and allocating funds for U. S. bilateral programs.
- (e) Directing negotiations and relationships with intergovernmental agencies and with other U. S. agencies participating in the coordinated program or otherwise carrying on technical assistance activities.
- (f) Reviewing instructions to the field.

4. The Interim Office will coordinate the development of operating policies governing administrative problems generally applicable to technical assistance programs such as utilization of available specialized personnel, conditions of employment, and utilization of training facilities.

5. The regional bureaus have responsibility with respect to technical assistance programs for :

- (a) Initiating and developing plans for technical assistance programs for individual countries or groups of countries within their respective regions.
- (b) Reviewing program proposals affecting their regions which originate from any other source.
- (c) Negotiating and communicating with foreign governments.
- (d) Directing State Department personnel assigned abroad to coordinate, and give administrative and program support to, bilateral programs.
- (e) Continuously evaluating programs and projects within regions.
- (f) Proposing program changes.
- (g) Initiating instructions to the field carrying out their responsibilities, and reviewing all other instructions concerned with technical assistance programs.

Responsibilities previously assigned to the regional bureaus in connection with the Philippine Rehabilitation Program, Economic Cooperation Administration Aid programs, and existing programs in Germany and Japan are not affected by this announcement except for paragraph 4 above which will apply where circumstances require.

6. The Bureau of United Nations Affairs has—

(a) Action responsibility for—

- 1. Developing the U. S. position concerning the international organizational machinery to be used in connection with technical assistance activities ;
- 2. Developing the U. S. position concerning the relative proportions of contributions to be made by the U. S. and by other countries to the special technical assistance accounts of international organizations ;
- 3. Coordinating negotiations involving such accounts.

(b) Advisory responsibility concerning :

- 1. The character and scope of technical cooperation programs undertaken by international organizations ;
- 2. The amounts of U. S. contributions to the special technical assistance accounts of international organizations ;
- 3. U. S. positions on program allocations from such accounts by international organizations.

The Bureau of United Nations Affairs maintains general contact with international organizations in line with its over-all responsibilities and arranges for direct contact between the United Nations and the participating specialized agencies and the Interim Office of Technical Cooperation and Development or U. S. agencies on operating program matters as requested by the Interim Office. The Bureau for Inter-American Affairs makes corresponding arrangements with respect to intergovernmental arrangements of the American states.

7. The following have such responsibilities in connection with technical assistance programs as are in accord with their general responsibilities set forth in the Organization Manual of the Department.

(a) The Office of Financial and Development Policy with respect to the International Bank and Monetary Fund.

(b) The Office of Transport and Communications Policy with respect to the International Telecommunication Union and the International Civil Aviation Organization.

(c) The UNESCO Relations Staff with respect to UNESCO.

8. Responsibility for the administration of the Department's scientific and technical exchange activities under the U. S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, and under the Act of August 9, 1939, authorizing the President to render closer and more effective the relationship between the American republics, insofar as these activities are directly related to specific economic development projects, is transferred from the Office of Educational Exchange to the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development. Activities which are not so related remain the responsibility of the Office of Educational Exchange. The functions, personnel, and records of the Secretariat of the Inter-departmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation are transferred from the Office of Educational Exchange to the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development, except for the editorial functions connected with the publication of "The Record" and the corresponding personnel and records, which remain in the Office of Educational Exchange.

9. The Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs will become the Department's representative on, and the Chairman of, the Inter-departmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, in place of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. He will also serve as Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance. The Director of the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development will serve as Vice Chairman of both committees.

10. The other offices under the Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs advise the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development on the economic feasibility and desirability of projects and programs, from the standpoint of their respective specialized interests; make or arrange for such economic studies and analyses as the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development may require; and maintain liaison with U. S. and international agencies and with private organizations on matters within their respective fields of interest as necessary in the planning and operation of the technical assistance programs.

11. The Director will become a member of the Board of Directors of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development responsibilities enumerated under 3 and other paragraphs above apply in full to technical assistance activities, present and future, carried on by the Institute. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs exercises all responsibilities listed under paragraph 5 above with respect to the Institute's program.

The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs are jointly responsible for developing such working arrangements as are necessary to insure the administration of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs as a constituent part of a coordinated technical assistance program.

12. The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development consists of the following organizational units under the supervision of the designated officers:

Director: Leslie A. Wheeler, Ext. 3871.

Technical Cooperation Projects Staff, Chief: Haldore Hanson, Ext. 3011, 5012.

Technical Cooperation Policy Staff, Chief: Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., Ext. 4571, 4572.

Technical Cooperation Management Staff: Richard R. Brown, Director of Executive Staff, E. Ext. 2155.

(2-21-50.)

EXHIBIT No. 59

TEXT OF HANSON LETTER TO SENATOR TYDINGS

What happens to a man's standing in his community when charged with pro-Communist leanings was told yesterday by Haldore Hanson, chief of a technical staff working in the State Department on the Point 4 program for aiding backward areas of the world.

Mr. Hanson wrote of his experience to Chairman Tydings of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee investigating charges by Senator McCarthy, Republican, of Wisconsin. Senator Tydings released the letter to reporters last night.

Mr. Hanson lives here at 1233 Thirty-seventh Street NW., during the winter and at his farm in Loudoun County, 12 miles south of Leesburg, the remainder of the year.

Text of his letter follows:

MARCH 24, 1950.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: On March 13 Senator McCarthy in sworn testimony before your subcommittee accused me of having pro-Communist proclivities and of being a man with a mission to Communize the world.

Immediately afterward, both at a press conference and in two radio broadcasts, I flatly denied these irresponsible charges. I pointed out that Senator McCarthy's charges were based solely on my public writings in China twelve years ago and that he had withheld from your committee and the American public the following facts which are public knowledge: First, that my assignment to cover the Chinese Communists was as a correspondent for the Associated Press in 1938; second, that the Chinese Communist armies were then under Chiang Kai-Shek's Supreme Command and were resisting the Japanese invasion; third, that the work of the Chinese guerrillas was one of the great news stories of 1938, and I wrote the story as I saw it. There is no mystery about any of my writings and I shall be glad to discuss them.

On the day that Senator McCarthy mentioned my name, I made known to my superiors in the Department of State that I desired the opportunity to appear before your committee and publicly defend myself against these charges and to answer any questions that members of the committee might have concerning me.

I knew that an examination of my record by your committee could quickly establish the complete falsity of Senator McCarthy's accusations. For the record, I submit that I was the subject of a favorable investigation by the Department of State at the time of my appointment in 1942. In 1947 as a result of irresponsible statements by Representative Busbey of Illinois, I was investigated by the Department with favorable results. After the inception of the President's loyalty Program I was processed under the government-wide investigation by the FBI which was completed in 1948. In these investigations my activities in China, as well as in the United States, were covered and my writings were reviewed. On the basis of this investigation I was again given a complete loyalty and security clearance by the Department of State.

In view of these circumstances I expected that I would be quickly vindicated by your committee, and that the slurs upon my devotion to the United States would be removed by your official action.

However, during the short time which has since elapsed, I am shocked to find that, as a direct result of Senator McCarthy's untrue accusations and insinuations, my family and I have been subjected to a series of humiliating incidents. Each of these incidents is probably trivial in itself, but shows what a chain reaction such irresponsible charges can have and, I fear, will continue to have.

For example, a man who feeds cattle on my farm in Virginia has been asked why he continues to work with "that Communist." One neighboring farmer began last week to refer to me as "that Russian spy." A man near my farm made public remarks which could reflect on my credit standing, an indispensable asset in the cattle business.

A petition calling my family undesirable and urging that we get out of the community was circulated in a village near my farm. Most people approached refused to sign it. Several of them were good enough to report the story to me. I understand a lawyer has now advised the drafter of the petition not to continue his activities.

If these incidents were the work of an occasional gossip, I would not dignify them in a letter to a Senate committee. But these cumulative actions occurred in a decent, educated, church-going community where I have owned a farm for five years, helped others, been helped by them, and enjoyed a reciprocal friendship and respect with many of my neighbors. I hold no resentment against those involved in these incidents, but I deeply resent the false accusations of a United States Senator, speaking irresponsibly and protected by senatorial immunity which can start such whisperings of suspicion and hate.

Therefore, I feel that it is of urgency for me to be granted a formal hearing before your committee at its earliest convenience, not only for the purpose of refuting Senator McCarthy's charges, but also in order that I may personally tell you and the other members of the committee what damaging effects such false accusations as Senator McCarthy makes can have upon an innocent American in his relationships with his neighbors and his community. I would like to do anything within my power to prevent others who are innocent from going through such experiences.

EXHIBIT No. 60

Chain of Command for Personnel Security




EXHIBIT No. 61

Enforcing the President's Loyalty Program

Employees enrolled prior to October 1, 1947





EXHIBIT No. 62

Screening Civil Service Applicants (since October 1947)

Security Screening

Loyalty Screening



*Note: All applicants for positions under international information & educational exchange program, receive FBI full field investigation before appointment.

EXHIBIT No. 63

Screening Non-Civil Service & Foreign Service Applicants




EXHIBIT No. 64

Eliminating Security Risks




EXHIBIT No. 65

Composition of Loyalty and Security Board

Department of State




EXHIBIT No. 66

State Department Loyalty and Security Board

Procedures for handling cases




EXHIBIT No. 67

Name: Conrad E. Snow

Date and Place of Birth: August 6, 1889, New Hampshire.

Son of Leslie P. Snow, president of New Hampshire Senate, 1919-20; Justice, New Hampshire Supreme Court, 1920-1931

Education:

Dartmouth College—A. B., 1912.

Majored in Economics.

Magna Cum Laude and Phi Beta Kappa.

Oxford University—B. A., 1915; M. A., 1929.

Honor School of Modern History.

Rhodes Scholar.

Harvard Law School—LL. B., 1917.

Editor, Harvard Law Review.

Ames Prize.

Experience:

Professional Attainments:

General practice of law, 21 years in New Hampshire. Active trial attorney in State and Federal Courts. Senior partner or sole attorney—19 years. Martindale-Hubbell rating—AVIG.

New Hampshire Bar Association: Secretary-Treasurer (10 years).

American Bar Association:

Member House of Delegates (5 years).

Section of International and Comparative Law.

American Law Institute: Compiled "New Hampshire Annotations of Restatement of Law of Contracts."

American Judicature Society; Director (5 years).

Federal Bar Association

American Society of International Law

Rochester Trust Company; Director (12 years).

Public Offices:

New Hampshire Legislature, 1929-30; Chairman, Judiciary Committee.

New Hampshire Constitutional Convention, 1930; Chairman, Judiciary Committee.

Department of State, 1946 (August 22)—Date; Assistant Legal Adviser for Political Affairs, P-8.

Military:

First Lieutenant to Captain, 1917-19;

Personnel Adjutant, Fourth Field Artillery Brigade, AEF.

Lieutenant Colonel to Brigadier General, 1940-46

Director, Legal Division, Office of Chief Signal Officer, 1941-45.

Officer in Charge of Clemency, OUSW.

Legion of Merit, 1945.

Name: Theodore Carter Achilles.

Place and Date of Birth: Rochester, New York, December 29, 1905 (straight

American descent on both sides for several generations).

Education:

Hill School, Pottstown, Pennsylvania.

San Jose High School, San Jose, California.

Leland Stanford University, A. B., 1925.

Yale University, 1926-28, graduate study.

Member of: Metropolitan and Chevy Chase Clubs, Washington; Yale Club, New York.

Experience:

Engaged in newspaper work in California and Japan, 1928-30.

Married in 1933 to Marion Field.

Appointed, after examination, Foreign Service Officer, January 8, 1932.

Stationed as Vice Consul at Havana, 1932, in Rome, 1933.

Assigned to the Department of State, 1935-39.

Third Secretary at the Embassy in London, 1939-41.

Charge d'Affaires ad interim near governments of Belgium, Netherlands, Norway and Poland, in London in 1940-41.

To the Department in 1941.

Assistant Chief, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, 1944, Chief, 1944.

Experience—Continued

First Secretary of Embassy in London, 1945, and in Brussels, 1946.
Assigned to Department of State, 1947, as Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.
Member of U. S. Delegations at the International Labor Conference, New York, 1941.
UN Conference on Food and Agriculture, Hot Springs, Virginia, 1943.
UN Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945.
Council of Foreign Ministers, London, 1945.
Paris Conference, 1946.
First Session, UN Assembly, London, 1946.
Second Session, UN Assembly, New York, 1947.
Present position: Director, Office of Western European Affairs.

Name: Willard F. Barber.

Date and Place of Birth: March 21, 1909, Mitchell, South Dakota.

Education:

Public Schools of California, Iowa, South Dakota, and New Mexico.
Stanford University, A. B., 1928; M. A. 1929.
Columbia University, Postgraduate work, 1930–1933.
Awarded Einstein Prize for Excellence in American Diplomacy, Columbia University, 1933.
Graduated from the National War College, 1948.

Membership in Societies:

University Club, Washington, D. C.
American Foreign Service Association (Associate Member).
Pi Sigma Alpha.
National Honorary Political Science Fraternity.
American Society of International Law.
Association of American University Professors.
American Political Science Association.
American Society for Public Administration.
Member of Latin American Committee of American Political Science Association, 1946, and reappointed in 1947, 1948, and 1949.
Foreign Policy Association.

Publications:

In collaboration with W. B. Guthrie: American Government, a textbook, published by Globe Book Company.
Contributor to: Foreign Service Journal, American Political Science Review, American Journal of International Law, Hispanic American Historical Review, The Journal of Politics, International Journal (Canadian), The Western Political Science Review, The New Mexico Quarterly Review, American Political Science Quarterly, The Western Political Science Quarterly, etc., etc.

Professional Activities:

1931–1938, Tutor, then Instructor, in Government in Diplomacy, College of the City of New York.
1938–1943, Officer of the Division of American Republics, Department of State, working on problems of Panama, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Cuba.
In 1942 on temporary assignment for U. S. Embassies at Port-au-Prince and Ciudad Trujillo.
1944–1945, Assistant Chief, Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs, Department of State.
1943–1946, Assistant Chief and Acting Chief, Division of Central American and Caribbean Affairs, Department of State, including countries of Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic.
In 1944, Secretary to Interdepartmental Committee on Inter-American Economic Development.
During 1945, on detail to U. S. diplomatic missions in Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Haiti.
February 1946, Adviser to U. S. Delegate at Second West Indian Conference, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands.
May 1946, Representative of the Department of State at inauguration of Governor of American Virgin Islands.
In 1946 appointed Chief of Division of Caribbean Affairs.

Professional Activities—Continued

1946 and 1947, Lecturer at Institute conducted by the School of Advanced International Studies (Washington, D. C.) on Political Problems of the Caribbean Area.

1947, Lecturer, American University, Washington, D. C., on "Problems in Inter-American Relations."

1947, Participant in Brookings Institution Seminar on International Relations, held at University of Virginia and Dartmouth College.

September 1947, assigned to the National War College.

June 1948, graduated from National War College.

August 1948, Chief, Division of Central American and Panama Affairs, State Department.

In 1948 on temporary assignment to U. S. Embassies at Panama, San Jose, Managua, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, and Guatemala City.

Appointed Alternate Member of State Department Loyalty and Security Board, 1948.

1948, Appointed to State Department Advisory Committee on Information Policy.

July 1949, appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs.

Travel: United States, Mexico, Canada, Caribbean Area, Europe and Iberian Peninsula, Central America.

Marital Status: Married, one daughter.

Residence:

1522 Red Oak Drive, Silver Spring, Maryland.

Telephone: SLigo 8275.

Name: John O. Bell.

Date and Place of Birth: Manila, P. I., October 4, 1912 (parents U. S. citizens).

Son of John Oscar and Frances Earle (Cooley).

Education:

George Washington University, B. S., 1934; J. D., 1939 National War College, graduated 1948.

Admitted to D. C. bar, 1938.

Experience: With U. S. Department of State since 1931.

Officer in Fraud Section, Passport Division, 1937-39. Assisted U. S. District Attorney (S. D. N. Y.) in preparation and prosecution ppt. fraud case vs.

Earl Browder, chief government witness in connection therewith.

Executive Officer, Passport Division, 1939-41.

Chief, Air Priorities Section, 1943-46.

Chief, Air Transport Section, 1946.

Assistant Chief, 1946.

Associate Chief, 1947-48.

Chief, 1948.

Assistant Chief, Division of Northern European Affairs since 1948.

January 1949 assigned as Political Adviser to Chairman, Foreign Military Assistance Correlation Committee.

Assistant Director, Mutual Defense Assistance Program since 1949.

Secretary for documentation, International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, 1944.

Conference Registration Officer, United Nations Conference, San Francisco, 1945.

Special Representative of U. S. State Department Aviation negotiations in Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay 1946-1947.

Alternate member U. S. Department of State Loyalty and Security Board since 1948.

Member of:

D. C. American Foreign Service Association.

George Washington University Law Association.

Alpha Chi Sigma.

Name: G. Hayden Raynor.

Date and Place of Birth: August 28, 1906, Brooklyn, New York.

Education:

Sidney Lanier High School, Montgomery, Alabama, 1923;

University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, A.B. 1927; (Held fellowship in English teaching courses in Freshman English during senior year.)

Harvard, Graduate School of Business Administration, MBA 1929.

Experience:

- Summer, 1928: Wall Street Journal;
1929-30: Irving Trust Company, New York City, general banking training;
1931-37: Guaranty Trust Company of New York, Personal trust administration;
1937-40: E. R. Stettinius, Jr., Estate of Judith C. Stettinius, Financial and investment work;
1939-40: U. S. Steel Corporation, Office of the Chairman of the Board, General Assistant, studies special problems;
1939: Served on Staff War Resources Board while Mr. Stettinius was chairman thereof;
*1940: Assistant to the Commissioner in charge of Industrial Materials (E. R. Stettinius, Jr.) of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense;
*1941: Assistant to the Director of Priorities (E. R. Stettinius, Jr.) of the Office of Production Management;
*1941-3: Special Assistant to the Administrator (E. R. Stettinius, Jr.) of the Lend-Lease Administration; Served as Executive Secretary of the Policy Committee of the Lend-Lease Administration;
*Dec. 1944-45: Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (E. R. Stettinius, Jr.);
*Dec. 1944-45: Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (E. R. Stettinius, Jr.);
1945: Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs of Department of State (title now is Adviser to the Assistant Secretary for and the Bureau of European Affairs). For first six months handled Economic Affairs for EUR and since early 1946 have handled United Nations Affairs.

Publication: An article on the United Nations Charter in the University of Virginia Law Review (late 1945 or early 1946).

Clubs: Harvard Club of New York City.

Conferences: Have attended following conferences as Assistant to Chairman United States Delegation: Dumbarton Oaks, Chapultepec, Mexico City, San Francisco.

Have attended following conferences as Adviser to the United States Delegation: Last half 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and the two Special Sessions of the General Assembly (both parts), of the United Nations.

On occasion have served as Adviser to Senator Austin in his capacity as United States Representative on the Security Council of the United Nations.

Have also served in 1946-47 as United States representative on the Membership Committee of the Security Council and occasionally on other committees during meetings of the General Assembly.

Name: David A. Robertson.

Date and Place of Birth: July 2, 1910, Birmingham, Alabama.

Education:

Grade School, High School graduate, Birmingham, Alabama.

University of Alabama, B. S., 1931; LL.B., 1933.

Experience:

Land Department, Shell Petroleum Corporation, Box 2099, Houston, Texas, 1933-1940, curing titles, buying liens, royalties, pipeline rights-of-way, settling estates.

State Department, Division of Controls, 1940-1941, by Executive Order transferred to Board of Economic Warfare handling export control policy and action on various commodities including oil, machinery, copper, brass, and bronze.

Naval Officer (Lt. (j. g.) to Lt. Com.) in Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Navy Department, 1942-1945, administering petroleum supply programs for Army, Navy, Air Force, and Lend-Lease programs. Commended by Forrestal in 1942 for avoiding stoppage in war industry manufacture. Also served as Naval witness before Truman Committee on oil transport.

*Served with the late E. R. Stettinius in these several jobs in a confidential capacity. Duties involved handling important correspondence, reviewing reports, and advising on policy questions which arose.

Experience—Continued

State Department, 1945-1950: Petroleum Division, 1945-1947 Chairman, Petroleum Facilities Coordinating Committee, interdepartmental, handling disposal surplus oil facilities abroad. 1947-1950, Special Assistant for Politics-Military matters coordinating and preparing positions for National Security Council, cabinet and subcabinet discussions and matters involving relations with Department of Defense in Near East, Africa, and South Asia.

Alternate Member, Department of State Loyalty Board, 1948-50.

Name: John William Sipes.

Place and Date of Birth: Washington, D. C., October 29, 1919.

Marital Status: Married—Two Children.

Education:

Lee-Jackson High School (Fairfax County, Virginia).
George Washington University, A. A. and A. B. degrees.
George Washington Law School.
Georgetown Law School, L. L. B.

Memberships:

George Washington University Alumni Association.
Georgetown University Alumni Association.
Phi Delta Phi Legal Fraternity.
Pi Gamma Nu (Honorary Social Science)
U. S. Naval Reserves.
Kenper Lodge No. 64, A. F. & A. M., Falls Church, Virginia.
First Baptist Church, Alexandria, Virginia.

Military Experience:

Lieutenant, USNR, 1942-1945, assigned as follows:
Communications Watch Officer—Vice Chief Naval Operations.
Communications Watch Officer—Commander, North Pacific Forces.
Communications Officer—NAS, Moffatt Field, California.

Experience:

Executive Office of the President, Office of Government Reports—Personnel Officer, 1940-42.
Department of State, Division of Departmental Personnel, Recruiting and Placement Officer, 1945-46.
Office of the Secretary, Executive Secretariat, 1946-48.
Office of Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Legislative Assistant, 1949 to date.

Name: William Pennell Snow.

Place and Date of Birth: Bangor, Maine, July 23, 1907.

Education: Phillips Exeter Acad.; Bowdoin College and Tufts College 1925-30.

Experience:

Employed by insurance company 1931-32.
Appointed clerk in dist. accounting and disbursing office at Paris June 2, 1934.
Vice Consul at Paris October 17, 1934.
Also Asst. Dist. Accounting and Disbursing Officer at Paris October 25, 1934.
Foreign Service Officer, unclassified, Vice Consul of Career and Sec. in the Diplomatic Service, and Vice Consul at Paris October 1, 1935, in addition to duties as Asst. Dist. Accounting and Disbursing Officer.
Foreign Service School September 21, 1936.
Vice Consul at Stockholm April 7, 1937; also Third Sec. at Stockholm November 27, 1940.
Vice Consul at Callao-Lima December 23, 1940; also Third Sec. at Lima April 26, 1941.
Second Sec. at Lima in addition to duties as Vice Consul August 23, 1943; at San Jose February 5, 1945.
Consul at St. John's, E. F.
Detailed to the National War College September 1947-June 1948.
Assistant Chief, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, August 23, 1948.
Officer in Charge, British-Dominion Affairs, since August 1949.

Name: Arthur G. Stevens.

Date and Place of Birth: May 23, 1912—Greenwood, Miss.

Education: Greenwood High School, and University of Mississippi, Duke University, B. A.

Experience:

Assistant Secretary to Congressman Will M. Whittington, Mississippi, 1934-35.
 Asst. to Executive Secretary, Central Statistical Board, 1935-38.
 Assistant to Commissioner, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1938-41.
 Asst. to Economic Advisor for the White House, 1941-42.
 Chief of Transportation Division, Munitions Assignment Board, Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1942-45.
 Budget Examiner, Bureau of Budget, 1945-46.
 Asst. to Asst. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1946.
 Special Assistant, Office of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1947.
 Executive Director, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

Member:

Phi Delta Theta Fraternity.
 Westmoreland Congregational Church.

Name: Allen B. Moreland.

Date and Place of Birth: November 7, 1911—Dawson, Georgia. Legal Residence—Jacksonville, Florida.

Education:

University of Florida, B. B. S. in Business Administration.
 Majored in Economics and Business Administration.
 Phi Kappa Phi Honorary Society.
 Georgetown Law School, LL. B.
 Member Staff, Georgetown Law Journal.
 Harvard University, M. A. in Government.
 Majored in Government and Political Science.
 Columbia University, M. A. in International Administration.
 Majored in International Law and Administration.
 George Washington Law School, LL.M.
 Majored in International Law and Administrative Law.

Experience:

Member of Bars of State of Florida and District of Columbia; American Society of International Law; American Political Science Association; American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars. State and County Deputy Assessor of Taxes (Florida); Advisor on economic affairs to Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (General Hildring); Legislative Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Asst. Secretaries Cross and McFall).

Military Experience:

Commander, USNR. Head of Counter Intelligence Section, District Intelligence Office, Seventh Naval District; Senior Naval Civil Affairs Officer, Cherbourg, France; Head, Government Section, Office of Island Governments, Navy Department.

Name: Berry, James Lampton.

Date and Place of Birth: Columbia, Mississippi—May 10, 1908.

Education: Webb Sch. grad.; University of Mississippi, B. A. 1929, M. A. 1931; Yale University graduate work 1932-34.

Experience:

Instructor in Political Science, University of Mississippi, 1930-31; Teaching Assistant in Political Science, University of Illinois, 1931-32; appointed Clerk in American Consulate at Durban, March 16, 1934; Vice Consul at Durban, August 11, 1934; at Johannesburg, temporarily, July 7, 1936; at Lourenco Marquez, temporary, September 1, 1936; at Durban, February 13, 1937; at Johannesburg, temporary, March 20, 1937; at Durban August 6, 1937; at Lourenco Marquez, temporary, January 3, 1938; at Capetown, temporary, January 22, 1938; at Durban, May 2, 1939; Foreign Service Officer unclassified, Vice Consul of career, sec. in the Diplomatic Service, and Vice Consul at Durban, July 15, 1939; at Port Elizabeth, temporary, July 18, 1939; at Durban, September 3, 1939; at Calcutta, June 1, 1940; also sec. to Commissioner of United States to India at New Delhi, September 16, 1941; sec. to personal representative of the President at New Delhi, March 21, 1942; sec. at New Delhi, May 16, 1942; class eight, July 16, 1943; Army and Navy Staff College, grad. 1945; country specialist in State Department, February 1, 1945; Acting Assistant Chief, Division of Middle Eastern Affairs, April 12, 1945; July 1, 1945; Assistant Chief, Division of Middle

Experience—Continued

Eastern Affairs, September 25, 1945, Division of Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs, August 16, 1946; Special Assistant to the Director; Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, September 7, 1947; Member Policy Planning Staff, November 22, 1948.

Name: Belton O'Neal Bryan.

Date and Place of Birth: September 8, 1910—Georgetown, South Carolina (of parents born in South Carolina).

Education:

Duncan High School, Duncan, South Carolina.

Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, B. A. 1934.

The Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., LL. B.

Admitted to District of Columbia Bar 1938.

Member of Pi Kappa Phi Social Fraternity.

Member of Delta Theta Phi Legal Fraternity.

Experience:

Employed by Federal Government since November 1933, in Coast and Geodetic Survey, General Accounting Office, and Department of State;

Commissioned in the United States Army Reserve in 1939 and entered on active duty in October 1941 as Second Lt.

Obtained rank of Lt. Col. and subsequently reverted to Reserve Status in June 1946.

Served in Ordnance Department and the Inspector General's Office.

Qualified as Pistol Expert.

Awarded Defense, Campaign and Victory Medals and two Army Commendation Ribbons.

Since leaving Military Service entered Department of State as Executive Officer to the Legal Adviser; Assistant Legal Adviser; and Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State.

Name: Robert F. Woodward.

Date and Place of Birth: October 1, 1908, at Minneapolis, Minn.

Education: University of Minnesota—B. A. 1930.

Experience

Manager of Printing Plant and Editor, 1927–1930.

Foreign Service Officer (unclass.), Vice Consul of career, and secretary in the Diplomatic Service, 1931.

Vice Consul at Winnipeg, 1932.

Foreign Service School, April 1933.

Vice Consul at Buenos Aires, August 1933.

Vice Consul at Asuncion, temp., September 1935.

Vice Consul at Buenos Aires, November 1935.

Third Secretary at Bogota, June 1936; Vice Consul, June 1936.

Vice Consul at Rio de Janeiro, 1937.

To the Department, April 1939.

Acting Asst. Chief, Division of the American Republics, Nov. 1941; Asst. Chief, July 1942.

Second Secretary and Consul at La Pas, Bolivia, Sept. 1942.

To the Department, June 1944.

Acting Asst. Chief, Division of North and West Coast Affairs, July 1944.

Second Secretary at Guatemala, August 1944.

First Secretary at Guatemala, June 1945.

Counsel of Embassy at Habana, December 1945.

To the Department, March 1947.

Deputy Director, Office of American Republic Affairs, March 1947.

Assigned to Army War College during 1949.

EXHIBIT No. 68

HEADQUARTERS OF THE GENERALISSIMO, CHINA,
Chungking, Szechuan, 12 January, 1942.

President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,

The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am happy to have the opportunity afforded by Mr. Lattimore's return to America on a short visit, to send you a word of greeting, and to thank you for recommending him as my political advisor.

Mr. Lattimore has fully measured up to our expectations and has entirely justified your choice. You unerringly detected the right man to select to act as a counsellor at a time when decisions which will affect the whole world for generations to come are in the balance. He has not only a wide knowledge of our language, history, and geography, he has in addition an invaluable understanding of our contemporary political affairs. His absolute integrity is manifest in everything that he does or says, and I never have the slightest doubt that any suggestion that he may make is based upon a genuine desire to assist China to the utmost of his power.

The various Missions that you have sent to China are doing valuable work. They, and the visits of various members of your Government, have greatly helped to bring America closer to us. Personal contacts necessarily tend to promote closer and more understanding relationship and friendship. You may be assured that all the American Missions are going about their duties with a zeal that promises permanently useful results.

Since the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines and Hongkong, the Pacific problem has become more acute. It is fortunate that under your wise and steadfast leadership, the future outcome of our concerted struggle against treachery and barbarity is assured. I assure you that I shall do my utmost to help bring about a world order based upon justice tempered with mercy.

Mr. Lattimore will personally convey to you my views on some important matters upon which I have not touched above. If there are messages you wish to send me, I should appreciate you entrusting them to Mr. Lattimore to be conveyed to me upon his return to China.

Madam Chiang joins me in sending best wishes to you and Mrs. Roosevelt.

Yours sincerely,

CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

EXHIBIT No. 69

ARCTIC RESEARCH LABORATORY ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of the Fourth Meeting, May 17, 18, 19, 1949

ARCTIC RESEARCH LABORATORY, POINT BARROW, ALASKA

ATTENDANCE

Members:

Commo. W. G. Greenman, Director, Naval Petroleum Reserves.
 Dr. John C. Reed, Staff Geologist, U. S. Geological Survey, Chairman.
 Dr. M. C. Shelesnyak, Head, Ecology Branch, ONR, Executive Secretary.
 Dr. Laurence Irving, Scientific Director, Arctic Research Laboratory.
 Dr. John E. Graf, Asst. Sec'y, Smithsonian Institution, vice for Dr. Alexander Wetmore.
 Prof. Owen Lattimore, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, vice for Dr. Detlev Bronk (Johns Hopkins).
 Dr. Walter H. Munk, Oceanographer, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, vice for Dr. Roger Revelle.
 Dr. J. Frank Schairer, Carnegie Institution of Washington.
 Mrs. Yvonne Reamy, Adm. Asst. to Exec. Sec'y.

Consultants:

Prof. George Carter, Head, School of Geography, Johns Hopkins.
 Dr. John Field, Physiology Department, Stanford University.
 Dr. S. R. Galler, Head, Biophysics Branch, ONR.
 LTCDR E. P. Huey, Office of Naval Research.
 Dr. T. J. Killian, Science Director, Office of Naval Research.
 Prof. G. E. MacGinitie, Director, William G. Kerekhoff Marine Laboratory.
 Mr. Graham Rowley, Chief, Arctic Div., Defense Research Board, Canada.
 Dr. D. Y. Solandt, Arctic Research Advisory Board, Defense Research Board, Canada.
 Dr. A. Lincoln Washburn, Exec. Dir., Arctic Institute of North America.

Absent:

Dr. Detlev Bronk, President, Johns Hopkins University.
 Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, General Research Office, Johns Hopkins.
 Dr. Roger Revelle, Co-Director, Scripps Institution of Oceanography.
 Dr. Alexander Wetmore, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution.

The meeting was called to order by the Chairman at 8:00 p. m., 17 May 1949. Before the reading of the minutes of the previous meeting, it was moved by Dr. Schairer that the Board express its appreciation to the women of the Arctic Contractors camp and the Arctic Research Laboratory for their hospitable reception during the afternoon preceding the meeting. The motion was seconded by D. Graf and passed unanimously.

The Chairman indicated that in order to facilitate the proper consideration of the agenda, those attending the meeting would be divided into working groups to consider various phases of the agenda. The teams, or working groups, were assigned as follows:

Committee on Oceanography:

Dr. Walter Munk, Chairman
Prof. G. E. MacGinitie
Dr. John C. Reed

Committee on Medical Research:

Dr. John Field, Chairman
Dr. M. C. Shelesnyak
Dr. D. Y. Solandt

Committee on Biology:

Dr. John Graf, Chairman
Dr. S. R. Galler
Dr. Laurence Irving

Committee on Geophysics and Geology:

Dr. T. J. Killian, Chairman
Dr. J. Frank Schairer
Dr. A. L. Washburn

Committee on Anthropology and Social Sciences:

Prof. Owen Lattimore, Chairman
Dr. George Carter
Mr. Graham Rowley

Minutes of the Third Meeting

Dr. Graf raised the question of disposition of specimens. The Chairman recommended that a paragraph be inserted in the minutes to the effect that type collections would be given to the Smithsonian Institution but that the privileges would be retained of keeping compared specimens. Dr. Graf moved—

"That the minutes of the third meeting be approved as amended."

Vote: The motion was seconded by Dr. Schairer and passed unanimously.

Minutes of the ARLAB meeting 8 February 1949

Dr. Irving stated that he did not wish to be included in the list of those attending this meeting, inasmuch as he did not arrive until the conclusion of the meeting. The Chairman suggested that an asterisk be placed after the name of the Scientific Director and a note be made to the effect that the Scientific Director did not arrive until the conclusion of the meeting.

There was a brief discussion of whether this meeting should be called the "Fourth" meeting of the ARLAB, as indicated in the minutes. Dr. Schairer said that the meeting was merely a discussion on policy and planning of the ARLAB. Dr. Graf moved—

"That a paragraph be inserted in the minutes to the effect that no formal action was taken by the Board at this meeting and that it consisted merely of a discussion by the Board members, consequently it was not to be called the 'Fourth' meeting."

Vote: The motion was seconded by Dr. Schairer and passed unanimously.

Report of the Executive Secretary

This report consisted of a number of items which the Executive Secretary wished to bring to the attention of the Board for discussion and suggestion.

(1) Contractor's Manual: a draft of this manual was made and submitted to the Board with the agenda for final consideration and comment.

(2) Internal Administration of ARL Manual: A draft of this was submitted to the Board for final consideration and comment.

(3) Report of Action based on recommendations that ONR seek out and attempt to stimulate a university of proper stature and graduate interest which would find itself in a position to support the laboratory on an operational basis.

In February at the invitation of Dr. Bronk, President of The Johns Hopkins University, a meeting was held with Dr. Shelesnyak, Dr. Irving, Dr. Prof. Cloos, Carter, Lattimore, Lee, Wilber, President Emeritus Bowman and others. Several weeks later the University submitted to ONR a proposal for the operation of the laboratory. This was included in the agenda submitted to the Board.

(4) Statement to the effect that a renewal of the contract with the Smithsonian Institution for the ARLAB is being processed and will be effected on the first of July, the beginning of the fiscal year.

(5) Item 5 consisted of a proposal which the Executive Secretary wished to submit to the Board. In view of the unique characteristics of medical research

and need for active medical research programs in the Arctic, and because of the integrated activities with the planned Arctic Health program at College, Alaska, the U. S. Public Health Service and Territorial Health interests, the Secretary wished the Board to consider establishing a medical advisory group.

(6) Policy and program on library facilities, promotion of interests among the other libraries and universities for forwarding material to the ARL in the form of an association. It was the opinion of the Executive Secretary that such an association would be in a better position to build up the ARL library than individuals.

(7) Request from the Executive Secretary for a statement of policy on publications of research reports carried out at ARL, bulletins of activities and other types of publications.

(8) Request by Executive Secretary for statement on planning an educational program for the laboratory relative to the matter of exhibits (periodic and program exhibits) and local publications.

The Chairman stated that items (1) and (2) would be designated to a working group to consider and to report at the Thursday session of the meeting. The group designated consisted of Dr. John Graf, Chairman, Prof. G. E. MacGinitie, Dr. Laurence Irving, Mrs. Yvonne Reamy.

Commodore Greenman informed the appointed committee that the office of the Director of Naval Petroleum Reserves and the Officer in Charge of Construction have reviewed these two items insofar as administrative procedure is concerned and that the committee need not consider that factor.

Dr. Shelesnyak said that the proposal for operation of the ARL as submitted by Johns Hopkins was under negotiation. It would have to be renewed on a fiscal year basis.

The Chairman stated that this was the first time there had been a contract proposed specifically for operating the laboratory.

Dr. Shelesnyak said that the laboratory was initiated under the leadership of Dr. Irving, from Swarthmore College. Its operation and existence would be completely impossible without Pet. 4, as all activities which are called "logistics support" are provided by Pet. 4. Money for this support is made available from ONR to the Bureau of Yards and Docks. Certain activities of the laboratory of an operations and "housekeeping" nature (clerical work, plant management, shop facilities, etc.) were of a research nature and the Arctic Contractors which provides these general services for Pet. 4, felt this type of activity was not within their realm and did not wish to carry it. In August of last year, additional funds were made available to the Swarthmore contract for operational support. However, no specific additions were outlined in the contract.

Dr. Irving indicated interest in the terms under which Johns Hopkins wishes to undertake direction of the laboratory. He asked the Chairman for additional time in which to study the proposal before discussion. The Chairman suggested that this proposal be postponed until a later session of the meeting.

Regarding renewal of the contract with the Smithsonian Institution, Dr. Shelesnyak stated that it is the policy of ONR to have advisory panels composed of specialists in those particular fields. These panels are appointed to advise the CNR regarding research and policy in these fields. This Board is an advisory panel to advise the CNR regarding operation, policy and planning of the ARL. The contract for the Board is renewed on an annual basis at the beginning of the fiscal year. No action on this is required by the Board.

In relation to the medical advisory group suggested by Dr. Shelesnyak, the Board was asked its opinion of such a group. He explained the function of advisory panels. This particular panel would be composed of specialists in Medicine who would report through the Board but would not necessarily be members of the Board. He felt that perhaps the Chairman of such a group could be a member of the ARLAB.

Dr. Killian explained the types of panels instituted by ONR. He did not feel that paid consultants were necessarily the best consultants. Dr. Graf felt that the Board might be limited to non-paid consultants. There followed a discussion as to what type of panel constituted the best and most desirable type.

Dr. Washburn asked if a medical advisory group were any more necessary than any other group and if such problems could not be handled when they arose.

Dr. Shelesnyak replied that there is perhaps less information and less organized activity relative to medical geography in the Arctic than any other field. At the same time there are whole series of groups with responsibilities for health and medical research in the Arctic. In view of the fact that one of the functions

of the Board is in nurturing research in the Arctic, he believed the advice could be gotten by having one member of the Board who would seek such advice from colleagues but that this type of arrangement would not have the effect that the appointment of a regular group would have.

The Chairman stated that if the need arose in any of the other disciplines the establishment of such groups would not be out of line.

Dr. Lattimore said that one point worth considering is that if Johns Hopkins takes over the operation of the ARL, it would be wise to avoid any appearance of monopoly on their part and that proposing a group to consider medical problems would be better than appointing or designating one person.

Dr. Graf said that the Navy had organized the laboratory ostensibly for defense and from that point of view, medical research assumes an important position.

The Chairman said that there had been some emphasis in some fields and not others simply because there was no adequate representation in those fields, but he did not favor any special emphasis given to any discipline beyond what was appropriate.

Mr. Rowley asked if the proposed medical group was supposed to advise on all medical problems or just those affecting ARL?

Dr. Shelesnyak replied that it was primarily concerned with medical research in the Arctic as focused around the activity of the ARL. He felt the NPR camp represented a highly industrialized scene where the impact of a high degree of technology on a native population exists. Not too far away there are native groups not under this impact and therefore he felt it rather unique and gives somewhat of an accent to the problem.

After considerable discussion Dr. Graf moved—

"That a member of the ARLAB be designated to consider problems of medical research appropriate to the ARL."

Vote: The motion was seconded by Dr. Schairer and passed unanimously.

A committee to consider library facilities of the ARL was appointed by the Chairman. This committee was for the duration of the meeting only and was instructed to report at a later session. Members were Dr. Killian, Chairman, Dr. Schairer, Dr. Washburn.

In regard to the educational program, Dr. Field stated that (a) he was particularly interested in seminars as he felt under such isolated conditions the need was more acute. He felt they gave opportunity for criticism of work and for suggestions. (b) Talks on less technical levels for the entire Arctic Contractor's camp were also desirable. Both types of discussions were needed.

Dr. Munk said he had noticed a strong tendency of people working on research problems not to bother about what has happened in the past. He suggested any educational program should include an attempt to familiarize people with past work. Secondly, he felt the library should purchase accounts of classic expeditions for reference as they contained much of value to current researchers.

Dr. Irving believed there was the question of just how far the library should go in expansion. The task of building up a true research library would have to be near university magnitude. He felt it might be more expedient to work toward a university library at Fairbanks to which the researchers could turn, or to work toward enlarging the University of Alaska library. He did not believe the educational program harmonized with field research.

Dr. Shelesnyak said the laboratory should have every aspect of continuity and as much of its own substance as possible in order to acquire a group of people who will work in the field.

The Chairman appointed a group to consider an education program for the laboratory, as follows: Prof. MacGinitie, chairman, Dr. Carter, Dr. Field.

The Board recessed at 10:30 p. m.

SECOND SESSION

The meeting was called to order by the Chairman at 7:15 p. m., May 18. This portion of the agenda was designated to acquaint the Board members and consultants who were not acquainted with the organizational background in Arctic Alaska with that background. Attendant at this session were employees of the Arctic Contractors and local residents of Barrow Village.

Dr. Shelesnyak explained the organization of the Office of Naval Research and its interrelationships with the Arctic Research Laboratory. He explained the situation as one where the laboratory is far removed from the campus and from ONR. ONR is engaged in basic research although not necessarily immediately

pertinent to the Navy. Illustrative remarks were accompanied by an organizational chart as the explanation progressed.

Commodore Greenman gave the administrative and organizational background of Pet. 4 and how it is integrated with other branches of the Navy. He stated that the Secretary of the Navy has supervision of all operations of Naval Petroleum Reserves. The Secretary established an operating committee to advise NPR. NPR serves only as an administrative office as the Bureau of Yards and Docks is the actual directing agency. The actual project manager is a group with whom the Bureau of Yards and Docks has a contract to carry on the work.

Dr. Reed called attention to the fact that Commodore Greenman has done a great deal to aid in the development of programs of other organizations such as the Geological Survey, ARL, Army, Air Forces, and a number of others.

The Scientific Director of the ARL reported on the scientific and general progress of the laboratory since the previous meeting. He reported that, after a year's use, the design and construction have proved satisfactory and well suited to its purposes. The local operating system of the laboratory was given credit for the effective work of the staff. A more complete report was reserved for a later session of the meeting.

THIRD SESSION

The third session of the meeting convened at 4:15 p. m. on 19 May 1949. Dr. Graf moved—

"That the Chairman of the Board prepare a letter of the Secretary of the Navy telling of the trip and giving credit to such people as desired."

Vote: Dr. Schairer seconded the motion and it pass unanimously. Dr. Graf further moved—

"That the Chairman of the Board send a letter to personnel at various points who were instrumental in making the trip a success."

Vote: The motion was seconded by Dr. Schairer and passed unanimously.

The Scientific Director gave the second half of his report to the ARLAB. He felt that the work done by the Naval Ordnance Laboratory over the course of a year revealed that the periods assigned researchers for work have been too brief to be entirely effective, and recommended that more economical and purposeful procedures be evolved if the work is to lead to justifiable research.

He felt that the practice of urging researchers to spend more time at Point Barrow has discouraged them from viewing arctic research as part of a longer career.

He was of the opinion that the examination of the research programs shows the necessity for a senior scientist experienced in field and arctic research to attend to the development of arctic research programs.

In regard to the building program, he stated to the Board that construction for married people was postponed until the winter of 1949. Dr. Shelesnyak advised the Board that materials have been ordered and all arrangements completed and construction would be initiated in the summer of 1949 and completed before winter 1949.

Dr. Irving stated that he did not think direction of research, critical stimulation of interest in arctic research and routine direction of the laboratory were too much for one man, although they could better be performed in a scheme of rotation among a group of investigators within a university. He felt difficulties resulted from incomplete information as to funds, construction, and research projects.

He expressed dissatisfaction with the routine flow of information and stated that in his opinion this deficiency has greatly retarded preparations for research.

Improvement, he added, appears to depend upon better use of the experience of the operational staff of the laboratory and more appreciative attention to their proposals.

Regardless of such difficulties, he stated that he believed the operating system of the laboratory is well established. For the support of the ONR and for the advice of the Board he expressed sincere appreciation on behalf of his colleagues and himself.

Dr. Schairer moved—

"That the report of the Scientific Director be received by the Board and filed."

Vote: Dr. Graf seconded the motion and it passed unanimously.

A discussion followed on the Johns Hopkins proposal for operation of the laboratory. The proposal contained the position of administrative assistant.

Dr. Shelesnyak explained that this person would be employed by the home base to expedite travel, administrative matters, etc. He added that the need for this type of position had been pointed out by the SDARL and inasmuch as ONR is now doing part of the work that should be handled by such a person, his employment was felt necessary.

Both Johns Hopkins and ONR feel that the proposed project is in one sense a research project. It is research in how to maintain a distant laboratory in cooperation between a university and government. The Board has continued to point out the need for a graduate school for a home base.

Dr. Schairer said that if a stateside base existed, there would be a need for a responsible person to accomplish a successful relation between the laboratory and ONR.

Dr. Graf said that if Johns Hopkins was willing to take on the contract, the Board should be willing to approve the university conditions, including whatever personnel they considered necessary.

Dr. Washburn said that as a consultant he was in favor of having a university assume administration and specifically, the Johns Hopkins University.

Dr. Field stated that he would like to comment on the general policy of having a university contract. He felt one of the greatest needs was to have a university base where researchers can go with data and get adequate criticism and have adequate facilities for research. He thought Johns Hopkins very well adapted for this type of program.

After considerable discussion it was moved by Dr. Schairer:

"That the ARLAB advise the CNR that the Board approves the proposal of Johns Hopkins University and recommends its acceptance."

Vote: The motion was seconded by Dr. Munk and passed unanimously.

The Board recessed for dinner at 6:20 p. m.

FOURTH SESSION

The Board reconvened at 7:30 with the Chairman calling for committee reports from the Board as assigned in previous sessions.

Committee on Oceanography.—(1) The committee supported one phase in the Archeological and Dendrochronological Research proposal, that dealing with study of ocean currents from driftwood.

(2) The oceanographic program of the Hydrographic Office was reviewed and the committee was in accord with the previously expressed view of the Scientific Director that short periods of research were expensive and relatively unproductive. Whereas the committee considers present oceanographic research problems of general interest, especially the collection of aerial photographs taken on *Pfarnigan* of arctic ice conditions, the committee thinks the time has come to make definite recommendations of long range goals.

There are essentially two oceanographic programs which might be carried out from the ARL:

(a) Support of biological work at ARL.

(2) The oceanography of the Arctic basin.

It is regrettable that present oceanographic work has largely been confined to studies of the shelf, when so little is known about the Arctic Ocean. The fundamental oceanographic work in little known regions has been to measure the distribution of temperature and salinity with depth, and from it to compute circulation. The measurement of temperature and salinity from ice drifts has the disadvantage of leading to oceanographic section parallel to the currents, whereas the most meaningful sections are perpendicular to currents. To obtain controlled sections perpendicular to currents one might, in winter, be able to establish airborne oceanograph sections covering perhaps the region from Barrow to the Pole. This is largely a problem of logistics and furthermore one that is not peculiar to oceanographers, but will have to be considered for any type of studies in the Arctic Basin. The committee recommended that this Board energetically pursue this problem on the appropriate level, and to help designate the most suitable agency for organizing an airborne Arctic expedition.

The oceanographers should consider drawing up rather definite plans for such an expedition, and to list the instruments and the modifications necessary, that would be required. Such a program might include a limited amount of meteorological observations, plankton collections, and some bottom samples. The committee suggests that with concerted effort it might be possible to occupy an experimental station in the winter of 1950.

Dr. Schairer moved—

"That the report as outlined should be submitted to the CNR and that the Board accept and concur with the report of the committee."

Vote: Seconded by Dr. Graf and passed unanimously.

Committee on Medical Research.—Dr. Field as Chairman recommended that (1) the work on lipid metabolism by Dr. Wilber be continued. (2) The work of Dr. Wennesland and party on thermal adaption on tissue should be approved. (3) In regard to the proposal submitted by Dr. Levine, the committee felt it would properly involve a large number of persons for a good many years. The program properly should take about ten years. The proposal was not focused enough for the Board to consider it and the committee suggested that Dr. Levine be requested to confine activities to one field where results could more efficiently be achieved.

Dr. Schairer moved—

"That the Board accept and concur with the report of the committee."

Vote: Dr. Graf seconded and the motion passed unanimously.

Committee on Biology.—Dr. Graf as chairman said the committee felt that the projects submitted by Prof. MacGinitie and Mr. Spetzman were very meritorious and although no request for continuation of the Swarthmore program had been submitted by Dr. Irving, he felt it should be continued.

The Biological Survey of Anaktuvik Pass was recommended for acceptance. The committee felt that in all surveys there should be specified the simple collection of forms. Such things as behavior, distribution, ecology, etc., should be considered. This is useful to other workers in other projects and assures publication within reasonable time limits. This additional information will aid in building the reputation of the laboratory.

The Ecological Studies of Marine Fauna proposal, with Prof. MacGinitie as principal investigator, was considered excellent. The committee felt in connection with this it might be important to encourage projects in limnology. The work might have very important applied aspects. The committee said that projects where additional research will result in completion of well-run investigations should be continued, and secondly that the Board should give study to the possibility of working out two and three year projects. This would have a very great effect on the planning of a project and would have the added advantage of assigning funds in one year, removing that project from future competition for funds.

Dr. Galler added that the committee recommends that the attention be invited of inland water specialists to determine some specific problems unique in Arctic environments.

Dr. Shelesnyak moved—

"That the Board accept and concur with the report of the Committee on Biology."

Vote: Seconded by Dr. Schairer and passed unanimously.

Committee on Geophysics and Geology.—Dr. Killian reported for the committee, giving a geophysics and evaluation of the work in progress, and made recommendations on proposals as follows:

(a) Measurement and Study of Arctic Phenomena: This work divided itself into two parts (1) a study of infra-red phenomenon in the Arctic and (2) a study of chemical and physical properties of sea ice. The first has been exploratory to date. The second could be made more valuable by the addition of petrographic studies to reveal past history of the ice. In regard to Permafrost studies, the work has just begun and good progress has been made by Dr. MacCarthy in familiarizing himself with the area. This program will be enlarged in the fall when additional investigators will attempt to study the nature and distribution of permafrost. The committee believed that strong support should be given to this program.

(b) Paleontological Studies: The committee recommended that this project be made part of the planned program of ARL.

(c) Determination of Beach Conditions Relating to Photo-Analysis and Trafficability Studies in the American Arctic: The program called for a widely varied series of undertakings which the committee did not feel such a small group could undertake in the three to four weeks proposed. They recommended that no action be taken by ONR until a clearer and more definitive proposal was submitted. The committee recommended that the work be encouraged in the study of geomorphic influence by the Arctic.

Dr. Munk moved—

"That the Board accept and concur with the report of the Committee on Geophysics and Geology."

Vote: Motion seconded by Dr. Graf and passed unanimously.

Committee on Anthropology and Social Sciences.—Dr. Lattimore reported on the following projects for the committee:

(a) Archeological and Dendrochronological Research: The committee felt this proposal was thoroughly justified and was the type of project that should be used as a pilot project. Its acceptance was recommended.

(b) Regional Geography and Climatic Research: This proposal was considered inadequate and it was noted by the committee that a rather negative report had been submitted by the Branch Office. The committee concurs with this report.

(c) Geographic Research Study of Point Barrow Area: There was no indication of the stature of the researcher and the committee felt such a project should be undertaken by a more mature investigator with an adequate geographic background. The committee stated that in not encouraging this particular proposal it did not wish to discourage the idea of undertaking both studies of adaptation and social impact of the Eskimos at Barrow who are affected by the NPR project.

(d) Medical and Biological Study of the Eskimo: This committee concurred with previously expressed opinions of the Medical Committee that this project was too ambitious for the personnel proposed.

The committee raised the question as to whether the Board should consider the fact that social sciences are thus far on a lower level than natural or physical sciences. From the point of view of a number of interests, it is not too early to make an attempt to raise the social sciences somewhere nearer the level of the natural and physical sciences.

The committee suggested that the Board recommend appointment of a committee with power to decide what should be classified as fundamental research in the social sciences appropriate to the Arctic environment as a whole and appropriate to research conditions available at the ARL and not only to set up standards but to indicate priorities. Social sciences should not neglect economics as the committee feels it is within the proper framework of social sciences. The committee also felt that this proposed committee should include Canadian representatives.

Dr. Schairer moved—

"That the Board accept and concur with the report of the Committee on Anthropology and Social Sciences."

Vote: Seconded by Dr. Irving and passed unanimously.

Committee to Consider Manuals for Contractors and Internal Administration.—Dr. Graf reported the committee was well satisfied with these proposed manuals and agreement was also expressed by Dr. Irving. Prof. MacGinitie also agreed, adding that cooperation would be needed for their effective administration.

Dr. Schairer moved—

"That the Board accept and concur with the report of the Committee."

Vote: Seconded by Dr. Lattimore and passed unanimously.

Committee on Library and Publications.—Dr. Killian reported that the committee assumed that the primary functions of a research library at ARL is to assist the research workers of a frontier field establishment to the fullest possible extent. Among means by which this may be accomplished are—

(1) Act as repository of general scientific handbooks, guide books, basic texts, and references.

(2) Through cooperation of other libraries to arrange for the long and short term loan of books and publications.

(3) Subscriptions to a limited number of technical journals so that they can be made immediately available.

(4) In cases where loan is not practicable, to secure photostats or reprints.

(5) To provide other visual presentation material, including moving pictures, slides and micro-film.

The library problem should be continually studied. This can be done by a small staff library committee to advise the SDARL. This committee should be appointed by the SDARL and report to the ARLAB annually. A recommended budget of \$2,000 yearly was considered necessary by the committee. Close coordination of the library with the ONR library in Washington, which will act as representative for the ARL library, was recommended.

In regard to publications the Board was informed that there were no new publications from ARL at this time. The committee felt that mailing lists should

be established as well as exchange lists. Monographs may be indicated later. Dr. Killian reported that Dr. Washburn had indicated that a section of the publication Arctic would be reserved for news notes from the ARL.

Dr. Lattimore moved—

"That the Board accept and concur with the report of the committee."

Vote: The motion was seconded by Dr. Graf and passed unanimously.

Committee to consider Education Program.—Dr. Field reporting for the committee said it recommended a system of scheduled and professional seminars be set up at ARL, primarily for the common benefit of the staff. These seminars should afford opportunity for discussion of work in progress or in contemplation. All interested, competent persons in the area should be invited to attend.

The committee also recommended a series of lectures on a less technical level designed for the benefit of the intellectual life of the community. Navy and Arctic Contractor personnel should be cordially invited to attend these lectures and to participate in the program.

Dr. MacGinitie added that a program should be formulated for the ensuing year and should be flexible enough to allow for visitors to be included.

Dr. Lattimore moved—

"That the Board accept and concur with the report of the committee."

Vote: The motion was seconded by Dr. Irving and passed unanimously.

Following the report of committee chairmen, The Chairman announced that Dr. G. E. MacGinitie would take over as Scientific Director of the ARL upon the expiration of Dr. Irving's appointment on 30 June 1949.

The Chairman stated that he had been requested to raise the question of housing and construction. There have been complaints about the adequacy of the present BOQ, principally because of lack of privacy.

Members of the Board expressed the opinion that scientific workers have a real need for privacy in their quarters, but Dr. Shelesnyak pointed out that the facilities of Barrow are those of an advanced exploratory camp and not a community. He stated that BuDocks and DNPR feel it would be desirable to establish good living quarters but there is a temporary aspect to the entire program of NPR. There are legal as well as financial limitations on the amount of housing that may be constructed. The cordial relation of the ARL and Arctic Contractors must be maintained. The long range position is jeopardized by making special demands in housing. Housing occupied by ARL personnel is identical with that of employees of Arctic Contractors in comparable positions.

A request for special housing was made by Dr. Irving through channels and was forwarded without approval at each endorsement. An attempt is being made to recruit more married couples. Two additional MOQs are to be constructed. A shop is to connect Buildings #250 and #251.

The Chairman said that as long as the matter of housing is a subject of discussion among the working personnel, it is up to the Board to note the fact and to move toward recommending remedial measures for the situation. It is incumbent upon the Board to push the need for improved quarters just as far as it is expedient.

Dr. Graf felt that trying to make a special elite corps of the researchers would result eventually in a loss to the laboratory.

Dr. Irving said that he wished to emphasize there was no suggestion that there has been any discrimination against the laboratory personnel in the matter of quarters. He added when the proposals for better quarters were returned marked with disapproval, Dr. Shelesnyak wrote to the Chief of Naval Research requesting consideration. The CNR answered that the matter should be referred to the Board.

The Chairman said the Board would write to the CNR advising him of the opinion of the Board.

Dr. Shelesnyak made a statement to the Board regarding the role of ONR in arctic research. He said that from the earliest days of ONR it has been the conviction of many in that office that the only method by which the vitality of a government agency engaged in research administration by contractual relations with universities may be maintained is for that organization to sustain a continuing influx of new professional personnel with an opportunity for those associated with the ONR to return to academic centers. In Navy parlance, we speak of the need for "sea duty" in order to keep able officers abreast of developments and better qualify personnel. To this end ONR has been attempting to induce qualified scientists to join the staff of ONR on a leave-from-university basis and afford opportunity for others at ONR to re-associate themselves with universities and laboratories outside of the government.

This original conviction has with time become increasingly firm and within the past several months planning has been under way for the association of Dr. John Field with ONR in the billet now occupied by Dr. Shelesnyak. Dr. Shelesnyak in turn is to be associated with a nongovernmental group. The Board of governors of the Arctic Institute of North America feels it propitious to establish a Washington-Baltimore office to be primarily concerned with arctic research. The office will be housed on the campus of Johns Hopkins University and will be associated with that university. Dr. Shelesnyak has been invited to be Director of that office and is planning to join the group on or about 1 September 1949.

Dr. Shelesnyak said that he felt the change in geographic location would be a step toward the achievement of the goal of stimulating nurturing and encouraging arctic research. The furtherance of this program demands the cultivation of a university center with strong academic and professional guidance. Such a center must, of course, work closely and constantly with the federal agencies interested in research in the north regions. Without such close collaboration it is certain that neither the university center nor the federal agencies can achieve fullest effectiveness. Dr. Shelesnyak added that it was his hope and definite intention to continue in as close a relationship as possible with the research and activity of ARL and other research in the arctic, and that he would be most unhappy if continuing demands were not made on his time and energy for such counsel as he might be able to give in reference to the ARL at Barrow specifically, and arctic problems of the Navy in general.

Dr. Washburn stated that he would like to express the continuing interest of the Arctic Institute of North America in the Arctic Research Laboratory.

Mr. Rowley expressed his appreciation at being invited to the meeting and added that he had learned quite a lot as a result of the trip.

Prof. Lattimore said that Johns Hopkins University feels very much that it hopes to be in the fore-front of those institutions which have been stimulated by the Office of Naval Research and that if the contract between the university and that office is activated, the university will be on its toes because of what has been said at the meeting, because of the stimulus of Dr. Irving's leadership at ARL, and because of the AINA establishing its Baltimore-Washington quarters with the university.

The meeting adjourned at 11:50 p. m.

EXHIBIT No. 70

AN ANALYSIS OF MR. ALFRED E. KOHLBERG'S CHARGES AGAINST THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

(American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York
22, N. Y.)

FOREWORD

The following pages contain a somewhat detailed analysis, made early in 1945, of an 88-page photostatic document prepared and widely circulated by Alfred Kohlberg in November 1944 which purports to show that the publications of the American and Pacific Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations follow the Communist Party "line." In a court action brought by Mr. Kohlberg to compel the American Council to make available to him the names and addresses of its members, so that he might circulate this and other documents, he further charged the staff writers of the IPR with being "unpatriotic, biased, uninformed, and incompetent."

While a superficial examination of Mr. Kohlberg's document reveals it to be unscholarly and unscientific in its approach, the Executive Committee of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations felt that a careful analysis of his charges should be prepared out of justice to the members and friends who might be disturbed by an attack on the IPR's integrity. Although this was prepared in February 1945, it was not widely circulated at the time because (a) it was a long document and might unduly burden the Trustees and members at the expense of more important matters on the IPR program agenda and (b) the officers of the Council did not desire at that time to broadcast voluminous documents about Mr. Kohlberg and incur the heavy expense involved.

Inasmuch as Mr. Kohlberg has thus far felt unable to accept any of the IPR's efforts to meet his wishes but apparently is determined to continue court action, it has seemed wise to send this lengthy analysis to the Board and to those members who wish it so that they might have the background in the event of Court action leading to wholesome and unwholesome press publicity.

The manner in which materials have been selected from IPR publications to buttress these accusations indicates little understanding of the aims and methods of scholarship as exemplified by the publications program of the IPR. The Institute, as an international, nonprofit, educational organization, does not express opinions on public affairs; and it has consistently adhered to "the principles of complete freedom of scientific inquiry, broad hospitality to all points of view but subservience to none." The analysis in the following pages shows that principles of objectivity and fairness in the presentation of controversial materials have been faithfully observed. The alleged parallel between statements in IPR publications and the Communist "line" breaks down completely when the IPR publications of each period are viewed as a whole. While it is natural that over a period of years a critic should be able to find selections which thoroughly parallel Communist views on some issues, there is also much material that is highly critical of the Communist position. The same could be said of reputable newspapers like the New York Times or the Christian Science Monitor.

The small proportion of IPR publications which Mr. Kohlberg finds suitable for quotation is perhaps the best indication of the weakness of his case. His charges are based on selections from 33 articles and book reviews, 3 pamphlets, and one book, covering a seven-year period in which the organization published 1,961 articles and book reviews and 384 books and pamphlets. Fragmentary excerpt from these articles and pamphlets are quoted in the 58-page document on which he has based his court case. These appear out of context and without explanation. In the following pages these same excerpts are shown in context and, where, as in some cases, they appeared as part of a symposium in which opposing viewpoints were presented, that fact is set forth. Attention is also called to many articles in IPR publications and to other quotations from the very articles cited by Mr. Kohlberg, which express views directly opposite to those which he seeks to attribute to the Institute. The fact is also brought out that several of the publications criticized by Mr. Kohlberg, notably *Wartime China*, were highly praised by Government officials and extensively used in Army and Navy orientation courses. As a matter of fact, so useful were the publications of the Institute to the war effort that the American Council was awarded the Navy E in 1945.

Further evidence of the reckless nature of Mr. Kohlberg's charges is found in his attempt to impugn the integrity, competence, and patriotism of the IPR staff writers. In his petition for court action against the IPR he declares that many IPR staff writers had an extensive background of Communist activity and that their articles presented untrue, false, and misleading facts. No evidence is presented to support the charge of Communist activity because none exists.

Further proof of the irresponsibility of this charge is shown by the fact that Mr. Kohlberg obviously has never taken the trouble to find out who the staff members of the American Council are. Of a total of 25 authors and contributors to IPR publications cited in his document, the following pages show that 13 had never been on the staff of the IPR and only four were on the staff at the time of his charges. Of these, only *one* was employed by the American Council. Among the distinguished authors not on the staff of the IPR whose writings were cited as incompetent or subversive by Mr. Kohlberg were: Nathan M. Becker, formerly professor of economics at a midwestern university; Brig. Gen. Evans Carlson, leader of the famous Carlson's Raiders; Tyler Dennett, former president of Williams College; Foster Rhea Dulles, professor at Ohio State University; Edgar Snow, associate editor of the *Saturday Evening Post*; Owen Lattimore, formerly political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, Deputy Director for the Far East, Office of War Information, and Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations of Johns Hopkins University; and George E. Taylor, head of the Far East Department of the University of Washington who, during the war, was Deputy Director for the Far East, Office of War Information, and until recently was connected with the State Department.

Of the four persons on the IPR staff whose work was criticized by Mr. Kohlberg, two—T. A. Bisson of the International Secretariat and Miriam Farley of the American Council staff—now hold responsible positions on General MacArthur's staff.

Another interesting sidelight on Mr. Kohlberg's criticism of the handling of China by *Pacific Affairs* in the period before Pearl Harbor may be found in the fact that the magazine was edited at that time by Owen Lattimore, noted Far Eastern expert. If Mr. Lattimore was as unfair to China as alleged by Mr. Kohlberg, he scarcely would have been called directly from this post to become confidential adviser of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek upon the recommendation of the President of the United States. As a matter of fact, Mr. Lattimore's appointment was hailed by T. V. Soong, the present Premier of China, as "a major token of increasing understanding between China and the United States."

Further evidence of the general competence of the Institute in handling controversial issues with respect to China is demonstrated by the harmonious cooperation between the China Council of the IPR and the Pacific and American Councils. The Chinese delegation to the Hot Springs Conference of the IPR in January 1945 contained many of the country's leading educators and political figures, and a notable Chinese delegation headed by former Ambassador Hu Shih cooperated with the Americans on the most friendly terms in the subsequent meeting of the Pacific Council at Atlantic City later that year.

The first twenty pages of the analysis which follows document in detail these and other facts which demonstrate the irresponsibility and inaccuracy of Mr. Kohlberg's charges.

The rest is devoted to a detailed review of the publications from which portions are quoted out of context in his 88-page document. In an effort to reconcile the fact that IPR materials include various points of view, particularly on controversial issues, he adopts the strange device of dividing the years from 1937 to 1944 into four periods during which he endeavors to prove that Institute publications indulged in "severe criticism of the Chinese Government, alternating with praise, closely following the alterations of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and that of the Communist press."

Needless to say, this claim collapses under careful scrutiny as shown from pages 21-52, which follow. Even a hasty review of the books and magazine articles published by the IPR, if read *in toto* and not out of context, reveals the absurd inaccuracy of such a charge.

In selecting materials for publication, the organization is guided by various considerations, including the scholarly merit of the material, the importance of the subject, and its public interest. So far as is humanly possible, it endeavors to assure the accuracy of all facts appearing in its publications. Most of its books and pamphlets are sent out in manuscript form to a number of competent critics. It does not attempt to impose censorship on opinions, neither does it solicit manuscripts exclusively from persons of a single viewpoint. On the contrary, believing that truth is arrived at only in an atmosphere of free discussion, it aims to present information reflecting different and often conflicting opinions.

It is hoped that anyone who is inclined to give credence to Mr. Kohlberg's accusations will take the time to study the following pages and read the recent biennial report of the American Council, *Windows on the Pacific*, before passing final judgment on his charges.

SEPTEMBER 1946.

A. INTRODUCTION

On February 13, 1945, Alfred Kohlberg, Inc., through its president, Alfred E. Kohlberg, submitted a petition before the Supreme Court of New York County, requesting a judgment (1) enjoining the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations from holding its regular annual membership meeting scheduled for February 20, 1945, and (2) compelling it to make available to Alfred Kohlberg, Inc., the names and addresses of its members.¹

The petitioner based his reasons for this demand on the charge that many of the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations were—

prepared by staff writers employed by the American Council, which writers had an extensive background of Communist activity, and which staff writers in said articles presented inaccurate, untrue, false, and misleading facts, opinions, and conclusions which, in effect, constituted effective Communist propaganda and which, being published and circulated during the course of the war between the United States of America and the Government of Japan, has given aid and comfort to the enemy by tending to create dissen-

¹ The IPR won the case on May 8, Mr. Kohlberg has appealed it, however.

sion and disunity among the Chinese people and between the Chinese Nation and the United States Government who are allied in the war effort against Japan."

The petitioner further charged the staff writers of the American and Pacific Councils of the Institute with being "unpatriotic, biased, uninformed, and incompetent."

As evidence for this thesis, the petitioner cited an 88-page document, circulated on November 9, 1944, by its president, Alfred Kohlberg. Of this document, 34 pages list excerpts from Institute publications, taken out of context, and 41 pages of it are devoted to quotations from Communist and left-wing publications, which, it is alleged "follow the same line."

Instead of sending this document to the Secretary or officers of the American Council, it was mailed, together with an accompanying letter, to the trustees and certain large contributors of the American Council and to four or five score of other people whose names Mr. Kohlberg has declined to divulge. Although the accompanying letter was addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, the Secretary-General of the Institute, it and the document were mailed to the foregoing without prior notice to, or consultation with, Mr. Carter.

After an exhaustive study of the articles cited in this document, and of many other books, pamphlets, and articles published by the Institute during the seven-year period in question, the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees of the American Council of the Institute believes that Mr. Kohlberg's charges are invalid. Here are a few statements from other individuals and their opinion of the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

STATEMENTS ABOUT THE WORK AND PROGRAM OF THE IPR

SUMNER WELLES—Formerly Under Secretary of State:

"* * * I am glad to say that in the opinion of the officers of the Department of State who are especially familiar with the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the publications of this Institute have been of interest and value. The Institute has been making a substantial contribution to the development of an informed public opinion."

HERMAN BEUKEMA—Colonel, U. S. A., The United States Military Academy, West Point, N. Y.:

"* * * I am convinced that no other civilian research organization in the country presents as wide, thorough, and up-to-date coverage of the Far Eastern field as that of the Institute of Pacific Relations."

EUGENE STALEY—School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C.:

"The American Council of the IPR has made the most important contribution of any organization to the knowledge and understanding in this country of Far Eastern affairs. I can testify from personal experience to the great value of its background publications to Government Agencies when they were suddenly faced with the war emergency against Japan, and of their present value to agencies planning Relief."

RAYMOND SWING—Radio Commentator, Washington, D. C.:

"The research work of the IPR has for years been acknowledged as an invaluable source of information by men in and out of our Government and other Governments on the Far East; and an attack upon it should be inconceivable. The charges you mention against the IPR (i. e., by Alfred E. Kohlberg) would in effect indict official American policy to aid in the promotion of unified China. It is so irrational as to be incredible and ludicrous."

JAMES L. McCONAUGHY—President, United China Relief:

"I have examined Mr. Kohlberg's charges against the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and do not believe they are valid. On my recent trip to China, I found no evidence of any feeling that the American Council was pro-Japanese or pro-Communist. I believe the publications are scholarly and objective. I believe Mr. Kohlberg's efforts, if successful, will harm American friendship for China, and American efforts for international peace."

EDWARD R. EMBREE—President, Julius Rosenwald Fund, Chicago, Illinois:

"The charges are absurd and sound as if they were motivated by a desire to cause dissension among the United Nations. The Institute is devoted to fact finding in conferences and publications and not to propaganda. The

officers and members of the American Council are loyal Americans determined on the destruction of Japanese aggression and the creation of world peace and order under the United Nations."

W. W. WAYMACK—Editor and vice president, *The Des Moines Register and Tribune*, Des Moines, Iowa :

"It is obviously possible, very readily possible, for a person to approach the broad and diverse activity of the IPR in research, in publication, and in conferences, with the determination to pick out every expression that resembled some other expression by a Communist, and argue that the IPR was Communist. It would be equally possible for any person to set out in the same way to bolster his already fixed notion that the IPR is pro-Japanese, and in the same sense do it. Alternatively, it would be, I am sure, quite as easy to apply the same methods and come out with the same sort of "proof" that the IPR is anti-Communist or anti-Japanese or, indeed, pro or anti nearly anything you might propose."

GALEN FISHER—Former YMCA Secretary in Japan; now retired, San Francisco, California :

"* * * I believe the Institute Staff and Board have been usually objective and thorough and have given the utmost aid to the war effort."

HUNTINGTON GILCHRIST—American Cyanamid Co., New York, N. Y. :

"The Institute of Pacific Relations has rendered distinguished service for many years as a private research organization. The officials of our own State Department, and of Canadian, British, Chinese, and other governments attended the recent Hot Springs Conference. The Institute should be proud to stand on its record."

It is the further opinion of the Executive Committee that Mr. Kohlberg's charges are based upon evidence that is biased and insufficient.

1. *The document of November 9 covers only a fraction of the material published by the Institute during the seven-year period in question—less than 2 percent of the articles which appeared in its periodicals, and 0.002 percent of its books.*—It bases its conclusions on about 33 articles and book reviews, 3 pamphlets, and 1 book, during a period when the publications of the organization totaled 1,961 articles and book reviews, and 384 books and pamphlets.

2. *Mr. Kohlberg charges that the staff employed by the IPR is pro-Japanese and "unpatriotic."*—It is interesting to note, however, that the Japanese Government does not share this opinion. A Japanese Government spokesman, broadcasting from Shanghai on February 20, 1945, said :

"The Institute of Pacific Relations, which, in prewar days proved itself to be strongly anti-Japanese, is professedly an organization to serve as a clearing house of international information on economic, political, social, and cultural affairs."

The attitude of the IPR toward Japan was clearly stated in the following statement, made on December 17, 1941, by Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, President of Stanford University, and at that time, chairman of the American Council of the Institute :

"* * * The immediate job of the American people is the prosecution of war against the military imperialism of Japan and the other Axis powers, whose defeat is the condition of any peaceful adjustment in the Far East and elsewhere. The tradition of the IPR does not permit 'neutrality' on this issue; on the contrary, military aggression, in complete disregard of the rights of other peoples, contradicts everything the IPR has stood for."

Mr. Kohlberg also states that his study of IPR publications revealed "no criticism of Japan in these seven years, except of her rural land system."—There are numerous statements critical of Japan's policy, in IPR publications. One example is the pamphlet, *Know Your Enemy Japan* of which nearly 200,000 copies have been sold, and which is widely used by the Army and Navy. This pamphlet includes such paragraphs as the following :

"Japan is a dictatorship without a dictator. She has no Hitler, but dictatorial powers are exercised by a ruling clique dominated by the Army. Like the Nazis, Japan's dictators have but one object: oppression of their own people and despoilment of their neighbors. * * *"

"The real ambitions of Japan's militarists are accurately described in the words of the 'Tanaka Memorial' of 1927 :

"With all the resources of China at our disposal, we shall proceed to the conquest of India, the Archipelago, Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe. * * * In order to conquer the world, we must first fight China * * *. But if we want the gainful control of China in the future, we must shatter the United States'" (pages 17 and 10, *Know Your Enemy Japan*).

A study of editorials and broadcasts based on articles from IPR publications makes it clear that columnists and commentators have not had the same difficulty in finding material critical of Japan.

SAMUEL GRAFTON—Radio Commentator and Columnist, New York Post, January 29, 1941:

"The *Far Eastern Survey* for January 29 tells how Japan has recently stopped publishing vital statistics, that her people may not read in black and white the story of their death."

NEW YORK WORLD TELEGRAM—Editorial—April 14, 1943:

"Whether or not one agrees with the recent report of the Institute of Pacific Relations that 'Japan is our No. 1 enemy,' most Americans probably share the Australian fear that it would be 'suicidal' to give Japan time to consolidate her gains in strategic materials and bases."

3. *A natural problem for those engaged in evaluating Mr. Kohlberg's charges, is the question of his qualifications for passing judgment on the research findings of dozens of authorities.*—Mr. Kohlberg has released public statements on China which would indicate that his factual information on that country is inadequate. On his return from his last trip to China, for example, he reported on The Fighting Condition of the Chinese Army. This report was released by the East and West Association on February 7th, 1944. In describing his contacts with Army men at forward headquarters, Mr. Kohlberg says:

"One morning I had breakfast with Lt. Gen. Chang Teh Nun, Commander of the Fourth Army (known as the Ironside Army) at his headquarters in Changsha. Gen. Chang is typical of the new spirit and the new leadership in the Chinese Army."

The *New York Times* of Monday, August 28, 1944, however, contained the following short release:

"Chinese Execute General for Changsha Dereliction: Chungking, China, Monday, Aug. 28.—It was announced officially today that Gen. Chang Teh-neng, commander of China's Fourth Army, was executed August 25 for dereliction of duty during the defense of Changsha."

Furthermore, according to Mr. Kohlberg's own document of Nov. 9 (p. 45), he was reported in the *New York Times* of November 25, 1938, as stating that "according to information given by sources within the Chinese Government" Soviet aid to China was to end. The full quote follows:

"An agreement giving a free hand to Japan in China has been reached by Russia, Japan, and Germany, according to information given by sources within the Chinese Government to Alfred Kohlberg, president of the Art Embroidery Linen Importers Association. He returned yesterday from a seven weeks' tour of Chinese territory on both sides of the battle lines there.

"Mr. Kohlberg's understanding was that during the summer, Russia, Japan, and Germany had arrived at an agreement by which Russia either joined the German-Japanese alliance, or, if she did not go so far, made peace with Japan and Germany. The arrangement, he understands, calls for cooperation with Russia by Japan and Germany rather than antagonism, and provides for withdrawal of Russian support of Chinese forces."

As a matter of fact, however, further commercial agreements were signed between representatives of the Soviet and Chinese governments in 1939 and 1940; in addition four barter agreements were reached. In his study *Far Eastern War, 1937-1941*, published by World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1942, Professor Harold S. Quigley (University of Minnesota) states:

"The Soviet Union and New Zealand were the only members of the League Council to urge strong measures against Japan in 1938. Mr. Litvinov criticized the Council's report [of September 30, 1938], which stated that sanctions under Article 16 of the Covenant were left to the discretion of individual members of the League. 'My Government,' he said, 'would be happy to take coordinated measures but since other governments will not do so my Government is compelled to accept the report.' Again, in May 1939, Ivan Maisky stated to the Council, after the British and French representatives had declined to support Chinese proposals of economic sanctions, that 'I would like to support the pro-

posals put forward by the Chinese representative * * * (China is the victim of brutal and unprovoked aggression and she is fighting hard and heroically for her independence * * *).

"The commercial accord signed by Sun Fo and A. I. Mikoyan in Moscow on June 16, 1939, provided for the exchange of Chinese raw materials for military supplies. A second agreement was signed in July 1940. Preceding and paralleling these broader conventions were four barter agreements, the first in October 1938 (250,000,000 rubles or approximately U. S. \$50,000,000), the second in February 1939 (U. S. \$50,000,000), the third in August 1939 (U. S. \$150,000,000), and the fourth in December 1940 (U. S. \$50,000,000), a total of U. S. \$300,000,000. Tungsten, antimony, tea, and wool were the principal Chinese products desired by the U. S. S. R. In return China received planes, trucks, tanks, guns, and bombs, transported along the Turkestan-Shensi and Vladivostok-Urga-Ninghsia land routes or by sea via Hanoi and Rangoon.

"The rapprochement of the Soviet Union and Japan, culminating in the Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941, appeared to undermine this program of assistance * * *. The Soviet Government, however, was not moved from its policy of friendship and assistance to China. It assured the latter of its desire to implement the barter agreements and gave proof of its attitude by sending munitions, planes, and pilots" (pp. 256-58).

§. *Mr. Kohlberg's charges and his document reveal that he has little understanding of the aims and objectives of a scholarly organization like the IPR, which may be described as follows:* The Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., is a non-partisan, nonprofit, international organization engaged in research and educational activities. It was founded in 1925 for the purpose of promoting scientific investigation and rational discussion of the problems and mutual relations of the peoples of the Pacific area, and is composed of National Councils in ten countries with interests in Asia and the Pacific area. The American Council is the IPR affiliate in the United States.

The Institute, governed by a Pacific Council, made up of representatives of the various National Councils, does not engage in propaganda. It is contrary to its policy to express opinions on public affairs, and a statement to that effect is carried in most of its publications. The Institute does not, however, seek to escape responsibility for the scholarly standards maintained in its publications, nor for the selection of material which is published. Its policy in this regard has been publicly stated as adhering to "the principles of complete freedom of scientific inquiry, broad hospitality to all points of view but subservience to none."

In selecting materials for publication, whether articles, pamphlets, or books, the Institute is guided by various considerations, including the scholarly merit of the material, the importance of the subject, and its public interest. So far as humanly possible, it endeavors to assure the accuracy of all factual statements appearing in its publications; and most of its books and pamphlets are sent out to a number of competent critics—professors, State Department people, etc.—before publication. It does not attempt to impose a censorship on opinions, nor does it solicit manuscripts exclusively from persons who share a single viewpoint. On the contrary, believing that truth is arrived at only in an atmosphere of free discussion, it aims to present materials reflecting different and often conflicting viewpoints.

Each issue of *The Far Eastern Survey*, published by the American Council of the Institute contains the following statement:

The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations does not express opinions on public affairs. Responsibility for statements of fact or opinion appearing in the *Far Eastern Survey* rests solely with the author.

The Institute does not feel it necessary to apologize for the fact that certain materials which it has published are critical of conditions in China. It has, on occasion, published materials criticizing not only the policies of China, but those of Great Britain, Russia, and other Allied nations including the United States. This it believes to be an integral part of the principle of freedom of scientific inquiry. The same right of criticism has been freely exercised by other American institutions, including the press, publishers' and research organizations.

The publications of the Institute have not shown any special bias against China, as is shown by the fact that (a) many criticisms of countries other than China have appeared in IPR publications, and (b) that Institute publications on China have included not only criticisms but also, as admitted by Mr. Kohlberg, praise of China and support for China.

There are, of course, occasional similarities in subject material between articles published by the Institute and those appearing in the Communist press.

But this does not constitute proof that the Institute is biased in favor of communism or that it is disseminating Communist propaganda. Equal similarity can be found in the subjects covered by the IPR and the *New York Times*, *Life*, or *The Christian Science Monitor*.

5. In his petition to the court, Mr. Kohlberg states that his study of IPR publications revealed that many were "prepared by staff writers employed by the American Council, which writers had an extensive background of Communist activity, and which staff writers in said articles presented inaccurate, untrue, false, and misleading facts, opinions, and conclusions * * *." He declares that " * * * the refusal of the Executive Committee * * * to seriously consider the said charges * * * constitutes gross mismanagement * * * and tends to give comfort and aid to the enemy of the United States, namely, the Japanese Government during time of war, by enabling *unpatriotic, biased, uninformed, and incompetent* staff writers of the American Council and Pacific Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations to continue *writings which constitute Communist propaganda, causing disunity, dissension, and misunderstanding, both within the Chinese Government and among its peoples, and between the Chinese Government and the American Government which are allied in the war effort against the Japanese Government.*"

Elsewhere in this report we shall give detailed attention to the material he has quoted, and the facts and points of view expressed therein. In this section we are interested specifically in the reference made above to "unpatriotic, biased, uninformed, and incompetent staff writers * * *." These statements impugn the integrity, competence, and patriotism of our staff and our contributors. A few facts are presented below—it is our belief that the record speaks for itself.

In his selection of material Mr. Kohlberg quotes a total of 25 authors and contributors. Of these 14 have never been employed on the staff of the IPR, although they may have contributed to its publications or engaged in specific studies for the IPR on Far Eastern subjects. An additional 7, although formerly employed, are not now on the staff. Only 4 of the 25 quoted by Mr. Kohlberg are now on the staff, and only one of these is working for the American Council. It is of interest to glance briefly at the record and background of each of the persons quoted in Mr. Kohlberg's charges.

The following authors, cited by Mr. Kohlberg, are not now and have never been employed on the staff of the IPR, although they have contributed to its publications or special studies:

NATHAN M. BECKER: Formerly Professor of Economics at a midwestern University.

COL. EVANS F. CARLSON: A Marine officer who has given a lifetime of service to his country. Hero of many engagements; leader of the famed Carlson's Raiders in the Solomon Islands campaign. Spent a year studying the Chinese Army and the tactics of the guerillas. Author: *The Chinese Army, Twin Stars of China*.

TYLER DENNETT: In China several times. Former historical adviser, Department of State; former president of Williams College. Author: *Americans in Eastern Asia, Biography of John Hay* (Pulitzer Prize).

FOSTER RHEA DULLES: Formerly a correspondent in China; formerly on staff of *Christian Science Monitor*, *New York Post*, *New York Herald Tribune*; formerly Professor of History at Smith, Swarthmore. Now a professor at Ohio State University. Author: *Forty Years of American-Japanese Relations, Behind the Open Door*.

HALDORE HANSON: Formerly correspondent in Peking; at present in the Department of State. Author: *The People Behind the Chinese Guerrillas*.

OLGA LANG: Spent some years in China. Author, forthcoming book to be published by the IPR *The Chinese Family*.

MARTIN R. NORINS: Formerly in Department of History, University of California. Author: *Gateway to Asia, Sinkiang*.

EDGAR SNOW: Former China correspondent, *New York Sun*, *London Daily Herald*, *Saturday Evening Post*. Lecturer at Yenching University, Peiping. Covered the Sino-Japanese war 1931-33 and 1937-41. Author: *Red Star Over China, The Battle for Asia, People on Our Side*.

GUENTHER STEIN: For many years China correspondent for various newspapers including *Christian Science Monitor*. Formerly editor of *China Airmail*. Author: *Made in Japan*.

MAXWELL S. STEWART: Six years in China; 4 years teaching Yenching University, Peking; formerly Research Economist, Foreign Policy Assn.; now Editor, Public Affairs pamphlets, Associate Editor, *Nation*. Author: *Case for China*,

Social Security. Building the Peace at Home and Abroad, America in a World at War, Wartime China.

ANNA LOUISE STRONG: In China several times. Author: *I Change Worlds, One-Fifth of Mankind, My Native Land.*

LT. GEORGE UHLMANN: Enlisted in French Navy at outbreak of war; after fall of France returned to Peiping where he had lived for many years and served with French Consular Service, joining Fighting French forces in Chungking.

NYM WALES (Mrs. Edgar Snow): Lived and traveled in China and the Far East from 1931-40. Author: *The Chinese Labor Movement, China Builds for Democracy.*

WEI MENG-PU: Formerly Professor of Political Science at the National Northwestern University, Mukden; at the same time the article cited by Mr. Kohlberg was contributed the author was making a study tour in the interior provinces of China.

The following authors quoted by Mr. Kohlberg are not now on the staff, but were formerly employed by the IPR.

ROBERT BARNETT: Rockefeller Fellow, IPR, 1939-40; visited China, returned to work on IPR staff in 1941. Worked for United States Government Office of Strategic Services. At present in China with U. S. Army Air Forces. Author: *Economic Shanghai—Hostage to Politics 1937-41.*

DOROTHY BORG: Research Associate, American Council, IPR, 1938-42. Wrote articles for *Far Eastern Survey*, and directed school program of the American Council.

FREDERICK V. FIELD: On staff of IPR from 1928-40. Assistant Secretary, American Council, 1928. Traveled in Far East, China, Japan, and Philippines 1928-30; China, 1931; Honolulu IPR, 1932; London 1933. Secretary, American Council, 1934-40, Member Executive Committee and Board of Trustees of IPR, 1940. Executive Vice Chairman, Council for Pan-American Democracy. Author: *American Participation in the China Consortiums*; Editor: *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area*; General Editor: *Economic Survey of the Pacific Area*; Contributor to *New Masses* and *Daily Worker*.

MICHAEL GREENBERG: On IPR staff 1941-42. At present with United States Government Foreign Economic Administration.

OWEN LATIMORE: Worked and traveled in the Far East, 1920-26; on a grant from Social Science Research Council, Manchuria, 1929-30; in Peiping under Harvard-Yenching Institute and Guggenheim Foundation, 1930-33; Mongolia, research in Peiping for IPR, 1934-35; Editor, *Pacific Affairs*, 1934-41; Political Adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, 1941-42; Deputy Director for the Far East, Office of War Information, 1942-44. At present consultant OWI, and director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations of Johns Hopkins University. Author: *Inner Asian Frontiers of China, Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict, Mongol Journey, Solution in Asia.*

HARRIET MOORE: On IPR staff 1932-33; 1935-36. Assistant Secretary American Council, IPR, 1943; Acting Secretary, 1943-44; member Research Committee, IPR; Secretary American-Russian Institute. Author: *A Record of Soviet Far Eastern Relations.*

GEORGE TAYLOR: Taught 3 years at Nanking University, China, and 2 years at Yenching University, Rockefeller Fellow, American Council of IPR, 1940-41. Head of Far Eastern Department, University of Washington, Seattle (on leave). At present Deputy Director for the Far East, Office of War Information (1942-). Author: *The Struggle for North China, America in the New Pacific.*

The persons listed below are the only ones of the 25 quoted by Mr. Kohlberg who are on the staff of the IPR at the present time:

EDWARD C. CARTER: Secretary of the American Council, 1927-33; Secretary-General of the Pacific Council, 1934-. Editor: *China and Japan in our University Curricula.*

T. A. BISSON: On the staff of the Pacific Council since 1943, formerly with the Foreign Economic Administration, and for 12 years Far Eastern Expert of the Foreign Policy Association. Author: *American Policy in the Far East, Shadow Over Asia, Japan in China.*

MIRIAM S. FARLEY: On the staff of the American Council, 1934-. Formerly Chairman, Board of Editors, *Far Eastern Survey*; at present editor, popular pamphlets series. Author: *The Problem of Trade Expansion in the Postwar Situation, Speaking of India.*

Y. Y. HSU: On the staff of the Pacific Council 1941-. Author: *Chinese View of Wartime Economic Difficulties.*

The references cited above are not in any sense a complete review of the positions held, the publications written, or the other qualifications of the authors cited. A compilation of favorable critical comment on their published works would undoubtedly make a substantial volume in itself. It may be of interest, however, to cite two typical reviews—one from the *New York Times*, one from the *Herald Tribune*, of books by two of the authors mentioned.

NEW YORK TIMES—February 21, 1945

Re: *Solution in Asia*, by Owen Lattimore:

"Owen Lattimore is one of the best qualified of all Americans now writing on Oriental affairs * * * devotes the greater part of *Solution in Asia* to a review of recent political history in Japan and China."

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE (Sunday Edition)—June 5, 1938

Re: *Japan in China*, by T. A. Bisson:

"*Japan in China* (by T. A. Bisson, 1938) is an extraordinary book. It is beyond all doubt the soundest and most scholarly volume which has yet appeared on the more immediate background and origins of the Sino-Japanese conflict, and on its earlier phases. Nor is it likely that its position in this field will soon be usurped. For until the archives are thrown open and the memoirs of those who have been close to the seats of power during the last five years are published, it is difficult to see how any historian could surpass Mr. Bisson's work. It represents the quintessence of years of painstaking research, and of lengthy conversations, during 1937, with leader and rank and file in China and Japan, by a first-class authority on Far Eastern social and political developments."

COLONEL EVANS CARLSON—*American Journal of International Law*—January 1941

Re: *The Chinese Army, Its Organization and Military Efficiency*:

"To the layman who has been confused by the rival claims of Japanese and Chinese military prowess in the present Sino-Japanese war, and more especially by the excessive claims of the partisans of China or Japan, of Occidental race, this handbook of information by Major Carlson will be most welcome * * *. In the concluding chapter the author gives much credit for China's awakened consciousness to the just and kindly leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, their military leader * * *."

NEW YORK TIMES—January 28, 1945

Re: *China's Wartime Politics*, by Lawrence K. Resinger:

"This is an absorbingly interesting and important monograph which includes fourteen documents of outstanding significance, particularly with reference to Kuomintang-Communist aims and relations, with which half of them deal. It is heartening to serious students (and it behooves Americans to become serious students) of contemporary China that the author and his patrons of the Institute of Pacific Relations should have seen fit, in a study so limited in scope, bulk, and chronology, to have used and rendered accessible so many fundamental source materials.

Clearly written, coolly objective, essentially sound as to facts, this essay presents the highlights, with comparatively few contrasting shadows, of the period touched upon. Never does Mr. Resinger wax enthusiastic; never is he ironical or condemnatory, never does he guess, suggest, or imply, and rarely does he attempt explanation or interpretation. Facts are facts, without nuances."

Finally, reference might be made to the many qualified persons at present carrying on the work of the IPR, and to those others who have left the IPR to assume important and responsible positions with the United States Government. The latter group includes:

CATHERINE PORTER: On the staff of the IPR, 1942-44, formerly assistant editor of *Pacific Affairs*, and chairman of the Board of Editors of the *Far Eastern Survey*. At present Regional Specialist on the Philippines for the Office of War Information.

W. L. HOLLAND: On the staff of IPR, 1929-45, formerly editor of *Pacific Affairs*, and International Research Secretary of the Pacific Council; on leave at present as Assistant Chief, China Outpost, Chungking, Office of War Information.

WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD: On the staff of the IPR, 1935-42; Secretary of the American Council, 1941-42. Office of Strategic Services (1942). At present in China with the U. S. Army Air Corps.

RUSSEL G. SHIMAN: On the staff of IPR, 1933-41. United States Tariff Commission, 1941-43; Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, 1943-44; UNRRA, 1944-45.

PHILIP E. LILIENTHAL: Pacific Council Staff 1938-42; in charge of International Secretariat's Shanghai Publication Office, 1940-41; now with Office of War Information, San Francisco.

KATRINE R. C. GREENE: American Council staff, 1938-42. At present with American Red Cross in North Africa.

LAURA MAYER: Pacific Council staff, 1942-43; now with Red Cross in New Guinea.

MARY HEALY: Pacific Council staff, 1942-43; now with Foreign Economic Administration in New Delhi, India.

ELIZABETH DOWNING: Pacific Council, 1936; Shanghai Publications Office, 1937-38; American Council, 1941-43; at present with Office of War Information, New York.

BARBARA WERTHEIM TUCHMAN: American Council, 1934-36; at present with Office of War Information.

ISABEL WARD: Pacific Council, 1936; 1940-41; at present with OWI in San Francisco.

6. *The Kohlberg document attempts to prove that the IPR publications followed a definite pattern with regard to China: i. e., that, prior to the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 23, 1939, they praised China; from then till June 22, 1941, they abused China; from then till the summer of 1943, they praised China; and since the summer of 1943, they have again concentrated on abuse of China.*—This, according to Mr. Kohlberg, represented shifts in the Communist Party line.

In order to prove his case, the author of the document has resorted to the device of taking passages of articles out of context. Yet in a number of instances, these same articles contain other paragraphs which, if similarly taken out of context, could be used to prove the opposite. The IPR pamphlet, *Wartime China*, is a good example of this.

The pamphlet sets out neither to "praise" China nor to "abuse" China, but to present what, in the opinion of the author and many expert critics who read it in manuscript form, is a balanced view supported by the best available evidence. Mr. Kohlberg has taken from its pages quotations which indicate criticism of China. However, as is demonstrated below, it is possible to select numerous quotes indicating praise of the country and its leaders, which give an entirely different picture. The fallacy of this method of selection is apparent, and it illustrates the weakness of Mr. Kohlberg's assertions: *Wartime China* states:

"We have been filled with admiration at the way in which the people of China, in the face of almost incredible hardships and disappointments, have stood up to the Japanese year after year without giving in * * *" (page 6).

"From a military standpoint, the remarkable thing is that the Chinese were able to maintain resistance in the face of great inferiority of arms and supplies of all kinds. Comparatively little help has been obtained from broad * * *" (page 10).

"Against this historical background, the degree of national unity that has been achieved in China since 1937 under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership is truly remarkable. Without it, the miracle of military resistance could not have taken place * * *" (page 16).

"When measured against the handicaps which she has had to overcome, China's war effort is truly impressive. Try to imagine that an enemy power has occupied both sea coasts of the United States and most of the country east of the Mississippi. The capital has been moved to Denver and is flooded with refugees. Then take away nearly all of the factories, railroads, highways, telephone and telegraph lines, electrical equipment, coal, iron, and oil fields from the unoccupied area. Even so, we should be better off than China for we should still have an abundance of skilled labor and trained technicians and administrators. For the political picture, go back to 1776 when our country consisted of thirteen "sovereign" states with hardly any organized national government, and plenty of conservatives who saw no sense in fighting for that new and unfamiliar idea, the 'United States of America.' Keep up the enemy pressure for seven years with little help from outside. That might give you a rough idea, in American terms, of what China has been up against" (page 20).

"The fact that Chiang is President of the Republic Prime Minister and Commander in Chief of the Army has led many people to think of him as

a dictator. This is hardly accurate. Although on paper his powers are great, actually he serves as a sort of balance wheel, stabilizing the conflicting forces of the various groups * * * (page 42).

"Most of all, perhaps, Americans can help China by trying to understand the magnitude of the task which she faces in transforming an ancient medieval society into a modern democratic nation. Only if we appreciate her difficulties as well as her achievements can we deal fairly with China. And we must remember that many of the difficulties which she faces today and in years to come are the result of seven years of war in which China fought our battle almost unaided" (page 63).

In his letter accompanying the November 9 document, Mr. Kohlberg termed *Wartime China* as "from start to finish * * * a deliberate smear of China and the Chinese Government." The above paragraphs would not bear this out, however. Neither would such letters and reviews as the following:

TYLER DENNET—April 6, 1944, former President of Williams College

Re *Wartime China*:

"Maxwell Stewart's booklet seems to cover very well the ground about the internal conditions in China. Probably the Chinese will not like it but it seems to me that he almost went out of his way to give all the extenuating circumstances and to qualify the criticisms. It's about the best booklet I have seen out of the IPR."

FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL—August 1944

Re *Wartime China*:

Wartime China, by Maxwell S. Stewart. American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Behind the Open Door, by Foster Rhea Dulles. American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

"Here we have two splendid additions to the illuminating series of pamphlets produced by this publisher. The first describes the stresses and strains behind the fighting lines in China. The second is a popularly written history of Japanese aggression from Perry's time to Pearl Harbor. Like the rest of the series, these booklets are written by specialists in their fields and have been carefully checked by experts; their scholarship is sound."

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW—December 1944

Re *Wartime China*:

"This Institute of Pacific Relations pamphlet on China by the editor of the widely circulated Public Affairs pamphlets gives an authoritative, balanced discussion of the problems, resources, personalities, and confusions in that much misunderstood land."

7. *Mr. Kohlberg is much more sensitive to criticism of China than many Chinese.*—Unlike Mr. Kohlberg, the China Institute of Pacific Relations is not hostile to the work and publications of the IPR. One of the basic practices of the IPR has been not only to provide for criticism but to welcome and stimulate it. The research publications and monographs of the National Councils and of the International Secretariat are submitted to a number of competent critics before publication, and at the International Conferences of the IPR every effort is made to stimulate the frank expression of every point of view.

This procedure is important because neither the Institute itself nor any of its National Councils express an "institute" point of view on any political or economic questions. Every article, pamphlet, book, or oral statement rests solely on the authority of the individual author.

There have recently been vivid examples of this policy of frank criticism at the January 1945 International Conference of the Institute at Hot Springs, Va. There was frank and forceful criticism of statements of American members by French, British, and Dutch members. There were Chinese criticisms of American statements, and vice versa. There were Indian criticisms of British statements, and vice versa. Many of these will be reflected in the preliminary report of the Hot Springs Conference which will be published sometime in April 1945.

At the Atlantic City meeting of the Pacific Council of the IPR in January 1944 there were likewise British criticisms of some of the articles of members of the International Secretariat. There were similarly American and Chinese criticisms of the International Secretariat. On one occasion there were criticisms of the International Secretariat because it was too "pro-Chinese," too "pro-American" and too "pro-British."

At Hot Springs, one Chinese member criticized the International Secretariat for the writings of some of its members on Chinese problems. This was countered

by the Chairman of the China IPR, Dr. Chiang Mon-lin, former Minister of Education in China, who said that he personally had no sympathy with such criticisms, that the essence of the IPR was frank criticism and freedom of speech. He felt that criticism of China both by Chinese and by foreigners was an asset and that he welcomed the criticisms of people of whatever school of thought, who were interested in the problems of China and China's relationship to other countries.

There is a wide difference between friendly criticism and hostility. If the Chinese IPR were hostile to the parent organization, it could take one or both of the following steps: (1) it could cease or reduce its financial support of the International Secretariat. As a matter of fact in both 1943 and 1944 the China IPR made a larger financial contribution to the International Secretariat than any other of the ten National Councils with the single exception of the American Council. (2) It could either withdraw from membership in the Pacific Council or give notice that it was considering withdrawal. It has adopted neither course.

On the contrary, its cooperation has been substantial and important. It contributed several data papers to the Hot Springs Conference. It is actively cooperating in the International Research Program. The services of its National Secretary in Chungking have been loaned for a period of six months to the International Secretariat in New York without cost to the International Secretariat for traveling expenses or salary.

At very large expense the China IPR sent a truly representative group of Chinese to the Hot Springs Conference (January 6-17, 1945). They include the following:

CHINA'S DELEGATES TO HOT SPRINGS CONFERENCE OF THE IPR, JANUARY 1945

CHIANG, MON-LIN—Formerly Minister of Education; Chancellor, National Peking University. New, Member Executive Council, National Southwest Associated University; President, Chinese Red Cross, and Chairman, China Institute of Pacific Relations. *Chairman.*

CHANG, CARSON—Member, Peoples' Political Council.

CHANG, CHUNG-FU (1936)—Director, Department of American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

CHEN, S. C.—Professor of Sociology, National Southwest Associated University, Associate Director, Nankai Institute of Economics.

CHIEN, TUAN-SHENG (1939)—Professor of Political Science, National Southwest Associated University; Member, Peoples' Political Council.

CHOW, S. R. (1939-1942)—Professor of International Law, National Wu-Han University; Member, Peoples' Political Council.

Hsia, CHING-LIN (1929, 1931, 1942)—Member, Legislative Yuan; Director, Chinese News Service, New York. Address: Chinese News Service, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, N. Y.

HU, SHIH (1931, 1933, 1936)—Formerly: Ambassador to the United States; Dean, College of Literature, National Peking University; Member, Peoples' Political Council; and Chairman, China Institute of Pacific Relations. Now, Visiting Professor, Harvard University.

LEE, KAN (1936, 1942)—Commercial Counsellor, Chinese Embassy, Washington, D. C.

LI, CHOH-MING—Associate Director, Nankai Institute of Economics.

LIU, YU-WAN (1933, 1936, 1939)—Executive Secretary, China Institute of Pacific Relations.

LOWE, C. H. (1931, 1936)—Director, India Office, Ministry of Information.

NING, ENG-CHENG (1929; 1931)—Chief Auditor, The Farmers Bank of China; Member, Peoples' Political Council.

POE, DIMON HSUEH-FENG—Professor of Political Science, National Central University; Counsellor, National Supreme Defense Council.

SHAO, YU-LING—Secretary, National Military Council.

WU, WEN-TSAO—Professor of Sociology, Yenching University; Counsellor, Supreme National Defense Council.

YANG YUNCHU—Director, Department of Eastern Asia Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

YEH, GEORGE—Representative, Ministry of Information, London.

YUAN, T. L.—Librarian, National Library of Peking.

Chinese Secretariat

CHENG, PAO-NAN—Director, Mid-West Bureau, Chinese News Service, Chicago.

MRS. ENID CHEN (1942)—Chinese News Service, New York.

HELEN NELSON ENGLUND—Director, International Relations Speakers Bureau, Chicago, Ill.

T. C. HSU—Chinese News Service, New York.

ELEANOR STRYNSKI—Chinese News Service, Chicago, Ill.

Many of the foregoing flew from Chungking to the United States specially for the Hot Springs Conference.

When in 1943 the Secretary-General and the International Research Secretary visited China on behalf of the Pacific Council, they went at the invitation of the China IPR and were given every facility for consultation with Chinese scholars, publicists and high officials of the Chinese Government. They both have been invited to visit China again as soon as possible.

B. ANALYSIS OF MR. KOHLBERG'S DOCUMENT

Section I, p. 49 (1937–August 23, 1939)

On page 4 of his document, Mr. Kohlberg states that the IPR was not critical of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang from the time of the agreement, early in 1937, between the Kuomintang and the Communists, and August 1939, when Germany and the Soviet Union made their nonaggression pact.

By this statement, Mr. Kohlberg implies that the IPR is following the "Communist line." However, a careful study of the issues of the *Far Eastern Survey* of that period of 2½ years reveals that in no instance did the Survey make comparisons, invidious or otherwise, between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang and did not praise the Chinese Communists. References to Chinese Communists had no political coloring.

In that period there were three articles relating to Chinese guerrillas. One was a half-page in length, one less than a page, and one five pages. In none of the three articles does the word "communist" appear. The guerrillas are treated as Chinese, not as partisans within China of an alien ideology. The three articles are factual descriptions of what Chinese termed "guerrillas," were doing to aid in the war against Japan. The three articles are "Guerrilla Industries May Displace 'Scorched Earth' Policy," page 179, *Far Eastern Survey*, 1938; "Chinese Guerrillas Spike Japanese Raw Cotton Hopes," page 201 of the same year; and "The War Economy of China's Guerrillas," page 265 of the same year.

Mention in other articles of Chinese Communists include neither criticism or praise of either the Communists or the Kuomintang. For example, an article entitled "Revitalizing British Interests in China," states, on page 139 of the 1937 volume: "There is little doubt that the degree of political unification which has been achieved by the Nanking Government, together with the stabilizing effects of the financial reforms, would under any circumstances have served to attract new British capital to China"; in an article entitled "China's Domestic Transport System," page 255 of the 1937 volume: "* * * the excellent high-ways of Kiangsi, for example, grew out of the needs of the recent anti-Communist campaign"; in an article entitled "The War and Western Interests in North China," page 231 of the 1938 volume: "Moreover, the widespread continuance of guerrilla warfare has prevented the consolidation of the Japanese position and the restoration of peace and order."

Had the *Far Eastern Survey* been following a "Communist line," it would have taken opportunity to praise the Chinese communists at the expense of the Kuomintang. This it did not do in the period under review, a period stated by Mr. Kohlberg to be a time when the IPR was following the "Communist line."

Mr. Kohlberg quotes the *Survey* twice, presumably to support his contention. The first is from an article by Frederick V. Field on page 57 of the 1937 volume entitled "The Chinese Communists Re-merge." The sentence to which Mr. Kohlberg takes exception is apparently the following: "If this information is correct [that an agreement has been reached between the National Government and the Communists] it means that for the first time since 1927 the Communists have been officially recognized, the government has agreed to give up its anti-Communist campaigns, and—most important—an actual beginning to an anti-Japanese military and political front has been established." To anyone who was following Chinese affairs at that time, regardless of his political views, this seems to be a mere statement of fact.

The other statement from the *Far Eastern Survey* quoted by Mr. Kohlberg in this section of his document (page 7) seems to have no connection with his general argument, and cannot therefore be dealt with. A study of the four issues

of *Pacific Affairs* quarterly of the year 1937 quoted in the Kohlberg document, also fails to indicate that there was any following of the "Communist party line."

Mr. Kohlberg quotes only from one article during the year 1937, namely, the article entitled "*Soviet Society in Northwest China*" by Edgar Snow. From that article he quotes the sentence: "*In Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic* (by Martin Lawrence, London, 1934) the First All-China Soviet Congress in 1931 set forth in detail the 'maximum program' of the Communist Party of China—and reference to it shows clearly the ultimate aim of Chinese Communists is a true and complete socialist state of the Marxist-Leninist conception." Mr. Snow's next sentence (not quoted by Mr. Kohlberg) reads, "Meanwhile, however, it has to be remembered that the social, political, and economic organization of the Red districts has all along been only a very provisional affair." This second sentence gives the point of the article, which as the title indicates, is a description of the Chinese Communist area based on Snow's first-hand knowledge of it. Mr. Snow writes for the *Saturday Evening Post* on the subject of Chinese Communists, as well as other subjects. He has also written several best sellers, published by reputable firms. But it is doubtful if this fact makes these publishers open to the charge of following the "Communist line."

Note is taken below of all other articles and book reviews which touch on the question of either the National Government of China or the Chinese Communists during this period.

In the March 1937 issue there is an article entitled "*The Dragnet of Local Government in China*" by Norman D. Hanwell, which, in pointing out the defects of local government, is indirectly critical of the National Government.

In the issue of June 1937 there is no criticism, either favorable or adverse, of either the National Government or the Chinese Communists. The matter is ignored.

In the September 1937 issue, which contains the article by Edgar Snow referred to by Mr. Kohlberg, the only other article referring to either the National Government or the Chinese Communists is an article entitled "*Japan and China: A War of Minds*" by Robert S. Morton, in which the writer expresses his own views as follows: "To many Chinese the Kuomintang now seems tame, even reactionary; and highly subservient to Japan in yielding territory and influence repeatedly, without daring to risk its own position by real struggle for defense" (page 312). "By most Chinese * * * Communism is opposed, whether domestic or Russian" (page 312).

"Moreover, the predominant Chinese view is that internal Communism has steadily lost ground for five years, despite the spectacular flight of guerrilla bands through sparsely settled areas. A subcurrent of Chinese opinion is inclined to listen to Communists, not so much because of their social program or their actual record in China, as because they denounce and oppose Japanese imperialism more openly than does the cautious Chinese Government" (page 313). The article praises neither the National Government nor the Chinese Communists.

In the same issue, in an article entitled "*The New Era in Chinese Railway Construction*" by "Asiaticus," is a statement that "The only danger points which signify yielding to foreign pressure by Nanking are to be seen in leaving North China, menaced by the Japanese, to its fate, and a tendency to compromise with the Japanese plans for usurping control of all railway interests in this zone." Except for this statement the article is descriptive of accomplishments in railway construction and does not praise or criticize the National Government.

The only book review in this issue which falls within the current study is a review of *China Calling* by the Reverend Frank Houghton, a British missionary. The book is reviewed by Eugene E. Barnett, and he quotes a sentence from the book "*Probably no Chinese government has ever included so large a proportion of energetic and public-spirited officials as those now at work in Nanking.*" Quoting this statement was no "Communist line." Anyone who had association with the government at Nanking at that time would subscribe to the statement.

There is no article in the December 1937 issue which refers to the National Government or to the Chinese Communists. The opening article, however, is by Frederick V. Field. The title of the article is "*American Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1937.*" Mr. Field, however, fails to mention either the National Government of China or the Chinese Communists, although the subject of the article gave him room to do so if he wished.

With regard to book reviews, Dr. Shuhsi Hsu is given an opportunity to make objections, in more than two pages, to a review in the same issue of Dr. Hsu's book *The North China Problem*. In the review of that book the reviewer,

Owen Lattimore, states that Dr. Hsu describes the position of the Chinese Communists as "virtually laying down their arms" and then Mr. Lattimore states,

"I was in the Red territory about two weeks before I read Professor Hsu's book, and I saw no signs of any such docility. The Chinese Communists still appear to think that they have improved their local footing in the Northwest and at the same time won a stronger position in national politics by their negotiations in Nanking since the release of Chiang Kai-shek from Sian, and that as a result they will be able to press their old demands for a general national resistance against Japanese aggression."

Mr. Lattimore's review is an honest and unheated criticism of a book which was obviously incomplete in its content, not only with regard to the Chinese Communists but with regard to the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, a subject on which Mr. Lattimore is an outstanding authority.

The Lattimore review is followed by a review by a Chinese (Chen Han-seng) of a book by Harry Gannes entitled "*When China Unites: An Interpretive History of the Chinese Revolution*." Mr. Chen does not seem to approve of Gannes' treatment of the Chinese Communists. The criticism of this aspect of the book, however, is less than one-half of a page out of a review of more than two and a half pages.

Taking up the four issues of *Pacific Affairs* for the year 1938:

The only item in the issue for March 1938 which Mr. Kohlberg quotes is a review of Edgar Snow's book *Red Star Over China*, the reviewer being Mr. Edward C. Carter. The review on the whole commends the book, in common with practically all reviewers of the book at the time of publication. Mr. Carter's review, however, is not entirely favorable, pointing out "the author's tendency to ignore the very substantial achievements of the Nanking Government" (page 110).

Mr. Kohlberg fails to point out that ten pages in front of that review, four pages are devoted to an attack on the Chinese Communists by W. W. Wheeler 2d, in which Mr. Wheeler refers to the Chinese Communist forces as follows: * * * "such unattached free-booting armies are an old and even stereotyped evil" and "the present Communist army is notable chiefly for the length of its retreat, its proclivity for plunder and its avoidance of pitched battle." In final paragraph of this almost four pages statement is contained the sentence, "The bulk of the Communist Army is recruited from vagabonds" (pages 101-104).

This issue contains two articles on the military situation in China. The first, entitled "China's advance from Defeat to Strength" by "Asiaticus," praises both Chiang Kai-shek and his armies and the Communist armies. The second article, "The Strategy of the Sino-Japanese Conflict" by Herbert Rosinsky, praises the armies of Chiang Kai-shek and refers favorably to "guerrilla tactics" and to the vindication of the Red Army's reputation by its "outstanding bravery in the fighting in Shansi." In this connection it should be remembered that *there was every reason to praise both Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists at that time. It seemed that unity had been achieved between them and during that period Chiang Kai-shek's troops were doing magnificent fighting at Shanghai and Taierhuang, fighting such as has not been attained by the National Government forces since then.*

There is also an article in this issue "The Revolution in Chinese Legal Thought" by N. H. van der Valk, which inter alia adversely criticizes the new Criminal Code of 1935 of the Chinese government.

In *Pacific Affairs* of June 1938 no article deals either with the National Government or with the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Kohlberg quotes some statements made by Edgar Snow in this issue. *These statements occur in five pages given to Edgar Snow in which to reply to more than six pages of criticism of Snow's "Red Star Over China" by "Asiaticus." It is an indication of a dispassionate publication to permit two writers to air their opinions pro and con on a controversial subject.*

There are no book reviews in the June 1938 issue relating to either the National Government or the Chinese Communists.

Regarding the issue of *Pacific Affairs* of September 1938, it is impossible to perceive why Mr. Kohlberg quotes what he does from the article by Haldore Hanson entitled "The People Behind the Chinese Guerrillas" (page 285). This article is a factual account of Mr. Hanson's visit to those places in North China (not Communist Northwest China) where "self-defense governments" had "sprung up everywhere in the wake of the Japanese Army," these groups being led "jointly by Communist agents and patriotic University students." The

activities of these "self-defense governments" were watched during that period with the greatest sympathy and enthusiasm by all Westerners in the cities of North China, regardless of the political views of those people, because of their effective hampering of the Japanese. This article is a factual recital of eye witness experiences of a man of excellent reputation who has been serving for the past two years or more in the Cultural Division of the Department of State.

Mr. Kohlberg quotes from an item in this issue entitled "*Why the Chinese Communists Support a United Front.*" This is in its entirety an interview which Nym Wales had with a Chinese Communist. It is in quotation marks to show that everything said in this article was said by the Chinese Communist. It is an interview and it is clearly published as such (page 311).

No other article of this issue deals with either the National Government or the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Kohlberg quotes from two pages of comment made by Owen Lattimore (pages 370-72) in regard to a criticism by William Henry Chamberlin (of four pages in the June issue of *Pacific Affairs* entitled "*The Moscow Trials,*" which appeared under "Comment and Correspondence"; a brief article which did not refer to the Chinese Communists but only to the Moscow trials. *Mr. Kohlberg fails to point out that immediately preceding Mr. Lattimore's comment are four pages of comment by Mr. William Henry Chamberlin adversely criticizing the Moscow trials. Again, this is the procedure of a dispassionate publication—to print the opposing views in close juxtaposition so that both sides may have an equal opportunity to reach the readers of the publication.*

Mr. Kohlberg does not quote from *Pacific Affairs* of December 1938. This issue does not have any material which might be regarded as following the "Communist line." However, in fairness to the Institute, Mr. Kohlberg might have referred to a four page editorial (pages 495-8) in which reference is made to the practice of *Pacific Affairs* in presenting both points of view in regard to a controversial subject. In the final paragraph of that editorial it is stated: "While 'avoiding the practice of presenting every controversy through two 'selected' spokesmen, we have also done our best to increase the representation, in *Pacific Affairs*, of national points of view—a policy which is not inconsistent with our major policy of trying, first and foremost, to establish the real course of events and the real trend of development."

In *Pacific Affairs* for March 1939 there is one article dealing with the resistance to the Japanese, "The Good Iron of the New Chinese Army," by Olga Lang (page 20). This is primarily a case study of Chinese who are fighting the Japanese. Mr. Kohlberg quotes the final three sentences: "All of this does not mean that the Chinese Army is already perfect. Far from it. Much remains to be done: But what is important is that the way to victory is found." Mr. Kohlberg evidently intends to suggest that a statement so favorable as this about the Chinese forces early in 1939, is incompatible with recent statements regarding the present malnutrition of the National forces of China, and the present neglect of troops by some Chinese generals. The two statements are not incompatible. A deterioration has taken place in the past two or three years in the treatment of the Chinese forces by their leaders, just as there has taken place deterioration in its resistance to Japan.

There is nothing else in this issue either praising or criticizing the National Government of China or the Chinese Communists, not even among the book reviews.

In the June 1939 issue of *Pacific Affairs* there are two articles dealing with China's resistance: one, "*The Nature of Guerrilla Warfare*" by Major R. Ernest Dupuy (pages 138-48), and the other, "*The Failure of Civil Control in Occupied China*" by B. Ward Perkins (pages 149-56). The first article is a study of aspects of guerrilla warfare in history, and other countries, and its purpose is to discover what one may hope for from guerrilla warfare in China. It is unemotional in character. The second article is critical of the Japanese and speaks favorably of the guerrillas.

The third article in this issue is "*The War in China and the Soviet Press*" by Martin R. Norins (pages 157-68), from which Mr. Kohlberg quotes extensively in his document. This article is composed of reports from Communist sources and these reports are always identified as such. *Taken in conjunction with the preceding two articles it forms one of three serious studies, and to drop any one of them would result in giving a less complete picture of the situation that is obtained from the three together.*

In "*Comment and Correspondence*" there are two letters with regard to guerrilla warfare, one by Captain Evans F. Carlson of the United States Marine Corps (pages 183-84), and one by Haldore Hanson (pages 184-85), both of them men who have had first-hand experience in guerrilla areas. The purpose of each letter is to comment on Dupuy's article, "*The Nature of Guerrilla Warfare*," and they deal with Dupuy's statements from a legal and technical viewpoint rather than from a partisan viewpoint.

Quotations Critical of China in I. P. R. Publications, 1937-Aug. 23, 1939

The following excerpts demonstrate that in the period under review the I. P. R. (American and Pacific Councils) published materials critical of both Kuomintang and Chinese Government policies (as well as other materials commending them).

As many of these quotations are from the Far Eastern Survey, it should be noted that before 1941, the Survey was devoted to economic topics and avoided discussion of political or controversial issues. Nevertheless the tenor of many articles was clearly critical of Chinese Government policy.

MR. KOHLBERG'S PERIOD OF PRAISE OF CHINA

"*Merchant Capital and Usury Capital in Rural China*," by Leonard T. K. Wu, *Far Eastern Survey*, March 25, 1936

"Rural credit is the crux of the great financial problem facing China today" (p. 63).

"Certain conclusions seem to the present writer, to be the only logical implications.

"(1) The operation of the present system of usury-merchant-landlordism must lead to the disintegration of rural China. With interest rates as high as 100 percent or more * * * it is inevitable that the middle class peasants will be reduced to small peasants, small peasants to poor peasants, and poor peasants to hired or unemployed persons.

"(2) Under the present system, the bulk of the peasants are hardly able to keep body and soul together. It is therefore absolutely impossible to expect them to make any technical or other scientific advance in methods of production * * *

"(3) The pauperization of the peasantry and decline in agricultural productivity means a shrinkage in national purchasing power * * * Usury-merchant-landlordism in China is destroying, instead of creating, markets * * * (p. 68).

"*Rural Bankruptcy in China*," by Leonard T. K. Wu, *Far Eastern Survey*, October 8, 1936.

"If any one problem can be said to overshadow all other internal economic questions facing harassed China today, it is the rural crisis." (p. 209)

"The present state of rural China may be summarized in one word—bankruptcy" (p. 209).

"The poverty and desperation of the peasants is indicated in the growing restiveness which often spontaneously breaks out into open opposition. In famine regions the eating of bark of trees and grass roots, and the sale of children is commonplace" (p. 211).

"The central and fundamental cause of the rural crisis is what Chan Han-song has aptly termed the contradiction between land owning and land using'. * * * The dire need of no less than 65 percent of China's rural population is for land" (p. 212).

"The Rajchman Report [report by Dr. Ludwik Rajchman to the League of Nations] states: 'The number of tenants is on the increase, since owner-farmers are being forced, because of the depression and the decline of agriculture, to sell their land or to mortgage it on such terms as to leave them little better than tenants.'" (p. 212).

(Note that the report of the eminent scholar, Dr. Rajchman, to the League of Nations parallels Dr. Wu's findings as reported in the Far Eastern Survey.)

"Exorbitant rents, arising from this system of land tenancy, further provokes the seriousness of the rural problem" (p. 214).

"The second structural cause of the rural crisis is the assessment of all kinds of exorbitant taxes and tolls. While the very lifeblood of the tenants and partial tenants is poured into high land rents, that of the peasant proprietors and small landlords is poured into stiff taxes and tolls" (p. 214).

"Chinese Reconstruction in Practice" by Frederick V. Field, Far Eastern Survey December 19, 1936

In this article Mr. Field surveys the efforts of the National Government toward national reconstruction and finds them very inadequate.

"The aspects of reconstruction on which we have already touched—landlordism and tenancy, taxation and cooperation—are those in which the social problem is conspicuous. A survey of the application of the reconstruction program in these fields throws grave doubt on whether fundamental reform can be achieved under the present auspices. The compromise necessarily made in the interests of political expediency and economic support seem practically to frustrate the basic readjustments called for in blueprints * * *" (p. 268).

"In relation to the immense problem [of water control] the energy and resources the government has devoted to it are pitifully insignificant" (p. 270).

"The key to understanding the whole current reconstruction movement is found in the purposes and methods of the communications program * * *. Considerable emphasis has * * * been put * * * on highway construction. Yet * * * the highways * * * have been developed less to supplement the economy of the Chinese farmers * * * than to force the provinces into a central federation by military coercion. Unification of a sort has been achieved, but it has been achieved in such a way as to * * * establish a military dictatorship over an already oppressed people. * * * It is this factor which throws doubt on the validity of the entire reconstruction effort. The evidence would seem to indicate that below the surface of construction activities of the sort represented by highways there remain all the fundamental maladjustments of a feudal, agrarian society (pp. 270-71).

"The Financial Stability of the Nanking Government" by Kate Mitchell, Far Eastern Survey, July 1, 1936

"Internally the Nanking Government faces problems fundamentally more serious than those presented by foreign political and financial pressure. Its political authority is far from complete, and there is increasingly widespread discontent, aggravated by economic distress, at the Government's failure to take action against the inroads of Japan. The majority of Chinese farmers are increasingly impoverished. The extortionate demands of tax collector, usurer, merchant, landlord and military leaders; the ruining of the land by flood and drought; the decline in agricultural prices; and the lack of rural credit facilities have resulted in widespread bankruptcy" (p. 139).

"* * * 'rural reconstruction' remains largely a much used phrase rather than an actuality. The problems of land ownership, land taxation and rural credit remain untouched. The trend toward economic deterioration, though slightly checked, has not yet been reversed * * *" (p. 139).

"On the credit side of the balance sheet a comparison of the financial organization today with that in 1928 reveals a marked degree of progress * * *.

"On the debit side of the ledger, however, we find equally convincing evidence. * * * Throughout its nine years of existence the Nanking Government has never been able to escape from the perilous financial position of a government fighting for its political life. Among the outstanding features of government finance throughout this period have been a heavily unbalanced budget, a current deficit necessitating large-scale borrowing by costly methods, the expenditure of a large percentage of government revenue for military purposes, lack of effective budgetary control over government expenditure and inability to fix and enforce the areas of taxation for the various grades of government * * * (p. 144).

"The whole question of the Central Government's financial position thus provides an excellent illustration of the many external and internal forces which are complicating, if not completely blocking the way to political stability and economic reconstruction in China. Predictions as to the future course of events are extremely hazardous. Internally, Nanking's political power is challenged both by the Southern and the Communist factions. There is no clear indication as to which of several possible lines of action Nanking is likely to choose. Externally, the policies of Japan, Great Britain, and the United States are all uncertain quantities, dependent perhaps as much on the course of events in Europe as on conditions in eastern Asia. Barring the possibility of some form of foreign assistance, it would seem that Nanking's only chance of continuing to finance its operations and carry on the administration of government depends upon whether such revenues as remain to it are devoted solely to the objective of improving the economic welfare of the people and thereby eliminating the principal cause for internal revolt against its political control" (p. 146).

Review of Chiang Kai-shek, by Gustav Aumann. Reviewed by Bruno Lasker, Pacific Affairs, March 1937

"Mr. Aumann is especially successful in describing the miracle of how even so much as is now visible of the structure of China's national government could arise in so short a time. To have 'enthroned' the middle classes by giving them workable instruments of rule, appears to Mr. Aumann the outstanding achievement of Chiang Kai-shek. One of China's greatest strategists, the generalissimo is pictured nevertheless as the relentless enemy of 'neo-militarism.' This is done by a literary form of flood-lighting which keeps in the shadow the essential nature of the scene: the concentration of power in a small group above the party, the suppression of public discussion, censorship in an extreme form, devitalization of the labor movement—in short the adoption of many of the methods if not the whole ideology of fascism" (p. 88).

The conclusion one reaches after a study of all of the material in both the Survey and Pacific Affairs for the years 1937, 1938, and the first half of 1939—during which period Mr. Kohlberg claims that the I. P. R. followed the "Communist line"—is that views on both sides are presented; that there was both criticism and praise of the National Government.

Section II The Period from August 23, 1939, to June 22, 1941

During this period, according to Mr. Kohlberg, the Institute of Pacific Relations in general, and the American Council in particular, followed what he called the "Communist line," i. e., abusing (but not praising) the Chinese Government.

In order to prove this, he quoted some lines from two articles and book reviews in Pacific Affairs and six short articles in the Far Eastern Survey. During these twenty-two months the Pacific Affairs published approximately sixty-five articles and one hundred reviews. Thus, Mr. Kohlberg could find fault with less than three percent of the articles and two percent of the reviews in Pacific Affairs. During the same period there were 47 issues of the Far Eastern Survey in which there were published more than 280 articles. Thus, again, the articles quoted by Mr. Kohlberg constitute only about two percent of the total number of articles. Beside this, during the period under consideration, the Pacific Council and American Council published many books which were ignored in Mr. Kohlberg's accusations. Of the articles published in Pacific Affairs during this period, there were twenty-five dealing more or less directly with China; Mr. Kohlberg used only two of them. In the Far Eastern Survey about twenty-five of all articles had direct relation to China, but Mr. Kohlberg used only six of them.

Furthermore, during the period under consideration until June 24, 1941, the editor of Pacific Affairs was Owen Lattimore, who left that post to become confidential adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. If Pacific Affairs was abusing the Chinese Government to the extent charged by Mr. Kohlberg, during the period under consideration, it is strange that Mr. Lattimore on June 24, 1941, was recommended to such a position by the President of the United States and stranger still that the Generalissimo accepted the recommendation. Yet according to T. V. Soong, this appointment of Mr. Lattimore was regarded in Chungking as "a major token of increasing understanding between China and the United States."

The aim of Pacific Affairs is to give information on the developments in the Pacific area as broadly and as completely as possible. During this period in question, the magazine published articles on China or on the Far East in relation to China by the following authors:

- E. SCHUMPETER, of the Harvard-Radcliffe Bureau of International Research.
- L. ROSINGER, who is now an expert on the Far East of the Foreign Policy Association.
- E. CARLSON, famous colonel of the U. S. Marines, hero of Makin, Saipan, and other battles.
- N. WALES, a well-known writer on problems of China.
- K. BLOCH, writer on the staff of Fortune magazine.
- T. A. BISSON, now with the I. P. R., formerly with the Foreign Policy Association and with the Board of Economic Warfare.
- E. K. LIEF, Chinese economist in service of the National Economic Research, Chungking.
- FRANZ MICHAEL, Professor, University of Washington.
- PHILIP C. JESSUP, Professor, Columbia University.
- WEI MENG-PU, formerly Professor, the Northwestern University of Mukden.
- W. BRANDT, an Australian economist.

GALEN FISHER, former Y. M. C. A. Secretary in Japan.

OWEN LATTIMORE, formerly Personal Adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, and later connected with the Office of War Information, now Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University.

M. NORINS, in service with the Library of Congress, Washington.

ANNA LOUISE STRONG, a well-known leftist writer, who has visited China frequently.

It is clear, from this list, that it would have been difficult for Pacific Affairs to have confined itself, even if it had been inclined to do so, to a Communist line.

Let us now examine the record of the Far Eastern Survey. According to Mr. Kohlberg, after August 23, 1939, this publication pursued a policy of abuse of the Chinese Government. *Yet the first signs of such "abuse" listed by Mr. Kohlberg are in articles published January 29, 1941, or seventeen months later. The quotations used by Mr. Kohlberg for this period are confined to three months between January 29 and May 5, 1941.*

A careful reading of these quotations does not reveal abuse of the Chinese Government. It does, however, show concern over the possibility of a break in the United Front in China, a concern shared, for example by the New York Times. The following items from that newspaper, which certainly cannot be suspected of following the Communist line, reveal considerable interest in the Kuomintang-Communist conflict, certainly no less than that appearing in the Far Eastern Survey:

New York Times:

Jan. 8: Maj. E. F. Carlson reports military forces of China formidable and national spirit high, but cites widespread economic corruption involving trade in Japanese goods; reports Kuomintang-Communist crisis past and United States popularity high, sees continued U. S. S. R. aid.

Jan. 10: Foreign aid and supply routes control give Chiang Kai-shek power to deny 8th Route (Chinese Communists), Army request for mass transfer from northern to southern China for national conference.

Jan. 12: Chinese army organ reports pact involving exchange of Chinese minerals for U. S. S. R. military supplies.

Jan. 18: Chiang Kai-shek forces disband Communist-controlled new 4th Route Army, hold its Commander General Yeh Ting, and search for General Kang Yang, following army refusal to move to north of Yangtze River; Japanese Army spokesman reports Chinese troops moving against 4th Route Army.

Jan. 19: Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist representative in Chungking, states further Chinese Government-Communist friction will be avoided and expresses regret over 4th Route revolt; North Chinese Communist leaders demand Chiang Kai-shek end attacks on Communist forces and lift blockade of the north Communist areas.

Jan. 21: 8th Route Army renews demands for transfer to Yangtze Valley and release of Chungking and Communist leaders for supervision; Shanghai foreign circles fear free China rift will lessen foreign support.

Jan. 28: Tass Agency reports Chinese Government dissolution of 4th Route Army directed at Communist elements and might cause civil war.

Jan. 29: Chiang Kai-shek states action toward 4th Route Army is based on military discipline and reaffirms national unity.

Feb. 4: Chungking-Government reduces 8th Route Army branch office, Kweilin, Kwangsi.

Feb. 6: Kuomintang-Communist rift cited in editorial.

Feb. 21: Report continued Kuomintang-Communist armies strife in Anhwei Province; Chungking denies rift.

Feb. 23: Hunan Province People's Political Council appeals to Communist military and political leaders for full central government support.

Feb. 27: Domei reports Kuomintang-Communist clashes spread, Shansi Province Nanking regime gain by Chinese dissensions.

Mar. 3: 6 Communist delegates refuse to attend opening session (of People's Political Council).

Mar. 7: Chiang reported backing Council plan to arbitrate Government-Communist dispute. Chiang is confident of * * * continued British, U. S. and U. S. S. R. aid.

Mar. 8: Chiang states Communists violated 1937 support pledges to Council. Report military operations aided by continued Kuomintang-Communist 4th Army clash.

Mar. 9: Chungking urges apportionment of future defense bank issues among wealthy.

Mar. 10: Communist demands on Council published. Chiang says demands cannot be met without destroying national unity and recalls 1937 pledges. Council urges Chinese Government to improve Burma Road Administration.

Mar. 12: Dr. Baker appointed Kunming-Burma Transportation Bureau Director to keep Burma Road open.

Mar. 16: Kuomintang-Communist struggle background and U. S. S. R. role in Sino-Japanese War discussed.

Mar. 17: Shanghai groups hold German agents responsible for Kuomintang-Communist clashes. Sino-Japanese peace believed object of German intervention.

Mar. 22: Premier H. H. Kung denies report of Chinese military council anti-Communist army organization and predicts early solution to Government-Communist conflict.

Mar. 23: Abstract of Chiang's speech to Council stating Communist demands and Government stand.

Mar. 24: Takungpao reports wide government reorganization planned.

Mar. 30: Communist activity against Chungking and Nanking (pro-Japanese) regimes reported.

Apr. 4: Chungking Government issues manifesto stressing national unity and trend to democracy.

May 1: Chungking says USSR war materials transshipment ban does not apply (to Chinese) since all supplies from USSR are Soviet-made.

It is worthy of note that the New York Times of May 2, 1941, includes the following paragraph, which would seem to indicate that the Chinese did not recognize the extensive "abuse" of their country by the IPR, which, according to Mr. Kohlberg, existed during this period:

"Kuo Tai-chi, foreign minister of China, honored by American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations (and other organizations) in New York City."

Perhaps our Chinese friends were more aware than was Mr. Kohlberg of such article as the following in publications of the Institute, which asked for more help for China. As early as in December 1939, for example, Mr. Bisson wrote in Pacific Affairs in an article entitled "Japan Without Germany":

"The Chinese people are fighting for their own independence, but also for the best interests of all the democratic, nonaggression nations. China does not ask for military assistance. It merely asks that these nations, among which the United States now holds a position of decisive power, cease being the armory of its assailant. The time for an answer is long overdue."

Kurt Bloch wrote in the Far Eastern Survey, April 7, 1941:

"Since this information was received, no incidents of civil conflict have been reported here except from Japanese sources. During this time, it is safe to say that the weight of the American Government and of American public opinion has been thrown on the side of China's continued united resistance."

Examination of Mr. Kohlberg's charges shows plainly that Section II of his document has misrepresented the publications of the Institute and, that consciously or unconsciously, he has selected only those quotations which suited his preconceptions.

Section III—Mr. Kohlberg's "Third Communist-Kuomintang Honeymoon"

This period, as defined in the Kohlberg document, began with Hitler's invasion of Russia in June 1941, and ended with the Red Army's triumph at Stalingrad on February 4, 1943. Mr. Kohlberg sees it as a period of "praise of China." According to his letter to the Trustees of the American Council on December 28, however, articles published by the IPR continued to "praise China" for several months after this—until the summer of 1943, to be exact—a discrepancy which would appear to indicate that Mr. Kohlberg himself finds it difficult to prove his own formula.

MR. KOHLBERG'S "THIRD COMMUNIST-KUOMINTANG HONEYMOON"

Furthermore, the articles he lists in this section of his document fail to bear out his contention that this period was one confined to "praise of the Kuomintang and the central government of China. As is the case with respect to other articles cited in his document, the material here, if read *in toto*, includes both criticism and praise of the Chinese Government, the Kuomintang and the Communists as well.

Mr. Kohlberg's document quoted excerpts of eight articles and one pamphlet. Of these nine writings, two had nothing to do with China. In fact, one—a letter of an anonymous journalist entitled "Why Were We Wrong" did not contain even the word "China." Except for Robert Barnett's "Isolated China," all the remaining six contained certain remarks critical of the Kuomintang government. One, however (by Harriet Moore), may be regarded as defending the Chinese Government: the other (by Lieutenant Uhlman) praises the Communists, and reflected unfavorably on the Kuomintang Government's Chief of staff.

The following are some of the findings which contradict Mr. Kohlberg's contention that IPR publications confined themselves to praise of "China," during this period.

Serious indictments of the Kuomintang as well as laudatory statements about the Chinese people and Chiang Kai-shek were contained in both George Taylor's article *Chinese Resistance in North China* and his pamphlet *Changing China*, cited by Mr. Kohlberg. These also contain statements praising the Chinese Communists. In his Oct. 10, 1941 article, *Exposing Kuomintang Blockade of the Guerrillas*, the following may be noted:

"But now it is very difficult to move from one area to the other (i. e. from the Kuomintang area to guerrilla territories) and much needed medical supplies consigned to North China have not been allowed to pass through the Central Government blockade. The success of the Japanese drive through lower Shansi to the Yellow River can be explained partly in terms of failure to achieve cooperation between the Central Government and the guerrilla forces north of the River" (p. 232).

"There is a constant ebb and flow of political pressure from Chunking which wishes to maintain resistance against the Japanese even up to the gates of Peiping, but always hopes that the people of North China will not be won over entirely to the cause of the Border Government" (p. 233).

Praise of the Communists or guerrillas

"The Border Government, although it has suffered constantly from invasion of its territories, today has as great a measure of political control as at any time in its history. A government which can survive the occupation of nearly every county seat in its area is one which has a firm hold on the imagination of the people * * *. Although the charge has been made that too much time has been spent in political propaganda, it must be admitted that the task of organizing the peasantry of North China into units which could be effectively employed for military and other purposes was enormous" (pp. 236-7).

Again in Taylor's *Changing China*, 1942:

Government dominated by landlords

"Today their (landlord-gentry's) sons are pilots in the air force, officers in the armies, officials in the government. But because this class prides itself on not doing what the peasantry had to do, work with his hands, the tradition has carried over to the present, and most educated Chinese look down on manual labor as something beneath their dignity" (p. 46).

New classes and gentry

"The new classes in China * * * are the industrialists, bankers, and merchants * * *. They provide many of the new officials; they have power in the Central Government * * *. As so many of them came from the gentry, they are still strongly connected with the land * * *" (p. 47).

The peasantry and landlord and government

"On the back of the peasant is built the whole fabric of Chinese civilization. He does the work, pays the taxes from which he gets no benefits, turns back to the landlord fifty to sixty percent of his harvest as rent, and is robbed and taken advantage of every way he turns" (p. 47).

Chiang Kai-shek and the landlords

"There was a deeper separation, however, in the Nationalist movement (1925-27) than that caused by personal jealousy. This was the split between the right and left wing of the Kuomintang * * *. The left wing * * * wanted to base their power on the peasants and workers of China. The right wing included industrialists, bankers, and merchants who * * * were opposed to changing the system of land ownership. * * *

"The right wing, under Chiang Kai-shek, was alarmed, for many of the army officers came from the families of local gentry. * * * The revolution (of

1925-27) split * * * many thousands of Chinese Communists were killed, and the right wing of the Kuomintang * * * set up a government in Nanking without the Communists" (pp. 66-67).

Chiang's lack of interest in democracy

"He [Chiang] shared their [army officers'] ideas * * *. They did not have the same interest as the intellectuals in democracy and they hated Communism. They wanted to preserve the old order in the villages, for they came from the landed gentry and they did not think that merchants and professors could build a strong China. They had a great admiration for Italy and Germany * * *. They wanted to build a new China by appealing to the old virtues and traditional institutions, not by building up a real democracy" (p. 68).

Kuomintang Government a one-man show

"The Nanking Government, or Kuomintang government, as it is often called, for it was a one-party administration, soon emerged as a one-man show. That man was Chiang Kai-shek" (p. 68).

Chiang and Communists on land reform

"There is much truth to the criticism that Chiang adopted no radical measures to solve the land problem because he founded much of his power on the landlords and did not want to turn them against him" (p. 90).

"The Communists have not arrived at a solution of the land problem, either, but they have made the lot of the peasant easier than it was before" (p. 91).

Guenther Stein's article, if read completely, is also found to contain comments critical of the Kuomintang. In his account, *Wartime Government in China*, Mr. Stein stated at the very start that "The war has made political reorganization necessary for China." Yet he found "a comparatively small number of men, mostly well-known and prominent in Chinese political affairs long before the war, held the decisive positions. Little new blood has been added, and much of the expansion of government activity has been carried out through a combination of a number of functions and activities in the hands of already important political leaders."

Mr. Kohlberg's own marginal notes on the passages he lifted from the next article listed—Y. Y. Hsu's *China's First Two Years of a Tax in Kind*—indicate the critical nature of the article, despite the fact that this is supposed to be a "Communist-Kuomintang honeymoon period."

And the Uhlman article, *Laud of the Five Withouts*, likewise did not "praise" the Kuomintang; in fact, the Kuomintang Gen. Ho Ying-ching was referred to therein as pro-Japanese.

Mr. Kohlberg also cited a statement by Under Secretary of State Welles on American policy toward China. Although occasioned by an interview with an American Communist leader, this constituted an important diplomatic declaration. *The Far Eastern Survey would certainly be unworthy of its name without taking notice of such an announcement. To link it with a charge of Communist leanings is tantamount to labeling as Communist, all newspapers headlining the Russian Army's advance against Hitler.*

There is no evidence here of any "period" in the sense indicated by Mr. Kohlberg. It may be noticed, however, that Pearl Harbor and developments after America's entrance into the war influenced writers in this country. Immediately after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese, and the loss of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, Anglo-Americans were overwhelmed with a sense of humiliation. They tended to become more critical of themselves and tolerant of their allies. But with the turn of the war tide in the Pacific they regained their confidence. With the return of Stilwell in May 1943, to confer with the American Supreme Command on the strategy of the war on the Asiatic mainland was the occasion for the American writers began to consider the potentialities of China in the war.

Outspoken criticism of China began about this time. Mr. Hanson Baldwin blazed the path by belittling China right and left. In contrast, however, critical articles in the Far Eastern Survey, tried as a rule to evaluate not only the weaknesses apparent in China's situation, but the positive sides as well.

MR. KOHLBERG'S SECOND PERIOD OF ABUSE OF CHINA

Section IV—The Period Since February 1943 (Abuse of China)

During the 1940-43 period in China, economic, political, and military deterioration had seriously reduced the fighting strength of the Chinese Government and

its central armies. Recognition of this fact occurred first in Washington, but by 1943, writers such as Pearl Buck, Hanson Baldwin, and T. A. Bisson were informing the American public of the situation. In China itself, Kuomintang leaders such as Sun Fo were voicing criticisms of the politically and economically repressive policies of the Chinese central authorities. These persons were calling attention to weaknesses in the government organization as the basic problem, and not merely to lack of military supplies as the leading Chinese authorities maintained. Yet all of the critics of Chungking's policies cited by Kohlberg were *at the same time* demanding that more supplies be sent to China.

The warnings by American publicists were borne out by the military crisis which developed in 1944. In half a dozen provinces, large Kuomintang armies crumbled in the face of a well-planned Japanese offensive. This collapse seriously affected the American position in China. General Stilwell was withdrawn, and Ambassador Gauss resigned. A new set of American officials was sent to China. Donald Nelson sought to ameliorate economic conditions, General Hurley tried to overcome political disunity, while General Wedemeyer attempted to strengthen the Chinese armies.

These developments have proved to be a central feature of the Pacific War in 1944-45. For their potential effects on the remainder of the war, and even more on the postwar future of the Far East, they might well be ranked as the outstanding feature of this period. The question thus arises: Were those writers and Far Eastern specialists who first called attention to this problem in 1943 at fault or were they in fact performing a necessary service, both to the American public and to the United Nations as a whole? And following from this—was it out of place that, among various American writers calling attention to the problem, some of these should be staff members of the Institute of Pacific Relations? Had this not been the case, the Institute staff might well be accused of falling below the level of penetration displayed by outside writers in analysis of Far Eastern conditions—the specific function of the Institute.

Pp. 24-25 "China's Part in Coalition War," *Far Eastern Survey*, July 14, 1943, pp. 135-141, T. A. Bisson

This is a critical article, as Kohlberg maintains. Yet the article states that American aid to China has been "pitifully meager" and that China has had "legitimate grievances." Kohlberg's document omits these qualifications.

Note that Kohlberg's "Timing" as to his parallel Communist sources (p. 25) do not hold up, since they are all *prior* to the summer of 1943. The New Masses articles, as cited, are dated October 7, 1937, February 8, 1938, and January 28, 1941, while the article cited from the Communist is dated March 1941. *These citations thus have no validity so far as proving a parallel in timing between IPR articles and Communist-published articles. Moreover, the first two of the critical articles from the Communist press fall within the period (prior to the pact of August 23, 1939) when the Communist "line" is stated by Kohlberg to be one of praise for the Chinese government. In this case, then, even the Communist-published articles do not conform to the time divisions set up by Kohlberg.*

Note also that Kohlberg labels the Bisson article "Blast #1." But the timing falls down here, too. *Pearl Buck's article in Life, critical of political repression in China, appeared on May 10, 1943, two months before the Bisson article. Kohlberg should therefore attribute "Blast #1" to Pearl Buck, not to an IPR writer.* In this article, "A Warning About China," Miss Buck, acknowledged by even Mr. Kohlberg as a great friend of China, makes the following statements:

"American friendship for China has at this moment reached a popular height which brings it to the verge of sentimentality. The Chinese are being exalted into persons such as cannot exist in our fallible human race. A dose of common sense is needed. If the dose is not taken in time those who have rushed to give gifts, those who have sold valued possessions, as some have, to make a gift, are going to wake up one morning condemning China and all Chinese, and then they will regret their possessions and feel ashamed of their emotionalism, and isolationists will make the most of this disillusionment. But the Chinese people deserve neither adoration nor condemnation. They do deserve understanding and help, and that we may give what they deserve, it is necessary for a friendly diagnosis to be made now of China's present condition" (p. 53).

"Already, undemocratic forces, which could not do their evil work so long as China was hopeful of her place as an equal ally of the United States and England, have been strengthened by our policy which has relegated Japan to the place of a secondary enemy, allowing Burma to be lost and the line to China cut. In the isolation and helplessness of China those in the government

there who were voices for the people and for democracy cannot speak loudly and clearly as once they did, as they did when they were promising their people effective aid from us. Division within China is deepening in spite of the fact that the leadership and the genius of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek are not yet being challenged." (P. 53.)

"And now come these reports from China, even from Chinese sources themselves, that there are signs that in China this is ceasing to be a people's war. The great liberal forces of the recent past in China are growing silent. The center of liberalism in China for the past two generations has been in the students and teachers. Nowhere in the world have the young and intelligent played so heroic a part as in China. Their courage, their self-sacrifice, even to the lives of thousands who dared to oppose the officials, have provided the strongest correctives to bureaucracy and official corruption. Now those students are ceasing to speak. As China becomes more isolated the power of bureaucrats is growing. Oppressive elements in the government are becoming more oppressive. Chungking is a place where free speech is less and less possible and those who want to be free are going to other places.

"These oppressive influences extend even into the Generalissimo's family. We who are the American people would be better pleased if we could hear the voice of Madame Sun Yat-sen today. It was Sun Yat-sen who provided for the Chinese people the clear direction toward modern democracy. Why is it necessary for Madame Sun Yat-sen to be silent? The people believe in her. It is not only fear, it is also hopelessness which deepens the people's silence. Economic conditions in China at this hour are so appalling that the persons who might be the leaders for freedom are turning away from public service and are taking up better paid jobs. More and more students, for example, are discreetly specializing in money and banking. Cynicism is killing the spirits and hunger is killing the bodies of those who were once such a strong and purifying political force.

"Yet the Chinese people are agreed that certain evils now existing must go and certain reforms must be established if China is to continue as a democracy. The chief evil that must go is official corruption, first in high places but everywhere as quickly as possible. The only way to get rid of this corruption is to put into the hands of the people the power to accuse and dismiss their officials when corruption is proved" (p. 54).

"In this state of mutual uncertainty it is inevitable that certain forces are for the moment strengthening themselves as they tend to do in similar periods in any country. There is now no real freedom of the press in China, no freedom of speech. The official implement of repression is an organization far more severe than the secret service of a democracy ought to be, for insecurity of individuals in power breeds repression upon the people. These antidemocratic forces are being strengthened now, and not only by China's isolation" (p. 54).

Previous references to the internal situation in China may also be found, as, for example, in the leading article in *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, April 23, 1943. Under the heading "U. S.-Chinese Views Seen As Diverging" Earl H. Leaf, Managing Editor, says in part:

"Misunderstandings arise concerning the use or misuse of American supplies sent to China. Communist sympathizers repeatedly charged that the U. S. supplies were being employed to arm Central Government troops against the Chinese Red Armies.

"Independent check-up on these reports has revealed some puzzling aspects of the internal Chinese situation as, for example, the fact that Gen. Hu Tzu-nan's troops, who face the Communists and have never yet fought a battle with the Japanese, turn out to be the best-equipped, best-paid, and best-fed army in China. Hence, some influential American officials, fearing civil war in China, reinclined towards holding back supplies. Chinese army leaders have an explanation for that situation, but many Chinese and American officials do not see eye to eye about it."

In the same issue of *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, in an editorial (p. 4), it is stated:

"The foregoing hard realities (military) and many others, notably the alarming inflationary situation and growing malnutrition affecting even the Chinese army, must be faced. There are other factors of encouraging sort. Nowhere, it is agreed, is there any sign of surrender to or appeasement of the Japanese. (Neither is there much sign that a war is on, aside from high prices and shortages—and 'fighting fronts' in China are mostly nonexistent except sporadically.)"

In August 1943, *Reader's Digest* published an article entitled "Too Much Wishful Thinking About China," written by Hanson W. Baldwin, military

analyst of the New York Times. The author discussed the average American's conceptions of China, and states (pp. 63, 64) :

"Unfortunately, the China of such dreams is far from reality. Missionaries, war-relief drives, able ambassadors, and the movies have oversold us. China has become not merely China but the royal road to victory in the Pacific.

"China has needed no such overselling. Her people are plainly courageous; their patient fortitude and philosophic resignation are unmatched. But an enumeration of her virtues should not blind us to her weaknesses: above all, it should not lead us to a fallacious conception of Pacific strategy."

* * * * *

"She has as yet no real army as we understand the term; most of her troops are poorly led and incapable of effectively utilizing modern arms. They require intensive and protracted training, and capable leaders bound together by a common loyalty to a common cause. Today there are few such leaders; too many of them are still old war lords, in new clothing, for whom war is a means for personal aggrandizement and enrichment.

"The truth about China—known to a few, but not to millions of Americans—is that the military situation there today is bad, has been bad for two years, and will probably continue to be bad for some years to come."

* * * * *

"The Chinese communiques are almost worthless for obtaining a true picture. Had they suffered even half the casualties the Chinese have claimed, the Japanese would by now have given evidence of a manpower shortage. Sometimes the Chinese report battles where there are no battles; often they exalt skirmishes and guerilla fighting to the status of campaigns. In the recent Tungting Lake-Ichang fighting, for example, the Japanese almost certainly never intended—as reports from China claimed—to try to take Chungking. Their objective patently was the rich Chinese rice-bowl region around Tungting Lake; they took some of it, sacked it and retired. Yet Chinese communiques interpreted the Japanese retirement as a great victory."

In quoting these above statements, we neither endorse nor criticize them. They are presented simply to disprove the assertion that in discussing the situation in China the I. R. followed any "line," Communist or otherwise. The logical fallacy in attempting to prove by analogy was pointed out by Miss Buck in a letter to the New York Herald Tribune, published August 20, 1943. She begins by stating that she had welcomed Rodney Gilbert's reply (Herald Tribune, August 16 and 17, 1943) to Mr. Baldwin's Reader's Digest article. Then Miss Buck says:

"Mr. Gilbert himself, however, falls into the easy error of oversimplification. That is, because one objects to Fascist tendencies in China, as one objects to them elsewhere, he leaps to the conclusion that one must be pro-Communist. This tendency to oversimplification is everywhere seen in these peculiar times in which we live."

Contrary to the pattern laid down by Mr. Kohlberg, IPR publications during the summer and fall of 1943 contained material favorable to or praising the Chinese authorities. Among others, the following should be noted:

The Far Eastern Survey for July 28, 1943—the issue immediately succeeding that containing Bisson's article—carries a leading editorial article praising a set of principles enunciated by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on July 7, 1943. The following quotations from this editorial article are pertinent:

"The destiny of China is one and the same as that of the United Nations—so is China's policy. Those are the words of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, spoken on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the war in China.

"What China sees as her policy and her destiny is that of contributing her full strength, not only to bring the war to a successful conclusion, but also to establish a strong postwar organization which will ensure the peace.

"* * * His (Chiang Kai-shek's) statement of China's hopes in this connection is forthright and challenging, and deserves wider attention than it has had in the American press." There follows a long series of quotations from Chiang Kai-shek's address (pp. 147-48).

This editorial article was signed by Catherine Porter, editor of the Far Eastern Survey. It would indicate that the editor of the Survey was not seeking to include only materials critical of China in the magazine during this period.

In a friendly analysis entitled "China's Political Development" (Far Eastern Survey, October 6, 1943), N. C. Liu, Professor of Political Science at National

Wuhan University of China, discusses the meaning of "democracy," and its applications in China. He concludes by saying:

"From the foregoing paragraphs, we may conclude that, since the downfall of the monarchy, popular support for the republic has always been strong and that the foundation for democratic government is thereby firmly laid; that we have for the moment, indeed, only a partially representative government but we are ready to organize true responsible government in the near future; that restrictions are, to be sure, being imposed on popular rights and liberties in wartime, but these will be swept away in time of peace; that, as the different parties are now reconciled, there is no reason to suppose that they cannot adjust their political differences in time to come; and that, as we had the traditional form of popular participation in local affairs, legal codification is certainly a step forward. In short, it may be accurate to say that China, being a republic, is dedicated to and will make great strides toward democracy in the world of tomorrow."

The September 1943 issue of *Pacific Affairs*, the first issue of this quarterly which followed publication of Bisson's article, contains an article by Guenther Stein entitled "Free China's Agricultural Progress." The first sentence of this article reads: "The collection of rice and wheat, partly by way of land tax payments in kind and partly by compulsory purchase, has become one of the most successful economic policies of the Chinese Government." Statistical data given in the rest of the article is devoted mainly to proving the thesis stated in the first sentence, although the conclusion stresses the need for agrarian reforms (pp. 330-343).

This article would again indicate that the IPR publications of the period were not concentrating on abuse of the Chinese central government.

Many of the criticisms contained in the Bisson article had been voiced by the Chinese themselves. Sun Fo, president of the Legislative Yuan and Kuomintang leader, spoke as follows on September 8, 1942 (eight months before the Bisson article), in a lecture delivered at Chungking:

"At present, grain collection has not yet reached its saturation point; the system employed in levying and buying needs to be much improved. The share contributed by most of the landowning class is still too light, while self-cultivators and tenant farmers are bearing too heavy a burden. Landowners as a whole have reaped large fortunes these few years; those who collect their rent in kind and receive grain amounting to several hundred *piculs* a year are living lavishly. Big landlords are proportionally much better off than in prewar days."

"* * * At present, big landlords are acquiring real estate with their unused and unusable wealth from small landowners, mostly self-cultivators, so that the wealth produced on the land becomes harmful rather than beneficial to the nation. If they invested their money in industries, it would be quite different. But instead of doing so, they buy more and more farm lands. Land values are thus bolstered up ten, twenty, fifty times; but the agricultural products gathered therefrom cannot be increased in any such proportion. Hence, nine-tenths of the money sunk in such investments is lying idle from the nation's point of view; and, what is worse, the cost of rice, and with it the general cost of living, are artificially raised to incredible heights in order to pay proper interest on their uneconomic investments" (Sun Fo, *China Looks Forward*, John Day, 1944, pp. 145-146).

Sun Fo is not averse to using the word "feudal," which Kohlberg takes exception to in the Bisson article. On page 224 he writes: "Not only the traditional system of land tenure which still smacks of peasant feudalism, but also the antiquated and inefficient method of small-farm individual tilling shall be abandoned, and in their places substitutes state or common ownership of land and collective and cooperative cultivation."

Note that in the first of the above quotations, Sun Fo is extremely critical of the grain tax in kind. But Guenther Stein, one of the IPR writers cited by Kohlberg, wrote favorably in *Pacific Affairs* (as cited above) of the grain collections. In this case, the "critical" IPR writer falls behind Sun Fo in his criticism.

Sun Fo is also highly critical of the political repression and lack of democracy which characterizes the Kuomintang Government at Chungking. On pages 108-109 of *China Looks Forward*, he writes:

"Unfortunately, we have in the past assumed unwillingly the attitude and habit of a ruling caste. The suppression of outside criticism against our party, and even criticism by our party members is less than one percent of the Chinese population. The Kuomintang is simply a minority in terms of population. But we

have come to regard ourselves as if we were the sovereign power entitled to the enjoyment of a special position and to the suppression of all criticism whatsoever against us. It is dictatorship and tyranny which the peoples of the world today are trying to destroy by means of sacrifices of their lives, and blood. For these reasons, we must, first of all, reorientate our psychology and correct our attitude of intolerance."

On page 119 of *China Looks Forward* he writes:

"I think there is something wrong with our method of approach. The San-Min-Chu-I Youth Corps is supposed to train and organize the promising youth of the nation for national service and leadership. This is done by instituting political training and military discipline. Instead of guiding them to think for themselves, it has been drilling them to repeat by rote the San-Min-Chu-I political creed. Instead of teaching them the methods of democratic practice and leadership, it has been imposing upon them military regimentation in the name of discipline. Discipline, of course, is required to habituate them to law and order. But the thing may be overdone. As a result, the people we are turning out from the various training centers become rather like puppets. The first thing they learn to perfection is how to click heels at the mention of, or mere reference to, the Supreme Leader. Heel-clicking may be proper in the army, but it is not appropriate in a democratic country. For instance, you don't see Englishmen jumping up from their seats and clicking their heels at the mere mention of their sovereign's name, or have you ever seen or heard that Americans at home or abroad would click heels every time President Roosevelt's name is mentioned, even at their political party meetings? The only examples of such practice that I know of were Russian emigre officers when they spoke of their dead Czar, and the German Nazis heil-Hitlering their Fuhrer. But why should we adopt the outmoded practice of the Czarist Russians or imitate the behavior of our Nazi enemies?"

P. 26 *"Japan's Army on China's Fronts," Guenther Stein, Far Eastern Survey, July 14, 1943*

Mr. Kohlberg here uses comparative "official Chinese figures" to prove that Guenther Stein underestimated the number of Japanese troops in China. He fails to note, however, that Guenther Stein's material was broadcast by short wave from the Chinese government's station at Chungking. As such, his figures were subject to censorship. If there was any marked discrepancy, the official censors would doubtless have acted, especially on a matter dealing so closely with military affairs. Actually, the discrepancy is more apparent than real.

Guenther Stein counted a total of 30 Japanese divisions "in use" at a given moment. Kohlberg's figures state that 42 divisions were "used" in 1943, but not all of these may have been "in use" at the time Stein made his estimate—based, incidentally, on Chinese official sources.

P. 26 *Far Eastern Survey, May 3, 1944*

Here Mr. Kohlberg quotes from a statement by Sun Fo as cited in the Survey. His quotations carefully eliminate the serious political charges against the Kuomintang made by Sun Fo in this statement. The quotations in the Survey give Sun Fo's full meaning. A comparison of Mr. Kohlberg's selection with the Survey article in this case offers *the most striking evidence of bias on the part of Mr. Kohlberg and not on the part of the Survey*. He states one side; the Survey states both.

Mr. Kohlberg then omits all quotation from a parallel statement by Raymond Gram Swing included in this Survey article.

P. 37 *Behind the Open Door, by Foster Rhea Dulles*

Mr. Kohlberg cites two paragraphs from this booklet, which run to 32 pages. The citations indicate that the Soviet Union signed the neutrality treaty with Japan "to protect Russia's eastern flank in order that she might be the more free to defend her western front against the far greater menace of Germany." They also state that both the United States and the Soviet Union "are equally concerned in the defeat of Japan and the creation of a strong, independent China. There should therefore be no conflict in the post-war policies of these two great powers fronting the Pacific. It is highly important that they should reach a full understanding on all Far Eastern problems. A cordial American-Russian relationship would contribute much to the future peace of Asia."

It is difficult, indeed, to find anything objectionable in these statements.

EXHIBIT No. 71

COMPARISON OF MCCARTHY AND KOHLBERG

Kohlberg

Appointed Editor *Pacific Affairs*, 1934. Accompanied E. C. Carter to Moscow. "This trip apparently completed his conversion to an admiration of the Soviet Union's system of government" (China Monthly, Oct. 1945).

"Lattimore told a friend (Freda Utley) in London in 1936 that he almost lost his job for publishing an article by Harold Isaacs, a Trotskyite" (China Monthly, Oct. 1945).

"Lattimore continued with other duties including service on the editorial board of *AMERASIA* and the editorship of *Pacific Affairs* until 1941" (China Monthly, Oct. 1945).

Kohlberg's version of the Communist line as allegedly followed by IPR and IPR publications in reference to Chinese government.

(Letter from Alfred Kohlberg dated March 18, 1947, to members of AIPR:)

(1) "Beginning 1.37 and up to the end of 1939, the IPR articles uniformly praised the government of Chiang Kai-shek."

(2) "After the Hitler-Stalin alliance of Aug. 23, 1939, the IPR soured on Chiang Kai-shek and by 1941 were stating that in the government of China 'uncertain quarters were "pro-Nazi" and were "willing to make peace with Japan."' 'Fascist ideas were popularized among and praised by Kuomintang members'." (Compare Lattimore's secret letter to E. C. Carter in the enclosed article from *Plain Talk*).

(3) "Then came the day that shook the pro-Communist world when Hitler invaded Russia, June 22, 1941. That day was a Sunday if I remember correctly and it caught Frederick V. Field, formerly Secretary and now member of the Executive Committee of the IPR leading the picket line in front of the White House with placards proclaiming 'FDR is a War-Monger. * * * This same day caught the IPR and the Communist press equally flatfooted. So the IPR and Communist line switched again to the most fulsome praise of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. * * * No longer did they charge Chiang Kai-shek with 'negotiating to join the Axis.' This praise of Chiang Kai-shek's government continued until the summer of 1943."

(4) "Beginning in the summer of 1943, both IPR and the Communist press changed to abuse of China."

McCarthy

McCarthy notes somewhere on page 231-35 in a hearing that Lattimore was editor of *Pacific Affairs* from 1934-1941.

McCarthy, in a hearing (p. 194) quotes from Freda Utley's book *LOST ILLUSION* "he [Lattimore] told me a few months later in London how he almost lost his position as Editor of *Pacific Affairs* because he had published an article by the Trotskyist, Harold Isaacs."

P. 226 (Hearing Record) introduced Exhibit L-2 which connected Lattimore with *Amerasia* editorial board.

(Page 440, Cong. Record, March 30, 1950:) "In 1935 at the World Communist meeting in Moscow * * * the so-called United Front or Trojan horse policy was adopted—a policy calling for the Communists to combine with the governments in power and to get into strategic positions so that Moscow could control or at least exert influence on governments in question. At this time in 1935 * * * Chiang Kai-shek made an agreement with the Chinese Communists.

"From 1935 to 1939 the Communist line was pro-Chiang Kai-shek.

"In 1939 after the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the Stalin-Matsouka Pact, the Communist Party line again became anti-Chiang Kai-shek.

"As the Senate will recall, this continued until June 22, 1941, the day Hitler invaded Russia, at which time the Communist Party line again switched and was pro-Chiang Kai-shek.

"This continued until 1943. The Senate will recall the Russian victory at Stalingrad in the early spring of 1943 and the reversal in the course of the war at that point. * * * The Communist Party line again definitely became anti-Chiang Kai-shek."

Lattimore Defended Purge Trials (China Monthly, Oct. 1945): The real point, of course, for those who live in democratic countries, is whether the discovery of the conspiracies was a triumph for democracy or not. I think that can be easily determined. The accounts of the most widely read Moscow correspondents all emphasize that since the close scrutiny of every person in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses have been discovered and rectified. A lot depends on whether you emphasize the discovery of the abuse or the rectification of it; but habitual rectification can hardly do anything but give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in the future he finds himself being victimized by "someone in the party" or "someone in the Government." That sounds to me like democracy. *Pacific Affairs*, Sept. 1938, p. 371.

Book jacket SOLUTION IN ASIA quoted by Kohlberg (China Monthly, Oct. 1945): He shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as they see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism. He inclines to support American newspapermen who report that the only real democracy in China is found in Communist areas.

Solution in Asia. The jacket.

Article, "I. P. R.—Tokyo Axis" by Sheppard Marley in *Plain Talk*, Dec. 19, 1946 (attached). In which was discussed IPR as action and pressure group.

Letter to Watertown Daily Times, Watertown, N. Y., Dec. 6, 1946: Attacked Lattimore for his alleged shift in attitude toward Chiang between 1943 and 1946.

Letter to members of IPR, March 18, 1947: "Members of our Board of Trustees and our Staff managed to get control of the Far Eastern Division of the State Dept., UNRRA, and OWI where they loaded all three with pro-Communists. Two of them, Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, accompanied Henry Wallace to China in 1944 and talked that adolescent into reporting to Roosevelt that 'we were backing the wrong horse in China. * * *'"

On page 237 of the Hearing Record McCarthy says: "Mr. Lattimore praised the net result of the Moscow trials and the blood purge by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 1936-1939 'as a triumph for democracy.'"

(Page 4447, Cong. Record, March 30, 1950): "This is what the editor says about the book: 'He shows that all Asiatic people are more interested in actual democratic practices such as the ones they can see in action across the Russian border than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism. * * *' He inclines to support American newspapermen who report that the only real democracy in China is found in Communist areas."

Article read into record by McCarthy (Pages 4461 to 4463, Cong. Record).

(Cong. Record, p. 4441:) "The Senate will recall the date of this letter, June 15, 1943, the time when Chiang Kai-shek was our very badly needed ally in the Pacific. * * * It was at this time that Lattimore sends this highly secret letter in which he twice urges the strictest secrecy be followed in getting rid of any Chinese who are loyal to our ally, Chiang Kai-shek. * * *"

(Cong. Record, p. 4447:) "In 1944 he [Lattimore] and John Carter Vincent accompanied Henry Wallace on a tour of China after which Wallace made his report to the State Dept., recommending the torpedoing on Chiang Kai-shek."

"Owen Lattimore, Director, School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University. Advisor to Pres. Roosevelt, Pres. Truman, Henry Wallace, was connected with pro-Communist Nat'l Emergency Conference for Protection of Human Rights; Washington Committee to Aid China, Writers Congress, Defense of Moscow Purge Trials, Associate editor of *Amerasia*. Maintains liaison with heads of Communist Party. Reportedly operative for Soviet Military Intelligence in Far East."

(Hearing Record, pp. 259-62:) Associates Lattimore with Maryland Asso. for Democratic Rights which he alleges to be an affiliate of the Nat'l Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights.

Principal speaker at meeting of Wash. Committee for Aid to China.

On Oct. 1, 2, 3, of 1943 meeting of Writers Congress and Hollywood Writers of Mobilization at the Univ. of Calif., L. A., campus in Westwood "appearing as the representative of the Office of War Information was Mr. Owen Lattimore."

"In the magazine *Pacific Affairs* of Sept. 1938, Owen Lattimore described the Moscow Purge Trials as a 'triumph for Democracy.'"

(Pages 333-334, Hearing Record:) "It perhaps should be mentioned here that Owen Lattimore was formerly an editor of *Amerasia*."

See previous statement by Kohlberg.

(Page 4445, Cong. Rec.): "The testimony will be that the head of the Russian Intelligence told this witness [the Russian General] * * * that they were having excellent success through the Institute of Pacific Relations which the Soviet Intelligence through Communists in the U. S. had taken over. In connection with this he particularly mentioned Owen Lattimore. * * *"

(China Monthly, Oct. 1948:) "Lattimore, head of OWI Far East Division, San Francisco, sent orders to his superior in New York (Joseph F. Barnes, later Foreign Editor N. Y. Herald Tribune * * *) to fire all Chinese staff members who sympathized with their own government and replace them with Communist from the newly launched New China Daily News, New York Chinese language daily."

(Cong. Record, p. 4440:) "This is a letter * * * dated 6-15-1943 which is when the line had again swung to anti-Chiang Kai-shek. This is a letter from Owen Lattimore, Director of Pacific Operations, OWI. The odd thing is that he is writing to his boss in the government service, telling the story to him, not writing to someone who is working for him. * * *"

"In it he directs the recipient of the letter to get rid of the Chinese in OWI who were loyal to either the Nationalist gov't or Wang Ching-wei. * * *"

"He then issues instructions that the personnel be recruited from the shareholders of the New China Daily News, a Chinese Communist paper in New York."

(Cong. Record, p. 4460:) "In 1947 one of the members of the Board [of IPR], one of the good American members insisted that there be an investigation to determine the extent to which the Communists had taken over control of the American Council of IPR."

(China Monthly, Dec. 1949, p. 243:) "The White Paper and the State Dept. categorically deny that Vice President Wallace made any written report to Pres. Roosevelt on his return from China. In spite of this denial, Amb. Hurley states that he read Mr. Wallace's report which was shown to him by John Carter Vincent who accompanied Wallace."

(China Monthly, Sept. 1946, p. 325:) "Editorial suggestions (according to the introduction) were made by John Hazard, Owen Lattimore, Joseph Barnes, Albert Rhys Taylor, and Dr. Treadwell Smith. * * *"

Kohlberg's article "China via Stilwell Road," China Monthly, Oct. 1948, has the central idea that Stilwell was a sucker for Owen Lattimore and others such as Theodore White, John Fairbank, and Joseph Barnes.

(Article entitled "Who Is Responsible for Chinese Tragedy" *China Monthly*, Dec. 1949:) Main thesis is that a pro-Soviet clique headed by Dean Acheson was responsible for yielding China to Communists.

(Letter to members of IPR. March 18, 1947:) "Our Board of Trustees (47) scattered all over the country never meets. The Executive Committee (10) is chairmaned by a Californian who never attends. The connections of the others are as per attached sheet. Most of our Trustees are of course not Communists. * * *

(China Monthly, Dec. 1949:) "The White Paper reveals in reports of Embassy attaches Ludden, Davies, Service, and George Acheson a determination to discredit the National Government and to build up a picture of the Chinese Communists as ardent fighters for democracy."

(Cong. Record, p. 4447:) "Incidentally in this connection the State Dept. issued a press release * * * denying the existence of such a report and stating as follows:"

(Cong. Record, p. 4447:) Upon his return from this trip, Henry Wallace wrote a book entitled SOVIET ASIA MISSION in which he pay tribute to Owen Lattimore for his invaluable assistance.

(Cong. Record, p. 4445:) "I think Lattimore was as much responsible if not more so for Stilwell's activities in China than any other one individual."

(Cong. Record, p. 4446:) "He [a mystery witness] points out that: the Lattimore crowd was responsible for the indoctrination of Stilwell against Chiang Kai-shek."

(Cong. Record, p. 4445:) "* * * I am sure that if the Senator will sit here and will listen to the material which I am presenting he will be convinced that the clique of Lattimore, Jessup, and Service has been responsible, almost completely—under Acheson of course—for what went on in the Far East. * * *"

(Cong. Record, p. 4463:) "Since its creation it has had on both Board of Trustees and Executive Committee a very sizeable number of outstanding and loyal Americans. Membership on the Board of Trustees or on the Executive Committee in no way in and of itself indicates any Communist sympathies or leanings. * * * However, as far as I know, the Board actually never meets but does its business by having the various members send in their proxies.

(Cong. Record, p. 4447:) "* * * the reports from its foreign service officials in China during the war as given in the White Paper read like extracts from Lattimore's books. * * * These Chinese Communists are represented by Lattimore and his friends in the State Dept., as 'democrats', 'liberal agrarian reformers', 'progressives not under Moscow's direction' or more recently as 'detachable from' Soviet Russia."

(China Monthly, Aug. 1949:) "Under Philip Jessup's direction the Far Eastern Survey of July 14, 1943, the first blast in the campaign against the Nationalist government of China was published." "Referring to what is called the two Chinas, it said in an article signed by T. A. Bisson. * * *

(China Monthly, Aug. 1949:) "One is now generally called Kuomintang China, the other is called Communist China. However, these are only Party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China, the other democratic China." (Bisson's statement).

"This theme song of Democratic Communist China and 'feudal fascist reactionary' Nationalist China was taken up the following month by the Daily Worker, the New Masses, and others."

(China Monthly, Aug. 1949:) "When charges of Communist-line activities were made against the IPR in 1947 he signed a letter denying the charges and questioning motives behind such charges. When the question of appointing a committee to investigate came before a membership meeting, he voted against any investigation."

(China Monthly, Aug. 1949, p. 168:) "Professor Jessup must therefore be honored by our State Dept., as the initiator of the smear campaign against Nationalist China and Chiang Kai-shek, and the originator of the myth of the democratic Chinese Communists."

(China Monthly, August 1949, p. 168:) Communist fronts sponsored by Jessup according to Kohlberg:
The American-Russian Institute
National Emergency Conference
American Law Students Asso.
Nat'l Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights
Coordinating Committee to Lift the Embargo

(Cong. Record, p. 4463:) "The first blast in this campaign was fired in Jessup's publication on July 14, 1943, in an article signed by T. A. Bisson."

"Under him [Dr. Jessup] the Council bi-weekly publication, Far Eastern Survey, pioneered the smear campaign against Chiang Kai-shek, and the idea the Communists in China were merely agrarian reformers and not Communists at all."

(Page 4464:) "Prof. Jessup must, therefore, be credited by the American people with having pioneered the smear campaign against Nationalist China and Chiang Kai-shek, and with being the originator of the myth of the 'Democratic' Chinese Communists. From that time onward we witness the spectacle of this 3-horse team of smears and untruths thundering down the stretch—Jessup's publications, Far Eastern Survey, the Daily Worker, and Isvestzia."

(Jessup) (Cong. Record, p. 4460:) "In 1947 one of the members of the board, one of the good American members, insisted that there be an investigation to determine extent to which the Communists had taken over control of the American Council of IRP [sic]. That was very vigorously opposed. Keep in mind that at that time Frederick V. Field was a member of the Board. Hiss was then a member or was shortly thereafter. One of the men who vigorously protested, and sent a letter over his name, which I have, objecting strenuously to any such investigation, was our Ambassador at Large, Philip Jessup."

(Cong. Record, p. 4464:) "Prof. Jessup must, therefore, be credited by the American people with having pioneered the smear campaign against Nationalist China and Chiang Kai-shek, and with being the originator of the myth of the 'democratic' Chinese Communists."

(Cong. Record, p. 4465:) McCarthy's list:

American Law Students Asso.
United Students Peace Conference
Nat'l Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights
National Emergency Conference

(China Monthly, August, 1949, p. 168:) "[Jessup was] signer of letter in the N. Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1946, urging 'the cessation of atomic bomb production.'"

(Letter to Mr. E. C. Carter Dec. 26, 1946:) "In my opinion this organization (Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy) was set up by the IPR. * * * just as much as Amerasia was (which was also not officially connected although it made its office with you in the early years)."

(Cong. Record, p. 4465:) "I have in my hand a photostat of the N. Y. Times dated Feb. 16, 1946. * * * In this letter the brilliant Dr. Jessup urges not only that we quit producing atomic bombs but that we eliminate the necessary ingredients which were produced for the atomic bomb by 'means such as dumping them in the ocean.'"

(Cong. Record, p. 4464-65:) "The magazine Amerasia about whose Communist line there can be no question for a period of time had its offices right next to the offices of the Jessup publication for IPR."

EXHIBIT No. 72

A CONFERENCE ON DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS

June 14 and 15, 1940, at the Parish Hall of Emmanuel Church, Cathedral and Read Streets, Baltimore, Maryland

"FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH, PRESS, ASSEMBLY . . . NO UNREASONABLE SEARCH . . . NO ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT . . . RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY . . . EQUAL PROTECTION TO ALL PERSONS."

Called by Maryland Association for Democratic Rights, 19 Medical Arts Building

PROGRAM

FRIDAY EVENING, JUNE 14

Opening Meeting

8:30 p. m.

"DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE"

Presiding Chairman: Rev. Theodore P. Ferris, Temporary Vice Chairman, Maryland Association for Democratic Rights.

Speakers:

Josephine Truslow Adams, Swarthmore College, Descendants of the American Revolution.

Walter White, Secretary, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Charles I. Stewart, Member New York Board of Education, Director American Union for Democracy, Inc.

Morris Watson, Vice President, American Newspaper Guild.

SATURDAY AFTERNOON, JUNE 15

Registration

1:00 p. m.

General Session

1:30-2:00 p. m.

Presiding Chairman: Rev. Theodore P. Ferris.

Address: Samuel L. M. Barlow, National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights.

Round Table Discussions

2:00-4:00 p. m.

ROUND TABLE I. DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND LABOR

Issues Involved: National Defense and Civil Liberties; the industrial mobilization plan; legislation and trade-unions; antitrust prosecutions:

Chairman: Merle Vincent, President, Washington Committee for Democratic Action.

Speakers:

Richard Lindsley, United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers.
 Charles W. Mitzel, Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen.
 George Engeman, Baltimore Newspaper Guild.
 Harry Cohen, President, Teamsters Joint Council No. 62, A. F. of L.

ROUND TABLE II. DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND MINORITIES

Issues involved: The attack upon the foreign born; Discrimination against the Negro; the anti-lynching Bill; anti-Semitism; civil rights of political minorities; intellectual freedom in the schools.

Chairman: Dean George C. Grant, Morgan State College.

Speakers:

Alan Cranston, Foreign Language Information Service.
 Dr. Floyd Banks, Morgan State College.
 E. Foster Dowell, Hollins College.
 Wilfred T. McQuaid, Attorney.

ROUND TABLE III. DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND THE CHURCH

Issues involved: The Church and intolerance; religion in a democratic society; freedom of speech for the clergy; the responsibility of the Church in the face of attacks upon minorities.

Chairman: Jesse A. Stanfield, Council of the Fellowship of reconciliation.

Speakers:

Rev. Gottlieb Siegenthaler, Pastor, St. Matthew's Evangelical Reform Church.
 Roland Watts, President, Baltimore Peace Congress.
 Rev. John O. Spencer, Former President, Morgan State College; Former Chairman, Maryland Interracial Commission.

Business Session

4:00-5:30 p. m.

Reports by the Chairmen of Round Tables, with recommendations for action.

Election of Officers and Executive Committee.

The purposes of the Round Table Discussions will be:

(1) To point out the dangers threatening civil rights and the security of democratic institutions in daily life and in the legislative assemblies of the state and nation;

(2) To determine the best and most fruitful methods of coping with these dangers, suggesting a program of action to be developed by churches, schools, labor unions, fraternal orders and other organizations.

MARYLAND ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS

Affiliated to the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights

Franz Boas, National Honorary Chairman

TEMPORARY OFFICERS

Wm. F. Cochran, Chairman
 Rev. Theodore P. Ferris, Vice Chairman
 Edna R. Walls, Secretary
 Albert Lion, Jr., Treasurer
 Bert L. Clarke, Executive Secretary

SPONSORS OF THE CONFERENCE

Mr. & Mrs. Leo Alpert	Fred D'Avila	Mr. & Mrs. A. Goldman
Mr. & Mrs. I. Duke Avnet	Carrington L. Davis	Richard Goodman
Dr. Floyd Bank	Mrs. Emond S. Donoho	Sarah Hartman
Walter Bohanan	Jacob J. Edelman	Mary Hastings
Gertrude C. Bussey	Daniel Ellison	Dr. Dwight O. W. Holmes
Marthe-Ann Chapman	Dr. Ernst Feise	Mrs. Anne G. Huppman
Savilla Cogswell	Mr. & Mrs. Bliss Forbush	Owen Lattimore
J. Marjorie Cook	Dr. Jonas Friedenwald	Mrs. Owen Lattimore
Mrs. Henry E. Corner	Helen Garvin	Clare Leighton
Dorothy Currie	Mrs. Leon Ginsberg	Edward S. Lewis

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Charles W. Mitzel	Leon Rubenstein	William Smith
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Samuel R. Morsell	C. A. B. Shreve	Arthur K. Taylor
Rev. Joseph S. Nowak, Jr.	Dr. Henry E. Sigerist	

In his last speech to the Senate the late Senator William E. Borah said: "So long as the Bill of Rights stands and is preserved in its integrity, so long as we live up to its terms and conditions, there can be no denial of free speech, of free press, no religious persecution, no arbitrary government, no concentration camps, no breaking into homes, no unlawful arrests, no denial of personal liberty. When so-called emergency legislation strikes at this sacred document in any particular it should be stricken down without hesitancy. If doubts are to be indulged in, they should be resolved against all possible encroachments."

This Conference has been called to provide an opportunity in these difficult, hysterical times for people to stop and think things out clearly, for what is needed now is clarity and courage, not suspicion and fear. The Maryland Association for Democratic Rights hopes and believes that individuals and organizations will want to join with it in its program for the defense of democratic institutions.

EXHIBIT NO. 73

(NOTE.—The excerpts from letters included within this exhibit reflect the views of the outstanding scholars and experts on Far Eastern history and politics. Some of these letters were mailed directly to Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore or Mr. Lattimore's attorneys, and others are copies of letters sent to various Members of Congress, the copies being sent to Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore or Mr. Lattimore's attorneys.)

EXCERPTS FROM LETTERS AND TELEGRAMS FROM SCHOLARS WITH A PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF OWEN LATTIMORE'S WORK

NATHANIEL PEFFER, Prof. of International Relations, Columbia Univ. Author: *Basis for Peace in the Far East; America's Place in the World.*

I think if you canvass all the Far Eastern people in this country, including all who have known Lattimore long and well, that you will have an almost unanimous vote of confidence as to his character and integrity. I doubt whether you will find anybody in that class in whose mind the question has ever arisen.

To say that he is a Russian agent is fantastic or lunatic. In any event it must be clear that the effect on himself, his family, and his career is or can be tragic. In that sense the whole episode is dreadfully unfair.

If I seem to use strong language, please believe me, it is not stronger than the feeling of most of us.

DERK BODDE, Asso. Prof. of Chinese, Univ. of Penna. Author: *China's First Unifier*, etc.

I hope you will forgive me for speaking my mind very strongly but I can no longer refrain from expressing my disgust and abhorrence at the antics taking place in Washington which have culminated in the case of Owen Lattimore. Knowing Mr. Lattimore as I have for many years, the charges are so utterly ridiculous that it is hard for me to believe that any seriously minded person can take them at their face value. If they deserved a hearing at all, the least that could be done, on the grounds of common decency, would be to conduct the hearings in camera. The present policy of splashing them across the headlines of the world press not only throws unjustified villification on loyal Americans who are doing their best for their country, and drives intelligent men out of government employment at a time when their knowledge and skills are most needed. It also weakens our foreign policy by presenting the outside world with a picture of a divided America, and most important of all, makes a farce of the democratic process as it operates in this country. I speak with some feeling on this last point, having recently returned from a year in China where I had the chance to have contacts with numerous non-Communist Chinese intellectuals who were once favorably disposed to the United States but no longer are so today. I can well imagine these men, as they read the accounts of the Washing-

ton investigations well played up in the Chinese Communist press, saying to themselves: "If this is the best American democracy can show for itself, we want no part of it." In short, what is now happening in Washington provides Communists in China and elsewhere with unparalleled anti-American propaganda.

PAUL M. A. LINERBARGER, Professor of Asiatic Politics, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C. Author: *The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-Sen; The China of Chiang Kai-Shek, etc.*:

Having opposed the views of Owen Lattimore for some years with respect to America's China policy, I feel that I am entitled to protest the fantastic way in which Lattimore has been injured without opportunity of previous hearing or of subsequent redress commensurate to the damage done him.

I have opposed the weak and silly policy of the State Department toward the Kuomintang, which I respect. I have regarded the Marshall mission as a wild-goose chase. I have supported the pro-Chiang and anti-Lattimore viewpoint for some years. But I draw the line at hearing the issue in this fashion.

If Lattimore is a "master spy," the *Saturday Evening Post* is a voice of Moscow, General Marshall a traitor, and Elmer Davis a rascal.

There is a case against Lattimore's views. I have tried to make it as a Federal Employee, as a G-2 officer in Stilwell's headquarters, as a Joint Chiefs of Staff liaison officer to the OWI, and as a postwar private scholar. But the case is one which can be made honestly against the views. To make it a charge against the man reduces our republican and democratic processes to absurdity.

Allow me, sir, as a known opponent of Lattimore's viewpoint, to protest the tactless melodrama with which he has been attacked. The Senate of the United States will be the ultimate sufferer if careful and exact justice is not done in this case.

May I recommend, sir, that when the charges of Senator McCarthy are aired and dismissed, the Senate of the United States consider a resolution of apology to each individual who has been hurt by this exercise of a prerogative which is, after all, sacred first to the Senate as a whole and only thereafter to its individual members. Such a resolution might help Lattimore somewhat; it will be enough if it deters comparable attacks in the future.

ANDREW G. TRUXAL, President, Hood College, Frederick, Md.:

May I respectfully request that Dr. Owen Lattimore, on his return to this country, be granted every privilege and opportunity to clear himself of the charges being currently made against him. As a former colleague of his distinguished father, Professor David Lattimore, at Dartmouth College, I know the family and the charge that Dr. Owen Lattimore is the "top Soviet espionage agent" is simply fantastic.

JOHN K. FAIRBANK, Professor of History, Harvard University. Author: *The United States and China*:

Senator McCarthy's allegation that Owen Lattimore is a "top Soviet agent" seems to me completely incredible, on the basis of my long acquaintance with Mr. Lattimore and with his writings. I have specialized on Chinese history since 1929, have known Owen Lattimore since 1932, and in the course of my professional work have had occasion to read a very considerable amount of what he has written, both in books and in articles. I have also heard him speak many times and have had conversations with him many times. I have never heard him express views or make statements which were disloyal in character, and I firmly believe him to be a thoroughly loyal and law-abiding American citizen who is devoted to the free, democratic way of life in this country.

Considering our urgent national need, in the dire struggle against Russia in Asia, for expert knowledge of Asia such as Mr. Lattimore demonstrably possesses, it seems to me the national interest demands that the accusation of disloyalty against him be thoroughly investigated and publicly disproved, as I am confident it will be, so that his future usefulness to his country will be impaired as little as possible.

H. H. FISHER, Chairman of the Herbert C. Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford University; Director, Civil Affairs Training School, 1943-1945; Director, Belgian-American Educational Foundation. Author: *The Famine in Soviet Russia; A Tower to Peace, etc.*:

I have known Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mrs. Esther Caulkin Brunauer for many years. I know them to be citizens of wide knowledge and exceptional ability,

which they have employed in the service of our country. They are incapable by character and temperament of being Communists or Communist sympathizers.

FREDERIC C. LANE, Professor of History, The Johns Hopkins University; Editor, *Journal of Economic History*:

From one source or another during the last twenty-five years I have heard the Communist line and observed its gyrations. Lattimore has *not* followed the Communist line. He is an independent thinker with whom I have sometimes agreed, sometimes disagreed. But I never had any reason to think him a Communist or to doubt his good faith and loyalty.

B. C. HOPPER, Professor of Government, Harvard University. Author: *Sovereignty in the Arctic; The War for Eastern Europe*.

I worked intimately with Owen Lattimore for three years in the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. And, naturally, I know his writing. It is beyond belief that he could be a spy, a Communist (definitely a card-bearing member of the party), or could have worked for the Soviet government against his own country.

The use of such high-powered labels, upon what seems to be conjecture as evidence, discredits the government machinery set up for social protection.

ROBERT I. CRANE, Department of History, University of Chicago.

I do not know Dr. Lattimore personally, but I know his views and writings. In them he is clearly not a pro-Communist. In fact, he has stood forth as an unselfish American citizen trying to advise a more viable foreign policy that would *prevent* China from going Communist. One may even differ with Dr. Lattimore's opinions and still realize that he is sincerely trying to think our foreign policy out in a constructive, pro-American fashion.

MARY C. WRIGHT (Mrs. A. F.), The Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford University, Calif.

You are not here dealing with an obscure individual whose views and connections are difficult to pin down. Nor are you dealing with a politically naive individual whose research is remote from contemporary issues and who might therefore be the dupe of foreign agents. The way in which Mr. Lattimore's views have developed and the direction in which he has made his influence felt are perfectly plain, and they are sharply and fundamentally at variance with Communist and Communist-front programs. Mr. Lattimore's work is characterized to perhaps a greater degree than that of any other scholar in the Far Eastern field by precisely that kind of free-ranging, creative thinking which is the chief bulwark of free peoples against the subversion of their institutions. He is the last man who would tolerate any kind of strait-jacket, and it is literally impossible that he could associate himself with the ruthless discipline and dogmatism of the Communist Party.

This completely unfounded and unwarranted attack on him is itself a grave threat to American liberty. I earnestly hope that your committee will lose no time in investigating the facts and making public your findings.

MARION J. LEVY, Jr., Assistant Professor of Sociology, Princeton, N. J.

I am writing you about Senator McCarthy's accusation that Owen Lattimore was a "top Soviet agent." I have not known Mr. Lattimore intimately, but I have long used his scholarly works, and I have had a number of personal contacts with the man. At no time in my knowledge of either the man or his work have ever known him to express views which were disloyal to our country.

WOODBIDGE BINGHAM, Columbia University. Letter to Senator Tydings.

At this time when Mr. Lattimore's good name is under suspicion I wish to go on record as having the utmost confidence in his integrity as a scholar and as a person. I cannot think of him in any way but as a loyal American.

May I take the liberty of appealing to you to see that Mr. Lattimore is completely cleared of whatever is unfounded in the current charges against him. By so doing you will not only be of service to Mr. Lattimore and to those who have a personal interest in him but also to those who are working for the best interests of the United States in its international relations.

HAROLD VINACKE, Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati. Author: *Far East in Modern Times*.

As a student of Far Eastern history and politics over a period of twenty-five years, I have had occasion to examine Mr. Lattimore's writings with some care.

I have found myself in disagreement with Mr. Lattimore's views and findings on occasion. I have also found myself in agreement with him on occasion. In case of either agreement or disagreement, I have never had any reason to believe that his views were not honestly and objectively arrived at. It is obvious that there is a wide area of national foreign policy in which there may be honest difference of opinion as to the expedient course to follow in protecting and advancing the interests of the United States. A case in point is the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. It does not follow that because recognition has been extended by the U. S. S. R. that an advocate of recognition by the United States would be seeking to promote Russian rather than American interests. There is plenty of historical evidence that individuals of unquestioned loyalty honestly come to what prove to be unwise or unsound conclusions as to what the national interest requires. I believe that the record will show that Mr. Lattimore's views, whether correct or incorrect, as to national policy, have been derived from his own independent analysis of the existing situation in the Far East and the response to the policy situation which he honestly believes will best advance the interests of the United States. There is no evidence, on the record as I know it, which would sustain the allegation that he is or has been, seeking to promote the interests of the Soviet Union rather than the interests of the United States. As I have stated above, I have on occasion found myself in disagreement with some of his conclusions as to what would best serve American interests. But that has never led me to conclude that he was not fundamentally motivated by loyalty to the United States.

HYMAN KUBLIN, Assistant Professor of History, Brooklyn College.

The serious allegations made by Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin impugning the loyalty of Owen Lattimore can appear only as fantastic to those familiar with his scholarly career. As a student of the Far Eastern field for the past twelve years and a close follower of Mr. Lattimore's work, I wish to state that at no time have I had cause to question his devotion to this country and the democratic way of life. His numerous books and articles have in my opinion clearly presented an over-all pattern of opposition to the policies of Soviet Russia. Charges of "pro-Soviet" inclinations and beliefs against Mr. Lattimore based on his published writings can only proceed from distortion of his theses and removal of quotations from context.

GEORGE B. CRESSEY, Chairman, Department of Geography, Syracuse University; Member, Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions. Author: *Field Work in Mongolia, Tibet, and Interior of China—1932-1929*; *Asia's Lands and Peoples*, etc.

May I express my deep concern over the unsupported attacks which are being made on Owen Lattimore, Haldore Hanson, and others, without supporting evidence. I am under the impression that under Anglo-Saxon law a person is to be regarded as innocent until proven guilty, or certainly until specific evidence is forthcoming. In a police state, on the other hand, guilt is assumed as soon as anyone mentions rumor or suspicion.

I consider that these whole proceedings, including the attacks on the Secretary of State, are the most effective device to impair our standing abroad and to create a situation favorable to communistic propaganda. One might make a good case for an assertion that Senator McCarthy and his associates are the most effective agents for communistic agitation which are currently operating in the United States.

LANGDON WARNER, Curator of Oriental Art, Fogg Museum, Harvard University

I have known him (Mr. Lattimore) intimately, both in China and this country, for some twenty-five years. I know him to be loyal and intelligent with an uncommonly courageous and penetrating attitude and a sound analytical mind. I have seen him in his social and professional contacts with Europeans and orientals and can best describe his talk and his privately held opinions as being unequivocally and patriotically American.

You have but to read his many books of travel and of political analysis to be persuaded that the impression he firmly intends to convey is distrust of Communist and other authoritarian policies. This is quite as obvious in those passages in which he is seeking a reasonable and sympathetic explanation of their psychology as in those where he is more drastically critical of them. No doubt among such voluminous writings, where the author bears constantly in mind the need to be judgmatical, paragraphs may be lifted from their context in an attempt to demonstrate sympathy with the enemy. But there cannot be any

doubt with all the evidence before you, that even such passages are additional proof of the author's sensitive regard for American democratic ideals.

It should not detract from the cogency of my argument to add that I have frequently disagreed with Mr. Lattimore's conclusions.

LAURENCE SICKMAN, Vice Director and Curator of Oriental Art, Wm. Rockhill Nelson Gallery of Art, Kansas City, Mo.

The extremely serious implications of Senator McCarthy's charges against Owen Lattimore compel me to write urging a complete investigation of these charges which, in my opinion, are utterly false and incomprehensible. I have known Owen Lattimore personally since 1931 and as a specialist in Far Eastern studies, I have had occasion to read many of his writings. I consider Mr. Lattimore to be not only a loyal and forthright citizen but also a brilliant credit to our country.

GEORGE GRASSMUCK, Boston University, Assistant Professor of Political Science.

It is my fervent hope that the current damaging attacks on the loyalty and integrity of Owen Lattimore receive an early investigation and that his expected exoneration gets as much publicity as did the remarks of his protected accuser.

Upon my return from wartime naval service in the South Pacific and occupied Japan, I studied for three years (1946-49) at the Johns Hopkins University, and took several Far Eastern seminars under Mr. Lattimore's direction. I became well acquainted with his political and economic ideas by reading his books and through informal conversations with him. During my last year at the university, my office was next to his, premitting even more frequent discussions.

At no time during my stay at the Johns Hopkins University did Lattimore impress me as a member of the Communist Party or as a "Russian espionage agent."

Since leaving Hopkins I have been giving courses in international politics and in governments of the Far East at Boston University. I use Lattimore's recent book, *The Situation in Asia*, (Little, Brown & Co., 1949) as one of several references in the Far Eastern course. There have been no classroom allegations whatever that the book was "Communist" or "pro-Russian."

Instead passages from the book show Lattimore's desire to see Oriental nations become independent and free of Russian domination. On page 167 of *The Situation in Asia*, he states:

"Nor do the Russians start out with the advantage of being the 'favorite foreigners' of the Chinese, as the Americans have long been. In the Chinese folk tradition, the Russians have always been the most barbarian of the 'foreign barbarians', the 'dangerous neighbors' with a common frontier. The fact is that the Russians, like the Americans, are going to find that what counts in China is the kind of government evolved by the play of Chinese political, economic, social, and military forces."

In proposing a possible plan for dealing with Asia by helping to establish a group of independent third force countries, Lattimore summarizes the scheme's purported advantages by saying (p. 237):

"On our side, we shall have given a fresh impetus to both capitalism, and political democracy. We shall have a strong competitive advantage in being able to help more people get what they want than the Russians can. We shall have turned the disadvantage of an Asia that we are not strong enough to control into the advantage of an Asia strong enough to refuse to be controlled by Russia."

Mr. Lattimore's point of view is obvious to those who read his books. To my mind it is not based on espionage but on knowledge, analysis, and loyalty.

ARTHUR F. WRIGHT, Assistant Professor of Chinese History, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

I am sure you and your committee must be aware that Mr. Lattimore is the author of many books. These writings, which are basic works for the understanding of Inner Asia, are not the work of a "Russian Agent"; they are unmistakably the work of a free creative American intellect. They are honest, clear presentations of the results of mature scholarship and profound thought. I realize that investigating committeemen have no time to read books, but these books are the "documents" on Mr. Lattimore, and they completely exonerate him from the contemptible and malicious slanders of Senator McCarthy.

We in university circles in northern California are gravely concerned over the threat to our free institutions presented by Senator McCarthy and his fellow witch-hunters. Many of us feel that the traditions and the prestige of the

Senate are jeopardized by the completely conscienceless behavior of Senator McCarthy and his ilk. I think you owe it to the august body of which you are a Member and to the people of this country to see this investigation through to the end with maximum publicity on all findings. So far the practice of investigating committees has been to publicize charges, give some publicity to rebuttals, and then leave the case and rush off on another. It is time that this shoddy and un-American practice is brought to an end and that some semblance of fairness and justice is introduced. We look to you, Senator, to see that, in the conduct of the hearings on Mr. Lattimore, the dignity and good name of the Senate are maintained and the principles of our common law heritage preserved.

DR. GEORGE BOAS, Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University. Author: *The Major Traditions of European Philosophy; Philosophy and Poetry*; etc.

It may be of interest to your committee that the undersigned is a veteran of both wars, having served in the Infantry in the First World War and in the Navy in the second. As for his political opinions, they are, as you know, those of a confirmed Democrat. He is horrified to find in the United States Senate a man who will not hesitate to blacken the name of one who is at present, as so often in the past, serving the interests of the United States and the western democracies unselfishly and tirelessly. Those of us who hold no political position can do little but appeal to those who are in the Government for help in such matters as these. It is with such an appeal in view that I am writing you, trusting that the force of public opinion may back you up in seeing that justice is done.

JOHN A. POPE, Smithsonian Institution, Freer Gallery of Art.

The investigations now being conducted by your subcommittee, necessary as they may be, could do no greater disservice to our country than to deprive it of the services of a man of the stature of Owen Lattimore.

SHANNON McCUNE, Department of Geography, Colgate University.

Mr. Lattimore's recognition of the strength of Russian influence in Asia and his labor to make this important fact known, and appreciated by American citizens, so as to guarantee a more workable foreign policy in Asia certainly does not make him "an agent of Russia" and hardly constitutes "disloyalty" to the United States. His early analysis of the situation in Asia and his plea for a more aggressive American policy coupled with reform in various areas of Asia, which would negate the Russian influence, certainly should merit praise rather than condemnation.

If defamatory practices such as Mr. McCarthy has used are continued, the United States is going to find itself either without trained specialists in foreign affairs or with a group of spineless yes men who will counsel us falsely. The result will be the loss of this country's present position as the leader of those countries and peoples who believe in democracy.

Prof. WILLIAM R. AMBERSON, University of Maryland.

I wish to express to you my confidence in my good friend, Owen Lattimore, and my conviction that he is a loyal and devoted citizen of this country. These are indeed strange days when a scholar of Mr. Lattimore's high standing can be so irresponsibly attacked. I have known him in the work of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives as a man with wide knowledge and broad human sympathies, contributing much to the study of pressing political and social problems, particularly in the Far East. He is an able representative of the American liberal tradition. I trust that you and other Senators who also hold that attitude, or at least respect it, will see that he has full opportunity to explain his position, and establish his integrity, as we, his friends, know that he can do.

L. CARRINGTON GOODRICH, Professor of Chinese, Columbia University. Author: *A Short History of the Chinese People*:

As one who has known Mr. Owen Lattimore both in China and the United States for well over twenty years, I would like to associate myself with those who believe wholeheartedly that he is every inch a loyal American.

EARL SWISHER, Director, Institute of Asiatic Affairs, University of Colorado.

I have known Mr. Lattimore for many years both in China and in the United States, and am personally convinced that there is no question of his loyalty and certainly he is no Communist. Moreover, as a scholar and authority on the northwest frontier of China, Dr. Lattimore is a valuable man to the State

Department and to the Nation, at a time when every expert we have is needed. It seems to me a grave mistake to malign able and patriotic statesmen for political or publicity motives.

For the last few years, it happens that I have disagreed with certain phases of the policy which Mr. Lattimore has advocated for the United States in the Far East. We have had arguments about this and if occasion offers shall probably argue again, but this is certainly no reason for me or anyone else to smear his good name or to call him a Communist, which would mean nothing more nor less than saying that he disagreed with me. He may be right, but certainly both of us can have our opinion. I should hate to have my character damaged because others are of a different opinion. If individual Americans and particularly qualified experts are not allowed to develop and express opinions on vital American questions, the functioning of democracy will be seriously impaired.

THOMAS C. SMITH, Assistant Professor of Far Eastern History, Stanford University, California.

There is not the slightest evidence to support the charges of Senator McCarthy in the whole of Mr. Lattimore's extensive published works: nothing that remotely suggests the Communist Party line and, indeed, the very quality of Mr. Lattimore's thinking—tentative, empirical, and open-minded, is, quite aside from the question of content, distinctly uncommunist.

The clear intent of Mr. Lattimore's more controversial books is an informed public and an effective American foreign policy, to both of which he has made a distinguished contribution. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that this is not the way of a man such as Senator McCarthy alleges Mr. Lattimore to be, but of a man who takes the responsibilities of his citizenship seriously.

HAROLD J. WEINS, Assistant Professor of Geography, Yale University.

Like many other Far Eastern scholars, I have known three of the individuals singled out by Senator McCarthy in his attacks. During my service in the U. S. Navy and the OSS I have had some contact with each of them. These men are Owen Lattimore, John Service, and Haldore Hanson. I am convinced of their American loyalty. These men have had occasion personally to learn about both the Chinese Nationalist regime and the Chinese and other Communist regimes and the effect of their operations upon the welfare of the Chinese and other Asiatic peoples. In the course of their official duty with the Government they were required to give objective appraisals of the situation as they observed it. Because the evolution of reform under previous regimes or under the Chinese Nationalist regime has been slow and even retrogressive, an objective observer did not need to be "leftist" or even very "liberal" to discover that in the contemporary scene the Communist regimes often served the people under their control in a more beneficial manner. Such a conclusion on his part need have no bearing upon his political affiliation or loyalty. I am anti-Communist and I believe that communism in the long run will harm the Chinese if it is not eliminated. Nevertheless, although many of my interpretations of the Far Eastern situation differ from theirs, I have come to some of the same conclusions as have Service or Hanson or Lattimore.

ALEXANDER LAING, Librarian, Dartmouth College. Author: *The Sea Witch; Clipper Ship Men; Jonathan Eagle*.

The other possible explanation is that Senator McCarthy is deliberately endangering his country in the conduct of its foreign policy, his Republican Party in its public reputation, the repute and dignity of Congress, and the good name of a distinguished scholar and public servant, all to make dubious political capital of some sort for the Senator personally. If this is the case, he is a depraved scoundrel, a dangerous and deeply evil man.

CLAUDE A. BUSS, Professor of History, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif.

Through conversations with him (Lattimore) and through careful study of his books and articles, I respect him as one of our most profound and original American thinkers about the situation in Asia. Whether he has seen fit to support or criticize any particular aspect of our policy in the Far East, I have always noted that his attitude has stemmed from his fundamental regard for our national welfare and our national interest. Whenever I have disagreed with him, I have never doubted the sincerity of his conviction that his ideas were best for the United States.

I like to think that I worked closely with him in the Office of War Information. When I succeeded him as Director of the San Francisco Office, I found the Office permeated with a spirit of contributing wherever we could to the winning of the war. We all—British, Chinese, and Americans—cooperated against a common enemy. No one was more jealous of American rights—wherever threatened—than Mr. Lattimore. Our broadcasts to China were dedicated to the help of our ally and it was deemed essential to stiffen the morale of the armies of the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek. Most of our Chinese employees were naturally sympathetic with the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Consul General and the head of the official Kuo Min News Agency were always accorded both the most cordial welcome at our office and the most liberal use of our facilities.

NOBUTAKA IKE—Former student of Mr. Lattimore and Curator, Japanese Collection, The Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

As a student of his I had almost daily contact with Mr. Lattimore. I saw him not only at the university, but on many occasions at his home. Thus, I came to know him very well as a teacher and a friend. For a period of three years, I heard him discuss the grave problems that confront us as a world power. His ideas were always creative and original, scarcely the kind that would be tolerated in Russia today. I feel certain that if you would carefully examine the things that Professor Lattimore has stood for, you would come to the conclusion that the charges made against him are entirely without foundation.

VIRGINIA THOMPSON ADLOFF, Author, 30 Sutton Place, New York 22, N. Y. Author: *French Indo-China; Thailand; The New Siam; Postmortem on Malaya.*

I should like to offer my testimonial as to the devotion to democratic ideals and the brilliant scholarship in regard to East Asian affairs which Mr. Lattimore has consistently shown. Such an irresponsible attack as Senator McCarthy has made upon Mr. Lattimore is not only crudely unjust, but a blow to other scholars striving to study the Far East from an objective viewpoint.

(NOTE.—Excerpts from various communications from people with a knowledge of Owen Lattimore's work:)

FREDERICA DE LAGUNA, Associate Professor, Anthropology, Bryn Mawr College.

Senator McCarthy's attacks on the State Department and on Prof. Owen Lattimore have been truly vicious. Have we indeed come to such a pass that the citizen who tries to serve his country loyally in a position of importance, as Secretary Acheson and Professor Lattimore have done, are to be branded as traitors, without the protection of our courts, by any Member of Congress hiding behind his immunity? Not only do such attacks make it impossible for us to carry out any coherent foreign policy, and so play into the hands of those who would like to see the United States divided and impotent, but they are subversive to the rights and dignities of our citizens. Again and again we have seen loyal Government servants slandered, what good work they might do nullified, their families subjected to anguish and to actual threats of violence, as a result of such ill-considered accusations. How are we to get able men, or keep them, in responsible Government positions if they are to be treated in this way?

FRANZ MICHAEL, Professor, Far Eastern History, University of Washington.

Through radio and newspaper reports, I have learned that Senator McCarthy has accused Mr. Owen Lattimore of being a bad security risk and has attempted to throw doubt upon Mr. Lattimore's character and loyalty to the United States, indicating that he has betrayed this country by spying for Soviet Russia.

I have been deeply shocked by the carelessness with which the Senator is endangering the honor and reputation of a citizen who happens to be a colleague of mine in the field of Far Eastern studies. I have known Mr. Lattimore since 1939 when I was a research assistant at Johns Hopkins University at the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations of which Mr. Lattimore is the director. During the time of my work there, I came to know Mr. Lattimore well and have the fullest confidence in his character and in his loyalty to this country.

I have the greatest respect for your committee and have no doubt that Mr. Lattimore will be able to refute without difficulty the charges made by Senator McCarthy. However, I want to express my deep concern over a state of affairs in which Senator McCarthy should think it permissible to play so irresponsibly with a person's honor and good name.

LLOYD D. MUSOLF, Graduate Student, The Johns Hopkins University.

I am writing this entirely unsolicited letter in protest against the serious charges made against Prof. Owen Lattimore by Senator McCarthy. As a graduate student at the John Hopkins University between 1946 and 1949, and as a student in one of Professor Lattimore's classes for one of those years, I wish to express my strong belief that the charges are utterly groundless. In his brilliant lectures Mr. Lattimore followed no one's line. As a matter of fact his is the most independent and original mind I have ever encountered. If his writings and actions are studied as a whole instead of by calculated and dishonest exegesis, this readily will become apparent.

SCHUYLER VAN R. CAMMANN, Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania.

In the first place, it is ridiculous to call Professor Lattimore a Communist. His writings show that he has no illusions about the present government of Russia. In such books as *Situation in Asia* he has presented the stupidities and limitations of the Russian rulers just as shrewdly as he has pointed out mistakes in our own Far Eastern policies. As a distinguished scholar with high integrity he does not let ideological arguments distract him from seeking out and presenting the truth as he sees it, and we all know that such freedom is denied to members of the Communist Party. Furthermore, he speaks freely of Russian imperialism, which would be heresy for a Communist. In any case, as a determined individualist and shrewd thinker, with a keen sense of humor, it would be temperamentally impossible for him to follow the strict (though amusingly shifty) dogmas of the "party line," or to hold to the fanatic, pseudo-religious beliefs of Russian communism.

As to the idea of his being an espionage agent, that is extremely laughable to anyone who knows him and his manifold activities. With the amount of time he puts into teaching, writing, and lecturing, and the amount of energy he pours into these tasks, it should be plain that he would have no time or energy left over for a spy's duties even if he were so minded, which of course, he is not.

I hope that a review of Professor Lattimore's real achievements and his freedom from the charges leveled at him by Mr. McCarthy will put the latter in his place. It is rather low to try to cover one's own bad record by reflecting on the reputations of others, but it is doubly contemptible to have made public accusations of Professor Lattimore when he was out of the country and unable to answer the slanderous attacks as soon as they were made. His conduct reflects on his party as well as his country at a time when we urgently need constructive forces to lead us.

GEORGE McTURNAN KAHIN, Lecturer in Political Science, Johns Hopkins University.

I am shocked at the outrageously false charges of Senator McCarthy that Owen Lattimore is pro-Communist and a Russian spy. I would like to make the following statement.

For the last three and a half years (except the period June 1948-June 1949 when I was in Indonesia on a fellowship of the Social Science Research Council) I have as a graduate student, and recently as a faculty member, been a member of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University. During this period I have been closely associated with Owen Lattimore. My field is political science with special emphasis on the Far East. This has meant that my frequent contact with Professor Lattimore—in class, in seminar, and in personal conversation—has largely concerned discussion of the dominant social and political problems of the Far East. Communism and Soviet Far Eastern policy, being among the most important of these problems, were frequently discussed by Professor Lattimore. Never in such discussions, or at any time, have I heard Professor Lattimore indicate sympathy for communism or for Soviet policies. He certainly did show strong and vigorous anti-Communist feelings repeatedly, sustainedly, and unequivocally. Consistently he was severe and incisive in his criticism of Russian policies.

JAMES P. WARBURG, Financial Adviser, World Economic Conference, London, 1933; Director Philharmonic Symphony Society of New York; Author: *The Money Muddle*; *Foreign Policy Begins at Home*; etc.

As one who is proud to be a friend of Owen Lattimore and as a citizen deeply concerned over the irreparable damage done to innocent, loyal, and in this case exceptionally valuable citizens, by irresponsible denunciation, may I respectfully urge you to see to it that your committee after due investigation take whatever

action it may deem appropriate affirmatively to clear Lattimore in such a way as to leave no doubt in the public mind. When citizens of the character of Secretary Acheson, Ambassador Jessup, and Owen Lattimore are denounced by a United States Senator as bad security risks it is time for the Senate to reassert its own dignity and to repair as best it may the damage done to the prestige of the United States.

VILHJALMER STEFANSSON, Explorer and Arctic Specialist

Protest most strongly McCarthy's Lattimore attack. Lattimore and men like him are our best defense against communism and fascism.

PEARL BUCK, Author: *The Good Earth*, etc.

RICHARD J. WALSH, President of John Day, Publishers.

We are indignant and dismayed at completely false charges against Owen Lattimore. We have known him for nearly twenty-five years both in China and United States and have read his books and kept informed of all his activities. We have often and recently discussed with him his views on Asia on which he is leading expert today. We know that he is opposed to communism. The false charges are all the more unfortunate for the United States because this country needs the services of a man of his experience and wisdom. We urge immediate investigation of what persons and interests are behind this destructive attack.

E. COWLES ANDRUS, M. D., Baltimore, Md.

My wife and I have known Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore since his association with the Johns Hopkins University. I have full confidence in his integrity and patriotism.

Mrs. SANFORD V. LARKEY, President City-County Democratic Club, 1010 Winding Way, Baltimore 10, Md.

We are your constituents. We appeal to you to take appropriate action to protect one of your constituents—Owen Lattimore, a resident of Baltimore County. We refer to the slanderous statements made on and off the Senate floor by Senator McCarthy whose irresponsible accusations against Mr. Lattimore have shocked this entire community.

He has not as yet been able to present evidence for any of his charges and when his victims have been able to reply he has been proved guilty of misrepresenting facts which are easily available to those who might wish the truth. It is our opinion that such conduct is unworthy of a Senator. We therefore call upon you to make your stand in this matter unequivocal and to initiate expulsion proceedings against Senator McCarthy.

EDWARD A. PARKS, M. D., Former Director Harriet Lane Clinic, The Johns Hopkins Hospital, Professor of Pediatrics.

It is a tragedy that Senator McCarthy is enacting. From his position of senatorial immunity he is mortally injuring splendid American citizens. Although Mr. Lattimore will be completely exonerated for the simple reason that he is completely innocent of the charges made, he can never recover from the wound inflicted and I am afraid that his great usefulness to this country with his vast knowledge of conditions in the Far East will be permanently impaired. It is easy for Senator McCarthy from a height which cannot be reached to toss out atomic bombs indiscriminately but he ought to be made to pay in some way for damage to the lives of patriotic citizens.

MARGARET O. YOUNG, Mr. Lattimore's secretary from 1938 to 1941.

No doubt you will receive many letters testifying to the integrity of Owen Lattimore, and expressing indignation at the charges placed against him.

I want to add one more, and to say that I worked as Mr. Lattimore's secretary from November 1938 until August 1941, and at no time was there the least indication of subversive activity. In my opinion he is a man of high principles and broad outlook, and the charges against him are grossly unjust. Every effort should be made to clear his good name.

ROBERT E. SHERWOOD, Playwright; Author: *The Petrified Forest*; *Idiot's Delight*; *Roosevelt and Hopkins*.

During the Second World War, I became closely personally associated with Lattimore in the Office of War Information. He directed the part of our overseas activities concerned with the war in Asia and the Pacific. He was important as a policy maker. I therefore have had ample opportunity to gain knowledge of his opinions and his general processes of thought and I respectfully beg to assure

you of my conviction that any charges or insinuations against his loyalty to our country, our Constitution and our American way of life are as outrageous as they are fantastic.

ELMER DAVIS, American Broadcasting Co., Washington 9, D. C. Director, Office War Information (1942-1945); News Analyst, American Broadcasting Co.

Lattimore is accused of promoting chaos and ruining Christianity in Asia, of apparently preferring totalitarian government in Japan to the kind of democracy MacArthur is giving, of being a bad security risk and an old-time pro-Communist. I have known Owen Lattimore for years; he was one of my leading associates in the Office of War Information. He may have overestimated the nationalistic aspects of the present Chinese Communist regime, but if he did, so did many other people. To call him a pro-Communist or to say that he prefers totalitarian government anywhere, is as ridiculous as to say that he is trying to ruin Christianity.

Rev. LOUIS M. J. SCHRAM, Immaculate Heart Missions.

I am a scholarly Roman Catholic priest, student of the University of Louvain, Belgium, and the University of Leyden, Holland, and have spent the last forty years in Mongolia and on the borders of Tibet. I am in America now to publish the material on which I have worked for the past forty years.

It is in this connection that I am glad to cooperate with the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, so that this part of the world can be made known through our publications to the Western World.

EDGAR SNOW, Contributing Editor, Saturday Evening Post.

I should like to add my protest to the hundreds you have doubtless received from other loyal citizens, against the unfair and un-American persecution of Owen Lattimore (and others) being currently conducted under the cloak of senatorial immunity by Joseph R. McCarthy.

I believe you wish to be scrupulously just in your own part in this hearing and for that reason may welcome this voluntary statement.

I happen to have known Mr. Lattimore for 17 years. In that period I have had numerous opportunities to study and judge his character, as well as his work. In my opinion he represents the highest type of American—devoted to democratic ideals and principles, superior in his intelligence, a first-rate scholar, and wise in the judgments he has offered to the American people concerning events which affect our future and our lives.

I myself was born in Missouri in a family descended from generations of Americans. Whatever I know of Americanism, and how to identify it in others, derives fundamentally from what I learned from my parents' teachings and in American schools. I know Mr. Lattimore so well that I can say that if he is "disloyal" then my own teachers and parents were likewise. I do not find in any of Lattimore's writings, nor in my recollections of any of our many conversations, nor in my knowledge of his behavior, anything which would violate the good conscience or the best standards of Americanism.

Aside from that, in my own work as a journalist I have been concerned with matters on which Mr. Lattimore is regarded as a specialist. This experience as a foreign correspondent has also equipped me to judge whether anyone is, or is not, a Communist or a spy or an agent for Russia in an objective or a subjective sense. In the present instance it is Senator McCarthy, not Lattimore, who is serving, objectively, as a tool of Russia, however unwitting. They could not (the Russians) conceive of anything better calculated to advance their propaganda aims than Senator McCarthy's current campaign, which is making a shambles of the integrity and dignity of the entire United States Government.

Mr. Lattimore could not possibly be a spy for Russia. No Communist could write the books he has written. No one could read them and assert that he has been the "architect of our Far Eastern Policy."

STANLEY SALEM, Executive Vice President, Little Brown & Co. Telegram to Senator Aiken.

As editor of Owen Lattimore's last three books I can vouch for the fact that his greatest concern has been that the United States should not lose its position as the leader of democratic principles in the Far East. I know you have been thinking about the same problem within the United States and I hope you will do everything possible to give Lattimore a chance to set forth the truth.

THEODORE WEEKS, Editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*. (Letter to Senator Tydings.)

Forgive me if I speak personally, but so men must do when they are troubled. This is my twenty-fifth year on the staff of the *Atlantic* and the twenty-fourth in my friendship with Owen, and it saddens me to see what a reckless accusation flapping in the wind for a few days can do to smirch the record and the authority of a man who has given so much of his life to the work he loves. Owen Lattimore is no Communist; anyone who knows him knows that he is loyal to this country and that he has written and worked for its best interest.

Throughout his career, he has believed in the Open Door policy for the Chinese and in the early 1940's, it was his hope as it was that of many Americans that the country could be unified under Chiang Kai-shek. Even as recently as January 1950, in the *Atlantic* he wrote: "The Kuomintang, under the increasingly jealous and narrow leadership of Chiang, put up the worst possible defense of *cause that was originally good and should have won.*" He could not fail to detect the increasing corruption in Nationalist China; in this he was not alone—ask any American who flew the Hump. * * * We accuse the Politburo of telling Stalin only what Stalin wants to hear. Now it seems to me appalling that there should be Americans in high places who try to make Mr. Lattimore the scapegoat because he told the truth.

SAMPLE MISQUOTATIONS IN SENATOR MCCARTHY'S REFERENCES TO LATTIMORE WRITINGS

1. *Senator McCarthy* (Congressional Record, p. 4448) quoting from *Solution in Asia*, p. 139, said Lattimore wrote that the Russians had "a greater power of attraction" for Asiatic peoples.

The correct phrase in the book is "a great power of attraction." The book then adds that the United States has a potentially greater power of attraction for the same peoples.

2. *Senator McCarthy* (Congressional Record, p. 4458) quoting from *Situation in Asia*, p. 53, said Lattimore agreed with Stalin's formula for revolution.

In the book, Lattimore explains this formula and points out that America can prove it wrong.

3. *Senator McCarthy* (Congressional Record, p. 4448) quoting from *Situation in Asia*, p. 89, in reference to the Russian gutting of Manchurian factories, said Lattimore claimed that "this has not diminished the Russian power of attraction in Asia."

In the book, Lattimore called it "a ruthless example of the sacrifice of the interests of non-Russian Communists to the paramount interest of the Soviet Union." In an entirely different paragraph, the book says "On the whole, however, the Russian power of attraction has not diminished, at least potentially."

4. *Senator McCarthy* (Congressional Record, p. 4459) quotes correctly from *Solution in Asia*, p. 94, but says "The period referred to is the late thirties." The period actually is the early thirties and Senator McCarthy has thereby misapplied the quotation to distort my position.

(See explanation in last sentence above.)

5. *Senator McCarthy* (Congressional Record, p. 4448) quotes correctly from *The Situation in Asia*, p. 238, but exactly contradicts the meaning of the passage by his remark "In other words, he says to America, 'Keep your hands off.'"

He further contradicts the meaning by not quoting the immediately preceding paragraph which expresses my confidence in American participation in Asiatic affairs.

6. *Senator McCarthy* (Congressional Record, p. 4469) quotes from a Lattimore "article 'Asia Conquers Asia' in March of this year in which Lattimore refers to Russian communism only as a 'hypothetical threat—a card unplayed.'"

The article was actually titled "Asia Reconquers Asia." It included several different references to Russian communism. One passage, perhaps distantly related to what Senator McCarthy quoted, reads: "As it is, we do not even have a measuring stick for assessing what kind of strength Russia has in the Far East or how much of it there may be. Whatever the Russian strength, it remains behind the Russian frontier—undeployed, unexposed, a card unplayed."

7. *Senator McCarthy* (Congressional Record, p. 4448) quotes correctly from *Situation in Asia*, p. 147, about supplies going to the Kuomintang and then comments, "This is Communist propaganda pure and simple." On the contrary this statement is based upon the most reliable eyewitness sources: American newspapermen working in China and is so credited in a footnote.

EXHIBIT No. 74

[Columbia, September 1949]

DISASTER IN CHINA

(By James F. Kearney, S. J.)

Who or what has so vitiated the opinion of intelligent Americans on the China question? Until recently, despite the dust that has been deliberately thrown in American eyes by pink correspondents, the question could be stated so clearly and simply that grammar school students could grasp it. Having explained it to grammar school students, I know. Here it is, expressed in monosyllabic words: "If the Reds win out there, we lose. If they lose, we win." Well, for all practical purposes, the Reds have now won, and in consequence we and the Chinese have lost. For communism it is the greatest triumph since the Russian Revolution; for us, though few Americans yet fully realize it, it is perhaps the greatest disaster in our history; and the end is not yet. Who is responsible? It wasn't a one-man job; short-sighted Chinese officials contributed some 50 percent to the catastrophe, we the other 50 percent. There are those who believe, though, that no Americans deserve more credit for this Russian triumph and Sino-American disaster than Owen Lattimore and a small group of his followers.

Owen Lattimore, confidant of two United States Presidents, adviser to our State Department, author of ten books about the Far East, where he has twenty-five years of travel and study to his credit, was born in Washington, D. C., but after a few months was taken to North China. At twelve he went to study in Switzerland, then in England, and returned to China as a newsman before taking up exploration, particularly in Manchuria and Mongolia. He then studied in Peiping, first on a fellowship from the Harvard Yenching Foundation and later on a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation fellowship, knows the Chinese, Mongolian, and Russian languages well.

Returning to the United States at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, a year later he became director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations of Johns Hopkins University, a post he still holds. In 1941 he was for six months President Roosevelt's political adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, then returned to the States to enter OWI, becoming deputy director to the overseas branch in charge of Pacific Operations. In June 1944 he and J. Carter Vincent, later to head the Far Eastern Bureau of the State Department, accompanied Henry Wallace on a diplomatic tour of Siberia and Free China.

So high does Owen Lattimore stand in Washington that it is said the only two books on President Truman's desk when he announced Japan's surrender were newsman John Gunther's *Inside Asia* and Lattimore's *Solution in Asia*. Lattimore was next named special economic adviser to Edwin V. Pauley, head of the postwar economic mission to Tokyo. Though not an authority on Japan, he did not hesitate to criticize former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's plan, adopted by MacArthur, to govern the Japanese people through the Emperor. He believed that the Emperor and all his male heirs should be interned in China and a republic set up in Japan.

In this thoroughly distinguished orientalist's career there are many disturbing features. For example, in former Red Louis Budenz' March 19, 1949, *Collier's* article, entitled "The Menace of Red China," we read, "Most Americans, during World War II, fell for the Moscow line that the Chinese Communists were not really Communists * * * but 'agrarian reformers'. * * * That is just what Moscow wanted Americans to believe. Even many naive Government officials fell for it. * * * This deception of United States officials and public was the result of a planned campaign; I helped to plan it. * * * The number one end was a Chinese coalition government in which Chiang would accept the 'agrarian reformers'—at the insistence of the United States. * * * We could work through legitimate Far East organizations and writers that were recognized as Oriental authorities. Frederick V. Field emphasized use of the Institute of Pacific Relations. * * * The 'agrarian reformers' idea started from there. It took root in leading Far East cultural groups in the United States, spread to certain policy-making circles in the State Department and broke into prominent position in the American press. * * * The Communists were successful in impressing their views on the United States State Department simply by planting articles with the proper slant in such magazines as *Far*

Eastern Survey, Pacific Affairs, and Amerasia. Both Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs are publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This is not a Communist organization."

Where does Mr. Lattimore come in? From 1934 to 1941 he was editor of Pacific Affairs. Freda Utley mentions him in two of her books. In her Last Chance in China she tells how Moscow, where she then worked as a Communist, was able to help its friends and discomfit its enemies in the Far East thanks to the Institute of Pacific Relations, and that Mr. Lattimore was among those Americans who came to Moscow for help and advice (p. 193). In her Lost Illusion (p. 194) she refers to the same 1936 Moscow meeting: "The whole staff of our Pacific Ocean Cabinet had an all-day session at the Institute with E. C. Carter, Owen Lattimore, and Harriet Moore, leading lights of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I was a little surprised at the time that these Americans should defer so often and so completely to the Russian viewpoint. * * * Owen Lattimore found it difficult at first to submit to the discipline required of the Friends of the Soviet Union. He told me a few months later in London how he had almost lost his position as editor of Pacific Affairs because he had published an article by the Trotskyist Harold Isaacs. In later years in the United States it did not astonish me to find the Institute of Pacific Relations following the same general lines as the Daily Worker in regard to China and Japan."

Henry Wallace never claimed to be an expert on the Far East. How much, if any, of his report after returning from the Siberia-China visit was written or suggested by the oriental expert, Mr. Lattimore, I do not know. One thing emerges, however: after their return, the American policy which has proved so disastrous for both Chinese and American interests and so helpful to Russia was put into effect and is still being pursued. Lattimore's Solution in Asia was described by one reviewer as "an appeal to Chiang Kai-shek to free himself from the galling yoke (of the Kuomintang) and to set free the democratic forces which have proved effective in northwestern China," i. e., the Chinese Reds. That book is again referred to in an article by ex-Communist Max Eastman and J. B. Powell in a June 1945 Reader's Digest article, "The Fate of the World Is At Stake in China," wherein they blast the deception "that Russia is a 'democracy' and that the Chinese can therefore safely be left to Russian influence." Owen Lattimore is perhaps the most subtle evangelist of this erroneous conception.

Mr. Lattimore praised the net result of the Moscow trials and the blood purge by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 1936-39 as "a triumph for democracy." He now urges our government, in Solution in Asia, to accept cheerfully the spread of the "Soviet form of democracy" in Central Asia. His publishers thus indicate the drift of his book: "He (Mr. Lattimore) shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism." Does that sound as if Mr. Lattimore, a top adviser on our Far Eastern affairs, is on our team?

The same article continues with a prophecy which has just about come true: "If Russian dictatorship spreads its tentacles across China the cause of democracy (i. e., United States style) in Asia is lost. As is well-known, these tentacles need not include invading Soviet troops, but only the native Communist parties now giving allegiance to the Soviet Union and taking their directives from Moscow. When these Communist parties get control of a neighboring state the Moscow dictatorship and its fellow-travelers call that a 'friendly government.' It is by means of these Communist-controlled 'friendly governments'—not by Soviet military conquest—that Russian power and totalitarian tyranny is spreading from the Soviet Union, in Asia as in Europe."

That is perhaps good background for the current slogan of Mr. Lattimore and his loyal followers, Edgar Snow, Ted White, Richard Lauterback, Harvard's Fairbank, and many an ex-OWI man—that there's nothing much for America to worry about because Mao Tse-tung's communism is a nationalist movement. A moment's reflection should make it clear that the very last thing a real Chinese nationalist would do would be to swallow hook, line, and sinker the doctrine of Karl Marx, a German Jew, who besides being a foreigner has a system that goes counter to every Chinese instinct and every tradition in the Chinese concept of society.

This recalls an incident a Belgian priest related to me in Shanghai a year and a half ago. He had become a Chinese citizen, and when the Chinese Reds

occupied his church in North China they followed the usual custom (which is probably news to Mr. Lattimore) of putting up the pictures of Marx and Stalin in the place of honor above the high altar, with those of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh below. A Chinese Red then told the priest flatly, "We are going to get rid of absolutely all foreign influence in China. Our policy is China for the Chinese." I can imagine Mr. Lattimore saying, "Just what I told you!" But the Belgian-Chinese replied, "And those two foreign gentlemen up there, Marx and Stalin? When did they become Chinese citizens?" The Red slunk silently away.

If anyone is still puzzled by the contention that Chinese Marxists are primarily nationalists, a glance at the Communist Manifesto will clear matters up. "Though not in substance, yet in form," we read there, "the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie." That, I believe, shows us what is back of the present national slogan our United States pinks apply to China's Reds. It's not authentic nationalism, of course, as the Manifesto explains later: "The Communists are reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality. The workingmen have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got."

The spurious nature of the nationalism of Mao Tse-tung was admitted by Mr. Lattimore himself, perhaps unintentionally, in a tape-recorded speech he gave in San Francisco, December 7, 1948: "The Chinese Communists never made any bones about the fact that they are Marxists. They are Marxist Communists in their international relations. They never question the Russian line. They follow every twist and turn of it." That is an important admission by Mr. Lattimore, since so many of his followers have been trying to tell us there is no Moscow control over China's Reds. If they follow every twist and turn of the Moscow line they are evidently not Chinese nationalists as we understand the term, but pseudo nationalists.

A. T. Steele and Andrew Roth, of the New York Herald Tribune and the Nation, respectively, after getting out of Red Peiping recently, declared that the Chinese Red leaders are in every sense of the word Communists who stand squarely and faithfully for the Moscow Party line, and will join the Kremlin in the coming world war III against the imperialist powers, particularly America. They likewise agree that while Mao might possibly become an extreme nationalist at some future date, another Tito, there is absolutely no evidence that this is a factor to be seriously reckoned with for a long time. Mr. Lattimore to the contrary notwithstanding. Spencer Moosa, latest newsmen out of Peiping, confirms their statements. The very first movie put on by the Reds in the auditorium of the Catholic University in Peiping after they moved in this year was the Life of Stalin. Need we say it was not anti-Russian? And so, instance after instance shows the very close connection between Moscow and Chinese communism that has been witnessed throughout the last twenty-eight years by intelligent observers who have lived in Red China—where Mr. Lattimore has never lived.

To the average American, whom pro-Red propaganda is intended to victimize, it seems quite natural that Mao Tse-tung, a native of China who has never visited Moscow, should think first of China's instead of Russia's interests. Yet how many native-born Americans are there who, once they join the party, think nothing of selling out their country and its secrets to the Kremlin? Such is the strange mesmerism exercised by their Moscow masters. It is, then, no harder to understand Mao's utter devotion to the party line than it is to understand that of Foster, or Dennis, or Earl Browder. After all, remember, a real Communist has no country. And surely Mao has proved he is a one hundred percent Communist. Let's not be deceived any longer, then, by this fake "nationalism" of China's Reds, which is the central thesis of Mr. Lattimore's recent book, *The Situation in Asia*.

If a man who had written ten volumes about Africa, and thereby won a name for himself as an authority, should nevertheless maintain that the Negroes in Africa aren't really black but white, it would be a cause for wonder. Mr. Owen Lattimore, who has written ten books on Asia and is called "the best-informed American on Asiatic affairs living today," is doubtless well-informed on many Asiatic matters but unfortunately, if we are to take his written words as an index of his knowledge of China's Reds, he is very badly misinformed about the true color of that most important body of individuals and their whole way of acting. Which reminds me of a recent conversation with one of Mr. Lattimore's OWI boys who had just returned from a three-years' corres-

pondent assignment in China. I asked him why it was that practically all our foreign newsmen, though supposedly educated in the American tradition of fair play, spoke entirely of corruption in the Chiang regime, but said nothing about the corruption in the Mao regime? And this man, who was being paid for giving his American readers an honest picture of conditions in the vital Far East, answered, "Because there is no corruption in the Red regime!" I laughed at him for wasting his three years in the Orient and passed him an article showing that not only is the Red regime corrupt, but from every conceivable American standpoint it is conservatively ten times more corrupt than its corrupt opposite number.

It is probably of such men that Mr. Lattimore, in his *Situation in China* (p. 177), writes: "Hitherto American observers who have been acutely conscious of secret police activities in Kuomintang China have had nothing comparable to report from Communist China." The reason is that these official observers were allowed the freedom to observe the limited activities of KMT secret police, while they weren't even permitted to enter Red China. Had they wished, though, they could have learned a lot from people, some of them Americans, who had lived in Red China. They would have heard for instance about the "Ting chuang hui," or eavesdropper corps, who after killing off all watchdogs, creep up at night, next to the wall or on the flat roofs of North China homes, to hear what is being said inside the family about the Communists. Children are rewarded for spying on their parents and, if anyone is believed to be guilty of anti-Communist remarks, a terror gang swoops down at midnight and the chances are the unfortunate victim will be discovered next morning buried alive outside his home. This sort of secret police and terrorism combined has been so universal in Red China that if Mr. Lattimore doesn't know about it he knows extremely little of Chinese communism.

As far back as 1945 the predominant sentiment everywhere in Red areas was fear, universal fear, fear at every instant, according to an official report of a Frenchman, a former university professor from Tientsin who spent the years from 1941 to 1945 in Red territory, and had been hailed before both Japanese and Red tribunals. "It is not terror," he says, "for terror is a fear which shows itself exteriorly. Here one must not allow his fear to be seen; he must appear satisfied and approve everything that is said and done. It is a hidden fear, but a creeping, paralyzing fear. The people keep quiet. They do not criticize; they avoid passing out any news. They are afraid of their neighbor, who may denounce them. They are afraid of the Reds who might hear and imprison them. When the Reds impose a tax, it is paid without a word. If they requisition anyone for public work, the work is done carefully and rapidly, without need of any blows and curses as in the time of the Japanese, and wonderful to say, without any need of supervision. (This is amazing to anyone who knows the easy-going Chinese character.) I have witnessed groups of workers along the big highways built by the Japanese, doing exactly the same kind of work they did for the Japanese; but how different their attitude! There was no foreman there to supervise, and yet everything was done carefully, with hardly a word, without the least bit of joking." Mr. Lattimore, with his lack of background, might interpret this as a sign of enthusiasm for the Red masters. But the report states simply, "They were afraid."

What was true in 1945 in Red areas is also true today according to the very latest 1949 reports that have filtered through the Bamboo Curtain: "There isn't too much suffering from hunger in the city, but it is impossible to lay up any reserves. The Communists search every house methodically and confiscate any surplus. Anyone who complains or criticizes them disappears mysteriously, buried alive, it is said. No one dares say a word, even to his best friend. In the country districts conditions are terrible. The Reds take everything: grain, livestock, clothing, tools, and now all are being mobilized for army service. Famine reigns everywhere together with fear. The people endure this with clenched teeth, but when asked how things are going always answer, 'Everything is going well.'" They had better!

These reports come from reliable people who were there and know what they are talking about, and who ridicule the fairy tales Mr. Lattimore from his distant and comfortable chair in Johns Hopkins spins for eager young Americans who believe he is an authority on China's Reds. What, for example, could be further from the truth than this statement in *The Situation in China*, p. 160: "In China it may be conceded (not by anyone who knows the situation, though, if I may interrupt) that the Communists hold the confidence of the people to such an extent that they can probably do more by persuasion, with less resort to coercion,

than any previous revolutionaries in history. But the Communists cannot indulge in experiments which the people do not accept, because the armed and organized peasants would be able to resist them just as they have hitherto resisted the return of the landlords," Sheer nonsense! The only real landlords left in Red areas are the Red leaders themselves, and the people know enough not to try to resist these ruthless masters. For some reason, no one seems to relish being buried alive; and so the Communists can indulge in absolutely any experiment they choose without the slightest open resistance from the peasants, who are merely waiting patiently for better days.

Since Mr. Lattimore is patently in error on so many vital points connected with the China Red question, it becomes more and more strange that his advice on Red China should be followed almost slavishly by the United States State Department. It has already brought China to disaster and may, if we continue to follow it, also ruin America. It might be well to consider what advice he has given for future United States policy so we shall know what a new litany of Lattimore disasters awaits us.

He has a chapter on Japan in his *Situation in Asia* and, though he admits General MacArthur is a first-class administrator, he dislikes his "fatherly mysticism" and "old-line Republicanism," hints it would have been wiser to give the Russians more say, considers the present policy as pseudo realistic and bound to fail. "It's likely to blow up in our faces, like a humiliating stink bomb," damaging MacArthur's reputation in the end. He doesn't like keeping the Emperor, nor the type of democracy MacArthur is giving, apparently preferring for Japan the totalitarian type Mao Tse-tung is employing in China. Mr. Lattimore doesn't like to see Japan made a bulwark against Russian expansion, and believes that since she is possessed of the most advanced technical and managerial know-how in Asia she will eventually make her own terms with both Russia and China, without consulting the United States. "The Japanese, watching America's failure to control the situation in China through the Kuomintang, have been giggling in their kimono sleeves. In a queer way it has helped to restore their self-respect for their own failure on the continent." He sees no future for Japan apart from the future of Asia, since she needs the iron and coal of Manchuria and the markets of China.

In this he is probably right; that is why it was always to America's vital interest to see that the Open Door policy and the territorial integrity of China were preserved, though this adviser to our State Department did not think them very important. He considers East Asia now definitely out of control by either Russia or America, stating that it forms a group of "third countries," which seem to resemble Nippon's ill-fated "East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." He believes Japan, then, will come to terms both with Communist Russia and Communist China, and will end up by being more anti-American than anti-Russian. If we had only adopted his plan for a Japanese "democracy" right after the war, what a deal of trouble we would have saved!

What, now, are his plans for the mainland? He was long in favor of a Chiang coalition with the Reds, and blames our Eightieth Congress for spoiling that. The result is now Communist control—which of course would have eventuated just as well had his original coalition idea gone through. We mustn't lay down our own conditions for dealing with a Red China, he says, or we shall spoil our favorable position with the Chinese. Has he never heard how Mao's Reds detest Americans, and hold half a dozen United States consuls under house arrest? "We must at all costs avoid the appearance of wanting to punish the Chinese people for having a government which we didn't approve for them in advance." As if the Chinese were really anxious for a puppet Red regime. We must not support any rump government, for that would be dividing China. We must extend credits to poor Red China and help build it up by trade and American engineering "know-how" as "Ford Motors and General Electric did in Russia in the period between wars." But let's not lay down any conditions for our aid, by insisting that Red China be hostile to Red Russia.

And if all that isn't enough to make Uncle Sam suspect that Owen Lattimore is making a fool out of him in the interests of world communism, the expert goes much further: "The new government of China will claim China's Big Five position in the United Nations, including the right of veto. By the use of our own veto we could delay China in moving into this position," but of course it would be unfair to deprive Russia of another vote, especially since Russia has had nothing whatsoever to do with imposing communism on China. See now why the pinks are so strong on their insistence that the Red movement in China is purely nationalistic? And another vote for Mother Russia?

Let's take Outer Mongolia, that voted unanimously to be annexed to Russia in 1945—each voter being required to sign his name on his ballot. "Mongolia," he says, "is between a Communist-ruled Russia and a Communist-controlled China. It would be an advantage to American policy to be able to emphasize that there is a country occupying 600,000 square miles of territory * * * inhabited by people who are neither Chinese nor Russians. It is impossible to make use of this advantage unless the separation of Outer Mongolia is emphasized by membership in the United Nations. * * * It is true that Mongolia as a member of the United Nations would mean another vote for Russia; but would this be a greater disadvantage than our present complete lack of access to this key country between China and Russia?" (p. 226).

Yes, Mr. Lattimore, it would. Considering that the whole United States has but one vote in the United Nations, while Russia started out with three, it is simply wonderful of Owen Lattimore to give a couple more Far East satellite votes to our "cold war" enemy. Since he is one of the chief advisers to our Far Eastern State Department Bureau, is it any wonder that disaster has been piled on disaster in Asia for Americans while world communism engages in frenzied applause? If Mr. Lattimore is permitted to turn over one Far Eastern vote after another to Russia, Moscow will soon dominate the United Nations, and then can safely discard the veto. Why should one man, whose writings show he has no knowledge of the character of China's Reds, be allowed to go on unchallenged promoting chaos and ruining Christianity in Asia? True, he doesn't say he wants a Red Asia; but the publisher of his *Situation in Asia* indicates his intentions when on the jacket of the book they print a map of Lattimore's Asia, including Japan, Sakhalin, all of China, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Siam, Burma, Malaya, and India, in nice Soviet Red.

EXHIBIT No. 75

[From the *New Masses*, October 12, 1937]

CHINA'S COMMUNISTS TOLD ME—A SPECIALIST IN FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS INTERVIEWS THE LEADING MEN OF RED CHINA IN THEIR HOME TERRITORIES

(By Philip J. Jaffe)

Fifteen days before Japanese troops opened fire on a Chinese garrison near Peiping, I was seated in the one bare room which is the home of Mao Tse-tung, the political leader of the Chinese Communist Party. In the course of the interview Mao Tse-tung said to me: "Japan cannot stop now. Japan wants to swallow China. Its next step will not be long delayed. You ask about the future of the united front? The united front is inevitable because Japan's invasion farther into the heart of China is inevitable."

Twenty-four hours later, in the military headquarters of the former Chinese Red Army, only two big rooms, walls covered with huge military maps, I asked the most famous of the Communist commanders, General Chu Teh: "Why do you think that General Chiang Kai-shek will have to accept the aid of the Red Army?"

Chu Teh replied: "A form of the united front has now existed for several months and has resulted in a large measure of internal peace. The Chinese bourgeoisie, however, is not easily able to forget its ten-year fight against the Red Army. But when the war with Japan eventually begins, it will not be a question of what the bourgeoisie wants; they will have to have the Red Army. In a war with Japan, it will not only be a question of regular troops. China must also depend on its peasants and workers whom the Communists alone can lead. It is not merely the numbers of the army which count; it is the mass population as well. If Chiang Kai-shek thinks that he can raise a large army to fight Japan, without at the same time enrolling the masses as the backbone of the struggle, then he will be rudely disappointed. No war against Japan can be successful without a correct organization of the peasants and workers, and this only the Red Army can successfully carry out."

Two weeks later I knew that the prophecy made by the two famous leaders of the former Chinese Red Army had been fulfilled. On July 7, Japan invaded North China. On August 22, the first stage of the united front—that of military coöperation—was concluded between the Nanking and Red Armies. In the words of the official *communiqué* from Nanking, "the Chinese government and

the Communist army have been fighting for the last ten years; this is the official conclusion of the war." Mao Tse-tung has since been appointed governor of the former Soviet region, now renamed the Special Administrative District. Chu Teh has been appointed commander-in-chief of the former Red Army, now called the Eighth Route Army. Chou En-lai, another outstanding Communist with whom I spoke, is the official Communist representative on the general staff in Nanking.

Mao Tse-tung, political leader.—Yenan is the capital of the former Soviet region. On June 21, after four days' travel from Sian, the capital of Shensi province, scene of the Chiang Kai-shek incident of last December, through semi-starved villages, on bridgeless rivers and roads deep with gullies, we finally passed through the beautiful, ancient main gate of Yen-an. We were greeted at the gate by Agnes Smedley, the distinguished American writer and an old friend of the Chinese people. While in Yen-an, our party which included beside myself, T. A. Bisson of the Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore, editor of *Pacific Affairs*, stayed at the Foreign Office. The building was soon buzzing with excitement. We had barely finished our first dinner in Yen-an, when guests arrived: Ting Ling, China's foremost woman writer; Li Li-san, an old associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; the only two non-Chinese then in the region, Agnes Smedley and Peggy Snow, wife of the American writer, Edgar Snow, and many Communist leaders. Before long, we were talking and singing in a variety of languages. In the midst of our animated discussion, somebody entered quietly and sat down. "Comrade Mao," someone said—Mao Tse-tung, the political leader of the then Chinese Soviet Government.

We spent many hours with him after that evening—at interviews, during meals, at the theater—and we were increasingly impressed by the complete sincerity and lack of ostentation that is so typical of him and of the other leaders we saw. It was during these visits that we grew to feel his tremendous force, a force likely to be overlooked at first because of the low, even voice, the quiet restraint of his movements, and the beautiful hands, almost too delicate for a soldier, but so dexterous with the writing brush. But the quiet voice speaks with brilliance and authority, the movements of the tall slim body with slightly stopped shoulders are sure and well coördinated. Like all other Red Army commanders, Mao wears exactly the same uniform as the rank-and-file soldiers, eats the same food, sleeps on the same sort of *k'ang* (a low, long bed of stone), avoids all social ceremonies, and altogether lives an extremely simple life. It becomes easy to understand the tremendous personal appeal which Mao has as a leader. This leadership dates from the first organizational meeting of the committee which organized the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1920. Mao was an important figure at that meeting.

Our interviews with Mao Tse-tung were many and on a host of topics: the evolution of Nanking's policy; the inner political struggle within Nanking; the Sian incident; the united front; the student movement; the role of other powers in Far Eastern affairs; and the perspectives of China's future development, etc. But since Mao Tse-tung asked me to transmit a message to the American people, it is perhaps best to confine his remarks to those concerning America and its isolationist policy.

"Though there are many Americans who are isolationist in principle," he began, "America is not and cannot be isolationist. America is in this respect like other capitalist countries: part proletariat, part capitalist. Neither one nor the other can be isolationist. Capitalism in the imperialist countries is world-wide, and so is the problem of liberation which needs the effort of the world proletariat. Not only does China need the help of the American proletariat, but the American proletariat also needs the help of the Chinese peasants and workers. The relation of American capitalism to China is similar to that of other capitalist countries. These countries have common interests as well as conflicting ones—common in that they all exploit China, conflicting in that each wants what the other has, as exemplified by the conflict between Great Britain and the United States, as well as between Japan, Britain, and the United States. If China is subjugated by Japan, it will not only be a catastrophe for the Chinese people, but a serious loss to other imperialist powers."

At this point Mao was handed a wireless message announcing both the fall of Bilbao and the resignation of France's premier, Léon Blum. We discussed the probable causes of both these events. Mao clearly showed his grasp of the world situation, despite the isolating distance. We took time off to answer a host of questions, this time by him. What is the comparative strength of the Socialist and Communist Parties in America? Did we know the life-stories of

John L. Lewis and Earl Browder? The strength of the American labor unions? The Trotskyites? American official opinion on the Far East?

Then Mao Tse-tung continued: "The Chinese revolution is not an exception, it is one part of the world revolution. It has special characteristics, but fundamentally it is similar to the Spanish, French, American, and British struggles. These struggles are all progressive. Therein lies their similarity. It is this similarity that evokes the broad sympathy of the American masses and their concern with the fate of the Chinese people. We, on our part, are also concerned with the fate of the American people. Please convey this message to your people. The difference between our peoples lies in this: the Chinese people, unlike the Americans, are oppressed by outside invaders. The American people are, of course, oppressed from the inside, but not by feudal forces. It is the hope common to all of us that our two countries shall work together."

Chu Teh, military leader.—Though Chu Teh is known to the outside world for his military exploits, his other activities are many and varied. We first met Chu Teh in a class he was teaching on the "Fundamental Problems of the Chinese Revolution." Wearing spectacles, he could very well have been mistaken for a professional teacher. At the People's Anti-Japanese Military Political University at Yen-an, he teaches both military tactics and Marxist-Leninist principles. From 1922 to 1925, Chu Teh studied political and economic science, philosophy, and military strategy in Germany. As a result he speaks German freely. His favorite recreations are reading, conversation, horseback riding, and basketball. The latter sport is a subject for much fun among the troops. His love for the game is greater than his ability and he can often be found hanging about a group which is choosing sides. If he is not picked, he quietly moves on to the next court in the hope that there his luck will turn. My greatest disappointment at Yen-an was that rain ruined an appointment we had to play basketball with him.

Chu Teh, commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army, is the personification of the spirit of these armies which for ten years have been continuously victorious in the face of overwhelming odds. His career has been devoted mainly to the military side of revolutionary activities. Fifty-one years old, he has taken part in the entire development of modern China, from the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 to the present struggle against Japan. Beginning with August 1, 1927, when, together with another famous Red commander, Ho Lung, he organized the Nanchang uprising, he participated in exploits which have now become legend. In November 1931, the first All-Soviet Congress in Juikin, Kiangsi, bestowed upon him the title of commander-in-chief of the army. Even in Nanking I heard many call Chu Teh the greatest military genius in all China.

There is strength and assurance in that square, stocky figure, in that strong peasant face, weather beaten by a life of campaigning, and in those small bright eyes which are quite hidden when he laughs, and he laughs frequently. We took a picture of him standing with legs apart and hands on hips. That is Chu Teh.

"The Red Army in this region under our direct command numbers about ninety thousand," he began. "This force occupies a contiguous territory extending from North Shensi to East Kansu and South Ninghsia. From Yen-an to Sanyan there are some partisan troops in Kuomintang uniforms. In this region professional full-time partisans number from ten to twenty thousand. The number of part-time partisans is much larger: their duties are to maintain order in their districts.

"Of the ninety thousand regular troops here, only twenty to thirty thousand come from the original Kiangsi district. About thirty thousand were recruited on the way, chiefly in Szechwan, and the rest are from local areas.

"In other partisan areas there are various groups numbering from one to three thousand soldiers, but it is hard to estimate the total figure; we ourselves are not certain about this. These partisan areas are located in southern Shensi (southwest of Sian), the Fukien-Kiangsi border, the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei border, northeastern Kiangsi, the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border, the Kwangtung-Hunan border, the Kiangsi-Hunan border, and the Shensi-Szechwan border. Connections with several of these are still maintained, but not with all; and these connections are irregular and uncertain." Asked if we might publish this, Chu Teh replied: "It doesn't matter. The fact is well known throughout China."

Having seen many Red troops carrying on their maneuvers with excellent new rifles, machine guns, automatic rifles, and the ubiquitous Mausers, we were curious to know how well armed they were as a whole. Chu Teh replied, "Our

regular ninety thousand troops in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia region are in general well armed. Other equipment, such as clothes, food, and supplies, is not satisfactory. Although it greatly improved after the Sian incident, it is still far from sufficient. Though we had established contact with Chang Hsueh-liang before the Sian affair, it was only during the two weeks following the actual incident that any large quantity of munitions, clothing, and food reached us."

As Chu Teh continued the conversation, punctuated frequently by his broad, genial smile, he came to the discussion of his well-known theory of the military tactics necessary to defeat Japan, namely, to avoid decisive engagements in the early stages in favor of guerrilla tactics to encircle the enemy and harass it until its morale was shattered. We wanted to know something about the Manchurian volunteers. Were they really well-organized or were they mere hungry "bandits"?

"At first," Chu Teh said, "the Manchurian volunteers were largely impoverished peasants and the scattered remnants of the defeated Manchurian troops. They operated without a plan, could not accomplish much, and finally were almost destroyed. The Communist Party then began to organize new peasant detachments who were later joined by what remained of the original volunteers. As a result, most of these formerly leaderless forces have been converted into important detachments with wide popular support. This year there has been some increase in the number of volunteers along the Korean border, in eastern Fengtien, and in eastern Kirin. The increase has been more systematic than hitherto. New groups have recently been formed in Jehol and Chahar. About three months ago a report to me stated that the total number of Manchurian volunteers ranged from fifty to sixty thousand." In reply to a statement made by the Japanese to the effect that 70 percent of the Manchurian volunteers are Communists, Chu Teh said that this was not an exaggeration.

On the united front.—Of all the questions facing China and the former Soviet area the most important is that of the united front. No one in Soviet China knows the details of the negotiations more intimately than Chou En-lai, vice chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, and second in importance only to Mao Tse-tung. It was he who carried on all the negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. Born thirty-nine years ago of a mandarin family, Chou En-lai joined the revolutionary movement in 1911. Upon his return to China in 1924 from a stay abroad, he became chief of the political department of the Whampoa Military Academy under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek. It is said that even today the generalissimo has a great fondness for Chou. When asked why the united-front conversations were then not moving very fast, Chou En-lai said: "The form of the Chinese united front is quite different from that in Europe or the United States. In China two parties fought each other for ten years. The Communist Party, representing the proletariat and peasantry, was a revolutionary party with its own areas and military forces as well as its own social, political, and economic system. The Kuomintang represented the ruling social groups throughout the rest of China. But the position of the Chinese bourgeoisie was such that the obstacles arising from their class position could not forever bar a united struggle against Japan. The bourgeoisie of China have at last come to realize that the Japanese invasion harms all classes and that, standing alone, they are too weak to safeguard China's freedom and independence."

Up to the time of Japan's most recent invasion, the united-front negotiations had progressed quite slowly though not without positive results. Internal peace had been achieved, and the two armies no longer fought each other. Confiscation of land in the Soviet regions was abolished. The name of the Red Army was changed. Dramatic troupes began to tour the countryside to teach the peasants the meaning of democratic elections. Nanking began to contribute a considerable, though as yet insufficient, sum of money monthly to the Soviet area. Technical difficulties made a complete united front often seem impossible. But Japan's military aggression scattered all the major obstacles.

The land problem.—Ever since October 1935, when the main body of the Communist armies from Central and South China began to arrive in north Shensi, their immediate objectives have been twofold. First, to build a permanent base for internal development, and second, and more important, to use this base as a spearhead for unifying all elements in China for a successful war of defense against the invading Japanese militarists. Despite the fact that the former Soviet area, the largest single contiguous territory ever held under Communist rule, started as one of the most economically backward areas in

China, the welfare of the peasants and workers has been improved considerably. There is not sufficient room here to tell all that we saw and heard, but a few high spots, in the words of Po K'u, one of the important leaders of the region, will perhaps shed some light.

Po K'u's home and office is in the abandoned compound of an English Baptist mission. When we expressed surprise at finding religious pictures hanging on his walls, Po K'u said that he left the compound just as he found it in the hope that the missionaries would return.

In reply to several questions on the land confiscation problem, Po K'u said in quite good English: "When the first Soviets were established in 1933 in Shensi, all the good land along the river banks was in the hands of rich landlords who used the great famine of 1930 as a lever for confiscating this land. From then until the Sian incident in December 1936, all this land was divided among the peasants; all taxation and levies were abolished; democratic liberty was extended to all; peasants built up their own armed forces for their protection instead of relying on landlords' forces; and peasants enjoyed the aid and direction of the Soviet government to increase production, improve the land, and develop consumer cooperatives.

"After the Sian incident when the united-front conversations had already begun, the redistribution of land among the peasants was stopped in districts occupied after the beginning of the negotiations. In general, the ownership of land is not the main problem in this territory. Land is plentiful, for Shensi is thinly populated, with an average of one family to every thirteen miles. The form of exploitation and, therefore, the main problem are usury and excessive interest rates on money and cattle. Land rents and money lending rates, therefore, have been reduced drastically. The maximum rent now permitted in the Soviet areas is 30 percent of the land produce, and peasants can bargain with landlords to further reduce this percentage, while the money-lending rate has been reduced from a general 10 percent monthly rate to a maximum of 2 percent. Even last year, when warfare was still going on, the Soviet government spent one hundred thousand dollars for ploughs, seeds, etc., while this year there will be an additional cash distribution of sixty thousand dollars."

Apparently there has been a great deal of confusion about this abandonment of land confiscation. Mao Tse-tung's pithy words perhaps explain it most simply. He said: "It is not so much a question now of whether our land belongs to the peasants or the landlords, but whether it is Chinese or Japanese." The same reasoning is applied by the Communist leaders to the larger question of China as a whole. To all of them "it is not a question now of which general controls which province, but whether the land will remain Chinese or come under Japanese control. If the latter should happen, the original problem disappears."

Life in the Special Administrative District.—Our visit, however, did not consist only of a series of interviews. We visited stores and shops, noting with interest how much cleaner and more orderly they were than any we had seen on our trip, and how relatively well stocked they were. And the cheesecloth covering the food for sale stood in marked contrast to the cities in non-Soviet areas where the only coverings we had seen were armies of flies. Even the dogs, the most miserable of all living things in China, were active and barking. Anyone who has seen the worm-eaten, starved gaunt dogs of China, too weak even to move out of the way of a passing vehicle, will understand the meaning of that.

Culturally, too, the Soviet region is making great strides. Besides Yanan, the present capital, three other cities are being developed as cultural centers: Tingpien, Yenchang, and Chingyang. Anti-Japanese academies and dramatic groups are the axes around which the cultural life is being developed. Study classes, reading rooms, theatricals, dances, lectures, and mass meetings are regular features of life in the Soviet territories. We were amused to hear the universal complaint of all librarians. "They keep the books out too long."

But most interesting and important of all was our visit to the theater. A troupe of players was scheduled to go on the road the following day, and they graciously went through their repertoire for us as well as for their own delighted audience. In a packed auditorium, seated on low, narrow, backless wooden benches, before a crude stage whose footlights were flickering candles, we sat through four hours of amazingly excellent plays, superbly acted. With perfect realism (so different from the classical Chinese theater) and delightful humor, they presented plays designed to teach the peasants how to vote and how to unite. They explained the value of cleanliness, of vaccination, of education, and the stupidity and danger of superstitions. At one point, for instance, one

character complained of being tired. "We weren't tired on our seven thousand-mile march," was the reply. And the audience roared as did Mao, Chu Teh, and the rest of the leaders who sat next to us, having as good a time as anyone. The high spot of the evening was a really professional performance of a scene from Gorki's *Mother*, which had been given at the Gorki memorial evening celebrated in Yen-an, and a *Living Newspaper* by the young people on such subjects as bribery, bureaucracy, and hygiene. All these plays were being sent out to the villages.

Our visit to Yen-an was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the one thousand five hundred cadet students of the People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University and about five hundred from other schools. Here are some questions asked of me. "What is the position of woman in the U. S. A.? How do American workers live and how developed is their movement? What are the results of Roosevelt's N. R. A. campaign? What is the present situation in the Left literary movement in America? What do the American people think of our long march west?" And innumerable questions concerning America's attitude in the event of a Sino-Japanese conflict, the American attitude toward the war in Spain, and what Americans think of the Kuomintang-Communist coöperation.

This stress on the role of the United States is altogether typical of the reaction throughout China. These people have traditionally considered Americans as their friends and they do not want us to fail them now. A few days after our arrival in Shanghai, I received a letter from Agnes Smedley which tells better than I am able how much hope and enthusiasm the visit of Americans evoked in the former Soviet regions.

"In my imagination I follow your journey from here, and my friends and I speculate as to your exact location day by day, and your exact occupation. I want to tell you that you left behind remarkable friends. I did not realize the effect of that meeting until two or three days had passed. Then it began to roll in. I have no reason to tell you tales. But the meeting, and your speech in particular, has had a colossal effect upon all people. One was so moved by it that he could not sleep that night but spent the night writing a poem in praise of you all. I enclose the poem. It is not good from the literary viewpoint. But from the viewpoint of the emotion behind it, it is of value. It is a deeply passionate poem. It is not good enough to publish, but it is good enough to carry next to your heart in the years to come. To that meeting, it may interest you to know, came delegations sent by every institution. Many institutions could not cross the rivers. But they sent activists, groups of six to a dozen. They later gave extensive reports. I am getting those reports from instructors day by day. All are deeply impressed and moved and grateful to you and all of you. There has never been anything like this here before."

EXHIBIT No. 76

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CHINA'S PART IN A COALITION WAR

(By T. A. Bisson)

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The recent Chinese victory helps to swell the tide of United Nations' military successes as the decisive summer of 1943 begins. It coincides with the first significant Anglo-American triumphs in Europe, and links together the two global fronts—East and West—more unmistakably and more prophetically than ever before. Already, as the Mediterranean is cleared for United Nations' merchant shipping, Japan girds herself for the sterner test which her military leaders see ahead.

The Chinese victory is playing an even more important role in the political field, for it tends to ease the serious friction which had developed between China and the other members of the United Nations. It was a victory won mainly by Chinese armed forces. As such, it gives the lie to the alarmists, both in and outside China, who were beginning to clamor that the economic situation had become so bad that the collapse of Chinese resistance to Japan was threatened.

But the victory was also won in collaboration with the United States 14th Air Force Command. As such, it was a demonstration that some American aid—little enough in the face of the needs of the Chinese front, and pitifully meager when measured against the past contributions of China for the fight against Japanese aggression—was being practically effective in a current operation.

It is to be hoped that, in the wake of the recent Roosevelt-Churchill strategy conferences at Washington, further military aid of a similar practical nature has been scheduled for China. More than airplanes are needed. Preparations for a Burma campaign should be already well under way if operations are to begin this fall, as our military commentators have indicated.¹

There are no sound reasons, moreover, for accepting the pessimistic conclusion that China is unable to help herself, pending the arrival of military or economic aid on a large scale. In a significant review of the Hupeh campaign, General Ch'en Ch'eng declared on June 9, from his headquarters at Ensihih, that the initial Japanese penetration of difficult terrain "was due to our negligence."² He then went on to state that it was necessary for China "to coordinate the military, political and economic aspects" of the war, and "to intensify preparations for a counterattack."

From a Chinese commander in Ch'en Ch'eng's position, there are strong words. They are a double rebuke. They imply, in the first place, that the Kuomintang armies displayed a military passivity during the first phase of the Japanese advance. They suggest, in the second place, that a more comprehensive and energetic mobilization of China's war potential is required in order to pass to the attack. With both China and the other United Nations doing their full share in the coming months, it should be possible to make the situation much more difficult for the Japanese forces in China.

An easy attainment of these desirable ends should not be expected. They can be accomplished only if the changes in policy required by a united war in the Far East are made by China, as well as by the other members of the United Nations. The disunity which featured this past winter is the result of a long series of mistakes, omissions and failures, past and present, which have combined to weave a network of frustration around "the China problem." There have been legitimate grievances on the part of China. Some of these still exist and should be remedied. Others are mixed with a past which at this time might better be buried and forgotten.

FEARS ABOUT KUOMINTANG POLICY

There have been well-justified fears and apprehensions over the trend of Kuomintang policy within China, shared by some of the keenest and most discerning friends of the Chinese people in countries abroad. These apprehensions are based on a careful appraisal of conditions in China, as will be indicated in some detail later on in this article. They cannot be lightly dismissed. They affect not only the current prosecution of the war, but also the prospects for the postwar emergence of a stable, united and democratic China.

It is essential that the mistakes of the United Nations in dealing with China, as well as China's own shortcomings should be brought into the open and subjected to critical examination. Innuendoes and behind-the-scenes speculation and gossip, which have largely taken the place of frank and open statements in recent months, have a much more serious effect than forthright exchanges on the issues now uppermost. Frank appraisal of these issues becomes disruptive and harmful only if used in bitterness and with a desire to wound. Critical examination should rather be directed toward uncovering mistakes and unhealthy tendencies, and indicating the path to be taken to correct them.

MISTAKES IN UNITED NATIONS' POLICY

Present Chinese grievances are cast against an historical background in which China suffered greatly from policies followed by western nations now engaged in the common struggle against Axis aggression. It is unnecessary at this time to enter into a discussion of this background, including China's long and painful efforts to throw off the shackles imposed by the "unequal treaties." Fortunately, the treaties recently concluded with China by Great Britain and the United

¹ See, for example, Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times, June 16, 1943.

² China Daily News, June 19, 1943. General Ch'en Ch'eng had been previously transferred (probably in February) from this vital sector to the Yunnan front, but was recalled to command of the Hupeh operations after the Japanese offensive had developed.

States, which provide for the abolition of the extraterritorial system, promise a speedy termination of this long-standing injustice.

Proper appreciation of this historical factor should lead to somewhat more generous policies in working out arrangements already made and others which may prove necessary. It is advisable, for example, that agreements for the rendition of leaseholds, such as Kowloon and Kwangchowwan, and for the return to China of Hongkong be worked out now and announced as soon as possible. It is also necessary that the postwar restoration of Manchuria and Formosa to China be unequivocally indicated. A declaration that Korea shall obtain its freedom is required in more formal terms than hitherto stated. Exclusion laws on the United States' statute books are a standing affront to the Chinese. Finally, China is rightfully interested in the postwar future of India and the countries of Southern Asia. There can be no real independence for China in a Far East that remains largely colonial or semicolonial.

These are not the burning issues of the moment, but they are directly related to the task of winning the allegiance of all Far Eastern peoples, including the Chinese, and therefore to an efficient and effective prosecution of the war.

MILITARY AID NEEDED

The issue of more immediate concern to China is that of military aid and support. This question also has its historical setting. For some four years, nearly up to Pearl Harbor, China held the fort against Japanese aggression virtually alone. The aid rendered to her by the United States and Britain was almost purely economic; up to 1941, they had supplied little or no munitions of war to the Chinese armies. During this period, moreover, the economic aid to China was heavily outweighed by the stream of American and British strategic materials flowing across the Pacific to the Japanese war machine.

All this formed the background to Pearl Harbor. Immediately thereafter, China experienced a further series of chilling disillusionments. Within a few months, Japanese forces had swept the British and Americans out of their Far Eastern strongholds. Some of the circumstances attending this defeat which directly affected the Chinese cut more deeply than the defeat itself. At Hongkong, the local Chinese population was not permitted a share in the military operations, while in Malaya the attempt to enlist the Chinese in the defense of the peninsula was made too late to be effective. Negotiations attending the entry of Chinese troops into Burma were inexcusably protracted. When defeat came in Burma, too, China saw the last of her road-and-rail links to the Pacific cut for an indefinite period.

These failures reinforced the validity of China's demand for effective military aid. Yet at the moment when the validity of her demand stood at its highest point, and political barriers ("neutrality" or appeasement policies) had been removed, the facilities for satisfying that demand suddenly became most circumscribed.

Some assistance has been rendered during the past 18 months. On the economic front, the 500-million-dollar loan has been a positive psychological factor, even though its full utilization has been made impossible by the inability to send goods into China in large amounts. Small quantities of munitions and supplies have been flown in from India. The former devastating bombings of Chungking have ceased, as a result both of the appearance of an American air force in China and of Japan's preoccupation with other fronts in the Pacific war. In addition to their defense role, American planes have conducted modest bombing forays and participated in tactical operations supporting Chinese ground forces.

It still remains true that the sum total of this aid is lamentably small. More transport planes can be assigned to the India-China air route, both to increase the flow of war materials into China and to expand the American air forces now operating from Chinese bases. It is probable that the increased emphasis on the Pacific war fronts, recorded in the Churchill-Roosevelt conferences, includes expansion of this air freight being carried into China.

The recent Burma campaign was thoroughly disappointing. Much larger air and naval forces must be employed in any operation meant to be decisive in this theater. To the Chinese, the effectiveness of military aid is measured by the quantity of weapons reaching China and by the seriousness of the effort made to reconquer Burma.

CHINA MISPLAYS HER HAND

The strength of China's case is such that it requires no elaboration. Before Pearl Harbor, the western democracies were already heavily indebted to China; since then, the indebtedness has steadily increased. The importance of China's position in the Far East, both during and after the war, requires that this account be fully discharged in the shortest time possible.

There was no need to pass beyond the bounds of this argument. It rests on unassailable foundations. It is unanswerable, save by action on the part of the western democracies.

In the American forum of this past winter, nevertheless, the tragic fact is that China badly misplayed her hand. Instead of conducting the debate along the above lines, the representatives of Chungking called into question the basic strategy of the war. On more than one occasion, in private as well as in public, the demand was voiced that Japan rather than Germany should be made Enemy No. 1, or that forces comparable to those being utilized in Europe should be sent into the Pacific.

In choosing this ground for debate, China's representatives were committing three basic mistakes. They were demonstrably wrong, in the first place, on the point at issue. The consensus of expert military opinion is overwhelming on the fact that the German war machine is more formidable than the Japanese. United Nations' war potential—Russian, British, American—is predominantly concentrated in the European-Atlantic theater of operations. With logistics playing the great role which it does in this war, and in view of the acute shipping shortage, it was inevitable that the choice be made to eliminate the nearest enemy first.

Above all, this choice had been made early in 1942; by last winter, it had clearly become the settled strategy on which the war was to be waged. To reverse that strategy in the winter of 1942-43, after the North African campaign had begun, would obviously have been unwise and dangerous. The demand that relatively equal forces be dispatched to the Pacific is merely a variant of the same thesis, with similarly dangerous possibilities.

APPEAL TO THE ISOLATIONISTS

In the second place, taking domestic politics in the United States into consideration, the appeal to reverse the strategy of the war represented a tactical blunder of the first importance. It brought under attack a policy to which President Roosevelt was thoroughly committed. More, it made its strongest domestic appeal to the political opponents of the administration. These were, at the same time, the isolationists who had supported appeasement of Japan, who had strongly opposed aid to China, in the pre-Pearl Harbor days. It was no accident, but a logical development, that these same elements should now be clamoring loudest of all for a policy "to defeat Hirohito first." Diversion of much of the United Nations' strength to the Far East, before Hitler was disposed of, would be the surest path to defeat on both sides of the globe. The appeal to these forces failed, as it was bound to fail, and China's cause thereby suffered a bad set-back in the United States.

In the third place, it was equally an error to lead the argument along lines which suggested that China was in danger of imminent collapse. This plea, strongly advanced by many Chinese in the United States this past winter, argued a weakness on China's part which the stubborn resistance of previous years belied. It verged on a propaganda claim which the best-informed students of Chinese conditions were not willing to accept at face value, despite the admittedly serious economic situation which prevailed.

The argument that "you must save us quickly or all is lost" had dangerously confusing implications. To some Americans it suggested that China might have to be written off as an effective ally in the immediate perspective of the war, and that she would have to be picked up again at a later stage when greater forces could be ranged against Japan. Much the sounder position for China would have been to put up a strong front, to dig in and fight even harder, at the moment of crisis. China's representatives could then have argued from strength and not from weakness.

DOUBTS RAISED IN THE UNITED STATES

The net results of this American forum on the position and prospects of China in the war have been confusing and, to some extent, disheartening. As the

debate proceeded, it tended to disillusion many of the groups in the United States best able to help China. It raised questions as to the political judgment of the Kuomintang regime and the representatives of Chungking who were acting for China in the United States. It weakened the case for more effective Chinese representation in the highest military councils of the United Nations where the basic decisions on strategy are made. In many quarters, it strengthened existing reservations as to the methods and conditions which should be applied in the extension of aid to China.

Still more, it left questions in the minds of many Americans as to what lay behind the ineptness of the political tactics applied to Chinese relations with this country. The answers to these questions must be sought, in large part, in the changes which have occurred in China's political and economic life during the past few years.

TWO CHINAS

At the outset of such an analysis, it is necessary to repeat an important generalization stressed by many commentators on Chinese affairs—that the early promise held out by the war for the broadening and deepening of Chinese national unity through the achievement of liberal political and economic reforms, has not been fulfilled.³ This promise, in fact, died early in the war.

It received its best documentary expression in "The Program of National Resistance and Reconstruction" adopted by an emergency session of the Kuomintang Congress at Hankow, on March 29, 1938.⁴ The democratic provisions even of this program, which was not without shortcomings, were not carried out, and this high point of the first year of the war soon became a melancholy landmark.

Early in 1939 the Kuomintang conservatives became alarmed at the rapid reconquest and reorganization of territories behind the Japanese lines by the Eighth Route and New Fourth, Communist-led, armies.⁵ Clashes, at first sporadic, soon became more frequent. Early in 1941, the New Fourth army was outlawed by the Chungking military authorities, following an abortive effort to destroy its headquarters corps and crush its leadership. Central Government aid to the Eighth Route army had meanwhile lapsed; and the blockade of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region by Kuomintang forces, numbering some 500,000 and commanded by General Hu Tsung-nan, has since continued.

A year or more before Pearl Harbor, therefore, two Chinas had definitely emerged. Each had its own government, its own military forces, its own territories. More significant, each had its own characteristic set of political and economic institutions. One is now generally called Kuomintang China; the other is called Communist China.

However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China; the other, democratic China.⁶ These terms express the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the two Chinas.

COMPARISON OF CASUALTIES INFLICTED

In an attempt to analyze these differences, it should be recognized at once that one is not dealing with irrelevant abstractions. The institutions which characterize one China as feudal and the other as democratic have the most practical relevance to the leading problems of the day. They are, in fact, the determinants of all policies, domestic and international, espoused by the two Chinas. They explain, as will be indicated, why Kuomintang China is compelled to demand immediate aid on a scale so great as to necessitate reversal of United Nations' global military strategy. They also explain the declining rate of casualties inflicted on the Japanese by the Kuomintang armies, as contrasted with the increasing rate of casualties inflicted by the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies.

According to official reports, the Kuomintang armies have inflicted on the Japanese average annual casualties (in a total of 66 months) of 354,935, while the

³ See, for a recent example, Pearl Buck, "A Warning About China," *Life*, May 10, 1943, pp. 53-56.

⁴ For text, see *Amerasia*, April 25, 1943, pp. 118-120.

⁵ It is important to note that the "reorganization"—involving land reform and electoral procedures in local government—was as much opposed as the "reconquest." For the emergency of effective political unity in China required, on the part of the Kuomintang, the acceptance of at least these minimal land and electoral reforms.

⁶ The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this relationship.

combined annual average for the Eighth Route (58 months' total) and the New Fourth (48 months' total) amounted to 113,338. For the last comparable year (July 1941-June 1942), however, the absolute figures are respectively 182,094 and 130,010. In other words, the Kuomintang armies show an average annual record of 76 percent of total casualties inflicted, but in 1941-42 their achievement falls to only 58 percent of the total. On the other hand, the record of the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies was lifted to 42 percent of the total in 1941-42, as against an annual average of 24 percent.

The significance of this comparison is that it excludes the problems of blockade and foreign aid. Indeed, in these respects, the advantage lies entirely on the side of the Kuomintang armies. They are supported by incomparably larger populations and richer territories. They have enjoyed the benefit of virtually all the military and economic aid rendered China by foreign nations. Since before Pearl Harbor, the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies have been doubly blockaded, by the Japanese on one side and by the Kuomintang armies on the other.

The differences indicated by the casualty figures must therefore be explained solely on the basis of efficiency or lack of efficiency in the mobilization of the human and material resources of the two Chinas. This question forces one back to an examination of the institutions which differentiate the two regions.

DEMOCRATIC CHINA

The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Communist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown off the feudal incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one supporting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which has freed the peasant—the primary producer in these areas, and, indeed, over most of China—from the crushing weight of rent, taxes, and usurious interest charges as levied by a feudal economy.

But the ingenuity of this reform, without which it could hardly be made to work, is that the newly introduced procedures of local democracy serve as the final sanction. The landlord and entrepreneur are not excluded from this process, but neither are they permitted to dominate it. Tax assessment committees, for example, are controlled by a majority of local members and exercise a strictly local jurisdiction. Farmers know well what their neighbors own.

Over wide areas of this new China, elected councils—village, town, and district—and elected executive officials have completely supplanted the old autocratic system of feudal agrarian China. These councils and officials are either unpaid or receive mere pittance which leave them no better off economically than their fellow citizens.

It is this democratic process, finally, which permits a large measure of free competition to operate over the whole of the economy. Bureaucratic price controls are not attempted. They are as unnecessary in this society as they would be in a New England town meeting. No landlord or merchant, with the watchful eyes of his neighbors upon him, can engage in hoarding or speculation. Within limits set mainly by local democratic checks, the individual landlord or entrepreneur is free, and is even encouraged, to expand his operations, and many are doing so.

By no stretch of the imagination can this be termed communism; it is, in fact, the essence of bourgeois democracy, applied mainly to agrarian conditions. The leaders in Yenan see in this program more than the answer to China's immediate problem of efficiently mobilizing her resources for the war against Japan. They see in it also the means of throwing off China's feudal shackles, the transition to modern nationhood.

FEUDAL CHINA

The declining curve of military achievement by the Kuomintang armies is correlated with a progressive decrease in the economic strength of Kuomintang China. While this decrease is notable, there is no need to adopt the alarmist view that collapse is inevitable. The human and material resources of Kuomintang China are large. Its economic reserves are still considerable. So also are its military reserves and potentialities.

General Ch'en Ch'eng's use of the term "negligence" clearly implied that more could be done with the military resources at hand than was being done. Concen-

tration on the demand for more planes and guns from abroad, in other words, was getting in the way of full utilization of the weapons and forces at hand. General Ch'en Ch'eng has since given a specific illustration of this situation by pointing out that the American planes were based too far from the fighting fronts to be fully effective in the Hupeh campaign.⁷ An attitude of military passivity is revealed by this failure to develop facilities for air action near the front. The alert, active seizure of opportunities open even to limited means is evidently lacking.

These considerations also apply to the economic sphere, although the problem is far more complicated and difficult. Here, too, General Ch'en Ch'eng's comments go straight to the nub of the issue. He states that "there should be unrelenting vigilance and intensified preparations for counterattacks through military, political and economic coordination."⁸

This is a demand for more vigorous action on the home front, with an emphasis sharply different from pleas for help from outside. As has already been seen, questions of blockade and outside aid are not necessarily decisive for effective military resistance, providing an efficient economic mobilization is accomplished.

In Kuomintang China, such a mobilization is severely handicapped by the leaders' unwillingness to challenge the basic postulates of the feudal system. No serious effort has been made to uproot the landlord-usurer system. With the port cities and their nascent bourgeois class removed, the landlords have become the economic mainstay of the Kuomintang regime.

BUREAUCRACY TIGHTENS HOLD

At the same time, the bureaucracy has taken over administration of a considerable slice of industrial production. Many industries have become government monopolies, not forced to maintain themselves in competition with private industry. Industrial development under private initiative, valuable as an offset to feudal relations, and needed in an economy of scarcity, was thus choked off at the very time when stimulation of the entrepreneur was justified. The declining numbers and strength of the industrial class weakened its challenge to the landlord-bureaucrat regime, thereby putting new props under the tottering structure of Chinese feudalism.

In these circumstances, there could be no real progress toward democratic reform or wider civil liberties. Inauguration of constitutional government, considered for a time in 1938, was eventually shelved for the duration. Non-Kuomintang representatives on the People's Political Council, which could have evolved into a national legislature, have steadily decreased. Over the new Political Councils in the provinces, Kuomintang control is carefully maintained. In the so-called "new hsien system," embodying the program for instituting representative local government, candidates will be limited to those who have acceptably passed through Kuomintang training schools, while suffrage will be indirect and linked to the household units of the pao-chia system. These developments do not promise to create effective popular checks on the Kuomintang bureaucracy.

With no effort at reform of the land system or initiation of democratic processes, the two basic prerequisites for an efficient wartime economic mobilization were lacking. As conditions deteriorated, successive measures looking toward the institution of a "controlled economy" were introduced. The bureaucracy steadily expanded until its relative cost, measured against the limited output of the productive system, itself became a drag on the war effort.

Even so, it could institute neither price nor commodity controls that were adequate to stay the course of inflation. Grain hoarding and speculation, the key factor in Kuomintang China's inflationary problem, could be curbed by nothing less than genuine popular participation in application of the controls. This solution was barred. In a country predominantly agrarian, with the landlords still entrenched in their feudal positions, no centralized government organ could send out the multitude of agents required to enforce its paper controls. Turn as it would, the bureaucracy could not solve this problem, and the economic foundations of the war effort were increasingly undermined.

It is at this point that the true relevance of foreign aid to an economy of the Kuomintang model becomes evident. In order to conduct war on the basis of such an economy, access to the outside world is imperative. Steady injections

⁷ New York Times, June 28, 1943. The same paper on June 29 carried Ch'en Ch'eng's statement that China needed "guns and equipment of all kinds," and would welcome "even one thousandth part of one percent" of United States production.

⁸ China Daily News, June 19, 1943.

of foreign supplies were in fact pumped into Kuomintang China up to Pearl Harbor, although in declining amounts after 1940.

This extreme dependence on aid from the outside is a key which unlocks many mysteries. It provides an adequate explanation for the declining rate of the Kuomintang armies' military achievements. It also explains the persistent outcry in Chungking for a reversal of United Nations' strategy, as expressed in the editorials of its leading papers.⁹ The desperate need for outside assistance felt by Kuomintang China could only be met by such a reversal of strategy, since this alone would bring aid quickly on a large scale. And, finally, this appeal was logically transferred directly to the United States in the propaganda campaign conducted last winter.

Obviously, the resources available in Free China are much too limited to encompass the defeat of Japan. Large amounts of outside supplies are essential if the Chinese armies are to be equipped for successful offensives. Until then, however, the need is for the most effective utilization and development of the resources at hand.

Elements within Kuomintang China are making efforts to achieve this end, as indicated by the forthright statements of General Ch'en Ch'eng. Strong forces are working to establish greater freedom for the entrepreneur, as a means to increase industrial production. The industrial cooperative movement, once freed of bureaucratic restrictions, would be able to forge ahead more rapidly. With proper encouragement, these sound elements within Kuomintang China can do much to overcome current economic weaknesses, although more thoroughgoing reforms are necessary in order to effect complete mobilization.

A COALITION WAR—AND ITS REQUIREMENTS

The United States, as the arsenal of democracy, bears a heavy responsibility for the war program of the United Nations. Its immense productive effort has begun to register with increasing effect on the war fronts. As the German tide in Europe recedes, the pressure on Japan will steadily increase. It is clearly essential that China, which has borne the heat and burden of the defensive in the Far East, should have a full and significant share in the victorious offensives that are now in the making. Toward this end, it would be advisable that China be given an adequate voice in framing the decisions on strategic policy. But China herself must change, if she is to make her full contribution to a coalition war.

Realistic thinking on this problem will be stimulated if there is candid recognition that two Chinas exist at the present time. The task of statesmanship is to merge these two Chinas into one. To be sound and effective, such unification must come on the high plane of social advance and democratic reform. Until unification is achieved on this plane, China's full strength cannot be placed behind the war effort.

It is also necessary to recognize that Kuomintang China is passing through a serious crisis. The challenge is for a renewal of the forward-looking elements in the party of Sun Yat-sen and a bold cutting loose from an archaic past. Defections of allegiance, already occurring, will tend to increase as reform is postponed, and the leadership of the China of the future may well pass to the progressive forces outside the Kuomintang.

These issues in China pose a delicate and difficult problem for the other members of the United Nations. They are issues of such fundamental importance, however, that they cannot be ignored. Not only does the effective prosecution of the war during its final phase depend on the answers given. The future status of China as a healthy and vigorous nation, in which the people's livelihood is safeguarded by democratic processes, is at stake. Only such a China, moreover, can bring to the family of nations that level of constructive statesmanship that will be needed to guard the peace that the war has won.

EXHIBIT No. 77

RED MYTHS, STARRING CHINA

(By Louis Francis Budenz, for Collier's)

America will be rocked, during the coming year, by mounting espionage revelations. Shock after shock is about to be given the American people as to

⁹ See excerpts in article by Guenther Stein, *Far Eastern Survey*, June 14, 1943, p. 117.

the extent their national security has been placed at the mercy of the Soviet dictatorship, through native American traitors. The activities of Eugene Dennis, present secretary of the Communist Party, in the stealing of information from the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, in itself constitutes one of the gravest scandals that has ever hit this country.

Right now there is a great burning of documents in Communist conspiratorial hide-aways and many feverish consultations as to how to cover up the widespread looting by Moscow of our official files and secrets.

Along with this espionage, went an equally grave offense, which was carried through with high success by Soviet agents; the winning of the confidence of American public officials in order to influence and dictate American foreign policies. It is ironical that America's path in China has been exactly that mapped out by Soviet agents here in the United States on behalf of Communist China. The whole idea of "coalition government"—which American officialdom swallowed hook, line, and sinker and which led to the withholding of real aid to nationalist China—was concocted by Soviet Russia in order to defeat America in the Far East. The orders to push this idea of "coalition government" were given to leading members of the Communist Party here, were printed in official Communist publications, and then oddly enough became the patent medicine of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department.

I was one of those who took a leading part in arranging for this deceit of American officialdom. I sat in the conferences that received the instructions from the Soviet capital and was active in carrying them out, for the discomfort and defeat of the United States.

Neither the espionage nor the deceit (which made American policy so often that which the Kremlin wanted it to be) could have been so successful had it not been for the Red myths which were created to befuddle the American people.

No hoax has been more complete and convincing than that which deluded the American people from coast to coast into the belief that the Chinese Communists were a mild edition of agricultural reformer. These Moscow agents, pledged by their own declarations to establish Soviet slavery over the millions in China, were portrayed by so-called experts and distinguished authors as a sort of Non-Partisan Leaguer such as functioned for some time in North Dakota. A writer like Harrison Forman could say in his Report from Red China that he saw "not the slightest tangible connection with Russia" among these Chinese Communists. He could even tell us that "occasionally I saw portraits of Marx and Lenin; but these seemed the relics of a revolutionary past." And these were the words of a man who was accepted by the American people as one of the leading authorities on China as late as 1945. What he wrote there could be refuted by every fundamental document issued by the Chinese Communists and their leaders when they were writing for themselves and not giving interviews to hick Americans.

Had Mr. Forman and other American "authorities" familiarized themselves with the Chinese Communist programs they would know that repeatedly they stated their adherence to "the revolutionary doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin." These "authorities" would have known, as a striking instance, of the declarations of the Chinese Communists in 1937. This was at the moment when these Reds were about to "make a new peace" with Chiang Kai-shek because their masters in the Kremlin were on the eve of signing a nonaggression pact with Nationalist China. At every turn of history, the Chinese Communists have acted in accord with the twists taken by Moscow, and 1937 is a big year in this respect.

It's a big year because the Chinese Communists from 1931 up to that time had openly proclaimed their complete domination by Moscow. They had called the territory they occupied "Soviet China" and their military forces "The Red Army." It is a big year because it is the time when the Soviet fifth column in the United States will begin to put forward the hoax of the Chinese Communists being something other than Russian Communists.

But at that moment, when Soviet Russia had ordered the Chinese Reds to make a change in tactics, they told themselves that this alleged cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek was only a subterfuge. Through one of their leading spokesmen, Wan Min, these Reds pledged that no matter what cloak they put on, they would always be "true supporters of Marxist-Leninist teachings." They further declared, to show their devotion to Soviet Russia, that they would always remain "true pupils" of the great teacher, Joseph Stalin! (You may read this at your own convenience in International Press Correspondence, September 18, 1937, vol. 17, No. 40, p. 924.)

It was in early 1937 that Earl Browder called a few of the Communists functionaries, including myself, to a "China conference" on the Ninth Floor of the East 12th Street house of treason. There were ten people present, conspicuously among them being the late Harry Gannes, then foreign editor of the *Daily Worker* and a reputed Red authority on China. To us Browder brought the word, which he said he had received from abroad, that "the followers of Mao Tse-tung have to be presented in a new dress." This had been made by Moscow one of the chief tasks of the American Party. Browder had served as a representative of the Communist International in China for a number of years, and stressed that China was "the herald of the emancipation of all Asia from the imperialist yoke and would be the key to the smashing of American imperialism." These words, uttered by the then chief Communist agent in America at the time when the Reds were supposedly endorsing Franklin D. Roosevelt, were to be heard frequently in secret Communist sessions from that time forward. They were to break into print on a number of occasions in *The Communist*, official theoretical organ of the Soviet fifth column here.

China was the key to the Soviet domination of Asia, Browder told us bluntly, and a Soviet-controlled Asia "was the beginning of the end of American imperialism." That is why Moscow, we were told, placed upon the shoulders of the American Communist Party the responsibility of persuading the American people and our government to have "a benevolent attitude" toward the Chinese Reds.

It was then that Browder, with a sarcastic grin, said that our objective was to "picture the Chinese Communists as a mild variation of the North Dakota Non-Partisan Leaguers." This could not be done all at once, we all agreed, since a tremendous amount of emphasis had previously been put on the "revolutionary aspects of the Chinese Soviets." But as a beginning, it was agreed that the name of an "authority" would be used—a name that would sound good to the American people. The first decision of our China conference, therefore, was to publish "tens of thousands of copies" (as Alexander Trachtenberg, the Soviet cultural commissar here put it) "of the interview with Mao Tse-tung, Communist leader, obtained by Edgar Snow, the well-known American writer and published originally in the *China Weekly Review* of November 1936.

While that interview did not go so far as Mao Tse-tung was to go later, in picturing his cause as that of a mild agricultural movement, he did stress greatly the principles of Sun Yat-sen, the socialistic-democratic leader. It is ironic to note that the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party was talking in this language to Mr. Snow at the very time when Wan Min was writing in effect that Sun Yat-sen's "principles" would be used only as a matter of strategy.

This idea of the upstanding Chinese Communists, the great agrarian reformers, was peddled everywhere from that time on. It turned up in Washington, was increasingly popular in certain sections of the State Department, and broke into prominent positions in the American press. Everybody who was "in the know" was ready to say that the Chinese Communists were entirely different from the Communists of Soviet Russia and would never be anti-American nor puppets of the Kremlin.

This propaganda was to reach its height around 1943, when the Communists began the big campaign to see that the Cairo pact would be smashed. With the same success with which they persuaded America to break its word to Poland and also to agree to the Potsdam monstrosity, they proceeded to flood the United States with the idea that there should be a coalition government in China. This was "sold" by respectable authors throughout America. It was favored in some of the most surprising places in the field of public opinion. It was particularly a pet theory of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, which did everything the Communists would have wanted that Division to do.

And yet, Mao Tse-tung had stated in a special report "On Coalition Government" made in April 1945 to the Seventh National Convention of the Chinese Communist Party, that this slogan would lead to the destruction of Chiang Kai-shek and the defeat of "reactionary American imperialism." The "coalition government" as a tactic aimed at the United States of America on behalf of Soviet Russia was clearly emphasized as such in that report. The entire history of Communist tactics throughout the world had been that all "coalition governments" in which Communists joined are sabotaged by the and finally conquered for Soviet imperialist purposes. The flood of document from Communist China, which I could quote at length were it feasible to do so, had all asserted the Marxist-Leninist aims of the Chinese Communists and their devotion to Soviet Russia. Indeed, and most ironically, one of the main points made by Mao Tse-tung in his coalition government report is that the Soviet Union has changed the whole situation in China.

Interpreting this, the chief of the department of information of the Chinese Communist Party, Lu Ting-Yi, places the New China on the side of the successes of the Soviet Union, and against the American imperialists.

At the same time, in the first flush of victory, achieved through American blundering, Mao Tse-tung now proclaims the Red advance in China to be against American imperialism as well as against Chiang Kai-shek's gang of brigands. He mentioned the great masses of people that will be brought into the struggle—and puts them, in the world scales, against American Republic. Frederick V. Field, the millionaire Chinese expert of the Communist Party, jubilantly writes in the Political Affairs of July 1948: "Our Chinese comrades are destroying American imperialism in the Far East. Let us, American anti-imperialists, at least accept and make use of the historic contribution which they are making toward our own welfare." This millionaire Communist agent chides American labor for not being anti-American in its activities, and thus holding back from "the new China which is developing under the leadership of the Communist Party." A new enemy of tremendous strength in numbers is being forged in Asia against the United States—and every agency of American life has aided to make that enemy strong.

On December 7 last, it was discovered in Washington that there had been a tragic lag in the delivery of promised war material and other goods to Nationalist China. Fighting equipment valued only at \$63,000,000 had been delivered during the preceding eighteen months, whereas \$220,000,000 in supplies had been sent to Greece and Turkey in a similar period. This is merely an index of the entire lag of American opinion and American governmental understanding of the Chinese crisis. It is a measure of the powerful effectiveness of the Soviet fifth column in the United States that it can report this and similar results in its warfare against American imperialism.

How is it that American public opinion was drugged in this fashion? It was the outcome of a most skillful and persistent campaign by the Soviet fifth column coupled with an almost incredible amount of naïveté on the part of leading American citizens. I say this out of my own participation in much of the planning on the part of the Reds, which went on at the 12th Street headquarters.

Our campaign was extensive but not complicated. It was simply to make everybody ashamed of being for Nationalist China. This was done by playing up the words "China's New Democracy" which was the title of a pamphlet written by Mao Tse-tung in 1940. This pamphlet was designed to satisfy everybody while at the same time educating the followers of the Chinese Communists to an unbreakable alliance with Soviet Russia. When it was prepared for an American edition, we had a special session on the Ninth Floor as to how to handle some of its promises of the establishment of "dictatorship" and other forecasts of a Soviet slave state. This was easily handled by editing out the most flagrant verbiage, so that what Mao Tse-tung said on these points was actually misrepresented in the American issue. The milder edition, with a foreword by Earl Browder, went far to befuddle American liberals and not a few American statesmen.

Nor was this campaign for Communist China merely a matter of persuading good intentioned people to become mixed up. A special secret order was sent out to the Communists, to be pushed in unions and in every occupation where sympathizers were engaged, to see that books favoring Communist China were widely sold. Arrangements were made—and I have sat in on some of them—whereby the legs of book reviewers were to be pulled so that those words which gave a break to the Chinese Communists would receive favorable notices.

Back of all this was the popularization of the fiction that the Chinese Communists had proved to be such bitter foes of Japanese imperialism. A lot of noise was made about the statements in 1937 along that line when the agreement with Chiang Kai-shek was reached. But writers of alleged high authority were persuaded to forget that this pact of 1937 had only been reached because Soviet Russia wanted it. It was also conveniently forgotten that when the Kremlin entered into friendly relations with Japan, the Communists quit fighting the Japanese entirely; they devoted themselves to harboring their forces for the showdown with Chiang Kai-shek and the United States. I have distinctly in mind a conference of American Communist leaders meeting in April 1941 to decide how to handle the Chinese situation after the Soviet-Japanese Pact, at which a report was given that the Chinese Communists would preserve their strength as much as possible.

One of the chief figures called upon by the Soviet fifth column to streamline this campaign of confusion was Frederick Vanderbilt Field, who first became conspicuous as Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Formerly a Norman Thomas Socialist, Mr. Field became converted to the views of Moscow. In turn, he became a writer for the New Masses, Communist weekly, a columnist for the Daily Worker, official daily organ of the Communist Party, and now the chief theoretical writer on Far Eastern affairs for Political Affairs, theoretical organ of the Communist Party. This last distinction (following so soon after Mr. Field's service for the party at San Francisco, during the Conference of the United Nations,) is a tribute by the Soviet fifth column to his services in influencing the opinion of many gullible American writers and publicists.

Two men of distinction who have seen eye to eye with Mr. Field for a long time in regard to China, and who have enjoyed close personal relations with him are Owen Lattimore, author of *Solution in Asia*, and Joseph Barnes, former foreign editor of the New York Herald Tribune and now editor of the leftist New York Star. As a Communist, I have heard the names of Messrs. Lattimore and Barnes frequently referred to in reports by Mr. Field, and always in the most complimentary manner. They have been devoted adherents of the "poor Chinese Communists agrarian reformer" theory.

It is somewhat startling, nevertheless, to discover a Mr. Lattimore as a specific endorser of Dilemma in Japan, by Lt. Andrew Roth. Indeed, Mr. Lattimore hails Mr. Roth as representing "the younger school of American experts."

Such an expert is this gentleman that he was a participant in the "borrowing" of hundreds of secret documents from the files of our State Department, in the Amerasia case. That magazine had been established by Phillip Jaffe, of whom I first learned from the Soviet secret police as a valuable friend. Reports to the National Committee disclosed this publication to be organized for the purpose of affecting opinion in favor of the Chinese Communists. But its main objective was to make those contacts in the State Department and elsewhere in Washington which would directly help in the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek. It was no surprise to me, therefore, when in early 1945 the news broke that the FBI had raided the Amerasia office, to discover scores of secret documents belonging to the State Department and also extensive photographic equipment for reproducing such documents.

That day a session was held on the Ninth Floor. The danger involved in the Amerasia disclosures was realized by leading members of the Soviet fifth column to be considerable. Sitting in Browder's room, in a little circle, seven of them went over the steps that must be taken to becloud America's mind as to what had actually taken place. The proposals which were adopted—brought in appropriately by Eugene Dennis—who had been educated in espionage in the Lenin School in Moscow—included these significant steps: 1. To get the aid of men upon whom we could depend, Alger Hiss being mentioned, and at least six other men of like position being considered; 2. That the comrades connected with the newspapers be instructed to do all they could to see that the incident was played down and allowed to die out quickly; 3. That the argument be used everywhere by the comrades disguised as non-Communists that the Chiang Kai-shek government was "rotten to the core" and that therefore any information obtained against it was not injurious to America.

Secret instructions to this effect were dispatched at once to all sections and districts of the party. They were very effective, at that. The Amerasia defendants got off without difficulty, and there was a big celebration at Phillip Jaffe's house in which toasts were drunk to the coming victory of communism in China and the defeat of American imperialism. Several members of the Daily Worker editorial board were present at this victory feast.

One of the reasons why there was no appreciation of the treason involved in the Amerasia case was the effective work the Soviet fifth column had done among the majority of the organizations dealing with the Orient. Through infiltration, corruption, persuasion, or use of personal weakness, leading members of most of these groups had come to see eye to eye with the Communists on China. That is, they peddled the talk of agrarian reformers, coalition government, and other similar claptrap. Conspicuous among these was the Vice President of the United States, Henry A. Wallace, who contributed to the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, a pamphlet in 1944 in which he said: "The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their willingness to refrain from interfering in China's internal affairs." That sentence is familiar to me because it even provoked laughter on the Ninth Floor of the 12th Street Kremlin. A separate Red Army, "Chinese Soviets", and

Communist forces which would hang back during the Soviet-Japanese Pact were not regarded by Mr. Wallace as evidences of intervention. In his zeal to defend the Chinese Communists Mr. Wallace lately overshot his mark. In his most recent book, *Toward World Peace*, the former Vice President continued to argue that the comrades in China were agrarian reformers. The Communist organ, *Political Affairs*, for May 1948, reluctantly and sadly had to take him to task for this mistake. For now, since Mao Tse-tung has announced his union of purpose with Soviet aggression, and his hostility to the United States, this fakery is no longer serviceable. And so, *Political Affairs* writes: "No, the Chinese Communists are really Communists, not agrarian reformers. It is precisely because they are Communists that they express best of all the real interests of the Chinese people." And that sentence proclaims in effect that all the previous Communist propaganda, palmed off on the liberals and used by them to confuse America, was a tissue of lies.

One of the most appalling developments out of all this was the apparent acceptance of these lies by the Far Eastern Division of our State Department. On November 11, 1946, at the Far East luncheon of the National Foreign Trade Council, the director of that office went so far as to strike a hard blow against Nationalist China. In his address, Mr. John Carter Vincent indicted Nationalist China as a place "unsound to invest private or public capital." This was based upon the threat of civil war there, upon wasting of armaments, and on undemocratic concepts of government existing there. Mr. Carter, unfortunately, neglected to state what would occur if his advice were taken. Namely, the greatest fiasco ever to greet America. That is precisely what has happened today and it will cost the lives of thousands of our men eventually to make up for the possible loss of China. It is distressing to note that Mr. Carter's utterance in Washington came at the same time as the Communist Party's campaign to "get out of China", which was headed by that veteran party liner, the late General Carlson. It is constant attitudes of this kind on the part of Mr. Vincent Carter that has made his name so warmly welcome in the secret councils of the Soviet fifth column. I have never heard the former head of the Far Eastern Office of the State Department mentioned in high Communist circles except with the highest approbation.

The same deceit and disguise which led to these successes on China also marked Red penetration of organizations dealing with this matter. The Institute of Pacific Relations is a case in point. This is an organization composed of odds and ends of people in many countries touching the Pacific. The American Council, although not absolutely controlled by the Communists, has never found anything wrong with Communist China and has never warned the American Nation of the grave danger to its security that will result from a Communist conquered China. Quite to the contrary, most of its publications have presented Communist China as a land of sweetness and light. One of its most conspicuous directors has been Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and notorious Communist writers such as the so-called James S. Allen, recently Foreign Editor of the *Daily Worker*, have been on its list of authors. It may be added that "Allen" is a former agent of the Communist International in the Philippines and has close conspiratorial connections with many Soviet agents in lands bordering on the Pacific. Edward C. Carter, director of the Institute, for years, has had such close associations with the Communists as to rob him of any critical attitude toward them. He has been a leading figure in the Russian-American Institute, a contributor to *Soviet Russia Today*, and director of *Russian War Relief*. Not satisfied with the penetration of organizations, organs of public opinion, or the government, the Communists began a new campaign of their own on China just before I left the party. It was designed to center the attention of the comrades on China as the biggest of all tasks of the American Reds, and to arouse them to the subsequent campaigns through other organizations which they inaugurated. Well known party liners have also been vociferous in the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, formed around the same time and preparing the way by its complete echo of the party position for further American division in the face of the Communist advance in China.

"What is happening in China today is the most open expression of American imperialism at work," said a secret memorandum sent to all Communists by the New York State office just before I left the party. "Today, American imperialism, by armed force, is intervening in the struggle of the Chinese people to establish a democratic Chinese Republic." Such allegations would be highly comical were they not so tragic, when we view the hesitancy of America to defend itself by taking a firm stand in the Chinese picture. The Committee for a Demo-

cratic Far Eastern Policy echoed this sort of farcical charge, demanding that the United States give no military aid to China since it would "in effect make the President of the United States Commander in Chief of the Chinese Armies."

It is arguments like these when pressed by the gentlemen in diplomatic morning clothes that have made Washington sway back and forth in tragic uncertainty on China. It is certain harried editors looking around for material on China who pick up a pamphlet by the supposedly respectable Institute of Pacific Relations and use it for information, even though it is written by Abraham Chapman. And who is he? None other than a most trusted Communist, who under the name of John Arnold has written extensively for the Communist press and served as a member of the State Committee of the Communist Party of New York. That would be unknown to the unwary editor, guided by Comrade Chapman's discourse on the Far East.

Or to use another example, which came to my attention during my last days in the party in 1945: Hundreds of leading citizens in various communities received in the mails early that year a pamphlet entitled "China's Greatest Crisis." Its author, Frederick V. Field, was stated to be "a member of the Executive Committee of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and an authority on Far Eastern problems. He is also Executive Vice President of the Council for Pan-American Democracy, and a member of the Editorial Board of New Masses." The publisher was New Century Publishers, Inc., 832 Broadway, New York.

That was a rather impressive-sounding statement, and the publisher seemed to be respectable enough in name. No one is opposed to anything "new." How was the leading citizen of Kalamazoo, Mich., receiving such a pamphlet, from the list of a certain religious organization of which he was a member, to know that the New Century Publishers are the official publication society of the Communist Party's theoretical organ and its most valued pamphlets? How was he to know of Mr. Field's connection with the Communist movement except through the reference of the New Masses of which he might have heard vaguely?

This was the manner in which many patriotic Americans, who say quite emphatically that no one can dictate their opinions, were hornswoggled into a completely distorted view of the Chinese crisis.

It was out of all these pressures, Moscow directed, that President Roosevelt was persuaded to amend our solemn pledge of China's integrity made at Cairo to the Yalta promise that Soviet Russia would get Outer Mongolia and even a chance at Manchuria. It is from such creation of confusion in the American mind that we have promised aid to China and not given it in the measure it was pledged. Is it any wonder that the American Nation faces the greatest debacle in its history, the possible loss of 470,000,000 people for our side in the battle for American existence?

EXHIBIT No. 78

[From the Daily Worker]

Books

THE SITUATION IN ASIA. By Owen Lattimore. 238 pp. Boston. Atlantic-Little, Brown. \$2.75.

"SITUATION IN ASIA" CRITICIZES U. S. GOVERNMENT POLICY IN FAR EAST

(By David Carpenter)

Owen Lattimore's *Situation in Asia* is extremely critical of our government's policies in that immense area of colonial and semicolonial peoples. He shows that our government has done nothing but alienate the people's forces seeking national liberation in Asia.

Lattimore, who is the director of the Walter Hines Page School of Foreign Relations at Johns Hopkins University, points out that our dependence on the Kuomintang has served only to make the United States hated by the Chinese people. He contrasts, to our disadvantage, the reliance on the unpopular imperialist agent Syngman Rhee and the maintenance of U. S. occupation troops in South Korea with the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the establishment of a native peoples government in North Korea.

He shows clearly that the efforts by the U. S. government to make Japan a major bastion against the Soviet Union must end in failure.

Lattimore proposes that our government end its alliances with dictatorial corrupt antipeople's forces in Asia. He urges that we stop intervention in the internal affairs of the colonial and semicolonial countries. He asks that we aid the peoples of Asia to achieve national independence.

* * *

All this is to the good as far as it goes. But Lattimore goes completely off the beam in his efforts to explain the relationship of political and social forces in Asia and their impact on world affairs. And as long as we fail to recognize the reality of these relations so long will we be unable to help in the achievement of those aims Lattimore proposes.

In the first place, Lattimore argues that the colonial and semicolonial peoples struggling for national independence are developing a "third force" that seeks to remain equidistant from American and Russian power. He refuses to admit that the struggle is completely an anti-imperialist struggle, to drive out the American, British, French, and Dutch capitalists who are subjecting their native peoples to superexploitation for their raw materials and as markets for capitalist products.

Lattimore admits that the Asiatic colonial and semicolonial peoples are looking to the Soviet Union for examples of how oppressed peoples achieve independence and are turning away from the United States because of its imperialist line. But he makes this a contest of tactics which the United States can change by adopting new methods.

* * *

Lattimore refuses to see that the reason the colonial people turn to the Soviet Union for their example is precisely because of the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of socialism in that country. As Stalin points out:

"It is precisely because the national-colonial revolutions took place in our country under the leadership of the proletariat and under the banner of internationalism that pariah nations, slave nations, have for the first time in the history of mankind risen to the position of nations which are really free and really equal, thereby setting a contagious example for the oppressed nations of the whole world.

"This means that the October Revolution has ushered in a new era, the era of colonial revolutions which are being conducted in the oppressed countries of the world in alliance with the proletariat and under the leadership of the proletariat."

The core of the leadership in the colonial struggle against imperialism and the guarantee of the achievement of national independence lies in the growth and development of the native Communist Parties, springing out of the exploited native working classes and leading the exploited working class and the oppressed peasant masses. That is why the imperialists, under the leadership of the United States, direct their main fire against the destruction of these native Communist Parties.

Secondly, Lattimore makes the mistake of assuming that the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union in Asia is that of a struggle for power. Here he falls into the trap laid by American imperialism, which would like to hide the reality of its efforts to maintain its grasp of the resources and manpower of Asia.

* * *

This approach to American-Soviet relationships obscures the truth. The Soviet Union is not seeking world power. When the colonial peoples look for alliances with the Soviet Union, it is because they see in that socialist country the true defender of their national aspirations. When the Soviet Union aligns itself with these peoples, it is not just a counteralliance to protect its own borders against the attack of imperialism, it is fundamentally a defense of the national interests of the peoples of these oppressed nations.

Because the peoples of the world recognize that an attack on the Soviet Union is an attack on the defender of their own aspirations, because they see in such an attack on their own efforts to break the hold of imperialism, they join with the Soviet Union in a common front against imperialism. They have already seen how the peoples of the Eastern European democracies were able to protect themselves from the encroachment of imperialism and to begin their own internal development as the result of alliances with and protection by the Soviet Union.

In our own country, if we are to adopt the proposals Lattimore makes for "the situation in Asia," it is necessary for us to loosen the hold of the imperialists on our government. Otherwise, our official policies will continue to be that of oppressing the colonial peoples in the interests of our monopoly capitalists.

EXHIBIT No. 79

THE ASSEMBLY,
STATE OF NEW YORK,
Darwin Center, New York, June 20, 1944.

Miss ROSE V. RUSSELL,
13 Astor Place, New York 3, N. Y.

MY DEAR RUSSELL: I am in receipt of your letter informing me of the informal meeting in tribute to Dr. Bella Dodd inasmuch as she is leaving her position as Legislative Representative of the Teachers Union.

I first became acquainted with Dr. Dodd when I became Chairman of the Rapp-Concert Committee and in the four years that I have held this position, I have had occasion to contact Dr. Dodd on a great many occasions and would like to say that she has always been fair in presenting her views and while at times we have differed I have always found her very sincere and her word with me has always been as good as a certified check.

I wish to extend to Dr. Dodd my best wishes for her continued success in her new field.

Sincerely yours,

HERBERT A. RAPP W. C.

STATEN ISLAND, N. Y., *June 17, 1944.*

Dr. BELLA V. DODD,
25 West 43rd Street, New York City.

DEAR DR. DODD: Thanks so much for your gracious letter of June 12. Your kind wishes are appreciated.

There are probably not many people in New York who have as divergent political and economic ideas as you and I. I like and respect you as a person, however, and I am happy to read that you don't think I am entirely bad.

Good luck to you in your new work, and best regards to you from

Yours sincerely,

ELLSWORTH B. BUCK.

THE ASSEMBLY,
STATE OF NEW YORK,
Albany, June 22, 1944.

Miss ROSE V. RUSSELL,
*Secretary, Teachers Union,
13 Astor Place, New York.*

DEAR MISS RUSSELL: I am writing these few lines to extend to Dr. Bella Dodd my best wishes and may her future endeavors be successful.

I also wish to state that during the past four years as a member of the Legislature, I have met Dr. Dodd on many occasions and while at times we may have differed politically I have always admired her for her sincerity, honesty, and integrity.

With every hope for a successful affair and with greeting to all.

Sincerely,

GEORGE ARCHINAL.

THE ASSEMBLY,
STATE OF NEW YORK,
Albany, June 14, 1944.

Miss ROSE V. RUSSELL,
*Teachers Union,
13 Astor Place, New York 3, New York.*

MY DEAR MISS RUSSELL: I understand that you contemplate an informal "Tribute to Bella Dodd" on Friday, June 23d. May I ask you to deliver the following message to your guests assembled:

During the many years that Bella Dodd has appeared in Albany as Representative of the Teachers Union, I know of no one who has given more service and been more effective in behalf of those employed in the school system and education, generally, than has Bella Dodd. She has the regard, respect and confidence of all members of the Legislature, regardless of party.

Sincerely yours,

IRWIN STEINGUT.

THE ASSEMBLY,
STATE OF NEW YORK,
Buffalo, New York, June 3, 1944.

MISS ROSE V. RUSSELL,
c/o Teachers Union,
13 Astor Place, New York 3, New York.

DEAR MISS RUSSELL: I regret exceedingly that I shall be unable to attend the reception in honor of Bella Dodd to be held on Friday evening, June 23rd at Manhattan Center.

I have had the pleasure of knowing Bella Dodd during my long tenure in the Legislature and desire to state that the Teachers Union and education generally will lose a most energetic figure in her retirement as Legislative Representative of the Union.

While not always in accord or agreement with Mrs. Dodd, I always respected her sincerity of purpose as well as her zeal for those things beneficial to the education of our children and the welfare of the teachers.

Please express my regrets to Mrs. Dodd of my inability to be present.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD B. EHRLICH.

THE ASSEMBLY,
STATE OF NEW YORK,
New York, N. Y., June 5, 1944.

TEACHERS UNION,
13 Astor Place, New York 3, N. Y.
(Att. Rose V. Russell.)

DEAR MISS RUSSELL: I was very pleased to note the forthcoming Teachers Union "Tribute to Bella Dodd," who recently left her position as the Union's Legislative Representative.

I have known Dr. Dodd for about seven years. She has the respect of practically every member of the Legislature, be they Democrat, Republican, or American Labor Party. We know her for her sincerity, humaneness and perseverance.

Regardless of political opinions or affiliations, she has earned the respect of us all and we wish her well. I am most happy to say this about Bella Dodd in writing and I would be happier to say the same things about her in person.

Sincerely,

FRED G. MORITT.

THE ASSEMBLY,
STATE OF NEW YORK,
ALBANY, June 20th, 1944.

TEACHERS UNION,
13 Astor Place, New York, N. Y.

Members and Friends of the Teachers Union:

Permit me, on this auspicious occasion, to join in a tribute well merited and attest to my respect and admiration for the inspiring leadership, unswerving loyalty and devotion manifested by Bella Dodd, while serving as the legislative representative of the Teachers Union of the City of New York.

I wish her the utmost of success in her new field of endeavor.

Sincerely,

FRANCIS X. MCGOWAN.

THE ASSEMBLY,
STATE OF NEW YORK,
Albany, June 2, 1944.

MISS ROSE V. RUSSELL,
Teachers' Union, Local 555, SCMWA-CIO,
13 Astor Place, New York 3, N. Y.

DEAR MISS RUSSELL: I have received your communication of May 31, informing me of the Teachers' Union proposed informal "Tribute to Bella Dodd," to be held on Friday evening, June 23, at Manhattan Center.

I greatly appreciate the invitation extended to me to participate in this great tribute to a very noted person who has served the cause of education zealously. Her efforts have contributed to the improvement of our educational facilities and better schools for our youth. She is a great champion in the onward march of democracy and people of all races, creeds, and religion pay honor to her for her leadership and fearless struggle to better the lot of the masses educationally. It was a pleasure to see Bella in action in Albany, as she buttonholed legislator after legislator on the important questions affecting education and State aid for education. She did an excellent job and much credit is due her for the tireless hours, days, and months spent in winning over many of the legislators to a more liberal viewpoint on the subject of education.

I will make every effort to personally appear at this reception to join in paying glowing tribute to a heroine of the home front, one whom I admire and value her friendship. If, because of my campaign for reelection to the legislature, I am unable to attend in person, I will certainly forward a message of tribute to Bella Dodd, to be read at the meeting.

With kind regards and best wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,

HULAN E. JACK.

NEW YORK, N. Y., June 7, 1944.

MISS ROSE V. RUSSELL,
Secretary, Teachers Union, Local 555, SCMWA-CIO,
13 Astor Place, New York 3, N. Y.

DEAR MISS RUSSELL: I am delighted that you are tendering a reception to Bella Dodd. The Teachers Union has gained immeasurably from her leadership these past years, and the school system from her activities. All those interested in improving the schools should be glad to do her honor.

My own contacts with Bella Dodd were many. I found her most sympathetic with every effort to improve school conditions—with the attempts to eliminate oversize classes, to keep playgrounds open all day long and in the summer, to secure permanent teaching positions for substitutes, to work toward an earlier retirement age for classroom teachers, to enlarge the Bureau of Child Guidance, and to restore and expand work in the field of adult education. She and I have fought together continuously for more funds for education from both city and State.

Her primary interest was the children of this city and their welfare, and of course this includes children of every race, creed, and color. She possesses boundless energy and of course can be counted on always to help any social cause. More power to her!

Sincerely yours,

STANLEY M. ISAACS.

THE ASSEMBLY,
STATE OF NEW YORK,
Brooklyn, N. Y., June 22, 1944.

ROSE V. RUSSELL,
c/o Teachers' Union,
13 Astor Place, New York 3, N. Y.

DEAR MISS RUSSELL: Please extend my sincerest and best wishes to Bella Dodd. In the short time that I know Bella Dodd, I have learned to admire her a great deal. In my two years in Albany, I have found her to be a very valuable person to know because she is sincere, honest and possesses all the qualities of an intelligent representative for any group.

Her inspiring leadership in behalf of the Teachers Union has made it possible to defeat many measures which, if passed, would be detrimental to the teachers

of our city and I know that she is responsible for many measures passing the legislature which are beneficial to the teachers and to the children in the public school system.

I sincerely hope that she will be a tremendous success in her new endeavor.

Sincerely,

ALFRED A. LAMA, A. I. A.

THE ASSEMBLY,
STATE OF NEW YORK,
Albany, June 13, 1944.

Miss ROSE V. RUSSELL,
Local 555, SCMWA-CIO.

13 Astor Place, New York City 3, N. Y.

DEAR MISS RUSSELL: I am indeed pleased to know that a reception is being given in honor of Dr. Bella Dodd. I was present several years ago when Dr. Dodd spoke before a group at Cornell University. In my brief remarks I paid tribute to Dr. Dodd for her conscientious work in Albany. At that time I stated that her associates could well be proud of her as she was a splendid person and doing a sincere job. I would like to reiterate these same words upon this occasion.

I am sorry that Dr. Bella Dodd is leaving the work in Albany, but I wish her every success in the future.

Sincerely,

STANLEY C. SHAW.

THE ASSEMBLY,
STATE OF NEW YORK,
New York, N. Y., June 9, 1944.

Miss ROSE V. RUSSELL,
c/o Teachers Union,

13 Astor Place, New York 3, New York.

DEAR MISS RUSSELL: I am happy to send a message in "Tribute to Bella Dodd" who, for a number of years, was the Legislative Representative of the Teachers Union for the State of New York.

It was my pleasure and good fortune to meet her and to work with her during the years she was in Albany. I assure you that the cause of progressive and enlightened social government will lose an able and energetic worker at the Capitol of our State in the retirement or resignation of Mrs. Dodd from her former position. The teachers in particular will lose a most energetic and intelligent worker. The liberal legislators in Albany will miss her.

I trust that in her new work, that she will maintain her interest, not only in improving the educational system in the City and in the State of New York, but that she will continue her interest and activities on behalf of the liberal and progressive legislation and government, in general.

Her advice and counsel to me on legislative matters has been of inestimable benefit.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM T. ANDREWS.

THE ASSEMBLY,
STATE OF NEW YORK,
Albany, June 14, 1944.

Miss ROSE V. RUSSELL,

Teachers Union, 13 Astor Place, New York City.

DEAR MISS RUSSELL: I welcome the opportunity extended to me of joining with the many coworkers of Dr. Bella V. Dodd in their tribute to her.

During the six years that I have represented my district in the Legislative, I have found no one more conscientiously devoted to the welfare of the school system than Dr. Dodd. Her sincerity and good faith were beyond question and for that reason alone she had the respect and esteem of all my fair-minded colleagues.

It is with keen regret that I learned of her decision to relinquish her position as Legislative Representative of the Teachers Union for not only was she your "representative" but she was also a faithful friend to every person interested in a progressive school program.

Cordially yours,

LOUIS BENNETT.

THE ASSEMBLY,
STATE OF NEW YORK,
Albany, June 23, 1944.

MISS BELLA DODD,
Teachers Union, New York City.

DEAR MISS DODD: The interest you have had in the children of this State and their education has always been an inspiration to me and your influence in the Legislature will be felt for years to come. Godspeed to you.

Sincerely,

DANIEL L. BURROWS.

EXHIBIT No. 80

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Saturday, April 29, 19—]

DOUBLE TROUBLE IN ASIA

China and Indo-China are obviously critical areas on the map of ideological conflict in Asia. From both these hot spots comes news of meaningful developments. Christopher Rand's report to this newspaper from Hong Kong on the surprising extent and depth of anti-Communist activity on the Chinese mainland reveals the immense task of digestion still confronting the Communists and their collaborators. In Indo-China, on the other hand, the struggle against communism is impeded by French reluctance to face squarely the fact that the colonial attitude is as out of date in Asia as the dinosaur.

A Saigon dispatch reports that Dao Dai's first prime minister, Nguyen Phan Long, has been obliged to resign because of French displeasure over his insistence that American aid be given directly to Vietnam instead of being funnelled through France. If this is the real and principal reason—and we sincerely hope it is not—then we cannot but regret that the French and the Bao Dai government have so exposed themselves to the Communist tirades that will inevitably follow. To be sure, the Vietnamese are weak, inexperienced, and short of able leaders. For the time being, the military burden is primarily a French responsibility. Yet political factors are equally important. The grant of "independence" to Vietnam will become a mockery in the eyes of the Vietnamese people and the world unless the Bao Dai regime is given at least equal consideration with the French in the expenditure of such American funds and materials as may be made available.

Mr. Rand's story says that a huge part of the Chinese mainland—perhaps half or more—is now beyond the control of the Communist-dominated government. Mr. Rand emphasizes that a major factor in peasant discontent is excessive taxation—mainly in the form of grain levies. There are of course many other causes: floods and famine, conscription, banditry, guerrilla activity, and the Nationalist blockade. In the cities, business stagnation, heavy taxation, and the high-pressure methods employed to dispose of Victory bonds have contributed to anti-Communist feeling.

This is but one side of the China picture. The Communists have their strong side, too, and it will be a long time before it will be possible to draw any sound conclusions on the success or failure of their program. Mr. Rand points out significantly that for the most part the resistance movement is without cohesion or over-all leadership. It is at least evident that the Reds are experiencing plenty of trouble. This hardly squares with the view of those disciples of appeasement who insist that present United States policy—weak though it is—is driving the Chinese people into the arms of the Communists.

EXHIBIT No. 81

THE CURTIS PUBLISHING COMPANY,
Paris, France, April 7, 1950.

Senator MILLARD TYDINGS,
*U. S. Senator from Maryland,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I am writing to you because Owen Lattimore was my house guest during his visit to Moscow in 1936, about which Senator McCarthy has raised questions before your subcommittee. Mr. Lattimore stayed with me

because he was—and is—an old and valued friend whom I had known intimately during my previous ten years in the Far East as correspondent for American newspapers.

There was nothing mysterious about Mr. Lattimore's visit to Moscow; he came there as editor of *Pacific Affairs*, a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations. As you probably know, the Institute was organized into national groups, and the Soviet group was then an active participant.

As I had already worked in Russia for more than two years, I was able to help Mr. Lattimore to meet some Russians. In particular, I introduced him to a Soviet consular official I had met as a reporter, and who had spent some time in Mongolia, a country about which Mr. Lattimore was—and is—the foremost American specialist. This Soviet official (whose name I have forgotten) was very helpful to Mr. Lattimore—as he had been to me—and introduced him to other Russian experts on Mongolia and Central Asia, and guided him through Moscow museums and libraries devoted to these subjects. At that period, the great purges had not yet started in Russia, and it was much easier for Americans to meet Russians than it later became.

Knowing my interest, Mr. Lattimore gave me detailed reports of his meetings with Russians. He was understandably impressed by the extent of Russian material concerning Russo-Chinese border regions—which seem very remote to Americans but are not so remote to Russians.

In a speech on the Senate floor, Senator McCarthy mentioned an affidavit by an unnamed Russian who has reported a conversation in 1936 with a Soviet intelligence officer who boasted that his organization was getting valuable information through the Institute of Pacific Relations, and especially through Mr. Lattimore. This is interesting evidence that the Soviet intelligence organization was as smart as I myself was at the time—because I, too, was getting useful background material for my newspaper articles from the Institute's specialized reports and from conversations with Mr. Lattimore and other Americans working for the Institute.

But perhaps the Soviet intelligence officer mentioned by Senator McCarthy was not quite so smart as he thought, because there is no doubt in my mind that Mr. Lattimore learned considerably more from the Russians during that Moscow visit than they did from him—and this information later became available through Mr. Lattimore to our own intelligence services and to the State Department.

During my many years' friendship with Mr. Lattimore in China, he never showed any special interest in Russia except insofar as the Russians were concerned with Mongolia and Central Asia, his chosen field of research and exploration. To my certain knowledge, Mr. Lattimore devoted almost his entire time during the 1936 Moscow visit to this same specialty. Those were the years when it was popular in the United States to be a "pink," but I never saw even the slightest evidence that Mr. Lattimore was becoming even the mildest form of fellow traveler.

You may use this letter, in whole or in part, in any way you see fit. My own record is available in *Who's Who in America*. I think that my articles in the *Saturday Evening Post* during the war—when it was not popular to be critical of Russia—are sufficient evidence of my personal views about the Soviet system.

Sincerely yours,

DEMAREE BESS,
Associated Editor, The Saturday Evening Post,
2, rue Jean Mermoz, Paris, France.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

ABE FORTAS,

Arnold, Fortas & Porter, 1200 18 St., Northwest:

In 1946 I was the wife of Frederick Vanderbilt Field; I secured an interlocutory decree of divorce from him on April 1, 1949, in San Francisco, California, and this decree was made final on April 12th, 1950; I am not now, nor have I ever been a member of the Communist Party. I am certain that neither Owen Lattimore, nor his wife Eleanor, attended any meetings or any party in our home on West 12th Street, New York City, during the year 1946.

EDITH CHAMBERLAIN FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. S2

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., April 26, 1950.

Mr. ARE FORTAS,

*Arnold, Fortas & Porter, Attorneys at Law,
1200 18th Street NW., Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SIR: I confirm sending you the following telegram today:

"In 1946 I was the wife of Frederick Vanderbilt Field; I secured an interlocutory decree of divorce from him on April 1, 1949, in San Francisco, California, and this decree was made final on April 12th, 1950; I am not now, nor have I ever been, a member of the Communist Party. I am certain that neither Owen Lattimore, nor his wife Eleanor, attended any meetings or any party in our home on West 12th Street, New York City, during the year 1946."

Very truly yours,

EDITH CHAMBERLAIN FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. S3

IN THE MATTER OF DESIDERIU HAMMER, ALIAS JOHN SANTO, RESPONDENT IN
DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS FILE No. A-6002664

[File No. A-6002664, Immigration and Naturalization Service]

[P. 75] LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, called as a witness in behalf of the Government, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

Direct examination by Mr. BOYD:

INSPECTOR PHELAN. You are informed that if you willfully and knowingly give any false testimony in this proceeding, you may be prosecuted for perjury, [p. 76] and the penalty for such offense is imprisonment of not more than 5 years or a fine of \$2,000, or both. Do you understand?

The WITNESS. I understand that fully.

Inspector PHELAN. Will you state your name for the record?

The WITNESS. Louis Francis Budenz.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Mr. Budenz, have you ever been known by, or made use of, any other name or names?—A. No, sir.

Q. Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party, Mr. Budenz?—A. Yes; I have been a member of the national committee.

Q. When did you first become a member of the Communist Party?—A. Member of the Communist Party in 1935 after the People's Front convention.

Q. Where did you join the Communist Party?—A. I joined the Communist Party in New York City.

Q. Were you issued a membership book?—A. Yes; I was, in October 1935, although my first contact with the party was August, in that respect. I had to wait until Earl Browder came back from Moscow to decide just how I would function, whether as an under-cover [p. 77] Communist or open, and it was decided that I should function openly, and then I received a card.

Q. When did you leave the party, Mr. Budenz?—A. 1945.

Q. Why did you leave the party in 1945?

Mr. SACHER. I object to that as incompetent in this proceeding.

Inspector PHELAN. Overruled.

Mr. SACHER. Exception.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Please answer the last question.—A. I left the Communist Party because I learned from experience that it is a fifth column of Soviet Russia, of Soviet dictatorship, and that the Soviet dictatorship plans to dominate the world, specifically aimed against the United States. Also, in this respect, I returned to the Catholic Church, and I found after a long effort to reconcile communism and Catholicism that this was impossible.

Q. Did you hold in positions or offices in the Communist Party? Were you a member of any committees?—A. Yes, sir; I held quite a few positions.

Q. Would you name them?—A. I was a member of the national committee for 6 years of my membership. I was labor editor of the Daily [p. 78] Worker

from 1936, we will say, until late 1937 when I was appointed editor of the Midwest Daily Record, a Communist-controlled and -created paper, but supposedly an organ of the People's Front. That was in Chicago. In 1940 I became president of the Freedom of the Press Co., Inc., which was created by the Communist Party during the Hitler-Stalin pact as a defense measure, and shortly thereafter I became managing editor of the Daily Worker. I was in supervisory charge of the Daily Worker, in other words, from 1940 on. I also have been a member, without being able to give from memory the dates, of the State committee, the national trade-union committee, the State trade-union committee, the Illinois State committee, and some other offices of that character.

Q. These are all organizations of the Communist Party, these committees?—A. Those are the State committees or national committees of the Communist Party, and the trade-union commissions are the trade-union commissions of the Communist Party at the time I served on them.

Q. Is the Daily Worker an official publication of the Communist Party?—A. The Daily Worker is the official organ of the [p. 79] Communist Party for popular uses, although from time to time it has denied that capacity. It is, nevertheless, the official organ.

Q. Was this paper in any way subsidized by the Red International or the Communist Party in Russia?—A. The Daily Worker was subsidized by the Soviet Union for a number of years.

Mr. SACHER. I move to strike that out as representing nothing more than the conclusion of this witness for which there appears to be no foundation of the evidence.

Inspector PHELAN. Sustained.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. You were the editor of the Daily Worker; is that correct?—A. I was the managing editor of the Daily Worker.

Q. Was the paper in any way subsidized while you were the managing editor, to your own personal knowledge?

Mr. SACHER. Subsidized by whom? You cannot just have a vacuum.

Mr. BOYD. I asked him.

Mr. SACHER. I object to that on the ground that the witness has shown no foundation for such a conclusion.

Inspector PHELAN. Well, I take it it is a [p. 80] preliminary question.

Mr. SACHER. I do not care whether it is preliminary or not. The word "subsidize" comprehends a conclusion. I object to it and move to strike it out.

Inspector PHELAN. Denied.

Mr. SACHER. Exception.

The WITNESS. It was subsidized by the Runag News Agency, owned by the Soviet Government.

Mr. SACHER. I move to strike that out, Mr. Inspector, on the ground that there is no evidence in the record under which that conclusion is based.

Inspector PHELAN. I shall deny it at the moment, subject to it being connected up as the matter proceeds.

Mr. SACHER. I note an exception to that, Mr. Inspector.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. In what manner was the Daily Worker subsidized by the Runag News Agency?

Mr. SACHER. I object to that, unless the witness has evidence of the basis on which he could arrive at that conclusion.

The WITNESS. I have that.

Mr. SACHER. I suggest, therefore, Mr. Inspector, that the witness be required to state first the basis of his knowledge.

[P. 81] The WITNESS. The basis of my knowledge is the records of the United States Department of Justice under Attorney General Francis Biddle and, secondly—

Mr. SACHER. Just a moment, please. Mr. Presiding Inspector, I ask that you admonish the witness, when counsel objects, to please withhold his comment.

The WITNESS. I shall be delighted, Counselor.

Mr. SACHER. I move to strike out that answer of the witness, on the ground that the so-called records of the Attorney General of the Department of Justice are the best evidence of the facts, and not the statements by this witness, if that be the basis.

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel's objection is good. Sustained.
Mr. BOYD. I would like to ask the previous question.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. In what way was the Daily Worker subsidized by this Russian-controlled paper?

Inspector PHELAN. Speak only of your own personal knowledge that you have, in answering.

A. This is personal knowledge as president of Freedom of the Press Co.

Inspector PHELAN. Proceed.

The WITNESS. As a member of the editorial board.

[P. 82] Inspector PHELAN. Proceed.

The WITNESS. The Daily Worker for a number of years received free of charge hundreds of thousands of words from Moscow, which every newspaperman knows is about 13 to 15 cents per word. The Daily Worker was asked, consequently, and the Communist Party, to file as a foreign agent as a result of this. As a matter of fact, the decision was made that Earl Browder file as a foreign agent.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Was this news furnished to any other paper in the United States?—

A. Not immediately. Later on, when Attorney General Biddle ruled that this had to be registered for, a new organization was created which carried on the same activity. That also was ruled to be a foreign agent. They then sought to sell to other agencies, but the Daily Worker continued to get for a very small sum this information.

Mr. SACHER. In other words, do I understand correctly that the Daily Worker paid for the news service which it got from this Runag News Co.? Is that the witness' testimony?

The WITNESS. No, sir; it didn't.

Mr. SACHER. Didn't pay anything?

The WITNESS. It may have paid a small sum.

[P. 83] Mr. SACHER. That, to me, seems the best evidence of the fact that he does not know what he is talking about. First he says they did not pay, then they paid a small amount. Now he says they may not have paid. Which of the three alternatives is this witness' testimony to be?

Mr. BOYD. Mr. Presiding Inspector, may I ask that you admonish counsel that he refrain from asking this witness questions and commenting on his testimony until the proper time? He will be afforded an opportunity of cross-examining the witness.

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel, I believe we should proceed here subject to your objection to each individual question. If the matter is not ultimately connected up, it will be subject to a motion to strike on that account.

Mr. SACHER. In the interests of expedition, I will go along with you.

The WITNESS. The reason I stated that was that the policies changed from time to time, very small nominal payments being made; so much so that it was ruled that this was a foreign agency and would have to register as such.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Are you acquainted with the Trade Union Unity League?—[P. 84] A. Yes. It was just being dissolved when I joined the party, but I knew of it as a non-Communist.

Q. Mr. Budenz, have you ever been called upon to address Communist meetings?—A. Yes, sir; great numbers, all over the country.

Q. Do you care to state some of the occasions on which you have addressed Communist meetings?

Mr. SACHER. Just a moment. I object to this on the ground that it is immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent in this proceeding.

Inspector PHELAN. What do you propose to show?

Mr. BOYD. I propose to show this man's authority on communism, that he addressed meetings from time to time on the subject.

Mr. SACHER. Mr. Inspector, I just want to say that a lot of ignoramuses have addressed meetings on a lot of questions and one does not prove his authority by the fact that he speaks about something. As a matter of fact, regrettably there are too many people who talk about things they know nothing about.

Inspector PHELAN. I suggest that the witness be asked what various assignments he had in connection with the party as a foundation for possibly qualifying him as an expert, as I understand you propose to do.

[P. 85] Mr. BOYD. I believe the witness has pretty well covered that.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Mr. Budenz, do you know whether or not the Communist Party of the United States of America advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence?

Mr. SACHER. Just a moment. I object to that question on the ground that the witness' qualifications for such a conclusion have not been established.

Inspector PHELAN. Overruled.

Mr. SACHER. I respectfully except.

The WITNESS. The Communist Party with its basic platform of Marxism and Leninism stands for the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence. Of course, it is a fifth column of Soviet Russia.

Mr. SACHER. Just a moment. I move to strike everything out after that first sentence of his as being not responsive. He was asked only one question.

Mr. BOYD. If the presiding inspector please, it is responsive and the witness has a right to complete his answer.

Inspector PHELAN. Read the question, please.

(Question read by reporter.)

[P. 86] Mr. SACHER. The answer to that is either "Yes" or "No."

Mr. BOYD. Not necessarily at all.

Mr. SACHER. I submit that everything beyond the word "Yes" be stricken out.

Inspector PHELAN. Answer "Yes" or "No" and then you may explain your answer.

The WITNESS. To the same question?

Mr. SACHER. Just a moment, please. I respectfully suggest that, if you either rule or you do not rule, either you say that the witness must testify "Yes" or "No" and that is the answer to the question and then let another question be placed, the propriety of which we can test, or else say you overrule me. I want to know what you are doing. Are you ruling that the witness must now in response to that question answer "Yes" or "No," or aren't you so ruling? Let us get through with that first.

Inspector PHELAN. What I am ruling is that he must answer "Yes" or "No," but he is at liberty to explain it. I think that is a proper answer.

Mr. SACHER. No; I don't think, Mr. Inspector, that that is proper at all according to court procedure. If the appropriate answer to a question is either "Yes" or "No," then I respectfully urge that you rule that the witness answer yes or no and then, after he answers, let counsel [p. 87] put whatever question he deems appropriate to elicit anything else that he wishes in addition to that.

Inspector PHELAN. I shall overrule that objection and you may have an exception.

Mr. SACHER. Thank you.

INSPECTOR. Read the last question, please.

(The reporter read the question, as follows:)

"Mr. Budenz, do you know whether or not the Communist Party of the United States of America advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence?"

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Will you please answer yes or no to that question and then qualify your answer as you see fit?—A. Yes; it does. That is the basic—

Mr. SACHER. Your Honor, I have another objection to make, and that is this, and that goes to the basis of these charges: The question that counsel now puts to the witness is as to present advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government. I invite your attention to the fact that the charges, the amended charges as lodged yesterday, all read in the past. I call your attention to the following: It says, "Upon the basis of this evidence, the Government proposes to lodge the following additional charges as additional grounds to the [p. 88] deportation of Santo, to wit: The act of October 16, 1918, as amended, in that he is found to have been, after entry, a member of the following class set forth in section 1 of said act: an alien who was a member of and affiliated with the following organizations, associations, societies, and groups, to wit: the Communist Party of the United States of America and the Trade Union Unity League, which organizations advised, advocated, and taught the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the United States," et cetera.

I therefore respectfully submit that, in view of the fact that the charges here are that the two allegedly prescribed organizations acted in these respects in the past, that this question is utterly immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent in

this proceeding, as the charges now stand, for the question under attack is one which addresses itself to a present advocacy.

Mr. BOYD. I think my next question will answer that objection.

Mr. SACHER. Let us not do that. Let us get to what the charges are. I think it would be nice if we could try the charges first and then try what is in the imagination of counsel some other time, but let's try these charges now. That is what I urge, and I [p. 89] respectfully ask for a ruling at the hands of the inspector on this specific question and move to strike out the witness' answer.

Inspector PHELAN. The objection is overruled, again subject to a motion to strike if it is not ultimately connected up with the issues in this case.

Mr. SACHER. But the only issue, Mr. Presiding Inspector, is whether these allegedly prescribed organizations did these things in the past, and this question addresses itself exclusively to the present. Now, it seems to me that, if we are still practicing in American courts, that we ought to distinguish between past and present, you see.

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel, I doubt that any single question can be asked on any of these subjects which would cover the particular type of issue that you speak of. I think this is all preliminary. I think all of us understand that and we will expedite things.

Mr. SACHER. Let us get some things through my head, anyway. I want to know, and I emphasized it yesterday, what it is that we are going to try. Now, the very essence of due process is that an accused, and not only an accused, but any litigant should know what specific charges he is being called upon to answer in a judicial [p. 90] proceeding. All I am asking here is, in view of the fact that the language of these amended charges is so clear in the casting of these events in the past, that it be limited to the past and not to the present.

Now, frankly, I must say that I cannot see where you or anyone else can possibly find any fault with that insistence. If you were prosecuting the case or defending it, I cannot imagine that you would be willing to go along on the theory that a client which charges something in the past justifies an incorporation as to the events of the present. That is all there is to my argument. I want due process; that is all.

Inspector PHELAN. The objection is overruled. If counsel fails to connect it up, I will have it stricken.

Mr. SACHER. Exception.

By Mr. BOYD.

Q. Mr. Budenz, did the Communist Party of the United States advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence for the entire period that you were a member; that is, from 1935 until 1945?—A. Basically it did; yes. The Communist Party in that respect——

Mr. SACHER. Just a moment. The witness has answered. I object to any further elaboration.

Mr. BOYD. He certainly is entitled to qualify his [p. 91] answer.

Mr. SACHER. Is he going to qualify it in the sense of detracting from it or limiting it, or what, or is he just going to elaborate on it? What is the witness going to do?

Inspector PHELAN. The objection is overruled.

Mr. SACHER. Exception.

The WITNESS. How was the wording? I want to continue my sentence. The basic principle is Marxism and Leninism, which is this thing we have been speaking of, but this is from time to time blurred by the fact that the Communist Party is a fifth column of Soviet Russia.

Mr. SACHER. Now I move to strike that out as not responsive, Mr. Inspector. It represents conclusions of the witness which have no foundation in the evidence.

Mr. BOYD. Mr. Inspector, I am going to ask you to admonish counsel to let the witness complete his answer and then, if he wishes to make an objection, in the right manner to do so.

Mr. SACHER. No, sir; not when this witness undertakes with your aid and assistance to violate proper rules of evidence. I will not succumb to any such admonition if it should be made, and I am going to interrupt every time the witness violates the law here. I ask for a ruling, Mr. Inspector, on that sentence.

[P. 92] Inspector PHELAN. I think counsel is entitled to object in the course of an answer. However, again I shall overrule this objection.

Mr. BOYD. Would you read the answer, please?

Mr. SACHER. I respectfully except.

(The reporter read the answer, as follows:)

"A. Basically it did; yes. The Communist Party in that respect—".

The WITNESS. And never departs in any way from the policies laid down by the Kremlin in Moscow. The Communist official records prove that. The Communist Party resolutions prove that. The Communist press proves that. No Communist can show at any time a deviation in one small iota of the Communist press or the Communist Party in the United States from the order sent out from the Kremlin in Moscow by official statements. In the declarations by Soviet leaders are the policies laid down by the Moscow government.

Mr. SACHER. I now move to strike all of that effusion from the record, on the ground that it is not responsive to the question.

Inspector PHELAN. Denied.

Mr. SACHER. Exception.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Did you, as the editor of the Daily Worker, [p. 93] receive instructions from Moscow in the form of news releases?

Mr. SACHER. Now, just a moment. I object to that question on the ground that it calls for the witness' conclusions. If he wishes to produce news releases and then argue to you, Mr. Inspector, that in those news releases are contained instructions, then we shall deal with the competency of that when we reach it, but this question suffers from the double vice of first asking for the contents of written documents which are not offered in evidence and whose failure to present in evidence is not justified and, second, asks for the conclusion of the witness as to what the nature, not merely the contents, but what the nature of the contents of those documents is. On that twofold ground I object to the question as immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent.

Inspector PHELAN. Will you read the question, please?

(The reporter read the question, as follows:)

"Q. Did you, as the editor of the Daily Worker, receive instructions from Moscow, in the form of news releases?"

Inspector PHELAN. The objection is overruled.

Mr. SACHER. You know, once in a while, Mr. Inspector, I would really like to hear a reason why [p. 94] you overrule, apart from the fact that maybe you have been instructed to do so.

Inspector PHELAN. I think occasionally I have stated reasons. I do not feel that I should in every instance. We would be here too long. Proceed.

Mr. SACHER. Exception.

The WITNESS. Yes, sir; every news release from Moscow is an instruction and also the various statements of the Soviet leaders contained in the publications of the Communist International and the other publications received from Moscow. That is recognized by the political committee of the Communist Party. That is a recognized procedure.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Were you a member of the political committee of the Communist Party?—

A. No, sir; not the political committee; that is the executive committee of the national committee. I was a member of the national committee, though not too often, but occasionally I sat in political committee meetings.

Q. Is the national committee of the Communist Party the higher governing body of the Communist Party in the United States, or was it at the time that you were a member?—A. Well, technically in the Communist Party you always have to distinguish between the set-up and the fact, but [p. 95] technically the national committee is the governing body in between conventions. The political committee is the one that makes the decision in between sessions of the national committee, but these decisions are never in conflict with the decisions of Moscow.

Q. How were you appointed to this committee?—A. National committee?

Q. Yes; by whom? Were you elected? In what way did you become a member?—A. Well, there is a slate chosen which is never defeated.

Mr. SACHER. I move to strike that out as not responsive. He was either elected or appointed. Now, which way were you designated to that?

The WITNESS. It appears both, in the Communist movement.

Mr. SACHER. Which way were you elected?

Mr. BOYD. Just a moment, please. If you have any cross-examination, you put it in at the proper time.

Mr. SACHER. Believe me it will be proper when it comes, but in the meantime let this man answer your questions responsively.

The WITNESS. Is counsel intimidating me, Mr. Examiner?

Mr. BOYD. He is trying to but he is not making much—

[P. 96] Mr. FANELLI. I move to strike that from the record, Mr. Presiding Inspector.

Inspector PHELAN. What is the answer to the question?

(The reporter read the answer, as follows:)

"A. Well, there is a slate chosen which is never defeated."

Mr. SACHER. Will you act on Mr. Fanelli's motion to strike counsel's statement from the record?

Inspector PHELAN. I have an objection that preceded that which I have not ruled on yet.

(The reporter read the previous question and answer, as follows:)

"Q. Yes, by whom? Were you elected? In what way did you become a member?—A. Well, there is a slate chosen which is never defeated."

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. By whom is this slate chosen?—A. This slate is chosen by the inner corps of the political committee.

Q. How is it acted on? By whom?

Mr. FANELLI. Did you rule, Mr. Examiner?

The WITNESS. Excuse me.

Mr. SACHER. It seems that counsel ignores you as well as the witness. Now, someone ought to have some [p. 97] respect for the inspector. It should not be limited to the respondent alone.

Inspector PHELAN. Like the answer to which the objection was directed. Proceed.

Mr. SACHER. Will you also say like the statement of counsel?

Inspector PHELAN. I didn't hear that statement.

Mr. SACHER. Well, it is on the record. He made a statement that I am trying to intimidate this witness, and Mr. Fanelli moved to strike it from the record.

Mr. FANELLI. It is not justified by anything that has occurred this morning.

Inspector PHELAN. Strike it from the record. Proceed.

The WITNESS. Where are we, Mr. Inspector?

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Do you know whether or not counsel is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. SACHER. You are beginning to hit below the belt.

Mr. BOYD. I am not.

Mr. SACHER. I object, Your Honor, to—this witness will swear his mother away. I object to that as immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent in this proceeding.

[P. 98] Inspector PHELAN. Sustained.

Mr. BOYD. Mr. Presiding Inspector—

Mr. SACHER. That is foulest, dirtiest thing I have ever seen from any lawyer in almost 25 years.

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel, the objection has been sustained.

Mr. BOYD. One of the charges is that this man has been affiliated—

Mr. SACHER. Just a moment. I object to any statements by counsel, and I warn him now, if you open your mouth you will have a suit for slander on your hands before this day is over. Now just get that straight, and I warn you also that the laws of criminal libel in this State are such as to embrace any false statements that you make in the presence of newspapermen when you are on notice that your statements will be published in the press.

Now, with that notice, I warn you I will pursue you civilly and criminally if you dare to utter or imply a word of slander against me.

Inspector PHELAN. The objection has been sustained. Proceed.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Do you know whether or not John Santo is or was a member of the Communist Party?

[P. 99] Mr. SACHER. I object to that question on the ground that the witness has not been qualified to give any such testimony.

Inspector PHELAN. The objection is overruled.

Mr. SACHER. Exception.

The WITNESS. I know that John Santo was, while I was a member of the Communist Party, a member likewise of the Communist Party. We were comrades in the Communist Party.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Did you ever attend any meetings of the Communist Party, the membership of which was limited to Communist members only, at which John Santo was present?—A. Oh, yes.

Q. When you referred to John Santo, to whom are you referring? If he is in this room, will you please identify him?—A. the gentleman there between Comrade Quill—

Mr. SACHER. I move to strike that out. You foul-mouth! Why do you refer to him as comrade? You claim you aren't a comrade now. Why do you refer to anyone like that now?

The WITNESS. Mr. Quill.

Mr. SACHER. That is better. Don't carry the Judas kiss in this place.

[P. 100] Mr. BOYD. Now please.

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel, I have stricken it. Proceed.

Mr. SACHER. I ask that the witness be admonished to desist from such conduct in the future.

Mr. BOYD. And that counsel be admonished not to intimidate this witness.

Mr. SACHER. Every time he is caught, he is being intimidated.

Inspector PHELAN. Proceed.

(The reporter read the last question.)

Inspector PHELAN. Let me interfere here. The witness in referring to Mr. Santo will use the word "respondent," and in referring to counsel will use the word "counsel." In speaking of others, I desire that he mention them by name only.

Mr. SACHER. Prefixed only by the word "Mr."?

Inspector PHELAN. Correct.

The WITNESS. Gladly. Mr. Santo is sitting right opposite me in a blue-serge suit.

Mr. BOYD. Does the record show satisfactorily that the witness has identified—

Mr. SACHER. He has identified Santo. He was taken around to see him outside the building before the hearing.

[P. 101] Mr. BOYD. I object to such a statement and ask that it be stricken.

Mr. SACHER. I am making a concession. If you do not want it, do not take it.

Mr. BOYD. I ask that part of the answer wherein he stated—

Mr. SACHER. That is the concession. If you are not satisfied with it, go ahead and have the witness walk around and put his hand on Santo's head.

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel, I think if we would take a calmer attitude we will get along faster.

Mr. FANELLI. Could we have a 5-minute recess?

(A short recess was taken.)

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel, we are here trying two basic issues of the fact. One of them is an allegation that the respondent was connected with certain organizations; the other involves the doctrines or teachings or character of those organizations. I am addressing counsel for both sides. We are not trying the conduct of any other person here as far as I am informed. This hearing is not subject to the strict rules of evidence that are applied by the courts. I personally am interested in just getting these facts.

I hope that all concerned will confine themselves to that. Counsel for both sides will necessarily be [p. 102] allowed considerable latitude in the questions that they may ask any witness. I see no escape from that in this type of a proceeding. I think, if those matters are borne in mind, that we can carry this hearing on in a more expeditious manner and probably in the end get closer to a proper record and result. Proceed.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Now, Mr. Budenz, you testified that the Communist Party of the United States has advocated the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence. Just how did they propose to bring that about?—A. By the armed insurrection of a minority group. That is Leninism.

Mr. SACHER. Can the witness say how small a minority is envisaged?

Mr. BOYD. You may bring that out in cross-examination, counsel.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Did the Communist Party of the United States of America distribute literature in the United States?—A. Oh, extensively; yes, sir; distributed literature extensively in all parts of the United States.

Q. Did they have a literature department?—A. They have several literature departments.

Q. Are you familiar with the literature which they [p. 103] distributed?—A. With considerable issues: yes.

Mr. BOYD. Mr. Presiding Inspector, I have some pamphlets and books here that I would like to have marked for identification.

Inspector PHELAN. Very well. I observe that in the prior hearing there were 14 exhibits offered in evidence in rotation, without designating whether they were Government's exhibits or respondent's exhibits. If counsel are agreeable, we shall start marking future Government's exhibits as "Government Exhibit 15." As to defense exhibits, we can either start with "Respondent Exhibit 1" or—

Mr. SACHER. Letter them, perhaps.

Inspector PHELAN. That will be excellent.

Mr. SACHER. That is agreeable.

Mr. BOYD. All right.

Inspector PHELAN. These are being marked at this time, for identification only, "15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26."

(Whereupon the pamphlets and books above referred to were marked "Government's Exhibits 15 to 26" for identification.)

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Handing you what is marked "Government's Exhibit 15" for identification, will you please state what it is and whether or not you are familiar with it [handing same to witness].—[p. 104] A. State and Revolution, by V. I. Lenin, International Publishers, New York. I am familiar with that.

Q. Do you know whether or not that pamphlet, marked "Government's Exhibit 15," entitled "State and Revolution," was displayed and offered for sale by the Communist Party of the United States of America?

Mr. SACHER. Just a moment. I object to this unless a connection between this organization and the specific sales is established. Otherwise, it represents the witness' conclusion without any substantiating evidence.

Inspector PHELAN. Overruled.

Mr. SACHER. Exception.

The WITNESS. Yes; this is distributed widely by the Communist Party in one form or another. It is in book form, too, in addition to this pamphlet. The International Publishers are an outlet for the Communist Party, owned and controlled by the Communist Party.

Mr. SACHER. I object to that, Mr. Inspector, and I wish to point out that, if the title to a mongrel dog was involved in a \$2 lawsuit, a witness would not be permitted to testify that the dog was owned by one or another of the parties; and I therefore move to strike from the record this witness' testimony [p. 105] as to the ownership of the book publishers of Government's exhibit 15.

Inspector PHELAN. Does the document show who issued it?

Mr. SACHER. Yes; the International Publishers. That is all it shows, according to the witness.

Inspector PHELAN. The witness may answer and state how he knows the facts of ownership.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Mr. Budenz, you have testified that the International Publishers are owned and controlled by the Communist Party. Will you state how you know that fact?—A. I know it from decision and discussions in the political committee and the national committee, and the fact that representatives of the International Publishers, as part of the party apparatus, appear at every Communist Party convention and urge the sale of this literature as Communist literature, and the International Publishers is a Communist outlet, a Communist organization.

Mr. Trachtenberg, who is the representative of the International Publishers, has been many times a member of the national committee of the Communist Party and also appears at every convention of the Communist Party in that capacity. That is, as a representative of a Communist book firm.

[P. 106] Mr. SACHER. Mr. Inspector, I respectfully submit that, if that constitutes the entire basis for the witness' statement in regard to ownership, that it does not support the conclusion and that the statement in regard to ownership should be struck from the record.

In that connection, I would like to point out that there probably isn't a book publisher in America or a newspaper publisher in America who is not a member of some political party and who either directly or indirectly attends, participates,

or controls political parties and is in turn controlled by political parties, and yet no one would assume to say that any of these publications is owned by those political organizations.

On that basis, I move to strike the statement in regard to ownership from the record.

Inspector PHELAN. Denied.

Mr. SACHER. What is the ruling?

Inspector PHELAN. Denied.

Mr. SACHER. Exception.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Have you personally seen these documents offered for sale, this document offered for sale at Communist Party meetings?—[P. 107] A. Oh, many, many times. This is a standard Communist work which is constantly distributed.

Q. Does the Communist Party have literature agents?—A. In the branches they have literature agents. They also have a literature department in State organizations, and each section of the party which feeds the literature to the branches.

Q. What are the functions of these literature departments and literature agents of the Communist Party?—A. To distribute, by sale, books of this character, pamphlets of this character.

Q. Is this one of the books that was distributed by the Communist Party through its literature department?—A. That is one of those most extensively distributed and most constantly distributed.

Mr. BOYD. I am now offering in evidence Government's Exhibit 15, State and Revolution.

Mr. SACHER. Look; I just want to suggest this. You have there exhibits running from 15 to 26.

Mr. BOYD. Would you like me to offer them all at once?

Mr. SACHER. To save time. You make an over-all offer, and I will make my objections accordingly.

Mr. BOYD. All right.

By Mr. BOYD:

[P. 108] Q. I hand you what is marked "Government's Exhibit 16" for identification, and ask you what it is and whether you are familiar with it [handing same to witness].—A. The Communist Manifesto, by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.

Q. By whom was it published?—A. International Publishers again.

Q. Are you familiar with this?

Mr. SACHER. Why don't we also get a concession that it will be testified that he is familiar with the contents of all of these documents, that he will also testify in regard to each of these subsequent documents substantially the same as he testified in regard to Government's exhibit 15 for identification, and we can save the time then.

Mr. BOYD. If you wish to make a stipulation to that effect, the Government is agreeable.

Inspector PHELAN. I think that is advisable.

Mr. BOYD. Will you put that in the form of a stipulation?

Mr. SACHER. It is stipulated that the witness' testimony in regard to Government's exhibits 16 to 26, both inclusive, will be substantially the same as his testimony in regard to Government's exhibit 15 for identification.

[P. 109] Inspector PHELAN. That is as to—

Mr. SACHER. His familiarity, the contents, the sale, the distribution.

Inspector PHELAN. And the origin.

Mr. SACHER. And the origin.

Mr. BOYD. There is this about it, however. These books are not all published by the same publishers.

Mr. SACHER. The books themselves will show that.

Mr. FANELLI. Let's make sure that is agreeable to the witness.

Mr. SACHER. I do not care about the witness.

Inspector PHELAN. I think he should look at all of them and see if he is familiar with them.

THE WITNESS. I think a couple of these may not have been during the time I was a member of the Communist Party. I would like to qualify the knowledge I have of them.

Mr. SACHER. You probably won't.

The WITNESS. The program of the Communist International, together with the Status of the Communist International, copyright 1929. That was before I was a member of the Communist Party, published by the Workers' Library Publishers. I am familiar with it and know that it was distributed by the Communist Party.

Mr. SACHER. Well, if there is any one you are not [p. 110] familiar with or that was not distributed, tell us that, because we are stipulating. That is why we are stipulating that you would testify.

The WITNESS. Well, there is a slight difference.

Inspector PHELAN. May I ask a question?

The WITNESS. I want to be exact.

Inspector PHELAN. Were all of these documents distributed by the party, to your own knowledge, during the time that you were connected with that organization?

The WITNESS. Yes; some of these were not distributed in as large a measure because, for instance, these resolutions of the Sixth World Congress, while still available to Communists while I was there and accessible to their schools, was not as widely distributed as some other documents. That is the only qualification I would make.

Inspector PHELAN. Are counsel ready to enter into that stipulation?

Mr. SACHER. Yes; that he would so testify.

Inspector PHELAN. What is the stipulation for the record, please?

(Stipulation read.)

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel, is that satisfactory?

Mr. BOYD. It is satisfactory to the Government.

Inspector PHELAN. Proceed.

[P. 111] Mr. BOYD. I now offer in evidence Government exhibits 15 and 26, inclusive.

Mr. SACHER. I object to those exhibits, Mr. Inspector, on the ground that they are immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent, not binding upon the respondent, and have no probative force or value in this proceeding.

Inspector PHELAN. Overruled.

Mr. SACHER. Exception.

(Whereupon Government's exhibits 15 to 26, inclusive, heretofore marked for identification, were received in evidence.)

Mr. SACHER. Can't we have copies?

Mr. BOYD. I am sorry; there are none.

Inspector PHELAN. Is there any objection to loaning them to counsel after they are in the record here?

Mr. BOYD. I see no objection.

Mr. SACHER. Can we have them over the week end?

Mr. BOYD. Providing they are available to us at the hearing at all times.

Mr. SACHER. Oh, sure.

Mr. FANELLI. Mr. Presiding Inspector, may I ask, in view of the fact particularly that I am ordinarily in Washington and Mr. Sacher is ordinarily in New York and we are preparing this case together, I [p. 112] would ask counsel at least to check insofar as there may be some extra copies of that around the place; we would like to borrow them.

Mr. BOYD. I will be glad to loan you duplicates of any of those books we have.

Inspector PHELAN. Proceed.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Mr. Budenz, you mentioned the fact, or referred to schools. Did the Communist Party of the United States of America conduct schools in the United States?—A. Yes; it conducted several characters of schools.

Q. Tell us about them.—A. Originally they had the workers' school all throughout the country. They were open schools, open in the sense that they invited members of the party in general and also those who were sympathetic or even those whom they wanted to win to the party to attend these workers' schools. Later these workers' schools were all changed over, being given specific names like Jefferson School in New York and Lincoln School in Chicago and the like. That was during the Browder period in part. Then, in addition to that, though, they also had the secret schools; that is, the national training school, the State training school, and the section training school. Those were secret schools for members of the party only, those being trained to be [p. 113] leaders in the party; and they were held at various camps and places like that, so they had several different characters of schools.

Q. Did they use textbooks at these schools?—A. Yes; they used textbooks. That is, they used different literature from time to time.

Q. Did they use any of this literature here at those schools?

Mr. SACHER. Now, just one moment. I am going to ask that the witness be required to state whether he knows which of the proposed—I take it these are other exhibits, Mr. Boyd.

Mr. BOYD. The same ones.

Mr. SACHER. If it is the same ones, I am going to ask that the witness be required to state in which of the many schools he has mentioned here he can say that any or all of the exhibits have been or are being used. I am going to object to an omnibus statement in this case.

Inspector PHELAN. What is the question?

(The reporter read the question.)

Inspector PHELAN. The objection is overruled. Let the witness examine the exhibits and state which, if any of them, he knows were used in such schools.

Mr. FANELLI. And which schools.

Mr. SACHER. Is that right?

[P. 114] The WITNESS. That is right.

Mr. SACHER. May I suggest that the witness refer to the publication by exhibit number so that when we get to read the record we can see what it is?

Inspector PHELAN. That would be helpful.

The WITNESS. Government's exhibit 22 was used in both schools.

Inspector PHELAN. Which schools?

The WITNESS. Well, in all of the schools in one form or another.

Inspector PHELAN. You refer to both types of schools, then?

The WITNESS. That is right. That is, under Marxism and Leninism it was used. This was used as auxiliary reading. Government's exhibit 20, used as auxiliary reading in all schools. In courses on Marxism and Leninism, wherever they were held, this was referred to all schools, Government's exhibit 16.

Mr. SACHER. Why don't you take a quick glance at them? If your answer is "all schools," just put it in.

Mr. BOYD. Take your time in perusing the exhibits.

The WITNESS. Government's exhibit 26, well, at least, was referred to in all schools and used in the schools of the party proper. That is what I call the [p. 115] national training and district schools.

This likewise, which is a companion piece, Government's exhibit 23, was used in the same capacity as reading matter for the schools in general, as I recall, but as a textbook in Marxism and Leninism in the national training school and the section school.

Government's exhibit 25 was used during my very early part of the party, and I am not sure that it was used in the party schools.

Government's exhibit 24 was used as a side reference, at least, though not as a textbook proper, mostly in the party schools. This [indicating exhibit 25] was practically not used at all during my membership in the party in the general schools.

That was the case likewise with Government's exhibit 17.

I have no knowledge of Government's exhibit 19 being used in the schools.

I have no knowledge of Government's exhibit 21 being used in the schools, although reference to it was made because it was a document of the party, but not as a textbook, certainly.

Government's exhibit 18 was used only as auxiliary reading in the schools in both, but particularly in the party schools. This was for popular distribution, [p. 116] however, rather than for school work.

And this is a standard book for the schools in Marxism and Leninism, Government's exhibit 15.

Inspector PHELAN. Were those books sold to the students in these two types of schools or furnished in connection with the courses of study?

The WITNESS. They were sold to the students; yes.

Inspector PHELAN. Proceed.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Were what is marked "Government's Exhibits 16 to 26, inclusive"—A. Just a moment. There is a variation here, by the way, that you should bear in mind. That is, when the Jefferson School came into existence, there was a course in Marxism presented there which may not have used all of these documents. I can say, though, that there was used Government's exhibit 26, Government's exhibit 15, Government's exhibit 23, Government's exhibit 16, Government's exhibit 22.

Inspector PHELAN. When did that school come into existence?

Mr. FANELLI. Which school?

The WITNESS. The Jefferson School as distinct from the Workers School. Well, let me try to recall. It was approximately, though the date may have to be changed exactly, approximately 1941, 1940—may be a [p. 117] little later.

Inspector PHELAN. Did the school operate locally in New York City?

The WITNESS. There had been workers schools through different cities of the United States. They were done away with, and in their place were established other local schools which had different names. That was under Browder's leadership. These schools were the Samuel Adams School in Boston, the Jefferson School in New York, the Lincoln School in Chicago, and some other schools. Those are the ones that I recall.

Inspector PHELAN. Were those schools open to the public in the sense that the party was inviting people in to take the instruction which the schools offered?

The WITNESS. Oh, yes; those were open schools. They had open public offices. The other schools, the national training school and the State training school and the section training schools, were secret; that is to say, it was restricted to people chosen by the officials of the party and held without any label or address or anything like that. They were generally held at some camp when the camp season was over with. Those were for training leadership in the party.

Inspector PHELAN. How widely distributed was the other type of school? You spoke of Boston and New York [p. 118], I believe. Were there other schools throughout the United States?

The WITNESS. Yes; in certain cities throughout the United States. I just cannot recall their names now or locations, but there were others.

Inspector PHELAN. Proceed, Counsel.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Do you know whether or not they taught the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence at these schools to which you have made reference?—A. Yes, sir.

Mr. FANELLI. Could we have that question repeated?

(The reporter read the question.)

Mr. FANELLI. I just do not understand the question, Mr. Inspector. Could it be rephrased? I do not know what "taught the overthrow" means.

Mr. SACHER. Taught.

Mr. FANELLI. Oh, I misunderstood.

Mr. SACHER. That being the case, I object to the question as calling for the most ridiculous of conclusions.

Inspector PHELAN. I will sustain that and I will ask the question.

Did you at any time have any connection with the [p. 119] management of any of these schools, either the schools inside the party or the schools that were open to the public?

The WITNESS. As a member of the State committee I passed on their curricula several times; as a member of the national committee on the curricula.

Inspector PHELAN. What governing body of the organization—

Mr. SACHER. May I suggest that you ask him what might appear in the curricula that would indicate that they teach the overthrow of the Government?

Inspector PHELAN. I was leading up to that, Counsel.

What governing body of the organization was responsible for the over-all direction of these two types of schools?

The WITNESS. Well, the national committee was generally responsible for them all. The State committees were responsible for the schools in their own localities. Whether they were open or secret—by the way, there was, however, a special educational department, creators of special educational records. For instance, "Pop Mendel" was the head of the educational department for the private training schools.

[P. 120] Inspector PHELAN. Did he sit on any of these governing committees at that time?

The WITNESS. Well, he regularly reported to them from time to time.

Inspector PHELAN. Do you know just how this educational director was appointed? What I am trying to get at is—

The WITNESS. Oh, he was appointed by the national committee, and in the States he was appointed by the State committee.

Inspector PHELAN. Did you testify that you yourself had served on the national committee?

The WITNESS. That is correct. Also—

Inspector PHELAN. For what period?

The WITNESS. Well, I cannot recall the years at the moment, because there was an interval there when I was made president of the Freedom of the Press Co., Inc.; and my impression is that during that interim I was not on the national committee for certain defensive reasons.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Can you tell us about when you were on the committee?—A. I became a member of the national committee about the year after I joined the party in 1936, and I was a member all throughout the Chicago period.

Inspector PHELAN. That would be up to about what [p. 121] year?

The WITNESS. That would be up to and including 1940. Now, if I remember correctly—I may be a little bit mixed up in this—but, if I remember correctly, when I became president of the Freedom of the Press Co., Inc., the understanding was for defensive purposes that I would not be a candidate for the national committee; and I wasn't for a couple of years, if I remember correctly. There was a couple of years there where there was an interim I was not on the national committee.

Inspector PHELAN. During the time you served—

The WITNESS. But in 1945, when I left the party, I was still a member of the national committee.

Inspector PHELAN. During the periods that you served on the national committee, was the party operating these schools of which you have spoken?

The WITNESS. Yes, sir.

Inspector PHELAN. Was the party operating those schools under the direction of a national committee?

Mr. SACHER. If it please the inspector, I would like to object to this whole line of questions. I don't want to be discourteous to you, and I do not want to retard the proceedings, so if you will grant me an exception to your complete line of questions and answers I will appreciate it.

[P. 122] Inspector PHELAN. The objections will be overruled and an exception granted.

The WITNESS. Your inquiry was whether the national committee directed these schools?

Inspector PHELAN. During the time that you served on the committee.

The WITNESS. Yes, sir; in a general way they directed the schools. Of course, they allocated the direct running of the schools to educational departments, but they, in general, supervised them and approved or disapproved what the schools did.

Inspector PHELAN. On what do you base your statement that these particular exhibits or certain of them were used in those two types of schools?

The WITNESS. Well, that was a regular procedure, almost auxiliary. The point of the matter is that Marxism, Leninism, whenever on the program of the schools—and that was the heart of the school—would include certain of these well-known documents which are part of the theory of Marxism-Leninism.

Inspector PHELAN. You spoke of the curricula of the schools. What, in general, would that embrace?

The WITNESS. Well, there would be public speaking; there would be courses in English, courses in parliamentary [p. 123] law for union activities, courses in other things of that character. Some of them were courses in history, history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, sometimes, which was a special textbook for that.

Inspector PHELAN. Were there certain specified books to be used in connection with certain specified courses?

The WITNESS. Oh, yes.

Mr. SACHER. That is true of Harvard University, too, I understand.

Inspector PHELAN. I just want to get the record clear. Proceed, Counsel.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. I believe you testified that these exhibits 18 to 26, inclusive, were offered for sale by the Communist Party during the entire period you were a member of the party. That is from 1935 to 1945; is that correct?—A. A couple of them were not widely distributed, but in general that is correct. I have distinguished, I think, between the different exhibits.

Q. Did the party offer these exhibits for sale as a matter of raising funds or for the purpose of spreading communism?—A. Primarily for the purpose of spreading communism. That is why they are in existence, that is why the Communist [p. 124] Party exists.

Q. Who paid for the publishing of these books; do you know?

Mr. SACHER. I suppose the World-Telegram publishes for the purpose of publishing.

The WITNESS. The payment for these books, of course, was sometimes complicated. That is, the party creates different corporations. The Daily Worker is a special corporation, the International Publishers, Workers' Library Publishers. Technically those corporations pay for them, but these reports on them, their finances, and the stabilization of them is all the party responsibility—the national committee's responsibility.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Can you—

Inspector PHELAN. May I ask a question for clarity here? Do I understand that the national committee is the highest governing board of the party in the United States?

The WITNESS. Well, in one way it is. The national committee is the board which functions between conventions, but the political committee, which is the executive committee of the national committee, functions in between sessions of the national committee and frequently when the words "national committee" are used [p. 125] it means political committee because the political committee has power to issue statements even in the name of the national committee without calling the national committee together. So a great many of these questions are allocated in detail or in continuous operation to the political committee, which is the executive committee, though, of the national committee.

Under the new constitution, because the Communists are always changing the names of these different committees, it has a new name. I think it is called the national board now, but it was formerly known as the political committee.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Referring to these books here, how about the Workers Publishers? Is that owned and controlled by the Communist Party, or was it owned and controlled by the Communist Party during the period that you were a member of the party?

Mr. SACHER. I just want to interpose an objection on the ground, as I said before, that you could not prove the ownership of a dog with that kind of a question. I think it is irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent.

Inspector PHELAN. I will sustain it and suggest that the witness be asked what, if anything, he knows as to any relationship between the Workers Publishing Co. and the Party?

[P. 126] The WITNESS. The Workers Library Publishers is a corporation formed by the Communist Party, or an organization formed by the Communist Party, which reports regularly to the Communist Party, for which the Communist Party is responsible financially and promotionally.

There are many such corporations formed by the Communist Party for defense and other purposes, legal purposes.

Inspector PHELAN. In what form does it report to the Communist Party and to what governing body of the party?

The WITNESS. It takes the report of the financial standing to the national committee, and then this is referred to the political committee for its detailed examination.

Inspector PHELAN. That is a periodic report, is it, at intervals?

The WITNESS. It is done from time to time. I do not know whether you call it periodic. It generally is before the national conventions, and then it is—the reports for the political committee are more periodic without reference to the national committee.

I have been at certain political committee meetings on other matters where a report has been made on the finances on one or the other of these corporations or [p. 127] organizations.

Mr. BOYD. I would like these two books marked for identification, please.

(Whereupon the books referred to were marked "Government's Exhibits 27 and 28" for identification.)

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Referring to what is marked "Government Exhibit 27," will you state whether or not you know what that is [handing same to witness].—A. I know the publication; yes.

Q. The Communist?—A. The Communist was then the official theoretical organ of the Communist Party and continued so for a number of years until its name was changed to Political Affairs.

Q. On the preface there appears: "The Communist, a magazine of theory and practice of Marxism and Leninism published monthly by the Communist Party of the United States of America, entered as second-class matter, November 2, 1927, at the post office at New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879."

Mr. SACHER. Are you offering that in evidence?

Mr. BOYD. I am now offering in evidence Government's exhibits 27 and 28 for identification.

Mr. SACHER. If it please the inspector, I heard Mr. Boyd read from this. That is why I was anxious to [p. 128] see this, in which it says on the top of this magazine, "Entered as second-class matter, November 2, 1927, at the post office at New York, N. Y."

Now, I am going to object to the receipt of this by yourself as inspector here, on the ground that this cannot conceivably be used—I am referring now to Government's exhibit 28 for identification—as a basis for any conclusion in this proceeding for the following reason: Under the law the Postmaster General of the United States is charged with the duty to exclude from the mails all matter which advocates, teaches, et cetera, the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence.

In view of the fact that this publication appears on the face of it that it was received and passed through the mails by the Postmaster General, I respectfully submit that the Government of the United States has placed its imprimatur on Government's exhibit 28, and that which it itself saw fit to distribute through the mails cannot now constitute any part of a basis for the deportation of any inhabitant of the United States. That applies, of course, to both of the tendered exhibits.

Inspector PHELAN. The objection is overruled, and the documents will be marked in evidence.

Mr. SACHER. I respectfully except.

[P. 129] (Whereupon Government's exhibits 27 and 28, previously marked for identification, were received in evidence.)

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Did Mr. Santo hold any office in the Communist Party at the time you were a member of the Communist Party?—A. Well, in 1936 and 1937 he was a member of the State trade-union commission.

Q. What is the State trade-union commission, Mr. Budenz?—A. That was an organ of the Communist Party created to infiltrate the trade-unions and to discuss their problems and to advance the Communist view in the trade-unions. It was created by the State committee of the Communist Party of New York. These commissions exist all through the country in every State organization of the Communist Party.

Q. Did you attend any meetings of this commission at which Mr. Santo was present?—A. Yes, sir; I was a member also at that time as labor editor of the Daily Worker.

Mr. SACHER. You were a busy little man, weren't you? You got around everywhere.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Did Mr. Santo ever make any reports to this committee at any time you were there?—A. Yes; he did on a couple of occasions.

[P. 130] Q. Do you remember the subject of those reports?—A. In a general way. It is a long time ago.

Q. What was the subject of those reports?—A. The subject of those reports was on one occasion I know—

Mr. SACHER. I ask for a specification of at least the month.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. About when was this committee meeting held?—A. It is very difficult to give the month. I have met him at many meetings. In fact, many apartment-house meetings, because the party meets in all sorts of ways.

Inspector PHELAN. Can you fix the year?

The WITNESS. Oh, yes; the year is 1936 and 1937, in those years. It had to be.

Mr. SACHER. Are those the only years you claim?

The WITNESS. Yes; those were the only years in that capacity.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. You referred to one specific meeting.—A. Those were the only years I was a member of the State trade union commission.

Q. About when was this specific meeting to which Mr. Santo made a report?—

A. Well, it had to be between the spring of 1936 and the fall of 1937.

[P. 131] Q. Where was the meeting held?—A. It was held in the Workers School in 35 East Twelfth Street. That is the headquarters building of the Communist Party.

Q. Who was present at this meeting?—A. We met in some of the offices of the Workers School.

Mr. SACHER. Just a moment. I object, Mr. Inspector, to the attempt by this witness to drag in any other people, and I submit that the only question at issue is the attendance of the respondent and of nobody else, and I therefore ask that testimony concerning any others allegedly present be excluded.

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel, it might be pertinent to determine whether this was or was not a Communist meeting.

Mr. SACHER. Well, the witness has already said it was, and I take it that counsel for the Government is not questioning veracity, and as yet there has been no attempt to impeach this witness. That may come later.

I am not saying "Yes" or "No," but for the time being the record does not show any impeachment, so I think that it would be improper.

Inspector PHELAN. I think the question is proper. The objection will be overruled.

[P. 132] Mr. SACHER. I respectfully except.

The WITNESS. May I have the question again, please?

(The reporter read the question, as follows:)

Q. Who was present at this meeting?

The WITNESS. Some of those present I can recall. Sam Nesain, formerly of the unemployment council and now an organizer in a number of unions. I. Rosenberg, of the shoe workers, United Shoe Workers. Michael J. Obermeier, of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen.

Well, as members of the committee, there was also Irving Potash, of the furriers, and Shulman, who is Louis Weinstock's colleague in the painters. Offhand those are the people I remember.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. Was Mr. Santo present?—A. Yes; he made a report on the transport.

Q. And what was the subject of that report?—A. Well, in regard to the activity of the transport workers at that time. The reason I recall his particular report is that it dealt with the difficulty of collections in part; that is, of dues collections.

Q. Did you say collections for what?—A. For the organizations.

Q. What organization?—[P. 133] *A. The transport workers; and, as a matter of fact, Rose Wortis, who was present—she was the director of the trade-union work in the New York district—she was inclined to be critical of the fact that the union at that time was not on a more stable basis. The report centered around this idea.

Q. Was this a union meeting or was this a meeting of the State trade-union commission of the Communist Party?—A. State trade-union commission of the Communist Party.

Q. Were there any persons present at this meeting who were not members of the Communist Party?—A. No, sir. These meetings were held by the Communist Party every so often; once a week or twice a month in this Workers School; and only members of the Communist Party active in the trade-unions, could be in attendance.

Inspector PHELAN. Were they especially called for or regularly scheduled meetings?

The WITNESS. There was a regular schedule. Sometimes it was changed by necessity, but it was a regular schedule of a certain evening in the week, or twice a month, I don't recall, and I think it was approximately one a week.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. How did one become a member of this State trade-union commission?—[P. 134] A. Appointed by the State committee of the Communist Party.

Q. About how many meetings would you say you attended, conducted by the Communist Party, at which Mr. Santo was present?—A. Well, I should say four. I can remember—I should say that would be a correct estimate.

Q. And those four meetings were held between the years 1935 and 1940?—A. No, no; 1936 and 1937.

Inspector PHELAN. Were those all meetings of the same committee that you have spoken of?

The WITNESS. Yes, sir; that was a regularly held meeting every so often. Inspector PHELAN. And these four meetings that you speak of, having seen the respondent present, were meetings of that particular body?

The WITNESS. Yes, sir; of which the directing agent was Rose Wortis. She was present also. She is the trade-union director of the State organization operating at that time under Jack Stachel.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. What was the purpose of the State trade-union commission? What were its functions?—A. To discuss the problems in the unions where Communists were active and also to discuss the progress of [p. 135] Communist activity in these unions, including recruitment into the party, the advance of Communists to official positions, the control of the unions by the Communists, and things of that character. There came to these meetings general representatives of three different unions of an evening. That is to say, sometimes the dealings would be three to five people, sometimes one person, sometimes two, but generally three unions were heard, the Communist representatives in three unions were heard of an evening.

Q. Were heard by the members of the State trade-union commission?—A. That is right.

Q. And this commission was comprised of how many persons, again?—A. Well, of 10 to 15 people.

Q. Your membership in the State trade-union commission terminated in about 1937?—A. When I went to Chicago; yes.

Q. And how long were you in Chicago?—A. Oh, I was there until 1940, when I returned to become president of the Freedom of the Press Co., Inc.

Inspector PHELAN. I think this is an excellent point to adjourn until 2 o'clock is counsel are in [p. 135-A] accord.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing was adjourned for luncheon recess until 2 p. m.)

[P. 136]

AFTERNOON SESSION, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1947, 2 P. M.

LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ resumed the stand and testified further as follows:

Direct examination (continued) by Mr. BOYD:

Q. Mr. Budenz, you testified to attending a certain meeting in the trade-union commission of the Communist Party in which Mr. Santo, respondent, made a report?—A. That is right.

Q. And I believe you testified that he reported on dues collections?—A. Yes, dues collection in the transport system. That was a review of that session.

Q. Dues collection for the Communist Party or for the TWU?—A. That was in regard to the TWU, but he also reported on party recruitment.

Q. What party recruitment?—A. Communist Party.

Q. What did he say about party recruitment?

Mr. SACHER. Just a moment. Is this on the basis of a refreshment of the witness' recollection during the lunch hour? Is that what this is based on?

[P. 137] Mr. BOYD. No; I had no knowledge of it, so I certainly could not have refreshed his recollection.

Mr. SACHER. My recollection is that this witness completed his testimony of what he claimed transpired at this meeting of the spring of 1936 and the fall of 1937, and he—

Inspector PHELAN. I hadn't so understood it, counsel. I assumed that this would be further developed.

Mr. SACHER. That is just an exfoliation, so to speak. All right, if that is what it is.

Mr. BOYD. I ask that counsel's remarks be stricken from the record.

Inspector PHELAN. That may go out.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. What did he say about recruitment, Mr. Budenz?—A. Details of it are not longer fresh in my mind, but the idea was in regard to getting more members of the party in that particular section of industry.

Q. When you say the party, you mean—A. Communist Party. That was one of his assignments. That was his assignment in part. He was the political representative of the Communist Party.

Q. Assigned to—[P. 138] A. Transport. The assignments were made of different Communists to different industries.

Q. Who made these assignments?—A. They were made by the different organs of the party, the State committee of the New York party, in case of activities within New York State, always under the direction of Jack Stachel, who was the political committee's man at that time in charge of labor in general, labor relations in general.

Q. Did you ever attend any other meetings of the Communist Party in which Mr. Santo, respondent, was present?—A. Yes; I did.

Q. Will you please state when and where?—A. It was a convention of the Communist Party, national convention secret session of the delegates. I am not sure whether it was 1936 or 1938, but it is a matter of public record. It could be checked.

Mr. SACHER. You say it was secret. How could it be a matter of public record?

The WITNESS. Oh, the convention was public. But this particular session was what you call executive, I suppose. Most of the sessions of conventions of the Communist Party are of that character. But this was particularly so. And a delegation of [P. 139] Communists from the transport industry presented Rose Wartus, the New York director on labor, with a great display of roses. Red roses, for her work in transport.

By Mr. BOYD:

Q. When you say her work in transport, what do you mean?—A. Her work in directing Communists like Santo and others in their work in the transport industry.

Q. Were you present at this meeting?—A. Yes; I remember the roses on the side of the stage.

Q. Was Mr. Santo present at this meeting?—A. He was one of the delegation, or he was on the stage, but he did not speak.

Q. Was Mr. Santo a delegate to this National Convention of the Communist Party?

Mr. SACHER. I object, unless the witness gives the basis for his statement.

A. Well, I am not sure of that. As a matter of fact, anyway, he was present there, as a Communist, at this particular session.

Q. Were you present as a Communist?—A. I was present there as a delegate.

Q. Did you attend any other meetings of the Communist Party at which Mr. Santo was present?—[p. 140] A. Two other meetings, and large national committees of the Communist Party, around 1940 or 1941; that is, in those years. On one occasion in which I was introduced to him again, we were all there together, by Jack Stachel, in the back of the hall.

Mr. SACHER. Where was this; when was this?

The WITNESS. Well, it was 1940 or 1941.

Mr. SACHER. You were introduced to him then?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. SACHER. After having met him 4 years before?

The WITNESS. Oh, yes.

Mr. SACHER. You were introduced 4 years after you had met him?

The WITNESS. That is common among Communists.

Inspector PHELAN. Proceed, gentlemen. You may cross-examine later.

The WITNESS. Jack Stachel just said, "This is a good Bolshevik, Comrade Santo," and told me, and we laughed and I said, "Well, of course, I know him." It was in the back of the fraternal clubhouse, the hall. I mean that is the hall, the fraternity clubhouse in the forties, where this meeting of the enlarged national committee was held, to my recollection.

[P. 141] By Mr. BOYD:

Q. You made reference to Rose Wartus; who is Rose Wartus?—A. Rose Wartus is the director of labor work in the New York district of the Communist Party.

Q. Of the Communist Party?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. And did she hold that position at the time of the convention?—A. Yes; she did. She has held it for many, many years. She is in charge of the entire labor activities of the Communist Party in the New York district, under the direction of whoever is the national director, or for the political committee. At that time, Jack Stachel, very frequently he was, though Roy Hutchins supplanted him sometime or other.

Q. Directing your attention to these exhibits again, Government exhibits 15 to 28, do these exhibits contain the doctrine of ideology of the Communist Party of the United States of America?—A. What is that?

Q. Do these exhibits, exhibits 15 to 28, inclusive, contain the doctrines and ideologies of the Communist Party of the United States of America?

Mr. SACHER. As to what time?

[P. 142] Mr. BOYD. As of the time that you were a member of the party. In other words, between 1935 and 1945?

A. That is correct in general. The Communist Party has one basic principle all the time.

Q. What is that basic principle?—A. That is the Marxism, Leninism, the overthrow of all bourgeois, democratic governments by armed force.

Q. And is the United States Government considered a bourgeois government?—A. It is considered the chief bourgeois democratic government.

Mr. BOYD. I have no further questions.

Cross-examination by Mr. SACHER.

Q. Where were you born?—A. Indianapolis, Ind.

Q. Did you ever live in Terre Haute, Ind.?—A. No, sir.

Q. Were you ever known by any other name than Louis Francis Budenz?—

A. No, sir. I may have written in the Daily Worker, but I don't even recall that. Once in a while it was a practice, but I never passed myself off as anyone but Louis Francis Budenz.

[P. 143] Q. Are you married?—A. Oh, I am, indeed.

Q. What is your wife's name?—A. Margaret Rogers.

Q. Margaret Rogers Budenz?—A. That is correct.

Q. When did you marry her?—A. I married her in St. Patrick's Cathedral in 1945.

Q. How many children do you have?—A. Four children.

Q. You did not have those children between the time of the marriage in St. Patrick's Cathedral in 1945 and this twelfth day of September 1945, did you?

Mr. BOYD. Mr. Presiding Inspector, I object.

Mr. SACHER. Wait a minute. I am on the track of something, and I want a chance to go after it.

Inspector PHELAN. Strike it out as argumentative. You may rephrase the question.

Mr. SACHER. I will rephrase the question, Mr. Inspector.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. Did you have the four children that you and your wife, Margaret Rogers Budenz, have between the date of your marriage at St. Patrick's Cathedral in 1945 and this [p. 144] 12th day of September 1947?

Mr. BOYD. Just a moment. I would like to renew my objection. It is irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial.

Inspector PHELAN. Same ruling.

Mr. SACHER. Mr. Inspector, I ask the same indulgence. I promise to connect it. And I ask your indulgence. Now, for Heaven's sake, you cannot do this for the prosecution and deny it to the defense. When you said earlier that you were going to give us the same latitude that you gave the Government—

Inspector PHELAN. You know there is a way of asking that question that isn't objectionable.

Mr. SACHER. You tell me. I don't know.

Inspector PHELAN. Shall I ask it?

Mr. SACHER. Yes. Would you be good enough to?

Inspector PHELAN. How many children do you have?

The WITNESS. Four children. Four girls.

Inspector PHELAN. Will you state the dates of the birth of each of these children?

The WITNESS. Most decidedly. One of them was born on June 13, 1934, at the time of the [p. 145] Toledo strike. The other, March 11, 1937. The other, 1943. The other, 1946.

Inspector PHELAN. Proceed.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. Do you then say that these first three children were had by you and Margaret Rogers Budenz before you were married to her?

Mr. BOYD. Again, I object to this question.

Mr. SACHER. I am leading to something. I will connect it in a moment. Give me a moment or two and I will connect it.

The WITNESS. Yes, sir.

By Mr. SACHER :

Q. You were not married to her at the time that you had these children ; is that it?—A. Not technically.

Q. What do you mean, "not technically"? What other way were you married to her?

Mr. BOYD. Just a moment, please.

Mr. SACHER. I am going to prove bigamy against this man, and I ask for an opportunity to prove that bigamy.

Mr. BOYD. I ask that this line of questioning be stricken as irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial. [P. 146] It has no bearing on the issues here.

Mr. SACHER. I want to prove that this man committed the crime of bigamy in the State of New York, and I want to prove that, because of the commission of that crime, his creditability is impaired, and I therefore demand the opportunity to show that Budenz is a bigamist.

Mr. BOYD. If the man has not been convicted of the crime——

Mr. SACHER. But I have a right to show that he committed the crime. He has been getting away with bigamy, and I want to show that he committed the bigamy.

Mr. BOYD. I renew my objection, Mr. Inspector.

Inspector PHELAN. Objection, in the absence of evidence of a conviction, is sustained. You could ask him if he ever has been convicted of bigamy.

Mr. SACHER. Let me read you the rule of law.

Inspector PHELAN. Proceed.

Mr. SACHER. In 70 Corpus Juris, at page 882, section 1095, it is said as follows [reading] : "It is usually held that for the purpose of impeachment and as bearing in his creditability, a witness may be interrogated in cross-examination as [p. 147] to his commission of a crime or guilt thereof, where such crime reflects on his integrity and creditability as a witness, subject, however to his right to refuse to answer incriminating questions."

Now, there is no rule of law, Mr. Inspector, either in the Federal courts or in the State courts, which limits the right of impeachment on the grounds of commission of crime to those instances where the man has been convicted of a crime. The cross-examiner has a fundamental right to prove, through the testimony of the witness himself, the commission of crime.

I grant you that I won't be entitled to prove the commission of the crime in the absence of a conviction by any witness other than this witness himself. But the rule is so old and so well established and so well known to every lawyer in America that on the cross-examination of a witness you may bring up his commission of a crime that will bear on his creditability, regardless of whether or not he has actually been convicted of it.

And I demand the opportunity to prove that Budenz is a bigamist, having committed the crime of bigamy in the State of New York, and I am prepared, as I told Mr. Boyd this morning, that I would prosecute him criminally [p. 148] for libel. I am ready to answer to Budenz' charge of criminal libel if he denies that he committed bigamy in the State of New York.

Now, I demand the opportunity to prove those facts.

Inspector PHELAN. What does counsel have to say in answer to the argument that that is a proper impeaching question?

Mr. BOYD. I think in this State you can attack him on proof of conviction. But you can't attack a man in the matter that is being conducted here. I don't think it is proper cross-examination.

Inspector PHELAN. Well, I may say that my impressionable rule was similar. However, this hearing is not conducted under strict rules of evidence, and for that reason I will permit the question to be asked at this time.

By Mr. SACHER :

Q. I show you this book and ask you whether you wrote this book [hands to witness].—A. I wrote it ; yes, indeed.

Q. Do you have an extra copy which we can put in the record as evidence?—A. No ; I haven't.

[P. 149] Q. What's the matter? Are you all sold out?

Mr. SACHER. I ask that this be marked as "Respondent's Exhibit A" for identification.

(Book marked "Respondent's Exhibit A" for identification as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER. Now I read you the following from page 15, respondent's exhibit A for identification——

Mr. BOYD. Pardon me just a moment. Has the book been admitted in evidence yet?

Mr. SACHER. No. Do you want it in evidence?

Mr. BOYD. I certainly do.

Mr. SACHER. I will offer in evidence the following pages, Mr. Inspector. I will offer in evidence pages 115 and 117 of respondent's exhibit A for identification. Would you like to see it, Mr. Boyd?

Mr. BOYD. Yes, I would.

(Mr. Sacher hands book to Mr. Boyd.)

Mr. BOYD. I suggest that the book be admitted in its entirety and reference be made to portions.

Mr. SACHER. No, Mr. Boyd. As the good lawyer that you are, you know that the only propriety of the offering of anything in evidence is that it is material and relevant to the inquiry being made. I [p. 150] am interrogating him only in regard to matters which are on pages 115 and 117. That is the extent of the thing which I admit. And I might say parenthetically, Mr. Inspector, that there is no obligation on me even to offer that much. You always have a right to ask a witness, "Did you ever write so and so and so"; isn't that so?

Mr. PHELAN. Yes.

Mr. SACHER. Then I withdraw my offer and ask the witness the following.

By Mr. SACHER:

I invite your attention to the following language at page 115: "It was at that time that I met Margaret, and we became husband and wife."

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel, there is a long-distance call out here for Mr. Boyd. If we can just have a short recess.

(Whereupon a 10-minute recess was taken.)

By Mr. SACHER:

The WITNESS. May I explain that to you?

Q. Just wait a minute. You gave nobody any mercy. Santo couldn't ask you for mercy. Just answer the question.

Inspector PHELAN. Proceed. What is the question?

[P. 151] By Mr. SACHER:

Q. Isn't it a fact that you wrote as follows at page 115: "It was at that time that I met Margaret and we became husband and wife. Little did we suspect then, when our views of life and more or less almost mocked at Catholicism, that her understanding and intelligence would help us back to Bethlehem and Rome. A Unitarian educated on a godless philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, and in the Freudian Psychoanalytic School for Social Work, Margaret had no knowledge of Catholic history or philosophy. But hers was a warm heart and a long-suffering patience. It was on the very day that I was arrested at Toledo in the Autolite strike that our first daughter, Julia, was born prematurely in New York."

"After her came Josephine, and then Justin. They were not reared in the knowledge of the church and God, but had a respect for the beliefs of their neighbors that testified to an effort at education of the heart."

I will ask you if you wrote that.

A. I did, but I want to explain it.

Mr. SACHER. Now, Mr. Inspector—

Inspector PHELAN. I am holding the hearing, Counselor.

Mr. SACHER. What are you doing? Are you acting as judge or prosecutor here? I want an [p. 152] opportunity to run my examination as I see fit. And, if this witness wants to make any explanations, he can do it afterward, when he is examined on redirect. At this moment I have had an impossible examination, and I will not tolerate it, Mr. Inspector, that you or anybody else should disrupt this cross-examination.

Inspector PHELAN. Just a moment. I think any witness is entitled, after he answers your question—

Mr. SACHER. I am not through. That is a foundation for another question. I want to get the date that he refers to when he says, "It was at that time that I met Margaret and we became husband and wife." Am I entitled to ask that?

Inspector PHELAN. Put your next question.

Mr. SACHER. All right.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I ask you what is the time that you refer to when you say here, "It was at that time that I met Margaret and we became husband and wife"? What year was that?—A. That was in 1933, but we were not married technically.

Q. Wait a minute. Next question, who is Gizella I. Budenz?—A. She was my first wife. Divorced woman.

[P. 153] Q. When were you married to Gizella Budenz?—A. Well, I don't remember the exact year any more.

Q. Well, was it in 1916?—A. When I lived in St. Louis, Mo.

Q. Was it 1916?—A. We were married in Terra Haute, Ind.

Q. Well, I asked you before whether you ever were in Terra Haute, Ind. and you said "No."—A. You said, didn't I live there.

Q. Didn't you live there when you married her in Terre Haute, Ind.?—A. No.

Q. What year did you marry her in Terre Haute?—A. It was a Gretna Green wedding.

Q. What is that?—A. A Gretna Green wedding. We went to Terre Haute. You could do that and——

Q. What happened? What did you do? Did you seduce her, or something?

Mr. BOYD. I ask that these remarks be stricken from the record.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I am just asking you questions, and you just answer them. Was it in 1918 that you married Gizella?—A. Yes; it was.

Q. [P. 154] And did you remain married to Gizella until she obtained a divorce from you on the ground that you deserted her and failed to support her in the year 1938?—A. On the technical grounds of desertion——

Q. Technical, my eye. Were you divorced by her on the grounds of desertion in the year 1938?—A. Counsel is familiar with the legal procedure.

Q. Yes, or no? I ask you was it in the year 1938 that she divorced you?—A. Yes, indeed.

Q. And it was from 1916 to 1938 that you remained in a state of marriage with Gizella Budenz; is that right?—A. I was separated from her for 7 years. I was separated from her for 7 years, from 1931 on.

Q. Now, look, let's not go into what you were separated from her. You were married to her and you remained married to her until you were divorced from her, weren't you?—A. I was separated from her.

Mr. SACHER. I move to strike it out as not responsive. Mr. Inspector, I ask the witness be directed to testify as to whether he was married to Gizella until 1938.

The WITNESS. Technically, I was. For 7 [p. 155] years.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. Marriage. The holy sacrament is a technicality to you, isn't it, Mr. Budenz?—A. Not since I became a Catholic. It was when I was a Communist.

Q. Well, you took up with Margaret before you became a Communist, didn't you?—A. That's right.

Q. You testified that it was in 1933 that you took up with Margaret; isn't that right?—A. But I was——

Q. Answer my question. Isn't it a fact that you took up with Margaret in 1933?—A. That's right.

Q. That was 2 years before, according to your testimony, you became a member of the Communist Party; is that right?—A. This is a matter——

Q. Is that right, or is it not?

Mr. BOYD. Mr. inspector, I think the attorney here should allow the man an opportunity to answer the question.

Inspector PHELAN. Give him an opportunity to answer.

[P. 156] Mr. SACHER. He will have all the opportunity in the world. It isn't lack of opportunity that is bothering this poor man now.

Inspector PHELAN. Answer the counsel's question.

Mr. SACHER. Wait a minute, Mr. Examiner.

Inspector PHELAN. Answer the counsel's question. If you have anything else to say, you will be given a later opportunity in the course of the questioning. And I will ask counsel.

The WITNESS. That is right. I was already working with the Communists, though.

Mr. SACHER. If it please the examiner, I now offer in evidence a certified copy of the petition for divorce of Gizella I. Budenz, together with the decree nisi of

the Court of Chancery of the State of New Jersey, index No. 116-133, in the action entitled "Gizella I. Budenz, petitioner, and Louis Francis Budenz," and I also offer in evidence the final decree of divorce issued by the court of chancery on the 13th day of July 1938 in the action entitled "Gizella I. Budenz against Louis Francis Budenz." And in particular I invite Your Honor's attention to certain allegations which I will refer to after you [p. 157] have received them in evidence. I offer these in the following order as respondent's exhibits A, B, C, and D, respectively. The petition for divorce will be A; the decree nisi will be B; and the final decree will be C. Would you like to see them, Mr. Boyd?

Mr. BOYD. Yes, I would.

(Mr. Sacher hands papers to Mr. Boyd.)

(Petition for divorce, decree nisi, and the final decree marked "Respondent's Exhibits A, B, and C," respectively, and received in evidence as of this date.)

Inspector PHELAN. These documents will be admitted and are so marked.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. Now, Mr. Budenz, Gizella says here in paragraph 1 of her petition, respondent's exhibit A: "Petitioner was lawfully married to her present husband, Louis Francis Budenz, the defendant in this suit, on December 23, 1916, in the city of Terre Haute and State of Indiana." Is that statement true?—A. That's correct.

Q. She says in the second paragraph: "There were no children born of the marriage; but in 1917, in St. Louis, Mo., petitioner and defendant adopted a female child named Louise. Said adopted daughter is now 20 years of age and is married." Was that statement true?—[P. 158] A. That is correct.

Q. In item 3 she says: "Petitioner and defendant lived together as husband and wife from the date of the marriage aforesaid continued until September 1, 1930." Is that statement correct?—A. That's correct.

Q. And in paragraph 4 she says: "On September 1, 1930, petitioner and defendant were living together as husband and wife at 1350 Bryant Street in the city of Rahway, county of Union, and State of New Jersey." Is that correct?—A. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Q. And then in paragraph 5 she says: "On September 1, 1930, defendant deserted petitioner and has, ever since that date and for more than 2 years last past, and down to the date hereof willfully, continued, and obstinately deserted petitioner, and during said entire period—namely, from September 1, 1930, down to the date of the commencement of this action—defendant has willfully, continued, and obstinately refused to live with the petitioner as husband and wife and has during said entire period lived and still does live willfully, continued, and obstinately separate and apart from petitioner." Was that statement correct?—A. That is correct.

[P. 159] Q. And in paragraph 6, "at the date of the commencement of the desertion afore-mentioned, petitioner and defendant were both bona fide residents of the State of New Jersey." Was that correct?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then in paragraph 9 she says: "Petitioner knows that defendant resides at apartment 22, 328 East Fifteenth Street, in the city of New York, county of New York, and State of New York." Did you live at that address at the time of this petition, which was on or about August 1936?—A. I think so; yes, sir.

Q. Were you living at that address at that time with Margaret?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Before that time, you had lived in Williamsburg; is that right?—A. Yes, sir. Separately entirely from my first wife. From 1930.

Q. I did not imagine you were operating a harem. One at a time is enough.

Mr. SACHER. Mr. Fanelli suggests that—I withdraw that. Mr. Fanelli has withdrawn that.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. Did you ever go through any civil ceremony of marriage with your present wife, Margaret?—A. Yes, sir.

[P. 160] Q. When did you go through that ceremony?—A. Oh, civil?

Q. Yes.—A. Well, I was married by Monsignor Sheen in St. Patrick's Cathedral. That was civil and religious too. There was a civil filing in the city of Yonkers, where I live.

Q. Did you have to procure a certified copy of the decree of divorce from your first wife, Gizella?—A. Well, that I don't know.

Q. Who attended to that for you, Monsignor Sheen?—A. No.

Q. Mr. Budenz, you will recall that the final decree of the court declared as follows—and I read from respondent's exhibit C:

"The court having in this cause by a decree nisi, bearing date and entered on the 12th day of April A. D. 1938, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the petitioner, Cizella I. Budenz, and the defendant, Louis Francis Budenz, be divorced from the bonds of matrimony for the cause of desertion, unless sufficient cause be shown to the court why said decree should not be made absolute within 3 months from the date thereof; and application being now made to the court by the petitioner for an order that said decree nisi be made absolute and that a final [p. 161] and absolute decree be entered; and no cause to the contrary being shown or appearing:

"It is thereupon, on this 13th day of July A. D. 1938, by His Honor, Luther A. Campbell, chancellor of the State of New Jersey, by virtue of the power and authority of this court, and of the acts of the legislature in such case made and provided, doth hereby order, adjudge, and decree that the said decree nisi be made and become absolute, and that the said defendant, Louis Francis Budenz, are divorced from the bonds of matrimony for the cause aforesaid and the marriage between the said petitioner and the said defendant is hereby dissolved accordingly, and the said parties and each of them are and is hereby freed and discharged from the obligations thereof."

Do you remember that language in the final decree of divorce?

A. Well, I don't remember all the language, but I remember that there was a final decree of divorce.

Q. And that was the only decree of divorce, the one that I have just read, and which is respondent's exhibit C, that was ever made by any court of competent jurisdiction in this country or anywhere else, dissolving the bonds of matrimony between you, Louis Francis Budenz, and your wife [p. 162], Cizella I. Budenz; is that correct?—A. Well, I don't know. That is my impression. I don't know all the papers that were served at that time. I know in 1938 I was granted a final divorce in New Jersey.

Q. That is the only one; you were not granted it, you did not apply for it. Your wife got it.—A. I mean she was granted it.

Q. That is the only divorce you know of between you and Cizella; is that right?—A. Yes; that is the only one I know of. If that is the one, I don't know that that is the one that you are quoting from. In 1938 she was given a final decree of divorce on the basis of my having not lived with her for 7 or 8 years.

Mr. SACHER. May I ask for a short recess at this time?

Inspector PHELAN. Granted. Five minutes.

(Whereupon a 5-minute recess was taken.)

Mr. SACHER. Mr. Inspector, at this juncture I wish to point out that, on the basis of the statements contained at page 115 of the book of this witness, in which he states that he and his present wife became husband and wife in 1933, as testified to here on the stand, and in view of the fact that [p. 163] at the time that he and Margaret became husband and wife he had another wife, he had a wife living, I respectfully submit to you that under the provisions of section 340 of the penal law of the State of New York, which reads as follows: "A person who, having a husband or wife living, marries another person, is guilty of bigamy, and is punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary or State prison for not more than 5 years."

In that connection, Mr. Inspector, I call to your attention the case of Hayes against the People, in 25 New York 390, in which the court sustained a conviction in a case where the second marriage, as in the case of this witness, was a nonceremonial marriage. In these circumstances, Mr. Inspector, I respectfully submit that the respondent in this case has established, out of the mouth of this witness himself, that he is a bigamist, a criminal. And on that ground I respectfully request that all of the testimony given by this bigamist be stricken from the record.

Inspector PHELAN. Denied.

Mr. SACHER. If it please the inspector, in order to proceed with other cross-examination of the witness, it will be necessary for us to examine these 10 to 15 exhibits that were introduced. And [p. 164] therefore, with your permission, I would suggest that we defer this further examination, cross-examination of the witness, until such time as we have had an opportunity to go over the material for the purposes of cross-examination.

Inspector PHELAN. I think that is a fair request. When would you suggest that we call and finish this witness?

Mr. SACHER. We might just as well at this time discuss the question of an adjournment. Tomorrow is Saturday, and I don't work on Saturday. Monday and Tuesday are the high holy days, which I shall observe, so that I cannot be

in attendance on those days. I will, however, use some of the intervening time to examine those exhibits, and I shall be happy to be ready to proceed with this witness on Wednesday morning, so you need have no delay whatever in completing his examination.

Inspector PHELAN. In view of the fact that we won't convene again until Wednesday, would it not be possible to continue on Saturday, thus giving us an extra day?

Mr. SACHER. I would love to do that, but ever since Hitler came to power, I, as a Jew, insist on maintaining my Sabbath, just as other people maintain [p. 165] theirs, and I would therefore like to observe the Sabbath tomorrow.

Inspector PHELAN. In view of counsel's statement, we will not consider a Saturday hearing. It was merely a suggestion that we might conserve time.

Is there any further proceeding that we could take today in order to take advantage of the hour that remains?

Mr. SACHER. I don't know. Maybe Mr. Fanelli has some motions.

Mr. BOYD. Is that the only phase of cross-examination that you intend to pursue? In other words, is there some other phase that you could take up today?

Mr. SACHER. Mr. Boyd, I don't like to appeal for consideration on this ground, but if you have observed the pace at which I have been going in the last 40 minutes, I am not in condition to take up any further cross-examination. So I would appreciate it if you wouldn't press on my going on any other matter. I may have them on Wednesday.

Inspector PHELAN. Is there any objection to excusing this witness until Wednesday and calling your next witness now?

[P. 166] Mr. BOYD. Well, there is only an hour before an adjournment now. I think perhaps that this would be as good a time as any to adjourn.

Inspector PHELAN. All right. The hearing is adjourned until next Wednesday morning, at the hour of 10:30 a. m.

(Whereupon at 3:05 p. m. an adjournment was taken until Wednesday, September 17, 1947, at 10:30 a. m.)

[P. 166-A]

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[P. 167] United States of America, Department of Immigration, Immigration and Naturalization Service. In the Matter of Charges against Desideriu Hammer, alias John Santo, alias John or Jack Weiss. Ellis Island No. 99600/850 Central Office

70 Columbus Avenue, New York City, N. Y. September 17, 1947, 10:30 a. m.

Before: Hon. ARTHUR J. PHELAN, Presiding Inspector.

NATHAN BERAK,
Stenotype Reporter, 80 Broad Street, New York City.

[P. 188] Appearances:

JOHN F. BOYD, Examining Inspector,

FRANCIS X. WALKER, and

MAURICE A. ROBERTS,

For the Department of Immigration.

HARRY SACHER, and

JOSEPH A. FANELLI,

For the Respondent.

LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, called as a witness on behalf of the Government, having previously duly been sworn, resumed the stand and testified further as follows:

Cross examination (continued) by Mr. SACHER:

Inspector PHELAN. Respondent is present and all the counsel are present. Proceed.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. Did you work for the American Federation of Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers at any time?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. In what years did you work for them?—A. Well, I do not remember exactly, but it was in 1928, for example, 1929.

Q. How about the year 1930, Mr. Budenz?—[P. 169] A. 1930?

Q. Yes, how about 1930?—A. Well, I went with the Conference of Progressive Labor Action.

Q. Don't you remember a strike in the year 1930 against the Kramer Hosiery Mills in Nazareth, Pa.?—A. Oh, yes.

Q. What year was that?—A. 1929.

Q. Are you sure it was 1929?—A. Well, it began then. It have have extended over until 1930.

Q. What is your best recollection as to whether you were still there in 1930?—A. Perhaps in the early part of 1930 I may have been, although I am not quite clear because I went with the Conference for Progressive Labor Action about that time.

Q. Did you ever stop at the Hotel Easton in Easton, Pa., in the year 1930?—A. Well, I don't recall.

Q. You mean to tell us that you don't remember whether you were in the Hotel Easton in 1930?—A. I was in 1929, but I am not sure in 1930.

Q. You are not sure about 1930?—[P. 170] A. No, sir.

Q. Is there any reason why the year 1930 is blocked from your memory at this time, Mr. Budenz?—A. No, sir.

Q. None at all?—A. Except that I am not quite certain about my connection with the Conference for Progressive Labor Action.

Q. Suppose I show you this letter on the stationery of the Hotel Easton in Easton, Pa., bearing date of May 14, 1930, and ask you whether you sent that letter to anybody from that hotel on that date [handing to witness]?—A. I refuse to answer that question.

Q. On what ground do you refuse to answer, Mr. Budenz?—A. First of all, this is not a smear investigation. Secondly, it violates my constitutional rights.

Q. Which of your constitutional rights does it violate?

Mr. BOYD. If the presiding inspector please, I do not see that this line of questioning is germane in the issues here involved.

Inspector PHELAN. Well, I assume that it is preliminary.

Mr. SACHER. It is preliminary to establishing a number of things.

[P. 171] Inspector PHELAN. The witness, if he declines to answer, will have to state the grounds as counsel has asked.

The WITNESS. Well, counsel is trying to show—do you mean to say what offense I committed?

Inspector PHELAN. Well, let me see if I may clarify it, and counsel will correct me if I am wrong.

The only ground a witness may refuse to answer a question on, is on the ground that it may incriminate him. Now, do I understand that it is your desire to refuse to answer that question on that ground?

The WITNESS. It is.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. In other words, Mr. Budenz, you refuse to answer whether you signed this letter on the ground that it may tend to incriminate you; is that right?—A. That is right?

Mr. SACHER. I ask that it be marked for identification, please.

Inspector PHELAN. What is the next exhibit in order?

(Letter dated May 14, 1930, marked "Respondent's Exhibit D" for identification as of this date.)

[P 173] Mr. BOYD. May I see the document, please?

Mr. SACHER. Shall I wait until you have read it, Mr. Boyd?

Mr. BOYD. Please.

Mr. SACHER. I would just like to say, Mr. Inspector, that I am extending an unusual courtesy to counsel for the other side when I permit them to look at a paper that is not in evidence; so I expect some reciprocity.

Mr. BOYD. You anticipate offering it in evidence, do you not? That is the usual custom.

Mr. SACHER. No; I haven't made an offer. You are entitled to look at it when I make the offer. Mr. Budenz will tell you that. He is a lawyer.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. You are a lawyer, aren't you?—A. I was educated as one; yes.

Q. What do you mean you were educated as one? As a matter of fact, you were graduated from a law school?—A. That is correct.

Q. What was the name of the school, Indianapolis Law School?—A. That is right.

Q. And how long ago was that?—[P. 173] A. That was 25 years ago. Just a moment, 35 years ago.

Q. Did you ever know a girl by the name of Louise Gahen?—A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did you get to know her in the year 1930 while you were at the Easton Hotel?—A. I refuse to answer that.

Q. On what ground do you refuse to answer that?—A. It may incriminate me.

Q. Is that what you learned in law school? Did you learn that in law school?

Mr. BOYD. This is not proper examination.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. Or were you told by counsel here today?—A. I was not told by counsel anything on this matter.

Q. Where did you learn that you have the right to testify on the ground that an answer to my question may tend to incriminate you?—A. Because I see that a smear is being developed here.

Q. Well, you are not objecting on the ground that it is a smear. You are objecting on the ground that that it may expose you to criminal penalties, aren't you? Isn't [p. 174] that the ground of your objection, that an answer may expose you to criminal prosecution and conviction?—Yes, sir.

Q. Isn't that the ground?—A. May I have the question again?

Q. Isn't the answer yes?—A. That is right.

Q. Would you care to tell the inspector which State or Federal statutes you are afraid you will be incriminated under if you testify?—A. Well, that I am here to state.

Mr. BOYD. I object to the question, if you please. After all this man is not qualifying as an expert in law.

Inspector PHELAN. I think counsel, that is calling for a conclusion.

Mr. SACHER. I think if I may briefly say this, Mr. Inspector, because I, like yourself, am anxious to move ahead, but I believe that while a witness may not be obliged to disclose the facts in his answer on the basis of which a criminal prosecution might take place, I do believe that in order that the court or administrative agent may determine whether the claim is made in good faith, that a witness may be required to state under what [p. 175] law or statutes he fears exposure to criminal prosecution and conviction.

Mr. PHELAN. I think counsel is correct on that. The mere assertion of a constitutional privilege without stating some basis is not in and of itself sufficient.

Mr. BOYD. I think the question calls for conclusion on the part of the witness and I object to the question on that ground.

Inspector PHELAN. Possibly counsel could rephrase the question.

Mr. SACHER. Well, Mr. Inspector, I think that a violation of one law is as bad as another, as Epictetus used to say, and perhaps it is of no great consequence; so I won't press the inquiry.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. Did you ever spend any time with Louise Gahen in the State of Connecticut, specifically in the city of Stamford and more specifically in the year 1930?—A. I refuse to answer that on the same grounds.

Q. On what grounds is that, that you will incriminate yourself?—A. Yes.

Q. I show you this envelope and ask you whether this [p. 176] is your handwriting on that envelope [handing to witness]?—A. I am not sure. It looks like it.

Q. You do not deny that it is your writing?—A. I do not; no.

Mr. SACHER. I offer it in evidence.

(Envelope marked "Respondent's Exhibit E" and received in evidence as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER :

Q. On this Respondent's Exhibit E, which bears a photograph of the Hotel Easton with the name Hotel Easton and the name of Easton, Pa., appear the following words in your handwriting: "In case of accident to Budenz, these belong to Miss Louise Gahen." Is that right?—A. That is correct.

Q. You therefore knew Miss Gahen, didn't you?—A. Oh, yes; I said I knew her. I said that originally, sir.

Q. And do you know what was contained in this envelope, Respondent's Exhibit E, when you said, "in case of accident to Budenz, these belong to Miss Louise Gahen"; do you know what was in Respondent's Exhibit E?—A. Well, now, let's see. I don't recall definitely now.

[P. 177] Q. Let us see if we can refresh your recollection. I show you these papers and I ask you to be good enough to preserve them in the order in which they appear here, and ask you to read all these letters from Louise to you and tell me whether that refreshes your recollection as to what was in this envelope, Respondent's Exhibit E?—A. I will have to refuse to answer this question.

Q. On what ground?—A. On the ground that it would tend to incriminate me.

Q. Do you think, Mr. Budenz, there is anything I can ask you that you won't refuse to answer on the ground that it will incriminate you?—A. Oh, yes.

Q. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof," as the Psalmist says. So let us take these one by one. Did you ever stop at the Great Northern Hotel in the city of New York in the year 1930?—A. Well, I may have. I don't recall.

Q. You do not deny it, do you?—A. No; I don't deny it. I don't recall it.

Q. Let me show you a letter and ask you whether that refreshes your recollection as to whether you did stay in the Great Northern Hotel [handing witness]?—A. [Witness looking at letter].

[P. 178] Q. I show you this paper and I ask you to read it, and tell us whether that letter from Louise refreshes your recollection as to whether you were in the Great Northern Hotel at that time?—A. No; it doesn't.

Mr. SACHER. I ask that this be marked for identification, please.

(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit F" for identification as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER :

Q. Can you tell the inspector how many times in the last 17 years you spent a night in the Great Northern Hotel right here at 109-121 West Fifty-sixth Street in New York City? How many times were you there in the last 17 years?—A. Well, I can't recall being there at all, to tell you the truth. I can't recall it.

Q. You cannot recall it?—A. No.

Q. But you won't deny it?—A. No; I can't deny it.

Mr. BOYD. If the Court please, this line of questioning is argumentative. The witness has answered the question.

The WITNESS. I can't recall ever having been [p. 179] in the Great Northern Hotel. I may have been and I may not.

By Mr. SACHER :

Q. Mr. Budenz, did you ever visit the city of Bernardsville?—A. I don't know where that is.

Q. A little distance away from Easton?—A. Yes; I know where it is.

Q. You are familiar with the name Bernardsville?—A. I am indeed, yes.

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel, may I interrupt? I assume that you propose to connect this questioning up with the issues of the case.

Mr. SACHER. Oh, sure. I tell you frankly that this is all directed ultimately to establishing once again that this man has committed crimes under the Federal laws with a view to impeaching his credibility. That is what this is heading for. That is what my evidence is directed to here and I shall, of course, demand a full opportunity, an adequate opportunity in any event to accomplish that purpose.

Inspector PHELAN. Proceed.

By Mr. SACHER :

Q. You are also familiar with the name of a sculptor by the name of George Barnard; is that right?—[p. 180] A. No; I am not.

Q. Never heard of George Barnard, the sculptor?—A. Except in a general way.

Q. Of course, you knew his name back in 1930, didn't you?—A. I think not; no. I don't recall his name at all. I mean, I don't recall any intimate knowledge of his name.

Q. Well, but you were, according to your book, anyway, you were quite a literate person, interested in literature, the arts, etc., weren't you?—A. To a degree, but I don't know everyone who is engaged in this business.

Q. But George Barnard was an outstanding American sculptor, wasn't he?—
A. It doesn't recall to my mind anything specific. This is the first time that he has been called to my attention in any specific way. I may have known it in a casual way, but not in a specific way.

Q. Do you recall whether you registered in the Great Northern Hotel under the name of Bernard, second name?—A. I refuse to answer that.

Q. On what ground do you refuse to answer that?—A. That it may tend to incriminate me.

Q. Do you remember an occasion when you told your [p. 181] wife, Gizella, that you had registered at the Great Northern Hotel with Louise Gahen and that you had registered under the name of Bernard because you got the idea from the name Bernardsville?—A. No, sir.

Q. Or, did you ever tell her that you got the idea from the name of George Bernard, the sculptor?—A. No, sir.

Q. You don't recall ever telling Gizella that?—A. No, I most decidedly did not.

Q. But you did spend time with Louise at the Great Northern; isn't that right?—A. I refuse to answer that question.

Q. Did you spend time with Louise in Stamford, Conn.?—A. I refuse to answer that.

Q. As the ground of your refusal to answer that you transported her across State lines for immoral purposes?—A. No, sir.

Q. Which constitutes a violation of Federal law?—A. No, sir.

Q. Is that the grounds?—A. No, sir; that is not the ground.

Q. What is the ground, then? Do you refuse to [p. 182] answer that, too?—
A. Well, I am being accused of living with a person in a hotel and I think that that is technically an accusation that one can refuse to answer.

Q. How about the crossing of the State lines, does that bother you at all, transporting a woman across State lines for immoral purposes?—A. No, sir.

Q. What crime do you claim you committed or you may be charged with having committed by reason of spending the night in a hotel with a woman, what crime, if not under the Federal statute for immoral transportation across State lines?—A. Well, in various States there are various statutes on subjects of that character.

Q. Of what character? Do you mean adultery, fornication; what do you mean?—A. One or the other, and besides that, counselor, this is a very small piece of business you are engaging in.

Q. You mean that white slavery is a small piece of business to you; is that what you are saying? Is white slavery in your opinion a small piece of business?—A. No, sir.

Q. Is the Mann Act a small piece of business?—[P. 183] A. No, sir.

Q. Do you regard the violation of the Mann Act as a small piece of business?—
A. No, sir; I do not.

Q. Would you regard a violator of the Mann Act as a person unworthy of belief?

Mr. BOYD. If the Court please, I object to that question.

Inspector PHELAN. Sustained.

Mr. SACHER. Exception.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I show you Respondent's Exhibit F and ask you whether you received this letter from Louise Gahen [handing to witness]?—A. I do not recall.

Q. Do you recall whether the letter was addressed to you?—A. I do not.

Q. You mean the sunny waters, the white sand and sky where a few white clouds—

Mr. BOYD. Just a minute. I object.

Mr. SACHER. Wait a minute. I am not reading from the letter. I am just refreshing my recollection. I am not referring to the contents of a paper now. I am asking him apart from the paper.

[P. 184] Inspector PHELAN. Counsel, I would like to seek some authority that a witness may be impeached by evidence of acts which might be criminal where they are not connected up directly with the issues of the case and where there hasn't been any conviction. I am somewhat disturbed over that.

Mr. SACHER. If you wish to call a recess for an hour, I will go back to my office and dig up 100 authorities, not one. As an elementary principle of law, when any witness offers himself for testimony, you may contradict that witness in one of a number of ways: One, by prior inconsistent statements; two, by evidence from the witness himself of specific acts of conduct which would con-

stitute either crimes or immoral conduct, not only crimes but immoral conduct, and that testimony is confined to eliciting from the witness, himself—in other words, as I said the other day, it would be utterly incompetent to call third parties to testify to these specific acts; and the third method is by proof of conviction of crime.

Now, I am pursuing the second method here.

INSPECTOR PHELAN. As to the limits of that second method, I am a little doubtful. As to the limits of that second method I am doubtful that we aren't going a little too far afield in this instance.

[P. 185] However, proceed for the present.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I show you this letter and I ask you to read it very carefully and tell me whether you received this one from Louise Gahen [handing to witness]?—A. I refuse to answer.

Q. On what ground do you refuse to answer that?—A. It may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SACHER. I ask that this be marked for identification.

(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit G" for identification as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I ask you to look at this letter and tell me whether you received that from Louise Gahen [handing to witness]?—A. Same answer.

Q. Well, you haven't read it yet. You don't know whether it will tend to incriminate you or not. Maybe it says something nice about you for once.—A. Same answer.

Mr. SACHER. I ask that that be marked for identification.

(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit H" for identification as of this date.)

[P. 186] By Mr. SACHER:

Q. Did you know a doctor by the name of Dr. Kenworthy?—A. No, sir.

Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether it refreshes your recollection as to who Dr. Kenworthy was [handing to witness]?—A. No; it doesn't.

Q. Was he an abortionist?

Mr. BOYD. I object to this line of questioning.

A. I have no idea, sir.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. Did you receive this letter from Louise Gahen?—A. I refuse to answer that.

Q. On the ground that it will incriminate you? Is that it?—A. That's right.

Mr. SACHER. I ask that this be marked for identification.

(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit I" for identification as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received this one from Louise Gahen? Read it before you say it will incriminate you [handing to witness].—A. I refuse to answer.

[P. 187] Q. On the ground it will incriminate you?—A. Yes; that it may.

Mr. SACHER. I ask that this be marked for identification, please?

(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit J" for identification as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. Now I ask you to read this one and tell us whether you received this one from Louise Gahen [handing to witness]?—A. Same answer.

Mr. SACHER. I ask that it be marked for identification.

(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit K" for identification as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I show you this one. I do not think you will say that that incriminates you?—A. Same grounds.

Q. You refuse on the grounds that it will incriminate you?—A. Yes.

Mr. SACHER. I ask that this be marked for identification.

(Letter consisting of two pages marked "Respondent's Exhibit L" for identification as of this date.)

[P. 188] By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received that from Louise Gahen.—A. These are letters generally presented in a divorce proceeding.

Q. Well, you would know about that. You have gone through that. I wouldn't. Just tell us whether you received that, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BOYD. I object to remarks on the part of counsel and ask that they be stricken.

Mr. SACHER. I think they were as valid as the witness' observation.

Inspector PHELAN. He is answering the observation of the witness, counsel.

The WITNESS. Yes; I was married to a divorced woman originally.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. We all know about that, but how about this letter? That is what we do not know about and that is what we would like you to tell us. Did you get that letter from Louise Gahen?—A. Same answer.

Q. That is, you refuse to testify on the ground it may tend to incriminate you?—A. That is correct.

[P. 189] Mr. SACHER. May I have this letter marked for identification? (Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit M" for identification as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I now show you another epistle and ask you whether you received this from Louise Gahen [handing to witness]?—A. Same answer.

Mr. SACHER. I ask that it be marked for identification, please.

(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit N" for identification as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received that from Louise Gahen [handing to witness]?—A. Same answer, for the same reason.

Q. That is, you refuse to testify on the ground that it may tend to incriminate you; is that it?—A. Yes.

Mr. SACHER. Will you be kind enough, Mr. Inspector, to mark this for identification?

(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit O" for identification as of this date.)

[P. 190] By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received that from Louise Gahen [handing to witness]?—A. Same objection.

Mr. SACHER. I ask the inspector to mark that please.

(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit P" for identification as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received that from Louise Gahen [handing to witness]?—A. Same answer.

Mr. SACHER. I ask to have it marked for identification, please.

(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit Q" for identification as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received this from Louise Gahen [handing to witness]?—A. Same reply.

Mr. SACHER. Now, if it please the inspector, I respectfully request that the inspector read this proposed exhibit, and I ask for the judgment of the inspector as to whether the objection of the witness is well founded, that that letter may tend to incriminate him?

[P. 191] (Inspector reads letter.)

The WITNESS. May I give my ground, inspector?

Inspector PHELAN. Yes, sir.

The WITNESS. The counsel for the respondent is endeavoring to show a continuous relationship, one letter with another, and this letter indicates that relationship is continued, as explained by other letters.

Mr. SACHER. And the man has admitted that he knew Gahen. There is no denial of that; so that a mere communication from her to him would not tend to incriminate him, assuming that the contents of the letter do not contain anything on the basis of which a prosecution could be based. Of course, I do want to say that, if this letter goes in, I shall offer all the other letters by providing that the handwriting in the letters is the same.

Inspector PHELAN. It seems to me that it is the witness' privilege to object to all the letters on constitutional grounds, if it exists. Of course, as he has indicated, it is a connected course of conduct, I assume. I do not think that a single letter could be taken out of the series and accepted if the others are kept out on the ground that he asserts,

Mr. SACHER. Well, he is the best judge as to [p. 192] whether he committed the crime, I guess, at this juncture.

Mr. BOYD. I ask that the remarks of counsel be stricken from the record.

Mr. SACHER. I am just stating what the Supreme Court of the United States has said.

Mr. BOYD. I still ask the remarks be stricken from the record.

Inspector PHELAN. They may go out.

(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit R" for identification as of this date.)

The WITNESS. It is my constitutional privilege to make this objection. That has been made many times by many people.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I show you this letter and ask you whether you received this one from Louise Gahen [handing witness]?—A. Same answer.

Mr. SACHER. I ask that it be marked for identification.

(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit S" for identification as of this date.)

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel, I am reserving [p. 193] a ruling on this entire course of questioning. I would like to hear it briefly argued after the noon recess—

Mr. SACHER. You will have to give me an extra bit of time.

Inspector PHELAN. On the point that I spoke of as to whether and to what extent a witness can be impeached even out of his own mouth with regard to the specific occurrences.

Mr. SACHER. Oh, I will be glad to argue that.

Inspector PHELAN. Incidentally, at the same time I would like to hear from counsel for the Government on the same point.

Mr. BOYD. We will be glad to do so, Mr. Inspector.

Mr. SACHER. Will you please mark that?

Inspector PHELAN. It is marked.

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I ask that it be marked for identification.

[P. 194] (Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit T" for identification as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. I show you this one and ask whether you received that from Louise Gahen [handing to witness].—A. Same answer.

Mr. SACHER. I ask that that be marked for identification.

Inspector PHELAN. That will be U.

(Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit U" for identification as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. Do you recall being arrested in the city of Springfield, Ill., in October 1933?—A. No, sir.

Q. You were not arrested in that city?—A. No, sir.

Q. Springfield, Ill.?—A. No.

Q. You had an adopted daughter by the name of Louise, didn't you?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was she with you in Springfield, Ill., in October 1933?—A. I believe she was. I think she was.

[P. 195] Q. You were there at the time, were you?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. I show you this letter contained in an envelope bearing date October 7, 1933, and ask you whether this refreshes your recollection as to whether you were arrested in the city of Springfield, Ill. [handing to witness], in October 1933?—A. I was not arrested in the city of Springfield, Ill., in October 1933.

Q. In what city were you arrested?—A. On what charge? I have been in the labor movement. You know that.

Q. I am not asking you about the labor movement. These are extracurricular activities we are asking you about now.—A. The fact of the matter is, well, certainly proved by a number of your comrades, Counsel.

Mr. SACHER. I move that the witness be admonished.

Inspector PHELAN. That may go out. Please answer the question.

The WITNESS. The point of the matter is that I was not arrested in the city of Springfield, Ill., at any time.

By Mr. SACHER:

[P. 196] Q. Were you arrested on a morals charge anywhere in Illinois in 1933?—A. No, sir; I was not, at any time.

Q. That letter doesn't refresh your recollection at all?—A. I was not arrested on any such charge.

Q. What was the situation in regard to the statements made by your daughter in this letter, can you tell the Inspector? I want to call one or two sentences to your attention. Look at this down here and tell the inspector what it was about [indicating].—A. I refuse to answer that.

Q. On what ground?—A. Same ground.

Q. That it will incriminate you?—A. Yes.

Q. This is 3 years later after the event referred to with Louise Gahen, isn't it; isn't that right?—A. Right.

Q. So that 3 years later you still refuse to answer things on the ground that it will tend to incriminate you; is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Mr. SACHER. I offer this letter for identification.

[P. 197] (Letter marked "Respondent's Exhibit V" for identification as of this date.)

By Mr. SACHER:

Q. The matter referred to in Respondent's Exhibit V for identification do not relate to Louise; is that right, Louise Gahen; they have no connection with Louise Gahen; is that right?—A. No, no.

Q. As a matter of fact, if you will look at the letter again you will see that Margaret Rogers was with you at the time, the woman that is now your wife; isn't that so?

Mr. BOYD. I object to this line of questioning. No proper foundation.

Mr. SACHER. I am trying to refresh the witness's recollection as to something that he has refused to answer on the ground that it will incriminate him.

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel, I think that is going a little afield. I will sustain the objection.

Mr. SACHER. Exception.

Can we have a recess for a few minutes?

Inspector PHELAN. Yes; we will take a 5- [p. 198] minute recess.

(Whereupon a 5-minute recess was taken.)

Inspector PHELAN. Gentlemen, counsel for respondent has suggested that we recess until 1:30 and then hand up authorities on the point as to whether this questioning is proper, with the thought that we may save time by doing so, if there is no objection on the part of the Government.

Mr. BOYD. No objection on the part of the Government.

Inspector PHELAN. The hearing is recessed until 1:30 p. m.

(Whereupon the hearing was adjourned to 1:30 p. m., September 17, 1948.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

(1:30 p. m., September 17, 1947)

LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ resumed the stand and testified further as follows:

Inspector PHELAN. Counsel for respondent and the Government are here. Proceed. I would like to have counsel argue briefly the point that was raised just prior to the recess. I trust counsel can keep the argument down to 5 minutes for each side.

Mr. SACHER. Mr. Fanelli will present the argument.

Inspector PHELAN. And the argument will not be recorded in the record.

(There was a discussion off the record on the objection of Mr. Boyd.)

Inspector PHELAN. The objection is overruled. You may have an exception.

Mr. BOYD. Exception.

(Whereupon a 15-minute recess was taken.)

Inspector PHELAN. The respondent and all counsel are present. Proceed.

Mr. SACHER. In regard to the witness, Budenz, I have one inquiry I am not prepared to make at this moment. If it is agreeable to the Presiding Inspector, I will be glad to call Mr. Boyd this evening and let him know whether I will want Mr. Budenz back tomorrow. I will call you before 6, if you want it so.

[P. 200] Mr. BOYD. I would be agreeable to that but Mr. Budenz has other activities. If at all possible, I would like to have you complete your cross examination today.

Mr. SACHER. If it were possible for me to do it I would love nothing better. But I cannot at this moment. There is a bit of written material in regard to which I have to interrogate him and I haven't got the writing here. And I will call you and let you know later in the day whether I will have it or not. If I don't have it today, then we can let him go.

Mr. BOYD. I understand, then, that the defense has completed their cross-examination with the exception of one item.

Inspector PHELAN. So I understand with the exception of possible questioning on that further item, if counsel decides to do that.

It seems that counsel isn't prepared to go any further anyhow, so that, at the moment, that leaves us in the position of going ahead with some other witness. If later there is any argument or dispute, we will have to argue it or dispose of it as it comes up.

Call your next witness.

Mr. BOYD. I understand that Mr. Budenz is [p. 201] excused at this time?

Inspector PHELAN. Unless he is recalled at some future date.

Mr. SACHER. The point is this: I will know this afternoon whether he is to be recalled or not. I would therefore suggest that, so you can have some continuity in the record, that if I am in a position this afternoon to indicate that I want him back, I will indicate that to Mr. Boyd.

Mr. BOYD. Is there a possibility of calling him this afternoon?

Mr. SACHER. I do not think so, because I doubt if I will have it within an hour.

Mr. BOYD. Mr. Budenz will not be available tomorrow morning in any event. At least, he will not be available until tomorrow afternoon.

Mr. SACHER. All right. If this comes, I will be just as happy to have him in the afternoon as in the morning.

EXHIBIT No. 84

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(Letter)-----	March 1939.

EXHIBIT NO. 85

SIGNERS OF LETTERS FROM PEOPLE WHO KNOW OWEN LATTIMORE'S WORK

William R. Amberson, professor of physiology, University of Maryland
 E. Cowles Andrus, professor of medicine, Johns Hopkins University
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 Hollis Bautier, professor, University of Chicago
 Knight Biggerstaff, professor of Chinese history, Cornell University
 Carrol Binder, journalist
 Woodbridge Bingham, associate professor of Far Eastern history, University of California
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 Demaree Bess, staff writer, Saturday Evening Post
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 Robert Blakely, editor, St. Louis
 Dorothy Borg, research on Far East, New York city.
 Hugh Borton, associate professor of Japanese, Columbia University
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 Eleanor Breed, columnist
 Norman Brown, director of South Asia Institute, University of Pennsylvania
 Percy Buchanan, director, Institute of Asiatic Affairs, University of Oklahoma
 Pearl Buck, author
 Gladys W. Bundy, lawyer and Republican clubwoman

Robert E. Bundy, town clerk, Bethel, Vt.
Claude Buss, professor of history, Stanford University
Gertrude Bussey, professor, Goucher College
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John C. Caldwell, ex-deputy director, United States Information Service for Korea
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Zachariah Chafee, Jr., professor of law, Harvard University
Melvin Conant, China program, Harvard University
James J. Corry, Jr., lecturer in Chinese, University of Michigan
Robert S. Cochrane, director, Station WMAR, Baltimore
John Hadley Cox, assistant professor, University of Michigan
Lester Cowan, moving picture producer
Olive Thompson Cowell, professor of education, San Francisco State College
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Carl T. Keller, Harvard-Yenching Institute

Willis J. King, Bishop of the Methodist Church

Marion J. Levy, Jr., assistant professor of sociology, Princeton University

Wayner Leys, professor, University of Chicago

Frederica de Laguna, professor of anthropology, Bryn Mawr College

Richard Lauterbach, author

Clare Leighton, author and artist

Paul Linebarger, professor of Asiatic Political School of Advanced International Studies

William Lockwood, department director, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton

Helen Lynd, professor of social sciences, Sarah Lawrence College

Clarence Long, professor of political economy, Johns Hopkins University

Donald McKay, professor of history, chairman of committee on international studies, Harvard University

Shannon McCune, chairman, department of geography, Colgate University

Desmond Martin, research student and author

Manry Maverick, former Congressman and mayor of San Antonio

William Mayer, former military attaché, Peking

Franz Michael, professor of far-eastern history, University of Washington

Broadus Mitchell, professor of economics, Rutgers University

Hans Morgenthau, professor of political science, University of Chicago

Saul Padover, dean of School of Politics, New School for Social Research

E. F. Penrose, professor of geography, Johns Hopkins University

Arthur Upham Pope, director, Asia Institute

John A. Pope, Freer Gallery of Art, Washington

Edwards A. Park, professor of pediatrics, Johns Hopkins University

Lucius C. Porter, ex-professor, Yenching University, Peking

Earl H. Pritchard, associate professor of far-eastern history, University of Chicago

Dale Pontius, Roosevelt College, Chicago

Rollin B. Posey, professor of political science, Northwestern University

Hortense Powdermaker, professor of anthropology, Queens College

Earl Pritchard, associate professor of far-eastern history, University of Chicago

Hermann Pritchett, professor

Nathaniel Peffer, professor of international relations, Columbia University

Harold S. Quigley, professor of political science, University of Minnesota

Wilnot Ragsdale, foreign correspondent, Time and Life

Christopher Rand, foreign correspondent

C. F. Remer, professor of economics, University of Michigan

Lloyd Reynolds, professor of economics, Yale University

Charles J. Rhoads, former Governor, Federal Reserve Bank, Philadelphia

Millard Rogers, assistant professor of Chinese art history, Stanford University

Lawrence K. Rosinger, research associate, American Institute of Pacific Relations

Doris Russel, professor of English, Vassar College

Easton Rothwell, vice chairman, Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford, University

Stanley Salmen, executive vice president and director, Little, Brown & Co.

Lawrence Sickman, vice director, Nelson Gallery, Kansas City

Dorothy Shields, professor of political economy, Goucher College

Father Louis Schram, Immaculate Heart Missions

Harvey Schuman, publisher

Elbridge Sibley, Social Science Research Council

Charles Siepmann, professor of education, New York University

Ernest J. Simmons, professor of Slavic languages, Columbia University

Harlow Shapley, professor of astronomy, Harvard University
Robert E. Sherwood, author and playwright
Stanley Spector, Far Eastern Institute, University of Washington
Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Arctic explorer and author
David Stevens, former director, division of humanities, Rockefeller Foundation
Edgar Snow, editorial writer, Saturday Evening Post
Rodger Swearingen, lecturer, University of Southern California
Leland Stowe, editor, the Reporter
Earl Swisher, history department, University of Colorado
Bradford Smith, author
Thomas Smith, assistant professor of far-eastern history, Stanford University
Herbert Bayard Swope, editor
Philip H. Taylor, professor of international relations, Syracuse University
S. B. Thomas, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York
Virginia Thompson, far-eastern research, New York
Daniel Thorner, assistant professor of economic history, University of Pennsylvania
Elliott R. Thorpe, brigadier general, United States Army, retired
Nischa Titlieve, associate professor of anthropology, University of Michigan
Alfred Tozzer, professor of anthropology (retired), Harvard University
Andrew G. Truzal, president, Hood College
Harold Vinacke, professor of political science, University of Cincinnati
James P. Warburg, banker and author
Royal J. Wald, research fellow, California
Langdon Warner, curator of oriental department, Fogg Museum, Harvard University
Richard J. Walsh, president, John Day Co.
William Stix Wasserman, chairman, Electronized Chemicals Corps.
George H. Watson, University of Chicago
Edward A. Weeks, editor of the Atlantic Monthly
George Wilson, social science department, University of Chicago
Thomas Wiener, department of Slavic studies, Duke University
Harold J. Wiens, assistant professor of geography, Yale University
Herbert F. West, professor of English, Dartmouth College
C. Martin Wilbur, associate professor of Chinese, Columbia University
John B. Whitelaw, professor of education, Johns Hopkins University
Arthur Wright, assistant professor of history, Stanford University
Mary Wright, curator of Chinese Collection, Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford University
Quincy Wright, professor of international law, University of Chicago
J. B. Whitehead, professor of electrical engineering, Johns Hopkins University
H. R. Wishengrad, Overseas News Agency
H. G. W. Woodward, professor of history, Johns Hopkins University
Joseph K. Yamigawa, associate professor of Japanese, University of Michigan
Margaret Young, formerly secretary of Page School of International Relations

EXHIBIT No. 56

MINUTES OF FIGHTING-FUNDS FOR FINLAND, INC., 1940

The first meeting of the Maryland Committee for Fighting-Funds for Finland, Inc., met on Tuesday afternoon, February 20, 5 p. m., at 516 North Charles Street. Those present were Mr. Baldwin, Judge Leser, Dr. Lovejoy, Mr. Theodore Marburg, Mr. Charles Marburg, Miss Poe, Mr. Porter, and Miss Snow. Mr. Charles Marburg in the chair.

The names of those who had consented to serve on the committee were announced as follows: Dr. Harold N. Arrowsmith, Mr. Rignal W. Baldwin, Mr. George G. Carey, Jr., Mrs. Rufus Gibbs, Dr. W. Stull Holt, Mr. Wallace Lanahan, Dr. Owen Lattimore, Rabbi Morris S. Lazaron, Judge Oscar Leser, Dr. Arthur O. Lovejoy, Dr. Kemp Malone, Mr. Charles L. Marburg, Mr. Theodore Marburg, Mr. F. Furnival Peard, Miss Mary Lee Poe, Mr. Alexander G. Porter, Maj. Gen. Milton A. Reckord, Dr. F. C. Reynolds, and Miss Jessie L. Snow.

Mr. Charles Marburg announced that Maj. Gen. John F. O'Ryan had accepted the chairmanship of the National Organization with headquarters at 120 Broadway, New York City. Quoting from a telegram from Mr. R. F. Seton-Harris,

executive secretary of the national organization, "Fighting-Funds for Finland, Inc., is now actively forming in each State. Its charter calls for monies and other donations to be outright gifts to the Republic of Finland without restriction for the purchase of armaments and other munitions in defense of Finland * * * all organizing expenses are to be privately underwritten as far as possible, so that funds will go in toto to the Finns." Mr. Seton-Harris also emphasized the importance of speeding up organization plans in order that action could start at once to rush collections to the courageous Finnish people.

Mr. Theodore Marburg presented a statement for the press. A copy is attached to these minutes. A letter written by Mr. Marburg which was to appear in the Morning Sun the following day was also read.

Mr. Charles Marburg announced that Mr. F. Furnival Peard, of the Maryland Trust Co., had consented to receive contributions for Fighting-Funds for Finland, Inc., in Maryland.

The motion was made by Mr. Porter and seconded by Miss Poe that Miss Snow be appointed the executive secretary of the Maryland Committee for Fighting-Funds for Finland, Inc. The meeting adjourned to be reconvened the following day, February 21, at 4:30 p. m.

Respectfully submitted.

JESSIE L. SNOW, *Executive Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 87

QUOTATIONS FROM OWEN LATTIMORE'S WRITINGS

"The spread of direct Russian control over Asia would be disastrous for the countries of Asia as well as for America and Europe." ("The Situation in Asia," by Owen Lattimore (Little, Brown & Co., 1949). Page 12.)

"No Chinese government can be genuinely independent if it is subject to manipulation by Russia." (Statement signed by Mr. Lattimore together with Senator Flanders, Senator Murray, and Professors Dulles, Fisher, and MacNair, December 30, 1946.)

"At the same time, any new departure in United States policy in Asia must be proof against the accusation of 'appeasing' Communism as a doctrine or Russia as a state." (Article in "The Atlantic Monthly," January 1950, by Owen Lattimore.)

"Those of us who have never been Marxists have many straightforward disagreements with the Marxists." (Book Review in the "New York Herald Tribune" by Owen Lattimore, November 30, 1947.)

"United States policy should aim to increase the ability of countries in Asia to do without Russia, by encouraging a steady improvement of the three-way economic relationship between Asia, Europe, and America, including the resumption of the supply of raw materials from Asia, the sale of Europe's manufactures in Asia, and American financing both of industrialization in Asia and recovery in Europe. The American financing should be undertaken as a sound enterprise in increasing production and consumption, not as a doling out of subsidies to keep the economies of Asia and Europe stagnantly alive." (Article in "The Atlantic Monthly," January 1950, by Owen Lattimore.)

"* * * American policy, to be successful, must operate through the United Nations as much as possible and strengthen the United Nations as much as possible. A two-world system of American allies and satellites, ranged against Russian allies and satellites, is not enough in America's favor and may be too much in Russia's favor. Only by working through the United Nations can the third countries, which are already critically important in Asia and may become important in Europe, be brought closer to the American side than to the Russian side." ("The Situation in Asia" by Owen Lattimore (Little, Brown & Co., 1949) Page 227.)

"The fact is that the American interest, of course and without further discussion, lies in making sure of the minimum expansion of Russian control and influence." (Lecture by Owen Lattimore, Mt. Holyoke College, June 1948.)

"Nationalism is the only bedrock on which a political structure can be built in China—or anywhere in Asia—today. If we are as quick as the Russians and the Communists of Asia are to build on that bedrock, then the new political structures that are being built in China and all over Asia will incorporate many features of capitalism, private enterprise, and political democracy in their 'third

country' architectural design. If the Russians and the Communists continue to keep ahead of us in accepting Asia on its own terms, there will be more socialism in the superstructure." ("The Situation in Asia" by Owen Lattimore (Little, Brown & Co., 1949). Page 180.)

"I do not believe that a spread of Communism anywhere in Asia (or indeed in Europe or America) is either inevitable or desirable. * * * More than that, I believe that the country which most people in Asia would like to imitate and emulate is America rather than Russia." (Article in "China Monthly," December 1945, by Owen Lattimore.)

"What I believe in, and what my whole record shows I believe in, is the spread of democracy, not the spread of Communism." (Article in "China Monthly," December 1945, by Owen Lattimore.)

"[A safe American policy] would guarantee that the Chinese Communists remain in a secondary position, because it would strengthen those Chinese who are opposed to Communism. * * *" (Article in "Virginia Quarterly Review," 1940, by Owen Lattimore.)

"We shall have turned the disadvantage of an Asia that we are not strong enough to control into the advantage of an Asia strong enough to refuse to be controlled by Russia. We shall have given a fresh impetus to both capitalism and political democracy." ("The Situation in Asia" by Owen Lattimore (Little, Brown & Co., 1949). Page 237.)

"The fact is that my comments and interpretations have always been so independent that I have in my time been criticized by Chinese, Japanese, Germans, Russians, and Mongols, as well as by intemperate American writers. * * * The criticisms run all the way from calling me an arch-imperialist to calling me a Red." (Article in "China Monthly," December 1945, by Owen Lattimore.)

"A great part of Asia's hopes, however, will be fulfilled, and should be fulfilled with American cooperation. We have everything to gain by being on the side of hope." ("The Situation in Asia" by Owen Lattimore (Little, Brown & Co., 1949). Page 238.)

"Our cardinal need there is a United China, carried forward on a current of orderly reforms. There is no need for violent revolution; but, unless the current of orderly reforms is given a free channel, there will be violent revolution. It would be a tragic folly, and the culminating folly of two decades, if American vacillation and failure to support the patriots in China—the hard-pressed guardians of the American stake in evolutionary democratic progress—should let loose defeatism, civil war and revolution. America has no time to lose. We must have a policy that does not limit us to defending the possessions of the democracies, but pledges us to support and spread democracy itself." (Article in magazine "Asia," April 1941, by Owen Lattimore. Page 162.)

EXHIBIT No. 88

ATTACKS ON OWEN LATTIMORE IN COMMUNIST PRESS

[From Problems of History of China, April 1949]

VOPROSI ISTORII (QUESTIONS OF HISTORY, 1949)

The proclivity to libel and slander the struggle of the toilers of China in the revolution of 1925-27 is explained not only by the fully understandable hatred of the learned lackeys of imperialism towards the revolutionary movement of the masses. Slander is also used in a given case to represent, despite the truth, the Chinese bourgeoisie, who betrayed the national interests of the country, as the progressive force of the Chinese national-liberation movement.

This notion in this or another form can be found in the writings of all the authors we have named. Lattimore, the former American adviser to Chiang Kai Shek in the years of the second World War, formulates it most clearly. Lattimore advertises the clique of Chiang Kai Shek as "the bearer of the revolutionary traditions" of the Chinese people. The mercenary rulers of Kuomintang China, according to the affirmation of Lattimore, are the "sons and heirs of the Chinese revolutionaries who were active twenty and thirty years ago" [Lattimore, Owen and Eleanor. The Making of Modern China, p. 183. London, 1945]. The Kuomintang's betrayal of the revolution in 1927 Lattimore holds to be only a sensible craving to make a "pause" in order "to consolidate the already achieved successes (?!) and to attempt to win with the help of negoti-

ations (with foreign powers—L. B.) that which still remained to be won (?)” [Lattimore, op. cit., p. 138. Here are clearly manifested the causes of the Lattimore's sympathy toward Chiang Kai Shek and Co. He is attracted by the rejection of this clique of traitors of the struggle with imperialist expansion, of the struggle for a genuine liberation of China].

[In: The Pacific Ocean, a political, social, and economic quarterly review. No. 1. Published by the State Social and Economic Press, Moscow, 1935]

EXCERPTS FROM AN ARTICLE BY N. TERENTIEV, TITLED “PACIFIC AFFAIRS”

* * * Mr. Lattimore asserts that the coronation of Pu EE is a new step forward in the direction of “supporting the independence of Mongolia.” The author's assertions, to a considerable extent, reveal that fact that this term is applied by him to Japanese politics not in an ironical sense, but literally, and that the reactionary forces in Inner Mongolia, having put themselves in the service of the aggressive Japanese plans, are constantly and respectfully called by him “conservative Mongolians.” Analyzing the further invasion by Japan into that portion of Inner Mongolia which remains under Chinese control, Mr. Lattimore once again, with complete seriousness, speaks of “the politics of Japan and Manchukuo supporting the conservative Mongolians on terms favorable to the Mongols themselves” * * * (p. 218).

* * * Mr. Lattimore finds himself under the hypnotic influence of his own theory concerning the struggle between land and marine (naval) tactics in the politics of the powers in relation to China and Eastern Asia, and from the point of view of this theory he attempts to partially explain—and to a certain degree justify—the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. * * *

* * * We also consider that Mr. Lattimore's scholasticism is similar to Hamlet's madness, and finds its *system* with a rather obvious political content” * * * (p. 217).

* * * Among the group of articles earning special attention is the declaration of the editor of the Magazine, Mr. Owen Lattimore (the article “Mongolia Enters World Affairs” in the March issue, the commentary “Japanese Europe” in the June edition, and the commentaries “Empire and Exploitation,” “Land power of the Japanese Fleet” in the December edition). To begin with, let us note that we are separated (divided) from Mr. Lattimore by insurmountable differences in opinion, not only in a general world outlook, which is not worth special mention, but also in the concrete evaluation of the current political situation in the Far East * * * (p. 217).

* * * According to Lattimore, “a Japanese continental policy is unthinkable without an active Mongolian policy (politics),” “a Japanese aggressive policy in Inner Mongolia is inevitable,” and in the same way evidently, is justified, the similar idea that “no less inevitable is a conflict between Inner and Outer Mongolia.” After all this, it appears that, “even though the government of Outer Mongolia is strong * * *” and even “has for its leaders probably the best people of the country,” it still “unquestionably is a government of the minority” (?) and cannot be considered stabilized until the generation which still remembers olden times has died out * * * (p. 218).

* * * A further development of these same ideas, in the December issue, brings Mr. Lattimore to the decision that the Japanese militarists with Araki at their head are acting on purely idealistic bases, that they “are sincerely working for the creation of a strong Manchukuo with its very own sound financial, industrial and trade organizations freely and profitably trading for itself with Japan, but *economically not drained* (exhausted) and in the future becoming dependent on Japan” that the “military idealists” of the latter defend “the Empire's structure, which can more properly be characterized as a federation, than as plain (naked) exploitation,” and that “the Pan-Asiatic movement” is directed towards the “establishment of a group of Asiatic countries in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Northern and Southern China, which will be under Japanese political hegemony, but would not demand individual support from Japan, which could divide and weaken Japanese military and economic resources.” Mr. Lattimore, it is true, emphasizes the conflict between military and civilian points of view which exist in Japan, and leaves the problem open, of whether the victor will be “Federation or Exploitation,” but the very manner in which this problem has been formulated by the author misinforms the reader concerning the actual aims and methods of the Japanese Aggressive policy in Manchuria and China and is direct apologetics for Japanese imperialism.

In another of the articles mentioned earlier, the same land-naval theory blooms. This brings Mr. Lattimore to the conclusion, that Japan is supposedly ready at any moment to make concessions in naval matters, in return for "a betterment of her position in Manchuria, China, and Mongolia." Mr. Lattimore even feels that if the Japanese naval tonnage norm were really to be raised, that would be nothing more than a concealed defeat of Japan, which "not being able to establish (confirm) its new profitable positions on the continent, would be forced to return to the less satisfactory policy of naval protection (defense) of a land position." Even if we were to agree with the essence of this evaluation—and we feel that Japan's refusal of the Washington Naval Act is an action which not only strengthens Japanese pretensions for rule of the continent, but supplements them with plans of naval expansion, which Japan has no thought of refusing—then the verbal peelings, heaped up by Mr. Lattimore, would leave us alienated from his point of view (p. 219).

[In: The Pacific Ocean (Tikhii Okean), a political, social, and economic quarterly review. No. 1. Published by the State Social and Economic Press, Moscow, 1936]

EXCERPTS FROM AN ARTICLE BY A. LIFSHTITZ TITLED "THE MAGAZINE 'PACIFIC AFFAIRS' FOR 1935"

* * * In this manner Mr. Lattimore once again returns to that apology (apologetics) of the plundering Japanese politics in relation to Mongolia, which is so precisely expressed in his above-mentioned book (The Mongols in Manchuria). This conception of his is here again woven together with the scholastic theory of the beginning of a new era of "land power" as opposed to "marine (naval) power," which supposedly characterized the period right up to the beginning of the 20th century. This "new era," in the author's opinion, must logically lead to the "rebirth of Mongolia," evidently under Japanese protection.

Lattimore's concept stems from the thesis of the supposed readiness of the Japanese to give the Mongols actual independence. In part, concerning Manchuria, these fantasies of Lattimore's are criticized in the already mentioned article by Grazhdantsev, and Lattimore himself was forced to admit, in a footnote, that his original expectations did not materialize * * * (p. 169).

* * * However, inasmuch as we are speaking of the article in "Pacific Affairs," it is not difficult to see that Lattimore's deliberations and especially the conclusions which inevitably follow them (which ask to be made because of them) are very close to the Japanese slogan of "the battle with the communistic threat," and that his article can and will serve as justification for Japanese aggression in Northern China and in Mongolia (p. 170).

* * * Of course, Mr. Lattimore can say that he is not responsible for the actions of the Japanese, but after all he is a politician and not an archeologist, and cannot in his writings become diverted from the concrete and extremely threatening surroundings in the region of Japanese operation, or from the criminal acts of aggression, either in preparation, or already completed by the Japanese imperialists * * * (p. 170).

(The article referred to is in No. 4 of Pacific Affairs "The Inner Gates of China.")—Tr. note.

[Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika, No. 4-5, 1946, p. 91-92]

REVIEW OF THE MAKING OF MODERN CHINA

(V. Maslennikov)

The author's approach to some of the questions of history of China is simplified and superficial. * * *

* * * they fail to rightly evaluate the Opium wars and the transformation of China into a semicolony of the capitalist powers. Their characterization of the Taiping revolution and of the Boxer Rebellion is superficial. The anti-imperialist character of the Boxer Rebellion is not pointed out. * * *

* * * as regards contemporary China: events are often characterized wrongly or superficially. * * *

* * * the well-known Japanese satrap Chian-Tso-Lin is an "honest military governor," who "never sold his native land."

* * * nothing is said of the fact that Sun-Yat Sen was a democrat who loved and was devoted to his country. * * *

* * * they say nothing on the character and role of the Chinese democratic movement which was primarily led by the Communist Party.

* * * they compare the period 1928-37 with the industrial revolution in England. This does not correspond to reality.

* * * they endeavor to prove that the Gomindan regime is a preparatory stage preparing the future development of democracy, and that its dictatorship thereby differs from a Fascist dictatorship. * * *

* * * they fail to mention that the financial capital of USA endeavors to strengthen its position in China and to occupy a position of power in its economy. * * *

[From the Daily Worker]

Books

THE SITUATION IN ASIA. By Owen Lattimore. 238 pp. Boston. Atlantic-Little, Brown. \$2.75.

'SITUATION IN ASIA' CRITICIZES U. S. GOVERNMENT POLICY IN FAR EAST

(By David Carpenter)

Owen Lattimore's *Situation in Asia* is extremely critical of our government's policies in that immense area of colonial and semi-colonial peoples. He shows that our government has done nothing but alienate the people's forces seeking national liberation in Asia.

Lattimore, who is the director of the Walter Hines Page School of Foreign Relations at Johns Hopkins University, points out that our dependence on the Kuomintang has served only to make the United States hated by the Chinese people. He contrasts, to our disadvantage, the reliance on the unpopular imperialist agent Syngman Rhee and the maintenance of U. S. occupation troops in South Korea with the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the establishment of a native peoples government in North Korea.

He shows clearly that the efforts by the U. S. government to make Japan a major bastion against the Soviet Union must end in failure.

Lattimore proposes that our government end its alliances with dictatorial, corrupt anti-people's forces in Asia. He urges that we stop intervention in the internal affairs of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. He asks that we aid the peoples of Asia to achieve national independence.

* * *

All this is to the good as far as it goes. But Lattimore goes completely off the beam in his efforts to explain the relationship of political and social forces in Asia and their impact on world affairs. And as long as we fail to recognize the reality of these relations so long will we be unable to help in the achievement of those aims Lattimore proposes.

In the first place, Lattimore argues that the colonial and semi-colonial peoples struggling for national independence are developing a "third force" that seeks to remain equi-distant from American and Russian power. He refuses to admit that the struggle is completely an anti-imperialist struggle, to drive out the American, British, French, and Dutch capitalists who are subjecting their native peoples to super-exploitation for their raw materials and as markets for capitalist products.

Lattimore admits that the Asiatic colonial and semi-colonial peoples are looking to the Soviet Union for examples of how oppressed peoples achieve independence and are turning away from the United States because of its imperialist line. But he makes this a contest of tactics which the United States can change by adopting new methods.

* * *

Lattimore refuses to see that the reason the colonial people turn to the Soviet Union for their example is precisely because of the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of socialism in that country. As Stalin points out, etc.:

"It is precisely because the national-colonial revolutions took place in our country under the leadership of the proletariat and under the banner of internationalism that pariah nations, slave nations, have for the first time in the history of mankind risen to the position of nations which are really free and

really equal, thereby setting a contagious example for the oppressed nations of the whole world.

"This means that the October Revolution has ushered in a new era, the era of colonial revolutions which are being conducted in the oppressed countries of the world in alliance with the proletariat and under the leadership of the proletariat."

The core of the leadership in the colonial struggle against imperialism and the guarantee of the achievement of national independence lies in the growth and development of the native Communist Parties, springing out of the exploited native working classes and leading the exploited working class and the oppressed peasant masses. That is why the imperialists, under the leadership of the United States, direct their main fire against the destruction of these native Communist Parties.

Secondly, Lattimore makes the mistake of assuming that the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union in Asia is that of a struggle for power. Here he falls into the trap laid by American imperialism, which would like to hide the reality of its efforts to maintain its grasp of the resources and manpower of Asia.

* * *

This approach to American-Soviet relationships obscures the truth. The Soviet Union is not seeking world power. When the colonial peoples look for alliances with the Soviet Union, it is because they see in that socialist country the true defender of their national aspirations. When the Soviet Union aligns itself with these peoples, it is not just a counter-alliance to protect its own borders against the attack of imperialism, it is fundamentally a defense of the national interests of the peoples of these oppressed nations.

Because the peoples of the world recognize that an attack on the Soviet Union is an attack on the defender of their own aspirations, because they see in such an attack on their own efforts to break the hold of imperialism, they join with the Soviet Union in a common front against imperialism. They have already seen how the peoples of the Eastern European democracies were able to protest themselves from the encroachment of imperialism and to begin their own internal development as the result of alliances with and protection by the Soviet Union.

In our own country, if we are to adopt the proposals Lattimore makes for "the situation in Asia," it is necessary for us to loosen the hold of the imperialists on our government. Otherwise, our official policies will continue to be that of oppressing the colonial peoples in the interests of our monopoly capitalists.

EXHIBIT No. 89

THEY CALLED ME A SPY

(By Emmanuel S. Larsen)

I often wonder how great a portion of the American reading public knows what became of the "espionage" case that figured so prominently in the headlines of the Nation's newspapers on June 7, 1945.

Since I was one of the six persons involved and was made the "goat" in the final settlement of the case, I deem it timely to give my story to the American people while its representatives in Congress are investigating the remarkable circumstances surrounding the entire affair.

I was born in 1897, in San Rafael, Calif. My father was a teacher; he had taken great interest in the Chinese revolutionary movement and had made the acquaintance of many of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's adherents. In 1906, after the San Francisco fire, we went to China where my father was to teach in the Imperial University in Chengtu.

My boyhood in China was very much different from that of most other American children there, for I was taught by my parents to like and respect the Chinese, among whom we were residing as guests. I attended Hua Yang Middle School, and when I was not yet fourteen, I was already so completely Chinese in my speech, thoughts and outlook on life that I can honestly say that what goes on in the average Chinese mind is no "Oriental mystery" to me. I have, of course, since then acquired sufficient of the American characteristics to enable me to judge China rather impartially, and because my friends always said I was mentally a Chinese I have, perhaps, been excessively conscientious

in my attempt to be strictly impartial in my career as an analyst of Chinese affairs.

In 1911, when we were about to leave China, I did not have a single boyhood friend of European stock; my playmates were all Chinese with whom I had played, studied, fought, and dreamed. One particular boy, who was my constant companion, schemed and talked endlessly of what we would do for China when we grew up. Together we pored over the illustrations in the British magazine *Graphic*; we compared the pictured splendor of the outside world with the often pitifully low standards of living in China; and I frequently had a hard time explaining such embarrassing questions as why foreign gunboats were free to cruise at will on Chinese rivers and why foreigners in China generally treated the natives with such contempt. These little friends of mine, not only then, but when we met in later years, placed so much confidence in me and expected such great things of me, that to this day I feel that I have succeeded very poorly in fulfilling my promises to them.

When the revolution broke out, our family went to Denmark, where my father wanted to visit his aged mother. He signed a five-year contract to teach in a school in Denmark, and I thus received my high school education there and later received my B. A. from the University of Copenhagen. In 1916, we returned to the United States, where my father entered the Chicago school system and I found employment in the oriental art department of Marshall Field's famous store. My daily contact with Chinese objects of art made me long for China, and as a result of several applications, I was favored with an appointment to the Chinese Postal Administration when I was barely 20 years old.

My first station in China was Canton. After a year, I was sent to my old home in West China; there I had a thrilling reunion with my former classmates. The western world was then in the throes of a devastating war, and I had little to brag about in regard to western civilization; my Chinese friends, on the other hand, modestly apologized for the chaos into which the greedy warlords of China had thrown their country. Our somewhat more mature thoughts and discussions now centered around plans to make China and America the sister republics of all times by bringing together the peoples of these two great nations. I had to confess that Chinese youth knew so infinitely much more about America than our people knew about China.

In the summer of 1918, I registered for war service in the United States Army and was on my way home when armistice was declared. Returning to work in the postal service, my duties took me on extensive travels through most of China; I was stationed in Taiyuan, Peking, Foochow, Amoy, Hangchow, and Mukden. It was as postmaster in the port of Amoy that I was called upon by the Directorate of Posts in Peking to supply biographical information about the many new military and political personalities who had suddenly come before the public eye as leaders of the Kuomintang forces that were then threatening the North China government. Amoy was an excellent locality for the study of these new elements, for the port lay on the dividing line between the political entities of north and south China.

Right from the start I became very fond of this minor part of my regular duties, and the collection of current Chinese biographies thus became my principal hobby since the year of 1923.

The politics of early revolutionary days were extremely involved; the many groups and factions were interwoven in a confusing pattern due to the maneuverers of numerous minor leaders who for purely selfish reasons would climb first on one bandwagon and then on another as the fortunes of the revolutionary wars developed.

Outstanding and more clearcut, however, were the leaders of the Nationalists who fought their way up to the Yangtze Valley in 1927. They were the forces of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, under the able military leadership of Gen. Chiang Kai-shek. They had started out from Canton in 1924 after many local reverses. Dr. Sun had tried in vain to obtain the support of the United States and Britain, but his attempt to seize and utilize Chinese customs funds had been answered with American naval gunfire. Right then and there we had chilled the friendship that the Chinese Republicans had held for us; we had literally pushed Dr. Sun's revolutionaries into the arms of Soviet Russia. Russian advisers and military supplies, thereafter, streamed into Canton, and, in 1924, Chiang Kai-shek's revitalized armies had finally been able to start their northward march. When these armies reached the Yangtze, Dr. Sun had died, and Chiang felt that he could no longer retain his Soviet Russian advisers. He dismissed Galen and Borodin and many staff officers attached to their advisory mission; but large units of

his armies had already been so thoroughly indoctrinated in communism that they refused to obey Chiang's headquarters; under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, Ho Lung, Chu Te and others, these pro-Communist troops fled to the hills of central and southern Kiangsi and began to harrass the newly established Nationalist Government in Nanking.

I was then stationed in Mukden, where I was postal accountant for the southern part of Manchuria. As an official of the North China regime, which consisted of a bewildering blend of modern diplomats and old-time warlords, I was beset with misgivings concerning my future as a Chinese official. I was beginning to have great faith in Chiang Kai-shek's new government; our official reports, read eagerly by all of us in the North China government, indicated that the Nationalists had a very definite policy and were actually doing things. The main item on their program was unification of China, and the next one was to present to the outside world an orderly state with a balanced budget and thereby, in an honorable and acceptable manner, accomplish the abolition of the unequal treaties. To China's enemies, however, these were the very things that must not materialize. Russia armed and aided the opposition to Chiang's government because she wanted to see China sovietized; Japan armed and aided the northern generals because she liked these greedy weaklings and feared a strong and unified China under Chiang. The British played their usual small die-hard merchant-politics in China, and our Government did a pretty good job of following in their footsteps.

I held a good position in Mukden, with a fairly high salary and an excellent residence; and I had been decorated three times by the North China regime, yet I felt that I wanted to get out and go into business on my own. During 1926, on a hunting trip in Manchurian Inner Mongolia, I had become acquainted with a young and very brilliant Mongol lama, known as the Te-ch'ing-mu Lama, with headquarters in the Ko-ken Monastery, in the Solun area of northwestern Manchuria. The lama, who was a graduate of a university in Peking and spoke fluent Chinese, was the spiritual leader of the many clans under the Khorchin League of Mongols. Immensely wealthy, and with unlimited power and influence over his Mongol herds-men, he was eager to invest millions in model ranches and tanning factories. After I had visited his headquarters several times and spent many pleasant days roaming over the plains with him in my Dodge car, he prevailed upon me to resign from the Chinese government and join him in the capacity of an adviser. In the latter part of 1927 I, therefore, made careful preparations for adequate export outlets, through British firms in Tientsin, and I spent six months studying up on wool and sheep-breeding. With the aid of a Czechoslovak engineer and several Australian sheepmen, we finally built three ranches, a tanning factory, some roads, and imported merino rams and numerous cars and trucks. I was the first American pioneer in that part of Asia. Soviet Russians had been coming into the border town of Taonan for several years to buy wool and furs; they now streamed in bent on wrecking my business. But I had a fairly well established partnership with the lama, the Chinese garrison commandant and the Mongol resident prince. The Russians were constantly telling the Mongols and the Chinese that Americans were swindlers and thieves and urging them not to deal with me. The Japanese, on the other hand, owned the stock in the Szepingkai-Taonan Railway, had staked off a Japanese concession outside the city walls of Taonan, and strongly resented any American establishing himself in this coveted area. As usual, China was the battle ground of foreign powers, each with their eyes on rich or strategically important morsels of China's periphery. Japan wanted the Taonan-Solun plains of Inner Mongolia as a jumping-off place for a huge mechanized army aimed at Siberia and Outer Mongolia; Russia wanted this area with its gentle grades from the Mongolian Plateau down to the fertile Sungary valley of Manchuria for exactly the same reasons—conquest.

And just as the pattern would appear, the Japanese took Manchuria first (in 1931) and then lost it to the Russians (in 1945). I did not stay long in Mongolia; in 1928, after the assassination of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, there was a change of officials in Taonan, and the new garrison commandant was eager to please the Japanese and forced me to leave. I went to Tientsin in the autumn of 1928 and joined the British-American Tobacco Co., which sent me to Peiping to take charge of their traffic department there.

That same year I married a Russian girl I had met in Manchuria. I was already fairly well conversant with the Russian language, and as a result of my Russian marriage I became well acquainted with the various types of Rus-

sians—Whites and Reds alike. I found the Russians by nature to be a fascinating people; they are hospitable to the extreme; they love to laugh and joke, much as the average American. But the Soviet Russians seemed to live under a cloud of restraint; they were ever cautious in their conversation, and there was hardly anything they dared to discuss freely. The few Soviet Russians that one met in the International Club and at parties were so noncommittal that they were outright boring; it was simply impossible for an American to have anything to do with them. It was obvious, however, that every adult Soviet Russian was a cog in Russia's political machine, and they went about their sinister duties in China with clock-like precision, never daring to become friendly with Chinese or westerners, and constantly spying on each other. A year or two among those people would be the best cure for any American with a hankering for the Communistic way of life. By apologists it was always explained that it was necessarily so during the first years of the Russian revolution, where everyone was engaged in a gigantic struggle; the struggle must still be on, for I have observed that the present-day officials of the U. S. S.-R. in Washington act in exactly the same manner, keeping aloof from the people in whose midst they live and discouraging even their children from associating with their American schoolmates.

Five and a half years with the British-American Tobacco Co. ended with the closing of the company's traffic branch in Peiping. I decided to return to the United States and sailed for home in the spring of 1934. I went to Chicago, where my father was still connected with the school system, but since conditions for employment, especially in my particular field of interest, were extremely poor at the time, I returned to China in the autumn of the same year. When I got back to Peiping I met a Chinese friend of mine in the street who said he had been looking for me for several months. He was an intelligence officer in the Gendarmerie, the military police under the Ministry of War. He explained to me that when the Chinese forces retreated from Jehol in 1933, many Chinese commanders had buried their large and fresh stocks of arms in the vicinity of Peiping rather than risk a futile stand against the Japanese. Subsequently some of these commanders had secretly gone back to their caches and unearthed their munitions hoards which were now finding their way into the hands of all sorts of lawless elements. General Shao Wen-k'ai of the Gendarmerie wanted me to assist in the apprehension of Chinese officers involved in this illicit arms traffic. He had selected me for this work, my friend told me, because of my fluent Chinese and my knowledge of personalities in Chinese military circles. He offered me a handsome salary and commissions on all seizures; but what intrigued me most was the fact that the Gendarmerie's personalities files were made available to me, and I was able to check on the accuracy of information. I had collected patiently as a hobby during the past 11 years. In some instances, of course, I found that I was way off, while in others I was right on the beam; the most amusing, however, was to find some of my own earlier reports to the Chinese government copied verbatim and tucked away in the secret files. General Shao, a highly intelligent man and a student of Buddhist philosophy, accorded me all the usual privileges of a foreign "guest" and I had a high regard for this modest and ascetic looking officer. It was, therefore, painful to me to learn many years later that during the Japanese occupation of North China, he had become a puppet official. I have often wondered whether he and a number of his men did not join the Japanese the better to keep an eye on them. For his whole organization, prior to the invasion, was much feared by the Japanese, and he himself was extremely anti-Japanese.

In the early part of 1935 the Japanese found out that I was working for the Chinese Gendarmerie; the Japanese military attaché in Peiping contacted me and offered me the alternative of quitting the Gendarmerie or possibly getting run over by a Japanese military truck. I was then seeking a divorce from my Russian wife, who had fallen under the spell of a young German aviator, and since I intended to return to the United States anyway, I told the Japanese attaché that I would be glad to accept a good riddance visa for travel via Japan on my journey home.

Back in the United States, I discovered that no matter how much Chinese a man knows about China, he would not qualify for any official position without the stamp of approval of the men who control positions in the Far Eastern field. I, therefore, went to the University of Chicago, enrolled for a brief course, qualified for one Rockefeller scholarship after another, and in the course of six months found myself in Washington, a candidate for the position of research

analyst in Chinese affairs in the Office of Naval Intelligence. I was employed by the Navy in October 1935, and served almost nine years as Chinese analyst.

During the war, I became acquainted with almost all the naval officers serving in the Far Eastern branch of the Intelligence system. One of these was Lt. Andrew Roth, a brilliant young boy who had been commissioned a junior lieutenant after completing the Navy's special course in the Japanese language. The fact that he had been commissioned and accepted for work in Naval Intelligence placed him in the status of a man whose loyalty to the U. S. government was not doubted by the authorities and whom I had no need of fearing. My friendship with Roth was neither very intimate nor of long duration, but—as was the general practice—we frequently went to lunch together and occasionally got together in the evening over a glass of beer or a pot-luck dinner, ending up with a good argument, ranging anywhere from Japanese Shinto to my Chinese personalities file.

One day Roth came to my desk in the Navy Department around noontime and asked me whether I had had my lunch: I told him that I hadn't. He then asked me if I would like to walk up-town with him and have lunch, and I readily agreed. When we had crossed Pennsylvania Avenue at 17th Street, and I was about to suggest going into the Trianon Cafe, Roth stopped me and asked me whether I knew a man named Philip Jaffe. For the moment I could not recollect where I had seen the name but was sure that I did not know any such person. He then explained that Jaffe was publisher and editor of the magazine "Amerasia," and I then remembered having often seen the name. Roth told me that he was well acquainted with Jaffe and knew that he and I would have a lot in common since Jaffe also was interested in Chinese personalities and would be in a position to trade information with me. I was particularly interested in the biographies of the Communist leaders in China, Roth knew, and he suggested that we get together. I asked him how that would be possible, and he smilingly informed me that Jaffe was in Washington that day, and he, Roth, was just then on his way to have lunch with him and would be glad to bring me along and introduce me.

We walked over to the Statler Hotel and met Jaffe in the lobby. First we had a cocktail in his room and then we had lunch in one of the dining rooms. While eating, we discussed the conditions under which we could trade information concerning Chinese personalities. Jaffe said he would visit Washington about once a month and would then ask me for biographical notes or background material on personages he had in mind, and if I didn't have such information ready on my cards, he would pick it up on his next trip. Likewise I was to give him a list of personalities I was studying, and he would try to supply them to me on his next trip. Thus started my relations with Jaffe, ever so innocently, as far as I could see, and I was quite happy to have a new source of information. Incidentally, I may mention here that the personalities information available from official sources was generally negligible and very similar to the tedious and euphemous stuff that one may find in any Who's Who. What I valued in my collection was the off-the-record "dirt" on a man's character, hitherto unpublished information about his past career, earlier political affiliations and the real reasons for his switching from one faction to another. Most of the China experts in Naval Intelligence did not believe in the importance of collecting such data, and I had a hard time explaining to one of my superiors that China, as many other countries, was governed not so much by ideologies as by personalities.

After that I began to read Jaffe's magazine Amerasia with greater interest. I found that all the government agencies in Washington that handle Far Eastern affairs subscribed to Amerasia and took its comments and opinions quite seriously. I was several times called upon to give my own opinion to superior officers regarding Amerasia articles that interested them; at times I found that the general picture presented by Jaffe corresponded pretty accurately with that given us by our naval and military attachés in China; however, it generally resembled much closer that of our State Department's field representatives in China. In the June issue, 1944, Jaffe published a strong criticism of Joseph Grew, particularly attacking his book: *My Ten Years In Japan*. At that time I had not read Mr. Grew's book, nor was I well acquainted with the opposing Far Eastern policy groups in the State Department. In fact I had just then started to think of asking for a transfer to the State Department. Nor had I ever given Jaffe any information except Chinese personalities notes of my own origin. I had, however, noticed that Roth took a strong interest in Jaffe's article on Mr. Grew; Roth told me that he was working on a book, in which he also would attack Grew. I personally did not like Mr. Grew's postwar policy, but

had nothing to do with it at that time. On his next trip to Washington, Jaffe invited my wife and me out to a Chinese restaurant for dinner and told us that he was worried over reports that Joseph Grew had been unduly angered by Jaffe's June article. Jaffe did not explain how he had obtained this information, but it had very obviously come to him from someone in the State Department. He asked me whether I thought he ought to go and talk to Grew and I told him that it certainly could do no harm to meet Mr. Grew face to face and clarify the sorest point in dispute. I understand that Jaffe did go to see Grew, who told him that much of what he had written in Amerasia was wrong due to sheer ignorance of fact; to which Jaffe had answered that it was regrettable that not more facts were made available to the press.

Since I severed my connections with the government service, I have been asked several times by the FBI and members of the congressional committee investigating the Jaffe case, whether I ever heard Roth discuss secret and confidential matters with Jaffe or whether I ever saw Roth carry out government documents from the Navy Department. I must admit that on the few occasions that I was together with Roth and Jaffe, I never did hear them discuss anything that could possibly violate the government's Secrecy Act. Perhaps this discreet attitude was an act put on specially for my benefit, but that is, of course, purely conjecture on my part. It is a fact, however, and a very strange one at that, that after introducing me to Jaffe for the purpose of exchanging personalities data, Roth never once asked me how I was getting on with Jaffe or in any other way even hinted at the matter. As time went by, I thought this strange but finally put it down as just so much gentleman's and naval officer's discretion on his part.

As to carrying out documents from the Office of Naval Intelligence I can only say that there existed at that time a sort of caste system, which differed between officers and civilian experts; the former wore gold badges which entitled them to carry out anything without inspection, whereas the latter wore green badges and were not permitted to remove any documents from the building. Therefore, if I wanted to take a voluminous document home and read it over the week end, I had to ask an officer to carry it out for me and then hand it to me when we got out of sight of the guards. This was a rather frequent occurrence, I would say, and although officers and analysts trusted each other implicitly, the usual practice was for an officer to examine the material the civilian employe was removing temporarily from the premises. Many a time have I brought home the papers on which I had worked all day and then continued long into the night with my work at home.

On September 1, 1944, when I was transferred to the State Department, I felt that nine years with the Navy Department had been pleasant and instructive. I had learned a lot about the merits of the various intelligence systems employed throughout the world and had developed many improvements of our system; I had also brought to a high degree of perfection my personal reference cards on Chinese leaders and political groups and had presented the Navy with copies of my most important cards and subsequently built up a separate file especially adapted for use by the officers of the Intelligence services. I had, however, reached a grade in my civil-service status beyond which I could not go, and I was eager to take a hand in the shaping of our policy toward China. My transfer to the State Department gave me precisely this opportunity; I was attached to the planning and research unit which was entrusted with the drafting of basic postwar policy toward China, Japan, Korea, Siam, and the various Far East dependencies.

Coming from Naval Intelligence, where policy was, perhaps, not always clear-cut, but always typically American and largely free from politics, it was amazing and bewildering to step into State Department and find that there was little general policy, while every clique and group had its own preconceived policy to suit its particular political aspirations. There was within the Far Eastern Division a clique generally known as the pro-Japanese faction, although this is strictly speaking a misnomer, since none of its members were actually pro-Japanese. It was more a case of their being ignorant of the affairs of China and the psychology of the Chinese people and more accustomed to dealing with the Japanese. They were, therefore, suspicious of the Chinese, and favored a strong postwar Japan as the main stabilizer in Asia rather than a strong China. One fairly good reason for that was that they feared China would go communistic and play power politics hand in hand with Soviet Russia against the interests of the United States. Another, and less well-founded reason, was their fear that a victorious postwar China, fully emancipated in the family of nations, would be

a haughty block of 475 millions which would some day present a much greater threat to us than that of which sassy little Japan had been capable. The chief proponents of this so-called pro-Japanese policy were Joseph Grew, his close adviser, Eugene Dooman, and many lesser lights, mostly yes-men, with which the department is so stuffily packed. Meeting with these men on the policy committee was often an experience bordering on the farcical; the wording of policy decisions was often watered down till it became meaningless and valueless; there were provisions for this and that to happen or not happen, so that no matter what happened, our diplomats would be able to wiggle out of what they had meant, and the same policy would be applicable to diagonally opposite purposes. Perhaps I am the one who is just ignorant of the ways of diplomacy, but I still have to see a single instance of good results accruing to this country's foreign relations from the "slimy" code of diplomacy.

Then there was within the crew on the China Desk a group of men, who for some reason or other had chosen to champion the cause of the underprivileged Chinese, as if the latter hadn't been able to take pretty good care of himself for thousands of years in one of the greatest democracies of all mankind. Time and space are insufficient in this article to give an outline of village and other self-government throughout the ages in an ancient democracy where coolies have risen to rule an empire and where the principal prerequisites for advancement were scholarly learning and the respect of the people. There have, of course, always been tyrants and power politicians who usurped the power that was not rightfully theirs; we have such men in our country this very day. But Chinese history and legend alike is rich in stories of the ultimate downfall of such men who did not live according to the code of the inherent and truly democratic ethics of the Chinese. And if such men have come to power in recent times, their downfall is no less certain in a modern China, where political emancipation and material advancement have been in geometric progression during the last decades. But the average American does not realize that China is such a large country with so massive a population, living on so different a standard, and largely without the means of communications that we possess, that political advancement to match our standards cannot be brought about overnight. The period of political tutelage imposed by the Kuomintang undoubtedly is beginning to seem unduly long to the educated people of China and must appear horribly long-drawn-out to the average American observer. But the principal gripe of the Chinese masses is one rising out of economic discontent, and to understand the reasons for the latter one must take into consideration many, many factors, foremost of which is the terrific impact of China's head-on collision with the western world barely a hundred years ago. With the fall of the Manchu empire came fantastic and distorted ideas of a new freedom. Since the country was—and to a certain extent still is—divided geographically and dialectically, regional leaders first sprang into prominence; their contribution to national advancement and social reform was erratic and of little value and often a direct deterrent to real progress that could only come through national unity. Chiang Kai-shek, therefore, held fanatically to a program of national unification first as the foundation for political emancipation. I sincerely believe this policy is correct, and had it not been for evil foreign influences in China, unification would have been realized many years ago.

But all this is the problem of the Chinese people, and I cannot see where it becomes the problem of a few minor career men in the United States Government. Their functions as servants of this Republic are to maintain smooth and pleasant relations with the properly constituted and duly recognized foreign governments with which this Nation comes into contact. Instead they set themselves up as the reformers of China, critical of every political appointment that Chiang, as head of the Chinese state, makes from time to time. I can see where the urgency of the war effort imbued them with the importance of keeping our ally, China, in the fight, and, undoubtedly, this gave the anti-Kuomintang elements in our State Department a marvellous opportunity to further their partiality to all opponents of the Nationalist government. It tended to unduly encourage the opposition which, as a result, looked in vain to this country for the aid that could not possibly be extended to it. Nevertheless, this was wrong and constituted a betrayal of their duties as diplomats, and I believe it has done considerable harm to our relations with China as well as to the internal situation in China. A constant critical attitude, on our part, toward the de jure government of China, and a consistent flow of moral support to the Communists, tended to unduly encourage the opposition to our war ally. When Gen. Patrick

Hurley resigned as Ambassador to China in December, 1945, he was right when he charged that members of the "China Group" within the State Department had deliberately sabotaged his official policy in China.

In the spring of 1945, I was at the height of my activity in research and policy planning in the State Department. I worked largely on postwar problems of Manchuria and Korea. My chief was Dr. Blakeslee, and my colleagues were Dr. Hugh Borton, Mr. Paul Josslyn, now consul-general in Singapore, and Mr. Robert Feary. Our group in general was conservative and in no way partial to any particular ideology. We were analysts confronted with problems that had to be tackled realistically from the point of view of serving the best of American interests in a postwar world, yet with the greatest possible understanding of the problems of the people within the countries we dealt with. When we met on the policy committee, however, we were seated around a conference table with foreign service members of the Japanese and Chinese sections of the Far East Division. We wrote papers on policy, submitted them to the committee for discussion, made changes in conformity with motions that were voted on, and finally filed our completed papers with the higher authorities. In general, the system was good and the problems were well handled. However, it happened fairly frequently, especially with papers concerning postwar policy toward China, that the China group of foreign service officers fought stubbornly against anything that favored the Kuomintang in the slightest. Thus, for instance, before our forces in the Pacific had launched the attack on Japan proper, and while it was still generally believed that the China coast was next in line for invasion, a paper on Manchuria was submitted to the policy committee; the problem was what we would do with the Manchurian administration if we were to invade that area and seize it and Chungking troops would be unable to penetrate Communist-occupied North China and take over Manchuria from us. Were we to sit tight and govern Manchuria for an indefinite period, or were we to hand it to any local Chinese faction, even the Communists? The author of the paper was Mr. Feary, and his proposal was that we ought to hand over Manchuria to the Chinese Communists if Chiang Kai-shek's troops were not there to take it over at once. The proposal struck me as outrageous, since we had promised China at the Cairo Conference that Manchuria would revert to China, and by that we unmistakably had meant to the properly constituted government of China. I launched the initial protest and obtained sufficient support to defeat the proposal. Mr. Feary was furious. He was a well-meaning fellow with a good record in the Embassy in Japan, but he knew nothing about China or Manchuria and had most likely been strongly influenced by the China group of the foreign service. And for one who was not really familiar with Chinese affairs, such influence was almost to be expected, for the officers in the department relied largely on dispatches from the field, and the writers of such dispatches, such as John Service, Emmerson, Davies, and Ludden, were all violently critical of the Chungking government and full of praise for the Communists and the Democratic League. Chief believer of these field reporters was John Carter Vincent, then chief of the China Section in the State Department and now head of the Far East Division.

After the policy meeting concerning Manchuria, a tall, young foreign service officer of Scandinavian extraction pulled me aside and warned me in a friendly way that I would soon get into trouble if I opposed the anti-Kuomintang group in the China Section. This young man died recently, but long before his death I had already made a statement to the above effect before the congressional investigating committee in Washington. Not long after the incident, I met Roth in the street one day, and he told me that he had heard from a young man named Friedman that John Carter Vincent suspected me of being "too close to the Chiang Kai-shek crowd." I resented the remark, since I had never had anything but purely social relations with the Chinese Embassy in Washington, and I wondered whether Roth was merely testing me out with a fabricated story or whether Vincent actually had expressed such suspicion to Friedman. For that reason I did not take it up with Vincent.

A few days later, some time in the latter part of May, I came home from office in the afternoon and found Andrew Roth in my apartment, chatting with my wife. He seemed extremely nervous and told me that he and his wife had originally intended to meet at our apartment somewhat later for a friendly chat, but that he had just received some startling news which he was in a hurry to tell his wife. He said that whereas he had been ordered to Honolulu by the Navy, his instructions had suddenly been cancelled; he expressed the belief that the Navy had changed its mind about his transfer because of his book, which he had submitted to the naval authorities for inspection prior to publication.

Since Roth was early, and didn't know where his wife was shopping, he had to wait an hour or so, during which time he had little to say but continued to evince considerable uneasiness. Then his charming and talented wife arrived, happy and smiling, only to become dumbfounded and strangely peeved about the news of the Navy's sudden change of plans. I tried to say something comforting to her about the Navy probably having a better job for him or, perhaps, wanting merely to postpone his departure for Hawaii until his book had been passed, but she brushed my remark aside in a peeved manner that indicated complete mental preoccupation and fear of some danger. It is possible that both Andrew and Rene Roth were aware, at that time, that they were being shadowed; however, they said nothing about it. I myself felt perfectly at ease, for I was not even faintly aware that I was on the brink of any trouble. Yet it was not long after that when the sensational "espionage" case broke.

The 6th June, 1945, was an exceptionally chilly day in Washington. When I left my office in the State Department, I decided I would walk home. Usually I did not allow myself this luxury, as I was always in a hurry to get home and do a few hours' work on my private card file.

About seven o'clock, I had just sat down to dinner with my wife, Thelma, and little daughter, Linda, when there was a knock at the door. I went to the door and found two men who asked me in a very business-like manner whether I was Emmanuel S. Larsen, to which I answered in the affirmative. They immediately stepped into the apartment and informed me that I was under arrest. I couldn't believe it and asked them if this was some sort of a joke, but they assured me that it was no joke and that they were agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Naturally I asked them what the charges were, but they simply stated that I would find out in due course. In the meantime they proceeded to search my apartment from end to end. In a private filing cabinet they found about 4,000 of my Chinese biographical cards and a number of copies of Government documents from various agencies, all dealing exclusively with Chinese personalities. During the search which lasted till almost midnight, I was painstakingly questioned by the agents concerning my relations with Jaffe and my possible knowledge of and relations with communists and other subversive groups. I made a clean breast of my relations with Jaffe and had no difficulty in denying that I had ever had any relations whatsoever with parties advocating the overthrow of our present government and constitution. I explained that I had, in fact, no experience in or understanding of these phases of American politics, except for the few individuals who appeared to me to be working in favor of the Chinese Communists, and I knew of them only through my work in the Far Eastern research field. A female agent had entered the apartment with the others, probably in the capacity of a stenographer; she and a male agent kept my wife separated from me throughout the search. From time to time I saw Thelma seated in the sun porch with the agents, and it appeared that the stenographer was typing her answers to questions posed by the agent. On one occasion my wife signalled to me and asked me if I objected to her making a statement, and I told her that I had no objections and that she was free to tell all she knew, as I preferred the truth to be known. My six-year-old daughter had moved about the apartment for several hours, ignored, distressed, sensing that something was wrong, and occasionally moving close to me only to press my hand and look pleadingly up into my eyes. Eventually she had fallen asleep in an easy chair in the bedroom, her little face pale and her hair in disarray. About midnight, when the agents prepared to take me away, I was permitted to transfer the sleeping child to her bed.

I was not handcuffed; merely taken out and placed in a car. There were several cars lined up on the street outside the apartment, and at the entrance stood silent and grim agents, all tall, dark and handsome, giving the appearance of a movie version of the capture of the Touhy gang. In the K Street field headquarters of the FBI, I was photographed—oh yes, with large numbers on my chest—then fingerprinted and then grilled again till about three o'clock. By this time I was terribly exhausted and sleepy. I had suffered from a slight headache and sore throat that day and had hardly eaten any lunch; I had walked home from office and had missed my dinner; furthermore I had been placed in such mental anguish as does not come to many people in their lives, for in the K Street building I had been solemnly informed that I was charged with violation of the espionage act, and remember, there was a war on! Frankly, I did not understand what it was all about. On the way to the office of the U. S. Commissioner, I began to turn the matter over in my mind. Could it be that

they arrested me on an espionage charge because I had been working at home on copies of official documents? Or was it because I knew Jaffe? And what was this about Jaffe, seeing that they had asked me so many questions about my possible knowledge of his political affiliations? Was it possible that I had been associating with a man who was, perhaps, involved with the Nazis, the Japanese, or even the Soviet Russians? Of course, there were no answers to all those questions in my mind, and with the sense of futility comes a strange inclination to lapse into an apathy. I was in such a condition when I was taken into the Commissioner's office, and I believe I must have been there for a few minutes before I suddenly realized that I was sitting next to John Service of the State Department and Lt. Andrew Roth of the Office Naval Intelligence.

I began to understand things now. My mind became wide awake again. I knew that Service had known Jaffe, and it dawned on me that here I was, arrested together with every other government employe who had had anything to do with Jaffe. And then, on the other hand, how could that be? Why did I not see there Mike Michael Lee and John Emerson and Franklin Day and all the other persons Jaffe had spoken of as his friends in Washington? The whole thing was still a puzzle to me. I turned around and asked John Service in Chinese what it was all about, and he told me very curtly to shut up. When it came to the arraignment, there was considerable discussion between the FBI agents and Commissioner Turnage. All the mumble-jumble about article this and that of espionage act did not seem to convey much to the Commissioner; at least I heard him say that he still didn't quite understand "what in the hell" the boys were charged with. There was more explaining on the part of the agents, and then we were finally asked to stand before the Commissioner and hear the charge read.

After that, the U. S. Marshal took charge of us, handcuffed us all together and transported us to the D. C. Jail. It was then about five o'clock in the morning of the 7th June. On the way to the jail, the radio in the Marshal's car was blaring forth the news of the arrest of six spies in a sensational conspiracy to steal secret and vital information from the U. S. government. I was completely dumbfounded. Upon arrival at the jail, we were ordered to strip off every stitch of clothing and were then given a cold shower bath. After that, we were given blue denim prison overalls and our shoes. We were then taken up to the tiers and locked in individual cells. Neither Roth nor Service had spoken a word to me; on the contrary, they had seemed quite hostile to me. I considered this quite significant and began to review in my mind the time when Roth came to my desk and asked me out for lunch, and then introduced me to Jaffe. Now I had heard on the radio that the other three arrested were Jaffe, Miss Kate Mitchell and Mark Gayn. As I lay down on the bed in the cell, shivering with cold and exhaustion, I took mental stock of the names mentioned. Mark Gayn I had never met in my life, hadn't even the faintest idea of what he looked like, so I could not possibly have conspired with him. Kate Mitchell I had met twice in Jaffe's company, but I had hardly said a word to her and really might have considered that I did not know her at all. To John Service I had only spoken twice in my life, once when Mr. Ballantyne introduced me to him in one of the corridors of the State Department and another time when a group of "China hands" in the Department went out together for lunch. On both occasions I had merely said hello and the usual formalities about being glad to meet him after reading all his reports from China. Then there remained Roth and Jaffe. With neither of these had I conspired; if there had been any conspiracy, it must have been between Roth and Jaffe and not by me with either of them. The subsequent events in the preparation of the defense bore this out, for my attorney found it impossible to get together with the attorneys of the others involved. Gayn got his attorneys from the paper he worked for in Chicago; Miss Mitchell got her high-powered attorneys from Buffalo, where her uncle appeared to be prominent and influential; John Service hired his own attorneys and received generous financial aid from the China group of the foreign service officers in the State Department; Roth's and Jaffe's attorney's worked together; and my attorney, whom I told I had no money to pay him, took my case like a brave soldier, left completely out in the cold by his professional colleagues. My attorney was Arthur J. Hilland, a Lutheran of Norwegian extraction, and a man who has an enviable reputation in the courts of Washington, D. C.

Hilland's first demand on me was that I tell him the truth without concealing anything and without the slightest deviation from facts. Like Mohandas Gandhi, who was a practicing lawyer for twenty years in South Africa, Hilland believes that if you get your facts straight the law will take care of itself. And when

Hilland got the facts from me, his next move was to take me straight into the Justice Department for a conference with Assistant Attorney General MacInerny, and the prosecuting attorney in the case, Mr. Hitchcock. It was not long before Hilland and I were invited in for another conference, and then another. I, on my part, felt that I had nothing to conceal and nothing to worry about. My principal worry had been my wife's difficulty in raising a \$10,000 bail in order to get me out of that comfortable D. C. Jail, from which most others walk out, with or without permission. Over and over we discussed the facts of the case as far as I knew them, and it became evident to the Justice Department that there were no grounds for indicting me on any espionage charges, and the charges were dropped. A grand jury—before which, for some reason or other, my attorney advised me not to appear—indicted Jaffe, Roth and me on charges of removal and possession of official documents, while it completely cleared Gayn, Mitchell and Service. The Grand Jury proceedings are secret; yet it has been reliably reported to me that Service testified before the Grand Jury that I was the one who had given Jaffe the documents that were found in his possession. If he said this, it was a lie, and it seems strange that in this country, where there is supposed to be justice for all, one man can testify against another without giving the accused an opportunity to defend himself. Service went scot-free and even received apologies in writing from both Mr. Joseph Grew and Secretary Byrnes. When I read of this in the papers, I wanted to confirm my status with the pro-leftist "China group" in the State Department; I called Mr. Drumright on the phone; Drumright, I would say, is an excellent diplomat, and as impartial as one could possibly expect an American official to be; his answer was brief and to the point; all he said was: "Vincent wouldn't touch you with a ten-foot pole."

That was really all I wanted to know. I was now convinced that John Service, because of his strong anti-Kuomintang and his pro-Communist leanings, had received not only financial aid from his friends in the State Department but also sufficient pull to obtain quick and complete vindication. This seemed entirely unfair to me, because from a word dropped here and a hint there I had myself come to feel pretty certain that Service, whom Jaffe knew and admired, was Amerasia's real pipeline from the State Department. I may, of course, have been wrong in this assumption, for I had no definite proof. There may have been others, for Jaffe had many contacts throughout the various government agencies in Washington.

I lay awake nights and hoped for a speedy trial and a real knock-down, drag-out fight which would bring the real culprits to light. August and September went by, slowly, painfully. For some five or six weeks I had remained on the State Department payroll as "on leave with pay"; now I had passed to the status of "on leave without pay." I owned a tiny piece of property on the Civil War battlefield, near Manassas, and I used to go down there every day for weeks at a time and work like a madman, repairing the little house on it, for no other purpose than to work up a good sweat and forget my troubles, and at least to get tired enough to be able to sleep at night.

Then suddenly one day I had a bombshell explode over me in the form of a news report that Jaffe had pleaded guilty to the possession of government documents and had been ordered to pay a fine of \$2,500. His brief hearing or trial in court had apparently implicated no one; yet I felt that his small fine, measured by his plea of guilt, must have been the result of an arrangement. I went up to the Justice Department for further conferences with Mr. Hitchcock, trying to sound him out on the matter of whom Jaffe had implicated. Hitchcock was pressing me hard for some sort of confession so as to get the case over with, but his attitude was still the same friendly one as from the very start, openly admitting to me that he did not believe I was guilty of any disloyalty. I, therefore, concluded that Jaffe had not implicated me; and since no other arrests were made, it seemed that Jaffe, perhaps, had not been made to implicate anyone in the settlement of his particular case.

The Justice Department felt that they had insufficient evidence against Roth, while against me they at least had the evidence consisting of documents seized in my apartment. Technically, therefore, I was guilty of a crime, although this crime of taking home official documents was being committed daily by almost every government employee, except, perhaps, those who were more interested in cocktail parties than their work and completely forgot the war effort the moment they left their offices. Mr. Hitchcock, therefore, suggested that if I did not enter a plea of guilty I might enter a plea of *nolo contendere*. The idea of this was at first repulsive to me; I thought I had suffered enough as a result of a humiliating

arrest and attending publicity constantly referring to me as a spy. I had lost my livelihood because of a blunder; if there really was any espionage—and I don't know even now whether there was or not—then it was most unfortunate that it was not proven, unfortunate for the welfare of the nation and unfortunate for me, because I would then have been completely exonerated. I, therefore, felt that the Justice Department owed me some sort of compensation for charging me under the espionage laws and then dropping those dreadful charges, and I thought the minor charges of possessing documents in the best of faith might conveniently be dropped.

But there just had to be a goat somewhere; I don't usually accept the part willingly; but it so happened that in October there appeared an article in one of the Washington papers to the effect that Representative Dondero of Michigan was about to launch a bill in the house to order an investigation of the "espionage" case. I sort of welcomed this investigation and felt that it might clear me completely; but I also realized, since my case had not been settled yet, that an example might be made of me. I immediately went to see Mr. Dondero; at first he was extremely skeptical; but through mutual friends in high places he was assured that I had never in any way whatsoever been affiliated with communistic or other subversive activities, either in this country or abroad. Unfortunately, for the same reason, I was unable to give Mr. Dondero any information that he wanted about Mr. Jaffe's and Lt. Roth's alleged subversive activities, but I was able to and willingly did acquaint him with the truth of the "espionage" case as well as I knew it. After my conversation with Mr. Dondero, I felt that it would, perhaps, be better to make some sort of a settlement right now, before he let go his blast in the House. I told my attorney that I was in favor of entering a plea of *nolo contendere* and, at the worst, pay some sort of a small fine. He was against it in principle and was all for fighting the case to the bitter end, even if we had to go to the supreme court. But he argued that if that was the way I felt, and my wife agreed with me, then he would make no objections and would help me see it through as well as he could manage it. That same night we informed the Justice Department that I was ready to enter the plea of *nolo contendere*. The following day I requested Secretary Byrnes to allow me to resign from my position in the State Department, and the answer came through with my resignation accepted "for personal reasons." A few days later, on the second of November 1945, I went before Judge Proctor in the U. S. Court for the District of Columbia. The Justice Department's attorney, Mr. Hitchcock, told the court that he was convinced there had been no disloyalty on my part and that he, therefore, recommended a small fine. The court fixed the fine at \$500; and with the knowledge and consent of the Justice Department, the fine was paid immediately by an attorney acting on behalf of Mr. Jaffe; the same attorney likewise reimbursed me for bond expenses and my own attorney's fees.

When I walked out of that courtroom into the sunshine and fresh autumn breeze, I felt like a free man again, yet I could not get away from the smarting stigma of the fine. I couldn't help brooding over this for a few days. Then my mother, who had been hospitalized in Washington with a broken leg since August 9, came home to our apartment, and all of a sudden we were busy with preparations for a trip by car to Florida, to bring mother back to her home in St. Petersburg. From there, my wife and I and our little daughter visited Miami for the first time in our lives. We stayed 10 days in a hotel right on the beach, and at no time have ever loafed so luxuriously, without a care in the world, for a brief spell.

On the morning of one of our last days in Miami, the papers brought news of Pat Hurley's resignation as Ambassador to China and his indignant outburst against the persons in the State Department who, he claimed, had sabotaged his important work in China.

I sympathized with Hurley in his indignation and knew there were sound reasons for it, because I had seen a good deal of what was going on in the Far East division of the State Department. His indignation was over the cross purposes to which he and the members of his staff were working in China. His instructions and the United States policy, at the time of his departure for Chungking, were to bring the Kuomintang and the Communists together, in order to prevent the Allied war effort from being jeopardized on the Asiatic mainland. His *modus operandi* was fairly simple; by sheer personality he was to get the two parties first to agree that they would agree, and then, by maintaining a reserved but correct attitude toward the Reds, he was to make it clear that the United States, in war plans and operations alike, intended to deal solely with

the Nationalist government, to which he had been accredited. The effect of this on the Communists was calculated to discourage them in any hopes for further moral support from official or private elements in the United States and make it clear that United States military supplies could not be given to Red units even for the purpose of fighting the Japanese as long as the Communist Army remained independent of the Kuomintang and in open rebellion against it.

But when Hurley arrived in China, he found himself surrounded by State Department field officers who resented the intrusion of a noncareer man and who, furthermore, had come to admire the Chinese Communists, among whom they had lived as observers over long periods. These field officers probably never at any time made any openly and admittedly hostile move against Hurley and his policy through the official correspondence channels, although the latter constituted their principal means of opposing him. But in the course of their relations with, and their interviewing, of Communist leaders, they showed sympathy with the Red cause in China by listening attentively to all the anti-Kuomintang gripes and reporting them faithfully and painstakingly to the Department, with personal assurances that the information was reliable. They also discussed with the Communist leaders the possibilities and probabilities of the supplying of United States military aid to the Communist forces in the coastal provinces in the event of an Allied landing in Japanese-occupied China. The effect of all this was, of course, to encourage the Communists in their alternative of holding out against Chiang's government rather than getting together with the Kuomintang in a wholehearted anti-Japanese war effort and the formulation of a new Chinese constitution. Thus Hurley's strenuous attempts at mediation were made of no avail—in fact they were wilfully sabotaged. And back in the State Department, his reports were discredited by John Carter Vincent and his crew. These men often expressed openly their hatred of Hurley and discussed means of getting him out of the ambassadorship.

I do not have the documentary evidence, and feel certain that nothing would be made available to me on request, since even Hurley was denied the use of the Department's files when he wanted to testify before the United States legislature. But I do have a fairly good recollection of some of the outstanding reports and attached comments that would bear me out in my contention that Hurley's assistants in China sympathized so openly with the Reds and were so consistently critical of the de jure Chungking government—to which they had been officially accredited—that they did considerable harm to our good relations with China.

One of the pet themes of the field officers was the question of whether the Chinese Communists had any liaison with Soviet Russia. Over and over again it was reiterated that the Chinese Communist Party was divided into three factions, (a) the political faction headed by Mao Tse-tung, (b) the army faction, headed by Chu Te, and (c) the International or pro-Soviet faction headed by the soldier poet Ch'en Shao-yü (better known by his pen-name Wang Ming); and it was unmistakable in all reports, as late as 1944 and 1945, that Wang Ming's pro-Soviet faction had lost its influence since the alleged dissolution of the Russian Third Internale. Chou En-lai, the Communist representative in Chungking, late in 1944, went out of his way to stress the point to one of our observers that whereas we here in America thought the Chinese Communists had close liaison with Moscow, this was, in fact, untrue, since there were no representatives of the Chinese Reds in Moscow. This was faithfully reported, without any comments indicating doubt of the truth of Chou's statement; yet only four months later it was confirmed that for years one of the Communists' earliest leaders, Li Li-san, had been living in Moscow as liaison officer and that radio communications with Moscow did exist and that three Russians in Yen-an were responsible for the functioning of the radio equipment.

A mystery closely associated with liaison was that of actual Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists. It has been steadfastly denied by anti-Kuomintang publishers that aid of any sort was rendered in recent years. Yet I remember distinctly that in the early part of 1944, when the "Kazak incident" occurred in the Altai region of Sinkiang province, it was generally known, and it was duly reported by one of the department's field officers that Soviet Russia was involved. The Kuomintang armies were at that time surrounding the Communist forces in Shensi and Kansu, and it appeared that Russia engineered the Kasak revolt in order to draw Nationalist troops into Sinkiang and thus relieve the pressure on the Chinese Communists. These are the things the American public has never been allowed to know.

About the same time, namely early in 1944, there was wide speculation in Allied Councils as to whether Soviet Russia would enter the war or not in Asia. Dr.

T. V. Soong, Foreign Minister in Chungking, told an official of this country that he was convinced that when Germany was defeated, the Russians would attack Japan, but that the mode and locality of their offensive would be for the sole purpose of serving communistic interests in Asia. Soong warned us that our real headaches would then commence. Officers in the China Section of the State Department discredited this warning and preferred to believe the Communists who contended that they were in no way receiving the support of Russia; they also preferred to believe John Davies who reported that the Chinese Communist Party was dominated by a faction with a non-Russian orientation. And finally, as late as the spring of 1945, when Ambassador Harriman returned from Moscow to Washington, they preferred not to believe him when he reported that, in his opinion, Soviet Russia would support the Chinese Communists in the event of Russo-Japanese hostilities in Asia.

The best evidence, however, that the "non-Russian orientation" story was clever propaganda, is the record of Communist military success in Manchuria since the entry of Russian forces into that territory, and particularly since their withdrawal northward. The American public must surely have read and understood that Japanese munitions, seized by the Russians, were allowed to fall into the hands of the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria who robbed China of her principal war prize, namely the return of 40 million Chinese citizens to Chinese central government control.

One of my principal objections is to the manner in which our diplomatic field officers have conducted themselves in China by appearing overzealous in their willingness to listen to and report the most long-winded expressions of discontent on the part of anti-Kuomintang elements, while they have hardly ever bothered to record any of the Kuomintang's arguments against its opponents. I remember how our Consul in Kweilin interviewed General Li Chi-shen on the subject of the Democratic League, and then waxed hot in his report in an effort to faithfully impress the Department with all the abuses that General Li had heaped upon the Chungking government. It appeared strange to me that a United States official should have seen fit to be receptive to such violent criticism of the regime to which he was accredited. These field officers seemed to believe anything that the Communists told them. Thus, just as John Davies believed that the Communists had a non-Russian orientation, John Service tried hard to convince Washington that the Communists were pursuing a policy of avoidance of civil war. I remember that Ambassador Gauss did not quite subscribe to this and argued that the steady expansion of Communist fortifications showed that the Reds intended to take over control of all China. And I also recollect that in trying to discredit Ambassador Gauss's analysis of the Communist-Kuomintang dispute, Mr. Vincent suggested that it was rather the failure of the Kuomintang to enlist popular enthusiasm for the reforms championed by the Communists that was largely responsible for the present difficulties in China.

The "Democratic League" was represented in official dispatches as a moderately liberal political organization although there were rumors that many of its members in the working committees were communists. Because this organization did not openly declare itself a 100 percent for the Chinese Communist program, its members were able to operate throughout Nationalist China. In the latter part of 1944, General Chu Te told John Service that he thought the Democratic League was an organization determined to introduce some good reforms but that he did not believe the movement would amount to much and particularly that it would not denounce the Kuomintang government. This was indeed a strange statement to forward to Washington without comments, since we were daily reading other reports of the League's regular denouncements of Chiang and his government and for its plans for the overthrow of the Kuomintang. And when the Communist representative arrived in Chungking on the 24th January, 1945, to present Yen-an's proposals to Ambassador Hurley, it was made quite clear by the Communists that the Democratic League was to be included in a conference of all parties. Thus the Communists had suddenly come out strong for the League, yet I failed to see within the ensuing months any report on this important change in the League's political affiliations.

TYPICAL CASE OF BIASED REPORTING

The encouragement, extended to the Chinese Communists by our officials and writers, was such that the Reds in China, at the time of our 1944 Presidential election, declared they would sit back and wait for greater United States pressure on the Kuomintang. The two southern cities of Kweilin and Liuchow, where the United States Army maintained large airbases, were then being attacked by the

Japanese, and Communist Chou said openly that if Chiang's armies couldn't hold back the Japanese, and these two cities were lost, he was sure the United States would put some real pressure on the Kuomintang.

It was obvious from the reports that our officials in the field had given the Communists to understand that wherever American military action was contemplated in China, Communist forces would be utilized if Nationalist forces were not on the spot at the time of operations. Secretary Ludden of our Embassy in Chungking reported at the end of the year 1944 that in certain areas the Communists were then well organized and ready for action against the Japanese "when circumstances and equipment permit." It must be remembered that, at the time, Ambassador Hurley was trying hard to discourage the Communists from too strong a stand; yet morale boosting encouragement appeared to flow from the United States to Yen-an through a number of secret channels, and the anti-Kuomintang clique in the China section of the State Department was able to see its views on their enemy Hurley well expressed when the Communist newspaper "Hsin Hua Jih Pao" in Chungking said:

"We deeply regret the statements made by General Hurley as he does not understand the popular demand for democracy. * * * And if the United States fails to supply the strongest Chinese forces—the Communists—with arms, the war will be prolonged and losses increased. We are of the opinion that General Hurley will aggravate disruption, promote civil war and postpone victory."

EXHIBIT No. 90

[From the New York Times, Tuesday, October 31, 1944]

ALLIES HERD 40,000 NAZIS TOWARD MEUSE; 3 JAPANESE CRUISERS BOMBED AT MANILA; STILWELL RECALL BARES RIFT WITH CHIANG—LONG SCHISM SEEN—STILWELL BREAK STEMS FROM CHIANG REFUSAL TO PRESS WAR FULLY—PEACE WITH REDS BARRED—GENERALISSIMO REGARDS THEIR ARMIES FIGHTING JAPANESE AS THREAT TO HIS RULE

The following account of the recall of Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell is by the Chungking correspondent of the New York Times, who has just returned to this country. It was delayed and finally cleared by the War Department censorship in Washington.

(By Brooks Atkinson)

Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, relieved of his command in China, Burma, and India, before leaving Chungking on October 21 made a final swift tour of some of the military bases in his command and then flew directly toward Washington in his silver-colored transport plane facetiously dubbed "Uncle Joe's Chariot."

For the last two months negotiations had been going on between President Roosevelt's personal representative, Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to give General Stilwell full command of the Chinese ground and air forces under the Generalissimo and to increase China's participation in the counteroffensive against Japan.

Although the Generalissimo at first was inclined to agree to General Stilwell's appointment as commander, he decided later that he would accept any American commander except General Stilwell.

PRESSED FOR REFORM

His attitude toward the American negotiations became stiff and hostile. At a private meeting of the standing committee of the Kuomintang (National party) Central Executive Committee this month he announced the terms of his personal ultimatum to Americans who were pressing him for military and governmental reform.

He declared that General Stilwell must go, that the control of American lend-lease materials must be put in his hands and that he would not be coerced by Americans into helping to unify China by making terms with the Chinese Communists. If America did not yield on these points, he said China would go back to fighting the Japanese alone, as she did before Pearl Harbor.

President Roosevelt agreed to the Generalissimo's demand for General Stilwell's recall. Dividing the huge China-Burma-India war sector in two, the War Department appointed Maj. Gen. Albert G. Wedemeyer, now Deputy Chief of

Staff to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, as Commander of United States Army Forces in China and Lieut. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, General Stilwell's Chief of Staff in India, as Commander of United States Army Forces in India and Burma.

After a career of more than twenty years largely devoted to military affairs in China and two years and eight months as commander of the United States Army Forces in China, Burma and India and as Allied Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell has now concluded a busy and constantly frustrated attempt to help China stay in the war and to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese forces.

Uncle Joe speaks Chinese. He knows more about China than most foreigners. He is more intimately acquainted with the needs and capacities of the Chinese Army than the Generalissimo and Gen. Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War and Chief of Staff, because he has repeatedly been in the field with the troops.

He is commonly regarded as the ablest field commander in China since "Chinese" Gordon. The second retreat with Stilwell seemed the final one. It was not from the enemy but from an ally.

The decision to relieve General Stilwell has the most profound implications for China as well as American policy toward China and the Allied war effort in the Far East. It may mean that the United States has decided from now on to discount China's part in a counter-offensive.

Inside China it represents the political triumph of a moribund anti-democratic regime that is more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in driving the Japanese out of China. America is now committed at least passively to supporting a regime that has become increasingly unpopular and distrusted in China, that maintains three secret police services and concentration camps for political prisoners, that stifles free speech, and resists democratic forces.

THE MAIN DIFFERENCE

The fundamental difference between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell has been that the latter has been eager to fight the Japanese in China without delay and the Generalissimo has hoped that he would not have to.

In no other way is it possible to understand the long series of obstructions and delays that have made it impossible for General Stilwell to fulfill his original mission of equipping and training the "unlimited manpower" resources of the Chinese Army.

The Generalissimo has one positive virtue for which America is now indebted: he has never made peace with the Japanese, although there have been times when his Ministers thought the future looked hopeless. But the technique of preserving his ticklish balance of political power in China keeps him a passive man.

Although he is the acknowledged leader of China, he has no record of personal military achievement and his basic ideas for political leadership are those of a war lord. He conceives of armies as political forces.

In an enormous, loosely strung country populated chiefly by ignorant peasantry he maintains his authority by preventing any group from becoming too powerful. A few well-equipped armies under a command not entirely loyal to him personally might upset the military and political balance inside China and curtail his authority.

The Chinese Communists, whom the generalissimo started trying to liquidate in 1927, have good armies that are now fighting guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in northeast China. The generalissimo regards these armies as the chief threat to his supremacy. For several years he has immobilized 300,000 to 500,000 (no one knows just how many) Central Government troops to blockade the Communists and keep them from expanding.

Distrusting the Communists, the generalissimo has made no sincere attempt to arrange at least a truce with them for the duration of the war. The generalissimo's regime, based on the support and subservience of General Ho, Dr. H. H. Kung, Minister of Finance, and Dr. Chen Li-fu, Minister of Education, has remained fundamentally unchanged over a long period and has become bureaucratic, inefficient, and corrupt.

Most of the armies are poorly fed and shockingly maltreated. In some parts of the country the peasants regard the armies as bandits and thieves. In Honan last Spring the peasants turned against the Chinese armies during the Japanese offensive in revenge for the ruthlessness with which the armies collected rice during the famine years.

Most of China's troubles now are the result of her having been at war with Japan for more than seven years and totally blockaded for two and one-half.

The reason nothing is done to alleviate the miseries is that the generalissimo is determined to maintain his group of aging reactionaries in power until the war is over, when, it is commonly believed, he will resume his war against the Chinese Communists without distraction.

Bewildered and alarmed by the rapidity with which China is now falling apart, he feels secure only with associates who obey him implicitly. His rages become more and more ungovernable and attack the symptoms rather than the causes of China's troubles.

ACQUIESCENCE IN REGIME

Since the negotiations with General Hurley began the generalissimo's attitude toward America has become more resentful and American criticisms of China are hotly rebuked. Relieving General Stilwell and appointing a successor has the effect of making us acquiesce in an unenlightened, cold-hearted autocratic political regime.

Into this stagnant, baleful atmosphere General Stilwell came in February 1942, animated by the single idea of fighting the Japanese immediately. Like most foreigners who know the Chinese people, he loved them, for they are the glory of China. From long experience Stilwell had great confidence in the capacities of the Chinese soldiers, who even then were fighting on nothing.

In November 1941 the Magruder Military Mission had already made an agreement with the generalissimo to train and equip the Chinese Army on the theory that it would then become unnecessary to ship thousands of doughboys to fight on Chinese soil. The war in China was initially handicapped by the decision to fight Germany first and Japan second. General Stilwell was never able to get 1 percent of the American Army for use in his C-B-I theatre and was never able to get all the equipment he has wanted, because it has always been needed elsewhere.

On March 3, 1942, less than a month after he had arrived in China, General Stilwell was plunged into the calamitous Burma campaign without notice. He had to return to Chungking to induce the generalissimo to come to the front to vest him with sufficient authority to command the troops.

Even then the command was never secure or efficient. There were other troubles. At a time when the troops needed transport, most of China's trucks were hauling civilian loot out of Burma up the road into China, where goods were worth huge sums of money.

When at last Stilwell got out of Burma into India he did persuade the generalissimo to let him feed, train, and equip the Chinese soldiers who finally arrived. After training of a year and a half, those soldiers were the backbone of the Chinese divisions who got Myitkyina back last August and are now pushing toward Bhamo to free the Burma road. Inside China everything Stilwell has tried to do has been obstructed and delayed.

The generalissimo and his staff, like the United States Air Force, which they get free and which asks for nothing except food and airfields, which we equip with buildings and installations. But the Chinese Government hedges and hesitates over anything involving the use of its armies. Foreigners can only conclude that the Chinese Government wants to save its armies to secure its political power after the war.

A nervous and driving field officer who is impatient with administrative details and political tangles, General Stilwell is no diplomat. He goes straight to the point in his dealings with anybody. He is plain and salty. He is personally incapable of assuming a reverential mood toward the generalissimo, and he is impatient with incompetent meddling in military command. Although General Stilwell is anything but arrogant, the generalissimo complained that the American was trying to subjugate him.

But with the situation in China as it is, no diplomatic genius could have overcome the generalissimo's basic unwillingness to risk his armies in battle with the Japanese. Amid the intrigue and corruption of China's political and military administration, General Stilwell has been a lone man trying to follow orders, improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army, force open the Burma Road, and get China back into the war.

Now he has been forced out of China by the political system that has been consistently blocking him and America is acquiescing in a system that is undemocratic in spirit as well as fact, and is also unrepresentative of the Chinese people, who are good allies.

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

NEWS PUBLISHING Co.,
Wheeling, W. Va., March 25, 1950.

HON. MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: The matter of the controversy which has arisen over the Wheeling Intelligencer's report of Senator McCarthy's speech in Wheeling has come to my attention.

I do not approve of the manner in which it has been handled. Our newspapers have no desire to become involved in a political controversy. Our only interest is in accurate reporting, and there is no reason why we should withhold any information concerning the authenticity of stories appearing in our columns.

I have today talked with Mr. Frank Desmond, the reporter who wrote the story in question. He tells me there can be no doubt that Senator McCarthy did use the figure "205" in referring to his list of men in the State Department who have been named as members of the Communist Party, and members of a spy ring.

We, of course, have no knowledge as to the accuracy of the figure. As I have stated above we are only interested in the fact that our reporting was accurate.

Very truly yours,

AUSTIN V. WOOD.

[From the Wheeling (W. Va.) Intelligencer, Friday, February 10, 1950]

MCCARTHY CHARGES REDS HOLD UNITED STATES JOBS—TRUMAN BLASTED FOR RELUCTANCE TO PRESS PROBE—WISCONSIN SENATOR TELLS LINCOLN FETE HERE "CHIPS DOWN"

(By Frank Desmond of the Intelligencer staff)

Joseph McCarthy, junior United States Senator from Wisconsin, was given a rousing ovation last night when, as guest of the Ohio County Republican Women's Club, he declared bluntly that the fate of the world rests with the clash between the atheism of Moscow and the Christian spirit throughout other parts of the world.

More than 275 representative Republican men and women were on hand to attend the colorful Lincoln Day dinner of the valley women which was held in the Colonnade Room of the McLure Hotel.

Disdaining any oratorical fireworks, McCarthy's talk was of an intimate, homey nature, punctuated at times with humor.

But on the serious side, he launched many barbs at the present set-up of the State Department, at President Truman's reluctance to press investigation of "traitors from within," and other pertinent matters.

He said that recent incidents which brought traitors to the limelight is the result of an emotional hangover and a temporary moral lapse which follows every war. However, he added:

"The morals of our people have not been destroyed. They still exist and this cloak of numbness and apathy needs only a spark to rekindle them."

Referring directly to the State Department, he declared:

"While I cannot take the time to name all of the men in the State Department who have been named as members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 that were known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who, nevertheless, are still working and shaping the policy in the State Department."

The speaker dwelt at length on the Alger Hiss case and mentioned the names of several others who, during the not so many years, were found to entertain subversive ideas but were still given positions of high trust in the Government.

"As you hear of this (Hiss) story of high treason," he said, "I know that you are saying to yourself—well, why doesn't Congress do something about it?"

"Actually, ladies and gentlemen, the reason for the graft, the corruption, the disloyalty, the treason in high Government positions—the reason this continues is because of a lack of moral uprising on the part of the 140,000,000 American people. In the light of history, however, this is not hard to explain.

"It is the result of an emotional hangover and a temporary moral lapse which follows every war. It is the apathy to evil which people who have been subjected to the tremendous evils of war feel.

"As the people of the world see mass murder, the destruction of defenseless and innocent people and all of the crime and lack of morals which go with war, they become numb and apathetic. It has always been thus after war."

At another time, he declared:

"Today, we are engaged in a final all-out battle between communistic atheism and Christianity. The modern champions of communism have selected this as the time and, ladies and gentlemen, the chips are down—they are truly down."

In an informal quiz with his audience, the Senator answered a number of questions dealing mostly with the plan of Secretary of Agriculture Brannan to destroy millions of tons of potatoes, eggs, butter, and fruits; he gave forth-right views on the old-age and social-security problems and a number of other topics.

McCarthy was introduced by William Callahan, executive director of the Ohio Valley Republican organization. Mrs. Eberhard, president of the women's group, presided, while program director, Mrs. Robert J. Harshman, introduced Callahan. State Senator William Hannig led the group singing.

The invocation was delivered by the Reverend Philip Goertz, pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church, and the benediction was pronounced by the Reverend W. Carroll Thorn, of St. Luke's Episcopal Church.

Senator McCarthy arrived by Capital Airlines at the Stifel airport late yesterday afternoon and was greeted by former Congressman Francis J. Love and Tom Sweeney, Jr., who drove him to the Fort Henry Club.

[From the Nevada State Journal (Reno), February 12, 1950]

MC CARTHY BLASTS STATE DEPARTMENT—SENATOR TELLS REPUBLICANS ACHESON'S STAFF IS FULL OF TRAITORS

(By Edward Conners)

Senator Joseph A. McCarthy of Wisconsin last night indicted the Democratic State Department as full of traitors and dubbed Dean Acheson's defense of Alger Hiss in his reference to the Sermon on the Mount as one of the greatest blasphemies in history.

The ex-Marine, who has been a thorn in the side of the Truman administration ever since his whirlwind campaign and election from Wisconsin after being discharged from the service in 1945, told more than 400 Nevada Republicans last night in the Mapes Hotel that democracy is being sold out from within—especially within one of our most vital governmental functions, the State Department.

Last night's crowded banquet room was filled with Republicans from throughout Nevada observing the birthday of Abraham Lincoln, the founder of their party and to hear one of the more aggressive and progressive national leaders.

COMMUNISTS

Senator McCarthy, who was introduced to the mixed crowd of both Bourbons and interested citizens from all sections of Nevada, cautiously referred to members of the State Department staff in the light of being out-and-out Communists but left no doubt in the minds of the audience as to their absolute loyalty to the United States Government and democracy.

Warming up to the subject he chose as his theme last night the Senator startled many of the already stern faces among the audience with a résumé of the Communist program to dominate the world and made his declaration that two such

world-apart ideologies as communism and democracy evidently cannot exist in the world as it is today.

He said that two vast camps are indulging in a great armament race but that the "mad moment has not yet arrived for civilization to destroy itself."

But that the crucial moment in the world's history is at hand and that civilization as we know it today is squaring off for "a show-down fight," was a point the Wisconsin solon drove home to his audience last night.

In referring to Acheson's blasphemy, Senator McCarthy said that the stand taken by the Secretary of State could well be the spark that "would sweep from power the intellectuals" who have sold out to the Communists.

Following Alger Hiss' sentence to Federal penitentiary for a 5-year term, Acheson made the voluntary statement to the press that he would "not turn his back" on his former staff member and in explaining his loyalty to the convicted Federal official, he referred to Christ's Sermon on the Mount in which he did not quote the passage directly but implied that he was only following the admonition laid down in the ageless Sermon.

FIFTY-SEVEN CARD CARRIERS

Senator McCarthy, who had first typed a total of 205 employees of the State Department who could be considered disloyal to the United States and pro-Communists scratched out that number and mentioned only "57 card-carrying members," whom Acheson should know as well as Members of Congress.

He did not divulge the names of any of the 57, but dispatched a lengthy telegram to President Truman yesterday morning asking that each of those known to Congress to be pro-Communist and now employed by the State Department be exposed and expelled.

However, he did refer to at least four ex-members of the State Department who are still in positions of national and international responsibility and whose loyalties are very much in doubt.

They include John W. Service, who, Senator McCarthy said, declared that "communism is the only hope of China," while he was serving in China for the United States Government.

CHALLENGED

"This same man," who the Wisconsin Republican said was tossed out by Ambassador Joseph Grew and then reinstated by Acheson after his recommendation for China, "is now on his way to Calcutta, India, to help shape and determine Indian policy" as far as American foreign policy is concerned.

Officials of the State Department in Washington, D. C., yesterday challenged Senator McCarthy to divulge the names of the 57 "card-carrying Communists" now in the employ of the State Department, and the Wisconsin solon indicated before he reached Reno that he might do it.

Last night, however, he named, in addition to Service, Gustavo Duran, Mrs. Mary Kenny, and Harlow Shapley, none of whom he referred to as Communists but whose activities and loyalties he questioned and all of whom were given a clear bill of lading by the Senator's chief target in last night's speech, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State.

He referred to the screening board which President Truman set up as a security measure against Communist infiltration into high Government offices and made pointed remarks that of 300 that this board certified for discharge from their positions, Acheson fired only 80 of them, the Senator declared.

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL A. MYERS

To Whom It May Concern:

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,

County of Ohio, to wit:

This day Paul A. Myers, personally appeared before me Lucille M. Bock, a notary public of said county, and being by me first duly sworn says:

As program director of radio station WWVA, I read the attached 13-page speech script before it was delivered by Senator Joseph McCarthy on February 9, 1950. I reviewed our tape recording of the delivered speech before WWVA broadcast it on the same evening and again reviewed it, against the script, on the following day. I certify that the tape recording was the same as the

attached script with the exception of interpolations and connective words, such as a's, and and's, and the's, which to my way of thinking did not materially change the meaning of the text.

I have initialed each page of the attached photostatic copy of Senator McCarthy's speech.

PAUL A. MEYERS.

Taken, subscribed, and sworn to before me this the 25th day of April 1950.

[SEAL]

LUCILLE M. BOCK.

My commission expires February 3, 1952.

Ladies and gentlemen, tonight as we celebrate the one hundred forty-first birthday of one of the greatest men in American history, I would like to be able to talk about what a glorious day today is in the history of the world. As we celebrate the birth of this man who with his whole heart and soul hated war, I would like to be able to speak of peace in our time—of war being outlawed—and of world-wide disarmament. These would be truly appropriate things to be able to mention as we celebrate the birthday of Abraham Lincoln.

Five years after a world war has been won, men's hearts should anticipate a long peace—and men's minds should be free from the heavy weight that comes with war. But this is not such a period—for this is not a period of peace. This is a time of "the cold war." This is a time when all the world is split into two vast, increasingly hostile, armed camps—a time of a great armament race.

Today we can almost physically hear the mutterings and rumblings of an invigorated god of war. You can see it, feel it, and hear it all the way from the Indochina hills, from the shores of Formosa, right over into the very heart of Europe itself.

The one encouraging thing is that the "mad moment" has not yet arrived for the firing of the gun or the exploding of the bomb which will set civilization about the final task of destroying itself. There is still a hope for peace if we finally decide that no longer can we safely blind our eyes and close our ears to those facts which are shaping up more and more clearly * * * and that is that we are now engaged in a show-down fight * * * not the usual war between nations for land areas or other material gains, but a war between two diametrically opposed ideologies.

The great difference between our western Christian world and the atheistic Communist world is not political, gentlemen, it is moral. For instance, the Marxian idea of confiscating the land and factories and running the entire economy as a single enterprise is momentous. Likewise, Lenin's invention of the one-party police state as a way to make Marx's idea work is hardly less momentous.

Stalin's resolute putting across of these two ideas, of course, did much to divide the world. With only these differences, however, the east and the west could most certainly still live in peace.

The real, basic difference, however, lies in the religion of immoralism * * * invented by Marx, preached feverishly by Lenin, and carried to unimaginable extremes by Stalin. This religion of immoralism, if the Red half of the world triumphs—and well it may, gentlemen—this religion of immoralism will more deeply wound and damage mankind than any conceivable economic or political system.

Karl Marx dismissed God as a hoax, and Lenin and Stalin have added in clear-cut, unmistakable language their resolve that no nation, no people who believe in a god, can exist side by side with their communistic state.

Karl Marx, for example, expelled people from his Communist Party for mentioning such things as love, justice, humanity or morality. He called this "soulful ravings" and "sloppy sentimentality."

While Lincoln was a relatively young man in his late thirties, Karl Marx boasted that the Communist specter was haunting Europe. Since that time, hundreds of millions of people and vast areas of the world have come under Communist domination. Today, less than 100 years after Lincoln's death, Stalin brags that this Communist specter is not only haunting the world, but is about to completely subjugate it.

Today we are engaged in a final, all-out battle between communistic atheism and Christianity. The modern champions of communism have selected this as the time, and ladies and gentlemen, the chips are down—they are truly down.

Let there be any doubt that the time has been chosen, let us go directly to the leader of communism today—Joseph Stalin. Here is what he said—not back

in 1928, not before the war, not during the war—but 2 years after the last war was ended: “To think that the Communist revolution can be carried out peacefully, within the framework of a Christian democracy, means one has either gone out of one’s mind and lost all normal understanding, or has grossly and openly repudiated the Communist revolution.”

This is what was said by Lenin in 1919—and quoted with approval by Stalin in 1947:

“We are living,” says Lenin, “not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with Christian states for a long time is unthinkable * * *. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.”

Ladies and gentlemen, can there be anyone tonight who is so blind as to say that the war is not on? Can there be anyone who fails to realize that the Communist world has said the time is now? * * * that this is the time for the show-down between the democratic Christian world and the communistic atheistic world?

Unless we face this fact, we shall pay the price that must be paid by those who wait too long.

Six years ago, at the time of the first conference to map out the peace, there was within the Soviet orbit, 180,000,000 people. Lined up on the anti-totalitarian side there were in the world at that time, roughly 1,625,000,000 people. Today, only 6 years later, there are 80,000,000,000 people under the absolute domination of Soviet Russia—an increase of over 400 percent. On our side, the figure has shrunk to around 500,000. In other words, in less than 6 years, the odds have changed from 9 to 1 in our favor to 8 to 1 against us.

This indicates the swiftness of the tempo of Communist victories and American defeats in the cold war. As one of our outstanding historical figures once said, “When a great democracy is destroyed, it will not be from enemies from without, but rather because of enemies from within.”

The truth of this statement is becoming terrifyingly clear as we see this country each day losing on every front.

At war’s end we were physically the strongest nation on earth * * * and at least potentially the most powerful intellectually and morally. Ours could have been the honor of being a beacon in the desert of destruction * * * shining proof that civilization was not yet ready to destroy itself. Unfortunately, we have failed miserably and tragically to arise to the opportunity.

The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our only powerful potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores * * * but rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation. It has not been the less fortunate, or members of minority groups who have been traitorous to this Nation * * * but rather those who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest Nation on earth has had to offer * * * the finest homes, the finest college education and the finest jobs in government we can give.

This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been most traitorous.

Now I know it is very easy for anyone to condemn a particular bureau or department in general terms. Therefore, I would like to cite some specific cases.

When Chiang Kai-shek was fighting our war, the State Department had in China a young man named John Service. His task, obviously, was not to work for communization of China. However, strangely, he sent official reports back to the State Department urging that we torpedo our ally Chiang Kai-shek * * * and stating in unqualified terms (and I quote) that “communism was the only hope of China.”

Later, this man—John Service—and please remember that name, ladies and gentlemen, was picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for turning over to the Communists secret State Department information. Strangely, however, he was never prosecuted. However, John Grew, the Under Secretary of State, who insisted on his prosecution, was forced to resign. Two days after, his successor, Dean Acheson, took over as Under Secretary of State. This man, John Service, who had been picked up by the FBI and who had previously urged that communism was the only hope of China, was not only reinstated in the State Department, but promoted * * * and finally, under Acheson, placed in charge of all placements and promotions. Today, ladies and gentlemen, this man Service is on his way to represent the State Department and Acheson in

Calcutta, by far and away the most important listening post in the Far East.

That's one case. Let's go to another—Gustavo Duran, who was labeled as (I quote) "a notorious international Communist," was made assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American affairs. He was taken into the State Department from his job as a lieutenant colonel in the Communist International Brigade. Finally, after intense congressional pressure and criticism, he resigned in 1946 from the State Department. And, ladies and gentlemen, where do you think he is now? He took over a high-salaried job, as Chief of Cultural Activities Section in the office of the Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations.

Then there was a Mrs. Mary Jane Kenney, from the Board of Economic Warfare in the State Department, who was named in a FBI report and in a House committee report as a courier for the Communist Party while working for the Government. And where do you think Mrs. Mary Jane is—she is now an editor in the United Nations Document Bureau.

Then there was Julian H. Wadleigh, economist in the Trade Agreements Section of the State Department for 11 years. And who was sent to Turkey and Italy and other countries as United States representative. After the statute of limitations had run so he could not be prosecuted for treason, he openly and brazenly not only admitted but proclaimed that he had been a member of the Communist Party * * * that while working for the State Department he stole a vast number of secret documents * * * and furnished these documents to the Russian spy ring of which he was a part.

And, ladies and gentlemen, while I cannot take the time to name all the men in the State Department who have been named as active members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 * * * a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department.

One thing to remember in discussing the Communists in our Government is that we are not dealing with spies who get 30 pieces of silver to steal the blueprints of a new weapon. We are dealing with a far more sinister type of activity because it permits the enemy to guide and shape our policy.

In that connection I would like to read to you very briefly from the testimony of Larry B. Kerley, a man who was with the Counterespionage Section of the FBI for 8 years. And keep in mind as I read this to you that at the time he is speaking there was in the State Department Alger Hiss (the convicted traitor), John Service (the man whom the FBI picked up for espionage), Julian Wadleigh (who brazenly admitted he was a spy and wrote newspaper articles in regard thereto).

Here is what the FBI man said: "In accordance with instructions of the State Department to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the FBI was not even permitted to open an espionage case against any Russian suspect without State Department approval."

And some further questions:

MR. ARENS. "Did the State Department ever withhold from the Justice Department the right to intern suspects?"

KERLEY. "They withheld the right to get out process for them which, in effect, kept them from being arrested, as in the case of Schevchenko and others."

ARENS. "In how many instances did the State Department decline to permit process to be served on Soviet agents?"

KERLEY. "Do you mean how many Soviet agents were affected?"

ARENS. "Yes."

KERLEY. "That would be difficult to say because there were so many people connected in one espionage ring, whether or not they were directly conspiring with the ring."

ARENS. "Was that order applicable to all persons?"

KERLEY. "Yes, all persons in the Soviet espionage organization."

ARENS. "What did you say the order was as you understood it or as it came to you?"

KERLEY. "That no arrests of any suspects in the Russian espionage activities in the United States were to be made without the prior approval of the State Department."

Now the reason for the State Department's opposition to arresting any of this spy ring is made rather clear in the next question and answer.

Senator O'CONNOR. "Did you understand that that was to include also American participants?"

KERLEY. "Yes, because if they were arrested that would disclose the whole apparatus, you see."

In other words they could not afford to let the whole ring which extended to the State Department, be shown.

This brings us down to the case of one Alger Hiss who is important not as an individual any more, but rather because he is so representative of a group in the State Department. It is unnecessary to go over the sordid events showing how he sold out the Nation which had given him so much. Those are rather fresh in all of our minds.

However, it should be remembered that the facts in regard to his connection with this international Communist spy ring were made known to the then Under Secretary of State Berle 3 days after Hitler and Stalin signed the Russo-German Alliance Pact. At that time one Witter Chambers—who was also part of the spy ring—apparently decided that with Russia on Hitler's side he could no longer betray our Nation. He gave Under Secretary of State Berle—and this is all a matter of record—practically all, if not more, of the facts upon which Hiss' conviction was based.

Under Secretary Berle promptly contacted Dean Acheson and received word in return that Acheson (and I quote) "could vouch for Hiss absolutely"—at which time the matter was dropped. And this, you understand, was at a time when Russia was an ally of Germany. This condition existed while Russia and Germany were invading and dismembering Poland, and while the Communist groups here were screaming "warmonger" at the United States for their support of the Allied nations.

Again in 1943 the FBI had occasion to investigate the facts surrounding Hiss. But even after that FBI report was submitted, nothing was done.

Then late in 1948—on August 5—when the Un-American Activities Committee called Alger Hiss to give an accounting, President Truman and the left-wing press commenced a systematic program of villification of that committee. On the day that Truman labeled the Hiss investigation a "red herring," on that same day (and listen to this, ladies and gentlemen) President Truman also issued a Presidential directive ordering all Government agencies to refuse to turn over any information whatsoever in regard to the Communist activities of any Government employee to a congressional committee.

Incidentally, even after Hiss was convicted it is interesting to note that the President still labeled the exposé of Hiss as a "red herring."

If time permitted, it might be well to go into detail about the fact that Hiss was Roosevelt's chief advisor at Yalta when Roosevelt was admittedly in ill health and tired physically and mentally * * * and when, according to the Secretary of State, Hiss and Gromiko drafted the report on the conference.

According to the then Secretary of State, here are some of the things that Hiss helped to decide at Yalta. (1) The establishment of a European High Commission; (2) the treatment of Germany—this you will recall was the conference at which it was decided that we would occupy Berlin with Russia occupying an area completely circling the city, which, as you know, resulted in the Berlin air lift which cost 31 American lives; (3) the Polish question; (4) the relationship between UNRRA and the Soviet; (5) the rights of Americans on control commissions of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary; (6) Iran; (7) China—here's where we gave away Manchuria; (8) Turkish Straits question; (9) international trusteeship; (10) Korea.

Of the results of this conference, Arthur Bliss Lane of the State Department had this to say: "As I glanced over the document, I could not believe my eyes. To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."

As you hear this story of high treason, I know that you are saying to yourself—well, why doesn't the Congress do something about it. Actually, ladies and gentlemen, the reason for the graft, the corruption, the dishonesty, the disloyalty, the treason in high government positions—the reason this continues is because of a lack of moral uprising on the part of the 140,000,000 American people. In the light of history, however, this is not hard to explain.

It is the result of an emotional hang-over and a temporary moral lapse which follows every war. It is the apathy to evil which people who have been subjected to the tremendous evils of war feel. As the people of the world see mass murder, the destruction of defenseless and innocent people, and all of the crime and lack of morals which go with war, they become numb and apathetic. It has always been thus after war.

However, the morals of our people have not been destroyed. They still exist. This cloak of numbness and apathy has only needed a spark to rekindle them. Happily, this has finally been supplied.

As you know, very recently the Secretary of State proclaimed his loyalty to a man guilty of what has always been considered as the most abominable of all crimes—being a traitor to the people who gave him a position of trust—high treason. The Secretary of State in attempting to justify his continued devotion to the man who sold out the Christian world to the atheistic world, referred to Christ's Sermon on the Mount as a justification and reason therefor.

* * * And the reaction of the American people to this would have made the heart of Abraham Lincoln happy.

Thus this pompous diplomat in striped pants, * * * with a phony British accent, tells the American people that Christ on the Mount endorsed communism, high treason, and betrayal of a sacred trust, this blasphemy was just great enough to awaken the dormant, inherent decency indignation of the American people.

He has lighted the spark which is resulting in a moral uprising and will end only when the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers are swept from the national scene so that we may have a new birth of honesty and decency in government.

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES K. WHITAKER

To Whom It May Concern:

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,

County of Ohio, to wit:

This day James K. Whitaker personally appeared before me, Lucille M. Bock, a notary public of said county, and being by me first duly sworn says as news editor of radio station WWVA I was in charge of the tape recording of Senator Joseph McCarthy's speech at the Hotel McLure, Wheeling, W. Va., on February 9, 1950. At the hotel I followed the prepared script as I listened to the speech. I certify that the delivered speech, as recorded by me, and on that evening broadcast by the Station WWVA was in the same form as the attached photostat of the prepared script—with the exception of the usual added connective phrases and the addition or deletion of such words as a's, and's, and the's which, to my thinking did not materially change the meaning of the text.

I have initialed each page of the attached photostatic copy of Senator McCarthy's speech.

JAMES K. WHITAKER.

Taken, subscribed and sworn to before me this the 25th day of April 1950.

[SEAL]

LUCILLE M. BOCK.

My commission expires February 3, 1952.

Ladies and gentlemen, tonight as we celebrate the 141st birthday of one of the greatest men in American history, I would like to be able to talk about what a glorious day today is in the history of the world. As we celebrate the birth of this man who with his whole heart and soul hated war, I would like to be able to speak of peace in our time—of war being outlawed—and of world-wide disarmament. These would be truly appropriate things to be able to men as we celebrate the birthday of Abraham Lincoln.

Five years after a World War has been won, men's hearts should anticipate a long peace—and men's minds should be free from the heavy weight that comes with war. But this is not such a period—for this is not a period of peace. This is a time of "the cold war." This is a time when all the world is split into two vast, increasingly hostile, armed camps—a time of a great armament race.

Today we can almost physically hear the mutterings and rumblings of an invigorated God of War. You can see it, feel it and hear it all the way from the Indochina hills, from the shores of Formosa, right over into the very heart of Europe itself.

The one encouraging thing is that the "mad moment" has not yet arrived for the firing of the gun or the exploding of the bomb which will set civilization about the final task of destroying itself. There is still a hope for peace if we finally decide that no longer can we safely blind our eyes and close our ears to those facts which are shaping up more and more clearly—and that is that we are

now engaged in a show-down fight—not the usual war between nations for land areas or other material gains, but a war between two diametrically opposed ideologies.

The great difference between our western Christian world and the atheistic Communist world is not political, gentlemen, *it is moral!* For instance, the Marxian idea of confiscating the land and factories and running the entire economy as a single enterprise is momentous. Likewise, Lenin's invention of the one-party Police State as a way to make Marx's idea work is hardly less momentous.

Stalin's resolute putting across of these two ideas, of course, did much to divide the world. With only those differences, however, the East and the West could most certainly still live in peace.

The real, basic difference, however, lies in the religion of immoralism—invented by Marx, preached feverishly by Lenin, and carried to unimaginable extremes by Stalin. This religion of immoralism, if the Red half of the world triumphs—and well it may, gentlemen—this religion of immoralism will more deeply wound and damage mankind than any conceivable economic or political system.

Karl Marx dismissed God as a hoax, and Lenin and Stalin have added in clear-cut, unmistakable language their resolve that no nation, no people who believe in a God, can exist side by side with their Communistic state.

Karl Marx, for example, expelled people from his Communist Party for mentioning such things as love, justice, humanity or morality. He called this "soulful ravings" and "sloppy sentimentality."

While Lincoln was a relatively young man in his late 30's, Karl Marx boasted that the Communist specter was haunting Europe. Since that time, hundreds of millions of people and vast areas of the world have come under Communist domination. Today, less than 100 years after Lincoln's death, Stalin brags that this Communist specter is not only haunting the world, but is about to completely subjugate it.

Today we are engaged in a final, all-out battle between Communistic atheism and Christianity. The modern champions of Communism have selected *this* as the time, and ladies and gentlemen, the chips are down—they are truly down.

Let there be any doubt that the time has been chosen, let us go directly to the leader of communism today—Joseph Stalin. Here is what he said—not back in 1928, not before the war, not during the war—but two years after the last war was ended: "To think that the Communist revolution can be carried out peacefully, within the framework of a Christian democracy, means one has either gone out of one's mind and lost all normal understanding, or has grossly and openly repudiated the Communist revolution."

This is what was said by Lenin in 1919—and quoted with approval by Stalin in 1947:

"We are living," says Lenin, "not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with Christian states for a long time is unthinkable * * *

"One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that and supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable."

Ladies and gentlemen, can there be anyone tonight who is so blind as to say that the war is not on? Can there be anyone who fails to realize that the Communist world has said the time is now? . . . that this is the time for the showdown between the democratic Christian world and the communistic atheistic world?

Unless we face this fact, we shall pay the price that must be paid by those who wait too long.

Six years ago, at the time of the first conference to map out the peace, there was within the Soviet orbit, 180 million people. Lined up on the antitotalitarian side there were in the world at that time, roughly 1 billion 625 million people. Today, only 6 years later, there are 80 billion people under the absolute domination of Soviet Russia—an increase of over 400 percent. On our side, the figure has shrunk to around 500 thousand. In other words, in less than six years, the odds have changed from 9 to 1 in our favor to 8 to 1 against us.

This indicates the swiftness of the tempo of Communist victories and American defeats in the cold war. As one of our outstanding historical figures once said, "When a great democracy is destroyed, it will not be from enemies from without, but rather because of enemies from within."

The truth of this statement is becoming terrifyingly clear as we see this country each day losing on every front.

At war's end we were physically the strongest nation on earth—and at least potentially that most powerful intellectually and morally. Our could have been the honor of being a beacon in the desert of destruction—shining proof that civilization was not yet ready to destroy itself. Unfortunately, we have failed miserably and tragically to arise to the opportunity.

The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our only powerful potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores—but rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation. It has not been the less fortunate, or members of minority groups who have been traitorous to this Nation—but rather those who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest Nation on earth has had to offer—the finest homes, the finest college education, and the finest jobs in Government we can give.

This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been most traitorous.

Now I know it is very easy for anyone to condemn a particular bureau or department in general terms. Therefore, I would like to cite some specific cases.

When Chiang Kai-shek was fighting our war, the State Department had in China a young man named John Service. His task, obviously was not to work for the Communization of China. However, strangely, he sent official reports back to the State Department urging that we torpedo our ally Chiang Kai-shek—and stating in unqualified terms (and I quote) that "communism was the only hope of China."

Later, this man—John Service—and please remember that name, ladies and gentlemen, was picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for turning over to the Communists secret State Department information. Strangely, however, he was never prosecuted. However, John Grew, the Under Secretary of State, who insisted on his prosecution, was forced to resign. Two days after, his successor, Dean Acheson, took over as Under Secretary of State. This man, John Service, who had been picked up by the FBI and who had previously urged that Communism was the only hope of China, was not only reinstated in the State Dept., but promoted—and finally, under Acheson, placed in charge of all placements and promotions. Today, ladies and gentlemen, this man Service is on his way to represent the State Department and Acheson in Calcutta—by far and away the most important listening post in the Far East.

That's one case. Let's go to another—Gustavo Duran, who was labeled as (I quote) "a notorious international Communist," was made assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin-American affairs. He was taken into the State Department from his job as a lieutenant colonel in the Communist International brigade. Finally, after intense congressional pressure and criticism, he resigned in 1946 from the State Department. AND, ladies and gentlemen, where do you think he is now? He took over a high salaried job as Chief of Cultural Activities Section in the office of the Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations.

Then there was a Mrs. Mary Jane Kenney, from the Board of Economic Warfare in the State Department, who was named in an FBI report and in a House committee report as a courier for the Communist Party while working for the Government. And where do you think Mrs. Mary Jane is—she is now an editor in the United Nations Document Bureau.

Then there was Julian H. Wadleigh, economist in the Trade Agreements Section of the State Department for 11 years—And who was sent to Turkey and Italy and other countries as U. S. representative. After the statute of limitations had run so he could not be prosecuted for treason, he openly and brazenly not only admitted but proclaimed that he had been a member of the Communist Party—that while working for the State Department he stole a vast number of secret documents—and furnished documents to the Russian spy ring of which he was a part.

And ladies and gentlemen, while I cannot take the time to name all the men in the State Department who have been named as active members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205—a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department.

One thing to remember in discussing the Communists in our Government is that we are not dealing with spies who get 30 pieces of silver to steal the blue-prints of a new weapon. We are dealing with a far more sinister type of activity because it permits the enemy to guide and shape our policy.

In that connection I would like to read to you very briefly from the testimony of Larry E. Kerley, a man who was with the Counter-Espionage Section of the FBI for 8 years. And keep in mind as I read this to you that at the time he is speaking there was in the State Department Alger Hiss (the convicted traitor), John Service (the man whom the FBI picked up for espionage), Julian Wadleigh (who brazenly admitted he was a spy and wrote newspaper articles in regard thereto).

Here is what the FBI man said:

"In accordance with instructions of the State Department to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the FBI was not even permitted to open an espionage case against any Russian suspect without State Department approval."

And some further questions:

Mr. ARENS. "Did the State Dept. ever withhold from the Justice Dept. the right to intern suspects?"

KERLEY. "They withheld the right to get on process for them which, in effect, kept them from being arrested, as in the case of Shevchenko and others."

ARENS. "In how many instances did the State Department decline to permit process to be served on Soviet agents?"

KERLEY. "Do you mean how many Soviet agents were affected?"

ARENS. "Yes."

KERLEY. "That would be difficult to say because there were so many people connected in one espionage ring, whether or not they were directly conspiring with the ring."

ARENS. "Was that order applicable to all persons?"

KERLEY. "Yes, all persons in the Soviet espionage organization."

ARENS. "What did you say the order was as you understood it or as it came to you?"

KERLEY. "That no arrests of any suspects in the Russian espionage activities in the United States were to be made without the prior approval of the State Department."

Now the reason for the State Department's opposition to arresting any of this spy ring is made rather clear in the next question and answer.

Senator O'CONNOR. "Did you understand that that was to include also American participants?"

KERLEY. "Yes, because if they were arrested that would disclose the whole apparatus, you see."

In other words they could not afford to let the whole ring which extended to the State Department, be shown.

This brings us down to the case of one Alger Hiss who is important, not as an individual any more, but rather because he is so representative of a group in the State Department. It is unnecessary to go over the sordid events showing how he sold out the nation which had given him so much. Those are rather fresh in all of our minds.

However, it should be remembered that the facts in regard to his connection with this international Communist spy ring were made known to the then Under Secretary of State Berle three days after Hitler and Stalin signed the Russo-German alliance Pact. At that time one Whittaker Chambers—who was also part of the spy ring—apparently decided that with Russia on Hitler's side he could no longer betray our nation. He gave Under Secretary of State Berle—and this is all a matter of record—practically all, if not more, of the facts upon which Hiss' conviction was based.

Under Secretary Berle promptly contacted Dean Acheson and received word in return that Acheson (and I quote) "could vouch for Hiss absolutely"—at which time the matter was dropped. And this, you understand, was at a time when Russia was an ally of Germany. This condition existed while Russia and Germany were invading and dismembering Poland, and while the Communist groups here were screaming "warmonger" at the United States for their support of the Allied nations.

Again in 1943 the FBI had occasion to investigate the facts surrounding Hiss. But even after that FBI report was submitted, nothing was done.

Then late in 1948—on August 5th—when the Un-American Activities Committee called Alger Hiss to give an accounting, President Truman and the left-wing press commenced a systematic program of vilification of that committee. On

the day that Truman labeled the Hiss investigation a "Red Herring"—on that same day—and listen to this, ladies and gentleman—President Truman also issued a Presidential directive ordering all government agencies to refuse to turn over any information whatsoever in regard to the Communist activities of any Government employee to a congressional committee.

Incidentally, even after Hiss was convicted it is interesting to note that the President still labeled the exposé of Hiss as a "Red Herring."

If time permitted, it might be well to go into detail about the fact that Hiss was Roosevelt's chief advisor at Yalta when Roosevelt was admittedly in ill health and tired physically and mentally—and when, according to the Secretary of State, Hiss and Gromyko drafted the report on the conference.

According to the then Secretary of State, here are some of the things that Hiss helped to decide at Yalta: (1) The establishment of a European High Commission; (2) the treatment of Germany—this you will recall was the conference at which it was decided that we would occupy Berlin with Russia occupying an area completely circling the city, which, as you know, resulted in the Berlin airlift which cost 31 American lives; (3) the Polish question; (4) the relationship between UNRRA and the Soviet; (5) the rights of Americans on control commissions of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary; (6) Iran; (7) China—here's where we gave away Manchuria; (8) Turkish straits question; (9) international trusteeship; (10) Korea.

Of the results of this conference, Arthur Bliss Lane, of the State Department had this to say: "As I glanced over the document, I could not believe my eyes. To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to Stalin."

As you hear this story of high treason, I know that you are saying to yourself Well, why doesn't the Congress do something about it. Actually, ladies and gentlemen, the reason for the graft, the corruption, the dishonesty, the disloyalty, the treason in high Government positions—the reason this continues is because of a lack of moral uprising on the part of the 140 million American people. In the light of history, however, this is not hard to explain.

It is the result of an emotional hang-over and a temporary moral lapse which follows every war. It is the apathy to evil which people who have been subjected to the tremendous evils of war feel. As the people of the world see mass murder, the destruction of defenseless and innocent people, and all of the crime and lack of morals which go with war, they become numb and apathetic. It has always been thus after war.

However, the morals of our people have not been destroyed. They still exist. This cloak of numbness and apathy has only needed a spark to rekindle them. Happily, this has finally been supplied.

As you know, very recently the Secretary of State proclaimed his loyalty to a man guilty of what has always been considered as the most abominable of all crimes—being a traitor to the people who gave him a position of trust—high treason. The Secretary of State in attempting to justify his continued devotion to the man who sold out the Christian world to the atheistic world, referred to Christ's Sermon on the Mount as a justification and reason therefore.

* * * and the reaction of the American people to this would have made the heart of Abraham Lincoln happy.

This this pompous diplomat in striped pants, with a phony British accent, tells the American people that Christ on the Mount endorsed communism, high treason, and betrayal of a sacred trust, this blasphemy was just great enough to awaken the dormant, inherent decency indignation of the American people.

He has lighted the spark which is resulting in a moral uprising and will end only when the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers are swept from the national scene so that we may have a new birth of honesty and decency in government.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

To DEAN H. ACHESON, *Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, D. C., Greeting:*

Pursuant to lawful authority, YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear before the subcommittee established by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

Senate of the United States, pursuant to Senate Resolution 231, Eighty-first Congress, on April 4, 1950, at 10:30 o'clock a. m., at the subcommittee room F-53, United States Capitol, then and there to produce all original books, records, reports, memoranda, and other documents and papers in the custody of the Department of State or any officer or employee thereof (or, in the absence of the originals thereof, true and correct copies thereof) of the categories described in Appendix I hereto (which is attached hereto and is made a part hereof) which pertain to any individual named in Appendix II hereto (which is a sealed instrument attached hereto and made a part hereof).

Hereof fail not, as you will answer your default under the pains and penalties in such cases made and provided.

To JOSEPH C. DUKE, Sergeant at Arms of the Senate of the United States, to serve and return.

Given under my hand, by order of the subcommittee, this 28th day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty.

(Signed) MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Loyalty of State Department Employees.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 29, 1950.

I made service of the within supena by personal service to the within-named Dean H. Acheson, at Department of State, Washington, D. C., at 2:42 o'clock p. m., on the 29th day of March 1950.

JOSEPH C. DUKE,
Sergeant at Arms, Senate of the United States.

APPENDIX I

1. The personnel file maintained by the Department of State or any subdivision thereof in the regular course of the personnel administration thereof concerning each present or former officer or employee thereof or consultant thereto named in Appendix II hereto.

2. A copy, duly certified to be true and complete, of the transcript of each proceeding before (a) the State Department Loyalty Board, (b) the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission, or (c) any other board or body established pursuant to Executive Order Numbered 9835, dated March 21, 1947, as amended, to hear or determine questions concerning the loyalty to the United States Government of officers and employees of the United States, involving as a party thereto any person named in Appendix II hereto.

3. Every document and paper received by, or originated within, the State Department, in the period from January 1, 1940, to date, which shows, with regard to any person named in Appendix II hereto—

(a) Any allegation, complaint, representation, question, or imputation concerning the loyalty or disloyalty of such person to the Government of the United States; or

(b) The nature, extent, progress, or result of any investigation conducted by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States with regard to, or for the purpose of ascertaining, the loyalty or disloyalty to the United States Government of any person so named.

APPENDIX II

This appendix contained the names of the persons charged by Senator Joseph McCarthy on the floor of the Senate on February 20, 1950. This list is confidential and is not being printed in the public record.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

To J. HOWARD McGRATH,

Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., Greetings:

Pursuant to lawful authority, YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear before the subcommittee established by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of the United States, pursuant to Senate Resolution 231, Eighty-first Congress, on April 4, 1950, at 10:30 o'clock a. m., at their subcommittee room F-53, United States Capitol, then and there to produce all original books, records,

reports, memoranda, and other documents and papers in the custody of the Department of Justice, any division, bureau, office, or subdivision thereof, or any officer or employee thereof (or, in the absence of the originals thereof, true and correct copies thereof) of the categories described in Appendix I hereto (which is attached hereto and is made a part hereof) which pertain to any individual named in Appendix II hereto (which is a sealed instrument attached hereto and made a part hereof).

Hereof fail not, as you will answer your default under the pains and penalties in such cases made and provided.

To JOSEPH C. DUKE, Sergeant at Arms of the Senate of the United States, to serve and return.

Given under my hand, by order of the subcommittee, this 28th day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty.

(Signed) MILLARD E. TYDINGS,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Loyalty of State Department Employees.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 29, 1950.

I made service of the within subpoena by personal service to Mr. Peyton Ford, on behalf of the within-named J. Howard McGrath, at Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., at 4:05 o'clock p. m., on the 29th day of March 1950.

JOSEPH C. DUKE,

Sergeant at Arms, Senate of the United States.

APPENDIX I

Every document and paper received by, or originated within, the Department of Justice or any division, bureau, office, or subdivision thereof, in the period from January 1, 1940, to date, which shows, with regard to any person named in Appendix II hereto:

(a) Any allegation, complaint, representation, question, or imputation concerning the loyalty or disloyalty of such person to the Government of the United States; or

(b) The nature, extent, progress, or result of any investigation conducted by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States with regard to, or for the purpose of ascertaining, the loyalty or disloyalty to the United States Government of any person so named.

APPENDIX II

This appendix contained the names of the persons charged by Senator Joseph McCarthy on the floor of the Senate on February 20, 1950. This list is confidential and is not being printed in the public record.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

To: Harry B. Mitchell, Chairman, Civil Service Commission, Washington, D. C.

Greeting:

Pursuant to lawful authority, YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear before the subcommittee established by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of the United States, pursuant to Senate Resolution 231, Eighty-first Congress, on April 4, 1950, at 10:30 o'clock a. m., at their committee room F-53, United States Capitol, then and there to produce all original books, records, reports, memoranda, and other documents and papers in the custody of the Civil Service Commission, any agency or subdivision thereof, or any officer or employee thereof (or, in the absence of the originals thereof, true and correct copies thereof) of the categories described in Appendix I hereto (which is attached hereto and is made a part hereof) which pertain to any individual named in Appendix II hereto (which is a sealed instrument attached hereto and made a part hereof).

Hereof fail not, as you will answer your default under the pains and penalties in such cases made and provided.

To JOSEPH C. DUKE, Sergeant at Arms of the Senate of the United States, to serve and return.

Given under my hand, by order of the subcommittee, this 28th day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty.

(Signed) MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Loyalty of State Department Employees.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 29, 1950.

I made service of the within subpoena by personal service to the within-named Harry B. Mitchell, at room 441, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C., at 11:15 o'clock a. m., on the 29th day of March 1950.

JOSEPH C. DUKE,
Sergeant at Arms, Senate of the United States.

APPENDIX I

1. All documents and papers filed with or maintained by the Civil Service Commission or any agency or subdivision thereof in the regular course of its duties concerning the appointment, employment, compensation, promotion, retention, fitness, efficiency, service, or separation from service of each present or former officer or employee of the Department of State named in Appendix II hereto.

2. A copy, duly certified to be true and complete, of the transcript of each proceeding before (a) the State Department Loyalty Board, (b) the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission, or (c) any other board or body established pursuant to Executive Order Numbered 9835, dated March 21, 1947, as amended, to hear or determine questions concerning the loyalty to the United States Government of officers and employees of the United States, involving as a party thereto any person named in Appendix II hereto.

3. Every document and paper received by, or originated within, the Civil Service Commission or any agency or subdivision thereof, in the period from January 1, 1940, to date, which shows, with regard to any person named in Appendix II hereto:

(a) Any allegation, complaint, representation, question, or imputation concerning the loyalty or disloyalty of such person to the Government of the United States; or

(b) The nature, extent, progress, or result of any investigation conducted by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States with regard to, or for the purpose of ascertaining, the loyalty or disloyalty to the United States Government of any person so named.

APPENDIX II

This appendix contained the names of the persons charged by Senator Joseph McCarthy on the floor of the Senate on February 20, 1950. This list is confidential and is not being printed in the public record.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, June 16, 1950.

HON. MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: This will refer to your letter of May 8, 1950, with regard to the loyalty files of the State Department relative to the so-called 81 individuals identified through numbers by Senator McCarthy in his speech on the Senate floor on February 20, 1950, and identified by name in the subpoena of the Senate subcommittee.

Following are the names of the individuals whose State Department files are being made available to your subcommittee:

(Here are set forth the names of all the individuals whose files were reviewed and who are identical with the individuals identified by Senator McCarthy in his speech on the Senate floor on February 20, 1950.)

The Federal Bureau of Investigation furnished me a record of all loyalty material furnished the State Department in these cases. The State Department files have been checked, and I can assure you that all of the reports and memoranda furnished the State Department are contained in the files.

Yours sincerely,

PEYTON FORD,
Deputy Attorney General.

There are set out below memoranda concerning data extracted from the State Department loyalty files relative to 108 individuals. These memoranda were prepared in 1947 by investigators for a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations of the Eightieth Congress. These individuals are identified only by numbers.

No. 1

He was born in New York City in 1918. He was employed as an economist and analyst with OSS and the State Department since June 1945. Previous to that he had worked for the Treasury Department and the War Production Board. He is now in research and intelligence.

An undated memorandum in the file, which according to T. L. Hoffman, of CSA, was prepared during the week of October 13, 1947, recommended that this subject be terminated as a security risk. The memorandum states that he was an active member and officer of the American Student Union; that he advocated military opposition to Germany in 1937, and opposed conscription in the United States of America in 1940. He has been closely associated with several subjects of a Russian espionage case, and has two brothers who are Communist Party members.

No. 2

The subject was born in 1903 in Flushing, N. Y. He was employed on June 1, 1942, with OSS as a geographer. In September 1945 he was transferred to the State Department where he is presently in research and intelligence.

The investigative file on this subject has in it information from a Government investigative agency indicating that the subject possesses radical political views, according to neighbors and confidential informants. Three informants reported him a member of several Communist-front organizations and stated he associates openly with Communists. The report in which this information is included is dated July 3, 1942.

A CSA report of April 18, 1946, contains information obtained from another Government agency. The information of that Agency is set out in a report dated April 22, 1942, and indicates that numerous witnesses, including college professors and police officers in California, testified that the subject is a radical and fellow-traveler, if not a Communist. He was very friendly and sympathetic toward Harry Bridges and strongly opposed moves to deport him. He was also a friend of Ralph Friedman, Secretary of the Communist Party in northern California.

A CSA report of November 13, 1946, sets out information obtained by interviewing subject's present and former associates in Washington. Several of his former associates in OSS state he is "left of the New Deal." Another associate stated that subject favors the Chinese Communists over the Kuomintang Regime and favors Russia in most respects. The subject reportedly told another associate that he thought Union members should have the right to strike against the Government. A State Department official described him as being extremely Left and said he seemed to be sympathetic to Russia in the Communist experiment. Another Government official said the subject blamed the capitalists for all ills, and further blamed the State Department for all the trouble with Russia during the war and praised Russia and her foreign policy.

Eleven subsequent investigative reports were prepared between November 13, 1946, and September 22, 1947, with most of the witnesses confirming the above-mentioned statements regarding the subject. As of November 1, 1947, the subject's case had been referred to the State Department Loyalty Board but no action had been taken on it.

No. 3

The applicant came to the United States from Hungary in 1938 and was naturalized in New York City in August 1944. She has been employed since October 1944 as a translator and script writer with OWI and the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs.

A report of January 3, 1947, states the subject was an active member of the International Workers Order, a Communist-front organization. One former employer said he discharged the subject for being argumentative and inclined toward communism. Another former employer said she is a radical and boasted of being a Communist. A third informant said the subject had told him that communism is a very good thing. A fourth informant said the subject always argues over politics and stated communism was right for this country. A fifth

informant said she is oversympathetic to communism. Two references on her application for citizenship were members of the IWO and contributors to Communist periodicals.

Another reference on her State Department application refused to recommend the subject, questioning her loyalty and saying she is inclined toward communism.

A report of April 24, 1947, contains the statement made by the subject's supervisor with the State Department, "I feel sure she is a fellow traveler." This supervisor later, on reinterview, changed his mind saying she is loyal but liberal. (This supervisor was subsequently discharged for security reasons.)

The subject has been a contributor to the Hungarian Communist magazine NOK.

A memorandum in the file dated June 19, 1947, stated that investigation to date had failed to prove or disprove the allegation that the subject is a Communist, but that if a decision is necessary, the recommendation would be unfavorable as to retaining the subject on the rolls.

A report of June 27, 1947, stated that most of the informants who previously gave derogatory information were reinterviewed and they reiterated their statements.

Further investigation was conducted and set out in report of September 17, 1947, but no further substantiating information concerning the subject's Communist activities was obtained.

The file reflects no further action in this matter, but, on October 20, 1947, T. E. Hoffman advised that an unfavorable security recommendation was being prepared.

No. 4

She was Associate Business Economist with OPA from November 1941 to August 1944; with FEA from August 1944 to August 1945; and since that time has been employed as an Economist with the State Department.

Confidential files of several governmental agencies were checked by CSA in August 1946 and disclosed that she had been affiliated with—

1. The American Student Union
2. The National Youth Congress
3. Young Communist League
4. Washington Committee for Democratic Action
5. Washington Book Shop

Several associates of the subject were interviewed and stated she is a liberal but of unquestioned loyalty. On March 11, 1947, she was given clearance for security purposes. Subsequently, she was interviewed by CSA and she admitted having been a member of the above-mentioned organizations, but also stated that she had changed her views and had no contact with them since 1941 or 1942.

A memorandum dated June 18, 1947, from CSA to Mr. Peurifoy suggested that "if sufficient time could not be devoted to a further investigation of the subject, her services should be terminated."

Further investigation has been conducted since June 18, 1947, but no additional evidence has been obtained to change the recommendation and the case is still pending.

No. 5

This is an example of the failure of the Evaluation Section to take action on considerable derogatory information available relative to security, and expenditure of many weeks of additional investigation with no conclusion reached.

The subject was born in New York City in 1900. He was employed by the Foreign Economic Administration from August 1942 to August 1945 and has been employed by the State Department since that time in Research and Intelligence.

An investigative report dated May 4, 1946, reflected eight persons, including six professors at Harvard and University of California, a Naval Officer and a fellow student, stating that the subject has strong Communist sympathies. They stated he frequently expounded these sympathies and is either a Party Member or a fellow traveler.

Examples of comments by associates of the subject who were interviewed are as follows:

A professor at the University of California stated:

"I am acquainted with (subject) as a friend and student * * * I have known him since September of 1937 * * * I would not trust him * * * I could not prove that Harry Bridges was a Communist * * * I would not trust him either. (Subject) was a radical. He was a mediocre

student. I teach the course on Russia and that is how I know about these fellows who are Communists. (Subject) told me that I was too hard on the Bolsheviks. He ran with the radicals and there is no question but what he is a radical and I would not hire him. There is something about him that arouses my intuition and that causes me to be afraid of his outside connections * * * I would not recommend him to the Government".

A fellow student of the subject's at the University of California stated. "I have known (subject) since 1939 as a friend and fellow student. I am surprised that he gave me as a reference because he should have known his Communist ideas would have come out. He was definitely a Communist * * * I felt like he was getting some money from the Communist Party and the other fellows did too because they would say that (subject) wasn't preaching communism for his health, and that it was a business with him. He was very sincere and I believe he was really sold on Communism * * * I would not recommend (subject) to the Government because I feel he is a Communist and very sincere in his beliefs."

The subject was discharged from a Navy School during the war for poor grades and for pro-Communist activities. Two former associates of his with FEA criticized him as lacking in ability and being a disagreeable associate.

A memorandum dated May 15, 1946, from CSA to the Office of Controls states, "investigation disclosed evidence of a material nature tending to affect adversely the subject's loyalty to the Government of the United States and its institutions. It reveals that the subject is unmistakably identified with Communist activities.

"The records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel show that he was given a Special Order Discharge on March 27, 1942, 'under honorable conditions', but confidential information obtained from a reliable source reveals that the subject was discharged because it was found he was an ardent student and advocate of Communist doctrines. The investigation indicates that in view of the danger inherent to this situation, the acknowledged qualifications of the subject are insufficient to merit employment in the Department of State."

The file reveals no action taken on the memorandum of May 15, 1946. A report of March 25, 1947, reflecting interviews with State Department associates and neighbors of the subject indicated the subject is quiet in regard to political matters and none of the persons interviewed seemed to know his political sympathies. One person said that on several occasions he has seen letters addressed to the subject from the Soviet Embassy. He also stated that several publications have been observed in the subject's mail which caused him to be suspicious of the subject's political leanings.

An official of Georgetown University advised he had hired the subject to conduct an evening class in Chinese and later learned that the subject was connected with Communist groups on the west coast.

A report of investigation conducted on April 20, 1947, reflected subject took graduate work at the University of California during the years 1937 to 1940, but that no degree was awarded him and he failed in the examination for his PhD. (it is noted here that on his Form 57 he stated he had received a PhD Degree from the University of California). Four members of the faculty at the University confirmed the subject's Communist leanings.

Another report was submitted by the New York Office on May 5, 1947, but failed to confirm the subject's communistic views.

A memorandum dated June 18, 1947 was prepared by CSA to the attention of Mr. Peurifoy. This memorandum summarized the entire case against the subject and recommended that his services be terminated. Another memorandum dated July 21, 1947, was prepared by Wilson of CSA to Boles, also of CSA, and was as follows:

"In Mr. Bullock's absence I am assigning to you the case of (No. 5). This case was evaluated on June 18, 1947, and recommendation was made (subject) be terminated from the Department; however, Mr. Peurifoy did not feel that there was sufficient evidence against (subject) in view of the fact that he had not been shown to commit *any overt acts* or to affiliate himself with Communist organizations. I believe that full consideration should be given to the testimony of several Catholic Priests in this case. However, it does appear that the case could be developed and that further investigation is in order".

A report of September 4, 1947, by the Washington Office set out results of an interview with the subject. During the interview, the subject stated that he

would prefer a Communist regime in China to their present form of government, although his views may be contrary to the State Department's policy. He admitted having subscribed to the Daily Worker in 1940, and stated that he is a member of the American Veterans Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations and World Citizens Movement, Inc.

Four subsequent reports have been submitted: On September 12, 1947, by the Washington Office; on September 30, 1947 by the Philadelphia Office; on September 30, 1947 by New York City Office, and another on October 15, 1947, by the Washington Office.

The report of September 12, 1947, consisted of 20 pages summarizing previous investigations conducted of the subject since 1943.

The report of October 15, 1947, disclosed that the subject's previous position in an Area Division was abolished in August 1947, and he was transferred to the Division of Research replacing an employee with less seniority who was terminated. The report also states that a State Department official who knew the subject in China as well as here, said the subject's work was below par; that he is a mediocre, dull and slow-thinking individual, and that he is the only man in the Government he knows of whom he would speak unfavorably.

Another State Department official said he "considers subject weak as to ability, common sense and public relations."

In spite of the extensive investigation conducted, and the considerable derogatory information obtained, the subject was transferred in August 1947 to another Division when his previous position was abolished and he replaced another employee who was terminated.

No conclusion had been reached in this case, as of October 20, 1947, after a year and a half of investigation.

No. 6

She is employed with the Division of Central Services.

A report of December 31, 1946 reflects that witnesses describe her as being "liberal," "pink," "no more of a security risk than many others he has come into contact with if kept under proper supervision." She has been quoted as saying "Everyone in Russia has equal rights" and that in this country the minority groups were persecuted.

On January 7, 1947, a memorandum summarizing the investigation stated that nothing had been developed tending to affect adversely subject's loyalty. The file reflected that she was a shareholder in "Presentation, Inc.," the organization created by Carl Marzone which was the subject of a separate investigation by the State Department.

A memorandum of August 8, 1947 recited in detail subject's connection with the United Public Workers of America. It indicates that she was at the April 1946 conference of the UPWA at Atlantic City, New Jersey, when the pro-Russian resolution was passed. She, reportedly, favored the resolution and subsequently supported it locally. Reportedly, she also opposed the President's loyalty order in local union meetings.

This case is pending.

No. 7

She is a biographical analyst in the Biographical Information Division.

The files of a Government investigative agency indicate that a person by the same name as subject of 1418 Madison Street, NW., made application for membership in the American Youth for Democracy and the Sweethearts for Service Men organizations and has submitted her membership fees to the American Youth for Democracy Headquarters in Baltimore.

Her husband lived in New York City in 1941. An individual with his name was a Communist Party Election Petition signer. Apparently to date (October 10, 1947) no effort has been made to identify the above election petition signer as the subject's husband though the information has been on hand for several months.

The file reflects that subject did some work for the Political Action Committee in 1944 in Michigan and is active in the UPWA. Her acquaintances feel that she is a liberal Roosevelt Democrat but do not think her a Communist.

She has been under investigation since December 1946. Investigation is presently pending in the Evaluation Section.

No. 8

She was an analyst in OSS from July 1943 to August 1945, and has been employed in the Division of Map Intelligence since August 1945. Investigation

by CSA on January 22, 1946, disclosed an old acquaintance of subject as saying that the subject has communistic leanings, and is a friend of (C-1), who the informant believes is a Communist. The subject reportedly told the informant it would be a good idea if we had communism in this country.

Upon interview by a CSA agent, the subject denied being a Communist, but admitted having expressed an interest in communism, stating "I am interested in everything".

On an application for a passport to Brazil in 1941, and on her Form 57, the subject gave as a reference (C-2). This individual has been connected with many Communist-front activities.

On November 21, 1946 a full investigation of the subject was requested of CSA by Mr. Bannerman. A memorandum dated June 18, 1947 from CSA to Mr. Puerifoy listed the evidence against her as stated above, but pointed out that other available information should be checked before making a security recommendation.

An investigative report dated September 26, 1947, set out a reinterview with a previous informant and that person reiterated her statements about the subject having communist leanings, and informant also said the subject regularly read the newspapers PM and the Daily Worker when she lived with the informant in 1944.

Several other persons interviewed reported favorably on the subject.

No. 9

This is an example of the failure of the Evaluation Division to recommend obvious leads for investigation. It is also a case of a questionable security risk. Subject was appointed to a very important position prior to full security investigation.

The subject is also an applicant for a position as Foreign Service career officer, and is presently a Foreign Service reserve officer under the Informational and Cultural Program. He was appointed to this position in September 1947 and was assigned to Milan, Italy, where he is engaged in the educational program. He was a major and, subsequently, lieutenant colonel in the U. S. Army from May 1943 to August 1946, where he was assigned to the educational program in Italy.

Subject's file reflects that on April 13, 1942, he was granted a passport to travel in South America representing the Division of Cultural Relations of the State Department. Assistant Secretary of State (X-1) at that time, raised the question as to the advisability of granting him a passport and finally approved it.

A memorandum dated April 13, 1942, from the Passport Division to Charles M. Thomson, Assistant Chief of the Division of Cultural Relations, stated: "A passport will be issued to (No. 9) today in accordance with the Assistant Secretary's instructions, which read as follows:

"This is the conclusion. It is a flimsy case either way. I don't think the man is politically dangerous—merely a fool.

"I see no reason for not granting the passport. I can think of several for not giving him the job—but that is already done."

"I may add that I consider the synopsis of (No. 9's) activities, as prepared by Mr. Pattee of your office, as belittling (his) association with various radical activities of the past, probably because of a lack of familiarity with the set-up and activities of such organizations."

The basis for doubt regarding the issuance of the passport was a report submitted by another Government agency to the Department concerning the applicant.

Investigation conducted in connection with the application of subject for Foreign Service Officer disclosed the following activities on his part:

* * * Member of Trade Unions Delegation to Soviet Russia in 1927.

(This delegation was repudiated by William Green, President of the A. F. of L.)

* * * A sponsor of the New Theater Guild (Communist-front organization).

* * * A member of the American Civil Liberties Union.

* * * A member of the Supervisory Committee on Progressive Education Association.

* * * Organizer of the Chicago Branch of the North American Committee to Aid the Spanish Democracy.

* * * Member of League of American Writers.

* * * Member, American Society for Cultural Relations in Russia.

All the above organizations have been identified as Communist-fronts or heavily infiltrated with Communists.

The subject has written, and collaborated in writing, with several individuals on books and articles showing Russia in a very favorable light.

He was superintendent of schools in a small city and revolutionized the educational system there. He is reported to have introduced a Russian primer in the school after having visited Russia in 1927. The Daily Worker has mentioned him in a very favorable light on a number of occasions. He signed a petition to the Secretary of Labor in 1935, requesting right of asylum for John Strachey, well-known British radical. The records in the industrial detail, Chicago Police Department, listed him as a Communist in 1930.

A summary memorandum was prepared by CSA on July 9, 1946, and stated in the first paragraph: "Investigation discloses evidence of a material nature tending to affect adversely the subject's reputation, ideologies, and his loyalty to the Government of the United States and its institutions."

A memorandum dated August 6, 1946, from "Counsel—ACOPS" to "Security Officer" regarding the applicant, stated:

"1. The file in this matter has been turned over to me by (A-R) for ACOPS. After reading the file, and after conversation with (No. 9), who was sent by A-R to see me, I reached the conclusion that the CSA recommendation, on the entire record, would not merit submission of the case as a security case. Since CON has not had an opportunity to make its recommendations on this matter, I am sending to you the file and all supplementary material received by me for your consideration and report.

"2. I note that the report of Special Agent Pirro purports to be based almost entirely on the (writings) of Mrs. Elizabeth Dilling. * * * I call your attention to the fact that Mrs. Dilling was indicted for conspiracy involving allegations close to treason, and that she would hardly seem to be an authority, whatever the merits of any particular allegation might otherwise be, as respects the loyalty to the United States of people she attacks. With reference to the CSA language with respect to the teaching of 'hatred of God' I call your attention to the fact that (subject) states that he has been an active Quaker for many years. I believe that the CSA Special Agent should be informed of the foregoing."

It appears that the writer of this memorandum was Mr. Klaus who was Counsel—ACOPS at that time, and the "A-R" referred to in the memorandum appears to have been Assistant Secretary of State Russell. It is noted that the report of Special Agent Pirro, referred to in the memorandum, was a report of 13 pages which had only 2 pages of notes from Mrs. Dillings' writing and in the report Agent Pirro pointed out having verified her statements knowing she did not have "clean hands" herself.

On August 12, 1946, a memorandum from T. E. Hoffman to R. L. Bannerman stated in the first paragraph, "I have re-read the CSA report and have noted the additional material forwarded by Mr. Klaus, and it is my opinion that the available information is not sufficient to regard the subject as a security risk." The above recommendation was confirmed on August 22, 1946, by Mr. R. L. Bannerman to Mr. Klaus by memorandum.

A CSA report of August 22, 1946, related to "a protest of the Roman Catholic Church against the subject's assignment to educational duties with the Allied Military Government in Italy." A high official (X-3) of the National Catholic Welfare Conference said that he was convinced that the applicant was not a suitable person for a position in charge of education in Italy and not a suitable representative of our Government.

Notes of a conference between (X-2), Papal Secretariat of State, Vatican City, and Lieutenant Colonel Gayre of the British Army, indicated the following regarding the applicant and two of his associates:

Gayre indicates that these men are wild theorists who lack the stability and background for the job, and who are constantly opposed to Gayre's moderate program. They are reportedly Leftists who would veer entirely in that direction if given the opportunity.

The informant pointed out that Lieutenant Colonel Gayre was applicant's supervisor in Italy when the latter was with the Army. He also referred to the appointment of Adolfo Omodeo as Rector of Naples University, and one Ferretti as Rector of the University of Palermo. Informant stated that both of these individuals are known Italian Communists and were selected for their positions by the applicant.

The applicant's file reflects that he was given a "good" efficiency rating on April 30, 1947, by an American Consul (X-4) in Italy. In preparing the rating the consul expressed the feeling that he was not overenthusiastic about the subject but made no mention regarding his being considered a security risk; however, an efficiency report of March 27, 1947, submitted by a Foreign Service inspector (X-5) states in part, "The Inspector has seen too little of (the applicant) to judge either his work or his philosophy but would be inclined to consider him decidedly of the liberal school. (The applicant) expressed an interest in remaining in the work of the Department of State once his assignment as a reserve officer terminates. The Inspector was not sufficiently convinced of outstanding ability on the part of (applicant) to spread American influence and culture in Italy, or elsewhere, to warrant a recommendation on his part toward continuing (the applicant) beyond the anticipated period of service as a reserve officer. The Inspector even feels that (applicant) might conceivably get involved unwisely in political matters within this period. He is a pedantic, tedious, conceited, impractical, pompous man who would enjoy the pleasures of the Right, but popularity with the Left." The grade rating that was given by the Inspector was "satisfactory."

The committee investigator noted that; in spite of considerable derogatory information in the file, there is a notation on file that only a spot check is to be made in connection with the subject's application for the position of Foreign Service career officer. This spot check would merely include a check of the FBI and Un-American Activities Committee records. It also was noted that the former Assistant Secretary of State has never been interviewed although the file shows he made the statement in 1942 that he could think of several reasons for not employing the subject. Likewise, there appears to be no intention of interviewing the American Consul in Italy and the Foreign Service inspector, the latter especially, since he has expressed derogatory comments regarding the subject.

No. 10

This is a case of pressure from a high Department official to give clearance to a subject although derogatory information is available.

The subject was appointed in December 1945 as a translator for "not over a year." He had previously been a special attorney with the Justice Department and was in the U. S. Marines for one year during World War II.

A report of another investigative agency, under date of January 9, 1946, advised that the subject has homosexual tendencies and made suicide attempts in 1936 and 1942.

A memorandum dated January 22, 1946, by Mr. Bannerman recommended terminating the subject's services which could be done rather easily because of his appointment being of a temporary nature. He was terminated February 19, 1946, and appealed the termination.

A memorandum dated April 1, 1946, from J. A. Panuch stated that he had interviewed the subject and reviewed various affidavits and letters of reference submitted by this subject and he rescinded the termination action of February 19, 1946. A memorandum from Mr. Panuch, dated May 28, 1946, to Mr. Fred Lyon, of the Office of Controls, referred to an opinion expressed by Mr. Lyon on May 27, 1946, that the subject was an undesirable employee because of moral depravity, and requested substantiation of Lyon's charge in writing with evidence additional to what was already in the file. Mr. Lyon's memorandum of May 31, 1946, to Mr. Panuch pointed out that dismissal of charges against the subject was premature because—

1. No complete CSA investigation had been made to determine the subject's current personal conduct.

2. No interviews were had with two witnesses who had originally reported homosexual tendencies on the part of the subject and later denied their statements in affidavits.

3. The subject is known to have an arrest record in the District of Columbia for disorderly conduct. The facts regarding this arrest had not been checked.

Mr. Lyon pointed out that this is another case where it is necessary to either resolve all doubts in favor of the individual or the Department, and he favored the latter.

A memorandum of June 19, 1947, from the Foreign Activities Correlation Division to CSA stated information had been received from a Government security agency to the effect that the subject had been an enlisted man in the

Marines and while such had shown undue interest in naval activities and had pro-German sentiments during the war. The memorandum also stated that investigation by another Government agency exposed him as a flagrant homosexual.

A CSA report of September 2, 1947, set out considerable information confirming the subject's homosexual activities and tendencies. It also relates an interview with an attorney who originally reported the subject a homosexual to a Government agency and who subsequently on March 2, 1946, signed an affidavit contradicting his former statement. In connection with the affidavit he informed an investigator that the subject had approached him and begged him to sign a document he had written. He said he refused, but that a short time later Mr. Joseph Panuch, representing himself to be from Assistant Secretary of State Russell's office, called him by telephone on behalf of the subject and said the subject was being ruined by statements that he had made about him. Mr. Panuch reportedly said that everyone else who had made statements against the subject's character had retracted them and the informant was the only one holding out. Mr. Panuch then reportedly asked the informant to make an affidavit rescinding the statements made by him to another Government agency. It is noted that although Panuch said everyone else had rescinded their statements against the subject, the key witness to an incident of perversion by the subject did not sign an affidavit until March 18, 1946, whereas the informant's affidavit was signed March 2, 1946. The CSA investigation developed quite conclusively that the subject had homosexual tendencies.

On September 12, 1947, a form memorandum from CSA to the Personnel Division stated that the subject is a homosexual.

He was still on the Department rolls as of October 29, 1947.

No. 11

There is nothing in the file of this former employee to indicate when he discontinued working for the Department. Mr. Hoffman has advised that he resigned. Previously, the file reflected that he was a close associate of suspected Soviet agents. Most of the derogatory information was developed in late 1946. The index card reflects that this case was closed August 30, 1946, and makes no reference to any interest in the subject subsequent to that date.

This is another illustration of the fact that the index cards do not reflect the status of the cases.

No. 12

This former employee's file is perhaps the largest physically in the files of CSA. Among other things, the file reflects that he furnished material to a known Soviet espionage agent and that he has had consistent contact with a long list of Communists and suspected Soviet agents.

On July 24, 1946, a recommendation for dismissal was made. In September 1946 further information was requested. As of October 15, 1947, there was nothing in the file to indicate whether this individual was with the Department or not, or what the final action was in his case. Inquiry of Mr. Hoffman elicited the information that he did not know what had been done in this case except that he understood the subject was no longer with the Department.

This subject was, in all probability, the greatest security risk the Department has had. It was subsequently determined from the Division of Departmental Personnel that he had resigned December 13, 1946.

No. 13

This employee was one of those dismissed under the McCarren rider. Nevertheless, there is no copy of the dismissal letter in his file. That he had been dismissed only became evident from review of a subsequent hearing afforded him. The file was found in the closed section but the index card, though reflecting a previous closing of the case, did not reflect it was subsequently opened and subsequently closed as a result of dismissal. This is just one of the cases that illustrate the rather lax manner in which the Personnel Security Branch reopens and closes cases without CSA records reflecting accurately what has taken place.

No. 14

The file reflects that this former employee signed Communist Party election petitions on a number of occasions.

On January 13, 1947, she was given a hearing. A memorandum dated March 21, 1947, from Mr. Robinson to the Security Committee said that the decision

as to whether or not she was to be dismissed must rest on a policy decision of the Assistant Secretary for Administration as to what should be considered grounds for dismissal.

"That decision is whether substantial evidence of Communistic affiliations, past or present on the part of an employee, without equally substantial refutation or a substantial evidence of a change of heart, is, in and of itself, sufficient to classify the subject as a security risk and to warrant dismissal. I believe that, in the light of all the circumstances, the decision should be in the affirmative at this time."

The memorandum of April 15, 1947, relates that the Security Committee decided that she was not a security risk. The decision was made to terminate her employment on the grounds that she was an undesirable employee.

Mr. Fitch, in a memorandum for the file dated April 23, 1947, stated that Mr. Goodrich advised that she had resigned effective April 25, 1947. This case has been cited because Mr. Robinson's memorandum, quoted above, indicates his philosophy concerning who constitutes a security risk. It would indicate that he is inclined to accept a change of heart as sufficient to nullify positive evidence of a prior definite Communist activity.

No. 15

Investigation in this case has been conducted after sufficient evidence had been obtained to indicate that he is not a suitable employee for the State Department.

This individual was employed by UNRRA prior to August 26, 1947, when he filed his application for a position with the State Department.

A CSA report, dated September 23, 1947, includes an interview with a reference of the applicant's who stated that he would not recommend the applicant because of his morals, criminal record and association with Communists. A check was made by the CSA Investigator at the Rikers Island, N. Y., Penitentiary, and it was verified that the subject had been arrested and convicted in 1928, 1931 and 1939 on charges of nonsupport. The investigation in this case was still continuing in Washington with several leads outstanding as of October 31, 1947.

No. 16

The subject applied for a clerical position in November 1946. A derogatory report was received from the Detroit office of CSA on January 23, 1947, which stated that subject is a psychopathic case, a personnel problem, and has been an unsatisfactory employee in other places where employed.

A report from Detroit on January 28, 1947, reflects that she made attempts at suicide in 1937 and 1946, and that she has been carried as a psychopathic case on the records of the Detroit Department of Public Welfare since 1930; however, additional investigation was conducted at Boston, Mass., in March 1947 and as of October 2, 1947, leads were still pending in Washington, D. C.

A check of the records of the Personnel Division of the State Department revealed that she was appointed on December 26, 1946, to a clerical position. This appointment was made "subject to investigation" but the Personnel Division had received no reports from CSA.

No. 17

This man is a Foreign Service applicant.

A report dated September 19, 1947, from New York shows beyond any doubt that the applicant is a fourflusher, unreliable, and not truthful. Nevertheless, on the same day, additional leads were set out and there is no indication that the investigation will not be terminated until all references of prior employers and schools have been checked.

No. 18

She is an applicant for a position with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange.

A report in the file reflects that she was with Foreign Service from May 11, 1943, to April 13, 1944, and was not a very satisfactory employee. Her record indicates that she jumps from job to job. A report of September 4, 1947, reflects that most of her recent employers have not been satisfied with her work. Her investigation continues.

Mr. Hoffman, when questioned concerning the desirability and necessity of continuing to investigate an individual who obviously is an undesirable employee, stated that the policy was to continue until all the investigation was completed. This is in line with the policy as already set out in this report.

No. 19

He is an applicant for the Office of Foreign Service with the Foreign Service Institute as an instructor. He is, apparently, presently employed as a linguist with the Interior Department. The file reflects that he is a brilliant linguist, but a psychopathic case, and unfit for teaching though possibly quite satisfactory on linguistic research.

One office reference is suspected of having Communist Party connections. A memorandum from another governmental investigating agency dated June 10, 1947, shows subject has a possible Communist Party connection. Reports of June 20 and 23 reflect that he had been a poor instructor. Reports were still coming in as of September 8, 1947. The case was still pending on October 7, 1947.

No. 20

He is an applicant for a position with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange.

In an evaluation report of February 19, 1947, it is indicated that he had been an employment risk. He belonged to numerous "liberal" organizations such as the "American League for Peace and Democracy," and the "National Federation for Constitutional Liberties." His associates say that he is a liberal, not "red" but rather unstable. He, his sister and father all apparently spent time in mental hospitals. A report dated July 7, 1947, shows that his health is uncertain.

As of September 29, 1947, he was still being investigated. In this instance, there appears to be no justification for continuing this investigation.

No. 21

This is an example of expenditure of considerable investigative effort after substantial derogatory information was available.

This individual is an applicant for a position in the Division of Research for Europe. He was born in Posen, Poland, in 1913, and was naturalized in New York City in 1942. He was with OSS from May 1942 to May 1946, and with UNRRA from May 1946 to January 1947.

Information received from another Governmental investigative agency on May 2, 1947, indicates that subject was a contact of E-1, a known Communist, and suspected Espionage Agent. In speaking of going to Germany when he was with OSS, he had told her, "I think the Russians will dominate the situation, they deserve to. The inefficiency of the AMGOT in Italy is terrible."

A highly confidential source revealed that in August 1942, a known Communist who solicited money from Local No. 203 of the United Federal Workers of America for Allied War Relief received a contribution from the subject. A reliable informant reported that he was a member of the Washington Book Shop.

Considerable investigation has been conducted since the above information was furnished on May 2, 1947, and the matter had not been decided for or against the applicant as of October 15, 1947. Two witnesses who worked with him said he has definite Leftist tendencies and associated with Communists while in Italy. Several others stated that he is a Liberal.

It is noted that an Agent of the Washington Office of the CSA, who has handled most of the investigation in this matter, stated that he has spent three weeks to a month on it and still has work to do, and that other Agents have worked a total of about two weeks on the case. All of this investigative effort had been expended after May 2, 1947, when the derogatory information concerning him was received.

No. 22

This is another example of an applicant investigation being conducted after considerable derogatory information was already in the file. He is an applicant for Foreign Service Career Officer, and was employed by the State Department in 1936 and remained to 1940, and was then with the National Defense Advisory Committee for OPA from 1940 to 1947.

On June 23, 1947, the following information was received by CSA from another Governmental investigative agency:

1. Confidential informant reported him as a member of the Communist Party (but this was denied by the subject on interview).
2. His name appeared in the indices of the Washington Chapter of the American Peace Mobilization (he denied being a member during interview).
3. He is reported to have attended the Youth Internationale in Russia in 1934 or 1935. (This has not been confirmed and subject denies it.)
4. An informant in the State Department states he received a number of unfavorable reports on the subject from 1936 to 1940—one to the effect he

was intensely interested in everything pertaining to Russia even though not pertinent to his work.

5. He was discharged from the A. F. of L. Federation of Government Employees on charges of Communistic activities.

6. He and his wife were on the membership rolls of the American Peoples' Mobilization.

7. He has been an active member of the American Civil Liberties Union and actively participated in a protest against the discharge of Myra Collins, a colored Government worker accused of Left Wing agitation.

8. He has been associated with the following persons who are active in Communist Front organizations:

(a) (C-3), active in the United Federal Workers of America, and a member of the Washington Committee for Democratic Action and American Peace Mobilization.

(b) (C-4), member of the Washington Society for Democratic Action and the American League for Peace and Democracy.

(c) (C-5), a member of the American League for Peace and Democracy.

(d) (C-6), a left-Wing Socialist.

9. He is said to have been a member of a central group spearheading an attack on J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI.

In spite of the substantial derogatory information above set out, this individual was still being investigated as an applicant as of October 6, 1947.

No. 23

This applicant was an Economic Adviser in Japan for the War Department from November 1945 until the date of the application.

He worked with (E-2) and (E-3) at the Treasury Department. The latter speaks highly of him. Two government investigative agencies list his affiliations with questionable organizations. He was apparently a member of the "American League Against War and Fascism" (later the American League for Peace and Democracy). He was a member of the "American League for Peace and Democracy." In 1936 he was a member of the "United Federal Workers of America" and was still active in 1943.

A confidential informant associated with the subject in Japan said that he had a poor personality and would make a poor Foreign Service officer.

A former supervisor of his in Ankara spoke very unfavorably of him. The file contains an unfavorable memorandum dated July 30, 1947, and unfavorable reports dated August 7, August 22, and September 8.

He apparently belonged to questionable groups in college. His parents are both Russian born. A penciled note on top of the file says "Needs checks only," thus indicating that if the checks revealed no derogatory information he is being given security clearance. If he is not being given security clearance, there appears to be little necessity for continuing the investigation.

No. 24

The file reflects that this Foreign Service applicant while with OSS handled unvouched funds in a very questionable manner. When he left OSS, he was indebted to that organization for approximately \$26,000. The legal counsel for CIG is reportedly now attempting to collect this. There is a possibility that this indebtedness was due to a misunderstanding of instructions on the part of the subject.

The subject has worked for (E-3), (E-4), (E-2), (E-5), (E-6), and (E-7), all of whom vouched for his loyalty. Credit records indicate that persons describe him as irresponsible. (E-2) said that he had sent subject to Lisbon for the Treasury Department. (C-7) also vouched for him.

A reference hinted that he would want to check the subject carefully before recommending him. A letter from the applicant, dated April 16, 1947, states that he is a Deputy Chief in the Division of Monetary Research, Treasury Department, at \$7,581 per annum.

When in Lisbon subject attended a party given by a suspected Russian undercover agent against the Ambassador's recommendation. Several acquaintances report that he has a gift for antagonizing people.

There is no indication of any action as of October 10, 1947, being taken since the report dated September 24, 1947, which indicates that he may possibly be satisfactory from a loyalty standpoint but otherwise a very undesirable employee. Investigation is apparently pending.

No. 25

Consideration is still being given this applicant, although he is a known Communist Party member, and a recommendation has been made that his brother, who is now employed by the Department, be dismissed for security reasons.

He has filed application for a position as Administrative Officer at \$8,179 per annum. Investigation of his case was started on April 9, 1947. Another Governmental investigative agency advised, on April 13, 1947, that a reliable informant said subject, who is employed by the Civil Service Commission, is a member of the underground Communist group in Washington, D. C. This informant further advised that the subject and his wife paid a social call on December 11, 1945, on a functionary of a Soviet Espionage ring in Washington, D. C., and on December 29, 1945, his wife contacted the wife of another Soviet Espionage functionary and identified herself by saying her husband was acquainted with the functionary. The informant also advised that a brother of the subject was a member of, and active in, the Jackson Heights, Long Island, Branch of the Communist Party in 1944. Further information was obtained to the effect that the subject himself has been a member of the Communist Party.

Subsequent investigation was conducted and reports were submitted on May 14, 19, and June 27, 1947, without further evidence being developed. This case is presently in a pending, inactive status awaiting action concerning his brother.

No. 26

This is a pending investigation of an applicant for the position of Commodity Specialist in the State Department. He was with UNRRA from April 1, 1944, to October 15, 1946, handling procurement of commodities.

A Government investigative agency has reported that it has received information from a highly confidential source that the subject has been in contact with several subjects of a Russian Espionage case. Although this investigation is still pending, the Personnel Department advised upon inquiry by the Staff that it has no action pending regarding employment of the subject, and the Office of Foreign Personnel likewise advised that it was not considered employing subject.

No. 27

This applicant worked for the Foreign Economic Administration for three months in 1945, and was with the War Department from July 1944 until June 1946. Investigation at these two agencies resulted in unfavorable recommendations of the applicant; however, several leads were outstanding as of September 29, 1947, although upon inquiry the Personnel Department advised that its records failed to disclose that this applicant is being considered for a position. The Foreign Personnel Department had no record of the applicant.

No. 28

He is a Production Supervisor of Motion Pictures for OIE in New York City. Request for investigation was made on August 8, 1946, and CSA sent a memorandum to New York City on August 13, 1946, stating that a man by the same name from 1746 East 13th Street, Kings, New York City, signed a Communist Petition in the State of New York in 1942. There were no reports submitted as of October 2, 1947.

No. 29

This employee has been with the Government since July 1942. The Un-American Activities Committee records show that a person with the same name as the subject residing in New York City, signed a Communist Party Election Petition in New York in 1940. A memorandum furnishing this information is dated October 28, 1946. Nevertheless, to date (September 29, 1947), no effort to check out this information has been made.

No. 30

This employee is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange.

A memorandum of December 20, 1946, shows that the House Un-American Activities Committee records reveal that an individual of the same name as the subject residing in New York City was a signer of a Communist Party Election Petition. As of September 29, 1947, nothing had been done to determine if the signer of the Election Petition and the Departmental employee were identical.

No. 31

He is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New York City. On November 1, 1946, New York advised that a man of the same name as subject of 743 Alabama Avenue, Kings, New York City, signed a Communist Party Election Petition in 1942. However, to date (September 29, 1947) no effort had been made to identify the signer of the Election Petition although it would be a relatively simple matter to determine if the subject and the signer were identical.

No. 32

She is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New York City. She was born in Russia in 1896; became a naturalized United States citizen in 1938. From July 1934 to April 1940 and from February 1941 to May 1941, she worked for the Amtorg Trading Corporation. From June 1941 to August 1941 she worked for the National Maritime Union. She listed an Amtorg employee as a reference. The War Department records are the only ones that have been checked to date. She was with OWI from February 1945 to February 1946 and since that time has been with the State Department.

No. 33

She is a good example of a subject about whom little is known in spite of what is construed as a complete investigation. In this instance, the applicant furnished reference and recited her school history. Though the references were interviewed and the high-school attendance verified, no effort was made to interview her school associates or her neighbors. Under the circumstances, it could not be anticipated that anything unfavorable would likely be developed.

In this connection, further reference is made to the case of No. 34. In his case, no suspicion was attached to him as a result of his investigation. The suspicion arose only because of his activities while employed at the State Department. His investigation could hardly have developed such information inasmuch as no one other than his references was interviewed concerning his character or loyalty.

No. 34

He is a messenger in the Division of Central Services detailed to the Division of Protective Services.

In a memorandum dated June 30, 1947, the Division of Protective Services' Chief called attention to the fact that the subject evidenced an unusual interest in the mail. The following appeared in the memorandum:

"In a recent discussion with one of the members of the Division, he is supposed to have remarked that the two least Democratic countries in the world are the United States and Great Britain and that he would like to go to Russia."

He was cleared originally for employment on June 2, 1946, as a result of an investigation which consisted of the following:

"His military certificate of discharge was reviewed, the Personnel Office was consulted concerning his previous record with the State Department, the records of the Registrar's Office at Howard University were examined, three references were interviewed, the customary name checks were made with the Police, FBI, credit, Passport Division, and Un-American Activities Committee."

In this connection it will be noted that aside from the three references, no one was questioned during the course of his investigation concerning his actions, attitudes and beliefs.

His investigation is pending.

No. 35

This applicant graduated from Ohio Wesleyan University in 1940 where she majored in Bible study. She has had a long list of employers. Everyone contacted to date has reported favorably concerning the applicant. Nevertheless, a very extensive investigation is being conducted to find all her previous employers though in a couple of instances she was employed there many years ago and for a very brief period. This is an example of where an additional amount of investigator's time is being consumed in interviewing individuals who, in all probability, will be unable to furnish much pertinent information and therefore there is nothing to indicate that such interviews are desirable or necessary.

No. 36

In this case a supplementary lead was set out to determine when this applicant left the Navy though examination of his application shows that the year 1947 was inadvertently given instead of 1946 because he was employed from 1946 on. This would tend to illustrate the point that so much investigative attention is directed toward every minute of previous employment that very little of the limited agent time is left for more searching inquiry into the applicant's past associations, etc.

No. 37

This employee is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange. In this case though nothing was developed to cast suspicion on the subject a needlessly exhaustive investigation was made. This was done though there are numerous important uncovered leads outstanding in other cases. This is an example of where closer supervision would result in a better utilization of available man power.

No. 38

This case clearly shows the desirability of interviewing applicants prior to extensive investigation. This person had filed application for a clerical position in the State Department.

Investigation of her background was conducted on May 21, June 3, 4, 5, and 16, 1947, at Jefferson City, Canton, Shelbyville, Chillicothe, and St. Louis—all in Missouri. Finally, on June 16, a personal interview of applicant was conducted by the CSA representative in St. Louis and he gave an unfavorable recommendation of the applicant on the basis of the interview. Nevertheless, he stated after reporting on the interview that he would submit a supplemental report after checking one more employment record.

The case was still pending as of September 25, 1947. On November 6, 1947, the Personnel Division advised that this applicant is not being considered for a position.

No. 39

The report of interviewing agent dated September 18, 1947, was unfavorable. The report of August 12, 1947, had been unfavorable. The file reflects that the applicant is uncertain as to his prior history; nevertheless, investigation of this case was continuing as of September 29, 1947.

No. 40

This employee is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New York City.

His application is very sketchy. There has been no investigation. (C-8) is a reference. Though he is 43 years of age, his file reflects no history prior to June 1941.

Case is awaiting a report from the New York Office.

No. 41

This employee is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New York City where he has been since September 25, 1942.

His case is typical of that of many of OIE employees in New York.

Though 47 years of age, there is no data in his file as to his whereabouts prior to October 1941. As a result, nothing as to his past activity has been checked, nor can it very readily be checked until he is interviewed.

No. 42

She is a typist with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New York City and has worked on a part-time basis since April 22, 1947.

She has been in the United States since 1930. She is not a citizen and has applied for her first papers.

There are gaps in her employment record but she indicates that she was with the Russian Embassy in Turkey from 1920 to 1923. Since 1944 she has been with the Russian Children's Welfare Society.

No. 43

This is a case of failure to closely follow and supervise an important security case.

The subject is employed in a responsible position in the Broadcasting Division, World-Wide News Unit, OIE, New York City. An investigation was requested of the New York Office of CSA on August 8, 1946. A 13-page report was submitted by

the New York Office on December 4, 1946. A summary of the investigation was prepared by CSA on December 10, 1946, which is as follows:

"Investigation discloses evidence of a material nature tending to affect adversely subject's loyalty to the Government of the United States and its Institutions.

"It revealed that when subject was employed as a reporter for a newspaper from 1936 to 1939, he held an office in the American Newspaper Guild. Subject was very liberal in his political thinking and associated himself at times with the Left-Wing element of this organization.

"Investigation further revealed that when the subject was employed as a rewrite man for a newspaper, from 1930 to 1936, he was reported to have been Vice President of the Newark Chapter of the American Newspaper Guild during and after his employment by this paper. He was further reported to have been one of the leaders of the strike of the editorial staff employed by this paper which occurred in March 1934, and lasted until April 1935. According to one informant, however, subject could not be called an agitator in this strike, as the consensus was that it had been thoroughly justified. The informant further stated, though, that the subject definitely identified himself with the Left group and because of his office in the Guild, his Leftist or Communist Party Line policy dominated the affairs of the Guild. This informant hesitated to definitely state whether or not the subject was communistic in his political thinking, but it was his opinion that he was exceedingly liberal, pro-Labor and 'slightly pink.'

"Investigation further revealed, according to an informant who was Managing Editor of a newspaper on which the subject was employed, that the subject is communistic. This informant commented that he had often engaged the subject in conversation along Communist lines and that he was very outspoken and fanatical on the subject. Subject is very pro-Labor, anti-Capitalistic, and definitely followed the Communist Party line. Informant also stated that in the latter days of subject's employment on the newspaper, he had found him very unreliable on reporting news coverage of any industrial, labor, or political situation. Subject was reported to have colored his reports with communistic theory, and did not give complete and unbiased coverage to such stories.

"Investigation also disclosed, according to another informant who knew subject very well, that subject and his brother are definitely communistic. In 1937 subject was reported to have been the principle organizer and strike leader of a strike amongst the editorial staff of a newspaper of which informant was Associate Publisher. While this strike affected only eight people, during the first week of the strike, subject organized 50 to 75 people to picket the office. During the strike Mr. Milton Kaufman, of the New York Chapter of the American Newspaper Guild, was in conference on several occasions with the subject. Subject appeared to be taking orders from Mr. Kaufman who is reported to be a well-known Communist.

"Investigation would seem to indicate that serious consideration should be given the determination whether subject should be retained in the Department of State."

A review of the report of December 4, 1946, disclosed, in addition to what is in the summary, that another investigative agency advised that a reliable informant said in November 1944, that a well-known Communist in Newark, N. J., advised him that the subject was a Communist Party member.

On January 23, 1947, R. L. Bannerman requested further investigation to be conducted by CSA. There are, however, no subsequent reports in the file since the report of December 4, 1946, although this could certainly be classified as an important security case.

No. 44

This is a case of appointment to an important position from the security standpoint without prior security clearance. The subject was born in 1901 in Germany. His Form #57 indicates he obtained a B. S. Degree from the University of Detroit in 1931. He was employed by the Soviet Purchasing Commission and its subsidiary Autostroy from 1932 to July 1945. At the time of application in September 1946, he was employed by the Department of Commerce.

On interview in June 1947 by a CSA Investigator, Victor Kravchenko stated that the applicant had to be a Communist Party member, or a strong sympathizer in order to hold a position with the Soviet Purchasing Commission as long as he did, or in fact, for any appreciable length of time.

There was no indication in the file that security clearance had been given in this case; however, contact with the Personnel Division disclosed that he was appointed on January 2, 1947, for a position as Economic Analyst in Research and Intelligence.

No. 45

This individual has been a Correspondence Research Clerk in the Division of Public Liaison since March 1947. She was formerly with the Office of Foreign Liquidation Committee and with the War Department.

There are no indications in the file that any investigation has been conducted regarding her background; however, information was received on October 9, 1947, from a former supervisor in the War Department to the effect that she is a Communist.

The file was reopened on the basis of this information, but no report was submitted as of October 31, 1947.

No. 46

This is another example of employment of a person to a responsible position without full information.

The subject was born in 1910 at Cleveland, Ohio. He was with the LaFollette Civil Rights Committee from June 1936 to June 1940, and subsequently with OPA, the Board of Economic Warfare, RFC, OSS, and was appointed to the Department as an Assistant Chief in the Division of Occupied Areas at \$8,478.75 per annum. Investigation of the subject was conducted by CSA intermittently from December 1946 to August 1947, and disclosed that most of his close associates and friends have records as fellow travelers or Communists, and he is classified by most persons interviewed as a Leftist. No definite evidence of Communist activities on his part was obtained, but he admitted to a Government Investigator in 1942, having contributed money to the American League for Peace and Democracy.

There is no record in the file that he was given security clearance prior to his employment.

This case was in the hands of the Evaluation Section as of October 31, 1947, and no report had been submitted subsequent to August 13, 1947. There is a memorandum in the file, dated January 3, 1947, by Bannerman, which stated that Leo Garney called on December 30, 1946, inquiring as to whether the Security Office had disapproved the subject for appointment. The memorandum indicates Garney as saying that Panuch had disapproved him. There is no further explanation as to these statements of disapproval of the subject, but it is noted that he was appointed.

No. 47

The subject came to the United States from Germany in 1940 and was naturalized in Alabama in 1943. He was in the United States only from August 1943 to January 1946, after which he was a Civilian employee of the War Department in Germany. He was appointed to the State Department in November 1946 on the basis of an advance security clearance.

On January 7, 1947 a Government investigative agency informed that it has no file on the subject, but has information that his brother and sister may be possible agents of the Comintern and that they are active in Communist activities.

Through investigation by CSA, it was determined that the subject was an instructor for one year at Olivet College and was a close friend of a Professor there who was known for his pro-Communist views. This College is known as being very liberal.

A memorandum, dated February 6, 1947, prepared by CSA, stated "investigation discloses evidence of a material nature, tending to affect adversely the subject's loyalty to the Government of the United States and its Institutions."

Another investigative report was submitted on April 8, 1947, but no subsequent action was taken until the subject submitted his resignation on May 26, 1947.

No. 48

This is another case of appointment to an important position from the security standpoint without prior investigation.

This individual applied for a position with the Department on June 4, 1947; was immediately appointed and assigned to Warsaw, Poland, as a Secretary to the Ambassador. She left the United States for Warsaw on June 11, 1947.

Investigation disclosed that the subject, who is an American citizen, served in the Polish Women's Army from 1941 to 1946. Interviews with her references

were excellent as to loyalty and character except for one who felt that the applicant's loyalty to Poland was equal to that of her loyalty to the United States.

Neighborhood investigation disclosed that the applicant was a member of a heavy drinking group with loose morals. She appears to have a reputation in her neighborhood as being a heavy drinker and promiscuous. The investigation is continuing.

No. 49

The subject is a Research Analyst in the Division of Research for the Far East. In December 1942 he was transferred from a clerical position in the Post Office Department at New York City to the Board of Economic Warfare, on request of the latter agency. He was made an Intelligence Clerk with that agency. On June 7, 1945 he was recommended by E-21, who is a suspect in a Soviet Espionage case as a candidate for Administrative Intern Training. Nevertheless, no investigation has been conducted of the subject in this case although he appears closely tied in with the Espionage suspect.

* * * * *

The following individuals, numbers 50-65, inclusive, comprise some of the more important security cases in the Department who are not grouped under specific categories or specifically referred to in the section of the report on CSA.

No. 50

He was, until July 25, 1947, with an important policy board.

A memorandum of August 1, 1947 requested clearance as he was to go to Paris on a conference. A note dated September 15, 1947, said "Cleared for UNESCO Placement." The subject was described in reports by various witnesses as "interested in Communism as an experiment but his political philosophy is in keeping with liberal new-deal social reform under Democratic processes of Government"; "he is a very ardent New Dealer"; "he is a live liberal"; but an informant who also lived at the International House at one time said "He was one of those accused of being a Red here but the people who do get up and talk Communism are refuted."

The file reflects that he is a friend of (C-9) whose father is suspected by many as being a Communist. One of his associates is (C-10).

A penciled note addressed to "David" and signed "M" dated January 28, 1947, inquires if subject is having another mental breakdown (File reveals he did at one time) and says "Place before Committee as security hazard—possible break and embarrassment if Congress gets on this."

No. 51

He is employed in the Office of an Assistant Secretary.

Nothing derogatory was developed by his investigation. A memorandum of August 2, 1946, by Mr. Bannerman indicated that subject is friendly with (E-8) and, by surveillance, had been placed in contact with a member of an espionage group. He was approved for appointment September 25, 1946.

A memorandum of December 13, 1946, indicates that subject had General Hildring intervene with Assistant Secretary Russell on behalf of (E-8) and (E-9). (E-8) is very closely tied up with Soviet espionage agents and (E-9) had a very bad record of Communist Party connections.

In late 1946 or early 1947 (E-8) went with the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees and his appointment investigation was discontinued.

(E-9), whose file reflects that he was without any doubt an active Communist, was employed by FEA in 1942. From there he was transferred to the Auxiliary Foreign Service. While with the Auxiliary Foreign Service, he became an applicant for a position in the State Department in February 1946.

In a memorandum to Mr. Russell, dated November 6, 1946, General Hildring said that he needed (E-9) badly in a peace expedition. He was transferred to the Foreign Service November 12, 1946.

A memorandum dated November 25, 1946, indicated this individual had been ordered removed on November 13, 1946, and to be out of the Department no later than November 15, 1946. He was observed working as late as November 20, 1946, and had access to classified material as late as November 22, 1946. A memorandum of November 27, 1946, pointed out that No. 51 was pushing this individual's appointment and possibly he and this individual were both associates of (E-10), an alleged Russian espionage agent.

No. 52

He was formerly a ranking official and presently occupies a high diplomatic post.

A memorandum dated April 24, 1947 from another Government investigative agency says "Nothing in addition to information previously furnished." The other information referred to is not in the file. Mr. Hoffman is of the opinion that it is being held somewhere by one of the higher officials of the Department. He was unable to locate it after a search of several days.

A raincoat, believed to be the subject's, was found on September 28, 1946, by guards in the men's room of the State Department Building. In the pockets were papers which were believed to be those of a Russian language student. The subject does not know Russian and is not studying Russian and there is apparently no explanation for the papers found in his coat pocket. A State Department investigator wrote the following memorandum pertaining to the subject on October 25, 1947:

"In connection with my investigation into affairs of the Institute of Pacific Relations, I am in receipt of information which appears to be most incriminating against a State Department personality. My informant stated that (X-6, a special emissary) for Franklin D. Roosevelt, has divulged the following story and that, furthermore, information relating to this incident is in possession of (U. S. Senator X-7).

"In April 1945 (X-6) told my informant he was in London and was to depart shortly for Tehran. A few minutes before his plane left the airport, 50 miles from London (X-8, a high official in OSS) arrived at the airport seeking him. (The OSS official) told (the President's representative) that a telegram, which had been prepared by President Roosevelt to send to Chungking, China, had been 'picked up at Moscow'; that an investigation had concluded the possibility that the leak of information could have occurred in Washington, because the information in the telegram reached Moscow before the actual telegram left Washington. (The OSS official) stated that (a high official of the State Department, No. 52) had been observed contacting a man in Washington, and that this man, after leaving (the Department official) had been followed to the Soviet Embassy. (The OSS official) was clearly disturbed by this occurrence and warned (the emissary) against divulging information of a secret nature which might reach (this Department official—No. 52)."

This case is in a pending status.

No. 53

He is a ranking official in the Office of Financial and Development Policy. He was appointed August 12, 1946.

On September 30, 1946, a Government investigative agency reported that subject was scheduled as a speaker before the Maryland Citizens Council in Baltimore on a given date. Many members of this group were members of the Communist Party and others were individuals who had followed the Communist Party line.

He had been with the Treasury Department and very closely associated with (E-2), (E-3) and (E-7). He was, reportedly, particularly close and harmonious with the first mentioned individual who was a reference on his application.

Subject, reportedly, recited the fact that several people in his office were recently dismissed by the Department and he said that the procedure in ousting the individuals was rather vicious.

He has requested the appointment of (No. 100), a classmate at Harvard, who is also presently being investigated by the State Department. That classmate appears to be closely associated with the (E-2) crowd.

The subject, in collaboration with two others, wrote a book for the National Planning Association. One coauthor, a former editor of the New Masses, has a very questionable background. A review of the book by Foreign Activities Correlation concluded "Aside from this sympathy through half-truths, there is no evidence, after a brief perusal of the book, of anything in it inimical to the United States."

This investigation is pending.

No. 54

He holds a high position in the Department.

A memorandum dated March 22, 1946, by Mr. Bannerman to Mr. Russell (at that time Assistant Secretary for Administration) summarized the investiga-

tion of this individual to that date and pointed out that he had been affiliated with the magazine *Amerasia* from May 1937 to November 1941. This magazine consistently followed the Communist Party line. It was under the direction of, and its articles and activities controlled by, Philip Jaffe and Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Field has been outstanding in Communist activities and has been head of the American Peace Mobilization. He has been a contributing columnist for the *Daily Worker*.

Jaffe has been active with Communist-front organizations and lectured at the Jefferson School of Social Activities. He was also treasurer for the National Council for American-Soviet Friendship. When affiliated with *Amerasia*, subject worked closely with these individuals.

Not mentioned in the memorandum, cited above but previously developed was the fact that the subject was closely related with the Institute of Pacific Relations which has been composed of both loyal and questionable individuals. The recommendation made in the memorandum of March 22, 1946, follows:

"On behalf of the above information, it is recommended that action be instituted to terminate subject's services with the State Department. It is suggested, to achieve this purpose, that an appropriate officer of the Department should inform (subject) that his continued presence in the Department is embarrassing to the Department and that he be given an opportunity to resign. If (subject) should not resign voluntarily, action should be instituted under Civil Service Rule XII to terminate his services with the Department."

T. E. Hoffman in a memorandum dated June 18, 1947, summarizing the case, included information subsequently developed that subject requested a Communist sympathizer (C-11) to accept a position with the Board of Economic Warfare.

Reportedly, subject has been visited on several occasions by (C-12), an alien allegedly sympathetic to the Communist cause. Subject has also since recommended two former employees of the *Amerasia* Editorial Board to positions with the State Department. This memorandum concludes with the following two sentences:

"It is not believed by this office that the information at hand raises a reasonable doubt as to (subject's) loyalty to the United States and, accordingly, security clearance is recommended. However, this office intends at a later date, when the personnel is available, to review the issues of *Amerasia* Magazine from 1937 to 1941 and to determine if the contents of the articles are such as to have a bearing on the security status of subject."

NOTE.—In this connection, in October 1947, Hoffman advised that he has time to date to accomplish this review.

A report dated August 18, 1947, recorded an interview with a former member of the Editorial Board of *Amerasia*, believed to be very reliable, who pointed out the radical viewpoints of most of the members of this Board. He classified subject as "far to the left—awfully close to a fellow traveler" and later modified this by referring to him as "radical liberal." The file reflects that an individual by subject's name, located in the National Press Building (Note: Subject was located there in 1941), was a subscriber to the *Daily Worker* and also a member of the Capital City Forum.

(C-13), an alleged Communist Party member, has twice worked for subject. One of subject's associates, when interviewed, said that he "went through the usual left-wing stage, as did most of the young people identified with the Association during their twenties and thirties."

There is no indication that further investigation is contemplated in this case.

No. 55

This individual was employed in March 1944 as Division Assistant in the Division of Internal Security. She had been employed for a number of years by the American Association of University Women in connection with International Education. In July 1946 she was assigned to a position as a representative to UNESCO at \$8,778. Her previous highest salary with the American Association of University Women was \$4,000 per annum.

This case was assigned for investigation by CSA in November 1943. Interviews with references and a check of school records resulted in nothing derogatory. The case was reopened for security investigation on April 28, 1947, on oral information received by CSA concerning her husband reportedly being a Communist. He is employed in a responsible position with the Navy Bureau of Ordnance.

A CSA report on August 15, 1947, indicated as a result of contact with seven associates and former supervisors of subject that she reportedly was a Liberal. Her husband, according to the informants, has a highly confidential position with the Navy Department and was possibly present at the Bikini Atom Bomb Test.

The House Un-American Activities Committee advised on August 18, 1947, X-9, an admitted former Communist Party member, was formerly associated with the subject in Communist Party activities in Washington, D. C. Interview with this informant by the CSA Agent indicated that the subject's husband had admitted to him in 1929 or 1930 that he was a member of the Communist Party in Baltimore, Maryland. The informant also advised that the subject had associated with a group of known Communists. The informant said he had not seen the subject for over ten years.

On July 16, 1947, it was ascertained that in 1941 a Senate Investigating Committee had stated the subject and her husband were members of the Communist Party. On September 15, 1947, a Government investigative agency advised that early in 1941 a reliable informant reported the subject as a Communist. Further, that the subject had been recently contacting a subject of a Soviet Espionage case.

This investigation is in a pending status.

No. 56

The subject was born in 1909 in London, England. He came to the United States in 1934 and taught at Amherst College from September 1934 to June 1936 at \$2,500 per annum. He also taught at Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, New York, from September 1936 to June 1942 at \$3,000 per annum. Since June 1942 he has been employed by the U. S. Government—first, by the Board of Economic Warfare, then by the Foreign Economic Administration, and subsequently by the War Department. He is now a Special Assistant to an Assistant Secretary of State at \$8,750 per annum.

Investigation disclosed that he was a student of Harold Laski, from 1927 to 1931, and he was in his employ as a research assistant from 1931 to 1933. He was naturalized in the United States in 1944. Subject was highly recommended by several witnesses although several stated he is a Socialist and anti-Fascist.

A former Department employee, E-9, about whom derogatory information has been obtained by CSA, recommended the subject very highly and the subject in turn had recommended E-9 highly.

The subject wrote a book which the CSA investigator reviewed and reports is anti-Capitalistic as well as anti-Fascist. In 1937 the subject contributed a book review to the publication "Science and Society" which on its face says "A Marxian Quarterly."

A memorandum of February 25, 1947, points out, in addition to the above, that the subject is a friend of (E-11), a suspect in a Russian Espionage case. Further investigation was requested in this memorandum.

A memorandum dated June 16, 1947, from CSA to Mr. Puerifoy, summarizes the above information, pointing out in addition that the subject's sister was reported a Communist Party member in 1944, and an individual believed to be a relative was a Communist Party member in England. It has not been definitely established whether that individual is a relative of the subject.

Although this is a pending case, there has been nothing in file since June 16, 1947.

No. 57

He is presently employed in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Derogatory information concerning this individual, which appears in his file, is confined to reference to a speech he made in New York City in 1946 at a meeting sponsored by the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy. It is fairly well established that the meeting was a Communist-controlled and sponsored gathering. On the program with him was Andrew Roth and R. W. Stephan Fritchman. The first mentioned of these two individuals was remembered as having been accused of turning over Government documents to outside sources and was determined to be a close associate of such individuals as Philip Jaffe. The latter named individual has taken a prominent part in numerous Communist front organizations.

Subject was also a reference for (C-14) who has been described as a "pink." C-14 also is known as a contact of Philip Jaffe.

Case closed August 12, 1947.

No. 58

The file indicates that he is presently assigned to UNESCO.

Information received October 22, 1946, from several sources, indicated that subject associated and was in sympathy with various left-wing elements. Another informant stated that he is a friend of C-15 who was removed from the Department on the basis of his long record of Communist activities. An informant stated that the subject and No. 54 were trying to secure a position for C-15 in the Cultural Relations Division of the Department even though his record as a Communist was well known.

NOTE.—No. 54 and subject were both in Cultural Relations at the time.

The informant also said that subject was trying to place C-16, an alleged London Communist, in that Division. Several informants pointed out that the subject had, on several occasions, appeared on programs with pro-Soviet individuals.

An article in the Daily Worker, 1946, indicates that he addressed a meeting concerning films for UNESCO along with Thomas J. Brandon of the Film Council of America, a well-known Communist propagandist.

A letter from a Government investigative agency of June 20, 1946, indicates the subject, when still with Cultural Relations, prevented the American Federation of Labor representative from being included on a list of educators for Japan. The informant in this matter indicated the belief that the A. F. of L. representative's name was omitted deliberately.

This investigation is pending.

No. 59

He is with the Division of Occupied Areas.

His wife is with the Division of Research and Intelligence. The file reflects that the subjects are regarded as liberals and possessors of leftist views but contains very little derogatory information.

He has an application on file for the Foreign Service. A memorandum dated December 3, 1946, pertaining to the subjects contains the following last two paragraphs:

"The Security Office has carefully reviewed the entire files on the subject cases. On the basis of present available information, the Security Office is of the opinion that there is insufficient information to warrant a recommendation for termination action.

"However, in view of the fact that both (subjects) are known to be close associates of individuals linked with Soviet espionage activities, this office will continue to keep their cases under active consideration."

Then, on February 11, 1947, Mr. Hoffman prepared the following memorandum concerning the female subject:

"The subject was approved for top-secret material on this date, inasmuch as her case had been carefully considered by the Security Office, and it had been decided that there was insufficient information to warrant termination of her services."

Mr. Hoffman, when questioned concerning this clearance, stated:

"If there is not enough to dismiss them, then they cannot be denied access to top-secret material."

It would appear to logically follow from this that anyone in the State Department who has not been dismissed should be given access to top-secret material, and that the maintenance of a list of employees having access to top-secret material is not of too much importance.

No. 60

This person has been employed as an Executive Secretary with the State Department since July 1945. Prior to that, she had been employed by the Political Action Committee, Foreign Economic Administration, National Labor Relations Board, and the Treasury Department. For some time, she was associated with C-17, a well-known Left-Wing Social Worker. She is also a friend of two female employees of the State Department who are also under investigation for Left-Wing associations.

Another Government investigative agency informed in February 1947 that the subject has been in contact with E-10, a Soviet Espionage subject.

This investigation is in a pending status.

No. 61

This individual has been with the State Department since August 4, 1943, and is now with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange.

Interest in the subject developed from remarks of Congressman N-10, appearing in the Congressional Record, listing Communists employed by the State Department.

On May 3, 1944, she was reported as being very close to C-18, a Political Action Committee official. On April 28, 1945, she was reported as having rented an apartment to the brother of No. 12, a Russian espionage suspect, during her absence. On September 5, 1946, she was interviewed concerning her interest in having this espionage suspect employed by the State Department.

On December 6, 1946, she furnished a 42-page statement (actually an autobiography with 5 pages of references included) in which she disclaimed any interest in Communism. She explained her interest in Russia as being academic. The material developed centers principally on the subject's contacts with suspected Soviet espionage suspects, with Communists, and visiting Russian delegates during the San Francisco Conference, together with the fact that she has allegedly criticized the Secretary of State and favored the Soviet in reports.

The subject agreed that she was responsible for the State Department having employed No. 12, but stated that it was because of his ability only that she had recommended him. State Department officials are presently (October 1947) being interviewed concerning their knowledge of her ideology and beliefs. A number indicate suspicion of her but have little specific information other than her criticism of Secretary Byrnes and her unnecessary close association with the visiting Russian delegates. Some of the individuals interviewed expressed the belief that there was nothing wrong with her thinking but that she was merely too vigorous in her beliefs.

Investigation is pending.

No. 62

He is a Regional Specialist, P-6, in OIE. He was, allegedly, a former correspondent for a publication of short existence which had been created by No. 12 and E-12, alleged Soviet espionage agents. He and his wife are close associates of E-13 and E-14, who also are alleged espionage agents. He has continued to be a close associate of No. 12 and, reportedly, rode to and from work with No. 12 when that person was still employed with the State Department.

Investigation is pending.

No. 63

He is presently assigned to the Office of American Republic Affairs. He entered the Foreign Service in 1939.

A memorandum of August 19, 1946, indicated he worked with the Editorial Board of the American Foreign Service Journal during 1938 and 1939.

A memorandum of the same date indicates that another Governmental agency had received information that he was a recognized section leader of the Communist underground. A subsequent check with this Agency (September 30, 1947) developed that in 1939, when he was with the Foreign Service Journal, he had a small Communist Party unit meeting in his home. The source of this information said that he was a leader of this Communist underground unit.

His investigation is pending.

No. 64

He is presently in the Division of International Labor, Health and Social Affairs. He was transferred to the State Department from OSS.

A report by another Government investigating agency made in 1941 while the subject was with the Bureau of Labor Standards, Department of Labor, reflected that as of January 21, 1941, he was on the active indices of the Washington Committee for Democratic Action and as of February 17, 1941, on the active indices of the American Peoples Mobilization. He was listed in the "Call for National Negro Congress" pamphlet distributed in Chicago in 1936. When interviewed in 1941, the subject denied connection with the first two organizations but verified that his name had been used as a sponsor for the National Negro Congress with his consent though he was a trifle vague as to the circumstances in which his name was given.

The OSS investigation indicated the subject was on the liberal side. The records of the un-American Activities Committee indicate he was a member of the Marion Anderson Citizens Committee. No recent material from the Government Agency which investigated him in 1941 appears in the file.

A Memorandum of October 10, 1947, by Mr. Hoffman states that an informant said that subject was urging the Visa Division to issue a nonimmigration visa to a French Communist leader. This labor leader intended to come to the

United States to attend a labor union's conference. The informant did not know if subject's interest was personal or if he was acting on behalf of his division chief.

No. 65

She is employed in the Division of International Exchange of Persons.

A previous employer said that she was "dishonest with time," untruthful, untrustworthy, and also "wrapped up in Communism"; that she finally had to let her go under unfavorable circumstances, and that she later married a man who was, reportedly, a Communist.

A summary memorandum of December 3, 1946, advised that the risk involved in employing subject required careful consideration. Her application was dated August 15, 1946, and a report with derogatory information was dated November 6, 1946. It should be noted at this point that subject was employed regardless of the above derogatory information.

A Memorandum of April 3, 1947, bears a penciled note which says "she is a friend of No. 11 of State Department. She and husband are contacts of a subject in the (——) case." The case referred to is a current important espionage case. Further contact with another Government agency failed to develop exactly how close the subject was with the subjects of the above espionage case.

A report of June 27, 1947, reflects that the former employer quoted above was not as certain as he had previously indicated about the subject's Communist connections, though her remarks concerning the subject's associations and acquaintances were still derogatory.

This case is pending.

The following individuals, listed as Numbers 66-77, inclusive, are employed in divisions under the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence. In addition, Numbers 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, and 44, who were referred to in the section of the report on CSA, are employed in Research and Intelligence.

No. 66

The subject was employed as an Analyst by OSS from June 1944 to October 1945, when he was transferred to the State Department. Since his transfer he has been assigned to Research and Intelligence.

He was born in Russia and naturalized in San Francisco in 1929. An investigation conducted in 1946 by CSA consisted of checks of employment and school records, and interviews with three former supervisors on non-Government jobs. Two of these supervisors recommended subject unfavorably. Three references, with Russian names, all in Government employment, recommended him favorably. On the basis of that investigation he was given security clearance. Subject subsequently became the subject of a security investigation as a result of his roommate, one of his references, having in his possession a State Department report which he had no authority to possess. This information was furnished the State Department by a Navy Department Official who had seen that individual with the State Department official confidential report in his possession.

Investigation was instituted on the basis of this information.

No. 67

The above subject was employed by OSS from July 1942 to November 1943, and in the U. S. Navy from November 1943 to March 1946. In 1946 he was employed as a P-7 Consultant with the State Department in the Division of Research. An investigation, including only checks with reference, employers, and schools, was conducted in April 1946 and revealed no derogatory information as to loyalty. He was cleared on May 16, 1946, as to "character, ability, dependability, general reputation, and loyalty." One reference, a Navy Captain, said "he was hard to handle, and the reason he was sent to Siberia was to get him out of Washington where he persisted in going over the heads of his immediate superiors to get assignments of his choice." This statement was concurred in by a Navy Lt. Commander.

In June 7, 1946, a Government investigative agency advised that the subject is a known contact of E-15, a subject in a Russian Espionage case. The subject has played bridge and exchanged language lessons with persons in the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. He is also a known contact of Jessica Smith of Soviet Russia Today.

This investigative agency further reported on June 7, 1946, that E-16, a known Soviet Espionage Agent, was arrested with his wife in Finland in 1933 and while in custody E-16's wife requested the American Consul to forward on her behalf

a request for funds from the subject in Michigan. Further, on March 15, 1934, subject wrote Congressman X-11, requesting his assistance in the case of Arvid Jacobson.

There is no indication in the file that any investigation was conducted on this subject by CSA on the basis of the above information furnished by another Government Agency; however, on September 11, 1947, the subject was granted "top secret" clearance on the basis of a memorandum written by Moyer of CSA to Hoffman of CSA. This memorandum states "the derogatory information in this case, from the standpoint of security, consists of the following:

"(1) Report from Physical Security Section relating to the loss and recovery of official classified papers in February 1947.

"(2) In 1934, subject addressed letter to Congressman in behalf of an acquaintance of known Communist sympathies being held in Finland on espionage charges.

"(3) Information received from _____ in June 1946 as follows:

"(a) (Subject) known contact of (E-15).

"(b) (Subject) known contact of Jessica Smith of Soviet Russia Today.

"(c) In the summer of 1945 (subject) was transferred from OSS to a new assignment with ONI, which assignment would take him to Siberia, Russia. (Subject) indicated that his assignment, presumably with ONI, had included liaison with, and training of, Soviet Marines stationed at a Russian Port. (Subject) also advised that at one time he played bridge and exchanged language lessons with persons in the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C.

"In my opinion, the information related above is not sufficient to withhold top secret clearance. With reference to point (1), there appears to have been certain mitigating circumstances, and there is no indication that any disciplinary action was taken, with reference to point (2), the political and economic situation was somewhat different, and there is no indication that (subject) was in sympathy with the acquaintances' political philosophy. Moreover, we do not know the outcome of the incident. With reference to points 3 (A), (B), (C), the words 'known contact' mean nothing, especially since the subject was apparently connected with Russian affairs in ONI and would naturally seek out persons who possessed a knowledge of the language, etc. While the CSA file did indicate an interest in Russia on the part of the subject, there is no evidence of Communist sympathy. Likewise, there is no indication of subversive activity or affiliation with any Communist groups or fronts. The subject is highly recommended. In conclusion, the subject has been given security clearance to a responsible position, the satisfactory performance of his duties necessitating access to top secret material. To be consistent, in the absence of additional highly derogatory information, I feel that top secret clearance should be given. Even in cases where highly unfavorable information is developed, I think the remedy would be to withhold security clearance in the first place, or if subsequently developed, adequate for dismissal."

It is to be noted that the above security clearance was given without any further investigation, which would appear advisable on the basis of information of a serious nature furnished by another Government investigative agency. It is especially so in view of the fact that the original clearance in this case was based on an investigation of a rather sketchy nature including interviews with references, employers and check of school records.

No. 68

She was a research analyst with OSS from July 1944 to September 1945, when she was transferred to the State Department, where she is in the Division of Research. She has been active in Local #3 of the United Public Workers of America in the State Department, and until 1946, was a member of the Washington Book Shop. For many years she has been a close friend of B-10, a subject in a Russian Espionage case, and they both reside in the same apartment building.

Several informants interviewed by CSA commented favorably as to her loyalty to the United States and she was given security clearance on April 14, 1947, and again on June 18, 1947. On July 11, 1947 a Governmental investigative agency advised that it had received information from a highly confidential source of information, whose reliability is unquestioned, that the subject has been converted to communism by E-10.

The case was reopened on the basis of this information, but there were no further reports in the file as of October 1, 1947.

No. 69

He is a special assistant in Research and Intelligence.

He was with OSS from February 1943 until he entered on duty in the Department in October 1945. He was born and educated in Germany; he came from England in 1936, endorsed by Harold J. Laski. He was naturalized May 28, 1943.

From April 1936 to February 1943, he was with the Institute of Social Research, described as a Communist organization despite its camouflaging and carrying on in a clandestine manner.

During a meeting of the German-Austrian Secretariat, held in 1946, the prominent trade union offices in Germany were discussed and subject expressed the belief that it would be dangerous for an AF of L representative to go to Germany. He believed that in the United States Zone anti-Communist propaganda in the unions was unnecessary. He expressed the belief that if the AF of L man were admitted, then the World Federated Trade Union should also be admitted. The latter is the organization that has had active Russian participation and is suspected of being Communist-dominated.

A letter from a Government investigative agency dated June 18, 1946, is somewhat indefinite as to the status of the Institute of Social Research. It is apparently an organization of German-Jewish refugees. During the war, it was associated with the Russian Economic Institute whose aim was to increase the understanding of contemporary Russia.

This case is pending.

No. 70

She was employed by OSS in the Division of Research from June 1942 to September 1945, at which time she was transferred to the State Department where she is a branch Chief in Research and Intelligence.

A CSA investigation was satisfactory, from a security standpoint, except for one former supervisor who gave his opinion that she was a Communist. He said, however, that he had no tangible reason for this statement.

She was dismissed as an instructor at Hunter College in 1937 for unsatisfactory services. For some time she has resided with No. 14, a former State Department employee, whose resignation was requested because of Communist activities; however, the subject was cleared for top secret material on February 11, 1947, and the case is in a closed status.

No. 71

He is presently employed in the Division of Research for Europe.

The latest typed material appearing in his file is dated December 19, 1944. Prior to this he was investigated and nothing derogatory was developed. A card dated May 19, 1947, indicates he tried to get a job in the State Department for a former roommate of Shura Lewis. Shura Lewis is the individual who recently received so much newspaper publicity as a result of her supposedly Communist talks given before local high-school students, and who has been actively investigated by another Government agency. The case was assigned to the Special Unit on June 11, 1947. As of October 1947, the only material in the file was in the form of penciled notes.

Investigation is pending.

No. 72

This employee is presently in the Acquisition and Distribution Division under the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence.

Subject's file reflects no derogatory information; however, it is noted that subject has been active with the UPWA and that one of her references, C-19, has been affiliated with Communist-Front organizations.

A pencilled note of September 11, 1946, says that a Government investigative agency is working on the case and that subject is connected with the above-mentioned reference in some way. This agency has suggested that there is a strong possibility of a close tie up between this individual and the aforementioned reference. A memorandum of October 30, 1946, indicated advance security clearance was given and "additional investigation" is being made. There is nothing subsequent to this in the file; the papers are in the closed section of the files, the index card reflects that the case was closed October 18, 1946.

No. 73

He has been with the State Department since November 16, 1927, and is presently with the Acquisition and Distribution Division under the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence.

An investigation in 1940 developed no derogatory information concerning this subject. An undated but apparently recent memorandum from J. H. Finlator, a special agent, to Mr. Fitch follows: "Two employees of the Department who recently admitted to me that they are homosexuals told me that they believe the following persons of the Department also to be homosexual: (H-1), (H-2), and (H-3). One of these informants admitted having relations with (H-5) of D. C. and stated that (subject) has the reputation among homosexuals as being homosexual.

"A third informant advised me that (H-4) goes to homosexual parties, associates with homosexuals and is 'undoubtedly homosexual'."

Subject's case was opened September 12, 1947, and assigned to Agent Finlator. All of the above-mentioned individuals are presently employed by the State Department and investigations have been opened on all of them. H-1, H-2, and H-3 are in the Division of Communications and Records. H-4 is in the Division of Protective Services.

Concerning the above file, it should be mentioned at this point that a review of the file reflects Agent Finlator has had numerous cases of this type assigned to him and apparently has handled a number very successfully inasmuch as he has, on several occasions, secured the questionable members' resignations.

According to persons interviewed in CSA, Finlator has been very successful in obtaining admissions from this type of individual. In this connection, it might further be mentioned that homosexuals are regarded as security risks inasmuch as they are obviously easy blackmail victims. It is understood that having them classified as security risks was largely brought about by the insistence of Mr. Fitch as Mr. Robinson, reportedly, originally expressed the belief that though they were undesirable employees, they could not actually be considered security risks.

No. 74

He is a biographic analyst in the Biographic Information Division.

He was an alien until December 10, 1946. The subject received notice of termination because he was not a citizen.

B. M. Poole of the Biographic Information Division requested that the Department Security Committee reconsider their decision that his services be terminated because he was due to be naturalized in August 1946. On July 31, 1946, the Security Committee again disapproved the subject's employment and said that he had no unusual qualifications. This employee was transferred from OSS and nothing is known of his activities prior to 1941 that can be checked.

On August 27, 1946, Mr. Hoffman said in a note to Mr. Bannerman that Arch Jean, Chief of the Division of Departmental Personnel, stated that SA-E had submitted justification to DP for continued employment of subject and that the case was being cleared subject to a July SA-E report. Mr. Hoffman on May 9, 1947, stated that an additional clearance for top secret matter was being given, pending investigation. There is no indication of any investigation or that any leads had been set out though the case is in a pending status.

No. 75

He is presently employed by the State Department as a Research Analyst assigned to Research and Intelligence.

His background investigation developed nothing of a derogatory nature. He was with Army Intelligence from 1944 to June 1946. On April 7, 1947, he was given a security clearance.

He has been a very close associate of E-17, former War Department Employee who was dropped for security reasons and who is believed to have passed information and material to Soviet agents. One of his associates at the War Department, with whom he has since been in contact, is C-20, who is active with "liberal" groups. He has also been a close associate of C-21 who is said to be a Communist sympathizer. He is also a close associate of C-22, an individual of alleged radical beliefs.

This case is pending.

No. 76

This individual is presently employed in Research and Intelligence.

A report of another Government agency indicated that in 1943, when subject was with the National Resources Planning Board, he allegedly cursed a war veteran and the United States Government.

Informants were quoted as saying he and his wife maintained a Communist and un-American attitude. It was claimed that his wife admitted being a member of the Communist Party at the University of Wisconsin. He reportedly subscribed to *In Fact* and *Soviet Russia Today*. He is a close friend of E-15 and others in a major espionage case.

A note in the file indicates that as of February 25, 1947, Agent J. H. Finlator was working on the case. Another penciled note stated that the case should not be worked on until the FBI had given clearance as it might upset their investigation. This case has been open since early 1945. On September 25, 1945, Robert Bannerman, at that time Security Officer, said there was not enough evidence and they would have to let him slide through.

No. 77

He was born in 1916. He was with OSS from January 1942 to December 1945, when he was transferred to the State Department where he is presently a Chief in Research and Intelligence. An investigation of his background was conducted by CSA in April 1946. This investigation consisted of interviews with references and a check of college records.

Subject was given advance security clearance on May 8, 1946. In the file on the subject is a copy of a memorandum dated August 30, 1946, to Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2, from X-12, Colonel, AC, Acting Chief Air Intelligence Division. This memorandum states the following:

"1. During the latter half of August 1946 Major (X-13), A. C., undergoing final briefings prior to his departure to assume a position as an Air Attaché at Rome, Italy, was directed to the U. S. State Department for orientation.

"2. At State (subject) undertook, for better than an hour, to belabor Major (X-13) for his unbalance toward Capitalism and to excuse it on the basis that the Capitalistic Press of the United States was undoubtedly the source of (the Major's) bias. Further (subject) proceeded to 'sell' the advantages Communism would bring to the United States and to Italy were it the system prevalent.

"3. (Subject) may have been slyly trying Major (X-13) and experimenting with the mentality of a typical Army Air Officer * * * if, he (X-13), got the impression that State wanted the United States Air Attaché to favor Communism over the established U. S. Government, then (subject) is wrong. If (subject) is wrong, then he should not be advising Air Force Attachés going into the field."

In a memorandum dated September 9, 1946, from Bannerman to Klaus, it is pointed out that subject strongly supported the appointment of C-23, a strong pro-Communist, to an OIC Post in Belgrade.

A memorandum dated September 20, 1946, from Bannerman to Klaus, refers to an interview had with subject regarding the briefing incident mentioned in the memorandum of Colonel X-12. It was pointed out in the memorandum of Bannerman's that this should have been routine briefing of about fifteen minutes' duration but actually lasted 1½ hours. It developed that Major X-13 is a strong advocate of Capitalism as it exists in the United States. After his opinions were solicited by subject, the latter then proceeded to conduct the interview in the manner of a professor trying to show an errant student the fallacy of his political thinking, and pointing out that he (the subject) believes the most effective form of Government is one closely approaching state socialism. Subject admitted that it was quite possible the Major could have misinterpreted his remarks as a preference for Communism or Socialism on his part.

There is no indication in the file that any type of action was taken on the basis of Mr. Bannerman's memorandum of September 20, 1946.

On October 20, 1947, a CSA investigator in Philadelphia, advised that the previous evening he attended a meeting sponsored by the Sunday Night Forum (a liberal organization) at which the speaker was J. Raymond Walsh (a well-known liberal). He spoke on "The Witch Hunt in Washington," and during his talk stated that a close personal friend of his came to New York City recently and had a talk with him about the purge in the State Department. This friend told him he was going to resign from the OSS Section of the State Department that week

because of the prying of the investigators. On the basis of this information, the case was reopened for investigation inasmuch as the speaker identified his friend as the subject.

Individuals listed as Numbers 78-89 inclusive are employees of the Office of Information and Educational Exchange. Number 90 is an apparently qualified person for the position on the Russian desk who was rejected although the investigation was favorable. He is listed because the statement has been made that the foreign language positions are extremely difficult to fill and, consequently, some questionable security risks, as well as aliens, have been retained by OIE. In addition to Numbers 78-89, Numbers 3 and 43, who were referred to in the section of the report on CSA, are employees of OIE.

No. 78

Subject is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New York City in a highly responsible position.

Subject's Form 57 includes as references No. 79 and C-24.

The file indicates subject is the center of a Communist or extremely liberal group which has control of the type of material being broadcast. Numerous fellow employees cited examples of subtle news distortion and attitudes pointing out divergencies of broadcast from the State Department policy.

Material in the file indicates C-24, of the Radio Program Branch, sided with subject when X-14 called his attention to a broadcast very critical of the Pope.

A memorandum of June 18, 1947, from Fitch to Penrifoy, initiated by Goodrich, shows that action will be held in abeyance pending findings by OIE's own investigating Committee. CSA has no knowledge concerning whether or not OIE has accomplished anything in its investigation. (A lengthy report, dated February 17, 1947, by one of the New York Agents of CSA, is being set forth as an appendix in some detail because it gives a good picture of the general personnel situation in the International Broadcasting Division as well as the subject's activities. Inasmuch as most of the information in this report was given in the strictest confidence by loyal employees of OIE, it is strongly recommended that it not be made a matter of public record. However, there is set out below from a CSA memorandum of June 18, 1947 a summary of the information developed by investigation. It is suggested the Committee may wish to use it rather than the appendix in recorded hearings.)

The subject is presently employed as a Policy Information Specialist, CAF-13, in the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, State Department, New York City. Subject is responsible for the control of script and news material which is used in the broadcasts of the Voice of America programs and is in charge of the Policy Control Desk which acts as a clearing house or monitoring desk for all scripts which are used on the broadcasts to Europe.

1. From the standpoint of the investigation the Special Agent handling the investigation in New York was aware of the difficulties which would be experienced in contacting persons in the IIPD Office in New York who would be presumed to give reliable information concerning the subject. However, the Special Agent was able to locate and interrogate numerous witnesses who stated in substance that the subject has (gathered together in this office) a mixture of 'fellow travelers,' pseudo-liberals and outright Communists. These witnesses stated that this group is a closely knit sect the members of which protect each other and continuously assail anyone who dares to disagree with their way of thinking. It is alleged that the subject is the spearhead and dominant leader of this group and will quickly come to the defense of these persons when anyone makes any attempt to criticize them personally or the work which they do. It is also stated by these informants that it has been obvious that the script which is cleared through the Policy Control Desk which is under the supervision of the subject, has, from time to time, been altered or changed in a very subtle way and that it has been noticed that the alteration is invariably favorable to the Soviet Union or to the Communist Party line in the United States. One witness stated that there is a multitude of small clues which point to this group as a bunch of pseudo-liberals whose work is damaging and who almost terrorize the rest of the personnel in the Division and stated that it is unhealthy to oppose this group and that they conduct themselves in a most clever and insidious way and that it is very difficult to get anything on them.

"Two of our witnesses pointed out that as a result of poorly screened material for the broadcasts these news stories at times had been at cross purposes with the State Department's policy and they at times have even hindered the execution of the foreign policy of the State Department. The informant referred to a story concerning the State Department's policy regarding some bases in the Arctic and stated that a release of this news prematurely by the IBD Division had tipped off the rest of the world regarding this information.

Another witness stated that the subject and (associates) are dominating almost the entire personnel of the IBD because the Daily Guidance Bulletins and the MRD's emanate from (subject) (who) is the person who interprets and enforces these directives. He also stated that (subject) has very powerful connections in Washington and is constantly backed up in * * * decisions whether it regards the protection of (subject's) personnel scheduled for dismissal for inefficiency or infractions of rules or whether it involves anyone who dares to question (subject's) instructions.

"2. The script referred to herein which contains evidence of tampering or alteration has been made available to CSA for analysis and upon completion of this investigation the report of investigation will include a summary of the findings regarding this material.

"3. Without exception the witnesses contacted in the investigation to date have been highly critical of the subject and indicate that (the subject) is not suitable for the position which (subject) holds both from the standpoint of administrative ability as well as loyalty to the United States and have been very outspoken in their criticism of (subject's) administration of the Policy Control Desk of IBD in New York."

"4. Due to the fact that another investigative committee within the Department is presently making inquiries concerning the operation of the IBD Division and the use of script and other material used on the Voice of America programs it is believed advisable to coordinate the evidence of this committee with the current investigation and therefore in view of the necessity for additional investigation of this case it is believed inadvisable to make a recommendation concerning the subject at this state of the investigation."

No. 79

He has a ranking position in OIE.

The memorandum concerning the activities of the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New York City, which was reported as it appears in another file, puts this individual in a poor light but there is nothing in his file concerning this information. In fact, there is nothing in the file of a derogatory nature. During the course of his investigation, one witness commented that he was "somewhat left of center".

He was given security clearance June 16, 1947.

No. 80

He is a Music Director in OIE.

A report furnished by another investigative agency on June 5, 1945, reflected that he changed his name in June 1939. His file reflects that he received a draft classification of 4-F because of **psychoneurosis**.

His mother, with whom he lives, attended a number of Communist front organization meetings. Witnesses reported that the subject and his mother provided a coffee kitchen for protesters. This refers to a group of tenants who are accused of being a Communistic inspired protest group.

Subject's municipal service file indicated that he was employed from December 1938 to March 1939 by the State, County and Municipal Workers of America. This organization has been accused by X-15 and others as being a Communist-dominated organization. His connection with this group was out listed on his Form 57. Upon interview, subject denied that he had been employed by this organization and explained that he had taken a course of study from that organization in training for work as a social investigator. It was his understanding that it was the only course of its type in New York. In 1938 he studied music in the New School for Social Research under Hans Eisler, the individual who has received considerable recent publicity due to his appearance before the House un-American Activities Committee. There is no indication from the file that his association with Eisler stemmed out of anything other than a mutual interest in music. Concerning his being classified 4-F, his mother was quoted as saying that they did see to it that they kept him out of the Army.

When applying for a position as playground director he said on November 28, 1939, " * * * When conducting the chorus of the State, County, and Municipal Workers of America". He subsequently denied that this was a correct statement of his activities with the singing group with which he was connected.

An individual bearing his name at a certain address in New York City, listed with the Department of Information and Records, New York City, requested on June 29, 1939 that his address be changed to Apartment 1, A-3 in care of Seabrook. This card was not signed but was printed. On August 29, 1939 an individual with the same name as the subject's and the last-mentioned address, signed a Communist Party Election Petition. The investigating agent, however, after comparing printing and handwriting, is of the opinion that it was an individual other than the subject who resided at that address at the time and had signed the Petition. Concerning the change of address card, the Agent stated "the conclusion was drawn that an error had been committed either through the negligence of the clerk in the Municipal Civil Service Commission or through the deliberate attempt (by the individual bearing the same name and address) to benefit by the applicant's identification.

On April 10, 1947, complete security clearance was given the subject.

NOTE.—Concerning the above case, the Investigative Staff is of the opinion that it is fairly well established that the subject was not the signer of the Communist Party Election Petition. However, it is noted that the subject's forthrightness and honesty, at least, are somewhat subject to question as a result of the contradictions apparent from his execution of forms in subsequent interviews.

No. 81

The subject was employed by OWI as a news editor in March 1942 and was transferred to the State Department when that agency was taken over by the Department. Investigation disclosed that in December 1944, when C-25, a known Communist of the OWI Office in London was discharged after a Hatch Act investigation, the subject was vigorous in opposing this action. In June 1946, while attending a meeting of the National Committee to Win the Peace, which was attended by a number of well-known Communists and sympathizers, he was arrested for disorderly conduct.

CSA also advised that they had information from another Governmental investigative agency that a highly confidential source reported that on the morning following the subject's arrest, two members of the Soviet Underground discussed ways and means of assisting subject to get out of the predicament or to hush up the matter. The informant indicated that the circumstances leading up to this information clearly indicates that subject is of importance and stands high in Communist circles.

The above information was set out in a memorandum dated June 17, 1946, and a full investigation of the subject was requested. There was no indication that he had been given a full investigation before. Subsequent investigation disclosed that two former associates of the subject with the Newark Evening News stated in June 1947 that the subject was a very aggressive leader of the Local of the American Newspaper Guild and they stated that they would not rehire the subject nor recommend him for a Government position.

This case is still pending and no decision has been reached.

The subject was given a hearing on July 16, 1947, at which he denied any Communist or pro-Communist activities, and no admissions of a derogatory nature were obtained from him.

No. 82

She is employed with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New York City.

Her file reflects that she was born January 20, 1919 in Sofia, Bulgaria.

A memorandum of September 2, 1947 recites that an informant, a very intelligent reputable person, had advised that the subject married a United States soldier stationed in Bulgaria, who was uneducated and of no background though she has money, furs, and jewelry. Upon her arrival in this country according to informant, she immediately began trying to associate herself with the State Department. She allegedly has a brother in England who is a radio announcer with definite Communist Party leanings.

This investigation is pending.

No. 83

He is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New York City.

He signed a Communist Party Election Petition, as did his parents, on August 3, 1939. When voting in 1938, 1939, 1940 and 1941, he did not indicate a Democrat or Republican Party affiliation as is customary in that state. In this connection it was pointed out in the file that the Communist Party had not been on the ballot in New York since 1936. When questioned concerning his signing the election petition, he said he did not recall signing the petition but when confronted with the fact that he had, he said that it must have been at the request of a friend.

On November 4, 1941, the Civil Service Commission recommended his removal from the Government. This was never acted upon and on November 30, 1942, he was advised the Commission had reversed its decision. The file reflects no other derogatory information.

The form giving security clearance, on October 8, 1947, was checked "Results of investigation are completely favorable to subject."

No. 84

This individual is employed with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange in New York City.

She has been with the Government since September 1944. Her parents are Russian born. Investigation developed no derogatory information concerning subject, however, only her college attendance and previous employers were checked.

Her sister, according to the file, is a known Communist.

No. 85

This is an illustration of lack of follow-up even though subject appears to be possible security risk.

The subject has been employed by the Department with OIE in New York City since December 1945. Information was received by the Department from confidential sources indicating that he may be affiliated with Communist front groups, and that he may have Communist sympathies.

On April 16, 1947, the New York Office of CSA was requested to investigate the matter and they were provided with a report of another Government agency. No report had been received from New York since September 25, 1947, and there was no indication in the file that the matter had been followed up with New York.

No. 86

She is with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange as a consultant in New York City.

A Government investigative agency memorandum of May 1, 1947, stated that a confidential source advised that her reputation was lurid, that she was a leading light in the America First Movement, was a Nazi sympathizer and active in a Falange Movement.

No. 87

This individual has been employed by the Office of Information and Educational Exchange since February 1943 on a "when actually employed" basis.

The file reflects that he purportedly came from Italy in late 1942 and entered the United States illegally. He is Bulgarian. He lived for six months with C-26, editor of a supposedly Communist controlled Bulgarian language newspaper. He is a close associate of known Communists.

Subject attended the Military Intelligence Training Course at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, and Indiana University.

Another Government agency reported that the subject was reluctant to bear arms against the enemy and that he faked his inability to understand and speak English, etc., indicating he was a poor soldier. The wife of a reference said she felt the subject "is a bit 'Leftist.'"

He was issued a Certificate of Naturalization October 8, 1945. In his petition for naturalization he stated that he entered the United States in New York City, May 6, 1941.

The case is presently pending.

No. 88

The file reflects subject is an employee of the Information and Educational Exchange in New York City. He was born in Hungary. He offered to donate \$1,000 to Helen Bryan of the Joint-Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee. She is the same individual and the Committee is the same organization that were brought before the House Un-American Activities Committee. Though subject is a

medical doctor, he worked in a variety of war plants before going with OWI. His record in this country starts in November 1938. His investigation is pending.

No. 89

This Foreign Service applicant has been with the Office of Information and Educational Exchange.

The file reflects that his girl friend, E-18, was known as a "campus radical" at Syracuse University. Close social friends of subject and his girl friend are, and have been for some time, E-13, C-27 and C-28, all of whom have Communist connections.

A report of October 29, 1946 indicates subject has a poor personality and is "very slow," as well as being a close associate with the above individuals.

His investigation is pending.

No. 90

This is an instance where an apparently good security risk was passed up although he was highly recommended for an OIE position.

The subject was born at Kiev, Russia, in 1877. He was investigated in the fall of 1946 for a position on the Russian desk of the OIE. Investigation disclosed that he was a refugee from the Red Revolution in Russia and that he was naturalized in New York City in 1927. He is reportedly an expert on Russian affairs, having studied them for a period of many years. He was employed by OSS as a consultant from February 1942 to December 1942 and then requested to resign.

The subject stated that he was forced to resign because of Communist pressure, and that C-29 of the Jewish Telegraph Agency and Vladimir Stepanovskiy, an NKVD Agent in the United States, had openly stated that he was too anti-Soviet to be employed by OSS.

The subject's immediate supervisor with OSS reportedly told him he was forced to terminate the subject's services due to circumstances beyond his control. One of the subject's references and a high State Department official confirmed the subject's statement concerning his dismissal from OSS. The subject was very highly recommended by several witnesses as an able man and as a democratic American who supported Democracy for Russia and opposed Communism. There is no indication in the file that the subject was employed.

Contact was had with Mr. Ryan, of the Division of Personnel, and he advised that according to his file the subject apparently "did not have qualifications for the job."

Individual listed as Nos. 91-95, inclusive, are in the Foreign Service. Nos. 9 and 48, who were referred to in the CSA section of the report, are also in the Foreign Service.

No. 91

He was born in 1913. He practiced law from September 1936 to September 1942. He was with the Board of Economic Warfare from September 1942 to November 1943 and has been with the State Department as a Senior Economic Analyst in the Foreign Service from November 1943 to the present time. In addition, he is an applicant for the position of Foreign Service career officer. Prior to 1947, no previous full investigation had been conducted of his background.

Investigation from February 1947 to June 1947 disclosed that he has always associated with known Leftists and was highly recommended by C-30, C-31, C-32 and C-33, all known fellow travelers. In California, his closest associates for several years were C-34 and C-35, also active fellow travelers.

A former law associate of the subject refused to recommend him for Federal employment. The informant said subject's public relations are bad, he is lacking in polish, does not meet people well, and is so far to the Left that he would advocate any Liberal cause.

The file discloses a request of December 12, 1946, by a Department official, for a Foreign Service inspector to investigate an alleged irregularity on the part of the subject in his sale of a personal automobile at a fantastic black-market price in Spain, and the subsequent purchase of another automobile at the official price on the statement that it was to be used for official purposes. This car is apparently not being used on official business. There was no report in the file on the requested investigation.

In a letter of January 30, 1947, Foreign Service Inspector X-5 mentioned that he had previously submitted an efficiency rating of "unsatisfactory" on the subject, advising that he was "convinced (subject) was a rough type of lawyer who might look upon his own personal benefit in trustee operations and should not be continued in the Foreign Service."

A Superior Court judge in California, who knows subject well, said subject is a Leftist, and his associates were always of the same type. He said further that he would not have the subject in any responsible Government position if he had anything to say about it.

Another California judge said the subject associated with fellow travelers and he would definitely not recommend him.

There have been no reports in the files since June 6, 1947, but the case is still pending.

No. 92

This individual was employed at an American Mission in the Far East during 1947. He is a United States citizen of foreign-born parents.

Information was obtained by a Consul General that the subject may be furnishing information to a Russian Agent, and two sources of information reported that the subject has represented himself as an American Intelligence Agent. At the Mission where he was employed he had access to confidential information.

On the Consul General's recommendation, he was relieved of his assignment where he was a security risk, but he is still in the Department.

No. 93

This person was employed as a file clerk by the American Embassy in Paris, France, in December 1946. She went to Paris in November 1946 with her husband who was studying there. Both the subject and her husband are known contacts of two suspects in an investigation of Soviet espionage activities in the United States.

Another Government investigative agency advised that the subject's husband has transmitted back to the United States Communist literature of party fronts in France and in a communication he listed principal functionaries of the Communist Party in France.

Investigation conducted by CSA in March 1947 developed no derogatory information concerning the subject. A memorandum in the file dated July 16, 1947, stated that the subject recently sent a copy of a Communist publication to one of the Soviet espionage suspects who had previously given the subject names of well-known Communists she could contact in France.

On July 30, 1947, CSA requested the Embassy in Paris to investigate the subject's activities there.

No. 94

This is a case of clearance on insufficient investigation and failure to reopen the case for investigation although derogatory information was received.

The subject was employed as a news analyst with the American Embassy in Moscow in 1946. CSA had conducted an investigation in November 1945 which included contacts with references, two former teachers and two former supervisors in the Army. Nothing derogatory was obtained from the persons contacted. Information was received from a Government investigative agency on April 26, 1946, that the subject had informed the son of a known Communist Party member in Philadelphia that "all American Newspapers said horrible things about the Russians and that if one reads the Russian newspapers, he learns that these things are not true." At that time the subject is reported to have said he felt that he now has a wonderful opportunity in being able to analyze the Russian news.

No action was taken on the basis of the above information, and on July 17, 1947, Congressman X-16 told Assistant Secretary of State Peurifoy that subject and his wife, both very procommunist, are employed in our Embassy in Moscow and should be removed.

The case was re-opened on the basis of the information received from the Congressman, but there was nothing further in the file as of October 13, 1947, other than check of the records of the Un-American Activities Committee.

No. 95

He is employed by the Consulate General at Casablanca.

The investigation was initiated for the purpose of clearing him to perform cryptographic duties. The file reflects that he is a heavy drinker, evasive and

possibly engaged in questionable financial transactions concerning foreign exchange. A foreign service inspector rates him as "unsatisfactory."

The College he allegedly attended has no record of his claimed two years' attendance.

There is no indication that any action is being taken to dismiss this employee and no indication at the time the file was reviewed, as to whether or not he would be cleared for performing cryptographic duties.

Individuals listed as Nos. 96, 97, and 98 are examples of persons employed for responsible positions even though substantial derogatory information was available prior to appointment.

No. 96

This is a case of apparent pressure from a high official in the Department to employ the applicant in spite of derogatory information.

The applicant was born in 1909; he was appointed late in 1946 and was assigned to the Office of Assistant Secretary Hildring at \$8179.80 per annum. He was in the United States Army from December 1942 to May 1946 and rose from the rank of private to captain. He was employed as a civilian in the War Department after May 8, 1946, at a salary of \$6230 per annum and subsequently raised to \$7102. The maximum salary he ever received prior to going into the Army was \$57 per week with a newspaper.

Advance security clearance was given him on October 29, 1946, and on November 5, 1946, the following memorandum from the Office of Controls to the Personnel Division was prepared:

"Reference is made to the case of (subject), born——1909, applicant for the position Advisor, Standard of Living Policy, with the Department. Further reference is made to CON's Memorandum of October 29, 1946, and the remarks transmitted therewith, giving advance security clearance on (subject).

"(Subject) was confronted with the discrepancies, as outlined in the above-mentioned remarks, by CSA. In reply to various questions with regard to discrepancies in his education (subject) stated that the records revealed by CSA were correct. He further stated that he did not have his records available hence the discrepancies. (Subject) stated that he was not disqualified from——University for poor scholarship. He stated that he was maintaining a "B" average and the reason for his leaving was due to a misunderstanding with regard to prelegal requirements. The CSA investigation disclosed that (subject) was disqualified from this law school in May, 1934, for poor scholarship.

"With reference to (subject's) employment by the —— News Company and his statements that he made from \$100.00 to \$350.00 per month, (subject) stated that his salary was \$57.50 per week plus \$8.00 per week for car expenses. He further stated that in spite of his official titles with that company he did as a matter of fact, 'work in connection with the publication and editing.' The CSA investigation reflected no information to substantiate the afore-mentioned claim.

"(Subject) was asked to explain the discrepancies with regard to his claim that he received from \$60.00 to \$150.00 per month for employment in the law office of ——-. The CSA investigation had revealed that his salary was \$50.00 per month. (Subject) stated that it was true that he was employed on a part-time basis and that his salary may have only been the amount as shown by the investigation, however, he believed that the average was much higher. He further stated, 'He was not an Attorney at this time but a law student.'

"(Subject) claimed on Form 57 that he was engaged and associated in the private practice of law from 1936 to 1942, however, the CSA investigation failed to substantiate these claims and further revealed that (subject) was not admitted to practice law in the State of California until January 1944. (Subject) was confronted with this discrepancy and asked for an explanation. In reply he stated, 'I am very sorry but the above statement was a mistake with reference to the years 1936-1942.' * * * 'In no way did I mean to convey the impression in my application that I was practicing law during this period.'

"It is apparent, from the facts as set forth above, that (subject) attempted to build up his past experience and earning power at the time he executed Form 57 for employment with this Department. In practically all employ-

ments and experiences listed, (subject) made statements that varied from the facts as borne out by CSA investigation.

"On the basis of the investigation conducted by CSA and in view of the statements made by (subject) when confronted with discrepancies as revealed by the investigation, it would appear that the position to which subject has been appointed is not commensurate with his background, experience, earning capacity, etc. It would appear that (subject's) application should be given careful consideration before he is employed by the Department."

On November 29, 1946, Robert J. Ryan of the Personnel Division submitted a memorandum to the Office of Controls stating "The investigative file on (the subject) forwarded with your memorandum to DP of November 5, is returned herewith, the comments of Mr. Humelsine attached."

The attached item is a three-inch by five-inch slip of white paper with the notation "To, DP (Mr. McCoy) I can't see that the attached info altered the case enough to reopen. CHH"

Attached also, is a memorandum from Bannerman to Morse Allen "For the file—If Humelsine is so little concerned with the quality of Department personnel there is little we can do. I believe he is more interested in the politics of the situation. RLB 12/2/46."

No. 97

The subject has been employed in various Government agencies since 1937. His last position prior to joining the State Department in 1946 was with OPA as regional executive officer. He is presently an Assistant Director under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.

An investigative report, dated May 3, 1946, listed one reference as giving derogatory information concerning his personality and ability.

A report of May 11, 1946, lists an associate of the subject with OPA as refusing to recommend him because of his domineering personality and having some question as to his integrity.

A report of June 15, 1946, sets out that another associate of subject, with OPA, has given very derogatory information relative to his personality, and this associate also stated that the subject was a poor administrator. Two other associates confirmed the statement as to the subject's disagreeable personality and his being a poor administrator. Still another associate said the subject promised him he would get the informant a promotion in OPA if the informant helped obtain a commission in the Armed Services for the subject through the informant's relatives who had high positions in the Armed Forces. This informant also stated the subject had made improper advances to girls in the OPA Office.

A memorandum dated June 26, 1946, from CSA to the Office of Controls stated "investigation discloses no evidence of a material nature tending to affect the subject's character, ability, dependability, general reputation and loyalty to the Government of the United States and its institutions, and would seem to indicate that the person merits consideration for employment in the Department of State."

On the basis of the above memorandum, the subject was employed by the State Department.

A memorandum dated November 8, 1946, from the Office of Controls to the Personnel Division summarized the derogatory information concerning the subject and recommended careful consideration be given to retaining him. No action appears to have been taken on the basis of that memorandum.

Another memorandum, dated April 18, 1947, from CSA to the Personnel Division, stated "investigation reveals unfavorable information relating to the character or suitability of the subject," and this memorandum completed the file on the subject.

The subject is still employed by the Department.

This is a good example of an instance where substantial derogatory information was available to reject the applicant, but the derogatory information is of such a nature that there will be difficulty in getting rid of the employee on the basis of that information.

No. 98

This man is a Foreign Service applicant.

A former employer said, "He entertained quite advanced or even radical tendencies and beliefs politically." A reference was noncommittal as to his

loyalty. An informant (reference) said that he was, while with UNRRA, a supporter of the Communists in Greece. There is a strong indication that he sent greetings to the Daily Worker on May 4, 1934. Two reliable sources vouched for his political radicalism in the 1930's. A report dated April 10, 1947 indicates he is definitely a leftist. The subject closely associated with at one time, and used as a character witness, an individual with doubtful business ethics and an associate of Communists.

A note of June 6, 1947, indicates the subject was appointed statistician, Grade CAF-11, resubmission with termination in Grade CAF-11 at \$5,750 per annum on August 29, 1946.

The file contained the following: "To be investigated when volume of work permits." This case is still pending. The natural question in this case is why he was employed by the Greece Mission in June, July, and August in view of the above facts.

Individuals listed as Nos. 99-102, inclusive, are examples of applicants who are still being investigated although substantial derogatory information is available.

No. 99

This applicant is presently associated with the Americans for Democratic Action, a supposedly anti-Communist liberal organization.

Several references state he is a liberal but anti-Communist. One informant states he is a friend of C-36, of FCC, a reported Communist. He is a member of the National Lawyers Guild and Washington Book Shop. His wife belongs to the League of Women Shoppers. The applicant is a subscriber to New Masses, and has closely associated with members of the American Peoples' Mobilization and Washington Committee for Democratic Action. A relative of his has a financial interest in the Daily Worker.

Inquiry at the Personnel Department reflects that he was not employed inasmuch as security clearance was not given soon enough and he accepted another position. Mr. Ryan of that Office advised that Under Secretary Clayton's Office has requested completion of the investigation in this case in the event he is considered for a position in the future. The case was still pending on October 31, 1947.

No. 100

He is an applicant for a P-8 position with the State Department.

He has been employed by the Treasury Department from April 1940 to the present time, except for military leave from July 1942 to December 1942. He is highly recommended by E-3 and is an apparent prodigy of E-2. Both of these individuals are allegedly engaged in Soviet espionage activities.

CSA has received information from another Governmental agency to the effect that the subject was one of many contacts of E-19, subject of a Soviet espionage case.

One of subject's references refused recommendation of him because of his association with two pro-Communists.

Little investigation has been conducted as of October 1947 and the case was pending with several leads outstanding.

No. 101

This man is an applicant for a P-7 position.

Investigation was initiated June 25, 1947. The file reflected that he studied under Harold Laski at the London School of Economics, 1927-1929. In 1933 he wrote an article "Applied Marxism in Soviet Russia" which was an objective review of the principles of Marxism as applied by Lenin and Stalin. He pointed out that much progress had been made in Russia up to that time and predicted that program would continue to be made "toward the completion of the foundation of the classless socialist state". One of his former associates of UNRRA praised him and referred to his excellent educational background. In this connection investigation at the University of Wisconsin revealed that he was dropped for poor scholarship at that school in 1921, readmitted in 1923 and dropped again in 1924. Prior to coming with the Government in 1942, applicant's top salary was \$3,700 per annum. On his application he indicated that he would not accept less than \$8,500 per annum. His only position in excess of that has been with UNRRA. A coworker at the War Foods Administration in a report dated September 3, 1947, expressed reservations concerning his loyalty. The report reads

"He stated further that the applicant admitted his loyalty to the Government, had been questioned on two occasions when he was asked about the articles on Russia and the Communist activities of his father. It was alleged by the applicant that he was mistaken for his father who has the same name and who is known to have attended some Communist meetings." The applicant traveled to Russia in 1936.

As of October 15, 1947, the investigation was still pending.

No. 102

This man is an applicant. He is presently employed by Twentieth Century Fox and, as such, made a study of Greece. From July 1942 until November 1946, he was employed by the Chicago Sun. He was associated with E-20. This individual was involved with Philip Jaffee in the case in which confidential documents were allegedly turned over to outside sources. The applicant was dropped from Northwestern and Wisconsin Universities for poor scholarship. He was a participant in a round-table discussion on a Northwestern University program in 1945. In this discussion he took the side of the Chinese Communists as opposed to the Chinese Government. He has been quoted for some time as being a great admirer of Russia. On July 16, 1944, he was quoted as saying "Henry Wallace is the outstanding symbol of American Democracy." On July 8, 1945, he indicated that Russia "has much of economic and social democracy to teach."

However, in spite of the above information, no one interviewed during the course of his investigation raised any question as to his loyalty.

His investigation is pending.

* * * * *

Numbers 103-106, which follow, are typical of numerous cases where some question as to the person's loyalty exists, but where little information actually exists on which to make an evaluation.

No. 103

He is with the Division of International Security Affairs.

A memorandum of July 25, 1947, indicated that Under Secretary Robert Lovett had raised some question about the security of the Division of International Security Affairs. The file indicates that the subject visits socially with a well-known leftist, CC-37. It further indicates that he was a member of the American Committee for Democratic Action and his wife was very active in the Washington Committee for Aid to China.

This case is pending.

No. 104

She is in the Office of Foreign Liquidation Commission.

A memorandum of December 9, 1946, stated that one informant had said that subject had criticized our foreign policy. A number of informants have emphasized that she entertains negroes and whites, both men and women, in her apartment. However, none of these informants appear to be able to furnish any information pointing out anything irregular with these meetings.

Another Government investigative agency reported that her brother was suspected of having Communist sympathies. She has been an officer in one of the Locals of the United Public Workers of America. She has been very active in behalf of the Union. In 1943 she was employed for a couple of months as a clerk for a liberal Senator (X-17). The memorandum mentioned above concludes as follows:

"Investigation would seem to indicate that the risk involved in employing the applicant requires careful consideration."

No. 105

He is on the Special Projects Staff.

The file reflects, as indicated in a memorandum of February 26, 1947, that numerous confidential informants reported he "was pro-Communist, radical, left-wing, of dubious background, etc." His father is regarded as very liberal.

The file developed no tangible proof of any Communistic activities on the part of the subject. He was given security clearance on the date of the memorandum.

No. 106

This individual is a Chief in the Division of International Labor.

Information was received in October 1946, that the subject was a member of the Washington Book Shop in 1941, and that he is a fellow traveler. Substantial

investigation was conducted, but as of June 18, 1947, when the last report was prepared, the allegation had not been proved or disproved and the case is still pending.

* * * * *

Numbers 107 and 108 are cases of individuals who left the Department, one by resignation and the other by reduction in force, a year or more after considerable derogatory information was available and on which action was not taken by the responsible officials.

No. 107

This is another case of failure to take action on unfavorable information until many months after the information was available.

The subject was born in New Jersey in 1919 of Russian-born parents. She was employed as a correspondence secretary at the White House from November 1940 to April 1944. She was a typist for the Soviet Information Bulletin, Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., from May 1944 to February 1945. Her salary at the White House was \$2,700 per year.

In February 1945, she appeared at the Personnel Division of the State Department and requested a job, indicating her willingness to accept a position for \$1,800. After she had been employed by the State Department for one month she specifically requested a job in the office of a certain high official and was transferred to that office from the Personnel Division. Her duties in that office were the receiving, screening, and distribution of all cablegrams for the high official. She also handled important documents of international and economic significance.

In her Form 57 she gave as references the names of two employees of the Soviet Embassy. The above information was set out in a memorandum dated July 27, 1945, in the file of the subject.

A memorandum dated November 17, 1945, from the Office of Controls, to Assistant Secretary Russell, pointed out the above facts and stated that for the subject to have been an employee of the Soviet Embassy she must have been accepted politically by them. The memorandum further stated that she is a member of the Washington Book Shop and subscribes to the Soviet Information Bulletin. The memorandum suggested that these facts be brought to the attention of the official for whom she worked. There is no indication in the file that this action was ever taken.

On February 12, 1947, the Security Office disapproved clearance for the subject to accompany the American Delegation to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

In a report of March 6, 1947, the CSA investigator points out a number of instances of untruthfulness on the part of the subject found during the investigation which he reported in 25 pages. The investigator commented that "in the entire course of this investigation it is apparent that the subject exaggerates, deviates from truthfulness in varying degrees, and in a number of instances has made misstatements of facts so as to place herself in a more favorable position." The report also states that a former supervisor of subject at The White House said he had caught the subject in several lies and would not recommend her for a position of trust and confidence. Several other witnesses referred to her as a liar.

She reportedly associated closely with two women who were known to be pro-Communists. One of these women was interviewed and recommended the subject highly. Several witnesses reported the subject as pro-Russian. One informant said the subject had described John Foster Dulles as a Fascist and she was against General Bor, the anti-Communist General of Poland, and also disliked General Mihailovitch, of Yugoslavia.

A memorandum of April 1, 1947, from the Office of Controls, to Counsel-ACOPS, summarized the information against the subject and recommended her transfer to a position where she would not have access to highly classified information, and if such position could not be found for her, it was recommended her services be terminated.

A memorandum of April 9, 1947, from Mr. Peurifoy to Mr. Robinson stated that Mr. Peurifoy had reached the conclusion that she should be transferred to other work. There is no indication in the file, however, that this action was taken.

On June 18, 1947, a memorandum was prepared in CSA to Mr. Peurifoy again summarizing the facts and recommended the removal of subject from the rolls

of the Department. There is no indication in the file that action was taken on the basis of this memorandum.

On August 8, 1947, a memorandum from Arch K. Jean, of the Personnel Division to the Office of Controls stated that the subject had submitted her resignation from the Department effective at a subsequent date.

No. 108

This is a case of lack of follow-up on unfavorable security information and also indicates poor supervision.

The subject was employed with OWI in July of 1944 and, subsequently, was transferred to the State Department as a Public Affairs Officer in OIE. In the file was a form memorandum, dated December 17, 1946, from the Office of Controls to the Foreign Personnel Division, which approved him for appointment purposes.

Another memorandum of the same date, from the Office of Controls to the Foreign Personnel Division, suggested careful consideration be given to his employment as investigation indicated his suitability for employment was questionable. The memorandum further suggested he be interviewed and requested to explain the following items discovered during the course of the investigation:

1. His arrest in 1935 for passing three worthless checks totaling \$100.00.
2. His "no" answer to Question 28 on Form 57 (this is a question regarding whether applicant has been convicted of any criminal offenses).
3. His dismissal from a Missouri college.
4. His alleged failure to make restitution to that Missouri college of funds advanced to him for which he gave a note.
5. His giving of a worthless check to a Tulane University Professor in 1934.
6. His alleged padding of expense accounts while traveling for another college in 1930 and his dismissal therefor.

In addition to the above, several persons interviewed stated that they could not recommend the subject because of the activities mentioned above.

The Director of a Psychopathic Hospital in Iowa stated, in response to request for information by a CSA Agent, that the subject was examined in 1935, and was diagnosed as possessing a "psychopathic personality." This Director further said, "although in a certain number of cases, there is an improvement with maturity the lack of constitutional stability always makes such individuals a poor risk for a responsible position."

There is no indication in the file that the subject was ever interviewed, and he remained on the rolls until he was the victim of a reduction in force in October 1947.

Appendix for Case No. 78

The following is from CSA report dated February 17, 1947, partly paraphrased where necessary to protect informants, etc.

X-18 stated that his confidential files contained nothing on the subject and that his personal contacts with the subject are very infrequent so that he is unable to give anything definite about her. He stated that the efficiency ratings "Excellent" received by subject may as well be disregarded and that there is very little use to contact any of the references or supervisors given by subject in her Form 57. To clarify the above statement, he offered, in a very guarded and discreet manner, an explanation which is based only upon his impression, and it was very difficult for him to substantiate with concrete facts in all the details. He stated that since the start of the organization, it appeared that the personnel in the Policy Information Division consisted mostly of a very closely allied group, some of whom knew each other before they joined the organization, or became very chummy after joining it. This is substantiated by a superficial check of Forms 57 from that Division which disclosed an amazing frequency in use of names of the same people for references. It almost is "I refer to you and you refer to me." The informant stated further that practically on every occasion when someone from that Division was considered for dismissal, because of inefficiency, uselessness, or even for outright violations of the U. S. Civil Service Regulations—for example, falsifying information on Form 57 and others—the entire Division or at least the most prominent members of it, would rush to the culprit's defense, claiming he or she was indispensable and irreplaceable. Such clannishness amongst the members of the Division oversteps the harmony desired in any organization and acquires an entirely different and undesired aspect. He stated that through his association with the Division and

his analysis of it, he still cannot draw a definite conclusion regarding it. It might be that its members are only a bunch of liberals banded together, a group of opportunists who are trying to feather their own beds and who are acting in consort, or even some radicals who are protecting the inefficient and are making friends for themselves, facilitating thereby their subversive work. At any rate, the informant stated that to contact the individuals mentioned as references would be a useless task for they all give the most flattering information about each other. In view of the above, various other heads of the International Broadcasting Division sections were contacted.

X-19, before expressing his opinion on the subject, gave a brief outline of his relationship with the Policy Information Desk and his opinion of it. He stated that when he started to work with OWI at the outbreak of the war, he felt an apprehension about the personnel connected with it. He felt that although on the whole the personnel consisted of men and women loyal to the United States and eager to sincerely help in the prosecution of the war and to protect the interests of this country, there was also a group, and a substantial one, which did not fall in this category. He found many "fellow travelers" if not outright Communists who were organized in a very closely knit sect, members of which protected each other and continuously assailed anyone who disagreed with their way of thinking. This informant attempted to "combat them" but they were too strong for him and as a result he was transferred to another job. Upon returning to New York and his present job, he discovered that although some of the members of the sect were gone, the majority still remained and continued their "unhealthy activities." He also stated that it was difficult to furnish concrete evidence, at least in a strong enough form, to prove that the subject and the rest of her crowd were Communists. However, there are a multitude of small clues which point to them as a bunch of "pseudo-liberals" whose work is damaging and who "almost terrorized" the rest of the personnel. "It is unhealthy to oppose them" and they conduct themselves in a most clever and insidious way that it is difficult to get anything on them. The informant further stated that it appears that through her extreme intelligence and cleverness, the subject is the center of this group, to which also belonged some of their associates who no longer are in the employ of the State Department: they include C-24, C-38, C-39, C-40, and some others who were regarded as undesirable and dangerous to the State Department. Informant stated that C-24 and C-38 still keep in touch with the subject, visiting the office in the evenings and are very much in evidence on various farewell and other parties. He added that it appears that subject No. 79 is very much under the influence of subject, backing her up in everything, including her attempts to get rid of personnel (even some not employed under her supervision) who dare to disagree with her. Informant indicated he would have been in favor of subject's participating in guiding the International Broadcasting Division's operations but for the fact that he has no confidence in her.

X-20, a third informant, was very careful in selecting his statements, attempting to commit himself as little as possible. He said in his opinion, subject was definitely not a Communist and that he did not suspect her in purposely distorting the policy of the State Department; at least he did not see any definite pattern in any possible "mistakes" made in either selecting the material or in the "Guidance Bulletins" issued by the Policy Control Desk. On the other hand, he thought that at times the material suggested could have been selected better, as well as when some articles taken for the MRD* were contracted for the reason of saving space, some parts of them which were removed were the "core" and without them the meaning was changed entirely. However, again the informant indicated that he thought this was due to the "moderate ability" of the people involved in preparation of MRD's and not to a definite purposeful pattern of subversive activity. He mentioned, however, that the faulty selected material was at times at cross purposes with the State Department policy and at times even hindered its execution. He referred to an incident where the release of some news items has tipped off prematurely the Department's policy regarding some bases in the Arctic. It was apparent during this interview that the informant did not want to commit himself one way or the other.

A fourth informant, X-21, said the subject is "The head" of the group of "pseudo-liberals," even Communists, to which C-38, C-24 and C-40 also belonged. She is their "moving spirit" and "protector" and heads any and all persecutions against anyone who disagrees with her and who may at one time or another

*MRD—Master Radio Desk.

question the material in her Daily Guidance Bulletins and MRD's. The informant indicated that many of the Daily Guidance Bulletins which are written by subject are constructed in such a way as to make the broadcast material prepared in a form advantageous to Communist policy line and to the U. S. S. R. He said subject and her crowd are domineering almost the entire personnel of the IBD because the Daily Guidance Bulletins and the MRD's emanate from her and she is also the one who interprets and enforces them. "She has very powerful connections in Washington" and is constantly backed by them whether in protection of personnel scheduled for dismissal for inefficiency or infraction of rules (provided they belong to the crowd) or assailing of anyone who may dare to question her instructions. The informant's opinion of the subject is definitely unfavorable, and he also stated that because of his not infrequent disagreements with the subject, he has incurred her displeasure and is made a victim of frequent attacks by her.

A fifth informant, X-14, termed the entire Policy Information Section as a bunch of "pseudo-liberals" and "fellow travelers". Specifically, he referred to some instances when MRD's emanating from the subject contained instructions on material to be used for broadcasting, regarded by him as definitely in disagreement with the official policy of the State Department and detrimental and harmful to it. He stated that unfortunately he cannot make any direct accusations of the subject being a Communist or purposely sabotaging the Department's policy in favor of the U. S. S. R., but that the results are just as damaging whether she does it consciously or unconsciously. He also stated it is very difficult, practically impossible, to collect concrete evidence to substantiate his feeling of distrust of the subject but that a close study of the MRD's issued by the subject and the material upon which they are based would be the best way to illustrate the point. He further stated that by omission of either a few words in the material usually taken out of newspapers or of the source of the information, the meaning is sometimes confusing or even reversed entirely from the original and always favoring the line of propaganda by the U. S. S. R. or its satellites. He stated that some of the commentators and producers have come to him from time to time and inferred that they refused to present on the air some of the material sent to them via MRD's because they considered it detrimental to the United States.

A sixth informant, X-22, indicated that his opinion of the subject, based on several years of association with her, is an unfavorable one. He said he examines all the material submitted to him after it has had the subject's OK and on numerous occasions he was forced to make corrections or changes because he felt that if it went on the air in its original form, it would undermine the policy of the State Department. He explained that the violation was never a gross one, but a few words omitted here, changed just a bit there, have changed the meaning intended for the broadcast, always favoring the U. S. S. R. The informant stated he felt the members and employees of the Department, who are paid by the American taxpayers, should observe the interests of the United States first and not the interests of any foreign country. He added that his attempts to safeguard the interests of the State Department have caused the ire of subject and she made every attempt to discredit him in accusing him of all sorts of mistakes and infractions allegedly made by him, and that she made her accusations through her Daily Bulletin. He also stated that some of the sincerely loyal workers are either "terrorized" by subject or are very apprehensive and bewildered. He said he cannot accuse subject of being a Communist, but that the work she is doing is playing into the hands of the Communists, and he considers her too clever and too intelligent to be unaware of what she is doing.

A seventh informant, X-23, refused to comment on the subject because of short association, but he expressed apprehension regarding the way security is handled (the examination of material), stating he can't help but feel that the Policy Control Desk and the subject are lax in performing their duty.

(The following observations were made by the CSA investigator as set out in his report of February 17, 1947.)

From the above statements made by the informants contacted, the following brief résumé might be construed; it would appear that the subject of this investigation belongs to a rather closely knit group of individuals, superior and subordinate to her, and constituting a substantial part of the employees of the Policy Information Desk. This group is termed as "pseudo-liberals", "fellow travelers", and "almost outright Communists" who unfortunately are placed in the most critical positions in the entire International Broadcasting Division.

This group, especially the subject is charged with the responsibility of composing Daily Guidance Bulletins which instruct all the various Desks as to the type of material to be used in the daily broadcasts abroad, indicating which material should be stressed, played up to, or modified. It is also issuing the Daily MRD's with definitely prepared material, and it is also reviewing and correcting the material prepared for the broadcast by all the Desks. From the accusations made by the informants, it appears that the Policy Information Desk, and especially subject, have influenced the radio broadcasts to acquire a more pro-Communist and pro-U. S. S. R. aspect, thereby undermining the official policy of the State Department. This has been done—not in a crude and self-evident way—but very cleverly and insidiously through putting stress on the wrong kind of material, through selecting the material disproportionately in far greater quantities from the left wing press in comparison with the true ratio of it in the entire field of newspapers, through cutting out the punch lines—which changes the meaning of the articles, and using similar means which, if taken up one by one separately, would not show the subject and her crowd as Communists, but collectively are weakening the State Department foreign policy and are definitely damaging it. One of the informants contacted indicated that a telegram has been received from a Foreign Service officer in the Balkans who pointed out that the work of the Foreign Service was hampered, instead of facilitated, by the wrong kind of material broadcast to the country in which he was stationed.

It also appears that subject and her crowd exert a very strong influence on many employees of the IBD, even some not in her section, through constantly protecting "her people" regardless of their ability and usefulness, attacking people who question any of her instructions or who just don't belong to her crowd, and through attempting to replace the latter category with her "own people."

In view of the fact that very little concrete evidence was presented by the informants to substantiate the charges against the subject, which is due to "her clever and insidious way of operating," suggestion was made by the majority of them that an unbiased and competent party be delegated to examine the following documents: all the Daily Guidance Bulletins issued by subject and all the MRD's issued daily, the latter to be compared with the material from which they were taken. However, your Agent was cautioned that it was necessary to examine this material, not for one day only, but for some appreciable length of time (a month or two), and that whoever will make this examination should personally see to it that all the right material would be submitted for inspection—this so that no material could be withheld or substituted. Example was given that it was always evident when some material was submitted for examination to the Congressional Committee, for a few days before that and for the period covered by this Congressional check-up, the tone and content of material changed appreciably.

Neighborhood investigation and contact with former employers developed no information concerning Communist activities on the part of subject or her husband. One former employer said he would not reemploy her because she was not good in publicity work; and as a writer, she had numerous limitations. He indicated that in private business, her present top salary would be not more than \$80 per week. In all sincerity, this former employer said he could not see the subject employed in her present capacity which he considers entirely "out of her class."

A memorandum of February 6, 1947, by an employee who caught the change illustrates how changing a few words can change the entire meaning in a commentary. A commentary dealing with the new youth directive regarding Germany contained the following two sentences: "But Democracy is not a doctrine as National Socialism was a doctrine. Democracy means basically nothing else but the honest acceptance of a handful of rules for life in the community." On the Daily Report on Radio Output for February 4, 1947, these two sentences appeared as follows: "Contrary to national socialism, democracy is not a doctrine; basically, democracy means only the honest acceptance of a handful of rules for communist life." The employee who noted this change brought it up with the subject who stated, "So you're going to make a fight about it? If so, I will be forced to protect my people." (This Daily Report had been prepared by one of the subject's assistants.) Inasmuch as the employee who noted the change was responsible for preparation of the material in this commentary, he would be blamed for the "change" if it were noticed in Washington.

The following additional information is taken from the CSA Agent's report of March 10, 1947:

Informant X-19 pointed out to the Agent that in examining copies of MRD's and Daily Guidance Bulletins, it would be preferable to examine those in the middle months of 1946 rather than the last months, because after October 1946, "when the ax fell," there was a more cautious attitude on the part of the subject and her personnel. He also said that he has gained the impression that subject No. 79 has not consulted in the past, and is not now consulting the Area Division at the Department in formulating or in interpreting the Department's policy toward the U. S. S. R., which would appear rather strange since the policy of the Department is formulated upon the Area Specialist's advice. This informant expressed the hope that the Policy Information Desk be abolished, not only because he has no confidence in the personnel employed by it, but also because he feels it is an unnecessary superstructure, the elimination of which is also desired for administrative reasons.

Another example of the effect of selection of material for broadcasts by the subject and her personnel cited to the Agent is the following:

A Telegram from Budapest February 23, 1947, pointed out that many Hungarians not Marxist in outlook listen to the Moscow radio for reports and comment on developments in Hungary, because the American radio does not include such reports and comments. The telegram stated that failure to report and comment on Hungarian developments reduces the size and enthusiasm of the Hungarian audience and also suggests either that America is uninformed; or that what the Moscow radio says is true; or that America has no interest in Hungarian developments. The telegram suggested the situation should be rectified. The informant took up the matter with the Head of the Hungarian Desk, C-41 (who has since been dismissed for security reasons), and that individual pointed out in defense of himself that his broadcasts are prepared strictly in accordance with the Daily Guidance Bulletins, and that he cannot put in any material which is not approved by them.

A report on examination of Daily Guidance Bulletins and MRD's by CSA apparently had not been prepared as of the time of the Staff survey.

The State Department has furnished this subcommittee the following data on the employment of the persons named publicly by Senator McCarthy as well as the persons cited by Senator McCarthy in his 81 cases:

Names mentioned by Senator McCarthy during appearances before the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Name	Entered on duty	Secretary of State at time of appointment	Assistant Secretary of State for Administration at time of appointment	Present status	Secretary of State at time of separation	Assistant Secretary of State for Administration at time of separation
Brunner, Esther. This case appears as No. 47 in Senator McCarthy's list of 81—Congressional Record, Feb. 20, 1950.	Mar. 8, 1944	Hull	Shaw	Presently employed		
Duran, Gustavo.	Jan. 30, 1943	do	do	Resigned Oct. 3, 1946	Byrnes	Russell.
Hanson, Haldore.	Feb. 19, 1942	do	do	Presently employed		
Jessup, Philip.	Oct. 15, 1924	Hughes	Carr	Resigned 1925	Kellogg	Carr.
This case is No. 15 on McCarthy list.	Feb. 1, 1943	Hull	Shaw	Separated by transfer to Foreign Economic Administration, Sept. 30, 1943.	Hull	Shaw.
	Sept. 5, 1945 (without compensation)	Byrnes	McCarthy	Resigned Feb. 12, 1947 (completion of assignment).	Marshall	Peurifoy.
	Apr. 25, 1947 (when actually employed)	Marshall	Peurifoy	Terminated Dec. 5, 1947 (completion of assignment).	do	Do.
	Jan. 5, 1948	do	do	Terminated Mar. 1, 1949, to accept appointment as Ambassador at large.	Acheson	Do.
Kenyon, Dorothy	Mar. 1, 1949	Acheson	do	Presently employed	Acheson	Do.
	Nov. 8, 1946 (when actually employed United States member, Commission on Status of Women in Economic and Social Council.	Byrnes	Russell	Terminated December 31, 1949 (completion of assignment).	Byrnes	Russell.
Lattimore, Owen	Oct. 15, 1945 (U. S. Reparations Mission to Japan at the request of Edwin W. Pawley).	Byrnes	do	Terminated Feb. 12, 1946 (completion of assignment).		
	June 5, 1946 (Mr. Lattimore made a speech to a group of State Department employees on this date).	do	do			
	Oct. 5, 1949 (delegate to Conference on Chinese Affairs, without compensation).	Acheson	Peurifoy	Terminated Oct. 8, 1949 (completion of assignment).	Acheson	Peurifoy.
Sehman, Frederick L.	Never employed by the Department of State (Mr. Sehman gave a 1-hour lecture at the Foreign Service Institute on June 19, 1945).					
	June 29, 1933					
Service, John Stewart	May 29, 1947 (representative to national commission, executive committee of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.	Hull	Carr	Presently employed		
Shapley, Harlow	Dr. Shapley was designated by the association and was appointed as a member of the National Commission by the Secretary of State).	Marshall	Peurifoy	Presently has a without-compensation appointment.		

Status of individuals on Senator McCarthy list of 81

Num- ber	McCarthy list	Entered on duty	Secretary of State at time of appointment	Assistant Secre- tary of State for Administration at time of appointment	Present status	Secretary of State at time of separation	Assistant Sec- retary of State for Adminis- tration at time of separation
10	14	Dec. 6, 1945	Byrnes	Russell	Resigned May 13, 1948	Marshall	Peurifoy.
59	48, 49	Sept. 20, 1945 (transferred from OSS under E. O. 9621)	do.	McCarthy	Presently employed		
85	48, 49	Nov. 7, 1945	do.	Russell	do		
55	70	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608)	do.	None	do		
65	47	Mar. 8, 1944	Hull	Shaw	do		
68	55	Oct. 17, 1946	Byrnes	Russell	do		
50	58	Sept. 20, 1945 (transferred from OSS under E. O. 9621)	do.	McCarthy	do		
	44	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608)	do.	None	Separated June 30, 1946, to accept another position.	Byrnes	Russell.
		Reappointed Nov. 12, 1946	do.	Russell	Reduction in force July 26, 1947.	Marshall	Peurifoy.
23	23	Jan. 17, 1949	Lovett (acting)	Peurifoy	Presently employed		
51	26	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OIAA under E. O. 9608)	Byrnes	None	do		
49	21	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OIAA under E. O. 9608)	do.	None	do		
72	61	Sept. 27, 1945 (transferred from FEA under E. O. 9630)	do.	McCarthy	Reduction in force May 20, 1949.	Acheson	Do.
70	60	Sept. 20, 1945 (transferred from OSS under E. O. 9621)	do.	do.	Presently employed		
8	11	do.	do.	do.	Resigned Dec. 28, 1947	Marshall	Do.
31	43	Sept. 21, 1946	do.	Russell	Presently employed		
45	76	June 16, 1946 (transferred from FEA under E. O. 9630)	do.	do.	do		
25	40	Nov. 18, 1945	Byrnes	Russell	Presently employed		
25	29	Applicant never employed in the Department of State					
1	8	Nov. 7, 1945 (transferred from OSS under E. O. 9621)	Byrnes	Russell	Resigned Apr. 30, 1948	Marshall	Peurifoy.
83	25	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608)	do.	Russell	Presently employed		
4	68	June 3, 1946 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608)	do.	do.	do		
91	7	Sept. 27, 1945 (transferred from FEA under E. O. 9630)	do.	McCarthy	do		
79	73	Aug. 14, 1944	Hull	Shaw	Resigned Nov. 12, 1947	Marshall	Peurifoy.
3	65	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608)	Byrnes	do.	Resigned Apr. 15, 1949	Acheson	Do.
92	4	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608)	do.	do.	Resigned Mar. 8, 1948	Marshall	Do.
	74	Mar. 11, 1947	Marshall	Peurifoy	Resigned Jan. 10, 1948	do	Do.
	15	Oct. 15, 1924	Hughes	Cart.	Resigned 1925	Kellogg	Cart.
		Feb. 1, 1943	Hull	Shaw	Separated Sept. 30, 1943, by transfer to Foreign Eco- nomic Administration.	Hull	Shaw.
		Sept. 5, 1945 (without compensation)	Byrnes	McCarthy	Resigned Feb. 12, 1947 (com- pletion of assignment).	Marshall	Peurifoy.
		Apr. 25, 1947 (when actually employed)	Marshall	Peurifoy	Terminated Dec. 5, 1947 (completion of assign- ment).	do.	Do.

Status of individuals on Senator McCarthy list of 81—Continued

Num- ber	McCarthy list	Entered on duty	Secretary of State at time of appointment	Assistant Secre- tary of State for Administration at time of appointment	Present status	Secretary of State at time of separation	Assistant Sec- retary of State for Adminis- tration at time of separation
28		Jan. 5, 1948.	Marshall.	Peurifoy.	Terminated Mar. 1, 1949, to accept appointment as Ambassador at large.	Acheson.	Peurifoy.
100	30	Mar. 1, 1949.	Acheson.	do.	Presently employed.	Marshall.	Do.
43		Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608).	Byrnes.	None.	Reduction in force Dec. 6, 1948.	Marshall.	Do.
21	78	Applicant never employed in the Department of State.	Byrnes.	None.	Resigned Apr. 29, 1949.	Acheson.	Do.
16	38	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608).	do.	Russell.	Presently employed.	Marshall.	Do.
16	28	Jan. 1, 1946 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608).	Byrnes.	Russell.	Resigned Nov. 28, 1947.	Marshall.	Do.
93	24	Applicant never employed in the Department of State.	Acheson.	Peurifoy.	Presently employed.	Marshall.	Do.
66	75	Feb. 16, 1946.	Byrnes.	Russell.	Resigned Sept. 23, 1947.	Marshall.	Do.
66	56	Mar. 4, 1949.	do.	McCarthy.	Presently employed.	Marshall.	Do.
81	67	Dec. 3, 1946.	do.	None.	Reduction in force Sept. 12, 1947.	Marshall.	Do.
99	9	Sept. 20, 1945 (transferred from OSS under E. O. 9621).	Hull.	Shaw.	Separated by transfer Oct. 13, 1943.	Hull.	Shaw.
64		Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9630 on Sept. 27, 1945.)	Byrnes.	McCarthy.	Terminated Sept. 30, 1946 (completion of assign- ment).	Byrnes.	Russell.
84	54	Applicant for reemployment in October 1946. Not em- ployed.	Byrnes.	Russell.	Presently employed (on leave without pay).	Marshall.	Peurifoy.
47	69	Dec. 19, 1945.	do.	None.	Resigned Sept. 14, 1948.	do.	Do.
46	42	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608).	Marshall.	Russell.	Reduction in force May 26, 1947.	Marshall.	Peurifoy.
2	41	Jan. 21, 1947.	Acheson (act- ing).	do.	Presently employed.	Marshall.	Do.
12	3	Jan. 10, 1947.	Byrnes.	McCarthy.	Reduction in force Nov. 25, 1947.	Marshall.	Do.
32	16	Sept. 20, 1945 (transferred from OSS under E. O. 9621).	Byrnes.	Shaw.	Resigned Dec. 13, 1946.	Byrnes.	Russell.
67	34	June 7, 1944.	Hull.	None.	Presently employed.	Marshall.	Peurifoy.
53	57	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608).	Byrnes.	Russell.	Resigned Mar. 12, 1948.	do.	Do.
69	45	Apr. 24, 1946.	do.	do.	Resigned Apr. 30, 1948.	Marshall.	Do.
42	59	Aug. 12, 1946.	do.	McCarthy.	Presently employed.	Marshall.	Do.
78	37	Sept. 20, 1945 (transferred from OSS under E. O. 9621).	do.	Peurifoy.	do.	Marshall.	Do.
78	81	Dec. 16, 1948.	Marshall.	None.	Resigned Apr. 2, 1948.	Marshall.	Do.
73	62	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608).	Byrnes.	Car.	Resigned Mar. 19, 1948.	do.	Do.
		Nov. 16, 1927.	Kellogg.				

76	64	Mar. 30, 1945	Stettinius	Holmes	Presently employed.	Do.
105	79	Mar. 8, 1946	Byrnes	Russell	do.	Do.
7	10	Sept. 20, 1945 (transferred from OSS under E. O. 9621)	do	McCarthy	Resigned Feb. 11, 1948	Marshall
	77	Oct. 10, 1945	do	do	Presently employed.	
63	53	Jan. 18, 1940	Hull	None	Resigned Dec. 30, 1948	Marshall
62	52	July 14, 1931	Stimson	Cart	Presently employed.	Do.
80	66	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608)	Byrnes	None	Reduction in force Sept. 16, 1947	Marshall
	22	Mar. 7, 1949	Acheson	Feurloy	Presently employed.	
	19	Never employed in the Department of State				
5	5	Sept. 27, 1945 (transferred from FEA under E. O. 9630)	Byrnes	McCarthy	Resigned Apr. 16, 1948	Do.
61	31	Aug. 4, 1943	Hall	Shaw	Presently employed.	
29	31	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608)	Byrnes	None	do.	
30	32	do	do	do	do.	
60	32	Sept. 26, 1945	do	McCarthy	do.	
34	35	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608)	do	None	Resigned Dec. 24, 1948	Do.
31	33	do	do	do	Presently employed	
40	36	do	do	do	do.	
20	20	Applicant. Never employed in the Department of State.				
87	71	Aug. 31, 1945 (transferred from OWI under E. O. 9608)	Byrnes	None	Separated Dec. 8, 1947 (completion of assignment).	Do.
	46	Nov. 12, 1945	do	Russell	Presently employed	
54	17	Sept. 20, 1945 (transferred from OSS under E. O. 9621)	do	McCarthy	Resigned Apr. 23, 1947	Do.
14	6	Sept. 20, 1945 (transferred from OSS under E. O. 9621)	do	do	Presently employed	
6	2	Apr. 4, 1924	Hughes	Wright	do.	
52	39	Jan. 2, 1947	Byrnes	Russell	Resigned June 30, 1948	Do.
44	80	Never employed in the Department of State				
	13	Sept. 12, 1946	Byrnes	Russell	Terminated Aug. 11, 1948 (completion of assignment).	Do.
	63	Aug. 15, 1946	do	do	Presently employed	
75	12	Jan. 30, 1945	Stettinius	Holmes	Resigned Sept. 8, 1947	Do.
107					Marshall	

Summary.—Formerly employed, 33; never employed, 7; presently employed, 40; total, 80. Senator McCarthy did not name No. 72

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 19, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Loyalty of State Department Employees,
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: In reply to your request, I enclose for the use of your subcommittee the analyses made by this Department of the assertions of Senator McCarthy in speeches at Washington, April 20; Chicago, May 6; Atlantic City, May 15; Rochester, May 25; and on the Senate floor, June 6.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN E. PEURIFOY,
Deputy Under Secretary.

Enclosures:

1. Press Release No. 491, May 12, 1950.
2. Press Release No. 501, May 15, 1950.
3. Press Release No. 529, May 20, 1950.
4. Press Release No. 549, May 25, 1950.
5. Press Release No. 553, May 26, 1950.
6. Press Release No. 558, May 27, 1950.
7. Press Release No. 614, June 9, 1950.

[For the press, Department of State, May 12, 1950. No. 491]

FOR RELEASE AT 7 P. M., E. D. T., SUNDAY, MAY 14, 1950. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY
PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY

The following letter has been sent to the more than 500 full members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors:

MAY 12, 1950.

As a member of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, you undoubtedly heard or read Senator Joseph McCarthy's speech before the ASNE convention in Washington on April 20.

While the Secretary dealt with the same general subject in his subsequent speech, he of course did not undertake to deal with the specific allegations made by Senator McCarthy.

I am therefore attaching an analysis, point by point, of some of the inaccuracies contained in the Senator's speech.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD W. BARRETT,
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.

ANALYSIS OF SENATOR MCCARTHY'S SPEECH TO ASNE

1. *Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE.*—"First, as to the figure 205." He then went on to assert that he had made it clear that he never claimed to have the names of 205 known Communists allegedly working in the State Department.

The facts.—In a radio address at Wheeling, West Virginia, on February 9, 1950, Senator McCarthy stated: "And, ladies and gentlemen, while I cannot take the time to name all the men in the State Department who have been named as active members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 * * * list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department." He was quoted to this effect by the Associated Press, and subsequently two officials of the radio station over which he spoke signed affidavits saying that they followed Senator McCarthy's speech and that this was what he said.

2. *Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE.*—"Two hundred and five persons "were named as bad security risks" and were "listed by the President's own security board and the forerunner of the present Loyalty Board as dangerous to our Government." He also stated that this "President's own security board" was "gotten rid of by Acheson in favor of a weaker board."

The facts.—In 1945, approximately 3,000 employees were transferred to the Department of State from other agencies. An *ad hoc* committee responsible to Assistant Secretary of State Russell, under Secretary of State Byrnes, was set up to carry out preliminary screening of these 3,000 people. On July 15, 1946, this committee filed a report listing 285 tentative disapprovals in categories ranging all the way from automatic disapproval of aliens to disapprovals in the basis of derogatory information.

The report specifically stated, however, that:

"Any disapproval of the 285 may be reversed and subsequently approved if the further investigation resolves the investigation in favor of the employee. This is reported in order that the total disapproval basis may be thoroughly understood and does not mean on the surface there are or were 285 people in the Department against whom charges would eventually be preferred."

Today all of these transferees into the State Department originally screened for further consideration or action are either no longer in the State Department or have been thoroughly investigated and cleared for employment. Those still on the roll, number 46. Those 46 have, of course, been checked under the President's Loyalty Program by the FBI.

This departmental screening group, which Senator McCarthy referred to as the "President's own security board", was not abolished by Secretary Acheson. It automatically went out of existence in the fall of 1946 upon the completion of its screening job, at which time Mr. Byrnes was Secretary of State. The present Loyalty Board was established by Secretary Marshall in the summer of 1947.

3. *Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE.*—"What is wrong with the misnamed Loyalty Board? Perhaps the case of George Wheeler, whom you will recall as having recently sought asylum from democracy behind the iron curtain, may explain why Communists, bad security and bad policy risks are retained on the Government payroll. Wheeler was first unanimously rejected by the Loyalty Board. * * * Later the Loyalty Board reversed itself and passed him and sent him a letter of apology."

The facts.—At no time has the case of George Wheeler ever been considered by a security or loyalty board of the Department of State. Mr. Wheeler was one of a group of former FEA employees in Germany who in September 1945, were transferred temporarily to the rolls of the State Department. In February 1946, that whole group was transferred to the War Department, and in fact Mr. Wheeler's transfer to the War Department was even earlier—in December 1945. During his brief time on the State Department payroll, Mr. Wheeler's case was under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. All these facts were set out in a departmental press release a week before Senator McCarthy made his misstatements.

4. *Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE.*—"There are 600 clerks in the United States who have access to those [loyalty] files daily * * * yet five Senators cannot crack a file cover."

The facts.—Access to loyalty files is normally limited strictly to FBI and other Government officials and their responsible subordinates when, and only when, particular files are needed in the proper execution of their duties.

5. *Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE.*—"First, let's look at that perennial joiner, Dr. Philip Jessup, our Ambassador at large. * * * Why does he always join Communist fronts? Why not anti-Communist organizations?"

The facts.—Dr. Jessup testified, before the subcommittee, that he had joined no Communist-front organizations, whereas the organizations to which he did belong included the following:

- The American Legion (He is a former commander of Utica Post, No. 229.)
- The American Philosophical Society
- The Foreign Policy Association.
- The American Bar Association

6. *Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE.*—"* * * Dr. Jessup had control of the magazine Far Eastern Survey, when the Communist Campaign in 1943 was initiated therein to smear Chiang Kai-shek and deify all the Communists. * * * I pointed out that he was head of the Research Advisory Board having complete control of the magazine during the height of the Communist Party line campaign. * * * Mr. Jessup's aide-de-camp was a Mr. T. A. Bisson, another expert on Far Eastern Affairs. He has spent considerable time in the State Department."

The facts.—Dr. Jessup was not Chairman of the Research Advisory Committee of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1943. He was merely one of 50 trustees of the American Council. Mr. T. A. Bisson never was an employee of the Department of State.

7. *Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE.*—"* * * I am going to leave here on the table a number of photostats of checks representing Communist money—thousands of dollars—which was paid to his organization. * * * The Communists knew what those thousands of dollars were being paid for." As docu-

mentation, Senator McCarthy provided photostats of two checks signed by Frederick Vanderbilt Field totaling \$3,500.

The facts.—At that time, Dr. Robert Gordon Sproul, President of the University of California, was Chairman of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations; Mr. Francis Harmon, Vice President of the Motion Picture Export Association, was Treasurer; and Mr. William R. Herod, now President of the International General Electric Co., was Chairman of the Finance Committee.

Mr. Juan Trippe, President of Pan American Airways, and Mr. Henry Luce, of Time and Life, were sponsors of a drive during that period for funds on behalf of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Field's contributions, according to Senator McCarthy's own figures, totaled only \$3,500, as compared with a total expense for the two-year period of approximately \$200,000. About half of the amount was met by contributions from the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation. Generous donations by large industrial concerns made up a large portion of the remainder.

As Ambassador Jessup stated on April 3, 1950, "Surely these gentlemen would never have accepted payment from Mr. Field or anyone else for selling the Communist Party line."

8. *Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE.*—"Now, let's briefly discuss the architect of our far-eastern policy, this man Owen Lattimore.

The facts.—Senator Tydings asked Secretaries Hull, Byrnes, Marshall, and Acheson whether this description was true or false. They all replied that it was false.

9. *Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE.*—"The Afghanistan Government asked the United States in December of 1949 to send a preliminary mission to Afghanistan to investigate the possibility of economic development under United Nations technical assistance program. Owen Lattimore was selected to head this mission."

The facts.—Neither the United States nor the Department of State had anything to do with the sending of this mission to Afghanistan. It was sent by the United Nations at the request of the Afghanistan Government.

Senator McCarthy's statement is a repetition of a similar statement previously made on the floor of the Senate, citing the Library of Congress as the source of his information. On April 11, Senator Green of Rhode Island read on the floor of the Senate a letter dated April 10 from Dr. Luther Evans, Librarian of Congress, regarding Senator McCarthy's original quotation of this alleged information from the Library of Congress. Dr. Evans' reply said:

"I beg to report that the Library of Congress knows of no information to the effect that the Afghanistan Government ever made a request to the State Department in relation to the Owen Lattimore mission; to the effect that the United Nations consulted the State Department on Dr. Lattimore's appointment to the mission; to the effect that the State Department recommended Dr. Lattimore for this assignment, or to the effect that Dr. Lattimore's expense on this trip and any salary or fee which may be involved are a charge on the United States, except in the sense that the United States is one of the contributors to the United Nations Treasury.

"It is our understanding that the Afghanistan Government made a request to the United Nations in December 1949, for a technical assistance mission, that the United Nations responded by sending a preliminary survey mission to investigate the possibilities of a program of technical assistance and general economic development, and that the United Nations Secretariat chose Dr. Lattimore as one of the members of this preliminary survey mission."

Dr. Evans' statements are completely in line with the facts as known to the Department.

10. *Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE.*—" * * * about three weeks ago I made a statement to the effect that Owen Lattimore had been requested by Acheson to, and did furnish to the State Department a document to act as a guide for Ambassador at Large Jessup insofar as Asiatic policy was concerned." He also referred to this document as "Lattimore's instructions to Jessup," and gave the impression that the Secretary and the Department attempted to conceal the document by calling it confidential.

The Facts.—The Department publicly and fully explained in press conferences on March 31 that Owen Lattimore was one of a group of 31 persons who submitted written memoranda in response to requests made in August 1949, by Ambassador Jessup. These memoranda were used as background material by a consultants' committee consisting of Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick, Mr. Everett Case,

and Ambassador Jessup in their study of United States foreign policy in the Far East. Mr. Lattimore as director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at John Hopkins, was also one of 25 private individuals participating in a round-table discussion on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, arranged by the Office of Public Affairs for the purpose of exchanging views with informed private citizens on United States foreign policy toward China. The 31 who submitted memoranda were:

Former Consul General Joseph W. Ballantine, now at Brookings Institution
Prof. Hugh Borton, Columbia University
Former President Isaiah Bowman, Johns Hopkins University
Dr. A. J. Brumbaugh, American Council on Education, Washington
Former Ambassador William Bullitt
Former Under Secretary Castle
Former Consul John A. Embry
Prof. Rupert Emberson, Harvard University
Dr. Charles B. Fahs, New York City
Prof. John K. Fairbank, Harvard University
Dr. Huntington Gilchrist, New York City
Prof. Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University
Former Under Secretary Grew
Col. Robert A. Griffin, former Deputy Administrator, ECA China
Former Ambassador Stanley K. Hornbeck
Roger Lapham, former Administrator, ECA, China
Prof. Kenneth S. Latourette, Yale University
Prof. Owen Lattimore, director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University
Oliver C. Lockhart, Export-Import Bank of Washington
Walter H. Mallory, Council on Foreign Relations
Prof. Wallace Moore, Occidental College, Los Angeles
Prof. Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard University
C. A. Richards, Economic Cooperation Administration
Former Minister Walter S. Robertson, Richmond, Va.
Dr. Lawrence K. Rosinger, New York, N. Y.
Mr. James Rowe, Washington
Mrs. Virginia Thompson (Adloff), New York City
Prof. Amry Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky
Prof. Karl A. Wittfogel, Columbia University
Prof. Mary Wright, Stanford University
Admiral Yarnell

The following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31, attended the Round Table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 to discuss Far East Policy:

Joseph W. Ballantine, the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.
Bernard Brodie, Department of International Relations Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Claude A. Buss, Director of Studies, Army War College, Washington, D. C.
Kenneth Colegrove, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
Arthur G. Coons, president, Occidental College, Los Angeles, Calif.
John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, N. Y.
John K. Fairbank, Committee on International and Regional Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
William R. Herod, president, International General Electric Co., New York, N. Y.
Arthur N. Holcombe, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer, and Graves, Spokane, Wash.
Owen Lattimore, director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Ernest B. MacNaughton, Chairman of the Board, First National Bank, Portland, Oreg.
George C. Marshall, President, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.
J. Morden Murphy, Assistant Vice President, Bankers Trust Co., New York, N. Y.
Nathanial Pfeffer, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
Harold S. Quigley, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.

Edwin O. Reischauer, Department of Far Eastern Languages, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

William S. Robertson, president, American and Foreign Power Co., New York, N. Y.

John D. Rockefeller III, president, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York, N. Y.

Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

Eugene Staley, Executive Director, World Affairs Council of Northern California, San Francisco, Calif.

Harold Stassen, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.

Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.

Harold M. Vinacke, Department of Political Science, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.

All of the memoranda and all of the views above referred to were of course submitted to confidence by their authors, and the Department could not expect these people to be frank unless it respected that confidence. The Department would not and did not, however, in any way interfere with publication of any memorandum by its author. In fact, the substance of Mr. Lattimore's article was published in an article which he wrote for the January 1950 issue of the Atlantic magazine.

11. *Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE*—"Here is the Comintern program for Asia: (1) The armies of Chiang Kai-shek must be destroyed; (2) The United States must be forced to withdraw from Korea; (3) Force the withdrawal of the United States forces from Japan; (4) Prevent the formation of a Pacific pact against Communist aggression. * * *

"That is the official Communist Party program. There is nothing secret about it.

"Here is Jessup's program, in this document. There is nothing secret about that either, since we forced the State Department to make that public. What does Mr. Lattimore advocate as a foreign policy for Asia?

"(1) Abandon Chiang Kai-shek.

"(2) Get out of Korea.

"(3) Get out of Japan.

"(4) Deny the need of a Pacific pact.

"Is this striking parallel the result of master planning or is it pure accident? I leave it to you gentlemen to decide."

Senator McCarthy thus stated that Owen Lattimore's memorandum as summarized by Senator McCarthy to parallel the Comintern program "is Jessup's program."

The Facts.—There is no "Jessup program" distinct from United States foreign policy. The United States record and policy in the Far East, as it relates to the points made by Senator McCarthy, is well known. In the light of the Senator's charges, however, it may be summarized:

(1) The United States poured tremendous amounts of aid into China in efforts to bolster the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

(2) The United States has led the fight for a free, democratic Korea; took its case to the United Nations; and, since the establishment of this government, has contributed substantial economic and military support.

(3) The United States as the principal occupying power in Japan will not enter into any peace treaty which makes impossible adequate protection of United States' security interests in the Western Pacific.

(4) The United States has publicly indicated that it would look with sympathy upon a regional alliance of Pacific nations, provided the impetus for such an association came from the nations themselves.

12. *Senator McCarthy said to the ASNE*.—"This letter from Lattimore to Joseph Barnes, dated June 13, 1943, * * * was an order to Barnes to get rid of all Chinese employees with OWI who were loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, and supplant them with Chinese loyal to the Communists."

The Facts.—Mr. Lattimore, of course, is not connected with the Department of State, but all OWI correspondence is now in the custody of the Department. At the time Senator McCarthy publicly read from it, the document in question was classified "Secret." It has subsequently been declassified and the letter in its entirety was read into the record before the Senate subcommittee on April 6. Moreover, the Department sent Senator McCarthy a copy of the letter on April 10.

The letter does not say what Senator McCarthy asserted it did. What it does

say is: "In the circumstances, we have to be extremely careful about our Chinese personnel. While we need to avoid recruiting any Chinese Communists, we must be careful not to be frightened out of hiring people who have loosely been accused of being Communists * * *. For our purposes, it is wise to recruit as many unaffiliated Chinese as we can, to pick people whose loyalty will be reasonably assured on the one hand by the salaries which we pay them and on the other hand by the fact that they do not receive salaries or subsidies from somewhere else." (A copy of the letter is attached.)

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION,
111 SUTTER STREET,
San Francisco, Calif., June 15, 1943.

Mr. JOSEPH BARNES,
Office of War Information,
224 West 57th Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR JOE: In your capacity as a member of our Personnel Security Committee there are certain things which you ought to know about Chinese personnel. It is a delicate matter for me to tell you about these things because of my recent official connection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. For that reason I am marking this communication "secret."

When we recently reduced the number of our Chinese staff in New York it was quite obvious that there was going to be trouble and that this trouble would take the form of accusations against the remaining personnel. The fact is that certain of the personnel with whose services we dispensed had connections outside the office. This leads directly into the main question. It is extremely important from the point of view of security that intelligence information should not leak out of our office through our Chinese personnel. It is an open secret in Washington that the security of various Chinese agencies there is deplorable. Any pipeline from our office to any of those agencies is not a pipeline but practically an open conduit.

However, it is not only a question of Chinese government agencies. There is also a well-organized and well-financed organization among the Chinese in this country connected with Wang Ching-wei, the Japanese puppet. This can be traced back to the history of the Chinese Revolution as a whole. To present it in the fewest possible words: Sun Yat-sen was largely financed for many years by Chinese living abroad. Not only Sun Yat-sen but Wang Ching-wei had close connections among the overseas Chinese. However much he is a traitor now the fact must be recognized that Wang Ching-wei is a veteran of Chinese politics with connections which he has nourished for many years among Chinese communications abroad including those in the United States.

Chinese in the United States come almost exclusively from a few localities on the coast of China, practically every one of which is now occupied by the Japanese. Thus these Chinese in America have both family connections and financial investments which are under the control of the Japanese, because of his years of political organizing work Wang Ching-wei knows all of these connections and can apply pressure through them.

On the other side there is a special organization within the Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party at Chungking which is charged with maintaining political and financial connections with Chinese overseas. This Overseas Bureau also has a detailed knowledge of the Chinese communities in America and is able to apply pressure. Thus there is a very intense conflict going on every day in every Chinatown in America between the Wang Ching-wei agents and those of the Kuomintang. It must be remembered that while the Kuomintang is able to operate in a private way as a political party among Chinese residents in America, it is also the party which "owns" the Chinese Government and is thus able to make use of Chinese Government agencies.

Thirdly, there are numerous Chinese in America who are politically unaffiliated. There are of course Communists but they have neither the money nor the organization of the Wang Ching-wei and Kuomintang groups. The genuinely unaffiliated Chinese are a curious compound product of Chinese politics and the American environment. They tend to be intensely loyal to China as a country, without conceiving that the Kuomintang or any other political organization has a monopoly right to control of their thoughts and actions. They are like Americans; they like to give their political allegiance, not to have it demanded of them. They are reluctant to support a regimented series of causes laid down for them under orders; like Americans, they often give moral and financial support to a scattered number of causes some of which may even conflict with each other to a certain extent.

The conflict between the Wang Ching-wei organizing group and the Kuomintang organizing group in America cannot be fought out in the open. Both sides have very good reasons for not courting publicity. Each is anxious to bring into its fold as many of the unaffiliated Chinese as possible. Each is anxious not to be exposed as an "un-American" organization or a foreign political group working on American soil. Both of them accordingly find it very good tactics, not only to cover up themselves but to put pressure on those whom they are trying to bring under their control, to accuse unaffiliated Chinese of being Communists. This is an accusation which covers up the accuser at the same time that it puts pressure on the accused.

One of the outstanding rallying points of the unaffiliated Chinese in America is the New China Daily News in New York. This is controlled by an organization of laundrymen. I understand that the shareholders number two or three thousand and that they take an active interest in the newspaper. The essential thing about these laundrymen is that in that in the nature of their business they are independent small-business men. This means that they are on the one hand fairly well insured against Communist ideology, since the small-business man of whatever nationality is likely to be a man who has made his way by his own initiative and enterprise and is therefore suspicious of collectivist economic theories. On the other hand these Chinese small-business proprietors are reluctant to submit themselves unquestionably to the control of the vested interests which have grown up in China in association with the dominant Kuomintang. The New China Daily News, would probably not come under much pressure if it were not for the fact that it is one of the best edited Chinese papers in America with a growing circulation. It does not need to be subsidized or supported by a patron like many, perhaps the majority, of Chinese papers. It pays dividends on its own merits. A number of Chinese language papers in America receive subsidies from the Kuomintang. At least two, and perhaps three, receive subsidies from the Wang Ching-wei group. One or two others trace back to the group within the Kuomintang, which was at one time headed by the late Hu Han-min, a leader of a right-wing faction within the Kuomintang. The Hu Han-min group, though once regarded as right-wing conservatives, are now regarded in China as "old fashioned liberals"—liberal, so to speak, short of the New Deal. They are less bitterly involved in Chinatown politics than the Wang Ching-wei and Kuomintang groups. The two latter, which are engaged in handing out carefully colored news and doctored editorial policies, are intensely jealous of and hostile to an unaffiliated paper like the New China Daily News which, so to speak, flaunts its sins by being so readable that the Chinese public in America buys it for its own sake.

It would be rash to say that there are no Communists connected with the New China Daily News. Here it is necessary to consider another peculiarity of the politics of Chinese living out of China. These Chinese are far from being tied to the chariot wheels of Moscow; but when it comes to resisting the trend toward totalitarian regimentation within China they are often willing to support parts of the program advocated by the Chinese Communists within China. This is so much a part of the pattern of politics of Chinese living out of China that it is not uncommon to find wealthy men, even millionaires, supporting the program of the Chinese Communists in whole or in part. This was, for instance, conspicuous in Malaya before the fall of Singapore. For such prosperous and independent Chinese it was a question either of backing their independent judgment of the steps that needed to be taken toward creating a working democracy within China, or of paying financial tribute to the Kuomintang, which sometimes tends to be autocratic, and not infrequently spurs advise from Chinese abroad at the same time that it demands their financial contributions.

In the specific setting of America, it is the independent small-business man—like the laundryman—rather than the very few wealthy merchants, who most conspicuously maintain this tradition of political independence. In America, some of the most wealthy individuals are either committed to Wang Ching-wei and his puppet Japanese party or at least are hedging until they have a better idea of how the war is finally going to turn out.

In the circumstances we have to be extremely careful about our Chinese personnel. While we need to avoid recruiting any Chinese Communists we must be careful not to be frightened out of hiring people who have loosely been accused of being Communists. We have to be at least equally careful of not hiring people who are pipelines to the Wang Ching-wei group or to one or other of the main faction within the Kuomintang. After all, as American Government agency we should deal with the Chinese Government or regular agencies of the

Chinese Government, but should not get in the position of committing ourselves to the Kuomintang, the political party which control the Chinese Government, as if it were itself the Chinese Government. You will recognize both the importance of this proposition and the delicacy which it requires on the operational level.

For our purposes, it is wise to recruit as many unaffiliated Chinese as we can, to pick people whose loyalty will be reasonably assured on the one hand by the salaries which we pay them and on the other hand by the fact that they do not receive salaries or subsidies from somewhere else.

Mr. Chi and Mr. Chew Hong, both of our New York office, conform excellently to these requirements. Mr. Chi I have known for many years. Until his family estates were occupied by the Japanese, he was a wealthy landlord. He was brought up in the older scholastic tradition in China, before the spread of modern western education, but at the same time he is keenly interested in the national unification of China and the orderly development of a stable political organization there. I know by long experience that he is anything but a Communist; I also know that because of his seniority, his background of independent wealth, and his superior mentality he is not a man to be pushed around by party bureaucrats. Chew Hong is a much younger man, but one whom Dr. Chi trusts and of whose integrity he is convinced. There is something in their relationship of the old Chinese standards of disciple and master. As long as Dr. Chi stands in the relationship of loyal friendship to me and the loyalty of an honest employee of an American Government agency, there will be no difficulty with either man, no irresponsible playing with Chinese politics, and no leakage to any Chinese faction.

The retention of both men is therefore a guarantee to the secrecy and security of the work of OWI as well as a guarantee of the confident fulfillment of directives. I urge you not to be high-pressured into getting rid of either man. I know that both men may be subjected to attacks. Given the time to work on it, I could undoubtedly trace such attacks to their origin and give you the full details. I doubt whether the Personnel Security Committee of OWI would be able to trace such attacks, rooted in the intricacies of Chinese factional politics, to their source; but I should not like to see us placed in a position where, after getting rid of people now attached, we would be forced to hire people who would actually be nominees of factions not under our control.

It is for this reason that I have written this long letter to urge you to report to our Personnel Security Committee the necessity for exercising pronounced agnosticism when any of our Chinese personnel are attacked.

In the meantime I am doing my best to check over our Chinese personnel in San Francisco.

Once more I urge you to observe the strictest confidence in acting on this letter, because in certain quarters it might be considered that I am under moral obligation to see that OWI is staffed with Chinese who take their orders from some source other than the American Government.

Yours,

OWEN LATTIMORE,
Director, Pacific Operation.

[For the press, Department of State, May 15, 1950. No. 501]

1. *Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City.*—" * * * The skeleton files which the President has given to the Tydings Committee * * * were inadequate, * * * many of them had been completely rifled * * * [and] there is no way of knowing whether or not any file was complete." He also said that "in order to get at the truth, they must get not only the skeleton State Department loyalty files, but the Civil Service and the FBI files."

The Facts.—A charge of tampering with records is a very serious charge. It has been described by the courts in this country as "highly improper." (*State ex rel Department of Agriculture, Petitioner v. McCarthy, Circuit Judge, Respondent* (238 Wisconsin 258, 270, 299 N. W. 58, 65 (1941)). The files which have been made available to the subcommittee by the President are complete. They contain the material collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and transmitted to the State Department through the Civil Service Commission. These files were reviewed by a representative of the Department of Justice before they were turned over to the subcommittee. A representative of the Department of Justice has also attended the meetings of the subcommittee at which the files

were discussed. If Senator McCarthy believes any material has been deleted, it is his duty to bring to the attention of the subcommittee, and the FBI any evidence he has to back up his charge.

2. *Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City.*—Senator McCarthy described that portion of Owen Lattimore's memorandum on far eastern policy which dealt with South Korea and then said: "That is Lattimore's plan for South Korea. That is now the plan of the Lattimore-Acheson Axis for the entire Far East."

The Facts.—Mr. Lattimore's relationship with the Department of State from 1933 to date and the circumstances under which he and 30 other people supplied memoranda containing their views on far eastern policy have been described many times. These facts of public record are not reflected in Senator McCarthy's statement.

The facts concerning Mr. Acheson's position on South Korea are also a matter of well-known public record. On January 20, 1950, Mr. Acheson wrote a letter describing the adverse effects the defeat of the Korean Aid bill by a vote of 193 to 191 would have on our foreign policy. This letter which was the basis of a successful attempt to obtain aid for Korea is quoted below. It speaks for itself.

3. In his speech at Atlantic City, Senator McCarthy made other misstatements which will be refuted in the near future.

[For the press, Department of State, May 20, 1950. No. 529]

FOR RELEASE AT 7:00 P.M., E.D.T., SATURDAY, MAY 20, 1950, NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY

The Department of State today made public the following analysis of the speech delivered by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in Chicago, May 6, 1950, on "Communism in Government":

1. *Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—Senator McCarthy referred to the Department of State's files being examined by the Tydings Subcommittee as "skinny-ribbed bones of the files"; "skeleton files"; "These purged files"; "phony files"; "1947 and '48 files instead of 1949 and 1950."

The Facts.—The files transmitted to the Tydings Subcommittee are the full and complete State Department files current as of the date transmitted. They contain all information relevant to the determination of employee loyalty or security. Under the Federal Employees Loyalty Program, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is the agency charged with responsibility for conducting investigations into the loyalty of State Department personnel.

A representative of the Department of Justice has been present at the meetings of the Tydings Subcommittee. The files were viewed by a representative of the Department of Justice before they were turned over to the Subcommittee. The files made available to the Subcommittee contain the material collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and transmitted to the State Department.

2. *Senator McCarthy said in Chicago.*—"Now from page 37 of the House Report I quote the following: * * * almost anyone and everyone in the State Department had access to the files. * * *"

The Facts.—The report to which Senator McCarthy referred is a report of the House Appropriations Committee investigators, dated January 27, 1948, which accompanied the list of 108 cases which were the basis of Senator McCarthy's speech of February 20, 1950. Senator McCarthy misquoted this report.

The report said: "* * * most everyone and anyone in the Division has access to the files * * *"

The Division that the House investigators were talking about was the Division of Security. That is the division charged with the physical and personnel security program of the Department and the Foreign Service, and it is therefore essential that its staff have access to the files when needed. Senator McCarthy, by substituting "the State Department" for "the Division of Security," crudely misquotes the language of the report in order to give an entirely false impression: namely, that any and everyone in the Department has access to the files: whereas as a matter of fact such access is strictly limited to employees of the Division when required and to a very small number of employees outside the Security Division, such as the members of the Loyalty Security Board. Senator McCarthy substituted the entire State Department for the Division of Security, a crude misquotation for the purpose of giving an entirely false impression. It is not only a misquotation, it is a quotation out of context, a quotation over two years old made without reference to the facts as they exist at the present time.

3. *Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—"Tell them to take the list of names which I have given * * * the Secretary of State * * *."

The Facts.—Despite Under Secretary of State Peurifoy's reiterated requests since February 11, 1950, that Senator McCarthy furnish the Department with a list of names of the "205" or "57" accused State Department employees, Senator McCarthy has never furnished the Department or the Secretary of State such a list of names.

4. *Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—Describing the Federal Loyalty Program, Senator McCarthy said, "First of all, it permits each Department to investigate its own people. Those doing the investigating know little or nothing of communist techniques, even less of about how to conduct an investigation * * *"

The Facts.—The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the agency charged under Executive Order 9835, issued over three years ago, with responsibility for conducting loyalty investigations under the Federal Loyalty Program.

5. *Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—Describing loyalty investigations, Senator McCarthy said, "In dozens of cases, in dozens of cases—for instance, recommendation from Alger Hiss on State Department employees was all that was needed to completely clear them—like accepting a recommendation from Dillinger in hiring a bank clerk."

The Facts.—There is not a single instance of this.

6. *Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—"You will recall a former State Department employee by the name of George Wheeler recently retired behind the Iron Curtain after making typical communist name-calling statements damning and cursing the United States. This man, George Wheeler, who had been assigned tremendously important work by the State Department had first been given a completely clean bill of health by the Loyalty Board even though his file would have convinced anyone who could add two and two that he was a full-fledged communist."

The Facts.—At no time has the case of George Wheeler ever been considered by a security or loyalty board of the Department of State. Mr. Wheeler was one of a group of former FEA employees in Germany who in September 1945 were transferred temporarily to the rolls of the State Department. In February 1946 the whole group was transferred to the War Department, and in fact Mr. Wheeler's transfer to the War Department was even earlier—in December 1945. During his brief time on the State Department payroll, Mr. Wheeler's case was under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. All these facts were set out in a departmental press release a month before Senator McCarthy made his misstatements.

These facts were also contained in the Department's analysis of Senator McCarthy's April 20th speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, in which the Department pointed out twelve glaring McCarthy inaccuracies. Senator McCarthy on May 15 replied to the Department's statement by citing two alleged inaccuracies in the Department's analysis of his speech. He was silent as to the remaining ten. Of the two so-called inaccuracies he cited, one pertains to the case of George Wheeler. As to George Wheeler, Senator McCarthy said that the Department should "admit that Wheeler was on the pay roll and given an absolutely clean bill of health by whatever Government Loyalty Board cleared personnel for the State Department." Two comments may be made thereon: first, as of the date of Mr. Wheeler's brief employment with the Department the present loyalty program, under which the Department's loyalty board was established, was not in existence; second, Senator McCarthy's implication was that the Department's Loyalty Board was at fault. Even Senator McCarthy should see the irrelevancy of his attributing to the State Department matters under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

7. *Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—"Mr. Service, you will recall, was picked up by the FBI in connection with the Amerasia case * * * The papers carried the story that J. Edgar Hoover, who is not noted for overstatements, that J. Edgar Hoover stated that this is a 100 percent air-tight case of espionage."

The Facts.—On May 1, 1950, Deputy Under Secretary of State Peurifoy in a letter to Mr. Peyton Ford, The Assistant to the Attorney General, asked whether Mr. Hoover, in fact, made any similar statement. Mr. Ford, on May 8, 1950, replied: "You are advised that Mr. Hoover did not make the statement which has been attributed to him."

The exchange of correspondence is attached. (See pp. 8, 9.)

8. *Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—"* * * the State Department which is about to hear the case of Service is now busily giving Mr. Service's lawyer the secret documents which the President has denied the Senate, this so that he can properly defend Mr. Service."

The Facts.—The Department has categorically denied this. Mr. Service has been furnished copies of documents which he himself had prepared for the Department in the course of his duties as a foreign service officer.

Relevant excerpts from a letter of May 4, 1950, by General Conrad E. Snow, Chairman of the Department's Loyalty Security Board, to Mr. Whitelaw Reid, editor of the New York Herald Tribune, are attached. (See page 9.)

9. *Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—"First take the case of Philip Jessup, the State Department's Ambassador at Large. Now, here was really a great joiner, especially Communist-front organization * * * organizations which the President's own Attorney General and Congressional committee have labeled as agents of the Communist Party."

The Facts.—In view of Senator McCarthy's repeated assertions the Department wrote to Mr. Morgan, Counsel of the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, investigating Senator McCarthy's charges, to see if Senator McCarthy had supplied them with any information to back up these charges. Mr. Morgan replied that Senator McCarthy has not supplied any such material. The only documentary material supplied to the committee concerning the organizational affiliations or associations of Ambassador Jessup was provided by Senator Hickenlooper, a photostat of one letterhead of the American Law Students Association listing Professor Philip Jessup of Columbia University on the Association's "Faculty Advisory Board." The American Law Students Association is not listed by the Attorney General and does not appear on the list of "Citations by Official Government Agencies" issued in 1948 by the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

The correspondence with Mr. Morgan is attached. (See pp. 10 and 11.)

Dr. Jessup testified, before the Subcommittee, that he had joined no Communist-front organizations, whereas the organizations to which he did belong included the following:

The American Legion. (He is a former commander of Utica Post No. 229.)

The American Philosophical Society.

The Foreign Policy Association.

The American Bar Association.

On April 6, 1950, the Utica Post No. 229 passed a resolution condemning Senator McCarthy's attack upon their past commander, Philip C. Jessup. A copy of this resolution is attached. It will be noted that a copy of it was sent to Senator McCarthy with the admonition that "his reckless and despicable conduct in this instance cannot be condoned by any right-thinking American and should never be repeated if he hopes to retain a shred of public respect." (For copy of resolution, see pp. 11 and 12.)

10. *Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—"Jessup * * * was largely in charge of a publication known as the Far Eastern Survey, the publication of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations; that he was in charge while it was spewing forth the perfumed Communist Party line sewage * * *."

The Facts.—Senator McCarthy grossly exaggerated Dr. Jessup's relationship with Far Eastern Survey based on the single fact that in 1944 Dr. Jessup served on the Research Advisory Committee of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator McCarthy's allegation that Far Eastern Survey followed the Communist Party originates in discredited contentions made by one Alfred Kohlberg in 1944. The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations investigated Kohlberg's charges. In a document circulated to its members, it was demonstrated that Kohlberg had ignored the overwhelming number of facts that did not support his contention. The document showed, among other things, that Kohlberg had quoted, in connection with "Far Eastern Survey, and other publications, from less than 2 per cent of the articles published and from less than .002 per cent of the books published. In April 1947, the membership of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in a vote of 1163 to 66 overwhelmingly repudiated Kohlberg's charges as "inaccurate and irresponsible."

11. *Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—"I have brought with me photostatic copies of checks representing thousands of dollars of Communist money paid to Jessup's organization." As documentation he provided photostats of two checks signed by Frederick Vanderbilt Field totalling \$3,500.

The Facts.—This is another repetition of a refuted charge made by Senator McCarthy many times before. Senator McCarthy repeats it although it has already been refuted. The inference is that the Institute of Pacific Relations had been "bought" with Communist money. At that time, Dr. Robert Gordon Sproul, President of the University of California, was Chairman of the Ameri-

can Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations; Mr. Francis Harmon, Vice President of the Motion Picture Export Association, was Treasurer; and Mr. William R. Herod, now President of the International General Electric Company, was Chairman of the Finance Committee.

Mr. Juan Trippe, President of Pan American Airways, and Mr. Henry Luce, of Time and Life, were sponsors of a drive during that period for funds on behalf of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Field's contributions, according to Senator McCarthy's own figures, totalled only \$3,500, as compared with a total expense for the two-year period of approximately \$200,000. About half of the amount was met by contributions from the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation. Generous donations by large industrial concerns made up a large portion of the remainder.

12. *Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—"Mr. Lattimore, as the nation knows has long been referred to as the architect of the State Department's Far Eastern policy, the architect whose shadow lingers over the corpse of China."

The Facts.—Senator Tydings asked Secretaries Hull, Byrnes, Marshall and Acheson whether this description was true or false. They all replied that it was false. These letters were made public by Senator Tydings on April 29, 1950. The person responsible for long and repeated use of the term "architect of the Far Eastern Policy" is Senator McCarthy who employed the term in his testimony before the Subcommittee.

13. *Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—" * * * so that you will have a full picture of the extent to which Lattimore shaped our dismal policy of failure in the Far East. I call to your attention a secret document which he furnished to the State Department in August of 1949, a document which the State Department itself labeled as a guide for Ambassador at Large Jessup * * *."

The Facts.—This is another repetition of a refuted McCarthy charge.

The Department publicly and fully explained in press conferences on March 31, that Owen Lattimore was one of a group of 31 persons who submitted written memoranda in response to requests made in August, 1949, by Ambassador Jessup. These memoranda were used as background material by a consultant's committee consisting of Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick, Mr. Everett Case, and Ambassador Jessup in their study of United States foreign policy in the Far East. (Mr. Lattimore's memorandum was never singled out, or labeled as a guide for Ambassador Jessup.) Mr. Lattimore as director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins, was also one of 25 private individuals participating in a round-table discussion on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, arranged by the Office of Public Affairs for the purpose of exchanging views with informed private citizens on United States foreign policy toward China. The 31 who submitted memoranda were:

Former Consul General Joseph W. Ballantine, now at Brookings Institution
Professor Hugh Borton, Columbia University

Former President Isaiah Bowman, Johns Hopkins University

Dr. A. J. Brumbaugh, American Council on Education, Washington

Former Ambassador William Bullitt

Former Under Secretary Castle

Former Consul John A. Embury

Professor Rupert Emberson, Harvard University

Dr. Charles B. Fahs, New York City

Professor John K. Fairbank, Harvard University

Dr. Huntington Gilchrist, New York City

Professor Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University

Former Under Secretary Grew

Colonel Robert A. Griffin, former Deputy Administrator, ECA China

Former Ambassador Stanley K. Hornbeck

Roger Lapham, Former Administrator, ECA China

Professor Kenneth S. Latourette, Yale University

Professor Owen Lattimore, Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University

Oliver C. Lockhard, Export-Import Bank of Washington

Walter H. Mallory, Council on Foreign Relations

Professor Wallace Moore, Occidental College, Los Angeles

Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard University

C. A. Richards, Economic Cooperation Administration

Former Minister Walter S. Robertson, Richmond, Virginia

Dr. Lawrence K. Rosinger, New York, New York

Mr. James Rowe, Washington

Mrs. Virginia Thompson (Adloff), New York City
 Professor Amry Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky
 Professor Karl A. Wittfogel, Columbia University
 Professor Mary Wright, Stanford University
 Admiral Yarnell

The following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31, attended the Round Table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 to discuss Far East Policy:

Joseph W. Ballantine, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.
 Bernard Brodie, Department of International Relations, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
 Claude A. Buss, Director of Studies, Army War College, Washington, D. C.
 Kenneth Colgrove, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.
 Arthur G. Coons, President, Occidental College, Los Angeles, California.
 John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, New York.
 John A. Fairbanks, Committee on International and Regional Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
 William R. Herod, President, International General Electric Company, New York, New York.
 Arthur N. Holcombe, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
 Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer, and Graves, Spokane, Washington.
 Owen Lattimore, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.
 Ernest B. MacNaughton, Chairman of the Board, First National Bank, Portland, Oregon.
 George C. Marshall, President, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.
 J. Morden Murphy, Assistant Vice President, Bankers Trust Company, New York, New York.
 Nathaniel Peffer, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia University, New York, New York.
 Harold S. Quigley, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
 Edwin O. Reischauer, Department of Far Eastern Languages, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
 William S. Robertson, President, American and Foreign Power Company, New York, New York.
 John D. Rockefeller, III, President, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York, New York.
 Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, New York.
 Eugene Staley, Executive Director, World Affairs Council of Northern California, San Francisco, California.
 Harold Stassen, President, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
 Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
 George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
 Harold M. Vinacke, Department of Political Science, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.

All of the memoranda and all of the views above referred to were of course submitted in confidence by their authors, and the Department could not expect these people to be frank unless it respected that confidence. The Department would not and did not, however, in any way interfere with publication of any memorandum by its author. In fact, the substance of Mr. Lattimore's article was published in an article which he wrote for the January 1950 issue of *The Atlantic* magazine.

14. *Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—"But let me give a brief résumé of the official Communist Party program for Asia—there is no secret about that. Number 1, destroy the armies of Chiang Kai-shek. Number 2, get the United States out of Korea. Number 3, force the withdrawal of United States forces from Japan; and number 4, prevent the formation of a Pacific Pact against Communist aggression.

"Now, what does Lattimore tell Jessup our policy in Asia should be? Listen to this if you will: Number 1, Abandon Chiang Kai-shek; number 2, get out of Korea; number 3, withdraw United States forces from Japan; and 4, deny the need of a Pacific Pact."

The Facts.—This is another repetition of a refuted McCarthy charge.

The United States' record and policy in the Far East, as it relates to the points made by Senator McCarthy may be summarized as follows:

(1) The United States poured tremendous amounts of aid into China in efforts to bolster the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

(2) The United States has led the fight for a free, democratic Korea; and has taken its case to the United Nations; and, since the establishment of this government, has contributed substantial economic and military support.

(3) The United States as the principal occupying power in Japan will not enter into any peace treaty which makes impossible adequate protection of United States' security interests in the Western Pacific.

(4) The United States has publicly indicated that it would look with sympathy upon a regional alliance of Pacific nations, provided the impetus for such an association came from the nations themselves.

Following is the material referred to on pages 3 and 4:

Exchange of correspondence between Mr. John E. Peurifoy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, and Mr. Peyton Ford, Assistant to the Attorney General (referred to on page 3):

MAY 1, 1950.

The Honorable PEYTON FORD,

The Assistant to the Attorney General.

DEAR MR. FORD: In his address on April 20, 1950, to the American Society of Newspaper Editors at the Hotel Statler in Washington, Senator McCarthy said:

"One of those arrested was John S. Service. He was never convicted; he was never tried; he was never indicted.

"J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, publicly stated at the time of the arrests that this case was a 100-percent airtight case of espionage. At the time the case broke John S. Service was picked up by the FBI. Mr. Hoover made that statement, and he seldom errs on the side of overstatement, as you well know."

The Department of State is naturally interested in whether or not this statement of Senator McCarthy is an accurate one. As a result, I would appreciate it if you would inform the Department as soon as possible whether the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation made any statement similar to that attributed to him by Senator McCarthy.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN E. PEURIFOY, *Deputy Under Secretary.*

MAY 8, 1950.

JOHN E. PEURIFOY, Esquire,

*Deputy Under Secretary, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. PEURIFOY: This is on reply to your letter dated May 1, 1950, inquiring as to the accuracy of a statement alleged to have been made by J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, at the time of the arrest of John S. Service and other suspects involved in the so-called Amerasia case. You are advised that Mr. Hoover did not make the statement which has been attributed to him.

Yours sincerely,

PEYTON FORD,
The Assistant to the Attorney General.

EXCERPTS FROM GENERAL SNOW'S LETTER TO THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

(Referred to on page 3)

Because of the reputation of the New York Herald Tribune for fair and objective reporting, I am taking the liberty of calling your attention to the headings of two articles which appeared in your issues of May 3 and 4, respectively, regarding the conduct of the John S. Service case by the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State, of which I am Chairman. * * *

Nor is it true that Mr. Service is being given any illegitimate advantage in the matter of access to papers. Mr. Service has not been given and will not be given access to the loyalty or personnel files which were gathered by the FBI and other investigatory bodies and which were refused by the President to the Senate Committee. Mr. Service is entitled, however, as a matter of elementary fairness to see and put in evidence, any reports or other papers in the files of the State Department which were prepared by him or in connection with the missions on which he served, which may be material to his defense. Action by the Department of State is necessary to permit him to show them to counsel. To date, the only confidential documents in which this action has been taken are documents actually written by Mr. Service himself. This is all there is to that part of the story.

The Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State is a judicial body set up for the purpose of giving to an employee accused of disloyalty, or of being a security risk, a fair hearing. While under the regulations he has no opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses who have given confidential information to the Board, or even to see a transcript of their statements, he is advised of the substance of the accusations, and must be given a fair opportunity to defend himself, not only by his own testimony, but also by the production of any witnesses or of any documentary evidence that may tend to establish his innocence of the accusations. The Board has an obligation to give him the fullest opportunity to prepare and present his defense.

EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MR. JOHN E. PEURIFOY, DEPUTY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, AND MR. EDWARD P. MORGAN, CHIEF COUNSEL, FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE STATE DEPARTMENT

(Referred to on page 4)

MAY 16, 1950.

MR. EDWARD P. MORGAN,
Chief Counsel, Foreign Relations Subcommittee,
The Capitol

DEAR MR. MORGAN: In connection with the analysis of Senator McCarthy's speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors forwarded on May 12, 1950, to the Society by Assistant Secretary Barrett, Senator McCarthy has stated, as quoted on May 15 by the Associated Press:

"The State Department also states that Jessup belonged to no Communist front organizations. I gave photostatic proof to the committee that he was affiliated with five organizations listed by the Attorney General or congressional committees as fronts for the Communist Party.

"He was a director of one of the worst of such organizations named by the Attorney General, namely, the China Aid Council of the American League for Peace and Democracy."

At Atlantic City on the same day he said:

"* * * Now, the thing they forget is that I have presented to the Committee photostats showing that he belonged, that he was affiliated with not one, but with five Communist front organizations; and that he not only belonged to, but was a Director of one of the worst of the lot, named as such by the Attorney General. * * *"

In view of these assertions of Senator McCarthy, it would be very much appreciated if you could make available to this Department copies of the photostats which the Committee has received from him.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN E. PEURIFOY.

MAY 17, 1950.

MR. JOHN E. PEURIFOY,
Deputy Undersecretary, United States State Department,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PEURIFOY: Reference is made to your letter of May 16, 1950, referring in turn to the remarks, as quoted by the Associated Press, of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy relative to Dr. Philip Jessup, as follows:

"The State Department also states that Jessup belonged to no Communist front organizations. I gave photostatic proof to the committee that he was

affiliated with five organizations listed by the Attorney General or congressional committees as fronts for the Communist Party.

"He was a director of one of the worst of such organizations named by the Attorney General, namely the China Aid Council of the American League for Peace and Democracy."

* * * * *

"* * * Now, the thing they forget is that I have presented to the Committee photostats showing that he belonged, that he was affiliated with not one, but with five Communist-front organizations; and that he not only belonged to, but was a Director of, one of the worst of the lot, named as such by the Attorney General. * * *"

Relative to your request for photostatic copies of the material stated to have been turned over to the subcommittee by Senator McCarthy, you are advised that, after a careful and diligent search of our files, we find no record of any material having been turned over to the subcommittee by Senator McCarthy indicating that Dr. Jessup has been associated with Communist-front organizations.

For your information, however, in the course of Senator Hickenlooper's examination of Dr. Jessup, he offered in evidence, at page 530 of the transcript, a photostat of a letterhead of an organization known as the American Law Student's Association on which "Prof. Philip Jessup" of Columbia University is listed on the "Faculty Advisory Board," along with other named individuals. The subcommittee has been supplied no other documentary material concerning organizational affiliations or associations of Dr. Jessup.

After hearing of Senator McCarthy's statements referred to above, I immediately called his office requesting the photostatic material to which he referred. Again on May 16, 1950, I called Senator McCarthy personally, advising that the subcommittee had not been supplied the photostatic material concerning Dr. Jessup to which he had referred and requested that he supply the same for our record. As yet, I have not been supplied the photostats in question.

Should they be received by me, I shall be glad to make copies thereof available to your office.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD P. MORGAN,

Chief Counsel, Subcommittee Investigating the State Department.

RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ATTACK UPON PAST COMMANDER PHILIP C. JESSUP
ADOPTED AT A REGULAR MEETING OF UTICA POST, No. 229, AMERICAN LEGION, HELD
ON APRIL 6, 1950

(Referred to on p. 4)

Whereas Utica Post, No. 229, American Legion, is proud to number among the list of its Past Commanders a distinguished comrade, friend, and charter member, Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, whose record of patriotic devotion and continued helpfulness to our country over a period of many years is a source of great satisfaction, pride, and distinction to Utica Post and to its entire membership; and

Whereas the sterling character, splendid reputation, and unquestionable loyalty and patriotism of Past Commander Philip C. Jessup, both privately and in his public capacity as U. S. Ambassador at Large, have recently been subjected to scurrilous, unprincipled, and wholly unjustifiable attack by one Joseph McCarthy, who in so doing has sullied the office of U. S. Senator which he presently holds: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That Utica Post, No. 229, American Legion, and its entire membership shall and do strongly resent, condemn, and decry the unprincipled, unjustified, unsportsmanlike, un-American, and intolerable conduct of Senator Joseph McCarthy in his wanton attempt without proof or reason to smear and destroy the good reputation and high standing of so devoted and patriotic a citizen as our esteemed and valued friend and comrade, the Honorable Philip C. Jessup, U. S. Ambassador at Large; and be it further

Resolved, That Utica Post, No. 229, American Legion, and its members in meeting duly assembled feel privileged at this time to reaffirm their continued trust and confidence in, their esteem and devotion to, and their lasting friendship for a distinguished public servant, a loyal patriot, and a great citizen, the Honorable Philip C. Jessup, a Past Commander of this Post; and be it further

Resolved, That this resolution be inscribed upon the Minutes of this meeting, that a copy thereof be delivered to our comrade, Ambassador Jessup; that a sec-

and copy be delivered to the public press; and that a third copy be mailed to Senator McCarthy with the admonition that his reckless and despicable conduct in this instance cannot be condoned by any right-thinking American and should never be repeated if he hopes to retain a shred of public respect.

[For the press, Department of State, May 25, 1950. No. 549]

FOR RELEASE AT 7:00 P. M., E. D. T., THURSDAY, MAY 25, 1950. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY

The Department of State today made public the following analysis of some of the factual inaccuracies in the speech delivered by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy at Atlantic City, May 15, 1950, to the Sons of the American Revolution:

(1) *Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City.*—"[as to] the skeleton files which the President has given to the Tydings Committee * * * I have made photostats of a report [of House investigators] * * * based partly on FBI investigations of the files * * * they set forth in some detail that * * * some of them have been completely rifled * * * that practically everyone in the Division had complete and free access * * *" [Emphasis supplied.]

The Facts.—This charge has already been demonstrated to be false. It was previously made by Senator McCarthy at Chicago, on May 6, 1950, and the Department commented thereon in its press release of May 20. It was there pointed out that the files transmitted to the Subcommittee were complete files; that Senator McCarthy was referring to a report submitted by investigators of the House Appropriations Committee in 1948 and that the Senator had misquoted the language of the report by substituting "the State Department" for "the Division of Security." It is noted that the Senator at Atlantic City repaired his quotations by using "the Division" in place of "the Department of State."

At Atlantic City Senator McCarthy added one new element. He refers to an "FBI investigation of the files." The "FBI investigation" he refers to was a survey of the Security Division made for the Department by the FBI *at the Department's request*. In the language of the House Investigators, who conducted their investigations in the Fall of 1947:

"In April 1947, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at the request of the State Department, made a survey of the Security and Investigations Division * * *"

There was no suggestion, either expressed or implied in either the FBI or the House Report, that the condition of the files in 1947 was purposeful or suspicious. Senator McCarthy's use of the word "rifled" in speaking of the files was entirely without substantiation. The constructive criticism and suggestions invited from the FBI and the House Investigators have been of great help.

In 1950 these files are as rigidly controlled, accurate, and complete as it is possible to make them. The files delivered to the Subcommittee are *complete files*—State Department reports, FBI reports, interrogations, hearings, administrative memoranda, even pencilled working papers—everything. On May 10 when the committee started examining the files, Senator Tydings is quoted as saying:

"These 81 files contain not only all of the data which the State Department investigators have assembled, but also all of the loyalty data which the FBI has gathered and referred to the State Department and which has been made a part of these files.

"Thus the Committee will have the complete record from all sources * * *"

(2) *Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City.*—"Now to those in the State Department who say that Soviet Russia's aims have changed in the last few years and that she no longer wants to enslave America * * *"

The Facts.—Senator McCarthy insinuates that there are those in the State Department who do not realize that Soviet aims and propaganda are directed against America's free institutions.

The United States is striving, by all possible means, to preserve these free institutions. The Department and its personnel have no illusions about the methods or the aims of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party here or abroad.

Ambassador Jessup—whom Senator McCarthy has accused of having "an unusual affinity for communist causes"—expressed the viewpoint of the entire Department when he told the press of India and the world at New Delhi, February 23, 1950:

"Since the end of the Second World War, history has recorded the extension of a new imperialism that has brought more than a dozen countries under the domination of a single expanding power. The device used by this expanding power in extending its imperialism is to hold out the glittering promises of communism as a beacon light for the rescue of peoples who are suffering from economic underdevelopment or who are trying to remove the shackles of the old traditional kinds of colonialism. However, where communism gains control, it becomes immediately apparent that the peoples are not allowed to determine their own future, but must conform to a single policy laid down in Moscow."

Similarly, Counselor George Kennan wrote in an article appearing in the March issue of *The Reader's Digest*:

"The Russian leaders believe our downfall is inevitable. They would do anything they can to hasten it. * * *

On March 13, 1950, Secretary Acheson said at Berkeley:

"We can see no moral compromise with the * * * theses of international communism: that the end justifies the means, that any and all methods are therefore permissible, and that the dignity of the human individual is of no importance as against the interest of the state.

"To our minds, these principles mean, in their practical application, the arrogation to individual human leaders, with all their inevitable frailties and limitations, of powers and pretenses which most of us would be willing to concede only to the infinite wisdom and compassion of a Divine Being. They mean the police state, with all that that implies; a regimentation of the worker which is hardly distinguishable from slave labor; a loss to society of those things which appear to use to make life worth living; a denial of the fundamental truths embodied in all the great religions of the world."

(3) *Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City.*—(Referring to Mr. Owen Lattimore:) " * * * the architect of our eastern policy, Owen Lattimore."

" * * * Mr. Acheson's architect."

" * * * this architect of the new Lattimore-Acheson Pacific plan * * *

The Facts.—This characterization of Mr. Lattimore also has been repeatedly disproved. On April 29, 1950, Senator Tydings released letters he received from Secretaries Hull, Byrnes, Marshall, and Acheson conclusively showing that the description of Lattimore as an architect of our Far Eastern policy is false. Although it appeared widely in the press at the time, the text of this correspondence is attached, because of Senator McCarthy's twice renewed disregard of the facts.

(4) *Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City.*—" * * * after all, doesn't Mr. Lattimore * * * say in his secret instructions to the State Department * * *

The Facts.—As has now been publicly set forth by the Department several times, Owen Lattimore was one of a group of 31 persons who submitted written memoranda in response to requests made in August, 1949, by Ambassador Jessup. Mr. Lattimore was also one of 25 private individuals participating in a round-table discussion on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, arranged by the Office of Public Affairs for the purpose of exchanging views with informed private citizens on United States foreign policy toward China.

Allowing for duplications on the two lists, over 50 non-Departmental persons participated in the two projects. Included were former Ambassadors William Bullitt and Joseph Grew, General George C. Marshall, Harold Stassen, and many other prominent and informed citizens representing many shades of opinion. Their opinions had never been treated or referred to as "instructions" until Senator McCarthy began to foreshadow his reiteration of the theme in March 1950 when he referred to Mr. Lattimore as the "top adviser" of the Department.

As early as March 31, immediately after Senator McCarthy's references on the Senate floor to Mr. Lattimore, and long before his ASNE speech of April 20, the Department made public the full facts about the Lattimore memorandum. The names of the participants submitting memoranda were:

Former Consul General Joseph W. Ballantine, now at Brookings Institution.
Professor Hugh Borton, Columbia University.

Former President Isaiah Bowman, Johns Hopkins University.

Dr. A. J. Brumbaugh, American Council on Education, Washington.

Former Ambassador William Bullitt.

Former Under Secretary Castle.

Former Consul John A. Embry.

Professor Rupert Emberson, Harvard University.
 Dr. Charles B. Fahs, New York City.
 Professor John K. Fairbank, Harvard University.
 Dr. Huntington Gilchrist, New York City.
 Professor Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University.
 Former Under Secretary Grew.
 Colonel Robert A. Griffin, former Deputy Administrator, ECA China.
 Former Ambassador Stanley K. Hornbeck.
 Roger Lapham, Former Administrator, ECA China.
 Professor Kenneth S. Latourette, Yale University.
 Professor Owen Lattimore, Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University.
 Oliver C. Lockhart, Export-Import Bank of Washington.
 Walter H. Mallory, Council on Foreign Relations.
 Professor Wallace Moore, Occidental College, Los Angeles.
 Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard University.
 C. A. Richards, Economic Cooperation Administration.
 Former Minister Walter S. Robertson, Richmond, Virginia.
 Dr. Lawrence K. Rosinger, New York, New York.
 Mr. James Rowe, Washington.
 Mrs. Virginia Thompson (Adloff), New York City.
 Professor Amry Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky.
 Professor Karl A. Wittfogel, Columbia University.
 Professor Mary Wright, Stanford University.
 Admiral H. E. Yarnell.

The following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31 listed above, attended the Round Table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 to discuss Far East Policy:

Joseph W. Ballantine, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.
 Bernard Brodie, Department of International Relations, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
 Claude A. Buss, Director of Studies, Army War College, Washington, D. C.
 Kenneth Colgrove, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.
 Arthur G. Coons, President, Occidental College, Los Angeles, California.
 John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, New York.
 John A. Fairbank, Committee on International and Regional Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
 William R. Herod, President, International General Electric Company, New York, New York.
 Arthur N. Holcombe, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
 Benjamin H. Kizer, Kizer, and Graves, Spokane, Washington.
 Owen Lattimore, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.
 Ernest B. MacNaughton, Chairman of the Board, First National Bank, Portland, Oregon.
 George C. Marshall, President, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.
 J. Morden Murphy, Assistant Vice President, Bankers Trust Company, New York, New York.
 Nathaniel Peffer, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia University, New York.
 Harold S. Quigley, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
 Edwin O. Reischauer, Department of Far Eastern Languages, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
 William S. Robertson, President, American and Foreign Power Company, New York, New York.
 John D. Rockefeller, III, President, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York, New York.
 Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, New York.
 Eugene Staley, Executive Director, World Affairs Council of Northern California, San Francisco, California.
 Harold Stassen, President, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
 Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.

Harold M. Vinacke, Department of Political Science, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.

The full facts were reiterated, and again documented with the names of the individuals involved, in the Department's analyses of the Senator's ASNE and Chicago speeches. Despite this, Senator McCarthy has repeated this discredited charge on each occasion, and at Atlantic City repeated it again.

(5) *Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City.*—"I have presented to the Committee photostats showing that he (Dr. Jessup) belonged, that he was affiliated with not one, but five Communist-front organizations, and that he not only belonged to, but was a director, a director of one of the worst of the lot named as such by the Attorney General."

The Facts.—Senator McCarthy has submitted no photostats as of this writing. Mr. Edward P. Morgan, Chief Counsel of the Tydings Subcommittee, to which Senator McCarthy said he gave "photostatic proof," has informed the Department:

"* * * We find no record of any material having been turned over to the subcommittee by Senator McCarthy indicating that Dr. Jessup has been associated with Communist-front organizations.

"For your information, however, in the course of Senator Hickenlooper's examination of Dr. Jessup, he offered in evidence, at page 530 of the transcript, a photostat of a letterhead of an organization known as the American Law Student's Association on which 'Prof. Philip Jessup,' of Columbia University is listed on the 'Faculty Advisory Board', along with other named individuals. The Subcommittee has been supplied no other documentary material concerning organizational affiliations or associations of Dr. Jessup.

"After hearing of Senator McCarthy's statements referred to above, I immediately called his office requesting the photostatic material to which he referred. Again on May 16, 1950, I called Senator McCarthy personally, advising that the subcommittee had not been supplied the photostatic material concerning Dr. Jessup to which he had referred and requested that he supply the same for our record. As yet, I have not been supplied the photostats in question."

The Department checked by telephone again today with Mr. Morgan's office. The photostats referred to by Senator McCarthy have not been received by it.

With regard to the general charge, this has been repeated and refuted at least three times. Senator McCarthy originally claimed that Doctor Jessup had an "unusual affinity" for Communist causes. Before the ASNE, he claimed Dr. Jessup was a "perennial joiner" and at Chicago he said the Doctor was a "great joiner" of Communist fronts. Doctor Jessup himself discussed Senator McCarthy's original charge in careful detail in his statement before the Subcommittee, and the Department refuted the ASNE and Chicago repetitions in its analyses of both speeches.

In renewing this charge at Atlantic City, Senator McCarthy added one innovation: that Doctor Jessup belonged to and was a director of "one of the worst" Communist fronts cited by the Attorney General. In a supplementary statement to the Associated Press on the same day, Senator McCarthy said:

"He was a director of one of the worst of such organizations named by the Attorney General, namely the China Aid Council of the American League for Peace and Democracy."

Ambassador Jessup is not and has never been a director of the China Aid Council. This charge evidently is based—intentionally or carelessly—on the fact that not Mr. Jessup, but his wife, was listed in 1944 as a Director of the China Aid Council. However, at that time, Mrs. Jessup was taking no active part in the work of the Council and attended no meetings. Prior to 1942, Mrs. Jessup had been active in the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans, formed under the sponsorship of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek to raise money for orphanages in China. * * * This organization has never been cited by the Attorney General or the House Committee on Un-American Activities. In 1942 Mrs. Jessup turned her attention to the American Friends Service Committee in Philadelphia, for which she worked full time until 1946. Meanwhile, however, the China Aid Council absorbed the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans and continued as of 1944 to carry Mrs. Jessup's name on its letterhead.

Dr. Jessup is a member of a number of highly respectable non-communist-front organizations, including *Utica Post*, No. 229, of the American Legion, which, on April 6, 1950, *resolved* that the Post and its entire membership:

"* * * strongly resent, condemn and decry the * * * intolerable conduct of Senator Joseph McCarthy in his wanton attempt, without proof or

reason, to smear and destroy the good reputation (of) Phillip C. Jessup
* * *."

(6) *Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City.*—"This publication was being supervised by Mr. Jessup (and) was being used to spearhead the smear against the anti-Communist forces in China * * *."

The Facts.—This twice refuted yet now reiterated statement refers to Dr. Jessup's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations and its publication, *Far Eastern Survey*. In the Department's analyses of the ASNE and Chicago speeches, it has been demonstrated that:

1. Senator McCarthy has merely parroted thoroughly discredited charges leveled by one Arthur Kohlberg against the Institute of Pacific Relations (an organization which the Rockefeller Foundation has referred to as "The most important single source of independent studies of the problems of the Pacific Area and the Far East").

2. Dr. Jessup never "supervised" the *Far Eastern Survey*.

(9) *Senator McCarthy said at Atlantic City.*—"I have presented to the Committee checks totaling \$3,500 which represent Communist money paid * * * the Institute of Pacific Relations * * *. I have gotten photostats of additional checks which now total \$6,500.00 of Communist money * * *."

The Facts.—The charge, expressed or implied, that the Institute of Pacific Relations was bought and paid for by "Communists" is among the most thoroughly refuted charges the Senator has advanced. The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Department have repeatedly presented the facts in careful detail.

Senator McCarthy's evidence consisted of photostatic copies of checks signed by Frederick Vanderbilt Field. Mr. Field's contributions to the Institute of Pacific Relations were made in the course of a campaign for funds sponsored by Mr. Juan Trippe, President of Pan American Airways, and Mr. Henry Luce, of *Time*, *Life* and *Fortune*. At the time, Dr. Robert Gordon Sproul, President of the University of California, was Chairman of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations; Mr. Francis Harmon, Vice President of the Motion Picture Export Association, was Treasurer; and Mr. William R. Herod, now President of the International General Electric Company, was Chairman of the Finance Committee.

Characteristically, however, Senator McCarthy included among the new photostats shown at Atlantic City a \$500 check from Field payable, not to the Institute of Pacific Relations, but to the *American Council on Soviet Relations*. The American Council on Soviet Relations is a well-known organization listed as subversive by the Attorney General. The Institute of Pacific Relations is in no way related to it. The two organizations have never before been thus confused.

As pointed out in previous releases, the Institute's expenses averaged \$100,000 a year; therefore, Mr. Feld's \$5,000 represented only a drop in the bucket as compared with total expenses of \$300,000 for the three-year period.

TEXT OF LETTERS ON THE LATTIMORE ISSUE

APRIL 17, 1950.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: It has been stated by Senator McCarthy during the course of the hearings now being held by the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under S. Res. 231, that Mr. Owen Lattimore is "the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy."

It is important for our committee to determine the truth of this contention for whatever bearing it may have on other evidence adduced in the Lattimore matter. For that reason, I would appreciate it greatly if you would inform me at your earliest possible convenience of the extent to which, in your opinion, Dr. Lattimore was "the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy" or the extent that Dr. Lattimore influenced our Far Eastern policy during the period in which you were Secretary of State.

I am addressing a similar letter to Secretary Acheson, Mr. Hull and Mr. Byrnes.

Thanking you for your kindness in giving the committee this information, I am

Very respectfully,

MILLARD E. TYDINGS.

APRIL 22, 1950.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I have received your letter of April 17 in which you refer to a recent statement, in connection with the hearings of the subcommittee on Foreign Relations under Senate Resolution 231, that "Owen Lattimore is the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy." Your letter then asks the extent to which, in my opinion, "Lattimore was the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy" during the period in which I served as Secretary of State.

The statement referred to above is completely without basis in fact.

So far as I and my associates can recall I never even met Mr. Lattimore.

I take the liberty of commenting on the harmful effect on our foreign relations of such statements, charges or insinuations broadcast with so little regard for the truth. They undoubtedly confuse our friends abroad, undermine and weaken our position before the world and actually lend assistance to the powers that would destroy us.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL.

APRIL 24, 1950.

DEAR MILLARD: I have your letter of the 17th asking the extent to which, in my opinion, Mr. Owen Lattimore was "the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy" or the extent he influenced our Far Eastern policy during the period I was Secretary of State.

I do not know Mr. Lattimore. If he ever wrote me about the Far Eastern policy the letter was not called to my attention. If, while I was Secretary of State, he discussed our Far Eastern policy with any officials of the department concerned with that policy, in their discussions with me, they did not quote him.

Early in December 1945, General George C. Marshall went to China and thereafter his reports to the President and me influenced our policies in China and the Far East. I do not think General Marshall was influenced by Mr. Lattimore.

To my former colleagues, I take the liberty of adding that, regardless of the merits of complaints as to what has heretofore occurred, the President and the Secretary of State have given proof of their desire to restore the bipartisan policy in our foreign affairs, and I earnestly hope the members of the Senate will cooperate in that effort.

When I was Secretary of State I found I could talk to Senator Vandenberg with the same freedom with which I talked to Senator Connally and to my assistants, and I profited by his advice. I am sure that in his absence other Republican Senators will cooperate just as did Senator Vandenberg. It is extremely important at this time, in view of the tenseness of the situation in world affairs, that we do not give to either our friends or enemies abroad the false impression of a serious division among us in our policies as to the Soviet Government. Seldom in history have our people been so united on any issue.

I hope that, regardless of our differences on domestic issues, our political leaders can present a united front in our foreign relations.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES.

APRIL 20, 1950.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I have your letter of April 17 in which you inquire concerning the extent to which, in my opinion, Dr. Owen Lattimore was "the principal architect of our Far Eastern policy" or the extent he influenced our Far Eastern policy while I was Secretary of State.

In my opinion, he was in no sense the "principal architect" of our Far Eastern policy during the period I served as Secretary of State. Although his position in academic circles as a student of and writer on some aspects of Chinese life and history was, of course, known to us, I am not aware that during this period he had any appreciable influence on our Far Eastern policy. I do not remember having consulted with him on that subject or on any subject at any time.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL.

APRIL 27, 1950.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: In a letter dated April 17, 1950, you asked that I inform you of the extent to which, in my opinion, Mr. Owen Lattimore was the

"principal architect of our Far Eastern policy," or the extent to which he influenced our Far Eastern policy during the period in which I have been Secretary of State. On April 17 Mr. Peurifoy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, wrote you in full detail concerning Mr. Lattimore's connections with this department in the past. The Far Eastern policy of this Government, like all other foreign policy, is the responsibility of the Secretary of State and has been made by me in my administration subject, of course, to the direction of the President.

I welcome this opportunity to state personally and categorically that during the period in which I have been Secretary Mr. Lattimore, so far as I am concerned or am aware, has had no influence in the determination of our Far Eastern policy. There is clearly no basis in fact for describing Mr. Lattimore as the "principal architect" of our Far Eastern policy. I might add that, so far as I am aware, I have never met Mr. Lattimore.

The Far Eastern policy of the United States has at all times been determined after careful study by the responsible officers of the department and an objective evaluation by me of all of the facts available to this Government. The Department of State has explored all avenues to arrive at the relevant facts. The measure of the participation of Mr. Lattimore, so far as this department and I are concerned, is fully and fairly indicated in the letter of April 17 from Mr. Peurifoy.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON.

[For the press, Department of State, May 26, 1950. No. 553]

SENATOR MCCARTHY'S ROCHESTER CHARGES

On February 9, 1950, Senator McCarthy charged at Wheeling, West Virginia: "While I cannot take time to name all the men in the State Department who have been named as members of the Communist Party and as members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 that were known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping the policy of the State Department."

During the following months he has made numerous other charges. He has said that the Department has followed the Communist Party line, that the architect our foreign policy has been Mr. Owen Lattimore, and he has made many charges against Ambassador Jessup and other persons, both in and outside the Department. He has repeated these charges over and over again, even though they have been shown to be clearly without basis in fact.

To date his irrepressible and irresponsible charges have not resulted in the disclosure of a single Communist in the State Department. They have resulted in great harm to our foreign policy abroad, and in serious injury to the persons unjustly accused. The Department feels that his charges would have had an even worse effect abroad if they had not been answered as strongly and effectively as possible. Accordingly the Department has been carefully analyzing the inaccuracies in each of Senator McCarthy's statement and setting forth the facts as we understand them. It will follow this procedure with respect to his speech at Rochester last night.

An analysis will be made available in the near future. In the meantime, the Department points out that Senator McCarthy said in advance of the speech that he would disclose State Department files on Lattimore. Instead, he dealt with the clearance by the Civil Service Commission of two former Chinese employees of the Office of War Information.

The record has been set straight a number of times on some of the assertions which the Senator repeated again last night. The facts, however, unfortunately do not deter him in his reckless course.

The Senator's campaign does, however, seem to be getting further and further afield from his original assertion that there were Communists in the Department. He no longer talks about 205 Communists in the Department, or 81, 57, 3 or even 1. As State Department officers have often said before, if there are any Communists in the Department, they will be fired. The Department does not believe there are any.

Even Mr. McCarthy now seems to agree.

[For the press, Department of State, May 27, 1950. No. 558]

FOR RELEASE AT 7 P. M., E. D. T., SUNDAY, MAY 28, 1950. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY

The Department of State today made public the following analysis of some of the factual inaccuracies in the speech delivered by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy at Rochester, N. Y., on May 25, 1950, to the National Convention of the Catholic Press Association of the United States:

1. *Senator McCarthy said at Rochester.*—"When I began the presentation of the case against Owen Lattimore, the State Department's architect of our Far Eastern policy, * * * I informed the Senate that Lattimore in a letter to Joseph Barnes * * * instructed him, in effect to get rid of all Chinese employees in the Office of War Information who were loyal to * * * Chiang Kai-shek, and to replace them with Chinese Communists * * * Later when addressing the American Society for Newspaper Editors, I furnished them complete copies of and discussed the Lattimore-Barnes letter."

The Facts.—In the first place, as the Department of State has reiterated time and time again, Mr. Owen Lattimore is not an employee of the Department of State.

In the second place, Mr. Lattimore is not the "architect" of the State Department's Far Eastern policy. Four Secretaries of State have publicly contradicted this assertion.

In the third place, Senator McCarthy originally lifted completely out of context, from a document then classified as secret, a passage purporting to support his charge that Mr. Lattimore instructed Mr. Barnes to replace pro-Chiang Kai-shek employees of the Office of War Information with Communists. As a result, Senator Tydings publicly read the entire letter into the record, and on April 10—ten days before his speech to the American Society for Newspaper Editors—the State Department sent a copy of the letter to Senator McCarthy.

The letter did not say what Senator McCarthy asserted it did. What it did say was: "In the circumstances, we have to be extremely careful about our Chinese personnel. While we need to avoid recruiting any Chinese Communists, we must be careful not to be frightened out of hiring people who have loosely been accused of being Communists. * * * For our purposes, it is wise to recruit as many unaffiliated Chinese as we can, to pick people whose loyalty will be reasonably assured on the one hand by the salaries which we pay them and on the other hand by the fact that they do not receive salaries or subsidies from somewhere else."

2. *Senator McCarthy said at Rochester.*—"* * * Keep in mind those three names—Dr. Chi, Mr. Chew Hong, and the New China Daily News. Those names are the key to this (the Lattimore-Barnes) letter and the State Department's fraudulent cover up * * * I am therefore submitting to you the secret files on those two men * * *"

The Facts.—At Wheeling, West Virginia, on February 9, 1950, Senator McCarthy asserted in a speech:

* * * While I cannot take the time to name all the men in the State Department who have been named as active members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205—a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department.

The next day, he said he had the names of "57 card-carrying members of the Communist Party" allegedly working in the Department. Later he talked in terms of SI security risks of various sorts. Eventually, he said he would stand or fall on his ability to prove that there was one "top Soviet espionage agent" in the State Department.

To date, Senator McCarthy has utterly failed to prove that there is a single Communist or pro-Communist in the State Department, and he now appears to be reduced to an attempt to divert attention with two seven- and eight-year-old memoranda dealing with the Civil Service Commission clearance for Office of War Information employment of two Chinese.

3. *Senator McCarthy said at Rochester.*—"* * * Edward Barrett, Mr. Acheson's publicity chief * * * was Mr. Lattimore's superior when both worked in the Office of War Information."

The Facts.—In a letter to Senator Brewster, entered in the Congressional Record of May 2, Mr. Barrett, who is Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, stated:

"* * * I was in charge of the Overseas Branch of Office of War Information during the last part of the war, and I am proud of what I did toward helping to make that agency an effective psychological warfare arm of the Government. Owen Lattimore worked under me for a brief time during the war, but he left the Office of War Information a few weeks after I became his superior. I have not seen him since * * *"

4. *Senator McCarthy said at Rochester.*—"* * * Our disaster in China * * * is the disaster to which Mr. Acheson refers as the 'dawning of a new day.'"

The Facts.—Here, again, Senator McCarthy lifts completely out of context a single phrase in order to completely distort the meaning of Secretary Acheson's hour-long address before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950. The Secretary, in discussing the Far Eastern situation, emphasized the extent to which nationalism had "become the symbol both of freedom from foreign domination and freedom from the tyranny of poverty and misery."

Developing this theme, he added:

"Since the end of the war in Asia, we have seen over 500 million people gain their independence and over seven new nations come into existence in this area.

"We have the Philippines with twenty million citizens. We have Pakistan, India, Ceylon and Burma with 400 million citizens, southern Korea with twenty million, and within the last few weeks, the United States of Indonesia with 75 million. * * *

"Communism is the most subtle instrument of Soviet foreign policy that has ever been devised and it is really the spearhead of Russian imperialism which would, if it could, take from these people what they have won, what we want them to keep and develop which is their own national independence, their own individual independence, their own development of their own resources for their own good and not as mere tributary states to this great Soviet Union. * * *

"So after this survey, what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own and know it and intend to continue on their own. * * * So what we can see is that this new day in Asia, this new day which is dawning, may go on to a glorious noon or it may darken and it may drizzle out. But that decision lies within the countries of Asia and within the power of the Asian people. It is not a decision which a friend or even an enemy from the outside can decide for them."

5. *Senator McCarthy said at Rochester.*—"* * * I am enclosing in the folder for each of you photostats of five Communist-front organizations with which Jessup was affiliated. You will note that Mrs. Jessup appears on the Executive Committee of a sixth Communist-front organization. The reason for including this with the photostats on Philip Jessup is because of the close affiliation of Philip Jessup with this organization also."

The Facts.—At Atlantic City Senator McCarthy asserted that he had presented photostatic proof of such affiliations to the Tydings subcommittee, but counsel of the subcommittee informed the Department of State that such proof had not been submitted. The following analysis of the photostats produced by the Senator at Rochester reveals:

(1) American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations: Dr. Jessup has been prominently connected with the activities of this organization. It is not a Communist front. Senator McCarthy's only "evidence" against it was a single citation by a California Legislative Committee in 1948, on the ground that the Council "* * * received funds (from) Frederick V. Field * * *."

(2) Coordinating Committee to Lift the Spanish Embargo: Ambassador Jessup has never been affiliated with this organization in any way. At Rochester Senator McCarthy presented reproductions of three full pages and a part of a fourth page of a brochure entitled, "These Americans Say: 'Lift the Embargo against Republican Spain'." The full twenty-page document is and purports to be merely a compendium of public opinion concerning the Spanish embargo.

The only reference to Ambassador Jessup in the "photo-reproductions" presented by Senator McCarthy was a seven-line quotation from a statement by Charles C. Burlingham and Ambassador Jessup in *The New York Times* of January 31, 1939. A week earlier the *Times* had printed a three-column letter from Henry L. Stimson recommending the lifting of the Spanish embargo. On

January 26, the *Times* published a letter of rebuttal by Martin Conboy. It was from a three-column statement which the *Times* headlined as "Text of Reply of Burlingham and Jessup to Conboy's Letter" that the Burlingham-Jessup quotation was taken. The quotation in question reads:

"It (lifting the embargo) would further mark a return to our historic policy of avoiding intervention in European civil wars by following a strict hands-off policy instead of taking the affirmative action which, as events have demonstrated, inevitably affects the outcome of a struggle in which we profess not to be concerned."

The Burlingham-Jessup quotation was "photo-reproduced" by Senator McCarthy in such a way as to indicate that it constituted a full page of the brochure, whereas it was actually only one among eleven similar statements by private individuals included on the page in question of the original brochure. Furthermore, it was only one of a total of thirty-one such quotations in the brochure as a whole, including statements by Henry L. Stimson, John Dewey, Helen Keller, Raymond Leslie Buell, Dorothy Thomphon, A. F. Whitney, and William E. Dodd.

(3) National Emergency Conference and National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights: Senator McCarthy's "photo-reproductions" show that Ambassador Jessup, along with more than 280 other private citizens, was listed as a sponsor of a "call" for a National Emergency Conference, to discuss matters of alien registration, in 1939. They also show that Ambassador Jessup's name was carried in the letterhead of the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights, as a sponsor, in February 1940.

With regard to the National Emergency Conference, Ambassador Jessup testified before the Tydings Subcommittee that he had no recollection of the conference, that he did not attend the meeting for which the "call" was issued, and that he "certainly had no knowledge at the time that it was subversive." It was not until four years later that the Conference was first cited by the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

With regard to the National Emergency Conference for Democratic Rights, Ambassador Jessup testified that he did not recall the organization or any participation in it. This organization was first cited in 1943.

(4) American-Russian Institute: Ambassador Jessup has never been a member, sponsor, or officer of this organization. Senator McCarthy's "photo-reproductions" show Ambassador Jessup's name along with those of 285 other individuals on one list of "sponsors" and with 99 others, on a second list of "sponsors." These lists, however, were not lists of sponsors of the American-Russian Institute itself. They were lists of the sponsors of two dinners given by the organization—one in 1944, dedicated to American-Soviet postwar relations, and the other, in 1946, for the presentation of a posthumous award to Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Concerning the first of these two dinners, Ambassador Jessup told the Tydings Subcommittee:

"I do recall * * * that I was asked by Mr. William Lancaster, a prominent New York lawyer, to permit my name to be used as a sponsor of a dinner which was to be held on October 19, 1944. I had met Mr. Lancaster particularly through his activities on the Foreign Policy Association, at a time when General Frank McCoy was President and Senator Alexander Smith and I were members of the Board. I accepted that invitation in 1944, but was unable to attend the dinner."

Concerning the second dinner, he testified:

"The dinner in question was one given on May 7, 1946, on the occasion of the presentation of its first annual award to Franklin D. Roosevelt which was accepted on behalf of his family. A search of my files has failed to reveal any information concerning this incident, nor do I remember attending the dinner. From approximately February to June of the year 1946, I was seriously ill in a hospital in New York City, so it is unlikely that I attended."

Ambassador Jessup specifically declined invitations to speak at dinners of the Institute in 1948 and 1949. Meanwhile, the New York organization had been expressly excluded from the Attorney General's first published lists of subversive organizations and it was not included until 1949.

(5) American Law Students Association: This organization, which Ambassador Jessup served as a Faculty Adviser for about two years, was a perfectly innocent group. It was not and has never been cited as a communist front.

As "evidence" to the contrary, Senator McCarthy produced at Rochester a photostat of a letterhead of the association carrying the customary union shop

printer's label. This label was identified by Senator McCarthy in a typewritten notation as "Union label No. 209 which is the Communist print shop label."

He also handed out at Rochester a mimeographed statement in which he flatly asserted, without giving any supporting evidence, that the association was "affiliated" with three organizations cited as communist or communist front. He then devoted three single-spaced typewritten pages to a listing of various citations, not against the American Law Students Association, but against the three organizations with which he asserted it was "affiliated."

The fact that the association has never been cited in any way by any agency speaks for itself.

(6) China Aid Council: Ambassador Jessup has never been affiliated with this organization. Senator McCarthy had previously charged, at Atlantic City, that Ambassador Jessup was a director of "one of the worst" communist-front organizations, and identified that organization, to a press association as the China Aid Council. At Rochester, however, he presented a "photo-reproduction" indicating that, not Ambassador Jessup, but *Mrs.* Jessup, was at one time on the Executive Committee of the Council.

The Department, in its analysis of the Senator's Atlantic City speech correctly asserted that, intentionally or carelessly, the Senator had confused Dr. Jessup with his wife. The analysis then pointed out that Mrs. Jessup's association with the organization came about through her interest in the activities of an organization sponsored by Madame Chiang Kai-shek—the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans.

It will be noted that Senator McCarthy's letterhead presented as evidence shows that the "Council" was combined with this Committee for orphans. Mrs. Jessup's part in the Committee's work was to organize a tea business—the tea was called 'May Ling' tea (after Mme. Chiang)—and the profits went directly to orphanages. After 1942, Mrs. Jessup took very little active interest in the Committee, because from that year until 1946 she was working full time for the American Friends Service Committee (Quakers) in Philadelphia, Spain, and France. She did not attend meetings or keep in touch with the work of the China-Aid Council.

It will be noted that, of the six organizations in question, two are not communist-fronts, and two are organizations with which Dr. Jessup has had no connection. For the fifth organization, Dr. Jessup was a sponsor of two dinners which he did not attend. He signed a "call" which resulted in the formation of the sixth organization but had no further connection with it.

6. *Senator McCarthy said at Rochester.*—"They (the State Department in its analysis of Senator McCarthy's American Society of Newspaper Editors speech) quote me as having stated that at the height of the communist party line campaign on the part of the Far Eastern Survey that Dr. Jessup was head of the Research Advisory Council. The 'facts' they give were that he was not the Chairman in 1943 * * *. Now here is a photostat to show that he was head of the Research Advisory Council in 1944 * * *"

The facts.—The identifiable date in Senator McCarthy's American Society of Newspaper Editors speech was 1943. However, in his subsequent Chicago speech, Senator McCarthy broadened his charge and was again met with the facts. In its analysis on May 20, 1950, the Department stated:

"*Senator McCarthy said at Chicago.*—"Jessup * * * was largely in charge of a publication known as the *Far Eastern Survey*, the publication of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations; that he was in charge while it was spewing forth the perfumed Communist Party line sewage. * * *"

"*The Facts.*—Senator McCarthy grossly exaggerated Dr. Jessup's relationship with 'Far Eastern Survey' based on the single fact that in 1944 Dr. Jessup served on the Research Advisory Committee of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

"Senator McCarthy's allegation that 'Far Eastern Survey' followed the Communist Party originates in discredited contentions made by one Alfred Kohlberg in 1944. The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations investigated Kohlberg's charges. In a document circulated to its members, it was demonstrated that Kohlberg had ignored the overwhelming number of facts that did not support his contention. The document showed, among other things, that Kohlberg had quoted, in connection with 'Far Eastern Survey,' and other publications, from less than two percent of the articles published and from less than .002 percent of the books published. In April 1947, the membership of the American Council of the Institute

of Pacific Relations in a vote of 1163 to 66 overwhelmingly repudiated Kohlberg's charges as 'inaccurate and irresponsible.'"

At Atlantic City Senator McCarthy repeated these charges all over again. In its analysis, the Department added this characterization of the Institute of Pacific Relations by the Rockefeller Foundation: "The most important single source of independent studies of the problems of the Pacific area and the Far East."

7. *Senator McCarthy said at Rochester.*—"I have succeeded in digging up photostats of another \$3,000 making a total of \$6,500 (of 'communist money') paid to support the publication which Mr. Acheson's Ambassador-at-Large Jessup supervised."

The Facts.—Senator McCarthy's charges and implications that the Institute or its publication were bought and paid for by "communist money" have been repeatedly refuted by the Department. About half of the Institute's budget was met by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation, while Mr. Field's contributions were only a drop in the bucket as compared with the generous donations of large industrial concerns.

In 1941 Ambassador Jessup was Vice Chairman of the American Council, Ray Lyman Wilbur was Chairman. The Treasurer was Francis S. Harmon.

In addition to Henry R. Luce, of Time, Life, Fortune, William H. Herod, President of the International General Electric Corporation, Philo Parker, of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, and other outstanding bankers, industrialists, lawyers, etc., the Institute's Committee on Financial Support included both Frederick V. Field and Alfred Kohlberg, the New York importer who has admittedly been one of Senator McCarthy's principal sources of information. During this period Mr. Kohlberg also was a member of the Institute's Committee on Corporate Membership, the purpose of which was to increase the donations from larger organizations.

For the 1942-43 period, the persons responsible for over-all and financial affairs included the same distinguished names referred to many times before—Dr. Robert Gordon Sproul, President of the University of California; Mr. Francis Harmon, Vice President of the Motion Picture Export Association; Mr. Herod; Mr. Juan Trippe, President of Pan American Airways, and Mr. Luce.

Senator McCarthy at Rochester handed out as part of his "proof" the same photostat he used at Atlantic City—a check for \$500 signed by Field and made payable to and endorsed by the American Council on Soviet Relations. The American Council on Soviet Relations is a well-known organization listed as subversive by the Attorney General. The Institute of Pacific Relations is in no way related to it. The two organizations have now been twice confused by Senator McCarthy.

[For the press, Department of State, June 9, 1950. No. 614]

The Department of State has already characterized as absolutely false the statement by Senator McCarthy that a photostat which he produced on the Senate floor June 6 constituted proof that three men individually listed by the FBI as Communist agents in 1946 are still working for the Department.

It has pointed out that the Senator's charge was based upon the completely erroneous belief that a 1946 chart referred to in the photostated document, a chart purportedly evaluating Departmental personnel in terms of Communist "agents," "Communists," "sympathizers," and "suspects," was prepared by the FBI.

Furthermore, the Department has stated that the chart in question was not prepared by or received from the FBI, but was merely a working document prepared in the Department's Security Office as a basis of further personnel investigations in 1946.

The Department has also stated that no persons purportedly identified on that chart as Communist "agents," "Communists" and the like are now employed by the Department except those whose loyalty has since been thoroughly checked, evaluated, and reviewed under the President's Loyalty Program.

Since the issuance of this statement to the press by the Department, on June 6, 1950, a thorough review of the chart and report in question, together with a careful inquiry into the circumstances of their preparation and the status of personnel involved, has been made by the Department.

The following analysis of Senator McCarthy's speech is based upon the *facts* developed by that study:

1. *Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6.*—"The Bureau (FBI) sent to the State Department on that date (May 15, 1946) a detailed statement listing what they considered as No. 1, Soviet agents; No. 2, Communists; No. 3, Communist sympathizers; and No. 4, suspects."

The Facts.—As previously stated by the Department, neither the chart itself nor the report of August 3, 1946, in which Senator McCarthy has cited a reference to the chart, was prepared by, or sent to the State Department by, the FBI, and this has been verified to the Department of State both by the Department of Justice and by the FBI. On the contrary, the chart and the report were prepared within the Department of State itself. The chart was prepared on May 15, 1946, and the report on August 3, 1946.

The Department of State itself, after consultation with the writer of the report, with the former Security Officer under whose direction and in whose office the chart was prepared, with certain of his then subordinates familiar with the chart, and with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and after reviewing working papers which are still in our file, has conclusively determined that the chart was not prepared or furnished by the FBI, but was prepared as an investigator's working document in the Department of State in 1946 and by employees of the Department of State. Interview with the writer of the report, who is still in the Department, and the Security Officer with whom he had a conversation about the chart established that the writer of the report drew from his conversation with the Security Officer the unintentionally erroneous conclusion that the chart was prepared in the FBI.

2. *Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6.*—"The function of the FBI is merely that of a fact-finding body. * * * This is the only time it has been brought to my attention that the FBI has departed from its function and said, 'We will evaluate our own evidence in our files and give it to the Department.' Apparently, the reason was that they must have been seriously disturbed by what they had in their files. * * *"

The Facts.—This statement is patently false. In the first place, as previously stated, the chart in question was not prepared or submitted by the FBI to begin with. Information from the FBI was included with information from other agencies—OSS, Civil Service, etc., in the files which the State Department personnel consulted in drawing up the chart; but there was no FBI evaluation of the State Department employees.

In the second place, since the FBI had nothing to do with the preparation of the chart, it obviously could not have talked to itself in the manner described by Senator McCarthy about the "evaluation" of "evidence" concerned. Since the issuance of the State Department's first statement in this connection, the FBI has verified to the Department the fact that it not only had nothing to do with the preparation of the chart but that it also had nothing to do with evaluating the personnel indicated on the chart as purported "Agents," "Communists," etc., or in any other way. Thus, Senator McCarthy's assertion that the FBI took unprecedented action in the matter is utterly unfounded, and his inference that the FBI took such action because it was "seriously disturbed" by the contents of its files is pure fantasy.

3. *Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6.*—"The submission of the list of Soviet Agents, Communists, and so forth, to the State Department by the FBI met with such little favorable activity on the part of the State Department that, so far as I know, the Bureau has never submitted a like chart since that date."

The Facts.—Though the chart in question had not been submitted to the Department by the FBI back in 1946 or at any other time it was, as a matter of fact, a working list of Departmental personnel on whom the Department's Security Officer at that time (May 15, 1946) had received allegations which, in the opinion of the Security Officers by whom the chart was prepared, warranted further investigation. Virtually the entire activity of the Security Officer and his top men at that time was directed toward the utilization and full development of the leads and information received from the FBI, from departmental investigation and other sources, particularly relating to the people listed on the 1946 chart. Moreover, on the basis of the findings and recommendations contained in the "Secret" report in which the chart was referred to, energetic steps were taken toward an improved Security set-up of the Department, including the successful direction of such investigations as that leading in 1946 to the firing, followed by trial and conviction, of Carl Marzani.

4. *Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6*.—"This (the language of the report) is not the language of McCarthy; it is the language of the State Department's top investigators."

The Facts.—The language was not the language of any one of the Department's "investigators"; it was the language of an administrative officer of the Department, assigned by Assistant Secretary Russell, in charge of the Department's security program, to undertake, on a highly confidential basis, a study in Washington of the operations of the Department's organization in 1946 for dealing with problems of personnel security.

5. *Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6*.—"The man who makes this report says in effect, 'The only way we are going to get rid of the other Communists is accidentally by a reduction in the force.' * * * From all the information we have been able to obtain, none of the men who were labeled by the FBI have been fired, but were allowed to resign * * *"

The Facts.—The writer of the report said no such thing directly or by implication. His report dated August 3, 1946, in fact was intended to, and did, explore the means for making existing security procedures more effective, especially against the penetration of foreign intelligence agencies into the Department of State. His reference to reduction in force as a factor in eliminating persons named on the chart was factual—but it did not exclude other methods. Such other methods, including resignation—which the Senator himself contradictorily names as the only method—and firing, where investigation supported this action, were effectively employed. No case today remains unresolved.

6. *Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6*.—"The FBI wisely refused to submit top secret information to the State Department on these dangerous individuals * * * apparently not trusting the State Department to that extent * * *"

The Facts.—The FBI has never refused to make available to appropriate officers of the State Department through established liaison channels information concerning State Department personnel.

7. *Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6*.—"At least three of those listed as Communist agents by the FBI three years ago are still holding high positions in the State Department * * * Those names are included among the 106 names that I gave to the (Tydings) committee * * * Those names I have checked and I know the persons are working in the State Department * * * I * * * have the proof that those men are working in the State Department as of this very moment."

The Facts.—This statement is absolutely false. The Department of State has in its possession the working chart itself dated May 15, 1946. Of the 20 persons hypothesized on the chart as "agents", there is only one who—after thorough reinvestigation including a full FBI investigation, and clearance under the Department's Loyalty and Security procedures—is still in the employ of the Department. That one does not hold a "high position": his grade is GS-9. Furthermore, that one is *not* on the list of 106 Senator McCarthy gave the Tydings Subcommittee.

8. *Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6*.—"You will note that I am * * * only referring today to those who are listed as Communist agents. I hope to be able to give the Senate a complete picture of how many of the total of 106 agents, Communist sympathizers, and so forth, are still on the State Department's payroll * * *"

The Facts.—Any person among those listed on the old 1946 working chart referred to by Senator McCarthy who is still employed in the Department of State has been the subject of careful investigation and has been cleared for security after thorough study of his case either by the Division of Security, acting with the benefit of the FBI's information, or by the Loyalty Security Board of the Department. Each loyalty decision by the Department's Loyalty Board has been post-audited by the Loyalty Review Board, and in no case was the recommendation of the Department's Board changed.

9. *Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6*.—"Take, for example, case No. 1, which I presented on the Senate floor, the name has not yet been made public, so we shall not use it now. The committee has the name. In that case the Loyalty Review Board made what is known as a post audit, and, after looking at the post audit, they said, 'We are not satisfied with the findings.' They sent it back to the State Department Loyalty Board, and that Board said 'The case is closed.' That man is still on the State Department payroll."

The Facts.—Once again, Senator McCarthy's alleged quotations are not quotations—they are typical misstatements. The Loyalty Review Board did *not* advise

the Department of State that they were "not satisfied with the finding" in this case; they *did* make a procedural recommendation, and thereafter the case was *not* "closed." On the contrary, appropriate action was taken by the State Department Loyalty Security Board, and clearance in this case was again post-audited by the President's Loyalty Review Board. The Loyalty Review Board has in no way criticized or changed the final action and findings of the Department's Loyalty Security Board.

10. *Senator McCarthy told the Senate on June 6*—" * * * In the Office of War Information, Mr. Owen Lattimore * * * went to bat for one Communist * * * who had been officially turned down by the Loyalty Board * * * and another Chinese who had been rejected by one member of the board * * *"

The Facts—As the Department pointed out in its analysis of the Senator's Rochester, New York, speech on May 25, he now appears to be reduced to an attempt to divert attention with 1943 Civil Service Commission clearances for Office of War Information employment of two Chinese.

As for Mr. Owen Latimore, both Mr. Lattimore himself and the Department of State have repeatedly reiterated that he is not an employee of the Department.

At Wheeling, West Virginia, on February 9, 1950, Senator McCarthy asserted in a speech:

"* * * While I cannot take the time to name all the men in the State Department who have been named as active members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205—a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department."

The next day, he said he had the names of "57 card-carrying members of the Communist Party" allegedly working in the Department. Later he talked in terms of a "big three" and of 81 security risks of various sorts. He told the Tydings Committee to investigate 106 cases. Eventually, he said he would stand or fall on his ability to prove that there was *one* "top Soviet espionage agent" in the State Department.

And then, on June 6, we hear of 106 names on a four-year-old working chart and three "agents" purportedly still at large in the Department of State.

But the record—the facts—speak for themselves: Senator McCarthy has utterly failed to show that there is a single Communist or pro-Communist in the State Department. His numbers change; his credibility does not.

The following document was received by the Foreign Relations Subcommittee from Mr. Seth W. Richardson, Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board:

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Washington 25, D. C., September 21, 1948.

Memorandum: No. 19.

To All Executive Departments and Agencies.

Subject: Classification according to Section 3, Part III, of E. O. 9835 of Organizations Previously Designated by the Attorney General as within the purview of the Executive Order.

The Attorney General has furnished the Loyalty Review Board with information classifying the organizations which he has listed within the Executive Order under the following categories: (1) Totalitarian; (2) Fascist; (3) Communist; (4) Subversive; (5) Organizations which have "adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force and violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States"; and (6) Organizations which "seek to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."

Enclosed for your information and guidance is a copy of the consolidated list prepared by the Attorney General of organizations previously designated as within Executive Order 9835 by the Attorney General's letters of November 24, 1947, and May 27, 1948 (clarified on August 4, 1948), according to the classifications of Section 3, Part III, of the Executive Order.

SETH W. RICHARDSON,
Chairman, Loyalty Review Board.

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS PREVIOUSLY DESIGNATED AS WITHIN EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 9835 BY LETTERS OF NOVEMBER 24, 1947, AND MAY 27, 1948, ACCORDING TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF SECTION 3, PART II, OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER

Totalitarian:

Black Dragon Society
 Central Japanese Association (Beikoku Chuo Nipponjin Kai)
 Central Japanese Association of Southern California
 Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society of Japan or Military Art Society of Japan)
 Heimuska Kai, also known as Nokubei Heieki Gimusha Kai, Zaibel Nihonjin, Heiyaku Gimusha Kai, and Zaibel Heimusha Kai (Japanese Residing in America Military Conscripts Association)
 Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists)
 Hinomaru Kai (Rising Sun Flag Society—a group of Japanese War Veterans)
 Hokubei Zaigo Shoke Dan (North American Reserve Officers Association)
 Japanese Association of America
 Japanese Overseas Central Society (Kaigai Dobo Chuo Kai)
 Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, 1940
 Japanese Protective Association (Recruiting Organization)
 Jikyoku Iin Kai (Current Affairs Association)
 Kibei Seinen Kai (Association of U. S. Citizens of Japanese Ancestry who have returned to America after studying in Japan)
 Nanka Teikoku Gunyudan (Imperial Military Friends Group of Southern California War Veterans)
 Nichihei Kogyo Kaisha (The Great Fujii Theatre)
 Northwest Japanese Association
 Peace Movement of Ethiopia
 Sakura Kai (Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association—composed of veterans of Russo-Japanese War)
 Shinto Temples
 Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society)
 Suiko Sha (Reserve Officers Association Los Angeles)

Fascist:

American Patriots, Inc.
 Ausland-Organization der NSDAP, Overseas Branch of Nazi Party
 Association of German Nations (Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung)
 Central Organization of the German-American National Alliance (Deutsche-Amerikanische Einheitsfront)
 Citizens Protective League
 Dante Alighieri Society
 Federation of Italian War Veterans in the U. S. A., Inc. (Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Italiani, Federazione degli Stati Uniti d' America)
 Friends of the New Germany (Freunde des Neuen Deutschlands)
 German-American Bund (Amerikadeutscher Volksbund)
 German-American Republican League
 German-American Vocational League (Deutsche-Amerikanische Berufsgemeinschaft)
 Kyffhaeuser, also known as Kyffhaeuser League (Kyffhaeuser Bund), Kyffhaeuser Fellowship (Kyffhaeuser Kameradschaft)
 Kyffhaeuser War Relief (Kyffhaeuser Kriegshilfswerk)
 Lector Society (Italian Black Shirts)
 Mario Morgantini Circle

Communist:

Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois
 American League Against War and Fascism
 American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.
 American Committee for European Workers' Relief
 American Committee for Protection of Foreign-Born
 American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
 American Council for a Democratic Greece
 American Council on Soviet Relations
 American Croatian Congress
 American League for Peace and Democracy
 American Peace Mobilization

American Polish Labor Council
American Russian Institute (of San Francisco)
American Slav Congress
American Youth Congress
American Youth for Democracy
Armenian Progressive League of America
California Labor School, Inc., 216 Market Street, San Francisco, California
Central Council of American Women of Croatian Descent, aka Central Council of American Croatian Women, National Council of Croatian Women
Citizen Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City)
Civil Rights Congress and its affiliates
Committee to Aid the Fighting South
Communist Party, U. S. A.
Communist Political Association
Connecticut State Youth Conference
Congress of American Revolutionary Writers
Congress of American Women
Council on African Affairs
Council for Pan-American Democracy
Dennis Defense Committee
Friends of the Soviet Union
George Washington Carver School, New York City
Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense
Hungarian-American Council for Democracy
International Labor Defense
International Workers Order, including People's Radio Foundation, Inc.
Jefferson School of Social Science, New York City
Jewish People's Committee
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
Labor Research Association, Inc.
League of American Writers
Macedonian-American People's League
Michigan Civil Rights Federation
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners
National Committee to Win the Peace
National Council of Americans of Croatian Descent
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties
National Negro Congress
Nature Friends of America (since 1935)
Negro Labor Victory Committee
New Committee for Publications
Ohio School of Social Sciences
People's Educational Association
People's Institute of Applied Religion
People's Radio Foundation, Inc.
Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art
Photo League (New York City)
Proletarian Party of America
Revolutionary Workers League
Samuel Adams School, Boston, Massachusetts
School of Jewish Studies, New York City
Seattle Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Serbian Vidovdan Council
Slovenian-American National Council
Socialist Workers Party, including American Committee for European Workers' Relief
Socialist Youth League
Southern Negro Youth Congress
Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York
United Committee of South Slavic Americans
United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organization
United May Day Committee
United Negro and Allied Veterans of America
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade

Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark, New Jersey
 Washington Bookshop Association
 Washington Committee for Democratic Action
 Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation
 Workers Alliance
 Workers Party, including Socialist Youth League
 Young Communist League

Subversive:

Communist Party, U. S. A.
 Communist Political Association
 German-American Bund
 Socialist Workers Party
 Workers Party
 Young Communist League

Organizations which have "adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force and violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States:"

Columbians
 Ku Klux Klan
 Protestant War Veterans of the United States
 Silver Shirt Legion of America

Organizations which "seek to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means:"

Communist Party, U. S. A.
 Communist Political Association
 Socialist Workers Party
 Workers Party
 Young Communist League

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
 Washington, D. C., April 25, 1949.

Memorandum No. 43.

To All Executive Departments and Agencies.

Subject: Attorney General's Letter of April 21, 1949, Listing Additional Organizations Designated Under and Classified in Accordance with Section 3, Part III of Executive Order 9835.

Part III of Executive Order 9835 prescribing procedures for the administration of an employee loyalty program in the Executive Branch of the Government requires the Department of Justice to furnish this Board with—

the name of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which the Attorney General, after appropriate investigation and determination, designates as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."

In performance of said requirement, the Department of Justice has furnished to this Board a supplemental letter from the Attorney General containing the names so designated by him.

Part III of said Executive Order also requires this Board "to disseminate such information to all Departments and Agencies." A copy of said letter, dated April 21, 1949, from the Attorney General, is accordingly enclosed, and a copy is also being sent to each other Department and Agency of the Government.

SETH W. RICHARDSON,
 Chairman, Loyalty Review Board.

Enclosure.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
 Washington, D. C., April 21, 1941.

The Honorable SETH W. RICHARDSON,

Chairman, Loyalty Review Board, Civil Service Commission,
 Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: By letters of November 24, 1947, and May 27, 1948, you were furnished lists of organizations which were designated under Part III, Section 3, of Executive Order No. 9835, as well as those organizations which had

previously been declared to come under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9800, issued February 5, 1943, entitled "Establishing the Interdepartmental Committee to Consider Cases of Subversive Activity on the Part of Federal Employees," and under other relevant authority.

As stated in my letter of November 24, the organizations heretofore named do not represent a complete or final tabulation. The study of investigative reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a continuing one. The organizations named herein as coming within the scope of Executive Order No. 9835 are designated as a result of the same careful review of recommendations made by officials of this Department which has been outlined to you previously.

The organizations designated below are classified in accordance with the categories set forth in Section 3, Part III, of Executive Order No. 9835. As in the case of organizations previously submitted, the designation is predicated upon the dominant characteristics of each. It must be borne in mind, of course, that while an organization may fall within more than one of the specified categories, it is necessary for the purpose of the Executive Order to segregate them on the basis of dominant characteristics.

The organizations designated are:

Fascist:

- American Nationalist Party
- American National Labor Party
- American National Socialist League
- American National Socialist Party
- Committee for Nationalist Action
- National Blue Star Mothers of America
- Nationalist Action League

Communist:

- Abraham Lincoln Brigade
- Action Committee to Free Spain Now
- American Committee for Spanish Freedom
- American Jewish Labor Council
- American Russian Institute, New York
- American Russian Institute, Philadelphia
- American Russian Institute of Southern California, Los Angeles
- Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder
- Citizens Committee for Harry Bridges
- Comite Coordinator Pro Republica Espanola
- Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy
- Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas
- Detroit Youth Assembly
- Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee
- Michigan School of Social Science
- North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy
- North American Spanish Aid Committee
- Oklahoma Committee to Defend Political Prisoners
- Progressive German-Americans, aka Progressive German-Americans of Chicago
- Schappes Defense Committee
- Schneiderman-Darcy Defense Committee
- United Spanish Aid Committee
- Washington Commonwealth Federation

Organizations which have "adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force and violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States":

- American Christian Nationalist Party
- Association of Georgia Klans
- Knights of the White Camellia
- Original Southern Klans, Incorporated

Organizations which "seek to alter the form of government to the United States by unconstitutional means":

- Industrial Workers of the World
- Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico

From time to time I shall continue to furnish you with the names of additional organizations which this Department, after appropriate consideration, regards as coming within these categories, in accordance with the directive contained in Executive Order No. 9835.

Sincerely,

TOM CLARK, *Attorney General.*

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., July 21, 1949.

Memorandum No. 44.

To All Executive Departments and Agencies.

Subject: Certain Organizations and Groups Connected with Organizations Previously Designated and Classified by the Attorney General under Section 3, Part III of Executive Order 9835.

In a letter dated July 20, 1949, the Attorney General has advised the Loyalty Review Board concerning the designation of certain organizations and groups which are affiliated with or otherwise connected with organizations which have been previously declared to come within the scope of Executive Order 9835.

The Attorney General states that the United Spanish Aid Committee, designated in his letter of April 21, 1949, as a Communist organization, is more properly referred to as the United American-Spanish Aid Committee, and that the previous listing is hereby changed to reflect the designation of the United American-Spanish Aid Committee.

The Attorney General also states that other groups which are affiliates of or otherwise related to organizations heretofore declared to come within Executive Order 9835 are hereby designated as follows:

Communist:

American Rescue Ship Mission (a project of the United American-Spanish Aid Committee)

Emergency Conference to Save Spanish Refugees (founding body of the North American-Spanish Aid Committee)

National Conference on American Policy in China and the Far East (a Conference called by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy)

The Attorney General states further that the designation of the Communist Party, U. S. A., and of the Communist Political Association includes, of course, all of the state and local branches and factions of the parent groups. Thus the Florida Press and Educational League bears the same designation as its parent body, the Communist Political Association. The Daily Worker Press Club and the Yiddisher Kultur Farband are also included in the designation of the Communist Party, U. S. A., within Executive Order 9835.

The above information furnished by the Department of Justice is transmitted to you in accordance with Part III of Executive Order 9835 which requires the Loyalty Review Board "to disseminate such information to all Departments and Agencies." This information is also being sent to each other Department and Agency of the Government.

In accordance with regular practice, this information will be published in the Federal Register, Title 5, Chapter II, Appendix A.

SETH W. RICHARDSON,
Chairman, Loyalty Review Board.

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., September 27, 1949.

Memorandum No. 49.

To All Executive Departments and Agencies.

Subject: Attorney General's Letter of September 26, 1949, Concerning Change in Name of an Organization Designated and Classified under Section 3, Part III, of Executive Order 9835

Part III of Executive Order 9835 prescribing procedures for the administration of an employee loyalty program in the Executive Branch of the Government requires the Department of Justice to furnish this Board with—

"the name of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which the Attorney General, after appropriate investigation and determination, designates as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."

In performance of said requirement the Department of Justice has furnished to this Board a supplemental letter from the Attorney General designating the Independent Socialist League, successor to the Workers Party, as coming within the same categories as the Workers Party.

Part III of said Executive Order also requires this Board "to disseminate such information to all Departments and Agencies." A copy of said letter dated September 26, 1949, from the Attorney General is accordingly enclosed, and a copy is also being sent to each other Department and Agency of the Government.

SETH W. RICHARDSON,
Chairman, Loyalty Review Board.

Enclosure.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D. C., September 26, 1949.

Mr. SETH W. RICHARDSON,
Chairman, Loyalty Review Board, Civil Service Commission,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: In the Department's letter to you of November 24, 1947, transmitting organizations declared to come under the purview of Part III, Section 3, of Executive Order No. 9835, there was included the organization known as Workers Party. In its official organ, Labor Action of April 1949, the Workers Party announced that at the fifth national convention it had voted to relinquish the name of the Workers Party and adopt the name of the Independent Socialist League. The new organization, Independent Socialist League, which represents but a change in name and is devoted to the same aims and purposes of its predecessor, the Workers Party, is therefore designated as coming within the same categories of Executive Order No. 9835 as the Workers Party itself.

Sincerely,

J. HOWARD MCGRATH,
Attorney General.

There is incorporated by reference the publication Citations by Official Government Agencies prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities of the United States House of Representatives dated December 18, 1948:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 23, 1950.

Mr. ROBERT L. HEALD,
Assistant Counsel, Foreign Relations Subcommittee,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR MR. HEALD: It is understood that the Tydings subcommittee desires statistical figures of the work of the State Department Loyalty Security Board.

The most recent figures that have been compiled are those of May 1, 1950, which indicate that the Board since its inception to May 1, 1950, has received 304 cases from the Civil Service Commission. Of these 304 cases 230 have been cleared by the Board without preferring charges, or, in other words, without hearing. 37 of the cases have been cleared after the preferring of charges. In most of these cases there was an actual hearing but in several instances the employee elected to file a written statement and not to demand a hearing. In 3 of the 304 cases the employee was found by the Board to be a security risk, in each case, of course, after a hearing. In 7 of the 304 cases the employee resigned with charges pending. 4 of the 304 cases were lost to the jurisdiction of the Board by transfer to other Departments. The Board had on May 1st 23 cases pending on which no decision had been reached.

It will be noted that the above figures differ somewhat from the figures given by me in the hearing before the subcommittee, at which time I spoke of 246 cases decided by the Loyalty Security Board, of 30 loyalty hearings, of 2 cases found to be security risks, and 5 resignations with charges pending. The difference between these figures and the figures now given is due to the fact that I have now included in the computation not only the cases which were submitted to the Board as loyalty cases but also the cases which were submitted to the Board purely as cases involving security risk. Of course it will be noted that the present report is to May 1, while the previous report covered only to March 1.

Sincerely yours,

CONRAD E. SNOW,
Chairman, Loyalty Security Board.

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 8, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I am sending you herewith some material which I hope will be of use to the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee in examining the charges which Senator McCarthy has made against my wife. The enclosures include:

1. A statement which I have written about myself;
2. A file of testimonial letters, most of which were written at my request, together with a copy of my request for the letters; and
3. A copy of the statement about me which was released by the Navy Department on March 13, 1950.

Respectfully yours,

STEPHEN BRUNAUEER.

Enclosures.

AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN BRUNAUEER

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO WIT:

On this 11th day of May, 1950, before me, the subscriber, a Notary Public in and for the District aforesaid, personally appeared Stephen Braunauer, signed the attached declaration in my presence, and made oath in due form of law that said attached declaration is a true statement of the matters and facts set forth therein.

He has also initialed each page of said attached eight-paged declaration in my presence.

Subscribed and sworn to before me.

[SEAL]

HERBERT A. ENGLER, *Notary Public.*

My commission expires January 1, 1951.

I, Stephen Brunauer, residing at 3417 Quebec Street NW., Washington, D. C., make the following declaration because of certain statements and insinuations made by Senator Joseph McCarthy on March 13 and because of questions asked by Senator Bourke Hickenlooper on March 27 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This subcommittee was appointed under Senate Resolution 231 to investigate charges of disloyalty in the Department of State.

I am employed by the Department of the Navy as Chief Technical Administrator of Explosives Research and Development, Bureau of Ordnance. I have never been employed by the Department of State. My wife is a State Department employee, and in a previous appearance before the subcommittee has already dealt more than adequately with the statements and insinuations made about her. Since insinuations about me were used against my wife, I wish to show that they, too, are without basis in fact.

In support and corroboration of my declaration, I am attaching a file of testimonial letters, most of which I requested from the writers as a means of furnishing the subcommittee with detailed information about my work, character, loyalty and integrity.

I am a loyal American. I came to the United States from Hungary in 1921, at the age of 18, because I wanted to make my life in this country, which I considered the land of hope and freedom. I became a citizen on September 1, 1927. In 1942 I became an officer in the United States Naval Reserve and entered upon active duty on October 23 of that year, serving until November 13, 1946. I sought military service, although I could have continued my work as a civilian scientist throughout the war period, because I felt that I must participate wholeheartedly in the defense of the United States. I have remained in the Department of the Navy as a civilian employee because I believe that I have a contribution to make to the national defense through the development of more effective explosives. I am still a Reserve officer. I belong to Volunteer Ordnance Component W-1 of Washington, and attend its meetings regularly. At an appropriate place in this declaration I shall describe more fully some of the contributions which I have made and am now making to the national defense. The members of my immediate family are all in the United States. My mother has made her home with me in Washington since 1936; my brother and his wife arrived in this country on

December 27, 1948, as political exiles from Communist-dominated Hungary; my wife and children are native Americans.

I am not a Communist. I am not a Communist sympathizer. On the contrary, I am bitterly opposed to communism. At one time in my life, more than 20 years ago, I was a member of the Hungarian Section of the Young Workers League in New York City, for a period of about 3 years, from 1923 or early 1924, to the end of 1926 or early 1927. Since dropping out of this organization I have not belonged to any organization listed as subversive by the Attorney General nor to any organization cited by the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

In this declaration I am describing more fully certain aspects of my life and work which seem to me especially significant in refuting charges that I may be disloyal or a security risk.

First, I wish to summarize the evolution of my political opinions since coming to the United States.

From my arrival in New York in October 1921 until I moved to Washington in February 1928 I was occupied mainly in obtaining an education. I had graduated from high school in Budapest with the highest honors. In New York I studied at City College and at Columbia University and supported myself, and even sent money back to Hungary to help in the education of my younger brother. When I arrived in America I spoke no English. I was a lonely young man, and had few opportunities for personal contacts with native Americans. In the midst of my work and study it was not easy for me to gain an intimate and first-hand understanding of the culture and institutions of my new homeland. One illustration of the slowness with which a newcomer learns American customs was the fact that when, in June 1925, a few days before graduation from Columbia, I was notified that I had been elected to Phi Beta Kappa, I had no idea what this meant. I had to go to the University Library to look up the meaning of Phi Beta Kappa.

At the age of 20, I had spent two years in New York in new surroundings working and studying intensively, and I was starved for companionship. When I was sought out and befriended by some Hungarian Communists, my ignorance of the American way and my loneliness helped them to persuade me to join their group, the Hungarian Section of the Young Workers League. Social activities—dances, singing, and sports, especially soccer, which I had played as a boy in Hungary—occupied most of our time, and I was able to have some of the fun I had missed so badly during my first two years in America.

Thus, although the Young Workers League was an adjunct of the Workers Party (the forerunner of the present Communist Party), it was some time before I became critical of their ideas. The leaders of the League got me to write a few articles in the Hungarian Communist newspaper and to give some talks to Hungarians in New York and neighboring towns. I believe that I wrote five or six articles and I delivered a number of lectures. By this time I remember very few details of that period, because long ago I put my experience in the Young Workers League behind me and forgot it almost completely until 1947, when I discovered that this episode of my past had become an issue in connection with my security record.

Since Senator Hickenlooper asked a question of my wife about her belonging to the Young Workers League, I should like to state here that this question is probably based on mistaken identity. In 1926 I married Anna Friedmann, a Hungarian girl, in New York. She was a member of the Young Workers League and in fact she had been instrumental in bringing me into that organization. Her brother, about whom Senator Hickenlooper also inquired, also belonged to the Young Workers League. I understand that he is an active Communist, but I should like to state that I have not seen him for twenty-two years. My first wife and I were separated in 1928, and we were divorced in 1931. I married Esther Caukin, my present wife, in 1931.

In 1924 the Workers Party was in turmoil over the American Presidential election, the issue being whether to have their own candidate or to support La Follette. The Young Workers took part in the debate, though they were not permitted to vote at the Workers Party meetings. I wrote two articles for "Uj Előre" supporting the minority view, which was that La Follette should be supported. The majority, led by William Z. Foster, intended to run a Workers' Party candidate but, as we were given to understand, its decision was overruled by Moscow. Even though the side I had supported won, I felt disillusioned because I believe in majority rule. Also, I did not like the idea of Moscow directing the American Communists. As the months went by I found more and more to criticize in the ideas and methods of the Communists. At the end of 1926 or

possibly early in 1927 I dropped out of the Young Workers League. I did not write a letter of resignation, but told them I was leaving, and stopped paying dues and attending meetings.

From 1927 to 1933 I went through a period of transition from Communist ideology to liberalism. In that period I still had some radical tendencies, but they played a very unimportant part in my life as compared with my scientific work and professional advancement. One of the instances I can recall of my increasingly critical attitude toward communism is that when I was at Johns Hopkins in 1931-32, I gave a talk to a group of students on Science in the Soviet Union. In it I condemned the Soviet attitude toward science, especially condemning Science at the Crossroads, a Russian book which had just been translated and published in New York.

The complete break came in 1933, when I spent almost a year in Germany doing postgraduate study. I was on leave of absence from the Department of Agriculture. My wife and I were vigorously opposed to the Nazi regime and when we observed the Communist tactics, which at times opposed the Nazis and at times supported them, I decided that I could no longer approve of any Communist ideas or methods but must oppose communism completely and actively. In common with many other Americans in the early 1930's I thought for a time that the Communist system might be all right for Russia, but as more information came out of the Soviet Union I came to the conclusion that this view was incorrect, also, and that communism was not working even there.

In her testimony before the subcommittee my wife explained how she came to substitute for me as a speaker before the Washington Chapter of the American Friends of the Soviet Union in 1934. I corroborate her statement and add that except for this event and except for attending the two meetings of the organization at which my wife presided, I had no relations with the organization.

I wish to quote here a passage from the testimonial letter of Dr. George Gamow, Professor of Physics at the George Washington University, who escaped from Soviet Russia and came to this country in 1934; and who has known me ever since his arrival in Washington:

"I can assure you that, as a man who came from Soviet Russia, I have a very good nose to scent communistic sympathies, and I am certain that neither Stephen nor his wife, Esther, fall into that category. As a matter of fact, Stephen told me many years ago that in his youth he was interested in that kind of ideas, but realized very soon that they lead to perish rather than to the benefit of humanity."

I repeat here that since 1927 I have not belonged to any organization which has been listed as subversive by the Attorney General of the United States or by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. I am a member of the American Chemical Society, the Washington Academy of Sciences, the Philosophical Society of Washington, Sigma Xi, and Phi Beta Kappa. From 1928 until 1930 or 1931 I belonged to the International Friendship Club sponsored by the Friends Meeting at 1811 Eye Street NW., in Washington. This was a local social club whose membership represented all political views as well as several nationalities and races. Since 1943 I have belonged to the Parent-Teachers Association of the Phoebe Hearst Elementary School, the school which my two daughters attend. This is the extent of my participation in organizations.

In addition to the foregoing description of my political evolution, I wish to answer the three questions which Senator McCarthy raised in his statement before the subcommittee on March 13, and then comment on his assertions regarding the views of various investigative agencies about me.

As to the questions:

(1) Have I been the subject of a constant investigation by Government agencies over a period of ten years? The answer is probably "Yes." I know I have been investigated several times, and the explanation is simple. I have held a number of different posts during the past ten years, for each of which an investigation was required. Early in 1941, while I was still in the Department of Agriculture, I was asked to become a consultant to the National Defense Research Committee, and was investigated. I was investigated again in 1942 before being commissioned an officer in the Naval Reserve. In 1945 I was cleared to the Manhattan District, but do not know whether a special investigation preceded the clearance. I was investigated again under the President's Loyalty Program as a civilian employee of the Navy Department. The result of all these investigations was stated in the announcement given out by the Navy on March 13 that I had been thoroughly

investigated and was not charged with disloyalty. Among my testimonial letters there are many written by Naval officers who have worked with me and observed me closely. I quote here a paragraph from the letter of Vice Admiral G. F. Hussey, Jr., USN (Ret.) who was formerly Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department:

"On at least one occasion Commander Brunauer's loyalty was questioned. There were made available to me, as I recall it, all data in the possession of the Office of Naval Intelligence and, I believe, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning Commander Brunauer. After considering these data, together with my own observations of him, and after discussing the situation with my Deputy Chief, I was satisfied in my own mind that Commander Brunauer's loyalty was above reproach. On that basis I continued him in his responsible position involving classified work and subsequent to the war approved of his being placed in a civil status to do similar work. I am not certain whether his transfer to a civil status was finally accomplished before my detachment from the Bureau in September 1947 or after it, but the step in any event had my approval."

(2) Was I a close friend and collaborator of Noel Field, "known Communist who recently and mysteriously disappeared behind the Iron Curtain"? The answer is "No." I was never a close friend of Mr. Field, although I knew him from 1928 through the early thirties. At that time he appeared to be a liberal in politics. In 1934 after I returned from Germany I met him at a social gathering and learned that he had become a radical in his views. He did not say that he had become a Communist, and I had no further knowledge of his political views until they were referred to in the press during the past year. The last time I saw Noel Field was at the end of 1945 or early 1946 during the visit that he and his wife made in Washington after the war. About 30 or 40 of their former friends and acquaintances gathered to hear about the relief work they had done in France and Switzerland during the war. There was no discussion of politics, and I exchanged only a few words with Noel Field during the entire evening. To the best of my recollection, that is the only time I have seen him since he went to Geneva to work for the League of Nations in 1935 or 1936. As to the term "collaborator," I have never collaborated with Noel Field on anything.

(3) Have I admitted to associates that I was a member of the Communist Party? I can answer this question by referring to the information contained in the testimonial letters. I have told some of my friends of my early connection with the Young Workers League. I described my relationship with the Communist movement to the Loyalty and Security Board of the Department of State when I appeared as a witness for my wife, on July 28, 1948; and I described it to the Navy after I became aware that my early Communist connections caused some questions as to my present loyalty.

However, until Senator McCarthy mentioned the findings of the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1947 and "a Senate Investigating Committee in 1941" I did not know that my political views had been the subject of congressional investigations. If I had known this, I would have sought to clarify my political views and would have taken whatever steps were possible to clear my record.

The account of my political development and the answers to Senator McCarthy's allegations should be looked at against the background of my scientific work and my efforts for the national defense which, together, have occupied by far the largest part of my time, energy, and thought for the last twenty-two years.

From 1928 to 1942 I did scientific work in the Department of Agriculture, concentrating upon fundamental research in physical chemistry. During the first five years most of my spare time was devoted to graduate study, and I obtained the M. S. degree at George Washington University in 1929 and the Ph. D. degree at Johns Hopkins University in 1933. In this period of 14½ years I made some scientific contributions and some practical contributions. The latter related to the production of artificial fertilizers; the former to the processes of catalysis and adsorption which are of fundamental scientific importance and which also play an important part in industry. I published about twenty scientific articles, several of which received considerable acclaim in scientific circles. I also wrote a book called Adsorption of Gases and Vapors, which was published by the Princeton University Press in 1943 and the Oxford University Press in 1944. For my scientific contributions in the Department of

Agriculture the Chemical Society of Washington awarded me the Hillebrand Prize for 1945.

From October 1942 to August 1946 I was an officer in the Naval Reserve on active duty. I started as a Lieutenant and was assigned to the Research and Development Division of the Bureau of Ordnance. At that time Lieutenant (j. g.) W. E. Land and I were responsible for the work on explosives. Together we built up explosives research and development until, by the end of the war there were close to fifty men, officers and civilians, engaged in this work under my supervision. In addition, hundreds of men were collaborating with us in the National Defense Research Committee and within the services on the development of explosives. This work led to the development of new explosives which I recommended for adoption by the Navy, and the Navy accepted my recommendations. These new important explosives included one, which has been adopted for all underwater weapons of the Navy; another, which has been adopted for the antiaircraft weapons of the Navy; and a third one, which has been adopted as a filler of bombs by the Army. A considerable number of the testimonial letters attached to this statement deal with my contributions during the war. I quote here two paragraphs from one of these letters, which I received from E. Brigh Wilson, Jr., Professor of Chemistry at Harvard University, who is Visiting Professor at Oxford University this year. Professor Wilson, whom I have known well since 1942, is recognized as one of the most brilliant scientists in the United States and is considered by those who are associated with him as an American of unquestionable loyalty and highest integrity. Immediately upon reading about Senator McCarthy's charges on March 17, in Oxford, he wrote to me:

"Knowing your wartime work as I do I can say that there was no more devoted, self-sacrificing, and sincere patriot in all Washington than you. The job you did was magnificent and deserves the undying gratitude of all Americans and not a treatment like this.

"Your mobilization of scientific assistance for the solution of problems connected with explosives was a highlight of my acquaintance with the services."

For my contributions to the Navy during the war I was awarded the Commendation Ribbon by the Secretary of the Navy and was decorated by the British Government with the Order of the British Empire.

Since September 9, 1946, I have held my present position in the Department of the Navy. When I joined the Navy in 1942 I expected to return to scientific research after the war. However, the Navy wanted me to stay as a civilian scientist, and I stayed because I thought I could make some useful contributions to the national security.

Before discussing my main work for the Navy since the war, I wish to mention my activities in Hungary in 1946, where I was on temporary duty on technical intelligence work. From May 10 to August 10 of that year I was assigned to the United States Naval Representative in the Allied Control Commission for Hungary. I believe I was able to make a unique contribution because of being a scientist and a Naval officer and also a native of Hungary. The attached testimonial letters in Group II give a fairly detailed account of those activities in which I engaged that were not highly classified. These letters show especially what impression I made on people who were very sensitive to political attitudes.

I quote here a brief description of part of my work in Hungary contained in the letter from Rear Admiral W. F. Dietrich, USN (Ret), who was my commanding officer at that time:

"In the years 1945-46, I was US Naval Member of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, with headquarters at Budapest. During 1946, from about the latter part of May until early August, Commander Stephen Brunauer, then permanently attached to the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department—in which position he remained on in civil status—came to Budapest and served temporarily under me for a little more than two months. At this time the Office of Research and Inventions, Navy Department, was fostering a technical survey into developments during the past war in former enemy countries and the outstanding scientists in the various fields. Brunauer, born in Hungary, and had received his basic education there, knew not only the language but also had former colleagues of his youth in university, some of whom were well acquainted in the scientific advancements. Thus, Brunauer was particularly valuable in connection

with taking the survey in Hungary, and in writing up the leading Hungarian Scientists, giving a biographical outline of their accomplishments, political behavior past and present, etc. As a result of this work, which had to be cleverly and expertly handled, so as not to arouse Soviet and Hungarian Communist opposition, several of these scientists are now in this country. Others, seeing that the West was interested in their welfare, also escaped the Iron Curtain and are today in Britain, France, Sweden, and Switzerland, even South America. Still others, encumbered by large families or parents well in years, stayed back, but are either now in Russia or living in constant fear that they will be transported there as research workers."

Most of the scientists referred to by Admiral Dietrich who are now in this country as a result of my activities came to the George Washington University to begin with; some stayed there and others went to such places as Johns Hopkins University, National Fireworks, Inc., etc. They are doing outstanding work and some of them are already making significant contributions to aspects of science which are today of great importance to America.

My main work since the war has been to maintain and build up on a peacetime basis the explosives research and development program of the Navy. There have been three phases of this work, the preparations for the testing of the atomic bomb against ships; the consolidation and reorganization of research on explosives, and the continuance of the development of explosives.

The Bureau of Ordnance participated actively in the Bikini tests in 1946, its main job being to prepare and apply the instruments for measuring the effects of the atomic explosions at Bikini. I was appointed by Admiral Hussey, who was then Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, as Officer in Charge of this work.

At about this time, the first legislation on the control of atomic energy was being considered by a special committee of the Senate. Senator Ball and I discussed this problem many evenings. When he drafted a bill on the subject I helped him. In February 1946 I was called before the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy to testify on the pending legislation. In my testimony I touched briefly on several points but I went into detail on only one point, which was closest to my heart and to my personal interests. I urged that the military should not be excluded from the control of atomic energy, since they have a vital interest in its use.

Parallel with my activities when I was head of the Bureau of Ordnance Instrumentation Group for the Bikini tests, and more intensively later, I worked on building up an adequate postwar research organization in the field of explosives for the Navy. I feel that I was instrumental in persuading a considerable number of the leading scientists in this field to come to the Navy or to continue their work for the Navy and the other services, and as a result the Navy and the National Military Establishment now have an adequate organization to carry on explosives research and development during peacetime.

While I cannot reveal the nature of my contributions to the field of explosives since the war, I can state that they are considered to be of major significance by those who are familiar with my work.

The foregoing account of my scientific work and military service is offered as positive evidence of my loyalty to America and my trustworthiness as an official of the United States Government. I hope that I have described my beliefs and my activities fully enough and that no doubt is left in anyone's mind about my loyalty and my security status.

STEPHEN BRUNAUER.

[Enclosure 2]

DEAR —: Please forgive me for writing a form letter to you. I am sending out close to a hundred of these letters, and it would be impossible to do it if I wrote a separate letter to each of you.

You doubtless read the charges Senator McCarthy made against my wife and me on the thirtieth of March. You doubtless have your own opinion on the subject. I do not know how good the press service is where you are at present, so I enclose here a copy of the official Navy press release about me. The Department of State made a similar statement about my wife.

I expect to be called before the Senate sometime next week to clear myself of Senator McCarthy's charges. (No definite date has been fixed as yet.) I should like to enlist your help in clearing myself.

Would you be willing to write a letter about me to Senator Tydings? The way I visualize it, the letter should contain the following information:

- (1) a brief statement of who you are and what sort of work you are engaged in at present;
- (2) how long you have known me; what sort of connections we had with each other;
- (3) what you think of my character, my loyalty, my reliability, and my contributions; and
- (4) anything else you wish to state.

The letter should be addressed to the Honorable Millard Tydings, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. However, I would appreciate it if you would mail it to me, together with a copy for myself. I would not like to swamp Senator Tydings with individual letters arriving at separate times. It would look like an attempt to exert pressure on him. What I should like to do is to collect all letters and hand them over to Senator Tydings at the time of my appearance before the Subcommittee.

I would deeply appreciate it if you would act urgently on this matter. However, even if your letter does not arrive prior to the hearings, I can still collect the late letters, and transmit them to the Subcommittee later.

With grateful thanks for your help, and with best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

STEPHEN BRUNAUER,

3417 Quebec Street NW., Washington, D. C.

MARCH 17, 1950.

LIST OF TESTIMONIAL LETTERS

In order to facilitate the work of the investigation, I have arranged the 104 letters I received to date (May 8, 1950) into three groups. In Group I have been placed the 30 letters that I consider the most important for my case. In Group II I collected the 13 letters that have bearing on my activities in Hungary in 1946, and the consequences thereof. Group III contains the rest of the letters.

1. Senator Joseph Ball, Washington, D. C.
2. Vice Admiral G. F. Hussey, Jr., U. S. N. (Ret.), Formerly Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance
3. Dr. E. Bright Wilson, Professor of Chemistry, Harvard University
4. Dr. R. E. Gibson, Director, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University
5. Dr. L. R. Hafstad, Director of Reactor Development, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
6. Dr. John Von Neumann, Professor of Mathematics, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J.
7. G. F. Strollo, Ordnance Engineer, Explosives Res. and Dev., Bureau of Ordnance
8. Dr. G. B. Kistiakowsky, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, Harvard University
9. Dr. S. B. Hendricks, Head Chemist, Plant Industry Station, Beltsville, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture
10. Dr. George Gamow, Professor of Physics, George Washington University
11. Dr. G. K. Hartmann, Chief, Explosives Department, Naval Ordnance Laboratory
12. Dr. P. M. Fye, Associate Chief, Explosives Department, Naval Ordnance Laboratory
13. Dr. R. J. Seeger, Chief, Aeroballistics Department, Naval Ordnance Laboratory
14. Dr. F. J. Weyl, Acting Chief, Division of Mathematical Sciences, Office of Naval Research
15. Dr. Edward Teller, Professor of Physics, University of Chicago
16. Mr. S. J. Porter, Director of Research and Development, National Fireworks, Inc.
17. Rear Admiral M. F. Schoeffel, U. S. N., Commander, Carrier Division six, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
18. Rear Admiral F. I. Entwistle, U. S. N., Deputy Commander, Western Sea Frontier
19. Dr. D. P. MacDougall, Division Chief, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

20. Dr. B. D. Van Evera, Professor of Chemistry, Coordinator of Scientific Activities, George Washington University
21. Dr. F. G. Brickwedde, Chief, Heat and Power Division, National Bureau of Standards
22. R. W. Hummer, Chemist, Dow Chemical Company
23. Rear Admiral K. H. Noble, U. S. N. (Ret.), Formerly Assistant Chief of Bureau of Ordnance for Research
24. Professor Theodore Von Karman, Formerly Chairman of Scientific Advisory Board, U. S. Air Force
25. Dr. Richard Courant, Professor of Mathematics, Head of Department, New York University
26. Mr. Norman MacLeod, Research Director, Old and Barnes, Inc.
27. Captain S. H. Crittenden, Jr., U. S. N., U. S. Pacific Fleet.
28. Dr. W. E. Land, Deputy Section Head, Explosives Res. and Dev., Bureau of Ordnance
29. Captain J. H. Sides, U. S. N., Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
30. W. Edwards Deming, Adviser in Sampling, Bureau of the Census

GROUP II

31. Mr. Ferenc Nagy, Herndon, Virginia, Formerly Prime Minister of Hungary
32. Dr. Aladar Szegedy-Maszak, Washington, D. C., Formerly Minister of Hungary to the United States
33. Rear Admiral W. F. Dietrich, U. S. N. (Ret.), Washington, D. C., Formerly U. S. Naval Representative, Allied Control Commission for Hungary
34. Dr. Alexander Szasz, Bank of America, San Francisco, California, Formerly Counselor of Hungarian Legation, Washington, D. C.
35. Dr. Zoltan Bay, George Washington University, Formerly Professor of Physics, Technical University of Budapest
36. Dr. Sandor A. Hoffmann, National Fireworks, Inc., Formerly Associate Professor of Chemistry, Technical University of Budapest
37. Dr. Leslie Kovasznyay, Associate Professor, Johns Hopkins University, Formerly Associate Professor of Aerodynamics, Technical University of Budapest
38. Dr. John Farago, George Washington University, Formerly Assistant Director in Charge of Research, Chemical Institute of Budapest
39. Mr. Charles Pulvari, George Washington University, Formerly owner of the firm Charles Pulvari, Inc., Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Budapest, Hungary
40. Dr. Laszlo Jekely, Forest Hills, New York, Formerly Minister in Charge of the Cabinet Office of the President of Hungary
41. Miss Agi Jambor, Philadelphia, Pa., Concert Pianist
42. Dr. George Papp, George Washington University, Formerly Associate Professor of Physics, Technical University of Budapest
43. Mr. George Kovach, General Manager, Great Northern Hotel, New York, N. Y., Colonel in the Military Intelligence, U. S. Army Reserve

GROUP III

44. Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, U. S. N. (Ret.), Formerly Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
45. Dr. Ralph Connor, Vice President in Charge of Research, Rohm and Haas Company
46. Captain A. A. Burke, U. S. N., Research and Development Board, National Military Establishment
47. Mr. H. R. Kimble, Physical Science Administrator, Bureau of Ordnance
48. Dr. C. R. Naeser, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, George Washington University
49. Dr. T. L. Brownyard, Physical Science Administrator, Bureau of Ordnance
50. Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons, U. S. N., Office of the Secretary of Defense.
51. Dr. J. G. Kirkwood, Professor of Chemistry, California Institute of Technology
52. Mrs. Dorothy Bandow, San Antonio, Texas, Formerly Secretary of Dr. Stephen Brunaauer
53. Dr. S. R. Aspinall, Assistant Professor of Chemistry, Williams College
54. Mr. Datus Smith, Director, Princeton University Press
55. Dr. Eugene Wigner, Professor of Physics, Princeton University

56. Dr. R. H. Cole, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, Brown University
57. Dr. J. S. Coles, Associate Professor of Chemistry, Brown University
58. Dr. J. O. Hirschfelder, Professor of Chemistry, University of Wisconsin, Director, University of Wisconsin Naval Research Laboratory
59. Mr. N. H. Bullard, Head Engineer, Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California
60. Mr. O. H. Loeffler, Ordnance Engineer, Bureau of Ordnance
61. Mr. Eliot B. Coulter, Assistant Chief, Visa Division, U. S. Department of State
62. Mr. Robert C. Alexander, Assistant Chief, Visa Division, U. S. Department of State
63. Captain W. M. Moses, U. S. N. (Ret.), Wilton, Connecticut
64. Mr. J. S. Harper, Chemical Engineer, Laurel, Mississippi
65. Dr. E. H. Cox, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, Swarthmore College
66. Dr. F. O. Rice, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, Catholic University of America
67. Dr. K. F. Herzfeld, Professor of Physics, Head of Department, Catholic University of America
68. Dr. A. H. Blatt, Professor of Chemistry, Queens College
69. Mr. J. E. Levy, Chemical Engineer, Bureau of Ordnance
70. Dr. R. D. Bennett, Technical Director, Naval Ordnance Laboratory
71. Captain W. B. Moore, U. S. N., Bureau of Ordnance
72. Mr. Lester Glickman, Engineer, Naval Ordnance Laboratory
73. Dr. W. M. Cady, Head, Physics Branch, Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California
74. Mr. J. S. McCorkle, Physicist, Bureau of Ordnance
75. Dr. Henry Eyring, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, University of Utah
76. Mr. W. F. Skinner, Assistant Director of Research, Naval Mine Depot, Yorktown, Va.
77. Dr. E. H. Eyster, Associate Division Chief, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
78. Mr. R. W. Harris, Ordnance Engineer, Bureau of Ordnance
79. Miss Jacqueline Kitchens, Mathematical Analyst, Bureau of Ordnance
80. Dr. P. C. Cross, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, University of Washington
81. Dr. W. D. Kennedy, Senior Research Chemist, Tennessee Eastman Company
82. Dr. R. A. Beebe, Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, Amherst College
83. Dr. L. R. Rumbaugh, Deputy Technical Director, Naval Ordnance Laboratory
84. Dr. L. H. Farinholt, Associate Professor of Chemistry, Columbia University
85. Dr. W. A. Noyes, Jr., Professor of Chemistry, Head of Department, University of Rochester
86. Dr. J. J. Stoker, Professor of Mathematics, New York University
87. Mr. R. L. Woodard, Administrator, Koppers Company
88. Colonel C. H. M. Roberts, U. S. A., Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Department of the Army
89. Mr. J. T. Manley, Director of Research, Naval Mine Depot, Yorktown, Virginia
90. Mr. E. C. Kenton, Manager, Evans Research and Development Corporation
91. Dr. Elijah Swift, Jr., Division Chief, Explosives Research Department, Naval Ordnance Laboratory
92. Miss Katharine Love, Chemist, U. S. Department of Agriculture
93. Dr. R. H. Brown, Instructor of Mathematics, Columbia University
94. Dr. D. V. Sickman, Division Chief, Explosives Research Department, Naval Ordnance Laboratory
95. Dr. F. H. Westheimer, Professor of Chemistry, University of Chicago
96. Mrs. Hazel P. Marsh, Formerly Lieutenant, U. S. Navy, Bureau of Ordnance
97. Captain J. A. E. Hindman, U. S. N., Bureau of Ordnance
98. Dr. Urner Liddel, Director, Natural Sciences Division, Office of Naval Research
99. Dr. B. H. Sage, Professor of Chemical Engineering, Head of Department, California Institute of Technology
100. Dr. W. E. Lawson, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company
101. Mr. C. L. Tyler, Manager, Santa Fe Operations Office, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission

102. Dr. M. A. Tuve, Director, Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, Carnegie Institution of Washington
 103. Dr. K. O. Friedrichs, Professor of Mathematics, New York University
 104. Commander J. I. Cone, U. S. N., Commander Destroyer Division 12, U. S. Pacific Fleet

[Enclosure 3]

The Navy Department announces that Dr. Stephen Brunauer, who has been charged with being a Communist, served as a Commander, United States Naval Reserve, in the Bureau of Ordnance during the war, commencing in 1942. Subsequent to discharge, he was employed in the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department, where he is now serving in a civilian capacity. As an employee of that Bureau, Dr. Brunauer has been thoroughly investigated, and as a result of this investigation, administrative decision was made that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant Dr. Brunauer's being charged with having been disloyal and for that reason his case has not been referred to the Loyalty Board.

While a commissioned officer during the war and later as an employee, Dr. Brunauer has made noteworthy contributions in the field of explosives. He is regarded as an eminent expert in that field and his ability in the field of research is highly regarded.

MARCH 13, 1950.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: You have asked me to inform your subcommittee concerning the circumstances of the appointment of Dr. Harlow Shapley to the United States National Commission for UNESCO. Dr. Shapley was designated by the Executive Committee of the American Association for the Advancement of Science on May 20, 1947, to serve out the unexpired term of Dr. James Bryant Conant as the representative of that association on the national committee. On June 27, 1947, he was again designated by the association and has now served out his term, which expired April 15, 1950; Dr. Shapley was not, under Public Law 565, seventy-ninth Congress, eligible for reappointment.

Section 3 of Public Law 565 provides, in part, "Such Commission [United States National Commission for UNESCO] shall be appointed by the Secretary of State and shall consist of (a) not more than sixty representative of principal national, voluntary organizations interested in educational, scientific, and cultural matters * * *." The Secretary of State has appointed to the National Commission in every instance the person designated by each such organization to serve on the Commission. This seems to be in accord with the intent of Congress as expressed in the legislative history of the act. In the course of debate concerning the legislation, Congressman Karl Mundt (Republican, South Dakota) said:

"* * * it seems to me if we are going to have an advisory commission that is worth its salt it should be an advisory commission that is not obligated to anybody, not obligated to the Secretary of State, not obligated to any political party, not obligated to any point of view, but one which reflects and represents the views of the organizations to which in turn these delegates are supposed to carry the inspiration and the message and the information of UNESCO.

"Consequently, I want people selected from these organizations in whom the organizations have confidence. I want the Secretary of State to choose the man nominated by these various organizations so that they can go to the advisory conferences, consult and advise with the Secretary of State, so that our Government officials may have the benefit of this great cross section of information."

Congressman Mundt, whose interest in and support of the principles of UNESCO extends over many years, sponsored H. Res. 215, introduced on April 9, 1945, and agreed to by the House of Representatives on May 22, 1945. This resolution urged the participation of the United States in the creation of an international

framework within which educational and cultural relations could be considered and promoted in their various aspects.

It should be added that Dr. Shapley was appointed as a member of the United States Delegation to the Preparatory Conference for UNESCO at London in 1945 under former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. His participation in the work of UNESCO has stemmed from the outset from his position as a scientist and member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN E. PEURIFOX,
Deputy Under Secretary.

The following letters were received by the Foreign Relations Subcommittee in response to its invitations to the persons publicly charged by Senator McCarthy to either appear before the subcommittee as a witness or else submit a statement of their position :

OLD WESTBURY, LONG ISLAND, N. Y., May 10, 1950.

EDWARD P. MORGAN, Esq.,

*Chief Counsel, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORGAN : I have your letter of May 4, 1950, acknowledging the receipt of the documents submitted to the subcommittee on March 30, 1950, and offering me the opportunity to reply to Senator McCarthy's charges in public. I appreciate your offer and the spirit in which this opportunity is afforded me.

You will recall that, in my letter of March 30, 1950, I explained to Senator Tydings the difficulty of my position. As a member of the United Nations Secretariat, I am required to observe the spirit and substance of article 100 of the United Nations Charter. That article reads in part :

"In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek nor receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization."

For the above reason, and because I must leave on May 17, 1950, for Italy and Switzerland on official United Nations business, I do not feel that I can take advantage of the opportunity offered me by the subcommittee. I expect to return to the United States in late July.

I should tell you that I have caused to be sent to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a copy of the letter and memorandum of March 30, 1950, which I sent to Senator Tydings. I have also sent a copy of that letter and memorandum to Mr. Willard Barber of the State Department. I am enclosing herewith a copy of the memorandum, in affidavit form, which I have subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before a notary public of the State of New York. I do this to indicate that that memorandum contains all the pertinent facts known to me and to show that I have no hesitation whatsoever in adhering to them under oath. I should be only too happy, of course, to answer any questions pertaining to, or make any additional statements in explanation of, the facts which I have given in the memorandum when and if you, Senator Tydings, or other members of the subcommittee request it.

Respectfully yours,

GUSTAVO DURAN.

Enc. affidavit.

By registered mail.

MEMORANDUM TO SENATOR TYDINGS

On March 14, when I read the first reports on the charges made against me Senator McCarthy before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, I issued a statement denying the specific charges that had come to my attention and stating that I was not and never had been a Communist. I also said that I suspected that the so-called United States Army Intelligence Report on which Senator McCarthy was basing most of his allegations was nothing more than a literal translation of an article published in the April 9, 1946, issue of the Madrid newspaper *Arriba* which is the mouthpiece of the Falange Party of Franco Spain.

I have now had an opportunity to examine in detail the testimony of Senator McCarthy before the subcommittee, and my suspicions as to his sources have been fully confirmed.

I had thought that those accusations had long since been laid to rest. Both the charges and the exhibits which appeared to substantiate them were found to be entirely baseless and misleading by the State Department Security Committee in 1946. Even the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which had first given publicity to the charges, decided against pressing the matter any further.

You have before you the letter, dated September 14, 1946, of Mr. Donald Russell, then Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of Personnel Affairs, in which it is stated that the Security Committee, after reviewing the entire record as procured from all available sources, recommended favorably on me.

With only one or two easily refutable exceptions, Senator McCarthy has come forward with no new charges, and no additional material with which to support his accusations. I therefore cannot understand why the conclusions of the Security Committee and Mr. Donald Russell are not equally as valid today as they were in 1946. For the sake of clearing the record once and for all, and in the hope that these unfounded accusations will never again arise to disturb the peace to which my family and I are entitled, I wish to lay before you and the subcommittee the facts as they are known to me, and as they are known to the Security Committee and to all those responsible persons who have known me intimately for a period of many years. In this connection, I am attaching a biographical sketch of my family background and career.

The testimony of Senator McCarthy is based on (a) a United States Military Intelligence Report, dated June 4, 1946, which, in turn, is based on a report given the United States Military Attaché at Madrid by the A. C. of S., G-2, Spanish Central General Staff; (b) a report made by Mr. Indalecio Prieto on August 9, 1938, before the National Committee of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, and subsequently incorporated in a pamphlet entitled "How and Why I left the Ministry of National Defense"; (c) statements made by Lt. Edward J. Ruff, Assistant United States Military Attaché in the Dominican Republic; and (d) information allegedly obtained directly by Senator McCarthy or by his assistants.

(a) As I pointed out in my statement to the press, the Spanish Army Intelligence Report which was incorporated in the report of the United States Military Attaché was a literal reproduction of a scurrilous attack on me published in the April 9, 1946, issue of the Madrid newspaper *Arriba*, which is the mouthpiece of the Falange Party of Franco Spain.

The article in *Arriba* was published as part of the campaign of the Franco Government to counter disclosures that had been made by the United States State Department on the relations between Nazi Germany and Franco Spain during the last World War. These disclosures were actually excerpts from the captured records of the German Foreign Office, but the Franco Government broadcast the story in Madrid, first on February 28, 1946, and subsequently on March 3, 1946, that I had personally fabricated the disclosures. The Franco Government, which had paid no attention to me for seven years, suddenly undertook to make me an agent of Moscow and to smear my character in the vilest possible way.

A clipping of this article was forwarded to the United States Government by the United States Naval Attaché in Madrid, under Intelligence Report No. 135-46 dated April 15, 1946. I have a photostatic copy of the article in my possession, a copy and translation of which I am attaching hereto. Comparison of the article with the wording and very order of the Spanish Military Intelligence Report shows that both documents are identical.

When in May 1946 the United States Military Attaché requested information on me from the Intelligence Service of the Spanish Central General Staff, the Franco Government, feeling that at that moment it would serve its purposes to smear my character, and being unable to produce a single instance of substantial evidence, resorted to sending to the United States Military Attaché a literal copy of the *Arriba* article. Apparently the Military Attaché had no knowledge that the article had been already transmitted by the Naval Attaché at the time of its publication, and therefore accepted the Spanish Military Intelligence report as a bona fide document based on actual facts. Aside from the misrepresentations concerning my character and beliefs, the report contains such gross inaccuracies regarding easily ascertainable facts, such as my birthplace and residence, that had the Military Attaché taken the precaution of checking these facts, he would have questioned the validity of the report.

Having established the unreliable character of Senator McCarthy's chief source of information, I would like to examine the charges one by one.

1. The newspaper Arriba charged, and the so-called Intelligence Report repeated verbatim, that I came to Madrid "for the first time in the 1920's from the Canary Islands in the company of * * * Nestor." As stated in my biographical sketch, and as shown by the enclosed photostatic copy of my birth certificate dated April 3, 1940, which was extended by the very same government that six years later gave the Canary Islands as my birthplace, I was born in Barcelona. I resided with my family continuously in Madrid from 1910 till 1929. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has in its files a list of the various domiciles of my family. This information, which was provided by me, can be easily checked.

2. Arriba said, and the so-called Military Intelligence Report repeated verbatim, that "as a friend of Nestor" I became "employed as a pianist in the company of Antonia Mercé, the Argentinita." Actually, I was not employed by Antonia Mercé as a pianist, nor was I recommended to her by Mr. Nestor. Madame Mercé asked me to compose the score of a ballet, as she asked several other Spanish composers. My score was performed in various European capitals, and it was for the purpose of conducting it that I accompanied her during her tour of Germany in 1927.

Incidentally, the stage name of Antonia Mercé was actually "La Argentina," and "La Argentinita" was the stage name of a lesser dancer whose real name was Encarnación Lopez. Both dancers have appeared in New York. Had the report been prepared by a reliable official source, and not improvised by a journalist bent on libel, such confusion in identity could not have been made.

3. Arriba and the so-called Report go on to say that my "repulsive morals" caused me "to incur the fury of the Berlin police," that I was ousted from Germany, and that "similar trouble happened to me in other European capitals." Actually I have never been arrested at any time in any city on any charge, or ever been reprimanded by an officer of the law, except for once passing a stop sign in Mineola, Long Island.

As regards the loathsome immoral tendencies that Arriba and the so-called Report have attributed to me and that Senator McCarthy has echoed, I challenge Senator McCarthy or anyone to repeat that charge, not in classified reports or privileged statements, but to my face.

With respect to the charge that I was known under the name of "El Porcellana," the first time in my life that I had ever heard that appellation applied to me, or for that matter to anyone, was when I read the scurrilous Arriba attack. General Franco's pressmen who invented this particular piece of nonsense must feel proud to know that it has been picked up and echoed by a Senator of the United States of America.

4. Arriba, the so-called Military Intelligence Report, and Senator McCarthy charge that I returned to Madrid upon the Proclamation of the Spanish Republic (1931) under the cover of a representative of Paramount Pictures, but actually as an agent of the GPU. I returned to Spain in May 1934 from Paris, neither as an agent of the GPU nor as a representative of Paramount Pictures but simply as a person who returned home because the Spanish section of Paramount Pictures with which I had been working in Paris had been discontinued, as that company's records will show.

5. Arriba states, the so-called Report and Senator McCarthy repeat, that "such meetings took place in Duran's home at 104 or 106 Santa Engracia St., that the police had to make their appearance more than once." Any accurate police record would have given the correct number, which was 100, and would have mentioned the fact that that apartment was my father's home, and would have indicated that nothing took place at that address nor at any other place at which I or a member of my family has resided, which would call for police intervention.

6. Arriba, the so-called Report and Senator McCarthy charge that alleged records of the Madrid Police concerning me were probably destroyed "by his friend Serrano Poncela, Chief of Madrid Police, in October and November of 1936." The alleged police records on me never existed because I have never done anything that would call for an entry on any police record. In order to justify the lie that these records did exist a second lie had to be invented that they were destroyed. I have never met Mr. Serrano Poncela, nor any chief of the Madrid Police, nor any chief of police anywhere.

7. Arriba, the so-called Report and Senator McCarthy charge that I "formed part of the High Russian General Staff," that I "went to Moscow with a delegation of the male and female members of the Red Army," and that later I "was for some time in Paris." I was never a member of any Russian Staff; I have

never been in Moscow or any Russian territory; and, after the Spanish Civil War, I did not go to Paris until eight years later, when, in 1947, I was sent there on official duty by the United Nations.

At the end of the Spanish Civil War, through the intervention of Messrs. Abington Gooden, the British Consul General at Valencia, Alexander Hanson Ballantyne, Third Secretary of the British Embassy at Valencia, and Woodruff Wallner, American Consul at Valencia, I was evacuated from Spain aboard the British Cruiser *Galatea* and the Hospital Ship *Maine* and transported to England.

8. With regard to the United States Military Attaché's comment at the end of his report, I never, in the entire course of the Spanish Civil War, held any command in any International Brigade. As for the statement of the Attaché's incognito informer, that I murdered two innocent persons, it is a complete lie.

(b) With regard to the allegations based on Mr. Prieto's statement of 1938, I first learned that this statement had been made when ex-Congressman J. Parnell Thomas made his charges against me before the House on March 28, 1946. In the eight years that elapsed between the dates of Mr. Prieto's and Mr. Thomas' statements, I saw Mr. Prieto on a number of occasions. He was a guest at my house and our relations were cordial. At no time did he ever give me any indication that any one of my actions, past or present, had come in for criticism by him.

Immediately after Mr. Thomas had made his statement before the House, I wrote to Mr. Prieto requesting an explanation of Mr. Thomas' remarks. Mr. Prieto cabled as follows:

"Letter 29 received yesterday answered it today as follows: 'I affirm that the statements of Mr. John Parnell Thomas are not founded on any words said by me to him, with whom I have had no contact, nor to any person whatever. I have never accused you of being agent of the Russian police nor member of the Comintern and I never said anything whatever to anyone which would give a basis for believing it.' Referring to your telegram of today I add that I have not given to the Committee, with which I have never had any contact, any information concerning you or any other person."

When I learned, however, that Mr. Prieto had actually referred to "a certain Duran" in a report he had made on August 9, 1938, before the National Committee of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, I wrote to him again asking whether I was supposed to be that person. Mr. Prieto replied on April 12 that while I was the person referred to in his report, his statement did not imply that I was an agent of the Secret Russian Police or a member of the Comintern. Concerning my supposed Communist leanings, he went on to say:

"The facts described in that part of the report demonstrated how certain pressures were brought to bear, against my will, on government officials working under me. * * * I myself had to endure pressures of that kind without sufficiently defending myself against them."

Subsequently, Mr. Prieto stated to Messrs. Robert Willson Wall, Jr., and Richard Godfrey, Attachés to the American Embassy at Mexico City, that he had appointed me as head of the Madrid Zone of the Military Intelligence Service (SIM) at the proposal of General Miaja, then Commander of the Army of Madrid; he then reiterated that he (Prieto), like others in the Government who were equally hostile to communism, had been subjected to Communist pressures.

The facts concerning my brief assignment to the Military Intelligence Service (SIM) are as follows:

As already stated, I was an officer of the regular army of Spain under a legally constituted Government recognized by all countries with the sole exceptions of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. A coalition of political parties—right wing republican, center republican, socialist, communist and others—composed that Government.

As a soldier, I had sworn allegiance to that Government. It was therefore my duty to follow instructions from my superior officers, and through them from the Minister of National Defense.

Approximately six weeks after the conclusion of the Battle of Brunete (July-August 1937) in which my unit had actively participated, I was ordered by my immediate military superior, Colonel Heredia, Chief of the XVIIth Army Corps, to report for instructions to General Miaja, Chief of the Army of Madrid. When I reported to General Miaja he told me that I had been appointed by the Minister of National Defense (Mr. Prieto) as head of the Madrid Zone of the Military Intelligence Service.

As General Miaja will confirm, I objected to the assignment because I felt that I might best serve the interests of the Spanish Republic in my capacity as

a Division Commander on active duty at the front, and because I had a deeply rooted aversion towards the proposed type of activity. My objections were overridden and I was ordered to report to the Chief of the General Staff, General Vicente Rojo y Lluch, and to the Minister of National Defense (Mr. Prieto), at Valencia.

When, a few days later, I reported to the Chief of the General Staff at Valencia, I indicated again my objections to the assignment. The Chief of Staff told me that he had consented reluctantly to my appointment and only on condition that it be not considered permanent.

I then reported to Mr. Prieto and was instructed by him to receive technical advice and opinions from experts, for the organization of the Military Intelligence Service in the Madrid zone: these experts from whom I was to take advice would be designated by the Chief of the National Intelligence Service.

When I reported to the latter I was informed of the experts whose advice I was expected to follow.

I returned to Madrid at the beginning of October 1937 and, after a week of preliminary orientation, assumed my new duties. During the period of about two weeks of my actual tenure of office, a few temporary appointments were made at the recommendations of the experts. However, the operational stage of the service had not even begun when about the middle of October 1937, I was ordered by the Chief of the General Staff to report back to the XVIIIth Army Corps. The Chief of the General Staff, making preparations at that time for the Battle of Teruel (December 1937-January 1938), requested my return to active duty in order that I might reassume command of and reorganize my Division which was slated to participate at that Battle.

The decision was very much to my liking and seemed wholly logical to me. Mr. Prieto has asserted that he was subjected to various pressures and maneuvers to keep me in Madrid. I was completely unaware of such pressures and maneuvers and had no part of them. Whether justified or not, I had the reputation of being a successful military commander with a capacity for organization. This simple fact can explain why I was ordered to Madrid in the first instance, and why I was recalled to the active front when an important military operation was impending.

General Vicente Rojo y Lluch, Chief of the General Staff of the Army of the Spanish Republic, and now an Honorary Brigadier General of the Bolivian Army and a Professor of History of Strategy and Tactics at the Command and General Staff School of Bolivia, can verify the above account.

(c) Concerning the charges made and the opinions expressed by Lt. Edward J. Ruff, Assistant United States Military Attaché in the Dominican Republic, all of them are merely repetitions of the charges that have been previously answered in this memorandum.

The charges are said by Lieutenant Ruff to have been submitted "by a Spanish refugee who also served in Duran's promotion board in Spain." I do not know what is meant by this phrase. If it is meant that there was at any time a promotion board in any of the military units under my command, this part of the statement is as false as the rest. If the reference concerns the promotion board of the General Staff, my successive promotions in the Spanish Army were made exclusively at the recommendations of my immediate superior officers and for strictly military reasons.

(d) The statements made by Senator McCarthy based on information allegedly obtained by himself were (1) that I was taken into the State Department from my job "as a lieutenant-colonel in the Communist International Brigade"; (2) that I am "actually with the International Refugee Organization engaged in work having to do with screening refugees coming into this country"; (3) that my naturalization "took about six weeks"; and (4) that I obtained employment in the United Nations upon the recommendation of "a member of the present Presidential Cabinet."

(1) As stated in the attached biographical sketch, I was a reserve noncommissioned officer in the regular army of the Spanish Republic when the Civil War broke out, and consequently I served in the regular army throughout the war. I was never a member of any "International Brigade." During the years prior to my employment in the State Department, I resided in England for over a year. After arriving in the United States, I worked successively in the Museum of Modern Art of New York City, and in the Pan American Union, Washington, D. C.

(2) It is a matter of public record that I have never been employed by the International Refugee Organization nor have I had anything whatsoever to

do with screening refugees coming into this or any other country. Had the Senator consulted the telephone directory of the United Nations, he would have found the Department and Section in which I work.

(3) As regards my naturalization, I arrived in this country on May 28, 1940 and resided here continuously for two and one-half years prior to attaining citizenship. I declared my intention to become an American citizen at the time I received my immigration visa on April 30, 1940. I fully complied with the period of residence required by the Naturalization Statute, contrary to Senator McCarthy who presumes to know that I obtained my naturalization in "about six weeks."

(4) Finally, in obtaining employment in the United Nations, I neither sought nor received any form of support from any official of the United States Government.

At no time have I hidden the fact that I actively participated in the Spanish Civil War. When in 1940 I was registered for the draft in the United States Army, I gave a detailed statement on my military career in Spain to the Local Draft Board #750, at Mamaroneck, New York. This period of my life has also been mentioned in every application I have filed for employment.

I would like to add that there are many people in responsible positions in this country, in England, in Spain, and in Latin America who have known me for many years and who can testify as to my moral integrity and beliefs with an authority that the sources quoted by Senator McCarthy do not possess.

Finally, I wish to state that I chose to become an American because I believe in and unreservedly adhere to the institutions and ideals of this country. My wife is an American citizen by birth. My children are American and are being brought up in accordance with the best American traditions. The obscene and false accusations that have been made against me harm not only myself but also my wife and children. I have faith that the sense of justice of the Senate of the United States will correct this situation once and for all and will allow me to live in the decency and privacy to which I am entitled.

GUSTAVO DURAN.

MARCH 30, 1950.

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of Nassau.

Sworn to before me this 10th day of May 1950.

ANNA M. WILSON.

HARVARD COLLEGE OBSERVATORY,
Cambridge, Mass., May 9, 1950.

Mr. EDWARD P. MORGAN,

*Chief Counsel, Subcommittee Investigating the State Department,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORGAN: I thank you for your letter of May 4 and the subcommittee's kind offer to afford me an opportunity to reply in public to the charges by Senator Joseph McCarthy. Since I have never been on the payroll of the State Department, and since my activities seem to be wholly irrelevant to the current political attack on the Government, I have no desire to dignify the irresponsible slanders by appearing publicly in defense. I should be glad, however, to submit a statement, if the subcommittee would like, providing I can be informed as to the nature of the charges against me. When they were made 2 or 3 months ago they changed from hour to hour and day to day.

When I heard that the Loyalty Board proposed to examine again the records of all who had been named by Senator McCarthy, I wrote a letter to my acquaintance, Mr. Seth Richardson, Chairman of the Board, enclosing copies of two publicly issued statements. I enclose copies of both of these statements herewith.

Again with my thanks for the opportunity to reply publicly and in person.

Very sincerely yours,

HARLOW SHAPLEY.

APRIL 7, 1950.

Mr. SETH W. RICHARDSON,

*The President's Loyalty Review Board,
White House Offices, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: From a press report I learn that the President's Loyalty Review Board, or some similar agency, plans to look into the loyalty evidence of all the individuals named by Senator McCarthy during this past month or so of accusations. I enclose copies of statements I have made in reply to the McCarthy charges. Also a requested response to the attack by Mr. Ober of Baltimore, of last spring. This item, "Flying Samovars," was printed in June in the Harvard Alumni Bulletin. It comments on the Waldorf Conference; but all phases of that "Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace" are presented in a pamphlet *Speaking of Peace* which is probably in your committee's possession. If not, and it could be of any service with respect to the various participants, I shall be glad to have a copy sent to you.

I believe that the nature of the Waldorf Conference was the chief subject matter at a small dinner we both attended in New York City a year ago.

Sincerely yours,

HARLOW SHAPLEY.

APRIL 22, 1950.

Mr. JOHN O. TOERNER,

*Chairman, Catholic Activity Committee, St. Joseph Council,
521 West 207th Street, New York 34, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. TOERNER: I am sincerely glad to have your letter and the enclosed pamphlet. I have no doubt but that you sent me your letter and this printed statement in complete good faith. I appreciate the quotation from the encyclical of Pope Pius XI. As the holder of the Pope Pius XI Prize for my scientific and civic contributions, I am naturally sensitive to the statement by this great leader.

I note that you say in your first sentence that I am "unfortunately listed with pro-Communist organizations." I agree with you. It is very unfortunate, since I do not belong to any pro-Communist organization. In the days when Russia was our ally I helped, as did a million of Americans, with Russian relief; and I helped sponsor American-Russian friendship, as did General Eisenhower and many other distinguished Americans. Also I have fought hard, and will continue to fight hard, for the defense of all antitotalitarian activities, and against the abuses of constitutional civil liberties and human rights in America. It is true that in these days of hysteria, and of overwhelming suspicion of our fellowmen, the abuses of civil rights have largely involved adherents to left-wing movements. Here in America the minority persecutors have not yet gone after the fascists or the extreme rightists.

The American-Russian Institute, of which I am a trustee, along with several distinguished Wall Street lawyers and other patriotic Americans, is not the slightest partisan or pro-Communist, but an educational organization of some twenty-three years' standing, serving to give information about Russian political, economic, and demographic affairs to American business, government, and educational groups (Reader's Digest, General Electric Company, and the like). In blind mistake it is listed by the Attorney General as suspect, but that does not force me to run to cover.

I had hoped, and still hope, that some organization such as yours would have something to say (and I mean this seriously and sincerely) in response to Drew Pearson's comments on the relation of Senator McCarthy's rather wild red and publicity hunt to Father Walsh of Georgetown. Perhaps it has been answered. But I really need to know the answer. I want to treat it fairly, and I hope it is published.

Certainly your organization is not very proud of the career, for the past two months, of Senator Joseph McCarthy. Americans like sportsmanship; bravery; honesty.

I enclose a copy of a statement that was printed about his attack on me.

Sincerely yours,

HARLOW SHAPLEY.

IN RESPONSE TO A HEADLINE ATTACK BY CLERK DORGAN AND STATE ASSEMBLYMAN MCCARTHY OF BOSTON, REQUESTING HARVARD UNIVERSITY TO DISCHARGE THE UNDERSIGNED AS ONE UNFIT TO HOLD A POST IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY

(The account published in the Harvard Crimson on March 22 was followed on March 23 with the following reply)

The attack on me by Mr. Dorgan and the two McCarthy's¹ is both tiresome and rather comic. Tiresome, because they parade the old allegations fabricated by J. Parnell Thomas² and his agents, which are as untrue and misleading today as they were a year ago. I have no desire to argue with Dorgan and the McCarthy's in the interest of their headlines. Comic, because all this noise is made about one who has never met an American Communist and knows only three or four Americans who have been at times defenders of all things Russian. (I know "scientifically" half a dozen European scientists who are said to be Communists.)

In spite of this hysterical nonsense, however, I shall not retreat from my willingness to work for humanitarian causes, and in the interest of preventing war and of maintaining civil rights and freedoms in America.

The first wild and roaring charges against me by Republican Senator McCarthy, a month ago, contained six misstatements in four sentences—perhaps the indoor record for mendacity. The only thing right was my name. He moderated the charges in the course of a few days to almost nothing, thus admitting his complete irresponsibility. It seems to me that his methods are a decided menace to the Republican Party, a dishonor to the United States Senate, and a positive danger to America at this critical time.

HARLOW SHAPLEY.

FLYING SAMOVARs

TO THE EDITOR OF THE BULLETIN:

It is simply a matter of survival. Shall we gamble away our western culture that generations of artists, scientists, and industrialists have helped to build? Shall we rely on peace through threat and force, the temporary peace of the bully, or shall we seek peace and survival through peaceful means? We hear of the greatest of all peacetime armies in Russia. We find our own country, already the mightiest Nation in the history of the world, officially boasting its atomic bombs, showing off its all-powerful Navy, strutting with its world-girdling air forces, striving to grow mightier and more deadly. Is it any wonder that some of us who have watched history, who have invested a bit in current civilization, who are willing to recognize hysteria as hysteria—is it surprising that we are willing to look for alternatives to the force method, that has such a sad record of futility?

As one involved in international scientific work and responsibilities, along with many others I feel some obligation to concern myself with the social crisis. If conferences on ways of attaining international good will should be a part of our contribution, we shall not hesitate to plan meetings for the study of peace, notwithstanding Mr. Ober's³ nervous displeasure or continued attacks by the defamatory section of the Press.

No matter how loudly Mr. Hearst and his kind shout that the New York conference was Communist planned or Communist operated, the statement is completely false. More than anyone else, I personally planned the conference (beginning two years ago) and presided at all the major meetings. By no feat of distortion can I be made out as communist, or fascist, or reactionary Republican. I am a member of no political party. No one could be more opposed than I to totalitarianism, whether it emanates from dictator, political bureau, or those who advocate minority-suppression legislation.

The peace conference fell on unfortunate times. We did not foresee a year ago that the Government would in March be selling the Atlantic Pact to a worried Europe and that a terrifically expensive armament program must be glamorized and justified. How to do it? Frighten the public. Scare the togas off the Congressmen. Smear all antimilitarists. In transparent ways, sometimes,

¹ The other is Senator Joseph McCarthy, of Wisconsin.

² New Jersey Congressman, now in a federal prison in Connecticut.

³ Mr. Ober, attorney of Baltimore, has asked Harvard to do something about Professors Ciardi and Shapley. The University vigorously declines to do so.

built-up fears are employed. A Cabinet member publicly rumors a submarine off the coast—and Congress comes through with the big appropriations. Then no more of the submarine scare. Soon now more billions must be voted. What will be the panic technique this time—flying samovars?

Frankly, I am sorry that we had to witness the Government's deliberate stacking of the Conference with guests only from eastern Europe and the pulling down of an American iron curtain against western Europeans, thus thwarting a major goal of UNESCO, and setting the stage for red-baiting. I am sorry the National Manufacturers Association could not carry out its truly intelligent plan of showing America to the visiting communists. I am sorry that we must repeatedly point out what should be obvious—that all of our work in science and the arts—of the past, of the present and the future—will mean nothing at all if the trend toward war is not stopped or diverted.

In the opening address at the New York Conference for World Peace, I emphasized the fact that both Russia and America are so obsessed with each other's shortcomings that they overlook, or choose to ignore, their own shortcomings. I pointed out that racial discrimination in America is perhaps our most embarrassing social fault. The totalitarian curb on individual freedoms is, in the opinion of America, the primal curse of the Russian system. One country is said to export communistic social doctrines, the other economic imperialism. But why not both practice tolerance, seek adjustments, and turn our fighting instincts and our human wealth to war on the real enemies of all mankind—to war on poverty, disease, ignorance, and baseless suspicion.

The conference in New York, bravely sponsored by more than 500 leading American citizens, was impressive to those who took part. Serious, sincere, critical but friendly, all the meetings, from the initial dinner to the conclusion in Madison Square Garden, were oversubscribed, and hundreds sought to participate that could not be admitted. Much of the American public, however, obtained from press and radio the impression that something evil and dangerous was happening.

After the first World War, the minority persecution died down when the disgraceful furor, that had been whipped up largely by the Attorney General of that time, had become tiresome. Perhaps we have now reached the crest of this unthinking hysteria.

If more tolerant times come again and international disaster is averted, notwithstanding the militarism of Russia and the United States, then the various American conference for world peace may be remembered as events that turned us toward thoughts of saving ourselves, instead of risking the destruction of civilization, through attempting to solve world problems with bombs and poison.

JUNE 1949.

HARLOW SHAPLEY.

WILLIAMS COLLEGE,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
Williamstown, Mass., May 9, 1950.

MR. EDWARD P. MORGAN,
*Chief Counsel, Subcommittee Investigating the State Department,
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORGAN: Thank you for your letter of May 4, which did not reach me until yesterday afternoon, May 8, due no doubt to current delays in postal deliveries. I appreciate your consideration, and that of the subcommittee, in offering me an opportunity to reply in public to the charges made against me by Senator Joseph McCarthy, or to submit a statement to the subcommittee. For personal reasons arising out of family problems and my teaching duties, I prefer to do the latter, as follows:

Senator McCarthy's allegation that I am, or have ever been, a Communist or Communist sympathizer is a falsehood. On March 14, 1950, upon reading of his accusation in the daily press, I released the following statement to AP, UP, NBC, and the New York Times:

Senator McCarthy is mistaken in supposing that I have ever held any post in the Department of State or the Foreign Service. He is perhaps con-

fusing this with my lectures at the National War College, to which I was invited by Maj. Gen. L. L. Lemnitzer, Lt. Gen. H. R. Bull, and Vice Adm. H. W. Hill. I am as opposed to communism as is Senator McCarthy, but I do not believe we shall ever be in agreement as to the definition of "Communist-front organizations."

Senator McCarthy's references to various alleged "Communist-front organizations" to which he alleges that I belong, or once belonged, is a garbled and inaccurate rebash of accusations made against me by Martin Dies and by the House Committee on Un-American Activities early in 1943 when I was employed by the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications Commission. These accusations were investigated at length by the Kerr committee, a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. Senator Clinton P. Anderson, of New Mexico, former Secretary of Agriculture, and in 1943 a member of the House of Representatives, was a member of the Kerr committee. In referring recently to the McCarthy charges, he spoke favorably of my testimony (see the Congressional Record, March 27, 1950, p. 4162) and was quoted in the press of March 28, 1950, as saying:

If you were to sit down with Schuman for five or six hours, Joe (McCarthy), and talk to him, you would be convinced of his loyalty and intelligence. I think he's a fine American.

The stenographic transcript of the hearings before the Kerr committee was not published (except for those portions relating to three other individuals) but is, I presume, available in the files of the House Appropriations Committee, Seventy-eighth Congress, second session. In its first printed report of April 21, 1943, the Kerr committee asserted that in my case it had found no evidence of disloyalty or unfitness to hold Federal office.

My own evaluation of the motives and morals of Senator McCarthy need not here be set forth, since it is identical with the judgments already publicly expressed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Mr. John Peurifoy, Dr. Philip Jessup, Judge Dorothy Kenyon, and Professor Owen Lattimore. I have no information which is relevant to the current inquiry into alleged disloyalty in the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

With gratitude for your fairness and courtesy (and that of the committee) which seem to me to be in the best American tradition, I am, Sir,

Very truly yours,

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN,
Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government, Williams College.

NEW YORK, N. Y., May 15, 1950.

MR. EDWARD P. MORGAN,
Chief Counsel,

*Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Investigating the State Department.*

MY DEAR MR. MORGAN: Last Monday I received your letter dated May 4 but I have been and still am unable to reply thereto because of the absence from his office of my attorney, Mr. Clifford J. Durr, with whom I wish to consult by mail.

I wish now only to assure you that I appreciate the opportunity offered me by the subcommittee to reply to the charges made against me by Senator McCarthy, and that I shall communicate with you later after I have been able to get in touch with Mr. Durr.

Very truly yours,

MARY JANE KEENEY.

The subcommittee has never received any additional information from Mrs. Mary Jane Keeney.

The following letters were received by the Foreign Relations Subcommittee from Mr. Louis F. Budenz.

CRESTWOOD, TUCKAHOE, N. Y., May 3, 1950.

MR. EDWARD P. MORGAN,
*Counsel, Senate Subcommittee Investigating State Department,
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
U. S. Capitol, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORGAN: In connection with your investigation of the Amerasia case, it may be of value to your committee to know that according to my direct knowl-

edge. Robert William Weiner, alias for Welwel Warzover, was involved at least in supervising the financial arrangements for the defense in that case.

When I state that this arises from my direct knowledge, I mean to indicate that I heard statements to that effect from Mr. Weiner and others on the Ninth Floor of the Communist Party headquarters during the discussions of the Amerasia case.

Mr. Weiner, as you may know, is an illegal alien, who has been for years in charge of the conspiratorial funds of the Communist Party.

Very truly yours,

LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ.

CRESTWOOD, TUCKAHOE, N. Y., May 5, 1950.

MR. EDWARD P. MORGAN,
*Counsel, Subcommittee Investigating the State Department,
 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States Capitol,
 Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORGAN: The involvement of Robert William Weiner, whose real name is Welwel Warzover, in the "arrangement" of the Amerasia case, as it came to my official attention when editor of the Daily Worker, was as follows:

As I testified in the open hearing connected with the charges against Owen J. Lattimore, there was a number of hurried but official conferences of subcommittees of the Politburo on the Amerasia affair during a number of weeks after the arrests occurred. I was called into several of these conferences, in order that I would be informed as editor of the Daily Worker as to the trend of these official discussions and decisions.

Later on, if the committee so desires, I shall be willing and ready to testify to each one of these conferences in which I participated. In one of them, specifically, Robert William Weiner was in the process of reporting on the financial aspects of the case and its "arrangement" when I entered the conference, which was held in Jack Stachel's room on the Ninth Floor of Communist Party headquarters. I had been called there by Stachel.

Weiner then said that he had and was assuming direction of the financial arrangements for the defense in this case and also the "specific financial arrangements for the settlement of the case satisfactorily."

It was the latter statement which struck me then and remained in my memory. Every financial transaction of any size had to be supervised by Weiner, if connected with the Communist Party activities. In that connection, I had known that he had paid certain ex-Communists—and one specifically—to refrain from giving information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the Dies committee.

The other reports on the "settlement" of the case at this session expressed satisfaction that arrangements were being made through "Kate Mitchell's Uncle" and other sources, to assure a "settlement" such as the Communist Party desired. One active participant in these discussions was the late Joseph Brodsky, counsel for the Communist Party.

You will recall that I found it impossible to give this and other testimony on the conferences officially held by the Communist leaders on the Amerasia case because the executive session was finally subject to interruption. I was unable, on that account, to go into the matter of the reports on the activities of some of the participants in the affair which may be of importance, and to which I alluded in my open testimony.

For the same reason, I did not get time to introduce three exhibits which I had with me at the time of the executive session. These are being sent under separate cover by registered mail. They have to do with Communist praise or commendation of Owen J. Lattimore's writings and opinions.

The latest of these is taken from the Daily Worker of February 15, 1950. In a review by David Carpenter, whose underground activities have already received some attention, you will note the emphasis that is put on Mr. Lattimore's introductions to the two books reviewed. Those introductions are indeed viewed as more important than the books themselves. For several reasons pleasing to the Communists, you will note, Mr. Lattimore's observation on the Russian conquest of Outer Mongolia is given special consideration.

Another article is taken from Political Affairs, the official theoretical organ of the Communist Party, for November 1946. It is written by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and you will note on page 995 that he commends Mr. Lattimore as

"the well-known liberal writer" and also agrees with Mr. Lattimore's view that the United States had been "a hitch-hiking imperialist" in the Far East.

The third selection is taken from the July 1945, issue of *Soviet Russia Today*, written by Harriet Moore of the Institute of Pacific Relations and Amerasia. You will note the emphasis put on Mr. Lattimore's tribute to the "democracy" of Soviet Russia. You will also note the warm commendation given his book, *Solution in Asia*, by Trud, the Soviet publication. This is significant since the alleged supplement to that publication, known as *New Times*, is actually the Communist International magazine in disguise. It is designed to give directives to Communists throughout the world.

As stated in my wire to you, I shall be able within two weeks from today to submit to the Committee additional data of this character.

Very truly yours,

LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ.

The additional material, referred to by Mr. Budenz in his letter of May 5, 1950, has never been received by the subcommittee.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, June 22, 1950.

HON. MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Reference is made to your letter dated June 15, 1950, in which you request to be advised whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation has interviewed Father James F. Kearney and, in the event the Federal Bureau of Investigation has conducted such an interview, whether any information has been received concerning the sources of Father Kearney's information.

Father Kearney was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on January 20, 1950, and he advised that he had no direct knowledge of Lattimore's activities and that the principal source of his information had been Alfred Kohlberg of the American-China Policy Association in New York City, who, according to Father Kearney, had charged that Lattimore screened applicants for positions in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department.

If I can be of further assistance to you in this matter, please do not hesitate to communicate with me.

Yours sincerely,

PEYTON FORD,
Deputy Attorney General.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D. C., May 26, 1950.

EDWARD P. MORGAN, Esq.,
*Chief Counsel, Subcommittee Investigating the State Department,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORGAN: This will acknowledge your letter of May 17, 1950, to Mr. Ford transmitting copies of the transcript of testimony of Louis F. Budenz given at the public session of your subcommittee on April 20, 1950, and in executive session on April 25, 1950.

The testimony of Mr. Budenz before your subcommittee has been compared in the Criminal Division with the reports furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of interviews with Mr. Budenz concerning Dr. Owen Lattimore. It appears that the information which Mr. Budenz has furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation is substantially similar to the testimony which he gave before your subcommittee.

Your cooperation in making the transcript of Mr. Budenz' testimony available is appreciated.

Respectfully,

JAMES M. MCINERNEY,
*Assistant Attorney General
(For the Attorney General).*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 3, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: This refers to a telephone conversation between Mr. Morgan and Mr. Fisher in regard to the case of Mr. Haldore Hanson. According to a statement made by Senator McCarthy on June 2, 1950, Mr. Budenz is alleged to have given some testimony to your committee in executive session which, in the opinion of Senator McCarthy, "is to the effect that this man Hanson was an important part of the Communist organization in the United States" (Congressional Record, p. 8113).

For your information, Mr. Hanson was first thoroughly investigated and cleared by the Department, and then received a full field investigation by the FBI under the Loyalty Order. Mr. Hanson was cleared by the Loyalty Security Board of the Department on July 26, 1948, and his case has been post-audited. However, it will be appropriate for the Board to review the case in the light of the recent public hearing and concomitant developments. Therefore, in view of the fact that no such information as referred to by Senator McCarthy was available to the members of the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State when it previously considered the case of Mr. Hanson, it is highly desirable that the relevant testimony on the part of Mr. Budenz be made available to the Department of State so that it can be determined whether Senator McCarthy's statement had any basis in fact. If it is possible to do this, please inform me so that I can indicate the name of the person qualified to inspect this transcript. Upon receipt of this information the authorities of the Department concerned will take whatever action appears to them to be appropriate.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE,
Acting Deputy Under Secretary.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 15, 1950.

Senator MILLARD TYDINGS,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I have been requested by the persons whose signatures appear on the enclosed statement to forward this letter to you with the request that it be made part of the record of your hearings on the case of Mr. Owen Lattimore.

The persons named wish to make it clear to your committee that they have signed the statement in their personal capacities only and not on behalf of the institutions with which they are connected.

In addition to the original signatures, I am enclosing a typed list of the names arranged in alphabetical order. A copy of this list is also being sent to Mr. Lattimore and his legal representatives.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Senator MILLARD TYDINGS
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: We the undersigned individuals are each professionally concerned with teaching scholarly research connected with Asiatic studies in the United States, and Owen Lattimore is known to us as a professional colleague in this field. Among us as individuals there is a diversity of personal opinion concerning American foreign policy, and as individual American specialists we also differ among ourselves in the degree to which we agree with Mr. Lattimore's personal views, but we are each fully convinced of his personal integrity as a scholar and his loyalty as an American citizen, and we deplore and condemn the irresponsible presentation to your committee of unsubstantiated charges against him. Both in our own professional work and in the development of a healthy public opinion on American foreign policy, we deeply believe in the vitality and strength of our democratic tradition of freedom of expression and diversity of opinion. We urge that your committee publicly affirm its belief

in these principles, strive to reach a definite view as to Mr. Lattimore's loyalty as an American citizen and make this view widely known to the public.

Name (arranged alphabetically), position, and university:

Virginia Thompson Adloff, Research, Institute of Pacific Relations, N. Y.
Knight Biggerstaff, Professor of Chinese History, Cornell University
Woolbridge Bingham, Associate Professor of Far Eastern History, University of California

Eugene P. Boardman, Assistant Professor of History, University of Wisconsin

Dorothy Borg, Research, New York City

Hugh Borton, Associate Professor of Japanese, Columbia University

Percy Buchanan, Director, Institute of Asiatic Affairs, University of Oklahoma

John F. Cady, Associate Professor of History, Ohio University

Schuyler Cammann, Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania

James J. Corry, Jr., Lecturer in Chinese, University of Michigan

John Hadley Cox, Assistant Professor, University of Michigan

Robert I. Crane, Instructor, University of Chicago

George B. Cressey, Professor of Geography, Syracuse University

John K. Fairbank, Professor of History, Harvard University

Miriam S. Farley, Research Associate, American Institute of Pacific Relations

Charles S. Gardiner, Research in Chinese History, Cambridge, Mass.

Gussie E. Gaskill, Librarian, Cornell University

Meredith P. Gilpatrick, Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University

J. W. Hall, Instructor, University of Michigan

Ellen Hammer, Institute of International Studies, Yale University

G. W. Harrison, Assistant Professor, University of Florida

James R. Hightower, Assistant Professor of Chinese Language and Literature, Harvard University

W. L. Holland, Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York

Elizabeth Huff, Head, East Asiatic Library, University of California, Berkeley

George A. Kennedy, Associate Professor of Chinese Language, Yale University

Gerard P. Koh, Associate Professor of Chinese Language, Yale University

Lawrence Krader, University of Washington

Marion J. Levy Jr., Assistant Professor of Sociology, Princeton University

Lucius C. Porter, Ex-professor, Yenching University, China, now at Beloit, Wis.

Earl H. Prichard, Associate Professor of Far Eastern History, University of Chicago

Harold S. Quigley, Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota

C. F. Remer, Professor of Economics, University of Michigan

Millard B. Rogers, Assistant Professor of Chinese Art History, Stanford University

Lawrence K. Rosing, Research Associate, American Institute of Pacific Relations

Laurence Sickman, Vice-Director, Nelson Gallery, Kansas City, Mo.

Stanley Spector, Far Eastern Institute, University of Washington

Rodger Swearingen, Lecturer, University of Southern California

Earl Swisher, History Department, University of Colorado

Philip H. Taylor, Professor of International Relations, Syracuse University

S. B. Thomas, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York City

Daniel Thorner, Assistant Professor of Economic History, South Asia Regional Studies Program, University of Pennsylvania

Mischa Titiev, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of Michigan

Royal J. Wald, Research Fellow, California

Harold J. Wiens, Assistant Professor of Geography, Yale University

C. Martin Wilbur, Associate Professor of Chinese History, Columbia University

Arthur Wright, Assistant Professor of History, Stanford University

Joseph K. Yamagiwa, Associate Professor of Japanese, University of Michigan

ARNOLD, FORTAS & PORTER,
Washington, D. C., May 11, 1950.

EDWARD P. MORGAN, Esquire.

*Chief Counsel, Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORGAN: You will recall that during the testimony of Dr. Owen Lattimore a request was made that we submit to the Committee copies of his correspondence to the Soviet Ambassador and the Chief of State of the Mongolian People's Republic when, in 1947, Dr. Lattimore was undertaking to obtain entry into that country to pursue his studies and research. Copies of that correspondence are enclosed for the Committee's files.

It is also requested that Dr. Lattimore supply to the Committee such correspondence as he engaged in the matter of Dr. Walther Heissig. In response thereto, we are submitting on Dr. Lattimore's behalf the following:

Letter from Dr. Heissig to Dr. Lattimore from Peiping of February 7, 1946.
Dr. Lattimore's response to Dr. Heissig of March 11, 1946.

Letter from Arthur F. Wright and Mary C. Wright of June 6, 1946.

Letter from William Hume, of the Harvard-Yenching Institute, to Dr. Lattimore of June 19, 1946.

Letter from Dr. F. D. Lessing, of the University of California, to Dr. Lattimore of June 19, 1946.

Letter of Dr. Lattimore to Mr. John Kullgren of June 21, 1946.

Letter of Dr. Lattimore to John Carter Vincent of June 21, 1946.

Letter of Dr. Lattimore to Ambassador Stuart of January 23, 1947, with enclosure.

Letter of Ambassador Stuart to Dr. Lattimore of February 7, 1947.

Letter to Dr. Lattimore from Floyd E. Masten of December 27, 1946.

Letter of Dr. Lattimore to Mr. Masten of January 23, 1947.

Letter of Dr. Heissig to Dr. Lattimore of June 9, 1948.

Letter of Dr. Lattimore to Dr. Heissig of July 12, 1948.

Letter of Dr. Heissig to Dr. Lattimore of March 14, 1949.

Letter of Dr. Lattimore to Mr. Frank Reel of April 14, 1949.

Letter of Dr. Heissig to Dr. Lattimore of May 18, 1949.

As to this category of communications relating to Dr. Heissig, it would be appreciated if the committee would return them after they have served their purpose in order that they may be returned to Dr. Lattimore for his files.

Sincerely yours.,

PAUL A. PORTER.

Enclosures.

FEBRUARY 11, 1947.

His Excellency Ambassador N. V. NOVIKOV,

Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: In view of the fact that there is no exchange of diplomatic representatives between the United States and the Mongolian People's Republic, I am taking the liberty of asking for your assistance in the following matter.

This summer, from June to September, I should like to travel and study in the Mongolian People's Republic, accompanied by my wife and my sixteen-year-old son. I have accordingly written to Marshal Choibalsang, asking if his Government will grant me the necessary permission. I enclose the original letter in English, together with my own rough translation into Mongol. I should be deeply grateful if your Embassy will do me the courtesy of transmitting these letters to the Mongol Ambassador in Moscow, so that they may be forwarded to Ulan Bator Khota.

The time is now somewhat short for arranging a visit to the Mongolian People's Republic for June-September of this year. As in any case I wish to continue my studies this summer, it would be well to have alternative plans in case I cannot go to Mongolia this summer. I therefore venture to add some further details and an alternative plan of travel and study for your consideration.

If I should not receive permission to visit the Mongolian People's Republic this summer, I wish to request from your Embassy a visa to travel, together with my wife and son, either to the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR or the Kazakh SSR. In making the journey, I suggest travelling by ship to Vladivostok, and from there by railway, or by air if it should be possible, in order to shorten the travelling time.

My reasons for my first plan of visiting the Mongolian People's Republic, and for my alternative plan of visiting the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR or the Kazakh SSR are as follows:

For twenty years I have been a student both of the history and of the contemporary problems of the Far East. My wife and I have travelled extensively in Manchuria, in Inner Mongolia, and in Sinkiang, in addition to living for many years in China. I am especially interested in the minority peoples both of China and of the Soviet Union.

I believe that one the one hand the Mongolian People's Republic, as an independent state which is politically and economically of an intermediate character, may have an important part to play in stabilizing normal, peaceful, and mutually profitable relations between neighboring Far Eastern states, although the governments of these states differ widely from each other. On the other hand, I believe that the national minority policies of the Soviet Union may contain many valuable lessons which could be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, in solving the national minority problems of China and also in working out solutions for similar problems in a number of colonial countries in Asia.

Unfortunately the necessary material, for the use of historians and social scientists, is little known and not sufficiently studied in this country. I should therefore like to contribute to the study and discussion of all these problems on the basis of personal travel and observation.

I believe that my published writings, over a period of twenty years, will show that my methods are scientific and objective; that is, that I study both the historical data of the processes of change, and the contemporary evidence of things as they actually exist, before expressing personal opinions. Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of *Solution in Asia*, my most recent book (which is written in popular rather than in academically scholarly style) in which I have marked passages referring to the Mongolian People's Republic and to the national minority policies of the Soviet Union.

I have twice visited the Soviet Union. Once was in 1945, when I accompanied Vice President Wallace. The other time was in 1936, when I travelled via Siberia from China to Europe. At that time I was editor of *Pacific Affairs*, published by the Institute of Pacific Relations. I spent about ten days in Moscow and Leningrad, and had a number of meetings with Soviet specialists on the Far East and Central Asia, arranged for me by Dr. V. E. Motylev, who was at that time the representative of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and also Director of the Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas.

Both my wife and I speak Chinese fluently. In addition, I speak and read the Mongol language fairly well, though I am not an advanced scholar in that language. I read Russian fluently, and with a little practice should be able to speak satisfactorily. My son has already begun the study of Russian, and would assist me both as photographer and as secretary.

Thanking you in advance for your courtesy in helping me to send my letter to Marshal Choibalsang.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

FEBRUARY 11, 1947.

His Excellency Marshal CHOIBALSANG,

Ulan Bator Khota, Mongolian People's Republic.

DEAR MARSHAL CHOIBALSANG: In July 1945 when I was accompanying Vice President Wallace, I had the honor of meeting you in Ulan Bator Khota.

For twenty years I have been studying the history and problems of China, Mongolia, and Central Asia. I have travelled a great deal in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang, but have not been in the Mongolian People's Republic except for the two days that I was there in 1945 with Vice President Wallace.

In view of the fact that the Mongolian People's Republic is an important country in Eastern Asia, and in view of the fact that people in America know very little about the Mongolian People's Republic, I should like to spend several months in the Mongolian People's Republic studying its history, political and economic organization, education, and cultural life.

If your Government will grant me permission I should like to spend the months from June to September in the Mongolian People's Republic accompanied by my wife and sixteen-year-old son.

In view of the lack of exchange of diplomatic representatives between our two countries I am sending this letter to you through the courtesy of the Soviet

Ambassador in Washington, to be delivered to the Mongol Ambassador in Moscow.

Hoping to receive your permission to visit your country and to have the pleasure of meeting you again,

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

FU-JEN UNIVERSITY,
Peiping, 7th February 1946.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,

*Johns Hopkins University, North Charles Street,
Baltimore, Maryland, U. S. A.*

DEAR SIR: I hope you have already returned safely to the United States. On the very day after our pleasant conversation—for which I wish to thank you once more—I plunged into the business of purchasing books and have already been able to accumulate a small number. At the moment, however, the book market offers a rather meager assortment, because booksellers are holding back until the Chinese New Year festivals are over.

On the 22nd of January I mailed you the first two parcels of books through the kindness of a friend. Their contents you will find on the attached book list. Meantime I have got together, partly through purchases and partly from duplicates in my possession, a complete series of publications appearing in Kailu (given out under the direction of Bökekesik). These I shall dispatch within the next few days. I was also able to lay hands on an extremely rare Kōke sudur edition of thirteen volumes, with 1985 pages. Since these Kailu publications, collectively and individually, were printed in very small editions, they are very scarce and their prices accordingly high. At the next mailing opportunity I shall also send you a set of the Mongolian monthly periodical, Kōketuy (Blue Banner), which was published in Manchuria, as well as a few political propaganda magazines from Inner Mongolia.

The purchase and supply of Mongolian prints from Inner Mongolia is complicated and very slow, since this region is still occupied by the Communists and it will be some weeks before direct contact can be made. However, even then it will be difficult to procure successive series of all Mongolian publications, since the Kalgan Press has been dissolved and many books burned.

I have also obtained a big number of new Japanese publications for you and have already included a few small ones in the first two parcels.

I would greatly appreciate it if you could send me some money as soon as possible, since I am now hardly able to cope with the continually increasing book prices with my own small capital. I have made inquiries here and have been given to understand that you can send me any amount of U. S. currency by means of traveller cheques. Please do not send any money through the bank, because then I shall only receive for one American dollar C. N. C. \$500.— instead of the official Peking exchange rate of approximately 1300.—.

It would also be of great advantage if you were to confirm, by letter, the fact that you have commissioned me to purchase books for the Johns Hopkins University on this and that scientific field in the Mongolian, Chinese, and Japanese languages. Such a confirmation would not only minimize difficulties when purchasing bigger amounts of books from Japanese, but would also facilitate mailing them and would, likewise, have a certain helpful significance for me.

Many years ago you began the printing of bibliographies in Pacific Affairs with the "Personal Chronicle of the First Manchu Emperor" by Fuchs. May I now contribute thereto with a "Bibliography of Mongolian Publications in Japanese Occupied Areas from 1939-1945," which is on the verge of completion and will be sent you in the near future. It not only contains dry titles, but also brief, historical introductions to every section.

Of those books already sent you, I would like to recommend to your special attention the last chapter in Mongyol un uysayatan kiged teike sudur about the autonomic development of Inner and Outer Mongolia, because therein the Japanese viewpoints are clearly recognizable. Also of interest is the Japanese propaganda magazine, "Tabin on-u qoyinaki mongyol ayimagtan" (The Mongol Tribes after Fifty Years), wherein valuable material for a history on Japanese politics in Mongolia and their plans is contained.

Once again my very best thanks for the interesting conversation in the Hotel de Wagon Litts. Please acknowledge receipt of the first two parcels of books.

In the hope of hearing from you shortly, I remain, dear Sir,

Yours respectfully,

W. HEISSIG.

Contents of first two parcels:

- 1 Ex. Tüsimel-un jasay-un čiqula-yi quriyaysan bičig. (Administration), 36 pg.
 - 1 Ex. Yeke jegün aziya-yin bayiduyan. (Propaganda), 67 pg.
 - 1 Ex. Ayimaγ qubiyaysan jakidal-un bičig. (Administration), 162 pg.
 - 1 Ex. Lü oboytan-u jokiyaysan baγa keüked-ün ügüel-ün bicig, (Education), 118 pg.
 - 1 Ex. Güng-ün juu-yin gegen-u surγal, (Lamaistic), 33 pg.
 - 1 Ex. γurban bodylγa kemekü bicig (32 pg.), (Education).
 - 1 Ex. Tabin on-u qoyinaki mongγol ayimaytan, (Pol. Propaganda), 250 pg.
 - 1 Ex. Sine jil-un qous uγangγa (Folklore), 36 pg.
 - 1 Ex. Eng-ün medel-ün jayun setüb (Pol. Propaganda), 95 p.
 - 1 Ex. Boyda-yin surγal-i senggregülkü bicig, (History), 162 pg.
 - 1 Ex. Oyirod-un galdan bosuytu qayan-u teüke, (History), 16 pg.
 - 1 Ex. Mongγol üstüg-un yosun i todorqayilan altan toli (Grammar), 18 pg.
 - 1 Ex. Mongγol-un γsayatan kiged teüke sudur (Modern History), 259 pg.
 - 1 Ex. (in Chinese), (Lit. History), 161 pg.
 - 1 Ex. (in Chinese), (Chrestomatie), 82 p.
 - 1 Ex. (in Chinese), (History), 206 pg.
- Total: 16 Vol.—US \$11.50.

MARCH 11, 1946.

DR. WALTHER HEISSIG,

Fu-ien University, Peiping, China.

DEAR DR. HEISSIG: Your letter of 7 February and the first shipment of Mongol books have safely arrived. I have already sent an acknowledgement to Lt. Walton, but did not enclose a letter to you because I was not sure whether he would still be in China or might already have returned to this country. I am now writing to tell you how much I appreciate your energy and promptness in sending me such interesting material immediately. I am arranging to send you U. S. \$200 through Col. William Mayer, who is an officer on the Headquarters Staff of General Wedemeyer in Shanghai * * * I am not quite sure when this will reach you. I understand that the air mail is now subject to many delays, owing to shortage of crews to fly the planes, and therefore am sure that it is better to wait until I hear of someone who is actually going to Shanghai. I am also suggesting to Colonel Mayer that he make inquiries to see whether a request can properly be made that you not be deported from China. * * *

In addition to the initial sum of \$200 which I am sending I shall of course be prepared to send further funds for book purchases as soon as you let me know the amount you need. The first shipment is excellent in character and shows that you fully understood the range of my interests. I am just as much interested in material of a propaganda character as I am in historical and literary material, since one of my purposes is to attempt to reconstruct as far as possible the Japanese propaganda and political approach toward the Mongols. I am also interested in any statistical and factual material on population, economics, trade, etc.

I enclose herewith a letter certifying that you are empowered to act as my agent for purchases of books and manuscripts.

With regard to bibliographical articles in *Pacific Affairs* I shall be glad to recommend your "Bibliography of Mongolian Publications in Japanese Occupied Areas 1939-1945" to the present editor of *Pacific Affairs*. I myself have had no connection with *Pacific Affairs* since 1941, but of course I am still closely in touch with the Institute of Pacific Relations and I think I can assure you that the present editor will be interested in your material.

Please give my respects to Dr. Fuchs.

Thank you again most cordially for your promptness and energy.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

MARCH 11, 1946.

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that Dr. Walther Heissig is fully empowered to act as my agent in the purchase of Chinese, Japanese, Mongol, Manchu, and other books and manuscripts.

OWEN LATTIMORE,
*Director, Walter Hines Page School of International
 Relations, The Johns Hopkins University.*

12 FANG CHIA HUTUNG,
 AN TING MEN NEI,
Peiping, June 6, 1946.

DEAR PROFESSOR LATTIMORE: May we ask for your assistance in an urgent matter which concerns all scholars of the Far East. Dr. Walter Fuchs and Dr. Walther Heissig have been ordered deported to Germany and will be interned on June 10, prior to their departure. Local foreign and Chinese scholars are doing everything in their power to have their deportation at least delayed. But after careful investigation we have found that the final decision will in some curious way rest with our State Department.

Both Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Heissig have been appointed to professorships at Yenching University: Dr. Fuchs, Professor of Manchu and Dr. Heissig, Professor of Mongol. President Leighton Stuart has personally appealed to the Chinese authorities to retain both men here.

We have been authoritatively informed that the future careers of these men and their continued usefulness for Far Eastern studies depend upon the opinion which American scholars express to the State Department. We have cabled Dr. William Hung, who is at present at Harvard, and we hope he has already communicated with you. Dr. Hung is fully acquainted with the local situation, and before leaving China in the spring did all he could to help these men. Dr. Stuart's support of them should be ample proof that they in every way deserve the support of American scholars.

We hope that you will intercede immediately with the State Department to forestall this deportation which would deprive us of two outstanding experts. Their inclusion in the deportation list can be based only on oversight or faulty information. It is up to us, their American colleagues, to correct that mistake before it is too late. We have good reason to believe that the State Department will attach great weight to your opinion in this matter, owing to the Department's increased interest in the development of Far Eastern studies.

We are writing on this matter to Professors Goodrich, Lessing, Hummel and Gardner. If you know of other scholars willing to appeal to the State Department in this matter, we should be very grateful to you for sending this information to them.

Yours truly,

ARTHUR F. WRIGHT.
 MARY CLABAUGH WRIGHT.

HARVARD—YENCHING INSTITUTE,
Cambridge, Mass., June 19, 1946.

Professor OWEN LATTIMORE,

Walter Hinds Page School, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR PROFESSOR LATTIMORE: I arrived in Cambridge about two weeks ago and shortly after my arrival I received a cablegram from Mr. Arthur F. Wright in Peiping. It was stated that Dr. Walter Fuchs and Dr. Walter Heissig were in danger of immediate deportation from Peiping to Germany. It was suggested that American scholars interested in Far Eastern studies be mobilized to intercede with the American Department of State on the behalf of these two scholars.

Dr. C. S. Gardner, to whom I have shown the cablegram, expresses his kind interest in the matter and has already written to the Secretary of State and will probably communicate with you as well as other American scholars interested in Chinese studies.

I have now received a letter from Mr. Wright dated June sixth, in which he gives more detail about the matter. It seems that Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Heissig

were to be interned on June tenth, to be shipped to Tangu and then to Shanghai, until they were to leave China. Chinese and foreign scholars in Peiping have been doing everything in their power to have their deportation at least delayed, "But after investigation," says Mr. Wright, "We have found that the final decision will in some curious way rest with our State Department."

When I was in Peiping I had already heard rumors about the possible internment of Drs. Fuchs and Heissig. I tried to get some of the Chinese authorities interested in these two scholars and I thought they would be safe from then on. The new turn of events is indeed a surprise to me.

I may state that to the best of my knowledge these two scholars had more or less nominal connections with the Nazi Party, but their interests and activities during the period they have been in China were confined only to scholarly pursuits. Dr. Fuchs is a German sinologist especially gifted in Manchu literature. Dr. Heissig is an Austrian Mongolist. He is probably not as well known as Dr. Fuchs. His recent papers are mostly published in *Monumenta Serica*. According to Mr. Wright's letter, Dr. Heissig's long book on the Genkhis Khan Epic appeared on the fourth of June. Of course, I have not seen the book.

Mr. Wright is a Fellow of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. He and his wife were both interned by the Japanese in Weih sien. They were not released until after the Japanese had surrendered.

Dr. Gardner is of the opinion that it would be perhaps better not to have an organized petition to the State Department. It would be better for each scholar interested in the question to write individually to the State Department. I am inclined to agree with Dr. Gardner, and it is my hope that you may do something to help.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM HUNG.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES,
Berkeley, Calif., June 19, 1946.

MR. OWEN LATTIMORE,

Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: I enclose a letter I wrote to Mr. Vincent which I hope is self-explanatory. I wonder whether you would join the group of American scholars who are trying to stave off the worst from these two men. I learned today that the repatriation has been postponed for some time so it would not be too late to take action on their behalf.

I understand that you have inquired after Dr. Heissig. All I know about him is contained in the enclosed letter. If you wish to have a list of his publications I can supply it. Today I received a volume of several hundred pages published by him (it is just off the press), entitled "Bolus Erike." It is a Mongolian chronicle of the 18th century. I am preparing a review of it for the JAOS. Professor Boodberg authorizes me to state that he shares my views regarding the scholarship of both Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Heissig.

I hope that you, Mrs. Lattimore and David are enjoying the best of health. It would be pleasant to have some news of you.

I am scheduled to give a series of lectures for the Lowell Institute in the last half of October and the first two weeks in November. Following the lectures I plan to go to China on the first ship sailing after November 15th. I will stay in China until August or September of 1947 at which time I shall resume my duties at this University. I am looking forward to the trip to China and hope that the political situation will not interfere with my work there.

With kindest regards to you and all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

F. D. LESSING.

(1) Author: Rasipung suy.

Ansd.: 13 July 46, Sydney, N. S.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES,
Berkeley, Calif., June 17, 1946.

Mr. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, State Department,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: My colleague, Dr. Woodbridge Bingham, has permitted me to use his name in introducing myself to you.

I have just received a letter from Mr. and Mrs. Arthur F. Wright, dated Peiping, June 6, to the effect that two scholars, Dr. Walter Fuchs, a German, and Dr. Walther Heissig, an Austrian, residents of Peiping, China, are going to be repatriated within a few days. I am anxious to join the group of American and English scholars who have appealed or will appeal to the State Department on behalf of these two men.

I have known Dr. Fuchs for twenty-two years and I have not the slightest doubt as to his scholarly and personal qualifications. I met him first in 1924 when he was an assistant in the Far Eastern Department of the Museum für Völkerkunde in Berlin, where he had a very fine record. Since that time I have followed his scholarly development with growing respect. I have read his many contributions in the field of Sino-Manchu studies and I share the admiration of my American colleagues who have had an opportunity to use these works. Among these persons I wish to cite Professor Knight Biggerstaff, of Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, whose sound judgment can be relied upon.

My personal relations with Dr. Fuchs have been merely sporadic, but I have always regretted that a closer contact was not possible. As to his political activities I cannot make a statement based on personal observation, but I have indirect evidence which leads me to believe that he has never harbored pro-Nazi views. I base this opinion also on my acquaintance with his family. I have reason to believe that his antecedents would have prevented him from siding with the enemy.

I do not know Dr. Heissig personally, but I have received several letters and reprints of his articles from him since December of last year. The letters furnish me with a clear picture of his scholarly achievements and projects so far, and the reprints give me a clear insight into his methods. I am impressed with the soundness and erudition as demonstrated by his writings, and I am sure that we can expect from him many important contributions in a much neglected field. He is about thirty-five years old now. People who know him speak very highly about his moral character and personality.

To send these people back to what was formerly Germany and Austria would be tantamount to wrecking their scholarly careers and depriving American and international scholarship of the results of a highly specialized but very important work in a field in which they are generally recognized authorities. I understand that very few, if any, collections of Oriental books and manuscripts are left in Central Europe for the pursuance of research, and it is imperative for the continuance of their research that they have access to original sources.

I wonder whether it would not be better to secure, in some form or other, their cooperation in the development of Oriental studies in this country, or in an American institution in the Orient. I feel that the problems of the postwar period especially in Orientology are so pressing and the scarcity of experienced workers is so great that no honest, well-trained worker can be spared, and we just cannot afford to waste the life work of anyone qualified and ready to work with us. The very fact that judicious Dr. Leighton Stuart has singled out these two men and appointed them professors at Yenching University should vouchsafe for their reliability and capability.

I trust that it will be possible for you to take immediate action on behalf of these two men.

Very sincerely yours,

FERDINAND D. LESSING,
Agassiz Professor of Oriental Languages.

MUSQUASH LAKE, MAINE, 21 June 1946.

Mr. JOHN KULLGREN
2800 Woodley Road, N. W., Washington, D. C.

DEAR JOHN: We are on our way through to Nova Scotia, and yesterday in Bangor we picked up a batch of mail, in which was your letter, mentioning

Torgny's MS and also Heissig and Fuchs. I was very much relieved to hear the Oberg's had got the money I sent them, and I hope I shall be able to find a publisher for the MS, though on a thing like that you never know. I very much appreciate your taking the trouble to bring the MS.

You must have had a fascinatingly interesting time, staying in Peiping as much as three weeks. I was there only three days, and wasn't nearly satisfied!

About Heissig and Fuchs, I'll write to the State Department. I don't feel that I can give a *carte blanche* recommendation for the clearance of men when I don't know yet whether the military have cleared them. However, in the case of Heissig I had already cabled Chu Chia-hua, Minister of Education. The Chinese certainly need scholars in Manchu and Mongol; and if Yenching is willing to offer them jobs, so much the better, as their work will also be available to American scholarship.

We'll be back in Baltimore about August 1.

With regards to both you and your wife,

Very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

MUSQUASH LAKE, MAINE, 21 June 1946.

Mr. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,

Division of Far Eastern Affairs,

Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR JOHN CARTER: We are on our way through to Nova Scotia, and in Bangor yesterday a batch of mail caught up with us. In it were letters from John Kullgren, who is, I believe, still a civilian employee of the War Department, and from Arthur F. Wright, writing from 12 Fang Chia Hutung, An Ting men nei, Peiping—both writing about the cases of Walther Fuchs and Walther Heissig, the first a German scholar in Manchu (and in several other languages), and the second a German scholar in Mongol.

Both men have been accused of Nazi intelligence activities in the part of China occupied by the Japanese, where they spent the war years. Fuchs, however, has now been offered a professorship in Manchu at Yenching University, and Heissig a professorship in Mongol. President Leighton Stuart of Yenching has interested himself on behalf of both men.

Fuchs and Heissig are, however, both liable to deportation from China by the Chinese Government. The question is whether American scholars should show an interest on their behalf, and express their interest to the Department of State.

My feeling is that political clearance of these men depends primarily on the opinion of them formed by the Army's investigators in China. Without knowledge of their views, I should certainly not recommend the admittance of either man to America. On the other hand, I can see good reasons why both men should be allowed to stay in China. The Chinese are seriously short of men trained in the Manchu and Mongol languages. If these two men can be employed at Yenching, their work will be accessible to American scholarship also.

Since Leighton Stuart has already interested himself in their behalf, I believe that a favorable expression of interest on the part of the American Embassy would be appropriate.

Regards to Betty. We'll be back about August 1.

Sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

JANUARY 23, 1947.

Ambassador LEIGHTON STUART,

American Embassy, Nanking, China.

DEAR Mr. AMBASSADOR: A friend has shown me a clipping from a Shanghai paper, already several months old, indicating that at that time Walter Heissig had not yet been either cleared or sentenced as a Nazi. This news was a surprise to me, as I had earlier heard that he had already been repatriated to Austria. Because I believed he was no longer in China, I had taken no further steps to help him; but if he is still in China, and if you should think that he deserves help, I should be glad to do anything further in my power.

My attitude in the matter is that I do not want to do anything to help any man who was a genuine Nazi. I do not, however, believe in persecuting people who merely because they were in a position where they were under the control

of Nazis complied enough to "get by." The newspaper clipping which I saw indicated that you were sufficiently convinced of Heissig's good character to offer him a position at Yenching.

I am glad to have this opportunity to tell you how much I admire the teamwork between you and General Marshall. I am convinced that we may yet see a coalition Government in China in which "coalition" does not consist of the appointment of powerless men who are only nominally not members of one dominating party, and does consist of the grant of proportionate power as well as proportionate representation to all major political movements and regional interests in China.

Wishing you every success.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Nanking, February 7, 1947.

MR. OWEN LATTIMORE,

Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,
The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: I have your letter and am writing at once to explain that I had made active efforts on behalf of Walter Heissig before coming into my present post. This was based on what I had known of him and had learned from others who knew him better. When, however, the American military authorities demanded his detention for investigation because of information they had, there seemed nothing more that I could do. I understand that the inquiry was as thorough and impartial as would be expected under these circumstances, but I have no inside knowledge as to the evidence against him.

Thanks for your kind words about what General Marshall and I have been attempting. It was no slight compensation in all these difficulties to have the opportunity to know him at close quarters. I wish it were possible to discuss these problems with you and in the light of the latest developments benefit by your opinions.

With warm personal regards,

Very sincerely yours,

LEIGHTON STUART.

STUART LETTER ASKING HEISSIG STAY, IN COURT

(Shanghai, Dec. 30, 1946)

* * * * *

Dr. J. Leighton Stuart's letter to the Chinese repatriation authorities, asking Walter Heissig's exemption from repatriation, was submitted as evidence to the four-man United States military commission trying the Ehrhardt case at the Ward Road Jail yesterday.

Stuart, in his capacity as dean of Yenching University, stated in his correspondence dated June 6, 1946, that Heissig had been appointed adviser to the new University library for frontier studies and asked for his exemption.

Defense Counsel Paul Premet also brought out the point that Owen Lattimore, American expert on Far Eastern affairs, had commissioned Heissig as his agent for purchasing available materials on Mongolia.

MUELLER TAKES STAND

Dr. Herbert Mueller, another one of the accused, took the stand yesterday, denying that his office had any connection with Bureau Ehrhardt, and had not engaged in propaganda work between May 8 and August 15, 1945.

The accused further stated that he had no military status, and was not a Nazi party member. He claimed that he did not conduct intelligence work either before or after the German surrender.

After VE-day, Colonel Hidaka, Japanese intelligence officer in Peiping, told Felix Altenburg, a codefendant in this case, that he would convoke newspapermen's meetings, and also mentioned Mueller's name as he was a DNB correspondent, he told the court.

The so-called press conferences, sponsored by Colonel Hidaka, were described by Mueller as a kind of debate club where American magazines and newspapers were provided. During the gatherings, topics discussed were purely academical, the defendant alleged.

AN "OLD CHINA HAND"

The 61-year-old German suspect often ran his fingers over his face and tugged at his moustache. He said he first came to China in 1912, and came back again in 1924 as a correspondent of a German paper, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, which, he said, was similar to the *Christian Science Monitor* in the United States.

Mueller became a correspondent of the DNB (*Deutsches-Nachrichten-Bureau*) since January 1, 1924, when the German news agency first came into existence, he told the Commission, adding that DNB was amalgamated from *Wolf-Telegraf* and *Telegraf-Union*.

The accused recounted that he liquidated his agency bureau in Peiping after May 1, 1945. He also said that he had paid off his staff members with 3 months' salary. After the German capitulation, he started a new office, he continued, but the news reports he issued were censored by a bogus Chinese Government office controlled by the Japanese.

Mueller will be examined again today at 8 a. m.

JANUARY 23, 1947.

Mr. FLOYD E. MASTEN,
American Embassy, Rome, Italy.

DEAR MR. MASTEN: Many thanks for your letter of December 27. I am delighted to have this opportunity of thanking you for the Mongolian books which you mailed to me on behalf of Dr. Walter Heissig. I am also glad to know that you are going back to China again. Since you have imperiled yourself by making the offer, I shall almost certainly pester you with requests of one kind or another. After the great difficulty of publishing books and research work during the war in China, a number of good publications are beginning to come out, and I am anxious to get hold of those which deal with Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria.

I should appreciate it very much if you would write me your frank opinion of Dr. Heissig. He made a very favorable personal impression on me on the one occasion on which I saw him; but it is always possible to be fooled. I have tried to help him as far as I could on the question of being repatriated from China. My feeling is that as a German he was in a position where he had to comply with requests for reports when these were demanded of him. On the other hand, the volume of scholarly work which he produced while in China would indicate that he did not have much time left over for spying. My attitude in such matters is that I see no need for persecuting people whose choice was between martyrdom and stringing along with the Nazis who had control over them. I like to be cautious, however, because I decidedly am not interested in helping to save the skins of people who really believed in the Nazi cause and really worked to make it succeed.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
American Embassy, Rome, Italy, 27 Dec. 46.

Dr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR PROFESSOR LATTIMORE: Shortly before I left Peiping last spring, I mailed you some Mongolian books, ones which Dr. Walter Heissig said he had purchased for you. The books were mailed through the APO on April 5. Naturally I'm curious to learn if the same ever reached you. I'm returning to China next Spring (May). If there are some contacts I can make for you, I would be happy to help you.

My address in China will be c/o American Consulate General, Shanghai, China.

Very truly yours,

FLOYD E. MASTEN, *Attaché.*

(Return address on envelope:) Floyd E. Masten, Am. Embassy #1, P. M., N. Y., N. Y., APO 528.

DEARING FARM,
Bethel, Vermont, July 12, 1948.

Dr. WALTHER HEISSIG,
(13b) Landsberg (Lech), Hindenburgring 12,
American Zone, Germany.

DEAR DR. HEISSIG: Your letter of June 9 has reached me safely and I am delighted to be in touch with you again. I am particularly encouraged to know that in spite of all difficulties you are able to some extent to keep up your Mongol studies. I shall of course continue to keep in touch with your case, though I must frankly say that my influence is extremely limited.

I am writing this from the country, where I am working for the summer. Consequently, I do not have most of my Mongol books with me. The Japanese book about Old Stone Monuments in Manchuria may be with some other Japanese books which I lent to a colleague who reads Japanese. I am writing to Baltimore to see if he can identify the book. If so, I shall ask him to have photostats made of the two inscriptions which you need. Otherwise, this may have to wait until I get back to Baltimore at the end of August.

I was out in California 2 weeks ago, and there had a very pleasant visit with Arthur and Mary Wright.

Yours very sincerely,

(13b) LANDSBERG (LECH), HINDENBURGRING 12,
June 9, 1948.

Dr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Johns Hopkins University, W. Hines Page School of International Relations,
Baltimore.

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: Thank you so much for your kind letter which I received the other day. I am very thankful that the interest you have shown on my behalf and I sincerely hope that your efforts will prove successful.

I was greatly relieved by your information that you received all books purchased formerly at Peking. That I could not finish my biography of all the Mongol modern publications published during the war makes me feel sorry. But there remained many other things I could not finish. But Lowenthal's information is right: I am able to keep my knowledge intact. I am working in a very limited way during my leisure on the biography of the lamaist missionary Neyici toyin who was in the seventeenth century the great adversary of Shamanism in Eastern Mongolia. I have with me the Peiping xylograph of his Mongol biography and am transcribing and editing it, as well as preparing an English translation. The problems arising from it are fascinating: it is the only Mongol authentic source which tells us about the ways in which the subjugation as well as amalgamation of Shamanism has been done. But as long as I am here nothing final is to be expected.

It might be of some interest to you that Messrs. Roever, Reel and Donovan, Attorn., Boston, Pemberton-House, Pemberton Square, will file or have already filed a habeas corpus writ for the whole case in which I am involved. Besides that it was sent to Judge Sears, International Institute of Buffalo, 610 Delaware Avenue, Buffalo 2, N. Y., Judge of the Appellate Court of the State of New York and a former presiding judge at Nuremberg, an elaborate statement about the particular phase of the Peiping group. I do not know what Judge Sears undertook, as we have no answer. It may interest you to contact Judge Sears and obtain the brief for further information.

In the last paragraph of your letter you proclaimed your willingness to do something for me. My chief aim is to leave my present whereabouts in order to proceed in my research work. The present ratio of nourishment in Germany does not help to remain fit for work, however. I may ask you in the next weeks to help me in obtaining some material concerning the seventeenth century in Mongolia.

Very sincerely yours,

WALTHER HEISSIG.

P. S.—Amongst the books I have purchased for you was also a small booklet in Japanese language about Old Stone Monuments in Manchuria. It deals about two stone inscriptions concerning early Lama missionaries in Mandju, Mongol-Tibet, dated 1638 and 1658. Of the text of these two inscriptions I urgently would need fotostats. Could you kindly arrange that for me?

HEISSIG.

LANDSBERG (LECH), HINDENBURGRING 12, 14.III.49.

MR. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: I feel ashamed that I trouble you again with a letter within such a short time. Yet I think it necessary to inform you about the present state of my affairs because you showed all the time such friendly interest in my fate.

Developments here in Germany were the following:

(1) Few weeks ago a Reviewing Board under Judge H. Pitchford, of the Judge Advocate Office, Munich, reviewed the Nanking Case by order of the War Department as well as of the Judge Advocate General, Heidelberg. The results of this review were: (a) All prisoners convicted in the Nanking case (amongst them I) are *not guilty*; (b) did not commit any war crime; (c) would not have committed a war crime even assuming all facts charges with were true.

(2) Result of this review were handed over to JAG Heidelberg, where a Colonel Fleischer is the officer in charge of this case. He promised to deal with this case within the next weeks. Colonel Fleischer informed at March 3d, 49, a spokesman of the Evangelical Churches, that General Clay does not intend to intervene in the form of clemency and that instead of it the outcome of our procedures before the Circuit Court of Washington concerning habeas corpus will be waited for.

Development in U. S. A. were the following now:

(1) Our lawyer, Mr. Frank Reel (Roever, Reel, and Donovan, Boston, Pemberton House), filed an appeal against the denial of habeas corpus with the Washington Court of Appeal. There was already one session, in which the president of the court declared that he was much more bothered about the legal situation uncovered there than he had ever expected to be. Final decision is still pending.

(2) In the cause of this procedure our lawyer had to publish all legal material pertaining the question of jurisdiction, etc. Amongst them were some very peculiar documents from the side of the respondents, i. e., Mr. Royall, Forrestal, etc. From these documents, held until now as restricted or secret material, but uncovered now by the course of legal procedure, the following things could be detracted: (a) the trial at Shanghai was held for purely political reasons. Telegram, April 19, 1946, sent by the China Command to Washington asking permission to start a trial against Germans, has the following passus: "Local political situation makes trial by United States military commission in China strongly advisable" (cf. Respondents Exhibit No. 3).

(b) Upon this telegram granted Washington, War Department, with telegram, July 6, 1946, authority to the United States Forces, China Theater, to try "violations of the laws and customs of war and German soldiers, civilians * * * who are charged with violation of the German surrender terms" (cf. Respondents Exhibit No. 4). Authority was granted to try the Germans "provided the Chinese Government acquiesces."

(c) The Chinese Government acquiesced not earlier than November 26, 1946, to try before an American Military Commission war criminals only who had committed crimes against Americans. At that time I and the other men of the Nanking case were already arrested by the American authorities for several months, served with charges, and the prosecution had at that time already nearly finished their part. When at the beginning of the trial in the early days of October a Chinese defense counsel, Mr. Yang, of Shanghai, asked for dismissal of the accused on the basis that no authorization by the Chinese Government could be shown, the court ruled against him, although at that time existed in reality no such authorization. I, furthermore, have to point out, that Washington had made distinct discrimination between "the violations of the laws and war" and "violation of the German surrender terms," and that the Chinese Government at November 26, '46, acquiesced only to trial of *war criminals*. Yet we were charged with violation of surrender terms, for which no authorization was given by the Chinese and which constitutes no war crime.

(3) When Mr. Frank Reel, our American lawyer, inquired with the War Department about the finding of the Munich Reviewing Board, he was answered that "although action is being considered, probably in the nature of clemency, as yet no final action had been taken," (letter of Mr. Reel, February 16, 1949). To this Mr. Reel gives the following commentary: "My guess is that the opinion to that effect, that the prisoners did not commit a war crime, even assuming all facts charged were true, may never be published, and that instead clemency will be granted so that the habeas corpus remedy ceases to exist."

In spite of the fact that we legally are already for nearly three years imprisoned innocently and unjustified, nobody seems now willing to take the responsibility for set us free. Public opinion seems to be stronger than justice.

I wrote all this in details to you because I think it is now the time to do something about. Already many Senators and leading people took an interest in this case. It will over a long be impossible to prevent leaking the truth out.

The turning point seems to be that the same person who as Judge Advocate of the China Theater conducted the trial in Shanghai, is today in an responsible position in the War Crimes Section of the War Department. But is it justified that the face of somebody is saved for the price of the fate of 18 men who according to the finding of all law experts are not guilty and no war criminals.

It might interest you, that a professor of the Law School of the University of Chicago, Mr. Ernest W. Puttkammer, working on his own about this case, came to the same opinion as the Reviewing Board at Munich. Now Mr. P. has offered his services, as well as that of some colleagues of him of the University of Chicago, to the Judge Advocate General in Heidelberg for making an expert's opinion about the legal situation.

Thus things from the legal point are clear but nobody wants to take the responsibility—and I am still here and wonder how long that shall continue although it is now black on white that I am not guilty and no war criminal.

The facts I presented to you are no allegations; you can find them printed in the booklets presenting the exhibits for the proceedings before the appellate court. Mr. Reel, of Roever, Reel and Donovan, Boston, Pemberton House, will gladly give you access to this.

I beg you to understand me why I wrote you in such a length. I sincerely hope that there is a way to bring this stagnant situation to a solution. To create a legal scandal is in nobody's interest; there must be a way to solve all this mix up.

I hope you received my letter as well as the paper about *Nayici toyin*. Please let me know what you think about. Once more, forgive me for stealing so much of your valuable time with this my letter.

Sincerely yours,

WALTHER HEISSIG.

APRIL 14, 1949.

Mr. FRANK REEL,
Roever, Reel, and Donovan,
Pemberton House, Boston, Mass.

DEAR MR. REEL: I have received a letter from Mr. Walther Heissig, of Hindenburg 12 Landsberg (Lech) Germany, informing me that you have been representing him in an appeal against his sentence by a Military Court in Shanghai. I knew Mr. Heissig slightly in China, and have intermittently been in correspondence with him since. Naturally, not having seen any of the official documents, I, of course, know his side of the case only and his protestations that he is innocent.

If you have satisfied yourself that he is innocent, and if you think there is anything I can do to help see that justice is done, please let me know.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE, *Director.*

LANDSBERG (LECH), HINDENBURG 12.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md., U. S. A.

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: Thank you so much for your kind letter of April 20th. I am very much delighted about the news that you shall bring my *Neyici Toyin* edition to print. I hope it can be done. As already announced in my previous letter, I shall forward to you the final manuscript (which contains only minor changes) within the next few weeks. I am, of course, well aware of the fact that my notes—i. e., the English of my notes—need to be brushed up. But I hope that will make not too great a difficulty.

I have to thank you too for your quick consent to the translations of your two books by Mr. Albricht and me. Would you kindly let me know soon of the results of your inquiry about the copyright situation, as I should like to convey this to the interested German publishers. I hope that the copyright situation

will not make insurmountable difficulties, because I have learned that in many cases of translations of American books the copyright situation made no difficulties at all.

Your consent for having the books translated by Mr. Albricht and me is for us a good asset in further negotiations with the publishers. In case it should be necessary, I perhaps shall have to ask for a more explicit authorization to do the translations, yet I do not think it necessary.

In the meantime I think you will have heard from my attorney, Mr. Reel, about my legal situation. Since my previous letter I have learned that a Senate committee, consisting of the Senators Mr. Richard B. Russell, Estes Kefauver, and with Raymond E. Baldwin as a chairman, is going to investigate the legal situation of the whole China case.

And now I want to beg you for the favour to get a copy of your newest book—*Situation in Asia*—which was due for (Ea ar).

Once more, thank you very much for all your kindness, and I hope you will let me know soon more about the possibility of having the *Neyic Toyin Monogr.* published.

Finally I send you my congratulation to the enlivening of *Mongol Studies* at your University, which doubtlessly is due to your efforts.

I remain, yours very

Sincerely,

WALTHER HEISSIG.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 22, 1950.

Mr. EDWARD P. MORGAN,
Chief Counsel, Foreign Relations Subcommittee,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR MR. MORGAN: I understand that some question has been raised as to what part the Department of State has taken in financing three Mongolian scholars at Johns Hopkins University. As stated in Mr. Peurifoy's letter to Senator Tydings of April 17, 1950, the Department has paid \$3,200 to Johns Hopkins University pursuant to a contract, a copy of which is attached, entered into with the University under authority of P. L. 724 (79th Congress). No other payments have been made by the Department. As stated in Mr. Peurifoy's letter, it is understood that the Mongols referred to work on this project, and that the Department's \$3,200 supplement much larger sums made available by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Carnegie Foundation.

Sincerely yours,

ADRIAN S. FISHER,
The Legal Adviser.

Enclosure: Contract SCC-1855.

Contract SCC-1855

Negotiated: B. M.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Memorandum of Agreement made as of the 14th day of March 1949, between the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the Government) acting by the Assistant Secretary of State of the Department of State (hereinafter referred to as the Department) executing this agreement; and the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, acting by the Provost of the University (hereinafter referred to as the University).

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS the Congress of the United States has vested in the Secretary of State the authority to make grants or furnish such other gratuitous assistance as he may deem necessary or desirable to nonprofit institutions cooperating with the Foreign Service Institute in any of the programs conducted by the Institute to achieve its objectives, to wit: to furnish training and instruction to officers and employees of the Foreign Service and the Department and to other officers and employees of the Government for whom training and instruction in the field of foreign relations is necessary, and to promote and foster programs of study incidental to such training.

WHEREAS the University has been organized and is now operating on a non-profit basis, and is cooperating with the Institute in its language training program.

WHEREAS it has been found that the making of a grant or contribution to the University pursuant to the terms hereof and for the specific purposes of obtaining for the Foreign Service Institute adequate teaching materials in the Mongolian language of such a nature that they can be used both in the Institute and in field posts abroad; permitting the assignment of an employee of the Foreign Service, now detailed to the Institute, to the University to work with native Mongolian speakers and a linguistic scientist to acquire the ability to instruct other Foreign Service personnel in Mongolian; assisting the University to develop the Mongolian language project to the point that it will be able to obtain private grants to carry on the work beyond the present year and thus prolong an activity of continuing value to the Department through the Foreign Service Institute; and furthering the progress of instruction in linguistic science in this country along lines of value to the Institute in its language training programs, is a project of both immediate and future value to the Government and is within the authority granted by the Congress of the United States in Section 703 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

Now, therefore, for and in consideration of the premises and of the mutual agreements herein contained, it is mutually understood and agreed that:

ARTICLE I

The Government does hereby make a grant or contribution of three thousand two hundred dollars (\$3,200) to the University to be used by said Institution for the purposes hereinabove specified, provided, however, that the Department and the University may agree to the expenditure by the University of the sum made available hereby for related purposes if the University shall in writing demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Department that it would be preferable and advisable to make such expenditure in lieu of the one originally contemplated.

ARTICLE II

Payment of the sum specified above in Article I hereof shall be made to the University immediately following the execution of the contract.

ARTICLE III

The University undertakes to carry out diligently the activities designed to effect the purposes of this agreement, summarized as follows:

1. To maintain and make available at the University two native speakers of Mongolian for a sufficient period of time to enable linguistic scientists to make a descriptive analysis of the Mongolian language and develop teaching materials in spoken Mongolian.
2. To develop and make available to the Foreign Service Institute comprehensive teaching materials in Mongolian, including a descriptive grammar of the Mongolian language and instructional materials in the form of notes, mimeographed text materials and recordings.
3. To furnish to an employee assigned by the Institute full access to facilities involved in the project sufficient to enable said employee to acquire the ability to instruct other personnel in the Mongolian language.
4. To assist the University in developing the project to such a point that private grants may be obtained to continue the work beyond the present year and thus continue to be of value to the Department through the Institute's language training activities.
5. To further the progress of instruction in linguistic science along lines of actual and potential value to the Institute in its language training program.

ARTICLE IV

The activities of the University under this agreement shall be subject to such reasonable supervision by the Department, through the Institute, as the Department may desire to exercise.

ARTICLE V

The University shall make reports to the Department, through the Institute, for administrative purposes at such times and in such detail as the Department may require.

ARTICLE VI

The University shall return to the Government on or before September 30, 1949, any balance of the sum made available hereby to the University unused and unobligated prior to June 30, 1949, and shall also return at the earliest possible date any additional balance which may subsequently be found to be not needed to liquidate outstanding obligations, provided, however, that if the University shall demonstrate in writing to the Department that an extension of time for the expenditure of the sum made available hereby is necessary or desirable, such extension may be granted by the Department and provided further that, to the extent the University is authorized to use the sum made available hereby for administrative purposes, the University may, notwithstanding the terms of this article, retain sufficient funds for administrative expenses to permit it to render a final report and accounting to the Department.

ARTICLE VII

If the Department deems it in the best interests of the Government to terminate this agreement, the Department may terminate it by giving the University sixty days' notice in writing, and if for any reason beyond the control of the University, the University is unable to perform all of the conditions of this agreement, the University may terminate it by giving the Department sixty days' notice in writing. In the event that this agreement is terminated, under this provision, the University shall return to the Government any balance of funds received from the Government which is unused and not obligated under contracts made by the University. It shall also return at the earliest possible date any additional balance which may subsequently be found to be not needed to liquidate outstanding obligations.

ARTICLE VIII

No member of or Delegate to Congress, or Resident Commissioner, shall be admitted to any share or part of this contract or to any benefit that may arise therefrom, unless it be made with a corporation for its general benefit.

ARTICLE IX

The Contractor warrants that he has not employed any person to solicit or secure this contract upon any agreement for a commission, percentage, brokerage, or contingent fee. Breach of this warranty shall give the Government the right to annul the agreement, or in its discretion to deduct from the contract price or consideration the amount of such commission, percentage, brokerage, or contingent fees. This warranty shall not apply to commissions payable by contractors upon agreement or sales secured or made through bona fide established commercial or selling agencies maintained by the Contractor for the purpose of securing business.

ARTICLE X

The Contractor, in performing the work required by this contract, shall not discriminate against any worker because of race, creed, color or national origin.

ARTICLE XI

If any dispute shall arise in the execution of the terms of this agreement, it shall be subject to appeal within thirty days to the Secretary of State or to his duly authorized representative, whose decision thereon shall be final on the parties concerned.

ARTICLE XII

When the nature of this contract is such that it is subject to the provisions of the Walsh-Healey Act, 49 Stat. 2036 or the Eight Hour Labor Law, 37 Stat., 137 the Contractor agrees to be bound by these laws.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Government and the University have executed this agreement as of the day and your first above written.

FOR THE CONTRACTOR, THE JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY:

P. HOWARD MACAULEY, *Provost.*

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U. S., DEPARTMENT OF STATE:

BRUCE L. MCDANIEL,
Chief, Procurement and Supply Branch.

MARCH 1949.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington.

HONORABLE MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Reference is made to your letter dated June 14, 1950, in which you request that the Subcommittee Investigating the State Department be furnished copies or the contents of certain documents which Senator Joseph R. McCarthy stated on March 30, 1950, on the floor of the Senate that he was turning over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Senator McCarthy referred on page 4437, column 2 of the Congressional Record for March 30, 1950, to a document, the original of which he was turning over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This document is quoted in full except for signature and date in the Congressional Record on page 4437, columns 2 and 3.

Your next reference is another statement which Senator McCarthy indicated may have likewise been turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This reference appears on page 4437. Another statement with regard to same incident appears on page 4440, column 2, paragraph 3. Both these statements are to the same effect, that the two persons making the statements were house guests of the Lattimores during the month of June 1945. They were introduced by Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore to John S. Service, an official of the State Department, and Lt. Andrew Roth and a girl whose name was not remembered. After these two people arrived at the Lattimores' home, Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and their house guests John S. Service and Andrew Roth spent considerable time by themselves discussing what appeared to be a manuscript. One of the house guests making the statement was upstairs in the Lattimore home and upon leaving Mrs. Lattimore's bedroom saw Roth fastening a briefcase at the entrance to the next bedroom. This person was under the impression that she was followed upstairs by Roth. The next day she learned that John S. Service and Andrew Roth were arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The other house guest who made the statement to Senator McCarthy stated that he recalled these facts substantially as set forth except for the episode wherein the other house guest was upstairs in the Lattimore home, at which time she saw Mr. Roth. In addition, the second house guest sometime later learned that Lattimore's explanation of the arrest of Service and Roth was that they had been declassifying documents in favor of their friends and that this was a common Washington practice and they were arrested because of some feud with persons in Washington.

The third reference appearing in your letter is one to a statement on page 4440, column 2 of the *Congressional Record*. This apparently refers to the letter dated June 15, 1943, from Owen Lattimore to Mr. Joseph Barnes of the OWI. It is my understanding that you have a copy of this letter.

Your next reference is to the affidavit of a former General in the Red Army, which reference appears at page 4445, column 3. This former General in the Red Army is purported to have stated to an investigator for Senator McCarthy that he had a conversation during the middle 1930's with a high official in Soviet Intelligence in which they discussed the difficulty in getting good intelligence information from Mongolia and the Far East. The high official in Soviet Intelligence told the General that they had had excellent success through the Institute of Pacific Relations which Soviet Intelligence, through Communists in the United States, had taken over. In particular the high official mentioned Owen Lattimore and one Joseph Barnes as Soviet men connected with the Institute.

Your next reference is the one appearing on page 4446, column 1 of the *Congressional Record* in which Senator McCarthy mentions an affidavit of the editor

of a Chinese newspaper, the original of which was to be handed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The pertinent portions of this statement are as follows:

"As a result of early Russian offers to China, i. e., to give back everything the Czar had taken from China, this made a hit with Chinese students. Lattimore was one of the young 'white men' that went along with Chinese students. There were several student uprisings, in which Lattimore was involved. He enjoyed a kind of leadership therein.

"These Mongolian contacts gave him a close contact with Buddhism and with Mongol lamas on the Chinese Russian border. Chinese lamas are notoriously homosexual and was the kind of company he seemed naturally to tend to.

"There were always a number of Russians back and forth on the Russo-Chinese border.

"The I. P. R. was started by men who were sincerely interested in China's welfare. I belonged to the organization but left it when it was obviously an organ of Jap. propaganda.

"My first unpleasant contact with Lattimore was in the late '30's when it was obvious the I. P. R. became infiltrated with Communists. L. was among the group that began to turn 'Asia' magazine into first a pro-Jap propaganda sheet. It had been founded by Willard Straight, American Consul General, in Manchuria, in 1912, thereabouts. 'Asia' magazine was carried by son Willard, Jr. & later of 'Amerasia.' Lattimore had written for the old 'Asia,' very much for 'Amerasia.' 'Amerasia' from the start backed the 'Moscow-line.' There was the combination of Willard Straight Jr.'s mother's money, Pearl Buck's editorship & writing ability & Lattimore's political shrewdness. Straight is a confessed 'card carrying' Communist. Vanderbilt Field came in as an angel for 'Amerasia' & I. P. R.

"In this group Lattimore was probably the 'mastermind' that built the group that formulated the pro Chinese-Communist policy that took over, infiltrated, and gradually dominated the far eastern division of the State Department. In this group are included Alger Hiss, Service brothers, Jessup, Lattimore, etc.

* * * * *

"Later on Dec. '41 or Jan. '42 Lattimore arrived in San F. on way to China. I was N. B. C. specialist on Orient. I didn't trust him but inasmuch as he was special envoy to Chiang Kai-shek I invited him to appear on network. I heard of banquet to be given him by I. P. R. The hostess was Anita Whitney a well-known 'big-wig' among San Francisco Communists. I raised question, over phone, of his being entertained by Anita Whitney & other Communists & he became angry & as a result refused to broadcast.

"I understood that Lattimore was sent to China by F. D. R. upon recommendation of Mrs. Roosevelt & Wallace.

"I had a report back from Chinese officials indicating Chiang was displeased & Chiang to dismiss L. smoothly appointed him a Chinese official & sent him to Roosevelt.

"On an occasion when L. came through San F. on way to China, the radio doors was closed to us & given over to the left-wing crowd. Hornbeck was 'kicked upstairs' by being made ambassador to Holland.

"This crowd indoctrinated Stilwell against Chiang. (This story is told by the Alsop's.)

"In the Spring of 1942 I persuaded the N. B. C. to put on the 'Pacific Story.' I chose as producer Arnold Marquis, of Hollywood & the writers Siffield & Warren Lewis. The scripts written from my books. After the first few programs a strange influence caused us to discontinue. A few weeks later the program was reestablished under Owen Lattimore under same producer who carried it on for one to two years with who carried the Chinese Communist line.

"(Dates should be verified.)

"These facts to the best of my memory."

If I can be of any further assistance please do not hesitate to communicate with me.

Yours sincerely,

PEYTON FORD,
Deputy Attorney General.

The following material has been inserted in the record at the request of Mrs. Freda Utley:

1717-20 STREET, N. W.,
Washington, D. C., May 14, 1950.

DEAR SENATOR CHAVEZ: My attention has been drawn to certain statements you made about me in the Senate, on page 7056 of the Congressional Record for May 12th. You therein falsely stated:

(1) "That Freda Utley points to the fact that Dr. Lattimore failed to follow the Moscow line as proof that he is a Communist." You further stated that I was "trying to prove * * * that Dr. Lattimore * * * is a Communist because he did not follow the party line."

Evidently you never read my testimony and must have been misled by whoever it was wrote your speech. If you will look at my testimony I said the exact opposite of what you aver. I prefaced my series of extract from Lattimore's writings by saying that they showed that he did follow the Communist Party line. Nowhere in my testimony did I ever say, or imply, or in any way indicate, as you asserted, that "Lattimore is a Communist because he did not follow the Party line."

(2) You also asserted that I had "swallowed the Nazi line," asserting as proof that I had referred to "the outbreak of hostilities after the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1941 as the time when Russia attacked Germany." This again is untrue. I attach herewith a copy of the transcript of my testimony from which you will see that in the pages referring to Lattimore's switch (in conformity with the Communist Party line) following Germany's attack on Russia, I refer no less than five times to "Germany's attack on Russia," or to "Hitler's attack on Russia." The references are underlined in red pencil. In the final reference to this event, at the bottom of page 744 of the official transcript of my testimony, the recorder made what is obviously a typographical error, when he wrote "after Germany attacked Russia." I have already taken steps to correct this error, together with a number of other typographical errors in the transcript, such as the misspelling of Ludden's name and the word "million" instead of "billion" twice on page 760 of my testimony.

Concerning the recorder's error of which you have made use, I cannot conceive that anyone, who was not wilfully trying to misrepresent my views, could have made the assertion in the speech which you gave on the Senate floor. Five references in a few short pages to "Germany's attack on Russia" are sufficient evidence that I did not, as you assert, say that Russia attacked Germany. To anyone not deliberately intent on misrepresenting my views, the sixth reference to Russia's involvement in the war must have appeared as an obvious typing error.

I shall await your apology and your correction of your errors concerning my testimony in the Lattimore's case on both counts. I am in the meantime sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Morgan, the Counsel of the Tydings committee, to Senator Brewster, and to the press.

Yours truly,

FREDA UTLEY.

COPY OF OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PAGES 742 TO 745 OF FREDA UTLEY'S TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, ON MAY 1, 1950.

Page 742: Nor is this the only evidence that Lattimore followed the Party line in denouncing the war in Europe prior to *Germany's attack on Russia*, as an imperialist struggle in which both sides were equally guilty.

While Lattimore was one of the editors of *Amerasia*, in 1939 and 1940, following the Stalin-Hitler Pact, it published articles directly echoing the Communist Party Line, for which Mr. Lattimore must assume partial, at least, responsibility.

Senator TYDINGS. Do you know whether or not they published at the same time any articles that showed a contrary point of view?

Mrs. UTLEY. No. I will state that almost categorically, but in the time at my disposal, I have had no time to read every article in *Amerasia*.

It abused Italy and France and urged America not to be drawn into the European war, while urging that it take action against Japan. *Following Germany's attack on Russia*, in June 1941, it switched over to the opposite side, like all Communist organs, and urged American participation in the war against Germany.

I have here several pages of extracts from Amerasia and I feel that my testimony will be far too long if I read them all.

Senator TYDINGS. Put them in the record at this time.

I would like to ask a couple of questions.

Does this appear over Mr. Lattimore's signature?

Mrs. UTLEY. No.

Senator TYDINGS. Did they appear over anybody's signature?

Mrs. UTLEY. Yes. The particular articles I have mentioned, one was by William Brandt, entitled "The Embargo Threat—a Diplomatic Maneuver," was published in the March 1940 issue of Amerasia.

Senator TYDINGS. Read the others and identify them.

Mrs. UTLEY. Next is one by Harry Paxton Howard which explained and justified the Stalin-Hitler Pact. I don't want to impose on your time by reading it all.

Senator TYDINGS. Don't read it, but let me ask you another question. During the period to which you refer, evidently you have had some opportunity to read these magazines, is that right?

Mrs. UTLEY. During what period?

Senator TYDINGS. Have they been handed to you, or did you read them yourself, Mrs. Utley?

Mrs. UTLEY. I have been looking them up now, in the last few days.

Senator TYDINGS. Looking them up in the Amerasia Magazine?

Mrs. UTLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator TYDINGS. Have you found any articles in there that were published by people other than Mr. Lattimore, that presented any contrary view?

Mrs. UTLEY. No.

Senator TYDINGS. Nothing in the magazine at all except articles of one kind during this period?

Mrs. UTLEY. Yes.

Senator TYDINGS. How many of these articles to which you refer were over the signature, or over the masthead of the editor of the magazine, who, as I understand it, was then Mr. Lattimore, is that correct?

Mrs. UTLEY. Mr. Lattimore was only one. The managing editor was Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Senator TYDINGS. Who was the managing editor?

Mrs. UTLEY. I think that was Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Senator TYDINGS. How many other editors were there I have not read it.

Mrs. UTLEY. About half a dozen. I cannot recall all their names. One was Lillian Pepper, wife of a professor at Columbia University—

Senator TYDINGS. Why attribute all of that to Mr. Lattimore if he was only one of six, and wasn't the managing editor?

Mrs. UTLEY. Senator Tydings, if you are on the board of a magazine that continually publishes only one view—actually Mr. Lattimore got off the board in 1941, when he took up Government service.

Senator TYDINGS. Why give him the responsibility when you say there were six on the board? Do you know whether or not they approved these articles? Do you know whether or not they disapproved these articles? Do you know whether or not he saw the articles before they were published; because if he was only one of seven editors it would appear to me that in getting up a newspaper or magazine like Amerasia, or the Saturday Evening Post, that some of the articles could be published in there that might not be known to all of the editors on the board, and I am asking as to information—whether or not you can show any connection between this Mr. Lattimore and these particular articles, or do you just surmise it?

Mrs. UTLEY. Senator Tydings, I have already read out an article in Mr. Lattimore's own—

Senator TYDINGS. I am not asking about that.

Mrs. UTLEY. Which says the same kind of things as Amerasia—

Senator TYDINGS. There is only one fact I want to ask you now, whether or not you know that Mr. Lattimore sponsored, directly or indirectly, these articles for publication in Amerasia?

We have had a lot of opinion evidence here. I would like to get a few facts woven into it.

Mrs. UTLEY. The point I am making, Senator Tydings, is that Amerasia echoed almost exactly the same language I read you from Mr. Lattimore's writings.

Secondly, surely, if one is in disagreement with the total line of a magazine, it is the duty of one to get off the editorial board.

Senator TYDINGS. I don't think that always follows, but your observation can stand.

Mrs. UTLEY. I would say that if Mr. Lattimore, in Amerasia, had continued to write along these lines *following Hitler's attack on Russia*, his views could really be considered honest and consistent. But, once the Soviet Union was at war with Germany, you could find no more articles by Mr. Lattimore, saying that the war in Europe was one between two lots of master races, as he said *previous to Germany's attack on Russia*.

Senator TYDINGS. Of course, I don't want to take advantage of your opportunity to testify, but let me point out, Mrs. Utley, that even in our Congress, when Britain and France were at war with the Fascists, the Axis, and when Russia was invaded, we had Lend-Lease even before we got into the struggle, to give our money and substance to Russia and all the other countries, so that everybody who then took that particular side of the controversy would not necessarily be a Communist, because a good many of my colleagues in the Senate would be under very serious charges if that were true.

Mrs. UTLEY. May I make very clear, on that point, Senator Tydings, that I personally was against American intervention in the European war, because I considered it would lead to the domination of Stalin. I want to make clear, I want to make a clear distinction, and one which I think the Attorney General made several years ago, and which was to the effect that you could tell a Communist as distinguishing from an isolationist, or whatever word you use, non-interventionist, *by his attitude before and after Germany attacked Russia*. The people who went on consistently opposing American intervention, and kept on saying the usual things about the European war, and people who did not change their line after *Germany attacked Russia* can be perfectly honest people and are perfectly entitled to that opinion; but, those who switched directly the moment that Russia was involved in the war, the Attorney General said, he thought you could spot them as Communists.

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, DECEMBER 1950. REVIEW OF THE HIGH COST OF VENGEANCE. REVIEW WRITTEN BY GEORGE N. SHUSTER, PRESIDENT OF HUNTER COLLEGE

Freda Utley has scattered pieces of her heart over many a page. She is an economic historian with a warm soul, a passion for social crusades, and a gift for becoming very rational at unexpected moments. Accordingly she has at regular intervals troubled the slumbers of the more progressive sections of our population. Years ago, when communism was the ikon in many an intellectual's bedchamber, she announced that Stalin was not her candidate for the job of universal YMCA director. Today when the same sections are still pretty smug about Germany, she fires some fairly angry cannon at them.

One must discount a part of what Mrs. Utley says. Her motherly soul, having caught a whiff of democracy as meted out to Teutonic survivors of the most recent version of Armageddon, confers virtue on nearly every German and vice on a good many other people. The prostitutes of the fatherland are at least, neat, clean, and feminine. General Taylor, who was given the impossible assignment of wearing undertakers' gloves in Nuremberg with a genuine West Pointer non-chalance, is dubbed a "Communist sympathiser." The French as she sees them are overdone crepe suzette dripping with diluted santernes. It would be fearfully easy to point out these matronly shortcomings and pass on.

The trouble is that Mrs. Utley is dead right about the important things. She has found out that "democracy" was sold down the river in Germany by a platoon of experts in ideological hocus-pocus, while the American people thought they were financing peace, freedom, brotherly love, and other comparable commodities. She also does a first-rate report on the dismantlement program. It is of course not a systematic study—which would probably be dull as well as premature—but it is a very able and conscientious analysis of typical cases. I suppose that for many Americans dismantlement may have something to do with German fireplaces, for all they care. But when we read that Social Democracy in the Western Zones has just taken a fearful beating at the polls, and go on to wonder whether nationalism may not be rearing its ugly head in Germany again, it will help to let Mrs. Utley tell us that the explanation of what has happened is that

the Social Democrat clung to his devoted admiration of the British Labor party way past the point of German endurance. Four years ago the British had an unparalleled opportunity in Germany. They could have held in their hands the power that in all probability might have made Westphalia the cornerstone of a new and pacific West European Federation. But the heirs to the crown of Winston Churchill played for pennies and now have only holes in their pockets. Mrs. Utley's indictment of them (and to be sure, also of the United States) on charges of gross stupidity and bad ethics is complete and devastating. Here are offenses against humanity which no brave new world can live down, and it is high time we had a look at them.

Mrs. Utley also has her say about the Nuremberg trials. These grandiose experiments in how to coat your defeated enemy with justice no longer rate the empty spaces in the educational supplement, and I am not sure that this book makes any very startlingly novel statements. But what it does offer is a pretty effective survey of the way in which German public opinion has responded to the advertising copy which the trials and the denazification proceedings were expected to produce. This survey is not very exhilarating, but I believe that on every topic of real importance it is correct.

There is enough truth in this book to make it worth staying up with. I believe it will be followed by many another in similar character. At any rate, Mrs. Utley has earned her laurels as a pioneer, and the subject with which she deals is of the utmost importance.

GEORGE N. SHUSTER.

[Saturday Review of Literature, August 13, 1949]

THE HIGH COST OF VENGEANCE

(By Freda Utley, Henry Regnery Co. Reviewed by W. L. White)

Freda Utley has written both a very angry book and a very important one. To put her thesis in simple terms, she is very angry because she does not like Nazis, and is therefore horrified to find that the present Allied Occupation of Germany which was supposed to stamp out National Socialism, has nevertheless adopted policies the inevitable result of which has been to convince an increasing number of Germans that maybe after all Hitler was right, and that his only mistake was that he lost the war.

While the study of human behaviour is not yet an exact science, nevertheless its basic principles are beginning to be understood. We know that if certain pressures are put, either on an individual or a nation, its behaviour will then fall into an easily predictable pattern. The frightening memory of the almost incredibly vast Nazi crimes against humanity should be preserved, not as a measure of the vengeance we should take against the German people, but as a measure of the gravity of the mass-schizophrenia which has gripped a once civilized nation, a disease which clearly had its origin in our treatment of that nation after the Treaty of Versailles, and which it is now our task to cure.

It is one which calls not for mawkish "forgiveness" but for cool, scientific understanding; not for a sentimental turning of the other cheek but for self-discipline and detachment, which will enable us to perform the most badly needed job of "social engineering" of our time.

How are we measuring up? Well, Miss Utley, in this badly needed volume of Western democratic self-criticism, points out sadly that—

"the very same people who would insist at home in America that juvenile delinquency and adult crime are the result either of being underprivileged or of an unhappy childhood, and that criminals should be psychoanalyzed and reformed, not starved, reviled, and imprisoned, want to continue punishing the whole German people for their past."

Possibly the most valuable chapter in Miss Utley's book is her first, in which she points out that "the tragedy of modern history is that the Germans have always been kicked around when they were pacifically minded," so that inevitably "the apostles of violence have again won leadership * * * following the failure of the democrats and the anti-militarists to win a fair deal."

But her well-documented chapters on Western Germany today are scarcely less vital. In spite of the fact that production per acre in Germany is already 50 per cent higher than in the United States, Western Germany can never produce according to our E. C. A. experts, more than 50 per cent of the food it

needs. And to get the rest Western Germany must export at least two billion dollars worth of manufactured goods annually. Yet we make this impossible by limiting her production of steel, which deprives Europe and the world of vitally needed machinery and construction materials. Instead we expect Germany to produce for export only such things as textiles and ceramics, flooding the world with German toys at a time when it needs German locomotives and steel girders.

* * * * *

After its final Chapter, the American reader puts down Miss Utley's important work of democratic self-criticism with a feeling of regret and shame on two scores. The first is that we seem now to be abandoning our original "goat-pasture" policy not so much because we are ashamed of it, as we should be, but because we see that stone-age vengeance is a spiritual luxury whose cost in dollars is too great even for a nation so rich as ours. Secondly we seem, at last, we seem to be seriously tackling the job of reconstructing a truly democratic Germany largely from the somewhat sordid motive that, if we fail at our task of "social engineering" the Soviet Union certainly will succeed with their competitive brand.

Of course the sum of all Allied mistakes in Germany cannot for an instant be compared to the coldly calculated Nazi crimes against humanity during the war. The difference is however that our cruel stupidities are not being perpetrated in the name of our peoples by a dictatorship. They are the acts of free and democratic governments, for which every citizen is directly responsible. So we can never say—as did the Germans in 1945 and with some reason—"We did not know," or "This was not our doing."

CANDID SHOTS—EX-COMMUNIST UNDAUNTED IN FIGHT FOR UNFASHIONABLE CAUSE

(Paul Jones in Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, April 7, 1950)

The last time Freda Utley was in Philadelphia, we sat next to her at dinner. The occasion was a meeting of the local branch of the Centralverein, before whose members she gave an address later in opposition to the dismantling policy in Germany. The Centralverein is a liberal organization of German-American origins, now a century old. Its ancient hall near 5th and Gerard, is hung with pictures of Bishop von Kettler and other worthies whose views on social reform we recognize best in the Revolution of 1848. Since that glorious failure determined a great deal of the early German immigration to the United States, it stands for something very solid and real in their tradition.

Miss Utley, whose name came up recently in connection with the Senate investigation of the charges against State Department personnel, had just returned from occupied Germany, after a visit which made another of her interesting books.

For some reason, talented women are able to give a much better first-hand picture of what a place is like and what it feels to live in it than their masculine opposite numbers. * * * In the same way, when we told Freda Utley that we had read the story of her life in Russia and she asked us what we thought of it, we said at once: "The best thing since Emma Goldman." It is fact that "Lost Illusion" is far and away the most interesting book by an ex-Communist we have seen. This is because Freda was neither a tourist nor a wide-eyed innocent. She had a good job in the Soviet bureaucracy; she had married a Soviet citizen, who was later spirited away by the secret police, never to be heard of again; she had a baby to care for, and a house to keep. She was not, therefore, free to wrap herself in clouds of heavy thought, to the exclusion of common sense.

We suppose that the mechanics of food distribution, or the wonders of Soviet housing, look a little different to the woman who has to cope with these things. The cafe theorist can comfort himself with propaganda pictures and with the reflection that everything will be straightened out by 2250 A. D. His wife has to stand in line or take her chances in the maternity ward of 1950.

Miss Utley is a handsome woman with almost limitless energy marked by a dauntless determination not to be downed. In spite of a life more than usually unlucky, we could see no sign that she was ready to give in on any point that engaged her integrity.

We say she was unlucky, because she was an active and open Communist long before it was fashionable to be even pink. At just about the time when she

threw over the philosophy of Lenin, the Soviets began to be accepted, under the Popular Front idea, as really splendid chaps. Her forthright views about her erstwhile associates and the things she said and wrote about her experiences in Russia and China were not calculated to make her a popular writer.

Now that the tide has turned, as far as Russia is concerned, she is wrapped up in another minority crusade, the effort to show that a revengeful peace policy can only defeat its own ends. "The High Cost of Vengeance," a basically sound book, founded upon personal observations among Germans, rather than on bull sessions at the Press Club, has got her in wrong again, though not with the thoughtful reader.

However we must say that she seems to thrive on adversity, and when last we saw her, was as stout-hearted as ever in defense of what she believes to be right.

The following "Chronology of events" was furnished the Foreign Relations subcommittee by Mr. Charles Edward Rhett, attorney for John S. Service:

Chronology of events

Date	Movements and activities of John S. Service	Other movements and activities	
1941			
Apr. 18	Transferred from Shanghai to Chungking.	Ambassador Gauss arrived Chungking.	
May 3	Arrived Chungking.		
May 16			
Dec. 22	Sent on trip to Rangoon.		
1942			
Jan. 20	Returned to Chungking via Burma Road.	General Stilwell arrived in Chungking.	
March			
April	Trip through central Szechwan.		
July 5	Ordered on extensive travel through northwest China.		
Oct. 20	Promoted from FSO-VIII to FSO-VII.		
Nov. 2	Returned to Chungking after visiting oil fields and Honan famine areas.		
Nov. 26	Left Chungking for leave in United States.		
Dec. 16	Arrived at home in California.		
1943			
Jan. 19	Commenced consultation in Department (FE).		
Jan. 23	Prepared memorandum on situation in China pointing to postwar policy problem (Doc. 103).		
Feb. 24	Completed consultation and returned to home in California.		
Apr. 12	Departed for Chungking.		
May 3	Arrived Chungking.		
May 10	Detailed to Lanchow "listening post."		
Aug. 10	Assigned to General Stilwell.		
Aug. 18	Commenced duty with Stilwell's headquarters in Chungking.		
September	Trip to New Delhi and North Burma front.		
December	Trip to Yunnan, Kweichow, and Kwangsi.		
1944			
January	Travel in southwest provinces.		
February	Temporarily at Chengtu and returned to Chungking.		
Apr. 17		Japs commence campaign on Yellow River front.	
May 18		Japs capture Loyang.	
May 27		Japs commence Yangtze valley campaign.	
June 18		Japs capture Changsha.	
June 20	Comprehensive memo on situation in China with recommendations (Doc. 157).	Vice President Wallace visit to Chungking. Approval for Yen-an mission. FDR message to Chiang recommending Stilwell command of all forces. FDR message to Chiang notes agreement in principle.	
June 21-24			
Do			
July 7			
July 15			
July 16	Promoted from FSO-VII to FSO-VI.	Japs capture Hengyang.	
July 22	Arrived Yen-an with first section of United States Army observer group.		
Aug. 8			FDR nominates Hurley as personal representative.
Aug. 10			

Chronology of events—Continued

Date	Movements and activities of John S. Service	Other movements and activities
Aug. 23		FDR again urges Chiang to give command to Stilwell.
Aug. 28		Lishui captured by Japs.
Aug. 29	First recommendation that consideration be given to arming Communists.	
Aug. 30		Ambassador Gauss proposed to Chiang desirability of broadening base of Government by a "war council."
Sept. 1 (?)		Hurley interview with Molotov at Moscow.
Sept. 6		Hurley arrives at Chungking.
Sept. 22-26		Discouraging reports by Stilwell to Marshall.
Oct. 10	Memorandum recommending stronger attitude toward Chiang (Doc. 193).	
Oct. 19		Stilwell recalled.
Oct. 21	Ordered to return to United States.	
Oct. 23	Departed Yen-an.	
Oct. 24	Departed Chungking.	
Oct. 29	Arrived Washington, commenced consultation (CA).	
Nov. 1		Gauss resigned as Ambassador to China.
Nov. 7		Hurley flies to Yen-an.
Nov. 10		Hurley and Mao sign five-point draft agreement.
Nov. 12		Kweilin captured by Japs.
Nov. 18		FDR to Hurley instructing to press for immediate unification of armies.
Nov. 19	Completed consultation and departed Washington for leave in California.	
Nov. 22		Kuomintang three-point counterproposal.
Nov. 30		Hurley appointed Ambassador to China.
Dec. 16		Communists reject Kuomintang proposals.
Dec. 19		General McClure interview with Chen Cheng (Minister of War) on proposal for guerrilla operation in Communist area.
Dec. 26 (?)		Colonel Bird (OSS) discusses McClure proposals with Communists in Yen-an.
Dec. 28		Communists propose additional four points.
1945		
Jan. 2	Arrived Washington and ordered to Chungking for detail to General Wedemeyer.	
Jan. 7	Departed Washington for Chungking.	
Jan. 9		Mao Tse-tung makes secret proposal through Wedemeyer that he visit United States for talk with FDR.
Jan. 14		Hurley telegram to FDR blaming breakdown of negotiations on McClure proposals for arming Communists.
Jan. 18	Arrived Chungking.	
Jan. 31		Hurley summary report to Department.
Feb. 3		Proposal for Political Consultative Conference seemed about to be accepted by Communists.
Feb. 4		Hurley reported Chinese desire to negotiate with Russia and offered to be middleman.
Feb. 6		SecState cautions Hurley on assuming responsibility as go-between or adviser.
Feb. 11		Yalta Agreement on Far East.
Feb. 17	Memorandum prepared with Ludden at Wedemeyer's request stating military necessity for flexible policy (Doc. 204).	
Feb. 19		Hurley and Wedemeyer leave Chungking for consultation in Washington.
Feb. 26		Acheson telegram summarizing situation and recommending that deadlock be broken by direct action in giving some arms to Communist.
Mar. 1		Chiang announces People's Congress to convene November 12, 1945.
Mar. 9	Left Chungking; arrived at Yen-an under Army orders to report on expected Communist Party Congress.	Communist Party rejects further negotiations because of Chiang plans for People's Congress.
Mar. 10		OSS raid on Amerasia offices in New York.
Mar. 30	Ordered to return to Washington.	
Apr. 3		Hurley departed Washington for China.
Apr. 4	Departed Yen-an.	
Apr. 8	Departed Chungking.	

Chronology of events—Continued

Date	Movements and activities of John S. Service	Other movements and activities
Apr. 9.....		Acheson ordered to return to United States.
Apr. 12.....	Arrived Washington, commenced consultation in Department (FE).	
Apr. 15.....		Hurley interviews Stalin at Moscow.
Apr. 18.....	Met Gayn for first time.	
Apr. 19.....	Met Jaffe for first time.	Harriman in Department urges caution on Stalin assurances.
Apr. 23.....		Kennan in Moscow states Soviet assurances only good for short term.
Do.....		Department cautions Hurley and instructs to press for early military and political unification—before end of war.
Apr. 25.....	Talked to IPR, New York.	
May 8.....	Completed consultation and was assigned to Office of the Foreign Service for preparatory studies connected with projected legislation on the Foreign Service.	
May 10.....	Letter of commendation from Wedemeyer.	
May 16.....	Promoted from FSO-VI to FSO-IV.	
May 19.....	Given permanent assignment to Department, continued work in OFS.	
June 6.....	Arrested by FBI.	
June 7.....	Placed on leave with pay.	
June 15.....		Hurley informs T. V. Soong of Yalta Agreement.
July 1.....		Kuomintang-Communist negotiations resumed; committee of seven visits Yen-an.
July (?).....		Hurley report that Communists will present no difficulty if treaty signed with Russia.
Aug. 6.....	Appeared before grand jury in Washington.	
Aug. 10.....	Grand jury returns "no true bill."	
Aug. 11.....	Appearance before Foreign Service Personnel Board.	
Aug. 12.....	Returned to active duty and temporarily assigned to FE as liaison officer with administrative divisions in connection with arrangements for reopening offices in the Far East.	
Aug. 14.....	Received letters from Byrnes and Grew.	Sino-Soviet Treaty signed.
Aug. 28.....		Hurley brings Mao Tse-tung from Yen-an to Chungking to reopen negotiations.
Sept. 7.....	Assigned to staff of United States political adviser in Japan.	
Sept. 14.....	Departed from Washington.	
Sept. 22.....	Arrived in Tokyo with Acheson.	Hurley submitted report that basic agreement had been reached and departed from Chungking for U. S.
Oct. 2.....		Hurley in conversation with Secretary Byrnes says nothing of disloyalty or sabotage by Acheson and Service.
Oct. 10.....		Representative Dondero in speech on House floor charges Amerasia "white-wash."
Oct. 11.....		Mao Tse-tung returns to Yen-an.
Oct. 12.....		Hurley in conversation with President and Byrnes makes first statement that he had not had full support but agrees to return immediately to China.
Nov. 26.....		Hurley, in conversation with Byrnes, mentions Acheson and Service for first time but again agrees to return immediately to China.
Nov. 27.....		Congressman DeLacy makes speech in House criticizing Hurley.
Do.....		Hurley announces resignation and issues statement criticizing Foreign Service.
Do.....		General Marshall appointed President's Special Representative.
Nov. 28.....		Dondero again attacks Amerasia case.
Dec. 5-10.....		Hearings conducted by Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Hurley charges.
Dec. 15.....		President's policy statement establishes principle of conditional aid.
1946		
Apr. 16.....	Hospitalized in Tokyo.	
Apr. 18.....		House passed H. R. 430 introduced by Dondero for investigation of Amerasia case.
July 19.....	Transferred from Tokyo to Wellington.	
Aug. 26.....	Discharged from hospital.	

Chronology of events—Continued

Date	Movements and activities of John S. Service	Other movements and activities
Sept. 6.....	Departed from Japan.	Larsen article published in Plain Talk.
Sept. 18.....	Arrived at home in California.....	
Sept. 28.....	Left San Francisco for Wellington.	
Oct. 15.....	Arrived at Wellington.	House Judiciary Subcommittee reports on investigation of Amerasia case.
Oct. 23.....	-----	
Nov. 13.....	Reclassified as FSO-3.	
1947	At Wellington.	
1948	At Wellington.	
Apr. 14.....	Promoted to FSO-2.	
1949	-----	
Jan. 7.....	Left Wellington on transfer to Washington.	
Jan. 10.....	Arrived Washington and commenced duty with Foreign Service Selection Board.	
Feb. 11.....	-----	
Mar. 21.....	Completed Selection Board duty and assigned to Division of Foreign Service Personnel as Special Assistant (actual duties to consult Foreign Service officers in regard to their efficiency reports).	Discussion of Service case by House Subcommittee on Appropriations.
Oct. 19.....	-----	
Nov. 21.....	Assigned to Calcutta as officer in charge	Publication by Congressman Judd of Service memo. No. 40, Oct. 10, 1945.
1950	-----	
Jan. 5.....	-----	Attack by Senator McCarthy on Service on Senate floor.
Feb. 3.....	Left Washington for leave in California en route to Calcutta.	
Feb. 12.....	-----	Lincoln Day speech by Senator McCarthy at Reno, naming Service. McCarthy speech in Senate giving details of 81 cases but not including Service.
Feb. 20.....	-----	
Mar. 11.....	Departed from Seattle by ship for India.	McCarthy charges against Service presented to Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee.
Mar. 14.....	-----	
Mar. 16.....	Received cable recalling to Washington.	Senator McCarthy repeats testimony before Tydings subcommittee re Service.
Mar. 23.....	Arrived Yokohama.	
Mar. 24.....	Departed Tokyo for Washington.	
Mar. 27.....	Arrived Washington, D. C.	
Mar. 30.....	-----	

REILLY, RHETTS & RUCKELSHAUS,
Washington, D. C., June 27, 1950.

Senator MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
Chairman of the Subcommittee,
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee Appointed Under Senate Resolution 231,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: You may recall that during the course of Mr. Service's testimony before your Committee in public session, he made reference to the fact that the possibility of American landings on the coast of China was a subject of widespread interest and discussion in the spring of 1945. In that connection, as an example of general public interest in and discussion of this possibility, he referred (Transcript of Proceedings, June 22, 1950, p. 2086) to a press conference at which Admiral Nimitz was reported to have mentioned the possibility of such landings. In order to complete your record on this particular point, I should like to refer you to the publication in which Admiral Nimitz was so quoted, with the request that you include this letter in the record of the Committee's proceedings.

This press conference was referred to in the magazine *The China Monthly* for April 1945, at p. 25, and the account of Admiral Nimitz' press conference is as follows:

"ADMIRAL NIMITZ SUGGESTS LANDING ON CHINA COAST

"Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who recently came to Washington for important strategy conferences, intimated on March 8, 1945, that a China coast landing may precede the invasion of Japan proper. In a press conference he said:

"I believe that we should plan the war against Japan in such a manner that our chances of success are greatest and our casualties least. In planning the final assault on the empire, we will need more than one position from which to attack. We will need a number of positions. It well may be that some of these positions will be in China."

Respectfully yours,

C. E. RHETTS.

REILLY, RHETTS & RUCKELSHAUS,
Washington, D. C., June 27, 1950.

Senator MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
Chairman of the Subcommittee,
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee Appointed Under Senate Resolution 231,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: You will recall that during the course of the hearing in executive session before your Subcommittee yesterday, June 26, Senator McMahon requested, and you directed, Mr. Service to supply to the Committee for inclusion in the record of the Committee's proceedings, certain excerpts from published materials reflecting General Hurley's views (1) as to the desirability of effecting a unification of the forces of the Chinese Central Government with those of the Chinese Communist party, and (2) as to whether he personally agreed with the views expressed to him by Marshal Stalin and Molotov that the Chinese Communists are not really Communists and that the Soviet Union was not interested in the Chinese Communists.

I enclose herewith material bearing on the questions, consisting of certain extracts from the so-called China White Paper, extracts from the transcript of the minutes of a press and radio news conference held by General Hurley on April 2, 1945, and certain excerpts from the transcript of testimony taken before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on December 5, 6, 7, and 10, 1945.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. RHETTS.

I

The following are extracts from *United States Relations With China*, published as Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, Released August, 1949 (pp. 563-564):

Secretary Hull to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)

893.00/8-3144

WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 9, 1944.

1. Careful consideration has been accorded to your messages by the President and by me, and we are in agreement with you that at the present time, a frank, friendly, and positive approach should be made to Chiang Kai Shek on the matters of governmental and related military conditions in China.

* * * * *

4. Further, we note with approval that you utilized the opportunity afforded by conversation with Chiang to mention your idea of a coalition council as described by you. Please tell Chiang that the President and I feel your suggestion is timely as well as practical, and worthy of careful consideration; that we are concerned not alone with reference to nonsettlement with the Chinese Communists but also with regard to reports of dissidence and dissatisfaction among non-Communist Chinese in other areas of the country; that we are not concerned with Chinese Communists or other dissident elements as such, but are

anxious, on behalf of the United Nations and on our own behalf, and also on behalf of China, that, under the leadership of a strong but tolerant and representative government, the people of China develop and use the spiritual and physical resources at their command to carry on the war and to establish a lasting democratic peace, and to achieve this, factional differences can, and should be, settled and merged by intelligent cooperation and conciliation. It is our belief that a most effective means to achieve this end would be a council or some body which represents all influential elements in China, with full powers, under the leadership of Chiang Kai Shek. However, we recognize that Chiang may have in mind some means of achieving the same result which would be equally or more effective.

Further, you may make use as you wish of such portions of the cogent arguments expressed in your telegrams, as coming from us, and also the views which were well expressed by Acheson on August ninth in his conversation with Sun Fo.

Kindly inform General Hurley, General Stilwell, and Mr. Nelson with regard to the matter. You are authorized to invite one or more of them to go with you to call upon Chiang if you feel that it would serve a useful purpose.

HULL.

II. THE EFFORT AT MEDIATION

Initial steps

Upon arriving at Chungking in September, General Hurley came to the conclusion that the success of his mission to unify all the military forces in China for the purpose of defeating Japan was dependent on the negotiations already under way for the unification of Chinese military forces. Accordingly, shortly after his arrival he undertook active measures of mediation between the Chinese National Government and the Chinese Communist Party.

In December 1944 General Hurley commented as follows regarding his early efforts at reconciliation:

"At the time I came here Chiang Kai-shek believed that the Communist party in China was an instrument of the Soviet Government in Russia. He is now convinced that the Russian Government does not recognize the Chinese Communist Party as Communist at all and that (1) Russia is not supporting the Communist Party in China, (2) Russia does not want dissensions or civil war in China, and (3) Russia desires more harmonious relations with China.

"These facts have gone far toward convincing Chiang Kai-shek that the Communist Party in China is not an agent of the Soviet Government. He now feels that he can reach a settlement with the Communist Party as a Chinese political party without foreign entanglements. When I first arrived, it was thought that civil war after the close of the present war or perhaps before that time was inevitable. Chiang Kai-shek is now convinced that by agreement with the Communist Party of China he can (1) unite the military forces of China against Japan, and (2) avoid civil strife in China."

With respect to specific steps taken by him, General Hurley reported in December 1944 that with the consent, advice and direction of the Generalissimo and members of his Cabinet and on the invitation of leaders of the Communist Party, he had begun discussions with the Communist Party and Communist military leaders for the purpose of effecting an agreement to regroup, coordinate and unite the military forces of China for the defeat of Japan. He continued: "The defeat of Japan is, of course, the primary objective, but we should all understand that if an agreement is not reached between the two great military establishments of China, civil war will in all probability ensue."

The five-point draft agreement, November 10, 1944

Following discussions with Chinese Government and Chinese Communist representatives in Chungking, General Hurley on November 7, 1944, flew to Yen-an for a two-day conference with Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The Communist leaders were impressed by the fact that General Hurley had taken the initiative in making this flight and cordial relations were established at once. As a result of these discussions there was evolved at Yen-an a five-point draft, entitled "Agreement Between the National Government of China, the Kuomintang of China and

the Communist Party of China," which was signed by Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party * * * and by General Hurley as a witness. This important agreement read as follows:

"(1) The Government of China, the Kuomintang of China and the Communist Party of China will work together for the unification of all military forces in China for the immediate defeat of Japan and the reconstruction of China.

"(2) The present National Government is to be reorganized into a coalition National Government embracing representatives of all anti-Japanese parties and nonpartisan political bodies. A new democratic policy providing for reform in military, political, economic and cultural affairs shall be promulgated and made effective. At the same time the National Military Council is to be reorganized into the United National Military Council consisting of representatives of all anti-Japanese armies.

"(3) The coalition National Government will support the principles of Sun Yat-sen for the establishment in China of a government of the people, for the people and by the people. The coalition National Government will pursue policies designed to promote progress and democracy and to establish justice, freedom of conscience, freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances, the right of writ of habeas corpus and the right of residence. The coalition National Government will also pursue policies intended to make effective the two rights defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want.

"(4) All anti-Japanese forces will observe and carry out the orders of the coalition National Government and its United National Military Council and will be recognized by the Government and the Military Council. The supplies acquired from foreign powers will be equitably distributed.

"(5) The coalition National Government of China recognizes the legality of the Kuomintang of China, the Chinese Communist Party and all anti-Japanese parties."

The three-point plan

General Hurley felt that this Five-Point Draft Agreement, which he promptly submitted to the National Government, offered a practical plan for settlement with the Communists. National Government leaders, however, said that the Communist plan was not acceptable (pp. 73-75).

* * * * *

General Hurley reported that he was conferring daily with the Generalissimo and members of his cabinet "endeavoring to liberalize the counterproposal. We are having some success. The Generalissimo states that he is anxious that the military forces of the Communist Party in China and those of the National Government be united to drive the invaders from China. The Communist leaders declare this is also their objective. I have persuaded Chiang that in order to unite the military forces in China and prevent civil conflict it will be necessary for him and the Kuomintang and the National Government to make liberal political concessions to the Communist Party and to give them adequate representation in the National Government" (p. 76).

* * * * *

Mr. Harriman feared that Ambassador Hurley might give Chiang Kai-shek an "overoptimistic account of his conversations with Stalin" and he thought it might be advisable to suggest to General Hurley that he should be careful "not to arouse unfounded expectations." On April 23 Secretary Stettinius instructed Ambassador Hurley as follows:

"I attach great importance to Marshal Stalin's endorsement at the present time of our program for furthering the political and military unity of China under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. However, at the same time I feel, as I have no doubt you do also, the necessity of facing the probability that Marshal Stalin's offer is given in direct relation to circumstances that are existing now and that may not long continue. The U. S. S. R. is at present preoccupied in Europe and the basis for her position in Asia following the war is not yet affected by the Communist-Kuomintang issue to an appreciable degree. In view of these circumstances I can well appreciate the logic of Marshal Stalin's readiness to defer to our leadership and to support American efforts directed toward military and political unification which could scarcely fail to be acceptable to the U. S. S. R. * * * Con-

sequently I believe that it is of the utmost importance that when informing Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the statements made by Marshal Stalin you take special pains to convey to him the general thought expressed in the preceding paragraph in order that the urgency of the situation may be fully realized by him. Please impress upon Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek the necessity for early military and political unification in order not only to bring about the successful conclusion of the Japanese war but also to establish a basis upon which relations between China and the Soviet Union may eventually become one of mutual respect and permanent friendship" (p. 98).

II

The following are excerpts from the transcript of minutes prepared by the State Department of a Press and Radio News Conference, Monday, April 2, 1945, held by General Hurley :

"A. * * * You gentlemen should know though—I believe you all do know, that it is a matter of common knowledge that the Communist Party of China supports the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. That was generally referred to as the people's three principles of China. The three principles are government of the people, by the people, and for the people. All the demands that the Communist Party has been making have been on a democratic basis. That has led to the statement that the Communist party in China are not, in fact, real Communists. The Communist Party of China is supporting exactly the same principles as those promulgated by the National Government of China and conceded to be objectives also of the National Government.

"Q. Sir, I am not sure that I understood that last sentence. You said the Communist Party is supporting the same principles as the National Government of China.

"A. Yes.

"Q. Could you tell us what is the divergence between them? How do they differ?

"A. Well, as a matter of fact, the divergence between the parties in China seems to be not in the objective desired because they both assert that they are for the establishment of a government in China that will decentralize authority and conduct itself along democratic lines, employing democratic processes. The divergence between them is the procedure by which they can be achieved. To go a little further, the Communist Party would like for the National Government to inaugurate certain reforms immediately and to do this, they have suggested a bipartisan coalition government. The National Government, that is, the Kuomintang Party, has stated that it has a program outlined by the liberator of China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whereby the authority of the government of China is to be returned to the people of China under a constitution and not to an aggregation of political parties. The National Government of China contends that it is now in the process of a meeting being held on the 5th of next month, a program whereby it will return control of the government to the people. The National Government claims that it would not be justified in turning over the authority of government to any organizations or political parties, or any coalition of politicians but that it is the attitude of the National Government to return the control of China to the people and let the people select their own leaders.

"Q. General, what is the real difference between the Chinese Communists in China and the Communists in America, Britain, and elsewhere?

"A. Well, I know the difference between the Republicans and Democrats in Oklahoma, but you are getting too deep for me when you are trying to make me outline the difference between foreign political parties."

"Q. Is this Communist delegate who has been appointed to the Chinese delegation really a Communist as far as you know?

"A. I think he is. I do know that he was their representative at Chungking and that he is now in Yenan and I have had many conferences with him. Now, to say whether he is a real Communist as you understand Communism, I would not say that. I don't know because there is a question whether any of the Chinese Communists are real Communists, but I do say this; that he does belong to the Communist Party and does cooperate with and serve that Party. Now, to determine what is the degree of Communism and what kind of Communism it is, I could not give you a definition of that."

III

The following are excerpts from the transcript of testimony taken before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, December 5, 6, 7, and 10, 1945:

"General HURLEY. At that time our policy in China was clearly defined and could be stated roughly as follows: (1) To unify all anti-Japanese military forces in China, and (2) to support the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a free, united, democratic government," (p. 32).

* * * * *

Senator CONNALLY. It was part of your instructions, was it not, also to try to get union between the so-called 'communists' and the Chiang Government, so they could both fight the Japanese?

"General HURLEY. Yes, sir" (p. 39).

* * * * *

"Senator CONNALLY. Did General Stilwell ever tell you that his purpose in advocating the arming and unification of the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek's forces was to destroy the Government of China? Did he ever tell you that?"

"General HURLEY. No, sir (p. 44).

"Senator CONNALLY. I was talking about the deviation of opinion between General Stilwell and yourself. It was rather sharp, was it not?"

"General HURLEY. It was not.

"Senator CONNALLY. It was not sharp?

"General HURLEY. No, sir (p. 46) * * *

"Senator CONNALLY. What did they (Stilwell and Chiang) disagree about, if you do not mind stating—about the Communist army, or not?

"General HURLEY. As I recall, at that time General Stilwell and I were not in disagreement in regard to the Chinese Communist armies. * * * So far as I know, General Stilwell and I are not at odds about the issue, and we have never had a controversial word between us (p. 47). * * *

"Senator CONNALLY. General Stilwell did advocate, however, the unification of the Communists with the Central Government in fighting, making a united front against the Japanese?

"General HURLEY. He had been advocating that for two and a half years and, so far as I know, had not gone to the Communists as I had done. I think that he advocated everything that I advocated in that connection. * * * I think he was in favor of unification of the forces. I certainly was, and we had no controversy on that" (p. 90).

* * * * *

"General HURLEY. If the Chinese Communists had been armed at that time, if they had been armed by us or by Russia or by Great Britain, it would in my opinion have made the collapse of the National Government inevitable, and the documents I have asked the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to obtain I think will prove that the object was to arm the belligerents and withdraw support from the Government, which in my opinion was contrary to the American policy (p. 130).

"Senator Bridges. Whose objective was that, General Hurley? (p. 130).

"General HURLEY. I have stated that it was the objective of the Communists, the Communist armed party, and please distinguish between them and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, because they are different. * * * Russia is not supporting the Chinese Communist Party. * * *" (p. 130).

* * * * *

"Senator CONNALLY. If you had succeeded in your unification program, you would have been willing to arm the Communists, then, would you not? (p. 184).

"General HURLEY. Oh, yes. (p. 185).

"Senator CONNALLY. If they were going to fight with you?

"General HURLEY. Oh, yes, yes.

"Senator CONNALLY. Yes.

"General HURLEY. Through their own government.

"Senator CONNALLY. Why, certainly, certainly.

"General HURLEY. I certainly was willing to arm them through their own government. Any time the National Government wished to arm the Communists I would have been in favor of it, but I was not in favor of arming a belligerent against the government that we were committed to uphold" (p. 185).

* * * * *

"General HURLEY. * * * very early in our negotiations I had an understanding with the Russian Government in regard to a rapprochement between China and the Soviet. Russia has said from the beginning that the Chinese Communists are not in fact Communists at all, that Russia does support the National Government of the Republic of China and the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, that Russia desires closer and more harmonious relations with China. This attitude of Russia was finally solemnized in the Sino-Soviet Pact last summer" (p. 31).

"General HURLEY. Both the Communist armed party and the National Government have adopted the slogan which represents their objective—a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.' Both the Communists and the National Government state that their objective is to make effective in China all the rights of man enumerated in the Constitution of the United States. All the parties of China contend that their purpose is to make democratic processes effective throughout China" (p. 33).

"General HURLEY. * * * Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov * * * indicated to me that they do not consider the Chinese Communists as Communists at all. Oh, yes—there are some of them who are Communists, but the general rank and file of the Communist Party, the heads of the Soviet Government do not consider as Communists. Two: They advised me at that time that they were not aiding the Communist Party in China against the Republic of China. Three: That they would support the National Government of the Republic of China, and, a little further than we had agreed to go, the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Finally: that Russia desired closer and more harmonious relations with China (p. 40L).

"Senator CONNALLY. I believe you stated a while ago that you thought that Russia was observing and living up to its treaty with China.

"General HURLEY. I do (p. 40X).

"Senator AUSTIN. * * * This Chinese armed party occupies a large area in China, does it not? (p. 72).

"General HURLEY. It claims to.

"Senator AUSTIN. As a matter of fact, are there not segments of this armed party scattered over all of northern China as far down as the Yellow River?

"General HURLEY. Yes, sir"

"Senator AUSTIN. And are they unified so that the Army of this Chinese armed party would be a great threat to the unification of China under the Republic?

"General HURLEY. Yes, sir. That is true even if we do not arm them with lend-lease, and if they are successful in getting some of the Japanese arms. But without aid from Russia, aid from the United States, aid from Britain, or the acquisition of Japanese arms, they are not an insurmountable threat.

"Senator AUSTIN. Is it your opinion that they are getting financial aid from any of these sources that you have just mentioned? (p. 73).

"General HURLEY. I would have to answer that question in the negative" (p. 74).

"General HURLEY. * * * please distinguish between them and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, because they are different, and all of this time Marshal Stalin and Commissar Molotov had been telling me, and throughout the entire period of the vicissitudes through which we passed so far as I know they have kept their word to me, that, as I stated yesterday, Russia—and this is my own analysis, it is not a quotation—does not recognize the Chinese armed Communist party as Communist at all. Russia is not supporting the Chinese Communist Party. Russia does not desire civil war in China. Russia does not desire the division of China and the setting up of two governments. Russia desires closer and more harmonious relations with China (p. 130).

"* * * I have read that the Soviet has transgressed certain matters that involve the territorial integrity and the independent sovereignty of China, but frankly I have no evidence that would convince me that that is true. I believe that the United States and Russia are still together on policy in China" (p. 131).

"Senator WILEY. It is your judgment—from what you testified this morning I gained it—that American and Russia are both playing on the level in the Far East? (p. 164).

"General HURLEY. Yes, sir. * * * Our Government saw some time ago the possibility of a victory in Europe before a victory over Japan. Consequently it was the purpose of our Government to try to find an amicable basis, in our next point of contact with Russia, which is Manchuria; and that amicable basis was worked out I think satisfactorily in the Sino-Soviet Agreement and in the exchange of letters that accompanied it; * * *" (p. 164-165).

"Senator CONNALLY. * * * Now, as I understand it, there is a popular theory going around over the country that Russia is supporting the so-called Communists in China. You view is that that is not true? (p. 177).

"General HURLEY. I would say this, in answer to that question, Senator—that I have the word of both Marshal Stalin and Commissar Molotov that they are not (pp. 177-178).

"Senator CONNALLY. * * * Anyway, so far as you know, the Russians are not cooperating with the so-called Communists in China—as far as you know?

"General HURLEY. That is as far as I know" (p. 178).

"Secretary BYRNES. * * * During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our longer-range goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development of a strong, united and democratic China" (p. 189).

"Secretary BYRNES. * * * We believe, as we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well organized groups who are now without any voice in the Government of China" (pp. 189-190).

"Secretary BYRNES. * * * To the extent that our influence is factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the other factions" (p. 190).

"Secretary BYRNES. If I understand correctly what Ambassador Hurley has stated to me, and subsequently to the press and to this Committee, he entertains no disagreement with this conception of our policy" (p. 190).

[A carbon copy of the following memorandum was recovered in the offices of Amerasia]

THE STILWELL AFFAIR AND HURLEY'S APPOINTMENT

This information, classified as Top Secret ("Eyes Only"), is supplied by John S. Service. Especial caution must be shown in the use of the two White House messages to Chiang Kai-shek, whose text is given below.

Early in July 1944 the U. S. Command in Chungking received a Top Secret message from the White House to be conveyed to Gen. Chiang Kai-shek. The message was taken to Chiang by Brig. Gen. Ferris. For fear that the text might be garbled by Chiang's own translator, John Service accompanied Ferris as interpreter. On arrival at Chiang's place, the two Americans asked Chiang to exclude all others from the room. Chiang listened in silence, and later said he would transmit his reply to the White House through his own channels. The message, as paraphrased by Service on May 19, 1945, was:

The situation in China is desperate and calls for drastic steps.

The President, therefore, suggests that all armies in China, including those of the Communists, be placed under an American commander. Although the President knows of Chiang's dislike for General Stilwell, he nevertheless believes that Stilwell's experience and record make him the best man for the job. The President would give Stilwell the necessary rank—make him a four-star general.

Chiang's reply was apparently transmitted through H. H. Kung, who was then attending the Bretton Woods conference. About ten days after the Presi-

dent's first message, another message arrived in Chungking. It gives a fair indication of Chiang's reply to the White House. The second message, also transmitted to Chiang by Ferris and Service, said in essence:

I am glad that you are in principle agreed to my suggestion for an American commander over all the forces in the China theater. Although, as you say, there are political factors which must be considered and there is also the important question of timing, I believe that the situation is so urgent that we should not delay; the political questions can certainly be solved. I agree with your suggestion for a high ranking political representative who can discuss these military and political matters, and I am looking now to find such a man who can have your complete confidence. [Service's words are apparently garbled in transcription from shorthand.]

Service is not sure who was responsible for the choice of Hurley, but believes that Harry Hopkins, as FDR's chief adviser, had his hand in the selection. Hurley arrived in Chungking in September—a few weeks after Stilwell became a four-star general. At first Hurley was friendly with Stilwell, but eventually went over to the Chinese view that Stilwell must be fired for the sake of Sin-American amity. Stilwell today believes that Hurley stabbed him in the back by strongly urging the President to recall Stilwell.

Asked for some of the reasons for the Stilwell-Chiang rift, Service listed these:

(a) At various times, Stilwell recommended to Chiang a drastic reshuffle of the Chinese command. All these suggestions were invariably ignored. Stilwell regarded Ho Ying-chin as one of the main obstacles to army reform advocated by the U. S. Stilwell also thought badly of Gen. Tu Li-ming [Service is unsure of this name], who was in command on the Salween front, and once, in anger, Stilwell suggested to Chiang that the best thing to do with Tu is to shoot him.

(b) There were a number of controversies dealing with orders issued by Stilwell or Chiang. The Chinese divisions in Burma, for instance, were receiving order from Chiang of which Stilwell knew nothing, or which were in direct conflict with the orders issued by Stilwell. This completely muddled up the military picture in Burma. One controversy dealt with Chiang's insistence that the battle for Burma be fought not by the Chinese but by the Allies, landing at Rangoon. Stilwell's efforts to explain that he had nothing to do with the formulation of the campaign plans for Burma remained fruitless.

(c) Chiang continually complained to Hurley that "his subordinate" was not carrying out his orders.

(d) Chiang insisted that before the Communist armies were given any aid, or put under an American commander, a political settlement had to be arrived at. Chiang, however, made any such settlement impossible.

(e) A sharp conflict developed over the use of lend-lease, Stilwell insisting on retaining control over the supplies and arguing that there was no sense in spreading these precious supplies thin among the untrained Chinese troops. Stilwell's point was that the Chinese armies have to be carefully weeded and trained before U. S. equipment is given to them. Wedemeyer, incidentally, has managed to retain control of the lend-lease supplies.

There is nothing new in these points, but they give confirmation to the reports already published in this country. At present, Service says, there is some improvement in the Chinese army, for some units had been given "diluted training." Troops thus trained, of course, do not come up to the standard of the divisions trained at Rangar (?), India, where the Chinese were given regular GI training. Every Chinese division now is accompanied by a team of U. S. advisers and instructors—perhaps ten to a division. Unless I am mistaken, Service said that the Mars Force has been disbanded, and split into teams assigned to instruct Chinese units.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, June 19, 1950.

Hon. MILLARD E. TYDINGS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: This is in response to your letter of June 7, 1950, requesting advice concerning the nature and preparation of the chart which Senator McCarthy referred to in his address upon the Senate floor on June 6, 1950.

You are advised that the document referred to by Senator McCarthy was not prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It may be that the State Department will be in a position to furnish your committee information concerning this document. This Department does not have a copy in its possession.

Yours sincerely,

PEYTON FORD,
Deputy Attorney General.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 28, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: When I appeared before your subcommittee on June 21, 1950, you requested a copy of the report entitled "Survey of Departmental Personnel Security Investigations," which was prepared by Mr. Samuel Klaus on August 3, 1946. A copy of this report is attached for your information. The names of the persons who were either employed by the Department, or were applicants for positions, as well as the names of the informants, have been eliminated from the report, in accordance with our understanding.

This report was prepared after Mr. Klaus, who was then assigned to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration, had conducted a survey of the departmental personnel security investigations. You will note that the statements on pages 1 and 2 point out specific limitations of the survey and the report. Subsequent to this report and in early 1947 the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at my request, conducted a much more thorough and complete survey of the Department's Division of Security and Investigations. The completed FBI report was submitted to me on April 28, 1947. You will remember that when I appeared before your subcommittee on June 21 I stated that the FBI report, together with statements of actions taken on their recommendations, had been furnished to Senator Lodge. It is my understanding that Senator Lodge will make all of the information available to your subcommittee.

The conditions mentioned by Mr. Klaus do not exist today. Corrective action has been taken through a realignment of the security responsibilities of the Department, a reorganized Division of Security, and the establishment of loyalty and security standards. The details of these actions have previously been made available to your subcommittee. You will observe that on pages 29 and 30 of the Klaus report reference is made to a chart alleged to have been prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. No such chart was ever received by the Department of State from the FBI, nor was such a chart ever prepared by the FBI. After consultation with the writer of the report, with the former Security Officer, under whose direction and whose office the chart was prepared, with certain of his then subordinates familiar with the chart, and with the FBI, and after reviewing working papers which are still in our file, we have conclusively determined that the chart was not prepared or furnished by the FBI, but was prepared as an investigator's working document in the Department of State in 1946 and by employees of the Department of State. The interview with the writer of the report and the Security Officer with whom he had a conversation about the chart, established that the writer of the report drew from his conversation with the Security Officer the unintentional, erroneous conclusion that the chart was prepared by the FBI.

Furthermore, on June 14, 1950, Mr. Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, advised the Department by letter that the FBI did not send any such chart to the State Department and made no evaluation of information as was indicated in the Klaus report. While the letter from the FBI was made available for the record when I appeared before your subcommittee on June 21, a copy of that letter is attached for your convenience.

With respect to the persons indicated on the chart and in the report as "agents," "communists," "sympathizers," and "suspects," the FBI, as indicated above, made no such evaluation. It should be emphasized that the chart was prepared by the Department's Security Officers merely for working purposes. The chart showed the names of employees on whom the Security Officers had, in May 1946, received allegations which, in their opinion warranted further investigations. You are assured that none of these persons are now employed by the Department, except those who have since been investigated and who have been checked and evaluated under the Loyalty Program.

Copies of the Department's Press Releases of June 6 and June 9, 1950, pertaining to the report, are attached for your information.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN E. PEURIFOY,
Deputy Under Secretary.

Attachments: As stated.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Washington, D. C., June 14, 1950.

By special messenger.

Hon. JAMES E. WEBB,

*Under Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. WEBB: Recent newspaper articles have come to my attention containing statements made by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, wherein he quoted excerpts from the State Department report prepared by Mr. Samuel Klaus of your Department which referred particularly to an alleged "FBI Chart."

The comments made by Mr. Klaus in his report concerning this alleged "FBI Chart," as they appeared in the newspapers, were completely erroneous. This Bureau did not send any such chart to the State Department, and, of course, made no evaluation of information as was indicated in the report. The author of the report took occasion to criticize the FBI in this report. This Bureau does not claim to be infallible; however, it appears that, if the State Department had any questions concerning the report, the matter should have been discussed with us at that time. I want to point out that the erroneous statements made by Mr. Klaus were highly embarrassing and prejudicial to the FBI.

As you are aware, this Bureau cooperates fully with your Department through established liaison channels. I thought you would be interested in knowing the true facts in this matter, and they are being furnished to you for whatever action you may deem desirable.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, *Director.*

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, June 13, 1950.

Hon. MILLARD E. TYDINGS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: In response to your question as to the dates of various searches made by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the offices of Amerasia and the residences of the subjects in the case, the following data is submitted:

The offices of Amerasia, Room 1141, 225 Fifth Avenue, New York City, were entered by Bureau Agents on March 20, 1945; March 27, 1945; the night of April 23-24, 1945; May 14, 1945; and June 6, 1945. On this latter date Philip Jaffe and Kate Mitchell were arrested there.

Mark Gayn's residence, Apartment 16 B, 302 West Twelfth Street, New York City, was entered April 5, 1945; April 27, 1945; April 29, 1945; May 30, 1945; the night of June 4-5, 1945, and June 6, 1945. On this last date Gayn was arrested.

The apartment of Kate Louise Mitchell, 127 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York City, was entered on March 31, 1945, and April 2, 1945.

The apartment of Philip Jaffe, 49 East Ninth Street, New York City, was entered on April 2, 1945, and April 6, 1945. The apartment of Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, No. 207, 1650 Harvard Street NW, Washington, D. C., was entered April 6, 1945.

Apartment 227 at 1650 Harvard Street NW, Washington, D. C., was entered prior to June 4, 1945, on which date Larsen moved into that apartment, and also on June 6, 1945, when Larsen was arrested.

The residence of Andrew Roth in Arlington, Va., was never entered. An examination of his effects which were being transported from Arlington, Va., to New York City was made on June 1 and 2, 1945. Andrew Roth was arrested on the street in Washington, D. C., June 6, 1945.

The residence of John Stewart Service was entered June 6, 1945, when he was arrested there.

In response to your question concerning a conversation between Philip Jaffe and John Service in a Washington, D. C., hotel (Question No. 5), the conversation was overheard through facilities of a technical installation in Jaffe's hotel room, May 8, 1945.

Yours sincerely,

PEYTON FORD,
Deputy Attorney General.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM—UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Date, April 18, 1945.

To: The Director.

From: D. M. Ladd.

Subject: Phillip Jaffe; Espionage (C).

Mr. Gurnea and the writer attended a conference at the office of General Holmes, which was attended also by Major Matt Correa and Fred Lyon, at which time Mr. Gurnea discussed developments in the above-entitled case with these gentlemen. We advised the conference that you had instructed that they be brought up to date on the developments and that the question of policy with reference to the future handling of the matter be determined.

After the discussion, Major Correa and General Holmes both stated that they were of the opinion that the investigation should be continued for the next two months or so for the following reasons:

1. In order that any other persons in either the State, Navy, or other Government defendants who might be involved could be determined.

2. In order that continued check might be made in New York for the purpose of endeavoring to determine whether, in fact, Jaffe is obtaining this material for the use of the Russian Government.

3. If information is developed as suggested under item 2, even though it might not be possible to utilize this in any prosecution, it would still be of tremendous value in any diplomatic dealings between this country and Russia.

Both General Holmes and Major Correa requested that, at such time as it is deemed feasible to break this case, they both be advised in advance, in order that they may properly notify other departmental officials who will have to know of developments, inasmuch as they have not been discussing the details of this matter with their superiors. Major Correa stated that Admiral Thebaud of ONI has not in any way been advised of developments in this matter, and that he felt it would be necessary that some notice be given to him just immediately prior to any arrests. The gentlemen were assured by Mr. Gurnea and myself that they would be appropriately informed prior to taking any such steps.

General Holmes and Major Correa both stated that, in the event developments in the case at any time indicated a necessity for immediate action, of course, the Bureau had blanket authority from both of them to act in such an emergency provided they were immediately notified prior to making any arrests.

Both of these gentlemen expressed complete satisfaction with the developments to date and appeared to be following this case with considerable interest.

CAHILL, GORDON, ZACHRY & REINDEL,
(COTTON & FRANKLIN),
Washington, D. C., June 13, 1950.

EDWARD P. MORGAN, Esq.,

*Counsel, Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Investigating Loyalty of State Department Employees,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORGAN: In response to your request I enclose herewith on behalf of the executors of the estate a photographic copy of a portion of Mr. Forrestal's personal papers together with an affidavit of Eugene S. Dufield who has custody of various of Mr. Forrestal's personal papers at the present time.

Very truly yours,

MATHIAS F. CORREA.

STATE OF OHIO,

Hamilton County, ss.:

Personally appeared before me, a notary public, in and for Hamilton County, Ohio, Eugene S. Duffield, who, being duly sworn, deposes:

I currently hold, on behalf of the executors of the late James Forrestal, various of his personal papers in order to arrange them for possible publication. Among them is a page headed, "28 May 1945—Lieutenant Andrew Roth."

A photographic copy of this page is attached. Among the papers temporarily in my possession, this page contains the only reference to the case mentioned therein that I have discovered. My careful reading has covered everything through September 1945 and I have scanned the balance of that year.

I understand that, at the request of the Department of Justice, a typed copy of this page has previously been furnished to that Department.

EUGENE S. DUFFIELD.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 10th day of June 1950.

[SEAL]

MARIE F. WINGFIELD,

Notary Public, within and for Hamilton County, Ohio.

28 May 1945

LIEUTENANT ANDREW ROTH

Major Correa reported to me that the Department of Justice has evidence to the effect that Lieutenant Andrew Roth has been furnishing confidential and secret documents to a man named Jaffe, head of a publication named "Amerasia" in New York City. Jaffe has had intimate relationship with the Russian Consul in New York.

Other Departments of Government involved are the Office of Strategic Services, the Department of State, and the Foreign Economic Administration.

Major Correa reported that it was proposed that Lieutenant Roth should be taken into surveillance Wednesday. He said that the FBI thought that unless speedy action were taken important evidence would be dissipated, lost and destroyed. I pointed out that the inevitable consequence of such action now would be to greatly embarrass the President in his current conversations with Stalin, because of the anti-Russian play-up the incident would receive out of proportion to its importance, particularly in view of the fact that the people involved were members of the American Communist Party.

I asked Captain Vardaman to see to it that the President was informed in this matter and then I called Mr. Edgar Hoover and suggested that he advise Mr. Tom Clark and have him also see that the President is in full information of all of the facts in the matter as well as their implications.

JF: HCO.

5-29-45.

The staff of the subcommittee interviewed certain persons and submitted the following memoranda on the results of those interviews:

MAY 19, 1950.

MEMORANDUM RE INTERVIEW WITH JOSEPH W. BALLENTINE

On Friday, May 19, 1950, I interviewed Mr. Joseph W. Ballentine, at the Brookings Institute, where he is now employed. At the time of the Amerasia arrests Mr. Ballentine was Director of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and Larsen was employed in that Division.

Mr. Ballentine stated that he had no information about the Amerasia case and that as a matter of fact he was in San Francisco at the time the arrests were made. He also stated that he knew very little about Mr. Larsen since Mr. Larsen had first been employed under an independent section and had later been transferred to the Far Eastern Division. For this reason Mr. Ballentine stated he had not made the customary check into the employees background.

I specifically asked Mr. Ballentine about Larsen's story about going to him with statements about Jaffe and both of them subsequently going to see Acting Secretary Grew. Ballentine stated he could never remember any incident of this character and it sounded to him of sufficient importance that if it had happened he would have remembered.

Ballentine added that to the best of his recollection he had never heard of Jaffe or Larsen's association with him prior to the arrests. I also asked Ballentine about the Far Eastern Division and whether it was divided into pro-Chinese Communist cliques and pro-Chiang cliques. Ballentine stated that to the best

of his knowledge there were no such cliques that senior officers in the Division were all in accord. He did state that some of the junior officers were divided as to who would make the most effective fighting force in China to help us in the fight against the Japanese, but the entire emphasis was on who would help us most against the Japs and not who should be supported in China.

ROBERT L. HEALD.

MAY 22, 1950.

MEMORANDUM RE INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT BANNERMAN

Mr. Robert Bannerman was interviewed with a request that he advise of the knowledge and information which he personally has concerning the Amerasia case since allegedly he had participated in some investigation thereof in the State Department.

Mr. Bannerman advised that he had been employed in the office of the Chief Special Agent on work not relating in any way to the Amerasia case. On June 21, 1945, he was appointed Security Officer of the State Department and was assistant to the Director of the Office of Controls. Bannerman thought that this was done about three days after the arrests in the Amerasia case but it is to be noted that the arrests were made June 6, 1945. According to Bannerman, he had a desk but no staff, no files, and no office set-up.

The title Assistant to the Director of Office of Controls was merely a title because the Office of Controls had not yet been set up. Until February of 1946, as Security Officer, Bannerman had no staff except those individuals which he borrowed from other offices. During this period, most of his work was screening, with a committee, the approximately 4,000 individuals who had been taken into the State Department from wartime agencies such as FEA, Research and Analysis of OSS, etc. As Security Officer for the Department of State, Bannerman at that time had no personnel security work within his jurisdiction. As a matter of practical fact, Bannerman was working under Fred Lyon.

Bannerman had no knowledge of the Amerasia case until the arrests and no official knowledge of it until after the arrests when until sometime during the fall of 1945, he assisted the FBI agents in running down the documents in the State Department. The documents which were found in connection with the case and which seemed to have emanated from the State Department, were checked by the FBI to determine their validity if they were originals and to locate the originals where copies were seized. Bannerman assisted the FBI agents in doing this by making arrangements with the proper personnel in the appropriate division of the State Department. Bannerman had nothing to do with the action to be taken against the personnel or the policy to be followed by the Department of State in connection with the case. In other words, Bannerman has no first-hand knowledge of the case and conducted no investigation of the facts of the case. Insofar as Bannerman knows, the State Department in no wise conducted an investigation of the case but the case was duly investigated by the FBI. According to Bannerman, Assistant Secretary for Administration, Julius Holmes, took an active interest in the case and would be the former State Department official with direct knowledge as to the State Department position and handling of it.

Bannerman has no personal desire to appear as a witness and does not feel that he has any information or knowledge to which he can personally testify which would be of value.

Bannerman is presently with the Central Intelligence Agency and is located in Room 200, 2210 E St. NW.

LYON L. TYLER, JR.

MAY 25, 1950.

MEMORANDUM RE WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

We interviewed Gen. Donovan at his apartment, 4 Sutton Place. I informed Gen. Donovan that the subcommittee understood that he was leaving shortly and was anxious to obtain, before his departure, information from him concerning his knowledge of the Amerasia case.

Gen. Donovan asked if we had talked with Archbold VanBuren and when we replied in the affirmative, he indicated that his information was no more

than that which VanBuren probably gave us. Gen. Donovan verified VanBuren's story concerning the events during which VanBuren and Major Monigan took to Gen. Donovan the documents which Bielaski had brought in from the Amerasia office. Gen. Donovan advised that he took the matter up with Stettinius at Stettinius's apartment at which time Assistant Secretary of State Holmes, VanBuren, and Major Monigan were also present. Gen. Donovan advised that he knew nothing of the case thereafter except that he kept after them (the State Department and Fred Lyon) to do something about the matter.

Gen. Donovan discussed his belief at the time that "John Doe" warrants should have been obtained and statements under oath gotten from the principals. He indicated that he felt that the matter was incorrectly handled because when any agency conducts an investigation, the matter does not remain confidential and opportunity to cover up, etc., arises.

Gen. Donovan mentioned that in discussing the matter with Fred Lyon he asked if the State Department had any idea who might have been responsible for this material emanating from the State Department. When he pressed Mr. Lyon for some suggestions or suspicions, Mr. Lyon suggested that it might have been John Carter Vincent. Gen. Donovan then queried us as to whether Vincent did not have a wife who was a Communist.

Gen. Donovan suggested that we should see Pat Hurley. Shortly after the discovery of the Amerasia case, Gen. Donovan went to London and he met Pat Hurley at the airport there, Hurley being on his way to Moscow and China. Donovan told Hurley what Fred Lyon had said about Vincent because he knew that Hurley thought Vincent was "his boy."

Gen. Donovan advised that he was going to call Fred Lyon to tell him that he, Gen. Donovan, had told us about Lyon's suspicion about John Carter Vincent.

Gen. Donovan suggested very clearly that he thought we should talk to Gen. Hurley, and that the committee should call as witnesses Fred Lyon and John Carter Vincent.

LYON L. TYLER, Jr.

MAY 17, 1950.

MEMORANDUM RE FREDERICK B. LYON

I interviewed Frederick B. Lyon, Foreign Service Officer, now with the Foreign Service Inspection Division of the State Department. I informed Mr. Lyon that his name, as he probably knew, had been prominently mentioned in the press as one of those who should be called as a witness and who reportedly could furnish testimony concerning the Amerasia case. I informed Mr. Lyon that on behalf of the subcommittee, I desired to determine from him the nature of any testimony that he would be able to give and to determine the extent of his personal knowledge of the facts of the matter.

Mr. Lyon advised me that upon returning recently from Manila, P. I., he saw stories in the press about the Amerasia case and naturally was interested therein. He stated that he had seen a column by Sokolosky in which he, Lyon, had been mentioned as a witness who could give testimony. Mr. Lyon told me that he was shocked to see himself so considered. Mr. Lyon furnished the following information to me concerning his part and pointed out that he couldn't see where he could furnish any information of pertinent value.

Because of the indirect interest in the investigation of the case and the lapse of time, Mr. Lyon's recollections are described by him as vague and unclear. He understood that Gen. Donovan had come to see Secretary of State Stettinius and turned over to Stettinius certain papers which OSS had gotten hold of, that apparently emanated from the State Department. Secretary of State Stettinius called Assistant Secretary Julius C. Holmes and turned over the material to Holmes and either Stettinius or Holmes decided that the matter should be referred to the FBI for immediate investigation. At this time, Mr. Lyon was in the departmental service and was in charge of the Foreign Activity Correlation Division which handled liaison with the various intelligence agencies, such as FBI, OSS, G-2, ONI, etc. Additionally, since Assistant Secretary Holmes had only recently returned to the department after some years absence, Mr. Lyon had an office across the hall of Mr. Holmes in order to serve as a sort of informal adviser to Mr. Holmes on procedures and policies than in effect relating to the administration of the State Department. For these reasons, Mr. Lyon believes that he served to facilitate Assistant Secretary Holmes' action in turning the matter over to the FBI for investigation. Mr. Lyon could

not recall exactly, but he thinks that he may have accompanied Mr. Holmes to the FBI to introduce him to Director Hoover.

Thereafter, of course, Mr. Lyon as liaison officer of the State Department with the FBI, facilitated and assisted the FBI investigation within the State Department by making proper arrangements for them to interview individuals and review material. In no sense did Mr. Lyon conduct any of the investigations within the State Department. Any results of the investigation were results produced and obtained by the FBI and would therefore be in the possession of the FBI and not of Mr. Lyon, or, insofar as he knows, in the possession of the State Department. As a matter of personal knowledge Mr. Lyon is unable to testify to any of the facts in this case. He conducted no interviews, he reviewed no material, he took no action on behalf of the State Department and was only connected with the case as liaison with the investigating officers, namely the FBI agents. Mr. Lyon, of course, would be reluctant and feels that he is unauthorized to testify to the procedures used by the FBI and feels strongly that any information in this regard should come from the FBI itself.

In discussing the matter with Mr. Lyon, it was quite clear that he is not a primary witness to any evidentiary fact relative to the activities of the subjects or the handling of the prosecution of the case or the handling of the personnel from an administrative point of view.

It appears that since Mr. Lyon was liaison with the FBI and would have been in constant touch with the FBI on any of the investigations within the State Department, that there has been some confusion leading to the presumption that Mr. Lyon would have conducted or participated in the conducting of the investigation. Such a presumption is erroneous. How Mr. Lyon came into the picture is unknown to him except to the extent that we surmise it occurred as above suggested.

LYON L. TYLER, JR.

MAY 10, 1950.

MEMORANDUM RE INTERVIEW WITH JUDGE PROCTOR

I talked to Judge Proctor on Wednesday, May 10, 1950, concerning proceedings held before him in the District Court when Jaffe and Larsen were fined. I pointed out to Judge Proctor that there had been some indication in the case that the Justice Department had not disclosed to him all the facts in the case. I specifically wanted to know whether the attorneys in the case had ever had any informal meeting with him and discussed facts other than those shown on the transcript of the proceedings.

Judge Proctor stated that he had no independent recollection of the case. His records did show that on the day before, he was contacted by Mr. McInerney of the Justice Department. However, he does not recall what was discussed, but he is reasonably sure that the facts of the case were not discussed since he has no record of Mr. Jaffe's attorney being present. Judge Proctor did state that as far as he recalls, therefore, he had no information concerning the case other than that given him in open court.

Judge Proctor also pointed out that there had been nothing special about the Saturday morning hearing. He stated that he was on duty that morning and would therefore be the judge who would handle the case. The only possible need for the prior meeting would be to make arrangements to bring the case up out of order since it was not calendared for hearing on that date. Judge Proctor stated that it was his practice to hold hearings on Saturday morning in cases in which it would accommodate the attorneys or the parties in the case if it were possible.

Judge Proctor also indicated that while he hoped the Committee would not find it necessary to call him, he would be willing to appear if needed and would testify substantially as set out in this memorandum.

ROBERT L. HEALD.

Information on the following people, who were believed to be Washington contacts of Philip Jacob Jaffe, was developed by the staff of the subcommittee:

Alvin Barber

Alvin Barber was born February 6, 1905, at Newburg, New York, of American parents. From October 1942 through the Amerasia investigation he was em-

ployed by the Foreign Economic Administration and its predecessor the Board of Economic Warfare. At the time of the investigation he was Chief of the Supply Adjustment Section in the office of Economic Programs of FEA. He is known to have been a contributor to Amerasia and from February 1935 to December 1941 he was a research associate for the Institute of Pacific Relations. He was a personal contact of Philip Jaffe on Jaffe's visits to Washington, D. C.

Joseph Bernstein

Bernstein at one time was listed as an employee of Amerasia. At the time of the FBI investigation he was a writer of official publications for the Communist Party.

Thomas Arthur Bisson

Thomas Arthur Bisson was born in New York City November 8, 1900. He first went to the Orient in 1924 as a Presbyterian missionary. Since 1929, however, he has been identified in this country with the Foreign Political Association and with the Institute of Pacific Relations. He was employed by the Board of Economic Warfare in January 1942 but resigned from that organization subsequent to investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Civil Service Commission. He is a very close associate of Philip Jaffe and was formerly on the editorial board of Amerasia.

Chao Ting Chi

At the time of the Amerasia investigation Chao Ting Chi was Secretary General of the Foreign Exchange Control Commission of the Chinese Ministry of Finance, and director of economic research for the Central Bank of China. His permanent residence is New York City. He was married to Harriet Levine, a cousin of Philip Jaffe and apparently was successful in concealing from the Chungking government the fact that he, like Jaffe, was connected with the Communist activities in this country. Jaffe is known to have corresponded with Chi under an alias of Phillips.

Philip C. Curtis

Philip C. Curtis is a native-born citizen of the United States, born May 26, 1907. At the time of the Amerasia investigation he resided in Washington, D. C. He was a telephone contact of Philip Jacob Jaffe. An FBI check at the time of the Amerasia investigation indicated that Curtis' most recent employment had been with the Office of Strategic Services.

Frederick Vanderbilt Field

Field, who has been prominent in numerous Communist organizations, was a founder with Jaffe of Amerasia, Inc., and prior to dissolution of the corporation in 1944 owned 50 percent of the stock. He was President of the corporation and apparently frequently advised with Jaffe concerning the contents of publication. Field, like Jaffe was a lecturer at the "Jefferson School of Social Science" and also a director of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship.

John Thomas Find

John Thomas Find was reportedly born July 15, 1896, in Cleveland, Ohio. There is no birth record in Cleveland, however, which can be verified. His father was an American citizen of Dutch and Chinese descent. At the time of the Amerasia investigation he was employed as a Chinese translator in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D. C., and had been so employed since February 1942. He spent several years in China and is well acquainted with Thomas Arthur Bisson of the Institute of Pacific Relations who was formerly on the editorial board of Amerasia and who is a close associate of Philip Jacob Jaffe. Find was a known contact of Emmanuel Larsen, Lt. Andrew Roth, and Kate Louise Mitchell. Official documents bearing routing to Find were found in Jaffe's office.

Irving S. Friedman

Irving S. Friedman is known to have been a contact in the Treasury Department of both Jaffe and Chao Ting Chi who is married to Jaffe's cousin Harriet Levine. Friedman was born January 31, 1915, is a United States citizen and was formerly a member of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. At the time of the Amerasia investigation he was an economic analyst in the Treasury Department, Washington, D. C.

Julian Richard Friedman

Julian Friedman was born June 2, 1920, in New York City. Immediately upon graduation from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy he was hired by the State Department in 1943 as a junior divisional assistant in international economic affairs. At the time of the Amerasia investigation he held the rating of divisional assistant in the office of John Carter Vincent, chief of the division of Chinese affairs of the office of Far Eastern affairs of the United States Department of State. Friedman was a known contact of Lt. Andrew Roth and it was through Friedman that Roth was able to first introduce John Service to Jaffe. Friedman had an active interest in the affairs of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Donald Porter Geddes

At the time of the Amerasia investigation Geddes was described as a former writer and lecturer employed as editor of Pocket Book, Inc., and formerly employed by Columbia University Press. He was a contact of Philip Jaffe, Kate Mitchell, Mark Gayn, and also of Joe Bernstein, a known Communist writer.

Randall Gould

Gould during the Amerasia investigation was publishing a weekly newspaper in New York known as the Shanghai Evening Post. Prior to the Japanese conquest of Shanghai this newspaper had been published in that city. Mr. Gould was also active in the insurance business of New York. Mr. Gould was a contact of Jaffe and apparently quoted from and referred to Amerasia articles in his newspaper.

Michael Greenburg

Michael Greenburg, alias Menahem Greenburg, was identified as a telephone contact of Philip Jaffe. At the time of the Amerasia investigation Greenburg resided in Arlington, Virginia, and was employed by the Foreign Economic Administration. He was born in Manchester, England, November 28, 1914, of Russian parents and came to the United States at the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939. His sister, Esther, at the time of the Amerasia investigation was the organizer for the Lancashire district of the Communist Party of Great Britain. Prior to entering the employ of the United States government in 1942 Greenburg was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Chew Sick Hong

Chew Sick Hong was born December 10, 1910, in China and entered the United States in 1920 as the son of a native-born American. At the time of the Amerasia investigation he was assistant news editor in the overseas branch of the Office of War Information in New York City and was so employed since December 1941. He is well recognized in Chinese circles in New York as a Communist and met at the home of Philip Jaffe in New York City on April 22, 1945, with Earl Browder, president of the Communist Political Association; Y. Y. Hsu, of the Institute of Pacific Relations; and Tong Pi Wu, Chinese Communist delegate to the United Nations Conference on International Organization.

Y. Y. Hsu

Y. Y. Hsu is a citizen of China born in China May 1, 1902. At the time of the Amerasia investigation he was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Kate Louise Mitchell

Kate Louise Mitchell, coeditor of Amerasia, is a native-born citizen of the United States, born in Buffalo, New York, September 1, 1908. She was affiliated with the Institute of Pacific Relations since 1933. She is reportedly wealthy, and has lectured at the School for Democracy in New York City which reportedly was Communist-sponsored. Kate Louise Mitchell did most of the actual writing of the articles which appeared in Amerasia. Miss Mitchell was apprehended at the time the FBI made its arrests in the Amerasia case but was "no-billed" by the grand jury.

Obaidur Rahman

Obaidur Rahman was a secretary in the Indian Agency General of the Embassy of Great Britain in Washington, D. C. At the time of the Amerasia investigation he had been a contact of Jaffe for a considerable period of time. When he was transferred from Washington to India by way of London early in 1945

it was indicated that he might carry material of a secret nature for Jaffe. Rahman is Anti-British.

Alix Simon Reuther

Alix Simon Reuther was a contact of Philip Jaffe both in New York and Washington. At the time of the Amerasia investigation she was news editor in the domestic branch, Foreign News Bureau, Office of War Information, Washington, D. C. She was born in Frankfort Main, Germany, in 1903, and was naturalized in this country in May 1940. Between 1936 and 1939 she was employed by the Spanish (Loyalist) Information Bureau in New York City.

Lawrence Kaelter Rossinger aka Larry Rossinger

Left-wing Rossinger has been employed as a teacher, research worker, and writer in New York City. At one time he was employed by the Indian Government Trade Commission and was also affiliated with the Foreign Policy Association. He is reported to have leftist inclinations. Rossinger was a contact of Jaffe.

Howard Sulsam, also known as Howard Selsam and Paul Salter

Salsam was director and instructor of the "Jefferson School of Social Science," an organization sponsored by the Communist Party in New York.

Charles Nelson Spinks (USNR)

Charles Nelson Spinks was born in Berkeley, California, May 14, 1906. He went to Japan as an instructor in English at Tokyo University of Commerce in 1936. He returned to the United States in 1941 and was commissioned Lieutenant (j. g.), USNR, January 19, 1942. At the time of the Amerasia investigation he was assistant to the head of the Japanese section of the Far East Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Spinks was on the Far East Committee of the State, War, Navy Control Commission, and was loaned to the Department of State on a part-time basis to prepare studies on far-eastern questions to be brought before the State, War, Navy Control Commission. Spinks was a contact of Lt. Andrew Roth, and on April 18, 1945, Philip Jaffe instructed Larsen, in whose office at the State Department Spinks shared space, to obtain notes of the meetings of the State, War, Navy Control Commission, and furnish them to Jaffe. Larsen introduced Spinks to Jaffe.

Tung Pi Wu

At the time of the Amerasia investigation Tung Pi Wu was an elderly Chinese who had long been a member of the Communist Party of China. He came to the United States in April 1945 to attend the United Nations Conference on International Organization. Arrangements were made through Y. Y. Hsu for Tung Pi Wu to meet with Earl Browder and Philip Jaffe at the latter's residence in New York City, April 22, 1945.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, June 26, 1950.

HONORABLE MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee, United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary of the Defense has referred to me for reply your letter of June 15 requesting further information regarding the case of former Lt. Andrew Roth.

In this letter you inquired as to the reason Lieutenant Roth was not ordered to stand trial by a general court martial. This was due to a policy of long standing, and still in effect, that uniformed Naval personnel ascertained to be involved with civilians who would be subject to criminal prosecution in the Federal courts, would be made available to the Federal authorities for prosecution. The case of former Lieutenant Roth, therefore, was in line with general operating policy in such matters and constituted no deviation from normal procedures.

I hope that the foregoing will be of assistance to your subcommittee.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, May 16, 1950.

HONORABLE MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
*Chairman, Subcommittee of Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR SENATOR: Reference is made to your letter to the Attorney General of May 9, 1950, asking that your Subcommittee be furnished a copy of the transcript of grand jury proceedings of the so-called Amerasia case (*United States v. Philip J. Jaffe, et al.*) for its consideration and study.

Reference is also made to the letter of James M. McInerney, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, dated May 10, 1950, advising you that photostatic copies of documents seized from the premises of some of the defendants in this case will be available for your perusal in Room 4220 in the Department of Justice within the next few days.

When the members of your Subcommittee come to this Department to examine the documents in question we will gladly make available to them a copy of the transcript of grand jury proceedings in this case.

Yours sincerely,

PEYTON FORD,
The Assistant to the Attorney General.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
CRIMINAL DIVISION,
Washington, May 10, 1950.

HONORABLE MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
*Chairman, Subcommittee of Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: During the course of my testimony in executive session before your committee last Thursday, May 4, 1950, you requested that I furnish photostatic copies of certain documents.

Pursuant to your request, I am enclosing a photostatic copy of the Demurrer, Motion to Quash, and Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed on September 28, 1945, on behalf of the defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen. I am also enclosing a photostat of a newspaper article which appeared in the September 28, 1945, issue of *The Evening Star* entitled "Larsen Charges FBI Made Illegal Search of Home for U. S. Files."

With respect to the request of your committee that the documents which were seized from the premises of some of the defendants be made available to your committee, I have discussed this with Mr. Peyton Ford and we hope to have photostatic copies available for your perusal in Room 4220 of this Department within the next few days.

During the course of my testimony there was some discussion with respect to the classification and importance of the documents seized. This discussion may have left some members of the committee with the impression that the importance or nonimportance of the documents may have been an important consideration in the disposition of the case. Such of course is not the fact, because the indictment returned against the defendants charged them with conspiring to embezzle, remove, retain, etc., official government documents without respect to their classification or relation to the national defense. In any event, the maximum penalty under the conspiracy statute would be the same in either case, the net result being that the government had one less element of proof to establish at the trial.

Respectfully,

JAMES M. MCINERNEY.

[From the Evening Star, September 28, 1945]

LARSEN CHARGES FBI MADE ILLEGAL SEARCH OF HOME FOR U. S. FILES

Charging Federal Bureau of Investigation agents had illegally and secretly searched his apartment in the 1600 block of Harvard Street NW., Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen this afternoon filed motions in District Court attacking the charge against him of conspiracy to unlawfully remove Government records and files under which he and two others were indicted in August.

In a motion to suppress evidence, Mr. Larsen, a specialist in the China Division of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, State Department, also accuses the FBI of telephone wire-tapping and charged the FBI with search and seizure without a warrant.

In an affidavit accompanying the motions, Mr. Larsen says FBI agents forced him to show them his private files and he claims he heard whispered conversations between them, indicating they already knew where his files and other items were kept.

Lt. Andrew Roth, formerly on active duty as an intelligence officer in the Navy Department, yesterday filed a demurrer attacking the indictment and asked for a bill of particulars.

Lt. Roth was one of two other men indicted with Mr. Larsen. In the demurrer he charged the indictment is "vague, indefinite and uncertain."

Named with Mr. Larsen and Lt. Roth in the conspiracy indictment was Philip Jacob Jaffe, New York editor of Amerasia Magazine. All three are out on bond.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HOLDING A CRIMINAL TERM

Criminal No. 75457

United States, plaintiff vs. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, et al., defendants

Service of copies of the following is hereby acknowledged this 28th day of September 1945.

Motion to quash.

Demurrer.

Motion to suppress evidence and for return of evidence.

Affidavit of Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
R. M. HITCHCOCK,
By DONALD B. ANDERSON, *Special Assistant*.

NOTICE TO CALENDAR

The Clerk of said Court will please calendar the above motions and demurrer for hearing on Thursday, October 18, 1945, at 10 o'clock, A. M.

ARTHUR J. HILLAND,
Attorney for Defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen,
Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HOLDING A CRIMINAL TERM

Criminal No. 75457

United States, plaintiff, vs. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen et al., defendants

MOTION TO QUASH INDICTMENT

Now comes the defendant, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, and with leave of court first had and obtained, hereby withdraws his plea of "not guilty" entered herein August 30, 1945, and says that the indictment herein is defective and insufficient to require him to plead thereto and he moves the court to quash the indictment, and as grounds therefor says:

1. The use in the indictment of the alleged alias "Jimmy Larsen" is prejudicial to said defendant, as shown by the affidavit of said defendant filed herein.

2. The evidence upon which the indictment was returned by the Grand Jury was illegally obtained as shown by said defendant's affidavit and motion to suppress evidence filed herein.

3. The allegation that the defendants agreed to commit "certain offenses" against the United States is vague and uncertain.

4. The "certain offenses" which the defendants are alleged to have agreed to commit are not stated in the indictment.

5. The ingredients of the "certain offenses" which the defendants are charged with having agreed to commit are not stated in the indictment.

6. The indictment does not specify or identify, with reasonable certainty, the property, et cetera, referred to in paragraphs numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in the indictment.

7. The alleged overt acts are insufficient to make out an offense of conspiracy to commit certain offenses against the United States.

8. It does not appear either from any allegation of fact in the indictment or from their nature and extent that the alleged overt acts were in pursuance of the alleged conspiracy and were done in order to effect the alleged objects of the same.

9. The indictment alleges conclusions rather than allegations of fact.

10. The indictment is bad for duplicity.

11. The facts alleged in the indictment do not constitute a crime against the United States.

12. For other reasons apparent of record.

ARTHUR J. HILLAND,
Attorney for Defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen,
Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HOLDING A CRIMINAL TERM

Criminal No. 75457

United States, plaintiff, vs. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen et al., defendants

DEMURRER

Now comes the defendant, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, and with leave of court first had and obtained, hereby withdraws his plea of "not guilty" entered herein August 30, 1945, and demurs to the indictment herein and says that said indictment is bad in form and substance and that the same ought to be dismissed and this defendant released from custody, and as grounds therefor says:

1. The allegation that the defendants agreed to commit certain offenses against the United States is vague and uncertain.

2. The certain offenses which the defendants are alleged to have agreed to commit are not stated in the indictment.

3. The ingredients of the certain offenses which the defendants are charged with having agreed to commit are not stated in the indictment.

4. The indictment does not specify or identify, with reasonable certainty, the property, et cetera, referred to in paragraphs numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in the indictment.

5. The alleged overt acts are insufficient to make out an offense of conspiracy to commit certain offenses against the United States.

6. It does not appear either from any allegation of fact in the indictment or from their nature and extent that the alleged overt acts were in pursuance of the alleged conspiracy and were done in order to effect the alleged objects of the same.

7. The indictment alleges conclusions rather than allegations of fact.

8. The indictment is bad for duplicity.

9. The facts alleged in the indictment do not constitute a crime against the United States.

10. For other reasons apparent of record.

WHEREFORE, the defendant, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, demands judgment dismissing the indictment and discharging him from custody.

ARTHUR J. HILLAND,
Attorney for Defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen,
Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HOLDING A CRIMINAL TERM

Criminal No. 75457

United States, plaintiff, vs. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen et al., defendants

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND FOR RETURN OF EVIDENCE

Now comes the defendant, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, and moves the court that all the evidence, files, documents, papers, goods, and chattels relating to the alleged offense in the indictment and obtained or seized by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, be suppressed and that the Attorney General of the United States and the United States Attorney in and for the District of Columbia and their and each of their assistants be restrained from using any of said evidence, files, documents, papers, goods, and chattels aforesaid upon the trial hereof, or any information directly or indirectly obtained therefrom, or by means thereof, and further moves the court that any statement, oral or written, which the agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any of them procured from said defendant, be suppressed and that the Attorney General of the United States and the United States Attorney in and for the District of Columbia and their and each of their assistants be restrained from using any such statement or any part thereof upon the trial hereof, or any information directly or indirectly obtained therefrom, or by means thereof, and further moves the court that all the files, documents, papers, goods, and chattels seized from said defendant be returned to said defendant, and for such other and further relief as to the court may seem just and proper, and as grounds therefor says:

1. Said evidence was obtained by and through the lawlessness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
2. Said evidence was obtained in violation of said defendant's rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.
3. The search and seizure of said evidence by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were made without any search warrant, subpoena, or order of court authorizing said search and seizure.
4. Said evidence was obtained by means of or with the aid of information acquired by secret and illegal search of said defendant's home by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation prior to his arrest and the illegal seizure of said evidence.
5. Said evidence was obtained by means of or with the aid of information acquired by unauthorized interception of telephone messages and conversations with the aid of or by means of the tapping of telephone wires by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
6. The statements procured from said defendant were not made freely and voluntarily by said defendant.
7. Said statements were induced by illegal detention of said defendant and obtained in violation of his rights under Section 595, Title 18, United States Code Annotated.
8. Other reasons apparent of record.

ARTHUR J. HILLAND,
Attorney for Defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen,
Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

The defendant, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, hereby demands trial by jury of the issues of fact, if any, created by the foregoing motion and supporting papers and the Government's answer thereto.

ARTHUR J. HILLAND,
Attorney for Defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen,
Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HOLDING A CRIMINAL TERM

Criminal No. 75457

United States, plaintiff, vs. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen et al., defendants

AFFIDAVIT OF EMMANUEL SIGURD LARSEN

CITY OF WASHINGTON,
District of Columbia, ss:

I, EMMANUEL SIGURD LARSEN, being first duly sworn, on oath say that I am a citizen of the United States, a resident of the District of Columbia, forty-eight years of age, and one of the above-named defendants.

On June 6, 1945, after arriving home from work in the State Department, I had just sat down to eat my dinner at about seven o'clock p. m. when there was a knock at the door. I went personally to open the door of my apartment and two men forced their way in with the words "You are under arrest," after asking me whether I was Emmanuel S. Larsen. I was dumbfounded and asked them what I was under arrest for. They refused to answer my question but said that I would find out in due course.

They opened and displayed their badges and identified themselves as FBI men. Two of them gave their names as Winterrowd and Zander.

In the meantime, about four other men walked in and the room seemed entirely full of men. My wife and five-year-old daughter were practically speechless and I exercised the utmost self-control in order to prevent my family from hysterics.

The two men mentioned by name then told me that they were going to make a search of the apartment occupied by me, namely, Apartment No. 227, at 1650 Harvard Street, Northwest, of which I was then and there in exclusive possession and control and occupied the same with my wife and daughter, having leased the same in my name as a tenant as of June 1, 1945, from the Harvard Hall Apartments, Incorporated.

They told me to hold up my hand and searched my person, asking me whether I carried any weapons. Two were in front of me and the rest of them behind me. As an illustration of the extent of my surprise, I may mention that I went through all this and discovered only twenty minutes later that I was about to choke on a morsel of food that I still had in my mouth unchewed. I did not carry any weapon and nothing was found on my person that required removal by them.

Immediately thereupon they asked me whether I had my files in my house. I answered that I did have private files, and they ordered me to take them to the files. When I opened the file case they asked me what was in the file case, and I told them that the case contained a mixture of strictly personal material and a number of papers, mostly published material, and some official papers pertaining to the work I had been doing for the Government almost ten years.

They asked me how it came about that I had official papers at my residence, and I told them that as far as I knew from ten years experience in the Government all men who were interested in their work pursued considerable study at home, inasmuch as official time often did not allow of the reading of lengthy reports. They asked me whether I had information relating to the national defense of the United States, and I was able to assure them that I did not.

When the agents started the search, I protested by asking why the H—— I had to have my personal and private files and clothes drawers searched. They had not at that time shown me any search warrant, nor any arrest warrant, nor did they at any time present any such warrant to me.

I may add that upon repeated queries to my part as to why I was under arrest and as to why my apartment was being searched they answered again and again: You will find out in due course. Being unfamiliar with the legal procedure of arrests and searches, having never been subject to such before in my life, I was as a loss under the circumstances to take the right attitude or to know what to do in the matter.

I had that day been treating myself for a sore throat and a rather violent headache, and there was a time during the search, I estimate at about eighty-three, when my head was literally reeling. The agents allowed me to go to the

kitchen and take a drink of water while they watched me, but they would not permit me to take an aspirin.

Their questioning, first couched in a gentlemanly tone, latter became extremely sharp and harsh, although I had from the start answered all their questions. One of the agents, a man, and a female agent, took my wife, Thelma Earles Larsen, out on the sun porch in the said apartment and questioned her. At one time I heard the questioning when I was brought back to the living room from the bedroom, and she looked at me. She rose up from her seat and asked me whether I had any objection to her making a statement. I remember kissing her on the cheek and telling her to tell the truth, as I knew she would, and that otherwise I had no objection.

I want to add very emphatically that at this time I was under great mental stress due to the unrelenting search and questioning that I was under myself, particularly by the two agents mentioned by name. The door from the apartment to the hall was opened from time to time, an agent came in, whispered instructions, and went out again. The rooms were littered with drawers, envelopes, books, and other material that was removed from filing cabinets, closets, and bookcases.

At one time while talking to two of the agents, I overheard two other agents talking in a whisper about the location of certain material. I recognized the location and the material by their description in that one of them said: "Those OSS reports are in that second drawer," and thereby I realized that a previous search, obviously unauthorized by law, had been made of my apartment because on the occasion of this search none of the agents had previously been into the contents of that drawer.

In another instance during the search of my clothes closet in the bedroom, one of the agents looked up on the top shelf and saw there a leather case. Another one of the agents said to his colleague: "That is all right; that is the vase."

In the leather case concerned I have stored a valuable Chinese vase. They could not have known of this unless they had previously searched the apartment then occupied by me or the apartment previously occupied by me in the same apartment house building, on the same floor, namely Apartment No. 207, which I had occupied from August 1941 until June 1, 1945.

The realization of the privacy of my apartment having been violated made me extremely bitter, as a result of which I felt very sick. Over a period of time I felt so sick that I do not remember to this moment what passed, probably an hour or so, nor what I said during that period.

I recollect only vaguely that I shuffled from room to room at their orders and answered the questions about files that they removed and spread all over the floors. This search went on until about 12 o'clock midnight, at which time I was informed that I would be taken to FBI Field Headquarters, which is over here on K Street.

When we emerged from the apartment house, there were about four cars parked around the doors and a number of agents standing by. I was so confused that I remember practically no details, nor do I remember exactly the route we took or the manner in which we entered the FBI headquarters.

However, I remember that after we had gone up to the fourth or fifth floor I was to be fingerprinted and photographed. Immediately prior to the fingerprinting, I do remember that one of the agents, after examining my hands, gave my right hand a twist, which hurt me, and in surprise I asked him what was the matter. He did not answer me. Instead, he asked me what was wrong with my third and fifth finger on my right hand. At the same time he ordered an entry to be made to the effect that I had two broken knuckles, whereupon the fingerprinting man proceeded to fingerprint me and the photographer took four pictures of me.

After that, I was taken into one of the rooms at the south end of the building, I believe, on one of the upper floors, and there I was questioned. I sat at a wide desk, and opposite me sat Agent Winterrowd. He told me that whatever I said might be used against me and that I was to realize the importance of this, after which I begged him to let me know at this time what I was being charged with, but he told me again that I would hear the formal charge in full detail at a later time.

He said he merely wanted to help me, and that if I knew what was good for myself I would cooperate with him and give him the utmost help in his investigation and thereby make things much easier for myself. His manner was harsh and demanding, and he maintained this attitude throughout three hours or more of unceasing questioning. I determined this time approximately by my arrival

at midnight and my departure from the FBI Field Headquarters immediately after questioning at about three-fifteen.

Up to this time, I had had nothing to eat since noontime and, having suffered with a headache all day, I had practically eaten no lunch. I just took a glass of milk and a sandwich, and that is all I had had the whole day.

Mr. Winterrowd had before him a list which appeared to be questions arranged in a very systematic formation. Therefore every question embarrassed me to the utmost in the matter of exact dates and numbers of occasions and other details, of which no person normally keeps any record. Under my condition at that time I was still less able to remember offhand such dates and details, being for the moment in the agony of hunger and exhaustion from questioning. To summarize the causes of this exhaustion, I must make it emphatic that I stood on my feet for almost five hours and bent over files and drawers placed on chairs and the floors in my apartment.

At the FBI Headquarters I was not allowed to relax for a single second. I would have given anything to lay my head down on my arms and obtain sufficient rest to gather my wits. I debated with myself in favor of the easiest way out, namely, to answer all questions with as little arguing as possible to get it over with. Foremost on my mind of all things was the matter of getting it over with and getting out of that place. I really did not care very much where I was to go as long as I could get out of that place.

Around three o'clock I had worn out two stenographers, who had complained that they could not carry on any longer, and a third lady was brought in. This had the effect on me of creating a sense of complete hopelessness. I remember practically nothing of the last part of the questioning, except that I was taken with an obsession that I must get out of that office as soon as possible. This was the result of the high-pressure methods they used on me, namely, allowing me little time to answer questions, prodding me to deliver answers as snappily as they read the questions off the yellow sheet lying on the table.

At one time one of the agents resorted to a sort of flattery, stating that they could not imagine that a man with my education and background and with my specialty as demonstrated through the work they had seen on my personality cards and papers would be guilty of serious charges, and that they therefore said they wanted me to understand that if I talked freely I would indirectly be aiding my case.

On other occasions during their cross-examination of me the agents said to me that if I knew what was good for myself I would cooperate freely with them by telling them everything I knew and answering their questions in detail. The tone of voice in which this was said to me reminded me of the rough and cheap treatment given ignorant persons who would not on their own accord normally tell the truth or answer questions voluntarily.

I resented this attitude and told Mr. Winterrowd that I was definitely aware that he did not believe what I said and that it infuriated me. He refused to reply to that. He resumed his questioning only to make it more pointed and the prodding more unpleasant and threatening.

While I was leaving the apartment I remember one thing, namely, the progress the agents were making in the packing and removal of my files, including a six-drawer wooden cabinet containing several thousand personality cards which I had been collecting as a hobby since 1923, measuring four by six inches, and also my personal and private typewriter.

After the questioning at the F. B. I. Field Headquarters, I remember seeing a typewritten transcription of the statements I had made in answer to the said questioning. I remember correcting errors which were outstanding. In the making of the statements I was considerably excited at times when I noticed that the stenographer was putting down what Mr. Winterrowd was saying and not what I was saying, and he would precede such sections in the report with "Put this down," and I objected with the words: "Who the h—— is making this statement, you or I?" It was as a result of this that I was obliged to object to a number of things that were quite faulty in the statement when they showed me the typed transcription.

I do not recall signing the typewritten transcription but I recall correcting parts of it, immediately after which I was taken downstairs. Then I recollect riding in a car with the agents and being taken up to the U. S. Commissioner's office. I may have been unduly worried during that ride for I recollect absolutely nothing about the number of people in the car, the route taken, nor whether I was handcuffed or not. I do not remember anything about it. I do not remember whether I sat in the front or back seat. I do not remember anything.

I do remember that we were obliged to walk upstairs three or four floors to the U. S. Commissioner's office, and the exercise caused a genuine revival of my mental faculties. I also remember remarking that at that time my headache had disappeared but that I felt completely depressed and dumfounded. Sitting in the anteroom of the Commissioner's office I was startled by the flash of the photographer's bulb. Then I realized that next to me was sitting John Service and Andrew Roth. I turned to John Service and asked him in Chinese what this was all about but received no answer.

Then we were taken before the Commissioner and there was a peculiar incident. There was a great discussion around his desk as to the meaning of the charges being preferred against us, and while we were being taken in I overheard the Commissioner say: "I will be darned if I still understand what these men are charged with." Thereupon someone lifted the top sheet of the papers that had been placed before the Commissioner and showed him on a second sheet where the charges had been spelled out in some detail, and that indeed was the first time that I heard read off a piece of paper, although not actually directed at me, the charges upon which I had been arrested, namely, conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act.

The shock of that charge was so terrific that I had difficulty in my speech when soon after the Commissioner repeated the charges, set bail at ten thousand dollars, and I attempted to make him reduce the bail. I literally was unable to speak at that time. I did enter a plea of not guilty and thereupon was swiftly taken downstairs, handcuffed to one of the other persons involved. I think it was John Service.

From the time of my arrest, about seven p. m. on June 6, 1945, throughout the night and until after I had been arraigned before the United States Commissioner, I was without the advice of counsel and without opportunity to obtain the advice of counsel, and without opportunity to communicate with friends or relatives. They would not even allow me to talk to my wife without the presence of officers. When I said Good-bye to her, I tried to say a few comforting words to her, but they pulled me away and they said: "Come on; let's go."

They did not even give me the opportunity to undress properly and place in her bed my small daughter. I was permitted to pick her up from a chair at midnight where she had fallen asleep in pitiful disarray, pale and tired, surrounded by an unsightly litter of open drawers, books, papers, and other debris. I merely lifted her from that chair and put her into her little bed, without opportunity to undress her.

My wife at that time was being held in another room and was not permitted to move freely about the apartment.

In the FBI Headquarters they removed from my person my wallet, all my identification papers, a small pocketknife that they had previously overlooked in the search for a weapon, my fountain pen, my comb, and my glasses—everything.

Without my glasses I was unable to read. They returned my glasses to me at the time when they wanted me to look over the typed transcription of the questioning, and I held on to those glasses throughout the subsequent period of my imprisonment.

I remember that in the statements supposedly made by me the introduction and the final paragraph were completely dictated by Mr. Winterrowd. He said: "This is necessary because you do not understand and you may not get the wording of these technicalities right."

In going through my books in my apartment the agents found several small Chinese volumes and asked me to tell them truthfully what the interpretation of the title on the cover would be. I did so, and in one instance in the case of a small red volume, I said: "This is a book in which the Chinese Communists have tried to make clear their stand." They looked at me in great disgust, and I spared no details in making it clear to them that as an analyst of Chinese affairs I was called upon to study the position of all parties in China and report on them, and therefore the possession of Chinese Communist propaganda meant absolutely nothing. I had partially read that book in the hope of finding in it the names of the principal Chinese Communist spokesmen, but failing to do so and thus failing to gain any material that I might enter in my biographical cards, I had discarded the book as practically useless to me.

I have never been in any litigation, and therefore I do not know the details concerning my constitutional rights. I have spent twenty-four years of my life in China and five years in Europe. That makes twenty-nine years abroad, leaving me only ten of my adult years in the United States and about eight years in my childhood.

A partial inventory of the files, documents, papers, goods, and chattels seized by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from my apartment at 1650 Harvard Street Northwest, District of Columbia, on June 6th and 7th, 1945, is hereto appended as Exhibit A and by reference incorporated in and made a part of this affidavit.

My full name is Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen. I have no other name and have never had any other name, except the nickname "Jimmy" by which some of my friends, relatives, and fellow workers have called me from time to time. I have never used the name "Jimmy Larsen" and have never been called by that name except among and by persons who knew my name was Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen. I have never been convicted of any crime and have never associated with a criminal class. I am informed and believe and therefore say that the use in the indictment of the alleged alias "Jimmy Larsen" is prejudicial to me, because when the indictment is read to the jury it might suggest to the minds of the jury that I have a criminal record or that I belong to or associate with a criminal class.

On or about June 11, 1945, in his office in the Harvard Hall Apartment House at 1650 Harvard Street Northwest, District of Columbia, of which he was then the resident manager, one E. R. Sager told me that sometime prior to June 6, 1945, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation came to Mr. Sager at a time when my wife, child, and I were absent from my apartment in that building and told him that they wished to search my apartment. Mr. Sager told me that he admitted them to the apartment, using the duplicate key filed on the keyboard in the manager's office, and that he saw two agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation enter into my apartment at that address and then and there search the same. Mr. Sager, at that time and place, told me that in the absence of my wife, child, and myself agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation entered and searched my apartment at that address a couple of times prior to June 6, 1945, when I was arrested and they again searched my apartment and seized my files, documents, papers, goods, and chattels in the manner hereinbefore set forth. On the night of September 24, 1945, I had a telephone conversation with said E. R. Sager, I having called him at his said office, and he again told me that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had entered my apartment in the manner aforesaid prior to June 6, 1945. I believe the statements Mr. Sager made to me as aforesaid, and I expect to be able to prove, by his testimony, at the hearing of my motion to suppress evidence and for the return of evidence, filed herein, that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation did unlawfully enter and search my apartment aforesaid prior to June 6, 1945, as well as on that date.

(S) EMMANUEL SIGURD LARSEN.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 27th day of September, 1945.

[SEAL]

(S) GENEVIEVE M. FOREMAN,
Notary Public, D. C.

ARTHUR J. HILLAND,
Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C.
Attorney for Defendant Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen.

EXHIBIT A

Partial inventory of the files, documents, papers, goods, and chattels seized by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the home of defendant Emmanuel S. Larsen; namely, Apartment 227, 1650 Harvard Street Northwest, District of Columbia, on June 6th and 7th, 1945, commencing at about 7 P. M. on June 6, 1945, which is referred to in and made a part of the affidavit of Emmanuel S. Larsen:

- 2 Folders on China.
- 2 Folders on Intelligence Studies.
- 1 Folder on Japanese Personalities.
- 1 Folder on Mongolia.
- 1 Folder on Miscellaneous Personalities.
- 1 Folder on India.
- 1 Folder on Emmanuel S. Larsen.
- 1 Folder on Manchuria.
- 2 Folders on Chinese Geography.

Each and all of the foregoing folders contain numerous papers and pamphlets.

- 1 Six-Drawer Wooden Cabinet containing about 3,000 to 4,000 cards, each measuring 4 x 6 inches, and containing biographical information about Far Eastern Personalities.
- Other miscellaneous papers, pamphlets and books.
- 1 Underwood Typewriter.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
CRIMINAL DIVISION No. 1

Criminal No. 75,457

The United States vs. Philip Jacob Jaffe et al.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1945.

The above-entitled cause came on for the purpose of defendant named above to be afforded to change his plea formerly entered to the indictment herein.

BEFORE:

HONORABLE JAMES M. PROCTOR, Associate Justice, The District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, at 10:30 o'clock in the forenoon on the above date, there being

PRESENT:

ROBERT M. HITCHCOCK, Esquire, DONALD B. ANDERSON, Esquire, and JAMES M. MCINERNEY, Esquire, on behalf of The United States;

PHILIP JACOB JAFFE, the named defendant herein, and ALBERT ARENT, Esquire, of the District of Columbia Bar, and ARTHUR SHEINBERG, Esquire, of the Bar of the State of New York, his counsel.

The following proceedings and transactions were then had:

PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSACTIONS

The COURT. What is there about this matter of Jaffe, gentlemen?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. An indictment was returned at the July term charging this defendant, with two others, with having committed the offense of conspiracy.

On August 30, all defendants entered pleas of "not guilty" before Mr. Justice Schweinhaut.

It is my understanding that the defendant Jaffe, who is present, desires to withdraw his plea of "not guilty" and change his plea to one of "guilty."

Mr. ARENT. That is correct.

The COURT. That is correct?

Mr. ARENT. Yes.

The COURT. Are you a local attorney?

Mr. ARENT. Yes. I am.

The COURT. I understood a gentleman was coming from New York.

Mr. SHEINBERG. I am New York counsel.

The COURT. And you gentlemen are ready to enter that plea and it will be accepted.

You may take the plea, Mr. Clerk.

The CLERK OF THE COURT. Philip Jacob Jaffe, in case No. 75,457, in which you are charged with violation of Section 88, Title XVIII, United States Code, which is conspiracy to embezzle, steal, and purloin property, records, and valuable things of the record and property of the United States, do you wish to withdraw your plea of "not guilty" heretofore entered and enter a plea of "guilty" to the indictment?

The DEFENDANT. Yes.

The COURT. What disposition are you moving with respect to the case?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I think counsel for the defendant has an application to make in respect to that in which the Government will join.

The COURT. What is it?

Mr. ARENT. Your Honor, may I make a brief statement just setting forth the situation?

The COURT. Please make it brief because I do not expect to hold any extended session here this morning.

Mr. ARENT. Your Honor, this indictment charges this defendant and others with conspiring to obtain various Government papers. The Government does not contend that any of this material was used for any disloyal purpose.

I would like to say a word or two about Mr. Jaffe, the character of the man, and the situation out of which this whole matter arose:

Mr. Jaffe has for many years been a student of Far Eastern affairs. He is a graduate of Columbia University with an A. B. and M. A. degree, and has given lectures at such institutions as Harvard, Yale—Harvard, Vassar, Dartmouth, and other schools. In 1937 he helped to found a magazine dealing with the Far East called AMERASIA and, among his cofounders of this magazine were distinguished academic people, scholars, political scientists like Owen Lattimore, head of the Walter Hines Page School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Johns Hopkins; William Stone, former Vice President, Foreign Policy Association; and Professor Peake, of Columbia; Professor Reischauer, of Princeton; and Professor Colgrove, of Northwestern. The magazine has a limited circulation amongst scholars and specialists in Far Eastern affairs and has found a place in the leading libraries and educational institutions of the country.

For over eight years Mr. Jaffe served as managing editor and editor of this magazine and carried on his work without compensation and at considerable financial sacrifice. During this period, the magazine AMERASIA was one of the few voices warning of the dangers ahead with Japan, and Mr. Jaffe himself was active in such organizations as the Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression, of which Mr. Henry L. Stimson was the head.

If Mr. Jaffe has transgressed the law, it seems he has done so from an excess of journalistic zeal—

The COURT (interposing). There is no doubt but what he has.

Mr. ARENT. We recognize, technically, the violation—and not from any desire to enrich himself, as demonstrated by the character of the publication, or any intent to jeopardize the welfare of his country.

Mr. Jaffe's conduct has not been of the type which normally brings about criminal prosecution, even though a technical violation of the law is involved.

In all of his life Mr. Jaffe has had, heretofore, no experience of any kind with the criminal courts—he wants none. He has suffered severe humiliation and hardship from vicious and unjust publicity that stigmatized him with accusations of espionage, whereas the indictment charges a relatively minor violation which arose out of his anxiety to be accurately informed in the field of his scholarly and journalistic interest.

For personal and family reasons, such as the very grave illness of his wife, he is reluctant to go through with the ordeal of the trial. He pleads "guilty" in the belief that your Honor, upon acquainting yourself with the facts, will realize he already has suffered far more than his due, and that this Court will show consideration and mercy in the sentence it imposes.

Thank you.

The COURT. That is a very clear statement.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Is your Honor prepared to dispose of the matter today?

The COURT. I think I would like to hear what the attitude of the Government is.

Mr. Arent has asked the Court for consideration and sympathy in the assessment of sentence. Does he mean by that that he wishes the Court to consider probation?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. That you will have to ask him.

The Government is prepared to review the matter and, if you see fit, if you see fit to receive them, to make recommendations.

The COURT. I think it would be well, perhaps, if, in view of the statement that has been made, which I understand you approve of as a correct statement—

Mr. HITCHCOCK (interposing). In substance, yes, Your Honor.

The COURT. In substance, it would look to be a case which might properly go to the Probation Officer for his investigation and report, and take the usual course of such cases with a view to possible probation, and, if that is done, that will give Mr. Jaffe an opportunity to make a showing there on the records which are kept by the Court in such matters and which is referred to the Court. I think that would be the better way in which to handle it.

Let it take its regular course this morning, the course in which the Court is willing to consider probation after the reference to the Probation Officer.

Is that approved by you?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I assume that prior to the imposition of sentence, which I think counsel hoped to be disposed of today inasmuch as we have the facts pertinent to the subject that perhaps even the Probation Officer would get not only from this District but would have to go to New York for, your Honor may wish to hear what the Government has to say.

Would your Honor be willing to listen to Government counsel and consider any suggestion made?

The COURT. Of course I will listen to Government counsel and consider any suggestion he made.

But I am wondering whether or not—do you have a written statement?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. No, your Honor; no written statement.

The COURT. How long would it take you to make a brief statement of the Government's case?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Less than five minutes.

The COURT. Well, I think I will sit here. Possibly we can dispose of it today.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I think I would prefer that if you feel you could do so.

The COURT. Very well. I will be glad to listen to you. I do not like to be in a hurry, but I am the only Judge sitting today.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. The indictment, as counsel has pointed out, was returned during the July Term this year and charges this defendant, together with two others, with having conspired to commit a certain offense against the United States, particularly the taking and removing from Government files, primarily the State Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, Strategic Services and War Information, certain documents that belong to those various agencies.

The use to which they were put was, as I understand it, largely background material that Mr. Jaffe in the conduct of his AMERASIA magazine used to assist him in publishing articles and preparing arguments that would lend to its weight and, perhaps, its circulation. The magazine, we know as a matter of fact, was a losing proposition financially.

Mr. Jaffe, as editor and owner of the magazine, the sole owner of the magazine, enlisted the services of the two codefendants and perhaps others who were employed, one or both, by the State Department at the time the indictment was returned, or until shortly before the indictment was returned, and, in the instance of one of the codefendants prior to that time or to September last, or by the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department.

At the time the arrest was made in June of the defendant Jaffe, there were several hundred documents that on their face showed they emanated from these various Government agencies and copies of other documents that obviously had emanated from Government agencies.

That is, substantially, what the facts are.

The COURT. Let me ask you this question, please: Is there any evidence that the use to which these documents were put would be a use whereby injury or embarrassment would come to the Army or the Navy in the conduct of the war?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. We have no evidence of that, your Honor, and, furthermore, no evidence that they were intended to.

The COURT. Was there anything in the nature of publication that had that tendency?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. There was not, your Honor, so far as we know. So far as we know, there was nothing in the use put of these documents that had that tendency nor is there anything that we have in our possession that would indicate—in fact, quite to the contrary—that the defendant intended that they should have that tendency. To us, it was largely to the purpose of lending credence or variety to the publication itself, and perhaps increase its circulation and prestige.

The COURT. Was there any kind of compensation paid to the Government officials?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. There was no compensation paid to one. In the case of the other codefendant, there is evidence to the effect that with respect to an ancillary matter, namely, that this codefendant had made, over the period of years, he having been in the Far East during that time certain card indices in respect to Chinese officials, keeping them up, to date on their activities, upon their beliefs, politics, etc., and that the defendant Jaffe did pay to the codefendant Larsen or to his wife small amounts of money over a period of months, which is the only evidence we have to the effect they were paid, and that payment was for the transcription and typing of this particular card index, these particular cards, which were the personal property of the codefendant Larsen—they were not the property of any Governmental agency.

As a matter of fact, we believe it was through these contacts, in their inception, that this further complaint was made whereby Larsen and the other codefendant, and perhaps others, removed from the files for his use and made accessible and available to him the documents themselves.

Our quarrel is that the documents themselves, which is actually the property of the United States and various departments, were actually taken and re-

moved to Jaffe's office and there retained by him and undoubtedly use by him—else, why take them?

The trial in this case, I assume, would involve four months. The disposition started today here may well resolve the trial of the case in its entirety—I don't know. Now that the war is over there is the difficulty of changing personnel, the difficulties of proof, of identifying documents, and the sources of documents, those difficulties will all be increased.

We recognize that the defendant has no criminal record of any description and, after discussing the matter with counsel, who have been very fair with the matter, the Government agreed, if the Court would care to consider same, it would like to make a recommendation in the case.

The COURT. I will be glad to have your recommendation.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Namely, the imposition of no jail sentence but that a substantial fine be imposed.

The COURT. Will Mr. Jaffe pay the fine?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes. Our information is to the effect that the defendant Jaffe is a comparatively well-to-do man. He is the sole owner, we understand, of a prosperous greeting-card business, conducted largely by mail, and—

The COURT (interposing). What is the penalty under the statute?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. The penalty under the statute is a fine not to exceed \$10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed two years, or both.

The COURT. The regular conspiracy statute; the general conspiracy statute?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes; Section 88.

Our belief is, the defendant not being criminal in his tendencies, we believe probation would serve no useful purpose in the case.

The COURT. Is that the course you ask the Court to take?

Mr. ARENT. Yes, your Honor.

I would like to offer one argument for making the fine perhaps less than what the Government may consider substantial, and that is this: The publicity in the early stages of this and before the indictment was returned did the man so much harm, made such serious accusations, that a very substantial fine would leave in the minds of a great many people the thought that this man was guilty of espionage; something he would spend a lifetime erasing.

We think a more modest fine may make the public realize—

The COURT (interposing). What would you consider a "modest fine" having \$10,000 as a maximum?

Mr. ARENT. I see that New York counsel agrees with me: \$2,000 would be a modest fine.

May I urge in connection with prompt disposition this: The defendant's wife was operated on for cancer two months ago. The pendency of these matters is a great strain on her. If the thing were cleared up completely it would certainly serve the purposes of the defendant very well. I can see no harm to the Government flowing from any such action.

The COURT. Well, I think I understand the matter sufficiently to dispose of it without further delay.

The question is: Both sides desire that course be taken?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Apparently there is no dispute except the difficulty between what is termed by defendant's counsel a modest fine and the statement of the Government as to a substantial fine.

The COURT. I did not ask you what a substantial fine was, but I think if I get the defendant's idea of it I can perhaps reach a fair conclusion.

Well, I regret, Mr. Jaffe, that you in your zeal to carry on your work, which was evidently for a trustworthy purpose, that you were misled to do these things which of course did tend to break down the fidelity of Government employees and officials in the performance of their work. I think you realize that. That is one of the reasons why you feel disposed to plead guilty. Looking back on the matter, you see that is wrong and certainly it is.

I accept without any doubt the assurance both of your counsel and of the Government attorneys that there was no thought or act upon your part which was intended or calculated or had a tendency to injure the Government or the military forces in the prosecution of the war. It would make quite a difference to me if I did not have that assurance and did not know, confidently, that that was true. Nevertheless, it is serious, as I have indicated, to interfere with or in any way influence in any manner, whether the motives are good or bad, the duties and the fidelity of Government employees. I am sure you realize that.

I do not want to lecture you and have no intention to. I simply want to indicate, briefly, the considerations which lead to this sentence I am about to

impose: In view of what counsel has suggested as the course or the nature of the punishment, and the suggestion made by your own counsel with reference to it, I will impose a fine of Twenty-Five Hundred dollars.

That will be the judgment in the case.

Are you prepared to pay that fine now?

The DEFENDANT. Yes.

The COURT. Then you may settle it with the Clerk.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Your Honor, the Government appreciates your coming in and taking care of the matter this morning.

Mr. ARENT. Of course counsel for the defendant takes the same view.

(The Court then recessed.)

CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

I, H. S. MIDDLEMISS, Official Court Reporter for the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, hereby certify that the foregoing is the official transcript of the proceedings had in said Court on the date hereinbefore stated incident to the changing by the named defendant of his plea to the indictment filed herein and the proceedings then and there had with respect the disposition of the case by the Court.

H. S. MIDDLEMISS,
Official Court Reporter.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
CRIMINAL DIVISION No. 2

Criminal Action No. 75457

United States vs. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, defendant

WASHINGTON, D. C., November 2, 1945.

The above-entitled matter came on for plea and sentence before HON. JAMES M. PROCTOR, Associate Justice, at 12:10 o'clock p. m.

APPEARANCES:

ARTHUR J. HILLAND, Esq., for the Defendant.

R. M. HITCHCOCK, Esq., Department of Justice, for the United States.

PROCEEDINGS

Mr. HITCHCOCK. If the Court please, this is the second defendant in what has been known as the Jaffe case, Jaffe himself having been disposed of on a sentence by Your Honor under a plea of guilty on September 29, if I recall correctly. The Government has indicated that a plea of nolo contendere is acceptable and I would like to say what we feel about it.

The COURT. He has offered to enter that plea?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes; and the Government feels the plea should be accepted.

The COURT. Very well.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Your Honor will recall that this indictment, which was returned in July, alleged that the defendants committed four offenses against the United States, that is, to unlawfully remove documents and records from the departments and agencies of the Government. Mr. Larsen, together with the other two defendants, Mr. Jaffe and Mr. Roth, entered a plea of not guilty on the 30th of August and subsequently on September 28 this defendant filed motions to quash, motions to suppress, and a demurrer which are still outstanding and I assume will be withdrawn.

The COURT. That would necessarily be so.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. That is, if this plea is accepted. As I told Your Honor in the Jaffe case, there was no element of disloyalty involved. Mr. Jaffe, who was the procurer, these two being employees of the Government, being a man of considerable means—

The COURT. Yes.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. And who was and is the principal defendant and as I told you at that time I felt accepting a plea in Mr. Jaffe's case and imposing a fine rather than probation or imprisonment might resolve the entire case.

This is the second defendant. Mr. Larsen is a man of little means and really no means except the rather modest salary he was drawing.

The COURT. He does not hold that position now?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. No, he does not.

The COURT. Has he been disconnected from the public service?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. He has been disassociated with the public service. Whether that will be permanent or not I cannot say. I am inclined to think it will. He has had no means of income at all.

We feel that Mr. Larsen, together with the defendant Roth, were corrupted by Mr. Jaffe. Of themselves they never would have been involved in these series of violations.

The COURT. Did they receive compensation for this?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. No, Your Honor. There was one element in the case when Mr. Jaffe was here that Mr. Jaffe did pay small sums of money to Mr. Larsen and Mr. Larsen's wife for the transcribing of information contained on some personnel cards made available to Mr. Jaffe by Mr. Larsen which has no connection except as to their acquaintanceship or knowledge. There was nothing criminal whatsoever.

The COURT. Who was the third man?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Lieutenant Andrew Roth, formerly of the United States Navy.

The COURT. He was attached to the State Department?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. He was attached to the Office of Naval Intelligence to which Department Mr. Larsen was attached until last September, at which time he was transferred to the State Department.

The COURT. What has become of the Roth case?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Mr. Roth has a motion for a bill of particulars and a demurrer on file which has been adjourned from time to time. I think the final adjourned date will be in a week or ten days. I believe there will be a disposition of that case within a short time.

That very briefly, Your Honor, is our reason together with what I told you before which may deserve repetition now, that the war being over and these agencies closing the file in this case with the countless documents involved would involve at least four months work with very uncertain results.

The COURT. Mr. Hitchcock, what is your recommendation as to sentence?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Our recommendation as to sentence is that this defendant should be fined a substantially less sum than Mr. Jaffe. We had the sum of \$500 in mind. Mr. Jaffe was fined \$2,500 by Your Honor. If I understand your question correctly, my recommendation in this case would be of a fine substantially less than that in view of their financial discrepancies.

The COURT. It would be a fine that he can pay?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. A fine that he could pay, and our thought on that is a fine of \$500 on the acceptance of a plea of nolo contendere.

Mr. HILLAND. I believe Mr. Hitchcock has covered pretty much what I might have said, Your Honor, had I been heard first. He has pointed out, in substance, this: This charge did not arise out of any career of crime. Mr. Larsen is a man of good character and excellent reputation, and he has had a hobby for a number of years of collecting and recording information on Chinese personalities. He pursued that hobby after he became a Government employee. He started in that in 1923 when he was in China and this charge grew out of the pursuit of that hobby. That is what happened.

There is one matter that I wanted to clear up. I do not think Mr. Hitchcock intended to use the word "corruption." There was no corruption about the payment of money or anything of that sort.

The COURT. I assume he means—

Mr. HITCHCOCK (interposing). If I may interrupt, what I said was that Mr. Jaffe corrupted this defendant and I have extreme doubt there were any corrupt motives on the part of Mr. Larsen.

Mr. HILLAND. I think the term should be misuse or abuse of friendship, misuse of Mr. Jaffe's friendship with Mr. Larsen.

The conduct involved was one that would not normally result in criminal prosecution but, as Your Honor knows, it was not the charge that we had here originally. Everyone concedes the original charge should never have been brought. There was no indictment on that charge and, of course, because of the seriousness of the original charge all of these defendants have suffered gravely; the charge that will probably attach to them the rest of their lives, even though they were innocent of it.

As Mr. Hitchcock has pointed out, Mr. Larsen is a man of most modest means and together with the other punishments he has endured, a fine of \$500, as has been suggested, would be very severe and a substantial punishment to him.

The COURT. You may stand, Mr. Larsen.

I have no comment to make about the case. It is a case which probably has been given very serious consideration throughout and probably they have the public interest as much at heart as I have in this case and I am, therefore, inclined to accept their recommendation with respect to the disposition of it. Of course, that is induced by what is undoubtedly the past good record of this defendant. I do not assume there is any record of any kind against him.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. There is none.

The COURT. There is not anything I need to say about it. With an intelligent defendant such as this gentleman is I would be lecturing him and I am not a very good lecturer, so I will refrain from any comments on it.

The sentence will be as recommended. I guess we omitted taking the formal plea. I will accept that plea of nolo contendere.

The CLERK. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, in Case 75,457, in which you are charged with violation of Section 88, Title 18, of the United States Code, do you wish to withdraw your plea of not guilty heretofore entered?

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

The CLERK. And enter a plea of nolo contendere?

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

The COURT. The fine will be \$500.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. May the record show, Your Honor, that the motions made by Mr. Hilland and I are now withdrawn?

Mr. HILLAND. Yes, if the Court please.

The COURT. Yes.

Mr. HILLAND. I suppose technically that would be all that would be needed because when we started out we withdrew our plea of not guilty theretofore entered.

The COURT. That is withdrawn and the plea of nolo contendere is now entered. I assume the defendant will pay that fine now.

Mr. HILLAND. Yes, I understand he will.

CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

I, JEANETTE RAWLS, one of the Official Court Reporters of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, hereby certify that I reported by stenotype the proceedings had in Criminal Action No. 75,457, United States vs. Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, and that the foregoing pages 1 to 8 are a true and accurate transcript of my stenotype notes in said proceedings.

Dated this 2d day of November 1945.

JEANETTE RAWLS,
Official Court Reporter.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, June 19, 1950.

Honorable MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: This will acknowledge your letter of June 14, 1950 inquiring as to what the records of the Department of Justice may reflect concerning the status of the entity which published *Amerasia* during the year 1945.

According to the information available to us, *Amerasia, Inc.* was dissolved on January 21, 1944 as recorded in the Certificate of Dissolution on file with the County Clerk, New York County, file number 1229-1937. On and after this date, Philip J. Jaffe, published the magazine *Amerasia* as a sole proprietorship.

Yours sincerely,

PEYTON FORD,
Deputy Attorney General.

OFFICE OF THE EDITOR

AMERICA

NATIONAL CATHOLIC WEEKLY

329 West 108th Street, New York 25, N. Y.

JUNE 26, 1950.

Mr. JAMES J. McINERNEY,

*Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. McINERNEY: Thank you very much for your long letter explaining in detail the question of the documents in the *Amerasia* case. I am enclosing a clipping of your letter as it appeared in *America* for July 1st. This will correct the oversimplified version of the facts we have previously given.

My own impression is that you might have protected yourself against the misunderstanding if you had made a somewhat more guarded denial of the existence of the "documents."

Sincerely yours,

REV. ROBERT C. HARTNETT, S. J.,
Editor.

[From America, July 1, 1950]

CORRESPONDENCE

THE AMERASIA CASE

EDITOR: Your June 17 editorial on the Amerasia case has been brought to my attention. One paragraph reads as follows:

"If Senator Tydings' attitude bred mistrust of the Administration's handling of the loyalty investigation, on May 31 James M. McInerney, Assistant Attorney General, did his best to deepen public suspicion of the Democratic party's motives. As spokesman for the Justice Department he denied that the documents publicized by Mr. Andrews existed. Two days later he recanted. The documents, as described by Mr. Andrews, did exist, he admitted, and were found in the offices of Amerasia. The Herald Tribune's ace correspondent, who first broke the news of the secret Yalta agreements, had scored again."

In the interest of truth and accuracy I should like to set forth the facts with respect to this matter.

I read Bert Andrews' article on the morning it appeared in the New York Herald Tribune. Neither I nor three associates could identify the "documents" on the basis of the descriptions set forth in the news story. Later that same day several reporters inquired of me concerning the "documents" in question. At that time I told them that I did not recognize the "documents" as they were described in the morning news story.

I would like to discuss briefly the news stories upon which your editorial was apparently based. In Mr. Andrews' story, one of the "documents" was described in the following terms:

"One document, over the signature of former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, seemed, on the surface, to picture Amerasia, a magazine plugging for Soviet interests in Asia, as a veritable bible on what to do in the Far East."
[Emphasis added.]

The date and addressee were not stated, and among the very large number of documents in this five-year-old case I did not recall one over the signature of Mr. Hull which "seemed, on the surface to picture Amerasia * * * as a veritable bible on what to do in the Far East." There was found in the Amerasia office a cable which merely quotes five paragraphs from the July 1944 issue of the magazine, without any comment, endorsement or observation of any kind. It was one of hundreds of press clips sent to our representatives abroad by the Public Relations office of the State Department for the purpose of keeping them informed of the news developments here. I am sure you will readily agree that it would be difficult to associate this news despatch with the testimonial described by Bert Andrews.

Another "document" is described by Mr. Andrews in these words:

"One *document* tells exactly where more than a score of American submarines were in the last stages of the war in the Pacific, and it was taken out of the Navy Department at the time when top admirals shuddered at the thought of the slightest leak about their undersea plans. [Emphasis added.]

There is no such "document" in the *Amerasia* case and no such "document" was ever taken out of the Navy Department under the circumstances described in the newspaper article. What Mr. Andrews refers to is a personal note by an unidentified person, summarizing a speech on the Far East made by Mr. Grew before State Department personnel about six weeks after a tour of the Far East, in which he stated that some twenty-five American submarines in the Tshushima Strait were doing great damage to Japanese shipping.

The third "document" mentioned in the newspaper article was described thus:

"One document was in the most highly secret category of all—"for eyes only"—and it was a message from the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek."

No such "document" as described is contained among the *Amerasia* exhibits. However, there was found a personal note which refers to such a message and its transmission. Not being a Government document, this memorandum bears no classification, of course, and from its appearance it may have been prepared by a newspaperman. Its author was never identified.

The fourth and last "document" was described in the newspaper article as follows:

"One document disclosed the complete operations plan of a hush-hush Government agency on certain matters."

When queried with respect to this "document," I advised the newspaper reporters that its description was too vague to hazard an opinion as to whether or not it was included among the *Amerasia* exhibits.

The distinction as to whether the information existed in the form of Government documents or in unidentified personal notes is a necessary one, since it is obvious that Mr. Andrews' article, my answers to the press and your editorial references are predicated upon and deal exclusively with the contents of stolen "Government documents."

I would like to make it clear that I did not recant, as stated in your editorial, and most certainly did not admit the existence of the "documents," as described by Mr. Andrews. It is my opinion that both Mr. Andrews and the public were misinformed as to the true facts and their significance.

JAMES M. McINERNEY,
Assistant Attorney General.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D. C., June 29, 1950.

EDWARD P. MORGAN, Esquire,
*Counsel, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee,
United States Capitol Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. MORGAN: Enclosed for your information and such use as you may deem appropriate is a mimeographed copy of the presentment returned and filed by the Special Grand Jury in the Southern District of New York on June 15, 1950. This copy differs from the copy previously furnished to you in that it sets out the names of the signers thereto.

This Special Grand Jury, as you know, was in existence for its full legal duration and devoted its attention exclusively to espionage and related matters.

Respectfully,

JAMES M. McINERNEY,
Assistant Attorney General
(For the Attorney General).

Enclosure No. 79352

[Distributed by the Federal Grand Jury Association for the Southern District of New York, 101 Park Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.]

PRESENTMENT OF CONCLUSIONS OF GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION INTO ESPIONAGE

(Submitted to and accepted, approved, and ordered filed by Judge John W. Clancy, June 15, 1950)

WHEREAS the undersigned constitute all the members of the December 16, 1948, Special Federal Grand Jury of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, impaneled to inquire into espionage and subversive activities; and

WHEREAS this Federal Grand Jury has heard a volume of testimony concerning the activities of many men and women, associated with or having knowledge of a continuing conspiracy against the security of the nation; and

WHEREAS this testimony and evidence have led this Special Federal Grand Jury to certain conclusions it deems proper and important to be brought to the attention of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Departments of the United States Government for such action as may be necessary or appropriate, the undersigned members of this Grand Jury respectfully show and allege as follows:

1. The safety of this nation and its institutions is being jeopardized because:

(a) The underground activities of communists in this country, organized in a continuing conspiracy and using effective techniques to extend their influence beyond their ranks, have greatly increased during the last five years; and because

(b) The nation, confronted with an entirely new situation in its history—a situation in which for the first time the loyalty of certain of its own citizens has been diverted to a foreign ideology—has not as yet devised adequate means to combat this menace; and because

(c) There has been and is now a concerted attempt on the part of many, both communists and disloyal Americans aided by "fellow travelers," to conceal the truth from the American people.

This conviction was arrived at by the Grand Jury after an experience in which it came face to face with the evil that is communism. Its substitution of the false for the true as the standard of judgment has introduced into human affairs a new attack on man's integrity.

The American people cannot afford to tolerate evil of this character particularly in their government nor on the other hand can they deny their fellow citizens those civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution. But among such civil rights is no the rights to be employed by the government and the people are correct in demanding that all entrusted with the welfare and safety of the country be above suspicion.

2. This Grand Jury in a presentment submitted on April 26, 1949, warned the American people against the prevalence and increase of espionage activities. It specifically stated that existing laws applicable to espionage are "inadequate and unrealistic." It stated that these laws were loosely drawn. The Grand Jury now repeats that such laws are riddled with loopholes. Previously it recommended that new legislation or the amendment of existing legislation be enacted promptly. The Grand Jury now repeats that recommendation. Such legislation—the Internal Security Bill which embodies satisfactory provisions—has already been passed by the House of Representatives and is now in Senate Committee. It should be speedily brought to passage and made the law of the land.

3. The Grand Jury, in the same presentment, stated: "Having seen at first hand the difficulties in arriving at the truth concerning espionage violations, when witnesses have been alerted by publicized charges and countercharges, the Grand Jury recommends that all investigating bodies conduct their inquiries into espionage in secret." It repeats that recommendation. The latter does not imply that when such investigations are completed secrecy should thereafter prevail. It does imply that the half-public, half-secret operation of any investigatory agency is both confusing and harmful; and that no permanent good can be served unless a conclusive report is presented to the American people which will be convincing in its thoroughness and its honesty.

4. The Grand Jury system was anciently established as the representative of the people, to insure law and order and to protect the people against injustice, maladministration and lawlessness. The Grand Jury is vested with the broadest and most unlimited powers, and has no legal responsibility for its decisions,

unless corruptly made, to any public officer or to any branch of the Government. It not only can but it must conduct inquiry into violations of the Federal laws on its own initiative and, acting alone, it has the power of subpoena. Where it knows evidence exists which has not been presented to it, its duty is to order such evidence produced.

The very existence of this grand-jury system is a bulwark of independence. The grand jury's purpose is at once to ferret out the guilty and to protect the innocent whether the former is shielded by powerful influences or the latter is unjustly accused.

This Grand Jury has been surprised at the prevalent ignorance of its functions, an ignorance that apparently extends into areas where the Grand Jury's cooperation should be sought. The individual citizen himself in or out of the Government not only has the right but the obligation, when he has evidence of the law's violation, to present this evidence to a grand jury.

By law, this Grand Jury expires on June 15, 1950, after serving its maximum legal term of eighteen months. It believes this time limitation is wisely established for no group should be longer entrusted with such powers. But the experience and insight which it has acquired have been valuable adjuncts in its deliberations and in the establishment of a record available to any successor grand jury. From such experience, this Grand Jury is convinced that a similar body should promptly be impaneled so that it can immediately equip itself with the necessary knowledge to assay all evidence of espionage and subversive activities presented to it.

This Grand Jury, therefore, strongly recommends the impaneling of a new Grand Jury in the Southern District of New York to carry on both the work which now remains uncompleted and that which will arise in the future.

5. In its 18 months, this Grand Jury has had an intimate insight into the operation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and has come to have the highest regard for the efficiency, the thoroughness, and the honesty with which its affairs are conducted under J. Edgar Hoover. In the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the nation has one of its most potent agencies to protect its security. The present Congress should be commended for its recent action in strengthening the hand of Mr. Hoover in this vital work.

6. The Grand Jury is not convinced that the Loyalty Boards established by the Government are sufficient protection against the infiltration of communists or of the communist-inspired into governmental departments.

It is further convinced that the security of the country, is not adequately protected if a Loyalty Board limits its inquiry involving governmental employees to a determination of the individual's loyalty. Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney, on his retirement as Secretary of Commerce, called public attention to this inadequacy and stated that, since all governmental departments "today deal with secret information," each and all their employees should be good security risks, and hence should be screened by standards that include "the company they keep and stability of character."

The Grand Jury endorses Mr. Whitney's position and recommends that Congress study means to insure against the government's employment of any individual who is "a poor security risk;" and meanwhile repeats that no citizen is invested with the right to work in government.

7. This Grand Jury has been greatly disturbed by certain court procedures in recent trials concerning communism and espionage. The maneuverings of defense lawyers have not only violated the decorum of judicial procedure but have furthered the communist objective of establishing anarchy by undermining respect for the courts. Yet in pretrial and trial hearings of espionage cases, such attorneys under existing laws are often in a position to force on the prosecution the dilemma of choice between not proceeding or proceeding at the expense of revealing information injurious to national security. This choice is particularly grave when the nation is at war.

The Grand Jury recommends to the proper authorities that a competent and exhaustive study be made by legal experts to determine if this situation cannot at least be mitigated.

8. The Grand Jury has been shocked at the lack of cooperation shown by certain lawyers who have appeared before it as witnesses, who refused to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination, and who disregarded their obligations as citizens to further the ends of justice. If such a position is taken by any governmental employee, he or she would be ipso facto dismissed. Lawyers are officers of the court.

The Grand Jury, repeating its recommendation of April 1949, urges the judiciary and bar associations to take measures to disbar lawyers who refuse to answer questions on grounds of self-incrimination before judicial bodies, grand juries, or governmental boards of inquiry.

9. The Grand Jury, acting on its own authority, instituted an investigation into the Amerasia case. In the time legally available to it, it has not been able to conduct as exhaustive an inquiry as it would desire. It has examined a number of witnesses, always with counsel of the Department of Justice present.

The Grand Jury, sworn to secrecy, may speak to the American public either through an indictment or a presentment and hence now advances the following conclusions:

(a) The Office of Strategic Service, which precipitated the Amerasia case, acted in a responsible manner.

(b) The officials immediately concerned between that time and the arrests of the six accused, acted in a responsible manner. The Federal Bureau of Investigation properly performed its duty, a duty which was not only conditioned on bringing criminals to justice, but on the equally important considerations of thwarting further crime and protecting national security.

(c) The Grand Jury has found no evidence that any official acted improperly in regard to the delay in the arrests.

(d) The Grand Jury also has found no evidence to indicate that the Department of Justice was remiss in its prosecution of the case. If laws governing espionage had been different, the Grand Jury believes that the prosecution procedure would have been entirely different. Other telling factors involved certain legal procedures which, if followed, might have revealed to the enemy information that it was essential should be withheld. The determination of many of the legal issues involved, in particular the admissibility of evidence, would require a long and intensive study.

(e) The number of government documents seized is not important, save as a demonstration that precautions against their theft from governmental departments were entirely inadequate. It is important, however, that a certain number of these documents pertained to national defense and that others of a different nature, in the hands of the enemy, would have aided it.

(f) The Grand Jury believes that the American people have been poorly served by the compounding of confusion through disclosures of half-truths, contradictory statements, etc., in this and similar cases.

(g) The Grand Jury believes that, at this juncture, it would be salutary if the Justice Department would issue a public statement of the details of its handling of the case beginning with the time of the arrests, including a complete list and description of all documents or papers found in the office of Amerasia by any government agent or in the possession of those arrested; and the reasons for the various steps taken by the prosecution.

10. As Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, Thomas J. Donegan has served this Grand Jury, as he did its predecessor, from the day of its impaneling to that of its discharge. It has always been cognizant of his high purpose, his unquestioned probity, his unremitting zeal, and his devotion to duty. His knowledge of communism and the laws relating to the prosecution of espionage and subversion is expert. The country owes him a debt of gratitude.

11. Now, therefore, the Grand Jury respectfully petitions the court to accept this presentment and order it filed, authorizing the foreman and the secretary of the Grand Jury to send copies of it to the members of Congress and to the proper officers of the Executive Department of the Government, and to permit such other use as may properly be made of this document.

Dated: New York, N. Y., June 16, 1950.

(Signed by) John Gilland Brunini, Foreman; John G. Kilbreth, Asst. Foreman; Hugh V. Doran, Secretary; Robert L. Barrows; Joseph P. Christianson; Mrs. Evelyn Zorn Dingwall; James Sumner Draper; Raymond C. Fowler; Robert Frese; G. Leonard Gold; Henry E. Grant; Harold C. Hahn; Richard Brown Jones; Murray Kanner; Francis Keally; Samuel B. Leight; Sidney Leshen; Herman E. Nathan; Bernhard K. Schaefer; Harry Scherman; John Schreiber; Siegfried Stern; Wheeler Williams.

MOUNT VERNON, N. Y., May 12, 1950.

To Whom It May Concern:

I certify that I have attended Mr. John Huber, 15 Courtland Street, Mount Vernon, N. Y., on several occasions in the last three weeks. It is my honest opinion that Mr. John Huber, though physically sound, is on the verge of a mental collapse, probably induced by the terrific strain that he has been under.

In view of those findings I recommended that Mr. Huber should take a 2-3 weeks vacation with complete isolation from the outside world.

LUKE BERARDI, M. D.

JULY 5, 1950.

HON. MILLARD E. TYDINGS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: In connection with your inquiry of July 3, 1950, concerning Theodore Geiger, an ECA employee, I would like to state that he has been investigated as to loyalty and security by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such an investigation is required by Section 110 (c) of Public Law 472, "The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948," which prescribes as follows:

"(c) No citizen or resident of the United States may be employed, or if already employed, may be assigned under this title for a period to exceed three months unless such individual has been investigated as to loyalty and security by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a report thereon has been made to the Secretary of State and the Administrator, and until the Secretary of State or the Administrator has certified in writing (and filed copies thereof with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs) that, after full consideration of such report, he believes such individual is loyal to the United States, its Constitution, and form of government, and is not now and has never been a member of any organization advocating contrary views."

In accordance with these provisions of the law and after full consideration of the information developed, Mr. Hoffman certified in writing his belief as to the loyalty of Mr. Geiger.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) WILLIAM FOSTER,
Acting Administrator.

There is incorporated by reference that portion of the record of the hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate held March 23, 1948, appearing on pages 23 through 25, dealing with loyalty review procedures in the Department of State.

There is incorporated by reference the record of hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Eightieth Congress, second session, held March 10 and 12, 1948, which went fully into charges against the State Department and its handling of loyalty cases.

There is incorporated by reference that portion, being pages 169 through 201 and 206 through 210, of the record of the hearings before the subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, Eightieth Congress, second session, held January 28, 1948, dealing with the handling of personnel security and loyalty cases in the State Department.

There is incorporated by reference the speech made on the floor of the House, August 2, 1948, by Congressman Jonkman, entitled "Department of State" which appears in the Congressional Record for that date at page 9793.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 10, 1950.

Mr. EDWARD P. MORGAN,
Chief Counsel, Foreign Relations Subcommittee, United States Senate.

MY DEAR Mr. MORGAN: In response to your inquiry, the following is submitted in description of the position which Mr. Haldore Hanson holds in the point 4 program:

Under departmental announcement No. 41, dated February 21, 1950, Mr. Haldore Hanson is Chief of the Technical Cooperation Projects Staff of the point 4 program. He works under the supervision of an Administrator for the point 4 program, who is to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate in accordance with Public Law 535, Eighty-first Congress, second session. Pending appropriation for the Administrator of point 4, Ambassador Waynick has been brought back to Washington and is serving as Acting Administrator. Three staffs are provided for this Administrator: a policy staff, a projects staff, and a management staff. Mr. Hanson's responsibilities are limited to the projects staff. He advises the Administrator on the cost and feasibility of proposed projects and on problems which may arise in administering them. He also reviews the carrying out of projects by other government agencies.

I hope the foregoing information will be of use to you.

I am enclosing a copy of Public Law 535 and departmental announcement 41.

Sincerely yours,

ADRIAN S. FISHER, *the Legal Adviser.*

Enclosures:

1. Public Law 535.
2. Departmental announcement 41.

[PUBLIC LAW 535—81ST CONGRESS]

[CHAPTER 220—2D SESSION]

[H. R. 7797]

AN ACT To provide foreign economic assistance

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950".

TITLE I

SEC. 101. This title may be cited as the "Economic Cooperation Act of 1950".

FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY

SEC. 102. (a) Section 102 (a) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, is amended by striking out in the fourth sentence thereof "trade barriers" and inserting in lieu thereof "barriers to trade or to the free movement of persons"; and by inserting in the fifth sentence thereof the word "further" before the word "unification".

(b) Section 102 (b) (1) of such Act is amended by inserting a comma and the phrase "increased productivity, maximum employment, and freedom from restrictive business practices" after the word "production".

GUARANTIES AND LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE BETWEEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

SEC. 103. (a) Section 111 (b) (3) (ii) of such Act is amended to read as follows:

"(ii) the Administrator shall charge a fee in an amount determined by him not exceeding 1 per centum per annum of the amount of each guaranty under clause (1) of subparagraph (v), and not exceeding 4 per centum per annum of the amount of each guaranty under clause (2) of such subparagraph, and all fees collected hereunder shall be available for expenditure in discharge of liabilities under guaranties made under this paragraph until such time as all such liabilities have been discharged or have expired, or until all such fees have been expended in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph: and".

(b) Section 111 (b) (3) (iv) of such Act is amended to read as follows:

"(iv) as used in this paragraph, the term 'investment' includes (A) any contribution of capital goods, materials, equipment, services, patents, pro-

cesses, or techniques by any person in the form of a loan or loans to any enterprise to be conducted within a participating country, (B) the purchase of a share of ownership in any such enterprise, (C) participation in royalties, earnings, or profits of any such enterprise, and (D) the furnishing of capital goods items and related services pursuant to a contract providing for payment in whole or in part after the end of the fiscal year in which the guaranty of such investment is made; and".

(c) Section 111 (b) (3) (v) of such Act is amended to read as follows:

"(v) the guaranty to any person shall be limited to assuring one or both of the following: (1) The transfer into United States dollars of other currencies, or credits in such currencies received by such person, as earnings or profits from the approved project, as repayment or return of the investment therein, in whole or in part, or as compensation for the sale or disposition of all or any part thereof; and (2) the compensation in United States dollars for loss of all or any part of the investment in the approved project which shall be found by the Administrator to have been lost to such person by reason of expropriation or confiscation by action of the government of a participating country. When any payment is made to any person pursuant to a guaranty as hereinbefore described, the currency, credits, asset, or investment on account of which such payment is made shall become the property of the United States Government, and the United States Government shall be subrogated to any right, title, claim, or cause of action existing in connection therewith."

(d) Section 111 (b) (3) of such Act is further amended by striking out the words between the second and last provisos therein and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "It being the intent of the Congress that the guaranty herein authorized should be used to maximum practicable extent and so administered as to increase the participation of private enterprise in achieving the purposes of this Act, the Administrator is authorized to issue guaranties up to a total of \$200,000,000".

(e) Section 111 (c) (2) of such Act is amended by striking out "\$150,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$200,000,000".

(f) Section 111 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(d) The Administrator is authorized to transfer funds directly to any central institution or other organization formed to further the purposes of this Act by two or more participating countries, or to any participating country or countries in connection with the operations of such institution or organization, to be used on terms and conditions specified by the Administrator, in order to facilitate the development of transferability of European currencies, or to promote the liberalization of trade by participating countries with one another and with other countries."

PROTECTION OF DOMESTIC ECONOMY

SEC. 104. (a) Section 112 (a) of such Act is amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting a comma and the following: "and (3) minimize the burden on the American taxpayer by reducing the amount of dollar purchases by the participating countries to the greatest extent possible, consistent with maintaining an adequate supply of the essentials for the functioning of their economies and for their continued recovery."

(b) Subsections (b) and (c) of section 112 of such Act are hereby repealed.

(c) Section 112 (1) of such Act is amended to read as follows:

"(1) No funds authorized for the purposes of this title shall be used for the purchase in bulk of any commodities at prices higher than the market price prevailing in the United States at the time of the purchase adjusted for differences in the cost of transportation to destination, quality, and terms of payment. A bulk purchase within the meaning of this subsection does not include the purchase of raw cotton in bales."

(d) Section 112 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:

"(m) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the pricing provisions of section 112 (e) of this title and section 4 of the Act of July 16, 1943 (57 Stat. 566) shall not be applicable to domestic wheat and wheat flour procured under this title or any other Act providing for assistance or relief to foreign countries, supplied to countries which are parties to the International Wheat Agreement of 1949 and credited to their guaranteed purchases thereunder.

"(n) It is the sense of Congress that no participating country shall maintain or impose any import, currency, tax, license, quota, or other similar business restrictions which discriminate against citizens of the United States or any corporation, partnership, or other association substantially beneficially owned by citizens of the United States, engaged or desiring to engage, in furtherance of the purposes of this title, in the importation into such country of any commodity, which restrictions are not reasonably required to meet balance of payments conditions, or requirements of national security, or are not authorized under international agreements to which such country and the United States are parties. In any case where the Department of State determines that any such discriminatory restriction is maintained or imposed by a participating country or by any dependent area of such country, the Administrator shall take such remedial action as he determines will effectively promote the purposes of this subsection (n)."

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 105. (a) Section 114 (c) of such Act is amended by striking out the period at the end of the first sentence and inserting in lieu thereof a colon and the following: "*Provided further*, That in addition to the amount heretofore authorized and appropriated, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for carrying out the provisions and accomplishing the purposes of this title not to exceed \$2,700,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951: *Provided further*, That \$600,000,000 of the funds appropriated hereunder shall be available during the fiscal year 1951 solely for the purpose of encouraging and facilitating the operation of a program of liberalized trade and payments, for supporting any central institution or other organization described in subsection (d) of section 111, and for furnishing of assistance to those participating countries taking part in such program: *Provided further*, That not more than \$600,000,000 of such funds shall be available during the fiscal year 1951 for transfer of funds pursuant to subsection (d) of section 111: *Provided further*, That, in addition to the foregoing, any balance, unobligated as of June 30, 1950, or subsequently released from obligation, of funds appropriated for carrying out and accomplishing the purposes of this title for any period ending on or prior to that date is hereby authorized to be made available for obligation through the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, and to be transferred to and consolidated with any appropriations for carrying out and accomplishing the purposes of this title for said fiscal year."

(b) The last sentence of section 114 (c) of such Act is amended to read as follows: "The authorizations in this title are limited to the period ending June 30, 1951."

(c) Section 114 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:

"(h) The President is authorized to transfer to any department or agency any portion of the funds allocated for assistance to Germany from appropriations authorized by subsection (c). This portion may be used for expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary to meet responsibilities of the United States related to the rehabilitation of occupied areas of Germany, including the furnishing of minimum civilian supplies to prevent starvation, disease, and unrest prejudicial to the objectives of the occupation. This portion may be expended under authority of this subsection or any provisions of law, not inconsistent herewith, applicable to such department or agency and without regard to such provisions of this title as the President may specify as inapplicable.

"(i) As agreed upon by the Secretary of State and the Administrator, a part of the German currency now or hereafter deposited under the bilateral agreement of December 15, 1949, between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, or any supplementary or succeeding agreement, shall be deposited into the GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) special account under the terms of article V of the said bilateral agreement. In quantities and under conditions determined by the Secretary of State after consultation with the Administrator, the currency so deposited shall be available for meeting the responsibilities of the United States in the occupation of Germany."

COUNTERPART FUNDS

SEC. 106. (a) Section 115 (b) (6) is amended to read as follows:

"(6) placing in a special account a deposit in the currency of such country, in commensurate amounts and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed

to between such country and the Government of the United States, when any commodity or service is made available through any means authorized under this title, and is furnished to the participating country on a grant basis: *Provided*, That the obligation to make such deposits may be waived, in the discretion of the Administrator, with respect to technical information or assistance furnished under section 111 (a) (3) of this title and with respect to ocean transportation furnished on United States flag vessels under section 111 of this title in an amount not exceeding the amount, as determined by the Administrator, by which the charges for such transportation exceed the cost of such transportation at world market rates: *Provided further*, That such special account, together with the unencumbered portions of any deposits which may have been made by such country pursuant to section 6 of the joint resolution providing for relief assistance to the people of countries devastated by war (Public Law 84, Eightieth Congress) and section 5 (b) of the Foreign Aid Act of 1947 (Public Law 389, Eightieth Congress), shall be used in furtherance of any central institution or other organization formed by two or more participating countries to further the purposes set forth in subsection (d) of section 111 or otherwise shall be held or used for purposes of internal monetary and financial stabilization, for the stimulation of productive activity and the exploration for and development of new sources of wealth, or for such other expenditures as may be consistent with the declaration of policy contained in section 102 and the purposes of this title, including local currency administrative expenditures of the United States within such country incident to operations under this title: *Provided further*, That the use of such special account shall be subject to agreement between such country and the Administrator, who shall act in this connection after consultation with the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems and the Public Advisory Board provided for in section 107 (a): *And provided further*, That any unencumbered balance remaining in such account on June 30, 1952, shall be disposed of within such country for such purposes as may, subject to approval by Act or joint resolution by the Congress, be agreed to between such country and the Government of the United States;".

(b) Section 115 (e) of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "The Administrator shall also encourage emigration from participating countries having permanent surplus manpower to areas, particularly underdeveloped and dependent areas, where such manpower can be effectively utilized."

(c) Section 115 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(j) The Administrator shall utilize such amounts of the local currency allocated pursuant to subsection (h) as may be necessary, to give full and continuous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media, so as to inform the peoples of the participating countries regarding the assistance, including its purpose, source, and character, furnished by the American taxpayer."

FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950

SEC. 107. (a) Section 3 (c) of the Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950 is amended by striking out "June 30, 1951" and inserting in lieu thereof "June 30, 1952".

(b) Section 3 (d) of such Act is amended by striking out the period at the end and inserting in lieu thereof a comma and the following: "and \$100,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951."

(c) Section 4 of such Act is amended by striking out "June 30, 1950" and inserting in lieu thereof "June 30, 1951."

TITLE II

AID TO CHINA

SEC. 201. This title may be cited as the "China Area Aid Act of 1950."

NATURE OF ASSISTANCE

SEC. 202. Funds, now unobligated or hereafter released from obligation, appropriated by section 12 of the Act entitled "An Act to amend the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948", approved April 19, 1949 (Public Law 47, Eighty-first Congress), are hereby made available for furtherance of the general objectives

of the China Aid Act of 1948 through June 30, 1951, and for carrying out the purposes of that Act through economic assistance in any place in China and in the general area of China which the President deems to be not under Communist control, in such manner and on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, and references in the said Act to China shall, insofar as applicable, apply also to any other such place: *Provided*, That, so long as the President deems it practicable, not less than \$40,000,000 of such funds shall be available only for such assistance in areas in China (including Formosa): *Provided further*, That not more than \$8,000,000 of such funds (excluding the \$40,000,000 mentioned in the foregoing proviso) shall be available for relief on humanitarian grounds through the American Red Cross, or other voluntary relief agencies in any place in China suffering from the effects of natural calamity, under such safeguards as the President shall direct to assure nondiscriminatory distribution according to need and appropriate publicity as to source and scope of the assistance being furnished by the United States: *Provided further*, That not more than \$6,000,000 of such funds (excluding the amounts mentioned in the foregoing provisos), shall be available for allocation to the Secretary of State, to remain available until expended, under such regulations as the Secretary of State may prescribe, using private agencies to the maximum extent practicable, for necessary expenses of tuition, subsistence, transportation, and emergency medical care for selected citizens of China for study or teaching in accredited colleges, universities, or other educational institutions in the United States approved by the Secretary of State for the purposes, or for research and related academic and technical activities in the United States, and the Attorney General is hereby authorized and directed to promulgate regulations providing that such selected citizens of China who have been admitted for the purpose of study in the United States, shall be granted permission to accept employment upon application filed with the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization.

TITLE III

AID TO PALESTINE REFUGEES

SEC. 301. This title may be cited as the "United Nations Palestine Refugee Aid Act of 1950."

SEC. 302. The Secretary of State is hereby authorized to make contributions from time to time before July 1, 1951, to the United Nations for the "United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East," established under the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of December 8, 1949, in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate \$27,450,000 for the purposes set forth in this title.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 303. (a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, not to exceed \$27,450,000 to carry out the purposes of this title.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized and directed, until such time as an appropriation shall be made pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, to make advances to the Secretary of State, not to exceed in the aggregate \$8,000,000, to carry out the provisions of this title. From appropriations authorized under subsection (a) of this section, there shall be repaid to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, without interest, the advances made by it under authority contained herein. No interest shall be charged on advances made by the Treasury to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in implementation of this section.

NATURE OF ASSISTANCE

SEC 304. (a) The provisions of sections 301, 302, and 303 of the Act of January 27, 1948 (62 Stat. 6), are hereby made applicable with respect to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to the same extent as they apply with respect to the government of another country: *Provided*, That when reimbursement is made by said Agency, such reimbursement shall be credited to the appropriation, fund, or account utilized for paying the compensation, travel expenses, and allowances of any person assigned hereunder.

(b) Departments and agencies of the United States Government are authorized, with the approval of the Secretary of State, to furnish or procure and furnish supplies, materials, and services to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East: *Provided*, That said Agency shall make payments in advance for all costs incident to the furnishing or procurement of such supplies, materials, or services, which payments may be credited to the current applicable appropriation or fund of the department or agency concerned and shall be available for the purposes for which such appropriations and funds are authorized to be used.

TITLE IV

SEC. 401. This title may be cited as the "Act for International Development".

SEC. 402. The Congress hereby finds as follows:

(a) The peoples of the United States and other nations have a common interest in the freedom and in the economic and social progress of all peoples. Such progress can further the secure growth of democratic ways of life, the expansion of mutually beneficial commerce, the development of international understanding and good will, and the maintenance of world peace.

(b) The efforts of the peoples living in economically under-developed areas of the world to realize their full capabilities and to develop the resources of the lands in which they live can be furthered through the cooperative endeavor of all nations to exchange technical knowledge and skills and to encourage the flow of investment capital.

(c) Technical assistance and capital investment can make maximum contribution to economic development only where there is understanding of the mutual advantages of such assistance and investment and where there is confidence of fair and reasonable treatment and due respect for the legitimate interests of the peoples of the countries to which the assistance is given and in which the investment is made and of the countries from which the assistance and investments are derived. In the case of investment this involves confidence on the part of the people of the under-developed areas that investors will conserve as well as develop local resources, will bear a fair share of local taxes and observe local laws, and will provide adequate wages and working conditions for local labor. It involves confidence on the part of investors, through intergovernmental agreements or otherwise, that they will not be deprived of their property without prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; that they will be given reasonable opportunity to remit their earnings and withdraw their capital; that they will have reasonable freedom to manage, operate, and control their enterprises; that they will enjoy security in the protection of their persons and property, including industrial and intellectual property, and nondiscriminatory treatment in taxation and in the conduct of their business affairs.

SEC. 403. (a) It is declared to be the policy of the United States to aid the efforts of the peoples of economically underdeveloped areas to develop their resources and improve their working and living conditions by encouraging the exchange of technical knowledge and skills and the flow of investment capital to countries which provide conditions under which such technical assistance and capital can effectively and constructively contribute to raising standards of living, creating new sources of wealth, increasing productivity, and expanding purchasing power.

(b) It is further declared to be the policy of the United States that in order to achieve the most effective utilization of the resources of the United States, private and public, which are or may be available for aid in the development of economically underdeveloped areas, agencies of the United States Government, in reviewing requests of foreign governments for aid for such purposes, shall take into consideration (1) whether the assistance applied for is an appropriate part of a program reasonably designed to contribute to the balanced and integrated development of the country or area concerned; (2) whether any works or facilities which may be projected are actually needed in view of similar facilities existing in the area and are otherwise economically sound; and (3) with respect to projects for which capital is requested, whether private capital is available either in the country or elsewhere upon reasonable terms and in sufficient amounts to finance such projects.

SEC. 404. (a) In order to accomplish the purposes of this title, the United States is authorized to participate in multilateral technical cooperation programs carried on by the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and

their related organizations, and by other international organizations, wherever practicable.

(b) Within the limits of appropriations made available to carry out the purposes of this title, the President is authorized to make contributions to the United Nations for technical cooperation programs carried on by it and its related organizations which will contribute to accomplishing the purposes of this title as effectively as would participation in comparable programs on a bilateral basis. The President is further authorized to make contributions for technical cooperation programs carried on by the Organization of American States, its related organizations, and by other international organizations.

(c) Agencies of the United States Government on request of international organizations are authorized, upon approval by the President, to furnish services and such facilities as may be necessary in connection therewith, on an advance of funds or reimbursement basis, for such organizations in connection with their technical cooperation programs. Amounts received as reimbursements from such organizations shall be credited, at the option of the appropriate agency, either to the appropriation, fund, or account utilized in incurring the obligation, or to an appropriate appropriation, fund, or account currently available for the purposes for which expenditures were made.

SEC. 405. The President is authorized to plan, undertake, administer, and execute bilateral technical cooperation programs carried on by any United States Government agency and, in so doing—

(a) To coordinate and direct existing and new technical cooperation programs.

(b) To assist other interested governments in the formulation of programs for the balanced and integrated development of the economic resources and productive capacities of economically underdeveloped areas.

(c) To receive, consider, and review reports of joint commissions set up as provided in section 410 of this title.

(d) To make, within appropriations made available for the purpose, advances and grants in aid of technical cooperation programs to any person, corporation, or other body of persons, or to any foreign government or foreign government agency.

(e) To make and perform contracts or agreements in respect of technical cooperation programs on behalf of the United States Government with any person, corporation, or other body of persons however designated, whether within or without the United States, or with any foreign government or foreign government agency: *Provided*, That with respect to contracts or agreements which entail commitments for the expenditure of funds appropriated pursuant to the authority of this title, such contracts or agreements, within the limits of appropriations or contract authorizations hereafter made available may, subject to any future action of the Congress, run for not to exceed three years in any one case.

(f) To provide for printing and binding outside the continental limits of the United States, without regard to section 11 of the Act of March 1 1919 (44 U. S. C. 111).

(g) To provide for the publication of information made available by the joint commissions referred to in section 410, and from other sources, regarding resources, opportunities for private investment capital, and the need for technical knowledge and skill in each participating country.

SEC. 406. Agreements made by the United States under the authority of this title with other governments and with international organizations shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

SEC. 407. In carrying out the programs authorized in section 405 of this title—

(a) The participation of private agencies and persons shall be sought to the greatest extent practicable.

(b) Due regard shall be given, in reviewing requests for assistance, to the possibilities of achieving satisfactory results from such assistance as evidenced by the desire of the country requesting it (1) to take steps necessary to make effective use of the assistance made available, including the encouragement of the flow of productive local and foreign investment capital where needed for development; and (2) to endeavor to facilitate the development of the colonies, possessions, dependencies, and non-self-governing territories administered by such requesting country so that such areas may make adequate contribution to the effectiveness of the assistance requested.

(c) Assistance shall be made available only where the President determines that the country being assisted—

(1) Pays a fair share of the cost of the program.

(2) Provides all necessary information concerning such program and gives the program full publicity.

(3) Seeks to the maximum extent possible full coordination and integration of technical cooperation programs being carried on in that country.

(4) Endeavors to make effective use of the results of the program.

(5) Cooperates with other countries participating in the program in the mutual exchange of technical knowledge and skills.

SEC. 408. The President is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out the provisions of this title.

SEC. 409. The President shall create an advisory board, hereinafter referred to as the "board", which shall advise and consult with the President or such other officer as he may designate to administer the program herein authorized, with respect to general or basic policy matters arising in connection with operation of the program. The board shall consist of not more than thirteen members to be appointed by the President, one of whom, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall be appointed by him as chairman. The members of the board shall be broadly representative of voluntary agencies and other groups interested in the program, including business, labor, agriculture, public health, and education. All members of the board shall be citizens of the United States; none except the chairman shall be an officer or an employee of the United States (including any agency or instrumentality of the United States) who as such regularly receives compensation for current services. Members of the board, other than the chairman if he is an officer of the United States Government, shall receive out of funds made available for the purposes of this title a per diem allowance of \$50 for each day spent away from their homes or regular places of business for the purpose of attendance at meetings of the board or at conferences held upon the call of the chairman, and in necessary travel, and while so engaged they may be paid actual travel expenses and not to exceed \$10 per diem in lieu of subsistence and other expenses. The President may appoint such committees in special fields of activity as he may determine to be necessary or desirable to effectuate the purposes of this title. The members of such committees shall receive the same compensation as that provided for members of the board.

SEC. 410. (a) At the request of a foreign country, there may be established a joint commission for economic development to be composed of persons named by the President and persons to be named by the requesting country, and may include representatives of international organizations mutually agreed upon.

(b) The duties of each such joint commission shall be mutually agreed upon, and may include, among other things, examination of the following:

(1) The requesting country's requirements with respect to technical assistance.

(2) The requesting country's resources and potentialities, including mutually advantageous opportunities for utilization of foreign technical knowledge and skills and investment.

(3) Policies which will remove deterrents to and otherwise encourage the introduction, local development, and application of technical skills and the creation and effective utilization of capital, both domestic and foreign; and the implementation of such policies by appropriate measures on the part of the requesting country and the United States, and of other countries, when appropriate, and after consultation with them.

(c) Such joint commissions shall prepare studies and reports which they shall transmit to the appropriate authorities of the United States and of the requesting countries. In such reports the joint commissions may include recommendations as to any specific projects which they conclude would contribute to the economic development of the requesting countries.

(d) The costs of each joint commission shall be borne by the United States and the requesting country in the proportion that may be agreed upon between the President and that country.

SEC. 411. All or part of United States support for and participation in any technical cooperation program carried on under this title shall be terminated by the President—

(a) If he determines that such support and participation no longer contribute effectively to the purposes of this title, are contrary to a resolution

adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations that the continuance of such technical cooperation programs is unnecessary or undesirable, or are not consistent with the foreign policy of the United States.

(b) If a concurrent resolution of both Houses of the Congress finds such termination is desirable.

SEC. 412. The President may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this title through the Secretary of State or through any other officer or employee of the United States Government.

SEC. 413. In order to carry out the purposes of this title—

(a) The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a person who, under the direction of the President or such other officer as he may designate pursuant to section 412 hereof to exercise the powers conferred upon him by this title, shall be responsible for planning, implementing, and managing the programs authorized in this title. He shall be compensated at a rate fixed by the President without regard to the Classification Act of 1949 but not in excess of \$15,000 per annum.

(b) Officers, employees, agents, and attorneys may be employed for duty within the continental limits of the United States in accordance with the provisions of the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1949.

(c) Persons employed for duty outside the continental limits of the United States and officers and employees of the United States Government assigned for such duty, may receive compensation at any of the rates provided for the Foreign Service Reserve and Staff by the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 999), as amended, may receive allowances and benefits not in excess of those established thereunder, and may be appointed to any class in the Foreign Service Reserve or Staff in accordance with the provisions of such Act.

(d) Alien clerks and employees employed for the purpose of performing functions under this title shall be employed in accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended.

(e) Officers and employees of the United States Government may be detailed to offices or positions to which no compensation is attached with any foreign government or foreign government agency or with any international organization: *Provided*, That while so detailed any such person shall be considered, for the purpose of preserving his privileges, rights, seniority, or other benefits, an officer or employee of the United States Government and of the United States Government agency from which detailed and shall receive therefrom his regular compensation, which shall be reimbursed to such agency from funds available under this title: *Provided further*, That such acceptance of office shall in no case involve the taking of an oath of allegiance to another government.

(f) Experts and consultants or organizations thereof may be employed as authorized by section 15 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (5 U. S. C. 55a), and individuals so employed may be compensated at a rate not in excess of \$75 per diem.

(g) Such additional civilian personnel may be employed without regard to subsection (a) of section 14 of the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 219), as amended, as may be necessary to carry out the policies and purposes of this title.

SEC. 414. No citizen or resident of the United States, whether or not now in the employ of the Government, may be employed or assigned to duties by the Government under this Act until such individual has been investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a report thereon has been made to the Secretary of State: *Provided, however*, That any present employee of the Government, pending the report as to such employee by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, may be employed or assigned to duties under this Act for the period of three months from the date of its enactment. This section shall not apply in the case of any officer appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

SEC. 415. The President shall transmit to the Congress an annual report of operations under this title.

SEC. 416. (a) In order to carry out the provisions of this title, there shall be made available such funds as are hereafter authorized and appropriated from time to time for the purposes of this title: *Provided, however*, That for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this title through June 30, 1951, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated a sum not to exceed \$35,000,000, including any sums appropriated to carry on the activities of the Institute of Inter-American

Affairs, and technical cooperation programs as defined in section 418 herein under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 6). Activities provided for under this title may be prosecuted under such appropriations or under authority granted in appropriation Acts to enter into contracts pending enactment of such appropriations. Unobligated balances of such appropriations for any fiscal year may, when so specified in the appropriation Act concerned, be carried over to any succeeding fiscal year or years. The President may allocate to any United States Government agency any part of any appropriation available for carrying out the purposes of this title. Such funds shall be available for obligation and expenditure for the purposes of this title in accordance with authority granted hereunder or under authority governing the activities of the Government agencies to which such funds are allocated.

(b) Nothing in this title is intended nor shall it be construed as an expressed or implied commitment to provide any specific assistance, whether of funds, commodities, or services, to any country or countries, or to any international organization.

SEC. 417. If any provision of this title or the application of any provision to any circumstances or persons shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the title and the applicability of such provision to other circumstances or persons shall not be affected thereby.

SEC. 418. As used in this title—

(a) The term "technical cooperation programs" means programs for the international interchange of technical knowledge and skills designed to contribute to the balanced and integrated development of the economic resources and productive capacities of economically underdeveloped areas. Such activities may include, but need not be limited to, economic, engineering, medical, educational, agricultural, fishery, mineral, and fiscal surveys, demonstration, training, and similar projects that serve the purpose of promoting the development of economic resources and productive capacities of underdeveloped areas. The term "technical cooperation programs" does not include such activities authorized by the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 6) as are not primarily related to economic development nor activities undertaken now or hereafter pursuant to the International Aviation Facilities Act (62 Stat. 450), nor pursuant to the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 128), as amended, nor pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 137), as amended, nor activities undertaken now or hereafter in the administration of areas occupied by the United States armed forces or in Korea by the Economic Cooperation Administration.

(b) The term "United States Government agency" means any department, agency, board, wholly or partly owned corporation or instrumentality, commission, or independent establishment of the United States Government.

(c) The term "international organization" means any intergovernmental organization of which the United States is a member.

TITLE V

INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S WELFARE WORK

SEC. 501. (a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President not to exceed \$15,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, to enable him to make contributions to the United Nations, or any subordinate body thereof, in such manner and on such terms and conditions as he may deem to be in the interests of the United States, to support permanent arrangements within the United Nations structure for international children's welfare work.

(b) If at any time during such fiscal year the President deems it to be in the interests of the United States, he is authorized to make contributions, out of any funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization contained in subsection (a), to the International Children's Emergency Fund to carry out the purposes of the International Children's Emergency Fund Assistance Act of 1948 upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe; but such contributions shall not exceed the limitation provided by section 204 of such Act.

(c) No additional appropriation shall be made under the authorization contained in such Act of 1948.

(d) Funds appropriated by the second paragraph of title I of the Foreign Aid Appropriation Act, 1949, shall remain available for the purposes for which appropriated through June 30, 1951.

Approved June 5, 1950.

Department of State

Departmental Announcement 41

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERIM OFFICE FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (POINT FOUR PROGRAM)

1. Effective immediately there is established under the direction of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development (TCD).

2. The Interim Office is assigned general responsibility within the Department for (a) securing effective administration of programs involving technical assistance to economically underdeveloped areas and (b) directing the planning in preparation for the Technical Cooperation and Economic Development (Point Four) Program. In carrying out its responsibilities the Interim Office will rely upon the regional bureaus, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, and other components of Economic Affairs area for participation in the technical assistance programs as specified below, and upon the central administrative offices of the Administrative area for the performance of service functions.

3. The Interim Office has specific action responsibility for—

- (a) Developing over-all policies for the program.
- (b) Formulating general program plans and issuing planning directives.
- (c) Coordinating specific program plans developed by the regional bureaus and making necessary adjustments.
- (d) Approving projects, determining action agencies, and allocating funds for United States bilateral programs.
- (e) Directing negotiations and relationships with intergovernmental agencies and with other United States agencies participating in the coordinated program or otherwise carrying on technical assistance activities.
- (f) Reviewing instructions to the field.

4. The Interim Office will coordinate the development of operating policies governing administrative problems generally applicable to technical assistance programs such as utilization of available specialized personnel, conditions of employment, and utilization of training facilities.

5. The regional bureaus have responsibility with respect to technical assistance programs for—

- (a) Initiating and developing plans for technical assistance programs for individual countries or groups of countries within their respective regions.
- (b) Reviewing program proposals affecting their regions which originate from any other source.
- (c) Negotiating and communicating with foreign governments.
- (d) Directing State Department personnel assigned abroad to coordinate, and give administrative and program support to, bilateral programs.
- (e) Continuously evaluating programs and projects within regions.
- (f) Proposing program changes.
- (g) Initiating instructions to the field carrying out their responsibilities, and reviewing all other instructions concerned with technical assistance programs.

Responsibilities previously assigned to the regional bureaus in connection with the Philippine Rehabilitation Program, Economic Cooperation Administration Aid programs, and existing programs in Germany and Japan are not affected by this announcement except for paragraph 4 above which will apply where circumstances require.

6. The Bureau of United Nations Affairs has—

(a) Action responsibility for—

- 1. Developing the United States position concerning the international organizational machinery to be used in connection with technical assistance activities;
- 2. Developing the United States position concerning the relative proportions of contributions to be made by the United States and by other countries to the special technical assistance accounts of international organizations;
- 3. Coordinating negotiations involving such accounts.

(b) Advisory responsibility concerning—

- 1. The character and scope of technical cooperation programs undertaken by international organizations;
- 2. The amounts of United States contributions to the special technical assistance accounts of international organizations;
- 3. United States positions on program allocations from such accounts by international organizations.

The Bureau of United Nations Affairs maintains general contact with international organizations in line with its over-all responsibilities and arranges for direct contact between the United Nations and the participating specialized agencies and the Interim Office of Technical Cooperation and Development or United States agencies on operating program matters as requested by the Interim Office. The Bureau for Inter-American Affairs makes corresponding arrangements with respect to intergovernmental arrangements of the American states.

7. The following have such responsibilities in connection with technical assistance programs as are in accord with their general responsibilities set forth in the Organization Manual of the Department.

(a) The Office of Financial and Development Policy with respect to the International Bank and Monetary Fund.

(b) The Office of Transport and Communications Policy with respect to the International Telecommunication Union and the International Civil Aviation Organization.

(c) The UNESCO Relations Staff with respect to UNESCO.

8. Responsibility for the administration of the Department's scientific and technical exchange activities under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, and under the Act of August 9, 1939, authorizing the President to render closer and more effective the relationship between the American republics, insofar as these activities are directly related to specific economic development projects, is transferred from the Office of Educational Exchange to the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development. Activities which are not so related remain the responsibility of the Office of Educational Exchange. The functions, personnel and records of the Secretariat of the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation are transferred from the Office of Educational Exchange to the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development, except for the editorial functions connected with the publication of "The Record" and the corresponding personnel and records, which remain in the Office of Educational Exchange.

9. The Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs will become the Department's representative on, and the Chairman of, the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, in place of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. He will also serve as Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance. The Director of the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development will serve as Vice Chairman of both committees.

10. The other offices under the Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs advise the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development on the economic feasibility and desirability of projects and programs, from the standpoint of their respective specialized interests; make or arrange for such economic studies and analyses as the Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development may require; and maintain liaison with United States and international agencies and with private organizations on matters within their respective fields of interest as necessary in the planning and operation of the technical assistance programs.

11. The Director will become a member of the Board of Directors of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development responsibilities enumerated under 3 and other paragraphs above apply in full to technical assistance activities, present and future, carried on by the Institute. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs exercises all responsibilities listed under paragraph 5 above with respect to the Institute's program. The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs are jointly responsible for developing such working arrangements as are necessary to insure the administration of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs as a constituent part of a coordinated technical assistance program.

12. The Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development consists of the following organizational units under the supervision of the designated officers:

Director: Leslie A. Wheeler, Ext. 3871.

Technical Cooperation Projects Staff, Chief: Haldore Hanson, Ext. 3011, 5012.

Technical Cooperation Policy Staff, Chief: Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., Ext. 4571, 4572.

Technical Cooperation Management Staff: Richard R. Brown, Director of Executive Staff, E. Ext. 2155.
(February 21, 1950.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN S. SERVICE

Date: May 26, 1950, 10 a. m. to 12:35 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State.

Reporters: E. Wake and E. Moyer, court stenographers reporting.

Board members: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles, member; Arthur G. Stevens, member; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN S. SERVICE

(The Board convened at 10:05 a. m.)

The CHAIRMAN. Are you ready to proceed?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Loyalty Security Board will be in order for consideration of the case of John Stewart Service, whose representative is Mr. Charles E. Rhett, member of the firm of Reilly, Rhett & Ruckelshaus, 1120 Tower Building, Washington, D. C. Miss Annette Pettis of the Foreign Service staff will assist counsel in the handling of the documents which will be in the case.

The Secretary of State has been granted by Congress the right, in his absolute discretion, to terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Department of State or of the Foreign Service of the United States whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interest of the United States. (Title I, Public Law 490, 79th Cong., 2d sess.; title I, Public Law 166, 80th Cong., 1st sess.; title I, Public Law 597, 80th Cong., 2d sess.; Public Law 179, 81st Cong., 1st sess.)

In order to give effect to this act, the Secretary of State has promulgated regulations and procedures setting forth the revised loyalty and security principles of the Department of State and hearing procedure of the Loyalty Security Board. This document, a copy of which was forwarded to Mr. Service on March 27, 1950, sets forth in detail the categories of persons deemed to constitute security risks.

On July 9, 1947, the Secretary of State promulgated departmental announcement 611 establishing a Personnel Security Board consisting of three members to review security and investigative records of departmental and foreign service personnel whose cases are to be considered for termination as security risks. Subsequently, Conrad E. Snow was designated chairman, Theodore Achilles and Arthur G. Stevens, alternate members of this Board, and Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Mr. Service is specifically charged as follows:

"The specific charges are that within the meaning of section 392.2.f of Regulations and Procedures of the Department of State, you are a member or, or in sympathetic association with the Communist Party which has been designated by the Attorney General as an organization which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means; and further that within the meaning of section 393.1.d of said regulations and procedures you are a person who has habitual or close association with persons known or believed to be in the category set forth in section 393.1.a of said regulations and procedures to an extent which would justify the conclusion that you might, through such association, voluntarily or involuntarily, divulge classified information without authority."

The procedure for hearings under the Regulations and Procedures of the Department of State specifies:

1. A notice setting forth the nature of the charge in factual detail, setting forth with particularity the facts and circumstances relating to the charges so far as security considerations will permit, in order to enable the employee to submit his answer, defense, or explanation.

2. A right to answer the charges in writing, under oath or affirmation, within a reasonable period of time, not less than 10 calendar days from the date of receipt by the employee of the notice or:

3. A right to have an administrative hearing on the charges before the Loyalty Security Board not less than 15 calendar days after notice of the charges, and

4. A right to appear before the Loyalty Security Board personally, to be represented by a counsel or representative of own choice, and to present evidence on own behalf.

It should be pointed out that the transcript of the hearing will not include all material in the file of the case, in that it will not include reports of investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which are confidential; that also the transcript will not contain information concerning the identity of confidential informants or information which will reveal the source of confidential evidence; and that the transcript will contain only the evidence in the letter of charges and interrogatory, if any, and the evidence actually taken at the hearing.

It is understood Mr. Service has presented to the Board a written statement, which is within his right under the procedure, and that, after introduction at this time, it will facilitate the further examination of the witness.

Mr. RHETTS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and I should like, before doing that if I might, to make a short statement about the other material we have already submitted.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel may make a statement.

Mr. RHETTS. We submitted to the Board yesterday afternoon three copies of a document book, which is in several parts and which I should like briefly, if I may, to describe for the record. When you open the book to the immediate left are two sets of papers, one is a paper headed "Chronology of Events" which is designed to indicate in skeleton form, for the Board, basic dates. The left-hand columns show the movements and current activities as of any current movement of Mr. Service. In the right-hand column are listed other events and activities which have a bearing upon and against which Mr. Service's activities were carried on.

I think this may be of value to the Board as a reference document so that you may readily see where Mr. Service was at any given point and time under discussion.

Behind this document, on the left-hand flap, there is a numerical sequential list of numbers of the documents which are going to be dealt with in the course of the hearing. Not all these documents will be introduced in evidence. The first 100 documents include not only items that we introduce in evidence but various working papers that are in our actual file but they are included so that as we refer to document numbers, the Board can get a general idea what the paper is we are talking about by reference to this list.

The second series of numbers in this list, which begins with 101 and go through 227, are a list of the reports prepared by Mr. Service during the period, roughly, between May 1942 and April 1945 on a whole variety of matters; that is to say, they represent reports and memoranda which he, partly as a Foreign Service officer attached to the Embassy and later while attached to the staff of General Stilwell, prepared in the ordinary course of business, and you will have occasion to refer to these at some length.

This list of documents, I may say, is not a complete collection of all the work product of Mr. Service during this period. It represents all we have been able, by the most diligent research, to lay our hands on and collect out of the files of the State Department.

Then the series of documents on your right, as the folder opens, with tabs from 10 to 95, are excerpts from certain of the basic documents, such as material contained in the Congressional Record and material published in various magazine articles and the like, substantially consisting of the sources of various charges that have been made against Mr. Service.

We shall have occasion to refer to these from time to time and I think you will find they are readily usable because, for example, if you want to open document 31 you may pull that tab and then there are subnumbers setting forth different excerpts.

Behind this is a copy of a personal statement by Mr. Service, and on the reverse side of the folder, to the left, there are a series of excerpts from some of the reports prepared by Mr. Service during the period involved, these representing, in our view, certain key documents which we will want to actually have incorporated in the transcript and will be accordingly offered.

On the right-hand side of the back cover of the folder is an excerpt from the Congressional Record for May 22, 1950, which contains the report of the Hobbs subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, which was made in 1946 as a result of a resolution introduced by Representative Dondero, together with what purports to be all the testimony which was given before the closed hearings before that subcommittee. This material has very important bearing on this case.

Finally, behind that material are certain excerpts from the so-called white paper, entitled "U. S. Relations with China," a publication of the State Department.

Now I should like at this time to offer in evidence this document book with certain exceptions. I propose to offer in evidence the entire book with the exception of documents 198, 206, and 207, and with the exception of Mr. Service's personal statement, which I propose to offer separately in just a moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you identify 198, 206, and 207?

Mr. RHETTS. You will find them, if you will turn your document book over, in that series, 198, 206, and 207. I may say that I wish them to be available to the Board and we will make use of them but for certain reasons I will be glad to make known, I do not offer them in evidence at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. This book with all its contents may be accepted as an exhibit, and so marked and we will not at this present time incorporate any portion of it in the transcript.

(Document book was admitted in evidence and marked Exhibit I.)

Mr. RHETTS. As the proceeding goes along I shall propose from time to time to offer and ask there be included in the transcript certain portions of this book.

The CHAIRMAN. You have some statement to make with reference to Mr. Service's own statement?

(Off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel desires me to make clear that this exhibit, as well as all other exhibits, will be incorporated in the record of the case but not necessarily printed in the transcript except insofar as offered by counsel from time to time during the hearing.

Mr. RHETTS. That is my understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed?

Mr. RHETTS. If I might make one further statement before we come to testimony. I should like very briefly to suggest to the Board the general scheme by which we at least propose to go at this case. As we see it, the case divides itself into about three grand divisions, the first of which is what we have, as a shorthand term, characterized the China charges. These are charges which Gen. Patrick Hurley is said to be the grandfather and appeared originally in the course of General Hurley's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in December 1945.

These charges of General Hurley, relating to Mr. Service, consist in general of charges that he was pro-Communist, that he undertook to sabotage American foreign policy in China, as General Hurley was attempting to execute it, and that Mr. Service, along with other Foreign Service officers, was in general engaged in attempting to defeat the accomplishment of American foreign policy.

These charges by General Hurley have been repeated over and over. They have been picked up by Congressman Dondero, repeated by him, and picked up by Congressman Judd, and repeated by him. They have appeared in one form or another in various magazines such as Plain Talk, an article purported to be written by Mr. Emmanuel Larsen and published by Mr. Joseph Kamp, America Betrayed, and most recently they have been repeated over and over by Senator McCarthy, so that we shall attempt to deal (1) with this area of charges, as they made the first major division.

The second major division in the case, as we see it, arises out of Mr. Service's involvement in the so-called Amerasia case. Consequently, we shall propose to deal with that general subject matter as the second large division.

The third area of charges relate to certain allegations that have been made about Mr. Service during the period when he was on duty in Tokyo in the year 1945, and so we shall deal with that as a third major division.

As far as we are concerned, we are ready to proceed with the first division, which we shall treat generally as China matters.

The CHAIRMAN. May I insert a question which I should have asked earlier as to the oral elucidation of the charges made for the benefit of the counsel for Mr. Service.

Mr. MORELAND. Mr. Service has been informed that various allegations have been made that he is pro-Communist. The allegations have indicated that this is reflected in his writings and that while serving in China and Japan he consorted with Communists; and further that while in the United States he consorted with alleged Communists and Communist sympathizers and turned over to them classified documents without authority.

He has further been informed that the members of the Board are concerned with his associations with the following persons: E. S. Larsen, Mark J. Gayn, Kate L. Mitchell, Phillip J. Jaffe, Thomas A. Bisson, and Andrew Roth.

Mr. RHETTS. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to insert at this time a letter on behalf of Mr. Service which was written to Mr. Peurifoy, Assistant Secretary

of State, by Mr. C. Martin Wilbur, associate professor of Chinese history at Columbia University.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be accepted.

(Letter, dated March 28, 1950, from Mr. C. Martin Wilbur, Columbia University, to Mr. John R. Peurifoy was admitted in evidence and marked "exhibit 2.")

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to offer at this time document No. 93-1.

The CHAIRMAN. In exhibit 1?

Mr. RHETTS. Which is a portion of Mr. Service's personal history statement; that is, it is that portion of it which deals with the China affairs. It represents the first 34 pages of the statement which appears in the document book. I ask that this be incorporated into the transcript at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that is numbered 93?

Mr. RHETTS. No. 93. It shows up under your tab "Personal statement."

The CHAIRMAN. In the book as part of the record it shows up not as 93 but under the tab.

Mr. RHETTS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. The first 34 pages of the document 93 may be inserted in the record, and at this point I think we should have Mr. Service take oath and swear to the truth of what he says.

Mr. John S. Service, having been duly sworn, testified in his own behalf as follows:

Mr. RHETTS. With reference to document 93-1, which has been offered for inclusion in the transcript, this is your own personal statement you offer to the Board under oath?

Mr. SERVICE. That is correct.

"PERSONAL STATEMENT OF JOHN S. SERVICE—PART 1

"You gentlemen, I am sure, already know a good deal about me but perhaps you will allow me first to give a consecutive summary of my background and career.

"My parents were missionaries in China. In 1906 my father had been sent to Chengtu, the capital city of the extreme far western province of Szechwan to set up the work of the YMCA in that field. Chengtu is about 1600 miles inland due west of Shanghai. Here I was born in 1909.

"My first visit to the United States was when I was 6 years old. My father spent his furlough on a year's assignment to the central YMCA at Cleveland, Ohio, and I attended first grade in a public school in one of the suburbs of Cleveland. Just after my seventh birthday we returned to Chengtu and I remained there for the next 4 years. Chengtu was extremely remote, and the foreign community was small. There was a school operated by a Canadian mission for the children of missionaries but my mother and father were determined that I was to have an American education. The only solution was for my mother to teach me at home, using an American home-study course. This decision of my parents seems, as I look back on it, a typical one. They were anxious that their children not lose their American heritage although forced to grow up abroad. At a very early age I became an omnivorous reader and probably grew up with more knowledge of American history and America generally than many children living in this country.

"By my eleventh birthday I had completed the Calvert course and it became difficult for my mother to carry me further. I was sent to Shanghai where the Shanghai American school was the largest and had the reputation of being the best school in China for American children. I remained here for 4 years. In 1924 my parents were given their second furlough. We lived in Berkeley, Calif., which was my father's home. I attended Berkeley High School and graduated in June 1925 at the age of 15. In the fall of that year I returned to China with my parents and worked as an apprentice draftsman in the architectural offices of the YMCA National Committee of Shanghai. In the winter of 1926 I commenced a trip alone through southeast Asia, India, and Europe, which brought me back to the United States in time to enter Oberlin College in Ohio in the fall of 1927.

"During college I proved that I could be a good student if I was interested. I was active in sports, being captain of two teams, was president of the men's honor court and was active in other extracurricular activities. I partially supported myself by waiting tables and by summer jobs. After graduation in 1931 I returned to Oberlin for a year of graduate work in the history of art, thinking at this time that I would like to prepare myself for college teaching. The experi-

ence was sufficient to convince me otherwise and I became interested in the Foreign Service. In September 1932, after some independent study, I took the written examinations in San Francisco, passed them and came to Washington for the orals in January 1933 which I also passed. I learned in Washington however, that there was no likelihood of early appointment to the Foreign Service. I therefore returned to China, where my parents were now living in Shanghai, and applied for a Foreign Service clerkship. In June 1933 I was appointed clerk in the consulate at Kunming, in the then very isolated Province of Yunnan in the extreme southwest of China. This was a small post; the staff was one vice consul, myself, and two or three Chinese clerks. I did the typing, filing, coding, and gradually took over miscellaneous duties such as the handling of commercial letters and most of the citizenship and visa work. My fiancée, who was a classmate of mine at Oberlin, came out to China and we were married and had our first child. In July 1934 I was made a noncareer vice consul. I have always considered this experience at Kunming to have been valuable. Since it was a small post I had an opportunity to learn something about every phase of Foreign Service work. I gained detailed knowledge of an area of China which was later to become extremely important and which at that time was a case study of Chinese war-lord politics. Twice I was left in charge for brief periods.

"In October 1935 the first appointments to the career service were made and I was commissioned Foreign Service officer, unclassified (C). Having already indicated a willingness to volunteer for the specialized China branch of the Service, I was transferred directly to the Embassy at Peiping as a language attaché. I arrived in Peiping with my family in December 1935 and for the next 2 years my duties were to study the language, history, geography, economics, and laws of China. My childhood knowledge of Chinese gave me something of a head start but it had been a poor dialect and I had never learned to read Chinese. I worked hard and I believe made a good record as a student, not only of the language but also of the background subjects.

"China has always had a deep interest for me. To a technician in the field of foreign relations—which is one of the basic functions of a Foreign Service officer—it presents uniquely complex and difficult problems. For this Board, there is of course no need to have these problems spelled out in detail. But a few words may be permitted since in a very real way it was my inevitable involvement, as a reporting officer on the spot, in trying to find solutions to these problems—solutions which would best serve the long-range interests of the United States and be within American capabilities and willingness to act—which has led to my present difficulties.

"China is the world's greatest mass of humanity. Weak, burdened with probably insoluble economic problems, loosely organized, backward in every modern sense, it has been undergoing a tremendous upheaval and revolution in every phase of its life. In scope, breadth, rapidity, and in the mass of people involved this is one of the great changes of history. After a chaotic period of war-lord division, two modern parties (one Marxist and having a history of strong Russian influence in its early period) had emerged. They had worked together briefly, then split and fought each other bitterly but inconclusively for 10 years of civil war. Although Japanese aggression forced their temporary union in a united front in 1937 the contest for leadership of this underlying revolution and for the mastery of China was never abandoned; at best it was but partially submerged.

"American policy toward China had a long background of missionary activity, cultural interest, and trade. The factors of idealism, commerce, and strategic interest had led to our traditional concern for maintaining China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, to the open door doctrine and, by our retention of the Philippines, to actual involvement in the power contest in the Far East. As we have realized since the day of Theodore Roosevelt, our enforcement of these policies was hampered by our national repugnance for war or forceful methods. Realistically, therefore, there was a desirable aspect to a balance of power in the Far East between Russia and Japan. This balance was upset by Japanese aggression commencing in 1931 against Manchuria and setting off the chain of events which led up to Pearl Harbor. With the certainty of Japan's eventual defeat and its elimination as a power factor in the Far East, it was obvious that Russia would be left as the dominant power in Asia and the necessity of a strong, united, and independent China became, far more than ever before, an imperative of American policy.

"One could not be in Peiping in 1936 and 1937 without a developing awareness of these problems. I read very extensively and as my interests were scholarly rather than social I found most of my friends among the large groups of newspaper correspondents, professors, students, and researchers who were either residing in or continually passing through Peiping. By this time we were in the midst of the events leading up to the Sino-Japanese War and Peiping was close enough to be an excellent observation post. Just after my arrival in December 1935, I saw the student riots which in one sense marked the beginning of Chinese active resistance. In December 1936 the kidnaping of the generalissimo at Sian was to result in the united front which in turn provoked the final Japanese assault. The shooting phase of the war commenced only a few miles outside of the city of Peiping and I visited some of the battlefields with the newspapermen. It was during this period that I became acquainted, on the basis of mutual interest in the reporting and analysis of events, with such persons as Owen Lattimore (then with the IPR), F. McCracken Fisher (then with UP), Haldore Hansen (AP), Frank Oliver (Reuters), Arch Steele (New York Herald Tribune), Edgar Snow (Saturday Evening Post), and Frank Smothers (Chicago Daily News). At this time I also became acquainted with Colonel Stilwell who was military attaché at the Embassy, Maj. David D. Barrett and Capt. Frank Dorn, his assistants. During this period I briefly met T. A. Bisson, who was traveling on a Guggenheim fellowship and collecting material for his book Japan in China.

"In December 1937 I completed my language study assignment and was transferred to the consulate general at Shanghai where I arrived in January 1938. The consul general was C. E. Gauss, later to be our Ambassador to China, and the executive officer was Richard P. Butrick, at present Director General of the Foreign Service. Shanghai, with the exception of a part of the foreign settlements, was under Japanese occupation and hostilities were still proceeding in the lower Yangtze area. After a brief trial my superiors apparently concluded that I was able to serve as emergency and relief officer and for the next 3 years I was rotated through the consulate general. Whenever an officer went on leave I took over his job; when one particular section became swamped, I was put in to help. I served in every section of the consulate general at least twice and occupied every position except that of consul general for at least a brief period.

"On my own time and under considerable difficulties I prepared myself for the optional third-year examination in Chinese and the related background subjects which is taken by very few officers. A large number of my friends and associates continued to be newspapermen, writers, and research students. Acquaintances which I made at this time included such men as Robert Barnett, then with the IPR, William Johnstone, Hallett Abend, and Tillman Durdin (New York Times), J. B. Powell of the China Weekly Review, Randall Gould of the Shanghai Evening Post, Larry Lehrbas of the Associated Press, Robert Bellaire of the United Press, and many others.

"During this period I read most of the books published regarding China and subscribed to most of the magazines dealing with China. These latter included Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs, published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and Amerasia which had just been established by a group of men, several of whom I had known.

"In May 1938 my family, which had been evacuated from north China the previous August, returned to Shanghai. We had a great many friends because of my background, particularly in the American missionary community but also in American business circles and among Chinese. I became active in American community church affairs, joined the Junior Chamber of Commerce, was president of a luncheon club at the foreign YMCA, was a member of the two American clubs and resumed track athletics which I had kept up intermittently since college. In 1940, I followed my father who had been an active Mason and took my degrees in a lodge under the Philippine Constitution which had an almost wholly Chinese membership. In November 1940, events in the Far East seemed to be moving to an inevitable show-down and our families were evacuated to the United States. I was not to be reunited with mine on a permanent basis for almost 6 years.

"During this period the situation in China was hopeful. China was much more unified than ever before and was amazing herself and her friends with her success in fighting off or at least delaying the Japanese. My own views, privately expressed to my colleagues and friends, were in support of stronger aid to China and in opposition to the sale of ore and scrap iron to the Japanese.

In relation to Europe, my views were also strongly interventionist. I was outspokenly critical of the German-Soviet pact and entirely sympathetic with the Finns. I was critical of the Neutrality Act, strongly supported lend-lease and the destroyer deal and privately favored the fullest possible support and, in fact, outright military participation on the side of the Allies in Europe.

"In the spring of 1941 I volunteered for duty in the Embassy at Chungking about May 3, 1941, as third secretary. The Ambassador at this time was Nelson T. Johnson, under whom I had served at Peiping. Shortly afterward, however, he was transferred to Australia and his place in Chungking was taken by Mr. Gauss. The counselor of the Embassy who arrived at about the same time was John Carter Vincent, later to be Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, and, presently, Minister to Switzerland.

"When I arrived in Chungking the Embassy was seriously understaffed. The work of the office was being constantly interrupted by almost daily Japanese air raids and the limited staff available had to spread itself thin to keep abreast of the more urgently pressing work. My first assignment was in the consular and general affairs section. Later after more staff arrived I moved into the press and translation section. Next I served a period as chief of chancery, or administrative officer. During all this period, however, I was acquiring background and developing contacts and moving more into the reporting field. There were few China-trained officers on the staff and I believe that it was the Ambassador's desire that I concentrate on political work. Toward the end of 1941 I moved into a small house shared by the Ambassador and counselor and from that time on functioned as a sort of general assistant, handy man, and drafting officer. One fairly frequent assignment was to accompany the Ambassador when calling on the Minister of Foreign Affairs or other high officials and to prepare the memoranda of conversation. This type of work and the dispatches and telegrams which I prepared for the Ambassador's signature were of course subject to his closest scrutiny and I believe I convinced my superiors of my accuracy and objectivity.

"My boyhood at Szechwan (in addition to spending my first 10 years in Chengtu, my parents had lived in Chungking from 1922 to 1924) gave me immediately a great number of Chinese and missionary contacts. I could speak the local dialect and I was able to move about more easily than most officers. Accordingly, I was used to make a number of trips for the Embassy. In April 1942 I was invited through Chinese official contacts to make a trip through central Szechwan. When the first lend-lease representative arrived in Chungking I was assigned by the Ambassador to assist him and accompany him on tours of Chinese arsenals and industrial plants.

"The Embassy was a focal point through which passed all American visitors, officials, and missionaries. Most of these people I met in the normal course of events and from many of them, particularly the missionaries going to or coming from various places in China, I was able to pick up information on conditions. Also, many men whom I had previously known were among the correspondents in Chungking and I soon became thoroughly acquainted with the others. It was the policy of the Ambassador to treat responsible correspondents with a good deal of frankness. Also, because of their constant traveling and their broad contacts, we were often able to obtain from them corroboration or amplification of information which we received from our own sources. One factor of course which always had to be considered was that they were subject to the rigid Chinese political censorship, which was anxious to keep reports from reaching the American public which would be contrary to the exaggerated picture being painted of China by Chinese propagandists. This policy of giving background information was perhaps even more important in the case of visiting correspondents who could remain only a short while and who lacked the detailed background of permanent correspondents. Very often these visitors had great difficulty in visiting places or seeing people except as the Chinese Ministry of Information was willing. Some of these visiting correspondents whom I remember were Mr. and Mrs. Henry Luce, Ray Clapper, and Vincent Sheean. All of these people visited the Embassy and in most cases the Ambassador himself or some of us on his staff gave them a thorough fill-in.

"There was, as I look back on it, a gradual change in the character of our work and in the tenor of our reporting from Chungking during this period of 1941-42. We could see from month to month, even from our limited observation point of Chungking, a deterioration within China. The united front between the Kuomintang and the Communists which, although an unnatural arrangement, had been

effective in 1937-38 had gradually fallen apart until a definite break came with the new fourth army incident of January 1941. This split was accompanied in Kuomintang territory by an increasing concern with internal affairs and the need for checking the growing Communist power. The closing of the Burma Road and the isolation of China were important factors but not the whole explanation of Chinese inability to take effective measures against inflation, speculation, and official corruption. The disastrous defeat of the Central Government armies in the Chungtiaoshan area of north China in the summer of 1941 was a mark of the decline in quality and fighting spirit of the Central Government conscript armies.

"After Pearl Harbor China was our ally and her effectiveness in the war became increasingly our concern. The Central Government, at first jubilant over our entry and then despondent over the early Allied reverses, seized the opportunity for heavy demands in the way of financial and military aid. Ambassador Gauss expressed the view at this time that we should keep enough strings on the \$500,000,000 loan to be able to advise on its use.

"Stilwell arrived in the theater in March 1942 and came to share the same attitude: that the mere random giving of generous aid would not solve China's problems and that we should try to make sure that the aid was effectively used. On all sides, political, military, and economic, there was a constant effort to urge reforms which would strengthen the position of the Central Government and increase the potential of China's war effort.

"One of the important questions which any political reporter had to be concerned with was, of course, the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist parties. The two parties had not actually broken off relations and were theoretically cooperating in the war. The Communists therefore were allowed to maintain official representatives in Chungking. These people had access to the press and to foreigners, and I met them soon after my arrival in the normal course of events. The head of this Communist delegation at the time was Chou En-lai. He was later replaced by Tung Pi-wu. This is the gentleman about whom Mr. Earl Browder was recently questioned before the Senate subcommittee. You may recall that Mr. Browder was asked whether he attended a meeting with Tung Pi-wu and Philip Jaffe in the spring of 1945. Mr. Browder admitted meeting with Tung but declined to state who else was at the meeting and also declined to state whether I was present. I shall have more to say about my acquaintance with Mr. Tung later, but I may state here that I did not attend any meeting with Tung, Mr. Browder, and Mr. Jaffe in New York in 1945. There was not a great deal of activity at this period, however, on the question of relations between the two parties. My reporting on the subject was only a very minor part of my work. However, since I had been charged with associating with Communists, I assure the Board that I have indeed associated with Communists and that I have associated with as many and as prominent Chinese Communists as I could discover. That, as I shall point out a little bit later, was a part of my job even in 1941 and, as I shall indicate later, it eventually became my full-time job. Up to this time, however, I had never to my knowledge met a Communist of any sort, Chinese or foreign.

"My community activities in Chungking included membership in the predominantly Chinese Chungking Rotary Club and participation as a charter member in the establishment of a Masonic Lodge in which the great majority of members were Chinese in official positions. There was little conventional social life in Chungking but bridge was a popular relaxation. I was on friendly bridge-partner basis with T. F. Tsiang (now the Chinese representative to the UN), Quo T'ai-ch'i (then Minister of Foreign Affairs), C. T. Wang (formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to Washington), and a large number of others in positions of influence and knowledge. I do not mention these associations with any boastful intent. Nor do I claim that I was an intimate of all these men—although our relations were cordial and informal and they were often frank in discussing Chinese affairs and personalities. But I do think it important to point out that my contacts—who inevitably contributed to by knowledge and views—were not one-sidedly concentrated among Communists or other opponents of the Central Government but on the contrary were unusually broad and close, whether with missionaries, businessmen, newspapermen, or Chinese officials. I believe that my associates will agree that just as I eventually came to have the opportunity of being the most widely traveled officer stationed in China, I also came to know more Chinese more intimately than probably any other.

"In the summer of 1942 I was invited by the Minister of Economics to attend a meeting of the Chinese Engineering Society at Lanchow in the far northwestern province of Kansu and to accompany a party of engineers, officers of the National

Resources Commission, and Chinese newspapermen to visit the newly discovered oil field near the border of Sinkiang. These oil fields had not been visited by any non-Chinese since they had commenced operation. In addition, the trip would allow me to travel through an extensive area which had not been visited by American officers for a number of years. This included the so-called blockade zone around the Communist district in Shensi and Kansu Provinces. The trip finally extended into 4 months and covered five Provinces. For most of the time I was the only foreigner with a large official party of Chinese and had unusual opportunities for meeting Chinese and for obtaining information. In the latter part of the trip—I returned from Kansu alone—I visited a great number of missionaries and was able to obtain extremely detailed accounts of conditions in their areas.

"This trip made a deep impression on me. More clearly than in Chungking, I was able to see the effects of inflation, official corruption, speculation, thought control of students and professors, the workings of the secret police, the operation of a vicious conscription system, and the disastrously heavy military impositions which in some areas were forcing farmers to abandon land. I traveled through the Honan famine area where the people were starving while the troops, merchants, and officials prospered. I saw the active trade across the Japanese lines with luxury goods coming from the Japanese areas and strategic materials going in the opposite direction. I passed through the blockade zone around the Communist area, saw the lines of blockhouses and the idle concentrations of Central Government troops. I talked to missionaries living in the blockade area and to Chinese who had been across the lines into the Communist districts and learned that conditions were enough better to attract a movement of refugees who crossed the blockade lines at the risk of their lives.

"None of the Chinese I traveled with were Communists. Most were Government servants of some category. Nor, by any stretch of the imagination, were the numerous missionaries. But from every source I received the same general picture of the decline of the Kuomintang and the eventual conflict between the parties in which many seemed to feel that the Communists were the more dynamic and more preferable of the two.

"I returned to Chungking in late November, wrote the most important reports on the oil fields and the Honan famine and returned to the United States on leave. After a month in California I arrived in Washington in January 1943 for a short period of consultation. Here I was the first man from the Embassy staff at Chungking to have returned since before Pearl Harbor. I had had unequalled opportunities for travel and observation. I was asked to confer with and be interrogated by the numerous Government agencies concerned with China. Several newspaper people were sent to me by the Press Section for background information and the director of the office approved a request from the IPR for me to talk to one of their research staff. In the course of my consultations I met Dr. Lauchlin Currie, then an executive assistant to the President, specializing on far eastern affairs.

"Several officers noted my pessimistic view of the situation in China and its possible implications for us in the event of civil war. It was suggested that I summarize these in memorandum form. I did so and would like to put in the record at this time a copy of my memorandum of January 23, 1943 (document 103). In this I pointed out the dangers of the trend in China; the facts that a civil war would seriously interfere with the war against Japan, might well result in a Communist victory and would be likely either to involve us with the Soviet Union or force the Communists into their hands. I proposed, therefore, that it was urgent for us to find out by direct observation something about the Chinese Communists, who had been blockaded since 1939. With our present knowledge of subsequent events, it may be hard to realize that when this memorandum was written in January 1943 it was, as far as I know, the first suggestion that internal factors in China would probably lead to a civil war and Communist victory in China, and the first calling of attention to the problem the United States would have to face being accused of giving military aid to one side against the other. My views of the importance of getting reliable intelligence concerning the Chinese Communists was, however, accepted.

"This memorandum, I have subsequently felt, was a sort of milestone. As possibly the first to point the issues, I came to be regarded (erroneously because of my very subordinate position) as a leader, or at least forerunner, of an attitude on policy which has wrongly been interpreted as pro-Communist. Having pressed the need for direct and comprehensive knowledge concerning the Chinese

Communists, it was perhaps inevitable that I should be given an increasing amount of this work until it finally became a full-time assignment.

"At the conclusion of my leave I returned to Chungking in early May 1943 and was sent again to Lanchow, where the Embassy by now was regularly stationing an officer as observer. One reason for maintaining this post was that it was a strategic point for information concerning the Communists. The Embassy also agreed that if opportunity presented I might make an attempt to enter the Communist area, although any such venture would probably have to be disavowed by the Embassy and made on my own responsibility.

"In Lanchow I did a good deal of general political reporting on numerous aspects of the situation in the northwest, for which I was commended by both the Embassy and the Department.

"On August 10, 1943, I was recalled from Lanchow and assigned by the Department's orders to General Stilwell. The Department's instructions made it clear that I was to be completely under General Stilwell's orders for duties, movements, or station. This point is of some importance. My complete subordination to the Army was never questioned by the Department of State or by Ambassador Gauss. It was not, however, understood by General Hurley who has accused me, I understand, of disloyalty to him.

"Several other officers were assigned to Stilwell at the same time, and one officer, John Davies, had been with him since he first assumed duty as commanding general of the theater in early 1942. We functioned in a loose way under Mr. Davies and were assigned to duties and in places for which we seemed best experienced. I was assigned to Chungking where I worked as a consultant to G-2 and otherwise as the chief of staff instructed. My duties were multifarious and never very clearly defined. When necessary, I acted as a liaison between the headquarters and the Embassy. I advised OSS and many of the other agencies coming into the theater concerning projects which they were considering. I helped G-2 in appraising Chinese intelligence. I furnished oral and written background information to the headquarters on Chinese political situations and personalities. I was a headquarters member on a psychological warfare policy committee.

"One definite duty which I was given was to act as liaison between the headquarters and the Chinese Communist official office in Chungking which was by that time headed by Tung Pi-wu. The Army's primary interest at this period was in intelligence regarding Japanese forces of north China. The Communists were permitted to operate a radio station in Chungking for communication with their own headquarters in Yenan. G-2 would give me its questions. I would take these over to the Communist office and a few days later pick up the reply.

"Another general assignment was as a sort of public relations officer for Stilwell. His staff could, of course, handle the military aspects about which I was not in any case intimately informed. But some of Stilwell's greatest problems arose out of the political background in the theater. Understanding of these was essential to intelligent press reporting. In many ways this was the most complicated of all theaters and Stilwell's great problem of gaining Chinese cooperation could not be divorced from the Chinese political background. We therefore had Stilwell's directive to work closely with the press and to give them background information regarding the situation in China, particularly as it affected the war.

"These various duties still left me with a great deal of time. My own primary interest was political reporting. My position and my background in Chungking gave me unusually broad and numerous contacts, foreign and Chinese and in every walk of life. Association with the foreign correspondents was often a productive relationship, as they sometimes had access to people whom I could not reach and because they were continually traveling. I continued to expand an extensive circle of Chinese contacts, largely among newspapermen but also with members of such groups as the liberal wing of the Kuomintang, the minor parties making up the Democratic League, and various military figures or their representatives.

"Living in Army billets hampered this Chinese contact work and I moved into an apartment in the city with Solomon Adler, the United States Treasury representative. Except for perhaps an hour or two at the headquarters in the morning, I spent practically all of my time outside of the office and generally had both lunch and supper in Chinese restaurants with Chinese friends.

"With this background I found myself doing a great deal of voluntary political reporting of information which I picked up. This reporting was done by informal

memoranda. With General Stilwell's approval I gave copies of these memoranda to the headquarters and Embassy in Chungking and sent a copy to Davies, who had his office in New Delhi. A fourth copy I kept for my own personal files. I placed on these memoranda my own informal classification. This was based on a number of factors, such as the need for protecting my sources, the desirability of allowing attribution, and the question of whether circulation among our various allies, including the Chinese, and numerous American Government agencies was wise. Often, of course, the information contained should be considered confidential only for a short time; if it related to future events the need for confidence would be removed as soon as the event took place or became generally known. In some cases, the need for classification would be removed after correspondents or other public sources learned of the same information. Also, an important factor was that a great deal of the information contained in the memoranda was inevitably critical of persons or situations in China.

"Probably only a minority of these memoranda were directly useful to the headquarters. Most of them were on political rather than military subjects. They might be used, if at all, only as background information. If the headquarters desired to make further distribution it would transmit my memoranda through such an agency as JICA (Joint Intelligence Collection Agency) which would attach a covering sheet giving a summary, evaluation, and its own classification. I rarely knew anything about this disposition or the evaluation or classification determined by the Army. Actually I am sure the great bulk of my memoranda never were forwarded by the Chungking headquarters.

"Probably a much greater proportion of my memoranda were of direct interest to the Embassy. I was much less restricted in my movements than most of the Embassy officers and had only a light burden of routine duties. The Embassy reporting officers used these memoranda as working materials. If the subject matter was new or was thought sufficiently worth while, they would write a dispatch for the Ambassador's signature transmitting my memorandum as an enclosure. The dispatch would summarize and comment on the material in my memorandum, sometimes agreeing or disagreeing or adding material which the Embassy might have from other sources. Usually I never knew what use the Embassy had made of any particular memorandum, whether it had been transmitted by dispatch in to the Department, whether the Embassy agreed or differed, or what classification it had assigned. At this time, of course, I was detached from the Embassy, had only casual contact with it, principally in a liaison capacity, and I did not have access to the Embassy files.

"A large part of my political reporting during all this period was in the field of Kuomintang-Communist relations. I also kept in close touch with the minor parties who were attempting to take a more active role in the Chinese situation. The Embassy simultaneously was doing some reporting on the same subject but I think it fair to say that my contacts were becoming so well established that I supplied a large part of the Embassy's material.

"As general handy man and consultant for headquarters I was sent on a number of trips. In the fall of 1943 I made a trip to India, stopping in Kunming and visiting the Burma front, where the Ledo was being pushed southward. For 2 months in the winter of 1943-44 I accompanied an American engineer officer on an extensive trip through the southwestern provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow, and Kwangsi. His purpose was to make a thorough reconnaissance of all highways in that area. Mine was to interpret for him, act as guide and assistant, and observe political and economic conditions. Early in 1944 there were serious problems in Chengtu connected with the construction of B-29 bases involving a labor force of over 300,000 and the influx of a large body of American Air Force personnel. I was sent to Chengtu, and made a number of recommendations, some of which were adopted. Another trip I made was to Sian.

"In March 1944 the Chinese Government asked the headquarters to send American officers to Sinkiang to investigate an incident which had taken place between Chinese troops and Kazaks in a remote area where the border between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia was in dispute. The preliminary information furnished by the Chinese was highly misleading. Asked by the chief of staff for advice and all the information I could obtain, I made a number of reports and in the final one of these, dated April 7, 1944, I summarized in the most complete form up to that date my views as to the policy we should follow in China toward the Kuomintang, the Communists, and Russia. A part of this statement has already appeared in annex 47 of the white paper, but I believe that the complete text of that part of my memorandum which refers to policy

may be of interest and I would like to have it included in the record at this point. In this memorandum I suggested that the Kuomintang policies gave every indication of proving suicidal and that our overclose involvement with the Kuomintang would probably throw the Communists toward the Soviet Union and contribute to the Russian domination of Asia which we wished, to present. (Here present for record pages 7, 8, and 9 of enclosure to document 142 as marked.) My recommendation to headquarters that we not become involved in the incident by sending investigators was accepted. This was one of the few occasions on which my advice was actually sought and followed. I say this because there has been a great deal of misunderstanding of my duties in headquarters and the usual term "political adviser" was, by and large, a misnomer. The Embassy forwarded this memorandum to the Department and, although the Department did not comment specifically on my policy recommendations, it gave it a special commendation with a rating of excellent. (A copy of this commendatory instruction No. 698, June 21, 1944, is submitted for the record.)

"By the spring of 1944 military considerations were making it imperative that we get fuller information from north China and have ready a groundwork for possible military operations in the area. This meant, as a first step, the establishment of direct liaison by our own observers in the Communist area. The Fourteenth Air Force was already extending its strikes into north China. The bases for B29's were built at Chengtu. These planes would have to cross hundreds of miles of Communist guerrilla territory. For these air operations, we needed intelligence on Japanese air strength and defenses in the area, prompt and comprehensive weather information, and arrangements for the rescue of air crews. The theater was planning on the basis of an eventual landing by American forces on the China coast. In such event there would have to be effective action by all Chinese armies to assist the landing. And we would have to cooperate with whatever Chinese forces we found on the spot, whether Central Government or Communist. Finally, we needed the completest information on Japanese strength, movements, and defenses. The areas of the greatest Japanese concentrations and the area of greatest strategic value to us was north China, where the Communist guerrillas controlled the countryside and concerning which Kuomintang intelligence, by our experience, was insufficient and unreliable.

"Several attempts by headquarters to obtain permission to send observers into the Communist areas had already met with flat refusals, even though these requests were based solely on the need for intelligence. There had not been up to this time any proposal or request to supply arms to the Chinese Communists. The Central Government insisted on its rigid blockade. A preliminary opening wedge was forced by the association of foreign correspondents who argued for months: 'Why, if the Communists, who have been blockaded from the outside world completely for the past 5 years, are as weak and as bad as the Central Government says, can't we be allowed to visit them?' About May 1944 the issue became so embarrassing to the Central Government that permission was granted for correspondents to visit the Communist area. The government, however, remained adamant to the Army's request. The visit of Vice President Wallace in June 1944 gave an opportunity for high-level pressure and on President Roosevelt's instructions Mr. Wallace secured Chiang Kai-shek's agreement. The fact that because of my familiarity with the background I was present, by order, at this interview has always, I am sure, been one of the factors in apparently convincing the Chinese that I was the primary instigator. The interview is described on pages 556-557 of the white paper.

"In June 1944 I prepared a detailed summary of the situation in China with suggestions regarding policy. This was my most extensive analysis of the weaknesses of the Kuomintang. I recommended a realistic policy and conditional aid with active efforts to promote the liberal groups in China in an endeavor to bring about reform of the Kuomintang. In this again I pointed out that continuation of the current trend of the Kuomintang would hamper the effective prosecution of the war and that the only parties to benefit would be Japan immediately and Russia eventually. I believe that the inclusion of this memorandum in the record (document 157) will be of value in indicating the development of my thinking during this period. In this connection it should be remembered that in April the Japanese had commenced an important campaign southward from the Yellow River which, during May, resulted in their completing their control of the important Peking-Hankow Railway, and that toward the end of May they had commenced a campaign southward from the Yangtze River which on June 18 had captured Changsha and gave every indication that they

would be able to continue southward capturing our advanced air bases and sealing off all of eastern China. This situation was in reality dark.

"On July 7 the headquarters received a telegram from President Roosevelt to be delivered personally to Chiang Kai-shek. This was the first of a series of messages recommending that, in view of the desperate military situation in China, Stilwell be placed in command of all Chinese armies. I have no knowledge of the background or origin of this recommendation. Stilwell himself was in Burma and the chief of staff seemed to be surprised. The message was considered to be of such importance that the chief of staff determined that there should be no Chinese interpreter and that we should not follow the normal procedure of allowing the message to go through an intermediary. I was therefore ordered to accompany the chief of staff and to translate the telegram phrase by phrase to the generalissimo himself. This was, in effect, a proposal that the Chinese Communists be armed, since it was taken for granted that if General Stilwell was to command all Chinese armies this would include the Communists and that they would therefore be eligible to receive a share of American equipment. This was, so far as I know, the first such recommendation. On July 15 there was a second telegram from the President which I again was required to interpret for the chief of staff. I have been sure since then my presence on these unpleasant occasions helped to contribute to Chinese animosity toward me and to their conviction that I was again the instigator of a very unwelcome demand.

"As the white paper (pp. 66-67) reveals, Chiang Kai-shek agreed in principle to the appointment of Stilwell as commander but requested that the President send a high level representative to discuss the military and political problems involved. This was the origin of the Hurley appointment and I believe it is clear from the background that Hurley's principal mission was to persuade the generalissimo to accept Stilwell as commander of all Chinese armies as a means of unifying the Chinese war effort and of furnishing equipment to the Communists to make them a more effective force in fighting the Japanese.

"Following the receipt of Chiang's approval of the mission to Yen-an, I was active under Colonel Dickey, chief of G-2, in planning the organization of the observer group. This was made a joint enterprise with representation from all of the agencies in the theater which had particular interests in obtaining information from North China. These included the Twentieth Bomber Command (B-29s), Weather, Air-Ground Aid Service (rescue of air crews) G-2, OSS, and other intelligence units. The headquarters inquired from the Embassy whether it would be interested in having a State Department man included for the purpose of political intelligence. Ambassador Gauss was in favor of such participation and recommended, after consultation with the State Department, that I be included in this capacity. It was on this basis that I accompanied the first group to go into Yen-an by air on July 22, 1944. The commander of the observer section was Col. David D. Barrett. Our orders were that apart from the collection of all types of intelligence we were to be strictly observers. While we were to investigate and report on the possible desirability and the types of arms which the Communists forces might need, we were not to negotiate, offer any aid or supplies or make any commitments of any kind. Colonel Barrett and I made this clear to the Communist leaders during our initial interviews and there was never any doubt of this status while I was at Yen-an.

"Immediately after arrival I commenced a thorough attempt to become acquainted with and to interview all of the principal Communist leaders and to report in a systematic way on the political organization, policies, program, propaganda, extent of popular support, etc., of the Chinese Communist Party.

"The Communists received us cordially and cooperated thoroughly on our various projects such as setting up weather reporting, interrogating Japanese prisoners, and collecting Japanese order of battle and other intelligence. They gave us extensive facilities for travel and permitted us great freedom of movement and observation. All in all, we were favorably impressed. I remained in Yen-an for 3 months and during this period of course associated outside of our own group entirely with Communists. In fact, I had numerous long and detailed interviews with almost every one of the ranking Communist leaders from Mao Tse-tung on down. These interviews and my observations at Yen-an were thoroughly reported in memoranda which I prepared and which were forwarded to G-2 in Chungking where copies were furnished to the Embassy which, in turn, transmitted most by despatch to the Department.

"By late August we felt that we had verified our first favorable impressions sufficiently to make a recommendation that it would be worth while to give small quantities of equipment useful in guerrilla operations to the Communists as an

anti-Japanese fighting force. Such a recommendation was contained in my memorandum of August 29 (Document 177). Aside from the military considerations, I expressed the belief that impartial aid would be a constructive force in stimulation of reform and in prevention of civil war. An important background was, of course, the deteriorating military situation in South China where the Japanese had captured Hengyang and were moving into Kwangsi Province.

"By early October we had accumulated a great deal of information on Communist strength by direct observation, by field trips of American officers and correspondents, and by interrogation of American air crews and other foreigners who had traveled for long distances through the Communist guerrilla areas. This information was so overwhelmingly conclusive that on October 9 I wrote:

"From the basic fact that the Communists have built up popular support of a magnitude and depth which makes their elimination impossible, we must draw the conclusion that the Communists will have a certain and important share in China's future. I suggest the further conclusion that unless the Kuomintang goes as far as the Communists in political and economic reform, and otherwise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of which it yet shows signs of being willing or able to do), the Communists will be the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years."

"I would like to have this document (No. 192, enclosure No. 3) made a part of the record.

"General Hurley had arrived in Chungking on September 6 as the President's special representative. Although public statements had indicated that he was to try to bring about some agreement between the two parties and a unification of the two armies, we learned in Yenan in early October that the only immediate subject of negotiation was a demand by Chiang that Stilwell be recalled and that Hurley was swinging to support of Chiang in the hope, apparently promoted by T. V. Soong, that Chiang would cooperate on the other issues if Stilwell were removed.

"Against this background and my conviction that the Communists were now too strong to be dictated to, I wrote my memorandum no. 40 of October 10, to which General Hurley later took such violent exception. He has called it variously "a plan to let fall the government he was sent to support" and "a plan to bring about the collapse of the Central Government." I believe that a fair reading of this memorandum will convince anyone that it was not meant to be, and in fact was not, an argument for the abandonment or, as Senator McCarthy has called it, for the 'torpedoing' of Chiang and the Central Government. Rather it was an attempt to refute the argument so commonly advanced that we were dependent on Chiang and that if he were to fall Chinese resistance to Japan would collapse. I did not advocate the abandonment of Chiang but rather a more realistic policy toward him. It is interesting to note that the gist of my argument had already, without my knowledge, been said by General Stilwell in his reports to General Marshall in September and October (see white paper, pp. 68-69). In essence I was advancing the argument which we stated more clearly in February 1945 that the end and primary objective of our policy was not the support of Chiang but the revitalization of the Chinese war effort and the attempt to bring about a relationship between the parties which might remove the threat of civil war and unify the country.

"General Stilwell was recalled on October 19 and just before his departure ordered my return to the United States. I left Yenan on October 23 and spent one night in Chungking. I informed General Hurley of my presence and placed myself at his disposal if he wished to talk to me concerning the current Communist attitude. He asked me to dinner and kept me through the evening. My chief concern was to tell him of the confidence and strength of the Communist attitude and he repeatedly told me that he was in China to see that they were brought into the war effort and did receive some arms. His whole attitude was to minimize the difficulties in bringing the two parties together.

"I proceeded immediately to the United States and arrived in Washington on October 29, 1944. Here I was the first man to return after having visited Yenan and observed the Chinese Communists. I was sought after by the various Government agencies whose work related to China, by newspaper people, and by the general category of "Far Eastern experts." Agencies such as OSS or MIS called me for several sessions at which their experts or research people could interrogate me. An example of a report of such an interview is Document 201. Following these interviews individual members of these agencies would sometimes follow up their own particular line of inquiry by seeing me in the Department of State.

"Several newspaper and magazine writers were sent to me by the Press Division of the Department. I remember particularly a reporter for a women's magazine and from Pathfinder. Henry Luce, who had received a letter from his bureau chief in China, asked me to come up to New York to talk to him and I did so after consultation with my superior. While in New York I talked to Lawrence Salisbury, who had formerly been a close friend in the Foreign Service and was at that time with the IPR editing Far Eastern Survey. I was called separately to talk to Dr. Currie, Harry Hopkins, and Henry White of the Treasury. None of these men appeared to differ with my general views, although Harry Hopkins was pessimistic and discouraged over the situation and seemed to feel that there was probably little that could be done. Nevertheless the White House continued to press for unification of the Communist and Kuomintang armies.

"My first talk to the IPR was given during this period. The institute asked that I give an off-the-record talk at its Washington office. This invitation came through and was accepted by John Carter Vincent, then head of the Division of China Affairs. The meeting was quite a crowded one and included a number of people from other Government agencies and from outside the Government, and several newspapermen and writers. I remember Selden Menefee and a New York Times man. The chairman of the meeting, I believe, was William C. Johnstone. It was at the conclusion of this meeting that I first met Lt. Andrew Roth, who, along with a number of others, came up and introduced himself to me. There was no time for more than an introduction and I did not see Andrew Roth again till my next return to the United States in April 1945.

"It may be pertinent to point out that I had no regular duties assigned to me in the Department. I did not attend policy meetings nor prepare any policy memoranda or papers. I was spending full time being available to officials and others who had a responsible interest in China and wanted recent background, particularly on the Communists. My superiors knew that I was expressing my own personal views freely and they apparently considered that I had sufficient judgment and discretion.

"An interesting sidelight on classification concerns a map of the Communist areas which the Communist Chief of Staff gave me just before I left Yenan. I specifically asked him whether he wished any classification to be put on it. He said certainly not: 'The Japanese know where we are.' Furthermore, I found out that similar maps were being given to the newspaper correspondents and to American visitors to Yenan. I carried this map around with me when I was being interviewed by the various agencies and showed it freely to anyone interested. The OSS and Army both wanted copies. I therefore loaned it to MIS for reproduction. Later I found out that they had classified it—either as confidential or secret. I expressed some surprise but the Army insisted on retaining its classification. Exactly the same map was given to Harrison Foreman, one of the correspondents at Yenan, and appears as a full page illustration in his book.

"When I had returned to Washington it was expected that my assignment with the Army, which had been at Stilwell's personal request, would be terminated. The Department was considering an assignment to the Embassy at Moscow. I completed my consultation and left Washington about November 19 for leave at my home in California. John Davies in the meanwhile had remained in Chungking with General Wedemeyer, the new theater commander. During the last few days of December, while I was on leave in California, the Department asked whether I would be willing to go back to China and instructed me to report at once to Washington. There I found that John Davies had had a clash with Huxley which required his immediate transfer out of China and that Wedemeyer desired my assignment as a replacement. The Department, I learned, had made its release of me to Wedemeyer contingent on Wedemeyer's agreeing that one of my principal duties would be reporting on the Chinese Communists and that for this purpose I would spend a major part of my time in Yenan.

"I believe that the facts concerning my return to China in January 1945 are pertinent and deserve emphasis. By the time that General Wedemeyer asked for me and the Department agreed to send me back with the condition that one of my principal functions would be reporting on the Communists, the voluminous reports prepared during my assignment to Stilwell and during my first stay at Yenan from July to October 1944 had received wide dissemination and had been available to all the concerned parties. On these reports I had received numerous commendations. My views on the situation in China and my general attitude on

policy were well known, through my reports and through personal interviews, to: the White House (Harry Hopkins and Lauchlin Currie); the Department of State (Mr. Grew, Under Secretary; J. W. Ballantine and E. F. Stanton, Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs); the Army (Headquarters in Chungking, General Bissel—then Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in Washington, and responsible officers working on the Far East in OPD); and to other officials such as General Donovan of OSS. Some of my memoranda, specifically such as No. 40 of October 10, had caused discussion and had not been wholly concurred in by some of the recipients such as the Embassy in Chungking and the Department. I had not at any time, however, been told that my views were considered improper or contrary to American policy or that I should modify them or restrain my expression of them. I did not flatter myself that General Wedemeyer's request and the Department's action in approving my return for the primary purpose of observation and reporting on the Communists necessarily meant acceptance of my views. But at least they seemed to be an indication of confidence in my value as a reporting officer.

"Just before I left the Department I was called in by the Chief of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel, Nathaniel P. Davis. He noted that I had been separated from my family for over 4 years and said that the Department was hesitant about asking me to return to China. I told Mr. Davis that with the war still proceeding I was willing and happy to return since General Wedemeyer had indicated that I could be of service to him. However, I called attention to the difficulties of the Embassy staff and John Davies in their relations with General Hurley. Mr. Davis said that he was familiar with the situation in Chungking. He emphasized that I would be working for the Army and not for General Hurley, and that I would have the Department's understanding support.

"I arrived back in Chungking on January 18, 1945. General Wedemeyer wished to make me more definitely a part of the Headquarters organization than had been the case under General Stilwell. I commenced work on much the same lines as under Stilwell, doing voluntary political reporting and acting as consultant for G-2 and other intelligence agencies. I also was used by Wedemeyer as a drafting officer for communications dealing with policy matters having political significance. G-2 brought me closer into its operations and I was cleared for intelligence of the highest category, the exact nature of which cannot be mentioned. I was invited to attend Headquarters' briefing sessions.

"One or two days after my arrival General Hurley sent for me. He had a copy of my memorandum No. 40 and delivered me a lecture to the effect that I was very much 'off base' and that he intended to do all of the policy recommending in the future. He said that his mission in China was to uphold Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Government. I did not attempt to discuss the matter in detail—in fact, I was given very little opportunity to say anything. At the conclusion of the talk he said something to the effect: 'If you confine yourself strictly to reporting we will get along, but if you try to interfere with me, I will break you.' In this talk he mentioned that he had made the same threat to John Davies but had relented because he did not wish to ruin a young man's career. This interview was of course reported by me to General Wedemeyer, who told me that I was working only for him and should 'carry on.'

"It was General Hurley's practice during this period to have occasional meetings of representatives of all the different United States Government agencies in Chungking. I was assigned to be one of the Headquarters representatives. The most notable features of these meetings were General Hurley's long discussions of his instructions from the President and of the progress being made in his negotiations. It was common comment among those attending that Hurley's accounts of his instructions changed from week to week and came more and more to emphasize the upholding of Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Government. He minimized the difficulties of the negotiations with the Chinese Communists and continually gave what we knew to be an unrealistic, optimistic view of their progress and likely success.

"By early February it was obvious that the negotiations between the two parties had reached an impasse and broken down. Both Hurley and Wedemeyer prepared to return to the United States for consultation. Raymond P. Ludden had returned from a long trip from Yen-an into the guerrilla areas and was in Chungking. We had a talk with Wedemeyer in which we expressed our opinion that military considerations made it undesirable for the Army to become completely tied up with the Central Government. For instance, there might be problems in the fairly near future of operations in occupied China, possibly by landing operations on the China coast, and that we should be free to cooperate

with whatever Chinese forces we found on the ground. Wedemeyer said that he agreed and would appreciate a written statement. Furthermore, he ordered Ludden to return to the United States at the same time so as to be available for consultation in Washington on these matters. Ludden and I proceeded to write our memorandum. This was done only after considerable discussion between the two of us, since we well knew that it might involve us in serious trouble with Hurley. The result was our memorandum of February 17 (Document 204) which I would like to place in the record.

"This memorandum marked a definite stage in our thinking. It was obvious that Hurley's attempt to negotiate on the basis of acceding to the wishes of Chiang had failed. We felt that the situation had reached a stage of urgency where we could make headway only by taking positive action and in effect telling instead of asking Chiang. Far from being a proposal to arm belligerent opponents of the Kuomintang, as Hurley later charged, it was a proposal to arm anyone who offered reasonable expectation of providing real resistance to what was, after all, the real enemy—Japan.

"After Hurley had left Chungking, George Acheson, the Counselor of the Embassy, expressed the opinion to several of his staff and to me that there had been inadequate reporting on the situation and that the Department had received an incomplete and nonobjective picture of the negotiations from Hurley. Acheson suggested that we prepare a telegram summarizing the whole situation and making recommendations for overcoming the impasse that had been reached. It was agreed that I would prepare the initial draft since I was intimately familiar with the subject and had more time available. The telegram which we prepared is the one of February 26 which Hurley has objected to and on the basis of which he accused Acheson and me of sabotage and disloyalty. (Put in the record. White Paper 87-92.) We included in the telegram the statement that the presence of Hurley in Washington would afford an opportunity for discussion of the questions we raised. When it was shown to Hurley he is reported to have been extremely angry and to have held me primarily responsible.

"This telegram follows substantially the same lines as the memorandum drafted a few days earlier by Ludden and me. At Acheson's instructions, this telegram was shown by me to Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff General Gross, who was then in acting command, and he gave it his hearty endorsement.

"Meanwhile in Chungking it appeared that the meeting of the Communist Party congress was imminent. I proposed that I proceed to Yen-an for observation and reporting. This was strongly supported by Acheson and approved by the Headquarters and appropriate orders were issued. I flew to Yen-an about March 9. I resumed my contacts with the leading Communists and prepared a large number of memoranda, chiefly descriptive of various phases of their program and policies. One important development was the admitted Communist aggressiveness in their attitude toward the Kuomintang and in their plans to meet the expected situation at the end of the war. They were, for instance, actively moving into southeast China and were making preparations for a quick thrust into Manchuria as soon as the opportunity was ripe. In early April I received urgent but unexplained orders to return to the United States at once. I left Yen-an about April 4, passed quickly through Chungking, and arrived in Washington on April 12. There I found that Hurley had forced my recall by going to Secretary of War Stimson, the Department of State having told him that it had no authority to give me orders while I was under assignment to the Army.

"My return to Washington terminated my assignment to the Army and I was detailed to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs for a brief period of consultation. As on the two previous occasions this meant spending my time being available for interviews by people working on China in various Government agencies and branches of the State Department. I had no other assigned duties and did not attend policy meetings nor write any policy memoranda or papers. I emphasize this because of General Hurley's statements that after my return from China I was placed over him in a supervisory capacity."

Mr. RHETTS. Now, certain documents are referred to in the first 34 pages of this document which has just been included in the transcript and I should like at this point to offer certain of them also for inclusion in the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to introduce first, document No. 103, which is referred to on page 14 of the personal history statement and which is the memorandum dated January 23, 1943, entitled "Kuomintang-Communist Situation," and I ask that it be included in the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"An outstanding impression gained during the past 18 months spent in Chungking and in travel through southwest and northwest China is that the most careful study should be given to the internal political situation in China, particularly the growing rift between the Kuomintang and the Communists.

"The 'United front' is now definitely a thing of the past and it is impossible to find any optimism regarding the possibility of its resurrection as long as present tendencies continue and the present leadership of the Kuomintang, both civil and military, remains in power. Far from improving, the situation is deteriorating. In Kuomintang-controlled China the countering of communism is a growing preoccupation of propaganda, of both military and civilian political indoctrination, and of secret police and gendarmerie activity. There is not only a rigorous suppression of anything coming under the ever widening definition of 'communism' but there appears to be a movement away from even the outward forms of democracy in government. It is now no longer wondered whether civil war can be avoided, but rather whether it can be delayed at least until after a victory over Japan.

"The dangers and implications of this disunity are obvious and far reaching. Militarily, the present situation is a great hindrance to any effective war effort by China. Its deterioration into civil war would be disastrous. The situation therefore has direct relationship to our own efforts to defeat Japan. At the present time a large and comparatively well trained and equipped portion of the Kuomintang Army is diverted from active combat against the Japanese to blockade the Communists. In the north (Kansu and Shensi) the lines are well established by multiple lines of block houses and these large forces remain in a condition of armed readiness. Farther south (Hupeh, Anhwei, North Kiangsu) the lines are less clearly demarcated and sporadic hostilities, which have gone on for over 2 years and in which the Kuomintang forces appear to take the initiative, continue.

"On the other side, the Communist army is starved of all supplies and forced in turn to immobilize most of its strength to guard against what it considers the Kuomintang threat. It was admitted by both parties that there was extreme tension in Kuomintang-Communist relations in the spring of 1942. The Communists believe that it was only the Japanese invasion of Yunnan that saved them from attack at that time. The Communists and their friends claim, furthermore, that the Kuomintang is devoting its energies to the strengthening of its control over those parts of China accessible to it rather than to fighting Japan. This strengthening of the position of the Kuomintang will be course assist it in reestablishing its control over areas which will then be opened to it. A logical part of such a policy would be the taking over, as soon as an opportunity is found, of the Communist base area in Kansu-Shensi. Success in this move would weaken the Communists and make easier the eventual recapture by the Kuomintang of the Communist guerrilla zones. To support this thesis the Communists point to the campaign in the more extreme Kuomintang publications for the immediate abolition of the 'border area.' Another factor sometimes suggested as tending to provoke an early Kuomintang attack on the Communists is the desirability, from the Kuomintang point of view, of disposing of them before China finds itself an active ally of Russia against Japan.

"The possible positive military value of the Communist army to our war effort should not be ignored. These forces control the territory through which access may be had to Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and Japanese North China bases. The strategic importance of their position would be enhanced by the entry of Russia into the war against Japan. This importance is largely potential but fairly recent reports of continued bitter fighting in Shansi indicate that the Communists are still enough of a force to provoke periodic Japanese 'mopping up' campaigns. Reflection of this is found in the intensive Japanese anti-Communist propaganda campaign in North China in the summer of 1941, although the fact must not be overlooked that Japanese propaganda has emphasized the anti-Communist angle to appeal to whatever 'collaborationist' elements there may be in occupied China and to the more conservative sections of the Kuomintang. This activity in Shansi and the difficulties of the Japanese there contrast with the inactivity on most of the other Kuomintang-Japanese fronts.

"Aside from the immediate war aspects, the political implications of the situation are also serious. Assuming that open hostilities are for the time being averted, the eventual defeat and withdrawal of the Japanese will leave the Kuomintang still confronted with the Communists solidly entrenched in most of North China (East Kansu, North Shensi, Shansi, South Chahar, Hopei, Shan-

tung, North Kiangsu, and North Anhwei. In addition the Communists will be in position to move into the vacuum created by the Japanese withdrawal from Suiyuan, Jehol, and Manchuria, in all of which areas there is already some Communist activity. In the rest of China they will have the sympathy of elements among the liberals, intellectuals, and students. These elements are of uncertain size but of considerable influence in China, and the Kuomintang's fear of their power, and the power of whatever underground organization the Communists have succeeded in maintaining in the Kuomintang area, is indicated by the size and activity of its various secret police organs.

"But possibly the greatest potential strength of the Communists, and one reason why military action against them will not be entirely effective at the present time, is their control of the rural areas of North China in the rear of the Japanese. Here the Kuomintang cannot reach them and the Communists have apparently been able to carry out some degree of popular mobilization. I am in possession of a secret Kuomintang publication describing the 'Communist control of Hopei.' It discusses measures of combating the Communists (by such means, for instance, as the blockade now being enforced) and concludes that if the Communists fail to 'cooperate' (i. e. submit to complete Kuomintang domination) they must be 'exterminated.' I hope to make a translation of this pamphlet which would appear to have significance as an official Kuomintang indication of the policy it will pursue in these areas. It seems reasonable to question, as some thoughtful Chinese do, whether the people of these guerrilla zones, after several years of political education and what must be assumed to be at least partial 'sovietization,' will accept peacefully the imposition of Kuomintang control activated by such a spirit and implemented by military force and the political repression, and secret police and gendarmerie power, which are already important adjuncts of party control and which are being steadily strengthened and expanded.

"Non-Communist Chinese of my acquaintance (as, for instance, the nephew of the well-known late editor of the Ta Kung Pao) consider the likelihood of civil war the greatest problem facing China. They point out that the Communists are far stronger now than they were when they stood off Kuomintang armies for 10 years in Central China and that they will be much stronger yet if it proves that they have succeeded in winning the support of the population in the guerrilla zone. They point to numerous recent instances of successful Communist infiltration into and indoctrination of opposing Chinese armies (such as those of Yen Hsi-shan) and wonder whether this will not cause a prolongation of the struggle and perhaps make a victory for the Kuomintang, or for either side, impossible. There is undoubtedly a strong revulsion in the mind of the average, nonparty Chinese to the idea of renewed civil war and the Kuomintang may indeed have difficulty with the loyalty and effectiveness of its conscript troops.

"Belief in the certainty of eventual civil war leads these same Chinese to question whether the United States has given sufficient realistic consideration to the future in China of democracy. The question is raised whether it is to China's advantage, or to America's own interests, for the United States to give the Kuomintang government large quantities of military supplies which, judging from past experience, are not likely to be used effectively against Japan but will be available for civil war to enforce 'unity' in the country by military force. These Chinese also speculate on the position of the American troops which may be in China (in support of the Kuomintang Army) if there should be a civil war; and wonder what will be the attitude of Russia, especially if it has become by that time a partner in the victory over Japan.

"But ignoring these problematical implications, there can be no denial that civil war in China, or even the continuation after the defeat of Japan of the present deadlock, will greatly impede the return of peaceful conditions. This blocking of the orderly large-scale rehabilitation of China will in itself seriously and adversely affect American interests. Even if a conflict is averted, the continuance or, as is probable in such an event, the worsening of the already serious economic strains within the country may result in economic collapse. If there is civil war the likelihood of such an economic collapse is of course greater.

"There is also the possibility that economic difficulties may make the war-weary, overconscribed and overtaxed farmers fertile ground for Communist propaganda and thus bring about a revolution going beyond the moderate democracy which the Chinese Communists now claim to be seeking. Such a Communist government would probably not be democratic in the American sense. And it is probable, even if the United States did not incur the enmity of the Communists

for alleged material or diplomatic support of the Kuomintang, that this Communist government would be more inclined toward friendship and cooperation with Russia than with Great Britain and America.

"For these reasons it would therefore appear to be in the interest of the United States to make efforts to prevent a deterioration of the internal political situation in China and, if possible, to bring about an improvement.

"The Communists themselves (Chou En-lai and Lin Piao in a conversation with John Carter Vincent and the undersigned about November 20, 1942) consider that foreign influence (obviously American) with the Kuomintang is the only force that may be able to improve the situation. They admit the difficulty of successful foreign suggestions regarding China's internal affairs, no matter how tactfully made. But they believe that the reflection of a better-informed foreign opinion, official and public, would have some effect on the more far-sighted elements of leadership in the Kuomintang, such as the Generalissimo.

"The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be the emphasizing in our dealings with the Chinese Government, and in our propaganda to China, of the political nature of the world conflict; democracy against fascism. This would include constant reiteration of the American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuomintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China.

"Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army as a participant in the war against fascism. The United States might intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given by the central government to the eighteenth group army. The Communists hope this might include a specification that the Communist armies receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China.

"Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area. I have not heard this proposed by the Communists themselves. But there is no doubt that they would welcome such action.

"This visit would have the great additional advantage of providing us with comprehensive and reliable information regarding the Communist side of the situation. For instance we might be able to have better answers to some of the following pertinent questions: How faithfully have the Communists carried out their united front promises? What is the form of their local government? How 'Communist' is it? Does it show any democratic character or possibilities? Has it won any support of the people? How does it compare with conditions of government in Kuomintang China? How does the Communist treatment of the people in such matters as taxation, grain requisition, military service and forced labor compare with that in the Kuomintang territory? What is the military and economic strength of the Communists and what is their probable value to the Allied cause? How have they dealt with problems such as inflation, price control, development of economic resources for carrying on the war, and trading with the enemy? Have the people in the guerrilla area been mobilized and aroused to the degree necessary to support real guerrilla warfare?

"Without such knowledge, it is difficult to appraise conflicting reports and reach a considered judgment. Due to the Kuomintang blockade, information regarding conditions in the Communist area is at present not available. Such information as we do have is several years out of date, and has limitations as to scope and probable reliability. Carlson was primarily a military man and had a limited knowledge of the Chinese language. Most of the journalists who have been able to visit the Communist area appear to have a bias favorable to the Communists. They also suffered from language limitations and were unable to remain in the area for an extended period.

"I suggest that the American representatives best suited to visit the Communist area are Foreign Service officers of the China language service. One or two men might be sent. They should combine moderately long-term residence at Yen-an or its vicinity with fairly extensive travel in the guerrilla area. It is important that they not be required to base a report on a brief visit during which they would be under the influence of official guides, but that they should have a sufficient time to become familiar with conditions and make personal day-to-day observations.

"There is mail and telegraphic communication between Yen-an and Chungking, and similar communication between various parts of the Communist area. The officers would therefore not be out of touch with the Embassy and could, if it is thought desirable, make periodic reports.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to introduce document No. 142, which is referred to on page 20 of the personal statement. This is headed: "Excerpt from memorandum, April 7, 1944, by John S. Service, forwarded to Department as enclosure No. 1 of dispatch No. 2461, April 21, 1944, under title "Situation in Sinkiang; Its Relation to American Policy vis-à-vis China and the Soviet Union":

The CHAIRMAN. What number?

Mr. RHETTS. No. 142; and I ask that it be included in the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"We must be concerned with Russian plans and policies in Asia because they are bound to affect our own plans in the same area. But our relations with Russia in Asia are at present only a subordinate part of our political and military relations with Russia in Europe in the over-all United Nations war effort and postwar settlement. We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are. A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a careful first-hand study of the strength, attitudes, and popular support of the Chinese Communists. But in determining our policy toward Russia in Asia we should avoid being swayed by China. The initiative must be kept firmly in our hands. To do otherwise will be to let the tail wag the dog.

"As for the present Chinese Government, it must be acknowledged that we are faced with a regrettable failure of statesmanship. Chiang's persisting in an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies (or lack of them) are accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal dissension, can only be characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical desire to destroy unity among the United Nations is serious. But it would also appear that Chiang unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in eastern Asia by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too weak to serve as a possible counter-weight to Russia. By so doing, Chiang may be digging his own grave; not only North China and Manchuria, but also national groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets.

"Neither now, nor in the immediately foreseeable future, does the United States want to find itself in direct opposition to Russia in Asia; nor does it want to see Russia have undisputed dominance over a part or all of China.

"The best way to cause both of these possibilities to become realities is to give, in either fact or appearance, support to the present reactionary government of China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid directed solely toward the military prosecution of the war against Japan. To give diplomatic or other support beyond this limit will encourage the Kuomintang in its present suicidal anti-Russian policy. It will convince the Chinese Communists—who probably hold the key to control, not only of North China but of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria as well—that we are on the other side and that their only hope for survival lies with Russia. Finally, Russia will be led to believe (if she does not already) that American aims run counter to hers, and that she must therefore protect herself by any means available: in other words, the extension of her direct power or influence.

"It is important, therefore, that the United States have the following aims in its dealings with China:

"1. Avoid becoming involved in any way in Sino-Soviet relations; avoid all appearance of unqualified diplomatic support to China, especially vis-à-vis Russia; and limit American aid to China to direct prosecution of the war against Japan.

"This may involve soft-pedaling of grandiose promises of postwar aid and economic rehabilitation—unless they are predicated on satisfactory reforms within China.

"2. Show a sympathetic interest in the Communists and liberal groups in China. Try to fit the Communists into the war against Japan.

"In so doing, we may promote Chinese unity and galvanize the lagging Chinese war effort. The liberals, generally speaking, already consider that their hope lies in America. The Communists, from what little we know of them, also are friendly toward America, believe that democracy must be the next step in China, and take the view that economic collaboration with the United States is the only hope for speedy postwar rehabilitation and development. It is vital that we do not lose this good will and influence.

"3. Use our tremendous and as yet unexploited influence with the Kuomintang to promote internal Chinese unity on the only possible and lasting foundation of progressive reform.

"There is no reason for us to fear using our influence. The Kuomintang knows that it is dependent on us; it cannot turn toward a Japan approaching annihilation; it is inconceivable that it will turn toward communistic Russia; and Great Britain is not in a position to be of help. American interest in the Chinese Communists will be a potent force in persuading Kuomintang China to set its house in order.

"The Communists would undoubtedly plan an important part in a genuinely unified China—one not unified by the Kuomintang's present policy in practice of military force and threat. But it is most probable that such a democratic and unified China would naturally gravitate toward the United States and that the United States, by virtue of a sympathy, position, and economic resources, would enjoy a greater influence in China than any other foreign power."

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to offer document 192, which is referred to on page 25 of the personal history statement. This is an excerpt from a report prepared by Mr. Service and it is entitled "The Present and Future Strength of the Chinese Communists," and dated, on the second page, October 9, 1944. I ask it be included in the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"Reports of two American officers, several correspondents, and twenty-odd foreign travelers regarding conditions in the areas of North China under Communist control are in striking agreement. This unanimity, based on actual observation, is significant. It forces us to accept certain facts, and to draw from those facts an important conclusion.

"The Japanese are being actively opposed—in spite of the constant warfare and cruel retaliation this imposes on the population. This opposition is gaining in strength. The Japanese can temporarily crush it in a limited area by the concentration of overwhelming force. But it is impossible for them to do this simultaneously over the huge territory the Communists now influence.

"This opposition is possible and successful because it is total guerrilla warfare aggressively waged by a totally mobilized population. In this total mobilization the regular forces of the Communists, though leaders and organizers, have become subordinate to the vastly more numerous forces of the people themselves. They exist because the people permit, support, and wholeheartedly fight with them. There is complete solidarity of army and people.

"This total mobilization is based upon and has been made possible by what amounts to an economic, political, and social revolution. This revolution has been moderate and democratic. It has improved the economic condition of the peasants by rent and interest reduction, tax reform, and good government. It has given them democratic self-government, political consciousness, and a sense of their rights. It has freed them from feudalistic bonds and given them self-respect, self-reliance, and a strong feeling of cooperative group interest. The common people, for the first time, have been given something to fight for.

"The Japanese are being fought now not merely because they are foreign invaders but because they deny this revolution. The people will continue to fight any government which limits or deprives them of these newly won gains.

"Just as the Japanese Army cannot crush these militant people now, so also will Kuomintang force fail in the future. With their new arms and organization, knowledge of their own strength, and determination to keep what they have been fighting for, these people—now some 90,000,000 and certain to be many more before the Kuomintang can reach them—will resist oppression. They are not Communists. They do not want separation or independence. But at present they regard the Kuomintang—from their own experience—as oppressors; and the Communists as their leaders and benefactors.

"With this great popular base, the Communists likewise cannot be eliminated. Kuomintang attempts to do so by force must mean a complete denial of democracy. This will strengthen the ties of the Communists with the people: a Communist victory will be inevitable. If, as the Communists hope, the Kuomintang turns to democracy, this established popular support will ensure influential Communist participation in national affairs. If the Kuomintang continues its present policy of quarantine without itself instituting thoroughgoing democracy, the better condition of the common people in the Communist areas will be an example constantly working in Communist favor.

"From the basic fact that the Communists have built up popular support of a magnitude and depth which makes their elimination impossible, we must draw the conclusion that the Communists will have a certain and important share

in China's future. * * * I suggest the further conclusion that unless the Kuomintang goes as far as the Communists in political and economic reform, and otherwise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of which it yet shows signs of being willing or able to do), the Communists will be the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years."

Mr. RHETTS. I introduce document No. 204, which is referred to on page 32 of the personal statement. This is a memorandum entitled, "Military Weakness of Our Far Eastern Policy," and it is addressed to the Commanding General, USAF, etc., and bears the date, on the third page, February 14, 1945. I ask it be included in the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. I may be entered in the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"American policy in the Far East can have but one immediate objective: the defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of American lives. To the attainment of this objective all other considerations should be subordinate.

"The attainment of this objective demands the effective mobilization of China in the war against Japan. Operating as we are in a land theater at the end of a supply line many thousands of miles in length, the human and economic resources of China increase in importance as we draw closer to Japan's inner zone of defense. Denied the effective use of these resources the attainment of our primary objective will be unnecessarily delayed.

"There is ample evidence to show that to the present Kuomintang Government the war against Japan is secondary in importance to its own preservation in power. China's military failure is due in large part to internal political disunity and the Kuomintang's desire to conserve such military force as it has for utilization in the maintenance of its political power. The intention of the generalissimo to eliminate all political opposition, by force of arms if necessary, has not been abandoned. In the present situation in China, where power or self-preservation depend upon the possession of military force, neither the Kuomintang nor opposition groups are willing to expend their military resources against the Japanese through fear that it will weaken them vis-à-vis other groups. A recent instance is the lack of resistance to the Japanese capture of the southern section of the Hankow-Canton railway. Equally, the Kuomintang is jealously intent on preventing the strengthening of other groups: witness the blockade of the Communists.

"The aim of American policy as indicated clearly by official statements in the United States is the establishment of political unity in China as the indispensable preliminary to China's effective military mobilization. The execution of our policy has not contributed to the achievement of this publicly stated aim. On the contrary, it has retarded its achievement. It has had this undesired and undesirable effect because our statements and actions in China have convinced the Kuomintang Government that we will continue to support it and it alone. The Kuomintang Government believes that it will receive an increasing flow of American military and related supplies which, if past experience is any guide, it will commit against the enemy only with great reluctance, if at all.

"We cannot hope for any improvement in this situation unless we understand the objectives of the Kuomintang Government and throw our considerable influence upon it in the direction of internal unity. We should be convinced by this time that the effort to solve the Kuomintang-Communist differences by diplomatic means has failed; we should not be deceived by any 'face-saving' formula resulting from the discussions because neither side is willing to bear the onus of failure. We should also realize that no Government can survive in China without American support.

"There are in China important elements interested in governmental reform by which unity and active prosecution of the war may result. Aside from the Chinese Communists, however, all of these elements are cowed by a widespread secret police system and lack any firm rallying point. They will remain helpless to do anything constructive as long as statements of our policy indicate that we are champions of the status quo.

"At present there exists in China a situation closely paralleling that which existed in Yugoslavia prior to Prime Minister Churchill's declaration of support for Marshal Tito. That statement was as follows:

"The surest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness to fight the Germans and thus lighten the burden of Allied troops. This is not a time for ideological preferences for one side or the other."

"A similar public statement issued by the Commander in Chief with regard to China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessation of military aid to the Central Government; that would be both unnecessary and unwise. It would serve notice, however, of our preparation to make use of all available means to achieve our primary objective. It would supply for all Chinese a firm rallying point which has thus far been lacking. The internal effect in China would be so profound that the generalissimo would be forced to make concessions of power and permit united front coalition. The present opposition groups, no longer under the prime necessity of safeguarding themselves, would be won wholeheartedly to our side and we would have in China, for the first time, a united ally.

"Whether we like it or not, by our very presence here we have become a force in the internal politics of China and that force should be used to accomplish our primary mission. In spite of hero-worshipping publicity in the United States, Chiang Kai-shek is not China and by our present narrow policy of outspokenly supporting his dog-in-the-manger attitude we are needlessly cutting ourselves off from millions of useful allies; many of whom are already organized and in position to engage the enemy. These allies, let it be clear, are not confined to Communist-controlled areas of China, but are to be found everywhere in the country. The Communist movement is merely the most prominent manifestation of a condition which is potentially present throughout China. Other important groups favor the same program as that espoused by the so-called Communists—agrarian reform, civil rights, the establishment of democratic institutions—but the Communists are the only group at present having the organization and strength openly to foster such 'revolutionary' ideas.

"Our objective is clear, but in China we have been jockeyed into a position from which we have only one approach to the objective. Support of the generalissimo is desirable insofar as there is concrete evidence that he is willing and able to marshal the full strength of China against Japan. Support of the generalissimo is but one means to an end; it is not an end in itself, but by present statements of policy we show a tendency to confuse the means with the end. There should be an immediate adjustment of our position in order that flexibility of approach to our primary objective may be restored."

Mr. RHETTS. At this point I should like to inquire of the Board whether it has obtained copies of all of Mr. Service's efficiency reports. Those reports could not be made available to him, of course, under Foreign Service regulations but we have asked that they be made available to the Board.

The CHAIRMAN. The efficiency records of Mr. Service are in the hands of the Board and will be considered by the Board as part of the evidence but will not be made part of the transcript of the record. They will be made available to the Review Board with the rest of the confidential reports in this case.

Mr. RHETTS. As distinguished from the efficiency reports, Mr. Service has also received during the course of his service, numerous letters of commendation, which of course are made available to the Foreign Service officers. It is my understanding that the Board has received at least some of these letters. We have also sought to obtain copies of these letters.

I may add that the copies that have been supplied to Mr. Service are among his effects, which are not in this country at the present time, so that we have had to attempt to locate as many of these as we can and obtained some of them from the Department. Since we may have some letters which for one reason or another did not get into the hands of the Board, I should like to offer all we have at this time; that is to say, I should like—

The CHAIRMAN. Before you do that let me say for the record that the Board has before it letters of commendation of Mr. Service which may be introduced in evidence if you wish.

Mr. RHETTS. As to these, I do wish to introduce them in evidence as exhibits for inclusion in the record because these can possibly be made part of the record as an exhibit which would be available also to us. Since I have a complete set of them, I will be glad to offer all that. I think it includes what you have plus others.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have a complete set of letters of commendation, you may offer them, if you wish, as exhibits or for the transcript.

Mr. RHETTS. I haven't a complete set but I think I have a more complete set than you do. We still don't have all the letters of commendation given.

The CHAIRMAN. If they are not confidential, you may offer at your discretion.

Mr. RHETTS. At this point I would like to introduce, as exhibits, documents 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, and 310, and all of them being copies of letters of commendation of Mr. Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say for the record, the communications referred to by counsel are the ones taken from the document list contained in exhibit 1.

(The following copies of letters of commendation were admitted in evidence:)

Document 301, photostat of letter from Charles B. Rayner, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C., dated January 2, 1943, to Mr. Max Thornberg, Department of State, Washington, D. C., marked "Exhibit 3."

Document 302, photostat of letter from George Atcheson, Jr., American Chargé d'Affaires at Chungking, dated August 16, 1943, to John S. Service, second secretary of Embassy, care of General Stilwell's headquarters, Chungking, and marked "Exhibit 4."

Document 303, copy of letter from G. Howland Shaw, dated October 1, 1943, to Hon. Clarence E. Gauss, American Ambassador, Chungking, marked "Exhibit 5."

Document 304, photostat of letter from G. Howland Shaw, dated October 21, 1943, to Hon. Clarence E. Gauss, American Ambassador, Chungking, marked "Exhibit 6."

Document 305, copy of letter from G. Howland Shaw, dated June 21, 1944, to Hon. Clarence E. Gauss, American Ambassador, Chungking, marked "Exhibit 7."

Document 306, copy of letter from JGE, dated January 13, 1945, to Hon. Patrick J. Hurley, American Ambassador, Chungking, marked "Exhibit 8."

Document 307, photostat of letter from A. C. Wedemeyer, lieutenant general, United States Army, dated May 10, 1945, to the Honorable the Secretary of State, Washington, D. C., marked "Exhibit 9."

Document 308, photostat of memorandum from E. T. Wailes, dated June 20, 1947, to Mr. G. Ackerson, Jr., marked "Exhibit 10."

Document 309, photostat of letter from Donald R. Heath, American Minister to Bulgaria, dated April 1, 1949, to Mr. Donald W. Smith, Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel, Department of State, marked "Exhibit 11."

Document 310, photostat of letter from Christian M. Ravndel, Director General of the Foreign Service, dated April 4, 1949, to John S. Service, Esq., American Foreign Service Officer, care of Department of State, Washington, D. C., marked "Exhibit 12."

Mr. RHETTS. I should also like to offer as an exhibit at this time document No. 50, which is a letter addressed to the Board, dated April 18, 1950, signed by Dr. H. C. Mei.

(Document 50, letter from Dr. H. C. Mei to the Loyalty Security Board, dated April 18, 1950, was admitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 13.")

Mr. RHETTS. Now I should like to question Mr. Service if it is agreeable to the Board.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Mr. Service, General Hurley, former Ambassador to China, has made various charges against you in the course of hearings held before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 5, 6, 7, and 10, 1945. In that connection I should like to introduce into the transcript of the record at this point document 35-1.

"(1) HURLEY. I have said that I approved the policy of the higher echelon of the policymaking power of this Nation. I said * * * that this policy had been defeated by career men in the State Department, and they were able to say, in China, that the policy that I was supporting in China was not the policy of the United States Government, but my own policy. (P. 15.)

"(2) CONNALLY. Well, do you charge, then, that notwithstanding the President's policy, and notwithstanding the Secretary of State's policy, that there are some men in the State Department that overruled the President and overruled the Secretary of State, and that they carry on negotiations with foreign countries without the knowledge of the Secretary and the President; and is that what you charge? (P. 15.)

"(3) HURLEY. Of course, the Senator has made the charge very broad. (P. 15.)

"(4) CONNALLY. Well, I am not making the charge; I am asking you a question.

"(5) HURLEY. Well, I did not make that charge. I have made the statement that the policy of the United States in China was defeated to some extent—oh, it was not quite defeated, because my directive was to prevent the collapse of China during the war, and we did; my directive was to sustain the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek—we did; my directive was to harmonize the relations between the military establishments of the United States and of China—we did; my directive was to keep the Chinese Army in the field and contain as many Japanese

as possible, to protect our men on the beaches and in the jungle—and we did; our directive was to harmonize diplomatic relations between our Embassy in Chungking and the Government of the Republic of China—and we did, during the war. (Pp. 15-16.)

"(6) CONNALLY. Up to that time, these subordinates in the State Department, with all their endeavors, were not able to defeat your policy, because you succeeded; and so you say in all these enterprises, is that right?

"(7) HURLEY. Yes, sir. (P. 16.)"

Q. I ask you to look at this document, Mr. Service. This is an excerpt from the hearings to which I just referred. It sets forth in general the most general version of General Hurley's charges, does it not, Mr. Service?—A. I would say it does; yes.

Q. I would like to ask there be included in the transcript, at this point, document 35-2.

"(Hurley—Hearings before Senate Relations Committee, December 5, 6, 10, 1945)

"(1) CONNALLY. * * * It has also been testified over here that the foreign policy of the United States in China, in effect—I do not know, I am not quoting words, because I do not know exactly the words—but, in other words, that the foreign policy out there had been circumvented or paralyzed by reason of the activities of these men, Acheson and Service. Now, was any change in the foreign policy brought about by these men, in anywise? (P. 259.)

"(2) BYRNES. No; no change in the foreign policy. As a matter of fact, I must say that after that, in calling for information, as late as December 30, after the receipt of the Service cable—after that there was a statement from General Hurley in December, about December 24, a very fine statement according to my views, of the policy, and it was after the receipt of Service's message in October. (P. 260.)"

Q. I ask you, does this represent again in the most general terms the refutation of these charges by the then Secretary of State, Byrnes?—A. That is correct. General Hurley has said we defeated American policy in China and Secretary Byrnes says there was no change in foreign policy.

Q. In reference to General Hurley's charge that Foreign Service officers, including you, interfered with it, sniped at and sabotaged and generally sought to defeat American foreign policy. Will you describe to the Board what you were doing during the period when General Hurley was attempting to make this policy effective?—A. General Hurley has said that I particularly was responsible for the failure of his efforts in China because I sabotaged and undermined him, opposed him, and advised the Communists not to agree with the proposals. Actually, I wasn't in China during the critical periods of General Hurley's negotiations. If the Board will refer to the chronology of events on page 3, General Hurley arrived in Chungking on September 6, 1944. At that time I was in Yen-an as a member of the observer group where I was doing political reporting. I knew nothing of General Hurley's mission at that time and I wasn't charged with negotiations or wasn't conducting negotiations.

General Hurley's first task in Chungking was to harmonize relations between General Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek. He did nothing else until General Stilwell's recall on October 19. Immediately after General Stilwell's recall, I was ordered to the United States and I went through Chungking on October 23 and departed from Chungking on October 24 and arrived in Washington October 29.

General Hurley did not commence his attempts to negotiate or conciliate between the Kuomintang and the Communists until after I left Chungking, about the 1st of November, which can be confirmed by the white paper. He commenced active efforts to negotiate the differences between the two parties on November 10 and on November 7 he actually flew to Yen-an and on November 10 obtained Mao Tse-tung's signature to a 5-point draft agreement.

The various complications, I don't think you are interested in here but by the time I had completed my consultations and my leave and had returned to Chungking, on January 18, 1945, General Hurley had already telegraphed the Department on January 14, blaming someone else for the breakdown. On January 23, however, subsequently to my arrival in Chungking, on January 18, a new proposal was put out for a political consultative conference and that appeared about to be accepted. It wasn't accepted. It was refused by letter of March 9 from the Chinese Communists but that was because of actions taken by the Nationalist Government and Chiang Kai-shek and this letter from the Communist Party was written while I was in Chungking, before I arrived at Yen-an.

The next period of active negotiations between the two parties, with General Hurley as intermediary, did not commence until August 1945 when I had been,

for several months, out of China and wasn't connected in any way with far eastern or China matters.

Q. Now I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point document No. 35-3, consisting of two pages, also of excerpts from the hearings.

(Hurley—Hearings before Senate Relations Committee, December 5, 6, 10, 1945)

"(1) CHAIRMAN. * * * These subordinates in the State Department, with all their endeavors, were not able to defeat your policy, because you succeeded, so you say, in all these enterprises. Is that right. (P. 16.)

"(2) HURLEY. Yes, sir.

"(3) CHAIRMAN. It was only after the war? (P. 16)

"(4) HURLEY. No, sir—during the war, during the war. On the 30th of October 1944, a Mr. John S. Service, of the State Department, wrote to the State Department, and I believe it is his report No. 40, a general statement of how to let the Government that I was sent over there to sustain fall; and that report was circulated among the Communists whose support I was seeking for our policy; and that was during the war. (P. 16)

"(5) HURLEY. * * * The professional Foreign Service men sided with the Chinese Communist armed party and the imperialist bloc of Nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself. Our professional diplomats continuously advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States. These same professionals openly advised the Communist armed party to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the National Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control. (P. 21.)

"(6) HURLEY. The career men continuously told the Communist armed party and the world that America was betting on the wrong horse, that the American policy which I was upholding in China did not have the support of the United States Government. This made my situation impossible. (P. 32.)

"(7) HURLEY. * * * The career men opposed the policy; that they continuously advised the Chinese Communist armed party; that they recommended in my absence that the Chinese armed party, a belligerent whose purpose was to destroy the government that I had to sustain, be furnished lend-lease arms and equipment, and because I opposed that as destructive of the government that I had been directed to uphold, they charged me with making my own policy in China and said that it was not the policy of the United States Government. (P. 3A.)

"(8) HURLEY. * * * Nor will I recite at this point the communications of these gentlemen with the Communist armed party which was seeking to defeat the purpose for which I was sent to China. (P. 38A.)

"(9) BRIDGES. * * * What was the first date that your suspicions were aroused, or anything came to your notice whereby agents of the United States Government, either in the Embassy in China or in the State Department here in Washington, were undermining the policies of our country or sabotaging your efforts? (P. 89.)

"(10) HURLEY. The first that came to my attention was the report of Mr. John S. Service dated October 10, 1944, and numbered 40. That was the first outward evidence I had of a plan not to uphold but to cause the collapse of the Government of the Republic of China. (P. 89.)

Q. Would you refer to document No. 35-3, Mr. Service, and I should like to ask you whether these charges of General Hurley were in substance repeated in Plain Talk magazine for October 1946?—

A. Yes, they were.

Q. At this point I should like to have inserted in the transcript Documents No. 17-2, 17-3, 17-5, 17-6, 17-7, and 17-14, which are excerpts from the article in Plain Talk to which I referred.

"ARTICLE IN PLAIN TALK ENTITLED "THE STATE DEPARTMENT ESPIONAGE CASE"
BY EMMANUEL S. LARSEN, OCTOBER 1946, PAGE 27

17.2: " * * * Many sensational though little-explained developments, such as the General Stilwell affair, the resignation of Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew and Ambassador Patrick Hurley and the emergence of a pro-Soviet bloc in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, are interlaced with the Case of the Six, as the episode became known."

17-3: "Behind the now-famous State Department espionage case, involving the arrest of six persons of whom I was one, an arrest which shocked the Nation

on June 7, 1945, is the story of a highly-organized campaign to switch American policy in the Far East from its long-tested course to the Soviet line."

17-5: "* * * It is the mysterious whitewash of the chief actors of the espionage case which the Congress has directed the Hobbs committee to investigate. But from behind that whitewash there emerges the pattern of a major operation performed upon Uncle Sam without his being conscious of it."

17-6: "* * * How did it come to pass that Washington since 1944 has been seeking to foist Communist members upon the sole recognized and legitimate Government of China, a maneuver equivalent to an attempt by a powerful China to introduce Earl Browder and William Z. Foster into key positions in the United States Government?"

17-7: "* * * Whose was the hand which forced the sensational resignation of Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew and his replacement by Dean Acheson? And was the same hand responsible for driving Ambassador Patrick Hurley into a blind alley and retirement?"

17-14: "The day before President Roosevelt announced that Stilwell had been relieved of his command, on October 30, 1944, John S. Service submitted his report No. 40 to the State Department. As disclosed months later by General Hurley in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that report was 'a general statement of how to let fall the government I was sent over there to sustain. The report was circulated among the Communists I was trying to harmonize with the Chiang Kai-shek government.'"

Q. Were these charges also repeated in substance by Congressman Judd, on October 19, 1944?—A. They were.

Q. I should like to introduce at this point document 20-4, an excerpt from Congressman Judd's remarks as they appear in the Congressional Record for that date.

"REMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN JUDD, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, OCTOBER 19, 1949, PAGES 15282-15283

"The memorandum illustrates the conniving against highest officials of the Government of China, being carried on even during the war by representatives of our Government. The Chinese Government had the right to expect that the representatives of the United States, its ally, would do their best to help it with its overwhelming problems, which it knew better than anyone else it could not possibly solve without sympathetic understanding and support from us. Instead, officials of the United States were insisting that our Government intervene to coerce the responsible heads of the Chinese Government into so-called cooperation with a Communist rebellion."

Q. Were these remarks repeated by Senator McCarthy on the floor of the Senate on January 5, 1950?—A. They were.

Q. I should like to introduce at this point, document No. 31, which is an excerpt from Senator McCarthy's remarks as they appear in the Congressional Record.

"REMARKS OF SENATOR MCCARTHY, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, JANUARY 5, 1950, PAGE 90

"Mr. MCCARTHY. I wonder if the Senator could shed some light on a certain subject. I read in a local newspaper a short time ago that the man in charge of promotions or placements in one branch of the State Department is named John Service, the same John Service who in 1944, according to Gen. Patrick Hurley's papers, advocated that we torpedo Chiang Kai-shek, and who officially as a representative of the State Department, said that the only hope of Asia was communism. The same John Service was later picked up by the FBI on charges of espionage. He was not tried, he was not convicted, but was brought home, promoted, and put in charge of personnel and placement in the State Department.

"As I said, I read this in a local newspaper, the Times-Herald, and I wonder if the Senator could shed any light on that particular situation, as to whether or not the situation still exists, in other words, whether this man, John Service, who in 1944 said, 'Let us scuttle Chiang Kai-shek' and who said the only hope of Asia is communism, this man who was picked up by the FBI, for espionage, who was accused of having had a sizable number of secret documents in his possession which he was handing over to the Communists, is still in charge of personnel and placement, as he apparently was about a month ago when the article appeared in the newspaper."

Q. Were these remarks also repeated by Senator McCarthy before the Tydings subcommittee on March 15?—A. They were.

Q. And were these same charges repeated by Senator McCarthy on the floor of the Senate on March 30, 1950?—A. They were.

Q. At this point I would like to introduce documents 39-9, 39-16, 39-17, 39-23, 39-24, which are excerpts from Senator McCarthy's remarks appearing in the Congressional Record on that date.

DOCUMENT 39-9

"(P. 4438:) * * * In connection with this, it will be remembered that John Service, as Stilwell's political adviser, accompanied a highly secret military commission to Yenan. Upon the return of this mission, you will recall that Stilwell demanded that Chiang Kai-shek allow him to equip and arm some 300,000 Communists. Chiang Kai-shek objected on the grounds that this was part of a Soviet plot to build up the rebel forces to the extent that they would control China. Chiang Kai-shek promptly requested the recall of Stilwell and President Roosevelt relieved Stilwell of his command. It was at this time that Service submitted his Report No. 40 to the State Department, which, according to Hurley, was a plan for the removal of support from the Chiang Kai-shek government with the end result that the Communists would take over."

DOCUMENT 39-16

"(P. 4440:) When Chiang Kai-shek was fighting our war, the State Department had in China a young man named John S. Service. His task, obviously, was not to work for the communization of China. Strangely, however, he sent official reports back to the State Department urging that we torpedo our ally Chiang Kai-shek and stating, in effect, that communism was the best hope of China."

DOCUMENT 39-17

"(P. 4440:) * * * Strangely, however, he was never prosecuted. However, Joseph Grew, the Under Secretary of State, who insisted on his prosecution, was forced to resign. Two days after Grew's successor, Dean Acheson, took over as Under Secretary of State, this man—John Service—who had been picked up by the FBI and who had previously urged that communism was the best hope of China, was not only reinstated in the State Department but promoted. And finally, under Acheson, placed in charge of all placements and promotions."

DOCUMENT 39-23

"(P. 4443:) Not till I have completed my answer. J. Edgar Hoover did a phenomenal job in the Service case, and if the Department of Justice had done an equally good job, Service would not be in the Far East trying to turn the whole business over to Russia."

DOCUMENT 39-24

"(P. 4445:) * * * but I am sure that if the Senator will sit here and will listen to the material which I am presenting, he will be convinced that the clique of Lattimore, Jessup, and Service has been responsible, almost completely—under Acheson, of course—for what went on in the Far East, although there were other individuals taking part."

Q. Now, will you comment for the Board, Mr. Service, on the charge which appears in paragraph No. (4) of document 35-3 that your memorandum No. 40 which, for the information of the Board, appears as document No. 193, constitutes a plan, or proposal, as General Hurley put it, for letting fall the government which he was sent to sustain, or that it was planned for bringing about the torpedoing, as Senator McCarthy said, of Chiang Kai-shek's government?—A. Memorandum No. 40 was certainly not a plan or proposal for bringing about the collapse of China's Government. It doesn't even propose withdrawal of support of that government. The memorandum was a limited discussion of one particular phase of our problem in China and was an attempt to meet a persistent line of argument that China and China's resistance would collapse and cease if anything happened to Chiang Kai-shek or to the Central Government.

I feel it is necessary to consider this memorandum against the background of circumstances and events which occurred in China. In October of 1944 China

was in extremis. If the Board will refer to our chronology of events on page 2, in the spring of 1944, in April, the Japanese commenced a systematic series of campaigns to seal off all of eastern China. They drove through central China from the North clear to the south to capture our advanced air bases and cut off the coast of eastern China. You see the main events outlined—that means the Yellow River front. They took Loyang on May 18.

Having completed the occupation of the Peiping-Hankow Railway, in late May, they commenced from the Yangtze River south to Canton in order to seal off northeastern China. They took Changsha June 18. On July 7 the situation began to look so dark it was obvious the Japanese could accomplish almost any objective they picked for themselves.

President Roosevelt sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek recommending that General Stilwell, the commander in the theater, be placed in command of all Chinese forces. This was a drastic effort to force some sort of military unity in China so that the two armies, which were blockading and opposing each other, would be unified, and so that we could have perhaps more of a fighting chance of stopping the Japanese and holding part of China.

There were a long series of telegrams on this subject—repeated requests from President Roosevelt that the Generalissimo implement his agreement, which he had given in principle. This proposal to put Stilwell in command of all forces was the "genesis" of the Hurley mission and it was the primary task which General Hurley was to accomplish.

The Japanese campaign continued. In August they captured one of the most important forward air bases. They moved on. They were moving up toward Kweilin without heavy opposition; they would soon be in a position where they could threaten Chungking or move toward our main base at Kunming.

By the time this memorandum was drafted, the Yen-an mission had been in the Communist areas for 2½ months so all members had done extensive travel in the actual guerrilla areas. We had talked to a large number of rescued pilots, who had traveled long distances and we talked to foreign correspondents and other travelers, so in addition to our own observations in Yen-an, we had a broad basis for coming to a conclusion that the Communists were so strong and such an important factor that they could not be ignored and would have to be expected to play an important part in China's future.

These views are summarized in my memorandum, in Document No. 192.

Early in October we heard at Yen-an by scuttlebutt—by rumor—that the only subject of negotiation in Chungking was the Generalissimo's demand for the recall of Stilwell and that there was a great deal of weight being given by some of the negotiators, and certainly encouraged from the Chinese side, that we simply had to support Chiang Kai-shek, and that if Chiang went down, China went down, and that we were in a sense dependent on Chiang Kai-shek.

Against this background I wrote my memorandum, saying we are not dependent on Chiang Kai-shek; Chiang Kai-shek is dependent on us; that for us to waste time talking about who is going to be the commander is just a waste of time, and that we should adopt a more realistic, and, if you wish, hard-boiled policy toward Chiang Kai-shek. It was not, I repeat, a proposal to let fall or a plan to cause the collapse of the Central Government.

Q. Mr. Chairman, in view of the importance of this memorandum to all the charges in this area, I should like to ask that Document No. 193 be included in the transcript at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be done.

Report No. 40

U. S. ARMY OBSERVER SECTION, APO 879,

October 10, 1944.

Subject: The Need for Greater Realism in our Relations with Chiang Kai-shek.
To: General Stilwell, Commanding General, USAF-CBI.

1. You have allowed me, as a political officer attached to your staff, to express myself freely in the past regarding the situation in China as I have seen it. Although in Yen-an I am only a distant observer of recent developments in Chungking and Washington, I trust that you will permit the continued frankness which I have assumed in the attached memorandum regarding the stronger policy which I think it is now time for us to adopt toward Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Government.

2. It is obvious, of course, that you cannot act independently along the lines suggested. The situation in China and the measures necessary to meet it have both military importance and far-reaching political significance; the two aspects

cannot be separated. Because of this interrelation, and because of the high level on which action in China must be taken, there must be agreement and mutual support between our political and military branches. But this will be ineffective without clear decision and forceful implementation by the President.

3. It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted, as usual, to the American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters, USAF-CBI, for the information of Mr. Davies.

/S/ JOHN S. SERVICE.

Enclosure :

Memorandum, as stated.

"MEMORANDUM

"Our dealings with Chiang Kai-shek apparently continue on the basis of the unrealistic assumption that he is China and that he is necessary to our cause. It is time, for the sake of the war and also for our future interests in China, that we take a more realistic line.

"Kuomintang Government is in crisis. Recent defeats have exposed its military ineffectiveness and will hasten the approaching economic disaster. Passive inability to meet these crises in a constructive way, stubborn unwillingness to submerge selfish power-seeking in democratic unity, and the statements of Chiang himself to the Peoples Political Council and on October 10, are sufficient evidence of the bankruptcy of Kuomintang leadership.

"With the glaring exposure of the Kuomintang's failure, dissatisfaction within China is growing rapidly. The prestige of the Party was never lower, and Chiang is losing the respect he once enjoyed as a leader.

"In the present circumstances, the Kuomintang is dependent on American support for survival. *But we are in no way dependent on the Kuomintang.*

"We do not need it for military reasons. It has lost the southern air-bases and cannot hold any section of the seacoast. Without drastic reforms—which must have a political base—its armies cannot fight the Japanese effectively no matter how many arms we give them. But it will not permit those reforms because its war against Japan is secondary to its desire to maintain its own undemocratic power.

"On the other hand, neither the Kuomintang nor any other Chinese regime, because of the sentiment of the people, can refuse American forces the use of Chinese territory against the Japanese. And the Kuomintang's attitude prevents the utilization of other forces, such as the Communist or Provincial troops, who should be more useful than the Kuomintang's demoralized armies.

"*We need not fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition.* The Party and Chiang will stick to us because our victory is certain and its their only hope for continued power.

"But our support of the Kuomintang will not stop its normally traitorous relations with the enemy and will only encourage it to continue sowing the seeds of future civil war by plotting with the present puppets for eventual consolidation of the occupied territories against the Communist-led forces of popular resistance.

"*We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang Government.* All the other groups in China want to defend themselves and fight Japan. Any new government under any other than the present reactionary control will be more cooperative and better able to mobilize the country.

"Actually, by continued and exclusive support of the Kuomintang, we tend to prevent the reforms and democratic reorganization of the government which are essential for the revitalization of China's war effort. Encouraged by our support the Kuomintang will continue in its present course, progressively losing the confidence of the people and becoming more and more impotent. Ignored by us, and excluded from the Government and joint prosecution of the war, the Communists and other groups will be forced to guard their own interests by more direct opposition.

"*We need not support the Kuomintang for international political reasons.* The day when it was expedient to inflate Chiang's status to one of the 'Big Four' is past, because with the obvious certainty of defeat, Japan's Pan-Asia propaganda loses its effectiveness. We cannot hope that China under the present Kuomintang can be an effective balance to Soviet Russia, Japan, or the British Empire in the Far East.

"*On the contrary, artificial inflation of Chiang's status only adds to his unreasonableness.* The example of a democratic, nonimperialistic China will

be much better counterpropaganda in Asia than the present regime, which, even in books like 'China's Destiny', hypnotizes itself with ideas of consolidating minority nations (such as the 'Southern Peninsula'), and protecting the 'rights' and at the same time national ties of its numerous emigrants (to such areas as Thailand, Malaya and the East Indies). Finally, the perpetuation in power of the present Kuomintang can only mean a weak and disunited China—a sure cause of international involvements in the Far East. The key to stability must be a strong, unified China. This can be accomplished only on a democratic foundation.

"We need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American or democratic groups. All the people and all other political groups of importance in China are friendly to the United States and look to it for the salvation of the country, now and after the war.

"In fact, Chiang has lost the confidence and respect of most of the American-educated, democratically minded liberals and intellectuals. The Chen brothers, Military, and Secret police cliques which control the Party and are Chiang's main supports are the most chauvinist elements in the country. The present Party ideology, as shown in Chiang's own books 'China's Destiny' and 'Chinese Economic Theory', is fundamentally anti-foreign and anti-democratic, both politically and economically.

"Finally, we feel no ties of gratitude to Chiang. The men he has kept around him have proved selfish and corrupt, incapable and obstructive. Chiang's own dealings with us have been an opportunist combination of extravagant demands and unfulfilled promises, wheedling and bargaining, bluff and blackmail. Chiang did not resist Japan until forced by his own people. He has fought only passively—not daring to mobilize his own people. He has sought to have us save him—so that he can continue his conquest of his own country. In the process, he has 'worked' us for all we were worth.

"We seem to forget that Chiang is an Oriental; that his background and vision are limited; that his position is built on skill as an extremely adroit political manipulator and a stubborn, shrewd bargainer; that he mistakes kindness and flattery for weakness; and that he listens to his own instrument of force rather than reason.

"Our policy toward China should be guided by two facts. First, we cannot hope to deal successfully with Chiang without being hard-boiled. Second, we cannot hope to solve China's problems (which are now our problems) without consideration of the opposition forces—Communist, Provincial and liberal.

"The parallel with Yugoslavia has been drawn before but is becoming more and more apt. It is as impractical to seek Chinese unity, the use of the Communist forces, and the mobilization of the population in the rapidly growing occupied areas by discussion in Chungking with the Kuomintang alone as it was to seek the solution of these problems through Nikhailovitch and King Peter's government in London, ignoring Tito.

"We should not be swayed by pleas of the danger of China's collapse. This is an old trick of Chiang's.

"There may be a collapse of the Kuomintang government; but it will not be the collapse of China's resistance. There may be a period of some confusion, but the eventual gains of the Kuomintang's collapse will more than make up for this. The crisis itself makes reform more urgent—and at the same time increases the weight to our influence. The crisis is the time to push—not to relax.

"We should not let Chiang divert us from the important questions by wasting time in futile discussion as to who is to be American commander. This is an obvious subterfuge.

"There is only one man qualified by experience for the job. And the fact is that no one who knows anything about China and is concerned over American rather than Chiang's interests will satisfy Chiang.

"We should end the hollow pretense that China is unified and that we can talk only to Chiang. This puts the trump card in Chiang's hands.

"Public announcement that the President's representative had made a visit to the Communist capital at Yenan would have a significance that no Chinese would miss—least of all the Generalissimo. The effect would be great even if it were only a demonstration with no real consultation. But it should be more than a mere demonstration; we must, for instance, plan on eventual use of the Communist armies and this cannot be purely on Kuomintang terms.

"Finally, if these steps do not succeed, we should stop veiling our negotiations with China in complete secrecy. This shields Chiang and is the voluntary abandonment of our strongest weapon.

"Chinese public opinion would swing violently against Chiang if he were shown obstructive and noncooperative with the United States. We should not be misled by the relatively very few Kuomintang die-hards; they are not the people. The Kuomintang Government could not withstand public belief that the United States was considering withdrawal of military support or recognition of the Kuomintang as the leader of Chinese resistance.

"More than ever, we hold all the aces in Chiang's poker game. It is time we started playing them.

"OCTOBER 10, 1944.

"JOHN S. SERVICE."

Q. I take it, Mr. Service, when you prepared your memorandum you had no consciousness you were making a proposal which was in any way inimical to the best interests of the United States in the conduct of the war at that time?—A. Certainly not. The most effective conduct of the war was a primary consideration but this was not in any way different from the policy which General Stilwell had been following and which we had been following in China.

Q. In fact, it wasn't any different from General Stilwell's policy but precisely what General Stilwell's policy was.—A. Certainly, as can be seen in the white paper on pages 68 to 70. General Stilwell said: "It is not a choice between throwing me out or losing Chiang Kai-shek and possibly China. It is a case of losing China's potential effort if Chiang Kai-shek is allowed to make removals now."

Q. As a matter of fact, the telegram which you are reading from, which appears on page 68 of the white paper, was sent on September 26, 1944, wasn't it?—A. That is correct.

Q. Almost a little over 2 weeks before you prepared your memorandum of October 10, 1944?—A. That is correct, but I should point out I of course had absolutely no knowledge of these telegrams by General Stilwell until I read the white paper.

Q. Yes, but the fact that General Stilwell had sent the telegram of September 26, taking substantially the identical position which you took subsequently in a telegram dated October 10, tends to indicate that you were in complete unity with General Stilwell, who was indeed your superior at that time. Is that not correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. I should like to introduce at this point, into the transcript, document No. 35-5.

"(Hurley—Hearings before Senate Relations Committee December 5, 6, 10, 1945)

"(1) HURLEY. President Roosevelt sent me to China, first as an officer in the United States Army, as his personal representative, with a directive to (a) prevent the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China; (b) keep the Chinese Army in the war; (c) harmonize relations between the Chinese and American military establishments; (d) bring about closer and more harmonious relations between the American Embassy in Chungking and the Chinese Government.

"(2) That part of our mission was accomplished. It was not accomplished without the relief or removal in China of some very admirable Americans, who either could not go along with the American policy or were incompatible with the officials of the Chinese Government with whom we had to deal * * * (p. 29-30).

"We had in China a secondary objective (a) to unify the anti-Japanese military forces in China; (b) to prevent civil war in China; (c) to support the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a free, united, democratic government.

"(3) On these objectives we also had the opposition of most of the career diplomats. * * * Notwithstanding this opposition we did succeed for the first time during China's 8 years of war against Japan in reestablishing discussions between the Communist armed party and the National Government. We did bring Mao Tse-tung * * * and Chiang Kai-shek * * * together in conference. * * * We did prevent civil war among the factions of China, at least as long as we remained there (p. 30-31).

"(4) HURLEY. At that time our policy in China was clearly defined and could be stated roughly as follows:

"1. To unify all anti-Japanese military forces in China, and

"2. To support the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a free, united, democratic government (p. 32)."

Q. I ask you to examine that document, the various statements there by General Hurley of the American policy objectives in China. Do you disagree with any of these stated objectives of American policy as General Hurley described them to the Senate?—A. I certainly did not.

Q. As a matter of fact, did you agree with all of them?—A. Yes.

Q. Did your views differ from General Hurley's in certain respects as to how these policy objectives might most effectively be accomplished?—A. We raise a question in a way when we ask if my opinions differ, because General Stilwell and I never had any discussion on the matter and there was never any pointing up of issues at the time.

Q. By General Stilwell, I take it you mean General Hurley?—A. General Hurley, I mean. I would say though that—and Secretary Byrnes has said the same thing—actually there was no disagreement in objectives. American policy in China was clear and all of us agreed in it. We differed however on the best methods to achieve that policy. General Hurley put great emphasis on one particular feature, and that was support of Chiang Kai-shek and central government, and he believed that by persuasion along he would induce Chiang Kai-shek to make the concessions necessary to bring about a coalition government and a unification of Chinese armies.

At the first we all agreed that that had to be tried, but eventually as the negotiations had gone on for some time with no success and as became apparent later with only a worsening of the situation, some of us believed that we had to take more direct action and in effect tell Chiang Kai-shek instead of asking him, and that is the only disagreement which we had on China policy with General Hurley.

Q. When you say "in effect tell" Chiang Kai-shek rather than ask him, you mean, I take it, that the United States influence or United States economic and military aid had to be conditioned upon Chiang Kai-shek's taking reciprocal action which was necessary in the interest of promoting the war against Japan?—A. Basically the point at issue was the use of the Communist armies. We were hampered in making our aid conditional during the war—there were some who recommended it in a drastic form. I always argued that you can't stop aid to an ally during the middle of a war, so that the only way that we could attack this question of the use of the Communist armies if Generalissimo Chiang wouldn't agree was to simply tell the Generalissimo, as we did in the case of Yugoslavia, we are going to arm any forces that are in position to actively engage and resist the Japanese. That is the position which we reached about the middle of February 1945.

Q. At this point I would like to introduce document 35-21, which is an excerpt from the testimony of the Secretary of State Byrnes.

Mr. MORELAND. In the transcript?

Q. Into the transcript.

DOCUMENT 35-21

Hurley—Hearings Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 5, 6, 7, 10, 1945

"(1) BYRNES. * * * During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our longer-range goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development of a strong, united and democratic China (p. 189).

"(2) BYRNES. * * * We believe, as we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well organized groups who are now without any voice in the Government of China (p. 189-190).

"(3) BYRNES. * * * To the extent that our influence is a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the other factions (p. 190).

"(4) BYRNES. * * * If I understand correctly what Ambassador Hurley has stated to me, and subsequently to the press and to this committee, he entertains no disagreement with this conception of our policy (p. 190).

"(5) BYRNES. That phase of our policy upon which Ambassador Hurley has placed the greatest emphasis is our support of the National Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (p. 191)."

Q. I would like to call your attention particularly to paragraph marked "(5)" in this document, Mr. Service. I take it that Secretary Byrnes is there referring to what you have just testified to, namely that General Hurley emphasized above all others supporting Chiang regardless of this—regardless, period.—A. That is correct. The Secretary has given a very concise and clear summary in the paragraphs above of American policy, to which all of us subscribed, and he comments without elaboration that the phase on which Ambassador Hurley placed the greatest emphasis was the support of the Nationalist Government. I think I should say that General Hurley's own concept of his instructions developed, changed from time to time. The clearest indication of this in public form is on page 71 of the white paper. General Hurley himself said that his original instructions—General Hurley, I should say, said in August that his instructions from the President were: "(1) To serve as personal representative of the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; (2) to promote harmonious relations between Chiang and General Joseph Stilwell and to facilitate the latter's exercise of command over the Chinese armies placed under his direction; (3) to perform certain additional duties respecting military supplies; and (4) to maintain intimate contact with Ambassador Gauss."

As will be seen from the following material in the white paper and from the excerpts which we just discussed, by the beginning of 1945—

Q. By "excerpts we just discussed" you refer to document 35-5?—A. 35-5.

Mr. ACHILLES. Isn't that 35-21, 5?

A. No.

Q. Secretary Byrnes' statement is 35-21; 35-5, it is General Hurley's various statements of objective, I believe.

Mr. ACHILLES. Right.

A. By the passage of several months, Ambassador Hurley's own account of his instructions, which were oral, had developed a great deal.

Q. Yes. Now I would like at this point to introduce document 35-4 in the transcript.

DOCUMENT 35-4

(Hurley—Hearings before Senate Relations Committee December 5, 6, 10, 1945)

"(1) WILEY. (2) That there were in the Department certain individuals that you mentioned; that these individuals were cognizant of the policy laid down by the State Department and by two Presidents, but that they apparently did not cooperate with you in carrying out that policy; is that correct? (p. 159).

"(2) HURLEY. That is correct (p. 159).

"(3) WILEY. (3) Were these individuals motivated in your judgment by simply a disagreement as to the validity of the policy, or do you think there was back of their motives something else? And if you have any information or facts that would clarify the answer, I would like to have it (p. 159).

"(4) HURLEY. I think, Senator, your first question that these men disagreed with the American policy is correct, but my contention with them * * * [was] that when the "die is cast," when the decision is made, when the policy is announced by duly constituted authority, it becomes the duty of every one of us to make that policy effective; and I charge that these gentlemen did not do that. They continued to snipe the policy and tried to defeat it. * * * (p. 160).

"(5) WILEY. * * * Was there anything back of this 'inability,' to put it that way, on their part, to play ball with you as the American representative, to carry out the President's foreign policy? Was there anything back of it except simply their own stubbornness, their inability to see that it was their obligation to play ball, or were they disloyal, or were they conniving with the Communists, or what was the picture? (p. 160).

"(6) HURLEY. They were disloyal to the American policy. I would not say they were disloyal to the United States Government. I think possibly that some of them were imbued with the crusader spirit, that they believed that it would be best for China to destroy the National Government and the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, but I tried to tell them that I could not argue, while I could recommend to Chiang Kai-shek and the Government the changes that I thought should take place—which I did, and a lot of changes did take place—that while I might agree with them on a lot of their criticism, our directive, mine and theirs, was to prevent the collapse of the Government and to uphold the

leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and, whether I believed in it or not, as soon as that policy was made by my superior it became my duty to make it effective (p. 161)."

Q. I direct your attention particularly, Mr. Service, to paragraph (6). Mr. Hurley is there referring to the various Foreign Service officers whom he had asserted had been disloyal to him, and I direct your attention particularly to the sentence, "I would not say they were disloyal to the United States Government." That is a quote. "I would not say they were disloyal to the United States Government." Then, "I think possibly that some of them were imbued with the crusader spirit * * *." I take it from that statement of General Hurley that whatever he thought about you and other Foreign Service officers, he at least did not regard you as disloyal to the United States Government. Is that a fair reading of his testimony?—A. Yes. He says that we were—he said in the previous sentence we were disloyal to the American policy. To that I would add a footnote—as he conceived it—but he goes on to say that we were not disloyal to the United States Government.

Q. Yes. Now then, with regard to the suggestion that you and others were disloyal to the United States policy, I should like to introduce document 35-7 into the transcript, which are excerpts from the testimony of Secretary of State Byrnes concerning particularly Mr. Service's report No. 40—that is to say, document 193—and I ask that that be included in the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. It shall be included.

DOCUMENT 35-7

(Hurley—Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 5, 6, 10, 1945)

"(1) BYRNES. The specific action of John Service to which Ambassador Hurley referred in his conversation with me was the preparation of a memorandum on October 10, 1944. I have also read this memorandum.

"(2) Before I turn to its contents, I wish to call attention to a few facts, as they have been presented to me. At the time this memorandum was prepared by Mr. Service, he was not attached to the Embassy at Chungking. Although he retained his status as a Foreign Service officer, he was attached to the staff of General Stilwell as a political observer in Yenan. He was at the time administratively responsible to General Stilwell and not to the Embassy (pp. 196-197) * * *.

"(3) BYRNES. Ambassador Hurley, as of that date * * * was not in charge of the United States Embassy in Chungking.

"Under these circumstances, it seems to me, it cannot be said that anything Mr. Service wrote constituted insubordination to Ambassador Hurley (p. 197) * * *.

"(4) BYRNES. The Service report was addressed to General Stilwell. It was also routed to the Embassy in Chungking. The Embassy forwarded it to the Department without endorsing its conclusions, but with a noncommittal covering memorandum indicating that it represented the views of a single political observer (p. 198) * * *.

"(5) BYRNES. It is not my purpose to dwell at greater length upon the two documents. In my opinion, based upon the information which has thus far been presented to me, there is nothing in them to support the charge that either Mr. Acheson or Mr. Service was guilty of the slightest disloyalty to his superior officers (p. 198).

"(6) What it amounts to is that within proper channels they expressed to those under whom they served certain views which differed to a greater or less degree from the policies of the Government as then defined. Of course, it is the duty of every officer of the United States to abide by and to administer the declared policy of his Government. But conditions change, and often change quickly in the affairs of governments. Whenever an official honestly believes that changed conditions require it, he should not hesitate to express his views to his superior officers (p. 199).

"(7) I should be profoundly unhappy to learn that an officer of the Department of State, within or without the Foreign Service, might feel bound to refrain from submitting through proper channels an honest report or recommendation for fear of offending me or anyone else in the Department. If that day should arrive, I will have lost the very essence of the assistance and guidance I require for the successful discharge of the heavy responsibilities of my office" (p. 199).

Q. I take it, Mr. Service, that this testimony of Secretary Byrnes may be said to reveal he not only did not regard you as disloyal to the United States Government but not even to, nor to American policy, but not even to General Hurley personally. Is that your understanding of this testimony?—A. That is correct.

Secretary Byrnes says there is nothing in them to support the charge that either Mr. Acheson or Mr. Service was even slightly disloyal to his superior officers.

Q. Now, in that connection, as to who your superior officer was, I should like to introduce document No. 35-6, and I ask that that be included in the transcript.

DOCUMENT 35-6

Hurley—Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
December 5, 6, 10, 1945

"(1) CONNALLY. Was Mr. Service serving under you in China at that time?

"(2) HURLEY. Well, that is disputed, sir. He was in the State Department, and I was Ambassador.

"(3) CONNALLY. Well, where was he?

"(4) HURLEY. He was in China (p. 16).

"(5) CONNALLY. Well, was he not under you?

"(6) HURLEY. No, sir. If he had been, I would have taken him out immediately. I could not control him. He said he was serving the commander of American forces in China—anything to oppose the American policy of sustaining the Government of the Republic.

"(7) CONNALLY. Well, what was his status? I do not know him. I never heard of him until you brought him up; but what was his status out there? Was he attached to the Embassy, or was he the adviser to the American general, or what was he?

"(8) HURLEY. He was a foreign-service diplomat, who had been assigned as political adviser to the American general.

"(9) CONNALLY. Well, then he was not directly under your organization?

"(10) HURLEY. Well, eventually he was * * *" (p. 17).

Q. In this document General Hurley seems to suggest that there was some question whether you were responsible to him or to General Stilwell, does he not?—A. He does.

Q. Was there in fact any question whatsoever as to who your superior was and under whose orders you were operating?—A. Absolutely none. My original instructions clearly stated I would be completely under Army orders and all during the period from August 18, 1943, until April 12, 1945, I traveled and performed all my duties under Army orders.

Q. I should like to introduce into the transcript at this point documents number 94-1, 94-2, and 94-3. These documents consist of three letters from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, the first of them dated June 29, 1943, the second consisting of two pages dated November 22, 1944, and the third dated January 5, 1945, all of which relate to this particular question. I ask that they be included in the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. It shall be done.

Copy: ap

DOCUMENT 94-1

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 29, 1943.

The Honorable the SECRETARY OF STATE.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Political factors have proved to be of major importance in the prosecution of the war in the China-Burma-India Theater. Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General of the U. S. Army Forces in that theater, is therefore urgently in need of having trained political observers assigned to his command to supplement the work done by his military intelligence.

General Stilwell has indicated the names of certain Foreign Service Officers who would be of assistance if sent to the theater for this purpose, as follows:

To be sent to the U. S. Embassy, Chungking, China, for detail to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India: Raymond P. Ludden, John S. Service, John K. Emmerson.

To be sent to the U. S. Mission at New Delhi for detail to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India: Kenneth C. Krentz.

The duties of these officers would not only be to collect Chinese, Indian, and Japanese information of interest to General Stilwell, but also to be of service to commanders in the field in matters affecting relations with the various Burmese factions, British colonial administrators, the Free Thais, the French in Indo-China, and the Indo-Chinese.

Any assistance that you can give in connection with this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

DOCUMENT 94-2

Copy: ap

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 22, 1944.

The honorable the ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer again to your letter of November 8, 1944 in regard to the release of three of the four Foreign Service Officers who have been attached to the United States Army Forces in China, Burma, and India.

Your need for the restoration of these officers to regular Foreign Service duty is very evident. It was presented in full to Generals Sultan and Wedemeyer, the Commanding Generals of the India-Burma and of the China Theaters, respectively, and their views on the matter have now been received.

Unfortunately the only officer who, it appears, can be spared is Mr. Ludden, and General Wedemeyer indicates his regret at losing his services. Nevertheless when he returns from the field in approximately two months General Wedemeyer states that in accordance with your request Mr. Ludden will be given prompt air transportation to Washington.

As for Messrs. Davies, Service and Emmerson, who, as you know, are all detailed for duty in China, General Wedemeyer indicates that it is his conviction that unless these three officers are retained, military activities will be hampered. I therefore hope that their assignment to the China Theater need not be changed.

There is no political adviser assigned to the India-Burma Theater at the present time. General Sultan speaks of the former China-Burma-India Theater as having been full of political complexities and of your Foreign Service Officers having been an indispensable link with the State Department in connection therewith, as well as of the superior manner in which they performed their duties. Being without a political adviser not only would hamper our military activities, he states, but the British, who have a regularly assigned political adviser at Southeast Asia Command Headquarters and thoroughly understand such a position, would not comprehend General Sultan's having to secure advice from the American Mission in New Delhi. On the basis of the assignment of a really qualified political adviser to the India-Burma Theater being a necessity, he earnestly requests that Mr. Max Waldo Bishop be assigned by the State Department to the India-Burma Theater. At the same time he appreciates your need for having the services of all possible Foreign Service officers and will keep the situation constantly in mind so that as soon as the need for a political adviser is at an end this will be reported.

I am very aware of how great your need is to have as many of your Foreign Service officers as possible returned to regular duty. At the same time, these two theaters (India-Burma and China) have the most unusual political problems confronting them constantly, and your help in the matter is a real necessity.

In view of the above I trust that the request of General Sultan to have Mr. Max Waldo Bishop assigned to the India-Burma Theater, and General Wedemeyer's desire to retain Messrs. Davies, Service, and Emmerson in the China Theater can be acceded to.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

DOCUMENT 94-3

Copy : ap

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 5, 1945.

The Honorable the SECRETARY OF STATE.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to your letter of December 26, 1944, with respect to the Foreign Service Officers assigned as political advisors in the China Theater.

As the State Department has already been advised, General Wedemeyer has informed the War Department that Mr. John Davies is preparing to leave Chungking for assignment to the Moscow Embassy. General Wedemeyer is very desirous that Mr. Davies remain in Chungking, however, until the arrival of Mr. John Service who, it is understood, should be ready to leave Washington for China early in January.

Your letter indicates that the Embassy in Chungking is now sufficiently staffed so as to obviate the necessity of having a political advisor detailed to the U. S. Forces in that city, although you believe that the retention of one or two officers in Chinese Communist territory is advantageous, and you raise the question of releasing any or all of the Foreign Service Officers. Your need for Foreign Service Officers and your request that three out of the four advisors assigned to China Theater be released was communicated to General Wedemeyer in November. As I advised in my letter of November 22, 1944, he indicated that unless three of the original four advisors were retained, military activities would be hampered. Since that time military and political problems in the China Theater have increased. However, General Wedemeyer has again been queried as to whether he can relinquish the services of the Foreign Service Officers now assigned to his headquarters. Your indication that if General Wedemeyer requests the retention of Mr. Ludden you believe favorable consideration could be given thereto, as well as the question of his and Mr. Emmerson's proceeding to the United States for leave and consultation has also been submitted to General Wedemeyer. You will be informed as promptly as possible of his reply.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

(Off record discussion, short recess.)

Q. I also offer for inclusion in the transcript document No. 94-4, which is a copy of the telegram from the Department of State to the Ambassador at Chungking detailing Mr. Service to the Army in accordance with the Secretary of War Stimson's request.

[Telegram sent]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, Aug. 10, 1943, 10:00 p. m.

AMERICAN EMBASSY, CHUNGKING, 1081:

Monroe B. Hall, Class VI, New Delhi, has been directed to proceed to Chungking as soon as possible for consultation with General Stilwell after which he will return to New Delhi. He will be stationed at New Delhi but will be subject to instructions from General Stilwell.

John K. Emmerson, Class VII, Lima, has been designated Second Secretary of Embassy at Chungking.

Ludden at Kunming is designated Second Secretary of Embassy at Chungking. He will retain Commission as Consul at Kunming. Should proceed upon arrival of Langdon. This transfer not made at his request nor for his convenience. Transportation expenses, per diem, and shipment effects, Kunming to Chungking, authorized subject Travel Regulations. Air travel authorized. Expenses chargeable "Transportation, Foreign Service."

Hall, Emmerson, Ludden, and John S. Service are attached to the staff of the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India, and are subject to instructions from General Stilwell and authorized to travel to any country or place which he may designate.

While Department has authorized expenses for Hall, Ludden, and Emmerson in proceeding to Chungking, it assumes, as in the case of Davies, the Army will provide travel expenses and per diem for such missions as General Stilwell will direct for all four officers.

HULL.

(Off-record discussion.)

Q. Now, Mr. Service, you were assigned by the State Department to the commanding general of the CBI theater on August 10, 1943. How long did you remain attached to the commanding general of the CBI theater?—A. I was returned to active duty in the State Department on April 12, 1945.

Q. And in the meantime General Stilwell had been recalled on October 19, 1944, had he not? A. That is correct.

Q. And you returned to the United States at that time, did you not? A. Soon after that time, under Army orders.

Q. And you were subsequently recalled to China by General Wedemeyer, were you not? A. Yes; and returned to China under Army orders.

Q. But you remained attached to the commanding general, CBI theater, throughout? A. That is correct.

Q. And until April 12, 1945? A. (Nodded yes.)

The CHAIRMAN. The answer then is "Yes" to the last question? A. Yes.

Q. In that connection I ask you to refer to document 35-7, which has already been introduced into the transcript, and particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof. Secretary Byrnes makes it clear, does he not, that you were in no sense and at no time a subordinate of General Hurley but of the commanding general of the theater? A. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? Do you intend sections 2 and 3 to be written into the transcript?

Q. No, not again, just refer to them, since that has already been included in the transcript.

Now referring back to document 35-6, particularly paragraph 10, General Hurley seems to close that colloquy with Senator Connally by the suggestion that you eventually were a subordinate officer, but as a matter of fact you were not, ever?—A. I never was subordinate to Ambassador Hurley.

Q. You never were during his entire tenure of office as Ambassador a member of the staff of the Embassy or in any way responsible to General Hurley?—A. I was never administratively a member of the Embassy staff. The final orders under which I returned from China to the United States were issued by the Army, they were Army orders.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a question here.

Mr. STEVENS. Could you clarify for us or have it clarified, the relation to exist between General Stilwell and Mr. Hurley as a personal representative of the President? Did Mr. Hurley, in other words, feel that General Stilwell was responsible to him in his mission? A. I have never seen such a statement. I do not believe that the military commander of a theater would normally be considered subordinate to a personal representative of the President. I would say that General Stilwell's immediate superior was General Marshall, and eventually the President as Commander in Chief.

Mr. ACHILLES. May we just clarify for the record the dates that General Hurley stayed in China? Is it correct that he first arrived in China as the President's personal representative on September 6, 1944?

A. That is correct.

Mr. ACHILLES. When he was made Ambassador to China, that was done while he was in China?

A. No.

Mr. ACHILLES. He didn't return to the United States?

A. He was continuously in China from September 6 until the date of his appointment as ambassador, which was November 30, 1944. He did not actually present his credentials until one of the first days of January 1945, but he functioned as ambassador from November 1930. He left China on February 19, 1945, and returned to the United States for consultation. Page 5, if you have it.

Mr. ACHILLES. And then he returned again?

A. To Chungking. The date is not here but it was about April 22 or 23, 1945.

Mr. ACHILLES. And then he remained?

A. Which was after I had left China, it seems to me, and then he remained in China until September 22, 1945, when he returned to the United States for the last time.

Mr. ACHILLES. For the last time, yes.

Q. Now, you have testified, Mr. Service, that you were recalled to Washington under Army orders at about the same time as General Stilwell was recalled on October 19, 1944, and I believe that you also testified that you thereafter remained attached to the commanding general of the CBI theater during the period while you were back in the United States, and that thereafter you returned at

General Wedemeyer's request to China to continue to serve on the staff of the commanding general of the theater. Will you describe to the Board how you came to be attached to General Wedemeyer's staff after General Stilwell was recalled?—A. There were four of us Foreign Service officers who had been assigned to General Stilwell at his request. At the time of General Stilwell's recall, I believe that the State Department assumed that our assignment would be terminated and that we would come back to active duty under the State Department. I believe in the very first days of November the State Department addressed a letter to Secretary Stimson asking for the return of all of us or all but one officer. To that letter Secretary Stimson replied in document 94-2, saying that General Wedemeyer wished to retain at least three of us—Davies, Service, and Emmerson. It was on the basis of that request that my assignment with the Army was continued and never terminated.

Q. Well, particularly do you know what caused the revision of plans and the occasion for your return to serve with General Wedemeyer after you were under the impression that you were about to discontinue that work?—A. It had been expected when the Department assumed that I would be released that I would be assigned to Moscow, to the Embassy there. Subsequently, in late December, while the negotiations with the Army were still proceeding, John Davies, who had remained in Chungking, had a disagreement with Ambassador Hurley, in which Ambassador Hurley's reaction was so violent that it became necessary to remove John Davies from Chungking immediately. The State Department telephoned to me out in California, where I was on leave, and asked if I would be willing to return to Chungking and how soon, if I could leave in a few days. I said, "Of course."

Q. Were you advised that General Wedemeyer had particularly requested?—A. Certainly.

Q. Requested that you be detailed to fill this vacancy?—A. That is right, that is correct, and there was another consideration which I think should be mentioned which influenced the State Department in its willingness to release me or to extend my assignment, and that was the very important consideration of receiving intelligence on the Chinese Communists. That was a field in which I had done a great deal of work. I had a solid basis of personal acquaintance with the principal Communist leaders. The State Department did not feel that they were in a position to send an Embassy officer up there, so that from the State Department's point of view the only way they could continue to receive reports, direct reporting on the Chinese Communists, was by having a State Department man assigned to the Army, so that the Army would detail him to Yenan a good deal of the time. We do not have that letter but it is in the file in which it is very clearly stated as a condition of my return to China, that I would spend a large part of my time in Yenan and that the principal duty would be reporting on the Chinese Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. Who in the State Department made that telephone call?—A. Mr. John Carter Vincent, who at that time was Director of—I am not sure, he was either Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs or possibly Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.

Q. Now at the time of your return, then, to serve with General Wedemeyer, Ambassador, or rather General Hurley had already become Ambassador, had he not?—A. That is correct.

Q. Now, at the time of your return at General Wedemeyer's request, do you know whether he had knowledge of your report No. 40, which is document No. 193, which has been introduced into the transcript?—A. By "he" you mean General Wedemeyer?

Q. General Wedemeyer, yes.—A. I cannot positively say that he had knowledge of it, but I am convinced that he must have had knowledge of it because the paper had been discussed in headquarters, it was well known to the Assistant Chief of Staff for G-2.

Q. Who was that?—A. Col. Joseph Dickey. It was well known to Ambassador Hurley, who had already taken violent exception to it in discussions in Chungking. General Wedemeyer was familiar with my views, and I have always taken it for granted and I am sure it is correct that he certainly knew of my memorandum No. 40.

Q. So you think that—in your opinion anyway—A. My conviction.

Q. It is your conviction that General Wedemeyer was familiar with your report before he requested your return to China?—A. Certainly.

Q. For service on his staff?—A. That is right.

Q. Did he ever discuss—did he ever at any time discuss this with you, this memorandum, or this report, or the views expressed in it?—A. He certainly discussed the views I expressed in it. We had a number of discussions on general policy questions.

Q. Did he ever indicate that he regarded the general policy view that you expressed as being in any way inimical to the interests of the United States?—A. Quite to the contrary. He welcomed the views, and our document No. 204 was written at his specific request, and he said that he agreed with the views that he put forth.

Mr. STEVENS. May I ask a question, please, Mr. Service? You mentioned a letter that specified your return and assignment to General Wedemeyer. Can you give us enough identification of that so that we may obtain it?—A. It is a letter to which Secretary Stimson's letter of January 5 is a reply. It will be a letter in the last days of December or early January.

The CHAIRMAN. December 26.

A. You will note here—this is the letter of Secretary Stimson—that the—

The CHAIRMAN. You are reading from what document?

A. 94-3.

“Your letter indicates that the Embassy in Chungking is now sufficiently staffed so as to obviate the necessity of having a political advisor detailed to the United States forces in that city, although you believe that the retention of one or two officers in Chinese Communist territory is advantageous. * * *”

And in subsequent discussions in Chungking with General Wedemeyer he acknowledged, he stated himself that that had been one of the purposes, one of the conditions of the State Department agreement about continuation of my assignment with the Army.

Q. That is that you should continue your intelligence reporting activities on Chinese Communists—A. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. The direct answer to the question asked is that the letter in question is of December 26, 1944?—A. That is right.

Q. I should like to have included in the transcript at this point document 84-2, which is an exhibit from the Congressional Record for May 1, 1950, setting forth a broadcast by Mr. Henry J. Taylor.

“DOCUMENT 84-2

Taylor, Henry J.—J/S record—Cong. Rec. May 1, 1950,
pages A3322-A3323

“First, Ambassador Hurley told me that John Service had already been relieved of his duties once in China, and sent home, by Supreme Commander Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, another fine American. Nevertheless, State Department officials in Washington sent John Service back to China, through another channel, to the Communist area of Yunnan—by bypassing Wedemeyer, and without the knowledge or consent of Ambassador Hurley * * *

“When Service reached America, he was arrested by the FBI. He wasn't just questioned by the FBI. He was arrested by the FBI, as Mr. J. Edgar Hoover would verify to you. For J. Edgar Hoover is not afraid of anybody. That's what makes him a great American.”

Q. I should like to ask you, Mr. Service, were you ever relieved of your duties in China and sent home by General Wedemeyer?—A. The telegram ordering my return is from Marshall.

Q. That is the telegram ordering your return in April 1945?—A. That is correct.

Q. So that that is the only order that you know of for your return to the United States, your dismissal from attachment to the Army?—A. That is correct.

Q. At any time prior to that were you ever sent home by General Wedemeyer?—A. No.

Q. Were you ever at any time returned by the State Department to the Communist area of Yunnan, China, by bypassing General Wedemeyer and without the knowledge of or consent of Ambassador Hurley?—A. No. After I left China in April 1945 on Army orders I never returned to China.

Q. And before that time you had never been ordered back by General Wedemeyer and returned to China?—A. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice that in that exhibit that you quoted from, 84-2, that it states that you were returned to China without the knowledge of Ambassador Hurley. Do you know anything about whether Ambassador Hurley knew you were going back?—A. I did not return to China after my recall.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently Ambassador Hurley is alleging in this statement that you at some time previous to your final return from China—

Mr. STEVENS. Could this not have made reference to your return, I think it was in October, to the United States, and then your order from California out again?

The CHAIRMAN. That is the point that I was about to make.

Q. May I ask this question? If the reference in this document is to your return to China in January 1945, could that possibly have been by bypassing General Wedemeyer?—A. No, because we have from this correspondence—no, it was at his request.

Q. That is, you went at that time at the specific request of General Wedemeyer?

The CHAIRMAN. That already clearly appears in evidence, that you returned to China at the request of Wedemeyer. I just wanted to find out whether that return to China was with or without the knowledge of Ambassador Hurley?

A. I do not know, sir.

Q. Let us suppose it was without the knowledge of Ambassador Hurley, is there any possible reason why he should have known about an officer who had been attached to the commanding general's staff since August 1943 and who remained so attached, and who was merely returning to the theater?—A. Since my assignment to the Army was not broken, there was no reason for the State Department to consult the Ambassador. It was merely a matter of continuing an assignment which already existed and of which the Ambassador knew.

Q. So that the only time you ever went to China when General Wedemeyer was commanding general was at his specific request, is that correct?—A. That is correct, and under Army orders.

Q. And under Army orders. And that after your recall to the United States in April of 1945 you have never again been to China, is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. Now returning again, Mr. Service, to document No. 35-3, which has already been introduced into the transcript, I direct your attention particularly to paragraph 4 of this document, where General Hurley states that your report No. 40, which is document No. 193 in evidence here, was circulated among the Communists, whose support he was seeking for our policy. In this connection I also direct your attention to document 35-12, and I ask that that be introduced into the transcript at this point.

“Doc. 35-12

(Hurley—Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee December 5, 6, 10, 1945)

“(1) CONNALLY. Now, you said in your statement the other day in the press that these subordinates, these Foreign Service men, had been continually advising the Communists that your views did not represent the views of the Government. How did they advise them—in writing, or by personal contact? * * * You make the statement that they communicated with them. Now, how did they communicate with them? (p. 179).

“(2) HURLEY. By writing and by talking and by being with them (p. 179).

“(3) CONNALLY. Can you say what officials of the Communists they contacted and talked with? (p. 180).

“(4) HURLEY. Well, I would not know exactly. I do not think they all contacted the top officials, but they did contact, and I have told you that it is contained in Public Document No. 30.

“(5) CONNALLY. Oh, I know!

“(6) HURLEY. Signed by John Service, and dated October 10; and you can get it, in writing, sir.

“(7) CONNALLY. That was addressed to the Secretary of State; that was not addressed to the Communists?

“(8) HURLEY. No, sir; it was addressed to Stilwell.

“(9) CONNALLY. He was not a member of the armed Communists, he was our officer, was he not—Stilwell?

“(10) HURLEY. That is right, but I say this document that proves it is addressed to him * * *.

“(11) CONNALLY. Yes, but I want to know. You have made the charge, yourself, and I want to know what you have to say about your statement that they were continuously advising the Communists. Now, they would not advise the

Communists through the State Department: they would advise them directly, either in writing or personally. Now, which was it? Do you still adhere to the statement that they were advising them continuously that your views did not represent the Government's views? (p. 180).

"(12) HURLEY. I most certainly do! (p. 181).

"(13) CONNALLY. Well, would you mind telling us whom they saw?

"(14) HURLEY. All right, I will begin again. I will repeat. A telegram sent by George Acheson on the 28th of last February, in which he said—

"(15) CONNALLY. To whom?

"(16) HURLEY. To the Secretary of State.

"(17) CONNALLY. Oh, well, I want to know.

"(18) HURLEY. Well, you know, it is in writing, sir.

"(19) CONNALLY. Why, certainly.

"(20) HURLEY. And you ask me to prove what is in that, and I have given you a writing.

"(21) CONNALLY. All right. I was asking what communications they had had, not with the State Department but with the Communists. All right, we will not pursue that any further. We have to go out and find it out, ourselves (p. 181)."

Q. In his document General Hurley in substance repeats your charge that you had circulated or that this report was circulated among the Communists. Did you ever disclose the contents of document 193 to anyone in the Chinese Communist Party?—A. I did not.

Q. As a matter of fact, when was its first disclosed to the Chinese Communist Party and the world, as General Hurley says, according to your information?—

A. When Congressman Judd put it in the Congressional Record on October 19, 1949, stating at the time he did so that the copy was furnished him by General Hurley.

Q. That, I may say, appears on page 1523 of the Congressional Record for October 19, 1949.

Now again with reference to document No. 35-3 and General Hurley's statement in paragraphs 6 and 7 that you and other career men continuously told the Communist armed party and the world that America was betting on the wrong horse and that the American policy which General Hurley was upholding in China did not have the support of the United States Government, did you ever make any statement in substance or effect to anyone in the Chinese Communist Party to this effect?

The CHAIRMAN. What was that quotation you just gave?

Q. It is in paragraphs 6 and 7 of document 35-3.—A. There are several things there to answer. Certainly I never said to the Chinese Communists or to anyone else that Ambassador Hurley was not representing American policy. In fact, I don't understand how a junior officer could make such a statement. The fact that the Ambassador is the Ambassador and continues to be the Ambassador is the—you can't argue the fact that he represents American policy. I have never made a statement to the Communists that we were backing the wrong horse.

The CHAIRMAN. Or that the American policy which you were upholding in China did not have the support of the United States Government?

A. That is right.

Mr. STEVENS. Did you ever make any statements which could be so interpreted by the Communists?

A. Well, the Communists knew, as the correspondents knew and everyone knew that there was discussion and debate as to where we went next. That debate was going on in the press. The debate was going on in American circles. As to whether or not we could cooperate with the Communists in any form, for instance if we landed on the coast of China whether or not we would take more positive measures in China—now the Communists knew that we were not all of one mind but as for saying that we were backing the wrong horse, definitely not, because I always argued, if I was asked I always said that we were not committed to all-out support of any one party or faction in China. That was our line, that we were not there to take part in a civil war, we were all-out for a united and democratic China.

Q. Now, to the extent that this debate to which you refer had been going on, did you express any views that you may have had in that debate to the Chinese Communists or did you express them in your discussions with American officials?—

A. I made no secret of the fact that I was favorably impressed by the Chinese Communists. I made no secret of the fact that I thought that we would have to work with them in a military way, but those were exactly the same things that our official policy was recommending. We were trying to unify their forces,

trying to bring about a coalition government. But I did not express those views in a critical way of Ambassador Hurley.

Mr. STEVENS. Did you ever in your talks with the Communists indicate that Mr. Hurley's interpretation of the policies were wrong?

A. Certainly not. In fact, I have urged the Chinese Communists not to engage in personal attacks on Ambassador Hurley, which they were commencing to do even while I was in China, because, I said, that is the worst possible way for you to win American friendship or support, if that is what you want, to attack the American Ambassador, because he is the American Ambassador, he does represent America.

Q. As a matter of fact, in expressing the view that the United States should utilize the Communist forces in the fight against Japan, did you understand at any time from any of your contacts with General Hurley that that differed in any way from his objectives?—A. It did not.

Q. As a matter of fact, did General Hurley ever say anything to you about the subject?—A. Certainly.

Q. What did he say?—A. When I returned from Yen-an the first time——

Q. That is when?—A. On October 23, 1944, I was instructed to make myself available to Ambassador Hurley when I passed through Chungking if he should wish to talk to me about the current attitude, the policies, objectives of the Chinese Communists.

Q. Now, this is at the time you were on your way back to the United States?—A. That is correct.

Q. Coincident with General Stilwell's recall?—A. Yes. General Hurley was desirous of talking to me, called me over to his house, and I spent most of that evening of October 23 having dinner and talking with him. My chief concern was to tell him of the confidence and feeling of strength of the Chinese Communists and their determination to receive a share of American arms and some sort of recognition as a fighting force against Japan. Ambassador Hurley repeatedly told me that they don't need to worry, that is what I am here to do, that is one of the things I am here for, is to be sure and make sure that they do receive arms.

Q. This he told you when?—A. On the evening of October 23, 1944.

Mr. ACHILLES. Had General Hurley then read your memorandum of October 10, your memorandum No. 40? Did you discuss that with him?

A. I believe he had not read it at that time. Actually I brought that memo down with me from Yen-an on that occasion, and I had delivered one copy to the Embassy and one copy to the headquarters, but I did not—I was not at that time delivering copies or furnishing copies for General Hurley since he was the President's representative and was not the Ambassador.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you express the same views to General Hurley that you had in the memo?

A. I don't think that our discussion ever covered that point, that particular point of whether or not the major objective of policy was to support Chiang Kai-shek, no.

Q. As a matter of fact, did you do much of the talking on that occasion?—A. I did very little of the talking.

Mr. STEVENS. Do you intend to direct yourself to (7) in the document 35-3, the last three lines particularly? “* * * they charged me with making my own policy in China and said that it was not the policy of the United States Government.” Did you so charge? And to whom, if so?

A. I did not so charge.

Mr. STEVENS. As a matter of fact, did you ever make any statement of any kind at any time that suggested in any way to the Communists that General Hurley was making his own policy independently of the United States policy?

A. We were living in a very heated atmosphere where a great deal of debate and discussion was going on all of the time.

Mr. STEVENS. But what I wanted to know was, were you debating it with the Chinese Communists?

A. No, no, certainly not, sir. In my document 204, the memorandum which Mr. Ludden and I prepared on February 14, we stated at the conclusion:

“Support of the Generalissimo is but one means to an end; it is not an end in itself, but by present statements of policy we show a tendency to confuse the means with the end.”

Q. Now that memo, was that addressed to the Communists in any way or shown to the Communists?—A. No.

Q. That was addressed to the commanding general of the theater, was it not?—
A. But that can be interpreted, in reply to Mr. Stevens' question, that can be interpreted, if you so wish to interpret it, as a criticism of General Hurley and an inference that General Hurley is not following the basic objectives of American policy by confusing the means with the end.

Mr. STEVENS. One other question. Did you ever show to anyone a copy of this memorandum 40? Anyone who was not a member of the United States Government or its establishments?

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone in China?

Mr. STEVENS. Anyone in China; that is correct?

A. I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Q. Coming back to your reference a moment ago—

Mr. STEVENS. May I interrupt again? Do you know of anyone who did, Mr. Service? Any member of the United States Government forces that did or gave access of that document to someone in China?

A. I do not know of anyone; no.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you suspect someone?

A. I believe that it may have been shown; yes.

Q. Your position is that you have no personal knowledge?—A. I have no personal knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. This suspicion that you have—was it with any connivance of yours?

A. It was not, it was when I was physically absent from China, or from Yen-an.

Q. Or from China? Physically absent from China?—A. It was after I left Yen-an. It was not shown to the Chinese Communists at that time.

Q. According to your belief.—A. According to my belief.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's clarify this matter a little bit. To whom do you suspect that it was shown?

Q. I would like to suggest that if he has any suspicions I would like to avoid having him discuss suspicions in this proceeding.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think we should interject just suspicions into the transcript, perhaps.

Q. Which, I may say, is quite a different thing—I would advise him to discuss with you freely.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness seemed to have some hesitation on the point and I just wanted to make sure that it had nothing to do with revelation by him to the Chinese Communists.

A. It did not.

Mr. STEVENS. Or to anyone outside United States Government forces?

A. I was not—I did not show it to anyone outside the American Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Or you were not involved in its being shown to anyone?

A. That is right.

Q. And to the extent that you have any grounds for believing it may have been shown, it was at a time, you say, when you were not in China at all; you were physically absent from China?—A. That is correct.

Q. Not merely physically absent from Yen-an but absent from China?—A. I left China the next day after I left Yen-an, so the only thing I can say with positive knowledge is that it was not while I was in Yen-an.

Q. And that if it was shown to anyone, you had no connection or participation in it?—A. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And is it fair to say that whoever it was shown to was not a Communist?

A. If it were shown to anyone, it was not a Communist.

Q. At least as far as—A. As far as I know.

Q. More particularly, what you mean to say is that to the extent you have any reason to believe it was shown to someone, you have no reason to believe it was shown to anyone in the Communist Party.—A. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Q. I would like to return just a moment—a short time ago we were discussing the question of whether or not you had in any way indicated that General Hurley did not represent the policy of the United States or that you had indicated to Communists or anyone that the United States was backing the wrong horse, and in that connection you referred to your memorandum, which is document No. 204, and said that that might have been interpreted as a criticism of General Hurley. What I want to find out is, that memorandum was addressed exclusively

to your superior officer, the commanding general of the theater; is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. Did you ever show that memorandum to anybody in the Communist Party or anybody other than American officials?

The CHAIRMAN. In China? We are restricting our questions here to apply to when he was in China?

Q. That is right.—A. I did not show that to any Chinese or any Chinese Communists. I discussed the memorandum, some of the contents of it, with a very reliable friend who was an American correspondent. He did not read the memorandum but I discussed the contents, particularly that section where we draw the parallel between China—suggest a parallel between China and Yugoslavia.

Q. Now in that connection—

Mr. STEVENS. Would you mind inserting the name?

A. Mr. Harold Isaacs of Newsweek.

Mr. STEVENS. Is that the only person?

A. That is the only person.

Q. Now, insofar as you discussed the general views expressed in that memorandum with this American correspondent, did you understand that to be a proper and authorized activity as part of your functions on the staff of the commanding general of the theater?—A. I would say that discussion of background material, particularly concerning the political situation in China, was habitually and with authority discussed with the correspondents. And as far as this relates to my own personal views, which is what it was, it was quite proper for me to discuss them with the press, and with a reliable correspondent. It did not purport to be an expression of official views, of the Army's views—nothing except our own views on policy there and the situation in China.

Mr. STEVENS. This was a memo which was prepared jointly by you and Mr. Ludden; was it not?

A. Yes.

Mr. STEVENS. Therefore it reflected more than your personal views; did it not?

A. Yes; we were in the same status, working together.

Q. As a matter of fact, did it represent your personal views and the views of your commanding general, as you best understood them? A. He told us that he was glad to have it; that it pointed out certain things that he agreed with and danger he wanted to avoid, but it was not discussed with Mr. Isaacs on that basis.

Q. No; I am addressing myself to a slightly different question.

You say it reflected your personal views. Did not the views expressed also reflect, as you understood them, the views of General Wedemeyer?—A. Well, certainly, but I never told anybody that General Wedemeyer agreed with this.

Q. I understand that; that is not what I am asking.

Now, you have indicated that it was the general policy, it was authorized policy, and that you and others were authorized to discuss background material of political character with the American representatives of the press in China. Do you regard discussion of the general views embodied in this memorandum with members of the press as any deviation from that authorized?—A. None whatsoever so long as I do not represent to the press that those are the views of General Stilwell, or General Wedemeyer.

Mr. STEVENS. What people did this authorization, to authorize you to talk to newspaper people and others about your personal views? Was it ever anything in writing? How did you get that instruction and know the latitude that you could go to in talking to the press?

A. The status and duties of the political officers assigned to the Army were very loose and vaguely defined. The principal officer of the political officers was John Davies, who went out to China with General Stilwell when he first went out to take over command of the theater. John Davies had oral instructions from General Stilwell, and he functioned in a very important way as Stilwell's public relations officer, particularly on political background. When we came in, particularly when I came in in August 1943, I was serving really under Davies, who was the senior of the political officers, and John spent most of his time in India and I spent my time in Chungking. I became in a way the headquarters, Chungking headquarters, political public relations officer; press agent in a way, you might say, for the press. I tried to keep the press informed of the political background, the political problems that the Army was encountering.

Mr. STEVENS. The latitude that was given you was given you on oral instructions from Davies; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. O. K.

Q. On this general matter of dealing with the press, since we have got into it at this point, I would like you to describe to the board a little bit more fully what you understood to be the general scope of this somewhat vaguely defined latitude that you mentioned and how it came about.—A. I covered it fairly well in my first statement.

Q. Yes.—A. I think if you read Secretary Stimson's letters, particularly the first letter—well, and even the following letters—there is continual reference to the political problems in that theater. We had a continual effort to get—I am speaking only of China—we had a continual effort to get Chinese cooperation. General Stilwell wanted to fight an active war; the Chinese, generally speaking, hoped to hold out by a passive war. General Chennault was technically under General Stilwell's command but at the same time was in independent relationship to the Generalissimo. The Chinese preferred to follow General Chennault's recommendations of an air war rather than a land war because it would require, shall we say, far less effort on their part, and you had various forces hauling and pulling. The Chinese imposed rigorous censorship, largely politically motivated; the Air Force put out its own propaganda to try to get its view across—the Chennault-Stilwell feud, if you wish. You had Chinese propaganda in the United States, you had Madame Chiang coming back to the States and appealing to the American people over the head of the President, you had an American welter of emotion, really, after Pearl Harbor about China. China had been a neglected ally, we had been selling scrap iron and oil to Japan, and after Pearl Harbor they were the heroic allies who had been fighting alone all those years, and there was a great deal of misunderstanding about China in the United States.

All of this had a direct bearing on what General Stilwell was trying to do. It was to his advantage and it was vital to him that the American press be informed of the true situation of China, the difficulties that he was facing, the fact that the Chinese promised one thing but usually didn't deliver it, that there were commitments to open a campaign, for instance in the Salween front and in western Yunnan, to coordinate with the campaign which he was directing from India and north Burma. To accomplish all this it was necessary that we work closely with the correspondents and the policy was, in military matters as well as in political background matters, to deal with them very frankly and to give them all the information that was necessary, so that they could understand what was going on in China.

Q. Now, referring to the line of questioning that was brought up a moment ago—

The CHAIRMAN. By the way, we have reached 12:30. Is this a stopping point or do you want to go on with a question?

Mr. ACHILLES. There were one or two questions on that point we were just discussing.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's have them.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. You state that you discussed the purport and substance of this report 40 with the correspondent, but you did not give him a copy?—A. That was a different report, sir. My 204, which is unnumbered actually in my series, but it is document 204.

Q. You did not give any correspondent a copy?—A. No, sir.

Q. Did you give correspondents any copies of your other reports in Yenan?—A. Yes, they were allowed to read some of them, descriptive ones, informative ones.

Q. Did they include classified material?—A. Technically yes, everything was classified.

Q. You say you allowed them to read them. Did you at any time let them have copies to take out of your presence?—A. I don't recall ever doing that; no. You say "out of my presence"?

Q. To keep overnight or anything like that?—A. No; I may have said to some person, "You sit here and read this; I have to go down the hall a minute."

Q. You didn't allow them to take any of them away?—A. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this access to your descriptive reports known to your superiors, on the part of the correspondents known to your superiors?

A. Well, to my superior John Davies certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. He was the one under whom you were acting directly?

A. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEVENS. By means of your general instruction which you had got from him, or did he know specifically about the ones you were letting people read?

A. No, because he was one or two thousand miles away. I mean, it is a question of judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. It was the sort of things you understood he knew you were to do?

A. That is right.

Mr. RHETTS. It was the sort of thing, if I understand correctly, that you understood from him that General Stilwell wanted you and him to do.

Mr. STEVENS. With regard to the problem as discussed in the personal statement with regard to the classification of documents, mostly which you classified yourself, as I understand it—

A. That is right.

Mr. STEVENS. I think it might be well when we reconvene if you ask for a fuller explanation on that subject.

A. Fine.

The CHAIRMAN. Any more questions?

Mr. ACHILLES. No, that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn until 2:30 p. m.

(The board adjourned at 12:35 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN S. SERVICE

Date: May 26, 1950—2:30 p. m. to 5:15 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State.

Reporters: E. Wake and E. Meyer, court stenographers, reporting.

Board members present: C. E. Snow, chairman; T. C. Achilles, member; A. G. Stevens, member; and A. B. Moreland, legal officer.

(The board reconvened at 2:30 PM)

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed whenever you are ready.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

(Continuation of testimony by Mr. John S. Service.)

Q. Now, Mr. Service, in connection with the preparation of your reports, you, I believe, testified that you invariably put a classification on those reports at the time you prepared them. Is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. Can you describe to the board the considerations which in the first instance affected the determination for classifying any particular document at any particular level from unclassified to secret?—A. I think, to answer the question completely, we ought to examine the character of these memoranda as to just what they really were. I was really a free agent with very few assigned duties and because I was interested—because I had a great many contacts and because the information was sometimes useful to the army as background information and generally useful to the Embassy as political reporting material, I would put down such information that I thought of interest in these memoranda.

Now, if I had been working in an organization like the Department of State, or as a regular member of the staff of headquarters, assigned to a particular section, I would not be writing independent personal information memoranda. I would be preparing, if I were in G-2, a paper for the signature and forwarding action by the Chief of Staff, G-2. My initials might appear on it as drafter, but the signature would be his.

These were very different from that. They were strictly personal observations—reports of personal conversations, or sometimes my personal views. I put a classification on these things, sort of an informal classification or recommended classification, based on a number of factors. The principal reason was that these things should be locked up rather than left around for anybody to read, or the Chinese, working in headquarters, to read.

They were on economic or political subjects. They were often critical of Chinese personalities and Chinese conditions. They usually contained information from informants who had to be protected to some extent. We had inter-allied arrangements for exchange of some categories of information. These gen-

erally were not the sort of thing which we wanted to exchange with our Chinese allies as they were critical of the Chinese and, generally speaking, they were not things we wanted to hand to the British, with whom we exchanged certain categories of information.

Q. May I interrupt. Am I correct in believing that certain arrangements which existed between the American Government and the Chinese and the British, such as the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency and other interallied arrangements, contemplated that material of certain types of classification would be automatically circulated through that distribution machinery whereas material of other classifications would not? Is that correct?—A. Yes.

Q. Were you therefore motivated in part, as you suggested, by whether you wished it made available to others of our own allies in determining classification?—A. That is right. Most of my work was reporting on the Chinese Government. Obviously we did not want to hand it to them through official channels.

Q. What other types of consideration, if there were any, affected your determination to place any particular classification on a document?—A. Sometimes if I had advance information—if I had knowledge of something which was not at that time known by other people, I would make it classified. Later on when it became general knowledge and known to the correspondents, and so on, there was no longer any necessity for considering it classified.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any other considerations that affected these determinations?

A. I think I have covered most of them.

The CHAIRMAN. You might refer to the page in your statement that covers that point.

A. Page 17 or 18 of my statement discusses this question.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the last paragraph on page 17?

A. Yes.

Q. Now I show you document No. 197 and ask you to state what it is—characterize it.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going on to another subject?

Q. No; it is the same subject.

A. I would like to say something else on the same subject if I could; that is, in a military theater, and under these conditions, practically all material or reports were classified. However, it was normal practice, for instance, to brief the correspondents before an operation was going to take place and keep correspondents informed and to give them, in those briefing sessions, the most highly classified material so they would know what was going on. They would be taken into the confidence of the commanding officer and told: This is what the plan is; this is what we are going to try to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any provision for declassifying documents formally—removing classification lines?

A. I think, generally speaking, it was left to the discretion of the responsible commanding officer as to whether information should be given out.

The CHAIRMAN. No formal steps?

A. I don't believe there were, but the Chief of G-2 could certainly give any information which he thought appropriate to give.

Q. Mr. Service, I show you Document No. 166 and ask you to state for the Board in general what that document is.—A. This is an Embassy dispatch which transmitted a memorandum of mine, transmitting in turn the notes of a large number of correspondents, notes of their interviews with Communist leaders.

Q. By "correspondents" you mean "newspaper correspondents"?—A. Yes.

Q. State who the correspondents were.—A. Guenther Stein, Christian Science Monitor; Maurice Votaw, Israel Epstein, representing the New York Times at that time.

Q. Your memorandum transmitted notes taken by these American correspondents on what?—A. Notes of their interviews with Communist leaders.

Q. Your memorandum transmitting these foreign correspondents' notes, what classification does it bear, if any?—A. Secret.

Q. And what classification does the Embassy dispatch bear?—A. Secret.

Q. You were transmitting notes taken by American correspondents in a document which you in turn classified secret. Is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. The notes taken by the American correspondents were notes they were sending back to their papers to be printed in the press. Is that correct?—A. Yes; but the point is at that time they had not had an opportunity to publish them.

Q. They had not been sent out yet?—A. That is right.

Q. But were they subsequently, as soon as they could get them into channels?—A. Subsequently, after they left China. They could not publish them because of the Chinese censorship.

Q. But when it was physically possible to get them back to the United States, the respective papers published them?—A. Yes; and they wrote books.

Q. Before they could get published in the United States, you transmitted it under the classification of "secret"?—A. Yes.

Q. Would you have hesitated to discuss with other correspondents in China, the contents of those notes?—A. Certainly.

Q. Or interviews with the Chinese Communist leaders?—A. Certainly I would not discuss with Mr. Harold Isaacs what Mao Tse-tung had said to another correspondent such as Guenther Stein.

Q. I didn't make myself clear. Would you have hesitated to discuss with other correspondents in China the contents of these interviews with various Communist leaders, whether the interviews had been interviews held by you or other correspondents? Would you regard that as the type of material which was in any substantive way intended to be protected by classification "secret" so that it could not be talked about with anyone?—A. No.

Q. The point being that the nature of the material was such, it was going to be published sooner or later anyway, and, for example, would this document here—would the reason for your classifying the transmission as "secret," does that mean you did not want it to get into the hands of the Chinese Government?—A. It should not get into the hands of the Chinese Government and it should not, of course, get into the hands of other persons; that is, the actual notes. In other words, the confidences of these people had to be respected. They were giving me their complete notes of everything they were getting.

Mr. ACHILLES. You would consider yourself bound by the classification that you put on any particular document just as much as anybody else?

A. Yes, depending of course on whether the information in that document was still of a confidential nature.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you have any occasion at the time to write to anyone outside China concerning the subject matter or printing of these reports?

A. Absolutely not. I am the world's worst correspondent even with my own family and with my own family I was completely discreet. I am not an habitual correspondent with anyone outside my own family and when I was trying to get in touch with my mother recently to find out if any letters I had written her would throw any light on my attitudes and opinions during this period. I was completely unsuccessful because my letters during that period don't show it.

Mr. ACHILLES. Was your correspondence at the time subject to military or other censorship?

A. I wasn't granted authority to censor my own mail and every letter I wrote had to have on the envelope the signature of an officer authorized to censor.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Q. Unless the board has further questions I propose to drop this particular point.

I think I will just deal with one other facet of this before we go on and that is this: When you put a classification on a document or report which you prepared, what then happened to those reports? Whom did you send them to?—

A. Generally I prepared four copies of these memoranda. I had no clerical help. Usually I sat down to a typewriter and wrote them out—original and three carbons. One copy I gave to headquarters, one copy I gave to the Embassy—by agreement with the Army—and one copy I sent to John Davies, who is senior political officer, stationed in New Delhi, and that was my arrangement with the Army.

Q. You gave one to the Embassy and you sent one to John Davies. As a matter of fact, did you do that or did you keep one copy for your file and send all three to headquarters with the request they cause it to be distributed?—A. The practice differed from time to time. When I was physically in Chungking I usually took the copies to the Embassy myself. When I was in Yen-an—

Q. When you were in Chungking did you mail the copy to Davies?—A. I mailed it through G-2 channels. I actually put it in an envelope and took it to G-2 and they put the necessary stamps on it so it would go down by military pouch to Yen-an.

Q. When you were in Yen-an—A. When I was in Yen-an I prepared four copies and sent three copies to G-2 at the headquarters in Chungking and if you will look at some of my headquarters reports—

Q. Document 193 will show this.—A. "It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted, as usual, to the American Ambassador at Chungking and headquarters, USAF-CBI, for the information of Mr. Davies." G-2, in those cases, forwarded two additional copies, one to the Ambassador and one to Davies.

Q. Did you know, after you sent the copies to G-2 or after you personally delivered copies to the Embassy, we will say, did you have any knowledge thereafter what classification the Army, in one case, or the Embassy, in another, might put on the document which you had already classified?—A. No, I did not. I didn't know what use they might make of it or what classification they might put on it. I wasn't working as an integral part of G-2 and I wasn't physically a part of the Embassy and I was denied access to the Embassy files so that I never had any way of knowing what they did with my reports.

Q. So that, answering my question, you did not know what classifications they put on them.—A. That is correct. They did not always follow my recommended classifications.

Mr. STEVENS. You were denied access to the Embassy files. Did you ask for it and was it denied or was it customary for you not to?

A. It was an instruction by the Ambassador that the officers assigned to the Army, no longer being part of the Embassy staff, would not have access to the Embassy's file. He agreed that if we requested specific information, and if he thought it suitable, he would have it made available to us.

Q. This rule was not only applied to you?—A. No.

Q. It was a general rule applied by the Ambassador generally to persons not members of the Embassy staff. Is that correct?—A. That is correct. I am going to show some samples of the Embassy or Army use of these reports.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

A. Document 120 is a report by the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency which transmits one of the memoranda which I prepared. I would like to show it to you. The underlying part is my memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. Marked "secret."

A. The chief of G-2 presumably thought that that was worth forwarding. Most of my things were simply retained in G-2. He turned it over to the Joint Intelligence Agency for forwarding to Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. They marked it "secret"?

A. They marked it "secret", yes, and they also attached that cover sheet which gives an official evaluation of the source. It gives a summary and some comment. Now that final document has changed character from my original memorandum because it contains official Army views and comments and evaluation of my memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. By the addition of the cover sheet?

A. Yes; by the addition of the cover sheet.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

A. Similarly, I have here a document No. 161, which is a dispatch 2760 from the Embassy at Chungking to the Department of State transmitting a memorandum which I have prepared on June 28, 1944. My memorandum simply attaches a translation of a published document of the Chinese Communists summarizing their military operation during the month of May 1944.

Since that was a published document, put out by the Chinese Communists and published in their newspaper in Chungking, I did not classify my memorandum but the Embassy forwarded it to the Department of State under confidential dispatch. I would never have had any hesitation in letting any correspondent who wished to see it, sit down and read it. Of course I did not have any knowledge of the fact that the Embassy had forwarded it under confidential dispatch.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did the Embassy comment in the dispatch?

A. Yes; they made some comment and I presume that is the reason why they changed the classification on my material.

I have other examples here but you may not wish to see all of them. Here is another type of thing, a report of mine which was unclassified which has been stamped "secret" by Research and Analysis Branch of OSS.

Q. Refer to the document number.—A. Document 94, subject: Communist Interception and Use of Radio Bulletin. They intercepted something on the Radio Bulletin, misquoted it and put it in the press. There are quite a large number of these instances where classification has been either upped or generally raised by either the Department or some other agency which received copies of my memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any example where they lessened the classification?
A. No; I don't see any here.

Mr. ACHILLES. As far as the physical security of the reports are concerned, except for the copies which you kept and the ones which you delivered to the Embassy, when you were in Chungking, the other copies were in G-2 channels. Is that correct?

Q. At least their distribution was carried on by G-2.—A. G-2 might make further distribution, just as the Embassy might or might not forward the material and a copy was sent to Mr. Davies in New Delhi, and there again I don't know what became of it after it left my hands.

Q. Similarly, G-2 may have sent the material elsewhere within the theater or directly back to the War Department where in turn it might have further distribution that you know nothing about?—A. Yes.

Q. Has this Board further questions on this particular feature?

The CHAIRMAN. Not at this time.

Q. Returning, Mr. Service, to document No. 35-3, which is General Hurley's charges, I direct your attention particularly to paragraph (5) of that document where General Hurley asserts it was the policy of the professional Foreign Service officers to side with the Communist Armed Party and imperialistic bloc of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself. Did you ever recommend or entertain the belief that China should be kept divided against herself?—A. Certainly not. Quite the contrary, in all our arguments and recommendations for unifying the armies and eventually seeking a coalition government, we were doing our best to prevent civil war and prevent the division of the country.

Q. Did you ever openly or otherwise advise the Communist Armed Party, to use General Hurley's language, " * * * to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the National Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control"?—A. I did not; in fact, General Hurley's statement there is incomprehensible.

The whole problem was never discussed in those terms. The original proposal by President Roosevelt, starting in July 1944, was that the American commander, General Stilwell, be put in command of all Chinese forces. After Stilwell's recall the idea of an American commander over the Chinese forces was dropped. However, the National Government proposed, as one of the conditions for the coalition that the Communist forces only be placed under an American commander. The Communists, who had agreed to an American commander for all forces, refused to agree to the idea there would be any discrimination. They said they would be glad to have an American commander if he commanded both armies but not as long as the Nationalists would not accept an American. There was never any proposal made that the Communist forces would be anything more than about 20 percent of the unified Chinese army and no one—even the Communists I knew—ever proposed or thought a Chinese Communist should be a commander of that unified army.

Q. It was never your thought or proposal or suggestion in any way that the Chinese Communist Party should resist unification except upon the terms that they control?—A. No, it certainly was not my idea or recommendation.

Q. I would like to read to you a statement by General Hurley, a message from Hurley for the eyes of the Secretary of State alone, dated January 31, 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. Will that be offered in evidence?

Q. I am reading it right now. I will show the Board the document. It isn't complete yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Are these from the files of the State Department?

Q. It is a photostat.

The CHAIRMAN. Describe what it is.

Q. This is a photostat of a message which I have just described, or, more particularly, it is a photostat of a portion of it, which is part of General Hurley's papers that were in the Department. It was formerly classified "secret" and it is now unclassified.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it better be offered.

Q. I would suggest at the present moment—I subsequently wish to offer this. Since there are certain pages left out I hope to obtain a fuller version of it. At the moment I would just like to read a statement out of it to show the Board it actually appears there, as I read it, rather than offering the whole document.

The CHAIRMAN. You may read the document.

Q. General Hurley states on page 8 of this document:

"In conclusion of this part I of my report on the background of the Communist negotiations, I wish to state that in all my negotiations with the Communists I have insisted that the United States will not repeat nor supply or otherwise aid the Chinese Communists as an armed political party or as an insurrection against the National Government. Any aid from the United States to the Chinese Communist Party must go to that party through the National Government of China. The Chinese Communist Party has never indicated to me that they desire to obtain control of the National Government until, if and when they achieve control through a political election. The Communist Party demands the end of the one-party government by the Kuomintang. The Chinese Communist Party is willing for the Kuomintang to still have a vast majority of the government offices. The Chinese Communist Party demands representation, both for itself and other anti-Japanese political parties in China, in the policy-making agencies of the government."

I gather from that that on January 31, 1945, General Hurley did not understand the Chinese Communist Party to be demanding that it be given control of the government of China. Is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. I will show the board what I read is the passage right here [handing document to the chairman].

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Q. As I said, I later propose making further use of it but at the moment it seems to be incomplete.

Now referring to document No. 35-4, and particularly paragraph 6 of that document, where General Hurley asserts he would not say you and other Foreign Service officers, of whom he complained, were disloyal to the United States Government, I should like to ask you whether if General Hurley had seriously believed you were giving the Chinese Communist Party the type of advice and information he charged, would he not have been expected to regard you as disloyal to the United States Government as well as disloyal to what he called "American policy"?—A. He certainly would.

Q. Would you regard such action as disloyal to the United States?—A. Yes; if I were doing all the things General Hurley accused me of.

Q. With reference to General Hurley's charges, in document 35-3, paragraphs (6) and (7), that you continuously advised the Chinese armed party he was making his own policy in China which was not the policy of the United States Government. I believe you have testified you never made any such statement or suggestion. Is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. I would like to show you document No. 198 to look at and ask you if there is anything in this document that bears on such charges?—A. Yes; there is. In the early part of the memorandum I describe how the Chinese communist radio had been broadcasting certain statements that had been made by American correspondents traveling in their area. These statements were very laudatory and at least one of the correspondents said that he would recommend that American arms be furnished to the Communists.

In paragraph 4 I state:

"If the question of accreditation of Harrison Forman ever does arise, however, it may be of interest to note that his remarks here quoted are actually a very mild version of statements made in numerous public speeches in which he promised large-scale American help. It is of questionable wisdom and discretion under the present circumstances in China for any American to make extravagant public promises of American aid to the Communists. The effects are especially unfortunate when made, not to the better informed leaders in Yenan, but to the less informed and more anxious fighting forces in the forward areas."

Q. Now, I would like to introduce at this point document No. 35-8. I ask it be included in the transcript.

(Hurley—Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee December 5, 6, 10, 1945)

"(1) HURLEY. When I left China to come to the United States for a conference, I was confronted in Washington by a report from Mr. George Acheson, whom I had left in charge of the Embassy, addressed to the Secretary of State, in which he recited nearly all of the policies that I had upheld as the just policy, but in addition to that he recommended that instead of following my policy of not arming belligerents against the Government that we were upholding that we

furnish lend-lease to the Communists, and in that, Mr. Chairman, Mr. George Atcheson said that he had the support, the acquiescence, of every official member of the American Embassy in Chungking. (P. 41-42.)

"(2) CONNALLY. * * * Did Mr. Atcheson point out that the purpose of furnishing arms to the Communists was to get them to unite in fighting the Japanese, or not? (P. 42.)

"(3) HURLEY. * * * It is true. (P. 42.)

"(4) CONNALLY. * * * Now I am asking you what his reasons for that were. Were his reasons that they would aid in fighting the Japanese? (P. 43.)

"(5) HURLEY. They were already fighting the Japanese. (P. 43.)

"(6) CONNALLY. What were his reasons? (P. 43.)

"(7) HURLEY. His reasons were that that would destroy the National Government of the Republic of China, and the John Service report is for that purpose, and as soon as I left, George Atcheson and everybody attempted what they had been trying to do when the President sent me to China, and that was to destroy the Government of the Republic of China. (P. 43.)

"(8) CONNALLY. He said that in the letter? (P. 43.)

"(9) HURLEY. No, he did not, but he did use all of my arguments for unification. (P. 43.)

"(10) HURLEY. * * * the report of George Atcheson has a lot of the policy that I had outlined for the heads of the American services in China. In fact, I think that is the first time any career man announced that our policy was to assist in the establishment in China in proper ways without interfering in internal affairs of a strong, united, democratic China. * * * but, what Atcheson recommended to the State Department, and what he said he had concurrence in with every official in the Embassy, was that we supply lend-lease arms and munitions to the armed Communist Party. * * * (P. 49.)"

Q. Are you familiar, Mr. Service, with the telegram referred to by General Hurley here?—A. Yes, I am.

Q. Is that telegram set forth in full, pages 87 to 92 of the white paper?—A. It is.

Q. I ask that this telegram be inserted into the transcript at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. What paragraph in document 35-8 does this refer to?

Q. The whole document is in reference to this telegram.

The CHAIRMAN. Document 35-8, if I am looking at the right paper, is Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Q. The beginning first paragraph: "When I left China to come to the United States * * *" It is part of General Hurley's testimony—it is discussing this telegram of February 26.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; I see. It may be included in the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"It appears that the situation in China is developing in some ways which are neither conducive to the future unity and peace of China nor to the effective prosecution of the war.

"A necessary initial step in handling the problem was the recent American endeavor to assist compromise between the factions in China through diplomatic and persuasive means. Not only was unity correctly regarded as the essence of China's most effective conduct of the war, but also of the speedy, peaceful emergence of a China which would be united, democratic, and strong.

"However, the rapid development of United States Army plans for rebuilding the armies of Chiang Kai-shek, the increase of additional aid such as that of the War Production Board, the cessation of Japanese offensives, the opening of the road into China, the expectation that the Central Government will participate at San Francisco in making important decisions, the conviction that we are determined upon definite support and strengthening of the Central Government alone and as the sole possible channel for assistance to other groups, the foregoing circumstances have combined to increase Chiang Kai-shek's feeling of strength greatly.. They have resulted in lack of willingness to make any compromise and unrealistic optimism on the part of Chiang Kai-shek.

"Among other things, this attitude is reflected in hopes of an early settlement with the Soviet Union without settlement of the Communist problem, when nothing was ultimately offered except an advisory interparty committee without place or power in the Government, and in recent appointments of a military-political character, placing strong anti-Communists in strategic war areas, and naming reactionaries to high administrative posts, such as General Ho Kuo Kuang, previously commander in chief of gendarmerie, as chairman of Formosa; and Admiral Chan Chak, Tai Li, subordinate, as mayor of Canton.

"On their part, the Communists have arrived at the conclusion that we are definitely committed to the support of Chiang Kai-shek alone, and the Chiang's hand will not be forced by us so that we may be able to assist or cooperate with the Communists. Consequently, in what is regarded by them as self-protection, they are adopting the course of action which was forecast in statements made by Communist leaders last summer in the event they were still excluded from consideration, of increasing their forces actively and expanding their areas to the south aggressively, reaching southeast China, regardless of nominal control by the Kuomintang. We previously reported to the Department extensive movements and conflicts with forces of the Central Government already occurring.

"It is the intention of the Communists, in seizing time by the forelock, to take advantage of east China's isolation by the capture of the Canton-Hankow Railway by Japan to render themselves as nearly invincible as they can before the new armies of Chiang Kai-shek, which are being formed in Yunnan at the present time, are prepared; and to present to us the dilemma of refusing or accepting their assistance if our forces land at any point on the coast of China. There is now talk by Communists close to the leaders of the need of seeking Soviet aid. Active consideration is being given to the creation of a unified council of their various independent guerrilla governments by the party itself, which is broadcasting demands for Communist and other non-Kuomintang representations at San Francisco.

"Despite the fact that our actions in our refusal to aid or deal with any group other than the Central Government have been diplomatically correct, and our intentions have been good, the conclusion appears clear that if this situation continues, and if our analysis of it is correct, the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict will be accelerated and chaos in China will be inevitable.

"It is apparent that even for the present this situation, wherein we are precluded from cooperating with the strategically situated, large and aggressive armies, and organized population of the Communist areas, and also with the forces like the Li Chi-shen-Tsai Ting-k'ai group in the southeast, is, from a military standpoint, hampering and unsatisfactory. From a long-range viewpoint, as set forth above, the situation is also dangerous to American interests.

"If the situation is not checked, it is likely to develop with increasing acceleration, as the tempo of the war in China and the entire Far East is raised, and the inevitable resolution of the internal conflict in China becomes more imperative. It will be dangerous to permit matters to drift; the time is short.

"In the event the high military authorities of the United States agree that some cooperation is desirable or necessary with the Communists and with other groups who have proved that they are willing and in a position to fight Japan, it is our belief that the paramount and immediate consideration of military necessity should be made the basis for a further step in the policy of the United States. A favorable opportunity for discussion of this matter should be afforded by the presence of General Wedemeyer and General Hurley in Washington.

"The initial step which we propose for consideration, predicated upon the assumption of the existence of the military necessity, is that the President inform Chiang Kai-shek in definite terms that we are required by military necessity to cooperate with and supply the Communists and other suitable groups who can aid in this war against the Japanese, and that to accomplish this end, we are taking direct steps. Under existing conditions, this would not include forces which are not in actual position to attack the enemy, such as the Szechwan warlords. Chiang Kai-shek can be assured by us that we do not contemplate reduction of our assistance to the Central Government. Because of transport difficulties any assistance we give to the Communists or to other groups must be on a small scale at first. It will be less than the natural increase in the flow of supplies into China, in all probability. We may include a statement that we will furnish the Central Government with information as to the type and extent of such assistance. In addition, we can inform Chiang Kai-shek that it will be possible for us to use our cooperation and supplies as a lever to restrict them to their present areas and to limit aggressive and independent action on their part. Also we can indicate the advantages of having the Communists assisted by the United States instead of seeking direct or indirect help or intervention from the Soviet Union.

"Chiang Kai-shek might also be told, if it is regarded as advisable, at the time of making this statement to him, that while our endeavor to persuade the various groups of the desirability of unification has failed and it is not possible for us to delay measures for the most effective prosecution of the war any longer, we regard it as obviously desirable that our military aid to all groups be based

upon coordination of military command and upon unity, that we are prepared, where it is feasible, and when requested, to lend our good offices to this end, and although we believe the proposals should come from Chiang Kai-shek, we would be disposed to support the following:

"First, formation of something along the line of a war cabinet or supreme war council in which Communists and other groups would be effectively represented, and which would have some part in responsibility for executing and formulating joint plans for war; second, nominal incorporation of Communist and other forces selected into the armies of the Central Government, under the operational command of United States officers designated by Chiang Kai-shek upon General Wedemeyer's advice, upon agreement by all parties that these forces would operate only within their existing areas or areas which have been specifically extended. However, it should be clearly stated that our decision to cooperate with any forces able to assist the war effort will neither be delayed by nor contingent upon the completion of such internal Chinese arrangements.

"It is our belief that such a modus operandi would serve as an initial move toward complete solution of the problem of final entire unity, and would bridge the existing deadlock in China. The principal and overriding issues have become clear, as one result of the recent negotiations. At the present time, Chiang Kai-shek will not take any forward step which will mean loss of face, personal power, or prestige. Without guarantees in which they believe, the Communists will not take any forward step involving dispersion and eventual elimination of their forces, upon which depend their strength at this time and their political existence in the future. The force required to break this deadlock will be exerted on both parties by the step we propose to take. The modus operandi set forth in these two proposals should initiate concrete military cooperation, with political cooperation as an inevitable result, and consequently furnish a foundation for increasing development toward unity in the future.

"The political consultation committee plan, which could function, if adopted, side by side with the Government and the war council, would not be excluded by these proposals. It should be anticipated that the committee would be greatly strengthened, in fact.

"Of course, the statements to the Generalissimo should be made in private, but the possibility would be clearly understood, in case of his refusal to accept it, of the logical, much more drastic step of a public expression of policy such as that which was made by Churchill with reference to Yugoslavia.

"The fact of our aid to the Communists and other forces would shortly become known throughout China, however, even if not made public. It is our belief that profound and desirable political effects in China would result from this. A tremendous internal pressure for unity exists in China, based upon compromise with the Communists and an opportunity for self-expression on the part of the now repressed liberal groups. Even inside the Kuomintang, these liberal groups such as the Sun Fo group, and the minor parties, were ignored in recent negotiations by the Kuomintang, although not by the Communists, with whom they present what amounts to a united front, and they are discouraged and disillusioned by what they regard as an American commitment to the Kuomintang's existing reactionary leadership. We would prove we are not so committed by the steps which we proposed, we would markedly improve the prestige and morale of these liberal groups, and the strongest possible influence would be exerted by us by means of these internal forces to impel Chiang Kai-shek to make the concessions required for unity and to put his own house in order.

Such a policy would unquestionably be greatly welcomed by the vast majority of the people of China, even though not by the very small reactionary minority by which the Kuomintang is controlled, and American prestige would be increased by it.

"The statement has been made to a responsible American by Sun Fo himself that if Chiang Kai-shek were told, not asked, regarding United States aid to Communists and guerrillas, this would do more to make Chiang Kai-shek come to terms with them than any other course of action. It is believed by the majority of the people of China that settlement of China's internal problems is more a matter of reform of the Kuomintang itself than a matter of mutual concessions. The Chinese also state, with justification, that American nonintervention in China cannot avoid being intervention in favor of the conservative leadership which exists at the present time.

"In addition, by a policy such as this, which we feel realistically accepts the facts in China, we could expect to obtain the cooperation of all the forces of

China in the war; to hold the Communists to our side instead of throwing them into the arms of the Soviet Union, which is inevitable otherwise in the event the U. S. S. R. enters the war against Japan; to convince the Kuomintang that its apparent plans for eventual civil war are undesirable; and to bring about some unification, even if not immediately complete, that would furnish a basis for peaceful development toward complete democracy in the future."

Q. Will you describe to the board the background of this telegram about which General Hurley complains and your connection with the telegram?—A. You mean the background of events in China or the actual background of—

Q. Certain circumstances that gave rise to the sending of the telegram.—A. The immediate background was that General Hurley, while Ambassador, had done very little reporting. His first real report was a telegram of January 31, over 2 months after he became Ambassador, and in such reporting as had been done, the chargé d'affaires felt that an overoptimistic picture had been presented of the likelihood of success.

After Mr. Acheson became chargé he felt that it was his duty to make a full report to the Department, which up to that time had been impossible to make, and to point out his conviction and the conviction of the rest of us there that the situation was worsening rather than improving, so he suggested to some of the political reporting officers that they prepare a comprehensive study of the situation and make some recommendations.

Although I was not actually working in the Embassy, I shared the views Mr. Acheson and the other officers had and I had been doing a good deal of reporting and was, in some ways, more intimately familiar with the details, and also I had fewer routine duties, so after we consulted together it was decided that I would prepare the original first draft. I did so and, after consultation with the other officers, some revisions were made and finally we presented to Mr. Acheson and he suggested further revisions, and this is the telegram which we are here discussing.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you put that in evidence?

Q. Yes. It appears on pages 87 to 92 of the white paper material which is in your document book.

The CHAIRMAN. In the white paper, pages 87 to 92.

Q. Yes. Now, in his testimony, document 35-8, General Hurley states that the reasons for the proposal contained in this telegram of February 26 to furnish lend-lease assistance to the Chinese Communists was that "* * *" that would destroy the National Government of the Republic of China * * *" and that your report No. 40 was also for that purpose. He also adds, I believe, that it was made just as quickly as he left China. Will you state the reasons that were advanced in the telegram itself for the proposal to furnish lend-lease assistance to the Chinese Communists?—A. The reasons were to try and break the deadlock and the increasing tension between the two parties and force a coalition and unification of the armies, to promote the war effort and avoid civil war, and unify the country. We pointed out that the attitude of the Central Government is hardening and the Communists are reacting in the opposite way by hardening their own attitude and by preparing to defend themselves by seizing more territory, particularly in southeast China; that we are denying ourselves of military forces which can be useful; if the situation is not checked it is likely to develop with increasing acceleration, as the tempo of the war in China and the entire Far East is raised, and the inevitable resolution of the internal conflict in China becomes more imperative.

We then recommend that we privately tell the Generalissimo that military considerations impel us to commence moderate military cooperation with the Communists and that we believe that this statement by us will impel the Generalissimo to agree and when the fact of military cooperation becomes known, the Central Government will agree to something along the lines of a coalition government.

Q. Was this telegram in any sense, as General Hurley implied, done behind his back?—A. It was not done behind his back because we say in the telegram: "The presence of Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer in Washington will afford favorable opportunity for discussion of this matter." There was no effort to circumvent or bypass General Hurley.

Q. On the whole matter of supplying arms to the Chinese Communists, will you indicate to the board what views General Hurley expressed to you on this subject? You have already mentioned in part one conversation you had with General Hurley touching on this matter. I suggest you refer to any others you may have had.—A. I don't recall that we had any other conversations on the subject of military aid to the Communists.

Q. In the first conversation you had with him, as I recall your testimony, he assured you he regarded as one of the purposes of his presence in China to bring about unification of the military forces and engage the Communists more actively in the war against the Japanese.—A. That is correct, and repeatedly, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he says also that was one of his objectives.

Q. General Stilwell certainly favored supplying arms to the Chinese Communists in order to engage them in the war against the Japanese; did he not?—A. He did.

Q. I would like at this point to introduce document 35-9 and ask that it be included in the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

“(Hurley—Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 5, 6, 10, 1945)

“(1) SHIPSTEAD. Did they succeed in getting lend-lease to the Communists?

“(2) HURLEY. They did not.

“(3) SHIPSTEAD. Did you know of your own knowledge that they tried to?

“(4) HURLEY. Yes, sir. I can prove it by their record, that they recommended that I be reversed, and that we furnish lend-lease to the belligerent enemy of the Republic that I was instructed to uphold.

“(5) CONNALLY. That was during the fighting, though; was it not?

“(6) HURLEY. Yes, sir.

“(7) CONNALLY. The war was still going on?

“(8) HURLEY. Yes, sir.

“(9) CONNALLY. It was part of your instructions, was it not, also, to try to get union between the so-called Communists and the Chiang government, so they could both fight the Japanese?

“(10) HURLEY. Yes, sir (p. 39).

“(11) The Ambassador continued by pointing out that the United States has endeavored to use whatever influence it possesses to point the way toward a unification of military forces that would enable China to bring her full military power to the task of defeating Japan. He said that there had been some progress along these lines and that the United States still expected more favorable results (Hurley press conference, April 2, 1945) (p. 40B).

“(12) CONNALLY. Did General Stilwell ever tell you that his purpose in advocating the arming and unification of the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek's forces was to destroy the Government of China? Did he ever tell you that?

“(13) HURLEY. No, sir (p. 44).

“(14) CONNALLY. I was talking about the division of opinion between General Stilwell and yourself. It was rather sharp; was it not?

“(15) HURLEY. It was not.

“(16) CONNALLY. It was not sharp?

“(17) HURLEY. No, sir (p. 46). * * *

“(18) CONNALLY. What did they (Stilwell and Chiang) disagree about, if you do not mind stating—about the Communist army, or not?

“(19) HURLEY. As I recall, at that time General Stilwell and I were not in disagreement in regard to the Chinese Communist armies. * * * So far as I know, General Stilwell and I are not at odds about the issue, and we have never had a controversial word between us (p. 47). * * *

“(20) CONNALLY. General Stilwell did advocate, however, the unification of the Communists with the Central Government in fighting, making a united front against the Japanese?

“(21) HURLEY. He had been advocating that for 2½ years and, so far as I know, had not gone to the Communists as I had done. I think that he advocated everything that I advocated in that connection. * * * I think he was in favor of unification of the forces. I certainly was, and we had no controversy on that (p. 90). * * *

Q. In this document General Hurley indicates that he was in no disagreement with General Stilwell; does he not?—A. That is correct. General Hurley says that he had no disagreement with General Stilwell in regard to the Chinese Communist armies, and “* * * General Stilwell and I are not at odds about the issue. * * *

The CHAIRMAN. What paragraph are you reading from?—A. Paragraph (19).

Q. Also in paragraph (21) he makes it pretty clear, does he not, that he and General Stilwell were in complete agreement on this question.—A. That's right.

Q. Now, I ask you to refer to document No. 35-11 where General Hurley indicates, I believe, that from the beginning he was of the opinion that lend-lease supplies given to any organization in China, other than the National Government, was weakening that Government and would bring about its collapse; does he not?—A. That is what he says.

Q. Can you reconcile the views expressed by General Hurley in this document No. 35-11 and the views expressed in document No. 35-13, particularly paragraph (11)?—A. I would say they are inconsistent.

Q. As a matter of fact, did you ever propose that aid to the Central Government be discontinued?—A. I never made any such proposal; in fact, we repeatedly said it should not be discontinued. Even in the telegram of February 26 from Chargé d'Affaires Acheson, we make it clear that aid to the Central Government should not be discontinued and that the arms supplied to the Communists would be far smaller in quantity and would probably be really a natural increase of the supplies coming into China. In my Document 204, which I drafted with Mr. Ludden February 14, 1945, we state specifically that discontinuance of aid to the Central Government would be unnecessary and unwise.

Q. I ask you to look at Document 35-14. This is the testimony of Secretary Byrnes, expressing his views as to the propriety of the February 26 telegram; isn't it?—A. That's right.

Q. I ask that Document No. 35-14 be introduced into the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. No objection.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

“(Hurley—hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 5, 6, 10, 1945)

“(1) BYRNES. When Ambassador Hurley departed from the Embassy at Chungking, Mr. Acheson, as counselor, automatically assumed charge of the Embassy's affairs. On February 28, 9 days after the Ambassador's departure from Chungking and 3 days before his arrival in Washington, according to the records of the Department, Mr. Acheson sent his telegram. It contained a broad and thoughtful analysis of the situation in China as it appeared to him in the light of the shifting circumstances of the moment. It concluded with the recommendation that these shifting circumstances required a readjustment of our immediate strategy.

“(2) In his telegram, Mr. Acheson distinctly stated that ‘a favorable opportunity for discussion of this subject should be given by the presence of General Wedemeyer as well as General Hurley in Washington.’

“(3) The officer in charge of an American mission in a foreign country bears the responsibility for full and accurate reporting of the factors and events which are necessary to the intelligent formulation and execution of United States foreign policy. He is further responsible for the submission from time to time of recommendations with respect to this policy. If his reports and recommendations are to be useful, it is clear that they must reflect his free and honest judgment (p. 195). * * *

“(4) BYRNES. It is difficult to understand how Mr. Acheson failed in any way to observe the letter or the spirit of these rules and traditions. His telegram of February 28 was a full and free report of the current situation in China as he saw it. His recommendation was an honest effort to assist the Department of State in the formulation of its future policy in China. There is nothing to indicate that he sought to circumvent his superior in making this report and recommendation. On the contrary the telegram expressly suggested that this was a matter upon which the views of Ambassador Hurley should be sought by the Department in Washington (p. 196). * * *

“(5) VANDENBERG. Can I ask you in a general way, then, whether the telegram did represent a recommendation of a sharp and distinct change in our Chinese policy? (p. 212).

“(6) BYRNES. Yes. As I have stated, while it analyzed the conditions, it made a recommendation that would have involved a change. And as I say, when I called for it, investigating it, I was impressed by the fact that it was written 9 days after the Ambassador's departure, and that in the message Mr. Acheson said that he felt that it should be called to the attention of Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer, who were in Washington, so that the matter could be discussed by the Department in the light of their views (p. 212).

"(7) VANDENBERG. Was this sharp change in policy which was recommended the result of anything that had happened since Ambassador Hurley had left? (p. 212).

"(8) BYRNES. Evidently that was the opinion of Acheson, who was then in charge of the Embassy (p. 213).

"(9) VANDENBERG. You mean it did not refer to the situation prior to Hurley's departure from China?

"(10) BYRNES. Oh, it referred to the situation existing at that time as to our efforts to have unity among the Chinese factions and how we could best bring all of the manpower of China into the war against the Japanese.

"(11) VANDENBERG. That was the general problem that General Hurley had been dealing with.

"(12) BYRNES. Exactly. It impressed me, when I called for it, that here are two men (Acheson and Hurley) who have been considering a question of how to bring about unity between the factions in China, the objective being to secure unified action by all Chinese forces against the Japanese, and there was a difference of opinion as to the methods to be pursued. That is the impression that it made upon my mind (p. 213). * * *

"(13) VANDENBERG. And the views submitted by Acheson in his wire were contrary to the American policy? (p. 215).

"(14) BYRNES. It was providing a change.

"(15) VANDENBERG. That is what I mean.

"(16) BYRNES. It was suggesting a change in policy; not that something had been done that was contrary to the policy.

"(17) VANDENBERG. And you think it was perfectly appropriate for Mr. Acheson, in his temporary assumption of top authority, to take advantage of the opportunity to send this report to the Department?

"(18) BYRNES. I think that the man in charge of an Embassy owes it to the Department, if he believes there is a change in conditions that should be brought to the attention of the Department, to send it (p. 215).

"(19) GREEN. Was there any suggestion on the part of either of these two men that they would act in any way contrary to the policy of the State Department until and unless that policy was changed?

"(20) BYRNES. No; your statement is exactly right. That is what they were doing—submitting, making a suggestion to the Department based upon their views, but in the one case with the express request that it be called to the attention of the Ambassador.

"(21) GREEN. Do I understand the justification for that is that they simply represented their views, submitted them to the Department for the Department's approval, but were ready to carry out any policy that the Department instructed them?

"(22) There was nothing to indicate that they were not willing to carry out any policy of the Department. To me it is important that if from our representatives abroad we are to receive full and free expression, the best judgment that a man has, we cannot say to him, 'You have got to be entirely a "yes-man" to the policy of the Secretary of State,' but we should say to him, rather, 'If conditions have changed and you believe that that policy should be modified, it is your duty to make the suggestion.' The suggestion may or may not be accepted—it was not, in the case either of Mr. Acheson or Mr. Service—but nevertheless I would dislike greatly to think the foreign officers whose duty it is to advise us to the best of their ability of conditions and make recommendations would be prevented from doing so by any fear of offending me. Why, they do it constantly, and I read the reports that come to me. They come to me with recommendations, as in one of these cases, from the head of the office. About half a dozen of the things suggested by Mr. Service were wrong and should not be adopted. I must read the suggestion, I must read the recommendation, and in the light of all the information which I have, reach my own conclusion.

"(23) GREEN. It seems to me that is the correct policy. I am very glad to have this enunciation of it (pp. 227-228).

"(24) CONNALLY. When an ambassador is temporarily absent from his post, of course, the chargé d'affaires, or whoever is designated to take his place, is in fact the acting ambassador, is he not?

"(25) BYRNES. Yes.

"(26) CONNALLY. And if things were moving—out in that area they were moving pretty rapidly, were they not, in February?

"(27) BYRNES. Very. Very.

"(28) CONNALLY. The war was progressing, and the attitude of the Communist army and the Communist forces was of the highest importance; we were approaching the climax of the war?"

"(29) BYRNES. If our minds go back to that time, your statement is certainly correct.

"(30) CONNALLY. If things were happening out there, so that somebody—the acting ambassador—suggested a modification not of the objectives but of the methods of achieving the objective, was it not appropriate for him to indicate that to the Department, to the Secretary, especially when he advised him to consult General Hurley and General Wedemeyer, who was the military commander there?"

"(31) BYRNES. I thought so; I think so now (pp. 258-259)."

Q. Now I ask you to look at Document No. 35-17. Here again Secretary Byrnes indicates he can perceive no conflict in policy objectives between the drafting of the February 26 telegram and General Hurley's, does he not?—A. That is correct.

Q. I ask that this document, No. 35-17, be introduced into the transcript. The CHAIRMAN. No objection.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"(Hurley—Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 5, 6, 7, 10, 1945)

"(1) CONNALLY. One other question. As I understand from your testimony and from our general knowledge of this subject, there was no divergence between the objectives that the Government's policy contemplated, as between Mr. Acheson and General Hurley; the objective was to try to unite the Communist forces with the Central Government's Chinese forces, so that they would all fight the Japanese, is that correct? (pp. 223-224).

"(2) BYRNES. There is no question about that; the objective was the same (p. 224).

"(3) CONNALLY. The objective was the same; the only divergence then was, as I understand you, a difference as to the manner in which that could be brought about, is that right?

"(4) BYRNES. That is right. There is a serious difference as to the method to be pursued.

"(5) CONNALLY. But the objective of both parties remained the same?

"(6) BYRNES. There is no question about that (p. 224)."

Q. Now I request you to look at Document No. 35-16. I ask you, with reference to General Hurley's statement that his resignation as Ambassador to China was brought about by the alleged disloyalty of Foreign Service officers in China, whether the testimony of Secretary Byrnes, in Document No. 35-16, bears on this question?—A. It does.

Q. Will you characterize Secretary Byrnes' comments. A. The Secretary points out in paragraph 3 that when he had his first interview with General Hurley, on October 12, 1945, the Ambassador made no criticism of his staff. No; I am sorry. Pardon me. It was on October 12 that the Ambassador made his first comment that he had not been supported by employees of the State Department and the Embassy. At the time the charge was not specific and General Hurley was satisfied with Secretary Byrnes' assurance that if any man was opposing him, he would be withdrawn. Of course by this time both Mr. Acheson and myself had been out of China for 6 months.

Then in paragraph 5 Secretary Byrnes says that during the second conversation, about November 26, Mr. Hurley for the first time mentioned Mr. Acheson and myself. Secretary Byrnes asked him to go back to China and forget what Mr. Acheson and Mr. Service wrote back in October 1944 and February 1945.

Q. Now referring back to Documents 35-3 and 35-4 where General Hurley makes his broad charges that you and others were proponents of the Chinese Communists, is it your understanding that General Hurley regarded the Chinese Communists as being affiliated with or under control or in any way responsive to the Russian Communists?—A. We have General Hurley's repeated statements that both Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov agreed entirely with American policy and were not supporting the Chinese Communists and did not consider the Chinese Communists to be Communists at all and that Russia desired harmonious and close relations with China and would support the Chinese National Government. He makes it very clear, therefore, that he did not think there was close cooperation between the Chinese Communists and Russia.

Q. I asked you to look at Document No. 35-11 and then at Document No. 35-18 where I believe he expresses these views. Am I correct that 35-18 is as extensive an expression of General Hurley's views that the Chinese Communists are not really Communists and the Russians are not really interested in them. Is that a fair statement?—A. It is an extensive and repeated statement of that view.

Q. I would like to ask you if you shared General Hurley's views that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists at all and that they were, as is sometimes said, "vegetarian" Communists.—A. In Document 225, there is a memorandum I drafted at Yen'an on March 23, 1945. I make it very clear that there is contact between the Chinese Communists and Moscow despite the Chinese Communists denials. I give various ways in which this contact exists. I conclude: "In spite of all these possibilities for contact, the Chinese Communists consistently deny they have any relations with the Soviet Government and complain they know less than anyone else about such subjects as about what the Soviet Union will do. The first part of this statement may be true. I know nothing to disprove it. What contact does exist is between the two parties, not governments. I think it likely that such contact exists."

That was Document 225.

Q. That was the memorandum of March 23, 1945. Is that right?—A. That is correct.

In Document 168 which I prepared on August 3, 1944, I state: "The Chinese Communist Party claims it is Marxist. By this the Communists mean their ideological and philosophical approach and dialectical methods are based on the Marxist approach. Marxism thus becomes to them chiefly an attitude and approach to the problem. It is a long-term view of political and economic development to which all short-term considerations of temporary advantage or premature power are ruthlessly subordinated."

Q. I take it then it was your view that the Chinese Communist Party was essentially Marxist?—A. Certainly.

Q. And in no sense vegetarian?—A. No; and I point out numerous instances where their thinking exactly follows the Russians.

Q. What was the date of that memorandum?—A. August 3, 1944.

Questions by Mr. RIETTS:

Q. I ask you to refer to Documents 39-17 and 39-23.

The CHAIRMAN. Have we now finished with General Hurley's?

Q. No, no; it is just that—I am not finished with General Hurley by any means. I would like to ask that these two documents be introduced into the transcript at this point, 39-17 and 39-23.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be introduced.

Q. I will withdraw that. I have already put them in earlier in the proceeding.

The CHAIRMAN. You refer to Hurley but it is McCarthy.

Q. It is McCarthy speaking.

The CHAIRMAN. Hurley's words?

Q. I will show you what I have in mind by referring to these in just a minute. I gather however that while General Hurley seems to suggest that—while General Hurley understands the Chinese Communists not to be oriented toward the Russian Communists, Senator McCarthy seems to think that you were pro-Soviet Communist, does he not?—A. He does, very mistakenly.

Q. So that to that extent Senator McCarthy and General Hurley have parted company. I take it it is fair to say that, is that right?—A. That is right.

Q. Now I would like to introduce at this point Documents 26-1 and 26-2 and I ask that they be introduced into the transcript. This document refers to the testimony of Mr. Budenz before the Senate Tydings committee, where he indicates here what is the Russian Communist Party line.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this 26-1? Did you say 26-1?

Q. Yes—no, excuse me; it should be just 26.

The CHAIRMAN. The reference to the New York Times?

Q. That is right, reporting a quote of Mr. Budenz.

(The material referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 26

(Article in New York Times, April 21, 1950, Lattimore accused by Budenz as a Red; General backs him; by William S. White, p. 2C)

"In 1937, then, at a meeting called by Earl Browder, it was brought forward that we were now under instructions to name the Chinese Communists no longer

as Red Communists, but we were to begin to represent them, as Browder said, as 'North Dakota nonpartisan leaguers.'

'Field was present at that meeting and made a report at which he commended Mr. Lattimore's zeal in seeing that Communists were placed as writers in 'Pacific Affairs.'

" 'LINE WAS TO ATTACK CHIANG'

" 'It was decided,' Mr. Budenz went on, 'that the line was to attack Chiang Kai-shek. As a matter of fact, an article was discussed, to be put in one of the organs of the Institute of Pacific Relations—and it did so appear—by T. A. Bisson, declaring that Nationalist China was feudal China and that Red China was democratic China.'

"Mr. Service, a State Department foreign officer, has been accused by Senator McCarthy of Communist associations and his loyalty file is currently under review pending his own testimony before the subcommittee.

" 'Service has been referred to as Lattimore's pupil,' Mr. Budenz said, 'but I have no knowledge of his political affiliations.'

Q. Now Mr. Budenz there indicates what he understood to be the Soviet or rather the International Communist Party line and with respect to the Chinese Communists, both in 1937 and also again in 1943, does he not?—A. Yes.

Q. He indicates that the Communist Party line then was adopted that the Chinese Communists should be regarded as simply agrarian reformers and most comparable to the North Dakota non-Partisan Leaguers, does he not?—A. Yes.

Q. That is generally conformable to the views General Hurley entertained, is it not?—A. That is correct.

Q. So that to the extent anybody was pursuing the Communist Party line, it appears to have been General Hurley, wasn't it?—A. Yes.

Q. What was your attitude? Did you ever regard or indicate the Chinese Communist Party to be mere agrarian reformers?—A. I never did. I never used the phrase "agrarian reformers."

Q. It was extensively used, was it not, during that period?—A. It was.

Q. But you state you never regarded them as mere reformers?—A. That is right. I always considered them as Marxist Communist Party, and I never used "Communist" in quotes nor said "so-called Communists."

Mr. ACHILLES. Was that view of the agrarian reformers at that time being extensively carried in the press by correspondents in the Chinese Communist-held areas?

A. I would have to check my memory, sir. I don't think that it was. Actually, of course, there was very little appearing in the press at that time. The correspondents didn't get out of Communist territory until late 1944, and the first books and writings based on direct observation were in early 1945. The phrase "agrarian reformers" was used fairly frequently in articles, magazines, here in the States.

Mr. ACHILLES. Would you say that the origins of those articles were primarily in this country rather than in China?

A. Yes, a good many of the articles were certainly ideologically influenced in the States. A lot of them were based on old writings about Chinese Communists, written in the 1938-39 period when the blockade was not yet established. A lot of them were based on conversations with people who had come back, with Army people, the newspapermen themselves, and American officers.

Mr. ACHILLES. The Chinese Communist leaders were taking that line at the time, or did they admit the connection with Moscow? You say they did not admit direct connection with Moscow but they did, as I understand it, claim they were Marxists?

A. They always insisted they were Marxists and Communists. Almost every correspondent who went up there said, "Why don't you change your name?" They said, "Why? We are Communists. Why should we change our name?"

Enclosure No. 1 of document 177 is a memorandum of conversation which I had with Mao Tse-tung, the memorandum of a long conversation I had with Mao during a whole afternoon and evening on August 23, 1944, and I brought up the same question. I mentioned that the name "Communist" wouldn't be very reassuring to American businessmen. We were talking about economic development after the war and the need for American help. Mao laughed and said they had thought of changing their name but after all they were Marxists and they

weren't ashamed of it and why should they try to conceal it. They did subsequently in their publicity try to popularize the Chinese version of their name, which of course would have meant nothing to Americans or to foreigners, and to call themselves "Kungchantang."

Mr. ACHILLES. Would you say then that this concept of the Chinese Communists as liberal agrarian reformers was one which had its origin primarily in the Moscow party line rather than the Yenan party line?

A. They insisted all of the time that they were Marxists but they could quote Marxists scriptures to prove that in a backward agrarian society such as China the correct interpretation of Marxism involved first getting rid of their traces of feudalism and moving into a capitalistic democratic state as a step toward eventual socialism, but they couldn't jump at one step to socialism, and their only proper program in this intermediate phase, which they insisted would be a matter of decades, was a moderate program which would keep support of all classes on the united-front basis, which would permit the development of private enterprise, political democracy, and so on.

Mr. ACHILLES. But the point I am really interested in is whether this concept or this at least propaganda concept of it as being non-Marxist was Moscow Communist Party line and not the Chinese Communist Party line?

A. I can't answer the question specifically. They didn't talk very much about communism or Marxism. You had to probe them to get them to explain that what they were doing was all according to the book of Marx, and the whole program was united front, a moderate program, and that is the only thing they talked about. The average correspondent who went up there and looked around, said, "Why, this is wonderful." He was not concerned with the question of whether or not they were Marxists or real Communists, so that he was apt to go away and say, "Why, these people are cutting rents and taxes, reducing interest, trying to stimulate private enterprise, developing cooperatives."

The CHAIRMAN. I judge that your answer to the question is that it might have its origin right there in China by a misunderstanding of the newspapermen who took a superficial view of it?

A. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. But it was not your view?

A. It was not my view.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Q. Referring, Mr. Service, to charges by Senator McCarthy which are indicated in documents 39-7 and 39-8 and 39-16 and 39-17 and 39-23, I would like to ask you whether you ever expressed the view that communism represented the best hope of China or the best hope of Asia, as Senator McCarthy has charged?—A. I never made any such statements as that communism was the best hope of either Asia or China.

Q. Did you ever entertain such a view or belief?—A. I never did.

Q. Do you now?—A. I do not, most definitely not.

Q. Would you undertake to summarize for the Board what views you did express as to the prospects, if you like, of the Chinese Communist Party?—A. Well, I would say that the best summary is contained in document 192, which I drafted on October 9, 1944. I detailed the steps by which utilizing the opportunities of the war and their mastery of guerilla tactics the Communists had been able to build up a very, very strong popular support. And in the last paragraph I say:

"From the basic fact that the Communists have built up popular support of a magnitude and depth which makes their elimination impossible, *we must draw the conclusion that the Communists will have a certain and important share in China's future.* * * * I suggest the further conclusion that unless the Kuomintang goes as far as the Communists in political and economic reform, and otherwise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of which it yet shows signs of being willing or able to do), the Communists will be the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years."

Q. That, I take it, was a political prediction based upon your observation of political facts?—A. That is correct.

Q. Was it in any sense a statement of your aspirations or hopes?—A. It certainly was not.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did feel that the Chinese Communist forces could be integrated with the Nationalist forces?

A. Integrated into a coalition government, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In spite of the fact they were Marxist Communists?

A. Marxists committed for the time being to a moderate program and at that time showing a strong nationalistic orientation, strong desire for American aid and cooperation and postwar economic rehabilitation.

Q. Can you refer to any of your writings in which you both recognize this strong probability of Communist domination unless the Kuomintang took steps to bring about reforms in which you expressed any view as to either the possibility of orientation toward Russia or the desirability of it?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that question clear? Do you understand the question?

A. I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the reporter read the question.

(Reporter repeated the question.)

A. As I would say that right from the very beginning, from the memorandum which I drafted January 1943, which is Document 103, one of my primary concerns was to keep China from falling completely into the Russian orbit. We had a situation of Japanese elimination being inevitable and no one, or no country, left to balance Japan—the certainty that to balance Russia—the certainty that Russia would be the dominating power, and the very greater necessity than ever before of trying to build a strong and independent China and one which would not be forced or allowed to go into the complete Russian orbit—completely into the Russian orbit.

Q. I wonder if it might be possible to take a short recess?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, certainly; about 10 minutes?

(Recess from 4:05 to 4:15 p. m.)

Q. Shall we proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if you are ready.

Q. Before the recess I had asked a very awkward question which I would like to make a new attempt at. You have indicated that based upon your observation of political factions in China, you foresaw that the Chinese Communist Party was clearly in the ascendant and that its ascendancy would increase unless the Kuomintang took some sort of steps to bring about basic reforms in China. Is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. And while foreseeing the increasing growth of the Chinese Communist Party you have indicated that you did not recommend that development or in any way desire to bring it about. Is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. Now, I had asked you whether you could refer to any of your memoranda or writings of the time which expressed your concern about the possibility of China's becoming increasingly within the orbit of Soviet Russia, and I would like to ask you to refer to Document 142, which is a dispatch dated April 21, 1944, signed by Ambassador Gauss, transmitting a memorandum prepared by you under date of April 7, 1944. Now is there any expression of views in that memorandum which bears on the question before us?—A. Yes; I believe there is.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to read that into the record?

Q. Read it to the Board.—A. I quote from page 7 of my memorandum.

Q. This is not in your book, sir. (Mr. Rhett submitted a copy to the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. You refer to pages which appear as No. 142 in exhibit 1.

Q. Yes; I misfired.—A. I commence with the second paragraph of the excerpt before you:

"As for the present Chinese Government, it must be acknowledged that we are faced with a regrettable failure of statesmanship. Chiang's persisting in an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies (or lack of them) are accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal dissension, can only be characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical desire to destroy unity among the United Nations is serious. But it would also appear that Chiang unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in Eastern Asia by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too weak to serve as a possible counterweight to Russia. By so doing, Chiang may be digging his own grave; not only North China and Manchuria, but also national groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets.

"Neither now, nor in the immediately foreseeable future, does the United States want to find itself in direct opposition to Russia in Asia; nor does it want to see Russia have undisputed dominance over a part or all of China.

"The best way to cause both of these possibilities to become realities is to give, in either fact or appearance, support to the present reactionary government of China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid directed solely toward the military prosecution of the war against Japan. To give diplomatic or other support beyond this limit will encourage the Kuomintang in its present suicidal

anti-Russian policy. It will convince the Chinese Communists—who probably hold the key to control, not only of North China, but of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria as well—that we are on the other side and that their only hope for survival lies with Russia. Finally, Russia will be led to believe (if she does not already) that American aims run counter to hers, and that she must therefore protect herself by any means available: in other words, the extension of her direct power or influence.”

Mr. ACHILLES. Coming back, if we might for a minute, to the conclusion of Document 192 in which you expressed the belief that unless the Kuomintang did various things which it showed no signs of being able or willing to do the Communist would be the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years, did you believe that their inclusion in a government with the Kuomintang would change that situation or that they would still be the dominant force?

A. I thought that their inclusion in a coalition government would, say, stimulate the Kuomintang and encourage the liberal forces which were considerable in China, so that it would be unlikely that the Communists would gain complete control, that there would be a chance for survival in China of moderate, pro-American liberal forces whom we desired to see maintained, who would be completely eliminated if there was going to be a civil war which we believed would be won by the Communists, that it would be a modified transfer of power, a gradual transfer of power rather than a complete transfer of power which would come about through a civil war, which is the bitterest kind of conflict that there usually is, driving both parties to extremes.

I believe that it is correct to say that we anticipated that, as the dominant and most dynamic force, the Communists would substantially be the strongest force, eventually become the strongest force in a coalition government, but there would be or there was a good chance of its being the kind of government that we might be able to work with, that would not swing over completely to the other side. Of course, this was in 1944.

Mr. ACHILLES. Yes, I realize that.

A. We might have kept China, shall we say, in the status of a buffer, might have kept it from going completely the other way. It was a gamble, we knew it was a gamble, but faced with the alternatives it was the only possible thing.

CHAIRMAN. All right.

Q. Now I would like to introduce at this point documents 33-1, 33-2, 3, 33-4, and 33-5, and I ask that these all be introduced in the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 33-1

(Extension of remarks of Congressman Dondero, Congressional Record, December 10, 1945, p. A5403)

“Bishop Yu-pin had just returned from the San Francisco Conference where he had served as unofficial adviser to the Chinese delegation. Previously arriving in this country on Easter Monday 1943 he remained here until November 1944 and returned to the United States in April to attend the conference.

“The prelate said there was every indication that Service was working in the interests of the Communist Party and that it was upon his advice that General Stilwell approached Chiang Kai-shek in person no less than three times to ask that the Chinese Communists be armed with American lend-lease supplies.”

DOCUMENT No. 33-2, 3

(Extension of remarks of Congressman Dondero, Congressional Record, December 10, 1945, p. A5403)

“The prelate disclosed that when Service was appointed political adviser to General Stilwell, the American Communists immediately began howling for this Government to demand that the Chinese National Government arm the Chinese Communist soldiers.

“Meanwhile Service was doing a pretty job of finagling with the Chinese Communists, Bishop Yu-pin said, and kept urging Stilwell to send a representative to provinces in which they were active to investigate the part they were playing in the war against the Japanese.”

DOCUMENT No. 33-4

(Extension of remarks of Congressman Dondero, Congressional Record, December 10, 1945, p. A5404)

"'Vinegar Joe,' playing into Service's hands, the bishop continued, appointed Service himself to the job. The report Service submitted to Stilwell, the prelate said, 'lauded the Communist soldiers in glowing terms.'

"But, the bishop emphasized, Communist guerilla warfare actually was but a minor part in the battle against the enemy."

DOCUMENT No. 33-5

(Extension of remarks of Congressman Dondero, Congressional Record, December 10, 1945, p. A5404)

"Following his report to Stilwell, Service kept urging him to go to the Chinese generalissimo with the demand that the Communists be armed. Cognizant of the situation in China, Vinegar Joe hesitated to do so, the bishop said, but finally consented when his political adviser insisted.

"STILWELL SHOCKS CHIANG

"Bishop Yu-pin said that Chiang Kai-shek was astounded at the American general's velvet-gloved demands because the latter knew that to arm the rival faction could result in but one thing—an immediate outbreak of civil war and the possible destruction of the National Government of China.

"Although Stilwell's first Service-inspired visit failed, Service did not lose heart, the bishop said, but allowed some time to go by before he again urged a second visit by Stilwell to the generalissimo. Again the Chinese leader refused, and it was then, the prelate said, that Stilwell was informed that if the demand was repeated, there was no other alternative but to ask that President Roosevelt recall him from China.

"STILWELL TRIES THREE TIMES

"Undismayed, Service kept hammering at Stilwell that the Chinese Communists were getting a raw deal, and again insisted that the demand be resubmitted for the generalissimo's reconsideration.

"And it was on this third visit to his good friend, with whom he had broken bread on many an occasion, that Stilwell was informed by the generalissimo he was asking Roosevelt to relieve him of his duties in China.

"Service, the bishop said, was a definite detrimental influence during his assignment in China."

Q. Now, these documents relate to certain charges attributed by the Washington Times-Herald to Bishop Yu-pin. Do you know who Bishop Yu-pin is?—A. He is actually the archbishop of Nanking at the present time. He is also the—

Mr. ACHILLES. At the present time, now?—A. I believe at present he is the archbishop, at that time he was the bishop. He is the honorary chairman of a magazine called China Monthly, which is a propaganda publication published in the United States for which Kohlberg is one of the frequent contributors. He is an intimate of Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, functions in a way as an adviser to them and as an emissary for them on semiofficial missions abroad. He is a member of the People's Political Council of the Chinese Government. He was an adviser carrying a diplomatic passport to the Chinese delegation at the San Francisco Conference.

Mr. ACHILLES. You say he was a member of the People's Advisory Council, that was in 1945 or now?

A. In 1945 I know that he was. I am not sure now. With the changes in China I assume that the organization is no longer in existence.

Q. Now, it is evident from these documents which have just been introduced that Bishop Yu-pin regards you as a pro-Chinese Communist, is that not so?—A. Yes.

Q. Would you care to comment on the charges made in this article?—A. Well, he made a number of charges in the article. He says, for instance, I "lauded the Communist soldiers in glowing terms"—I did report that our military observers and newspaper correspondents and other contacts and sources had found the Chinese Communist troops generally to have high morale, good organization and

training, and considerable effectiveness in the type of guerrilla operations in which they were engaging. I believed that the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist forces was very thoroughly documented by our American military observers and has been pretty well demonstrated by subsequent events.

It is interesting to find in Bishop Paul Yu-pin's own China Monthly magazine, the issue for June 1945, an article by a Catholic priest, Father Cormac Shanahan, who visited the Communist area in 1944, the statement: "Allied military intelligence reported the fighting spirit of the Communist soldiers. This we saw for ourselves."

Now the main part, it seems to me, of the archbishop's interview is that I was the chief figure behind General Stilwell's request that the Chinese Communists be armed, and he says that I specifically was responsible for three separate demands by General Stilwell that the Chinese Communist forces be armed. He goes on to say that General Stilwell was warned after the second request that if it was repeated the generalissimo would have to ask for his recall. However, according to him, I persisted and forced General Stilwell to make a third request and caused the generalissimo to request his recall.

In the first place, I never made such recommendations during the period before Stilwell's recall. The first suggestion I made that we would have to face the problem of arming the Communists was in a memorandum which I wrote on August 29, 1944. Even my memorandum No. 40 of October 10 does not say anything about arming the Communists. I therefore never instigated or put pressure or urged General Stilwell to demand that the Communists be armed. The only explanation, possible explanation I can find for the archbishop's statements is the series of telegrams from President Roosevelt to the generalissimo which commenced in a telegram of July 7, 1944. We have referred to those before, I think. That is on page 68 of the China white paper. These telegrams were for the eyes of the generalissimo alone. Stilwell was in Burma, the chief of staff in Chungking was worried about using any of our interpreters or any of the generalissimo's interpreters. I was the only person available that had sufficient command of Chinese and could be trusted, so I was ordered to accompany General Ferris when he delivered the first and second of these messages on July 7 and July 15, and I was the interpreter translating these telegrams phrase by phrase to the generalissimo. It may be that because of my presence and because of the Central Government's dislike of me—for instance, I was credited with being the chief instigator of the observer group to Yenan that they may have jumped to the conclusion that really I had a great deal more to do with these telegrams than I did. Actually I had no knowledge of it beforehand, I had no part in preparing them or instigating them. I was just as surprised as the chief of staff himself was when the first one came.

The whole picture that the archbishop draws of my being an important figure, an influential member of Stilwell's staff, is completely erroneous. I was not even the principal one of his political officers, and none of us had any effect, any substantial effect, I am sure, on his own thinking. He had intimate knowledge of China, going back 20 years, or about 20 years. He didn't need us to tell him about China. And, in fact, my own direct contact with General Stilwell was extremely limited. There was simply no truth in what the archbishop says.

Q. Now, the archbishop also says that you were throughout this time, I think he says, finagling with the Communists. Will you tell the Board just what you were doing with the Communists?—A. The only thing that I was doing with the Communists was acting as the political reporter, getting acquainted with their leaders, trying to find out what they were thinking, and, more important, what they were doing.

Q. You were seeing as many of them as you could?—A. I was seeing every one of them that I could and spending a good deal of my time with them, but purely as a reporter. There was never any misunderstanding of my status, either on the part of headquarters or on the part of the Chinese Communists.

Q. Your contacts with the Chinese Communists, however, were part of your official duties, is that not correct?—A. At that time they were the major part of my official duties.

Q. So that if you can call an intelligence officer's associating with the persons from whom he seeks to obtain intelligence "finagling," you were finagling with the Communists?—A. I won't agree with your definition but—for instance, if I can interrupt you, in document 177, which I referred to before—it is a dispatch from the Embassy transmitting my memorandum of conversation with

Mao Tse-tung on August 23, 1944. In my memorandum of conversation I referred to the fact that General Mao asked me a number of questions about the United States, American policy, and so on, and I made the following statement:

"This and other questions about the United States were addressed directly to me. I therefore made it clear in most explicit terms that I had no official authority and that my replies were only my purely private and completely unofficial opinions."

And that was the basis on which I approached the Chinese Communists from the very beginning. They knew when we were sent and arrived in Yen-an, that I had no representative capacity, no authority to negotiate, or to discuss any sort of agreement, or on the equipping of the Communists, recognition of Communists, or anything of that sort. I was purely there as a pair of ears and eyes.

Q. Will you look at document 33-6, the first paragraph. This is an excerpt from the article appearing in the San Francisco Examiner for June 10, 1945, by Mr. Ray Richards, where he says, where he refers to John S. Service who allegedly made a special mission to Moscow a year ago to aid the Red group in the United States Embassy there in weakening the will of Chiang Kai-shek not to submit to north China Communist demands. Have you ever been in Moscow?—A. I have never been in Russia or Moscow. I would like to call your attention to the fact that the next paragraph of this quotation goes on to say that the information was supplied by an important attaché of the Chinese delegation to the World Security Conference.

Q. And that important attaché is presumably whom?—A. From the similarity of the information that has been given to this man and to the Times-Herald, and so on, I believe it to be Bishop Yu-pin.

Q. Now, will you refer to document 35-19? In this excerpt from General Hurley's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he charges that after you were relieved from duty on General Wedemeyer's staff at his insistence, you and George Atcheson were placed in positions of supervision over him. Were you ever put in any position in Washington or any place else which might remotely be regarded as supervisory of General Hurley?—A. Never in any position which by any stretch of the imagination could be called supervisory. I was never assigned duties or put in a position where I was concerned with policy even on a low level.

Q. You returned from your assignment to General Wedemeyer on what date?—A. I returned to Washington on April 12, 1945.

Q. And what was your assignment in the Department upon your return?—A. I was temporarily assigned to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, where I was used for consultation as customary with officers returning from the field who have information which may be of interest to various Government departments in Washington.

Q. Will you describe just a little more in detail what this term "consultation" means? What you do when you are assigned to consultation?—A. You are given no regular duties, you don't become a part of the union organization. You are literally just available.

Q. You are available to consult with whom?—A. In the first place with the interested officers of the division or the office to which you are attached, then to other divisions of State Department—and there were quite a number who were interested in one way or another in China, and then, too, other agencies, and there were a great many during the war who were concerned with China.

Q. Such as?—A. Such as MID of the Army and also OPD of the Army, ONI of the Navy, and the various branches of OSS, OWI, and FEA. I think I have mentioned enough.

Q. So that when you were assigned consultation, you were available to and did talk with these various groups about such information as you brought back from your assignment in the field?—A. That is right.

Q. Now, General Hurley in this document 35-19 states that when you and George Atcheson were returned to the United States, one of you was made Assistant Chief of the Far Eastern Division and the other Assistant Chief of the Chinese Division. Did you ever occupy either of these positions?—A. I never have. As I said, on this occasion I was not given any position in the organization. I spent actually very little time in the State Department. I continued my consultation only until about May 8 on which date I was assigned to the Office of the Foreign Service, which is an administrative branch of the State Department. My duties there were to assist in some preliminary studies

that were being made preparatory to recommending the revision of the Foreign Service Act, or Foreign Service legislation, I should say.

Q. And you remained on that assignment from May 8?—A. Until the time of my arrest on June 6.

Q. And then at the time of your arrest on June 6 you were put in the position of leave and had no further active duties of any kind in the Department from then until when?—A. After my arrest on June 6 I was on leave until my return to active duty following clearance by the grand jury.

The CHAIRMAN. This George Atcheson, who has been referred to in this recent testimony, is the man who was killed in the plane crash in the Pacific some years ago?

A. That is correct; 1947, I believe. I returned to active duty in the Department on August 12, 1945.

Q. What was the assignment you were next given?—A. At that time the war was ending and we found ourselves—the State Department found itself rather unprepared for the sudden need to reopen our offices in the Far East, particularly in what had been occupied China and in Japan. I was assigned temporarily to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and I acted as a leg man or liaison man between the FE and the various administrative divisions of the State Department.

Q. By "FE" you mean?—A. Office of Far Eastern Affairs. I was, you might say, an expeditor, a person to follow up. My jobs were to promote, expedite the making of travel arrangements. We arranged special cars for people trying to get out to the west coast quickly, arranged transportation across the Pacific, arranged for the shipment of supplies, some of which had to be sent out by air, of cryptographic material, Foreign Service regulations, files of Foreign Service circulars.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have anything to do with assignment of personnel?—A. I had nothing to do with assignment of personnel myself. I was a carrier of messages between the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and the Division of Foreign Service Personnel concerning their requirements of personnel and their recommendations. I was not in the position of recommending personnel myself. I was simply the man who provided the continual follow-up contact, because it was a matter of tremendous urgency and it was a desperately hard business to find personnel. I had several conferences a day, I think, with officers in FP on particular problems of getting this man who might be in South America, or this man who might be in some post in Europe. FP would say, "We can't get this man." I would go back to FE and say, "How about somebody else?" and I would go back—

Q. All right, now how long did you engage in this type of work?—A. September 7, 1945, I was assigned to the staff of the United States political adviser in Tokyo and I departed from Washington on September 14. Now, of course, those last few days I was engaged primarily in getting ready to leave, but roughly speaking I was on this temporary liaison job from August 12 until September 14, my departure.

Q. Now, when questioned as to any activities of yours which tended to be supervisory of or in any way interfere with General Hurley, the general indicated one example of this interference was a telegram addressed to him by Secretary of State Stettinius on February 6, 1945. Where were you on that date?—A. I was in Chungking.

Q. How long had you been there?—A. Since January 18.

Q. Did you have anything to do with this telegram of February 6 that General Hurley complains about?—A. I did not. I had no knowledge of it until I read it in the white paper many years later.

Q. It would not have been possible for you to have been the author or instigator or in any way connected with it, would it?—A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. In what paragraph does General Hurley refer to that?—A. That is in this 35-19. It is paragraphs 6 and 7 and 8.

Q. Now will you refer to Document 35-10? In this document General Hurley refers to another cablegram from the State Department which he seems to indicate was an example of your interference or supervision of him, does it not?—A. Yes.

Q. General Hurley, when questioned further about this, recognized that you were in Tokyo at the time of this cablegram, does he not?—A. That is what he states, yes.

Q. He states that you were an adviser to General MacArthur, who in turn, as he put it, was Commander of Asia, and therefore above him. Did you have any connection with political work or political advice to General MacArthur during

your tour of duty in Tokyo?—A. No; I did not, but there is a great deal of confusion in General Hurley's mind over this telegram. The telegram that he refers to in paragraph 4 of 35-10 is actually the telegram which was sent to him by the Department of State after it had received a telegram from George Kennan in Moscow on the 23d of April, and had discussed the interview with Stalin with Mr. Harriman. Ambassador Harriman in the Department here on April 19, and both of those officers were—

Q. By interview with Stalin, you mean an interview?—A. That Hurley had with Stalin about April 15 and both Kennan and Ambassador Harriman were very much concerned that Ambassador Hurley was taking far too optimistic a view of Mr. Stalin's statements—all this is contained on pages 96, 97 and 98 of the white paper—and therefore Secretary Stettinius sent his telegram to Ambassador Hurley, which as Ambassador Hurley says "was contrary to the instructions that he had received."

The CHAIRMAN. Where was the reference in here to a telegram from Japan and MacArthur? I did not see that?—A. It isn't there.

The CHAIRMAN. You said it is in 35-10. I don't care about any additional exhibit, but I was looking for it in the exhibits we are supposed to have.

A. I am sorry, it is in 35-19, paragraph 9, Senator La Follette inquires of General Hurley where these people were. He says, "Were these people in China now or in State Department or both?" Hurley said, "Both. I think by that time Atcheson, Service, and Emmerson had been appointed as advisers to the Supreme Commander in Asia."

The CHAIRMAN. You say 39-19?

Q. 35-19. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. It is my mistake.—35-19, paragraph what?

A. Paragraph 9. This is 35-19.

The CHAIRMAN. O. K., thank you.

Q. Now I should like to introduce at this point into the transcript document 35-20.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"DOCUMENT 35-20

(Hurley—Hearings before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 5, 6, 7, 10, 1945)

"CONNALLY. In your statement you say that the professional diplomats continually advised the Communists that your efforts in preventing collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States. Do you mean that they went directly to the Communists and made these representations from time to time? (P. S2.)

"(2) HURLEY. I mean they did more than that, Senator. I mean that when the program was prepared for President Roosevelt to go to Yalta that there is a paper dated January 29 on American policy in Asia, and one paragraph of that paper—it is listed among those I wish—provided, if the military, in landing on the coast of China, found the Communists instead of the National Army, they would have the right to arm all forces in such a condition that would assist the American landing force. With that I was in agreement. But imagine my consternation when I saw a general movement of Communist troops from a territory just described by Senator Austin, all moving toward a certain port in China. Then I read that some naval officer had been arrested here, and the Communists not only knew the naval port but they knew the most secret plan of the United States, and I picked that up, not from our career men, but from the Communist armed party in China, and I have asked for that record in what I have submitted to you (p. S3).

"(3) CONNALLY. You approved the policy that was outlined in the paper, but you did not like the leak, is that it (p. S4).

"(4) HURLEY. I do not like to be leaked on.

"(5) CONNALLY. Who leaked? Do you know who it was that gave the leak?

"(6) HURLEY. No, sir; I only know that it did leak.

"(7) CONNALLY. You cannot base any charge, because you do not know who it was who gave it out? (p. S4).

"(8) HURLEY. * * * if the military, in landing on the coast of China, found the Communists instead of the National Army, they would have the right to arm all forces in such a condition that would assist the American landing force. With that I was in agreement (p. S3).

"(9) HURLEY. I have never contended that in a landing you would not use all forces available to you. I believe that was essential. I am not quarreling with that as a policy. I am quarreling with the fact that it became known to the Communists and started a big movement from their territory in the north and northwest to the seacoast (p. 84).

"(10) HURLEY. The committee asked me to advise them who are the men who are guilty of the leaks from the State Department, which leaks are designed to defeat the foreign policy of the United States. Personally I have been on the perimeter of America's influence since we entered the war. I, therefore, could not have intimate or personal knowledge of what has been transpiring in Washington. I do recall that certain career men were arrested on information supplied by the FBI. Usually the FBI does not cause arrests in suspicions. They usually base their arrests on fact (p. 170)."

Q. This document deals with General Hurley's charges that you were engaged in improperly supplying information to the Chinese Communist Party. Did you ever supply any information—

The CHAIRMAN. In what paragraph does that appear?

Q. It commences with paragraph (1).

The CHAIRMAN. That is Connally.

Q. That is right. Connally asks him the question. Connally is asking him this question as to what these people actually did, and then in the next paragraph Hurley tells him what they did.

The CHAIRMAN. In paragraph 1 Connally simply refers to testimony we have already considered previously.

Q. Connally is saying in this statement:

"In your statement you say that the professional diplomats continually advised the Communists that your efforts in preventing collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States. Do you mean that they went directly to the Communists and made these representations from time to time?"

And then Hurley—

"I mean they did more than that, Senator."

And then he goes on—

"I mean that when the program was prepared" for the President, and he goes on to indicate that somebody leaked to the Chinese Communists the possibility that we were going to land troops on the southeast coast of China, and Hurley says he does not like to be leaked on. Connally says, "Who leaked, do you know it was, who gave the leak." He says at that point, "No sir, I only know that it did leak." Connally says, "You can't seem to base any charges on that," and Hurley came right back, "Yes." His implication certainly is, despite the fact that since he does not know and he can't make any charge, he indicates nonetheless it was some of these Foreign Service officers who, as he put it, leaked on him.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Q. Now, what I want to ask you, Mr. Service, is whether you ever supplied any information to the Chinese Communists or to anyone else outside the United States Government that the United States contemplated making landings on the coast of China?—A. I never supplied any such information. As a matter of fact, when this policy decision was reached, as General Hurley says, on January 29, I was in Chungking and I had no knowledge of any such paper or such decision being reached. It was generally understood from repeated public statements during the war that we would eventually land in China. I never had the slightest idea of any definite plans. For instance, I see from the China Monthly, in the April 1945 issue, that Admiral Chester Nimitz, who recently came to Washington for important strategy conferences, in a press conference on March 8, 1945, made the following statement:

"I believe that we should plan the war against Japan in such a manner that our chances of success are greatest and our casualties least. In planning the final assault on the Empire, we will need more than one position from which to attack. We will need a number of positions. It may well be that some of these positions will be in China."

The article was headlined something to the effect that Nimitz promises China landing.

Actually in my conversations with the Chinese Communists, it was very apparent right from August 1944, the time I first went to Yen-an, that they themselves were hoping to be on the spot when we landed, and I tried to discourage

that. For instance, in my conversations with Mao Tse-tung on August 23, 1944, quoted from my Document 177, I find the following in my memorandum:

"I noted his emphasis on American landing in China and suggested that the war might well be won in other ways and a landing not necessary."

In September 1944 I had a long conversation with Chu Teh, commander in chief of the Chinese Communist forces. This memorandum is contained in Document 186, and I quote: "He (Chu Teh) argued at length the necessity for an American landing on the China coast. He attempted to refute my suggestion that it might be easier and quicker to defeat Japan from the sea by claiming that the shipping and manpower required would be too great to be practical."

The CHAIRMAN. Did you at that time have any knowledge of the Manhattan project?

A. I certainly did not, sir. My first knowledge of that was the newspapers that were published the day before—the day I appeared before the grand jury. When I came out of the grand jury I saw the extras.

Now I mentioned a while ago that the Chinese Communists gave indications from at least August 1944 of their plans to move to the southeast part of China, as General Hurley alleges they did only after they found out about some plans of ours. In my document No. 180, which contains a memorandum of conversation on August 31 with General Chen Yi on August 25, General Chen said that: "This section of southeast China may be of great importance to the war against Japan because it must be the site of American landings. If the Kuomintang cannot hold it, the Communists can. Now however the situation may be changing. The possible near collapse of the Kuomintang in these areas and the importance of the areas to the United Nations war effort must be considered."

That is the end of the quotation from General Chen Yi. I go on in my memorandum to say:

"It would be a mistake to assume that the Communist consideration of the problem is all on a high-minded and unselfish plane, as indicated here."

I don't think that there is any need of mentioning all these various instances where the Chinese Communists with increasing openness as time went by discussed quite frankly their plans to try to be on the coast, the part of China where they thought we were going to land, but in a memorandum on March 4, 1945, I state that Communist forces are aggressively expanding in south China. In our telegram of February 26, this was a factor which we mentioned, the Communist expansion.

Q. That is, toward the southeast, the coast?—A. That is right. Here is a memorandum of conversation, again with General Chen Yi. Chen Yi, by the way, was commander of the Communist new Fourth Army, now the mayor of Shanghai. Chen Yi is saying: "Give us a year—this is March 11, 1945—and we will have all of east China from the borders of Manchuria to Hainan."

Then they say: "When that has been accomplished the Communist forces will be at least as strong as the Central Government and it will be the Kuomintang which will be blockaded."

I go on to say, and this is in March 1945: "Conflicts between the Central Government and Communist forces are widespread. The Communists admit fairly heavy losses to their units around Canton but claim that these are more than balanced by growth in the Shanghai area, south An-hwei, Che-kiang, Fukien, Hu-nan, and north Kwang-tung. Open civil war seems to be expected without fail by the Communists."

My only point in going into so much detail is that there was never any secret as far as we were concerned of the Chinese Communist intentions for a long time, and their movements were not dictated by any leaks from us. In any case, there were no such leaks and we did our best to discourage them from the idea that they would be successful in meeting us if they made a drive to south China.

Q. Now, I would like to introduce at this point document 39-4 and ask that it be included in the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"DOCUMENT 39-4

"Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950, remarks of Senator McCarthy)

"(Page 4437) : To indicate to the committee the importance of this man's position as a security risk to the Government, I think it should be noted that he is one of the dozen top policy makers in the entire Department of State on far-eastern policy.

"He is one of the small, potent group of untouchables who year after year formulate and carry out the plans for the Department of State and its dealings with foreign nations; particularly those in the Far East."

Q. You have already covered this point in part but would you comment generally upon Senator McCarthy's charge here that you were "one of the small, potent group of untouchables who year after year formulate and carry out the plans" and policies of the State Department?—A. Well, to this board there would hardly be any need to elaborate on that. No one man makes policy of course unless it is the President. The State Department makes policy, the State Department recommends policy, and the State Department is a sort of gathering together, a grinding mill of a great deal of grist from a great many sources. As a reporter in the field I was a minor participant in the process of providing grist for the policy-making mill, but I have never been assigned to the Department of State in a position which was connected or concerned in any way with policy. My assignments to the Department have been temporary and have been very brief. I was here for a few weeks' consultation while on home leave in 1938, again on consultation while on home leave for a few weeks in 1943, again on consultation for a few weeks only in 1944, I have already explained my assignments during 1945, which were, first, a brief period of consultation, and then administrative duties in the Office of Foreign Service, and then again administrative duties in connection with the reopening of the offices in China. The next time I came to Washington, the only time I have ever been assigned to the Department in Washington, was in 1949, when I was assigned to the Division of Foreign Service Personnel, but again in a position without any administrative or executive authority. I was a special assistant to the Chief of Foreign Service Personnel, but my duties principally were to advise Foreign Service officers on the contents of their files and their standing in the service. I was not concerned with the assignment or transfer of personnel.

Q. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Has anybody any questions they want to put in at this time before we adjourn?

(None.)

No, no questions until tomorrow. Thank you. We meet tomorrow at 10 a. m. (The meeting adjourned at 5:15 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: Saturday, May 27, 1950, 10:15 a. m.—1 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building, Washington, D. C.

Reporter: Violet R. Voce, Department of State, C/S—Reporting.

Members of Board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles; Arthur G. Stevens, and Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Representative for Mr. Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhett, firm of Reilly, Rhett & Ruckelshaus.

(The Board reconvened at 10:15 a. m.)

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Conrad E. Snow). The Board will be in session. I will read into the record the pertinent portion of the telegram from the Department of State to the American Embassy at Chungking, dated 10th of August 1943:

Restricted

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, Aug. 10, 1943, 10 p. m.

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

Chungking:

Ludden at Kunming is designated second secretary of Embassy at Chungking. He will retain Commission as Consul at Kunming. Should proceed upon arrival of Langdon. This transfer not made at his request nor for his convenience. Transportation expenses, per diem, and shipment effects, Kunming to Chungking, authorized subject Travel Regulations. Air travel authorized. Expenses chargeable "Transportation, Foreign Service."

Hall, Emmerson, Ludden, and John S. Service are attached to the staff of the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India, and are subject to instructions from General Stilwell and authorized to travel to any country or place which he may designate.

While Department has authorized expenses for Hall, Ludden, and Emmerson in proceeding to Chungking, it assumes, as in the case of Davies, the Army will provide travel expenses and per diem for such missions as General Stilwell will direct for all four officers.

HULL.

Mr. JOHN STEWART SERVICE, having previously been sworn as a witness in his own behalf, resumed the stand and continued his testimony as follows:)

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Mr. Service, at one or another of your returns to Washington from China it has been stated that you were interviewed by the Interview Section of the Military Intelligence Service in the War Department, date unstated. Did you at any such interview advocate taking United States aid away from Chiang Kai-shek and giving it to the Communists instead?—A. I think, General, that is Military Intelligence Section. I certainly never at any time recommended discontinuing aid to the Central Government and to Chiang. In fact, on numerous occasions I argued against such proposals which were made by some people. Therefore, my answer is that I never made the statement so alleged.

Q. Did you at any such interview represent that the Chinese Communists were free of Soviet influence?—A. I never made any such statement. I did, however, say, I believe, that they were not strongly oriented toward the Soviet Union at that time, that they were following a moderate program, that we might expect that they would, because of the strong nationalistic bias, because of their independent history which has resulted in their not having to rely on the Soviet Union for the past 10 years, we might expect them to maintain a somewhat independent position with the Soviet Union.

Q. In your statement on page 27 you refer to Document 201, just below the middle of the page, as an example of a report of such an interview which you had with either the OSS or the MIS, would that be a fair sample of the report that you made to the Intelligence Section of the Military Intelligence Service?—A. It would be a sample, sir, because I usually went to these sessions with no set speech. I simply want to be interrogated by their own experts, their own people who were working on China and these subjects were extremely various and maybe in one session they might cover the whole gamut of information or topics of interest. This is a fair sample.

Q. Has that been put in the transcript, or might it be introduced in the transcript in connection with this paragraph of the statement?

Mr. RHETTS. I may say, the only problem on that, General, is that these are mostly documents which have been located in files and which presumably have to go back into the State Department files.

The CHAIRMAN. This report seems to deal more particularly with the puppets, the puppet governments in China.

Mr. RHETTS. A copy could be made of this document so the copy could be introduced as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any other report which would confirm the testimony that you have just given with reference to the nature of your reports to the Military Intelligence Service on your return, or is this the only one you have, Mr. Service?—A. We have one or two others, sir, but most of these briefing sessions were not policy talks. In fact at most of them, like the OWI and some of the other agencies, I prefaced the meeting with the statement I was not there to discuss policy, that these meetings were simply factual discussions with their research people who were interested in getting news, information, facts.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the nature of this report, I do not think it will be necessary to introduce it at this moment.

Mr. RHETTS. In that connection, General, I think I ought to make clear to the Board what our situation is on this documentation problem. You see, this whole series of documents, from 101 to 227, are the documents which represent the product of research to try to find the various reports, memoranda, that Mr. Service has written. Those have simply been extracted from the files of the State Department and brought together for use in this proceeding and presumably must go back into those files.

Now, what we have done, those reports are right here in this file cabinet and they will be, of course, available to the Board for its inspection. We didn't try to make copies of all of them. We have made copies only of the few which appear in the document book, so as to any others, why they are all available for the examination of the Board. And as to any of them that the Board, for example, would like to have brought into this case separately,

it would be a question of making some copies of them, you see. But they are here and they are available for the use of the Board, even though they are not being physically introduced in the record as such.

The CHAIRMAN. With reference to that statement just made by counsel, I would like to say that any report—which either counsel or members of the Board think is material to any issue in the hearing—should be introduced either as an exhibit or read into the transcript.

Mr. MORELAND. You have the problem of classifications on some that you haven't been able to get declassified.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; insofar as classification forbids—

Mr. RHETTS. But even apart from that, General, if I may suggest, this series of documents from 101 to 227 is 6 inches or 8 inches deep. We think they are all material to this proceeding. On the other hand, the physical problem of reproducing all of them was simply beyond our capacity. Consequently, we have not tried to have them all so that they cannot all be physically a part of this record, though we use them in part to make available for the inspection of the Board and to refer to, and they will be used as the raw material for the testimony. But I don't know how we can actually put them into the record in the technical sense that you have in mind.

The CHAIRMAN (off the record). Will you now then offer for the record, but not for the transcript, documents numbered 101 through 227 as identified in your exhibit 1?

Mr. RHETTS. That is correct, in the document list containing exhibit 1.

The CHAIRMAN. That offer will be received and the documents will be attached to the FBI file in the possession of the Board and made available not only to the members of the Board but to the Loyalty Review Board.

You have now, I take it, found a report characteristic of Mr. Service's reports to the Military Intelligence Section on his return from China.

Mr. RHETTS. Yes, General, document 202, which is another memorandum prepared in this case by the OSS, a memorandum of one of these consultative conferences with Mr. Service.

The CHAIRMAN. What date?

Mr. RHETTS. Dated November 8, 1944. Actually this document consists evidently of the notes taken by two different people that attended this conference—because you have in effect two sets of notes on the same conference. On page 2 of the second set of notes is certain material which I believe bears on the precise question that you were interrogating Mr. Service about.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this document identifiable as No. 202?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes, 202 in our document list.

Mr. SERVICE. I think the material from the point marked on that page to the end will be of interest.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think you're correct. It just bears on the subject and I'd like to insert into the transcript at this time that portion of document 202 which begins with: "What hope of the KMT and CP coming together? Only through thorough reform of the KMT," to the end of the next page of the report.

Mr. RHETTS. In that connection, General, might I just ask two questions of the witness on this point?

The CHAIRMAN. Surely.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Mr. Service, did you prepare this memorandum?—A. I did not. I never saw the memorandum prepared by the agencies in any of these interviews or interrogations.

Q. So that these represent notes taken by someone who attended the conference?—A. Yes.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Have you examined these notes to ascertain if they accurately represent your report at the time?—A. The only ones I have ever seen, sir, are these. I think we have three altogether, which are notes of interviews in OSS, Research Analysis Branch. I have never seen any.

Q. You didn't get my question. Do these notes which I have just inserted in the record accurately represent what you reported at the time?—A. In some respects they do not.

Q. Would you point out in what respects they are inaccurate?—A. Well—

Mr. RHETTS. When you say "in some respects," in general you are referring to these particular notes here?—A. I think there is one point here.

Q. Just sit down and take that from the point marked [handing Mr. Service the document], the point I introduced, and read it through to yourself and call our attention to any inaccuracies in it.—A. The only statements in this section to which I take exception is this one: "(After meeting broke up, JAC asked if KMT reports of Communists fighting them and JS said that this was only in self-defense, usually when the KMT men went into Communists' areas to take the harvests.)"

This is undoubtedly an extreme abbreviation of considerable discussion. And I don't believe that I ever made the statement that these conflicts arose only from such circumstances as mentioned here.

Q. Otherwise than that the paper is an accurate, although abbreviated, report of what you said?—A. Yes.

Mr. RHETTS. I take it you're referring to only that portion of it which the general has asked to be inserted in the record. You have not read the whole document?—A. That is correct.

Q. Mr. Service, after your return to serve General Wedemeyer did you in your reports to him ever report that the Chinese Communist leaders are not real Communists but only Chinese farmers, or, in other words, that the Chinese Communist movement is a democratic agrarian movement not directly connected with the Soviet Union?—A. Could I ask you to repeat the first part of that question.

(Reporter read the portion requested.)

A. The answer to that is "No." Now would you read the second part?

(Reporter read the portion requested.)

A. No; I never made any such statement. In fact, I reported quite to the contrary. I reported on their ties with Moscow and I never made a statement that they were merely a democratic agrarian movement.

Q. I think you have already put in evidence, yesterday, reports that you made to the same effect as you have just testified. Am I correct, Counsel, that you have covered that point?

Mr. RHETTS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You state on page 22 of your statement that document 157 represents your criticism of the Kuomintang. You say that you prepared this summary of the situation in China in June 1944 and that it is your most extensive analysis of the weaknesses of the Kuomintang. It has been alleged from various quarters that you have drawn excessively on the weaknesses of the Kuomintang. What I'd like to know at this moment is if document 157—which represents, as I understand it, your view on that subject, your most complete view, the most complete statement of your view—has been introduced into the record.

Mr. RHETTS. There has been an oversight there, General; at the outset of the proceeding yesterday morning I thought that I had introduced into the transcript all of the documents referred to here, but I see that I have not. I should like at this time to offer for inclusion in the transcript document 157.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be admitted.

Mr. RHETTS. It appears in your document book.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be copied into the transcript at this point.

(The material referred to is as follows:)

THE SITUATION IN CHINA AND SUGGESTIONS REGARDING AMERICAN POLICY

I. THE SITUATION IN CHINA IS RAPIDLY BECOMING CRITICAL

A. The Japanese strategy in China, which has been as much political as military, has so far been eminently successful.

Japan has had the choice of two alternatives.

1. It could beat China to its knees. But this would have required large-scale military operations and a large and continuing army occupation. And there was the danger that it might have driven the Kuomintang to carry out a real mobilization of the people, thus making possible effective resistance and perhaps rendering the Japanese task as long and costly as it has been in north China.

2. Or Japan could maintain just enough pressure on China to cause slow strangulation. Based on the astute use of puppets, the understanding of the continuing struggle for power within China (including the Kuomintang-Communist conflict), and the knowledge that Chiang expects to have the war won for him outside of China by his Allies, this policy had the advantage that as long as the Kuomintang leaders saw a chance for survival they would not take the steps necessary to energize an effective war. It would thus remove any

active or immediate threat to Japan's flank, and permit consolidation and gradual extension of the important Japanese-held bases in China. Finally, it would permit the accomplishment of these aims at a relatively small cost.

Japan chose the second alternative, accepting the gamble that the Kuomintang would behave exactly as it has. Like many other Japanese gambles, it has so far proved to have been nicely calculated. China is dying a lingering death by slow strangulation. China does *not* now constitute any threat to Japan. And China *cannot*, if the present situation continues, successfully resist a determined Japanese drive to seize our offensive bases in east China.

B. The position of the Kuomintang and the generalissimo is weaker than it has been for the past 10 years.

China faces economic collapse. This is causing disintegration of the army and the government's administrative apparatus. It is one of the chief causes of growing political unrest. The generalissimo is losing the support of a China which, by unity in the face of violent aggression, found a new and unexpected strength during the first 2 years of the war with Japan. Internal weaknesses are becoming accentuated and there is taking place a reversal of the process of unification.

1. Morale is low and discouragement widespread. There is general feeling of hopelessness.

2. The authority of the Central Government is weakening in the areas away from the larger cities, and government mandates and measures of control cannot be enforced and remain ineffective. It is becoming difficult for the government to collect enough food for its huge army and bureaucracy.

3. The governmental and military structure is being permeated and demoralized from top to bottom by corruption, unprecedented in scale and openness.

4. The intellectual and salaried classes, who have suffered the most heavily from inflation, are in danger of liquidation. The academic groups suffer not only the attrition and demoralization of economic stress, the weight of years of political control and repression is robbing them of the intellectual vigor and leadership they once had.

5. Peasant resentment of the abuses of conscription, tax collection, and other arbitrary impositions has been widespread and is growing. The danger is ever-increasing that past sporadic outbreaks of banditry and agrarian unrest may increase in scale and find political motivation.

6. The provincial groups are making common cause with one another and with other dissident groups, and are actively consolidating their positions. Their continuing strength in the face of the growing weakness of the Central Government is forcing new measures of political appeasement in their favor.

7. Unrest within the Kuomintang armies is increasing, as shown in one important instance by the "young generals conspiracy" late in 1943. On a higher plane the war zone commanders are building up their own spheres of influence and are thus creating a "new warlordism."

8. The break between the Kuomintang and the Communists not only shows no signs of being closed, but grows more critical with the passage of time; the inevitability of civil war is now generally accepted.

9. The Kuomintang is losing the respect and support of the people by its selfish policies and its refusal to heed progressive criticism. It seems unable to revivify itself with fresh blood, and its unchanging leadership shows a growing ossification and loss of a sense of reality. To combat the dissensions and cliquism within the party, which grow more rather than less acute, the leadership is turning toward the reactionary and unpopular Chen brothers clique.

10. The generalissimo shows a similar loss of realistic flexibility and a hardening of narrowly conservative views. His growing megalomania and his unfortunate attempts to be "sage" as well as leader—shown, for instance, by "China's Destiny" and his book on economics—have forfeited the respect of many intellectuals, who enjoy in China a position of unique influence. Criticism of his dictatorship is becoming more outspoken.

These symptoms of deterioration and internal stress have been increased by the defeat in Honan and will be further accelerated if, as seems likely, the Japanese succeed in partially or wholly depriving the Central Government of East China south of the Yangtze.

In the face of the grave crisis with which it is confronted, the Kuomintang is ceasing to be the unifying and progressive force in Chinese security, the role in which it made its greatest contribution to modern China.

C. The Kuomintang is not only proving itself incapable of averting a debacle by its own initiative; on the contrary, its policies are precipitating the crisis.

Some war-weariness in China must be expected. But the policies of the Kuomintang under the impact of hyperinflation and to the presence of obvious signs of internal and external weakness must be described as bankrupt. This truth is emphasized by the failure of the Kuomintang to come to grips with the situation during the recently concluded plenary session of the Central Executive Committee.

1. *On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to perpetuate their own power overrides all other considerations.*

The result is the enthronement of reaction.

The Kuomintang continues to ignore the great political drive within the country for democratic reform. The writings of the generalissimo and the party press show that they have no real understanding of that term. Constitutionalism remains an empty promise for which the only "preparation" is a half-hearted attempt to establish an unpopular and undemocratic system of local self-government based on collective responsibility and given odium by Japanese utilization in Manchuria and other areas under their control.

Questions basic to the future of democracy such as the form of the Constitution and the composition and election of the National Congress remain the dictation of the Kuomintang. There is no progress toward the fundamental conditions of freedom of expression and recognition of non-Kuomintang groups. Even the educational and political advantages of giving power and democratic character to the existing but impotent People's Political Council are ignored.

On the contrary, the trend is still in the other direction. Through such means as compulsory political training for government posts, emphasis on the political nature of the army, thought control, and increasing identification of the party and government, the Kuomintang intensifies its drive for "Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Fuhrer"—even though such a policy in China is inevitably doomed to failure.

The Kuomintang shows no intensive or relaxing the authoritarian controls on which its present power depends. Far from discarding or reducing the paraphernalia of a police state—the multiple and innipresent secret police organizations, the gendermerie, and so forth—it continues to strengthen them as its last resort for internal security. (For the reinforcement of the most important of these German-inspired and Gestapo-like organizations we must, unfortunately, bear some responsibility.)

Obsessed by the growing and potential threat of the Communists, who it fears may attract the popular support its own nature makes impossible, the Kuomintang, despite the pretext—to meet foreign and Chinese criticism—of conducting negotiations with the Communists, continues to adhere to policies and plans which can only result in civil war. In so doing it shows itself blind to the facts: that its internal political and military situation is so weak that success without outside assistance is most problematic; that such a civil war would hasten the process of disintegration and the spread of chaos; that it would prevent the prosecution of any effective war against Japan; and that the only parties to benefit would be Japan immediately and Russia eventually. Preparations for this civil war include an alliance with the present Chinese puppets which augur ill for future unity and democracy.

2. *On the economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective steps to check inflation which would injure the landlord-capitalist class.*

It is directly responsible for the increase of official corruption, which is one of the main obstacles to any rational attempt to ameliorate the financial situation. It does nothing to stop large-scale profiteering, hoarding, and speculation—all of which are carried on by people either powerful in the party or with intimate political connections.

It fails to carry out effective mobilization of resources. Such measures of wartime control as it has promulgated have remained a dead letter or have intensified the problems they were supposedly designed to remedy—as for instance ill-advised and poorly executed attempts at price regulations.

It passively allows both industrial and the more important handicraft production to run down, as they of course must when it is more profitable for speculators to hold raw materials than to have them go through the normal productive process.

It fails to carry out rationing except in a very limited way, or to regulate the manufacture and trade in luxury goods, many of which come from areas under Japanese control. It shows little concern that these imports are largely paid for with strategic commodities of value to the enemy.

It fails to make an effective attempt to reduce the budgetary deficit and increases revenue by tapping such resources as excess profits and incomes of land-

lords and merchants. It allows its tax-collecting apparatus to bog down in corruption and inefficiency to the point that possibly not more than one-third of revenues collected reach the government. It continues to spend huge government funds on an idle and useless party bureaucracy.

At best, it passively watches inflation gather momentum without even attempting palliative measures available to it, such as the aggressive sale of gold and foreign currency.

It refuses to attack the fundamental economic problems of China such as the growing concentration of landholdings, extortionate rents and ruinous interest rates, and the impact of inflation.

3. *On the external front the Kuomintang is showing itself inept and selfishly short-sighted by progressive estrangement of its allies.*

By persistence in tactics of bargaining, bluff, and blackmail—most inappropriate to its circumstances—and its continuing failure to deal openly and frankly and to extend whole-hearted cooperation—which its own interests demand—the Kuomintang is alienating China's most important ally, the United States. It had already alienated its other major potential ally, Soviet Russia, toward which its attitude is as irrational and short-sighted as it is toward the Communists. The latest example of this is the irresponsible circulation of the report that Soviet Russia and Japan have signed a secret military agreement permitting Japanese troop withdrawals from Manchuria.

It is allowing this situation to develop at a time when its survival is dependent as never before upon foreign support. But the Kuomintang is endangering not only itself by its rash foreign policy: There are indications that it is anxious to create friction between the United States and Great Britain and Russia. When speedy victory—and any victory at all—demands maximizing of agreements and the minimizing of frictions, such maneuvers amount to sabotage of the war effort of the United Nations.

4. *On the military front the Kuomintang appears to have decided to let America win the war and to have withdrawn for all practical purposes from active participation.*

Its most important present contribution is to allow us—at our own and fantastic cost—to build and use air bases in China.

It delayed, perhaps too long for success, to allow forces designated for the purpose and trained and equipped by us to take the offensive in west Yunnan, even though needed to support the American-Chinese campaign in North Burma, the purpose of which is open a "life line" into China and facilitate the eventual landing on the China coast. It agreed to this action only after long months of obstruction.

It fails to make effective use of American equipment given to it, as it also failed with earlier Russian supplies. Equipment brought into China has often not been transported to the fighting fronts. In other cases it has been known to have been hoarded or diverted to nonmilitary purposes. China has displayed a dog in the manger attitude in regard to equipment consigned to China and deteriorating in India for lack of transportation. It has concealed and refused to make available to our forces hoards of supplies such as gasoline known to exist in China, even when the emergency was great and China's own interests directly served.

It has consistently refused to consolidate and efficiently administer transportation. In the past this resulted in great losses of supplies in the Japanese capture of Burma and west Yunnan; now it is crippling Chinese internal transportation on which military activity must depend.

It has allowed military cooperation to be tied up with irrelevant financial demands which can only be described as a form of blackmail. It has made these excessive demands in spite of the fact that American expenditures in China (against which there are almost no balancing Chinese payments) continually add to the large Chinese nest egg of foreign exchange, which cannot be used in China at present and thus constitutes in effect a "kitty" being hoarded for postwar use.

It has failed to implement military requisitioning laws to assist us in obtaining supplies in China and has left us at the mercy of conscienceless profiteers, some of whom have been known to have official connections. It has permitted the imposition on us of fantastic prices, made more so by a wholly unrealistic exchange rate, for articles in some cases originally supplied to China through American credits. It seemingly has ignored the fact that the more supplies that can be obtained in China, the greater the tonnage from India that can be devoted to other essential military items.

It remains uncooperative and at times obstructive in American efforts to collect vital intelligence regarding the enemy in China. This attitude is exemplified by the disappointing fruits of promised cooperation by Chinese espionage organizations (toward which we have expended great effort and large sums); by the continued obstruction, in the face of agreement, to visits by American observers to the actual fighting fronts; and by the steadfast refusal to permit any contact with the Communist areas. It apparently remains oblivious to the urgent military need, both in China and in other related theaters, for this intelligence regarding our common enemy, and it seemingly cares little for the fact that exclusion from Communist-controlled territory hampers our long-range bombing of Japan and may cost needless loss of American lives.

In its own war effort a pernicious and corrupt conscription system which works to insure the selection and retention of the unfit, since the ablest and the strongest can either evade conscription, buy their way out, or desert. It starves and maltreats most of its troops to the degree that their military effectiveness is greatly impaired and military service is regarded in the minds of the people as a sentence of death. At the same time it refuses to follow the suggestion that the army should be reduced to the size that could be adequately fed, medically cared for, trained, and armed. It bases this refusal on mercenary political considerations—the concentration on the continuing struggle for power in China, and the ultimate measurement of power in terms of armies.

For the same reason it refuses to mobilize its soldiers and people for the only kind of war which China is in a position to wage effectively—a people's guerrilla war. Perhaps our entry into the war has simplified the problems of the Kuomintang. As afraid of the forces within the country, its own people, as it is of the Japanese, it now seeks to avoid conflict with the Japanese in order to concentrate on the perpetuation of its own power.

The condition to which it has permitted its armies to deteriorate is shown most recently by the defeat in Honan, which is due not only to lack of heavy armament but also to poor morale and miserable condition of the soldiers, absence of support by the people—who have been consistently mistreated—lack of leadership, and prevalent corruption among the officers through such practices as trade with the occupied areas.

If we accept the obvious indications that the present Kuomintang leadership does not want to fight the Japanese any more than it can help, we must go further and recognize that it may even seek to prevent China from becoming the battleground for large-scale campaigns against the Japanese land forces. This helps to explain the Kuomintang's continued dealings with the Japanese and puppets. Thus the Kuomintang may hope to avert determined Japanese attack, maintain its own position and power, save the east China homes of practically all of its officials, and preserve its old economic-industrial base in the coastal cities.

If this analysis is valid it reveals on the part of the Kuomintang leadership—which means the generalissimo—a cynical disregard of the added cost of the inevitable prolongation of the war in American lives and resources.

D. These apparently suicidal policies of the Kuomintang have their roots in the composition and nature of the party.

In view of the above it becomes pertinent to ask *why* the Kuomintang has lost its power of leadership; *why* it neither wishes actively to wage war against Japan itself nor to cooperate wholeheartedly with the American Army in China; and *why* it has ceased to be capable of unifying the country.

The answer to all these questions is to be found in the present composition and nature of the party. Politically, a classical and definitive American description becomes ever more true: the Kuomintang is a congerie of conservative political cliques interested primarily in the preservation of their own power against all outsiders and in jockeying for position among themselves. Economically, the Kuomintang rests on the narrow base of the rural gentry landlords, the militarists, the higher ranks of the government bureaucracy, and merchant bankers having intimate connections with the government bureaucrats. This base has actually contracted during the war. The Kuomintang no longer commands, as it once did, the unequivocal support of China's industrialists, who as a group have been much weakened economically, and hence politically, by the Japanese seizure of the coastal cities.

The relation of this description of the Kuomintang to the questions propounded above is clear.

The Kuomintang has lost its leadership because it has lost touch with and is no longer representative of a nation which, through the practical experience

of the war, is becoming both more politically conscious and more aware of the party's selfish shortcomings.

It cannot fight an effective war because this impossible without greater reliance upon and support by the people. There must be a release of the national energy such as occurred during the early period of the war. Under present conditions, this can be brought about only by reform of the party and greater political democracy. What form this democracy takes is not as important as the genuine adoption of a democratic philosophy and attitude; the threat of foreign invasion is no longer enough to stimulate the Chinese people and only real reform can now regain their enthusiasm. But the growth of democracy, though basic to China's continuing war effort, would, to the mind of the Kuomintang's present leaders, imperil the foundations of the party's power because it would mean that the conservative cliques would have to give up their closely guarded monopoly. Rather than do this, they prefer to see the war remain in its present state of passive inertia. They are thus sacrificing China's national interests to their own selfish ends.

For similar reasons, the Kuomintang is unwilling to give wholehearted cooperation to the American Army's effort in China. Full cooperation necessarily requires the broad Chinese military effort which the Kuomintang is unable to carry out or to make possible. In addition, the Kuomintang fears that large-scale, widespread, and direct contact by Americans with the Chinese war effort will expose its own inactivity and, by example and personal contacts, be a liberalizing influence.

The Kuomintang cannot unify the country because it derives its support from the economically most conservative groups, who wish the retention of China's economically and socially backward agrarian society. These groups are incapable of bringing about China's industrialization, although they pay this objective elaborate lip service. They are also committed to the maintenance of an order which by its very nature fosters particularism and resists modern centralization. Countless examples can be given to show the line-up of the party with the groups that oppose modernization and industrialization—such as connections with Szechwan warlords and militarists. The Kuomintang sees no objection to maintaining the economic interests of some of its component groups in occupied China or in preserving trade with occupied China, the criterion of which is not the national interest but its profitability to the engaging groups. This explains why free China's imports from occupied China consist largely of luxuries, against exports of food and strategic raw materials. It is therefore not surprising that there are many links, both political and economic, between the Kuomintang and the puppet regime.

E. The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain of failure; if that failure results in a collapse of China, it will have consequences disastrous both to our immediate military plans and our long-term interests in the Far East.

The foregoing analysis has shown that the Kuomintang, under its present leadership, has neither the ability nor desire to undertake a program which could energize the war and check the process of internal disintegration. Its preoccupation with the maintenance and consolidation of its power must result, to the contrary, in acceleration rather than retardation of the rate of this disintegration. Unless it widens its base and changes its character, it must be expected to continue its present policies. It will not of its own volition take steps to bring about this broadening and reform. The opposite will be the case: Precisely because it has lost popular support, it is redoubling its efforts to maintain and monopolize control.

The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain to fail because they run counter to strong forces within the country and are forcing China into ruin. Since these policies are not favorable to us, nor of assistance in the prosecution of an effective war by China, their failure would not of itself be disastrous to American interests. For many reasons mentioned above, we might welcome the fall of the Kuomintang if it could immediately be followed by a progressive government able to unify the country and help us fight Japan.

But the danger is that the present drifting and deterioration under the Kuomintang may end in a collapse. The result would be the creation in China of a vacuum. This would eliminate any possibility in the near future of utilizing China's potential military strength. Because the Japanese and their puppets might be able to occupy this vacuum—at much less cost than by a major military campaign—it might also become impossible for us to exploit China's flank position and to continue operating from Chinese bases. The war would thus be prolonged and made more difficult.

Such a collapse would also initiate a period of internal chaos in China which would deter the emergence of a strong and stable government—an indispensable precondition for stability and order in the Far East.

China, which might be a minor asset to us now, would become a major liability.

F. There are, however, active and constructive forces in China opposed to the present trends of the Kuomintang leadership which, if given a chance, might avert the threatened collapse.

These groups, all increasingly dissatisfied with the government and the party responsible for it, include the patriotic younger army officers; the small merchants; large sections of the lower ranks of the government bureaucracy; most of the foreign returned students; the intelligentsia, including professors, students, and the professional classes; the liberal elements of the Kuomintang, who make up a sizable minority under the leadership of such men as Sun Fo; the minor parties and groups, some of which like the National Salvationists enjoy great prestige; the Chinese Communist Party; and the inarticulate but increasingly restless rural population.

The collective numbers and influence of these groups could be tremendous. A Kuomintang official recently admitted that resentment against the present Kuomintang government is so widespread that if there were free, universal elections 80 percent of the votes might be cast against it. But most of these groups are nebulous and unorganized, feeling—like the farmers—perhaps only a blind dislike of conditions as they are. They represent different classes and varying political beliefs—where they have any at all. They are tending, however, to draw together in the consciousness of their common interest in the change of the *status quo*. This awakening and fusion is, of course, opposed by the Kuomintang with every means at its disposal.

The danger, as conditions grow worse, is that some of these groups may act independently and blindly. The effect may be to make confusion worse. Such might be the case in a military *putsch*—a possibility that cannot be disregarded. The result might be something analogous to the Sian incident of 1936. But the greater delicacy and precariousness of the present situation would lend itself more easily to exploitation by the most reactionary elements of the Kuomintang, the Japanese or the puppets. Another possibility is the outbreak, on a much larger scale than heretofore, of unorganized and disruptive farmers revolts. A disturbing phenomenon is the apparent attempt now being made by some of the minority parties to effect a marriage of convenience with the provincial warlords, among the most reactionary and unscrupulous figures in Chinese politics and hardly crusaders for a new democracy.

The hopeful sign is that all of these groups are agreed that the basic problem in China today is political reform toward democracy. This point requires emphasis. It is only through political reform that the restoration of the will to fight, the unification of the country, the elimination of provincial warlordism, the solution of the Communist problem, the institution of economic policies which can avoid collapse, and the emergence of a government actually supported by the people can be achieved. *Democratic reform is the crux of all important Chinese problems, military, economic, and political.*

It is clear beyond doubt that China's hope for internal peace and effective unity—certainly in the immediate future (which for the sake of the war must be our prior consideration) and probably in the long term as well—lies neither with the present Kuomintang nor with the Communists, but in a democratic combination of the liberal elements within the country, including these within the Kuomintang, and the probably large sections of the Communists who would be willing, by their own statements and past actions, to collaborate in the resurrection of a united front.

Given the known interest and attitudes of the Chinese people, we can be sure that measures to accomplish the solution of these problems will be undertaken in earnest by a broadly based government. Such a government—and only such a government—will galvanize China out of its military inertia by restoring national morale through such means as the reduction of the evils of conscription and stopping the maltreatment and starvation of the troops. Such a government—and only such a government—will automatically end the paralyzing internal dissension and political unrest. Such a government—and only such a government—will undertake the economic measures necessary to increase production, establish effective price controls, mobilize national resources, and end corruption, hoarding, speculation and profiteering.

It is of course, unrealistic to assume that such a broadly based democratic government can be established at one stroke, or that it can immediately achieve the accomplishment of these broad objectives. But progress will be made as, only as, the government moves toward democracy.

II. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS DEVELOPING CRISIS WHAT SHOULD BE THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA?

It is impossible to predict exactly how far the present disintegration in China can continue without spectacular change in the internal situation and drastic effect on the war against Japan. But we must face the question whether we can afford passively to stand by and allow the process to continue to an almost certainly disastrous collapse, or whether we wish to do what we legitimately and practically can to arrest it. We need to formulate a realistic policy toward China.

A. The Kuomintang and Chiang are acutely conscious of their dependence on us and will be forced to appeal for our support.

We must realize that when the process of disintegration gets out of hand it will be to us that the Kuomintang will turn for financial, political, and military salvation. The awareness of this dependence is the obvious and correct explanation of the Kuomintang's hypersensitivity to American opinion and criticism. The Kuomintang—and particularly the Generalissimo—know that we are the only disinterested, yet powerful, ally to whom China can turn.

The appeal will be made to us on many grounds besides the obvious, well-worn, but still effective one of pure sentiment. They have said in the past and will say in the future that they could long ago have made peace with Japan—on what are falsely stated would have favorable terms. They have claimed and will claim again that their resistance and refusal to compromise with Japan saved Russia, Great Britain and ourselves—ignoring the truth that our own refusal to compromise with Japan to China's disadvantage brought on Pearl Harbor and our involvement before we were ready. They have complained and will continue to complain that they have received less support in the form of materials than any other major ally—forgetting that they have done less fighting, have not used the materials given, and would not have had the ability to use what they asked for. Finally, they have tried and will continue to try to lay the blame on us for their difficulties—distorting the effect of American Army expenditures in China and ignoring the fact that these expenditures are only a minor factor in the whole sorry picture of the mismanagement of the Chinese economy.

But however farfetched these appeals, our flat refusal of them might have several embarrassing effects.

1. We would probably see China enter a period of internal chaos. Our war effort in this theater would be disrupted, instability in the Far East prolonged, and possible Russian intervention attracted.

2. We would be blamed by large sections of both Chinese and American public opinion for "abandoning" China after having been responsible for its collapse. (In a measure we would have brought such blame upon ourselves because we have tended to allow ourselves to become identified not merely with China but also with the Kuomintang and its policies. Henceforth, it may be the better part of valor to avoid too close identification with the Kuomintang.)

3. By an apparent abandonment of China in its hour of need, we would lose international prestige, especially in the Far East.

On the other hand, if we come to the rescue of the Kuomintang on its own terms we would be buttressing—but only temporarily—a decadent regime which by its existing composition and program is incapable of solving China's problems. Both China and ourselves would be gaining only a brief respite from the ultimate day of reckoning. It is clear, therefore, that it is to our advantage to avoid a situation arising in which we would be presented with a Hobson's choice between two such unpalatable alternatives.

B. The Kuomintang's dependence can give us great influence.

Circumstances are rapidly developing so that the Generalissimo will have to ask for the continuance and increase of our support. Weak as he is, he is in no position—and the weaker he becomes the less he will be able—to turn down or render nugatory any coordinated and positive policy we may adopt toward China. The cards are all in our favor. Our influence, intelligently used, can be tremendous.

C. There are three general alternatives open to us.

1. We may give up China as hopeless and wash our hands of it altogether.
2. We may continue to give support to the Generalissimo, when and as he asks for it.
3. We may formulate a coordinated and positive policy toward China and take the necessary steps for its implementation.
- D. Our choice between these alternatives must be determined by our objectives in China.*

The United States, *if it* so desired and *if it* had a coherent policy, could play an important and perhaps decisive role in:

1. Stimulating China to an active part in the war in the Far East, thus hastening the defeat of Japan.
2. Staving off economic collapse in China and bringing about basic political and economic reforms, thus enabling China to carry on the war and enhancing the chances of its orderly postwar recovery.
3. Enabling China to emerge from the war as a major and stabilizing factor in postwar east Asia.
4. Winning a permanent and valuable ally in the progressive, independent, and democratic China.

E. We should adopt the third alternative—a coordinated and positive policy.

This is clear from an examination of the background of the present situation in China and the proper objectives of our policy there.

The first alternative must be rejected on immediate military grounds—but also for obvious long-range considerations. It would deprive us of valuable air bases and position on Japan's flank. Its adoption would prolong the war. We cannot afford to wash our hands of China.

The results of the second alternative—which, insofar as we have a China policy, has been the one we have been and are pursuing—speak for themselves. The substantial financial assistance we have given China has been frittered away with negligible, if any, effect in slowing inflation and retarding economic collapse. The military help we have given has certainly not been used to increase China's war effort against Japan. Our political support has been used for the Kuomintang's own selfish purposes and to bolster its short-sighted and ruinous policies.

The third, therefore, is the only real alternative left to us. Granted the rejection of the first alternative, there is no longer a question of helping and advising China. China itself *must* request this help and advice. The *only* question is whether we give this help within a framework which makes sense, or whether we continue to give it in our present disjointed and absent-minded manner. In the past it has sometimes seemed that our right hand did not know what the left was doing. To continue without a coherent and coordinated policy will be dissipating our effort without either China or ourselves deriving any appreciable benefit. It can only continue to create new problems, in addition to these already troubling us, without any compensating advantages beyond those of indolent short-term expediency. But most important is the possibility that this haphazard giving, this serving of short-term expediency, may not be enough to save the situation; even with it, China may continue toward collapse.

F. This positive policy should be political.

The problem confronting us is whether we are to continue as in the past to ignore political considerations of direct military significance or whether we are to take a leaf out of the Japanese book and invoke even stronger existing political forces in China to achieve our military and long-term political objectives.

We must seek to contribute toward the reversal of the present movement toward collapse and to the rousing of China from its military inactivity. This can be brought about only by an accelerated movement toward democratic political reform within China. Our part must be that of a catalytic agent in this process of China's democratization. It can be carried out by the careful exertion of our influence, which has so far not been consciously and systematically used.

III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS POLITICAL POLICY, THOUGH DIFFICULT IN SOME RESPECTS, IS PRACTICAL AND CAN BE CARRIED OUT BY MANY MEANS

A. Diplomatic finesse will be required in the execution of this policy in such a way as not to offend the strong current of genuine nationalism (as distinguished from the chauvinism of the Kuomintang) which characterizes almost all sections of the Chinese people. There must be a sensitivity to the situation in China and the political changes there so that there can be an appropriate and immediate stiffening or softening of the measures which we undertake. This tact and

sensitivity will be required not only of the top policy-directing agency but of all other agencies actually implementing that policy and concerned in direct relations with China.

B. There must be effective coordination of the policies and actions of all American Government agencies concerned in these dealings with China.

The present lack of effective cooperation between the various Government agencies—State, War, and some of the newer autonomous organizations—derails from the efficient functioning of each, and weakens American influence when it is most needed.

It must be recognized—and it will be even more the case under the policy proposed—that all our dealings with and *all our activities in China have political implication*. Coordination is absolutely essential for the achievement of unity of policy and synchronization of action. It's attainment will require intelligent and forceful direction both in Washington and in Chungking.

The logical person to coordinate activities in Chungking is obviously, because of the broad issues involved, the Ambassador. Similarly the corresponding person in Washington might be the Chief of the China Section of the State Department, who would watch the whole field for the President or a responsible Cabinet member. Positive action, of course, would depend on constant and close consultation, both in Washington and in the field, between the representatives of the State, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments and the other agencies operating in China.

C. Since all measures open to us should not be applied simultaneously, there should be careful selection and timing.

Some measures will be simple and immediately useful. Others should be deferred until primary steps have been taken. Still others will be more forceful or direct and their use will depend on the Kuomintang's recalcitrance to change its ways. We must avoid overplaying or underplaying our hand.

D. Specific measures which might be adopted in the carrying out of this positive policy include the following:

1. *Negative.*—(a) Stop our present "mollycoddling" of China by: Restricting lend-lease, cutting down training of Chinese military cadets, discontinuing training of the Chinese army, taking a firmer stand in the financial negotiations, or stopping the shipment of gold. Any or all of these restrictive measures can be reversed as the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang become more cooperative in carrying on military operations, using equipment and training supplied, being reasonable on financial questions, or allowing us freedom in such military requirements as establishing contact with the Communist areas.

(b) Stop building up the Generalissimo's and the Kuomintang's prestige internationally and in the United States. Such "face" services only to bolster the regime internally and to harden it in its present policies. Our inclusion of China as one of the "Big Four" served a useful purpose in the early stage of the war and as a counter to Japanese racial propaganda but has now lost its justification.

We make fools of ourselves by such actions as the attention given to the meaningless utterances of Chu Hsueh-fen as a spokesman of Chinese labor and the prominence accorded to China in the International Labor Office Conference. Our tendency toward overlavish praise is regarded by the Chinese as a sign of either stupidity or weakness.

Abandonment of glib generalities for hardheaded realism in our attitude toward China will be quickly understood—without the resentment that would probably be felt against the British. We can make it clear that praise will be given when praise is due.

(c) Stop making unconditional and grandiose promises of help along such lines as UNNRA, postwar economic aid, and political support. We can make it clear without having to be very explicit that we stand ready to help China when China shows itself deserving. This ties into the more positive phase of publicity and propaganda to the effect, for instance, that American postwar economic aid will not be extended to build up monopolistic enterprise or support the landlord-gentry class but in the interests of a democratic people.

(d) Discontinue our present active collaboration with Chinese secret police organizations, which support the forces of reaction and stand for the opposite of our American democratic aims and ideals. This collaboration, which results in the effective strengthening of a Gestapo-like organization, is becoming increasingly known in China. It confuses and disillusiones Chinese liberals, who

look to us as their hope, and it weakens our position with the Kuomintang leaders in pressing for democratic reform.

2. *Positive.*—(a) High Government officials in conversation with Chinese leaders in Washington and in China can make known our interest in democracy and unity in China and our dissatisfaction with present Kuomintang military, financial and other policies. Such suggestions will bear great weight if they come from the President and advantage can be taken of opportunities such as the visits of Vice President Wallace to China and H. H. Kung to the United States. A progressive stage can be questions or statements by Members of Congress regarding affairs in China.

(b) We should take up the repeated—but usually insincere—requests of the Kuomintang for advice. If advisers are asked for, we should see that they are provided, that good men are selected, and that they get all possible aid and support from us. While the Kuomintang will be reluctant to accept the advice we may give, its mere reiteration will have some effect.

(c) We should seek to extend our influence on Chinese opinion by every practical means available.

The Office of War Information should go beyond its present function of reporting American war news to pointing up the values of democracy as a permanent political system and as an aid in the waging of war against totalitarianism. We should attempt to increase the dissemination in China, by radio or other more direct means, of constructive American criticism. This should include recognition and implied encouragement to liberal and progressive forces within China. Care should be taken to keep this criticism on a helpful, constructive and objective plane and to avoid derogatory attacks which may injure Chinese nationalistic sensitivities. To do this work, there may have to be some expansion of the OWI in China and of our propaganda directed toward this country.

A second line is the active expansion of our cultural relations program. The present diversion—by Kuomintang wishes—to technical subjects should be rectified and greater emphasis laid on social sciences, cultural, and practical political subjects such as American Government administration. We should increase our aid and support to intellectuals in China by the many means already explored, such as aid to research in China, translation of articles, and opportunity for study or lecturing in the United States.

Other, more indirect lines, are the expansion of our American Foreign Service representation in China to new localities (since each office is in some measure a center of American influence and contact with Chinese liberals and returned students from the United States) and the careful indoctrination of the American Army personnel in China to create, by example and their attitude toward Chinese, favorable impressions of America and the things that America stands for. Where contact between American and Chinese military personnel has been close, as in Burma, the result has apparently been a democratizing influence.

(d) We should assist the education of public opinion in the United States toward a realistic but constructively sympathetic attitude toward China. The most obvious means would be making background information available, in an unofficial way, to responsible political commentators, writers, and research workers. Without action on our part, their writings will become known to Chinese Government circles and from them to other politically minded groups. We should, however, coordinate this with the activity described in the section above to promote dissemination in China.

(e) We should maintain friendly relations with the liberal elements in the Kuomintang, the minor parties, and the Communists. This can—and should for its maximum effect—be done in an open, aboveboard manner. The recognition which it implies will be quickly understood by the Chinese.

Further steps in this direction could be publicity to liberals, such as distinguished intellectuals. When possible they may be included in consideration for special honors or awards, given recognition by being asked to participate in international commissions or other bodies, and invited to travel or lecture in the United States. A very effective action of this type would be an invitation to Madam Sun Yat-sen from the White House.

We should select men of known liberal view to represent us in OWI, cultural relations, and other lines of work in China.

(f) We should continue to show an interest in the Chinese Communists. This includes contact with the Communist representatives in Chungking, publicity on the blockade and the situation between the two parties, and continued pressure for the dispatch of observers to North China. At the same time we should stress the importance of North China militarily—for intelligence regarding

Japanese battle order, Japanese air strength, weather reporting, bombing data, and damage assessment, and air crew evacuation and rescue work. We should consider the eventual advance of active operations against the Japanese to North China and the question of assistance to or cooperation with Communist and guerrilla forces. If our reasonable requests based on urgent military grounds do not receive a favorable response, we should send our military observers anyway.

(g) We should consider the training and equipping of provincial and other armies in China in cases where we can be satisfied that they will fight the Japanese.

(h) We should continue to press—and if necessary insist—on getting American observers to the actual fighting fronts. We should urge, and when possible assist, the improvement of the condition of the Chinese soldier, especially his treatment, clothing, feeding, and medical care.

(i) We should publicize statements by responsible Government officials indicating our interest in Chinese unity and our attitude toward such questions as the use of American lend-lease supplies by the Kuomintang in a civil war. It is interesting, for instance, that Under Secretary Welles' letter to Browder regarding American interest in Chinese unity was considered so important by the Kuomintang that publication in China was prohibited.

This program is, of course, far from complete. Other measures will occur to the policy agency and will suggest themselves as the situation in China develops.

E. Most of these measures can be applied progressively.

This is true, for instance, of the various negative actions suggested, and of the conversations, statements, and other lines of endeavor to influence public opinion in China. A planned activity of encouragement and attention to liberals, minor party leaders, and the Communists can advance.

F. The program suggested contains little that is not already being done in an uncoordinated and only partially effective manner.

What is needed chiefly is an integration, systematic motivation and planned expansion of activities in which we are already, perhaps in some cases unconsciously, engaged. We do, for instance, try to maintain contact with liberal groups; we have expressed the desire to send observers to the Communist area; we have a weak cultural relations program; and the OWI has made some attempts to propagandize American democratic ideals.

G. The program constitutes only very modified and indirect intervention in Chinese affairs.

It must be admitted that some of the measures proposed would involve taking more than normal interest in the affairs of another sovereign nation. But they do not go so far as to infringe on Chinese sovereignty. If we choose to make lend-lease conditional on a better war effort by China, it is also China's freedom to refuse to accept it on these conditions. We do not go nearly as far as imperialistic countries have often done in the past. We obviously do not, for instance, suggest active assistance or subsidizing of rival parties to the Kuomintang—as the Russians did in the case of the Communists.

Furthermore, the Chinese Government would find it difficult to object. The Chinese have abused their freedom to propagandize in the United States by the statements and writings of such men as Lin Yu-tang. They have also, and through Lin Yu-tang, who carries an official passport as a representative of the Chinese Government, engaged in "cultural relations" work. They have freely criticized American policies and American leaders. And they have attempted to dabble in American politics—through Madame Chiang, Luce, Willkie, and Republican Congressmen. They have had and will continue to have freedom to try to influence public opinion in the United States in the same way that we will try to do it in China.

(Off the record.)

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. It is stated somewhere in the record that General Stilwell ordered your return to the United States in October 1944 just before he himself returned. I'm not sure that it's clear in the record why General Stilwell ordered your return. Was it due to any criticism of your activities?—A. It was not due to any criticism whatever of my activities. I don't know all of the reasons why I was ordered back. Actually I was up in Yen-an at the time and not physically present with General Stilwell. I don't think I—I didn't talk to him until after he had returned to the United States. I think that General Stilwell

assumed that probably my assignment, which had been more or less a personally requested one, would be terminated. I had been in China, away from the United States, at that time for over a year and a half, a year and 9 months, and I think that was the motivation of his giving the orders to bring me back.

Q. As far as you know, your services were completely satisfactory to General Stilwell?—A. I know they were, sir.

Q. Did you receive any rating or commendation or anything on account of your service? Perhaps it's already in the record. Did you have any Army rating as a result of your service?—A. No; we received no Army rating or efficiency reports. General Stilwell was a busy man and not one for personal details. I have some letters from General Stilwell but they are on the high seas. I don't have them with me. I think we could confirm from the associates of General Stilwell and his wife that he was satisfied with my service.

Q. I refer to page 26 of your statement and your reference there to the Memorandum No. 40 of October 10. I think that has been put into the record.

Mr. RHETTS. Yes; that is Document 193.

Q. Referring to page 31 of the transcript, I'm just wondering if I have noticed a typographical error. At the bottom of page 31 it reads: "In this talk he mentioned that he had made the same threat to John Devies but had relented because he did not wish to ruin a young man's career. This interview was of course reported by me to General Wedemeyer, who told me that I was working only for him and should 'carry on'." Is that correct?—A. Yes, sir. That is, my interview with General Hurley was reported by me to General Wedemeyer, who was my superior.

Q. That is all right then. I think I had a confusion of generals in my mind. I thought they were talking about the same general who made the remark. No, I'm still in difficulty, this was not the statement of General Hurley but is a statement by General Wedemeyer. How could you report General Wedemeyer's statement to General Wedemeyer? Will you examine that?

Mr. RHETTS. At the beginning of the paragraph General Hurley sent for Mr. Service.

Q. It is General Hurley's threat and not General Wedemeyer's?—A. That is right. In the first part of the paragraph we will have to insert "General Hurley" instead of "he" in each case and when we get down to the next to the last sentence "In this talk General Hurley mentioned that he, General Hurley, had made the same threat to John Devies but had relented because he, General Hurley, did not wish to ruin a young man's career. This interview was of course reported by me to General Wedemeyer."

Q. I understand it now. I was confused before. On page 33 of your statement, just below the middle of the page you refer to white paper 87-92 with the notation it be put into the record. Is that in the record?

Mr. RHETTS. It is in the record in the sense I offered it entirely. I offered the entire book for the record. It is as an exhibit. It is not copied into the transcript, but as an exhibit.

Q. What I refer to is the text of the telegram from George Atcheson, which was drafted by Mr. Service.

Mr. RHETTS. That is correct. During the course of discussion of this telegram yesterday afternoon we did insert it in the transcript.

Q. Those are the questions that I wanted to ask in connection with part I of your examination. Have you gentlemen some questions?

Questions by Mr. Achilles:

Q. Mr. Service, the part of the charges which we are interested in at the moment is that your official writings in China were influenced by Communist sympathies. We have gone into certain aspects of that at considerable length but there are various aspects, some of a personal nature, which I would like to have a little more information on. According to your introductory statement, you were born in China of missionary parents. May I ask what faith your father was?—A. My father's family and my father were Baptists.

Q. Were you also a Baptist?—A. No. My mother was Presbyterian and neither one of my parents had a very strong denominational feeling. I was not baptized until my father thought I was old enough to know what it was about and wished it and I asked to be baptized when I was 12 by a very old family friend. So I was actually baptized by a Methodist clergyman. The church in Shanghai was an American community church which was a rather unusually successful interdenominational church and I always considered that church in Shanghai as my home church.

Q. Does that mean you are a Methodist or interdenominational, or what?—A. Technically I suppose I'm a Methodist. I have no very strong feeling on the matter. I have always picked my churches largely on the preacher, on the sermons. Generally I'm attracted toward Congregational churches. In Washington we usually attended the church on Connecticut Avenue.

Q. I see in your statement that you attended first grade in a public school in the suburbs of Cleveland and that thereafter you were educated at home by your mother in China, until you again came to the United States at the age of 11. Is that correct?—A. No, sir. I went to Shanghai to boarding school at 11 and I did not return to the United States until just before my fifteenth birthday.

Q. When you were at the American school in China, at Shanghai, was that for 4 years?—A. Yes.

Q. Were the students there principally Americans or were there a lot of Chinese as well?—A. There were no Chinese in the school. There were a few non-Americans but the school was supported largely by American mission boards and by American business organizations for their own children. And the foreign children were very strictly limited in number. I would say that at least 90 percent of the children were Americans.

Q. At that time did you have many Chinese friends, or were your friends principally Americans at that point?—A. At that period, you mean in Shanghai?

Q. Yes.—A. I had no Chinese friends at Shanghai. I was in a boarding school, completely American atmosphere, and I knew a few of my father's associates in the YMCA but I didn't know their children, generally, or their families. I couldn't say that I had any Chinese friends while I was in boarding school in Shanghai.

Q. You were 15 when you returned to the United States to high school?—A. That is correct.

Q. You attended Oberlin College, I see by your statement. While you were in college were you interested in political or social matters?—A. Very little. I'm afraid that, for the first two and a half years at any rate, my chief interests were (a) athletics, and (b) social, but I think in a different sense than the one you mean. Toward the end I became interested in study and I had very little time for political activities. When I say political activities, I joined a cosmopolitan club which they had there but it was almost moribund. I belonged for a short time to what they called the Oberlin Peace Society, but that again was not an active organization.

Q. What was the nature of that society?—A. The president of Oberlin at that time, Ernest Hatch Wilkins, was quite a strong—I suppose you would say—pacifist, and he invited I think Kirby Page to come to Oberlin and give a talk. This would be in 1930, I think. Kirby Page had the idea, as I remember it after all these years, that if enough people and enough countries around the world would get together and say we don't want war, that there won't be any more wars, and in this optimistic naive view we organized Oberlin Peace Society which I think had about three meetings and talks and, as far as I know, just folded up. We took no Pacifist oath. It was not an active organization at all.

Q. You were in college, I believe, from 1927 to 1931, is that correct?—A. I graduated—well, I entered as a freshman in 1927 and graduated in 1931 and I stayed for an additional year of graduate study, which carried me into June 1932.

Q. During the period you were in Oberlin was there to your knowledge any interest in communism or any communist groups?—A. Absolutely none whatever.

Q. Was there any particular interest in socialism either academically or otherwise?—A. I don't remember ever discussing the subject or hearing it discussed. Oberlin actually is a rather conservative school as far as the student bodies go. It's an old Republican school and every 4 years they have a Republican convention. The student body in all polls has traditionally gone Republican. They are more conservative than the faculty actually. They come from upper middle class homes, most of them. But this was before the real days of the depression and I think that Oberlin would be considered a very politically unconscious student body, at that time, sir.

Q. You say that, if anything, the students were more conservative than the faculty. Were any of your professors, as far as you recall, particularly interested in communism or socialism?—A. Certainly not in communism. There may have been one economics professor, who was an elderly man near retirement, who might be considered as having leanings toward socialism.

Q. Did you have any particular close contact with him in his courses?—A. No.

Q. In college did you generally mix freely with your associates, or were you the type who was inclined to keep to himself?—A. I think I mixed extremely freely. I knew every man in my class. There were perhaps 160 men. I was nominated for class president 2 years and was a runnerup. I was active in a good many student organizations, student activities. I think that probably I knew as large a number of student body as well as anybody else did in college.

Q. Following completion of your year of graduate work, you took the Foreign Service examinations, is that correct, in the following fall?—A. Yes.

Q. And since there was then a delay in appointing persons who had passed the examinations to the Foreign Service, is it correct that you returned to China and reported as clerk in Kunming?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. That was in 1933?—A. Yes. I worked for a short while in a bank in Shanghai, an American bank, while awaiting appointment as clerk.

Q. And you served at Kunming until when?—A. I was commissioned Foreign Service officer in early October 1935 and was ordered immediately to Peiping. I couldn't leave at once and did not reach Peiping until early December 1935. At the time of my appointment I was actually absent from my post because of the death of my father in Shanghai. I had to return to my post and make arrangements for my family's travel.

Q. Upon the completion of your language studies in Peiping, you were assigned to Shanghai in what year?—A. The orders, I believe, are dated in December 1937. I reached Shanghai in January 1938.

Q. And you served at Shanghai until your assignment to Chungking in 1941, is that right?—A. Yes; that is correct.

Q. During those years what was the prevailing political situation in China, during the years from 1933 until 1941? I realize that it's quite an extended period as far as Chinese politics are concerned, but during your period in Kunming, for example, what was the situation in that part of China?—A. It's a little hard to limit an answer to a question like that. In 1933 when I arrived in Kunming it was a semi-independent province governed by a typical Chinese war lord, General Lung Yun. He issued his own currency, managed his own foreign relations, maintained his own army. In every respect he was independent and only owed nominal allegiance to the Central Government. Access to Yunnan Province where Kunming was located was only possible, only easily possible, through French Indochina and French influence was fairly strong there.

During the spring of 1935, I believe, the Chinese Communists had broken out of their encirclement of the Kuomintang armies in southeast China and Kwangsi Province and detoured, zigzagged through the various provinces of southwest China and then came through Yunnan past, almost below, the walls of Kunming actually, and we had to evacuate all the women and children very hurriedly late one night.

The Central Government armies followed the Communists on the long march and established their control over these provinces of west China as a result. So that in the period, the last period that I was in Kunming the Central Government was in the process of really taking over the province for the first time.

Q. You say the Communists passed through Yunnan. Were they at any time in control of Kunming?—A. No, sir. They did not take the city. They were in a great hurry to beat the Central Government armies to the Yangtze River crossing. They had sidestepped the Yunnan armies and the Kuomintang armies and they had an open field ahead of them and they went through just as rapidly as they could.

Q. Did you have any contact with any of the Chinese Communists at that time?—A. None whatever. It would have been impossible. There were no Communists above ground in those days and, as far as I know, there were never any in Kunming. We never had any contact at all with them in those civil war days. It was actually a civil war going on at that time.

Q. To what extent were the teachings of Sun Yat-sen influential in Chinese thought in Yunnan?—A. We get into problems of the nature of Chinese society, if you will, Sun Yat-sen's Three People's principles were certainly known to and read by a narrow group of intellectuals. They were not influential on the mass of them and they were not influential with the tnen Government of Yunnan, which was purely a robber-baron type of government out for self-aggrandizement and maintenance of its own power. There was a headquarters branch of the party in Kunming.

The CHAIRMAN. Which party?

A. Kuomintang Party.

Q. The Kuomintang was then the leading proponent of Sun Yat-sen's philosophies?—A. It was and it was the party of the National Government but it had party headquarters in Kunming in Yunnan Province and had to be subservient to the local war lord or it could not maintain itself.

Q. The local government then was not particularly under the influence of Sun Yat-sen's philosophy?—A. It paid lip service to it.

Q. Were any of your associates there of that intellectual group who were sincere followers of Sun Yat-sen or strongly influenced by his teachings?—A. I didn't have a great many Chinese friends during this period in Kunming. I knew several Chinese students, exchanged lessons with them, helped them with some of their work, and they were certainly, if not members of the Kuomintang, at least believers in Sun Yat-sen's Three Peoples' principles. But I was a clerk in the Consulate. I was not in a position to mingle or meet with very many Chinese. My associates at that time were chiefly with the foreign community.

Q. To pass on to Peiping at the time you were there, what was the prevailing political philosophy in Peiping in those years?—A. Peiping is an old sophisticated capital which is not generally politically active, or politically interested. Most of the people of Peiping have watched governments come and government go and it is not as, for instance, Canton might be called a center of political activity. It was, however, a large university center and a good many of the students at that time, the university students, were politically interested but particularly on the question of resistance to Japan.

Very soon after I arrived in Peiping the students of all the universities staged demonstrations, the purpose of which was to demand that a Central Government take more active steps to stop the creeping Japanese aggression which was proceeding particularly against north China.

Q. Was there any noticeable Communist influence in Peiping at that period?—A. It has been repeatedly alleged that Communist sympathizers were active in promoting this student agitation but if that is true they were not doing it as Communists, not openly. I have known a good many of the student leaders and none of them were Communists so far as I know. In fact they will deny that they were Communists. But because it was not the policy of the Central Government at that time to stage riots which might aggravate the Japanese, a lot of these people were accused of communism and were imprisoned on that basis for some time.

Q. What is your own opinion as to whether they were actually Communists?—A. My own opinion would be that very few of them were Communists. I have known several of those people who took an active part in those student demonstrations who worked all through the war for Kuomintang organizations in Chungking, although they were imprisoned by the Kuomintang authorities in 1935 and charged with being Communists.

The chief line at that time, 1935, was the united front. And there were a lot of people who thought the united front was a fine idea.

Q. That was the official government line?—A. That was the Communist line. And there were a lot of people who sincerely supported the united-front idea, who were not Communists.

Q. During your period in Peiping, what in general were your principal associates? Were they other people in the Embassy, other Americans, or Chinese?—A. Well, I was spending 8 hours a day studying Chinese and the question of time spent, well, my principal associates were my Chinese teachers with whom I spent these 8 hours or so a day. They were representatives of the old scholar class. They had very little political inclinations of any sort. One of them was a Manchu who had been a member of the Imperial clan, who had actually been some sort of a minor attendant in the Empress Dowager's retinue. And another man was an old scholar who had taken degrees in the last days of the Empire. Outside of my studies, my principal associates were the other language students.

Q. Were any of your teachers in any way, would you say, communistically inclined?—A. Not in the least. I would say that none of them were even Kuomintang inclined. Outside of the teachers, my principal associates were the other language students. We had a group of embassy students. There was another group of Marine Corps and Navy students. They had finally a group of American Army students. All of these people knew each other well, associating together a great deal. And finally, of course, there were students from the other embassies whom we naturally saw a good deal of. I didn't belong to the social clubs in Peiping. Actually, I spent about 8 months living in the hills about 20 miles outside of Peiping where we lived in a very isolated way during the winter and spring.

Then there was a very large group in Peiping at that time of, I might call them, students, men holding fellowships who had come to Peiping because it was the cultural center of China, to do historical or other research, to do writing; and, in addition, there was a fairly large group of newspaper correspondents coming and going. Several of them had Peiping as a more prominent base, something like—well, Arch Steele of, at that time, the Chicago Daily News, now of the Herald Tribune. For instance, his wife lived in Peiping and he would make his trips and come back to Peiping and go out from Peiping. There was a Swiss correspondent, very well known, named Bosshardt.

Then there was John Kullgren, who represents the Swedish newspapers, and there was a very large group of these men who were writing, studying China, writing about and studying China.

Q. I notice in your statement that you list various persons who were studying reporting on China, including Owen Lattimore. How well did you know Owen Lattimore at that time?—A. I knew him very slightly, actually, at that time. I was surprised that he remembered knowing me at that time, but he did mention recently, I think, in some testimony, that he had met me first of that time. He was a well-known character. There was the aura of expertness about him. I met him at various social functions. I heard him talk once or twice.

Q. When did you next come in contact with Mr. Lattimore?—A. I think my next meeting with Mr. Lattimore was in 1941, in the summer of that year, when he arrived in Chungking as the adviser to the generalissimo.

Q. Did you see much of him in 1941?—A. Very little. Our Embassy at that time was on the south bank of the Yangtze River, across the river from the city. He lived in the city at the far end so it was very inconvenient for us to get together. Transportation was scarce and difficult. I don't believe I saw him more than three times, perhaps four times, during that year. I was in and out of Chungking a good deal. He actually made a point of avoiding close contact with the Embassy because of his position with the Generalissimo. He didn't want the Chinese to think he was being a pipeline or was running back and forth.

Q. He was there as the adviser to the Generalissimo?—A. Yes. And he was taking great pains to maintain that status and, as I say, to disassociate himself from the Embassy.

Q. When did you next come in contact with him?—A. My memory on this is not very clear but when I was on leave in California in December 1942, it might have been January 1943, Mr. Lattimore was I believe at that time head of the Pacific operations for OWI. They had their offices in San Francisco and I have a hazy recollection of just stopping and speaking to him, saying hello when I was visiting some friends in the OWI offices there in San Francisco.

Q. And after that?—A. The next time was in October 1944 when I returned to the United States. He was, I believe, at the off-the-record interview which I had with members of the IPR here in Washington. During that visit to the United States he invited me to come down and see him and spend the night at his home in Baltimore. And I did so. I don't remember the exact date but it would be probably about the middle of November 1944.

Q. Under what circumstances did you give that off-the-record talk at the IPR?—A. During the period of consultation at my return in 1944 I was much sought after because I was the first man to get back to Washington after having visited in the Chinese Communist areas since 1939. In addition to all these interrogations by the different agencies, a number of newspaper men were sent to me by the press section of the Department. I was asked to go up to New York to talk to Mr. Luce. I got approval. I talked to Mr. Hopkins, Mr. White, and various other people. And the IPR asked—

The CHAIRMAN. Will you just explain IPR?

A. The Institute of Pacific Relations. May we refer to it as the IPR?

The CHAIRMAN. Afterward, yes.

A. The Washington branch of the IPR asked Mr. Vincent, who I believe was then Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, if it would be possible for me to come over and give an informal off-the-record talk to some of their people in the Washington office. The first I knew of the matter was Mr. Vincent's telling me that he had received the invitation and had accepted and hoped it would be all right with me.

Q. In other words, your talk at the IPR was at the initiative of the IPR?—A. That is right.

Q. And authorized by the Department?—A. That is correct. And it was quite a customary thing. We had a great many officers who did exactly the same when

they came back from the field and had news, information of interest. I believe that Mr. Oliver Edmund Clubb had one of those meetings after he returned from Sinkiang. I know that Mr. Raymond P. Ludden was asked for and authorized to give a talk when he also returned from China in June 1945. And I'm sure there are many other instances of Foreign Service Officers being authorized by the Department to meet the research staff of the IPR in these off-the-record background sessions.

Q. And to return to Owen Lattimore, when did you next come in contact with him?—A. It's hard, after all these years, for me to remember all of the individual contacts, of course. The next time that I saw him was during the spring of 1945, in April or May. I can't remember the exact circumstances of seeing him, but during one of those contacts he asked me if I would come down and see him again. I was invited eventually to come down the first week end in June. I went down for a week end then.

Q. If I understand correctly, your contacts with Mr. Lattimore consisted of a few meetings with him in Peiping during your language student period, a few meetings in Chungking when he was there as adviser to the Generalissimo, one meeting in San Francisco when he was with OWI, one or possibly more than one meeting in November when you were in Washington in November of 1944, and spending the week end with him in the spring of 1945.—A. I spent a week end with him in '44, one night.

Q. And the week end of June 1945.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. I would like to ask if you could give us some idea as to how many of these meetings you had alone with Mr. Lattimore, or were they group discussions?—A. Well, in the language-student period in Peiping I never saw Mr. Lattimore alone. There was always some social occasion or a lecture by him or something of that sort. In Chungking, again I don't believe that I ever—I'm sure I never saw Mr. Lattimore alone. I was usually accompanying Mr. Vincent or someone else on calls in the city and we would stop in and see Owen. On one occasion we got caught by a very bad storm which made it impossible for us to cross the Yangtze River and we went back to Mr. Lattimore's house and asked if he could put us up for the night, and we slept on a couch in his living room. I saw him once or twice at the Embassy when he called at the Embassy, but there again it was not alone.

During 1944—pardon me, in 1942—my recollection is that it was just a casual conversation when I was being taken around the office by one of the OWI staff, an old friend of mine whom I was visiting, and there again it was not a solitary conversation. In 1944 I don't remember that anyone was at his home that week end. And that night I stayed there there was nobody, but his wife was there, of course. In 1945 I never saw him alone. There were other people present that week end and there was no solitary conversation.

Q. One last question. Would you characterize your relationship with him as one of casual friendship, or how would you classify that relationship, sir?—A. Yes; I would call it casual. It would be a casual friendship, based on mutual interests in the Far East and in China. I have always been interested in the extreme western and northwestern part of China. My father was one of the founders of the West China Border Research Society. He made several trips to that borderland, acquired over the years probably the most complete collection of Tibetan articles which have been in several museums here in the States. I myself have traveled some in the Tibetan country. I traveled up to the border of Sinkiang. I visited the caves Sir Aurel Stein handled on the Han and Tang Dynasty manuscript. I have been along the southern border of Mongolia. I have been interested in all the books on Mongolia and central Asia, and we have a considerable interest in bases for exchange of views and talk about that part of the world.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Throughout the years that you knew Owen Lattimore, did you regard him as a particularly well informed person on China?—A. I don't like to discuss Mr. Lattimore very much. On his specialty, which is Mongolia and central Asia, he is of course probably the outstanding American expert. In fact there are very few other people who can be called experts, there are very few other Americans who can be called experts on that part of the world. I don't think that Mr. Lattimore is a profound scholar. I think he is rather superficial in his views. He has a very active mind but his views are apt to shift a bit. I don't think his views on current affairs and China in general are particularly noteworthy. They are always interesting because he has a very facile mind, a very quick mind, always has new ideas and states them very dramatically.

Q. Have his views on China had any influence on your own?—A. None whatever, sir. In fact I haven't known his views until after I have formed my own views. In 1941 I did not discuss China with him. Well, he won't talk about China. By the time I saw him again in 1944, in November '44, my views were formed and I had not seen any writings or had any contact with him.

Q. It has been said that you were a student or pupil of Owen Lattimore.—A. There is absolutely no truth in any such statement.

Q. To get back to Peiping, I noticed among some of the other correspondents and people particularly interested in China that you mentioned are F. McCracken Fisher of the UP. What would you say his political views were?—A. You're thinking about the political views about China, are you?

Q. China or Soviet communism?—A. Well, he's certainly not a Communist or a Communist sympathizer. You have to remember, I think that a man who is a strong conservative in the American terms, and on American affairs generally, finds himself in China or has found himself during the past few years in China being sympathetic toward what might normally be called a much more liberal point of view. Practically all of the Foreign Service officers and even men such as George Atcheson and former Ambassador Gauss were all extremely conservative men in American terms.

But the conditions in China of inadequacy and inefficiency, corruption if you wish, the failure of the Kuomintang, and the aspects of the Communists which produced better government was winning popular appeal, made these people recognize that whether one liked the Communists or not they were doing a better job than the Kuomintang. They were not Communists or pro-Communists. I'm afraid I don't make myself clear.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean these people were not Communists?—A. That is right.

Q. Fisher particularly?—A. Fisher's attitude would be of that sort.

Q. Which sort?—A. Of being himself a conservative. But if you would transfer him to China I would assume that he—I know you would find him critical of the Kuomintang, in general agreement with the views held by most of us.

The CHAIRMAN. By who?

A. By most of us who were in China.

Q. Haldore Hanson is another. What would you say of his views?—A. At the time I knew him up to the end of 1937 he hadn't yet visited the Communist areas. He was, as all the rest of us were, bitterly critical of the Japanese war, very sympathetic toward the Chinese. I think that Haldore Hanson is a man who probably, at that time at any rate, read the New Republic. But he certainly is no Communist or no pro-Communist. He was a much more definite liberal in the American sense of the word than McCracken Fisher.

Q. Or Frank Oliver, of Reuters?—A. [Shaking of head.]

The CHAIRMAN. Your answer is?

A. No. I haven't seen him for years. And I don't remember well enough to make much of a guess as to what his views were in those days. He is an Englishman. In American terms he would be a liberal. But not by any stretch of the imagination would he be Communist.

Q. Or Arch Steele, of the New York Herald Tribune?—A. Arch Steele would be conservative by everything.

Q. Or Edgar Snow of the Saturday Evening Post?—A. Well, he is not a Communist. He is a leftist. He was at that time, of course, the only American who had visited the Communists in the northwest. He was in the process of writing Red Star Over China.

Q. You say he visited the Communists areas prior to that?—A. Well, during that period.

Q. During that period?—A. Yes.

Q. And Frank Smothers, of the Chicago Daily News?—A. It's awfully hard to characterize all these people in very definite terms. In the first place we usually didn't discuss American politics with each other and I have no idea of what their attitudes were.

Q. I notice that you mention becoming acquainted with Colonel Stilwell who was then military attaché at the Embassy. Was that the same Stilwell who was later General Stilwell?—A. That is correct.

(Off the record.)

(At this point, 11:45 a. m. the Board recessed and reconvened at 11:50 a. m.)

Q. How long was Colonel Stilwell military attaché to Peiping?—A. He was military attaché during the entire period I was there. And he continued as military attaché until I believe about 1939. I saw him occasionally when he passed through Shanghai during the years 1938 and 1939.

Q. Had he served in China previous to that?—A. Yes. He had been in China for a good many years. I can't give you his record in detail but I believe that soon after the First World War he was assigned to the Fifteenth Infantry which we had stationed permanently in Tientsin. He served one tour of duty there and then was assigned to Peiping as an Army language student, which for the Army is a 4-year detail. I believe he had a second tour with the Fifteenth Infantry before he became the military attaché. But he had spent the greater part of the period from the early 1920's up until 1935, when I first met him, in China.

Q. As far as you know, did General Stilwell have any pronounced political views or orientation?—A. Not in a party sense. General Stilwell was a terrific individualist. He had a great conviction that—well, a great sympathy for the common soldier. He was an infantryman and he was the type of officer who always believed that everything should be done for the soldier. He had an obsession, almost, against brass. He hated pretenition. He hated fuss about rank. I have never discussed political matters with him.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you intend your question to refer to Chinese politics, Mr. Achilles?

Q. No. In general did he have any strong views about Chinese politics?—A. He had a great impatience with inefficiency, the Chinese ideas of "face," covering up things. He had a great admiration for some things which the Chinese Army was able to do. He was impatient with a great many of the Chinese commanders, even in this early period. I remember hearing him talk about the terrific fight which the Chinese were putting up in Shanghai and I heard him discuss some of the other Chinese battles, such as Taierhchuang at the same time he was scathing in his comment on some of the Chinese military leaders in this period for failing to put up a fight for retreating before the enemy attacked them for giving up strong positions. But I don't remember in this period of ever hearing him discuss Chinese political matters.

Q. During your service in Shanghai, what were your principal duties?—A. Well, it's almost impossible to enumerate then all, sir. Ambassador Gauss was very much interested, I think, in junior officers and when I first arrived in Shanghai, I was put in the Visa Section as a subordinate there under a non-career officer. It was an assignment which several other Foreign Service officers had balked at. I got along well with this officer who was an experienced visa man. And I suppose I got a good report on my trial period. At the same time I was given several additional chores; one of them was to prepare a weekly summary of the press in Shanghai. It was a job which had been given several officers and not handled apparently completely satisfactorily.

I had a commendation from Mr. Gauss on the first one of these I prepared and within 2 or 3 months I think I was assigned to another section—and I can't at this time remember exactly which section—to fill the vacancy caused by an officer going on home leave. And thereafter during all of the 3 years and 3 months that I was in Shanghai I functioned as a relief officer and you might say an emergency man to go into a section which was temporarily swamped and help them out, take the place of anybody going on leave, I did all the jobs—accounts, invoices, leaves, citizenship, ran the land office for a while, had several periods in the political section, did a great deal of protection work in connection with our properties that were occupied by Japanese troops throughout eastern China, acted as assistant to the executive officer, handled the routine of the amalgamation, amalgamating the commercial attaché and agricultural attaché in 1939.

Q. How much political reporting did you do from Shanghai?—A. I didn't do a great deal because I was in the political section—well, I was generally in all of the sections for only 2 or 3 months when somebody was away and the political section was a fairly large one. Shanghai was probably the largest consulate general we had in the world at that time. And we were generally three or four officers in the political section and of those posts I was the most junior. I was still a Foreign Service officer unclassified at that time. So that most of the reporting I did was routine reporting, assigned reporting. It was to go over and see so-and-so and talk to him, write up this, it was secondary political reporting.

Q. Did you have many Chinese contacts at that time?—A. Yes; I had a number, but not very many in connection with my political reporting—because of my junior status I was not contacting important officials. Most of the work I did was from newspapers and that sort of thing. I had a good many Chinese friends, social friends, particularly through the Masonic lodge and organiza-

tions like that, and I came to know a good many. They were mainly Chinese businessmen or Chinese professional men.

Q. You were at that time a member of the Masonic lodge?—A. Yes. I joined it during that period in Shanghai.

Q. I note that the membership was largely Chinese. But was Masonry in China substantially the same as Masonry in the United States?—A. Yes. There were a number of lodges in the main cities—American lodges affiliated with mostly Massachusetts constitution. But the Philippine Grand Lodge established a branch lodge in China, about 1930 I believe. And there were two lodges in Shanghai under the Philippine Grand Lodge. The membership of most of those, the greater part of the membership of those lodges was Chinese who had studied in the United States.

Q. Were your Chinese associates at this period any particular group? Were they primarily your lodge associates, or were they any other particular group?—A. Well, numerically the lodge associates would be the greatest number. There were also Chinese friends who had been associates of my father in the YMCA. I didn't know most of those people intimately because generally they were much older than I. There was another group of Chinese whom we met through Chinese in the office. We had quite a large Chinese staff. Most of those people were business people. We had several Chinese in fairly high positions in the commercial attaché's office, for instance, and we met Chinese through them or in connection with our commercial work.

I had two tours of duty in the commercial section, the economics section. Then there were some friends whom I had known or were friends of people whom I knew in Peiping, younger people. Some of them were university people in Shanghai, at St. John's University.

Q. Were any of your Chinese associates at that time, as far as you know, Communists?—A. None whatever.

Q. I note that your statement lists a number of American acquaintances that time, Robert Barnett of the IPR; William Johnstone, Hallett Abend, and Tillman Durdin of the New York Times; J. B. Powell of the China Weekly Review; Randall Gould of the Shanghai Evening Post; Larry Lehrbas of the Associated Press; and Robert Bellaire of the United Press. Do you recall whether any of them had any particular political biases or views?—A. Some of them I would call more liberal than the others and some of them I would call definitely conservative. None of them were Communists or pro-Communists or strongly leftist in sympathy, as far as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. You say "or strongly leftist"?

A. Yes.

Q. I notice that in your statement you subscribed at that time to a number of magazines dealing with China, one of which was the Far Eastern Survey. What is the character of that?—A. The Far Eastern Survey is a biweekly publication put out by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations containing articles written by a very large number of people on subjects related to the Far East generally.

Q. And Pacific Affairs?—A. Pacific Affairs is a quarterly published by the International Council of the International Secretariat, I believe. Perhaps—I'm not sure of the exact wording of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Q. You were undoubtedly aware from the press of the charges that the Institute of Pacific Relations was seriously infiltrated by Communists. Do you have any knowledge as to how long that situation has existed, when the IPR first began to be influenced in its publications by Communist thinking?—A. No; I do not. Outside of being a subscriber to some of its magazines, I have had no interest in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I have never attended its periodic conferences or participated in its affairs in any way. Certainly it was always thought of in the days referred to here as a most respectable type of organization. I have heard from reading the press that there were some Communists who did occupy positions of some influence in it at one period, but I can't tell you with any definiteness or from personal knowledge when that was or how influential those people were.

Q. Did you at any time in China meet Frederick V. Field?—A. I have never met Frederick Field or had any contact with him in any way, not even to the point of attending a meeting where he was present, so far as I know.

Q. I also notice in your statement that at that time you subscribed to the magazine Amerasia. How would you describe that magazine?—A. I subscribed to it just after it was established, I think.

Q. When was it established?—A. I think in 1936 or 1937. I'm not sure of the exact date.

Q. Do you recall who established it?—A. I remember receiving some circulars giving the board of editors; a number of them were people I knew personally or knew of, who had a good reputation, and on that basis I subscribed to it for, I think, 2 years.

Q. Who were the persons connected with it that you knew personally?—A. I believe that William W. Lockwood was one of the original members. No, I see that he was not. I have the names of the editorial board as of March 1937.

Q. Will you read the names?—A. Frederick V. Field—

The CHAIRMAN. And indicate as you go along whether or not you were acquainted with them.—A. I was not acquainted with Mr. Field. Philip J. Jaffe, I was not acquainted with Mr. Jaffe and knew nothing about him. T. A. Bisson, I had met him in Peiping in 1935; I had read his book, Japan in China, and had read various other articles which he had written. And I believe at that time I also had read his book on—I have forgotten the title, but it is American policy in the Far East, or something of the sort.

Q. You had known Mr. Brisson at that time?—A. Yes.

Q. Where did you first meet him?—A. I first met Mr. Brisson during the winter of 1937, during the summer; yes, during the winter of 1937 in Peiping. He was traveling at that time, I think, on a Guggenheim grant, and had just been visiting in Manchuria. He came down to Peiping to collect material. He was writing a book on Japanese aggression in China. At that time Haldore Hansen was living temporarily with me. My family had been evacuated. I had a large house and Haldore Hansen had just had a very rigorous detention by the Japanese Army and was in need of a place to recuperate, so Haldore Hansen was staying temporarily with me.

As I remember it, Mr. Hansen, who was also beginning to write his book, was very anxious to see Mr. Bisson, to meet him, and we invited Mr. Bisson out for a lunch, I believe at my house. There were several other people present. I don't remember who they were now; and we spent several hours talking with Mr. Bisson. That was the only time I had met him.

Q. Did you have an impression at that point as to Mr. Bisson's political slant?—A. None at all. We were talking about Japanese aggression against China and his observations in Manchuria and he had no disagreement on anything like that.

Q. Would you give the other names—the other people?

Mr. STEVENS. Pardon me, did you have any reason to frame any judgment at all about his beliefs or along political lines?

A. There was no basis or reason to form any judgment on political lines.

Mr. RHETTS (off the record). I should like to offer as an exhibit document No. 32, which is a listing of the editorial board of the magazine Amerasia for the years 1937, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, and 1944, as they have been taken from the masthead of the magazine.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be introduced.

(Carbon copy of listing of members of editorial board of Amerasia magazine for years 1937, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, and 1944, was admitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 14.")

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Will you give information concerning the other names on the list?—A. The next name is Ch'ao-ting Chi. I did not know him. The next name is Kenneth W. Colegrove. I had never met Mr. Colegrove but I had read his writings and understood that he had a reputation, a good reputation, as a scholar in the Far East. The next name is Owen Lattimore, who was at that time living in Peiping, who I knew personally.

The CHAIRMAN. You have already covered Lattimore.

A. The next is Cyrus H. Peake, who at that time I believe was a professor at Columbia University, whose writings, I had also read and was familiar with. The next one is Robert K. Reischauer. I knew his family well. They were missionaries in Japan. Mr. Reischauer had been a senior at Oberlin when I was a freshman and his younger brother had been a housemate of mine all through college and was one of my best friends. Robert Reischauer was at that time at Harvard. The next two names are William T. Stone and Hester Lorn, neither of whom I knew.

Q. Among the editors at that time was Frederick V. Field, who I believe is a self-asserted Communist. Also there was Philip J. Jaffe, T. A. Bisson, and Owen Lattimore who have all been accused of being Communists. In reading that magazine, were you conscious of any Communist propaganda line at that

time?—A. None whatever. They favored active support of the Chinese Government. They were critical of American aid to Japan. Actually, of course, the magazine contained a great number of articles by very many people outside of the editorial board at that period—all the articles were signed articles and they published articles by a great many different people.

Q. At some point in all of our lives we have had occasion to become aware of Communist philosophy and Communist propaganda. At what point in your career, would you say, you had first come to be aware of Soviet Communist objectives and propaganda?—A. It's very hard, sir, to pick a certain point or date. Could you clarify the question a little bit?

Q. I'll try. What we had really in mind is that we would like to know when you first became conscious of Soviet Communist objectives, since I gather from a later part of your statement that you had occasion later to compare Chinese Communist policies with Soviet Communist policies, and I was wondering when you first became aware of what Soviet policies and objectives really were?—A. Well, I would say in the course I took during college in political science. In that course I learned enough about Communists to be very definitely sure that I was not and would not be sympathetic to communism, and was not a Communist. But in my thinking in China and the Far East it was not entirely based on ideology but based partly on the relations between powers, between the power balance and relationship in the Far East. I can't pick a date when I first became aware of the problems involved—but they were always there—that we didn't want China to be dominated by Russia. I certainly always had the conviction that Russia was latently aggressive. The example of Outer Mongolia was always present there from the early 1920's.

Q. Did you have occasion at any time in China to undertake a study of Soviet Communist policies and objectives?—A. Not in those terms; no.

The CHAIRMAN. How about Marxism?

A. After I left college I don't suppose I read any Marxist books or any Communist literature until during this period when I was reporting on the Chinese Communists, when I did so to inform myself more thoroughly. I did a little research when I was working on the Chinese Communists, so I would be informed and could recognize what they were saying or compare its relationship to Lenin and Stalin—compare its relationship to their writings.

Q. You had not at the time you were in Shanghai had occasion to make any study of Communist propaganda?—A. None at all.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. May I interject a question there on this point, on the general inquiry that Mr. Achilles is making as to when you began to become, if you like, really sophisticated about Marxism or at least Russian adaptations of Marxism, did I understand your testimony to be that—well, before coming to that, would you say that as of today you're reasonably alert and reasonably well informed about the main lines of Marxism and Communist Party tactics and operations in particular?—A. I certainly think so, sir; yes.

Q. What I'd like to get at is when did you begin to apply whatever intensive research or other process you utilized to acquire that expert advice which you now have?

Mr. ACHILLES. That is what I was trying to bring out.

A. I think during the period 1944-45.

Q. The period 1944 to '45 when you were engaged as an intelligence officer reporting on the Chinese Communists?—A. That is correct; yes.

Q. Is it your position that in connection with your work you had to study up on the subject in order to be able intelligently to appreciate what people were saying, what Communists were saying?—A. That is right, and so I could evaluate what I was being told and put it in its proper background.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Prior to that time you had not been sufficiently familiar with the doctrines and techniques of Communist propaganda to be able to recognize it when you saw it?—A. Well, I think I was reasonably intelligent at recognizing propaganda, of recognizing Communist propaganda, but I was not a student of communism nor had my work at this point put me in touch with Communists or communism.

Q. But in any event, you did not recognize Communist propaganda in Amerasia at that time?—A. I did not.

Mr. RHETTS. You're speaking of 1937?

Q. Yes.—A. I would be very much surprised if an examination now would show any very definite line in Amerasia at that time, because if there had been a very positive line I'm sure that I would have recognized it.

Q. Did the material in Amerasia or these articles in the Institute of Pacific Relations publications have any particular influence on your thinking?—A. No, I don't remember that they did. For one thing they covered a wide area, the whole Far East. They were not specifically limited to China, and when they did relate to China they were written, most of them, after the events occurred. So that a man on the spot usually knew of them and had drawn his own conclusions and points of view before he read about them in some magazine published much later.

The Pacific Affairs is a quarterly and it doesn't deal with current affairs very much. I'm very sure that they had no influence at all on my view of things in China.

Q. During the period you were in Chungking what were your principal duties?—A. I don't know how to answer that without repeating a good deal of material that is here in my personal statement.

Q. Will you just summarize it?—A. The Embassy was very short-staffed and I was the most junior officer. I started in, because of the urgent need, as a general consular officer and in what little citizenship or other routine work there was. I acted as protocol officer in getting passes and driver's licenses and gasoline permits and all that sort of thing from the Chinese authorities. Later I moved into what you might call the translation section and acted as the Chinese secretary, checking translations of notes to and from the Foreign Office, checking translations of newspaper articles and other published material, and for a period I actually read all the editorials and all the local papers—about 10 a day—and dictated very short summaries. It was the sort of thing we didn't have a Chinese at that time who was capable of doing. A Chinese could sit down and translate an editorial but it would take half a day to do it and then you spent the other half a day to put it into readable English.

All this time I was doing some political reporting. And as additional officers were assigned to the Embassy, I moved more and more into the political reporting. For a while I acted as chief of chancery, executive officer, reviewing correspondence, and having supervision of files and codes and so on. But by early 1943, or I guess about early 1942, I was spending practically all of my time on political reporting and drafting, accompanying the Ambassador at times when he interviewed the Minister of Foreign Affairs or someone like that. The Ambassador traveled with some difficulty between the Embassy and the south bank in the city and the Ambassador didn't speak much Chinese so it was customary to always have a Chinese-speaking officer to go with him when he had to visit the city.

Q. Who was the Ambassador then?—A. Mr. C. E. Gauss.

Q. During that period in what groups were your Chinese contacts?—A. Well, they were developing. I arrived in Chungking, of course, with very few Chinese friends. One group was again old friends of my parents. My father had served in Chungking and organized the YMCA and the Chinese YMCA secretaries and other people connected with the YMCA knew my father. Another group was the Chinese members of the Rotary Club, which I joined. The Rotary Club in Chungking was at least three-fourths Chinese. They were mainly business and professional men. We had informal Masonic meetings for a period and then we organized a Masonic lodge in Chungking and there again it was almost entirely Chinese and the members were Government officials, businessmen, professional men, officials of the Chinese Government. I met a number of—in fact I met most of the Chinese who were connected with the Ministry of Information and the Chinese officials of news agencies—they had a sort of club to which I belonged for a while. It was an informal club.

Then I became acquainted gradually with the junior officers in the Chinese Foreign Office and got to know some of them quite intimately before I left. About 1942 I began to become acquainted with many of the working Chinese newspapermen, reporters, junior editorial writers, on some of the leading Chinese papers.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that cover that question?

A. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Shall we adjourn for lunch?

Mr. RHETTS. We have one witness, Mr. Johnson.

Thereupon, Mr. Nelson Trusler Johnson, being produced, sworn, and examined as a witness in behalf of Mr. John Stewart Service, testified as follows:

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Mr. Johnson, will you state your full name and address for the record?—A. My name is Nelson Trusler Johnson and I have been employed with the Government of the United States since 1907, mostly in China. My last post in China was

that of Chief of the Mission beginning in February 1930 and ending in May 1941. I then went to Australia as American Minister and was there from September 1941 until April 1945. I retired from the Foreign Service on the first of April 1946 and have been temporarily employed by the Department of State since that date and acting as Secretary General to the Far Eastern Commission, which is an international organization established for the purpose of formulating policy in connection with the occupation of Japan.

Q. When did you become Chief of Mission in China, sir? What year was that?—A. It was—I presented my credentials, I think, on February 2, 1940.

Q. In 1930?—A. Yes; 1930.

Q. You're acquainted with Mr. Service, are you?—A. Yes; I know Mr. Service. I think my first acquaintance with his family was when I met his father and mother out in Chungking back in the early twenties. Then when I was in Peiping as Chief of Mission Mr. Service came to Peiping as a language attaché. I have forgotten the exact year, but I think it was about 1935. I'm not too certain about that year. He was there for the usual 2-year period of study, passed his examinations, as I recall, with ease, and then was assigned to the field as a vice consul and has continued in the career service since that time.

Mr. ACHILLES. Pardon me, may I ask a question at that point. Did you ever have any indication that Mr. Service's parents were in any way communistically inclined?—A. None whatever. I said that I met the parents there. I didn't know them but they were engaged in, I think, the YMCA, wasn't it?

Mr. SERVICE. Yes.

A. In western China, and I never heard the slightest report that the Service family was engaged in anything other than the most respectable and most respected occupations in China. If there had ever been any reports of that kind I'm certain that I would have heard some gossip about it. I never did. In fact they were held in the highest respect by those who knew them and by the Chinese.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. After Mr. Service graduated as a language attaché and was assigned to the consulate, was his work in general under your administrative supervision at all?—A. No; it was not. And he did not come under my personal observation again until he was assigned to the American Embassy or that portion of the American Embassy which was temporarily stationed at Chungking. In April 1941, just about, well, I think it was less than a month before I left to go to Australia, Mr. Service arrived on that detail. I saw something of him during those days when I was getting ready to leave. I do not recall that I saw him again until I met him here in Washington in 1945.

Q. Now, during the period that you had occasion to know him in China, first in Peiping and later in Chungking, did you have an opportunity to form a judgment about his general competence and his general political orientation at all?—A. Well, I would put it this way, that during the period that Mr. Service was attached to the Embassy as a language attaché there was nothing that occurred that would have attracted my attention in any way, shape or form to his political activities because unless there was something peculiar about them I would not have paid any attention to them. He was a member of the group of students attached to the Legation at the time I mentioned who came under my observation who were intelligent and who did their work with credit and who were, insofar as the reports which came to me from those who I had immediate supervision over their studies, intellectually honest.

There was no occasion, so far as I can recall, for my being interested at all in Mr. Service's political orientation or outlook. Certainly when I was associated, on occasions, with Mr. Service and his wife and those of his group of students, nothing ever happened, nothing was ever said, nothing ever came to me, that indicated that I should be in any sense of the word interested.

Q. In that connection, sir, if—during this period in Peiping—Mr. Service had been in any way active politically and communistically inclined, would you have expected that his immediate supervisors would in turn have reported to you would have brought that fact to your attention?—A. Well, I would certainly expect that that would happen because the reports on the personnel attached to the Legation were all signed by myself once a year and, as my mind goes back to those days and to the preparation of those reports, they were discussed among the senior members of the staff and those who came into immediate contact with the subjects of the reports so that if there had been anything peculiar about any of these young men I would have known it.

I remember one or two who were peculiar and who eventually disappeared in that strange way that mist has of disappearing in the morning for this reason or that reason. Their reasons were never too clear but it was my recollection that their disappearance was due chiefly to lack of interest in their work or lack of interest in the particular subject of Chinese which they were concentrating on.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you have at any time any indication that Mr. Service was opposed to or not in sympathy with American policy toward China at the time?—A. None whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. Now the question you originally asked, counsel?

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. With respect to this particular period you mentioned, sir, I take it you are referring to the efficiency reports which are annually made on each of the Foreign Service officers?—A. The efficiency reports that were made on the personnel in the Embassy at Peiping that ran all the way from those immediately junior to me on down to the last messenger.

Q. In that connection, am I correct in believing that the matter of preparation of these annual efficiency reports in the Foreign Service is a matter which is given very careful attention?—A. In my own particular case I tried to give them a special personal consideration because I had served for 2½ years, I think it was, as an inspecting officer—through the years 1922, 1923, 1924, and I know it was a phase of the work that I was particularly interested in. I had been interested in the personnel of the Foreign Service. I have been connected with it quite a long time. I have seen it grow. I have been sympathetic with it. I have been interested in the kind of young men that have come out to the Far East and interested themselves in the service in the Far East.

I was instrumental in a small way when I served in the Department in working over the regulations for that service. I helped somewhat in the discussions connected with the examinations for those young men. And I have been extremely interested in the type of young men, the kind of young men, and the kind of work that they were doing. So that when we prepared these efficiency reports or these personnel reports once a year I tried to give them a special consideration for that reason.

Now, of course, in preparing an efficiency report you sometimes are reporting on personnel who you're not too intimately acquainted with. But you have to build it on that. And you should build on that. I have always understood that these reports were given very serious consideration here in the Department. And I have always felt myself that if the man in the field didn't put some of himself into it that they were of no use here whatever.

Q. Turning to the later period in Chungking when Mr. Service became attached to the Embassy there, did you, during the course of your conversation and contact with him at that time, have any basis to reach a judgment about his political views and outlook?—A. The time that Mr. Service was with me in Chungking of course was a very short one, extending from about the middle of April 1941 until I left. I left in about the middle of May. And during that period of time he was just newly attached. There was no occasion for me to have any reason to read anything. I don't know whether he wrote anything during that time that I should have read. But I'd like to say that during that period of time when I was preparing to leave and when I saw and greeted Service—as a young man in whom I had been interested and who was now rejoining my staff in a sense—I welcomed him there and I certainly did not at any time have the slightest indication from anybody or do I recall anything that he ever said to me or he ever said in my presence that would have alarmed me in any sense of the word as to his political views.

I'd like to say in this connection I have been in the service a long time and as young men come on in the service they all come with new ideas, ideas that are the product of their own environment, the product of their own training. And the first thing that I recognized or have tried to train myself to recognize in relation to the personnel that I have had to deal with was their right to see things as they saw them, and I certainly expected them to speak to me of them as they saw them and not as they thought I would like them to see them. It just happens that in this case there was never any occasion, as far as I know, for Mr. Service to make any reports to me about things that he saw. But I have been curious about this matter, of course, and I have within recent months turned up memoranda which have been attributed to Mr. Service and which have been printed in the volume issued by the Department of State having special reference to "United States policy with regard to China," and I believe

vulgarily known as the white paper. And I have read these memoranda with special reference to what I might have thought about them if they had been made to me or had been made under my supervision. And I'd like to say this, that I couldn't find in those memoranda anything that I would not have forwarded to the Department of State if it had been made by one of my subordinates at that time.

Now, I'd like to say that I don't necessarily agree with the judgment of my young men. I don't necessarily agree with Mr. Service's judgment in interpreting some of the things he reports at times. And I would think, at least I hope I would have exercised my right to express my disagreement with that judgment, but I would not have considered that it was my duty or my right in my relationship with the Department of State to suppress views which young men who have been trained in the service to see and try to see honestly and I have always believed that Mr. Service was honest intellectually, and I don't remember any of my young men that I didn't consider honest intellectually. And I have never been known consciously to have been deceived by them. But I have never believed that, and I don't believe after reading those documents that there is anything in them that I wouldn't have forwarded and let the chips fall where they went; if the Department considered that the views therein expressed and the judgment therein expressed flowed with its judgment, that was something that I felt was the proper function of the leaders of the Department of State and not mine. I never interpret it as just my job in the field to present only my point of view.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. You say you would have forwarded those documents?—A. I would have.

Q. Did you see anything in any of the documents which you have read which indicated to you any disloyalty to the United States?—A. I saw nothing in those documents that indicated to me that the writer of those reports was in any sense of the word disloyal, either to the United States or to his office, as a reporter on what he saw.

Q. Well, did you see anything that would have indicated to you that he was a security risk?—A. No, sir; I did not.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. You're speaking now of documents written after your departure from Chungking?—A. I'm speaking now of documents written after my departure which had nothing to do with my period there, documents which I have read out of personal curiosity because I have been interested in a young man who was attached to my staff and in whom I had a personal interest and in whose training I had had an interest. And naturally I have been sort of personally concerned in knowing what was behind all this business. I wasn't conscious of any training of people to grow up here as traitors, spies, and disloyal people. And so I have read those documents. That is all, however, that is the whole of my reading of Mr. Service's writings.

Q. Did you—I take it, due to your long service in China, you have continued to keep familiar with our policy toward China, even while you were serving in Australia?—A. Well, only insofar as I could be familiar with it in such speeches or such reports as the press gave me. But I have not had any access to any of the files since. And I have particularly tried to refrain from it.

Q. You would say, would you not, that particularly in recent years you have had occasion to keep familiar with United States policy toward China?—A. Yes.

Q. And in reading these documents of Mr. Service, are there any of those that you would consider to be antagonistic to American policy towards China at the time as you understood it?—A. I would have to read those documents over again and think of them in that light because I did not read them for that purpose.

Q. But you had no such impression from reading them?—A. No, I have no such impression. My impression was that the reports were written by a young man who was trying to see things as honestly as he could and who was trying to tell the story as honestly as he could. I think those reports do perhaps contain some recommendations which must have been contrary to the practice that you found. But I do not consider that recommendations are necessarily in opposition to policy.

Q. Would you consider any of those recommendations of an improper nature?—A. Certainly not. I have never considered any recommendation made by a member of my staff as being improper. Perhaps I have never seen any, perhaps I wouldn't recognize an improper one, but I would certainly—if a recommenda-

tion came along with which I didn't agree or I had other views with regard to it, I would parallel it with my own and give it to the Department of State to choose. I wouldn't call the young man in and say "Take them out." I certainly did not see in those documents any recommendations that I would have considered improper for him to make, whatever I might have thought of it—what's the word I want, whatever I might have thought of the judgment upon which the recommendations would have been made.

I might not have agreed with the conclusions upon which those recommendations were made but I certainly didn't consider them improper. I thought they were very proper. I would have felt that a young man having those conclusions and having those views, if he didn't make the recommendations, was not doing his duty.

Q. In other words—A. That is what he was there for, it seems to me. At least that has always been my belief in the work of the Department of State. How else can the Secretary of State or any of those who advise him judge it? How can they judge the situation that exists abroad, which they have to deal with, if they can't get the picture as accurately as possible? There is no single truth. You have got to see it in all of its phases. You have got to see it from all of its angles.

White lights are made up of many colors. You can't judge white light by black or blue or red, but put them all together and it's white. You have got to put all of these recommendations and all of these views together for the Government or the Secretary of State to make his decision as to how he is going to act or what he is going to do and it would seem to me that it would be highly improper for—well, that the improper thing would be to try to guide these, for some single source in the field to guide these young men or guide the reporters in such a way that the facts as they saw them never got there. Does that say anything? That is my view anyway.

Q. Yes, I understand it.—A. That is my view, for good or bad. And I have always encouraged such young men as I had about me to go out and see things as they saw them and express them as they saw them, leaving to myself if I saw fit to disagree with them or approve. And it seems to me that is the function and honesty the reporter in the field should follow.

Q. Having spent part of your service in China as an inspector, it's correct is it not, that one of the principal functions of an inspector is to judge the character of the persons that he inspects?—A. That is correct, the character and, as I recall the old form, "the character and the ability and the reputation of the person upon which you report" was very much a part of the report that you prepared and I did not—well, in fact all Foreign Service officers attempt to make themselves aware of the character and the reputation of the personnel abroad and in their own staffs in order to give the Department an honest appraisal.

Q. From your personal contact with Mr. Service, what would be your appraisal of his character?—A. Well, my appraisal of his character would be that he was honest intellectually, that he was morally courageous, that he was intellectually curious, that he was trustworthy, and I would say loyal.

Q. Have you any reason at all to doubt his loyalty?—A. None. I have never had any reason to doubt his loyalty, up to this moment, none whatever. I have valued his friendship, I have valued the friendship of his family. He has a very charming wife, the daughter of an Army officer who came and joined our little group of personnel there in Peiping and Mr. and Mrs. Service while there as students bore themselves very well in the community and were liked and respected. And to the best of my knowledge and belief throughout his service he has enjoyed the respect of those around him.

Q. Did you ever have any occasion to question in any way Mrs. Service's loyalty?—A. Never. My children have played with their children and I have a very high regard for the character of the children, which the Service family are bringing into the world now to carry on the Service tradition.

Q. What would be your estimate of Mr. Service's reputation in China at the periods you knew him?—A. Well, I would have said that it was very high. I never heard anything to the contrary. I have never known anything to the contrary. I may say the greatest shock I ever had with regard to anybody that I have served with is the accusations that were made about Mr. Service. And I still don't know anything about them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

(Witness excused.)

(The Board adjourned at 1 p. m.)

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN S. SERVICE

Date: Saturday, May 27, 1950—2 to 5:30 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State.

Reported by: E. L. Koontz, CS/Reporting.

Board members present: Conrad E. Snow, Chairman, Theodore C. Achilles, Arthur G. Stevens; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

In the case of John S. Service: Charles Edward Rhetts, attorney.

(The meeting reconvened at 2 p. m.)

(After being duly sworn, former Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss testified in behalf of John S. Service as follows:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Mr. Gauss, will you state your full name and address for the record?—A. My name is Clarence Edward Gauss. I live at the Wardman Park Hotel.

Q. What is your present position, sir?—A. My present position is member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, a Government corporation.

Q. Would you describe briefly, sir, your prior positions with the United States Government?—A. Yes. I entered the Department of State in 1906 and retired from the Foreign Service on the 31st of May 1945. I retired as Ambassador. I entered the Department as a clerk at \$900.

Q. And at the time of your resignation from the Foreign Service your position was what?—A. Ambassador. I was Ambassador to China, and from about the middle of November 1944 until the end of May 1945 was on leave of absence, terminal leave I suppose you would call it, prior to retirement.

Q. So that the period of your incumbency in the Ambassadorship in Chungking was from—A. From the spring of 1941 through about the middle of November 1944.

Q. And immediately prior to that what position?—A. Prior to that I had been a minister to Australia for about—oh, 8 or 9 months is all I had down there, worst luck.

Q. And immediately prior to your—A. Immediately prior to that I had been consul general in Shanghai from 1936 until early 1940 and I went down to Australia and then went to Chungking as Ambassador in the spring of 1941.

Q. Yes. Am I correct in believing, sir, that the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank is by law a bipartisan board?—A. That's quite true. I am one of the Republican directors.

Q. Now, would you state to the Board when you first met Mr. Service?—A. Well, I think Mr. Service came to me at Shanghai sometime in 1938, I couldn't say when but my recollection is somewhere along in there, and if my memory is correct he was still there when I left early in 1940.

Q. Yes. So that he served under you there for a period of approximately—A. A year and a half.

Q. A year and a half. And at that time was your relationship to him such that you had an opportunity to observe him closely?—A. Very much so.

Q. Then when was the next period of your association with Mr. Service?—A. The spring of 1941 I believe Mr. Service was in Chungking when I arrived, if he wasn't he came a few days later.

Q. Yes.—A. And he remained attached to the Embassy from the spring of 1941 until the summer of 1943, when I think, I being in California in the hospital, not knowing anything about it, the Army grabbed him and attached him to military headquarters. He was detached from the Embassy; attached to military headquarters, but in his work with military headquarters he still continued to give us at the Embassy copies of his political information. He was, in a measure, a liaison officer between the headquarters and the Embassy and we saw quite a bit of him although I had no responsibility for him after the middle of 1943.

Q. Now, coming back, first, to the period during which he served under you at the consulate in Shanghai I believe you have indicated that his relation to you was such that you had an opportunity to observe him very closely?—A. Oh, yes.

Q. Would you care to characterize for the Board your general impression of him at that time with particular reference, first, to his competence as a Foreign Service officer, and, second, with special reference to his political orientation, if any, that came under your observation?—A. Well, gentlemen, I believe that out of Shanghai you probably will find in your State Department records an efficiency report on Mr. Service, which, I am quite sure, I prepared, and I think it will show you that I considered him one of the outstanding, if not the most efficient

and promising younger member of the Foreign Service that had come to my notice. I had a very high regard for him, so had members of my staff. When he first came to us we put him on—we would call it administrative work, and, as I recall, why he reorganized several of the departments of the consulate general. All you had to tell him was what you wanted and it was done. We knew, of course, that he had been born and raised in China. He had considerable knowledge of China and the Chinese, and just as soon as we could we put him in what I called our political office. At that time, I should explain, the Japanese were in occupancy of Shanghai, but not in actual occupation of the International Settlement. We had a great deal to do in the way of protection of American nationals at Shanghai at that time. We had a political office, which not only reported such political information as we gathered there but also had a great deal to do in negotiation with the Japanese for the protection of American interests. As I recall, we put Service in that office some time before I left Shanghai and he was continuing there to show the same ability that he had in other places. He was outstanding. I don't know of any officer in my whole 39 years of service who impressed me more favorably than Jack Service and I have had an awful lot of young officers with me.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to examine the efficiency report to refresh your recollection?

A. I am sure I would be glad to see it again. I think it will bear out my statement.

Q. I think it probably will.—A (after looking through efficiency report). Yes. Q. Is there anything you would like to add to your statement [indicating efficiency report]?—A. No; I don't think so. That was a rating that I gave to Mr. Service as a junior officer. After all, you had various grades of officers there at the post, and he was one of the very junior officers, and he had a very good rating.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now, Mr. Gauss, would you also comment, if you can, on any opinion that you may have formed of Mr. Service's political orientation or political views, and I should say that you are doubtless aware at this point in time we are particularly interested in any possible Communist leanings that he might have exhibited?—A. No; Mr. Service never in my observation exhibited any Communist leanings.

I would like to make this statement, and, General, I am rather surprised that it isn't in that efficiency report. But one of the first things that impressed me most about Mr. Service was this: He was born and raised abroad. Now, I think Mr. Achilles would bear me out there in submitting in the case of so many American boys born and raised abroad they become international in their outlook; they get away from their American side, and you find them in China—and it is particularly true, if Jack will forgive me, of language officers in Japan and China and in the Orient—first thing you know they are pro this or pro that: anti this or anti that. Jack Service impressed me particularly during my whole period of contact with him of going right down the middle of the road as an American.

He was objective in his approach to all of the political problems that we had. Now I don't mean to say he was ostentatiously American, but he thought in his whole analysis, his political information and everything else, he thought as an American. And, to me, that was one of the most refreshing things that I could have had in my whole service. For instance, at Chungking I had an officer who was so pro Chiang Kai-shek that he would just go red in the face when anybody said anything in criticism of the existing government. You couldn't deal—you couldn't use an officer like that. But Jack Service impressed me at Shanghai and at Chungking as one of that type of Americans that could go right down the middle of the road as an American who recognized that he was abroad to recognize American interests and look at things from the American standpoint. There was no suggestion in any case of pro or anti anybody. He liked the Chinese as we all did. He got along with them.

Mr. ACHILLES. In his Chinese contacts, would you say that he had any particular groups that he associated with more than any other?

A. Now, Mr. Achilles, I would like to go very positively into that particular question because the only thing that I know about of Mr. Service—of complaint against him—is the McCarthy statement that he associated with Communists. In Chungking, Mr. Service was a political officer of the Embassy. His job was to cover the waterfront. His job was to get every bit of information that he possibly could, and he went over to the Chungking side of the river every day and

he saw everybody that he could. Now it was difficult to get information in those days. We had a censorship. They had all these wonderful stories about Chinese victories which never proved to be true. Hollington Tong used to give out this information to the press and your Chinese press was censored, you couldn't get information, you had to go out and get it yourself. Jack Service's job was to go over to the other side of the river and to see everybody that he could. He would see the foreign press people. He saw the Chinese press people. He saw anybody in any of the embassies or legations that were over there that were supposed to know anything. He saw any people in the foreign office or any of the other ministries. He went to the Kuomintang headquarters and talked with whoever he could see there. He went to the Ta Kung Pao——

The CHAIRMAN. Would you spell that?

A. T-a-k-u-n-g-p-a-o, which was the independent newspaper. He went to this independent newspaper, he was in touch with those people. He went to the Communist newspaper. He went to Communist headquarters. He associated with everybody and anybody in Chungking that could give him information, and he pieced together this puzzle that we had constantly before us as to what was going on in China, and he did a magnificent job at it.

Now I would say this: During the period that Mr. Service was within the Embassy I had information—I don't know whether we ever mentioned it to Service or not—but I had it through my counselor that Chiang Kai-shek had commented that officers of our legation were going into Communist headquarters, and I was asked whether I wanted to prohibit them from going into Communist headquarters, and I said: "No, I want them to go wherever they ought to go to get the information that we need. We will do it openly and if Chiang Kai-shek has any comment to make on it let him make it to me and not indirectly." I told the counselor of the Embassy who reported that to me that he was not to give any instructions that Jack was not to go into the Communist headquarters.

Mr. ACHILLES. His contact with the Communists at that point was strictly in accordance with his official duties?

A. Strictly in accordance with his official duties. I didn't tell him to go there, but I expected him to go there, that was his job, and you didn't have to tell Jack Service what his job was, or how to do it. He did it. I would like to make that very plain. I would like to make very plain the fact that during the period he was there I was told that Chiang Kai-shek objected to some of our people going into the Communist headquarters, and I said we would not prohibit them from doing it.

Now, there was a representative in Chungking at that time of the Communist Party, who was recognized by Chiang Kai-shek, that representative, Chou En-lai, is now Foreign Minister to the Communist government in China, and was a frequent guest at most of the foreign embassies in Chungking. The British Ambassador, who was later British Ambassador here, had Chou En-lai constantly in his house at dinner. I knew Chou En-lai when I went to Chungking but I never entertained him, I had no more contact with him than to speak to him lightly on the steps of the Soviet Embassy when he would be going in, or I would be going in to some official reception, that's all.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. In that connection though I take it you expected Mr. Service to maintain all the contacts with him that were possible.—A. I expected him to maintain those contacts.

Q. Now in connection with your comments a moment ago, Mr. Gauss, you were referring to the fact that some people were pro this or anti that, and you indicated that in the case of Service, on the contrary, he was entirely objective. In that connection, was it your observation, in the light of your knowledge of events and political affairs in China, that a person who made statements critical of the Kuomintang at that time was in any way nonobjective?—A. Oh, no, I would not say it was nonobjective.

Q. In other words, your own judgment would be any objective reporting would include necessarily the making of critical.—A. It did. Unfortunately, he had to say a lot that was not favorable to the Kuomintang.

Q. Now General Hurley, as you may know, has preferred very serious charges against Mr. Service on account of his activities in China. General Hurley has stated in the course of hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December 1945 that Mr. Service was one of a group of Foreign Service officers in China, which included George Acheson, who sought to subvert or defeat American policy in relation to that country; that he exhibited pro-

Communist affinities and that he, in effect, was seeking to bring about the downfall of Chiang Kai-shek's government. While I recognize that you cannot have personal knowledge of the period subsequent to your departure, but inasmuch as you were the Ambassador who immediately preceded General Hurley as Ambassador I wonder if you would care to comment on those charges insofar as your observation of Mr. Service's activities can shed light on them?—A. I am sorry General Hurley isn't here because I would call him a liar to his face. There was never at any time any suggestion of disloyalty on the part of Mr. Service or George Acheson or any of the other members of my staff in Chungking with reference to American policy in China or any desire to bring about the collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek government.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say for the record here that General Hurley has been invited to be a witness before this Board—just for the record, that's all.

A. I have no objection to General Hurley being informed of exactly what I have said here.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Did you at any time question Mr. Service's personal loyalty to you?—A. I never expected any personal loyalty, Mr. Achilles, from Mr. Service or any other member of my staff. I considered that their loyalty was to the American Government. Now, outside of that, I would say that I had no occasion to question Jack Service's loyalty to me as his chief, or his respect to me as his chief.

Q. Nor to United States policy?—A. Not for one instant. Let me say this, too: I encouraged the younger officers of my staff, especially the political officers, to do a little thinking on their own. Now Service was not a political adviser; he was a political observer, a political reporter, and a political analyst. And I never discouraged, I encouraged, these younger officers when they were doing this political work to give us the benefit of their thinking, encouraged them to think and say what they thought, and they were probably freer to do that with me than they were with my successor.

Q. Mr. Service has told us that during the time he was at Shanghai he subscribed to magazines known as the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs, published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the magazine Amerasia, all of which, it is alleged, at some point have contained considerable Communist propaganda. Were you familiar with those magazines at the time you were in Shanghai?—A. No; I was not familiar with those magazines at the time I was in Shanghai. I heard about them and I was always sore because the Department of State didn't send them out to us. We never got anything; we had to go and get everything ourselves. I would like to know what went on. Occasionally, you would see a reference in the press to some article, but we never saw the magazines.

Q. You never had occasion then to form any judgment as to whether those magazines contained Communist propaganda in any way at that time?—A. No, as a matter of fact, I never saw those magazines until I retired from the Service and came down here to Washington and was interested in what was going on and I then subscribed for them. I wanted to know what was going on in these magazines.

Q. At the time you did subscribe to them were you conscious of any improper propaganda in them?—A. No; I considered that Amerasia was very distinctly anti-Chiang Kai-shek and rather, perhaps, favorable or complimentary toward the Communist regime in China, but I never had any impression of their being Communist propaganda. I didn't read them very carefully. I looked over them to see what they were. I bought one on the newspaper stand one day, this Amerasia, to see what it was like; I wanted to follow it. Pacific Survey—what do they call it—the Far Eastern Survey?

Q. The Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs.—A. I knew Lawrence Salsbury who was editing the Survey. He used to be on the Survey. I never saw anything in any of those publications that particularly disturbed me. I thought a great many of the people who were writing them didn't know what they were writing about.

Q. I take it from the efficiency reports, the outstandingly favorable reports that you gave Mr. Service, that you never at any time had occasion to question his character or personal integrity?—A. Not one bit. As I have said before, I considered him the outstanding younger officer who had served with me for 39 years.

Q. That is high praise.—A. He deserved it. I believe that I must have said it in some of my later reports. I believe I wrote one or two reports in Chungking

on Service. I am not sure whether you have them or not, but I think I said it.

Q. If I might say so, you have the reputation in the service of being a tough chief.—A. I don't think I was a tough chief. I think I was fair to my men, and I think I wanted them to get on. There was room at the top for everybody and I encouraged these men to do a lot of thinking of their own and to be free to come in and talk. But I was tough in some respects, I'll admit, but that's another thing.

Q. I don't have anything else.

Mr. STEVENS. Now, I take it from your earlier remarks concerning the responsibility that Mr. Service had to keep himself informed in China you would have considered it just as much his responsibility to read and to get his hands on any information that had a bearing upon that responsibility as well?

A. Oh, yes, quite. As a matter of fact, Jack Service because our, I think, governmental authority on Chinese communism. I don't believe that there was in the Army or the Navy anyone, and certainly not in the Foreign Service, who had made the study of that whole movement in the way that Jack Service did, who had translated these speeches and these pronouncements, and these edicts, and everything else that came out of Communist headquarters, and he did the whole thing. He had to spend a tremendous time documenting that thing to make himself what he needed to be—an expert on that situation—that's part of his job.

The CHAIRMAN (to Mr. Rhett). Do you want to proceed?

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now, Mr. Gauss, you have indicated that during the period when you were Ambassador in Chungking, Service was until August 1943 a member of your staff?—A. That's right.

Q. And that thereafter he was detached and attached to the staff of General Stilwell?—A. That's right.

Q. You also indicated that even after his becoming attached to the Army nonetheless copies of his political memoranda were furnished to the Embassy?—A. Oh, yes.

Q. And did you have occasion to read some of those or a substantial number of them as they flowed into the office?—A. Oh, yes, yes, and a great many of them were sent into Washington with covering dispatches, with or without comment that we might have in the Embassy on what Jack had to report.

The CHAIRMAN. The Ambassador's statement is borne out by an efficiency report which he signed dated August 1, 1942, and I think perhaps it would be well if it can be read into the transcript.

Mr. RHETTS. I would welcome it.

The CHAIRMAN. I won't read it at this time, but I will just indicate to the stenographer that it can be—unless the Board desires to hear it.

Mr. STEVENS. I would just like to caution here as to the use that the Board makes in putting materials that have come in on Foreign Service officers generally into the transcripts of the record. I would like to know how far, in your opinion, Mr. Moreland, we are privileged to do that? To summarize the contents, possibly yes; I just wonder whether it is within our prerogatives to do the other.

Mr. MORELAND. Perhaps an excerpt of the last paragraph would be sufficient.

Mr. STEVENS. I think that is perfectly permissible.

Mr. ACHILLES. I have read the report and I am satisfied that what the Ambassador has said accurately reflects what is in it.

The CHAIRMAN. I will read then portions of the efficiency report dated August 1, 1942 [reading:]

"He is, in my opinion, one of the ablest and most promising younger officers of the China corps and the service in general.

"At present he is assigned to duty as immediate assistant to the Ambassador on political and Chinese-language work; scrutinizing the Chinese press, making special inquiries and investigations, preparing dispatches and reports, etc. He has also become familiar with the administrative work of the Embassy, and is an all-around officer, capable of stepping in and filling any position.

"He is thoroughly dependable; has a fine sense of loyalty and responsibility; is tolerant, just, well balanced; is thoroughly devoted to his duties; industrious, cooperative, shows initiative, is ambitious, and displays force and will power. He has an acute mind, and is thorough and exceedingly painstaking in all his work. He has a good political sense; keen in his analysis of political developments and situations, his judgment is particularly sound and just. I have followed the practice throughout my career of encouraging younger officers to frank

examination and discussion of the political findings and conclusions of the office. Mr. Service has shown an admirable response in this direction, being frank and constructive in his analysis and criticisms and at the same time showing appropriate modesty and restraint.

"At the moment of writing this report, he is absent on a trip to the northwest with a group of Chinese engineers attending an engineering and economic convention at Lanchow. If the Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr. Wong Wen-hao (one of the ablest men in the government) carries out plans to proceed to the Chinese oil fields in Kansu he has indicated that he will be glad to have Mr. Service accompany him. No other foreigner is to attend the convention or make the proposed trip. The confidence and respect in which he is held by the Chinese is reflected in the invitation extended to him in this instance. He has accompanied other groups of Chinese on tours in Szechuan province when Dr. Wong was present and the present invitation is the result of Dr. Wong's observation of him on those occasions.

"Mr. Service in my opinion is one of the best equipped and most able of the younger officers of the service; head and shoulders over most of his colleagues of equal seniority in the service. I could ask for no more efficient or satisfactory staff officer. He is the outstanding younger officer who has served with me over my 36 years of service.

"I rate him: Excellent."

This is signed by C. E. Gauss, American Ambassador.

A. I wrote it. I didn't realize I had gone into such detail about him at that time, but I wrote it and I still stand by it. I had forgotten about this trip to Lanchow that Jack made, and Dr. Wong Wen-hao, who is mentioned in there as Minister of Economic Affairs, was one of the outstanding men in the Nationalist Government, one of the finest Chinese that I know, a man of great integrity, who appreciated what America was trying to do for China, and who appreciated Service.

Mr. ACHILLES. The Chinese officials mentioned in there were all officials of the Nationalist Government?

A. Oh, yes. You see, we had no contact with the Chinese Communists except through that one man, Chou En-lai, down in Chungking until the summer of 1944 when during the visit of Vice President Wallace to Chungking Chiang Kai-shek finally yielded on a demand that we would have a military mission in Yen-an, which was the Communist capital, a military mission for the purpose of gathering military information on what the Japanese were doing in Manchuria and north China. At that time I urged on General Ferris, who was the deputy chief of staff in command in Chungking, and on Colonel Barrett, who was to head that mission, and the only language officer I believe that was on it—I urged that I would like to have Jack Service go along as attached to the headquarters as a language man, which was designed to get him up there to see if he could verify the information that we had had down in Chungking as to what the Communists were doing in China. I didn't believe these darn rascals. I had developed—I would say I liked objective officers on my staff, but I admit I had developed a hate for Communists many, many years before, and I just was unwilling to accept a great many of the reports that we got on what the Communists were doing in the way of agrarian reform, in the way of building up the village councils, in the way of helping the people, troops, and so on. With all stories which we had, there was no verification from people that we had in confidence, no verification on the spot. We got hold of everybody who ever came through there and made them talk, but I wanted Jack Service to go up there because with his political mind he could give us then an estimate of that situation, and he was sent, and he was the only civilian on that group. I was afraid the Chinese might object to having a civilian officer being on that group, but it was all done by the military, and he was sent as an interpreter, I suppose, weren't you, Jack?

Mr. SERVICE. It was never specified.

A. Language officer was what I suggested he might be sent as.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that encourage him to make friends with the Communists that he met?

A. You bet your life, that was his job, to make friends with them in the sense, General, that you have got to make friends with these people if you are going to get them to talk. They have got to feel that you are friendly, otherwise they will clam up. That doesn't mean to say that you have got to pronounce Communist views, but you have at least got to be sympathetic with them and be willing to hear what they have to say and encourage them to talk.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe Mr. Service has reported from time to time that it was his impression that the Chinese Communists were at that time doing more toward fighting the Japanese than the Nationalist Government. Was that impression shared with other members of the Embassy?

A. We didn't know. It was one of the things that those people went up there to find out.

Q. And you relied on his report then in that respect?—A. On his report, yes, and everything else that we got.

Q. You had other confirmatory reports, I take it?—A. Oh, yes, that was the general tenor of all of the information that we were getting, but, of course, they couldn't expect as much from the Communists as might have been the case if they had had arms and ammunition.

Now, I don't know whether I am going ahead of things or not here, but there was at one time out there quite a feeling that our forces, the American Government, should give arms and ammunition to these Communist forces. I don't believe that Jack Service ever expressed that opinion, but it did come to us in the Embassy, and, as a matter of fact, it was an opinion that was shared by a great many of the military people, and I believe by some of this other group of officers that were connected with headquarters—I mean Foreign Service officers who were connected with headquarters. In any case, I think your files will show that as Ambassador I called this to the attention of the Department of State—that there was considerable feeling about this arming of the Communists out there. As a matter of fact, I feel General Stilwell was even accused of it at one time, and I expressed the view that if we had to land on the coast of China, and there came into contact with Chinese forces fighting the Japanese, we might give them assistance without reference to the brassards on their arms, but outside of that I was opposed to any military aid to the Communist forces in China except it be by agreement with the recognized Nationalist Government. I think the white paper will show some indication of an opinion in that respect. I don't recall that Jack Service ever expressed any opinion on it in my day.

Mr. ACHILLES. I believe the record shows that he subsequently did from the Embassy.

A. Well, I am sure he will be able to give you the answer on that.

Mr. ACHILLES. You say that view was held by a considerable number of officers in China at the time?

A. Oh, yes, I think it was probably held by Stilwell.

The CHAIRMAN (to Mr. Rhett). Go ahead.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. As a matter of fact, on that point, Mr. Gauss, as you suggest, the white paper confirms that impression of yours which General Stilwell ultimately did come to view it.—A. Stilwell never expressed himself that way. Stilwell wanted to get control of the troops, Communist troops, quarantine the Communist troops facing the National Government troops, and not facing the Japanese where they should have been. When the big Japanese push came down from the north the comment was made that the Communists hadn't stopped them—the Communists had nothing to stop them with. At that time I remember particularly the military opinion was that we should give arms, equipment to the Communist forces, if necessary fly it over there.

Mr. ACHILLES. One question at that point. In the light of subsequent events, how would you evaluate the accuracy of Mr. Service's reports on conditions there now?—A. I would say they are just about as close to being 100 percent accurate as any human being could present. Those that I saw, mind you—I saw nothing after I left Chungking in 1944, and I admit that I haven't read much of the white paper.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. One further question on that line, if I may. I take it from what you have said that after this military mission did go to Yen-an, to which Service was attached, the reports that came back tended to confirm the information which you mentioned you had been reluctant to accept; namely, that the Communists were doing a pretty good job of, first of all, obtaining popular support, and with their limited means fighting Japanese in a guerrilla way.—A. Those reports I should say were very largely oral. For a long time after they were up there we got nothing. Then I think one or two things did trickle through. You see, you could only send them out when you sent a plane up. And it wasn't very long after that when I left Chungking, so whether or not I received much in the way of written reports from Jack Service after he got to Yen-an I can't say, but I did

talk with him whenever he came down and I also talked with Colonel Barrett, who had been my military attaché—I talked with him when he came down. General Hurley had returned, but I got nothing out of him.

Q. Now, in connection with this subsequent matter, Mr. Gauss, it has been alleged that while Mr. Service was in China he was in communication with a Mr. Philip Jaffe, who was the editor of the *Amerasia* magazine, and it has been further suggested that in virtue of that communication he could have been in some way supplying Jaffe with large quantities, or at least quantities, or classified Government documents. I should like to ask you whether, subsequent to Service's attachment to the Army in August 1943, he had had access to the files in the Embassy, as he had formerly had access to them when a member of the Embassy staff?—A. Oh, no; neither Mr. Service nor any other member of that Foreign Service group attached to headquarters had access to the files. I recall the counselor of the Embassy coming to me with that question. I don't think it was in reference to Jack Service—I think it was with reference to the head of that group coming into the Embassy, and he just asked me the question, whether they were to have access to the files. The answer was "No," that if they wanted any information from the Embassy they could talk to either the political officer there or to the counselor or to me, and if we had anything we could give them that was going to be helpful we would give it to them, but they didn't have free access to the files. As a matter of fact, Jack Service didn't have free access to all the files at any time. My counselor and I had our confidential files—I mean our secret files, if you want to make a classification. Jack may have been instrumental in writing some of those, but they were kept by us, and there were only two of us that had it.

Q. Yes. Now, in that connection one of the charges made by General Hurley against Mr. Service, and, presumably, against George Atcheson, and others, was that they disclosed to the Chinese Communists classified information, information concerning American policy. In particular, General Hurley has charged that a memorandum that Mr. Service wrote in October 1944 was shown to the Chinese Communists. I would like to ask you whether on the basis of your knowledge of Service, and your knowledge of the way your Embassy ran, whether you ever had any reason to believe that there was any possibility that Service might be engaged in such an operation?—A. No. Emphatically no.

Q. In view of the fact that George Atcheson's name has been so closely linked with Mr. Service's in the charges made by General Hurley, and in view of the further fact that George Atcheson is dead, I wonder if you would care to comment here on George Atcheson from the point of view of his activities in relation—whether he, for example, in your opinion, ever undertook to defeat American policy.—A. Oh, heavens! Anyone who makes a suggestion like that is just beneath contempt. Of course, on the one hand, I had with me, in my 39 years' service, Jack Service as the younger officer; on the other hand, the senior officer whom I had the greatest of confidence and trust in and who proved himself worthy of that confidence and trust and in my opinion was one of the outstanding senior officers in the Service was George Atcheson. Go into your efficiency records and you will find that I have said that, and no more loyal, patriotic American served in our Foreign Service than George Atcheson.

Q. I think it fair to say then you would regard such charges as inconceivable.—A. Absolutely inconceivable, no basis at all, a figment of an imagination which is seeking its own glorification, if you can follow that through.

Q. Very good, I would just like to ask one final question, Mr. Gauss: I wonder if you could tell the Board something about the general policy which you as Ambassador and your subordinate Foreign Service officers were expected to pursue in the matter of dealings with American press representatives in presenting them with information concerning political events in China which were known to the Embassy?—A. Well, during the period that I was Ambassador I never held press conferences, but any reputable representative of the press—American, even British—who wanted to come in and talk to me was always welcome. We gave them anything we had in the way of leads because they gave us information that they had in the way of leads. We never disclosed to them anything in the way of confidential or secret information, of course, but we did help them because we wanted the picture that came back here to be as accurate as we could have it, and I consider it is part of the duty of a chief of mission to try to keep press representatives on the track. Now, they would sometimes come in with wild ideas and you could explain the situation. We were never quoted and I don't think there was ever any abuse of any confidence that we gave any of those people when we talked to them. Now I say we never

gave them secret information, but we could tell them what was going on and I know in many cases I sent them off on trips from Chungking down to Kunming, and suggested they would find a situation down there worth looking into and they went there and they did.

Q. Now in that connection, when you say "We never told them secret or confidential information," are you referring to what you would regard as subsequently secret information as distinguished from information which may be recorded in a document somewhere which has been stamped "secret" or "confidential"?—

A. I don't mean that type of information that was recorded in a document marked "secret" and "confidential," I mean information that came to us in strict confidence. For instance, unfortunately something I read in the white book, George Atcheson went over and talked to Sun Fo; Sun Fo made some comments there on Chiang Kai-shek and his failure to meet the situation. We would never tell that to the press, but I could get pressmen in who might be representing United Press or Associated Press and we would talk about a situation and I would tell them: "There is a dissident element operating in Yenai which is building up for a secession from the National Government; I think it would be a good idea for you to go down there and look into that."

Q. The report you had on that situation might very well be marked "secret" in terms of its transmission?—A. I even told Chiang Kai-shek that.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Did you ever have occasion to believe that Mr. Service was disclosing any information?—A. No, sir; no information. I had no indication that Mr. Service was ever disclosing any information, but I will tell you that a situation existed for months in which I was absolutely certain that everything we were sending into Washington that had any vital importance at all was immediately reported back to Chungking. I took occasion twice to make representations to Washington on that. In the first place, I think they traced the source; in the second place—

Q. What was that?—A. It stopped at the White House.

Q. This was information you had sent in from Chungking to Washington?—

A. Information that I or my military or naval attachés had sent in.

Q. Which in Washington was given to Chinese sources here or what?—

A. Which in Washington was given to sources which conveyed it to the Chinese. I had the wife of the premier, if you call him that, the president of the executive Yüan in China at Chungking, say: "We know what you are reporting to Washington."

Q. Those leaks were appearing here or were any of them, as far as you know, in China?—A. Those leaks were purely here, purely here, they could not have been in China, and the result of them, of course, when anything like that occurred was to simply close your source of information, so that in the end we had to be very careful in disclosing our source of information, and for that reason the information didn't have the value when it got here that it might have had if we had been able to say who had told us.

Q. Were you successful in getting action to stop the leaks here?—A. No, sir. The first case was one of suspicion, which I reported from out there, and I think there were in the Government at that time a lot of these people who were dogooders who said: "Now the Ambassador out here reports so-and-so; why I have got my friend who is Fu Man Chu over here in the Supply Mission and all you have got to do is sit down and talk to these people and they will straighten it out." I think it was that type of leak that first came.

In the second case, I think it was a personal relationship, which I have never been able to prove and which I believed existed, a personal relationship between a hiring of the Chinese Foreign Minister here and friends of his in the White House who didn't intend to give information by way of disclosure of secret information, but it was so easy talking amongst these people to get it out of them. Of course, that immediately went to T. V. Soong and after T. V. Soong left H. H. Kung and it was immediately out in Chungking. So for a time I was completely frustrated as to what I could send to Washington.

Q. Did you have any reason to suspect that information sent in by the Embassy was being communicated to other unauthorized sources beyond the Chinese?—A. No, no suggestion of that. Occasionally you would get a rather inkling in your talking perhaps with your British colleague that you had said something which had been mentioned, but that would be a normal sort of a situation, and perhaps you would even mention it yourself if he had asked you, or he would come toddling down and ask you about something which indicated, of course,

it had been given through the Department. It was not a leak, it was a communication of information.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. Did you allow the same liberties, discretion, and the like, to your political officers, sir, as you exercised yourself with regard to the handling of information with the press, as you just stated you handled it yourself?—A. No. I would with my counselor, but I don't think you would find that any of my political officers were in a position to give the full picture to the press. They might ask about it: "After all, I am going over to see so-and-so; do you mind if I mention so-and-so." Something to trail on, something to help while they were getting the other side of the picture or making inquiries. Now, often you could give them a report we had and ask them if we had anything on it that could help them. There was a certain amount of information that they could naturally give, but over-all, no.

Q. Were they specifically instructed as to how they were to handle themselves at that time, or did you leave it to their discretion?—A. Yes; I left it to their discretion. I never had any occasion to give any instructions. They were not to communicate to these people secret information that the Embassy had, but the whole proposition was we had a cut-out puzzle there and we were filling in pieces constantly and we might have this, that, and the other thing from a purely Chinese source, unofficial source, and their idea was to fill in all those crossword puzzles and those cut-out puzzles, and get the information if they could—an over-all picture was never given.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. I wonder here, Mr. Gauss, if you may not be thinking on somewhat higher plain than possibly—at least what I was trying to inquire about. I understand what you have been describing is the extent to which you discussed the over-all—A. Over-all.

Q. The over-all political picture and political developments?—A. Yes.

Q. But, let us take down to a slightly lower level where it is a matter of more or less factual reporting on particular factual situations.—A. Yes.

Q. For example, let us suppose in the case of Service, let us suppose that he had had an interview with say Mao Tse-tung at a time when other newspapermen who happened to be in Yenan also interviewed Mao Tse-tung. Would you have regarded it as improper for him to talk with members of the press about what Mao Tse-tung had said the Communist policies were in their general political programs, matters of that type, factual though no political character?—A. Are you speaking of an interview in which there were others present, newspapermen present?

Q. No. Let me suggest to you just the type of interview I have in mind. For example, you will recall at one point the newspaper people also went up to Yenan.—A. Oh, yes; yes.

Q. Now let us suppose Mr. Service had an interview with Mao Tse-tung, in which Mao describes what the official Communist program is and what their policies with respect to this and that will be, and he does that in a private interview with Service. Later, he has a similar interview with a newspaperman, but there is a discussion of perfectly factual character about what the political program is.—A. Those sorts of things I don't think he would go out and inform the newspapermen of what his interview was with Mao Tse-tung. If he gave him anything in confidence he certainly wouldn't divulge it. But as a general proposition of what the Communist policy was in his discussions he might have some knowledge of it, he might mention it in his conversations with newspapermen of reputation and integrity.

Q. You wouldn't have regarded that as improper or exceeding the general discretion which you would expect him to exercise?—A. Oh, no; no.

Q. Or describing purely factual situations. I mean if he says there is a famine in Ho-nan or something of that sort, describing factual matters that he has observed you would regard that as—A. No. Generally—

Q. Appropriate to discuss with members of the press?—A. Oh, in a general way; yes. In a general way; yes.

Q. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN (to members of the Board). Any further questions.

Mr. ACHILLES. No.

Mr. STEVENS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, very much. It has been very helpful. Nice of you to come in on a Saturday afternoon.

Mr. GAUSS. Oh, it is the best time for me. Good day.

(Former Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss after testifying in behalf of John S. Service left the hearing at this time.)

(Mr. John S. Service testified in his own behalf as follows:)

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Now you have listed among the correspondents that you knew in Chungking Mr. and Mrs. Henry Luce, Ray Clapper, and Vincent Sheehan. Were there any other correspondents at that time that you recall seeing much of in Chungking?—A. Well, I listed these people as visitors who stayed only a short while. There were correspondents coming and going. I can't recall all of them now. There was Sonya Tamara I think of the Herald Tribune, Eric Sevareid—there were a number of people there with Time and Life who came and went. There was a man from one of the small magazines. There was a man named McEntire from the Reader's Digest.

Q. During the time you were in Chungking did you know a Chinese actress by the name of Val Chao?—A. Yes.

Q. During what period of time did you know her?—A. Early 1944 until the time I left China I think.

Q. Did she, to your knowledge, during the time that you knew her have any Soviet associates?—A. No; not at all that I know of.

Q. Did you ever discuss political matters with her?—A. Not in any detail, no: do you mean Chinese political matters?

Q. Yes.—A. No.

Q. Did you ever by any chance disclose to her any classified information?—A. Certainly not.

Q. After you went to Yen'an, I believe you listed yesterday certain correspondents who came through there, one of their names I believe was Epstein of the New York Times.—A. Well, he was representing the New York Times on a sort of temporary basis during that trip. He wrote for the Allied Labor News and I think several publications, a number of Canadian newspapers, if I remember rightly. He was a man who had lived in China and had had various jobs with newspapers, and the news agencies in China and he wasn't a permanent member of the staff of any news organization that I remember, he was a local employee.

Q. Did he, to your knowledge, have any particular political bias?—A. Yes. He was leftist, but I discussed the question with him once about whether or not he was a Communist, and he insisted and assured me and gave a good many reasons why he was not a Communist.

Q. What was your own opinion of his views?—A. I accepted his statement that he was not a Communist.

Q. And I believe you mentioned Guenther Stein of the Christian Science Monitor, is that it, as being there?—A. That's right.

Q. And did you form any opinion of his political views?—A. I would have said that he was a very conservative person by nature.

Q. How much of him did you see while you were there?—A. Well, I saw a good deal of him up at Yen'an because he was by far the most assiduous of the correspondents. He was a German originally, naturalized British at that time, and he had a Germanic thoroughness about him. When he interrogated a person he usually prepared a long list of questions beforehand and went through and tried to get all the information on that he could possibly get in the most laborious and methodical way. Dr. Stein was a useful source of news, and some of my memoranda here transmit long sections of his notes of interviews which he had had with Communist leaders before we arrived up there.

Q. He was already there when you arrived?—A. They arrived there several weeks before we did, and so they had already covered a great deal of the ground and the quickest way for me to get fairly comprehensive news was to forward the views these men had of their own news.

Q. How long was he there after you arrived?—A. I had no recollection of his departure. He may have been there until I left.

Q. And you saw a good deal of him during that full period?—A. Well, particularly during the first weeks I was in Yen'an. After that, the correspondents were living some distance from us. During the first 2 weeks we were billeted next door to each other, one compound next to another compound.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. We are talking here about the 1944 period?—A. That's right. Subsequently, we were moved over nearer to the Communist military headquarters

and the correspondents were about 2 or 3 miles away. In Chungking it is hard to make a guess—I suppose I may have seen Stein once a week or something like that. Just as I saw most of the other correspondents. The correspondents I saw most of in Chungking and knew best were Brooks Atkinson, and Teddy White.

Q. Was Stein considered a reputable correspondent?—A. Very. He had unusually good contacts with some of the more important Chinese leaders like T. V. Soong. In fact, Guenther Stein had been an employee of T. V. Soong's at one time.

Q. Did you ever give him any classified information?—A. I never gave him any; no.

Q. Would you say that your views in the early days that you were at Yen-an were influenced by information which he gave you?—A. No, I wouldn't say they were. In fact, I differed from Guenther Stein on a good many points, and I believed that he was far more willing to accept what he was told than I was. I criticized his book very severely because so much of it is just repetition of things that he was told.

Q. On what points, if you can recall, did you differ with him?—A. Well, chiefly that he took a very idealistic view of the Chinese Communists and I didn't.

Q. How do you mean "idealistic"?—A. He was the man who made the statement, I think, that "this is the most modern place in China," and he would not agree that they were actually far-seeing, shrewd planners of what they were going to do. He would not accept the fact, which I knew to be a fact, that they had made their preparations in 1937 for the coming war and had foreseen the opportunity that would exist for them to expand their control of the guerrilla areas in north China.

Q. Was he inclined to consider them agrarian reformers as distinct from Marxist Communists?—A. That is such an oversimplification that it is hard to analyze—I mean hard to reply to. He certainly didn't think they were merely agrarian reformers, and he had agreed, he recognized the theoretical Marxist basis, but he was not inclined to accept the idea that they had planned it this way and that this was a long-range program toward control of China. His attitude is a little bit like Agnes Smedley. You haven't read Agnes Smedley's book on China?

BOARD MEMBERS. No.

A. She makes some sort of a statement that these were the most Christian people she had ever met. Guenther Stein was stricken with the sweetness and light theory about the Chinese Communists.

Q. At that time had you ever met Philip Jaffe?—A. No, sir.

Q. Do you recall ever hearing Stein speak of Jaffe at that time?—A. No, I never heard Stein speak of him at all. I don't think that Stein had ever been in the United States at that point; I don't know.

Q. At that time had you ever known Mark Gayn?—A. No, sir.

Q. Or Lieutenant Roth?—A. We are speaking of the first period I was in Yen-an?

Q. The first period.—A. No, I had never heard of Gayn or Lieutenant Roth.

Q. You had not heard Stein speak of those names?—A. No.

Q. When you reported to General Stilwell, as I recall, you had been personal friends in Peiping before?—A. I would say acquaintances rather than friends.

Q. Acquaintances. During the time that you were attached to General Stilwell, was he actually in the theater most of the time, or his command covered India as well at that point?—A. That's correct, his command covered something like 4,000 or 5,000 miles from India through China. He spent very little of his time in Chungking. More of his time in India and Burma than he did in Chungking.

Q. How much of the time, would you say during which you were under his command, were you physically in the same place in Chungking or elsewhere in the theater?—A. Two months out of fifteen, perhaps.

Q. How were your relations with him?—A. Very friendly and informal, but I saw him very seldom. I was not bound by military regulations. If I wished to see him, I could go directly to him. He called me "Jack," had me at his house once or twice. It was not a military relationship—a friendly one.

Q. Did you ever have occasion to differ with him particularly on policy questions?—A. None at all.

Q. After he was replaced by General Wedemeyer, how much of the time were you and General Wedemeyer physically in the same place?—A. I arrived in Chungking on January 18, 1945, and General Wedemeyer left Chungking

for the United States on February 19, 1945. I believe that he spent practically all of that month in Chungking, so that I was in the same city with him for 1 month.

Q. Had you ever known him previously?—A. I had never met him before.

Q. And about how much did you see of him personally?—A. Considering the short period, I saw more of him than I had seen of General Stilwell. General Wedemeyer wanted to use the political officers in a different way really. He used me for drafting of a number of communications, political or semi-political nature. He also made arrangements for me to attend the regular headquarters briefing sessions each morning, and I attended several meetings in headquarters, something which I had not done very much under General Stilwell.

Q. How would you describe your relations with him, I mean, primarily official or personal or friendly or—A. They were more official. They were on a friendly basis, again quite an informal basis, but without the background of friendship that I had with General Stilwell.

Q. Were there any pronounced differences between General Wedemeyer's views and General Stilwell's views?—A. I didn't discuss the matters with General Wedemeyer well enough to make a thorough answer to that. There certainly was a difference in circumstances. General Wedemeyer was more concerned in getting along with the Chinese. He didn't want—nobody at that time wanted any more trouble. The Stilwell recall had caused a good deal of bitterness and hard feelings and the general attitude was to try and patch up the harm that had been done. So that the attitude of headquarters was very much more friendly and cooperative as far as the Chinese were concerned. At the same time the situation in China had changed a great deal. The Japanese drive had ground to a halt about the first of December 1944, and they had overextended themselves, and apparently were being pressed in other places so as to abandon any further attempts to capture Chungking, and the heat was off. The hump had been built up at this time so something like 100,000 tons of supplies were coming in a month, far more than had ever come in under General Stilwell, and it was an era of attempts on both sides at cooperation. To a far greater extent than before the army and the political branch of the Embassy were pulling together and General Wedemeyer recognized General Hurley and the Ambassador as the President's representatives sent out for a special purpose to negotiate difference between the two parties and try to bring about unification of the armies, and he was not pursuing an independent line.

Q. Did you ever have any pronounced differences of opinion with General Wedemeyer?—A. None whatever.

Q. You say that General Wedemeyer was inclined to take his guidance from General Hurley on policy questions?—A. Yes, he recognized General Hurley as the boss really as far as the question of negotiations between the two parties went, and of any efforts to utilize or try to utilize the Communist forces.

Q. As I recall, your only personal contact with General Hurley in 1944 was the evening you spent with him on your way back to the United States?—A. That's correct.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Up to that time you had no differences with General Hurley?—A. None whatever, and even on that occasion we had no differences, we agreed completely.

Q. When did you have your first difference with General Hurley?—A. I don't know whether we could dignify it by the term "difference" with him. After I returned to Chungking in January 1945 I received word that General Hurley wanted to see me. I presented myself at his office; he was not—he did not have his offices in the Embassy—and on that occasion he had with him a copy of my memorandum No. 40, Document 193. He discussed it with me, told me that he was there to uphold Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Government, and that he would do all of the policy recommending. I don't think you want me to go into great detail.

Q. No; I just want to get the occasion.—A. He told me on that occasion that if I interfered with him in any way, which I took to mean making any policy recommendations at all, he would break me.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. That was on what date?—A. It would be about January 20, sir, I don't know the exact date.

Q. 1945?—A. 1945.

Q. It was on your return. And did you have occasion between then and your return to the United States in April to make any policy recommendations?—A. Yes, sir; the memorandum which Mr. Ludden and I prepared jointly on February 14, our Document 204, is a policy recommendation.

Questions by Mr. SNOW:

Q. That was at the General's request, wasn't it?—A. Yes, sir.
Mr. RHETTS. General Wedemeyer's request.

Questions by Mr. SNOW:

Q. General Wedemeyer's, I see.—A. The telegram which I helped to draft, Mr. Acheson's telegram of February 26 is, of course, a policy recommendation.

Q. And that was after General Hurley left?—A. Yes. But you asked me between January and April.

Mr. ACHILLES. Yes.

Mr. RHETTS. General Hurley was only temporarily out of China at that time.

Mr. ACHILLES. What, so far as you recall, were the nature of General's Hurley's instructions—that no one was to go to Yen'an again?

A. I have no knowledge of any such instructions.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the question?

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. What was the nature of General Hurley's instructions—that no one should proceed to Yen'an?—A. He could not give any such instructions except concerning his own staff.

Q. No authority to give such instructions to General Wedemeyer or people under his command?—A. He could ask General Wedemeyer to issue such instructions but military personnel and the accredited correspondents in the theater were under the army control, and General Hurley could not issue instructions directly to them. He could ask, as I say, General Wedemeyer, but I know of no such instructions; standing instructions in the military theater are that you don't travel on army planes without orders.

Q. I think that he did issue such instructions and that he was highly incensed to find out that you had proceeded to Yen'an at a later date.—A. Shall I describe the conditions of my going to Yen'an, sir?

Q. First, I am trying to find out anything we can about such instructions as he may have given—you knew of no such instructions?—A. I knew of no such instructions.

Q. You knew of no such instructions. Would you tell us then of the circumstances of your trip to Yen'an?—A. Now, we knew in Chungking that the Communist Party congress was about to convene in Yen'an. It was the first congress they had had since 1934, I believe—1935. In view of the situation in China we expected it to be a particularly important meeting. I had spoken once to General Wedemeyer in February about going to Yen'an and he said: "Yes, we want you to go. I know that State Department wants you to go, but as long as General Hurley is here I do not think it wise. Later on it will be all right." He did not want to have any argument with General Hurley at that time. There had already been several frictions between the two of them. As I say, about the first of March we expected the congress was about to convene. I talked to Mr. Acheson, the Chargé d'Affaires, and he agreed that of all the times to be in Yen'an for political reporting this was it. So I wrote a memorandum on that to the Chief of Staff, indicating request for orders.

Miss PETTIS. Two hundred and twelve was the number.

A. I wrote a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, General Gross. This memorandum first had the approval of the Chief of G-2, and had the approval of Mr. Acheson, suggesting the desirability of my proceeding to Yen'an. It was approved by the Chief of Staff, official Army travel orders were issued to me, and I proceeded about March 8 by Army plane to Yen'an. Can we insert this in the transcript?

The CHAIRMAN. Is this a copy?

A. It is a copy of my memorandum. I, unfortunately, do not have the actual orders. I am told they are not in Washington. They were theater orders and those are not forwarded to Washington. I have copies in my personal possession among my effects—those are not available to me at the present time.

Mr. RHETTS. I hand the Board Document 212, which is a copy of Mr. Service's request for Army orders travel to Yen'an dated March 4, 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be put in the transcript, if you would like.

Mr. RHETTS. Again, this is one of those things of which we do not have copies. We can have it put into the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a secret document—any harm in that?

A. Nothing has been declassified.

Mr. ACHILLES. I don't think that's necessary. I have read it and found it to be as described.

The CHAIRMAN. So that we do not need it to be made an exhibit.

Mr. RHETTS. You would like me to simply show that it has been exhibited to the Board. Of course, this is amongst the papers, all of which were introduced into the record this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; it is included in that list of papers.

A. This is in the 101 to 227 series.

The CHAIRMAN. O. K.

A. I think the only point that needs emphasis is that I went to Yenan under Army orders after the most complete consultations with the Chief of Staff personally, with the Embassy, and with G-2.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was General Hurley at this time?

A. He was in the United States.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Now, General Wedemeyer had returned to the United States with him?—

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did I understand you to refer a few minutes ago to differences which had arisen between General Hurley and General Wedemeyer?—A. We are getting into a field there that is still classified material.

Q. To your knowledge, did your recommendations to General Wedemeyer have anything to do with his disagreement with General Hurley?—A. No, sir; the disagreement took place while I was away from Chungking. If we look at the chronology on page 4 starting with December 19 in the right-hand column and going down through January 14 in the right-hand column, I suggest that the Board might wish to request some of that material.

Mr. RHETTS. Perhaps we could merely make the suggestion to the Board that it might seek to obtain through its own channels information bearing on this point which we understand to be available in the records of the Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Referring to what?

Mr. RHETTS. The subject matter of Mr. Achilles' inquiry here.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Are those documents in the State Department's records or the War Department's records?—A. State Department's records.

Q. I think it might be useful for the Board to take a look at those documents.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(Discussion off the record.)

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Going back on the record again, the Board will endeavor to obtain those and examine them. You say this disagreement between General Hurley and General Wedemeyer was not due to any recommendations of yours?—A. Absolutely not.

Q. I think that's all I have at this point.

The CHAIRMAN (to Mr. Stevens). Have you some questions?

Mr. STEVENS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, no further questions on this point. Do you have some questions you want to ask on this?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes, General, there are two points I would like to cover. The first is a question that grew out of a line of questioning by General Snow of Mr. Service earlier in the day. General Snow referred to certain interviews with Mr. Service conducted by the Interview Section of Military Intelligence Service in Washington, at dates not specified, and General Snow inquired of Mr. Service, as I recall it, whether in any of those interviews he, Service, had indicated that he regarded the Chinese Communists, as I recall the phrase was something like "democratic farmers" or, in other words, the implication being that they were essentially democratic—liberal democratic groups and not true Marxian Communists. In that connection, I should like to offer for inclusion in the transcript at this point Document No. 20-1, which is an excerpt from the Congressional Record for October 19, 1949, and, in particular, the remarks of Congressman Judd at the time he first made known to the world the contents of Document 193. At that time he took occasion to criticize Mr.

Service's use of the word "democratic" democracy in connection with the Chinese Communists.

DOCUMENT No. 20-1

(Remarks of Congressman Judd, Congressional Record, October 19, 1949, p. 15283)

"The memorandum repeats the Communist propaganda slogan 'democratic' or 'undemocratic' eight times. It *portrays the Communists in China as more democratic than the government—as more willing to cooperate with us, and equates Chiang Kai-shek's reluctance to arm the Communists and take them into the Government with unwillingness to cooperate with ourselves.*"

Questions by Mr. RHETTS :

Q. Now, I should like to ask you, Mr. Service, if you can explain to the Board the context and the specialized meaning, if any, that the terms "democratic" and "democracy" had in relation to the Chinese Communists in China during the period in question.—A. To explain fully what I meant would require quite a dissertation on China in the background and particularly on conditions of government in the Kuomintang-controlled areas. When I and some other reporters were saying that the Communists were democratic, or more democratic our yardstick, of course, was the conditions in the rest of China; none of us, certainly never at any time said they had a developed democracy or a complete democracy. They had made a start at the very lowest level of village and county, smaller than county, district level. In Document 182, which transmits a memorandum which I drafted on September 4, 1944, on the subject of the growth of the new fourth army I say :

"The conclusion, therefore, seems justified that the peasants support, join, and fight with the Communist armies because they have been convinced that the Communists are fighting for their interests and because the Communists have created this conviction by producing some tangible benefits for the peasants.

"These benefits must be improvement of the social, political, or economic conditions of the peasants, whatever the exact nature of this improvement it must be in the broader sense of the term as the serving of the interests of the majority of the people toward democracy."

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES :

Q. Were you at that time aware of the Soviet Communist use of the words "Soviet democracy" as something to describe their own system?—A. Yes.

Q. And in your use of those words how were you applying it in the case of the Chinese Communists? That is, were you referring to them as democratic in the American sense, or in the Chinese sense, or the Russian sense?—A. Since you put the question in those terms I would say in the Chinese sense. It is certainly not American, and it was an improvement of what I conceived to be the Russian sense, and in my fairly extensive study of the development of Soviet control of their areas in my Document No. 183 transmitting a memorandum which I drafted on September 10, 1944, entitled "The Development of Communist Political Control on a Guerrilla Basis" in a report, incidentally, which was rated excellent by the Department, I go into considerable detail to show that the use of democratic methods in the very lowest echelons where they have direct contact with the peasants and people hasn't hampered in any way the Communist control at the top. In that respect it might be considered to approximate the Communist Russian definition of democracy as perhaps used in the satellite countries, although those examples were not in existence at that time.

Q. But the system was one, was it not, of rigorous control from the top?—A. On the higher levels, yes. You had party control and the party was the strongest influence; however, they went to great lengths to get other groups into the Government.

Q. But in the Communist areas did the people enjoy any political democracy with respect to their choice of rulers or were they subject to direct control from the top?—A. On the local level they had far more choice than they had ever had before—the village governments, the local organizations.

Q. (to the Chairman). Do you have any questions?

The CHAIRMAN. You have finished. No. (To Mr. Rhett.) You had another question, did you?

Mr. RHETTS. Whenever you have finished I would like to pursue this a little further.

Mr. ACHILLES. Yes.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Would you elaborate a little bit on your last answer, that is, when you say they did enjoy political rights on the lowest level will you describe what they did enjoy, what officials did they elect, and how did it work out?—A. The most exact way of answering the question, of course, is the text of this paper (Doc. No. 183).

Q. Very well, why don't you read from portions of it?

The CHAIRMAN. Is the paper in evidence?

Mr. RHETTS. It is one of the 101 to 227 series, which is in evidence but has not been put into the transcript.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Would you like to read a portion of that into the transcript?—A. I can read portions of it.

Q. Is this a classified document?—A. Yes, sir. It is declassified.

Q. You may read a portion into the transcript, if you wish.—A. Shall I identify it?

Q. Yes, identify the paper.—A. This is an excerpt from document 183, which is dispatch 3022 from the Embassy at Chungking transmitting a memorandum prepared by me at Yen-an on September 10, 1944, entitled "The Development of Communist Political Control in Communist Guerrilla Bases."

Mr. ACHILLES. What you are reporting on is a statement of announced Communist policies, is that it, or of actual practices?

A. Not only announced policies but our observations of them after a period of almost 2 months in the Communist areas.

Q. And according to your observation these policies were being carried out?—A. Yes, sir.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. RHETTS. Let's treat this like another one of those documents and put the whole thing in.

(Mr. Rhett submitted Doc. 183 for insertion in the transcript as follows:)

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Chungking, September 29, 1944.

Unclassified.

No. 3022.

Subject: Transmitting Report on Development of Communist Political Control in Communist Guerrilla Bases.

The Honorable THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington 25, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a report (No. 26,¹ September 10, 1944) entitled "The Development of Communist Political Control in the Guerrilla Bases," prepared by Mr. John S. Service, Second Secretary of Embassy on detail to General Stilwell's Headquarters, who is now in Yen-an, Shensi (seat of the Chinese Communist regime) as a member of the United States Army Observer Section.

A summary of Mr. Service's report will be found in the opening paragraph thereof. The report constitutes a comprehensive and revealing account of Communist political and administrative policies and measures and accordingly seems to merit careful scrutiny.

In connection with this general question, it would seem only fair to observe that a good many Chinese, whether Kuomintang officials or civilians, take issue with the thesis that the Chinese Communist Party is democratic or that genuine democracy is being practiced in the Communist-controlled areas. A recent example is to be found in the editorial columns of the influential *Ta Kung Pao* which, in commenting on the scene at Yen-an, charged the Chinese Communist Party with possessing "almost *carte blanche* powers over all Party, political and mili-affairs" (see enclosure to the Embassy's despatch 2856, August 9, 1944). For what is probably a typical Kuomintang point of view of the "democracy" of the Chinese Communists, reference is made to the enclosure to the Embassy's despatch 2963, September 15, 1944.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. GAUSS.

Enclosure:

Original to the Department.

800-Communist.

EFD/ept

¹ Copy of Report No. 26, dated September 10, 1944.

(Enclosure to despatch No. 3022, dated September 29, 1944, from the American Embassy, Chungking, China)

[Confidential]

Report No. 26.

U. S. ARMY OBSERVER SECTION, APO 879.

September 10, 1944.

Subject: The Development of Communist Political Control in the Guerrilla Bases.
To: Commanding General, Fwd, Ech, USAF-CBI, APO 879.

Summary. Communist influence predominates in the guerrilla bases because the Communists took the lead in establishing the governments, because there has been no important organized political opposition within the areas, and because the Communists have been supported by the peasants and liberals. The Communists have used their influence in a democratic way and to further democratic ends. *End of Summary.*

1. The Chinese Communist Party has overwhelming political influence in the various guerrilla bases. In effect, this influence amounts to control. Although the governments of these bases are nominally independent of each other, their form of organization, and their policies and administrative programs, are all similar. Furthermore these policies are identical with those of the Communist Party.

It is sometimes suggested that this fact of Communist control is a refutation of Communist claims of democracy. Considering the history, political development, and present situation of these bases, I do not believe that this criticism is valid.

2. The political history of the guerrilla bases has been discussed at length with a number of Communist leaders. These include:

LIU Shao-ch'-----Member of the Political Bureau, Communist Party.

LIN Pai-ch'ü-----Chairman of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government.

NIEH Jung-chen----Commander of the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Military Region (General NIEH played a leading part in the establishment of the government of the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region, which is identical in extent with the Military District).

CH'EN Yi-----Acting Commander of the New Fourth Army. Political Commissar of the Shantung Military District.

YANG Hsin-feng----Chairman of the Government of the Shansi-Hopei-Honan-Shantung Border Regions. (At the outbreak of the war Dr. Yang was a professor in the National Normal University at Peiping and a member of the National Salvationist Group. He was a leader of the first popular resistance in Central Hopei. He joined the Communist Party in 1939).

3. From these talks it appears that the political development in the different bases has followed a generally similar pattern. I have therefore attempted to give a generalized account of this development which will fit all of the bases.

There have of course been minor differences from base to base. In Shen-Kan-Ning there was a Soviet-type government established several years before the war; even after the government was reorganized in accordance with the United Front agreement, the Kuomintang never made any attempt to set up its Party organization. Shansi-Hopei-Chahar was set up at a very early stage of the war when there was still some degree of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation; some Kuomintang Party Organization was maintained and there has been relatively greater Kuomintang participation than in other bases. In Shantung and the areas under the New Fourth Army, the Kuomintang attempted for a while to maintain its own separate governments; the Kuomintang therefore regarded the Communist governments as illegal and has never been willing to allow participation as a Party.

4. The political development of the Communist bases has been, in general, along the following lines.

There had never, even before the war, been much political progress in the area which has come under the influence of the Communist Party. All of it is rural. Much of it is mountainous, isolated, and backward in every respect.

Shansi, Shantung, and several other sections were "warlord satrapies" where the Kuomintang had never been able to develop a widespread and effective organization. What formal Kuomintang organization did exist in all these northern provinces was expelled by Japanese pressure in 1935 (by one clause of the Ho-Umetzu Agreement). In none of them had the Kuomintang, which was (a) chiefly Southern and Central Chinese and (b) tied to the large cities, established itself on a broad base among the rural population. And in none of these provinces had there been permitted the development of any other political party. Political control had always been from above, by small groups; there was no political foundation for democracy.

As the Japanese Army advanced through North China at the beginning of the war, most of the provincial and local governments collapsed. The officials and leading Kuomintang members—usually the same men—fled south with the Central Government troops. Many of the wealthy landlords also fled south, or took refuge in the large cities where there were foreign Concessions or which, even under Japanese occupation, were relatively quiet. North China, outside of the large Japanese-occupied cities, became a political void.

The Communist Armies rapidly overran these areas in their westward advance during late 1937 and 1938 which extended from Shensi to the sea. They came in *behind* the Japanese into this political vacuum. Some areas they had to fight for, but many fell into their hands because the Japanese had ignored them or had passed on in their swift southern advance which they hoped would defeat the Central Government and bring an early end to the war.

After occupation it was necessary that organized governments be set up to administer these areas and to enable them to serve as supporting bases for the Communist armies. The Political Department of the 8th Route Army (in other words, the Communist Party) set about this task as rapidly as possible. Intensive propaganda and indoctrination of the peasants could create support for the Army's government. But it could not immediately produce leaders. What local government and Kuomintang leaders there once had been had mostly left. The influential local citizens (landlords and gentry) had either fled (the Communist name frightened them into continuing this even after the immediate Japanese danger was passed), or those who did remain were dubious of Communist promises and skeptical that resistance against the Japanese had any hope of success. So these people cautiously remained in the background.

The *only* important, politically conscious, and experienced group that the Communists found in the areas and willing to join them were large numbers of liberals and intellectuals. Most of these were university professors and students from the great educational center of Peiping. Since the student demonstrations there in December 1935, they had been demanding resistance against Japan. In the first great tide of war enthusiasm they had left Peiping and other cities ahead of the Japanese occupation and gone into the countryside to organize popular resistance. Most of these groups had stayed behind after the Government and its defeated armies fled south. But they were not organized, and were operating individually or in small groups with whatever following their eloquence could attract.

A few of these people were Communists. A larger number were nominally Kuomintang members. Many belonged to no party. But the great majority of them were strongly liberal and in favor of the Communist plan of people's guerrilla warfare based on democracy. This was, in fact, what they were already actively trying to start. The need of coordination and the organization of governments which could serve as bases was obvious. Most of these groups therefore willingly—by inclination and by the logic of circumstances—accepted Communist leadership and joined with them on a United Front basis.

The first governments were thus mainly composed of these two elements, the Communists and these unorganized liberals, with the addition of the few influential local citizens who remained in the regions and could be persuaded to cooperate. These cooperating local elements were also liberal in tendency, as would be indicated by the fact that they had not fled and were nondefeatist enough to believe, in this gloomy and uncertain time, in the possibility of resistance.

The "democratic" nature of these first governments was "confirmed" by the followers of the Communist armies and these liberal groups and by numerous mass meetings organized by them, which often went through the gesture of voting (by acclamation) for the government which had been set up.

The liberals were very useful in this early stage for providing the bulk of the immediately needed administrative officials and hsien magistrates. As

democratic machinery was not yet set up, they were appointed to these posts by the government, or in very newly occupied areas by the political officers of the Army (who among many other duties fulfill the function of our Army's civil-government officers).

Most of the partisan bands which had gathered around the liberals were absorbed into the Communist Army; this was one important source of their rapid growth in this early stage of the war.

The Communists were not only the leaders in setting up these governments; they were also the only group ready with a complete and well-thought-out program. They were preparing for a long war and had determined that they would fight behind the enemy lines with guerrilla tactics. Mao Tse-tung's famous booklet, *Protracted Warfare*, was published at this time. (The broader question of the motives behind these Communist tactics, of choosing a theater where they could be separated and independent of the Kuomintang and develop warfare on a democratic basis, is outside the scope of this discussion.)

In brief, the Communist plan was the following: The apathetic peasant had to be aroused by convincing him that he had something immediate and concrete to fight for. It was also necessary to create a well-rounded, productive, self-sufficient base that could survive being cut off from the cities. This demanded the support of *all* classes and the return and cooperation of the landlords, local capitalists, handicraft entrepreneurs, and merchants. These conditions dictated moderate policies. Even if there had not been the United Front pledges to the Central Government, extreme policies would frighten away what little local capital existed and leave the base economically disorganized and unable to support the Army. Politically it was also desirable to bring all classes into unified resistance and to prevent the possibility of division by the Japanese. The most effective measure as far as the farmer was concerned was the reduction of rents and interest. But this reduction was to be moderate and *limited*; and the government would protect the interests of the landlord by guaranteeing the payment of these reduced rates. Private enterprise was guaranteed non-interference and was offered assistance to increase production. Thus the fears of the landlord-merchant group would be calmed. Finally democracy would be instituted. This would interest all groups in joining the government, through the democratic process, in order to protect or advance their own interests in such matters as rent and interest reduction and taxation.

The Communist leaders stress the importance and precedence of these measures: *first and basic*, limited rent-interest reduction to win the active support of the peasants, who are the bulk of the population; *second*, democratic self-government to bring all classes, particularly the landlord-merchants, into active participation and hence support of the government. This conception of the importance of democracy as a means of obtaining the participation and support of the capitalist groups is interesting and significant in the study of present and probable future Communist policies. They have no illusions that China can hope to build a proletarian state in anything like the near future.

This Communist program was logical and, objectively viewed in the light of the circumstances, reasonably fair to all. Even though it was only carrying out unenforced laws as far as rent reduction was concerned, it might have been opposed by the landlord-conservative (or even the orthodox Kuomintang) groups. But there were not at the time—for reasons described above—important participants in the governments. The liberal groups, without any strong organization or alternative program of their own, followed the Communist lead. The original Communist program was therefore adopted by these impromptu coalition governments as they were established, first in Shansi-Hopei-Chahar and later in other areas.

The program worked out as intended. As the government became well established and showed ability to withstand Japanese attack, and as the peasants through education (by the Communists) in their new democratic powers began to exhibit interest in more drastic rent-interest reduction and progressive taxation, the landlord-capitalist group was driven to active participation to preserve its own interests.

Within 1 year most villages were under elected governments. By 1939-40 the democratic election of hsien governments was general. And by 1942 most of the bases were governed by popularly elected Peoples Political Councils.

In all of these grades of government there is substantial, though not large, representation of both the land-lord capitalist and peasant-laborer groups. This landlord-capitalist participation has been rewarded (by means of Communist support) with some reduction of the early high tax rates on large

incomes, and more extensive government assistance to private productive enterprise.

This institution of political democracy has not, however, been accompanied by political development along definite party forms.

The landlord-capitalist element has formed pressure groups without unified party organization or leadership. Their main object has been merely the preservation of their own interests.

The Kuomintang has not established itself in an organized manner because (1) it had no strong original foundation in the regions and (2) the central Kuomintang authorities (Chungking) have generally taken the attitude that these are "traitor areas" and "illegal" governments. When the Kuomintang has tried to come back into some of these areas, it has done so with the backing of military force and government mandates abolishing the governments already set up and functioning. Such was the case, for instance, when the Central Government sent LU Chung-lin into Hopei to reestablish the Hopei Provincial Government. There seems to be no evidence that the Kuomintang has ever sought participation in these governments in a democratic, cooperative manner. Its attitude has been "all or nothing." The one exception is in the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar region. Its government was given recognition by the Central Government in January 1938. The recognition was later apparently rescinded (the attempt to set up a conflicting government under LU Chung-lin in Hopei would appear ipso facto to have been a cancellation of its authority) and its present status of legality vis-à-vis the Kuomintang and the Central Government is obscure. At the beginning a regular, recognized Kuomintang organization was set up. This still remains in existence, although the obscurity of its legality in Chungking's eyes is similar to that of the government. In any event, this Kuomintang branch has never found wide support and is reportedly in a languishing condition. Shansi-Hopei-Chahar is the only area in which there is a Kuomintang organization.

The increasingly politically conscious peasants have tended to gravitate toward the Communist Party. This can be regarded as natural. In the first place they regard the Communists as responsible for setting up the bases and for the practical improvement in their social-political-economic condition. In the second place, there is no other party with anything to offer the peasants or actively seeking their support. Even if the Kuomintang were active in these areas, it could give little practical attraction to the peasant.

It must, of course, be recognized that the Communists have controlled all political indoctrination and propaganda and have not discouraged this tendency of the peasants to regard them as their benefactors. Furthermore, the Communist Party has actively expanded its Party organization in its newly won areas and has established branches down to the villages. Of the approximately 1,000,000 present members of the Party, it is claimed that more than one-half are peasants. It is reasonable to assume that most of these are in North China.

The only other important group, the liberal-intellectuals, have also failed to set up a separate party organization. They have remained in close support and cooperation with the Communists. Some have actually joined the Communist Party. But it seems that this tendency is not at present encouraged—since the overwhelming domination of the Communist Party is something that the Communists, for political reasons described below, wish to avoid—and that many of those outside the Communist Party might as well, as far as thinking goes, be considered in it.

Even without party organization or their own following, this liberal-intellectual group has remained politically important as holders of elective offices. Reasons for this can be assumed to be (1) the shortage of men in the areas with their qualifications of education and experience and (2) during their first appointed terms they generally made a good impression on the people by their patriotic enthusiasm, democratic leanings, and honesty. Thus many of them have continued to hold posts as magistrates and high administrative officials.

The actual situation, therefore is that no strong opposition has developed to the Communists and they have remained the undisputably dominant political factor.

This dominance tended to become so pronounced that in 1940 the Communist Party decided, as a purely Party measure, to restrict itself to one-third of the membership of any elective government body, and to advocate that the other two-thirds be divided between Kuomintang and nonparty members. The one-third limitation on the Communists was a maximum, not a minimum, limit. It was hoped that this would improve the all-round representative character of the

governments, thus helping to keep the support of the numerically small landlord-merchant groups and countering Kuomintang charges of monopoly and violation of the United Front.

This self-restriction of the Communist Party has not had much effect on its leading role. It generally elects its solid one-third (in a few areas it actually continues to hold slightly over this ratio in the Peoples Political Councils). The Kuomintang representation is made up of *individuals* who were former officials or Kuomintang members but now have no Party machine back of them and are usually of liberal tendencies. It is usually difficult to find enough of these persons, with suitable qualifications, who are willing to join the government: with the present situation between the two parties, a "regular" Kuomintang member knows that he jeopardizes his Party standing and will be accused by Chungking of being a "Communist" if he participates in an "illegal" "Communist" government. As a result the Kuomintang (it would be more correct to say "nominal Kuomintang") representation in most governments is below the sought-for one-third. The remainder of the government is then made up of a few representatives of the landlord-merchant groups (who may also find some representation through the Kuomintang members) and a larger number of the liberal-intellectuals.

The typical composition, then, is one-third Communists, plus a few liberal Kuomintang (or ex-Kuomintang) members, plus a large number of liberal-intellectuals, and finally a relatively small group of the landlord-merchant group.

With this strong representation and a predominantly liberal and sympathetic majority, it is not surprising that the Communists have been the chief initiators of the policies followed by the base governments. Furthermore, since the Communist Party holds the same dominant position in each government, and since it is the one connecting link between these separate governments, it has secured the adoption by all of them of its program.

5. Related to this development of predominant Communist influence in the guerrilla bases are a number of other factors which should be mentioned, even though detailed study of some will be left for following reports.

(a) The Communists have kept their program moderate and within the limits that the liberal-Kuomintang and liberal-intellectual groups affiliated with it would continue to support. This has promoted unity. It has also increased and held support. It might also be said that it has robbed any important potential opposition of any issues.

(b) The Communist program has introduced democracy and improved the economic condition of the great majority of the population. This is the first experience the people have had of these benefits, and their political experience has not had a chance yet to go beyond the stage of being grateful. Nobody opposes Santa Claus.

(c) The Communists at times have played a balancing role. In areas where the landlords were too successful in gaining control over local governments, either through the old awe in which they were held by the peasants or their power over their tenants, the Communists have stepped up their assistance to the people through indoctrination in democracy and active support of the people's organizations. On the other hand, in areas where the peasants "felt their oats" and used their new political powers to monopolize the local governments, the Party used its influence to obtain the election of landlord representatives. Wherever used this policy makes grateful friends. And the Communists admit that when they use their influence to aid the election of a landlord, it is a progressive landlord—in other words, another supporter of their policies.

(d) The Communists have accepted and incorporated into their own program some proposals put forth by other groups. An example was the policy to "refine the Army and reduce the Government" (generally translated as "rationalization"), which was originally introduced into the Shen-Kan-Ning Peoples Political Council by a landlord representative. The Communists make much of this willingness to accept suggestions from others as an indication of their democracy. And they explain incorporation into their own program as the most expeditious and sure means, since they are the only party to all governments, of having these improvements universally put into effect. There is a great deal of merit in these arguments. But it must be recognized that the Communist Party, in a very smart and hard-headed political way, gets the credit for these improvements because the original introducer is not widely known and soon forgotten and it becomes known as another item of the Party program.

(e) The Communist control of propaganda has already been mentioned. This propaganda, except in special instances, does not attack the Kuomintang or other groups. But it does tend to put these other groups in a bad light. And it invariably works to promote the Communist Party.

(f) Finally, the Army is the army of the Communists. This is important because the political effect of the 8th Route and New 4th Armies is tremendous. This effectiveness comes in several ways. The Political Department, which is used in indoctrination of the people, especially of newly occupied areas, is highly organized and experienced, and under wholly Communist leadership (contrary to the rest of the Army). But even greater than this direct effect is the example of the behavior and attitude of the army toward the people, its volunteer character, its completely different attitude of unity with the people, its high morale, and the fact that it fights.

6. I have attempted to show that the political control of the Communist Party in the guerrilla bases has developed from its leadership in establishing and holding these bases, the absence of strong opposition, the adoption of moderate, democratic policies which have benefited the great majority of the population, and political astuteness combined with control of propaganda and the influence of the Army. The *policies* of the Communist Party have been democratic, and there is little which, under the circumstances, can be called undemocratic in its *methods*.

The question may be asked whether the Communists would have been so democratic in method if they had been faced with stronger opposition. The question is hard to answer because there has never been a strong opposition willing to cooperate on a democratic basis. In the one area where the Kuomintang has an organization, it has been allowed its own newspaper and other democratic freedoms. But this opposition was weak. In areas where the Kuomintang came in with military force to oust the Communists, the Communists won out because they had the democratic support of the people. The Kuomintang did not have this support and was unable to obtain it. This fact, together with difficulties connected with the war, forced the Kuomintang to withdraw.

The next question is logically the future. I believe that the Communist influence with the people in the guerrilla bases is now so great, and rests on such a strong democratic basis, that the Communists will be willing to contest their political control there with any other party *on a democratic basis*; and that they will accordingly content themselves with democratic methods, including freedom of propaganda, provided that the other party or parties do the same.

JOHN S. SERVICE.

Approved for transmission:

DAVID D. BARRETT, *Colonel, GSC.*

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I take it then, Mr. Service, in using the word "democratic" you used it advisedly insofar as you were referring to the fact that in the Communist areas they had for the reasons you have outlined instituted measures bearing the formal characteristics of democracy at the very lowest levels of the administration of the areas they controlled?—A. That's correct.

Q. And am I not correct that in various of your reports, which have already been discussed here, in which you spoke of the growing strength of the Chinese Communists, you refer to this phenomenon as one of the sources of their strength?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. But I take it also that you did not suggest that this type of "democracy" bears any resemblance to the completely developed type of democracy which we think about when we use the term in this country?—A. That's correct.

Q. Because of the fact that in the higher echelons of policy determination that remain firmly in the hands of the Communists themselves?—A. Yes.

Mr. RHETTS. Now I would like to turn to another matter. Yesterday the Board will recall that I read a short excerpt from a message from General Hurley for the eyes of the Secretary of State alone, dated January 31, 1945. At that time I explained that I did not then propose to put the entire document in the record because there were certain technical problems about it. The technical problems are these: This document has been declassified and it has been reproduced photostatically. For some reason, in the mechanical process of photostating, what is probably a page, or at least it is the concluding few paragraphs of General Hurley's telegram, simply didn't get fastened into this document.

The CHAIRMAN. Have they been since added?

Mr. RHETTS. I am convinced that it was the intention to have the entire thing reproduced. There are a few paragraphs that aren't here, but which do appear in another copy of the document which I have here.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. RHETTS. I should like at this time to introduce into the transcript document 321, which is a copy of a message from General Hurley for the eyes of the Secretary of State alone, dated January 31, 1945, together with supplemental comment on the telegram by the Embassy staff at Chungking.

The CHAIRMAN. No objections.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

[Confidential]

Urgent (321)

(Following message is from Hurley for eyes of the Secretary of State alone:)

31 JANUARY 1945.

PREAMBLE

This Embassy is not repeat not equipped to make reports of the nature that I am now entering upon. The Embassy has but one stenographer. America has never heretofore attempted to use its good offices in actual negotiations to bring about a unification of the military forces of China. We have official personnel who have communicated with, observed and reported on the Communists but we have no personnel who have negotiated with the Communists for the unification of the Communist and National forces. For that reason we have no official personnel in the Embassy, except myself, prepared to make either decisions or reports on the subject which I am covering. I make this statement not as a criticism but as a statement of fact.

We are fighting a relentless enemy. That, in my opinion, justifies our action in attempting to unify the forces of China to help us defeat the enemy. A unification of the military forces of the Communist Party and the National Government would have a battle effect, equal at least, to one fully equipped American army. The result of unification of the Chinese military force is worthy of much more consideration than it has heretofore received from America. As I have heretofore reported to you, my negotiations with the Communists have been with the advice, approval and direction of both the Generalissimo and the American Commander, General Wedemeyer. *Conducting these negotiations between factions in China is viewed, by some of our diplomatic staff, as an unusual and unjustified departure from State Department procedure. My position is that the ends we seek justify the departure.*¹

These reports are being dictated by me to an army stenographer. *There is no process in the Embassy through which I can pass the reports to improve their composition or substance. I do not have the time to properly edit the reports. My reports are going to you literally from the typewriter to the radio.*¹ As you know, I am conducting meetings of the representatives of all American agencies in China with a view of eliminating overlapping and conflicts. We hope to be able to coordinate American activities in China. I am conducting regular military conferences with the American military commander and the Generalissimo. I am also carrying on the routine duties of Ambassador. It is difficult for me personally to attend so many conferences and also to do my own reporting. I have wired the Department suggesting a set-up for this Embassy which I hope will have attention as early as convenient, *as I have no desire to make this a one-man job.*¹

PART I

As indicated by my message to you No. 107, 24 January 1945, conversations have been resumed between the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party. It should be frankly stated, however, that in the very first meeting both sides stated with great emphasis the obstacles to any practical agreement between the two factions. Dr. Soong for the Government and Chow En-lai for the Communists are both able debaters.

At this point I begin giving background that will provide correct outline of my participation in and the progress of the conversations between the National Government and the Communist Party. I had been talking to the Generalissimo

¹ Italicized portions shown on original draft but not on file.

at periods during the Stilwell controversy of the necessity of uniting China's military forces so that instead of fighting or watching each other the forces of the Nationalist Government and those of the Chinese Communist party could be united to drive the Japanese from China. I was advised that the crimes committed by the Communists were so grave that reconciliation seemed impossible although the Generalissimo said he was willing for me to negotiate with the Communist Party leaders in an effort to bring about unity.

On 11 September 1944, I received a telegram from General Chu Teh, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Communist troops, inviting me, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party and the new 4th and 8th Route Armies of Communist troops, to go to Yen-an, in the Communist area, for a personal investigation and a visit with the Communist leaders. I immediately made this invitation known to the Generalissimo. For a number of reasons he wished me to postpone the visit but he did not decline to permit me to meet with the Communist leaders. I then began rather extensive work with a committee which had been appointed by the Generalissimo and the National Government to confer with the Chinese Communist leaders. The members of this Committee were Dr. Wang Shih Chieh, now Minister of Information, and General Chang Tze-chung, Director of Political Training of the National Military Council. I found these two gentlemen were committed to the proposition that China must remain under one party rule, according to the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, until a period of tutelage would make it ready to support a democratic government. They were of the opinion that the time had not arrived to institute a bi-party or multi-party government. After much work with these gentlemen and with Dr. Soong, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Generalissimo, I evolved five points, some of them rather innocuous, to which the National Government Committee agreed. These points were suggested by me after conferences with the local representatives of the Communist Party and after meetings between these representatives and the representatives of the government. I was only beginning to understand the issues involved. On the 7th of November, I flew to Yen-an with the advice and consent and by the direction of the Generalissimo and General Wedemeyer. My reception by the Communist leaders was enthusiastic. They expressed great admiration that I had come into Yen-an at a time when it was necessary for my plane to be covered by fighter escort. This seemed to be of great significance to them. In opening our first formal meeting, Chairman Mao Tse-tung stated that our meeting was so important that I had risked my life to come to see him. That fact, he stated, impressed him with the earnestness of our desire to see all Chinese military forces united to defeat Japan and to prevent civil war in China. For two days and two nights we argued, agreed, disagreed, denied and admitted in the most strenuous but most friendly fashion and pulled and hauled my five points until they were finally revised and were signed by Mao Tse-tung to be presented by me as the Chinese Communist proposal to the National Government. I had been able to limit the inclusion of unnecessary details in the five points so that the whole document could be written on one page.

By agreement this document was to remain secret until the negotiations were closed or until Mao Tse-tung and I would agree to its publication. The document is still secret. The National Government has taken every precaution to keep it from becoming public. Therefore, the State Department should know that it would be injurious to our negotiations if this document should become public. I have outlined the document in reports to the President. This is the first time I have given the entire document. I am giving it now because I feel it essential that the State Department be fully informed if I am to expect direction, cooperation and support in these negotiations. The five point proposal of the Communist Party to the National Government is dated November 10, 1944 and is, in full as set forth in EMBTEL 142, Jan. 31, 7 PM.:

"AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA, THE KUOMINTANG OF CHINA AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

"1. The Government of China, the Kuomintang of China and the Communist Party of China will work together for the unification of all military forces in China for the immediate defeat of Japan and the reconstruction of China.

"2. The present National Government is to be reorganized into a Coalition National Government embracing representatives of all anti-Japanese parties and non-partisan political bodies. A new democratic policy providing for reforms in military, political, economic and cultural affairs shall be promulgated and

made effective. At the same time the National Military Council is to be reorganized into the United National Military Council consisting of representatives of all anti-Japanese armies.

"3. The Coalition National Government will support the principles of Sun Yat-sen for the establishment in China of a government of the people, for the people and by the people. The Coalition National Government will pursue policies designed to promote progress and democracy and to establish justice, freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances, the right of writ of habeas corpus and the right of residence. The Coalition National Government will also pursue policies intended to make effective those two rights defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want.

"4. All anti-Japanese forces will observe and carry out the orders of the Coalition National Government and its United National Military Council and will be recognized by the Government and the Military Council. The supplies acquired from foreign powers will be equitably distributed.

"5. The Coalition National Government of China recognizes the legality of the Kuomintang of China, the Chinese Communist Party and all anti-Japanese parties.

"(Sgd) MAO TSE-TUNG, *Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.*

Signed: November 10, 1944.

"(Sgd) WITNESS PATRICK J. HURLEY, *Personal Representative of the President of the United States.*

Signed: November 10, 1944."

I was also authorized to say to Chiang Kai-shek that the Communists pledged themselves to support and sustain his leadership both as Generalissimo and as President of the Government.

In Yenan I had contracted a heavy cold. The day after I returned (Nov. 11) I was confined to my room. I sent a signed copy of the Communist proposal to Dr. Soong and the other members of the National Committee and requested that it be translated and given to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Dr. Soong and Dr. Wang came to my room in a state of considerable perturbation. Dr. Soong immediately said "You have been sold a bill of goods by the Communists. The National Government will never grant what the Communists have requested." He then pointed out all of the defects he found in the proposal, only one of which seemed to me to have merit and that was that the Communists really meant to say that they desired a coalition administration whereas they had actually asked for a change in the name of the Chinese Government. This seemed to me to be trivial and could easily be corrected. I maintained that the offer made by the Communists did outline at least a basis upon which to construct a settlement. Drs. Soong and Wang saw the Generalissimo before I did. They had convinced him that a settlement on the basis suggested by the Communists was impracticable. The Generalissimo's argument was that he could not agree to a Coalition Government without acknowledging the total defeat of his party by the Communists. He also said that the proposed plan would be in conflict with the program outlined for China in the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He said that acceptance of the plan would have a serious effect on the war effort and would cause controversy at a time when the situation in China was already precarious. I, of course, had deep sympathy with him because I well understood that the National Government must be maintained. The collapse of the National Government would have caused chaos.

The Generalissimo was kind enough to say that the basis for settlement that I had obtained from the Communists would, in his opinion, be accepted as a settlement of the same kind of a controversy in Washington or in London but, owing to the peculiar Chinese psychology, it would mean total defeat for him and his party. I suggested to the Generalissimo that he revise the Communist offer and call the result a bi-party, or a multi-party, or a party representative government thus avoiding the use of the word "coalition." I believed that an agreement between the National Government and the Chinese Communist party would strengthen the government both politically and militarily and would prevent the collapse which, at that time, was widely predicted and to many informed people seemed imminent. My arguments were ineffective as were also the arguments of General Chow En-lai, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist party, who had accompanied me from Yenan to Chungking. The government finally and definitely declined the Communist offer of settlement. The government made a three point counter-proposal. The

three point counter-offer of the government was submitted to me on November 21st and I, in turn, presented it to General Chow. The three point counter-proposal of the government is, in full, as set forth in EMBSTEL 143 Jan. 31, 8 PM.:

"1. The National Government desirous of securing effective unification and concentration of all military forces in China for the purpose of accomplishing the speedy defeat of Japan, and looking forward to the post-war reconstruction of China agrees to incorporate, after reorganization, the Chinese Communist forces in the National Army who will then receive equal treatment as the other units in respect to pay, allowance, munitions and other supplies; and to give recognition of the Chinese Communist Party as a legal political party.

"2. The Communist Party of China undertake to give their full support to the National Government in the prosecution of the war of resistance, and in the post-war reconstruction, and give over control of all their troops to the National Government, through the National Military Council. The National Government will designate some high ranking officer from among the Communist forces to membership in the National Military Council.

"3. The aim of the National Government, to which the Communist Party subscribe, is to carry out the three People's Principles of Sun Yet-sen for the establishment in China of a government of the people, for the people and by the people, and will pursue policies designed to promote the progress and development of democratic processes in government.

"In accordance with the provisions of the 'Outline of the Program for the Prosecution of the War of Resistance and Reconstruction,' freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and association, and other civil liberties are hereby guaranteed, subject only to the specific needs of security in the effective prosecution of the war against Japan."

Dr. Wang stated, in a meeting, that the three point counter-proposal of the government was prepared by me and that it represented my idea of a fair compromise. To this statement I replied publicly that there was not one word of the counter-proposal that I considered mine, and that I had not presented it as my idea of an equitable compromise. I did not denounce the document. I disclaimed its authorship. The three-point proposal was not, of course, acceptable to the Communists. I did argue that the three-point proposal with General Chow En-lai and attempted to persuade him that it would be advisable on the part of the Communists to accept the three-point proposal and begin cooperation with the National Government to effect a unification of National and Chinese Communist forces for the defeat of the enemy. I pointed out that the government's three-point proposal did provide for the recognition of the Chinese Communists as a legal political party in China. At this time, in the discussions, the Chinese Communists began to charge the Chinese Government with bad faith. They said the Chinese Government had no desire to effect a unification of China and that the Chinese Government was in correspondence with Japan and, with support of the imperialistic governments of Southeast Asia, intended to keep China divided against itself. The charges and counter-charges of that period are too numerous to be recited here. All the atrocities committed in China during the civil war and much of those committed during the war of resistance were charged to the Communists by the representatives of the National Government. Chow En-lai returned to Yenan without having made any notable progress in his negotiations with the government.

In conclusion of this Part I of my report on the background of the Communist negotiations, I wish to state that in all my negotiations with the Communists I have insisted that the United States will not repeat not supply or otherwise aid the Chinese Communists as an armed political party or as an insurrection against the National Government. Any aid from the United States to the Chinese Communist Party must go to that Party through the National Government of China. The Chinese Communist Party has never indicated to me that they desire to obtain control of the National Government itself, if and when they achieve control through a political election. The Communist party demands the end of the one-party government by the Kuomintang. The Chinese Communist party is willing for the Kuomintang to still have a vast majority of the government offices. The Chinese Communist party demands representation, both for itself and other anti-Japanese political parties in China, in the policy-making agencies of the government. If proper representation is given to the Chinese Communist Party in the National Government that Party will agree to submit its army to the control of the National Government.

On the other side of the ledger there is opposition to the unification of the military forces of China within both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. Members of the Chinese Communist Party oppose unification with the Chinese National Government on the ground that the Government is incompetent, corrupt and destructive of the welfare of China. The Kuomintang party points to the fact that it began as the party of Sun Yat-sen, the party of reformation in China, and has brought China through a revolution and through nearly 8 years of the war of resistance. They believe themselves to have been successful. They believe that they have served China well and are naturally reluctant to surrender their one-party control of China.

There is honest opposition among some of our own military on the ground that the Communist armed party is stronger than the National Army and we should deal directly with the Communists bypassing the National Government. This opposition is, in my opinion, based on erroneous and unsound premises.

In addition to these factors, all of the representatives of the so-called imperialist colonial powers of southeast Asia are opposed to unification. The policy of the imperialist powers appears to be to keep China divided against herself.

I

The comment offered here is comment on the draft telegram merely as a report, which is the immediate task at hand, and we leave for later discussion the question of suggestions in regard to the negotiations.

We think that part I of the telegram is clear and precise (with the exception of one portion which will be discussed hereafter) and will provide the Secretary of State with a valuable background picture of the course of developments. We have not endeavored, as we usually do with draft telegrams, to work over the language for the sake of seeking greater conciseness or of condensing because we feel that it will be useful to the Secretary to have as full a description of the negotiations as it is possible to provide him. We feel too that, because of your intimate connection with and knowledge of this matter, you can draw in your own words a picture which might be made confused rather than clarified if we endeavored to suggest any radical changes in phraseology.

On page 3, line 14 we suggest "biparty" and "multiparty" instead of "bipartisan" and "multipartisan". The same suggestion is made in regard to page 6, line 19.

In the last paragraph on page 8 we suggest eliminating the numerals in parentheses for the sake of clarity. For example, the sentences following (2), (3), (4), and (5) do not seem to be matters on which you have insisted in your negotiations with the Communists whereas the clause following (1) does seem to be such a matter.

We would question the statement in the next to the last paragraph of the telegram that there is opposition among our own diplomatic representatives. There is no one on the staff who believes we should bypass the National Government in dealing with the Communists. From a recent conversation with Mr. Service (who is not substantively a member of the Embassy staff) I am convinced that he does not think we should bypass the National Government in dealing with the Communists.

II

As regards comment about the staff in the preamble:

We would question the penultimate sentence of the second paragraph. We have not heard anyone on the staff express an opinion that your conduct of the negotiations is an unusual and unjustified departure from State Department procedure. We do not believe that any member of the staff holds such opinion. There is no member of the staff that I know of who has not wholeheartedly hoped for the success of your negotiations and the benefit to the war effort which will obviously result therefrom.

We are at this moment endeavoring, by making these comments, to vitiate the second sentence of the third paragraph that there is no process in the Embassy through which reports can be passed for consultation on composition, and so forth.

The preamble is very damning to the staff. If I were in the Department I would imply from your comments that you feel that the staff is of little, if any, use and should be replaced. We hope that this is not the interpretation which you had in mind. But if it is we do not cavil about it; we feel that we are not in good position to offer comment.

III

We feel that your statement of the case of putting forth every feasible effort to bring unity to China and unity to the military forces of China to assist in defeating the Japanese is excellent. We feel also, from what we have heard and observed of the situation, that your statement of the position and attitude of the Kuomintang and the Communists toward each other is also excellent and succinct. We are sure that the Secretary will be very pleased indeed to have this outline of the negotiations and will consider it to be a clear, forthright, and generally excellent account of them.

(This memorandum has been written in cooperation and consultation with Messrs. Ringwalt, Yuni, Boehringer, and Freeman.)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now, Mr. Service, we have discussed General Hurley's charges set forth in Doc. 35-3, and particularly paragraph 5 of that document wherein General Hurley has stated that you and other Foreign Service officers who were pursuing the Chinese Communist Party line were seeking to keep China divided against herself. Now I refer you to page 9 of Document 321, the last paragraph of that page, where General Hurley says:

"In addition to these factors, all of the representatives of the so-called imperialist colonial powers of southeast Asia are opposed to unification. The policy of the imperialist powers appears to be to keep China divided against herself."

Now that is in this telegram to the Secretary of State in January 1945. General Hurley appears to be making a quite different suggestion, does he not, as to who was trying to keep China divided against herself. This does not suggest that this is a Communist Party proposal, does it?—A. No.

Q. I suppose he refers by the "so-called imperialist colonial powers" to Britain, does he? France?—A. He believed that the British wanted to keep China divided and weak, yes.

Q. Was it his belief that the British and the Chinese Communist Party were to that extent following the same line?—A. No, I can't follow his reasoning.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. I would like to call counsel's attention to the fact that the same expression occurs in 35-3, paragraph 5, in which he yokes together the professional Foreign Service men, the Chinese Communist Armed Party, and the imperialist bloc of nations all in one sentence.

Mr. RHETTS. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. This other quotation you have read doesn't seem to be any different from that.

Mr. RHETTS. Except that here he seems to suggest that this is only the policy of the proposal of the imperialist powers—he drops the Communist out here.

A. In the same telegram he has already said that the Chinese Communists are not seeking to gain power except by political means.

Mr. RHETTS. You see, I read another excerpt from this yesterday where he showed that he was satisfied that the Chinese Communist Party was not seeking to achieve dominance and control of the Government of China, but only wished participation in it, and indeed subordinate participation.

The CHAIRMAN. What we are trying to get at is the view of Mr. Service and not of Mr. Hurley.

Mr. RHETTS. If I may suggest to you, sir, I want to get at possibly what Mr. Hurley may think he is charging Mr. Service with.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Moreover, General Hurley has also charged that you and other Foreign Service officers were seeking to arm the Chinese Communists and that you were seeking to arm the Chinese Communists for the purpose of bringing about the fall of Chiang Kai-shek, has he not?—A. Yes.

Q. Now I should like to read this paragraph from General Hurley's telegram: "There is honest opposition among some of our own military on the ground that the Communist armed party is stronger than the National army and we should deal directly with the Communists, bypassing the National Government. This opposition is, in my opinion, based on erroneous and unsound premises."

Would you say that General Hurley suggests in any manner there that any person who sought to arm Communists even by bypassing the National Government was in any way seeking to defeat American policy?—A. No.

Q. Here General Hurley recognizes that an honest opinion can be properly held by certain of our military leaders, does he not?—A. Yes.

Q. Now I should like to refer you to the comment of the Embassy on this telegram of General Hurley.

Mr. ACHILLES. May I ask at this point: This telegram was sent by Hurley while he was Ambassador?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes, sir. It was dated January 31, 1945.

Mr. ACHILLES. Then how does it happen that the Embassy is commenting on his telegram in the same telegram? Doesn't the whole telegram—

Mr. RHETTS. The Embassy's comment is attached. When you read the document, sir, you will see that General Hurley goes to some length to say that he is having to send this telegram through Army facilities because the Embassy has no facilities to type a telegram or to comment on it. That all appears in the document.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. The paper just offered consists of a draft of a telegram from General Hurley to the Department of State, and of a comment thereon by the Embassy at Chungking, both of which papers were found among the Embassy papers at Nanking at the time of the evacuation.

Go ahead.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to read from page 1 of the Embassy comment on this draft as follows:

"We would question the statement in the next to the last paragraph of the telegram that there is opposition among our own diplomatic representatives. There is no one on the staff who believes we should bypass the National Government in dealing with the Communists. From a recent conversation with Mr. Service (who is not substantively a member of the Embassy staff) I am convinced that he does not think we should bypass the National Government in dealing with the Communists."

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask, did you have anything to do with drafting that comment?—A. No, sir. I did not know about the telegram at that time.

Mr. RHETTS. May I say, sir, that the concluding paragraph of this comment states:

"(This memorandum has been written in cooperation and consultation with Messrs. Ringwalt, Yuni, Boehringer, and Freeman.)"

A. I would like to add, however, that the drafter of the memorandum of comment is Mr. George Acheson whose initials appear on the original.

Mr. RHETTS. That's all, I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a witness waiting?

Mr. RHETTS. He is waiting.

The CHAIRMAN. No further questions at this time from the Board. You may produce your witness. Let's have a recess.

(After a 5-minute recess the hearing reconvened.)

(Mr. John Paton Davies, called as a witness in behalf of John S. Service, after being duly sworn, testified in his behalf as follows:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS.

Q. Will you state your full name and address?—A. John Paton Davies, Jr., home address: 1707 Duke Street, Alexandria, Va.

Q. And will you state your present position?—A. I am a member of the Policy Planning Staff of State Department.

Q. You are a Foreign Service officer, I believe?—A. Yes, sir; I am.

Q. Will you describe for the Board briefly your general background and the course of your career in the Foreign Service with a limitation, bearing in mind that we are interested primarily in the China phase and subsequent to 1941?—

A. I entered the Service in 1932, and after a year at a Canadian post I was transferred to China where I became a China language officer, that is, a specialist in Chinese affairs. I served subsequently in Mukden, Hankow, and then was transferred to the Department. Shortly after the outbreak of the war I was assigned to the Embassy at Chungking and detailed to the staff of the commanding general in the China-Burma-India theater. I served in this capacity until early January 1945 when I was transferred to Moscow where I served in the Embassy there until 1947 and returned on transfer to the Department to my present position.

Q. Now will you describe the general nature of the functions which you performed during the period while you were attached to the staff of the com-

manding general in the CBI theater?—A. To give an adequate impression of that I should perhaps go back to my personal relationship with General Stilwell. I believe it was in 1934 when I first met General Stilwell. I was a language officer at that time and the General was military attaché.

The CHAIRMAN. This was where?

A. In Peiping. In 1938 I saw him again in Hankow. At that period Hankow was under attack by the Japanese. He was then Colonel Stilwell, was then military attaché observing the Japanese offensive on Hankow. I was a vice consul in the consulate there. We worked very closely together, I doing political reporting, he doing military reporting. We exchanged information constantly, and worked very closely with a group of Americans and journalists of other nationalities. We used them to obtain information and we often helped them out with stories. It was on the basis of this considerable acquaintance and intimate contact with General Stilwell that he initiated the request through the War Department for my assignment to him in early 1943 to be detailed to his staff. This was, so far as I know, the first arrangement whereby the military took on to the staff of a commanding general a State Department officer. My functions were not clearly defined. They were left up to General Stilwell. When I reported to General Stilwell in the field early in 1942 at Maymyo, Burma, he was in the midst of the Burma campaign. I asked him what my instructions were. He said he was busy fighting a war and he left that pretty largely up to me. He said he expected me to keep him out of diplomatic trouble, and let it go at that. That was the general basis on which my functions were laid. I received very few specific orders from General Stilwell as to what I should do. My problem was to make a job for myself largely. I began to do political reporting in Burma almost immediately upon my arrival. That was a familiar field for me. I also, with his approval, maintained contacts with the press people. This was a familiar relationship between the General and myself; 1942 was a very bad year for the General.

The Burma campaign was, of course, a fiasco and the high command of the American forces in the CBI theater was scattered in retreat. After General Stilwell emerged from the Burmese jungle he assigned me to do political reporting and to follow the economic situation generally in India. From that developed a rather intensive coverage of Indian affairs throughout my period in the theater. From time to time he would request me, during the 3 years of my stay with him, to go over the Hump into China. He would discuss with me briefly the political situation there and accept the reports which I developed for him. Maybe you would like to lead me out more specifically.

Q I was going to say I would like to direct your attention— When you joined his staff you were the only one at the outset, I take it?—A. Yes.

Q. Now could you indicate to the Board what has been referred to as the political adviser group, how it came about that other officers, other political officers were attached to his staff?—A. I discussed with General Stilwell the work which I was doing. It became very ramified. It involved not only strict political reporting, it involved also production of indoctrination pamphlets on the Chinese scene for the troops. It involved maintaining contact and political guidance with his commanders in a very scattered theater. For one example the Ramgarh Training Center where Chinese troops were being trained. Later, as we began to prepare for the offensive in Burma there was a whole operation that was separate in Burma that required guidance in civil affairs in that area for which our people were very poorly prepared. There was a whole propaganda operation. We became intimately connected with the policy guidance on OWI. In fact, the General gave us the authority to guide that whole operation. He also drew on me for advice on the OSS operations. The necessity of a larger staff than one person soon became very evident, and I discussed that question with the General. The General then felt that more men were needed for this particular function, particularly as this was such a widespread, far-flung theater. He then took up the matter with the War Department, I believe, in 1943, and the request, as I recall, originated from the War Department for the assignment of three other officers.

Mr. ACHILLES. Were the officers assigned suggested by name by you to General Stilwell, or were they his own selections?

A. They were in agreement. We discussed several names. He specifically asked for Service. There was a complete agreement on that, that was the one man he wanted. He knew Service, of course, quite well. I don't think he knew the other two men. I recommended them. I think he looked into their records and accepted the recommendations.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. The addition of other people, as I understand it, came to fruition roughly in August of 1943?—A. Yes.

Q. Now, can you describe something of what the organization of that group was after additional people were added to the assignment?—A. The organization was extremely loose. It was very casual. That stemmed, I think, really from two things. One is that we had no positive guidance from the Department as to how we should operate, how we should function. We were in a very peculiar position. We were not like the political officers in Europe who were all senior officers who went out and maintained direct communications with the Department themselves. We were junior officer that were assigned to the Embassy, detailed over to the military. Therefore, our position was rather anonymous in the field so far as our chain of command into the State Department was concerned. As far as the military was concerned, there, again, our position was rather vague, and there was no real provision or requirement for a chain of command amongst the political advisers. That grew out of the fact, I think fundamentally, that General Stilwell did not operate on a tight staff concept. His headquarters was his musette bag, and because of my peculiar relationship with General Stilwell, from being a long-time acquaintance with him, the headquarters generally did not attempt to exercise any particular administrative control over our arrangements. For my part, I did not wish to put myself up as boss man over three other brother officers who were the same rank as myself. Finally, the theater itself was a very decentralized type of operation.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say "decentralized"?

A. Decentralized type of operation with different problems in India, different problems in China, different problems in Burma, and I felt that we could be most effective if each officer went out to perform a specific function, as it were, on a basis of a tacit understanding growing out of a common training that we had had together. By and large I think it worked fairly well.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. In that connection, is it correct that you throughout this operation, you more or less were active at the same places that General Stilwell was; that is, were you attached pretty much to him personally, wherever his personal headquarters was you were?—A. No. I suppose I spent more time in India at his rear headquarters than I did at his forward headquarters or with him, who was very peripatetic, who spent most of his time in a politically inactive area which was the Burma jungle. I also made several trips down to southeast Asia headquarters where I maintained liaison at Mountbatten's headquarters.

Q. Well, would you say that you were in any sense the sort of lead officer of this group of officers, even though you didn't set it up on a boss-man basis in terms of such chain of command as there was to Stilwell?—A. That was tacitly accepted by Stilwell and was tacitly accepted by the officers in the Military Establishment.

Q. Would it be fair to say that in terms of any expressions of desire on General Stilwell's part as to what he wanted to seek from particular members of this group that he would tend to pass the orders or the request through you, or was he dealing independently with each one of them?—A. Oh, he depended upon me to give the general line of what I knew he wanted done.

Q. Now can you give the Board some idea of the—this will be a very large assignment—but some general sketch of the nature of, and the relation of political problems to military problems in the theater?—A. Of course, the theater was a relatively minor theater in the war, militarily speaking. It was probably the most complex political-military theater in the war. That is to say, Stilwell's authority extended from Moslem Karachi off into Communist China by definition of the expanse of his theater. It involved, first, the colonial problem in the Indian subcontinent; the relations between not only the British and ourselves, but the British, ourselves, and the Indians, and at that time the Indians were a very difficult political factor. The Dutch were operating from there into Indonesia clandestinely. Technically, and initially, Stilwell's theater included Indochina. There was that problem there which involved French colonialism. Then, of course, in China there was this looming civil conflict which underlay the whole social political structure in which we were trying to conduct a war.

Q. Now in that connection, can you characterize the general political objectives which Stilwell sought to pursue in order to advance his primary military objectives?—A. Well, we could leave this as merely secondary importance.

Q. In China?—A. The situation in India, that was a base problem. In China, which was what he hoped to become an area of military operations, his problem was to make the Chinese Army an offensive force, which it was not. That involved Lend-Lease to get the arms there, and it involved a greater degree of unification and control over the Chinese armies over which he theoretically had some degree of command. It involved persuading the Generalissimo and the Chinese Communists that if that was possible to forget their internal civil conflict and join together in fighting the Japanese. Both of them claimed that they were fighting the Japanese very hard. We felt that there was much more that could be done on both sides. So in that sense his first problem before his theater could become an effective offensive theater was the political problem of the vitalization of the Chinese military forces.

Q. How did he seek to accomplish this political feat?—A. Well, he tried all sorts of means and it was just try one and if that failed just try another. He tried persuasion; that wasn't very effective. He tried to use Lend-Lease as a bargaining force to persuade the Chinese to become more aggressive, but that wasn't very effective. As I recall, he did not get much support from Washington on that. He sought to obtain later, just before I left, a unified command over both the Chinese National Government troops and the Communist troops, and in that he failed, of course.

Q. Well, now, in the process of his attempts to solve these political questions which had to come preliminary to any real offensive military operations, can you describe for the Board something of what his policy was and what you understood, well, first, what his policy was on the matter of dealing with the media of public information, the press, and others who had to report on these political problems.—A. He realized, of course, that in a democratic society, even during war, that public opinion in this country is necessary for the support of the war effort, an intelligent public opinion. He felt that the American people were being misled about many of the realities in China. He felt that made his job more difficult. He felt that there was a group of Chinese Government publicists in this country and their American friends who were oversimplifying, perhaps, the problems which confronted him. He was, therefore, in his own press conferences very frank with the press about the internal situations in China, the political situation. I have sat in on press conferences with him when he was exceedingly, by my standards, indiscreet in his discussions of the Chinese political situation. He indicated very clearly to me that he wished me to brief the press, and, subsequently, that the other members of the State Department who were detailed to his staff should do likewise. That was based on a very sound democratic tradition of an informed and enlightened public opinion of one's own country. These orders of his to me were oral, there were no written orders on that score. In fact, I don't recall any specific written directives to do a certain job of one type or another that I received from General Stilwell.

Our relationship was of such long standing and on such a personal basis that his instructions usually were oral and often they were only a response to a suggestion that I had made. He on three occasions sent me to the United States for the specific purpose of this briefing, on two planes, one within the Government. He was anxious that I should come back and report to the State Department what his problems were; that I would do. Then, he was also anxious that I should talk to representative Americans, in fact, I remember one occasion when he was here himself, and at his request, I believe it was, I arranged with Eugene Meyer for a dinner which Mr. Meyer was only to glad to give.

Mr. ACUILLES. Mr. Meyer was then publisher of the Post?

A. He was then publisher of the Post. For the dinner were present, I should say, maybe six or eight correspondents, and after dinner there trooped in, oh, I should say about 20, and Stilwell held forth on the military problems that he was confronting in a very, very frank way, and then turned to me and asked me to carry the political picture that confronted him. That was, I think, in '43—it may have been in '42.

Questions by Mr. RIETTS:

Q. May I interrupt just at this point? Would you think it fair to say that most of the information which both of you were discussing was probably recorded somewhere in a document that bore some classification stamp on it?—A. Oh, certainly. The only purpose of a briefing of that type is to provide material that is not readily available in the already open press.

Q. I interrupted you. You were referring to this occasion I think you were going to indicate. He said that there were others.—A. Subsequently, I was sent

back on other trips specifically for this purpose. General Stilwell did not send me back for my health. He sent me to do these jobs. As I say, there were no written instructions. I was orally directed to do these things. The only written indication that I have is a travel order in one case, which gives a hint of this, in which it is stated that (looking at travel order) I should proceed without delay to Washington, D. C., on temporary duty for the purpose of carrying out his special instructions, that's all that was said.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those instructions in part to orient the press?

A. Yes, sir; so much for the United States. In the field, of course, again we operated as the general line had operated in Hankow, that was with more than his permission, it was his desire that we work very closely with the American press and with non-Americans likewise that we considered reputable. We were very frank with them in these briefings. The only restraints that we reserved were those in our own judgment we felt that material which originated from the State Department, War Department, containing directives, policy guidance, expressions of view of high American officials should not be shown to the press, but the material which was reportorial about the local situations, political, social, economic—those we felt were the grist for the press mill to provide an enlightened American public about the events that were transpiring in his theater.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you place any limitations on the press as to reproduction of any of the things you told them? You say you were very frank—was it under agreement to secrecy in any respect or was it all intended for publication?

A. Most of it was intended for publication. Some of the material, of course—this is a familiar technique throughout the Government in agencies which deal with sensitive material—sometimes information is given for background, sometimes it is given for attribution, and so forth. I think in all instances during the war such information as we did give was given for background.

The CHAIRMAN. That meant they could reproduce it if they—

A. Well, generally, that was a question of judgment. There was some material—after all, we know that some reports which were classified "secret" were extracts from the New York Times, so it is a question of reproduction backward into the open again. That type of material, of course, there wouldn't be any objection to, if it were overt material.

The CHAIRMAN. I imagine then from what you say some things you told them in confidence; other things you told them were for their own background, for publication or not, as they saw fit?

A. Yes.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. So you gave them this substance with no identity as to source, is that correct? You gave them the substance of some of the material, but you did not attribute source, or things of that nature, which would have caused you to classify it in some instances?—A. Well, that would be overt material, you mean?

Q. Yes.

Mr. RHETTS. You would give them substantive material, but not indicate the source from which you obtained it?—A. Oh, I see what you mean.

Mr. RHETTS. Which might be the really confidential part of the material—I take it that's what Mr. Stevens had in mind.

A. That is, I don't recall the specific instance, but that is a conceivable category.

Question by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. I take it that in political reporting which you were doing very frequently you have material which in itself is not classified at all, not subject to classification, but which becomes classified solely from the fact that it is attributed to somebody which might disclose your source?—A. I see; surely, yes. I get that point, yes.

Q. So in such cases you would feel free to give the information.—A. Provided the source were not compromised.

Q. But not compromise the source.—A. Oh, yes.

Mr. RHETTS. I take it from something you said a moment ago, Mr. Davies, that even apart from that type of material it was common practice, was it not, to classify anything that anybody wrote practically without regard to its substance or sources—it was given some sort of a classification during wartime in a large part?

A. There was a tendency to grossly overclassify.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Let me ask you as to your own practice in that respect. Did you make some written reports from time to time to General Stilwell?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. And did you put a classification on them?—A. On my own reports?

Q. Yes.—A. I put my own classification on them. However, I have seen reports in headquarters with classifications being put on by sergeants and corporals.

Q. What would you put on "secret" and "confidential" in some cases?—A. Oh, yes.

Q. Sometimes "secret" and sometimes "confidential"?—A. Oh, yes. I was guilty of the same vice of overclassification. I think it was epidemic.

Q. Now would you afterward feel free to reveal to the press some of the information contained in those reports without regard to the fact that it was also contained in a report which you had classified as secret or confidential?—

A. That would depend entirely on my judgment of the circumstances.

Q. Absolutely, you would make it a matter of judgment?—A. Indeed.

Q. You wouldn't in every case didactically refer to the classification on the paper, but use your judgment as to what you would reveal and not reveal?—

A. Precisely, and I believe that is very much the procedure now in Washington.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. On that point, Mr. Davies, you have indicated you never had any general instructions from General Stilwell on the point, but was it your understanding that that was entirely conformable to his own policy and represented his desires as to how you should conduct yourself?—A. Emphatically so. That, I think, he considered—at least as far as I myself am concerned in the situation and the others in their varying degrees—one of our principal values to him, as persons who were trained in the area who could give an interpretation which perhaps not always showed good judgment but in what long term the policy should be, and, nevertheless, who did have a familiarity with the subject matter.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. I was going to ask whether in your personal practice you had ever permitted a correspondent to read classified material for background information?—A. Yes.

Q. Was that considered normal procedure?—A. Yes, throughout the theater.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. In such a case you might indicate certain information contained in the report was not to be made public?—A. Yes.

Q. Such as the source?—A. There, again, it was the question of the judgment of the material before you; the correspondent to whom you were giving it, a correspondent like, shall we say, Arch Steele, of the Herald Tribune, who was a long-time operator there whom we had worked with very closely and whom we trusted, we knew him extremely well. There was a man we had great confidence in and we didn't have to make many reservations in what we showed him; others we would say: "Now be sure this must not be attributed to us or to the Government."

Q. Or the source must not be revealed?—A. Or the source must certainly not be revealed; some newcomer would have to be told the source should not be revealed.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. Did this course you followed with General Stilwell deviate from the procedure you followed on your various Foreign Service posts, Mr. Davies?—A. No. Would you like two examples?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

A. The first time I encountered this practice was in 1935, I believe, at Mukden. There was a situation—the Japanese had come in and were in control of the country. American correspondents were having great difficulty in getting into the country and in filing information that could get through. Japanese propaganda was trying to build up a certain picture of Manchukuo. My consul general at that time and later authorized me whenever we had visiting Americans—William Henry Chamberlin, for example; there are several others that slip my mind—J. P. McAvoy, John Gunther. Our files were open to them, with discrimination, but material that was classified. The highest classification at that time was strictly confidential and it was put down on the table, and they were left to take notes on it, and they were told: "The only thing you

must not do is to reveal that you got it from the American consulate." This, we felt, was an essential operation, or my boss did, for the education of the American people about the realities of Manchukuo, which was then being publicized in very false colors by the Japanese propaganda agencies. That is one example.

During the foreign ministers conference in Moscow in 1947 Ambassador Bedell Smith set up a large file of material collected from our own reports, some of which was classified, for the benefit of American correspondents, not all, because some we didn't know very well, who came in to cover the foreign ministers conference, and they were allowed to come up and take notes and obtain background material from the official material from our files, with the understanding, of course, that it was not for attribution, and that the American Government was not going to be embarrassed by this. We felt again that this was an essential operation, operation prophylaxis, for the American public on the internal situation in the Soviet Union.

THE CHAIRMAN. Now this practice to which you have just referred was also known to and practiced by the other officers who were working with you on this assignment to General Stilwell?

A. Yes, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. Under oral instructions from you, Mr. Davies, or was that just a practice that was—

A. Under oral instructions from me.

THE CHAIRMAN. And that would include instructions to Mr. Service?

A. Yes, sir.

Mr. RHETTS. That is, I take it, you made clear to him that this type of activity was a part of his job in relation to that in China, just as it was a part of your job in India and Burma?

A. That it was the general's desire.

Mr. RHETTS. That is was what the general wanted him to do?

A. Yes.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. Now his ability, or your ability, to follow this sort of practice, applied not only to materials which you had prepared but which were available to you, Mr. Davies?—A. As I say, there, again, it was regarded as matter of judgment in our case.

Q. But you exercised the judgment?—A. We exercised the judgment that was delegated to us, on our best judgment we made the decisions of what could or what should not be shown.

Q. That related not only to material which you had classified, but material which had been classified by someone else that was made available for your use, and was a part of your file?—A. Theoretically that was true. In practice I don't think that we ever showed any material that was not our own because we were the only ones in the theater command who were writing political commentary.

Q. I see.—A. In other words, we would not show a military report that was out of our field. In fact, we may have had some in our files, but it was not our practice to—

THE CHAIRMAN. Is this a fair statement of the practice: The mere fact that you as a political reporter had written a report and marked it "confidential" at the top did not thereafter foreclose you from making it public to the press?

A. Not at all.

THE CHAIRMAN. In other words, you thereafter exercised your judgment?

A. That's right.

THE CHAIRMAN. The same judgment you exercised when you marked it confidential?

A. That's right. In effect, we were declassifying.

THE CHAIRMAN. You classified it and you declassified it to suit yourself according to your own judgment?

A. That's right.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Did you have occasion to make any material you received from Mr. Service available to the press?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you ever give anybody copies of his material?—A. Not that I recall.

Q. You never transmitted them to any unofficial person?—A. Not to any unofficial person that I recall.

Q. Do you think there is any chance of your having transmitted any of his reports to any unofficial person?—A. I doubt it because the people we were deal-

ing with were mostly—the people with whom we would transfer documents for holding would be only officials, I mean send copies in to would be officials. For instance, we would send copies of our reports to the Embassy. We would send them back sometimes directly to the Department, extra copies to the Department. Many of my reports were sent to the OSS, and some to the OWI when they dealt with propaganda. So they went to other agencies in transmission.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Did you ever incorporate part of your reports in a press statement, a written press statement to the press?—A. We made no written press statements that I recall.

Q. But you did the next thing to it—you permitted them to come in and take notes from your reports?—A. Oh, yes.

Q. Which is practically the same thing?—A. Which is practically the same thing.

Q. Except they did the writing instead of you?—A. Yes.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. You are not certain you never transmitted any of Mr. Service's reports to any unofficial person?—A. I will say I am reasonably certain I never did.

Q. Now is there anything that raises a doubt in your mind?—A. Only this: that we would occasionally lower classification—not lower classification, but lower what we would call strictly reportorial stuff, with perhaps no sources that would be compromised, which would embarrass us. We might loan a paper to somebody to bring back that afternoon, somebody that we trusted. I don't recall myself ever having done that.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. But you wouldn't see anything reprehensive in doing it?—A. I wouldn't see anything reprehensible in doing it, but I don't recall I ever did it. Perhaps it was never necessary. Perhaps the information could be gotten right from sitting at a table and taking notes.

Q. There is no distinction between taking notes on the premises or off the premises as far as the principle is concerned?—A. As far as the principle is concerned, no, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. If you did have occasion to ever send any of his reports to any private individual, what individual or type of individual might it conceivably have been, or what would be the circumstances? You say you are not positive you ever sent any of his reports to a private individual. I am trying to elucidate under what circumstances such a thing might have happened.

A. Well, I can't conceive of the circumstances under which I would send them to a private individual, send a report to them.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say that, do you mean to elude the press; are you trying to think of somebody besides the press?

A. I am thinking of the verb "send"; that is to say, to put in the mail or to pass by a third courier to somebody. I can't conceive of ever having done that. I don't recall ever having done that.

Mr. ACHILLES. But you are still not positive that you never did?

A. That was a very free and easy theater, but I don't recall ever having done it.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. I take it that in pursuing this general practice which you have described in detail, in which the basic principle was that you and the other officers engaged in this work were expected to use your judgment and discretion in relation to the particular persons whom you briefed and the nature of the material that you could therefore appropriately show them, I suppose that throughout you recognized that, given that latitude for the exercise of judgment, you expected that if you exercised it in a manner which your superiors found unacceptable you would pay for it?—A. Yes; we never got any—I never got, and so far as I know the other officers who were working with me never received, any complaint or reprimand from the general or any officer in headquarters over the way we were operating, which was general knowledge.

Mr. STEVENS. I want to come back to the word "send" now, not by a third person, but would you have loaned a copy of Mr. Service's report by hand to a correspondent to have taken out overnight, or 2 or 3 hours?—A. I don't recall having done that, but depending on my judgment of the correspondent and the material at that time, I would not exclude the possibility of doing that.

Mr. STEVENS. That would not have been anything which would have been so unusual for you as to remember it; in other words, it may have been a practice that was followed?—A. Yes.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. The real point is you would not have considered it reprehensible in any way?

Mr. STEVENS. That's right.

A. Depending on the circumstances, the individual involved, the material which was passed on, and so forth.

Q. Again, it is a question of the exercise of judgment?—A. Precisely.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going on to a different subject now? We were supposed to stop at 5, and it is now nearly 5:30.

Mr. RHETTS. I was about to suggest that I am about to turn to another subject now, and let's leave this matter of the policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other question on this particular matter we have been pursuing?

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. I would like to ask a question or two, if I may, about the times when you were in China. Take the period from October 1944—were you in China from October to January or at any time in there, Mr. Davies?—A. I was in China the latter part of 1944, and left early January 1945.

Q. Where were you then, Mr. Davies?—A. I was in Chungking, and then I went up to Yenan, and then I came back to Chungking, and then I departed for Moscow.

Q. You went back then to New Delhi, did you?—A. I went back to New Delhi, awaited my orders there for transfer to Moscow, and then proceeded from New Delhi.

Q. You went there early in January from China?—A. From China—from Chungking.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything you would like to ask? We are cleaned up for the moment.

Mr. RHETTS. If it is your proposal to recess, I would like at this point to introduce a document which deals with the matter we have just been discussing, namely, the policy on dealings with the press and other sources.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to offer for inclusion in the transcript Document No. 323, which is an affidavit by Paul L. Jones, colonel of the Infantry Reserve, dated May 23, 1950. Colonel Jones was the public-relations officer for the theater, and his testimony on this point, as a military man, I think, is highly relevant to this question and should go in at this point.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. I just wanted to ask the witness: Did you know Colonel Jones?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. And he was public-relations officer at that time?—A. Yes, sir. He was a very close friend of General Stilwell and the whole Stilwell family.

Q. And he was familiar with this practice you have been telling us about?—A. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 323

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA,
May 23rd, 1950.

To: The Chairman of the Dept. of State Loyalty Security Board.

From: Paul L. Jones, Col., Inf. Res., 3876 La Cresta Drive, San Diego, California.

Subject: Public Relations Policy in the China-Burma-India Theatre from 1942 to 1945.

1. At the request of Mr. John Service, I am submitting this statement of C-B-I Theatre Public Relations Policy as Theatre Public Relations Officer under the late General Joseph W. Stilwell during the period 5 June 1944 to 4 Feb. 1945. Prior to this appointment I had been Asst. Theatre Public Relations Officer for almost a year.

2. In order to have this report on the C-B-I Theatre have any meaning, it is necessary to state as briefly as possible the problems facing the Public Relations

Section of the Theatre Headquarters. The C-B-I was a theatre of complex animosities. The British despised and mistrusted the Chinese; the Chinese reciprocated in kind. The British and the Indians and the Burmese were constantly at odds. The Americans were caught in the middle. The relations between the British, Indian Government, the Chinese, and the Burmese were of such a nature that fighting the Japs was a very minor secondary operation. The American fighting forces found themselves involved in a battle for which they had had NO training, for the war in C-B-I was a war of international politics. American correspondents, in the early part of the American stay in Asia, wishing to write the truth about China for American papers would come to India, write their story, have it passed by the British POLITICAL censors and then send it to America. The Chinese returned the favor by allowing American correspondents to file derogatory stories on the British from China. This continued until orders were issued from Washington, on pressure from the British and Chinese Governments, that all stories written about either the British or the Chinese must be cleared by censors of the country about which the story was written, regardless of where they were filed. It was always necessary for an American correspondent to clear any story written on China with the Chinese even though it had cleared American censorship; stories on the British or Indian stories must be cleared with the British censors. I make a rather strong point of this condition for it is the reason for much of our censorship. The American policy of censorship had to do with information which would have proved injurious to the war effort in Asia. The British and Chinese censorship was based on political issues which had little or nothing to do with the actual fighting. The war in China (during the time I was Public Relations Officer at least) was a war of the printed word. I have been in Mr. Hollington Tong's office (then Minister of Information for the Chinese Government) when he would read the daily communiqués of the United States, Britain, and Russia and then sit down and write the one on the Chinese Armies along the lines of those released by the other three allies. This was then released as the official communiqué of the Chinese Government for the day.

3. The above paragraph on the situation is all too brief to set the scene, but it may serve to explain the Theatre's attitude on certain information which was freely given to accredited correspondents and which, because of the political situation in China and our Theatre, carried the stamp of classified material. It was very difficult to explain to American newsmen who had been to the other fronts of the world why certain things were forbidden them from Asia. To clear this point, the newsmen were briefed by competent personnel on the situation in China at that time. It must be borne in mind that all American correspondents in the Theatre had been cleared by the War Department Bureau of Public Relations prior to their coming to the Theatre, and I know of no case where a correspondent released background information of a classified material which was not either passed by the Theatre Censors or the War Department Bureau of Public Relations. Certainly none has ever been released, under any condition, which hurt the NONEXISTENT war effort against the Japs during my period in the Theatre.

4. During this period, the State Department of the United States had attached to our Headquarters as political advisors Mr. John Davies and Mr. John Service. Both of these men had spent many years in China and knew the history, the language, the courtesies, the people, and the Government. As it is impossible for a man to know a country whose language he does not speak, in the three years our group was in the Theatre, we of the Public Relations Office and the Headquarters were very dependent on these men for assistance in clarifying the American position in China to the correspondents in the Theatre. This was in line with the policy set down for the Theatre by the Commanding General, Joseph W. Stilwell. The General's attitude was that the American people deserved to know the truth; that the American people did not want any information released that would cause the life of a single American or Allied soldier; that the American people were not interested in news which if published would delay the end of the war a single day; but that the American people did deserve to know, and were paying enough to know, that all reports released by the Chinese were a long way from the facts of the case.

5. Therefore, in spite of the fact that much of this material was considered classified because it was politically objectionable to the Chinese it did become necessary for us to release information to correspondents as background and informational material so that they could understand and write intelligently on the problems we faced in Asia and what the future held forth. Both Mr.

Davies and Mr. Service assisted in this phase of our work and were expected to do so. In many cases I have referred correspondents to them for historical and political background on China, past and then present, which my office was unable to furnish the writers because of lack of knowledge.

6. I feel I am on very safe ground when I say that neither of these two men had any extensive knowledge of the military plans of the Theatre, for in visiting with them from time to time I was surprised at how little they knew of the military problems. Their knowledge, for which we were thankful, was in the political field; and there the personnel of our Headquarters, with a few exceptions, was woefully lacking. The American Army has never been trained to fight a political battle, and this lack of training made us the only Army in Asia which did not know the political objectives of its country. Perhaps we had none, but we would be better off today if we had had.

7. In closing, I beg forgiveness of the Committee for inserting a personal observation. It seems tragic to me that men like General Stilwell (whose report to the War Department in 1945 predicted the downfall of the Chinese Nationalist Government) and men like Mr. Davies and Mr. Service should be maligned from some quarters of our Government because they were intelligent enough to understand and warn our Government of what was coming in Asia. Had we heeded their warning, the condition in China in my opinion need not be what it is today. It is irony that these men are being blamed, in part, for the situation they predicted. It seems odd to me that we expect our public people to do the best job they know how for our country and then we blame them when they do. Won't such treatment make it impossible to get good people in the Government in the future?

8. May I say again that this is an all-too-brief account to clearly explain the problem. For the sake of the record, I have made every effort to keep it brief. If clarification or further details are desired, I shall be glad to assist in any way.

9. I certify that the above is true and factual insofar as I had knowledge as Public Relations Officer of the China Burma India Theatre.

Submitted by:

(S) PAUL L. JONES, *Col., Inf. Res.*

The CHAIRMAN. I think we can recess until Monday at 10 a. m.
(The meeting recessed at 5:30 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY REVIEW BOARD MEETING IN THE MATTER OF JOHN S. SERVICE

Date: May 29, 1950, 10:40 to 12 noon.

Place: Room 2254, New State.

Reported by E. Wake, CS/Reporting.

Board members present: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles, member; Arthur G. Stevens, member; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Representative for Mr. Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhett, firm of Reilly, Rhett & Ruckelshaus.

(The meeting reconvened at 10:40 a. m.)

(After being duly sworn Mrs. Annette Blumenthal testified as follows:)

Questions by the Chairman:

Q. What is your full name please?—A. Annette Blumenthal.

Q. And your residence?—A. 2805 Webb Avenue, the Bronx.

Q. Mrs. Blumenthal, will you state briefly, for the benefit of the Board, your business association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?—A. I worked for them for 9½ years and when I left I was subscription manager of their magazine "Public Affairs" and their bulletin "Far Eastern Survey."

Q. Would you give dates?—A. I started working there on a part-time basis in 1933—in March 1933—and I left in June 1942.

Q. In the course of your association with the Institute of Pacific Relations, did you become acquainted with Mr. Philip Jacob Jaffe?—A. Yes.

Q. What was his connection?—A. I don't think he was ever connected with the institute. He started publication of a magazine "Amerasia." I don't remember when it was started. I started working for Mr. Jaffe on a very part-time basis; in fact, I devoted only my lunch hour to working for him on the subscription list of Amerasia.

Q. What was the relationship, if any, between the Institute of Pacific Relations and Amerasia?—A. None that I know of.

Q. How did you happen to meet Mr. Jaffe?—A. Their offices were in the same building as the Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-seventh Street.

Q. New York City?—A. That's right.

Q. What did he employ you to do with reference to the publication "Amerasia"?—A. The girl that was in charge of the office was ill and their subscription list became very tangled up I would say and he asked me to straighten it up for him and the girl did not return to the job and he asked me if I could continue working during the lunch hour. I did that for 2 or 3 years.

Q. What years?—A. If it were 3 years it would start in 1939 to 1942—until I left.

Q. Now in connection with this work that you did for Mr. Jaffe, did you see any papers or did you actually copy papers for him?—A. I did manuscript typing, not Mr. Jaffe's work alone but any writers that offered manuscripts for the magazine.

Q. I pass you certain papers and ask if you can identify them as photostats of papers which you may have copied for Mr. Jaffe?—A. During the time I worked for him or after I left the office?

Q. During the time you worked for him.—A. I left in 1942 and I did work at home afterwards.

Q. Let me inquire as to that. Tell us about the work you did for him at home after you left the office?—A. One time he wrote a book and asked me to type the manuscript. Later on he asked for other material to have copied and I would copy it and return it to him.

Q. What date would you give to that?—A. Mostly on and off between 1942 and the spring of 1945.

Q. Did you at any time type any reports which were purported to be signed by Mr. John Service?—A. I wouldn't remember the signatures but I could identify the papers if I saw them.

Q. I pass you some photostats which may be photostats of papers which you have seen.—A. It is very hard to identify these. If I had the copies I had made myself I could recognize my typing—the general run of my typing, but the contents don't seem familiar at all. If I had my own papers I could identify them.

Q. Do you know where your copies are?—A. I know that they were held in the State Department at one time because I identified them down here in Washington.

Q. I have handed you a report No. 16, dated March 17, 1945, containing at the end the signature of John S. Service and entitled: "Subject: Plans for Relief and Rehabilitation Organizations of the Communist Liberated Areas." Are you able to identify that as a document you copied?—A. No, I couldn't remember it.

Q. You have looked at that paper?—A. Yes sir, I looked at it before. There were no headings on these papers originally? These are the only headings? There were no State Department headings?

Q. No.—A. I think the papers I worked on were all marked "State Department" or "OWL."

Q. Did you work on any papers without headings?—A. I cannot remember.

Q. You have looked at that paper and you are unable to identify it?—A. Definitely.

Mr. RHETTS. May I see this paper so I will know which one you are talking about.

Q. I pass you one No. 15, dated March 16, 1945, which also purports to have the signature of John S. Service and which is entitled: "Subject: Policy of the Chinese Communists Toward the Problem of National Minorities."—A. No, I can not identify it.

Q. I pass you a photostat of a paper numbered 17, dated March 17, 1945, bearing the signature of John S. Service and entitled: "Subject: Clarification of Communist Territorial Claims by Direct American Observation." Can you identify it?—A. I am afraid not.

Q. I pass you a photostat of paper No. 21, dated March 21, 1945, bearing the signature of John S. Service and entitled: "Chiang Kai-shek's Treatment of the Kuangsi Clique." Can you identify it?—A. No, I cannot.

Q. You cannot?—A. No, I cannot.

Q. I pass you an original document, dated March 22, 1945, No. 22, bearing the signature of John S. Service, and entitled: "Subject: Recent Appointments by the Generalissimo Contradictory to Announced Intentions of Peaceful Settlement of Internal Issues," and ask if you can identify that as a paper you copied?—A. No, I cannot.

Q. Now I hand you two original papers fastened together, one of which appears to be dated September 28, 1944, bearing the signature of C. E. Gauss, No. 318, subject: Transmitting Reports of: Interview with Mao Tse-tung; Need of American Policy Created by the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, and Desirability of American Military Aid to Chinese Communist Armies, which contains as an enclosure original report No. 15, dated August 27, 1944, subject: Interview with Mao Tse-tung, bearing the typed signature of John S. Service, and the further report of August 23, 1944, without title or signature, and report of September 3, 1944, numbered 20, subject: The Need of an American Policy Toward the Problems Created by the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, bearing the typed signature of John S. Service, and report of August 29, 1944, No. 16, subject: Desirability of American Military Aid to the Chinese Communist Armies, bearing the typed signature of John S. Service, and ask if you can identify any portion of that as a paper which you copied for Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, I cannot identify these papers either.

Q. I pass you a communication No. 3181, dated November 24, 1944, Transmission of Reports on Conditions in the Communist Area and on Kuomintang Communist Relations, which contained as an enclosure report No. 39, dated October 9, 1944, subject: Present Strength and Future Importance of the Chinese Communists bearing the typed signature of John S. Service; report No. 42, dated October 11, 1944, subject: Celebration of October 10 in Yen-an, containing the typed signature of John S. Service, and memorandum of October 11, 1944, Celebration of October 10 in Yen-an, having no signature on it; a report No. 43, dated October 12, 1944, subject: Comments of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and General Chou En-lai on the Internal Situation in China, containing the typed signature of John S. Service; and memorandum of October 10, 1940, Conversation with Chairman Mao Tse-tung, bearing the typed initials "J. S. S.," and the report No. 46, dated October 16, 1944, subject Communist Comment on the Generalissimo's October 10 Speech, containing the typed signature of John S. Service with a translation from the Yen-an Chieh Fang Jih Pao, October 12, 1944, entitled "Yenan Observer Criticizes the Dangerous Character of Chiang Kai-shek's Speech," and ask if you can identify any of those papers as papers you copied for Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, I cannot identify it either.

Q. While you are reading that I will read into the records a quote from this. Don't let it bother you. I am going to give you next photostats of four reports, one numbered 13, dated March 15, 1944, subject: Communist Views In Regard to Sinkiang, bearing the signature of John S. Service; one dated March 16, 1945, numbered 14, subject: Communist Views in Regard to Mongolia, bearing the signature of John S. Service; No. 18, dated March 18, 1945, subject: Establishment of Unified Labor and Women's Organizations for the Communist Liberated Areas, bearing the signature of John S. Service, and one dated March 19, 1945, numbered 19, subject: Communist Report of Kuomintang "Exile" Government Organizations for the Shen Kan-Ning Border Region, bearing the signature of John S. Service, and ask you the same question as to whether or not you can identify any of these reports as papers which you copied for Mr. Jaffe.—A. I am afraid I cannot identify these either.

Q. In your relations with Mr. Jaffe, did you know him as a Communist?—A. I never discussed Mr. Jaffe's political views. I never knew whether he was or was not a Communist. I was an employee in the office and I had no idea what his political beliefs were.

Q. Did you know Mr. John S. Service?—A. No, I did not.

Q. You have never met him?—A. I don't believe I ever did. He was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, if I remember correctly. He may have been in the office at one time or another but I never met him.

Q. And in connection with these reports, you had no connection with Mr. Service?—A. No.

Q. Do you recollect you copied any reports that bore his name?—A. I am sure I did copy some that bore his name.

Q. Can you fix the time when you did that?—A. It would be in the spring of 1945. That was when I did that particular work for Mr. Jaffe.

Q. Do you remember whether or not you copied reports that bore the classification "secret" or "confidential"?—A. Yet, I did.

Q. Did any of those reports bear the name of John S. Service?—A. I am sure some did.

Q. Did Mr. Jaffe make any explanation how he came by "secret" reports or "confidential" reports bearing the signature of John S. Service?—A. None whatsoever.

Q. Were you at one time interrogated by the FBI on these reports?—A. I was asked to appear before the grand jury in 1945 in connection with the reports.

Q. Did you identify some?—A. I did.

Q. Were you shown some copies of reports bearing the name of John S. Service?—A. Yes.

Q. Were you able to identify them?—A. I was able to identify my own copies of the reports.

Q. Did you have them?—A. The FBI had all of them. They had taken them from Mr. Jaffe's office, I believe.

Q. Did you have any connection with the taking of these copies from Mr. Jaffe's office?—A. No. Mr. Jaffe brought the material to my home and he called for them when they were ready.

Q. And with reference to the investigation by the FBI, you had no connection except to testify as you stated before?—A. That's right.

Q. Did you have any knowledge whatever of the source of the documents bearing the name of John S. Service, which you copied?—A. No, I did not.

Q. Or of any others of the reports?—A. No, I did not. The fact that they were marked "secret" or "confidential" meant absolutely nothing to us because in our work for the Institute of Pacific Relations we would get papers on and off bearing that sort of heading and we would mimeograph two or three hundred for circulation so it did not seem queer to me at the time. I would not question it. I mean, I didn't question it.

Q. All the papers bearing the name of John S. Service came to you through Mr. Jaffe?—A. That's right.

Q. Not through the Institute of Pacific Relations?—A. None at all.

Q. What did you do with the copies that you made for Mr. Jaffe?—A. Mr. Jaffe came to my home and collected them when ready.

Q. How many copies would you make?—A. I believe an original and three or an original and four. I don't remember.

Q. Did he state to you what he intended to do with them?—A. No; he did not.

Q. You have no knowledge, I take it, from what you have just said, as to how Mr. Jaffe got possession of these documents bearing the name of John S. Service?—A. No.

Q. Or any of the other documents which you copied?—A. All I know is that he brought them to me and said he was in quite a rush for them and the quicker I could have them ready and called him, the better it would be.

Q. Did he say that all the time?—A. There was a rush job on all of them and the quicker I could do it, the better.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do you recall when the name of John S. Service first came to your attention?

A. In my work for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do you remember approximately what date?

A. No; that I would not remember. I believe he was a member of the organization, and if he was we would send him our bulletin or the Far Eastern Survey, and his name would be one of the names appearing on the subscription list. He would receive it as a member or as a subscriber.

Mr. ACHILLES. Would you be able to make an estimate of the number of documents bearing his name that you copied?

A. No.

Mr. ACHILLES. What form did Mr. Jaffe give you his documents in? Were they originals or carbon copies?

A. No; I had no carbons at all. They were all originals. There was a tremendous amount of mimeographed material bearing the heading of OWI and they were mostly excerpts of articles run in different Chinese papers and although I did not copy them all in sections, I copied maybe half pages of one and quarter pages of others and on others he wanted the full contents copied.

Mr. ACHILLES. The documents Mr. Service signed would not be the mimeographed ones?

A. No; they would be State Department.

Mr. ACHILLES. You say they were original signed documents?

A. Yes.

Mr. ACHILLES. You spoke of the number of the Institute of Pacific Relations documents being marked "secret" or "confidential." Were those documents originating in the Institute of Pacific Relations or were they originating in governmental sources?

A. Not from governmental sources at all. They were either office copies, let us say, on economic viewpoints in a certain country or part of a manuscript or whole chapter of a manuscript as a rule. Nothing originated at the office. Some may have been originated by Mr. Carter or Mr. Field or any one of the people employed there but none of them were Government papers.

Mr. ACHILLES. And when some governmental papers of the same classification were given to you to copy, did that attract your attention at all as being unusual?

A. No, because of my contact with things marked "secret" and having stencils and making maybe two or three hundred copies. They would be marked for circulation and we made two or three hundred copies. So it did not seem queer at all.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you terminated your work for the institute in 1942?

A. In June 1942.

The CHAIRMAN. To that date were you aware that the institute was in any way Communist led?

A. No. As far as I was concerned, I was definitely under the impression it was a nonpartisan organization. They would publish articles in their magazine and in the Fortnightly Bulletin giving pros and cons on different subjects.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Mr. Field, up to that date, have anything to do with it?

A. He was secretary to the American Council during my employment there. I don't remember the exact years.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether or not he was a Communist?

A. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you amplify any further the reasons for your impression that Mr. Service was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

A. The name was just familiar. It just seems to stay there. I am quite sure he was a member of the institute. His name did come to my notice at that time. If he wasn't a member, then he was a subscriber to either their magazine or their bulletin but I am almost positive he was a member.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the difference between a subscriber and a member?

A. A subscriber would just pay for the subscription to either the magazine or the bulletin and a member would contribute anywhere from \$5 upward to the organization and if they contributed \$5 I think \$5 would entitle them to the Fortnightly Bulletin and I think a \$10 subscriber was entitled to both plus any other papers or documents the institute circulated among their members.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no recollection as to what type of membership Mr. Service may have had?—A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You may inquire.

Mr. RHETTS. Thank you. Can I have these original documents?

(Mr. Moreland handed papers to Mr. Rhettts.)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. I believe, Miss Blumenthal, you testified a moment ago that as to papers bearing the signature of Mr. Service, which you may have typed for Mr. Jaffe, it was your distinct recollection that all of those were original State Department papers?—A. Not all of them—some of them.

Q. I would like to inquire to see what you mean by original State Department papers. I show you document 177 which is the original of dispatch 3018, dated Chungking, China, September 28, 1944, and I would like to ask you whether that is the type of paper which you regard as an original State Department paper?—A. I don't recall if I did any on this type of paper. The ones I remember distinctly were all 8-by-11 standard size and it was on a much heavier paper and it wasn't flimsy at all.

Q. Did such papers bear a printed or reproduction of printed headings such as "Embassy of the United States of America," or "State Department"?—A. State Department I do remember. I don't remember if there was any Embassy of the United States of America.

Q. Are you familiar with the process of reproducing documents called the ozalid process?—A. No; I am not.

Q. Was the Board able to obtain a specimen of an ozalid?

Mr. ACHILLES. We will ask Mrs. Ivey to get a specimen.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Q. I will come back to this question.

I believe you testified that it is your recollection that the papers which you typed for Mr. Jaffe, which may have borne the name "John S. Service" on them, were all typed by you during the spring of 1945?—A. That is correct.

Q. Is it possible for you to place the dates a little more specifically?—A. I do know it was before May 24 because on May 24 I gave birth to a little girl so it couldn't have been after that. I think it was mainly between February and April. I think it was over a 2-month period.

Q. Mainly between——. —A. February and April 1945.

Q. By "April" do you mean the first of April or the end of April?—A. I wouldn't know. I think it was at the end of April. I don't think I did anything for Mr. Jaffe in May.

Q. You referred to copies being prepared between February and April. Can you give us some idea of how frequently Mr. Jaffe brought papers to you for copying?—A. I don't know. The first time he came up I think he brought 50 or 60 pages of typing.

Q. Can you place at all what the first time would be?—A. It is quite a long time back but I am quite sure it was about February. I think that is what I would say. That is in my mind, between February and April but I cannot remember exactly.

Q. Your recollection I believe you indicated is that the first time, which you place in February, he brought some 50 or 60 pages?—A. I mean sheets. I don't mean documents—I mean pages.

Q. Do you have a recollection as to whether any of these Service memoranda were among that batch?—A. No, I am quite sure they were not. I believe they were mostly all—they were long sheets of yellow paper—mimeographed material headed OWI. That was the first batch.

Q. Can you place when you think you began seeing papers that bore the name of Service on them?—A. Later on I did get papers marked "State Department." I don't know if there were any other papers from any other divisions but I did have State Department papers.

Q. Is it your recollection that any material bearing Service's name, which you typed, were a part of these State Department papers?—A. Yes, I believe there were some.

Q. Which would bear State Department or other printed headings at the top and would show it was from a Government department.—A. I believe there were some but how many I do not know.

Q. Do you remember any other names which appeared on any of the documents that you copied for Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, the only reason I remember Mr. Service's name is because it is a familiar name. I came across it before in my work in the office.

Mr. STEVENS. In your work for the office——

A. The Institute of Pacific Relations.

Q. I believe you testified you were questioned by the FBI at the time of the Amerasia arrests?—A. That's right.

Q. And I believe you testified you then appeared before the grand jury?—A. In Washington; yes.

Q. Have you been subsequently interviewed by the FBI?—A. No.

Q. Not since?—A. 1945. I came to Washington twice in 1945. The first time I appeared before the grand jury and the second time I don't remember if I appeared before the grand jury but I did come down but I don't remember what happened.

Q. But you are quite sure you have not been interviewed by other FBI agents since that time?—A. Not until Mr. Reynolds came up and asked me to come down to Washington.

Q. Can you recall whether in any of your interviews with the FBI in 1945 you then told the FBI that you recalled typing documents which bore the name of John S. Service?—A. I don't think they asked that question directly. They did show me copies of typewritten papers and asked me to identify. I did, I believe, by putting my signature to them.

Q. Have you ever told the FBI that you recall typing papers bearing the signature of Mr. Service and also papers bearing the signature of the American Ambassador in China?—A. I may have said I typed papers bearing Mr. Service's signature. That question was put to me. I don't know if I was ever questioned about papers with the American Ambassador's signature.

Q. Referring again to document No. 177, I ask you to look at page 4 of this despatch and I invite your attention particularly to the typed words "C. E. Gauss" above which is his signature in ink. Do you think that you ever copied any documents which bore the signature of C. E. Gauss?—A. I may have. The name is not completely new to me. It seems to click. I am sure I have seen the name before.

Q. Do you ever remember typing any documents which bore the handwritten signature of Mr. Service?—A. I wouldn't recall; no. I don't know if they were handwritten or just typewritten.

Q. You have no recollection whatever?—A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel has asked for a copy of ozalid paper and Mr. Tanquary has appeared with such a copy. Will you give it to counsel please.

(Off the record conversation.)

Mr. STEVENS. Do you ever remember Mr. Service having contributed any articles to the Institute of Pacific Relations, to your knowledge, while working for them?

A. He may have. I am not positive. Thinking back, in 1936 the Institute of Pacific Relations had a conference and I think one of the pamphlets written was called Manchuria 1931, and that was written by John Stewart. I don't know why but I think at the time the impression was that John Stewart was the same party as John Service. That is the only connection I can think of Mr. Service's writing anything for the Institute, if it is one and the same party.

Mr. STEVENS. You stated you remembered typing materials that bore the heading of the Department of State. Do you remember typing any material signed by Mr. Service that did not bear the heading "Department of State"?

A. I don't recall.

Mr. STEVENS. You don't recall whether you did or did not?

A. I don't recall whether there were two types of papers. I know there were some Department of State papers that did have Mr. Service's signature but whether there were any without, I don't remember.

Mr. STEVENS. Did you question any personal notes on the material you copied for Mr. Jaffe?

A. No.

Mr. STEVENS. You stated a little bit ago that you were certain Mr. Service was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. What makes you certain he was a member rather than a subscriber?

A. I didn't say he was a member. I said I didn't remember whether he was a member or subscriber. I remember his name from the Institute of Pacific Relations. I am quite sure I didn't say I was positive he was a member. No; I don't think I did.

Mr. ACHILLES. You were dealing with circulation matters for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

A. That's right.

Mr. ACHILLES. Miss Blumenthal, you stated a little while ago that you believed the original typed documents, signed by Mr. Service, had been on paper size 8 by 11.

A. Yes; I believe they were.

Mr. STEVENS. And did the headings of those papers, as you recall, read "Department of State" or "American Embassy, Chungking," or what?

A. I don't remember whether they bore "American Embassy" or not. I do remember there were papers marked "State Department." There were also identifications and classifications on top before the contents started. What those classifications were I don't know.

Mr. STEVENS. Do you recall copying any original papers bearing Mr. Service's name on legal-sized paper?

A. It is possible because I have quite a bit of legal-sized paper. I may have made a mistake on the 8 by 11 size. It may have been on legal size but I think there was some 8 by 11.

* Mr. STEVENS. The reason I ask is that documents prepared in the State Department are frequently on 8 by 11 paper, whereas documents from State Department offices abroad are ordinarily on legal-sized paper. You state you are not certain?

A. Not positive. If I saw the papers—not exactly the papers but my copies, I could identify my own papers by the way I type as typists can identify the papers by the type of machine they use but whether I can identify the material I typed from individually, I doubt very much if I could.

(Off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to examine Mr. Tanquary?

Mr. RHETTS. I would like to ask a question beforehand.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS.

Q. In the last few minutes, Mrs. Blumenthal, you began discussing documents bearing Mr. Service's signature. I take it, from my previous question, that when you used the word "signature" you do not necessarily mean his handwritten signature?—A. No, I do not.

Q. You mean a document that has typed upon it the name "Service"?—A. That is correct.

Q. A little while ago, when we were inquiring about the type of State Department papers that you may have copied—I show you document No. 177, which is an original despatch from the Ambassador in China—you stated, I believe, that the things you type were on much thicker paper than this.—A. Naturally.

Q. Than paper upon which this despatch is written. Now, I have here a three-page document, headed No. 13, and dated April 12, 1950, which is an ozalid reproduction of typewriting on ordinary paper and I ask you if that is the type of paper that you think you copied from?—A. This is not the same type of paper. It was a still heavier paper. I don't know if it was originally typed on this paper or whether it was offset copies but it was definitely heavier paper than this.

Q. Now I show you document 321, which is a positive of a photostat of this material and I ask you if that is the type of paper?—A. This is the type of paper. I definitely worked with this type of paper.

Q. I see. So that what you were given in the way of State Department papers was a photostat of a State Department document which photostat would reproduce the official department heading at the top of the page and you copied from photostats of the State Department.—A. Not all but a good many were photostats. There was mimeographed paper and all kinds.

Q. I am directing my attention exclusively to the State Department papers.—A. I believe most of them were on that type of photostat paper.

Q. Were you ever in Mr. Jaffe's office at Amerasia?—A. Definitely; I worked there.

Q. Did he have photostat equipment in that office?—A. Not that I know of—not during the time I worked there.

A. Did you work in the office of Amerasia?—A. In the office. They maintained two offices in the building. One was Mr. Jaffe's and Miss Mitchell's private office and the other was just a private room consisting of two desks, at one of which the office manager worked and I occupied the other.

Q. This was during a period which came to a close some time in 1942?—A. June 1942.

Q. June 1942. Were you ever in the Amerasia offices in 1945?—A. No.

Q. Or 1944?—A. No; definitely not.

Q. So that as of that latter period, you simply don't know whether they had any facilities for photostating or otherwise reproducing documents?—A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask counsel, is the paper you just used in evidence?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes it is.

(Off the record.)

Mr. RHETTS. I have no further questions.

Mr. ACHILLES. Just one or two further questions. You described some of the documents which you received and copied as being original documents. I am not quite clear whether by that you mean original typed and signed documents; that is, with the handwritten signature, or were they in some other form with stereotyped signature?—A. Truthfully I couldn't say myself. It is so many years since I handled the material and many came in mimeographed form. Some came photostated. There may have been original copies with signed signatures, I cannot recall. If I saw my own papers I could tell you whether I typed them and in that way you could trace their source but I would not make any statement I am not sure of. I don't remember. I know what the contents of some were—the general idea—but I don't think I remember the State Department papers. I remember what was in the mimeographed papers—the type of work.

Mr. ACHILLES. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be all. You have nothing further counsel?

Mr. RHETTS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mrs. Blumenthal.

(Mr. Harold Z. Tanquary being duly sworn, testified as follows:)

The CHAIRMAN. Your name is?

A. Harold Zimmer Tanquary.

The CHAIRMAN. You are an employee of the State Department?

A. Yes sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In what position?

A. Control officer in the Reproduction Section, Central Services.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel has some questions he desires to ask. .

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Are you, in your position as control officer in the Reproduction Section, familiar with the various methods and techniques for reproducing papers which are utilized in the State Department generally?—A. Yes sir.

Q. Now I show you document 321, which has previously been shown to Mrs. Blumenthal, and ask you to state by what process that document has been produced, if any?—A. By microfilm on 35 millimeter film and evidently on the automatic machine similar to the one we have downstairs.

Q. I am asking you by what method has the content of this paper been reproduced and what do you call this paper?—A. Well, it is a very good grade of photostat paper.

Q. Is that a photostatic reproduction or something?—A. No sir; it is microfilm.

Q. Can you tell us what the difference between that paper and photostat paper is?—A. It is a little bit lighter. It has a higher grade of rag content. It has to be a stronger paper to go through the machines—the filming and exposing of the paper through the developer, the fixer, and the drier.

Q. Would you say that, from the point of view of a person who is not expert in these matters, the glazed surface of this paper and the general thickness of the paper could easily be mistaken for a photostatic reproduction?—A. Yes sir.

Q. Is it fair to say that this is substantially like a photostat paper is in most respects, comparable to what a positive reproduction of a photostat would be?—A. That's right.

Q. Will you describe the ozalid process of reproduction of a typewritten document?—A. Any transparent piece of paper such as a maximum of about 13-pound paper—what we generally speak of as lightweight paper 13, 15, or 16. Generally it takes 13 and 9 as flimsy material. It does not necessarily have to be carbonized on the back, such as this; in other words, using any carbon image on lightweight paper would produce ozalid copies.

The master is placed on presensitized paper and fed into the machine where light will penetrate through the transparent master onto the presensitized paper.

The color and density of the ozalid copies are determined by an adjustment of the machine allowing so many feet of paper or sensitized material to travel so many feet per minute.

The master is stripped off from the presensitized paper after it passes by the light tube. The presensitized paper is carried up by tapes past tubes of ammonia fumes where the sensitized paper is developed, and thence by same tapes to be ejected as finished copy.

Q. I show you document No. 177 which is an original despatch.—A. That has all been carbonized.

Q. This paper has had a carbon reversed on the back side of each sheet, has it not?—A. Yes sir.

Q. You say that is not a necessary technique in order to be able to make an ozalid reproduction?—A. No, sir; but it makes a better ozalid reproduction.

Q. Referring again to document 177 and the first page thereof, this document bears, does it not, certain stamps, "Division of Communications and Records," and other routings as well as certain handwriting in the upper right-hand corner, indicating distribution which was to be made of that document. Is that correct?—A. That's right.

Q. If this piece of paper here—page 1 of this document—were to be reproduced by the ozalid process, would the reproduction show the handwriting here in the upper right-hand corner?—A. This would be very faint because light is so intense that it will penetrate this and, therefore, expose the presensitized paper which will leave only a faint outline. I mean, with the adjustment of the machine you can make this come up.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me inquire, paper 177 just referred to, is that numbered from your numbering system or the numbering on the paper?

Mr. RHETTS. This is our numbering system. This document is in evidence as an exhibit as No. 177.

Q. I ask you to look at page 4 of document 177 and I ask you—this bears the typed words "C. E. Gauss," doesn't it?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. And above it is a handwritten signature, is there not?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Would the ozalid reproduction process reproduce that handwritten signature?—A. It would be very faint.

Q. It would be faint but it would reproduce?—A. It would reproduce.

Q. I show you document No. 2181 which consists of four typewritten pages bearing the handwritten signature of John S. Service, and then, following that, four pages which are identical with the first except that they are on a different type of paper and I ask you whether the last four pages of this document were prepared by the ozalid process?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you unmistakably identify them as having been prepared by that process?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Could those last four pages have been reproduced by any other process; I mean, is it possible in other words that these four pages were reproduced by any process other than ozalid?—A. No, sir.

Q. Can you tell whether these last four pages were prepared from the first four pages? By that question I mean, can you, by inspecting the first four pages, ascertain whether they were placed on top of the presensitized paper and had light pass through them?—A. They are identical copies unless there were some notes that were entered later.

Q. I direct your attention to the first page of the reproduction. In the upper left-hand corner there is reproduced certain handwriting which is to the following effect: "Copies to MID-2, ONI, OSS, CA." Is that correct?—A. Correct, sir.

Q. And that same handwriting appears on the first page of the original document, does it not?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. On the other hand, on the first page of the original document, besides the initials "OSS" there is the figure "2," is there not?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Does that appear on the ozalid reproduction?—A. No, sir.

Q. On the original there appears the figure "2" beside the letters "CA." Is that correct?—A. Correct.

Q. Does that appear on the reproduction?—A. No, sir.

Q. On the original underneath the word "CA" appear the letters "CB." Is that correct?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do they appear on the reproduction?—A. No, sir.

Q. There are at least one, two, three, four impressions or rubber stamps appearing on the original copy, do they not?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do any of those appear on the reproduction?—A. Well, this one here is so faint it won't show.

Q. One of the rubber stamps which appears beside the third paragraph of this document is very, very faintly reproduced on the reproduction. Is that correct?—A. I believe it is 1945.

Q. One of the other rubber stamps—A. Well, this one here—

Q. The one at the bottom of the page—A. There is a faint outline of the document. It is extremely faint.

Q. You would not recognize it unless you had the original to compare with?—A. It isn't a good ozalid copy. It could have been run at a faster speed.

Q. Regarding the handwritten initials which appear in the upper right-hand corner of the original, showing the routing of this document, do those symbols appear on the reproduction?—A. No, sir.

Q. They did not come through at all, did they?—A. No, sir.

Q. Were you employed in the Department in 1945?—A. No, sir.

Q. When did you come?—A. In 1948.

Q. So that you would have no knowledge of the practices with respect to reproduction of documents in the spring of 1945?—A. From what I heard, sir, there was an ozalid process at the time. Almost all the documents were ozalid and photostated.

Mr. SERVICE. May we have a recess?

The CHAIRMAN. You said we would adjourn at 12. I think we will have to adjourn for the noon hour at this point because two of the members of the Board have appointments at 12 o'clock.

Mr. RHETTS. It appears that we may want to ask this gentleman some further questions so if he would like to come back—

The CHAIRMAN. He will come back.

Mr. RHETTS. I propose we take a 5-minute recess—

The CHAIRMAN. The Board will have to adjourn at this moment.

Mr. RHETTS. Then perhaps Mr. Tanquary will return for just a few minutes after the luncheon recess.

The CHAIRMAN. At what time?

Mr. MORELAND. Two o'clock. We have Mr. Kennan coming in at 2 o'clock.

Mr. RHETTS. Can you be here at 1:45? We may have further questions.

Mr. TANQUARY. Yes sir.

(Meeting adjourned at 12 noon.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: May 29, 1950, 1:45 to 5:30 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building, Washington, D. C.

Reporter: Edna C. Moyer.

Members of Board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles, Arthur G. Stevens; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Representative for Mr. Service: Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts & Ruckelshaus.

(The meeting reconvened at 1:45 p. m.)

(Continuation of testimony by Mr. Tanquary:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Q. Will you take the stand, Mr. Tanquary? I show you again document 321, which I showed you before the luncheon recess, and I believe you testified this morning that this is not a photostat or reproduced by photostatic process but is instead a photographic reproduction of the microfilm.—A. That is right, sir.

Q. I believe you also testified that the paper on which this photographic reproduction of the microfilm is made is heavier and of higher rag content than photostat paper?—A. Yes, sir, that is right.

Q. It is also accurate that the gloss on this photographic reproduction of a microfilm is heavier or shinier?—A. It is the gloss on the drum that it goes around to dry them.

Q. Is this a heavier gloss than appears normally on a photostatic reproduction?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you have with you copies of a photostatic reproduction of a document?—A. There is a photostatic reproduction [handing a paper to the attorney].

Q. I ask that that be marked for identification as "Document 325," a photostatic reproduction consisting of one page, which is headed at the top, "American Embassy, Stockholm, June 3, 1949." Now, do you have another copy of this?—A. Yes, sir [handed the copy to the attorney].

The CHAIRMAN. Just add for the record, if you will, that this paper is in itself not relevant to the case.

Q. That is correct, it is not relevant except in connection with this technical matter which we are discussing. The substantive content of this document is wholly unrelated to this case. I hand to the Board the document which has been marked for identification as "Document 325." Now you also showed us this morning a copy of an ozalid reproduction. Do you have that?—A. [Handed a paper to the attorney.]

Q. I hand that document to the Board.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to give that a number?

Q. I think we will. I ask that there be marked for identification as "Document 326" a three-page ozalid reproduction, a document headed "American Consulate General, Tientsin, China, April 12, 1950."

The CHAIRMAN. The contents of which are not of themselves relevant to the case.

Q. Now, Mr. Tanquary, would you say that an ordinary typist who is inexperienced on the various techniques of reproduction might easily confuse a document such as Document 325, which you identified as a photostat, with Document 326, which you have identified as an ozalid reproduction?—A. Very easily, sir. I mean, they would not be able to tell. They would know that this is some photographic process.

Q. "This" being 325?—A. 325, resemblance between these two, knowing that there was some kind of photographic reproduction.

Q. When you say "these two," you are saying resemblance between 321—A. 321 and 325.

Q. Now directing your attention particularly to the possibility of confusing the reproduction process used in 325, which is a photostat, and 326, which is an ozalid, would you say that those two might easily be confused by an inexperienced person as being the same type of document?—A. That is right, sir.

Q. Is it fair to say that the weight of the paper in the two is approximately the same?—A. Approximately the same.

Q. I have no further question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Tanquary.

(The witness was dismissed.)

Mr. RHETTS. Now I should like to offer at this point in evidence documents marked for identification 325 and 326.

The CHAIRMAN. How about 321? It is already in?

(Off-record discussion.)

Mr. RHETTS. I also offer in evidence as an exhibit Document 321, and ask that those be marked as exhibits.

(Document marked "325," headed "American Embassy, Stockholm, June 3, 1949," was submitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 15.")

(Document marked "326," headed "American Consulate General, Tientsin, China, April 12, 1950," was submitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 16.")

(Document marked "321," headed "The Following Message Is From Hurley for the Eyes of the Secretary of State Alone, 31 January 1945," was submitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 17.")

The CHAIRMAN. Now are we ready for Mr. Kennan?

Mr. MORELAND. As soon as he arrives.

The CHAIRMAN. Can Mr. Service go on the stand? Mr. Service is on the stand.

Mr. Service, some reference was made by Mrs. Blumenthal on the stand to an article written by a John Stewart. Did you write any articles under the name "John Stewart"?

A. I have never written any articles under the name "John Stewart."

The CHAIRMAN. Did you write articles for the Institute of Pacific Relations?

A. I have never written any article for the Institute of Pacific Relations nor for any other publication.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

A. I can't answer that question definitely unless I consult my own records. I am a type of member, the type which I believe is the cheapest and lowest in the scale and involving least participation.

The CHAIRMAN. Which is what?

A. I believe it is subscribing member, but I would have to check to state with certainty the type the membership is.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you are that. Were you that in 1942 to 1945?

A. No, sir; I believe I was not. I was a subscribing member from about 1936 or 1937 until about 1941, I believe, and after I went to Chungking during the war it was impossible for us to receive any magazines and I discontinued all of my subscriptions, including my subscription to the Institute of Pacific Relations. I did not resume that subscription or subscribing membership until about 1946.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do you recall what dues you paid for your subscribing membership?

A. The cost of the membership at present is \$15 a year. I believe in those earlier years from 1937 or 1938 to 1941 it was probably \$10, but it might have been even less than that.

Mr. ACHILLES. You have never had a membership in which the dues involved were more than \$15 a year?

A. Never. I couldn't afford it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Bring the witness in.

(Mr. Kennan, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:)

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Mr. Kennan, your full name, please?—A. George Frost Kennan.

Q. And your residence?—A. Washington, D. C.

Q. Your connection with the State Department?—A. I am the counselor of the Department.

Q. And would you for the record detail in general briefly your experience in connection with the State Department?—A. Yes, sir. I entered State Department 24 years ago this year and shortly after my entry into the Foreign Service was detailed to undergo special study as what they called a "Russian expert." In those days that meant a pretty long course of preparation; normally 3 years of academic training and a year of special preparatory service in the field, so that it was normally a four and a half year course of study. After that I served for 2 years doing research and reporting work on Russian matters in Riga, Latvia, because we had no representation in the Soviet Union at that time. When we recognized Soviet Russia, I went in there in the very beginning, even in advance of the establishment of a mission, with Mr. Bullitt when he went to present credentials, and since then a good deal of my services has been in the Russian field. I have served altogether three times in Moscow and at times in the Department in connection with the Russian matters.

Q. How many years have you served in connection with Russian matters?—A. I have served 9 years in what is now the Soviet Union; about 5 of those were

served in Moscow. I think that is correct. I have also had just before and during the war 7 years of service in other places, mostly in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Lisbon, Algiers.

Q. Mr. Kennan, the Loyalty-Security Board on May 25, 1950, asked you to review certain writings and reports of Mr. John Stewart Service, which were put into your possession. As an expert witness for the Board in that connection, were you given possession of certain documents, about 126 of them, which had for identification numbers attached running from 101 to 227?—A. That is correct. Those are exactly the numbers that I had.

Q. And have you made a review of those documents and are you able to give the Board your opinion with reference to the Communist attitude revealed by those documents, if any?—A. Yes; I have; I have reviewed them as carefully as I could within the limits of the time available to me, which meant that each one has had individual attention, and there are notes here which I could show you if you like. It was a considerable job but there are notes on each one of the documents. They run into quite a number of pages.

Q. Would you like to offer those in connection with your testimony?—A. I would be happy to. They should be retyped. Many of them I typed myself and just X'd out mistakes and that sort of thing, but they are certainly at the disposal of the Board if it can make any use of them in any way; I would be happy to have them used.

(Typewritten copy of notes submitted by Mr. Kennan was admitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 18.")

Q. Making such use of those notes as you desire, will you state to the Board what you find in these reports?—A. I will, indeed. I should say, I think, that in addition to going through these reports I have also given attention to a number of documents which I thought would be expressive of the Moscow Communist Party line or of the attitudes taken in conversation by Soviet officials during that same period in order that I might have a basis for comparison. The reports here were written by Mr. Service, as I see it, in a number of capacities, some as an official stationed temporarily in the Department, some as a consular official in Chungking, and Lanchow, some as a political adviser to General Stilwell in Chungking, and I think the largest group were written from Yenan in Communist China where Service was stationed for long periods, as I understand it, with the observers' section of the United States Army.

Q. Just to put dates to the period, they begin, I take it, in 1942 and end in 1945?—A. That is correct. They range, the ones that I had access to, from May 1942 to March 1945, according to my copies. They break down roughly as follows: 37 of them are purely factual, involving no comment; another 53 are reports of an essentially factual nature, the material presented objectively and with a minimum of comment or interpretation; 3 of them are special OSS interrogations; 14 of them are generally interpretative in nature, that is analyzing a given situation or an event but of relatively minor importance; 20 of them may be classed as important studies, interpretations and analyses of major problems. I have, of course, given most attention to those 20 as the ones that bear most on the question you have raised.

Now in reviewing those I would like to tell you something of the nature of the reports and the considerations which seemed to me to be applicable to the determination of the question you have before you. I think we should note first of all that all of these reports without exception were written during the period when this country was at war. You will all remember that it was the policy of this Government and it was very frequently expressed that we should concern ourselves primarily with the winning of the war and that we should not allow ourselves to be diverted from this purpose by any ulterior considerations. Our goal in the Far East in particular was primarily, first and foremost, the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Now it is against this background that I think we have to measure the fact that these reports were throughout severely critical of the Central Chinese Government. The picture you get of that Government from the reports is that it was dominated less by an interest in bringing the war with Japan to a successful conclusion as rapidly as possible, less by such an interest than by a determination on the part of the generalissimo and his leading advisers to cling to their own position of power in China and to arrange things in such a way that they might continue to cling to it when the war was over.

You get the impression that following our entry into the war the generalissimo felt that he could depend on us not only to win that foreign war for him but also to help him perhaps in the future in an internal Chinese struggle against

the Communists; that for this reason he felt that his own military forces, those who at any rate were most loyal to him and on which he placed the greatest value, need no longer be jeopardized in the war against Japan but could be held in reserve for what he undoubtedly envisaged as the coming internal struggle within China against the Communists; that for that reason he put inferior and unreliable forces in the front line, gave them no dynamic military leadership, did not conduct the war against Japan with full determination. It appears from the reports that Service and others—I know other United States observers, whom he quoted in his reports, were out at that time, had the impression that the Chinese Government was relying on our support not only to help it in a future military conflict against the Chinese Communists but also to relieve it of the necessity of making internal reforms which would have been necessary really in order for it to remain in power on a basis of popular approval. If it could avoid making those reforms it would be able to retain a sort of monopoly position in Chinese political life, and you have from the reports the impression that that was exactly what was in the minds of the Central Government leaders: that with our help they felt that they could dispose of both problems and at the same time be able to avoid venturing into reform projects which might have been dangerous to it.

Now it was Service's view, as I gather it from the reports, that such a policy represented a state of affairs which was unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the prosecution of the war against Japan and highly dangerous because of its lack of realism to the prospects—dangerous to the prospects of future stability in China. In one report he wrote:

"Chiang unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in eastern Asia by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too weak to serve as a possible counterweight to Russia. By doing so Chiang may be digging his own grave; not only in North China and Manchuria, but also national groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets."

Now I believe that he had the impression that it was all the more important that he should make these weaknesses in the Chinese Government apparent, and its policies apparent to people in our Government because it was the deliberate policy of the Chinese Government, as he saw it, to conceal this state of affairs from the United States public opinion, and he felt that unless he and other American observers did their part in bringing this situation to the attention of people at home, it would go unnoticed. I believe that those are the reasons why the reporting was of a nature highly critical of the generalissimo and the Kuomintang. Now I am unable to say from my own knowledge of the history of these matters that it was unjustly critical. My impression is that the facts were substantially as they are here described by Mr. Service in these reports. To the extent that the critical note rings out more sharply than it might otherwise have done, I must say that I find that myself explainable by the natural tendency of all official observers, a tendency that I know very well from my own reporting experience in Moscow and Nazi Germany, to try to debunk the official propaganda of a foreign government which you feel is trying to put something over on your own government. I know that our reporting about Russia was always more critical than it otherwise would have been because we always felt we must at all costs reveal to our own Government the falseness and dangerousness of the line which the Soviet Government was trying to put across to us, and I know that I myself have written report after report trying to break down what I felt was a false concept and build-up in the minds of the people here at home.

It is true that during this period the Soviet press and Communist Party line was also severely critical of the Chinese National Government. Many of its criticisms coincided in one area or another with ones which you can find in these reports. I have given special attention to that and have thought it over very carefully. I can't find any particular significance in it. The Russian Communists and those that follow their line are by and large, it seems to me, excellent critics of their adversaries, very shrewd and very penetrating. They are often as good and accurate and as telling in their criticism of others as they are hypocritical in their defense of their own policies.

I know from my experience that a large portion of their criticism of the Nazi and Japanese Governments during the war not only coincided with our own but won our admiration. When we read the Russian press we thought, "These boys really know something about picking an adversary to pieces." I think therefore it is not surprising that criticisms of our own observers in China should have happened to coincide with ones which were being voiced in the Communist press,

and I find no coincidence there that goes beyond what you might have expected by the circumstances.

I think it is also clear from these reports that the attitude reflected in them was not expressive, insofar as it criticized the Central Government, was not expressive of any Communist inspiration or guidance. The material is free from the exaggerations and distortions, from these peculiarly nasty little spins on the ball which the Communist propagandists invariably give to anything they write and which are the hallmarks of practically any material that has Communist origins. We can almost always trace it by certain trains of thought, of avarice, and distortion and certain peculiar nastiness of touch that those fellows have.

Let me give you an example. The Soviet propagandists, I noted, in their treatment of the relations between the Chinese Government and the Japanese at that time gave the impression that important elements in the Chinese Government were out-and-out paid agents of Japan endeavoring as they sit under direct orders from Tokyo to provoke a conflict or exacerbate the conflict between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Central Government. In other words, the Communist propagandists were saying the generalissimo's own entourage contained important elements, paid agents, up to their neck in a purely subversive type of treason.

There were no such suggestions in Service's reports. They contained no such extremes and distortions. They treated of the same subjects but in a moderate and dispassionate way. In certain important instances these reports take issue with the party line, with the Communist Party line. A notable one is that of the frequent defects to the Japanese of front-line commanders and units on the Chinese side. The Communist Party line alleged that this was by prearrangement between the Chinese Government and the Japanese, that the Chinese Government wanted these forces to go over in order that it might in that way insinuate the Chinese forces into the areas held by the Japanese, so that when the Japanese finally collapsed and left forces, there would be Chinese Government in that area capable of dealing with the Chinese Communists who had organized the territory among and underneath the noses of the people and among the Japanese lines.

Mr. Service takes issue with that view in his reports and interprets the defects as arising more probably from the fact that it was the policy of the generalissimo to place in the front line the forces of the war-lord allies of his in China, which forces were mostly composed of mercenaries and therefore had a poor morale and little conviction and were not very loyal to the generalissimo, the reason for that being on the generalissimo's part that these were troops that didn't matter and if they got shot up in the conflict with Japan that was a matter of relatively little importance to him. I simply cite that as an example of a direct conflict between these reports and the Communist Party line at that period. Now, so much for the attitude with respect to the Central Government in China.

I think I ought to treat also the attitude then toward the Chinese Communists themselves. I think again we must be careful to bear in mind the setting against which the reporting took place. We were at that time allies with Russia, our Government was giving aid on a colossal scale to the Russian Communists, who were the center of the movement. It could therefore not have—there could have been at that time no implication that the granting of aid to Communists or the conducting of relations with Communists in wartime was in itself anything surprising or out of the way from the standpoint of American policy. I simply cite that because I recall for part of that period I was in Moscow where we had a huge lend-lease mission, and anything that interfered with the tremendous flow of aid coming in there was dimly viewed indeed, and I got my own fingers burned at one time for asking why the Soviet Government needed 2 years' supply of film strip in one shipment on the lend-lease. In other words, I am simply emphasizing that at that time all this was not only legitimate but was sacrosanct in the case of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Service seems to have been advocated in these reports from the beginning that we should consider supporting the Chinese Communists in their effort against the Japanese. He did not urge initially that we do this—or at any time, I think—without adequate investigation and study of the Chinese Communists themselves. In 1943 the reports were urging the Department to send observers to the Communist-held areas in order to find out about conditions there and help us determine our policy with regard to Chinese Communists. There was obviously no intent at that time to influence the Government along pro-Com-

munist lines, because Mr. Service complained in those reports that the information then available to our Government stemmed in part from journalists "who appear to have a bias favorable to the Communists" and that therefore we ought to have our own people in there to get unbiased reports, and he warned that any brief visits by United States officials might not be fruitful because these officials would be, if they only went for 2 or 3 days, and I quote again, "would be under the influence of official guides," meaning Communist officials. It seems to me, therefore, that the initial reports urging our Government to make a study of the Communists in China, to send observers there to learn about it, were not written in any pro-Communist spirit, since they warned us clearly of the pitfalls and cited dependence on pro-Communist observers as one of the reasons why we ought to have ones of our own there.

During the period before he himself proceeded there, he obviously had extensive contact as a reporting officer with Communist representatives in the China controlled by the National Government, and he reported extensively their statements to him. Most of these were reported in what we can call deadpan fashion, they were simply relayed to the Department. Some of them were comment. I would like to point out that the matters discussed, the matters treated in the views of these Communist officials, which he reported to this Government, were matters of the highest importance in the conduct of the war against Japan. The Chinese Communist forces were part of the forces opposing the Japanese forces in the Far East. Anything we could find out about the territory from which they were being directed, about conditions in the Communist area, and about the merits and failings and policies and views of the Communist leaders was obviously highly pertinent to the war effort, and there was no greater impropriety in tapping this source of information than was involved in our own efforts in Moscow at the same time to tap the views of the Soviet leaders and to report them faithfully to this Government.

As I gather from the documents, Mr. Service went to Yen-an in the summer of 1944, and from that time on there follows a series of reports from Yen-an extending into the spring of 1945. Many of these reports again were purely factual and dealt with matters which were not really ones of political interpretation—somewhat strictly military or economic. Others were of high importance from the standpoint of interpretation of events. Like me and other official observers who went to the Communist areas at that time, he was impressed with a number of phenomena—and which compared favorably with those which he had known in the China under the control of the Nationalist Government—and he was impressed with superior morale, discipline, earnestness of intention, frankness of approach, and integrity of administration among the Communists. I think he was impressed with the greater determination evident in their effort against Japan. They had penetrated the areas back of the Japanese forces; they had organized those areas politically—all that called for daring and courage and for good morale, which there is no question about that they had. He felt that it would be desirable for our Government to take a greater interest in the Communists, to help them in their operations against Japan, and to try to build up such a relationship with them as could constitute one of the foundations of our postwar policy toward China, if I interpret the reports correctly.

He felt that the Chinese Communist Party, and I quote here, "must be counted under any circumstances a continuing and important influence in China." He felt that a hopeful future could be seen for China only if some sort of accommodation could be found between the Communists and the Central Government, that the Communists were already too strong to be defeated by force of arms by the Central Government in a civil war, that therefore some sort of political accommodation would be necessary eventually, that it was important for this that we, as far as we were concerned, have relations with both sides and not just with one. He said that if the conflict then in progress—namely, the World War—were to be followed by civil war, there could be expected to emerge out of such a civil struggle only, and I quote again, "a more progressive Kuomintang government or a Communist state, probably of the present modified Chinese Communist type."

Then, as the prospects for a more progressive Kuomintang government became dimmer, he became increasingly concerned for the future. He believed in the fall of 1944 that the Communists were then sincere in seeking Chinese unity, in the hope of American and on the basis of American support—that is, that if we gave them our support they might accept it sincerely—"But," he wrote, "this does not preclude their turning back toward Soviet Russia if they are forced to in order to survive an American-supported Kuomintang attack." In the early part of his period of service there he felt that basically, as I read it from these dispatches,

basically the Chinese Communist Government had in it enough learnings toward democracy to make it probable that if it could survive, if it did survive and continued in power after the war, its power and development along the lines should not be those of a monopoly of power by a single party.

Now it seems to me in reading over these reports that there was in them and in certain places a certain naïveté with respect to the Soviet Union and perhaps with respect to the forces which were already at work though not on the surface within the International Communist movement and within the Chinese Communist movement in particular. The indications of that attitude toward the Soviet Union are conflicting. There are a few which indicate a certain ignorance of Soviet conditions, of the full extent of the ferociousness of the concentration of power within the Soviet sphere and the full ruthlessness and relentlessness of the Soviet Government. There are other indications which would point to a greater understanding of it, but there are certain ones which I would say simply indicated a lack of knowledge of how really bitter things were inside the direct sphere of Soviet power.

When I say that there were also certain signs of lack of appreciation for the deeper forces which were at work in the International Communist movement and perhaps among the Chinese Communists, I mean it this way. In the Russian Communist movement, all of us are convinced that the factors which have forced this movement to become more and more ruthless, more dictatorial, more addicted to a monopoly of power, more intolerant of any rival opinion or opposition opinion, that those factors were planted in it at a very early date, actually at the time of the split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in 1904 and 1905, and that the principles of party organization and of methods which were adopted at that time by Lenin were ones which carried with them a sort of logical compulsion toward a greater and greater concentration of power, toward greater and greater excess on the part of the regime toward its enemies and toward the situation we have got today.

Now it may be that the same thing is operable in the Chinese Communist movement to the extent that those Chinese Communists did have their ideological origin in Moscow; that they, in other words, had been infected by some of those same things. You don't see in the earlier ones of these reports from Yen-an any recognition of that possibility. I notice that in the later reports from Yen-an, if I do not misinterpret them, there seems to have been a modification of Mr. Service's opinion and he is beginning to doubt that things will work out quite that happily and to feel that power itself and the struggle for power is going to play a much larger part in the motivation of the Chinese Communist movement.

However, you have to bear in mind in connection with that that he himself had predicted at an earlier date, as I just read to you, that if it were to develop into a Chinese civil war with ourselves on the side of the Chinese Government forces, that the Chinese Communists would be pushed along that direction and pushed into the direction of a closer association with Moscow.

Now I must say that I do not have sufficient knowledge about the Chinese Communist movement and I don't think the world does, I don't think the data are yet available on which to make such a judgment, to determine whether those things which were true of the Russian Communist movement were also true of the Chinese Communist movement. I think it is too early yet in the story for us to know whether the path on which the Chinese Communists have now embarked led from inner compulsions which would have been there anyway or whether it stemmed from the attitudes which we took during the war and immediately after the war, so that I cannot be sure in my own mind that the view reflected in these reports might not have been accurate and that if we had not supported the Central Government at all after the war, if we ourselves had taken a more or less equal attitude toward the two regimes, it is possible that these things would not have turned out in the way that they did.

With regard to this area which I have defined as that of a certain naïveté, if we can call it that, or certain ignorance of relationships within the Communist world, I would like to point the following factors which I think bear on them. In the first place it is my own experience that only or as a rule only those who have actually resided and worked in the Soviet Union for a long time can have a fully adequate picture in their own minds of the way that system works, of the jealousy of the central power, of its intolerance, and its insistence on an implicit obedience by everyone who is under its sphere.

In the second place, I think I detect in his report another thing with which I am familiar from my own experience, and that is a tendency, when we are critical of a regime about which we are writing to be indulgent toward others

who are its critics. I know that in Nazi Germany in the thirties many honest liberal observers tended to find themselves at one in their criticisms and their hatred of the Nazi regime with the German Communists and with the Soviet representatives, and they tended to take a much more indulgent view of Soviet Russia because it was against Nazi Germany than they did of Nazi Germany itself. I think there may have been something of the same sort of thing in China. There is no question about it in my mind that the behavior of the Chinese Government throughout those years to an honest American observer was irritating and alarming. It provoked a sort of debunking attitude on the part of those Americans who were there. In that they found themselves often at one with the Chinese Communists in their critical attitude toward that regime. There was a certain natural tendency to assume that another great government like the Russian Government which stood on the side and which was itself to some extent critical of the National Government must really be better. I think that is the thing which has affected all of us and I am to a certain degree guilty in that respect myself.

For example, all of us who served in the Soviet Union were outraged by the way the Russians treated the Chinese consular officers in the Russian provincial towns. That is, they treated all consular officers that way, isolating them, putting floodlights on their houses day and night, guards all around them, not permitting them to have a single unofficial contact in the town, that sort of thing, but they were worse toward the Chinese. When you read these reports you find that the Chinese were applying precisely the same treatment to the Russian representatives in China. Who was guilty of starting it, I don't know. I think it is old Asiatic practice and to look for the origins of it is like trying—well, a sort of chicken-and-egg procedure. All I can say is that we in Moscow sympathized with the Chinese representatives in their plight out in the Russian provincial towns. I see here that our representatives in China sympathized with the Soviet representatives in their plight in the Chinese provincial towns and I think they both reflect something of the same human reactions.

Finally I would like to point out that these deviations toward an attitude indulgent of the Soviet Government and indulgent of the Chinese Communists were no greater than what we might call the danger of the times, that is, the deviations from reality in this respect which were common to the statements of practically all the great war leaders on the Allied side, common to the statements and views of very many people here in Washington. I am sure that the views that Mr. Service expressed at that time in these reports would have been found if anything slightly on the conservative or reactionary side by a number of important people that I could mention here in Washington at that particular period. They are not nearly as "starry-eyed," if I may use that term, as things that you will find for instance in books that were published by prominent people here, by ex-Ambassadors, by people in Government life. This was a time, we must remember, at which Mr. Churchill was advocating a policy with respect to Tito which is almost directly analogous to that which is advocated in these reports with respect to the Chinese Communists, although at that time Tito was entirely a Communist loyal to Moscow and no one remotely envisaged the possibility that he would not be at a later date. Churchill too advocated that we not take a negative attitude toward him, that we supply him with arms and that we try to establish a relationship with him which could be fruitful for the postwar period. In general in our whole treatment of the Chinese problem at that time by prominent people in our own Government—I am thinking of people who came to Moscow and with whom we spoke there—you found a degree of unrealism certainly no smaller in these matters than that reflected in the reports.

I have to recall that when General Hurley came there in 1945 and talked with Stalin, he sent back a telegram to Washington which I, who was the *Chargé d'Affaires* in Moscow, thought so unrealistic that I had to follow it up with another telegram myself warning our Government please not to be misled by this, in that the Soviet Government was going to behave well after the war, and trying to explain—I said here: "It would be tragic if our natural anxiety for the support of the Soviet Union at this juncture, coupled with Stalin's use of words which mean all things to all people and his cautious affability, were to lead us into an undue reliance on Soviet aid or even Soviet acquiescence in the achievement of our long-term objectives in China." You could cite other examples of that sort of thing. The advocacy of the rapprochement between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Government itself was one which was carried forward at that time by very important people.

Again I am constrained to recall that General Hurley himself wrote that there was no stronger advocate of negotiations between the Communists and the Chinese Government than himself and that he had done more in an effort to bring about a just settlement between the Communists and the Government than any other man, and that he believed he was the best friend that the Chinese Communists had in Chungking. Now that was not—at this time it was made—in any sense a remarkable statement. I think that was the general policy of our Government at that time and the general atmosphere in which these reports were written.

Now in trying to judge the reports against that background which I have just described, I tried myself to determine in my mind what should be the central point of inquiry, that is, what was the most important thing to determine about these reports. It seemed to me that the important thing was to find out whether they represented Mr. Service's honest opinion and whether they stemmed solely from a desire to give the Department that opinion or whether they resulted from some ulterior motive or some ulterior source. It seemed to me that if Mr. Service was reporting honestly and conscientiously the views at which he had arrived on the basis of an open-minded examination and analysis of the facts, that he had before him, then it was up to the Department or his military superiors to tell him if they felt that his judgment was faulty or inadequate to the reporting function which he was fulfilling, that is, if his reports were found out to have, were discovered to have a bias which rendered them not useful or dangerous to this Government. It was really the matter of his superiors to determine that. They were then at liberty to dismiss him from the Service for incompetence or they were at liberty to transfer him to another field of endeavor where he might have signed invoices or performed some technical function but not carrying on this reporting. If instead of doing that they encouraged him to go on with it, as they did by repeated instructions of commendation signed by high people here in the Department, it did appear to me that then he had no choice but to conclude that the continuation of this activity was his duty in war time and that he would not be subject to reproach later for having done it to the satisfaction of his superiors.

For that reason in my own examination of these documents, I tried to concentrate on that. My conclusion is the following: I find no evidence that the reports acquired their character from any ulterior motive or association or from any impulse other than the desire on the part of the reporting office to acquaint the Department with the facts as he saw and interpreted them. I find no indication that the reports reported anything but his best judgment candidly stated to the Department. On the contrary the general level of thoughtfulness and intellectual flexibility which pervades the reporting is such that it seems to me out of the question that it could be the work of a man with a closed mind or with ideological preconceptions, and it is my conclusion that it was not. Such faults as it may reveal on analysis in the light of hindsight today, which is admittedly a great deal easier than foresight, are ones which appear to me to be explicable in the light of the background against which the reports were written and to have been ones which could and would have been corrected had he by that time had the opportunity for a wider area of service and one which included the Soviet Union as well as China.

Now those, Mr. Chairman, are my honest opinions. They are as objective as I can make them and I hope that they are adequate to the purpose here.

The CHAIRMAN. The Board is very grateful for this very exhaustive and fine presentation of the contents of these reports. Mr. Achilles, do you have any questions?

Mr. ACHILLES. The characterization of the reports has been so complete that there is very little to ask. Very briefly, did you find in any of his reports any indication that his thinking, his presentation was influenced by such themes as are common to international communism, Communist propaganda?

A. No; I can't say that I did. The problems of the Chinese Communists at that time in the middle of the war were so different from those of the average Communist Party anywhere else in the world that the discussion of them in these reports seems to me to have had relatively little relevance, let us say, to the problems and aims of the French Communist Party or Italian Communist Party or the international Communist movement in general.

Now I am glad you asked me that because there was one thing that I neglected to mention in this presentation which I would like to bring out. Throughout a large part of this period I am quite convinced that the Soviet Government was not able to give very much attention to the Chinese Communists, that it

was not giving them aid, on the contrary, if it was giving any aid to China it was going certainly primarily to the Chinese Central Government, and it was simply too preoccupied with the tremendous pressures of its own war effort and the resistance of the German attack to bother about these fellows out there at all. I think it entirely plausible that they felt themselves at that time pretty much on their own and were themselves uncertain how their relationship—

The CHAIRMAN. Meaning the Communists?

A. Yes; that the Communists felt themselves on their own and were themselves uncertain how their relationship with the Soviet Government was going to shape up when the war was over. Now that being the case, I think it is quite plausible that during those years they wandered further from the typical Comintern outlook of affiliation with the Soviet Government than perhaps any Communist Party in good standing has ever wandered, and they were also at that time engaged in the war with the Japanese and in the Far East a very considerable battle threatened their own power in China against the Chinese Central Government. For that reason I think it is no wonder that they gave an impression of sincerity and of concentration on purposes which are not normally associated with the Communist movement throughout those years, and these reports which I think reflect quite faithfully what were the real reactions, at least the statements, the actions of the Chinese Communists at that time, in these reports I think it is natural that you don't find much reflection of the sort of thing you asked about.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you have any impression that Mr. Service's thinking was influenced by Soviet ideology?

A. Not by Soviet ideology at all. I think you do find in some of these reports—he had to deal with the Communists, he talked with them a great deal—I think in many instances he was subject, as I think perhaps any sensitive and intelligent man would have been, to the sway of the atmosphere which they exuded, especially since it was one that had a greater appeal in many respects to many of us than did the atmosphere in the camp of their Chinese adversaries, but I can find absolutely no indication of any connection there with Soviet influences at all. Such influences as are reflected in this reporting are solely Chinese Communist. There is only one report as I recall it which—one or two there might have been which stemmed from statements of Soviet colleagues, and those were reported objectively and much as many of the rest of us might have reported them from any other place in the world.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Did you find any indication in Mr. Service's reports or a desire on his part for extension of Soviet domination into Asia?—A. None whatsoever. On the contrary I find that as one of the possibilities to which it seems to me he points with a certain alarm in several instances in these reports. I don't know whether I can find at this moment instances of that in my notes, but I may be able to here. He says, for example, and I quote—well, it is the same quote as before so I don't need to do it except to reiterate that,

“Chiang unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in eastern Asia by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too weak to serve as a possible counterweight to Russia.”

Mr. RHETS. Would you refer to the document number?

A. That is number 142. I would gather from that that he viewed the continued existence of China as a possible counterweight to Russia as a desirable thing.

Q. Just one minor question. You characterized his reports as being somewhat less “starry-eyed” than other prominent people including ambassadors. Would you care to name any of those?—A. Well, I would say, for example, that Mr. Davies' book on “Mission to Moscow” reflects an understanding of Soviet realities and international Communist realities much further from actuality than these reports.

Q. The former Ambassadors Nelson Johnson and Clarence Gauss have also testified. Would you include either of them in that category?—A. I am not familiar enough with their thinking to know whether that would apply to them or not and I did not have them in mind when I made the statement. I was reflecting that when I read even my own reports from Moscow at that time I find a slight sense of shame at the extent to which I felt obliged to moderate those reports in the Soviet favor if they were to get any audience in Washington and not appear to be extreme and anti-Soviet and to condemn themselves. I wish today I had been blunter—and we must remember that all of these were written in that period.

Q. You have never as far as I recall been charged as being pro-Comm yourself. Have you ever been as far as you recall?—A. No, I don't recall I ever yet been charged with that.

Q. Have you ever been charged with being anti-Communist?—A. Yes, in I have, many times. I served in the Russian field all through the thirties and we were all alleged to be married to Russian emigré princesses and to be a group of black reactionaries. I might point out at the present time that as far as I know or until recently I was of all the citizens of our country the public enemy No. 1 in the Soviet and international Communist press. When I recently visited South America that became very evident, because the walls of every city in Brazil, as far as I know, of any size, even those that I did not visit, were all covered with enormous far smears saying, "To death with Kennan," and I was buried four times in effigy by Brazilian Communists while I was in Rio, so that I don't think I am very popular.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you find any indication in any of the reports that Mr. Service was attempting to torpedo or sabotage or in any other way oppose the official American policy in China?

A. No, sir, I did not, and I must say that I can find no indication whatsoever of that. There was nothing in any way underhanded about these reports. In them his views are fully exposed to all of his superiors for what they are. The line of conduct they recommended would have been one disagreeable to the Chinese National Government and he repeatedly warns in his reports that it would be exactly that, that they would not like it, and he warned that if we were to send observers to Yenan that would not be appreciated in Chungking, and if we were to give military aid to the Chinese Communists, that would also go down hard. He recommended, if you will, a different policy from the one that we followed in certain respects, not in all respects, that is, his recommendations were different from what was actually followed but that—

The CHAIRMAN. Can you specify that?

A. We did not, as I recall it, ever get military aid to the Chinese Communists on any scale that could be called a realization of his recommendations. We continued to give aid on a very considerable scale to the Central Government of China after the war, although it was embarked on policies which not only Mr. Service but many others of our representatives in China viewed as dangerous and hopeless. I am thinking here, for example, of General Wedemeyer who warned the Chinese Government very sharply in 1945 that it did not have the military potential to reassert its authority in Manchuria and North China by force of arms and that if it attempted to do this, the entire future would be uncertain.

Now, as I understand, these reports of course cease in the spring of 1945, but I am sure the tenor of them was that we should not attempt to back a Chinese Central Government which had not created for itself a greater appeal to popular approval in China against the Chinese Communists in a civil war and in an effort to reassert its authority all over China by force of arms.

The CHAIRMAN. I refer to American policy in China and I refer also and particularly to General Hurley's mission.

A. I cannot find that he does. In fact, I read over specifically today the charges which General Hurley makes here which I suppose relate to Mr. Service. He does not say who, but he says "Foreign Service officers in China," and I suppose it is that. He charges them, as I understand it, with:

"The professional Foreign Service men sided with the Chinese Communist armed party and the imperialist block of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself."

The latter part of that I can certainly find no indication of, that there was any siding with a wider group of nations who were determined to keep China divided. On the contrary, the reports certainly urged anything, or urged consistently all the way through a political accommodation between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists which might avoid a Chinese civil war. In that respect, what bewilders me here is that they advocated, it seems to me, the same thing that General Hurley was advocating, which was political accommodation. It was perhaps only a question of on whose terms, that is, whether it should be entirely on the terms of the Chinese Central Government or whether there should be a recognition of the political interests and legitimacy of the Chinese Communists as a movement. Now, my understanding of Mr. Service's reports was that he never went at any time in the reports, as far as I can see, into the question of whether the Chinese Communists ought on moral grounds to have their legitimacy recognized. He advocated that it be

recognized because they were already so strong that it was impossible to overthrow them in any way by force of arms and a political accommodation was the only alternative to a civil war. He also did not feel that a hopeful future could be based on the Chinese Central Government in the absence of a reform program.

I am not a very good person to judge the rights and the wrongs of that attitude, but as to how possible it might have been or might not have been for the Chinese Central Government to carry on a reform program, but that the Central Government could not clean up on all of China by force of arms and win a civil war against the Communists without the involvement of this country on a scale which would really have been beyond our resources seems absolutely clear to me and reflects not just the views of Mr. Service but the views of people like General Wedemeyer and I am sure others of very high American officers who had to do with China at that time. As I see this difference it could only be this, that General Hurley felt that we should have been giving greater backing to the Central Government in its differences with the Communists than Mr. Service and others would have recommended.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions?

Mr. STEVENS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Counsel.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Mr. Kennan, in connection with this line of inquiry which General Snow has just been pursuing, in particular General Hurley has singled out a report No. 40, which is document No. 193 in the list that you have, General Hurley has stated that that memorandum in particular constituted in his judgment—and he has stated this, I may say, in the course of hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December 1945—he has stated that this was a plan to bring about the fall of the Central Government, and that charge in turn had been picked up by Senator McCarthy and others and elaborated on. I wonder if you have any particular notes on 193?—A. I do, indeed. I would like to refresh my memory from the document itself.

Yes, my notes on it were here that:

"Service's denunciation is strong but based exclusively on the urgency of aiding the American war effort in the Pacific. There is no indication of political bias toward any faction but only against Kuomintang corruption and power politics. There is a tendency to underplay the usefulness of the Kuomintang to the United States war effort and to discount any worth in the movement as an interesting parallel to Yugoslavia."

If I might be excused, I would like to run my eyes over this again (referring to report 40).

The CHAIRMAN. Would you do that again, please.

A. (After reading the report.) Mr. Chairman, may I make a further statement with respect to this, since we are getting into the actual question of the content of these reports. I think that what is said here in one part is extraordinarily penetrating, and that is:

"Encouraged by our support the Kuomintang will continue its present course, progressively losing the confidence of the people and becoming more and more impotent."

That has been directly borne out by the course of events. There is no question about that. It goes ahead and says:

"Ignored by us, and excluded from the Government and joint prosecution of the war, the Communists and other groups will be forced to guard their own interests by more direct opposition."

That you can give as you like, that has happened. I have never known myself, never felt able really to judge. I have always been skeptical about it, I have never known whether any sort of a tolerable political accommodation could have been reached between the Chinese Communists and the Central Government in China. In other countries the Communists have never been comfortable bedfellows for anybody, and the ideologic instructions under which they work tell them to enter into alliance with political groups only for the sake of ruining these groups from the inside, and eventually emerging the sole victors.

Now there is a question of judgment here as to whether it would have been—the Chinese Communists were enough different from other Communists so that they would have gone into any coalition effort in good faith, and all I can say. I believe that there were some hesitations in Mr. Service's mind about that but as I gather it from the reports he felt that this was the only possibility, the only alternative possibility to a civil war which probably would have ended

only in the complete Chinese Communist triumph. I think I should explain that. I mean, at the time I would have been skeptical about the possibility of the lion and the lamb lying down together and anything resembling a real regime coming out of it, but on the other hand I don't know Chinese realities remotely as well as he does, and you can balance off the knowledge of Chinese realities on the one hand against the knowledge of the international Communist realities on the other.

Mr. ACHILLES. On that point General Hurley's writings indicate that he had no qualms about the desirability of the Chinese taking the Communists into the government. Had he had enough experience with Soviet communism in Moscow and so on so that he should have known better or was he too new to that?

A. His visits to Moscow consisted only of one or two brief stays in that capital, to my knowledge, and talks with Stalin and Molotov. I don't think that that was enough to enable him to know what he was talking about when he reported on the views of the Soviet leaders. On the other hand, there was ample advice available to him which he showed no desire to tap on these subjects. I mean, it is not surprising to me that Hurley didn't know that he was being given the usual run-around and the usual patter by Stalin and Molotov, but I think that if he had been a wiser and more thoughtful man he would have asked some people who would be familiar with those conditions for some years for commentary on those.

Q. In that connection I take it that what you have commented, that the essential question of judgment as to whether there was any future in attempting to effect a political accommodation is an open question. Is it not fair to say, however, Mr. Kennan, that that question of judgment as a matter of official American policy had been decided by the President and by the State Department and that General Hurley accepted, if he had not been a partial architect of, the judgment that we should seek to effect that political accommodation?—A. That is quite correct, and it is my understanding that General Hurley had in a sense launched the most vigorous phase of our effort to bring precisely that about and went himself to Yen-an and brought these Communist leaders down in his own plan and worked very vigorously toward the implementation of that idea.

Q. So that although that may have been questionable judgment, it was the unquestioned policy of the United States Government to seek to effect that accommodation?—A. Yes.

Q. Referring back to this Document 193 and to the other aspects of it, do you see any evidence in that document which would support the charge by General Hurley that it was a plan to bring about the fall of the Central Government?—A. No. My understanding of the document was that Mr. Service said we should not fear the fall of the Central Government and not permit ourselves to be blackmailed by the threat of it, but not that he himself advocated it.

Q. And, indeed, does not the document further suggest that this is the only way to avoid the fall, as he saw it?—A. Let me just finish my reexamination because among 127 documents I don't want to speak about this until I glance at it again.

(Reread the document.)

I must say that I found in this document a strong belief that the Chinese Government as it existed at that time did not have in it the qualities which would have made it possible for it to play a constructive role in the future of China and that we would not help to create those qualities in it by aiding it ourselves in the policies that it was then conducting, but I did not find in it a specific desire that the Chinese Government as existed then should fall from power entirely.

Now again I would say, reverting to a prior questions about conflict, about General Hurley's assertion that this involved some disloyalty to United States policy, that I could find in going through his reports no indication in anything there other than a desire to make plain to our Government what Mr. Service felt our policy should be. Now that has never been considered in Government practice to have in it any impropriety. It would have been, rather, improper if for some reason or other he had failed to tell the Government of his own true thoughts about it, had concealed them from the Government in any respect or for some motives of his own, and I would have found an impropriety in this only if he had been doing this on behalf of somebody else and had not let the Government know the real motives of his making these recommendations. To my mind they stand or fall on the question of whether they were honestly made

and honestly believed, and if then they were that, then the only other question could be, about them could have been whether they reflected good judgment or bad judgment, and that was a question, as I say, for the Government, which the Government was at liberty to examine. I would feel very alarmed for the future of Foreign Service reporting if we ever were to permit the implication to creep in that a policy recommendation contrary to the policy that was actually adopted by the Government was a sign of disloyalty to the Government purposes, because as ones who perhaps in making policy every day in this building here we know that—as most of us who are in this position—probably the majority of things we recommended are never accepted, but we must continue to recommend them and out of that discussion and difference of opinion will emerge a policy which people then loyal will accept.

I also gather from what General Hurley wrote here that there is an indication that these observers in Yenan had given the Chinese Communists a false picture of what to expect from our Government. I do not find any indication of that. On the contrary, I notice in one report here that there were warnings given to the Chinese Communists that they should not hope for too much, that no decisions had been made, and that there was a specific effort to keep them from getting their hopes too high and being carried away.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean by that, in his talks with the Communists he had indicated that, as you just stated, to them?—A. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not that the report itself had been made available to the Communists?

A. No, no. There would, I believe, have been an impropriety if one had gone to the Chinese Communists and promised them a line of conduct on the part of our Government which had not yet been sanctioned in any policy determinations at home, but I can find no indication of that in the reports. Rather, on the contrary.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

A. It was in Document 186:

"Every effort has been made to avoid encouraging any high expectations, to point out the practical difficulties in the way of direct cooperation, and to suggest that Japan may be defeated in other ways than as the Communists insist, a slow process of liquidating the armies on the Asian mainland."

Q. Now, on the basis of your examination of these documents, Mr. Kennan, I would like to call your attention that Senator McCarthy and others have charged that Mr. Service during this period was trying to turn the Far East over to Russia, and it has been further asserted that Mr. Service expressed the view that communism was the best hope of China or the best hope of Asia, variously. Do you find anything in any of his writings that tended in any way to support such statements?—A. No; let me think of those. Trying to turn it all over—

Q. Trying to turn the Far East over to Russia?—A. No; I find the direct contrary to that proposition in these reports. The second was that—

Q. That communism was the best hope of Asia?—A. No; my understanding of what he said in these reports was that the best hope in China, to which his observations were restricted, was a regime which would be considerate of the interests of the opposition elements including the Communists, which is quite a difference.

Q. Yes. By the way, Mr. Kennan, will you state to the Board whether you are acquainted with Mr. Service?—A. I had never met Mr. Service before he returned on this occasion, and I have never spoken with him except concerning the technical arrangements for my appearing here. I purposely did not discuss anything that I was going to say on this occasion with him or with anyone that I thought might be in communication with him and have never discussed the content of his reports. I had also not read the reports before this except insofar as they were contained in the white paper, so that they came to me fresh.

Q. And you have no discussed these reports with Mr. Service at any time?—A. No; at no time.

Q. Or discussed them with me?—A. No; at no time.

Mr. MORELAND. Or members of the Board?

The CHAIRMAN. That is also true of the members of the Board?

A. It is also true of the members of the Board. I had meant to make that clear myself.

I am sure that the only thing I could add, I think, to what I have said so far voluntarily about the reports is that in their entirety there is no question about it, aside from the question of whether they might have a bias in favor of the

Communists, that they represent an absolutely outstanding job of reporting, on general Foreign Service terms. Many of them have nothing to do with this matter whatsoever. They are an excellent series of reports and recognized as such by the Department. I don't know whether that has any bearing: that is why I didn't mention it before, except that people who write excellent reports are not apt to be guilty of the great oversimplifications which have been suggested by some people.

Q. Just one question. I believe that during the early forties, as you testified earlier, the officials of the Soviet Union had generally expressed the view that they were not interested in the Chinese Communists and that they did not really regard them as true Communists at all. While necessarily over-simplification, is that generally a correct characterization of the Soviet Communist Party line, that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists?—A. That seems to have been a line taken in conversation by certain of the Soviet leaders during the war. I don't recall ever having seen it in the very carefully controlled written line that they put out, and it is my belief that it was not part of that.

Q. It was at any rate, I take it, clearly the line as put out by Messrs. Stalin and Molotov to General Hurley?—A. That is General Hurley's report, and he reported—I was not there that night, Mr. Harriman went up with him and left that following morning—that Molotov agreed that that was the line that he and Stalin were taking, that these were not real Communists and that—just as you described.

Q. Did you detect any indication anywhere in Mr. Service's writing that he did not regard the Chinese Communists as true Communists?—A. Yes: I had the impression that particularly in the earlier period of his stay in Yen-an he thought it possible the influences of their experience as a political movement, the extent to which they had been thrown upon themselves in their long march around China, and isolation during the war, and the pressures of purely Chinese psychological influences on them might have changed them in such a way as would make them untypical of the majority of Communists, of all the other Communist parties approved by the Kremlin, and might reconcile them to ruling by means which would be more like what we would consider democratic for a long period even if they came to power in China.

Q. In that connection do you recall any of his reports which commented particularly on whether or not the Chinese Communist Party was even though modified by its peculiar experiences essentially a Marxian political party?—A. Yes. There was one from Yen-an in the earlier period there. I would have to look it up to be able to cite the exact one to you which did comment on that point. Just a moment now. It was No. 168, I believe. My recollection is that in that report he said that he believed that the Chinese Communist Party aimed for an orderly and prolonged progress toward eventual socialism and not for violent revolution, and that it would consider the long-term interests of China and would not seek for an early monopoly of political power. I believe however that those views changed in the course of his service in Yen-an and that in the latter part of his service there he felt that there was less likelihood that they would not strive for monopoly of power. I hope I don't misquote him on that. I have here this report—let me see if I can find some of the passages that are pertinent. He did not say that they were not Marxists, I think I should add, but it was a question of what interpretation they would give to their own Marxism, and if you will permit me I will read this report, the passage that I recall.

"The Chinese Communist Party claims that it is Marxist. By this the Communists mean that their ideology, their philosophical approach, and their dialectical method are based on Marx materialism. Marxism thus becomes to it chiefly an attitude and an approach to problems. It is a long-term view of political and economic developments to which all short-term considerations of temporary advantage or premature power are ruthlessly subordinated. This interpretation of Marxist materialism means to them a certain logical development of economic society. It also means that this natural sequence cannot be short-circuited. To try to do so would be disastrous and a violation of their basic principles of strategy. Thus socialism in their view cannot be evolved at one jump from the present primitive agrarian society of China. It can come only after considerable development of the Chinese autonomy and after it has passed through a stage of at least modified capitalism. Their communism therefore does not mean the immediate overthrow of private capital because there is still almost no capitalism in China. It does not mean the dictatorship of the proletariat because there is as yet no proletariat. It does not mean

collectivism of farms because the political education of the peasants has not yet overcome their primitive individualistic desire to till their own land."

And he goes on at some length here to describe the view, ending with this conclusion:

"By this view the Communist Party becomes a party seeking orderly democratic growth toward socialism, as is being attempted for instance, in a country like England, rather than a party fomenting immediate and violent revolution. It becomes a party which is not seeking an early monopoly of political power but pursuing what it considers the long-term interests in China. It bases this seemingly idealistic policy on a rigid interpretation of materialism which holds it to be a violation of those materialistic principles to attempt to force the country into socialism before the natural development of the country's economy makes socialism possible."

That is the end of that quote.

Q. That, of course, is essential Marxism doctrine, too, is it not?—A. I would say subsequent history has borne out this analysis insofar as it related to the internal economic policies of the Chinese Communist Government. I don't think that Government has at the present moment any intention of collectivizing all Chinese agriculture or stamping out all Chinese capitalism. There is no question about that. It has a judgment here which I think has not actually materialized today and that is that "It is a party seeking orderly democratic growth towards socialism." However I must bear in mind in connection with that statement that he had prior to that time said that if this thing ended in a civil war with ourselves backing the central government of China these Chinese Communists would be impelled more in the direction of Moscow, and that after this time also his reports reflect greater skepticism on this point of whether you would expect a democratic development in the Chinese Communist Party.

Q. I have no further question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Kennan, for taking your valuable time for our benefit. You did a very fine report.

(The witness was dismissed, a short recess was declared, and the Board reconvened to hear continuation of testimony by Mr. John Davies.)

The CHAIRMAN. We will recommence questions by Mr. Stevens.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. Mr. Davies, you will remember on Saturday I asked you about your trip to Yenan?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Sometime between October and January. I wonder if you are familiar with Mr. Service's memorandum 40, about which Mr. Hurley commented a considerable amount in his Senate testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. That is Document No. 193.

A. Yes, I recall this document. I had not seen it, I think, since 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to have a chance to look at it?

A. Well, I can identify it.

Q. Did you receive that when you were in New Delhi or in Yenan, sir?—A. I probably got this in Yenan. I think by that time—I have forgotten, when was Stilwell relieved?

Mr. SERVICE. October 19.

A. I may have gotten that in New Delhi. I doubt if it would have gone through that quickly. If not, I probably saw it in Yenan or Chungking.

Q. Did you ever discuss the contents of that memorandum with other than a Government person in Yenan, sir?—A. No. It was certainly our firm policy not to discuss with any Chinese any American official documents. We went so far as to mark our documents, many of them, "for American official eyes only," some such phraseology as that, because we suspected that some reporting documents by Foreign Service officers were being shown to Chinese officials in Chungking, and it was an established policy with us that we should not reveal to any Chinese in any position what we were reporting about the internal affairs in China.

Q. Would you have revealed that to any newspaperman, sir? Would you have shown that document to anyone other than an official of the United States Government?—A. This document I don't think I would have. I can't conceive of having shown this one because this was obviously a pretty hot document.

Q. Your answer then would be that you did not?—A. That I did not.

Q. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. You never gave a copy of that or sent a copy of that to anyone not in an official capacity?

A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was examining? Were you, Mr. Counsel, examining?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed?

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. We had, I believe, at the end of the proceeding on Saturday been discussing again this matter of the whole matter of policy and dealings with the press, and I believe the last thing we did was introduce an affidavit by Colonel Jones, who was the public relations officer for the theater, so unless the Board wishes to pursue that general subject matter further, I would propose to go on to some other topics.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, proceed.

Mr. STEVENS. May I ask, sir, Document No. 323 is the one you were talking about, that you introduced on Saturday, is it not?

Q. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEVENS. Was that placed in as a part of the transcript or as an exhibit?

Q. It is part of the transcript.

Mr. STEVENS. Right.

Q. Now, Mr. Davies, I wonder if you can summarize in some way for the Board the general views which the political adviser's group, that is the group of political advisers attached to General Stilwell, came to hold regarding the type of solution of the political problems in China which the United States ought to seek to accomplish in order to further our interests in the prosecution of the war there?—A. I think that those views are fairly well summarized in the white paper on China. I don't see much point in reiterating those. You are familiar with them.

Q. But you would say that the views that are expressed there, and I take it you refer particularly to the annex 47 which deals with this phase.—A. Yes.

Q. Fairly represents the thinking of your whole group on this question?—A. Yes. There is one point in the summary or in the white paper which I would like to elaborate on a bit. I might say that I was the only one of the so-called political advisers who attempted to discuss in any detail the broadest problems of international politics, although the interpretations which I advanced were in no way binding on my colleagues, as they were simply the reporting efforts of one or of another junior officer. I believe I am accurate in stating that Mr. Emmerson went along with what I had to say regarding the international scene. I believe that Mr. Service shared with me a basic assumption that the U. S. S. R. would be the principal power rival of the United States in the Far East and that as such the U. S. S. R. was, although at the moment our ally, also our future enemy.

During the period 1943-45 this was not a theme which was widely proclaimed for obvious and sound reasons. However, it was introduced into our reporting at various times. You will find hints of it in the excerpts from our memoranda which I just referred to published in the white paper. I would, with the Board's permission, like to read several further paragraphs from my reports in an endeavor to throw more light on our attitude toward the U. S. S. R. In a memorandum dated September 17, 1943, I discussed Soviet policy in review of global policy, and I had this to say:

"Absorbed in their struggle with the Germans and realizing that they cannot depend upon Britain and the United States to defeat the wehrmacht for them, the Russian policy appears to have been less political than that of the British and the Chinese. In its singleness of purpose—confined to the defeat of the enemy—it has resembled ours.

"But while we follow such a policy from choice, the Russians have done so from necessity. A mortal struggle for survival leaves little slack for political picking and choosing. British policy in 1940 and 1941 and Chinese policy before Pearl Harbor had the same attributes of simplicity.

"Once the Russians feel, however, that they have won their fight for survival and that they have some leeway for maneuver, it will not be surprising if they begin to make their military strategy subservient to an over-all political policy. That point may already have been reached.

"It is perhaps not too early to suggest that Soviet policy will probably be directed initially at establishing frontiers which will insure Russian security and at rehabilitation of the U. S. S. R. There is no reason to cherish optimism regarding a voluntary Soviet contribution to our fight against Japan, whether in the shape of air bases or the early opening of a second front in northeast Asia. The Russians may be expected to move against the Japanese when it

suits their pleasure, which may not be until the final phases of the war—and then only in order to be able to participate in dictating terms to the Japanese and to establish new strategic frontiers.

"At this point it may be worth while to insert comments on our bargaining position. As the Soviet Union's peril diminishes its need for our aid diminishes. In direct proportion as the Kremlin feels its need of American assistance lessening, our bargaining position becomes weaker and we are less able to persuade the Russians to act as we desire. We appear to have made little use of our bargaining strength with the Soviet Union, because, perhaps, we were not prepared to force through what we wanted and because we would not have been prepared to exploit our advantage even had we done so. Now we find our bargaining strength with the Russians slipping away. * * *

A few months later in June, June 24, 1943, I had this to say:

"It would only be natural that, should Chiang attack the Communists, the latter would turn for aid to their immediate neighbor, the Soviet Union. And as such an attack would probably not be launched until after the defeat of Japan, the Communists might expect with good reason to receive Russian aid.

"This would be so because following the defeat of Japan Russia would no longer be threatened on its eastern borders, because the Kremlin's present need of Chiang Kai-shek's cooperation would have passed, because Stalin would then presumably prefer to have a friendly if not satellite Chinese Government on his flank, and because the Soviet Union would then have surplus arms in abundance for export.

"A central government attack would therefore in all probability force the Communists into the willing arms of the Russians. The position of the political doctrinaires who have been subservient to Moscow would be strengthened by such an attack. The present trend of the Chinese Communists toward more or less democratic nationalism—confirmed in 6 years of fighting for the Chinese motherland—would thereby be reversed and they could be expected to retrogress to the position of a Russian satellite.

"In these circumstances they would not be a weak satellite. With Russian arms, with Russian technical assistance and with the popular appeal which they have, the Chinese Communists might be expected to defeat the central government and eventually to take over the control of most if not all of China. It may be assumed that a Russo-Chinese bloc, with China as a subservient member of the partnership, would not be welcomed by us. The effect of such a bloc upon the rest of Asia and upon world stability would be undesirable."

Then on February 19, 1944, I observed:

"Nowhere does Clausewitz's dictum that war is only the continuation of politics by other methods apply with more force than in the Asiatic theater. If we are to plan intelligently the conduct of our war against Japan we must clearly define and understand our long-range political objectives in Asia.

"Presumably we seek in Asia (1) the greatest possible stability after the war, and (2) an alinement of power favorable to us when we again become involved in an Asiatic or Pacific war."

That is the end of the reading.

Q. Now, in that connection you say that you were satisfied that Mr. Service in general agreed with those views, that they represent views held by him as well as by you?—A. Yes: I was convinced of that, and still am.

Q. Do you have knowledge that Mr. Service shared the views that you have just expressed?—A. We had discussed these questions back and forth. He left to me the reporting on the broader, international picture, but this general approach became really the tacit basis upon which the further development of our political ideas with respect to the local situation was worked out.

Q. And I take it that insofar as Senator McCarthy, for example, has charged that Mr. Service thought to turn the whole Far East over to Russia, you would say that that was not any part of his objective, if he shared the views that you just expressed?—A. It would be fantastic because this was the basic assumption, that there was the power conflict with the Soviet Union as the force which would challenge us in a power rivalry at the end of World War II, and that our next problem would be to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming the dominant power in Asia.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. Davies, did you send copies of your reports, such as the ones you have read, to Mr. Service?

A. Yes; copies—well, let me go on. Two of these reports I believe were written before Mr. Service joined me, but he went through the whole files and we discussed this general outlook together, so he was familiar with these and he expressed general agreement.

Mr. STEVENS. Did he express on any of the points you raised disagreement?

A. No, sir.

Q. Now I would like you to look at document No. 35-5. I show you document 35-5, which is already in evidence here, which represents a statement by General Hurley of the policy objectives or slightly varying versions of the policy objectives which he sought to pursue in China.

(Mr. Davies read document 35-5.)

Q. Now I would like to ask you whether on the basis of your knowledge of Mr. Service's writings and your knowledge of his views apart from his writings, whether Mr. Service ever was in disagreement with any of these stated policy objectives?—A. I can't see that he ever was, so far as my knowledge of Mr. Service's reporting and his personal ideas, and so on.

Q. Now referring to document No. 35-3, General Hurley has charged that Mr. Service and other Foreign Service officers in China were pro-Communist. Did you ever hear Mr. Service make any expression of view which would render any support to this charge by General Hurley?—A. American Foreign Service officers are trained to be pro-American first. They are dedicated to that proposition. They evaluate foreign situations—and I say this of Mr. Service now specifically. He evaluated the local Chinese situation, the political factors that were there in terms of what was best for American interests. I never heard him say anything which in my interpretation of the word would be regarded as a bias toward the Chinese Communists. I think that his comments were made as objectively as he knew how to make them, and in that sense I don't see how he could be regarded as pro-Communist.

Q. Do you know who Bishop Paul Yu-pin is, Mr. Davies?—A. I know who he is. I don't know him.

Q. You don't?—A. I am not acquainted with him.

Q. Do you know what his relationship was in 1945 to the Kuomintang, if he had any relation to it?—A. As I recall it, it was a very close relationship with the Chinese Government officials and the Kuomintang. I couldn't go into it any deeper than that because my memory on that question is not detailed.

Q. It has been charged by Bishop Paul Yu-pin, as well as by others including Congressman Dondero and Senator McCarthy, that Mr. Service in effect kept hammering at General Stilwell to force General Stilwell to make demands on Chiang Kai-shek to arm the Communist Party, the Chinese Communist Party forces. Can you tell the board just how close a personal relationship Mr. Service had with General Stilwell?—A. General Stilwell had very few personal intimates. He took very few people into his confidence, including his intimates. His habit was to listen and to make up his own mind, and one was not always certain what his own conclusions were as a result of one's own comments. As for Mr. Service and his relationship with General Stilwell, I believe that General Stilwell had a feeling of considerable friendship for Mr. Service but obviously he regarded Mr. Service as a junior officer whose views he would listen to, take under consideration, but General Stilwell always made up his own mind as to what he was going to do.

Q. During the period Mr. Service was attached to General Stilwell's staff, Mr. Service was first in Chungking from August of 1943 until about July 1944—is that approximately correct according to your recollection?—A. According to my recollection; yes.

Q. And then at that time he went to Yenan with the observer mission, did he not?—A. Yes.

Q. And was there until October 1944 when General Stilwell was recalled, is that correct?—A. As I recall it.

Q. During that period, did Mr. Service have frequent opportunity for personal contact with General Stilwell?—A. I was not in Chungking at the time, so I can't answer it except as I knew from what Mr. Service had told me, which was that it was not frequent.

Q. As a matter of fact, was General Stilwell in Chungking very much?—A. General Stilwell was—he went to Chungking always reluctantly and left always as soon as he could. I don't recall whether General Stilwell was there—

Q. I am talking roughly now about the period August 1943 until roughly the—well, the year from the middle of 1943 to the middle of 1944.—A. You are being very subtle with me now! Wasn't he in Burma then? I have forgotten.

Q. My impression is that he was engaged in fighting somewhere but I don't recall.—A. Yes. I imagine he was in the depths of the Burma campaign. Is that—

Q. My impression has been that he was largely engaged during that period in actual military operations elsewhere.—A. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that your impression?

A. Yes. I don't recall definitely; but yes, when the Burma campaign was going on—and that was in late 1943, I believe, and early 1944, and that is the period you are covering, isn't it?

Q. Yes.—A. The great complaint was that General Stilwell was down in the mud in Burma all the time, instead of up in his headquarters in Chungking. When he was in Chungking, as I said, he kept very much to himself. When one saw him, he listened, made his own decisions, but he was a man who operated and lived quite a lonely life with very few intimates. I would not consider Mr. Service as one of General Stilwell's real intimates.

Q. Now, during the period from July, end of July 1944 until October 19, 1944, which is when General Stilwell was recalled, Mr. Service was in Yen-an. Was General Stilwell, as far as you know, ever in Yen-an during this period?—A. No, he was not in Yen-an during this period.

Q. So that any attempts by Mr. Service to influence General Stilwell would have had to have been largely through the written reports that he prepared, is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. Are you familiar with—as I understand, all of the reports which Mr. Service prepared, copies of all reports which Mr. Service prepared were sent to you, is that correct?—A. That is right.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of Mr. Service's insistence in any of these reports to General Stilwell that General Stilwell make demands on Chiang Kai-shek to arm some 300,000 Communist troops?—A. I do not recall any such recommendation. Certainly there would be no insistence or importunities on the part of a junior reporting officer to a theater commander.

Q. Bishop Paul Yu-pin is reported to have said that Mr. Service made at least three such insistent demands, kept coming back at General Stilwell, and finally caused General Stilwell to go to Chiang Kai-shek and make these demands on Chiang, and that thereafter Chiang requested President Roosevelt to recall General Stilwell. Does that accord with either your understanding of the circumstances under which General Stilwell was recalled or is it consistent with any activities of Mr. Service that you knew about?—A. On the basis of my information, that is a ridiculous charge. General Stilwell, I might add, had been trying to obtain control over Chinese troops since 1942. That was the beginning of his attempts to get control over the Chinese armies because he had very little confidence in the Chinese generals with whom he was associated and he felt that there was no discipline in the higher echelons of the Chinese Army and that the only way the Chinese fighting forces could be made effective was to have them brought under American control. That was irrespective of what political stripe the Chinese troops might be, whether they were Central Government troops, provincial troops, dissident troops in the southeast, or Communist troops.

Q. Referring back to your testimony for a few moments ago about General Stilwell's personal relations with his associates, whom would you regard as possibly the person who was on most intimate personal terms with General Stilwell, in terms of his associates around him?—A. I should think General—now Colonel—Frank Dorn, who had been an assistant military attaché with General Stilwell in 1938, who was a China language officer from the Army, who had been General Stilwell's aide when General Stilwell first went out to China after Pearl Harbor, and who was later in command of the operations on the Salween River operating from Yunnan Province.

Q. Referring to Document No. 33-6, a newspaper reporter by the name of Ray Richards has stated, Mr. Davies, that Mr. Service allegedly made a special mission to Moscow, roughly in the summer of 1944, to aid the Red group of the United States Embassy there in weakening the will of Chiang Kai-shek not to submit to North China Communist demands. Do you know whether Mr. Service was ever in Moscow?—A. He was not. He was never in Moscow.

Q. And you have personal knowledge that he could not have been there during the year 1944?—A. I do.

Mr. ACHILLES. From the contents that looks like a journalistic slip, it is intended to be Chungking rather than Moscow.

Q. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any? (None.)

Thank you very much.

Mr. DAVIES. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been very helpful.

(The witness was dismissed, the board adjourned for a short recess and reconvened.)

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. RHETTS. At this point I should like to introduce into the transcript Document No. 46, which is an affidavit of Arthur W. Grafton, consisting of 12 pages, dated April 24, 1950. May that be included in the transcript?

The CHAIRMAN. That may be included in the transcript.

(The material referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 46

AFFIDAVIT OF ARTHUR W. GRAFTON

STATE OF KENTUCKY,

County of Jefferson, ss:

Arthur W. Grafton, being first duly sworn according to law, states upon his oath as follows:

I am a practicing lawyer of Louisville, Kentucky. I was born in 1907 at Hsuehoufu, China. My father, the Reverend Thomas B. Grafton, was a native of Mississippi, and my mother, Lettie Taylor Grafton, was a native of Louisville, Kentucky. Except for a year in America when I was five and another year when I was twelve, in the course of my parents' sabbatical furloughs to the United States, I spent the first seventeen years of my life in China. For four school years (1919-1920, 1921-1924) I attended high school in the Shanghai American School, my parents at that time being stationed at Haichow, Kiangsu Province. During the course of my years in China I became well acquainted with John Stewart Service, who was likewise a missionary's son and went to Shanghai to school.

In 1924 I returned to the United States and for four years attended Presbyterian College of South Carolina, Clinton, South Carolina, from which I graduated in 1928. In that year I came to Louisville, attending Jefferson School of Law from which I graduated in 1930. I have been continuously engaged in the practice here since my admission to the Bar in the fall of 1930, except for a short period from January to June, 1942, when I was counsel for the Defense Plant Corporation in Washington, from June 1942 to August 1945 when I was on active duty with the Army Air Forces, and from August 1945 until December 1945 again with Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Washington.

In June 1942 I was commissioned a First Lieutenant in the Army Air Forces, went to the Air Forces Intelligence School at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and beginning about the first of July 1942, was assigned to the Current Intelligence Section of A-2 of the Headquarters, Army Air Forces in Washington. There I was also assigned to the China-Burma-India Theater of operations, with the primary duty of keeping the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and his Washington staff informed daily as to significant developments in the CBI Theater. I remained at this station until March of 1943. At that time I proceeded under order to New Delhi, India, where I was assigned to the Rear Echelon Headquarters of the Commanding General, CBI Theater (General Stilwell) and placed in the G-3 Section under then Colonel later General Frank A. Merrill. Late in June of 1943 I was transferred to Kunming, China, where I was Assistant G-3 in the headquarters of the Commanding General of what was known as the Y Forces Operations Staff (YFOS), commanded by Colonel later Brigadier General Frank A. Dorn. November 25, 1943, I was transferred back to Delhi, and assigned in the Intelligence Section of the newly established headquarters of the Commanding General for the Army Air Forces in the India-Burma sector of the CBI Theater (General George E. Stratemeyer). In March of 1944 I moved with his headquarters to Hastings Mill outside of Calcutta where I remained stationed until sent home on furlough in April of 1945. My orders to return to General Stratemeyer's headquarters at the conclusion of leave were cancelled and superseded while I was in the United States due to V-E Day intervening, and I remained unassigned until shortly after VJ-Day in August when I was relieved from active duty.

During my entire tour of duty in Washington, India, and China, I was charged with the responsibility of keeping informed as to the general situation in India, Burma, and China, as such situation affected current military operations. Beginning in Washington in July 1942 I was required to and did study all available current information concerning our own and the enemy's actions in China in order to keep the Commanding General and his staff informed. This included the study of radio and written reports from the military headquarters in the theater, as well as State Department reports reflecting upon political developments. More than any other theater, the CBI Theater was one in which

the political situation played a major role. In 1942 we had no combat troops of our own in China except for a very small Air Force detachment of the 10th Air Force under General Chenault. This force was gradually built up between 1942 and 1945 into the 14th Air Force, but at no time did it constitute a major military force in comparison to our forces in other theaters, and the existence and effectiveness of the 14th Air Force was in large measure wholly dependent upon the cooperation of the Chinese and the ability of the Chinese to provide and protect suitable bases from which the 14th could operate.

Except for the action of the 14th Air Force (severely restricted as to the scope of its operations by the difficulty of supply over the Hump) our forces in China were largely bystanders without the means to influence the outcome of the struggle for the Chinese mainland. The actual fighting with the enemy depended upon the Chinese themselves and General Stilwell's staff was primarily concerned with encouragements and advice to the Chinese and such supplies as could be gradually built up over the Hump. The Chinese effort or really lack of effort was in turn dictated almost entirely by political considerations, and an understanding of at least the major forces in the political background was an absolute essential to any sort of study of the military problems we were considering. In fact, the more one studied and learned about the political forces at work, the more it became apparent that events in China were going to be dictated by political rather than military moves. Increasingly, therefore, it became necessary for me to devote time and attention to the political reports which came to us principally through the Embassy in Chungking and through General Stilwell's political advisers who were in turn members of the Embassy Staff detached to him for that purpose.

From the military intelligence standpoint, evaluation of the information coming out of China was impossible without an understanding of the political situation. In the first place, we had very few primary sources of intelligence of our own. Detailed information as to the enemy Order of Battle, both Air and Ground, their capabilities and intentions, originated almost wholly from Chinese sources and was traditionally edited and colored for the purpose of further political ends. We knew from experience that most of this information was fed to us not for the purpose of informing us as to the facts, but for the purpose of influencing particular attitudes or actions on the part of the Americans. The daily communiques issued by the Chinese Ministry of Information at Chungking were almost wholly fictional and fanciful and were never given any substantial credence by our Intelligence Staff. To a lesser degree, official intelligence reports made to us through Chinese Army channels were likewise suspect and had to be weighed against the known political objectives.

When I got to India in March of 1943 I was delighted to learn that Jack Service and John Davies were acting as political advisers to General Stilwell. I had known John Davies like Jack Service in China as a boy, and I knew them both to have an exceptionally broad understanding of Chinese thinking and politics. Knowing them personally, and particularly knowing their background in China, I felt that they could be of tremendous help in the job of sifting the wheat from the chaff in the intelligence reports which were emanating from Chinese sources. I read every report which came into our headquarters from these two men during my entire tour of duty in the theater.

In the spring of 1943 Davies was primarily stationed in Delhi and Service was in China. Service's reports came through the office of General Stilwell's G-2 in Chungking, who I believe at that time was Colonel Dickey. I am sure that Colonel Dickey was the G-2 later in 1943 and during 1944.

In June of 1943 when I reported to General Dorn's staff, I found our problem more than ever tied to and dependent upon the Chinese political situation. The YFOS was a headquarters set up by General Stilwell in Kunming for the purpose of directing the operations of an Infantry training school and an Artillery training school in the Kunming area, where, according to plan, some fifteen divisions of Chinese troops were to be trained and equipped to combat efficiency. In addition, this staff was charged with the duty of preparation of a plan, in collaboration with the Chinese military headquarters in Kunming, for an ultimate launching of an attack on Burma from the Chinese side with a view of making a juncture with the X Forces, which was a name assigned to the Chinese divisions being trained in India, and which were designed to and ultimately did attack the Japanese in northern Burma through the Ledo Road.

After the establishment of the Infantry and Artillery schools, it was the duty of YFOS to negotiate with the Chinese concerning which troops were to be trained

and equipped and to make estimates as to the progress of the training and the combat capabilities of the troops as trained.

The Chinese army then, as now, varied widely in quality as between divisions and armies, being largely the reflection of the personality, ambitions, and political power of their commanders. We obviously wanted to get the best divisions possible assigned for this training, but were constantly faced with the fact that political considerations in China dictated what troops were made available and when.

The determination of which divisions we would try to get for training and the estimate as to whether or not particular troops would be assigned was largely a question of understanding Chinese politics. Repeatedly we were promised that particular divisions would be moved into the training area and repeatedly these promises were broken or countermanded. The best troops, according to our information, were largely immobilized in northwest China facing the Communists and were not made available either for training for eventual combat in Burma or even for the important task of guarding the forward fields of the 14th Air Force from possible enemy ground action. The units that actually were assigned for training were far below these troops in numbers, physical condition, equipment, and morale, and as a result the target date for the beginning of actual operations from the China side was repeatedly postponed. It was one long frustration and in the end the attack which had been originally planned for early 1944 only materialized in 1945 and contributed but little to the reconquest of northern Burma.

While I was in Kunming, Jack Service was there on at least two occasions. The first, to the best of my recollection, was in July, and on that occasion he and I renewed our boyhood acquaintance and discussed the military and political situation in China at considerable length. Jack at that date had spent considerable time in northwest China in the general area where the Nationalist armies were engaged in containing the Communists, and personally knew a great deal about the strength and disposition of the Nationalist forces there. I had previously noted his reports on this subject and was glad to get from him first-hand information as to general conditions in that part of China. He was also able to give me some highly useful information as to the nature and position of the various Chinese political parties then engaged in the constant struggle for power within the Nationalist Government, and filled me in on the personalities of a great many of Chinese political and military figures whose names appeared in the many reports which I was studying.

Another occasion in Kunming when I had a chance to talk with Jack at length was in November 1943, just prior to my return to India.

I did not thereafter have contact with Jack until in April of 1945 when I was returning home on leave. At that time he was likewise returning to Washington to make a report on the situation in China, and he and I traveled in the same plane from Calcutta as far as Casablanca. In the three days we were together then he told me about his recent visit to Yenan and what he had learned of the Chinese Communists first-hand and his general impression, most of which had already been embodied in a series of reports which had come to me through Colonel Dickey's office in Chungking. Some of these reports have since been published, excerpts at least appearing in the State Department publications concerning our relations with China.

During all these times both in the consideration and study of the reports which Service prepared and in the personal conversations and consultations with him, I never had any reason to doubt nor do I now doubt his complete loyalty to the United States. In the face of the almost complete frustration to which we were all subjected by reason of the tactics of the Chinese Government, it was probably impossible for anyone to remain completely objective in reporting on the Chinese, but within this general limitation, I felt that Jack's reporting was the kind of objective, accurate, and searching analysis of the existing situation that was most sorely needed. I have had but little opportunity to check on the accuracy of the details contained in these reports, but the correctness of his over-all estimates of the situation was repeatedly borne out by the day-to-day events. Particularly it seems that his long-range predictions as to the course of political affairs in China were startlingly accurate, especially when considered in the light of the apparent capabilities of the Nationalist forces and the apparent weakness and geographical isolation of the Communists.

In none of the many conversations with Jack did I detect any indication of personal Communist leanings on his part, or any indication of sympathy with the aims of Soviet Russia and world communism. He expressed the conviction that

the Chinese Communist had found a way to gain and hold mass support from the people. We at the same time had prepared an intelligence estimate to the effect that the Japanese could at will overrun our forward airfields in China. If his opinion was pro-Communist, then ours was pro-Japanese. Events shortly demonstrated that both estimates were accurate. In my judgment Jack's reports were nothing more nor less than objective conclusions on a subject vital to every phase of our effort in China based upon first-hand observation by a man singularly well trained by background and experience to understand the reactions and probable attitudes of the Chinese people.

Such reporting was in my judgment invaluable. If we needed or could have used intelligence reports tinged with wishful thinking and ostrichlike ignoring of the basic facts, we were abundantly supplied with them through both Chinese military and political sources on the Nationalist side.

Since charges have been leveled at Jack Service based in part at least upon his reports on China, I have reread such of the reports as I could locate, and I am still unable to detect in them anything which would remotely justify the slightest suspicion that Jack was doing any more than the job that was expected of him by the Commanding General to whom he was attached, and that was to ascertain the facts, interpret them in the light of his broad Chinese experience, and express whatever conclusions resulted therefrom. The only thing to be regretted is that we did not have more men doing as good a job as Jack did, and that his reports and those of the few who saw as clearly as he did were not given more serious consideration in the making of our over-all plans for Asia.

I understand that there is some criticism or suspicion directed at Jack because certain of his political information was disclosed to and known by the press both through correspondents accredited to the theater and through reporters and editors located in this country. Without knowing what particular information is thought to have been wrongfully disclosed, I do think it important that people generally realize that in most operating theaters, according to my understanding, and in the CBI Theater, according to my personal experience, there was a very wide range of disclosure to the accredited correspondents of the American press of the type of information that for general security purposes was classified all the way from Restricted to Top Secret. The policy of keeping the press representatives thoroughly briefed was one initiated from the very top. The fact that the CBI Theater was, as heretofore stated, as much influenced by local politics as by enemy action, made it apparent to the respective officers in charge that political background was an essential to an understanding by the American press and people of the manifold difficulties confronting military operations. The representatives of the press in the theater were, with but few exceptions, men of understanding, capacity, and discretion, and in many instances were as well informed or better informed through their own sources than the military headquarters which they visited. There was a constant interchange of information along these lines which was helpful to a high degree. Not only, therefore, was there a general understanding that the accredited American correspondents were to be taken into our confidence in regard to most of our military operations, but we were permitted to discuss freely with them our information and personal ideas as to the political situation. On more than one occasion I was specifically directed by my superior officers to brief correspondents on matters which came to my knowledge through classified documents, and nearly all of the political reports to which I have referred were classified either Confidential or Secret.

The political advisers to General Stilwell were naturally the best sources for this type of information for the correspondents, and it was only natural that they tended to discuss these matters at length. Not only was it well known that such discussions took place, but I am under the impression that they were encouraged by the commanding officers involved. I certainly never heard anyone criticized or reprimanded for frank discussions with American correspondents.

So far as I can recall there were but two military subjects which were beyond the range of permissible discussion. One was anything relating to plans for future military operations and the other was any discussion of the intelligence gained from radio intercepts. These two subjects, however, were restricted within the ranks of military personnel themselves, and even in General Arnold's War Room in Washington, where admittance was only to the highest ranking Air Force officers, these two subjects were never discussed or hinted at.

I would be very much surprised to find that there was any substantial amount of information contained in the political reports which I received that was not well known by at least a half a dozen of the better-informed correspondents

for the American press who were operating in China and India during the times that the reports were current.

Dated at Louisville, Kentucky, this 24 day of April 1950.

(S) Arthur W. Grafton,
ARTHUR W. GRAFTON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and County aforesaid, by Arthur W. Grafton, to me personally known, this the 24 day of April 1950.

My commission expires December 19, 1951.

(S) LILLIAN FLEISCHER,
Notary Public, Jefferson County, Kentucky.

Mr. RHETTS. Now I would like to offer document No. 47, which is the text of a communication from Col. David D. Barrett, assistant military attache, at Taipei, Formosa, to John S. Service, dated April 1950.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be included in the record, in the transcript.
(The matter referred to as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 47

"TEXT OF COMMUNICATION FROM COL. DAVID D. BARRETT, ASSISTANT ATTACHÉ AT TAIPEI, FORMOSA, TO JOHN S. SERVICE, APRIL 1950

"Over 1 year ago at request of Department of State I made detailed report on subject of your radio and my letter should be on file. During period we served in Yenan your views and recommendations on subject of Chinese Communists were set forth in reports submitted through official channels and I believe these should be carefully considered in connection with any investigation of your loyalty. In my opinion, these reports indicated that you, like myself and some others serving in China at that time, were deceived to some extent by Chinese Communist advocacy of agrarian reform, by careful soft-pedaling of their adherence to Marxian doctrine, by ardent professions of support of democratic ideals and undying friendship for the United States, and by other plays intended to gain United States support. I never saw in these reports any signs of disloyalty or desire to hurt the United States. In our discussions of Chinese Communists while we were in Yenan our primary consideration was part they could play in fighting common enemy and I do not believe any idea of helping communism as such ever occurred to you any more than it did to me. Seems to me essential to bear in mind that Chinese Communists and Soviet Union and other nations and groups then fighting on our side presented much different picture than from what they do today. In my association with you in Yenan and elsewhere in China theater I always considered you highly security-conscious and intensely loyal to your country. As for charges you passed secret documents to unauthorized persons anywhere it would require more convincing proof than has apparently ever been presented to agencies hitherto investigating you to make me believe them. Above included in written affidavit which follows by pouch."

(Mr. Robert W. Barnett, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Will you state your full name and address, please, sir?—A. Robert Warren Barnett, 4225 Forty-ninth Street NW., Washington, D. C.

Q. Are you acquainted with Mr. John Service, Mr. Barnett?—A. Yes.

Q. Will you describe when you first met him and the nature of your association with him since that time?

The CHAIRMAN. Before you do that why don't you qualify Mr. Barnett? Just state what he is doing.

Q. What is your present position, Mr. Barnett?—A. Mr. Chairman, I am now an employee of the Department of State. I am assigned to the Office of China Affairs, where I have the title of Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs. I have been working in the Department of State since the fall of 1945, and until my assignment to the Office of China Affairs I was in the economic part of the Department working primarily on Japanese questions.

Q. And you came with the Department in the fall of 1945?—A. That is right.

Q. What were you doing prior to that time?—A. I was in the Department of the Army, the War Department, immediately prior to coming to the State Department.

Q. In what capacity?—A. I was in the Military Intelligence Service of G-2, and I had been assigned there in May of 1945. Prior to that time I had been on the staff of General Chenault in China for some 22 months, where I was the assistant A-2 in charge of all combat intelligence for the Fourteenth Air Force Headquarters. Prior to then I was in Army schools in this country.

Q. Now, I believe you have stated that you were acquainted with Mr. Service. Would you tell the Board when you first met him and describe your association with him since that time?—A. My father happens to be the general secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association in this country, and prior to that he was the head of the YMCA in China. Mr. Service's father was a secretary of the YMCA, too. Our families were intimately acquainted with each other for many years. The Services were stationed in Szechwan and my family lived in east China in Hangchow and Shanghai. In 1922 I entered the Shanghai American School, which was an American institution and mainly supported by the missionaries throughout China that wanted an American school to which to send their children, and also supported by the business community and some of the official American community in China. Sometime following 1922, I think it must have been about 1925, the Service boys—there were several of them—started coming to Shanghai, and I first became acquainted with Jack in Shanghai in the mid or late twenties. I forget exactly what year it was. Jack was 2 or 3 years ahead of me in high school and grammar school. He was active in the Boy Scouts and various campus activities, and we got to know each other quite well, but not terribly intimately at that time. Jack went away to college and so did I, and our paths did not really cross in such a way that we could get acquainted with each other well until 1940, when Jack was assigned to the consulate general in Shanghai and I was in Shanghai writing a book on Shanghai under the joint sponsorship of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

My book was to be a part of the so-called inquiry series and was published in 1941. Jack was on Consul General Lockhart's staff and I saw a good deal of him socially. I didn't see too much of him in connection with my research because Jack's interests were not primarily economic and my connections with the consulate were primarily with Bland Calder and some of his Chinese assistants. The consulate general's staff was very cooperative in assisting me to make contact with members of the British and American and the Japanese business community and also in providing me with statistical and factual information which would have been quite difficult for me to have compiled myself in the short period that I was in Shanghai.

Jack was at that time hoping to be assigned to west China, and the next time I saw him was in 1942 when I was sent out by United China Relief to do an economic survey of China. The survey was intended to assist United China Relief in developing a program of relief for free China after the Burma Road had been lost. Jack was very helpful to me at that time in making contacts with members of the Chinese Cabinet people, like Wang Chung Hui—I believe he was Foreign Minister at the time—T. F. Chiang, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, the Kungs—in fact, the whole range of people in Chungking who were anxious to establish an effective working arrangement with the people in this country who were interested in going on supplying relief to the Chinese.

As you know, United China Relief was supported primarily by existing relief agencies but had been brought together through the active intervention of Mr. Henry Luce, who was the principal angel of the enterprise, coming in with financial assistance in a magnitude that would make it worth while for the agencies to work together rather than to work separately. My trip to China that time was a brief one. I was there only six weeks.

The next time I saw Jack was in the fall of 1943, when I had been assigned to General Chenault's headquarters, and Jack, I believe, had just been assigned to General Stilwell's headquarters, and we of course were very glad to see each other for personal reasons, but since his functions were largely in the political sphere and mine were exclusively in the military sphere, we did not have continuous or very close connections with each other during the war. In fact, I left Kunming during my 22 months' assignment out there only once prior to preparing to leave the theater. It was in early March that I had occasion to go to Chungking, and while in Chungking I saw Jack, together with a great many of my other friends there.

The occasion for my going, if you wish me to just continue in this manner——

Q. Go right ahead.—A. The occasion for my going was to obtain theater clearance for a manuscript which I had prepared at the request of General Chennault and General Glenn. This manuscript was entitled, "An Orientation Booklet for United States Military Personnel in China." It was written at a time when we thought that the war might last another year or two and it was intended for use by officers and noncommissioned officers already in the theater or who were expected to arrive in the theater. The Burma Road had quite recently been opened and we expected a huge expansion of American personnel in China. For some 15 to 18 months it had been one of my functions at the Fourteenth Air Force Headquarters to give daily briefings to General Chennault and weekly briefings on the military and economic and political situation in China to all transient personnel passing through Kunming who had any right to this kind of information. We had generals coming in and we had Intelligence sergeants coming in on Friday mornings, map room, and so on, so it was not very much of a trick for me to put in the manuscript what I knew to be the answers to the questions which this type of officer had on his mind.

I am sorry I don't have a copy of the book with me, but it breaks down into some 12 to 14 chapters something on the historical background of the war, organization of the Japanese Army, the organization of our own forces, the economics of the war, the combat record, our own combat record, the history of the campaigns that the Japanese had fought, some comment on the place of the China war and the Pacific war, and I had written a chapter on the Chinese political situation which I knew had to be handled discreetly, because although the booklet was classified "Restricted" we intended to print 10,000 copies of the booklet and it was quite certain that at least 1 copy would fall into the hands of the Chinese.

I chose to write this political chapter in such terms that neither the Kuomintang Party leaders nor the Chinese Communist Party leaders could find offense in it. That was a hard thing to do, but I thought it was a possible thing to do, because at that time both parties argued that they stood on the principles of the San Min Chu I of the Sun Yat Sen, so I described Sun Yat Sen's position in Chinese history, the development of the Kuomintang, an explanation of the way they applied the political doctrines of Sun Yat Sen to the China situation, and then concluded with a section on how the Chinese Communists had interpreted the same principles as their body of doctrine.

This manuscript was cleared by the Fourteenth Air Force Headquarters, the A-2 Colonel Williams, and the Chief of Staff General Glenn, it had been read by other members of the headquarters: Hank Byroade, for instance, was in headquarters at that time. I went to Chungking to clear this manuscript and it was read there by the G-2 Colonel Dickey, members of the G-2 staff, and other general headquarters staff officers, and generally cleared through all of these people with a few revisions and amendments, but it was felt that the political adviser to General Stilwell's headquarters should have a crack at it and approve it if possible, and that was Jack, so I had a professional reason for calling on Jack. I let him see the manuscript and he kept it a couple of days and he returned it to Colonel Dickey with a recommendation that this political chapter be deleted from the book on the grounds that whereas it was a fair and fairly innocuous treatment of the problem of the Kuomintang-Communist ideological friction, the Kuomintang would find offensive any Government publication which recognized the existence of the Communists. Now that was unquestionably the case, and I had not thought of that. Actually a few weeks later the theater headquarters under General Wedemeyer brought out a directive which prohibited the discussion of any political issues at all by military personnel in China. With that amendment in the manuscript, the manuscript was cleared, I brought it back and it was published. I would be glad to give you a copy at some time.

Q. I don't think that will be necessary.

(Off-record discussion.)

Q. Now, based on your knowledge of and acquaintance and association with Mr. Service, and apart from the instance that you have just given concerning his acute sensitivity to avoid political friction between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, would you be able to express an opinion to the Board as to whether Mr. Service has ever to your knowledge expressed any views or in any other way conducted himself so as to indicate that he was a Communist or a Communist sympathizer?—A. To my knowledge Jack has never done or said anything which would lead me to think that he was either a Communist or

avored the expansion of Communist influence and power anywhere in the world. Jack has, in my opinion, been critical of the Kuomintang Party in the Government of China only where he felt that those criticisms had a bearing on what the United States could do to strengthen Chinese potential as a country which would be aligned with our own in the preservation of a peaceful and progressive world. The criticisms that he has made of China have not been different from criticisms that many people have made, including many Chinese.

Q. Would you say, including many non-Communist Chinese?—A. Certainly.

Q. So far as your knowledge of him goes, do you have any reason to doubt that he is an entirely loyal American citizen?—A. None whatever.

Q. I have no further questions.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES :

Q. Mr. Barnett, you mentioned that you were in Shanghai, I believe at one point, writing a book under the joint auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation and Institute of Pacific Relations. What was your connection, the extent of your connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?—A. In 1937 I received a Rockefeller Foundation fellowship to study Chinese at Yale University. I held that fellowship for 2 years, and at the end of that period of time I was looking for a job. I heard at that time that the Rockefeller Foundation was granting fellowships to a number of people—I don't know whether it was four or six—but a number of people who would serve internships in the Foreign Policy Association, the Council of Foreign Relations, and the Institute of Pacific Relations. Two of these fellowships were to the IPR and were for 1 year. It didn't pay very much. I think it was \$1,500 a year. I got one of those two appointments as an intern on the staff. Being an intern, I was treated as a staff member and acted as a staff member. I wrote for the Far Eastern Survey. As a matter of fact, I believe I wrote the first comprehensive analysis of the Chinese industrial cooperative movement. That was a movement which had the warmest kind of support from the fellow travelers who were keenly interested in supporting the Chinese Communist cause in this country. My analysis happened to be very critical of the Chinese industrial cooperatives on the grounds that it could not succeed as an economic venture because cooperatives are too weak in an inflationary situation to be real cooperatives. They had to be subsidized by the government or by big financial interests in order to survive at all.

The other enterprise that I was particularly interested in was an analysis of economic conditions in Shanghai, and my series of articles on that subject interested the foundation, and when my internship expired the foundation found the money to send me out to Shanghai to write the book on Shanghai.

So that was my connection with the IPR before going out. When I came back from the trip to the Far East—I was not only in Shanghai but Japan and Hong-kong and Chungking as well—I was employed by United China Relief to work as a member of the committee, executive secretary of the program committee of the United China Relief, and I worked in that capacity for some months, almost a year.

Q. That was still the IPR or United China Relief?—A. United China Relief paid my salary, but the program committee's headquarters of operation was in the same building with Institute of Pacific Relations.

Q. About how long was your connection, such as it was, with the IPR?—A. I would like for these purposes to consider my period of duty with the United China Relief as being a part of my duty with the Institute of Pacific Relations. That is not the case, but since the headquarters were the same, I would like to discuss my associations with those, the United China Relief connection the same as the Institute of Pacific Relations connection. Bearing that in mind, I had an association with the Institute of Pacific Relations from the early fall of 1939 until the fall of 1942.

Q. About 3 years.—A. And during that period of time I was abroad twice, once under the Rockefeller Institute of Pacific Relations auspices, and the second time under the United China Relief auspices only.

Q. Had you any knowledge at that time of Communist infiltration in the IPR?—A. I was aware of course that Fred Field wrote for the New Masses and was occasionally, I believe, a contributor to the Daily Worker. His views on China and the Far East were in my opinion identical with those of Mr. Browder. There were other members of the staff whose political views and prejudices corresponded very closely to those of Mr. Field. However, during that period of time there were on the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations people who

disagreed violently with Mr. Field. I do not like to name names but I will in this connection, Kurt Block, for instance, who is now on the staff of Fortune, agreed on practically nothing with Fred Field. Russell Shiman, who was the editor of the Far East Survey, during that period disagreed with Fred. I disagreed with Fred. The IPR had a staff during the period from 1938 to 1942, when I ceased to have a close connection with it, which reflected practically every prejudice in the whole spectrum of American opinion on far eastern questions. The IPR headquarters in New York was a very stimulating place to study far eastern questions and be exposed to expert discussion on far eastern matters.

Q. May I interject? What I really was getting at is that you did recognize that influence in Field's and some other staff members' writings?—A. Certainly.

Q. Did you find any similarity at any time between the views Mr. Service was expressing and that type of view as expressed in the IPR?—A. Well, it is very important to be exact in what you are talking about in this connection. For instance, Field, Jaffe, and Service probably were all advocating an embargo on shipments of scrap iron to Japan during that period of time. I would have to document that, but I think that that is correct. But Stimson was too, and Stimson organized an organization called the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression. Literally, I mean, that was the name of the organization. A whole missionary group supported that enterprise. A large proportion of the business community supported the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression. So did the majority of the academic community. So a correspondence of views with Communists during that period of time did not necessarily indicate any sympathy with communism.

Q. Did you see anything in his writings which did?—A. In whose writings?

Q. Mr. Service's?—A. I don't think I have ever read anything of Mr. Service's except what appeared in the white paper.

The CHAIRMAN. No questions? Did you have anything further?

Mr. RHETTS. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Barnett.

Mr. BARNETT. I hope I have not taken too much of your time.

The CHAIRMAN. Not at all.

(The witness was dismissed.)

Mr. RHETTS. I should now like to offer for inclusion in the transcript a two-page affidavit signed by Col. Samuel B. Griffith, II, colonel, United States Marine Corps, dated April 19, 1950, as document 54.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 54

NEWPORT, R. I., 19 April, 1950.

STATEMENT OF COL. SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH, II, COLONEL, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1. I have known Mr. John S. Service since late 1935. Mr. Service came to Peiping, China, in December of that year as a language officer at the American Embassy. I was then a captain in the United States Marine Corps assigned to the office of the American naval attaché as a Chinese language student. During the next two years a firm friendship, which had grown stronger with the passage of time, was established between our families.

2. I know Jack Service intimately. My wife and I frequently visited his home in China. We have since exchanged visits when possible. I believe that Jack Service is an exceptionally intelligent man, and an able and conscientious Foreign Service officer. I have every reason to believe this, and no reason whatsoever to believe otherwise. Mr. Service has always struck me as a keen observer and a reserved and reflective man whose opinions as to Chinese affairs based on a thorough background knowledge, are entitled to attention and respect.

3. Mr. Service has never given me any reason to doubt that he is a loyal American and a devoted public servant. The idea that he could harbor "disloyal" thoughts, or utter "disloyal" sentiments, or be "pro-Communist" or in any sense be a "poor security risk," could not be entertained by anyone who knows him.

4. I have served nearly 5 years in China, both before and since the last war. I have always tried to keep myself informed of the Chinese situation to the best

of my ability. After the war I had several assignments which assisted me in doing this: One of these was as Nanking Liaison Officer on the staff of the Commander of the U. S. Seventh Fleet, Admiral Cooke. If it is alleged that despatches written from China during the war, and later printed in the State Department "white paper" lend credence to the charge that Mr. Service is "disloyal," I would say that they reflect a keen appreciation of conditions, which having had their inception many years ago, were readily apparent to those who served in China after the war and who were attempting to arrive at the truth.

5. My long and intimate association with Mr. Service makes it possible for me to state that he is too loyal to his Department and his country to obscure or distort facts, or to render opinions not based on a realistic appraisal of those facts, or to make recommendations not consonant with the interests of the United States Government, of which he is, in my opinion, an outstanding diplomatic officer of unimpeachable integrity.

SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH II,
*Colonel, United States Marine Corps,
Staff, Naval War College, Newport, R. I.*

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND,
County of Newport:

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of April, A. D. 1950.

BENJAMIN D. OLSON, *Notary Public.*

My commission expires June 30, 1951.

Mr. RHETTS. I would like at this time to ask the Board whether it does not have a letter addressed to Gen. Conrad E. Snow, dated May 10, 1950, signed Brooks Atkinson?

CHAIRMAN. The answer is yes.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to ask that this letter be included in the transcript at this point as document number 97.

CHAIRMAN. It may be so included.

DOCUMENT No. 97

THE NEW YORK TIMES,
Times Square, May 10, 1950.

MR. CONRAD E. SNOW,
*Chairman, Loyalty Security Board
Department of State, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. SNOW: Since I will be traveling in other parts of the country for the next two or three weeks I am afraid I shall not be available in person for the hearing of John S. Service. In the circumstances I wish to accept your invitation, contained in your letter of March 23, to send a letter in support of him.

My association with Mr. Service was confined to the years of 1942-44 when I was in China as war correspondent for the New York Times and he represented the State Department there. We were interested in many of the same problems and I was closely associated with him personally and professionally. I encountered him everywhere I went in China, placed a high value on his ability, respected his opinions and comments and liked him personally.

Six years having elapsed since we were in China together I cannot remember in detail our conversations and activities. But everything I know about Mr. Service testified to his complete loyalty to the interests of the United States. Those were war years, and I was interested primarily in everything that bore on the prosecution of the war in China as it affected the United States and the chances of a speedy victory. As an observer for the State Department, Mr. Service doubtless had attitudes that extended beyond the war. I am not now acquainted with them except through the quotations from his admirable and lucid reports contained in the State Department's published volume of China material. But there is not the slightest doubt of his thorough loyalty to the United States in the years that I was associated with him; and I also think the course of events in China since 1944 has proved the remarkable accuracy of his analyses at that time.

Apart from his loyalty, which cannot be questioned by anyone who knows him, I have a high regard for the quality of his work. During the time of my association with him, he was alert, keen, indefatigable, hard-headed, and objective. My only complaint as a reporter was that Mr. Service was too punctilious about State Department security and declined to tell me everything he knew. He never permitted me to see classified material and was cautious and guarded about matters that he regarded as confidential.

Since the subject of Russia has been dragged into the dispute about Mr. Service's loyalty I suppose I must mention it. I am sure we discussed Russia, since we must have discussed everything in one way or another, but I cannot remember anything either one of us said. I assume from this that nothing was said that seemed to me in any way remarkable. In those days Russia was one of our fighting allies and I personally hoped that relations with Russia were going to be pleasanter after the war was over. Owing to the long lapse in time I do not know now whether that was Mr. Service's opinion. But if it was it would not have been disloyal to the United States. On the contrary, I should have regarded it as evidence of his loyalty to American interests. I regarded the Chinese Communists as people who were valuable to us because they, too, were fighting Japan. If that was Mr. Service's attitude, as I think it was, I should have regarded it as sound and realistic in terms of American wartime necessities.

I have no doubt that a full investigation of Mr. Service's work and attitudes will prove that he is a reliable, loyal, and valuable servant of the United States.

Sincerely yours,

BROOKS ATKINSON.

BA:cr

STATE OF NEW YORK,

County of New York:

Sworn to before me this 10th day of May 1950.

E. LEROY FINCH,

Notary Public State of New York, residing in Suffolk Co.,

Suffolk Co. Clk's No. 62½.

Commission expires March 30, 1951.

Mr. RHETTS, I ask that there be included in the transcript at this point a two-page letter dated April 21, 1950, addressed to Brigadier General Conrad E. Snow, etc., and signed by Eric Sevareid, Chief Washington Correspondent, Columbia Broadcasting System.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be so included in the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT 49

OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLA., April 21, 1950.

Brig. Gen. CONRAD E. SNOW,

Chairman, State Department Loyalty and Security Board,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL SNOW: John S. Service has told me that among the questions raised in the review of his loyalty case is the question of his relations with journalists in his capacity as a Department career officer dealing with policy matters concerning the Far East. I would like, therefore, to go on record with this statement of my own journalistic relations with Mr. Service, whom I regard as one of the ablest diplomatic officers I have known in some thirteen years of professional work involving very frequent contacts with department personnel in many parts of the world.

In the summer of 1943, when I was chief Washington correspondent of the Columbia Broadcasting System, my company sent me on a short reporting trip to India and China, and I was, of course, duly accredited by the War Department's Division of Public Relations. I believe I first met Mr. Service in Chungking in September of that year. I sought from him, as I sought from every American authority, civilian or military, all the information I could get as to the political, economic, and military condition of China. This was the common, day to day practice of all responsible reporters. As I recall it, Mr. Service talked with me quite freely, though I do not remember him giving me any specific information which was not at the same time commonly known to other American officials in Chungking, and as a matter of course given by them to the accredited correspondents for what was generally called their "background" knowledge of affairs. If Mr. Service had ever given me any very special or unusual information I think I would remember it, but I do not.

I do remember, however, once asking a small group of American officials about a document which I had heard had been prepared as a kind of summary of the Chinese warlords and military leaders in their various regions, together with their estimated political attitudes and, I think, their estimated military strengths. I was new to China and ignorant of the overall picture in those terms and thought

I would be better prepared to understand and report the general problem if I could read this paper. I have a clear recollection that Mr. Service hesitated, on some manner of security grounds, probably because he felt the document should be given out, for our background knowledge, only by the military authorities. I believe I was shown it, though I do not now remember by whom—it was not by Mr. Service—and, of course, if I used it at all, the information was never used in any objectionable manner.

It should be remembered that Chungking was a small place; Americans, both civilian and military correspondents all lived rather closely together, and all felt themselves involved in a common cause. I suspect there were very few real secrets between them of any nature. I know that various military leaders, such as General Stilwell, and General Chennault and others, most freely answered my questions and told me, as they told other reporters, a great many things of a highly secret nature as far as the enemy was concerned, things involving troop placements and future operations and so on. But this was never regarded as an unusual procedure, there or in any American theater of war with which I became acquainted. Nor was it unusual in Washington during the war. General Marshall, for example, used to see a group of us every three or four months and often told us of our military plans in considerable detail, information which certainly would have aided the enemy, but which we were trusted to use only for our own background guidance. So far as I know, none of that group ever violated such a trust. Certainly Mr. Service, though he helped me to understand the basic forces at work in China, never gave me information of as secret a nature as that I received from the afore-mentioned general officers.

I knew all the American and foreign correspondents living in Chungking at the time, men who were, presumably, of many differing political persuasions. Never, at any time, from any one of them did I acquire any manner of suggestion that Mr. Service had any allegiances except his obvious allegiance to his work and his superiors and his government. Had he possessed any other allegiances I am certain I would have heard some references to that, in view of the intimate conditions in which we all lived and worked.

It was my clear impression at all times, that Mr. Service was held in highest esteem by everyone I knew in China and India, as an unusually able and valuable American government servant.

I was, therefore, completely surprised when he was first publicly referred to as being under somebody's suspicion of disloyalty. Nothing that I have read or heard concerning him since these suspicions were first put about has led me to change my high regard for him in the slightest degree.

Sincerely yours,

ERIC SEVAREID,
*Chief Washington Correspondent,
Columbia Broadcasting System.*

Mr. RHETTS. At this point I should like to introduce into the transcript as document No. 89 a 4-page affidavit dated Paris, May 2, 1950, signed by Theodore H. White.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be so included.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 89

PARIS 21, RUE DE BERRI—S.
May 2d, 1950.

REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, CITY OF PARIS.

Embassy of United States of America, ss:

CHAIRMAN, LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD,

Department of State, Washington, D. C.

SIR: I hope you will let me bring to your attention information about Mr. John Service which I, as a responsible citizen and one closely associated with American Military Headquarters in China during the war, feel should be entered on his record.

I am writing this letter in whatever confidence and trust covers the proceedings of your board, and hope no part will be made public without my prior permission.

During the war years, I was a war correspondent accredited to Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell's headquarters in the CBI theater, and later, after General Stilwell's relief, accredited to those of Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer. I write now having frequently heard General Stilwell speak of his affection and trust

in Mr. Service and knowing that were the general alive today he would certainly stand publicly in Mr. Service's defence.

There seem to me, on reflection, to be two pertinent sets of facts that should be placed on record.

The first concerns itself with the press policy of our command in China during the war. I can speak on this with some degree of authority for I was President of the Foreign Correspondents Club of China in the years 1944-1945 and this club included all uniformed U. S. War Correspondents permanently stationed in the theater; and because, although it may seem immodest to say so, I was closer to General Stilwell than any other newspapermen at the time. Mr. Service served on General Stilwell's staff and operated within the frame of the General's press policy.

It is difficult to recreate the atmosphere that prevailed in Chungking throughout the war. But it was an atmosphere in which our Theater Command found itself cramped at every turn by the unending publicity and propaganda of the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek. Any description of the corruption, ignorance, and incompetence of the Kuomintang armies which we were supposed to reorganize must sound now, so many years later, as slightly hysterical. But I know that General Stilwell and other Americans permanently in China were driven almost to the point of desperation by the fictions emanating from the Chinese Ministry of Information and planted in the American press. It was to counteract these distortions of truth that General Stilwell decided that all possible nonoperational information at his headquarters be made available to American and Allied correspondents.

General Stilwell's policy was to treat American newspapermen assigned to him as part of his operating team, a necessary part which had to be kept informed were the American people to be well informed. This policy of the General pervaded his entire staff, not only its political section but its vastly more important military section.

Most of the information we wanted was made available to us from the very top. I believe I do General Stilwell no dishonor when I say that he made available to American newspapermen documents marked "Secret" and even "Top Secret" when he thought the interests of the public information overrode the technicalities of diplomacy. What memoranda and reports I remember seeing attributed to Mr. Service were always made available to me by people higher than he in the Theater hierarchy.

Such practice was current in other war areas; it is still current in many embassies and American outposts around the world. It is, within limits, a good custom and never was it more necessary to the American press than it was in China. It would, literally, have been impossible to ascertain or report the simplest truths about the war in Asia had it not been for General Stilwell's policy.

This wise policy of treating American newsmen with confidence was continued by General Wedemeyer when he took up the command in October 1944.

A word, too, should be said about the process of classification. Many things were classified as "Restricted," "Confidential," or "Secret," simply to keep them out of Chinese hands. It was impossible for our government to publicly submit a report or utter a communique which gave the flat lie to the government of Chiang Kai-shek, our then Ally. Much matter was therefore first classified and then made easily available to those interested or needing to know for any public purpose. I know that sometimes excerpts of my dispatches were classified by the Army; I know that great bales of OWI reports on the Chinese press, with quotations, were classified.

What information Mr. Service may or may not have given Mr. Gayn or any other American newspapermen, I do not know. Mr. Gayn was then writing articles for the Saturday Evening Post, as I remember; I should think it quite normal that if he asked the State Department's experts on China for information they should give him what they could; and, since information arriving from China was classified, that they should try to conduct themselves with the same judgment of classification that prevailed at the point of origin of the information.

I cannot remember ever, once, having heard a single detail of military operations from Mr. Service or any other member of the political staff. Usually, they did not know military matters. Moreover, the press had direct access to the General and his commanders for operational information. With the political staff we traded views and ideas, and if any political information passed from them to us, it was more than balanced by political information which we brought them in return.

I should like to pass to a second set of facts: those concerning Mr. Service's mission in China.

Early in the war, the State Department assigned to General Stilwell's staff a number of political intelligence officers to aid him in the tricky politics of China, whose forces we were attempting to reorganize for war against the Japanese. Service was among these, and, like the others, was subject to military orders and discipline.

It was under General Stilwell's orders that Service made these trips to the Chinese frontal areas under conditions of great hardship and personal danger, which won him his wartime reputation as one of the ablest American agents in the Orient. And it was under General Stilwell's orders that he was sent to Yen-an, then the Chinese Communists' headquarters, in the summer of 1944.

Mr. Service's mission in Yen-an was an intelligence mission: to wriggle his way into the confidence and affection of the Chinese Communist leaders, to learn what they were doing, their strength, their ideas. Mr. Service speaks an almost flawless Chinese and is, as I remember him, a man of ingratiating personal charm. The Chinese Communists accepted him as a friend and exposed through him to our government more of their thinking, then we have ever before or since learned about any Communist group. Moreover they made available to us combat intelligence, vital against the Japanese, which saved numberless American lives.

It is now twelve years since I started, as a foreign correspondent, to report the doings of American diplomats abroad and the mechanics of our statecraft. I have never seen a more skillful technical performance than Mr. Service's in gaining the confidence and learning the inner workings of a potentially hostile group.

I do not know what, specifically, Mr. Service reported to the State Department from Yen-an. But I remember long conversations with Mr. Service during those days and I can testify that never was he carried away by the then prevalent sweetness-and-light theory of the Chinese Communists. He saw them as hard, cold men, vigorously seeking power. He saw them as more able, less corrupt, more shrewd, fundamentally stronger men than Chiang Kai-shek. I submit that this was, in retrospect, first-class reportage.

Writing now from abroad, I do not know the specific charges against Mr. Service. I notice in press dispatches a passing reference to a meeting of his with Tung Pi-wu of the Communist party in the United States. I do not know whether such a meeting took place. But I do know that Tung had been sent to the U. S. A. to represent China at the U. N. at the personal insistence of Ambassador Patrick Hurley, on the urging of our State Department. And that Mr. Service's assignment, which was to keep an eye on the Communists and learn their thinking, would normally have pressed him to seek Tung out and chat.

It is so very difficult six years later to recall now from Paris the persons and policies of Chungking, China, in 1944 and 1945. I have not seen Mr. Service, to the best of my recollection, since early 1945.

Of his political views then I remember above all his devotion to what we in America consider the basic civil liberties, his conviction that in any civil war the faintest liberties the Chinese might hope for would die; that such a civil war would drive the Communists of China directly into Russian hands; and that such a civil war should be avoided at all cost.

I remember him personally as a fine and honest man, loyal, and devoted beyond the trace of doubt to our Republic.

In my opinion, sir, he deserves well of it.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Theodore H. White,
THEODORE H. WHITE.

21 RUE DE BERRI, PARIS, SEME.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this May 2, 1950, day by Theodore H. White.

s/ Imogene E. Ellis,
IMOGENE E. ELLIS,

Vice Consul of the United States of America.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to ask the Board whether it has a letter dated March 28, 1950, addressed to the Honorable Dean G. Acheson, and signed by John K. Fairbank, professor of history, Harvard University. I should say to the Board that this letter which was addressed to the Secretary of State is not in our possession. A copy of it was furnished to us, and we have requested the Department of State to see to it that this letter, together with the other communications relating

to Mr. Service, of which we may have no knowledge, be furnished to the Board. The CHAIRMAN. Its receipt will be verified and furnished to the reporter.

Mr. RHETTS. Very well. Then I offer at this time as Document No. 66 a copy of the letter addressed to the Secretary of State, to which I have just referred, and ask that that be included in the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 66

MARCH 28, 1950.

The Honorable DEAN G. ACHESON,

The Secretary of State, Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: Having known John S. Service over a long period and in connection with his work in China during the war, I wish to submit my firm conviction that he is an entirely loyal public servant who deserves the strongest support in the effort to clear his name of recent charges of disloyalty.

I saw Mr. Service on numerous occasions in the period between October 1942 and December 1943, when I was attached to the American Embassy in Chungking on assignment from the Office of Strategic Services and with the title of Special Assistant to the American Ambassador. During this time I had a number of long talks with Mr. Service, in addition to seeing him casually on a day-to-day basis. At no time did I ever hear him express any sentiments or make any statements which were disloyal, subversive, or anti-American in character. On the contrary, he impressed me as having a most unusually strong concern for the national interest of the United States. I never heard him at any time express any belief in or attachment to Communist or Marxist doctrines. Every impression that I formed of him was of a man thoroughly devoted to the American way of life, to his country and its Government, and to the proper performance of his work in the Foreign Service. I have seen Mr. Service a number of times in the years since this period in Chungking and the above impression has been confirmed on every occasion.

As a professional student of Chinese affairs, I have furthermore been impressed with the foresight and clarity with which Mr. Service observed and analyzed the Chinese scene, as evidenced in his writings published in the White Paper on United States Relations with China. There is no more loyal act than a statement to one's superiors of truths which are unpleasant for them to hear. But since no policy founded on wishful thinking can be a safe one, Mr. Service deserves the thanks of all patriotic American citizens for his courage in stating the truth of the situation in China as he saw it, even though it was not at the time and has not since been palatable to some Americans. In stating the truth as he saw it, he performed his duty with courage; and the soundness of his appraisal of the Chinese scene has been in my judgment amply borne out by the record of history.

In the dire struggle in which we are unavoidably engaged against Russian expansion in Asia, it is of the utmost importance to our national defense and welfare that a man of Mr. Service's abilities remain available for effective Government service in the field of his special training. I therefore feel it a patriotic duty, and I believe many other academic specialists on the Far East will recognize a similar duty, to testify in defense of the realistic and fearless approach to the hard facts of our far eastern position which Mr. Service's record represents.

Yours very sincerely,

JOHN K. FAIRBANK,

Professor of History, Harvard University.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to ask the Board whether it has a letter dated May 1, 1950, addressed to the Chairman of the Loyalty and Security Board and signed by Knight Biggerstaff, professor of Chinese history, Cornell University.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the transcript.

Mr. RHETTS. I am asking whether you have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, we have it.

Mr. RHETTS. I ask that that be included in the transcript at this point as Document 88.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be so included in the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

223 THURSTON AVENUE,
Ithaca, N. Y., May 1, 1950.

CHAIRMAN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY BOARD,
Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I first met John Stewart Service in 1935 or 1936 when he was assigned to Peiping for language study by the U. S. Foreign Service. At that time I was in Peiping doing historical research in the Palace Museum archives. During the months we were both in Peiping I saw him frequently and was impressed with his keen, inquiring mind and his desire to understand China and the Chinese people. This, however, did not particularly surprise me because I had earlier met his father, Roy Service, an able and devoted YMCA worker in China.

As far as I can recall, I did not see John Service again until a few months after I joined the Department of State in October 1944. Thereafter I saw him occasionally in the State Department, or at the houses of friends. In preparation for and in the course of my research while a Country Specialist in the Division of Territorial Studies of the State Department, I read a great many of the reports that had been sent to the Department by the American Embassy and Consulates in China over a period of years. Some of these reports were impressive to a professor like myself not only because of the thoroughness of the research and the breadth of observation on which they were based but also because of the keen understanding of Chinese problems they demonstrated. Among the best of these were a number written by John Service. In fact, Service's reports seemed to me to be models of their kind. Referring to a mass of the information gathered from many sources, which he carefully analyzed and considered against the background of his extensive experience in and understanding of China, these reports seemed to me to provide the type of objective and thoughtful "intelligence" which is essential if our government is to have the information required for policy decisions. In none of Service's writings that I have read, nor in any of my personal contacts with him did I ever see the slightest evidence that he was either a Communist or an advocate of Communism.

In April 1945 I left Washington for Chungking, where I spent a year on the staff of the American Embassy. I have seen John Service only a few times since then; but I have never had any reason to change my favorable estimate of his ability and integrity as a Foreign Service Officer or to question his loyalty and devotion to his country.

Sincerely yours,

[S] Knight Biggerstaff,
KNIGHT BIGGERSTAFF,
Professor of Chinese History, Cornell University.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to ask the Board whether it has a letter dated May 11, 1950, addressed to the Chairman, Loyalty and Security Board, and signed by Phillips Talbot.

The CHAIRMAN. We have such a letter.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to ask that that letter be included in the transcript at this point as Document No. 96.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be so included.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT NO. 96

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
Chicago 38, Ill., May 11, 1950.

CHAIRMAN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY BOARD,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: It has come to my attention that Mr. John Stewart Service has been asked to reappear before the Loyalty and Security Board. I request the opportunity through this letter to express my personal view as to the loyalty and character of Mr. Service.

I came to know Mr. Service well during my tours as a United States Naval Intelligence officer in India and China from 1941 to 1945, especially from 1943 onwards when I served as Assistant Naval Attaché to the United States Embassy at Chungking. Our contacts have continued since the war, when I have been a newspaper correspondent and student of Asian affairs.

Official duties during the wartime period gave me occasions to be informed of analyses and recommendations presented by Mr. Service respecting some of

the very complex problems related to the conduct of the war in Asia. At times these assessments did not agree with those expressed by other American officials.

It was then my firm feeling, however—and it remains so today—that Mr. Service reached his judgments on the basis of a superior intellectual grasp of the situation and a sense of devotion to his duty and to his country. When he felt the need to criticize, I believed, and still believe, that he so expressed himself in order to bring about more effective American policy planning.

In my view Mr. Service showed himself an industrious, able, and highly principled officer of the United States Government. I regarded him and continue to regard him as a thoroughly loyal American citizen.

Yours very truly,

[S] PHILLIPS TALBOT.

Mr. RIETTS. I should like to include in the transcript at this point as Document 311 a one-page letter addressed to Brig. Gen. Conrad Snow, and so forth, and signed by Nathaniel Pepper, professor of international relations, Columbia University.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be so inserted.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 311

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC LAW AND GOVERNMENT,
May 11, 1950.

Brigadier General CONRAD SNOW,
Loyalty Board, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I take the liberty of writing with reference to John S. Service. Let me identify myself first by saying that I am a professor at this University, that I have been concerned with studying the Far East for thirty-five years and have lived in China many years. Further, I know John Service only casually. I did know his mother and father years ago; they are, incidentally, upright, honorable, decent human beings and good Americans.

I want to speak of John Service only as reflected in his official reports which I have read in the *White Paper*. From all I know of the period in China—and I have gone over the evidence pretty carefully—I should say that they were accurate, intelligent, and an intellectually honest analysis of China at the time. I got back to China myself only in 1946. Everything I saw, looking with as much detachment as possible, confirmed what he had written.

It seems to me fantastic or a reflection of a perverted mind to see in what he wrote evidence of communist affiliation. If what he wrote constitutes such evidence, then nearly every American in China between 1945 and 1950 was a communist agent—including, or perhaps putting first, George Catlett Marshall. If you doubt that last statement, read General Marshall's statement of January 7, 1947, when he started home.

I repeat, I do not know John Service well personally, but I am confident that in the mind of every professional student of the Far East there is nothing in the record of his views which gives any reason to believe that he was anything but a detached observer.

I repeat that I think the overwhelming majority of professional students of the Far East—diplomatic, military, commercial and academic—not only would agree with what I have just said but shared his views as reported to the State Department. Unless some evidence can be thrown up to show some direct personal connection with Russia or the communist party, I think it is monstrously unjust to attack this man.

Respectfully yours,

(S) Nathaniel Pepper,
NATHANIEL PEPPER,
Professor of International Relations.

P: AP

Mr. RIETTS. I ask that there be included in the transcript at this point as document No. 90 an open letter dated Paris, May 4, 1950, addressed to Senator Tydings, and purporting to be signed by Joseph Alsop.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be so inserted.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

CHINA AND McCARTHY

JOSEPH ALSOP TELLS CHIANG STORY, ATTACKS SENATE METHODS, UPHOLDS
LOYALTY OF ACCUSED

The following is a letter to Senator Millard E. Tydings, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee investigating charges of Communist infiltration in the State Department, from Joseph Alsop:

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: After long hesitation, I am impelled by the appalling effects in Europe of the McCarthy witch to offer my testimony to your committee, for what it may be worth.

I do so for two reasons. First, I have already sharply criticized the conduct of our affairs in China on several occasions. Second, I was intimately involved in the events which led to the loss of China, whereas Senators McCarthy, Wherry, and Taft and their informants are offering second-hand evidence. This evidence is so obviously corrupted by political and other pressures that it is a duty to correct the impression conveyed.

Stating the case as briefly as possible, I think it fair to say that the really crucial years in China were those when General Joseph W. Stilwell commanded the China-Burma-India Theater, from 1942 until 1944. In this period, Professor Lattimore, who was always at best a fringe figure, played his most important role in our China policy, as personal adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In this rather brief assignment, he accomplished nothing, but he was quite obviously loyal both to the American Government and to Generalissimo Chiang.

Professor Lattimore had no part whatever in the real debate about China policy, in which the different points of view have been fantastically misrepresented by Senator McCarthy and his friends. No informed person ever supposed that offering blank checks to the National government of China would accomplish anything. Those who advocated a strong policy of aiding the National government only did so with the proviso that the aid given would be closely controlled by American representatives on the spot, as it was during the short and successful period of General Wedemeyer's command. It should be noted that the Congressional advocates of postwar aid to China specifically rejected the responsibility involved in this sort of local on-the-spot control in the first major bill appropriating funds for the purpose during General Marshall's period as Secretary of State.

Returning to the vastly more important war period, the other school of thought was composed primarily of General Stilwell and his political advisers. General Stilwell, so far as one could judge, was chiefly animated by his personal detestation of Generalissimo Chiang, arising from their disagreements. His political advisers, among whom was Mr. John Stewart Service, were operating on a more reasoned theory, however.

They asserted, first, that the National government was too feeble and corrupt ever to be reformed, even with direct American help and under direct American pressure. They said, second, that the Chinese Communists were therefore bound to win in the end, no matter what measures might be taken by the United States. In the third place, they argued that the Soviet Union, insofar as it had intervened in China at all, had given all its assistance to the regime of Generalissimo Chiang rather than to the Communists who received no tangible Russian aid whatever until the war was over. Fourthly, they suggested that the Chinese Communists might be induced to declare their independence of the Kremlin if they were treated as friends and allies by the United States.

Opening friendly relations and offering aid to the Chinese Communists was frankly admitted, at the time, to be a bold gamble. The gamble now looks better than it did then. On the one hand, the Yugoslav Communists, whose experience was precisely what the experience of the Chinese Communists would have been if they had received American aid, have now rebelled against the Kremlin. On the other hand, the recent behavior of the Japanese Communist leader, Nosaka, a wartime refugee at Yen-an and intimate friend of Mao Tse Tung, clearly suggests that the idea of independence of the Kremlin must have been in the air in Communist China in war time.

My right to speak, if I may be said to have a right to speak, derives from the fact that in wartime I was one of the chief American opponents of the school of thought I have summarized above. As a member of the staff of the American Volunteer Group, as chief of the lend-lease mission to China, and finally as an assistant to Dr. T. V. Soong, I did everything in my power to present the pro-Nationalist point of view in influential quarters in Washington. Those who wished to develop an American policy of friendship toward and aid to the Chinese

Communists were finally and decisively defeated with the dismissal of General Stilwell, in October 1944. This occurred many months after I had finally succeeded in getting into uniform, as a member of General C. L. Chennault's staff in the Fourteenth Air Force. But although I had long before become a mere junior officer in the Air Force, the effect of my letters of Harry L. Hopkins and the other representations I had made was acknowledged by implication in General Marshall's first instructions to General Wedemeyer.

These are, so to speak, my credentials. Having known the situation in wartime China far more intimately than any of the pro-McCarthy witnesses you have yet heard, I think it my duty to say that while I disputed the judgment, I never had the faintest doubt of the loyalty of any of the American officials or others whom McCarthy attacked. They were serving the United States to the best of their ability, with courage and fidelity. This should be sufficient to protect them from the kind of vulgar attack McCarthy has made, even if their judgment was incorrect.

Although our views clashed so sharply, I was particularly well acquainted with Mr. Service. To the best of my knowledge, although I thought then and think now that he was gravely in error, he was a most conscientious and decent American public servant. It is difficult, of course, to offer hard evidence to support such contemporary impressions. But I may cite one fact, at least, to show how erroneous it can be to judge situations from the viewpoint of a later time. Former Vice President Henry A. Wallace has been, in effect, a pliable stooge for the American Communist party for more than two years. From this, many people have inferred that Wallace was a Communist stooge in wartime. In fact, however, nothing could have been more contrary to the party line in wartime than to urge the dismissal of General Stilwell, yet Wallace recommended the dismissal of Stilwell and his replacement by Wedemeyer in a telegram from China to President Roosevelt in the late spring of 1944. Incidentally, the telegram was sent with the full knowledge of Mr. John Carter Vincent, who entered no protest whatever, although he too has been under attack as a Communist stooge.

In conclusion, there are two points which I feel I must make. First, I do not think I was wrong in opposing the policy of gambling on winning the friendship of the Chinese Communists and inducing them to declare their independence of the Kremlin. I do not think I was wrong, simply because I and the others who took the same view could not possibly foresee that when this policy of winning the friendship of the Chinese Communists had been defeated with the dismissal of General Stilwell, there would be a long period after the war during which we had no China policy at all. None of the men now under attack by Senator McCarthy had any important responsibility, to my knowledge, for this singular hiatus. Speaking for myself, if I could have foreseen that the only alternative to a policy of gambling on the friendship of the Chinese Communists was a kind of vacuum of policy, I should have been on the other side in the struggle in China. The gamble on the Chinese Communists, although unnecessary, in my opinion, was at least a reasonable gamble, such as could be reasonably advocated by entirely loyal Americans.

Second, I should like to suggest to your committee that if the test of loyalty is following the line of the Communist party, you had much better launch an investigation of Senators McCarthy, Wherry, and Taft than an investigation of Messrs. Lattimore, Service, and Vincent. Let the test be a tabulation of the key votes on the three Senators above-mentioned on the great postwar measures of foreign policy, and especially of their votes on key amendments by which bills can be nullified. Unless I am gravely mistaken, such a tabulation will show that these three Senators, and most of the others who have joined them in the present clamor, have voted the straight Communist party line on every major issue of foreign policy, as laid down in *The Daily Worker*, ever since the end of the war. If temporary agreement with the party line is to be made the test of loyalty, let these men be called to the bar, to explain their records.

In summary, I do not attempt to excuse or palliate the grave American mistakes in China, which I have often before denounced, but I submit that we may as well abandon all hope of having honest and courageous public servants, if mere mistakes of judgment are later to be transformed into evidences of disloyalty to the state. And I submit further that the members of the Senate who are now persecuting these men who made, as I think, mistakes in China, have far more to explain, excuse, and rationalize in their own records. I still believe that the loss of China was unnecessary, but I think it far more im-

portant that we should not destroy the decent traditions of American political life. These now seem to be endangered.

Very sincerely yours,

JOSEPH ALSOP.

PARIS, May 4, 1950.

Mr. RHETTS. That is the end of the documents I have to offer at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 5:30 and I think we can adjourn until 10 tomorrow.

(The Board adjourned at 5:30 p. m.)

EXHIBIT 18

SERVICE

1. 5-14-42. Chungking.

Two memos.

The first is solely report to Con. Gen. of conversation.

Second is a similar report but with some interpretive comment, which is factual and does not reveal bias.

Subject of both memos is the "Chinese Industrial Cooperatives."

2. 7-24-42. Chungking.

Despatch (called for) on propaganda and psychological warfare by Chinese Gov't. Generally factual and detailed. Received commendation from Dep't. Repeats some communist criticism of Chinese Government organs, which was probably accurate, as commies have generally been perceptive and keen as critics of others, even when (and especially when) they were guilty of the same things, or worse.

3. 12-23-43.

Memo praperad in Dep't. A key document. This is a thoughtful and well-written memo pointing to the danger of impending civil war in China, from both military and political standpoints. While it relays, perhaps somewhat naively, certain communist suggestions for bettering the situation, it does not recommend that the suggestions be accepted and followed up. On the contrary, it recommends that U. S. officials be detailed to the communist-held areas to provide the answers to a number of questions concerning the communists and conditions in the area they hold. There was obviously no intent to influence the Government along pro-communist lines, for the author complains that such information as is available stemmed in part from journalists "who appear to have a bias favorable to the communists." And he warns against any brief visits during which our representatives "would be under the influence of official guides."

4. 2-11-43.

Inner-departmental memo drafted by S. and Smyth. Repeats briefly warning of unfavorable course of events in China and points out that "one possible course of action" might be sending U. S. representatives to Communist areas. Warns that Chinese Gov't. will probably not sanction this, but will be resentful if it is done without its consent.

5. 8-6-43.

Despatch from Lanchow. Called for report on Gold Market and Trading. Purely factual. No political implications.

6. 8-6-43. Lanchow.

Reporting experience of an American agricultural expert. Completely non-political. Points out exaggerated hopes for Chinese government organs for U. S. aid and tendency to enlist that aid even when they have no real need for it.

7. 8-16-43. Lanchow.

Reporting forced organization of professional people in Lanchow, for purposes of extortion and political supervision. Unsparing of Party, but factual. Essentially non-political.

8. 8-17-43. Lanchow.

On evidences of anti-Russian and anti-communist feeling in Chinese officialdom. Seems to be purely factual. In describing the restrictions placed upon the local Soviet consul, Service was perhaps unaware that this sort of treatment had been accepted general practise in the Soviet Union for at least a decade. Nevertheless, despatch contains no statement condemning Chinese Gov't for this treatment.

9. 8-17-43. Lanchow.

Service states that Soviet diplomatic representative has been very friendly to himself and to Capt. Tolstoy "and has been willing to discuss general problems with an openness and apparent frankness rather unusual for our Russian colleagues." Otherwise, report contains no independent comment by Service, and is restricted to a recounting of the views expressed by the Soviet representative.

10. 8-18-43. Lanchow.

Military notes. Purely factual. Describes deplorable state of Chinese troops passing through city, and brutality with which they were treated; but description is impassive, and without independent comment.

11. 8-18-43. Lanchow.

A report on political unrest and banditry in Kansu. Little relation to communists. Report is detailed and factual.

12. 8-19-43.

Embassy at Chungking refers in a despatch to certain of Service's reports. No comment on communists involved. Service speculates on Chinese government's plans with respect to communists. No bias apparent.

13. 8-20-43. Lanchow.

On reception of U. S. broadcasts in Kansu. Factual and objective.

14. 8-20-43.

A long report on activities of local Chinese police with regard to foreigners: restrictions of movement, observation, curiosity, suspicion, etc. Speaks of Chinese police using "Russian treatment of aliens as a model."

114. 9-10-43. Stilwell mission.

Reporting statements made to Stilwell by Chinese (Nationalist) General, obviously sympathetic to communists. No independent comment. Views expressed by General are somewhat similar to those expressed by Service in item 3.

116. 9-23-43. Chungking.

Two interpretative memos by Service concerning Eleventh Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. The memos subject the decisions of the gathering to a searching and skeptical scrutiny, but the conclusions were borne out by subsequent events.

(Note—these memos should be compared with communist publicity at the time.)

117. 9-29-43. Chungking. Stilwell.

Describes the circumstances of the withdrawal of the communist representative from a meeting of the People's Political Council, as represented by a communist source. Service adds no comment of his own.

118. 10-27-43. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo asserting, and stating reasons why Chinese public opinion will be offended if Burma campaign is not soon inaugurated. No apparent relation to communist problem.

119. 10-28-43. Chungking. Stilwell.

Describes the bickering and bad blood between the Government and the minority groups over the composition of the Committee for the Establishment of Constitutional Government. Report is objective and describes the Committee as "not a bad one"; but states that "it is a rather unfortunate omen that the committee is starting its existence with a background of petty and acrimonious politics."

120. 11-13-43. Stilwell. (Military report).

Report on "willingness of Chinese Military leaders to become puppets." An important memo, which should be compared with communist line of the same period. Service rejects the communist thesis that the Kuomintang was encouraging defection to the Japanese-occupied area in order to improve their prospects for combating the communists after the war. Says this is the result rather than the design. Says large-scale defections are due primarily to Chiang's policy of placing in front line war-lord forces which are of doubtful loyalty to himself and which, being mercenaries from the beginning, are naturally amenable to Japanese promises of better pay and treatment.

121. 2-2-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Unimportant. Relaying of report that airport construction is causing discontent in a certain district.
122. 2-3-44.
Memo from Kuomintang source about conspiracy against Chiang. Questions Kuomintang tendency to blame communists.
123. 2-15-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Also about plot against Chiang. Adduces further proof that plot existed, and that is was an inner-army affair.
124. 2-15-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
A further report about the dissatisfaction caused by airport construction and Government's policies concerning compensation to land owners and conscription of labor. Factual.
125. 2-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Giving background on certain feelers for direct negotiations between Government and communists. Factual. Reflects, like all of this reporting, good contacts in the communist camp.
126. 2-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Reporting information released to correspondent by Government on extent of Jap-controlled area. Points out that Government spokesman listed certain communist-controlled areas as entirely Jap-controlled, evidently communist domination the more humiliating. Service points to this as indication of bitterness now existing between two factions.
127. 2-16-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Reporting interview with Madame Sun-yat-sen. Factual.
128. 3-2-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Further report, detailed and objective, on Chinese unrest in Chengü arising out of construction of U. S. air bases. It is evident that Chinese officials somewhere along the line are pocketing funds appropriated for compensation of conscripted labor, knowing that resulting bitterness will attach largely to Americans; but Service does not charge this directly.
129. 3-14-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Commentary on a report submitted by an OWI official from Kweilin. Contains following significant passage:
"The war in China has stimulated political consciousness to the point where loose separatism, which is the goal of the provincialists and which will mean a return to the chaos of the early years of the Republic, is impossible. By present indications it *does not* seem likely that the existing Kuomintang Government will collapse during the war. But if the present conflict is followed, as *does* seem likely, by civil war * * * out of this civil war * * * there can be expected to emerge either a more progressive Kuomintang Government or a communist state, probably of the present modified Chinese communist type."
130. 3-14-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Another interview with Madame Sun Yat-sen. Purely factual. No independent comment.
131. 3-17-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
An excellent analysis of T. V. Soong's position—thoughtful and objective—acknowledged with special commendation by the Department.
132. 3-14-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Commentary on another personal incident in the Chiang entourage. Extremely moderate in tone, ending with the suggestion that "the real importance of this story, and of the many similar ones regarding the misdoings of the Soong-Kung family, is the readiness of the public to believe them."
133. 3-13-44. Military.
Review of second edition of Chiang's book—"China's Destiny." Points out changes since first edition. Severely critical of book ("a bigoted, narrow, strongly nationalistic effort at a special interpretation of history")—says that it reflects "unchanged a bitter anti-communist bias."
134. 3-24-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo on Chinese Territorial Claims in North Burma. Detailed, authoritative, analytical. "Chiang may have great ambition and vision. But his statesmanship does not ordinarily go far beyond shrewd, realistic, but often short-sighted bargaining."

135. 3-23-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo on the rumored plan to reduce China's armies. Service identical about this.

"China remains a country where life is valued very little, where corruption is deep-rooted and prevalent, where economics have been consistently ignored or not understood, where power derives from military strength and that strength is measured in numbers, where the interests and welfare of the people have not (except perhaps in Communist North China) been a concern of their rulers and where the basic, overriding consideration is the struggle for power."

136. 3-20-44. Military.

Discusses incident of bombing of Chinese forces in Sinkiang, obviously by planes having something to do with the Soviet Union. Reflects a certain naïveté about Soviet Union in assumption that Soviet Kazakhs might have taken initiative in Sinkiang and that Soviet Government might have been "willing to lend a little unofficial assistance."

137. 3-23-44. Military.

Reporting views of Chiang Kai-shek; critical of Chiang's attitude but offers explanation for it. Concludes Chiang is responsible for situation in China and will continue in his present ways until the U. S. formulates and applies a strong China policy. Analysis appears objective and unbiased. (Chiang mentions *Amerasia*.)

138. 3-22-44. Military.

More about bombing incident in Sinkiang. Warns against U. S. involvement, particularly if we want to run convoy through that area.

139. 4-5-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

More on bombing incident. Without particular interest.

140. 3-26-44. Military.

Transmitting report prepared by Englishman who had been residing in communist area.

141. 4-4-44. Military.

Memorandum. Miscellaneous news items. Purely factual.

142. 4-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Chungking Embassy despatch transmitting memo on situation in Sinkiang. Specially commended by Department. Objective analysis of Chinese Nationalist Government's motives in the Sinkiang incidents and the success of the move. Service's recommendations include: "We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are. A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a careful first-hand study of the strength, attitudes, and popular support of the Chinese communists. But in determining our policy toward Russia in Asia we should avoid being swayed by China. The initiative must be kept firmly in our hands." * * * "Chiang unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in Eastern Asia by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too weak to serve as a possible counterweight to Russia. By doing so, Chiang may be digging his own grave; not only North China and Manchuria, but also national groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets."

143. 4-17-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Transmitting text of an interview with General Lung Yun. No comments.

144. 4-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo reporting views held by leaders of some of the minor parties of China. Service's comments relate only to the relative importance of these minor parties and are purely factual.

145. 5-18-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Service's critique of a Military Intelligence Despatch. Objectively points out fallacies in the MI despatch. Outlines activities of Nationalist Government in attempting to discredit the Communists in a purely factual manner. Makes three points: 1) that there is a fundamental conflict between Communists and Japanese and puppets; 2) Kuomintang is attempting to convince foreign opinion that Communists are in league with Japs and puppets; 3) that Kuomintang actually is in contact with Japs and expects puppet support. Justifies his points factually. (Rated Very Good in Department.)

20-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo on plan to bring Chinese-American technicians to China. States objections to plan factually. Totally nonpolitical.

147. 20-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo offering possible drawbacks to U. S. Army plan to pay benefits to families of Chinese soldiers killed in Burma. Nonpolitical.

148. 5-23-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo recounting rumors of domestic trouble in the Chiang Household. Factual reporting.

149. 5-11-44. Military.

Transmitting a speech of Chou En-Lai: summary without comment.

150. 5-12-44. Military.

Memo on effects of Japanese victories in Honan. States objectively various interpretations which will be placed upon this in Chinese circles.

151. 5-24-44. Chungking. Stilwell. Military

Transmitting translation of statement of League of Democratic Parties. Summary without comment.

152. 5-25-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Recounting views of Lin Tsu-han, Chairman of Yen-an Border Government. Presented without comment.

153. 5-25-44. Military.

Transmitting information on the status of communist negotiations with the Central Government as received from the communists. Presented without comment.

154. 5-31-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Factual account of an interview with Counselor of French Delegation at Chungking. Reported without comment of political nature.

155. 6-9-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo of interview with Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, presenting Marshal's views without comment as to their validity. **Purely factual.**

156. 6-7-44. Military.

Presentation of the views of David An on Chinese Treatment of Koreans. Reported without comment or interpretation.

157. 6-20-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Important memo, widely circulated with favorable comment in Department. Strong denunciation of the weakness, corruption and venality of Kuomintang. Apparently written partly from exasperation at the Nationalist Government but criticism appears to be justified. Only political bias visible is that of American official trying to turn China into an asset to the American war effort. Encourages American contact with communists as with other minor parties and liberal elements to stimulate the Kuomintang to a reform program. No interest displayed in Communism as a movement in itself. Contact with communists areas desirable from an intelligence standpoint in the war effort. * * * "We should select men of known liberal view to represent us in OWI, cultural relations and other lines of work in China."

158. 6-23-44. Military.

Memo of conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and V. P. Wallace, J. C. Vincent, Gen. Ferris, Owen Lattimore and JSS. Factual account.

159. 6-24-44. Military.

Reporting communist agreement to the sending of a U. S. "observers' section" to Yen-an. Objective report of communist views on the matter, presented without bias or comment.

160. 7-6-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo on communist map showing contraction of communist-held territory. Service cites contemporary Central Government map which contradicts Communist claim. Illustrates distortions of Central Government map and comments that communist map may not be more than generally true and may not give whole picture. Objective, without political coloration.

161. 7-11-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo transmitting a report from communist sources on communist military operations against Japan during May 1944. Relayed without evaluation although several Japanese news items are submitted in conjunction with the report as some possible confirmation of communist claims. No political implications.

162. 7-20-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo transmitting a personal letter from Chinese intellectual expressing disillusionment with present Chinese regime and hopes of constructive American aid. JSS feels letter reflects present state of mind of large part of Chinese intellectuals and liberals. Objective presentation, pointing out strength as well as weakness of viewpoint.

163. 7-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Transmitting a statement of Chinese intellectuals "Appeal for Revolutionary Democratic Rights." Covering memo indicates approval of intellectuals' denunciation of Kuomintang suppression of freedom of speech, thought, study and expression.

164. 8-26-44. Chungking. Stilwell. Yen-an.

Memo of first impressions of Yen-an. Is highly favorable in comparison with Kuomintang-held areas. "There is a bit of smugness, self-righteousness and conscious fellowship" * * * but "most modern place in China." "What is seen in Yen-an is a well-integrated movement, with a political and economic program which it is successfully carrying out under competent leaders. * * * One cannot help coming to feel that this movement is strong and successful and that it has such drive behind it and has tied itself so closely to the people that it will not easily be killed." Service understandably favorably impressed by comparison between Yen-an and Kuomintang areas in matter of material conditions, morale, and efficiency.

165. 8-26-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yen-an.

Memo of conversation with Mao Tse-Tung in Yen-an in which Mao sounded Service on the possibility of opening an American consulate in Yen-an. Factual reporting.

166. 9-1-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yen-an.

Transmitting reports of interviews with various Chinese communist leaders. Factual.

167. 9-1-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Transmitting report of interview with Chief of Chinese General Staff. Factual account of diametrical opposition of views between communists and National Government.

168. 9-8-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yen-an.

Important memo outlining Service's interpretation of communist motives. Inclines to think the best of communists. Offers arguments in opposition to this attitude but explains why he does not feel the opposing arguments are justifiable. Believes the CCP aims for orderly prolonged progress to eventual socialism, not violent revolution, and in achieving that aim will not seek an early monopoly of political power but considers first the long-term interests of China. Service shows a certain naiveté in his grasp of Marxist doctrine and ignorance of some changes incorporated in that doctrine during and after Lenin's time, e. g., that capitalist development is an unavoidable stage of economic development. Service believes the CCP will initiate (or had initiated) a type of NEP program which will last indefinitely into the future—ignoring or ignorant of the fate of NEP in the USSR. Appears to be an objective analysis of the situation. (The conclusions appear to be what might be expected from one judging on the basis of Chinese experience only, not with reference to experience with communist seizures of power elsewhere.) The Chungking Embassy takes issue with Service's views that the CCP is not aiming for a monopoly of power in the near future.

169. 8-29-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.

Memo reporting on economic conditions in communist-controlled North Shensi. Tone is favorable toward achievement but information is presented in factual manner without comment.

170. 9-19-44. Chungking Observer Section in Yen-an.

Memo on *Chieh Fang Jih Pao*, communist newspaper in Yen-an. Submitted without comment save that the paper was well edited and of high caliber. Unimportant.

171. 10-11-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yen-an.

Memo summarizes lectures given by the Communist General, Chief of Staff of 18th Group, to officers of United States Army Observers Section regarding the situation behind the enemy lines in North China. Service comments only on the fact that the communist army is a political army as much as it is military. Factual.

172. 9-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.
Report designating communist-controlled areas of China. No political comment.
173. 9-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.
Transmitting report of a reception given the Observers Section. No political comment. Unimportant.
174. 9-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.
Report on communist charges against General Yen Hsi-shan. Details given factual without apparent bias.
175. 7-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.
Reporting on inauguration of daily news broadcasts from Yen-an. Purely factual.
176. 8-24-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.
Transmitting map of communist border area. No comments.
177. 9-28-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.
Well conceived analysis of the strength of the communist movement with the recommendation that American military aid be extended to the Communist forces, to aid in the struggle against Japan. Service expects the Kuomintang will object to such aid and stated the United States must soon formulate a policy to decide the question of this aid, keeping in mind that "the nature, policies, and objectives of the CCP are of vital long-term concern to the United States"; the "CCP under any circumstances must be counted a continuing and important influence in China." Arguments in favor of extending aid are presented factually. The interview with Mao transmitted with this despatch indicates Service's views regarding the question of United States relationship with the CCP parallel to a certain extent those of Mao himself. Service specifies his reasons.
178. 10-11-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.
Memo of lecture by communist military leader on strength, distribution, and arms of Communist forces. Factual account.
179. 10-13-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.
Memo of lectures by communist military leader on operations of 8th Route Army. Factual account without comment other than to point out the importance the communists attach to political programs as the basis of their military strength and success.
180. 9-29-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.
Report on possible usefulness of old communist bases in Southeast China. Objective account of facts. Specifies in connection with communist reasoning on matter that "it would be a mistake to assume that the communist consideration of the problem is all on the high-minded and unselfish plane." No political bias apparent.
181. 10-2-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.
Memo on personal impressions of communist leaders. Highly favorable of the personal qualities of these men. (Strikingly like the impressions of the old Bolsheviks which foreign observers acquired at the time of the Russian Revolution.) Service's favorable attitude obviously in part stems from the contrast with Kuomintang leaders. Apparently unaware of the potential dangerousness of the type of character molded in the communist school, especially when the CCP holds the reins of power. Objective in all.
182. 10-13-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.
Report on the popular appeal of the communist party. Outlines tactics employed by the Communists which win popular support, i. e., reduced rents, elimination of banditry, popular election of officials, and converting the army from instrument of oppression to one of aid to peasantry. Service views the accomplishments with favor tempered with reserve. Can find no other explanation of popular backing of the communists.
(NB. Service apparently considers "democracy" as synonymous with popular support, a definition which would apply to Hitler's regime as well. On basis of this definition, Service's opinion that the CCP is democratic is justifiable.)

183. 9-29-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.

Extremely well-balanced report on the development of communist political control in areas under their domination. (Rated Excellent in Department.) Report is well-rounded, presents a factual picture and appears to be very perceptive in divining the purpose of communist actions in many fields. Explains both how the communist program wins popular support and at the same time serves communist interests. No political bias evident and no effort to condemn or praise. Factual reporting. (Should be noted that CA's comments in Department on Service's reporting consistently put communist in quotation marks, implying something distinct from the Soviet brand. No evidence of this attitude has yet appeared in any of Service's work.)

184. 10-9-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.

Reports decision of CCP to change its name in foreign publicity to avoid the stigma of "communism." Service interprets it as a desire "to allay any foreign fears and to win foreign good-will." No political comment otherwise.

185. 10-25-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.

Transmitting communist views on treatment of Japan. No comment made but appears to be evident that Service accepts sincerity of communist spokesman and feels views expressed are honest aims of CCP.

186. 10-25-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.

Interview with CIC of communist military forces. Service states, "I am in general agreement with the views expressed by such communist leaders as Gen. Chu. Every effort, however, has been made to avoid encouraging any high expectations, to point out the practical difficulties in the way of direct cooperation and to suggest that Japan may be defeated in other ways than as the communists insist, a slow process of liquidating the armies on the Asian mainland." Chu's views followed the usual pattern that cooperation with the Kuomintang was impossible and U. S. strong role necessary in China.

187. 9-27-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.

Report of interview with Hungarian national. No political content.

188. 9-23-44. Yen-an.

Memo on the orientation of the Chinese communists toward the USSR and toward the U. S. Key document. Essentially, reasons that CCP orientation is exclusively pro-China. Ties with the USSR are of the past. Interests of the CCP are best served by cultivating ties with the U. S. which can aid the industrialization of China. USSR can't and China can't do it alone. Service states, "I believe that the Chinese Communists are at present sincere in seeking Chinese unity on the basis of American support. This does not preclude their turning back toward Soviet Russia if they are forced to in order to survive American-supported Kuomintang attack." Service's account appears to be an eminently fair statement of communist views as evident at that time—his conclusions, a reasoned choice between the lesser of two evils. Reveals ignorance of some of the finer points of communist doctrine, particularly in regard to the manner in which Marxism is to be applied outside the USSR.

189. 10-1-44. Yen-an.

Transmission of communist newspapers. No comments.

190. 10-25-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.

Memo on communist success in eliminating banditry. Cites communist explanation for this situation—economic improvement, mobilization of entire population in the war effort and removal of feudal basis of banditry—as only apparent explanation for its elimination. Objective reporting.

191. 11-24-44. Yen-an.

Reports of impressions of American medical officer and several foreign correspondents on popular support in communist areas. Presented without comment.

192. 11-24-44. Yen-an.

Transmission of memos on conditions in communist areas and on Communist-Kuomintang relations. Service's observations are, that the communists are fighting the Japanese, successfully because they have the people behind them mobilized. Mobilization based on economic, political and social revolution, gains of which the people will fight to

keep. Kuomintang will be unable to repress these mobilized people or the communists as long as the latter have popular support. Communists will continue to be important part of China's future and unless Kuomintang institutes extensive reforms (unlikely) Communists will be dominant force in China in a few years. Service's observations have been borne out by subsequent events.

193. 10-10-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Important memo on need for realism in U. S. relations with Chiang. Anti-Chiang, not pro-communist. Holds Kuomintang dependent on U. S., U. S. not dependent on Kuomintang. We do not need it militarily, we do not need to fear its opposition or fall or its international importance. Chiang does not represent pro-American or democratic groups, we owe him no gratitude and he understands only force. Need hard-boiled policy toward him to aid U. S. war effort. Only reference made to communists is that "we cannot hope to solve China's problems without consideration of the opposition forces, Communist, Provincial and liberal." Service's denunciation is strong but based exclusively on the urgency of aiding the American war effort in the Pacific. No indication of political bias towards any faction, only against Kuomintang corruption and power politics. A tendency to underplay usefulness of Kuomintang to the U. S. war effort and discount any worth in the movement.

194. 10-10-44. Yen-an.

Memo on communist interception of State Department radio bulletin. No political comments.

195. 11-24-44. Yen-an.

Memo on present communist attitude toward relations with Kuomintang. Service displays great insight into tactics of communists in increasing demands as the situation turns more in their favor. Reveals acute observation and understanding of the power politics involved. No personal comments of political nature appended.

196. 10-15-44. Yen-an.

Memo regarding censorship of escape stories coming out of communist territory. Unimportant.

197. 10-17-44. Yen-an.

Memo transmitting the published policies and administrative program of the CCP. No comments.

198. 10-18-44. Yen-an.

Memo on communist propaganda use of statements of foreign correspondents. Deplores the extravagant statements made by some promising American aid to the communists, but comments on the fact that many correspondents have been converted to a procommunist attitude. Unimportant.

199. 10-21-44. Yen-an.

Transmitting communist newspapers. No comments.

200. 11-8-44. Washington.

Interrogation of Service while on consultation in Washington. Views on Japanese communists. Appears to be purely factual information. Service states that he himself helped carry information for Japanese communists, apparently out of Yen-an to Chungking for relay elsewhere. No elaboration.

201. 11-44. Washington.

Interrogation of Service on Washington consultation. Views on probable developments in North China in the event of a U. S. landing. States that communists will cooperate with allied troops as long as allies do not interfere with their politics. Will not allow military considerations to prejudice their political program. Service suggests however "that it would be well to put out a rather large number of U. S. officers," since the communist area is decentralized. Chiefly factual evaluations.

202. 11-8-44. Washington.

Interrogation of Service while on Washington consultation. Predominantly factual information. Service states "China's first need is economic development, and U. S. must do it. Russian help would divide China but U. S. will unite them." * * * "Chinese communists are not radical at present. They are still Marxists, but are against subjectivism. Marxism points to ideal socialism." Little political comment.

203. 2-12-45. Chungking—for Wedemeyer.
Military only.
204. 2-14-45. Chungking—for Wedemeyer.
Memo on military weakness of our Far Eastern policy. States recommendations to aid communists parallel Churchill's policy in Yugoslavia, aiding the faction which would assist most in the war effort. Support of Chiang is only a means to an end but we tend to confuse the means with the end. We must clarify issue to restore our primary objective, defeat of Japan with smallest possible loss of life. Well-constructed analysis of situation.
205. 2-14-45. Chungking.
Recount of the current status of Kuomintang-Communist negotiations. Purely factual reporting.
206. 2-16-45. Chungking.
Views of Russian officials in China. No comments.
207. 2-17-45. Chungking.
Memo on Kuomintang hopes to make a deal with Russia. Service's opinions are contradicted by later events but analysis is interesting. Feels USSR will not deal with Kuomintang in view of its decided objections to the regime, no likely quid pro quo exists and besides Chinese Communists are stronger than Kuomintang. Unaware that USSR would be willing to sacrifice interests of a local Communist party for Soviet interests.
208. 2-17-45. Chungking.
View of Sun Fo. No comments or analysis.
209. 2-19-45. Chungking.
Memo on Chinese feelers regarding Formosa. Purely factual.
210. 2-28-45. Chungking.
Criticism of proposal to declare Shanghai an open city. Military interest primarily. Good analysis. No political application.
211. 2-28-45. Chungking.
Views of Captain (Joseph) Alsop. Diametrically opposed to Service's opinions. Alsop argued on the line that U. S. long-range interests were more important than the immediate ones of winning the war; that long-range interests involved allying China on our side as a balance against Soviet influence—our greatest threat—and destruction of the Chinese communists. Believed in necessity of getting involved in the inevitable civil war which would follow from U. S. complete backing of Kuomintang against communists.
212. 3-4-45. Chungking. Military.
Request to visit Yen-an. No political coloration.
213. 3-21-45. Chungking.
Memo of communist attitude toward Central Government. Notes change in CCP attitude toward U. S. cooperation in China and possibility of cooperation with Kuomintang. Service notes this change dates from Stilwell's departure. Communist expansions southward followed belief that U. S. would support only Chiang. Notes communists seem to be expecting large-scale Japanese activity in North China and are getting out of way of these Japanese efforts to consolidate on mainland. Communist determination to control China proper growing.
214. 3-13-45. Yen-an.
Views of Mao Tse-tung. Factual reporting. Opinions similar to those expressed in earlier papers.
215. 3-14-45. Yen-an.
Memo on communist expectations of Soviet aid and participation in the Pacific war at a late date. Probable course of military tactics to be followed by communists. Notes that communists will strive to gain control of Manchuria, that they have already infiltrated the area, because of its industrial importance. (Feeling that CCP did not expect USSR to strip Manchuria, as CCP intended to have benefits of its industrial potential.) Factual analysis.
216. 3-16-45. Yen-an.
Transmission of communist views regarding Sinkiang. Relayed without comment.
217. 3-16-45. Yen-an.
Communist views on Mongolia. Transmitted without comment.

218. 3-16-45. Yenau.

Policy of the Chinese communists toward the problem of national minorities. Service states that while communists claim their program is based on Sun Yat-sen's, in actuality it is based directly on that of the Russian communists (from whom Sun got most of his ideas). Service feels that some of these ideas (Stalin's "Marxism and National Question") may be unworkable in China because some of China's minority nations exist closes to other strong states and because China is weaker than Russia was at time of 1917 revolution.

219. 3-17-45. Yenau.

Communist plans for a relief and rehabilitation organization in communist liberated areas. No comments. Purely factual.

220. 3-17-45. Yenau.

Evidence to substantiate communist claims as to the extent of territory under their control. American observers evidence. No political comment. Purely factual reporting.

221. 3-19-45. Yenau.

Comments on communist report of Kuomintang exile government organizations in parts of China. Analysis of moves shows no political bias. Factual reporting.

222. 3-20-45. Yenau.

Transmitting information regarding dealings of Chinese Central Government military officials with the Japanese. No political coloration evident.

223. 3-21-45. Yenau.

Memo on Chiang Kai-shek's treatment of the Kwangsi Clique. Decidedly critical of Chiang's activities. Service's interpretation not necessarily accurate—CA disputes some points. Memo involves no mention of our references to communist movement. Factual reporting.

224. 3-22-45. Yenau.

Significance of personnel appointments made by Chiang. Service interprets these appointments are signs that Chiang is preparing for civil war with the communists, rather than peaceful cooperation. Factual.

225. 3-23-45. Yenau.

Memo on contact between the Chinese communists and Moscow. Service's interpretation is good. Gives known facts and distinguishes between governmental contacts and contact between communist parties. Appears to be a realistic view of situation. Service feels communists probably do not have relations with Soviet Government but contact between the Soviet CP and the Chinese is likely to exist.

226. 4-1-45. Yenau.

Statement of communist policy to be adopted by the communist congress as given by Mao and other leaders. Offered without political observations other than to point out high-lights.

227. 3-18-45. Yenau.

Memo on establishment of unified labor organizations and women's groups for the communist liberated areas. Factual account with comment that this step constituted a direct challenge to the Central Government, almost bringing the future conflict into the open. No political bias evident.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN S. SERVICE

Date: Tuesday, May 30, 1950, 10 a. m. to 12:30 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State.

Reported by: E. L. Koontz, court stenographer.

Board members present: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles; Arthur G. Stevens; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

In the case of John S. Service: Charles Edward Rhetts, attorney.

(The meeting reconvened at 10 a. m.)

(Col. Frank Dorn, called as a witness in behalf of John S. Service, being duly sworn, testified as follows:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Will you state your full name and address for the record, Colonel Dorn?—

A. Col. Frank Dorn, Department of the Army, Chief of Information, Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

Q. You are a colonel in the United States Army?—A. Right.

Q. Will you state your present duties?—A. My present duty is Acting Deputy Chief of Information in the Department of the Army.

Q. Now, would you state for the Board what your duties were during the period from 1941 to 1945: in general the positions you held?—A. In 1941 I was aide-de-camp to General Stilwell, who at that time in the early part of 1941 was in command of the Third Corps in California. Later, I went to Washington with him and after Pearl Harbor when he went to China on his mission, leaving Washington in February of 1942. I accompanied him on the trip. I was his aide until about October of 1942; then became artillery officer of the theater; later, deputy chief of staff of the theater, that is, the China-Burma-India theater; and later what they called chief of staff of the yoke force in Yen-an Province. From that, I became commanding general of what they called the Chinese Combat Training Command which was stationed in Yen-an Province, and left China in January of 1945 to come back to this country. I was then in headquarters Army Ground Forces for about 3 months. Then, accompanied General Stilwell to the Philippine Islands. Later, to Okinawa and went in with the early troop arrivals in Japan in late August of 1945. I remained in Japan until the end of 1945.

Q. I believe you indicated that during a portion of the period you were commanding general of—what were the forces?—A. The name of them was the Chinese Combat and Training Command, which was an American establishment set up to work with the Chinese troops primarily in Yen-an Province at that time for training purposes, equipment, supply, what advice we could give them.

Q. At that time, I take it, you were a temporary brigadier general?—A. Yes.

Q. Now, are you acquainted with Mr. John Service?—A. Yes. I have known him for about 15 years.

Q. For about 15 years. Would you summarize for the Board the nature of your acquaintance and association with Mr. Service during this period?—A. I first knew him when I was a language student in Peiping. I have forgotten whether it was late 1934 or early 1935, about that time, and he was in Peiping at that time. I ran into him occasionally in China during that period until 1938 when I felt China to come back to this country. I lost touch with him, ran into him again when I went out to China during the early war period.

Q. And after you met him again in China during the war period would you indicate to the Board something of how frequently you happened to see him and what the nature of your association with him was in terms of intimacy of your knowledge of him.—A. I saw him—I guess the best way to put it—I saw him off and on during that period over there. Sometimes it would be more frequent than others and there would be perhaps a long period where I might not see him. However, I was acquainted with the work he was doing more than I might say with him personally during that period.

Q. That is, you saw the memoranda and reports which he was preparing and turning into the Army headquarters as part of his work as a political observer?—A. Well, either that, or else in discussions of the staff heard the results of the reports which was more or less the same thing.

Q. Now, on the basis of your knowledge of Mr. Service over 15 years, and the relationship which you have described, I should like to ask you, first, whether you have ever had any reason to believe that Mr. Service was in any way disloyal to the United States?—A. I had no reason of any kind to think it at all.

Q. Did you ever have any reason to believe from any statements he ever made or any of his conduct that he was a Communist or a Communist sympathizer?—A. Never had the slightest idea that he might be and no reason to come to any conclusion of that kind.

Q. Were you aware that Mr. Service in the various reports which he sent back to the Army headquarters during the period when he was attached to the Army observers' mission at Yen-an, that he reported generally favorably on the morale of the Communist areas, and also that he reported favorably on their fighting qualities in relation to the Japanese?—A. I was aware of that in a general way, not having seen any of those reports.

Q. Were such reports also made by the members—strictly military members of that mission?—A. Yes. As far as I know, they were from talking to them and from some that I have read.

Q. I wonder if you could indicate to the Board something of your personal relationship to General Stilwell? I have gathered from your testimony that you were in a sense attached to him personally during quite a period.—A. I would say that, to use the expression, that I was "very close" to him in a personal way as well as in an official way. I had known him for a number of years, and had been with him—he was in China when I was a language student acting as assistant military attaché and I had very close connection with him and his family as well and still do with the family.

Q. It has been charged by Bishop Paul Yu-pin that Mr. Service insisted and repeatedly demanded that General Stilwell go to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and demand the arming of some 300,000 Chinese Communist troops. Bishop Paul Yu-pin has stated that Mr. Service put pressure on General Stilwell once, and then went back at him a second time and kept hammering at him until he finally forced General Stilwell to make these demands on General Chiang Kai-shek—could you comment on that assertion?—A. I have never heard General Stilwell say that Mr. Service had put this pressure on him.

Q. Do you think it likely that had Mr. Service been attempting to pressure General Stilwell in this fashion that it would come to your attention? In view of your relationship with General Stilwell?—A. I think in all probability it would because although General Stilwell had spent most of his time in India after 1942, nevertheless he came through where I was stationed in Yunnan Province. I would say, on an average of perhaps every 2 months and always stopped off and usually stayed at my house with me. We talked things over in a very general way and sometimes in a very detailed way, and I am sure that he would have mentioned something about it.

Q. From your knowledge of General Stilwell and your knowledge of Mr. Service would you say that Mr. Service was—in terms of the entire scheme of things in the theater at that time—a particularly potent or significant influence on General Stilwell personally?—A. No; he was not.

Q. Are you familiar with the general views that Mr. Service expressed in his report concerning the desirability of furnishing arms to the Chinese Communist forces?—A. Only in a most general way.

Q. I wonder if you would indicate to the Board what your general understanding of those views was?—A. Well, since I have not seen any of those reports that's not an easy one to comment on. However, I know that the general feeling of the officers that were at Yen-an and of many others in the theater was that the objective, after all, was to defeat the Japanese and as quickly as possible, and use any troops who were able bodied and who would fight for that purpose. So that the big majority of our people in the theater, as far as I know, looked on the Communists, Chinese Communists, more or less as another party; in fact, I frequently made the remark myself to Chinese that you might compare them to the Republicans and Democrats in this country, which was wrong, I realize now, but we felt that if we could get manpower we could do things and we didn't have manpower in the Chinese Nationalist Army.

Q. When you said a moment ago "our people" I take it you referred primarily to the military people?—A. To the military.

Q. Who felt that any able-bodied troops that were willing to fight should be encouraged to do so?—A. Yes. As an example, if I may digress a bit, in some of the troops I was working with in the Salween River area the divisions were depleted down to the strength of 1,500 men. Well, you are not going to accomplish much with that and our effort was to get replacements.

Q. Could you place for the Board in time roughly when General Stilwell came to view that it would be desirable to utilize the Chinese Communist forces in the war against Japan, and, as an incident to that, of course, to furnish them with arms necessary to permit them to fight?—A. As I recall, that would probably have been in late 1943 or early 1944. At that time one of the plans for the final consummation of the war called for an American landing on the coast of China, to use as a base to attack Japan. Naturally, the whole object would be to use whatever we could in CBI to open ports for American troops to use as landing points, and because some of the better ports, and, of course, closer to Japan, were in the north. General Stilwell, and, I believe, other members of the staff, gradually came to the idea to utilize the Communists for the purpose of moving over to the east to be ready to receive American landings.

Q. In placing that, do you happen to recall the date on which General Stilwell was recalled to this country?—A. He left China in October of 1944—roughly October 10.

Q. And you would place, as I understand your testimony, you would place the time when he came to view the Chinese Communist forces should be brought into play more actively against the Japanese, to have been late '43 or early '44?—A. That's as I recall.

Q. Yes. Now, were you familiar with the—Who was the head of the observer mission at Yen-an, if you recall?—A. I don't recall who was the head of the early one. I know Col. David Barrett went up there, and I believe, as I remember, he took it over.

Q. Were you in close touch at all with the work of that observer mission?—A. No; only my hearing reports from other members of the staff or from General Stilwell himself.

Q. Did you ever hear it suggested that Mr. Service was supplying information to the Chinese Communists of any improper character?—A. No; never.

Q. It has been charged, Colonel Dorn, that while Mr. Service was in China he was in some way in communication with a man by the name of Philip Jaffe, who was in this country, and who was editor of a magazine called Amerasia. The charge seems to be that Mr. Service was communicating or sending to Mr. Jaffe classified Government documents, including State Department and other documents. I wonder if you would care to comment to the board on the possibilities of Mr. Service being in communication with Mr. Jaffe, bearing in mind your knowledge of the restrictions on communications generally which prevailed in the theater. I suppose we might consider several possibilities. The first possibility, if it can be called possibility, would be that he was transmitting such documents to Mr. Jaffe through the mails. Would you comment to the Board on that suggestion?—A. I would say that it would be virtually impossible to do that for many reasons. The first thing that everything had to go back by air, back to this country, and Mr. Service in Chungking, assuming that he tried it, would have to put mail on a plane from Chungking to Kunming. There it would be changed to fly over the hump to some airdeld in Assam; would have to be changed again probably at Karachi, or possibly Delhi, and then when it got on the regular ATC run, either through middle Africa or north Africa, and across the Atlantic, every time the plane flew around 8 or 9 hours the crews are changed, so that it would be necessary to have a very complicated and almost impossible arrangement inasmuch as no one would know who the crews were who were going to take over the plane, even if the plane itself went all the way through. Then, when the plane arrived in this country, there was an inspection of all material that wasn't pouched properly, so I don't see how it could be done.

The CHAIRMAN. What you mean is that it could not be done by any regular method; any communication could go through the regular channels, I assume.

A. No; because mail was opened and censored.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that done?

A. It was done at the source. For instance, Chungking headquarters would censor—not all. They would spot-check it, of course, out-going mail, and then it was subject to censorship again when it arrived in this country.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it spot-checked by being opened and read?

A. Yes; opened and items cut out. Well, if any—I can't imagine anybody taking that risk because it would be impossible to accomplish it, I think.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Well, in the matter of the mails, am I correct in believing that in addition to the spot checks that all mail had to be initially censored before it was sent at all?—A. That's right. However, certain officers, the senior staff, didn't have their mail censored, but they had to sign on the outside of the envelop their name and official title, which would indicate, in effect, an affidavit that the material inside was proper.

The CHAIRMAN. How about political correspondents, like Mr. Service, did he have that authority to sign his own mail, so that it wouldn't be censored?

A. I don't know. However, I would like to add that though that meant it wouldn't be censored at the source that did not prevent it from being censored when it reached this country or censored possibly in India as it went through.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. So much for the mail. I think you have also testified on the other possibilities—by posting the regular mails would be one, and you have indicated the type of censorship that was applicable, and that in your view it would be a very foolish risk for anyone to take who sought to improperly transmit information that way. Another possibility, of course, would be some sort of a private

and illicit personal courier system. I wonder if you could comment on what the possibilities of that type of an operation would have been? For example, who could he have used for any kind of transmissions by some illicit personal courier system?—A. Well, to begin with, if it weren't an authorized courier he would never be allowed to go back because he would have to travel under orders and he would never get the orders, so the only type of courier that could be used would be an official one, and I think everyone is familiar with the instructions and restrictions on what they carry. So an official courier, I don't believe, could accept casual mail from anyone.

Q. Well, now, what would the possibilities be, for example, you have indicated that anybody moving would have to be moving under military orders.—A. Right.

Q. So that, presumably, he would have to develop some illicit arrangements with somebody who otherwise was traveling under military orders if you were to accomplish this thing. Now what would you consider the possibilities of such a system utilizing, we'll say, the crew of airplanes, that is, pilots or copilots, or whoever the other members of the crew might be?—A. Well, I think that would be virtually impossible because though he might be able to give a number of the crew leaving Chungking mail or documents, that crew would have to pass it on in Kunming.

Q. You mean to another crew?—A. Yes.

Q. That is, a crew on a plane from Chungking to Kunming ended its run there?—A. Normally.

Q. And then another crew would take over for the next leg of the run?—A. That's true, and when it came to Kunming, which was an enormous air operation, both combat and air transport, it would be almost impossible to know what crew was going to be handy to take it on, because they were coming in and out all the time, and, again, every time the crew changed I don't see how anybody would know who they would be, so that it would be a system that would be practically impossible to establish.

Q. Let's see if I can explore that a little further: You have one crew from Chungking to Kunming?—A. Normally.

Q. Then you have some one of several possible crews on the next run from Kunming to somewhere in Assam?—A. Yes.

Q. That is over the hump.—A. Yes.

Q. Then would the same thing prevail; that is, some one of a large number of possible crews on the next leg of the run from Assam to Karachi?—A. Right, either Delhi or Karachi.

Q. Yes. And then would the same thing prevail—that you would have again the chance of selecting some one out of a large number of possible crews from Karachi to—A. Probably Khartoum, and then someplace either in north Africa or central Africa, possibly Accra on the Gold Coast, and then Ascension Island, and Natal if it were the southern route, and then with stops all along the way up to Miami, and then, of course, when landing in Miami would be subject to anything.

Q. By "anything" you mean?—A. In the line of the crews.

Q. Inspection?—A. Yes; and examination. So, as a physical proposition I don't see how it could be done.

Q. Do you know whether the individual members of the plane crews were also subject to searches of their accompanying personal effects at any check points along the route from Chungking to the United States?—A. Well, I know they were when they arrived in the United States, all of them, and whether they were checked at any points I wouldn't be able to say. The probability is that where they entered a new country there was some kind of a check.

Mr. RHETTS. I think I have no further questions.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. As I understand, Colonel, you came with General Stilwell in March 1942 to China?—A. That's right; we arrived.

Q. You were then aide-de-camp?—A. Yes.

Q. At a later date you were detached as aide and given an executive position on the staff?—A. That's right.

Q. And what was that position?—A. First, as artillery officer for the theater.

Q. And then later what was the date of that?—A. That was in October of 1942.

Q. And then later on did you make a still further change?—A. Then I was made Deputy Chief of Staff of the theater with headquarters in Chungking.

Q. Now that was at what time?—A. That was either March or April of 1943.

Q. Did you come back with Stilwell in October?—A. Of 1944, no; I did not. I remained for 3 months and then left.

Q. Now, during the period while you were aide to General Stilwell, and later on when you were Deputy Chief of Staff, you were familiar with the various political reportings that were going on in the staff?—A. In a general way always and sometimes in a detailed manner.

Q. You did not regularly read the reports?—A. No; not regularly because after I went from my station at Kunming I was away from the theater headquarters, so that's why I did not read them regularly.

Q. But while you were with the staff you heard them discussed?—A. Yes.

Q. Did you have conversations from time to time with General Stilwell?—A. Yes.

Q. I don't mean Stilwell—I mean Mr. Service?—A. Occasionally, yes, sir.

Q. Did you discuss the political situation in China with him?—A. Well, I don't remember any particular time we did, but I would say, "Yes," because we all discussed it continuously, because the political and the military were so closely involved, and it was our work—it was our main topic of conversation anyway.

Q. So that I take it over that period until you were sent on detached service you were familiar with the general tenor of Service's reports?—A. Yes.

Q. Even though you didn't read the reports themselves?—A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever either in your discussion of his reports with other officers or in your examination of the reports or in your discussions with Mr. Service discover any indication that Mr. Service was attempting to talk Tito or in any other way oppose the policy of the staff?—A. No, sir.

Q. General Stilwell's policy?—A. No, sir; never.

Q. And I take it from what you have already said that you discovered nothing in his attitude which indicated that he was pro-Communist?—A. I never found anything. I looked in those reports—straight intelligence reports reporting on the situation that existed.

Q. And I also gather from what you have said that the reports were in general in harmony with the feeling among the military officers on the staff?—A. In a general way, yes; because we knew that the Chinese Communist troops were better men physically, they were better fed, they were better clothed. They had better morale than the Nationalist troops and any reports bearing out on that would simply be in line with what we had already had.

Q. So the reports were, as far as you were able to judge, factually accurate?—A. As far as I knew.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. Now it has been stated to us, Colonel, that you were probably as close to General Stilwell as anyone who was with him throughout this period. It has also been stated that General Stilwell was not in the general environment Mr. Service was for a very large part of the time that he was in the theater. Would you consider that Mr. Service was one of General Stilwell's intimates?—A. No, sir; I would not.

Q. Would you consider that Mr. Service had a marked influence on General Stilwell?—A. No, sir; I would not, and, if I may, I would like to add that when General Stilwell made up his mind no one had a marked influence on him.

Q. Yes. I think that's all.

Questions by Mr. ACIOLLES:

Q. You have indicated, Colonel, that it would be practically impossible for anyone to devise a system of sending communications by plane crews or anything like that. Would it be possible for someone to send messages by an American official returning to this country, and thus evading censorship?—A. Yes; I suppose it would, if that person had authority to go through the inspection at Miami without having his baggage and other material he might be carrying inspected, but that would normally have to be a pretty high-ranking military person, or a pretty high-ranking civilian official, if it were a civilian, and normally those people are responsible people who are not going to open themselves to any risk of that kind. You might get by with it once by mere chance, but I don't see how you could work it regularly.

Q. Were there many such people who were traveling frequently between the theater and the United States?—A. There were official couriers.

Q. No, I mean not couriers, but just high-ranking military or civilians who might not be subject to inspection?—A. Well, we had a great many people come out and visit out there, most of whom didn't accomplish much. I suppose on their return they would pass through without inspection.

Q. Were there any individuals who were frequently traveling back and forth?—A. Not individuals; no. Occasionally, a staff officer would be sent back for a conference in Washington. I would say that an individual—well, I think of General Merrell as one—I know he made, I believe, at least three trips back in a period of 3 years. Well, that is not very frequent.

Q. Were returning American correspondents subject to inspection on such trips?—A. Yes. They were supposed to be. I assume that the inspection was carried out.

Q. That's all.

The CHAIRMAN. Further questions?

Mr. RHETTS. No; I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel.

Mr. RHETTS. Thanks a lot.

(Col. Frank Dorn left the meeting at this time.)

(Lt. Col. Joseph Kingsley Dickey, called as a witness in behalf of John S. Service, being duly sworn, testified as follows:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Will you state your full name and address, Colonel Dickey?—A. Joseph Kingsley Dickey, lieutenant colonel, United States Army; resident 2801 Chesapeake Street NW., Washington, D. C.

Q. Would you state your present duties in the War Department?—A. I am not a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Q. Would you state for the Board what your duties were between the period, we'll say, 1941 to 1945?—A. 1941 I was in Japan as a Japanese language student for the United States Army. I came back from there in September of 1941 to the city of San Francisco where I joined then Colonel Reuchlin, and we ran a school for the teaching of Japanese to Nisei. The school was subsequently moved to Camp Savage, Minn., and I remained there until June of 1943. Then, I came to Washington for a month and I left there the twenty-sixth day of July for China, and I arrived in China, I believe it was, the thirtieth of August, 1943, and I went to Chungking about the fourth of September, and that was my residence until 1945.

Q. And what was your post in Chungking?—A. Chungking I was the G-2 Chief of Intelligence.

Q. In the headquarters of the commanding?—A. In the headquarters at Chungking.

In the headquarters at Chungking. Now, you are acquainted with Mr. Service, are you not?—A. I am.

Q. Would you state to the Board when you first met Mr. Service, and describe in general your association with him since that time?—A. Well, the exact time of the meeting, I don't quite remember whether it was a meeting discussing psychological warfare early in September or whether or not I met him over in Delhi, as I went immediately back to Delhi. I believe we came back on the plane at that time. It was either one of those two times I met him first—that was in September of 1943.

Q. That was in September 1943. At that time what was Mr. Service doing?—A. Service was the political adviser to our headquarters.

Q. He was attached to it?—A. Attached to the headquarters; that's right.

Q. To the headquarters staff. Now, subsequent to that time would you give a brief account of your association with Mr. Service?—A. Well, our work was rather close together. Mr. Service worked in Chungking a good deal of the time and he used to be—since he was the political associate for our headquarters he was turning in reports on things happening in China which would funnel through my office and went to General Stilwell and to the headquarters group there. He also acted in the capacity—when we had requests regarding political things they were usually handled by Mr. Service who went to the Embassy and got them. I believe Mr. Service did run one mission for us in which he and some other chap went on a sort of exploratory trip down toward the southeast over to French Indo-China—am I correct in that?

Mr. SERVICE. Yes.

A. And then at the time we set the mission up to go to Yenan, Mr. Service went up there as the political observer.

Q. Now, during this period was he in his capacity as member of the political advisory group, would you say that his dealings with the military staff were primarily through you?—A. I would say "Yes."

Q. Now, during the period when he was in Chungking before he went with the observer mission to Yen-an, could you give a little fuller description to the Board of the type of work that he was doing?—A. Well, it was writing of conditions in China the way it appeared to a man who had access to the military people there, and who knew China, and knew the political figures, knew the civilians, he was writing more or less general impressions of things that were going on and results that might be expected from things that were occurring. He was our liaison man with the Communists. Chou En-lai had a headquarters there in Chungking and in general we relied upon him for the political, the nonmilitary side of the life there.

Q. Now when you say he was your liaison man with the Communists, whose office there was headed by Chou En-lai, could you elaborate a little bit on that for the Board please?—A. Well, in China, of course, the very live question was the Communists—what was their contribution to the war? At that time we were absolutely blind north of the Yellow River. The National Government control went up as far as the Yellow River and stopped. That made our intelligence—from there on north we knew nothing. That was more or less Communist territory. So we cultivated them to find out what they knew and what they could give to us. They didn't give us very much military stuff. There was a great deal of political life evidently.

Q. And, as I understand, it was Mr. Service's job as a part of the military staff to obtain intelligence, of a political character at any rate, from the Communists?—A. That is right.

Q. Then, when you refer to his later going to Yen-an I take it that that also was after you moved north of the Yellow River, and this mission was for the purpose of obtaining intelligence on the ground from and about the Communists?—A. Three things: weather, intelligence, and to help our downed Air members were the reasons always given why we went up there.

Q. Yes. Now, as G-2 in Chungking did you receive all the reports which Mr. Service wrote for the headquarters?—A. I did.

Q. And you had to read them all, did you?—A. I did.

Q. Be familiar with them?—A. Yes.

Q. I wonder if you could, in general, characterize these reports from the point of view of their general objectivity as intelligence reporting, and any political orientation that they may have exhibited on the part of the author of these reports?—A. Well, these reports were not only read, but were studied with a great deal of interest in our headquarters. The political reporting seemed to us, who, as I said, had only a superficial knowledge what we could see around the city talking to people, to be accurate, seemed to be objective in their case. The questions of future in China, we never felt competent to pass on that, we used to read these with a good deal of interest. These reports were circulated in our headquarters and then used to remain on file in my office. The new officers who came in to responsible positions were usually given this file to read.

Q. Did you or any of your military superiors regard Mr. Service as being pro-Communist?—A. No.

Q. Did you ever have any, or do you now have reason to believe that Mr. Service is a Communist or pro-Communist or Communist sympathizer?—A. No.

Q. I would like to show you, Colonel Dickey, what has been introduced in evidence here as Document 193, which is the report No. 40 of Mr. Service, and ask you if you recall that report?—A. (After reading some of report.) Do you wish me to read the whole memorandum?

Q. Well, if you care to refresh your recollection about it, I suggest you do.—A. (Reading.)

Q. Do you have any independent recollection of this?—A. Well, this reads familiarly to me. I have read the white paper on China, whether or not I read part of it in there—that's from my past recollection.

Q. I take it that when this report was filed by Mr. Service, in accordance with your habitual practice, you read it at that time?—A. That's right.

Q. I take it, however, from what you have just testified that you have no clear recollection of it now?—A. No.

Q. General Hurley has testified that this report was a plan to bring about the downfall of Gen. Chiang Kai-shek and Senator McCarthy and others have repeated this charge. Do you have any recollection that when this report was received at headquarters that it was regarded as such a plan?—A. No, I have no recollection of that, nor do I, thinking back, think it would have been regarded as such.

Q. I take it that had you received anything which you so regarded there is some possibility that it would have remained in your memory more vividly, would it not?—A. That's right.

Q. Do you recall that General Stilwell ever regarded this as any plan to bring about the downfall or torpedoing of Generalissimo Chiang's Government?—A. No. I can't remember the message, even General Stilwell's connection with it. I can only presume that it went to him and returned to him.

Q. You were also G-2 in Chungking after General Stilwell was replaced by General Wedemeyer, were you not?—A. That's correct.

Q. Do you have any recollection that General Wedemeyer ever expressed any criticism of Mr. Service for this report or indeed for any other report that he ever filed?—A. No.

Q. On the basis of your knowledge of Mr. Service and your familiarity with his memoranda and reports as they were filed with you, did you ever see anything in his writings or hear him make any statement which would suggest to you that Mr. Service believed that communism was the best hope of Asia?—A. No, never.

Q. Or anything to that effect?—A. No.

Q. You have just read this Document No. 193, do you now regard it as a plan to bring about the fall of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek?—A. No.

Q. On the basis of your knowledge as a G-2 in Chungking would you have regarded the conclusions in that report as either incredible miscalculations or misrepresentations, as Congressman Judd has charged?—A. I would not. I would say that they were more or less what the Americans generally thought, usually they were much more vitriolic than this is after they had been out there awhile.

Q. Now I would like you to look at Document 35-5, Colonel Dickey, just this one page. Now, this represents the testimony of General Hurley before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in which he expresses differing versions of his conception of the American policy objectives in China. From your knowledge as G-2 in Chungking of Mr. Service's activities and reporting could you state whether Mr. Service ever disagreed with any of those policy objectives?—A. I would say he did not. I would say he agreed with all of these objectives.

Q. You would say he agreed with all of them?—A. Yes.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. With further reference to that document you were just looking at, Document 35-5, I note a statement in there by General Hurley that certain Americans could not go along with the American policy or were incompatible with the officials of the Chinese Government with whom we had to deal. Was Mr. Service unable to go along with the American policy?—A. I don't think he ever was.

Q. Was he incompatible with the officials of the Chinese Government with whom you had to deal?—A. No; on the contrary, Mr. Service was the only one we oftentimes had to deal with them; for instance, on one important message he was interpreter for the Generalissimo.

Q. I also notice that General Hurley says that "their objectives had the opposition of most of the career diplomats"—did their objectives have the opposition of Mr. Service?—A. As they are stated here, I don't think that I ever ran into anybody who had any opposition to these objectives.

Q. Thank you.

Questions by MR. RHETTS:

Q. Colonel Dickey, I wonder if you could state to the Board whether or not in the light of your knowledge of affairs in China at that time Mr. Service could be regarded in any sense as the principal or even an important force in bringing about the creation of the Army Observers Mission in Yenan?—A. I am afraid I would have to qualify my answer on that. He had a great deal to do with the thinking of us people in the headquarters as to the desirability and the way that we could do it if we approached the Chinese, different means of approaching them, we could get up there, but it was only as advice to us as how to get up there, I believe.

Q. That is, military had quite independent reasons for seeking—A. Oh, we were very independent, we did not—we said the political side of it was entirely the Embassy's and it was for that reason, I believe it was upon Embassy representation that Mr. Service himself went up there. The military reasons were quite different.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. But you had no reservations about Mr. Service being the man chosen by the Embassy to do this job?—A. None at all. In fact, we were very glad that he was going.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. It has been reported that Bishop Paul Yu-pin has stated that Mr. Service kept hammering at General Stilwell to make demands on Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for the arming of some 300,000 Communist troops. Bishop Paul Yu-pin is reported to have said that Mr. Service exerted great pressure on General Stilwell and came back at him at least three times in order in effect to force General Stilwell to make these demands on the Generalissimo as a result of which the Generalissimo brought about General Stilwell's recall. Do you have any knowledge of any such pressure brought by Mr. Service on General Stilwell?—A. First, I don't think any American could have brought any pressure on General Stilwell. He was a very independent man. And, secondly, he himself considered himself probably the best political observer in China, and what other people fed him was for him to note. I don't believe he other than listened to things to pick up new things, but you must remember General Stilwell himself had had a long background of China and had traveled in China extensively. What people like Mr. Service could give him was merely to bring him up to date on it.

Q. Do you know what opportunities Mr. Service had, apart from the reports which were filed with you, to bring pressure to bear on General Stilwell?—A. Well, if General Stilwell was at our headquarters he would have the opportunity to go to see and talk with him. He wasn't at our headquarters very much while I was there, he was in Burma most of the time.

Q. Would you have known of the occasions which Mr. Service would have had to confer personally with General Stilwell?—A. I believe I would. I think the arrangements would have been made through my office.

Q. If Mr. Service were engaged in attempting to bring about such pressure on General Stilwell do you think it likely that it would have come to your attention?—A. It might have and it might not have, I would have to equivocate that answer. I probably would not have been present.

Q. Did you ever at any time while you were in China, Colonel Dickey, learn or hear any reports to the effect that Mr. Service was transmitting classified information to the Chinese Communists?—A. I did not.

Q. Did you ever hear it charged that anyone was doing that?—A. Let me broaden that question a little bit: Do you mean by transmitting classified information—do you mean documents or just talking about things that were classified, it's hard to make a distinction?

Q. Yes, well, I refer to documents. General Hurley has charged, for example, that Mr. Service showed Document 193, which you have just read, to the Chinese Communists.—A. When you say that Mr. Service is the originator of these things, probably the first classification that was put on them was when they came into the military unless he placed it on there himself.

Q. Did you ever hear it suggested that this document or any other documents had been shown by Mr. Service to the Chinese Government?—A. No, I didn't.

Q. If information to that effect had come to General Hurley's attention, would you suppose that that information would, in turn, have been reported to you?—A. Perhaps not directly. I think I would have heard of it; yes. You see, security also comes under the G-2.

Q. In other words, had Mr. Service, or anyone else on your staff, been engaged in such work, or even reported to be doing so, it would have been your job, would it not, to have conducted the necessary investigation to find out whether it was true?—A. That's correct.

Q. And, if found to be true, to take some corrective action?—A. Yes.

Q. Did you, as the G-2 in Chungking, give Mr. Service access to highly classified material?—A. I did.

Q. Have you ever had any doubt whatsoever to his complete reliability to be trusted with access to such material?—A. No.

Q. Do you recall what Mr. Service's views were on the general problem of supplying arms to the Chinese Communist forces?—A. Well, I believe Mr. Service was of the opinion that we should utilize all the forces we could in China to fight the Japanese. Remember, during the war we were there to fight Japan, and we were certainly trying to use every pressure against Japan we could. Japan was the enemy in '43, '44, and '45.

Q. That being so, was it your impression that he favored utilizing the Chinese Communist forces as well as the Nationalist forces?—A. Yes.

Q. Was that view entertained by General Stilwell?—A. I believe it was.

Q. And by others of the military staff?—A. Oh, yes.

Q. Do you know whether Mr. Service—whether it was his proposal to arm the Chinese Communist independently of the National Government?—A. I don't ever remember him having proposed that. If he did, he wouldn't have gotten very far. It was understood by everybody that General Stilwell was the Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo. In other words, it was the Central Government whom we were working with and you always had to work through the Central Government for anything you did. If he made such a proposal, I don't remember it.

Q. I take it that as far as you know, Mr. Service's views on this question were not at least more—did not differ from General Stilwell's, as best you understand?—A. No. As far as I know they didn't differ at all. Let me say in that connection if he had he would have written it, and they would have been somewhere in these records because there are written records.

Q. That's the only way he had to get his views across?—A. That's correct.

Q. It has been charged, Colonel Dickey, that while Mr. Service was in China he was in communication with a Mr. Philip Jaffe, who was in this country, and that he in some manner or another transmitted to Mr. Jaffe various classified Government documents. I wonder if you would care to comment for the Board in the light of your knowledge as G-2 of the restrictions on communications, both of the mails and of persons, what the possibilities of such communication by Service with Jaffe might be?—A. Well, Mr. Service was in the anomalous position of being both State Department and working with the military. As a civilian, any mail that appeared anywhere in the mail systems would have been subject to Chinese censorship. It is very hard to get mail out, as a matter of fact, going by air, so if he sent it straight mail, which I doubt he would do, since all civilians who wished would be able to get their stuff into the governmental channels, he would hardly dare to do it that way.

Q. In that connection, if I might interrupt you, do you know whether Mr. Service had authority to initially censor his own mail, that is, put it—A. I don't know how the Embassy worked that. As far as the military is concerned, no. No civilian, to the best of my recollection, was ever allowed to do that.

Q. Well, now, he was attached to your staff, was he not?—A. That's right.

Q. So that—A. You see, he could go over to the Embassy and give them mail to go back through the Embassy pouches.

Q. Through the Embassy pouches, yes, but in terms of anything that he would deposit in the regular American mail system—A. Well, that's the Army system.

Q. That was the Army system?—A. That's right.

Q. As I understand it, officers of certain ranks had authority by writing on the outside of the envelope to make the initial censorship of their own mail, and of their own and others, and that we may call the censorship at the source. Do you know whether Mr. Service had that authority in the theater?—A. No, he wouldn't be allowed that. It was the military officers who had that.

Q. You had to be an officer with military rank?—A. That's right.

Q. Well, now, I interrupted you, would you care to go ahead with your comment on the physical possibilities of transmission?—A. Well, the way of getting these things out through regular channels with the Chinese mail system, as I said, of course, everything would be censored, or he had the opportunity to send it through our channels or through State Department channels, which one he used I really don't remember, and what arrangements the State Department made with their own pouches again I am in ignorance. That was none of our business. On military you have just asked me about—an officer certified on the outside that he had censored that.

Q. And after the initial certification mail was subject to further censoring?—A. Yes, it was subject to some further censoring—whether or not it was was a matter whether or not that letter happened to be picked up later on by censors along the route.

Q. Determined by spot check?—A. By spot checks, yes.

Q. But any mail that he deposited into the Army mail system would have to be censored by someone else at the source?—A. That's right.

Q. Do you have any knowledge whether Mr. Service had access to the Embassy files after he became attached to the military headquarters?—A. To the best of my recollection he did have access to the Embassy files. Mr. Service kept us aware

of what the Embassy was doing and likewise he was to keep the Embassy informed of what we were doing.

Q. On what do you base the recollection that he had access to the files in the Embassy?—A. Well, I can remember him coming over and telling us about some of the messages or something that they were going to send back.

Q. Those he could, presumably, have obtained by discussion with the Embassy staff in relation to a particular problem, could he not?—A. That's right, he could have.

Q. That does not necessarily imply that he had free access to the files on his own?—A. That's correct. It is merely supposition on my part.

Q. I understand. As a matter of fact it has been testified by the Ambassador that he did not have access to the files—that all non-Embassy people did not, and I recognize that you are only speculating.

I have no further questions.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Colonel, the disappearance of General Stilwell from the Chinese scene was due, was it not, to some demand he made on Chiang Kai-shek?—A. I have to say in that respect, General, that even though I had been an officer with him I was rather dark on the whole thing. The negotiations there—what was done was done very secretly. General Stilwell did not confide very much in his staff. I don't believe his own Chief of Staff could give you an answer, and I learned more by reading his book than by living in the house there.

Q. So that from your own knowledge at the time you can't testify on that?—A. No, sir, I can't.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions?

Mr. STEVENS. Yes, a few questions.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. Colonel, it is the usual practice, is it not, for a G-2 to obtain information from all sources possible and place an evaluation on that information?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Any materials, therefore, submitted by Mr. Service were subject to that same sort of treatment. In other words, you gaged his reporting abilities, his objectivity, etc., against the sources that came to you from elsewhere?—A. That's right, sir.

Q. Can you tell us whether any of the reports that you remember having read of his appeared not to be objective and to be so out of line with the tenor of the times and the general reports that you were getting as to cause suspicion on your part?—A. No, sir, I can't think of a single instance.

Q. I think it has been stated to us earlier that the materials that were prepared for the commanding general by Mr. Service were prepared in, I think it was four copies—one to the general, one to Mr. Davies, one to the Embassy, and one that Mr. Service retained in his own file. I think it was further stated that the copies, aside from the one that he retained, came through your channels in dispatch.—A. Could I qualify that, sir?

Q. Yes.—A. That during the period he was in Yen-an and, of course, while he was in Chungking—

Q. In Yen-an, I did not recall, but that would have happened in Yen-an, would it?—A. Yes. In Chungking he could give it right to the Embassy or send it to Mr. Davies.

Q. Now, how did that material come to you? Did it come already in envelopes, and sealed, or did it come open, or can you recall?—A. Well, now, I have got this perhaps not too exact. A plane used to go to Yen-an, our own plane, and come directly back. Then, the material was brought directly to our headquarters. Now, the first time I saw it, of course, was after it had been opened and was ready for distribution, things that were felt of immediate interest to me. I'm speaking now of my own staff there. It was brought to my attention. But our own people handled it throughout, our own headquarters personnel. In other words, mail people went down and met the plane, and brought it to our headquarters where it was handled as mail, except anything other than letters was brought immediately to our section for processing. In other words, we were held responsible for what went up to Yen-an and what came back—my own particular office was.

Q. You were also held responsible, I take it, for anything that came through that channel as to whether it was to be dispatched further or—A. That's right.

We made the further distribution of it other than plane mail going back and forth.

Q. Now, when was it that General Wedemeyer appeared on the scene?—A. Well, it was the end of October, or the first of November, just a matter of days in there.

Q. Did you have the responsibility for briefing him when he arrived with regard to things that had happened prior?—A. That's right.

Q. Do you know what of Mr. Service's materials were specifically called to his attention? Can you remember anything or would you have given him a composite report which would have contained materials possibly reflecting Mr. Service's comments?—A. No, sir; I can't remember specifically. As I said, Mr. Service's reports after they were circulated in our headquarters came back and I used to have them in a file there which I imagine I gave him to read, but I can't state that definitely. I did, of course, do a good deal of verbal briefing.

Q. Yes. Do you know much of Mr. Service's association with General Wedemeyer during the short while that they were together, that they were in the same theater?—A. No; I don't. He didn't have too much chance to see General Wedemeyer during that period that General Wedemeyer came to our headquarters, as Mr. Service was in Yenan most of the time.

Q. I see. Did you know of Mr. Service's relations with the American press during this period in Yenan? Were you any way involved in his relationships, in briefing sessions or anything else with the American press?—A. Not in Yenan I wouldn't have been; no.

Q. That wouldn't have been——

A. No, that would have been done by Colonel Barrett who was on the spot.

Q. I see. I have no more questions.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Did you have a relationship with respect to the briefing of correspondents at any other place than Yenan?—A. No, no briefing with relationship to them. I remember after they came back there was some flurry where they wanted to get back to the States rather quickly and I refused them passage.

Q. What I was referring to was the liberty that the correspondents had or that the political reporters had to discuss what they had observed with correspondents, were you familiar with that?—A. No. We took a rather careful position there that anything regarding China was a matter for the Chinese to censor, that we were not going to be placed in the position of censoring Chinese news by our own reporters because we took one definite stand: If it had military implications or violated military security we took out the material that they had. If it concerned Chinese politics and things like that, had we not had the Chinese censorship available we would have censored, that's true, as allies, but since they were, in turn, censored we took the stand: You do the censoring of what you consider objectionable, we will not.

Q. How would the Chinese go about censoring a conversation or a briefing session between, say, a political reporter like Mr. Service and the American correspondents still on the staff, connected with the staff?—A. Well, they wouldn't have had any opportunity to sit in on that. A briefing could have been a conversation.

Q. Yes.—A. But it was the writings, everything was written, every dispatch had to go through Chinese censorship.

Q. That is, dispatched to the home papers?—A. That's right, sir, anything that was to go out for dispatch.

Questions by Mr. SERVICE:

Q. Just as any mail the correspondents might wish to send back was also subject to Chinese censorship if it went through open channels?—A. If it went through open channels, if it went back through our couriers it was not subject to Chinese censorship.

Q. Subject to yours?—A. Subject to ours.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. Was there objection on your part to a political reporter like Mr. Service giving background information in a briefing session to American correspondents orally on Chinese matters, not military matters?—A. No, not at all.

Q. Was he expected to do that sort of thing?—A. I don't know if it was actually assigned as part of his duties, certainly there was no objection interposed.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Colonel, you have read Document 193, which is Mr. Service's Report No. 40 of October 10, 1944?—A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Service has stated that he ascertained later that General Stilwell had prior to the date of that report transmitted substantially the same recommendations to Washington. Do you recall from your own knowledge whether General Stilwell had expressed similar views?—A. You place me in a hard position, Mr. Achilles; I lived with General Stilwell. In other words, a good deal of things were said at the table. What was said in messages and what was said in table conversations is a little bit hard—

Q. I was referring to his official reports.—A. Most of his official reports I never read. They were his "eyes alone" message, as back here, and "eyes alone" we were not circulated, of course.

Q. They went as "eyes alone"? On pages 68 and 69 of the white paper are given extracts from certain messages from General Stilwell in September 1940; do you have that?—A. I have it; yes, sir.

Q. Could you state from your knowledge whether those represented General Stilwell's views, personal views at that time or the views of his staff as a whole?—A. I would say that they were General Stilwell's personal viewpoint. This reads like him. General Stilwell did not make use—in other words, a staff paper being drawn up and then revamping it and then sending it, he wrote his own material. And you see he came there early in September and remained there until he was sent home working on this type of thing by himself with General Bergin, and General Merrill came up there, but they actually worked in the general's quarters, and we, of course, were down at headquarters. This was, of course, a separate thing from our normal activity. This reads like the general himself; undoubtedly, he wrote this himself, I would say.

Q. You would say that was the general's statement himself rather than reflecting Mr. Service or his staff, that was the general's statement himself?—A. Oh, yes.

Q. You have stated that as G-2 you were responsible for the security of the intelligence material in the headquarters at Yenan.—A. Well, of anything classified, our counterintelligence, you see, is responsible for.

Q. While you were G-2 in Chungking do you recall any cases of violation or alleged violation of security with respect to material furnished by Mr. Service?—A. No; I can't think of any. There was an occasion after the war was all over—no, right after General Stilwell had left when we had some people there writing up the history now of the history during General Stilwell's time, during which a man lost a notebook which could have contained some of Mr. Service's material, as the fellow had made extracts from all of the different things available, and he lost that on the street.

Q. Was that an official, or a newspaperman?—A. It was an official, one of our officers, but he had it in a musette bag. He was all through and yet he lost his notes. He was sent home in a great hurry, rather harsh disciplinary action taken.

Q. In your capacity as G-2 did you have any view of the public relations director?—A. Yes, I did in Chungking during General Stilwell's time in office there. Public relations were actually a branch of my own office. In other words, I had people there who handled it and I consequently, had knowledge of policy and, in general, what was going on. I usually received a general briefing; under General Wedemeyer we made it a separate office.

Q. Your public relations activities were also under your responsibility as security officer?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were there any cases while you were there of alleged improper briefing by Mr. Service of any correspondents or persons?—A. I don't quite get your implication, Mr. Achilles, of improper briefings.

Q. That is, the improper disclosure of classified information to correspondents or others?—A. No, I can't remember anything like that. You oftentimes take a correspondent quite a bit into the bosom of the family so that he is able to write more intelligently. I refer, for instance, to reporters coming and asking: "Is this a good time to leave Chungking? Are things going to be quiet here? Is it safe to go down to the front? Is trouble going to break out in this spot or this spot?" Now, that is highly classified, and yet you will tell them: "If I were you, I would go to this spot." You have got to move them to the spots where things are happening. It is highly classified, no doubt about it, but you tell them.

Q. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. We will take a short recess.

Mr. RHETTS. Is the board finished with the witness for the moment?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Were you through with the witness?

Mr. RHETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, we can excuse the witness. Thank you very much, Colonel. It is very kind of you to come in on a holiday.

A. It is quite all right.

(Lt. Col. Joseph Kingsley Diekey left the meeting at this time.)

(After a brief recess the meeting reconvened.)

(Mr. Philip D. Sprouse, called as a witness in behalf of John S. Service, being duly sworn, testified as follows:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Will you state your full name and address for the record, Mr. Sprouse?—

A. Philip D. Sprouse, Westchester Apartments, Cathedral Avenue, Washington.

Q. What is your present position?—A. I am the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs.

Q. Of the Department of State?—A. Of the Department of State.

Q. Will you tell us, Mr. Sprouse, what your position was and where you were during the period from roughly, well, from 1941 to 1945?—A. Well, suppose I begin really at the beginning of the war with Pearl Harbor—I was on my way back to my post in Hankow. At the time of Pearl Harbor I came back to Washington, stayed here until April of that year, then went to Chungking, arrived in Chungking early May 1942. I was in Chungking from May 1942 until the middle of June 1944—at the American Embassy in Chungking in June of that year.

Q. What was your position in the Embassy at that time?—A. I was the third secretary of the Embassy at that time. In June of that year I was transferred to the American consulate general at Kunming, where I stayed until late November 1944.

Q. Now, are you acquainted with Mr. Service, Mr. Sprouse?—A. I have known Mr. Service very closely since December 1935 when he first arrived in Peiping where I was at that time.

Q. You were also a language student?—A. No; I was a language student later.

Q. Later?—A. Later, but I was in Peiping. I arrived in Peiping in October 1935; Mr. Service arrived in December 1935, I believe.

Q. And would you care to summarize for the board, if you can, in general, your relations with Mr. Service since that time?—A. Well, for the 2 years, a little bit more than 2 years, I think, that Mr. Service was a language student I knew him extremely well. We were very close friends. I knew his family. While I wasn't a language student our relationship was very close and very friendly, and I think in the beginning of 1938 he was transferred to Shanghai. I stayed on in Peiping until 1940. At one time, I think it was in '38, I went home on leave, came back to the United States on home leave. I passed through Shanghai on my way back to Peiping. I think I was in Shanghai for perhaps 2 weeks between boats. I stayed with Mr. Service and his family. In 1940 I was transferred from Peiping to Hankow. I passed through Shanghai again en route to my new post; I think it was approximately 10 days or 2 weeks that I stayed with Mr. Service and his family again. The next time I saw Mr. Service was, I think, '42, May '42, when I arrived at the Embassy in Chungking. Mr. Service was at that time living with Ambassador Gauss and Mr. Vincent, who was the counselor of Embassy. In the first few days until I got a place to stay I stayed in the house with Mr. Service and the Ambassador and Mr. Vincent. Then, later, I moved to another house. Sometime during that summer Mr. Service was sent out on an observer trip—I would say that lasted 3 months approximately—and he came back sometime in the fall. At that point I was living with Ambassador Gauss and Mr. Vincent, and Mr. Service stayed there—I don't know whether it was 2 weeks, 3 weeks, or 4 weeks, something like that. We were closely associated during those days.

Then, later, when Mr. Service was made political adviser and attached to General Stilwell's staff our liaison as political advisers was very close, that is between the Embassy, and I saw Mr. Service almost daily, I would say, when he was in Chungking.

Q. And I take it during the earlier period when both you and he were attached to the Embassy in Chungking you were in daily contact?—A. Oh, yes, in daily contact.

Q. Do you feel on the basis of your association with Mr. Service you are thoroughly acquainted with his mind and his outlook, particularly in political mat-

ters?—A. I think so. I don't think you could live with a person, I don't think you could visit his home, I don't think you could see him in daily contacts and know the work he was doing, without being as certain as you could be about anything about another program.

Q. In the course of all your dealings with Mr. Service have you ever had any occasion to believe that he was a Communist or a Communist sympathizer?—A. Not the slightest.

Q. Have you ever had any occasion to question his loyalty to the United States?—A. Not the slightest.

Q. Were you familiar with the political reporting which Mr. Service was doing both while he was attached to the Embassy prior to August 1943, and thereafter while he was attached to General Stilwell's staff doing political reporting?—A. I think I am in a particularly good position to comment on that because when I was at the Embassy I was in the political reporting section, and the reports of Mr. Service which were submitted to General Stilwell; that is, copies of the reports which were submitted to General Stilwell were also submitted by Mr. Service to the Embassy, and the same thing was true of other officers that we had on similar details, and also officers that we had as Embassy observers in these outlying posts which were not consulates, they were simply stationed in various provincial cities as Embassy observers, they were all forwarded to the Embassy, and it was my job to summarize them; that is, in a covering dispatch to submit to the Department and to add any comment that the Embassy might want to. I might add that all those covering dispatches, obviously, were signed by the Ambassador himself. So that during that period from August 1943, or even earlier when Mr. Service was in Lanchow—he was earlier stationed in Lanchow as one of those Embassy observers, of course, I saw all the reports that he wrote. We transmitted all of them, or practically all of them to the Department. We did the same with Mr. Service's reports when he was attached to General Stilwell's staff, always with a covering dispatch on them. So I was thoroughly familiar from say the time he went to the field, left Chungking and went to Lanchow; also during the period from August 1943 when he was attached to General Stilwell's staff up until the middle of June 1944 when I was transferred to Kunning. It is only since that date I think when I came back to Washington on home leave in the winter of 1944 and 1945 that I saw subsequent reports that he wrote during that period. I have seen them since then, but I didn't see them at the time—at a later period.

Q. Now, on the basis of your familiarity with those reports could you tell the board whether you ever saw any evidence in any of them that Mr. Service was in any way seeking to defeat or sabotage American foreign policy in China?—A. I would say definitely not because Mr. Service—I think you have to go back to the atmosphere of Chungking during that period which really started when I was in the Embassy in Chungking. In 1943 you began to see the signs of decay and the deterioration on the part of the National Government, and these things are things that came to us from Chinese within the Government, even extending to Cabinet members who were distressed about the situation, and it seems to me that it all boils down to the role of a Foreign Service officer who was reporting from the field, which is fundamental to our jobs. You report what you think objectively is the case, and it is up to your chief, the chief of mission, whether it is the Ambassador or the chargé to transmit that to the Department or to make such comment as you want, and I know of no indications that Mr. Service was doing anything which would be contrary to the long-range objectives of this country and I think that was the general feeling.

I might add at this point, at the risk of having Mr. Service blush, that Mr. Service was considered the sort of one or two top-ranking political reporting officers and other China language officers from the standpoint of his competence and from the point of his knowledge of China, the history, the language, his almost indefatigable quality of turning out tremendous quantities of work and extremely valuable work, and I do know we received many commendations from the Department on his reporting during the period that I was there.

Q. I believe you testified that you were consul in Kunning during what period, Mr. Sprouse?—A. From late June 1944 until late November 1944, and then again from the first of September 1945 until December, through most of December 1945, a period of about 4 months each time.

Q. So that you were the consul in Kunning on August 1, 1944?—A. I was the No. 2 officer. There was a consul general there, and I was the consul.

Q. Who was the consul general?—A. Consul general was Mr. Langdon who is now consul general in Singapore.

Mr. Achilles. Pardon. Where were you between the time you left Kunming on that assignment and the time you returned there?

A. I came home, Mr. Achilles, in late November 1944. I think I had 30 days' leave and I was in the Department under temporary assignment working on the revision of our China language course for the postwar period. Then, I was all set to go back to Chungking when I was practically removed from a plane. I was going up to General Hurley, but was sent to San Francisco—this was in April 1945—sent to San Francisco as a member of what they called the International Secretariat, as the liaison officer with the Chinese delegation—I think you remember that period, which lasted from some time in April until early July 1945. Then, I was here during a period of waiting for passage out—I mean it was a matter of priorities at that point. I think I was here for say 2 or 3 weeks waiting for a plane out in July and I returned to Kunming and—this got rather complicated. I returned to Kunming just about VJ-day on way to Chungking. I was to be sent to one of these observer posts at Chengtu. The Embassy in Chungking ordered me to stay in Kunming. They changed their minds at the last minute and sent me to Chengtu, and after 24 hours I was returned to Chungking to take the place of a language officer who was going out to take on Jap surrender ceremonies, and I took his place on September 1, 1945, at Chungking.

Q. Now do you know, was Mr. Service attached to the consulate at Kunming in 1944?—A. As far as I know, Mr. Service was never attached to the consulate. His brother was attached to the consulate at Kunming sometime in 1944.

Q. I wonder if you can recall a dispatch which was sent from Kunming, No. 58, dated August 1, 1944, entitled: "Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek—Decline of His Prestige and Criticism of and Opposition to His Leadership."—A. I think I can deliver on that because I think, looking at the title, that I wrote it myself.

Q. Are you reasonably certain of that?—A. Reasonably certain, yes. I might assemble material over a period of months on this particular subject because it was on of the things that was important on the China scene, and I know Mr. Service could not have submitted a dispatch from Kunming in the first place because he was not assigned there, or detailed there, to my knowledge.

Q. Now referring to Document 17, which is an article appearing in Plain Talk magazine for October 1946, I should like to read to you a quotation from page 34 of that article: "The substance of some of Service's confidential messages to the State Department reached the offices of Amerasia in New York before they arrived in Washington. Among the papers found in possession of Mr. Jaffe was Document No. 58, one of Mr. Service's secret reports entitled 'Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek—Decline of His Prestige and Criticism of and Opposition to His Leadership.'" I take it, therefore that you are quite certain that Mr. Service was not the author of this dispatch No. 58?—A. If it is a report that was submitted he couldn't possibly have been because I was there during that period. As I remember, I did not see Mr. Service during the period that I was at Kunming.

Q. And you think you are the author of a dispatch bearing that title?—A. I couldn't swear it, but I remember I did write one sometime during that period with a title somewhat similar to it.

Q. Now, Mr. Sprouse, at the time Mr. Service was arrested by the FBI on June 6, 1945, in connection with the so-called "Amerasia Case," certain documents were found, documents and papers were found in his desk here in the State Department—among these it appears that there was found "a handwritten letter dated May 27, 1945, addressed to 'Dear Jack' beginning: 'Kung Hai' etc., and ending 'Yours, Phil.'" I wonder if you know from that identification who was the author of that letter.—A. As a matter of fact, I am certain I can identify this letter because it is a letter that I think was written on the occasion of Mr. Service's promotion sometime in maybe April or May 1945, in which I wrote him congratulating him on his promotion and I can identify it even more by the enclosure because this thing came to my mind when I saw Mr. Service in July 1945 when I returned from San Francisco. I might go back and pick up a little background and explain this letter because Mr. Service has no connection with this letter except as the recipient.

Q. Well, glad to have you do so, but I am mostly interested in ascertaining whether you were the author?—A. Yes, sir, I was.

Q. And your name is Philip?—A. Yes.

Q. Are you called "Phil" by your friends?—A. Yes. Might I add that "Kung Hai" means congratulations in Chinese, if that has any pertinence.

Q. Now, another item found in Mr. Service's desk at that time is reported to have been a "handwritten letter" "77 Brattle Street, Cambridge, Mass., December 11, 1944" addressed to "Dear Jack, I heard that you were back," etc. contains the following: P. S. "heard that Phil is on way here, etc." Do you know anyone who at that time lived at 77 Brattle Street, Cambridge, Mass.?—A. I can't say definitely, but it seems to me that there was a Chinese girl named Yang Kang who was one of the two outstanding Chinese literary figures, that is among the female side of the vista. She was over here on a fellowship of some kind, a scholarship to Radcliffe and her address was Brattle Street, I am almost certain. I had known the girl in Chungking. She was literary editor of what was then the leading Chinese newspaper, the Ta Kung Pao, and she would have been here during that time, so it is easily possible that this reference is to me during the time I was in the States.

Q. Were you about to return to the States?—A. I was. I was coming home on leave during November and December 1944.

Q. So that it seems possible to you at any rate that reference to "Phil" is a reference to you?—A. It could easily be.

Q. I have no further questions.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. I understand from your testimony that you were very familiar indeed with all of Mr. Service's political reporting in China?—A. Very familiar during the period that I was in Chungking, and then reporting that Mr. Service did after I left Chungking—when I left in June 1944 I saw those reports subsequently in the Department.

Q. That reporting was factually accurate, as you remember it?—A. From the standpoint of facts, I would say it was accurate, because, obviously, in all reporting you run into the question of interpretation, judgment, and so forth. I might not agree with all of it but I never saw any reason—the arguments were equally valid on all sides and I dare say the same thing is true on what any officer does there is bound to be a difference of opinion.

Q. With respect to the controversy existing between the Nationalist Government and the Communist forces in China, were the reports impartial?—A. I would say—of course, there, again, you get into the interpretation. To my mind, they were largely objective reports, and there might be some conclusions that Mr. Service reached that I wouldn't agree with; there might be conclusions that I reached that he and the Ambassador wouldn't agree with, but there was never any feeling on the part of anyone that Mr. Service was doing anything but reporting in an objective fashion.

Q. And you saw no indication in that reporting that he was himself pro-Communist?—A. Not the slightest.

Q. And that, also, is true of your conclusions reached by your conversations with him?—A. Very definitely, sir.

Q. And your knowledge of his political attitude?—A. Yes, sir.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. The materials which were submitted by Mr. Service to the General he was attached to, General Stilwell, you stated, I believe, that it was your job to summarize those and transmit them over through the Ambassador?—A. Yes.

Q. Did Mr. Service at any time request that you dispatch any materials to the United States other than through normal channels of the Embassy? A.—No, sir; never. The only thing we had from Mr. Service were official reports.

Q. That's all.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Mr. Spronse, what were the security restrictions in the Embassy in Chungking during 1944 on the transmission of personal mail to the Department?—A. Well, it seems to me that we had two means, as well as I remember. One, of course, was by APO, in which you had to sign. They were subject to censorship, of course, by the Army itself, in which you had to sign your name and your title and the name of your organization. The other means was, I think, by open letter through the pouch. I can't swear to this, but it seems to me that the Chief of Chancery had to approve that, and they were forwarded unsealed, so the Department itself back here could check on any mail that went through, because you were always told to be extremely careful because you see these pouches went out by plane over the hump into India and you had frequently cases of planes being downed, and, of course, there was always that chance that a plane would crash and the mail would be lost, in which case some of this material would fall into

the hands of either the Japanese or agents of the Japanese, so I would say to that extent there was a very careful security check on what was sent back.

Q. Personal mail from people in Chungking sent through the pouch was also subject to censorship in the Department?—A. If I remember correctly, we had to forward mail in a sealed cover, and the letter itself, if it was personal mail, had to be forwarded unsealed. I am almost certain of that, because I thought it was a little bit of a vote of nonconfidence in the personnel. Obviously, if they were in effect in Chungking they must have been in effect with respect to the use of the Department pouch everywhere.

Q. It has been charged that Mr. Service was in communication from China with a Mr. Philip J. Jaffe in the United States. Can you ever recall seeing any communication of Mr. Service in China with Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir; never.

Q. Do you ever recall him mentioning the name Jaffe?—A. No, sir; never remember the name even being mentioned.

Q. That's all.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. There were certain differences of opinion between the Embassy staff and General Hurley.—A. I didn't serve under General Hurley, sir, and I can answer only by sort of second hand, but I know that there definitely were, because Mr. Hurley apparently charged that people on the Embassy staff were sabotaging his policy. That came out in his hearings here in December 1945.

Q. But you were during that period—A. I left Chungking in June '44 and I think General Hurley came out in August or September '44. I was in the Consulate General at that point. The first time that I saw General Hurley was when he passed through Kunming on his way back to the United States. I think maybe sometime in that fall, I'm not certain, I saw him at the airport—my consul general and I went out to the airport.

Q. That was after you ceased seeing Mr. Service's reports?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. No further questions.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. I would like to ask just one more question: Do you recall, Mr. Sprouse, whether after Mr. Service was detached from the Embassy and attached to the headquarters of the commanding general of the theater he had free personal access to the files of the Embassy?—A. If I remember correctly, he did not. It seems to me the Ambassador took the stand—I can't swear to this, again, but it is a sort of hazy memory—that the people on General Stilwell's staff who were his political advisers were not a part of the Embassy staff as such, and if they wanted things out of the file they had to get permission to get them. They didn't have access to the files in the sense that the regular Embassy staff did.

Q. When you say "get permission," is it your recollection that they would ask some one of the officers of the Embassy to obtain the information that they desired for transmission back to Army Headquarters.—A. Yes. I would say they would either have to go to the Ambassador or to me or to someone in the political section.

Q. That's all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sprouse.

[Mr. Philip D. Sprouse left the meeting at this time.]

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to offer as an exhibit at this time Document 327, which is a receipt signed by the Assistant Treasurer of the American Institute of Pacific Relations for membership dues for John S. Service in the IPR for the year ending February 1951 in the amount of \$15.

(Received and marked "Document 327—Exhibit 19.")

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will recess now.

(The meeting recessed at 12:30 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF MR. JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: Wednesday, May 31, 1950

10:25 a. m.—1 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building,
Washington, D. C.

Reporter: Violet R. Voce, Dept. of State, C/S—Reporting;

Members of board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman, Theodore C. Achilles, Arthur G. Stevens; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Representative for Mr. Service: Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts & Ruckelshaus.

(The Board reconvened at 10:25 a. m.)

The CHAIRMAN. (Mr. Conrad E. Snow). The Board will be in session. Thereupon Mr. Emmanuel S. Larsen, being produced, sworn, and examined as a witness in behalf of the Loyalty Security Board, testified as follows:

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Your name is Emmanuel S. Larsen?—A. Yes, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen.

Q. And you spell that with two "m's"?—A. Yes.

Q. You're a voluntary witness in this case at the request of the Board, is that right?—A. That is right, yes.

Q. Desiring to be of as much assistance to the Board as you can?—A. Yes.

Q. You were taken to China at a very early age, were you not?—A. Yes. I believe I went in 1906. My father went out there as a professor in the old Imperial Chinese—of what was equivalent to a university at that time—Keo Teng Hsich Tang. That is Tang.

Q. You were then about 11 years old?—A. No, I was about 9 years old.

Q. And your father was a teacher in this university that you mentioned?—A. Yes.

Q. You remained there until you went to college?—A. No, I remained there until 1911, early part of 1911, when the revolution broke out in China.

Q. And then you went to college in Copenhagen?—A. Then my father went to Copenhagen to visit his old mother and he took over the management of a school on a 5-year contract, so the family got stuck in Denmark for 5 years.

A. And during that period?—A. And during that period I completed high school and took my B. A. from Copenhagen University.

Q. Then in 1915 or thereabouts you returned?—A. In 1915, in May.

Q. You returned to China with your father?—A. I returned to the United States with my father.

Q. And then did you go to China?—A. Then I worked for some time for Marshall Fields & Co., in their oriental department. I was in the appraising department because of what remained of my knowledge of Chinese characters. And from there I went to China in October 1916 to join the Chinese Postal Administration as a Junior Assistant.

Q. And you remained in China until 1935?—A. Yes, I remained until 1935. I was home on two occasions in between.

Q. And would you roughly outline for the Board your occupation in China from 1916 to 1935?—A. From 1916 to the end of 1927 I was with the Postal Administration, stationed in Canton a year and in Chengtu a year, my old boyhood home, and a few months in Shanghai. I had resigned to go home to the war but when I got to Shanghai the armistice was signed and I was in North China in Taiyuanfu. Then a year in the director general post in Peiping and a year in Taichow and 2 years in Amoy, opposite Formosa, and home on leave 1 year, 1923 to 1924. And a year in Hangchow as postal accountant, and then approximately 2 years in Mukden as postal accountant and the deputy commissioner for South Manchuria.

While on a vacation, a hunting trip in 1927, I met a Mongolian lama in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Chinese educated, who took a liking to me for some reason or other and invited me to come up there and start a wool and skin export company. At the same time he gave me an advisorship in which capacity I was to build some roads and put up two sheep ranches and import some Merino rams, some trucks and tractors, some seeds, and so on, a small tannery. I was with him from January 1, 1928, until about October of the same year. In the meantime, the Manchurian warlord, Chang Tso-lin, had been assassinated and there was a change of officials and a rather pro-Japanese group came into Taonan, the town in which I made my headquarters in Inner Mongolia. They horsewhipped me in the street and let me know very emphatically that no Americans were wanted around that area.

So I left, went down to Tientsin, and William B. Christian, of the British-American Tobacco Co., appointed me to go to Peiping to be acting traffic manager of the British-American Tobacco Co. at their railway junction near Peiping, called Fengtai. I was with them from October 14, 1928, until March of 1934. I forget the exact date when I left. At that time reloading at the Fengtai

junction was no longer necessary and I was ordered transferred to Hankow, but I did not care to go to Hankow and I resigned and was given a bonus by Mr. Christian and sent home.

Q. That was in 1935?—A. In 1934, March.

Q. During that period while you were in China, did you at any time know John Stewart Service?—A. Yes, I did, but very, very slightly.

Q. When was that?—A. That was approximately 1907 or 1908. My old residence in Chengtu, when I was a boy, was flooded and Mr. Robert Service, John's father, very kindly took us in as refugees for a day or so. I think we were there one or two nights and, as far as I remember, the baby in Mrs. Service's arms was John Stewart, with whom I did not conspire at that time.

Q. That was the only occasion that you met him during your period in China?—

A. Yes. I don't believe I ever met him in China after that.

Q. Now, after your return from China to the United States, you went with the Office of Naval Intelligence?—A. Yes, first I went to the Library of Congress on that Rockefeller scholarship project, I think it was called, the writing up of the Ching Dynasty biographies and the translation of Chinese history. And I held that for about a month and a half.

Then I was approached by Naval Intelligence. I had not made any application to them. And that was at the time when Admiral Ellis Zacharias was a commander and was in charge of the Far Eastern Desk.

Q. What year was that?—A. That was October 1935.

Q. And you were with the Office of Naval Intelligence for some time?—A. Until August 31, 1944.

Q. For some 9 years, in other words?—A. Nine years, approximately.

Q. Then you went with the State Department?—A. Yes.

Q. In 1934?—A. In 1944.

Q. And you were with the State Department about a year?—A. About a year, yes.

Q. In the State Department you were country specialist in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs?—A. Yes.

Q. And did you, in connection with your year in the State Department, know or meet John Stewart Service?—A. Yes, I did on two occasions. One day after the Far Eastern Division meeting I was introduced to him by Mr. Ballantine. I just managed to say "How do you do," that is all.

Q. And the other occasion?—A. The other occasion was when we went to lunch one day. I think Mr. John Carter Vincent asked me to go to lunch with him.

Q. And those were the only two occasions when you met him?—A. Those were the only two occasions.

Q. The only occasions that you had occasion to meet with him or to hear him?—A. That is right.

Q. Now, after you returned to the United States you engaged in a voluntary collection of Chinese data on your own account, did you not?—A. Yes, sir. I would prefer to correct the first few words, "after your return to the United States." I started that in 1923, early in 1923. At that time Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary group in Canton and his army headed by Chiang Kai-shek as the rebel group by the Peiping Government that I operated under as postmaster of Amoy. And the postal administration, that is the director general of the postal administration, wrote me a letter and said "Go down and meet these people and try to find out who they are and how many of them have been affiliated with communism in Russia." And I took a small camera I had and went down and I ate with them and went on a hunting expedition with them and in general just hung around them until they almost got fed up with me. But during that period I managed to collect background material on biographies of about 55 of the leaders of that movement.

Q. That became a hobby with you?—A. That became a hobby. After some time I was told by Peiping to drop it. Instead of throwing my carbon copies away I set up a card system and used it later in China. From time to time I added to it. I gave the American military attaché, Colonel Drysdale, the benefit of that file and also used it and augmented it at a later date, which I forgot to mention, in 1934 and 1935, very late in 1934 and 1935 when I worked for the Chinese military gendarmerie.

Q. In that connection or in some connection, in March 1944 were you introduced to one Philip J. Jaffe?—A. Yes. In March 1944.

Q. Was that the correct date?—A. I don't remember whether that was March 1944.

Q. Would you give such date as you remember?—A. Yes. It may be thereabouts.

Q. Were you introduced to Mr. Jaffe by one Lieutenant Roth?—A. Yes, that is right. I was in Naval Intelligence then.

Q. You were then working for the Office of Naval Intelligence?—A. Yes.

Q. After meeting Mr. Jaffe, from time to time you exchanged information with him?—A. Yes.

Q. Will you tell the Board the circumstances of that, Mr. Larsen?—A. You mean the meeting, the first meeting with Jaffe?

Q. Yes, and go on from there and tell the arrangements you made with Jaffe.—A. Andrew Roth came to my desk one day and asked me whether I was going out to lunch and I said "Yes," and he said "Well, let's go out together." That was a very common practice, as I'm sure it is in most offices. At the time I had complete faith in the integrity and character of Andrew Roth because he was a naval officer in uniform and I went with him. We walked up Seventeenth Street and he asked me whether I still kept up my card file. I said "Yes." He said "Do you have much on the Chinese Communists?" and I told him "No, I don't." He said "I know a man. I just want to ask you, do you know Philip Jaffe?" I said "No, I don't know him, but I seem to know the name though." He said "He is the publisher and the editor of the Amerasia magazine." And I told him "Yes, I think I have seen it there, the name." "He has been in China and has been living among the Communists and has collected quite a bit of material and he has a hobby very much like yours," he said. "He collects biographical material. Would you care to meet him?" I said "Certainly, that is the way I build up my file." He said "Well, let's go to the Statler Hotel. He is in town today and I'm sure he would like to meet you."

Why, I didn't think there was anything strange about that at the time. And when I met Jaffe we had lunch. We talked over the manner in which I had built up my file and I told him I would be very eager to exchange material with him. We made a system whereby he would come to Washington once in a while or if he had anything special he would write to me. He never did write to me, though. And we would then hand each other lists of persons we were interested in, particularly information we required on persons. And we began that, oh, I believe it was probably July.

Q. In 1944?—A. Yes, 1944. I remember there was quite a lapse of time before he came down the first time. And I gave him a great number of duplicates I had.

Q. Duplicates of what?—A. Of my cards, the Chinese personnel cards, some Mongolians, some special cards on Japanese spies among the Mohammedan population in north-west China, and miscellaneous things, Tibetans, Indians also.

Q. Did you from time to time show Mr. Jaffe certain documents which you had in your possession?—A. I did on a few occasions, yes.

Q. And some of those documents were reports from Mr. John Service?—A. That I don't know. I doubt whether there were any reports. It may be there was one—if Mr. Service wrote material on personalities I would say there might have been some, but I don't remember that.

Q. Well, you had previously been interrogated by the FBI on this subject, haven't you?—A. Very emphatically, yes; very much so.

Q. And you gave a written statement to the FBI?—A. Yes; I did.

Q. Did you not state in that statement that among the documents you showed Mr. Jaffe were some classified documents written by John Service?—A. I have no copy of that and I do not remember exactly what was said. That is on the night of June 6, 1945. I would have to refresh my memory from that document, if it is available.

Q. Well, what is your recollection? Some of these papers are confidential and the Board can't reveal the papers themselves. But I'd like to get your recollection, your best recollection, if you did not show some classified documents written by John Service to Jaffe. Just give me the benefit of your recollection.—A. No; I cannot say that I did not. I showed him some in November 1944. Specifically, I remember there was a change of government in Chungking and there were a great number of charges hurled against the Chiang Kai-shek government that it constituted no more than "old faces and new windows." Well, there was a report to that effect from the field, giving a very excellent description of the various men who came into the government and some erroneous material. I remember I checked it as quite faulty in spots but that was inevitable. There are false spots in all reports. And I discussed that with Philip Jaffe when he came to my house. And I made the indiscreet blunder of allowing him to see it.

He asked me if he could take it with him because it was too long to just jot down notes from. He wanted some of that information. It was not secret.

I would challenge the secrecy of that particular dispatch and many others on the grounds that I think a secret document constitutes knowledge that is restricted to a few and is not to be given to the general public. That would be very good if it were so but if the information, the knowledge contained in the document, is popular and public knowledge, knowledge for, say, a month or so, and it is known generally to 475,000,000 people, it is not important as a secret in a document. Of course I did not have the authority to declassify documents. So in such instances, as I told the FBI right at the beginning: Yes; I'm guilty of an indiscretion in that matter. And I would prefer to tell the truth and then I feel that I have little reason to worry after that. So if I'm on trial here, I'm quite willing to repeat those admissions.

Q. I want you to understand you are not on trial.—A. I'm glad you say that. Nevertheless, I want to add, although you have not asked me: Did you, Emmanuel Larsen, give 1,700 or 2,000 or 3,000 documents—it's already pretty old-fashioned to talk about 1,700 documents. A man is more up to date if he talks about 3,000 documents. But, Mr. Snow, I'll tell you that when this case broke I was permitted by Mr. Hitchcock to see the documents and they were stacked on a table either two stacks—they must have been 10 or 12 inches high in each, and I said, "How many are there there?" And he said, "There must be three or four hundred." Now, how they grew to 1,700 or 3,000 is entirely a mystery to me. But I'll refer to them as the 3,000 documents because they are being referred to in that manner at present by Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Wherry, and various others, Mr. Ferguson, and people who have questioned me.

Q. With further reference to your statement that you might be on trial, the Board understands that you are seeking to help the Board in the case now before it and this is not any questioning with reference to yourself at all.—A. Oh, I'm sorry; I realize that.

Q. I'm reading from a statement which you made and signed and gave to the FBI, as you have testified.—A. I see.

Q. On June 7, 1945?—A. Yes; it probably was June 7. It was early in the morning.

Q. And in that statement you state: "Of the classified documents that I have shown to Mr. Jaffe I remember some written by Mr. John Service."—A. I did write that. I have forgotten some of those things.

Q. "On the subject of Communist relations with the Chinese Central Government."—A. Yes; that may be.

Q. "I believe those documents were mostly classified as confidential and I showed them to Mr. Jaffe because he had known them in advance." Do you remember making that statement?—A. Yes; that is right. He said at one time to me that he knew of that entire story. I cannot say for sure whether he stated to me that he had seen the document or had received a copy of the document or that he had a copy of the document, but he intimated that he knew of that report.

Incidentally, let me add this—and I'm not adding this in defense of anyone, because the implication clearly is here that someone else had given him such a report or a similar report or a report paralleling the official report, and there has been a great deal of misunderstanding among all the people who have investigated the Amerasia case.

In a discussion with Senator Ferguson, I believe it was, I pointed out that any intelligence work or any field work by State Department or other American officials in the field would necessarily depend upon other men not in the State Department who work in the field. There is very little in the way of a first-hand report because, if you knock it down, the first-hand report means that you, Mr. Snow, are sitting here and you see me and see what I do and hear what I say. But if I do these things down on G Street you will have to depend on a second-hand report. And it was the practice—I'm sure Mr. Service will not deny that—that when, let us say, Mr. Service was back in Chungking—he had been in Yenai and had followed the political development there—and he was back in Chungking. Naturally he was interested in the continuity of the development he had been studying and reporting on.

Then let us say that Correspondent Smith comes back. Naturally Mr. Service will get hold of Mr. Smith and find out what the developments are. I doubt very much whether he would definitely refuse to put into his report the material that Mr. Smith gave him. Mr. Smith, on the other hand, is going to send that

report home. Mr. Service's report may be a paraphrase of Mr. Smith's findings, his general findings.

I don't make the following as an accusation but this manner of reporting works in reverse too. If Mr. Service goes to Yenan and comes back there is nothing criminal about that. I have done it. I have been in intelligence work plenty in my life and there is nothing criminal in contacting a newsman in Chungking and saying, "Look; here is what I find. Some of these things I'm not quite clear about. What is the background of this," and so on. Well, a reporter with a good photostatic mind can record even without scribbling on paper the essence of Service's findings; whether he did that or not, I don't know. But that is my presumption, that I have given as a theory of why reports were frequently similar.

I remember when I was in Naval Intelligence a naval attaché sent in a very confidential report on something that was not at all confidential because hundreds of thousands of Chinese knew about it. Nevertheless, a report came in and was published in the papers. The same time I was reading it at my desk it was published in the newspapers. One of our better reporters will give it in exactly the same way. Some call it collusion. But—what the heck—the men work out there and they get the material. That is the main point.

Q. Was it in that spirit that you exchanged this information with Mr. Jaffe?—A. Yes.

Q. Let me read one more sentence to see if you recall it: "I loaned him, to peruse,—such reports that I thought would not harm." Correct?—A. Correct. That is right.

Q. "They were recent documents, all March 1945, relating to the position of the Chinese Central Government and Communist forces in the Province of Shansi?—A. That is right.

Q. "Some of them were classified and others were not classified and they were official copies."—A. That is right. They were copies.

Q. In that connection, and in order that you may be of as much service as possible to the Board in this connection, I'm going to show you certain papers, certain official papers, which were originally drafted by Mr. Service and copies of which were found among Mr. Jaffe's papers at the time he was arrested. I'm going to show you these papers to see if you can help the Board by identifying any of these papers as the papers which you may have seen or may have let Mr. Jaffe see. Would you help the Board in that way?—A. Yes; I would.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. May I ask a question. Just as a matter of clearing my mind on a few of the points I'd like to ask you this: When you were in Naval Intelligence, you were then working on the China desk over there, were you, Mr. Larsen?—A. Yes; China desk and Manchuria.

Q. You had access there to materials from what sources—just Navy, or State and Navy, and all the rest of the sources concerning such matters?—A. First of all I'd like to tell you that I had access to no secret material because I was not in uniform. That statement may be verified from Naval Intelligence. I had access to no secret information. When they had secret information and they brought it to a civilian analyst they did it in a very funny way. Sometimes there was garbled information that required the attention of a man who knew Chinese. They they would bring the report and cut a hole in the piece of paper and cover up everything but the pertinent part and very often I would tell these officers "I can't handle the thing out of context. I have to see a little more of the text to know what it is before I can handle it." Well, they would have to go back and get authority to let a civilian analyst see a secret and top-secret report and telegram.

Q. My question is the information that came to you came from sources other than the Navy?—A. I know. I remember your question, sir. I'm coming to that. The information coming to me emanated from, let us say, practically all departments. There were some from the State Department, some from OSS, some from War Department, some from Commerce Department, and some from Treasury Department.

Q. When you joined the Department did you know persons over here prior to your coming? When you joined the Department of State did you have contacts with them in connection with your work prior to joining the Department of State's staff?—A. Official contacts?

Q. Yes; official contacts.—A. Well, I can only say that I went officially from the Navy Department to the State Department on a few occasions to see a man by the name of Boggs who was the chief geographer. I worked on maps in Naval

Intelligence. But I don't believe I was ever sent officially, nor did I go over privately, to contact them about any work.

Q. In connection with your employment in the Department of State, will you explain to me just what the job was that you held over here, under whose direction you worked, the things that will let me get the picture in my mind as to where you were located and how you were there provided the tools with which to do your work, I mean the flow of materials.—A. When I went over to the State Department in September 1944 I was classified as country specialist, and it was a research unit that I was attached to that was under orders to scrutinize current events and make basic postwar policy.

Q. Where was that unit located in the Department?—A. It was located in the Walker-Johnson Building, up here on New York Avenue.

Q. It was under the administrative direction of what section, sir?—A. Well, I understand that we were first under the political—I forgot the correct title of that, but this was under Mr. Pasvolsky, Leo Pasvolsky. But then, as far as I remember, January 1 we were made the Research and Planning Unit of the Far Eastern Division and we worked directly under Joseph W. Ballantine, who was the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

Q. Was Mr. Ballantine's office and the principal desk officer's office located in the Walker-Johnson Building?—A. No; they were located in the other building, on the other side of New York Avenue.

Q. In the main State Department Building?—A. Yes; in the main State Department building. And we went over there three or four times a week and held policy meetings in the meeting room next to his office. The head of the Research Unit was Dr. George Blakeslee.

Q. The information that you utilized in your work came to you to Dr. Blakeslee, or to whom? How did you get that information?—A. I came to Dr. Blakeslee and Mr. Hugh Borton.

Q. And they routed it to you, or did it come automatically to you, when it hit there?—A. Well, secret and such highly confidential material would come on in and we would have very little time to study it. The messenger would wait for it and we generally had to sign a little slip "Received" and the "Returned," giving the exact minutes it took us to read it.

Q. That information was not left in your possession to study, sir?—A. No; not if it was in original and we would sign or initial the originals and that is why our initials also are on all originals.

Q. Supposing it had been reproduced?—A. Then I could request a copy of the division would request copies. And then they would send sometimes several copies. I never knew exactly why they sometimes sent two or three copies.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Could you tell us why you happened to transfer from Navy to the State Department?—A. Well, it was sort of a combination of circumstances. One thing that I must say was decisive was that I was a P-5 in the Navy Department and I was told that I could never rise above that. That would be the limit placed on civilian research analysts. And I think you will agree that every man has a right to have a little ambition. And I thought it over and it worked on my mind for a long time and I thought what the heck, to work as a P-5 and sit the rest of my life at this same desk here and do the same thing—well, I tried in June 1943 to join the Army to get a majority and become a lecturer on intelligence systems in the Charlottesville Military Government School. But Commander Martin, a friend of mine in the Navy, talked me out of it at the last minute, just a few days before I went over to get commissioned, and they got me an increase. So I stayed. Then in 1944 I happened to go in to see Mr. Hornbeck. I've known him for many years, since 1924.

Q. Mr. Hornbeck was then?—A. He was in State. He was not the Chief of the Far Eastern Division any longer. He said "I don't know that I can do anything for you." I mentioned to him "Is there any chance of me coming over to the State Department to work?" He said "I think there is a vacancy in that Research and Planning Unit if you would like to apply for it. But I certainly can't give you any encouragement." And I made application and told him "Navy Intelligence will block it, so I don't think anything will come out of it." He said "If they want to get you they can transfer you by Executive order."

So I came in a few days later and Dr. Blakeslee and Mr. Hugh Borton sent for me. And they questioned me for several hours in the manner in which I would go about a postwar settlement of Manchuria. That was, so to speak,

my examination subject with particular references to how Japanese private investment in Manchuria should be handled. And I broke down various classifications, those that had been grabbed from the Chinese and given to the Japanese and those that had been legally bought, and so on. He said my judgment was very fair and he liked my attitude and he said he would recommend me.

The next day I was going on 2 days' leave. I had a lot of leave accumulated and we went down to my wife's home near Roanoke and when I came back my colleague in the Navy Department called me to his unit and he said "Jimmie, how do you like being a member of the State Department," and I said, "I don't know." He said, "Well, you are. An order came down Friday or Saturday saying that you had been transferred by Executive order." So it all happened very easily like that.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN :

Q. Now, you have mentioned occasions on which you got copies of these papers, these classified papers. Those papers, I take it, you could retain?—A. Yes; retain or destroy. They were always mine.

Q. And among those were the copies you have testified Mr. Jaffe borrowed on some occasions to look over?—A. Yes.

Q. Who was A. S. Chase? Was he connected with your State Department employment?—A. He was after Mr. John Carter Vincent became Chief of the China Desk, Mr. Chase—no, that is not right. Let's see, Mr. Ballantine was Chief of the Far Eastern Division and Mr. Vincent was Chief of the China Desk and Mr. Chase was the assistant.

Q. Did you get some of these copies through him?—A. Oh, no.

Q. Now, then, I'm going to show you first a paper which is known as Service Report No. 14 on Chinese Communist Party views on Mongolia, dated March 16, 1945, and known in this proceeding as Document 217, and ask you if you ever saw that report?—A. No, I'm sure I never saw that report.

Q. Now I'll show you a—

Mr. ACHILLES. You mean the substance of the report or the original?

A. I'll read it more carefully now. There are certain things in here. I was a member of the Basic Policy Committee concerning Mongolia. I did not write any papers on Mongolia, so there is a possibility that this went to Mr. Paul Josslyn and that I did not see this at all. Of course I do not remember this paper at all. That is the subject that we discussed at the Policy Committee meeting but I do not remember reading this.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN :

Q. Let me show you a photostat of an ozalid copy of that paper which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession and see if you ever saw that.—A. That is the same thing. No.

Q. So you have no knowledge with reference to that paper?—A. No.

Q. I'm going to show you what is known as Service Report No. 13, dated March 16, 1945, on Chinese Communist Party views in Sinkiang, which is known as Document No. 216 in this proceeding. And I'll ask you if you ever saw that report?—A. Yes, I think I saw this report. I remember the substance of it. I can't say for sure that I saw it but I remember the substance of this with regard to Sheng Shih-tsai. Yes, I remember the substance of this.

Q. Now, I'll show you a photostat of an ozalid copy of that paper, which was found among Mr. Jaffe's papers, and ask you if you remember seeing that report? Did you show that report to Mr. Jaffe or allow him to see it or borrow it?—A. This was March 16, 1945. No, I did not have any copy like this. I did not work on Sheng Shih-tsai but I took notes from the material coming in regarding data that would fit into the biography of such men as Sheng Shih-tsai. I did not take notes of the substance of the report to the extent that I would copy what was secret. I may mention to you that in all these notes that I took and in any material that I showed to Jaffe there was never anything that was of national importance, of military importance, of danger to the Allied Military Corps.

Q. I call your attention to the fact that that report is unclassified.—A. Yes.

Q. And I ask you again if you think you showed that to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No; I did not. I'm pretty sure I did not show that to Mr. Jaffe or give it to Mr. Jaffe. I don't think I handled this beyond seeing it in the Department.

Q. When you say you did not show that report, do you mean also that you did not show him an ozalid copy of that report?—A. Yes, I'm sure.

Q. Now I refer to Service Report No. 15, dated March 16, 1945, on Chinese Communist Party Policy on Minorities, which is known as Document No. 218 in

this proceeding and ask you if you saw that report? Or did you see an ozalid copy of it? That is, by the way, an unclassified report.—A. I remember this subject very well. I doubt very much whether this is one of the few reports I gave to Jaffe, although it is not classified it is considerably off the track of my hobby. I was particularly interested in reports that were originally in personalities, biographical material, listing new members of the Government, their background, the background of their affiliations, their present doings, and so on.

Q. But I take it the reports you showed to Jaffe were not necessarily reports you were so much interested in but were reports in which he was interested in.—A. I don't know how to reply to that statement. I'm not evading it. You say you take it that way. He never requested any report from me.

Q. By name you mean?—A. So that would imply that I would have to say to him "Mr. Jaffe, what are you interested in?" I never did.

Q. How did you find out what to give him or what to show him?—A. Well, in the course of a discussion concerning a certain man, a certain personality or a certain list of new Government members. Say my contention was that they were liberals and definitely a departure from the old composition of the Kuomintang Cabinet. Mr. Jaffe on several occasions claims they were not at all. And to enlighten him I brought out my cards and very often I had the same information far long in advance than that that was sent in. Why was it sometimes my own wording in it? Why? Because when I was in Naval Intelligence I prepared hundreds of cards and sent them out to the military attaché, my cards, for nothing. I gave them as a present to the Navy Department. They sent them out to Chungking and when the members of the United States Foreign Service wanted information they could get it from those cards. And their attaché stooped as low as to send in personality reports, verbatim copies of my cards that I had given him when he went out.

Q. What is your testimony on this particular paper?—A. I remember the subject but I'm sure I never gave Jaffe this. May I see the ozalid?

Q. This is a photostat of the ozalid copy of the same paper you have been looking at and this is a photostat of the paper which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.—A. This is a major political discussion and contains very little, if anything, on personalities. I would normally throw this aside because my hobby, be it ever so crazy, is personalities. One Congressman, I think, inquired as to whether I was a screwball on the subject and I told him I was no more screwball on this than he is a screwball in representing the people of his State.. I had a theory there that China was not governed particularly by any ideology. Was not, but it is very much now, and that personalities were very important. The armies were strictly warlord armies, even during the war, under Chiang Kai-shek. And I think I quite rightfully maintain that the study of political developments and the probabilities of this or that development through a study of the personalities was the best way of determining what was going to happen.

Therefore, Mr. Stanton frequently called me and said "Jimmie, grab a cab, go home and get the cards on so-and-so. I want to see all the dirt you have on that man, see what we can expect from him as a new Minister or Assistant Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, what are his past affiliations, whom will he buck, whom he will stick to, and whom he will not double-cross, and so on.

Q. What is your conclusion on that?—A. I cannot swear to it that I did not show this, but I'm pretty positive that I did not. It is not in my field. If I were working here now and I got this I would read it with interest concerning China and I would throw it aside as of no interest to my particular hobby.

Q. Now I'm going to show you Service Report No. 18, dated March 18, 1945, on Labor and Women's Organizations, which is known in this proceeding as Document 227, and ask you if you showed that to Jaffe.—A. This is the report itself?

Q. Yes, this is the report itself. Did you ever see that or an ozalid copy of it?—A. No, sir; I don't think I ever saw that.

Q. Well, just as a further check on that I'll also show you a photostat of the ozalid copy of that which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.—A. No, no. Labor organizations, no; don't know it. I don't know that document at all. I don't remember seeing it ever.

Q. I now show you what is known as Service Report No. 16, dated March 17, 1945 on the subject of relief and rehabilitation organizations, known in this proceeding as Document No. 291, and ask you if you have seen that or an ozalid copy of that report?—A. I never saw that. I have no idea of Mr. Arnold. I never was introduced to the intricacies of UNRRA while I was in the State Department.

Q. I'm also handing you an ozalid copy of that, a photostat of an ozalid copy of that, which was found among Mr. Jaffe's possessions, and ask you if you showed that to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No; you see there were policy meetings in which Mr. Moffat was very active that concerned deeper political problems that were of current interest, political and economic problems. I was not present at those meetings. I did not handle this. This subject would not come to me, at least as I remember it, it did not.

Q. Now I show you what is known as Service Report No. 17, dated March 17, 1945, on Communist territorial claims, known in this proceeding as Document No. 220, and ask you if you saw that?—A. No; I don't remember the story or the importance of the area to our military observers. I doubt whether this would ever have been routed to me in the regular course of events.

Q. I'll also show you a photostat of an ozalid copy of the same paper and two typed copies of the same paper and ask if you recall showing or loaning to Mr. Jaffe such papers?—A. Implying that I typed the copies, you mean?

Q. No, no implication at all. I'd just like your information on the subject. Did you type copies sometimes?—A. I typed a copy of one, viz, Sun Fo's speech, which was highly confidential until after it was published in the newspapers.

Q. Do you recall handling any of those?—A. I do not recall handling them.

Q. I now pass you Service Report No. 21, dated March 21 1945, on the treatment of Kwangsi clique. I will also show you the photostat of an ozalid copy of the same paper and the photostat of a typed copy of the same paper, which was found among Mr. Jaffe's possessions.—A. That is an original, but this was not found in Jaffe's possession.

Q. That is right, only the ozalid and the typed copy were found.—A. I remember the report but I'm pretty sure that I didn't have any copy of this. Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-Hsia were my two particular hobbies. I remember the substance of this report. There probably were a number of reports on this subject, both Military Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, State Department, and OSS, on the subject of the treatment of Kwangsi clique, the shabby treatment of the Kwangsi commanders Li and Pai who came up north to help Chiang fight the Japanese in spite of the fact that up until the middle of 1936 they had been in violent opposition to Chiang. And I personally was a sympathizer with the two because I know General Pai personally and had the inside story of his life from him.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. In this connection you say there were reports from other sources?—A. Yes, there were other reports. This was a favorite subject and the reports were true.

Q. Those reports came over your desk from the other sources as well?—A. Yes, I have seen reports on that. They must have come over my desk because I remember seeing a number of reports on this subject, but I can't say that this one here—I don't know whether I ever took this report home. I took a great many reports home and I took them back. I had a gold badge and I was entitled to take them home. Many of these reports were extremely long and if I sat and read, say, 40 reports in the office it would be 4:30 and then I wouldn't have done a stroke of work. Therefore I took them home and I lay on my couch with a cup of coffee and my pipe and I read them and I made annotations—naturally the copies and not the originals—in the margin where I compared them with my cards and when I thought they were a little bit off on the information and where I found information that was vital to the correct analysis of that man I very often took little data, not in the way of a long discussion but the exact data of whom he was affiliated with, and so on.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Would you look at the ozalid copies, the photostats of the ozalid copies and of the typed copies and let us know if by chance you showed them to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I don't know, but I'll volunteer a method of checking it. I still have the typewriter. I don't type as well as this here. I still have the typewriter and I can see at a glance I didn't type this. But I still have the typewriter that I have had during the last 12 or 13 years and you're welcome to check this with my typewriter.

Q. But it is your opinion that it is not your typewriter?—A. It is my opinion, yes.

MR. STEVENS. How about the ozalids?

A. No more than the original.

Q. It is your opinion that you did not let Mr. Jaffe see the ozalid?—A. I did not. I'll tell you when I come to one that I think I can remember showing him. I have not denied to you that there were such, and I have nothing in particular to hide.

Q. That is the assistance the Board is seeking from you.—A. The secrecy, without any intention of casting aspersions on the Loyalty Board, of these hearings I'm considerably disillusioned about because when I went before the Hobbs committee they told me, "You can say anything you know and you can even tell us things you don't know but which are opinions and little things you have heard and little gossip and this and that and tell it all to us and we are not asking you to certify anything or to put it together, but we will do that. We may have other parts of the jigsaw puzzle." And I spoke rather freely and the testimony was published and has become public property. So far as that is concerned, I'm beginning to doubt whether any testimony can in the long run be secret.

Q. Well, you will give us the benefit of your knowledge without respect to secrecy, would you not?—A. Yes, I will. However, I must tell you I'll be extremely cautious in repeating things I have heard because I don't wish to involve anyone. I think it's extremely unfair to involve anyone in this huge mess and I heard so many things and they are of little value. I would like to stick to facts.

Q. Let me say with reference to the policy of this Board that this proceeding is a confidential proceeding and the Board does not make public any transcript of that hearing. However, a copy of the transcript is given to counsel for Mr. Service and we can, of course, make no promise that it will not be made known because Mr. Service can make any disposition of it, as he sees fit. That is the policy of this Board.—A. I'm really not worried about it. I just made the point to show that I'm aware of that.

Q. Now, then, I will show you Service report No. 19, dated March 19, 1945, on the Kuomintang exile governments, which is known in this proceeding as Document No. 221. Did you see that report?—A. I don't remember seeing that.

Q. I'll also show you the photostat of an ozalid copy of the same report which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession and ask you if you let Mr. Jaffe see that ozalid copy or take it.—A. No. This is purely theory on whether those newly established little Shen Kan-Ning local governments were bona fide governments or just a sort of sham. I didn't go into that, nor did I use it for my official work in the State Department.

Q. We won't need to have the contents of the article described because we already have that in the record, so you won't need to outline it, except as you need to to make your answers understandable.—A. Yes.

Q. I now show you photostats of two typed copies and carbon of a Time article by Mr. Theodore White, which has no number in this proceeding. It appears to be a MID document. These are photostats of the papers which were found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.—A. No; I certainly never saw this. This was a manuscript of an article for Time magazine, apparently.

Mr. RHETTS. I wonder if this document has any kind of a reference document number that can be used.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be referred to as Q-211.

Mr. RHETTS. Could we have some other number that isn't repeated?

The CHAIRMAN. J-139-F.

Mr. RHETTS. All right.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Did you see that?—A. No; quite honestly and certainly I don't know this one.

Q. And you never let Mr. Jaffe have it?—A. I don't think I ever handled it or saw it.

Q. I now show you a photostat of two typed copies and a carbon of a document known in this proceeding as 157 on Kuomintang China and the American policy. The original is an OSS paper. I'll show you the original and photostats of copies that were found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.—A. This is an original here?

Q. Yes; that is the original.—A. Of course reports came in in that purple ink. No; particularly with reference to this statement here. It's an interesting point but I never did say this. I have not seen this document. It is a secret OSS document and I doubt whether it would come to me. This copy; no, sir.

Q. I now show you what is known.—A. I may mention OSS sent very few documents to the State Department, as far as I was concerned, when I was in the State Department. It was very rarely that I saw an OSS document. When it

was, it was generally something heavily loaded with personalities and my colleagues promptly gave it to me and told me I could do with it whatever I liked. "This is your hobby, we are not interested in it," they would say.

Q. I now show you two documents known as Service Reports No. 3 and No. 7, dated October 4, 1944, on Chinese Communist Political Views. These two copies are known in this proceeding as Document No. 166 and are photostats of typed copies from MID.—A. I wouldn't get them in the first place. No material was received indirectly. I would never receive State Department material from MID.

Q. Well, would you look at this and see if you recognize it? I'll show you the original paper and photostats of two typed copies found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.—A. The original of the State Department papers, the dispatch, I have seen.

Q. You have seen that?—A. Yes, I have seen that. I know that report. The remarks of Guenther Stein and Maurice Votaw; yes, I remember it very clearly. This would normally have come to me in the Naval Intelligence Office where I was in July 1944.

Q. Is it your recollection that it did come to you?—A. Yes; I remember this. It is Mr. Gauss's report.

Q. Would you look at the photostats of the typed copies and let us know whether you showed that or loaned that to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No. I never received photostats in this form here.

Q. No; don't misunderstand me. You aren't supposed to have received the photostats. The photostats are just the possession of the Board. The question is whether or not you handed the typed copies of which that is a photostat.—A. Oh, I see. That is possible, because that is one question I discussed with him. I asked him about the reliability of these men. That was the first indication I received that Mr. Jaffe was very close with the various reporters out there, as listed here, viz, Mr. Epstein, Maurice Votaw, and one other—Guenther Stein.

Q. So you may possibly have given that report to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I may possibly have shown him this or shown him entries in my card file from it. I can't say for sure. I certainly remember this report. This report I had a great interest in.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. You mentioned a moment ago that your colleagues would send such information to you promptly and tell you that this was something that you were interested in and which they were not interested in. Are you referring to State Department colleagues, your colleagues in Naval Intelligence, or who?—A. I was referring in this particular instance to State Department colleagues.

Q. Did the State Department colleagues know that you were taking material home at night?—A. Yes. My boss even told me one time to take the Korean policy papers home, and it would have been a very bad thing if the arrests would have been made when I had the Korean policy papers home. Blakeslee informed the FBI about that and they promptly called him and verified it. "Did you on one occasion tell Mr. Larson to take papers home?" He said "Yes, he brought them back though. We had them the next morning." I had a gold badge and was entitled to take papers home.

Q. Your colleagues stated to you they were not interested in them?—A. They were not interested in personality material.

Q. Did you not mention earlier, sir, that Mr. Stanton would say to you to go get in a cab?—A. I do not consider him a colleague in my particular branch. He was Assistant Director of the Far Eastern Division and he was over in the Department. When I say "colleagues" I mean those who worked with me on the Policy Committee and the Research and Planning Unit, viz., Borton, Mr. Josslyn, Dr. Blakeslee, and Mrs.—what her name was I forget now, the lady who worked there.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. I now show you Service Report No. 156, dated November 13, 1943, on the Willingness of Chinese Leaders to be Puppets, which is a copy of the original and then I'll also show you a photostat of a typed copy which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you see this paper and did you make its contents known to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir; I don't think so. I don't remember this document.

Q. The paper you're looking at is a summary of the document.—A. I see. No, sir.

Q. Do I understand you to say you saw the original?—A. No; I don't think I ever saw this paper, no, sir.

Q. I show you now Service Report No. 5, dated August 3, 1944, on Communist Policy Toward the Kuomintang, which is Document No. 168 in this proceeding,

and ask you if you saw that paper or a typed copy of the same. I give you a photostat of a typed copy which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you see that paper and did you hand a copy of it to Mr. Jaffe?—A. Yes; I remember seeing that report. But I don't remember—there is no personality material in here. It's just the question of whether the Chinese Communists were pursuing a policy of self-limitation. That was a great problem at that time to me in my official work.

Q. This paper that I'm showing you a photostat of is combined with another document.—A. Yes; that is right. This document came into the State Department, this original, as a report from Mr. Service and had a covering dispatch from Mr. Gauss. I have not read the paper yet but I believe this is the one. I shall try to verify it now. This is the one in which Mr. Gauss said he did not quite agree with Mr. Service.

Q. Will you tell us, after you look at the photostat, if you handed a copy of this to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir; I did not. I did not hand this to Mr. Jaffe.

Q. Now I pass you Service Report No. 1, dated—A. I know this dispatch very well. It was an important problem at that time.

Q. Now I show you Service Report No. 1, dated July 28, 1944, known as Document No. 164 in this proceeding, on The Impressions of the North Shensi Communist Base.—A. I don't remember this report.

Q. I show you the photostat of a handwritten copy of the same report which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.—A. I don't remember this report here. I remember vaguely reading Mr. Service's material in this connection. I think you would find that one of these came to me and I saw it, but I doubt whether I even got copies of it. I wouldn't request it.

Q. Your testimony is you did not give that to Mr. Jaffe?—A. Yes, I feel sure of that.

Q. I also show you Service Report No. 2, dated July 27, 1944, known as Document 165 in this proceeding on the conversations with Mao Tse-tung. I ask if you saw that paper or gave a copy of it to Mr. Jaffe?—A. It was written on August 27, my birthday, the very day when I learned that I was transferred to the State Department. I had very little to do with it. However, it must have come in sometime after I was in the State Department. And I do remember the subject of this report on conversations with Mao Tse-tung.

Mr. RHETTS. May I interrupt a minute. Are you looking at the right paper? He now has before him Document 165, which is a despatch to which there is attached Service Report No. 2 on Conversations with Mao Tse-tung, dated July 28, 1944.

Q. Would you look at that and state whether you saw it?—A. Mr. Service's report is as of July 28, covering despatch of August 26. No; sir; this is concerning the station of an officer at Yen-an. I did not have anything to do with that. That was wartime policy. I didn't give a hang whether the station went down or not. It had nothing to do with me and my work. It had nothing to do with regard to my hobby on Chinese personalities. So I'm positive I did not handle this matter at all. I'm sure I never have taken it home and I'm sure I never have shown it to Mr. Jaffe.

Mr. MORELAND [Off the record].

Q. I now show you a document which has no number in this proceeding but can be identified as Q-268, dated June 12, 1944, Service Report on Economic-Political Effects of the Japanese Drive, together with a photostat of an ozalid copy of the same. We have not the original in this case, Mr. Larsen. All we have is the photostat of an ozalid copy which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you see that?—A. Was this document published in the white paper, because it's rather fresh in my memory, this sentence that: "The collapse of the Government, even though it would not come soon, might become only a matter of time." Well, of course that was stated in probably a number of despatches. That is my only key to recognition of this document here.

You know it's very difficult: I hope you will realize it's very difficult to remember. I don't have a bad memory at all. I have a particularly good memory for telephone numbers and dates, historical dates, and Chinese names, but I can't say that I remember many of these here. In many instances, while I have said I'm inclined to believe that I have handled this document, it is because I remember sentences in there that are familiar to me and it's no use denying that I haven't but it would be very difficult for me to say, yes, I took that document and showed it to Jaffe. But I'll tell you if I come across one. I'll repeat that again I'll try to volunteer to say if I did.

Q. About this one, do you think you showed this one to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No; I did not. I'm sure I did not. I remember the text there but it's outside my field. It is concerned with the effects on the Chinese Nationalist economy of the Japanese push down through China. That was a thing that we all had to consider in naval intelligence. For instance, I was ordered to make general reports once a month on the possible effect within the next few months of the advance of the Japanese. Well, in a case like this I would have to read a despatch like that and form an opinion as to whether they were now losing so much revenue by occupation of the ports that they would not be able to sustain the army and their general economy.

Q. That is Service report dated September 21, 1944, on charges against General Yen Hsi-shan, which is to be identified as Document 174 in this proceeding.—A. If this is the story told—now I haven't looked at it yet—if this is the story told by Michael Lindsay, then I have seen it. General Yen Hsi-shan is a personal friend of mine. A bigger crook probably does not exist and I have made a very close study of his life and have written his biography, and I cannot find in here any reference to Mr. Michael Lindsay. But it seems to be the same story. No, sir, the other story was expressly—I don't know whether it was written by Mr. Service or someone else, the story of Yen Hsi-shan's perfidious trickery in Shansi. The particular charges were—I'm sure Mr. Service will remember the story—

Q. I don't think we need to tell the story here.—A. Well, if I can verify that, then I'll verify the document. I'm trying to give an example of how I do this here. No, sir; this is not the story. This is a different story.

Q. I'll show you a photostat of an ozalid copy of the same paper and ask you if you ever gave that to Mr. Jaffe?—A. This is a photostat of an ozalid?

Q. Yes, and I'll ask you if you loaned an ozalid copy of that paper to Mr. Jaffe? This ozalid was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.—A. No, sir; strike it out. I don't know this one here. Furthermore, I remember the occurrence was in the spring of 1945, the crossing of the railroad by arrangement between the Japanese and Yen Hsi-shan.

Q. I show you now Service Report No. 31, dated September 23, 1944, on Post War Treatment of Japan, Document 185 in the proceeding, together with a photostat of a carbon copy of the same which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you see this paper and did you give a copy of it to Mr. Jaffe?—A. Yes. I did see this paper. I entered some cards on Susomo Okano and it is possible that I made a copy of those cards, 5 x 6 or whatever they are, for Mr. Jaffe.

Q. Did you give him a copy of this paper?—A. I don't think I gave him a copy of it. He asked me about Okano; if I knew anything about Okano. He is now known as Nosaka.

Q. Do you think you may possibly have given Mr. Jaffe a copy of this paper?—A. No, I doubt this very much. Well, yes, apparently I must have because—please correct that. I must have because I see my own personal handwriting on this here. That is definite then.

Q. You gave Mr. Jaffe a copy?—A. Yes, it must be. That is definite, it is my own handwriting. There can be no doubt about it. I don't remember the dispatch myself but I see my handwriting, that is enough. It says "entered in biographical notes," and so on. That is quite definite then.

Q. Now, then, I show you a paper which is identified as Document No. 133 in this proceeding, subject Chiang Kai-shek's book. I'm not sure of Mr. Service's connections with it. It is dated March 18, 1944.—A. It's a discussion on his book China's Destiny. I don't remember this. I remember plenty talk about the book itself, but I don't remember this here.

Q. Did you see this paper?—A. I remember seeing something on that before I came over to the State Department, viz., when I was in Naval Intelligence, March 18, 1944. I don't remember this paper here.

Q. I show you a photostat of two carbon copies of this paper which were found in Mr. Jaffe's possession and ask you if you gave copies of this paper to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No; I did not. I did not bother with Chiang Kai-shek's book. I never read it all the way through. I had it on my desk in Naval Intelligence.

Q. I now show you a paper which has no number in this proceeding on Chinese Trade in Strategic Materials, dated November 27, 1942, and ask you if you saw that paper or a carbon copy of it, of which I hand you a photostat, which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.

Mr. RHETTS. RF-294 is the identifying number.

A. No; this was way off my track.

Q. You didn't see that or give a copy to Jaffe?—A. No, sir; I doubt whether that ever came to me. I don't remember this despatch at all.

Q. I now pass you Service Report No. 40, dated October 10, 1944, on Greater Realism in Relations with Chiang Kai-shek, which is Document No. 193 in this proceeding, together with a photostat of a typed copy of the same which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you see this report and did you give a copy of it to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No; I don't know of this document. I don't think a copy of this would have come to me in the Department. No; I don't recognize it by the viewpoints expressed.

Q. I show you a typed copy of the same, which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you give that to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir.

Q. You did not pass that to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir; I did not. I'm quite sure of that.

Q. I show you Service Report No. 15, dated 27th of August, 1944, on an interview with Mao Tse-tung, known as Document 177 in this proceeding. This may be the document you already looked at.—A. It is. May I look at it again?

Q. Yes.—A. Yes, I saw that.

Q. Did you give a copy of it to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I doubt that very much. However, I may have extracted some personality material. I see here I have some information that I'm very well acquainted with. No, I don't think I gave him a dispatch. It's a very long dispatch with many, many other matters in it.

Q. Have you seen the photostatic copy of the carbon copy of that paper that was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession?—A. I would say no, for the simple reason that I always made a tick at the side. Whenever I had entered any personality material I made a tick at the side of the name so I didn't have to bother with it again when I came across it. There is no tick here in this copy and this is the one I would have handled. The original, while it might come to me for a very short period in the Department, eventually a copy would come to me and if he photostated a copy I had given him, then it very definitely would have had those ticks.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. But if he typed from a copy you gave him it would not have the ticks?—A. If he typed, yes.

Q. If he typed from a copy you gave him?—A. That is right, if he typed from a copy I gave him: But then I cannot say I recognize this as a copy I gave him.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. But you may possibly have given him a copy of this particular document?—A. I may have given him a typed version of the particular information on personalities but that is very brief in there. It's only a paragraph this long (indicating), listing Peng Teh-huai, and so on. But would he bother to photograph another document—

Q. He didn't do any photographing. These photostats were made for us of the documents found.—A. I see. Well—no, I don't think I gave him the document.

Q. I show you Service Report No. 34, dated September 28, 1944, on Communist orientation to the U. S. S. R. and the United States, which is Document 188 in this proceeding and I ask you if you saw this paper?—A. "Any orientation which the Chinese Communists may once have had toward the Soviet Union seems to be a thing of the past"—I remember that sentence. Although I did not agree with that and yet it stirred up something in my mind. But in general I can't say that I recognize this document. It would be entirely wrong for me to sit here and say that I handed this document and gave it to Jaffe or showed it to him because I don't recollect that in the least.

Q. I show you a photostat of a typed copy of that paper which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you give him a typed copy?—A. I don't think so. I do not think I gave or showed him this.

Q. I show you Service Report No. 10, dated March 13, 1945, which is Document 214 in this proceeding, on Views of Mao Tse-tung and ask you if you saw that paper.—A. No, sir, I don't remember this, "Wallace and other American statesmen", no.

Q. I show you a photostat of the typed copy of this paper which was found in the possession of Mr. Jaffe and ask you if you gave him or allowed him to copy that paper?—A. No, sir. I do not remember showing or giving that copy of Jaffe. I don't remember even reading that despatch there.

Q. I show you Service Report No. 20, dated March 20, 1945, on the Yen Hsi-shan dealings with the Japanese which is Document No. 222 in this proceeding. Did you see that paper?—A. Yes, sir. This is Mrs. Michael Lindsay's report.

Q. I show you a photostat of a typed copy of the same paper and ask you Mr. Jaffe's possession and ask you if you gave him that copy or allowed him to make a copy of it?—A. I did not allow him to make a copy, but I did show him this report. I remember that.

Mr. STEVENS. Did you allow him to take it with him, sir?

A. No, I doubt whether I did.

Q. But you may have?—A. My interest was the evaluation of Michael Lindsay's and his wife's veracity, which I doubted at the time. I looked upon much of his stuff as propaganda.

Q. You may have allowed him to borrow that report?—A. I know I showed it to him. I asked him who Michael Lindsay was. He told me he knew him very well. I remember I discussed it with him.

Q. But you may have allowed him to take it?—A. I cannot remember whether I let him take the report, sir.

Q. Now I show you Service Report No. 26, dated April 1, 1945, on Communist congress policy, which is Document 226 in this proceeding. Did you see that paper?—A. I don't remember anything so far.

Q. I show you a photostat of a typed copy of the same paper and ask you if you gave the typed copy to Mr. Jaffe or allowed him to borrow the typed copy?—A. No, I don't remember these references at all in here.

Q. Will you look at the typed copy, of which you have a photostat, and tell me if you gave the typed copy to Mr. Jaffe or allowed him to borrow it?—A. No, no, sir. It's not my typing either. My typing had more X's in it than any of these.

Q. I show you Service Report No. 38, dated 9th of October, 1944, on Popular Support of the Eighth Route Army, which is document 191 in this proceeding, and ask if you saw that paper? —A. Never heard of Major Casberg. I don't recognize it at all.

Q. I show you photostats of two typed copies of the same paper which were found in Mr. Jaffe's possession and ask if you gave those copies to Mr. Jaffe or allowed him to borrow such copies?—A. No, sir. I have not seen it. I never have seen it. I'm positive I have never seen it.

Q. I show you Service Report No. 22, dated March 22, 1945, on Recent Appointments by the Generalissimo, which is document No. 224 in this proceeding. Did you see that paper?—A. Yes, I saw that.

Q. I show you a photostat of a typed copy of the same paper which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession and ask if you gave him that copy or allowed him to borrow it?—A. Yes, I remember when this came in I made some entries, particularly regarding General Ho Ying-chin and Admiral Chan Chak. Yes, I remember that.

Q. Did you loan a copy of that paper to Mr. Jaffe? I show you a photostat of a copy found in his possession.—A. That I do not remember. But I know I know I made some entries in my cards on Tang En-po, whom I know very well who was Garrison Commander in Chungking, Hu Tsung-nan, yes, I saw that dispatch and I handled it and I jotted some notes from it, but I do not remember giving it to Jaffe. I made entries on Tang En-po, Liu Shih, Ho Ying-chin, Hu Tsung-nan, and Chan Chek. But I don't remember giving it to Jaffe.

Q. But you may have?—A. But he undoubtedly has received typed slips for those persons.

Q. From you?—A. From me. He was appointed on such-and-such a date.

Q. May you possibly have given him a copy of the original?—A. No, I don't think so, because it was very clearly indexed there and the biographical material was not involved in the discussion and I want everyone to understand that I did not freely give him material just to give him material. When I gave him material it was because it was too darned complicated to sit and type 20 pages of the argument in favor of such-and-such a position or analyze it, and I let him see it and let him read it, and if he could get the implication by reading it, all right. I took it back to the Department of State and returned it to the file, which was usually the burn file of these copies. Nobody wanted copies when you brought them back. There was no place for them except the burn basket and I committed many many documents to the burn basket. There was no place for them except the burn basket. Everything I had in my home, for instance, all went back when I was through with it.

Q. I show you Service Report No. 39, dated the 9th of October, 1944, on Present Strength and Future Importance of the Chinese Communists, which is document No. 192 in this proceeding. Did you see that paper?—A. Yes, I remember

seeing Mr. Friedman's note stating that Mr. Service's summary would include that not only should steps be taken to—yes, I remember seeing that.

Q. Now, then, I show you a photostat of a typed copy of this paper which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you show the paper to Mr. Jaffe or permit him to make a copy of it? Or did you give him a copy?—A. No, sir. This is not a report that I ever got a copy of, I'm sure. I have seen this report. It was circulated through the Department. I was always very eager to read the notes by Mr. Friedman or Mr. Chase or Mr. John Carter Vincent attached to the despatch when it was circulated for the simple reason that such reading would give me guidance to the policy of my superiors.

Q. What did you say about the copy, the photostat?—A. It means nothing to me. I have never seen this. I don't recognize it at all. I don't think I took this despatch home at all or showed it to Jaffe. It's a long and involved affair and I doubt whether you could find a little kernel of biographical material in here. Because Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung said so-and-so, it did not always cover an important biographical report.

Q. I show you Service Report No. 16, dated August 29, 1944, which is a part of Document No. 177 in this proceeding. You have already seen one part of No. 177. It's on the subject of American aid to Communist armies. Did you see that paper?—A. Yes; I saw that. I saw this report, I remember it. No, sir; I would not handle this. I would not bother to take it home.

Q. I show you a photostat of the typed copy of the same paper found in Mr. Jaffe's possession and ask if you gave Mr. Jaffe a copy?—A. No, sir.

Q. Or did you permit him to see it?—A. No, sir.

Q. I show you Service Report No. 20, dated September 3, 1944, which is another part of Document 177 in this proceeding, on American policy regarding the rise within the Chinese Communist Party, and ask you if you saw this paper?—A. Yes; I'm sure I saw this here. I'm sure that I did not give this to Mr. Jaffe or show it to him.

Q. I show you in that connection a photostat of a typed copy of the same paper, found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.—A. I don't quite understand why this is less than the other, or is it not? I haven't seen that. No; I haven't shown it to Jaffe. I just wondered why one was four pages and the other less than three. It may be an extract.

Q. I show you Service Report No. 19, which was dated August 31, 1944, and is Document No. 180 in this proceeding on use of old Communist bases in southeast China, and ask if you have seen that document.—A. No, sir; I wouldn't have been interested in it, anyway. I was a busy man in those days.

Q. I will show you a photostat of a typed copy of the same which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you give a copy of this to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir; I didn't handle this at all.

Q. I show you Service Report No. 22, dated the 4th of September 1944, known as Document 182 in this proceeding, on the Growth of a New Fourth Army, and ask you if you saw this paper.—A. I doubt it very much. When I left Naval Intelligence I left behind me interest in armies, movement of troops, strategic areas, bases, and so on.

Q. I show you a photostat of a typed copy which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you give that to him?—A. No, sir; I did not give that to him.

Q. I show you Service Report No. 37, which was dated October 2, 1944, known as Document 190 in this proceeding, on Eliminating Banditry, and ask if you saw this paper?—A. No, sir; I never saw these names or reports. I wouldn't have been the slightest bit interested.

Q. I show you a photostat copy of the same and ask you if you saw this or gave it to Jaffe.—A. I do not believe I saw this, showed it to Mr. Jaffe, or loaned it to him.

Q. I show you Service Report No. 26, dated September 10, 1944, which is Document 183 in this proceeding, on the Communist Political Control in Bases. Did you see this paper?—A. Yes, I saw that. I believe it was one of the first times I saw Liu Shao-chi mentioned in that report because he is a theorist in the first place and in another dispatch on him it was from that dispatch that actually created the interest in him. I had gathered a little information from Agnes Smedley's book. She knew who Liu Shao-chi was, but I remember this was a surprise to me when I saw him mentioned because practically no one knew of him and I asked Jaffe about him. I asked what he was. That was one of the men that Jaffe fell down on and did not supply me information on. When I gave him the list I sent it back several times and asked him why he didn't know the background on Liu Shao-chi's education. If he is a Communist theorist

he must have been educated in Moscow. I remember this dispatch. With a certain amount of personal risk I may have shown it to him but I don't remember showing it to him.

Q. You didn't show it to Jaffe?—A. I don't remember showing it to him. I doubt whether I would because a dispatch like this is quite a long dispatch with considerable discussion of these persons and their policies. And I would read it and for reasons of simplicity I would take out, after reading, just what I wanted and put it in my card files. I would type it on a slip and eventually write it into my cards and it would be confusing to take the dispatch and show it to anyone, even a day after, because then you would have to reread it and point out parts or let him photostat it deliberately and I would not do that. I never did that. I never had any understanding to let Jaffe have anything to photostat.

Q. I now show you Service report, a paper on a New Democracy Booklet by Mao. I have an ozalid copy of the same. This is Document Q316F188A55. It has no document number in this proceeding. It's an OWI paper. Did you ever see that?—A. I know the book but I don't remember reading about the book. I have a copy of the book. You can buy it. I think I got it from IPR or somewhere.

Q. Did you let Jaffe have this paper?—A. No, I did not.

Q. Or a copy of the same?—A. I'm sure if I offered it to him he would not bother with it. He knew the Communist literature pretty well.

Q. I now show you despatch 2790, dated July 20, 1944, which is Document 172 in this proceeding, on Chinese Liberal Hopes of Reform. Have you got that?—A. I'll have to admit I don't know Miss Yeng Kang. I don't know the name. I don't think I have her in my file. I don't know the story here. No, I don't know this.

Q. I have a photostat of an ozalid copy of the same which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession, which I'm showing you. You did not give that to Mr. Jaffe that copy, or that ozalid?—A. No, sir, I don't think so.

Q. I show you despatch No. 2604, on Domestic Troubles in Chiang Kai-shek's Household, which is known as Document 148 in this proceeding. Did you see that?—A. I know this story quite well. I read the despatch when it came in but I know I didn't give it to Jaffe. When I had dinner with Jaffe some time after this had come in he asked me "Is it true that Chiang Kai-shek kept a mistress and had considerable trouble with his wife?" and shortly thereafter a statement was made to the press by Madam Chiang and General Chiang, as far as I remember, and it came out in the press. It was somewhat hushed up but it did come out. But I didn't give him anything on it.

Q. I show you a photostat of a typed copy of this paper and a photostat of a photostat which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you transmit either a typed copy or a photostat to Jaffe?—A. No, sir, I did not. I don't think I ever made an entry in my own card about that scandal for the simple reason that I doubted it very much myself. It is possible, but I thought it was not exactly the type of material I wanted. I don't care if he had a mistress or not. It worries me very little. And it would be much more interesting to me to know what political affiliations he had.

Q. I show you despatch No. 2351 of March 23, 1944, on Chiang Kai-shek's Responsibility, and something else—I don't know just what the rest of the heading is—which is Document 137 in this proceeding and ask you if you saw that paper?—A. I don't think I ever saw that. I have heard of this report. Isn't this the one that Mr. Dondero mentioned? I don't think I have seen this despatch.

Q. I'll show you a photostat of a typed copy of this despatch which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession and ask you if you gave him this copy or permitted him to copy it?—A. This could look like my handwriting. Yes, I remember the story of this. It is possible that I may have shown him this despatch.

Q. Did you say you see your handwriting on the copy?—A. Yes, it could look very much like my handwriting. I'm inclined to believe it is.

Q. In that event, you gave him the copy?—A. In that event I did.

Q. Because the photostat is a photostat of the copy which was found in his possession.—A. I'm trying to find the reference. Yes, it's my system of making an arrow to anything important. It is not personality material.

Q. Now, then, finally I show you—A. In other words, I would say that this dispatch I did see and there are indications here that I did show this or lend this to Jaffe.

Q. You did more than that, you gave him a copy because the copy turns up with your handwriting in Jaffe's possession?—A. If you loan a man \$10 and he

doesn't return it that doesn't mean that you gave him \$10. He did return in time the things I loaned him but he apparently had some at the time of the arrest. And the FBI confronted me with that and asked me whether that was possible before I had seen any of the dispatches, before I knew his place had been raided. Remember, I was arrested on the night of June 6 and was held incommunicado until I was released from the District Jail on bail. But I corresponded with no one. I didn't talk to Mr. Service nor did I discuss the matter with Mr. Service. I did not know really what the case was. I did not know until I think the second or third morning that Jaffe had been arrested too.

Q. I pass you Document 134 on Chinese Territorial Claims to the North, which is dated March 18, 1944. I don't know that it has any number. I'll ask you if you saw that paper?—A. I remember the subject. It was my field while I was in Naval Intelligence, Burma and the boundary question.

Q. That is a photostat of a carbon copy of the paper which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. Did you give that carbon copy to Jaffe?—A. I don't think so. It was not my subject, later on but it was at the time in Naval Intelligence—Burma, and I know I made maps for Naval Intelligence on the British claims and the Chinese claims on the borderline.

Q. Do you think you may have given Mr. Jaffe a copy of that?—A. I don't see why I would. I doubt that very much.

Q. Now, just as a concluding question on this phase of the examination, let me say as we went over these some 40 documents we found 2, I believe, no, 3 in which you stated positively that you did give Mr. Jaffe copies and perhaps 3 more that you were somewhat doubtful about. At the time you were examined by the FBI, and your recollection was of course fresher than it is now on the subject, I believe you were able to identify some six or eight documents as documents which were ozalid copies of Mr. Service's Yenan reports, which you said you did give to Mr. Jaffe.—A. That is right.

Q. Now, those documents have all been among these that we have been over but you have not recognized them apparently.—A. Yes, they could be among the doubtful ones that I don't remember now.

Q. So it is apparent, is it not to you, that your recollection then being fresher than it is now, that you were able at that time to identify some documents that you are not able to identify then?—A. Yes.

Q. Your recollection is now that you did give to Mr. Jaffe some six or eight documents of ozalid copies of Mr. Service's Yenan reports?—A. That is right, yes, sir.

(The board adjourned at 1 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: May 31, 1950, 2:10 p. m. to 5:30 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building.

Reporter: E. C. Moyer.

Members of board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles; Arthur G. Stevens; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Representative for Mr. Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts and Ruckelshaus.

(The board convened at 2:10 p. m. to hear continuation of testimony by Mr. Larsen.)

The CHAIRMAN. Would other members of the board like to ask questions? Mr. STEVENS. Not at this moment, sir.

Questions by Mr. Achilles:

Q. Mr. Larsen, this morning we went over perhaps 40 documents and reports of Mr. Service which had been found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. You had identified perhaps three of those of which you believed he had been given copies and perhaps three or four others of which you might have shown or given him copies. Have you any idea yourself how those other reports of Mr. Service might have gotten into Mr. Jaffe's possession?—A. No, I have no knowledge that I can put down as definite knowledge.

Q. Do you have any theories even if it is not definite knowledge?—A. Yes, of course I have a theory on that.

Q. Would you care to state what it is?—A. I was told by Jaffe on two occasions that he was in a great hurry because he was going to have a meeting or meet with other persons. It is pure conjecture of course to feel or to think, to theorize on that, whether he had contacts—he mentioned Roth on several occasions, on meeting Roth, and he said on two occasions, "I am not staying at the Statler, I am staying with John K. Fairbank", and I remember he said on one occasion, "I am staying with Franklin and Tootsie." I said, "Who were they?" This was Benjamin Franklin Ray and his wife. And he mentioned that he knew Michael Lee. He is the man who is now somewhat on the spot from the Commerce Department. I can't think of any others now but my theory is from the conversation that time that he did receive reports from FEA, which were first from BEW and—

The CHAIRMAN. What does that stand for?

A. Board of Economic Warfare and then later it was called FEA, which meant Foreign Economic Administration. And, as I say, it is conjecture on my part when I feel very convinced that Roth was the man. I now give you an idea of how I arrived at that conclusion. It wouldn't hold up in court, but Roth was Jaffe's most intimate friend. He was a kind of foster son to Jaffe. I did not know that until after the case had broken, and then I discovered that Jaffe had put Roth through school and that he had helped him get into Naval Intelligence. Well, I figured that whatever Roth was doing or Jaffe was doing Roth would be willing to help him with, inasmuch as they were still friends and inasmuch as they collaborated on that book of Mr. Roth—I forget the name of it now, something about Japan, I read parts of it. I didn't think much of it, Roth had never been in Japan or China—and I do know that from conversation at a luncheon party in the Statler Roth and Jaffe discussed the book endlessly and Jaffe did say to Roth: "No, no; it is no good; that last chapter is absolutely no good. I will have to take that with me and work on it." All right. My conclusions therefore are that those two worked together and apparently shared the strongly pro-Chinese Communist ideology, but beyond that I can't make any statement because it would be false.

Q. Do you know whether Lieutenant Roth had access to Mr. Service's reports in ONI?—A. Oh, yes; oh, yes, definitely. They circulated in the basket, as we called it, and they went to every office and every analyst in the Far Eastern Section, as it was called. Furthermore, if I may interrupt, I have seen reports in various places, in the newspapers, in Dondero's office, in FBI, and so on, of the nature of the reports, the stolen documents, or rather the documents found in Jaffe's place, and I have seen—I have noticed that the subject of a great number of the reports was Japanese shipping and Japanese ships and location of Japanese ships. I know that that was Roth's particular business in OWI. He was assistant at the desk for Japanese ships. It would be a strange coincidence if there was another person at that desk who had given them to Jaffe and that Roth was entirely innocent.

Q. Well, Mr. Service's reports did not, as far as I recall it, concern Japanese ships; did they?—A. I don't think so. The only item dealing with Japan that I remember in Mr. Service's reports was the question of Susumu Okano, and I forget the other men there, Japanese Communists who were staying there in Yenan and who outlined their postwar policy in three or four stages to either Chinese Communists or directly to some of the Foreign Service officers there. I don't remember exactly whether they told it to Mr. Service or Mr. Service reported it as received from the Chinese, but nevertheless that is the only connection with Japan. Now there was quite a bit of material concerning Japan, Japanese forces, interrogation of Japanese prisoners, and so on. They wouldn't have come to Service, wouldn't have come to other divisions than those that handled Japanese affairs or American military affairs. It depended on subject material, of course—questioning of Japanese prisoners.

Q. In your statement to the FBI on June 7, 1945, you stated, I believe, "Of the classified documents that I have shown to Mr. Jaffe I remember some written by Mr. John Service on the subject of Communist relations with the Chinese Central Government."—A. That is a very broad title.

Q. "I believe those documents were mostly classified as confidential, and I showed them to Mr. Jaffe because he appeared to know of them in advance. He knew them by name and number."—A. There were two dispatches. I cannot remember the details of that now. You see, 5 years have elapsed since that time and apparently a couple of them that were rather fresh in my memory at that time—I can't remember now. I would have no reason to conceal any point on that score, but Jaffe did tell me at one time, "I have seen that report."

Q. Well, I am merely interested—A. “I have seen a report on that subject,” something like that.

Q. What I am interested in, is how he knew in advance of these reports by name and number. You say there were two instances in which he referred to them by name or number?—A. He mentioned—I don’t know name or number and title of the dispatch, and, you see, that would be more correct—what was it I said? Name and number? I tell you, I was in a very bad condition that night, I was yanked away from my dining table and my whole world seemed to collapse over me when they stepped in and said, “You are under arrest.” I said, “There must be a joke.” They said, “No; it is no joke.” From 7 until nearly 5 next morning—how would you feel if you were questioned? Do you not think that you would feel somewhat strained and nervous and excited? I was thinking of my wife at home, of the condition she was in. So my language was probably not legally, strictly to the point, and therefore I wouldn’t heckle a lot about the exact words.

Q. No; I am not interested in the exact wording, but in your recollection; do you recall whether Jaffe indicated such knowledge on one occasion or more than one occasion?—A. Oh, it was just one or two occasions.

Q. One or two occasions?—A. He mentioned that he knew of a report, and I believe I asked him, “How do you know about that?” And he said, “Oh, well, you know these newspapermen, they collaborate”—that is where I got the idea—“Epstein and Edgar Snow and so on, they collaborate out there with any Foreign Service officer on these little bits of information that all together form a complete jigsaw puzzle.”

Mr. STEVENS. Can you place a time for that, sir?

A. Well, it was probably—it was fresh in my memory that time—probably some time there in the spring of 1945.

I also was rather surprised to be told when I went to New York in August 1946—I had dismissed this Amerasia case as a damn bad dream, and I had gone down to Florida. My father was living in St. Petersburg and I was helping him build his new house. I was knee deep in concrete when two ex-FBI men came, told me they were now working for Plain Talk magazine, Don Levine. They wanted me to go up and write my story of the Amerasia case. I told them, “Nothing doing.” Well, they told me this would clear me, would help me rebuild myself. The first day I turned them down flat and they were going back, but the next day they got my wife and myself downtown. We talked it over and they prevailed upon my wife to see the light and make me go up there, so I agreed. For \$300 I would write them my story and they would pay my expenses, I would fly up. I flew up to New York. And then I sat in the New Yorker and typed my story. And when I handed it in on the 3d or 4th day, Don Levine nearly blew his top. He said, “Why, you haven’t got any story here. That is no good. This will have to be rewritten.” I said, “Well, I admit that it is somewhat hastily written, it is more rambling chronology of what I know, but that is what I want to put down.”

Q. Pardon me, I would like to come to that—A. Yes?

Q. That “Plain Talk” thing.—A. I am coming to that point. And then, that is exactly the point I am coming to, he said, “Now, let me tell you, you may not know an awful lot about these fellows, but let me tell you one of these things here is this.” And they said, “We have investigated Roth and Service very carefully, and as far as we know Service was sending copies of his reports direct to Jaffe.” I said, “By golly, that I didn’t know.” And they hardly believed me and I had a hard time convincing them that I was in no collusion or any conspiracy with Mr. Service nor with Mr. Roth nor Mark Gayn. I didn’t know Mark Gayn, I had never seen him in my life, and I had seen Kate Mitchell once—once or twice. I didn’t know what she was, up there. I thought she might be an employee. I didn’t know anything about Kate Mitchell. I never talked with her, never had anything to do with her. I said, “Hello.” I sent Amerasia once or twice.

Q. What I am really trying to find out is how Mr. Jaffe was familiar with Mr. Service’s reports.—A. Do you want my theory on that?

Q. Yes.—A. It is no more than theory. I think when the Foreign Service officers in the field got hold of a topic, naturally that was the thing that occurred in China, and everyone knew about it—everyone except the United States Government. That is, the United States Government had not yet been officially informed on the subject. Therefore it was cause for and call for a report on the subject. Now it is impossible to imagine—I will not—well, put it the other way, it is reasonable to imagine that there was collaboration between the Foreign

Service men and the various correspondents on the subject. That is putting it very mildly. I will say it is impossible to imagine that there was not some collaboration, since Mr. Service could not be in Yen-an all of the time, and then Votaw or Epstein or these others came down and they compared notes on these things.

Q. But these newspaper stories would not give the names and numbers of official reports.—A. I don't want you to think that I am vicious when I say that it is possible that Emmerson and these men at times showed their entire dispatch and asked for the opinion of, and that maybe there were some, if not exchange of copies, free exchange of ideas and evaluation of these situations and these reports went in.

Q. Do you recall any instances where newspaper correspondents referred to reports by name and by number?—A. No, no; I do not.

Q. In your same statement to the FBI you said: "When I met Jaffe for lunch on May 28, I gave him a list on the notes of personalities and on that evening Jaffe came to Larsen's home and Larsen gave him some newspaper translations. He advised that when he visited Jaffe at the hotel that Jaffe expressly asked him for Jack Service's last reports, which he apparently knew. These were the Sixth Kuomintang Congress and the other on the Election of Officers to the Fourth People's Political Council."—A. I didn't even remember that but I guess that is right. I said it at that time. I suppose it is right. I had forgotten it.

Q. Did you have those reports with you at your house?—A. That I don't know, I don't know whether I had them or not. I may ask you, for my own information, did you find those reports among them, among Jaffe's material?

Q. I have not been able to identify those positively from this list. This has short titles.—A. I would say, I dare say there were 100 reports on the PPC—People's Political Council—during the year or two 1944-45. There must have been a great many, but I can't say which one it was. They were all about the same. The squabbles about the formation and number of members, the manner of selection of members because they were not elected, they were selected.

Q. Turning to your article in Plain Talk—A. May I interrupt and treat that not as my article. I objected strenuously to that article when it was published. I asked—my last words were, "Don't put it as the Espionage Case because I will be a damned fool to call it an espionage case when I don't for one moment feel that there is espionage involved. At the very worst it was the purloining of documents, but I don't think there is any espionage nor has the Government proved any. Furthermore the Government dropped the espionage charges, so why should I call it espionage? I have referred to it in mine as 'espionage'—espionage in quotation marks—and I want you to put it that way." They said, "Well, that would defeat the cause," and this, that, and the other.

Q. What I was interested in was one statement in that article which is similar to the statement which you have just made, in which it was stated that, in the course of the investigation, "it was found that John S. Service was in communication from China with Mr. Jaffe. The substance of some of Service's confidential messages to the State Department reached the offices of Amerasia in New York before they arrived in Washington."—A. I can answer that question by referring to you the copy of my original manuscript which I have given to Mr. Peurifoy, in which there is no such wording, as far as I believe, and that is Mr. Don Levine's wording. They rewrote that article so I hardly recognized it. I had no feud with the Government, with the administration, with General Marshal, and he made it into that.

Q. Do you know of any basis for that statement of Mr. Levine's?—A. No; I don't; except that it could have been as a result of questioning me, that had Jaffe ever said that he had any reports—but that would not imply that he had sent them from China because I knew nothing about that. I had no idea until long after the case broke and I met these men out there, I was told for the first time that he had been sending his reports from China, and they put that in.

Q. But you have no personal knowledge?—A. No, sir. No, sir; I have no knowledge of that. I have nothing even to substantiate a suspicion on it.

Mr. ACHILLES. I think that is all I have.

Mr. STEVENS. One question, sir. You have mentioned your files that you maintained at home.

A. Yes.

Mr. STEVENS. Did you in the normal course of preparing those files declare either as notes for your master copy or otherwise the source from which the material was taken to go on your card?

A. No; I never put any source. Never. I can prove that because I have a great number of those notes.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, have you still your card file?

A. Yes; I still have my card file. What was that question—did I still have my card file?

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't hear your answer.

A. Yes; I still have my card file. It was seized by the FBI and then it was kept by them over a period, oh, for a period of almost a year, and it was sent to OSS for OSS to check whether there were any entries in that card file that were obviously from OSS documents, and it was likewise checked by the State Department, I was told, and by the Navy Department, and by Military Intelligence. They found five cards on which they had made some green markings—markings in green ink—and I got a little hot about that and I said, "Hell, that stuff is public knowledge." The entries, let us say now because I don't remember, the dates or names, let us say this is an entry as of April 14. I got a lot of that material from the press, and I happened to have my very voluminous clipping file where I had done clipping since 1936, and I went home and it took me a day of so, and I dug up the clipping file for those, of those five cards, and brought them back to the FBI and said, "Here you are. What was the date on that card here? April 14. Well, this is the Washington Post, April 13, and let's compare the texts." There was an abstract from that in the same wording, so the FBI got quite tired of the whole thing, said, "All right, we had intended you to delete the information before you take back these cards, but in consequence——" So I took back all my cards without any one single exception, not one kept by the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Has anybody any more questions? [None.]

Counsel for Mr. Service would like to ask you some questions now. They have that privilege in this proceeding.

A. Yes.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. What was the last time you saw Mr. Service, Mr. Larsen, before you came in here this morning?—A. I don't remember exactly, but I would say it was about, maybe, April 1949. I had a little office on Seventeenth Street, and the Far Eastern Information Service—I supplied information to newspapermen, magazine writers, background information, and I had a man working with me, a man there by the name of Otto J. Dekom. He later—I got rid of him and he went and worked for the Pat McCarran committee. Dekom and I that day went to lunch, and we turned around going westward on I Street. We were going to the New Baghdad Cafe to have some Near East food. And there I met Service on the side of I Street with, I think, one or two other persons, and they went into the Little Garden Shop, or Little Tea Shop for lunch, right there between Seventeenth and Eighteenth on I Street. We didn't say "hello" to each other; I just recognized him as he passed by.

Q. You did not speak to him?—A. No; we did not say "hello" to each other. I don't think he even remembered seeing me, but I am convinced it was him.

Q. You saw him on that occasion and he did not see you, and you did not speak to him?—A. He did not, I think, see me.

Q. When was the last time before that?—A. The last time before that was sometime in May. I can't fix a date, but it was——

Q. What year?—A. 1945. Jaffe was in town and I remember I took my wife and also, I think, my little daughter went along too. We had a Chinese dinner downtown and I was through with him—he said he had to see someone else by Sunday—I believe it was Sunday, it may have been Saturday, but it was, some way or other it seems to me it was a Sunday, he called me about 11 or maybe 11:30 and said "Do you have something on so-and-so?" I don't remember the name.

Q. Is this Service you are talking about?—A. No; I am talking about Jaffe calling me, and he said he was at the Statler Hotel. I said, "I thought you had gone home." He said, "No, I am leaving in a little while; it is urgent." I went to the home file and I saw it. I did not know whether I had it or not. I said, "What do you want me to do, read it to you?" "No, I would like to see the whole thing on four persons." And I said, "All right, I will hop a bus." I am not very far away from the Statler there. I had my pass and went out and got on a bus and went down. I didn't know what room he was in, so I went to the desk, asked them what room was Philip Jaffe in, I got a number,

went around to the elevator entrance, and there I saw Jaffe standing—I don't remember whether anyone else was there or not—he was standing there and Mr. Service, it seems to me, was wearing his hat and topcoat. I said, "Hello." "Hello. You know Mr. Service?" "Yes, I know Mr. Service. Here are the cards." I had them, I think in a small envelope and I remember only saying to him, "Be sure you let me have them back because they are important cards." He said, "All right." Then I went home. That is the last time I saw Mr. Service and greeted him.

Mr. ACHILLES. When was that, did you say?—A. I don't know, the FBI has a record of those meetings. I didn't keep a record of them.

Q. You recall it being May 1945?—A. Yes; it was May, pretty close to the time of the arrest there.

Q. You actually saw him the night you were arrested, didn't you?—A. I beg your pardon.

Q. You actually saw him the night you were arrested, didn't you?—A. Saw whom?

Q. Service.—A. Yes; that is right.

Q. In the office of the—A. In Mr. Turnage's office.

Q. So that the last time you saw him was in Commissioner Turnage's office.—A. I beg your pardon; it was not intentional.

Q. And the next time was the occasion in May 1949?—A. Yes; that is correct.

Q. And you saw him but he did not see you and you did not speak?—A. Yes; on I Street. That would be absolutely correct, yes.

Q. Incidentally, did you see ever see me before you walked in here this morning?—A. What is your name please?

Q. Rhetts.—A. No, I don't think I did.

Q. Now, I wonder if you would tell the Board whether you have any reason to all to believe that Mr. Service is a Communist?—A. No, I have no reason to believe he is a Communist.

Q. Have you ever had any reason to believe that he was a Communist sympathizer or fellow traveler?—A. I can't answer that very clearly whether I had any justifiable reason to think that he was a Communist sympathizer, but I can answer that there was a time that I believed that he was extremely enthused over the performance of the Communists.

Q. By the Communists you mean Russian Communists?—A. No, the Chinese Communists. No, I never had any idea that he was enthused over the Russian Communists.

Q. Now, you referred to this article which appeared under your name in Plain Talk magazine. I show you Document 17, which is a copy of that article. I believe you intimated a moment ago that you had very little to do with the actual content of that article. I wonder if you would describe in detail for the Board first of all how you came about to write it. You mentioned that you were in Florida.—A. It was in Florida, and two gentlemen came down. I didn't know them. They introduced themselves as Mr. Kirkpatrick and Mr. Higgins.

Q. K-i-r-k-p-at-r-i-c-k?—Yes, in one word, and Mr. Higgins.

The CHAIRMAN. H-i-g-g-i-n-s?—A. Yes. I remember initials of Mr. Kirkpatrick, W. T. I am pretty sure of that. And I did not seem them first. They went to my residence in St. Petersburg, and my wife was sitting in the garden. They came in, said, "Are you Mrs. Larsen?" She said to them, "Yes." They said they had come from Plain Talk magazine to get hold of me and ask me to write an article, and my wife said to them, "I would have thought you were a couple of FBI men. You certainly look like it." So they kind of got red in their faces and said, "As a matter of fact, we were FBI men. We both worked on the Amerasia case and we resigned in November 1945 and we have been working with Plain Talk magazine, that is Don Levine and Mr. Alfred Kohlberg, who kind of financed the magazine, and we have come down because these two gentlemen in New York, Levine and Kohlberg, believe that you are the key man in this case and that you would have a valuable story and they wanted to publish that story in their first issue." This is the first issue. Well, as I told you, I didn't want to, and eventually I went up. They told me several things and they induced me to go up. They mentioned that my story would help clear me, clear me of being a Communist and a spy and sympathizer and an assistant collaborator with Jaffe, and so on. Secondly, well, they told me, they said that they thought I had a good radio voice and they might possibly put me into radio work and get me a number of contracts that would result in a little financial rehabilitation of myself. That, however, did not materialize, and I can state that according to my judgment there was no attempt on the part of those gentle-

men to go further than just get my story, rewrite it as a power piece of anti-administration propaganda, and throw it on the street.

Q. When you say "these two gentlemen," are you referring to Kirkpatrick and Higgins?—A. No; they were just cogs in the wheel, they were research analysts in New York. I am referring to Don Levine and Mr. Kohlberg. Mr. Kohlberg never as much as asked me to become a member of the China-America policy association. He sent me from time to time not complete files of their material put out but occasionally he sent me some when he thought of me.

Q. Now, let's see if we can move back just for a moment. When these gentlemen, Messrs. Kirkpatrick and Higgins, came, did they make—they gave you these various reasons why you should come and do it?—A. Yes.

Q. Then did they make financial arrangements with you for it?—A. Oh, yes; right on the spot. They told me, "We will go now"—when I agreed that second afternoon—"We will go now and pay for your plane ticket. All you have to do is hop aboard the plane."

Q. Did they make some sort of a contract with you as to what you would be paid for the articles when you wrote them?—A. Yes; they made a contract I would be paid \$300.

Q. \$300?—A. Yes; they didn't make a written contract, they promised me three hundred.

Q. And they were to pay your transportation to New York?—A. Yes; and they booked a room for me and paid for the room, too; otherwise I paid my own expenses there. As a matter of fact, I had to borrow a few dollars from my father when I left.

Q. Will you describe in detail for us your dealings with Levine and Kohlberg after you got to New York?—A. Yes.

Mr. ACHILLES. The spelling of that Kohlberg?

A. K-o-b-l-b-e-r-g.

Shall I describe my meeting with him?

Q. Your dealings with him.—A. The first evening—I think it was the first evening I was there, I was eager to get to work and start writing. Mr. Kohlberg picked me up and took me out to his residence, out north of the Bronx, a very lovely residence. He is a very wealthy man, and his family members were all away. He was the only one in the house—the housekeeper, maid, was there, and we had a nice little dinner with a cocktail, and later we sat up until about 1:30 and talked, and he asked me—well, I would say very much the same way as you gentlemen here have asked me, what I knew about the Amerasia case. I knew at that time much less than I know now. Of course, I have added to that knowledge by reading papers, magazines, and hearing testimony and talking to Senators and Congressmen, but I was frankly quite shocked at that time. He said, "Do you mean to say you have been a dupe and have associated with a man like Jaffe if you don't sympathize with him?" I said, "I resent that." [Laughter.] "I don't see that you can't, with all your intelligence—you are undoubtedly a brilliant businessman—you ought to be able to get it into your head what I told you over a period of 1 hour, that I had in common with him that interest in Chinese personalities." He said, "Oh, don't get hot. I didn't mean it that way."

Well, I was extremely nervous and worried and I just didn't feel like playing games with any inquisitors, and I felt that I was facing inquisitors who were extremely purposeful. Many things I told them voluntarily that I thought might be of interest were not of interest to them because they did not bear on Republican views of the Democratic administration. I told him I didn't give a damn about the Republican view, sorry I am not politically-minded at all on American affairs. I came home in 1935 after 24 years in China, 5 years in Denmark, and only 11 years in the United States since my birth. I never voted. I am inclined to feel that if I meet a Republican and he is a nice fellow according to my code, he is all right for me. If I meet a Democrat who is a nice fellow, he is all right with me. But I have formed no battle plan one way or another, no political plan in my mind. Therefore, if you are seeking collaboration in Republican attack on the administration, I did not have the inclination of that. You might point out to me something. I agree with you it seems very strange, yes, but I don't know the background of it, I don't know the many ramifications of it. I don't see where it fits in here. And that attitude on my part is very clearly proved in my manuscript because my manuscript was strictly my story. In fact, I entitled it, "They Called Me a Spy."

Q. Do you have a copy of that manuscript?—A. I don't have it with me here but I think Mr. Peurifoy has a copy. I believe he has.

Q. Do you have any copies? Unfortunately, the copy Mr. Peurifoy has isn't available to me.—A. It isn't? No, but if you want a copy, I have one extra photostat at the Statler, photostat of it, and if you want it I would be glad to send it. If you write me your address I will see that it is delivered to you.

Q. Actually I would like to—it would be very useful if you had it a while—in the course of this proceeding. I would like to ask you some questions but since you haven't it with you—A. I don't have it with me; no.

Q. When did you write this manuscript that you did write? You told us—A. About the 8th of August.

Q. This first evening you went out and spent the evening with Mr. Kohlberg and had this chat which you describe.—A. Yes.

Q. And then what?—A. They left me alone for about 3 days.

Q. Back in your hotel?—A. Yes. I sat there and worked in the room.

Q. And that is when you wrote this manuscript?—A. Yes.

Q. And this was early August of 1946?—A. Early August. August 8 that I came up there, so it must have been 9, 10, and 11, like that.

Q. Yes. And then you turned this manuscript over to whom? Mr. Kohlberg or Mr. Levine?—A. To Mr. Levine. Mr. Kohlberg was rarely in the office, editorial office. He came in usually around 4 or 5 in the afternoon.

Q. Now, would you before going further, can you tell us anything about the nature of your dealings with Mr. Kohlberg before you got your manuscript written? If you had any dealings with him?—A. No.

Q. Excuse me, Mr. Levine.—A. With Levine, I see. Well, of course, it was more repetition of what Kirkpatrick and Higgins had said. "I will see that you are given considerable publicity and this will clear you and you have come out with a straightforward story. You have not denied the actual extent of your implication." Very nice talk like that. "Go to it, my boy, go back and finish it up," and so on. And then when—Q. He was going to help you further on this, what you referred to as your financial rehabilitation?—A. That is right, that is right.

Q. And you wrote your manuscript and you say you called it what?—A. "They Called Me a Spy."

Q. "They Called Me a Spy."—A. And I started roughly like this: Many American readers must wonder what became of the Amerasia or the State Department "espionage" case—espionage in quotes.

Q. And after you wrote this manuscript you turned it over to Mr. Levine?—A. Yes.

Q. And what happened then?—A. Then he told me, "Now, go and sleep." I had not slept much. Incidentally, the American Legion had a convention and they were in the hotel, and it was a very hectic week there. They banged on my door many times every night. And I may add, wild women suddenly burst into my room, threw themselves on the bed, and I had to take one and throw her out, and finally I kept my door locked all the time. So when I was through with that I was really very tired. Incidentally, I came up with a case of diarrhea, and I fought that while I was up there. I went to a drug store and got some medicine, some drops to take.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? When you gave him a copy, did you keep a copy yourself?—A. Yes. I kept a copy, and that is the one that has been photostated.

Then when I went there and I handed it to him, he threw up his arms, he said, "Good God, man, this is a hell of a mess!" So I said, "You don't like my writing, eh?" He said, "It is not that. I mean to say this whole this is nothing but a rambling chronology." I said, "What did you tell me when I came? 'Put down the facts of the Amerasia case, your background and so on.' I did exactly as you told me. If I haven't elaborated on the points that you would prefer, then say so and let's add that to it." He said, "What about this, and that" and he mentioned a number of things. I said "I don't know about these points."

Q. Can you recall any of the things he referred to?—A. Well, it was Marshall's policy, and I really didn't have the facts at my fingertips. The exact dates, etc. I would have to carry with me an enormous file of newspaper clippings, and I didn't do that. I carried with me a few of my notes and I couldn't supply all that. I said, "If you know of these things, dig up the dates locally and find them. That is a mere routine job." "Well, you should have commented on them." I said, "All right, what kind of comment do you want?" We talked back and forth. He said, "I will tell you what you do. You go home and sleep. You look bad. You go home and sleep and then I will rewrite this and you

come in tomorrow." And I remember I came in the next day and he was still working on it. He told me, "Could you go and loaf another day?" I said, "Oh, sure; with pleasure." And then I went out and got some tickets to various theaters. By that time I had slept enough, and then I went back again. He said, "Now, have a look at this."

Incidentally, he told me that day, "We prepaid your room and that is up today." I said, "Yes; and I want to tell you something, Mr. Levine. My father, when he left Washington, he left most of his furniture stored in Manassas, down on a farm there, and I have arranged a friend of mine who drives a fruit truck from down there somewhere, Clearwater, he is going back and he is going to drive my father's furniture down. We can load it in the truck when it goes back empty, and I have to be back tomorrow morning at 5. I have to leave for Florida." So he said, "All right, then let me give you some money," but I said, "Now, how about this title here?" We had a battle over that and I remember—

Q. You mean by this time he had rewritten it?—A. He had rewritten it, and rewritten it as the State Department Espionage Case. And Mr. Kohlberg came in, stood in the other window and he was less insistent than Levine was, and he kept on telling me—Levine kept on telling me that it would defeat the whole purpose of the article if we did not call it the Espionage Case and I said, "Well, you could grant me that one concession because it is hurtful to me to call it that, but you could grant me the concession of putting espionage in quotation marks." He said, "All right, we will see if we can work it out that way."

And remember, that was August, oh, say, 18th or 17th, something like that, and, as a matter of fact, I had my suitcase along with me that afternoon. I went straight from his office, walked over because I couldn't get a taxi in a hurry, and walked over to the Pennsylvania Station from Madison Avenue, and got on the train and came down to Washington. And then there was an elapse of time between August and October when this appeared. It appeared about October 6, I think it was. I thought it would be out September but it was not, and in October it came out, and when I got the first copy and I looked at it, I was disgusted. My wife was disgusted.

Q. You mean because of the title?—A. Because of the title, and when I read the whole thing there I found that they had not changed many things I had objected to, they had not left them out.

Q. Had you gone over the rewrite of the article as well as—A. Yes, I had.

Q. As well as the matter of the title?—A. Over the rewrite; yes.

Q. And was it—how much did it differ from what you had written?—A. It differed—in form it differed completely but in items I will say there were five or six items that I did not know about previously, but they had taken the trouble during that afternoon to show me, bring me the files and show me, "We have this" and "We have that," incidentally—

Q. Was that stuff then that you considered you knew about after they had shown you these files?—A. Yes.

Q. You were willing to make the statement on your own responsibility?—A. I was willing to let it go into the article, trusting that they were well-informed on it and that they were not simply fooling me on the subject.

Q. In other words, whatever they showed you was sufficient so that you were willing to publish the material as facts under your own name?—A. That is right, you might say that.

Q. Now I wonder if you would just take a look at the article. I would like to go over it with you to see what—

(Mr. Larsen and Mr. Rhetts looked at Document 17-X, Exhibit 20.)

A. The General Stilwell affair, I had nothing to do with. I had not discussed it with General Stilwell.

Q. Let's try to get at it from the beginning.—A. Nor had I mentioned the resignation of Joseph Grew.

Q. You state here in the second full paragraph of the article that—A. I did not say—

Q. Just a moment.—A. I did not say, "I have devoted many months."

Q. Just a moment. I will turn these in for the record later, but at this point I would like to introduce into the transcript document 17-1.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the whole thing?

Q. No, 17-1.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-1

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 27)

"I have devoted many months to a plodding investigation of the case in which I had become entangled, primarily to rehabilitate my reputation and to establish my complete innocence. I have collaborated with Congressman George Dondero of Michigan, who sponsored the creation of the House committee which is about to undertake an inquiry into all the circumstances of the disposition of the State Department espionage case, and have offered my fullest cooperation to the chairman of that committee, Congressman Samuel Hobbs."

Q. Now in this paragraph beginning with, "I have devoted many months to a plodding investigation"—A. Yes.

Q. Had you in fact devoted many months to a plodding investigation of it?—A. Yes, I had not devoted many months by going to an office every day, in that manner, but during the months prior to my going to Florida I had had occasion to talk to a number of people who knew about the case and I had discussed it very widely with them. Such people—

Q. You state there that you collaborated with Congressman Dondero.—A. That is right.

Q. Would you tell us something about the nature of that collaboration with Congressman Dondero?—A. I did not know Mr. Dondero but I heard one day that—I better give you the right sequence. In March 1946 I was here in Washington and I heard that they wanted men for Korea. I had worked on Korea both in the Navy Department and in the State Department, and someone gave me an introduction to go to the War Department and I went over and they examined me.

Q. Do you happen to know who that was that gave you that introduction?—A. I don't know. I guess it was Maj. Gorden Link. And then I went in to see the military government division that had control of appointments for Korea and they examined me and I asked them, "What about this Amerasia case I was involved in?" They said, "We don't care. We have investigated you very thoroughly and we don't worry about that." Then I had my shots and I was ready to go, I think it was in April I was to go, and then an article appeared in the Journal American, New York Journal American. This article was written by Ray Richards, who has an office downtown in the Times-Herald Building, and he had written roughly as follows: "Now why would the United States Government send a Communist spy to Korea? Mr. Dondero is going to make an investigation of this matter." So I immediately took a copy of this article and I telephoned various friends, said, "Where is Richards? Is he in New York?" And they said, "No, he is in the Herald Building, 608." So I rushed up there to him and presented myself, and he just let me stand up, and he said, "So! How much did Joe Stalin pay you to spy on the United States Government?" I said, "You are crazy!" He said, "You dare to tell me that?" I said, "Yes, I dare tell you that. I came home here with the idea that American newsmen were of a very superior quality, namely that before they write anything they investigate. You apparently have not investigated." Well, so and so. I said, "Do you want to talk further to me?" He said, "Yes." I said, "Please offer me a chair."

Now I forgot to tell you that I had been up to Dondero that morning before going to Ray Richards, and I had a very similar session with him. He refused to talk to me and he turned his back on me and he walked up and down the floor, and I am that type of person, probably because of my stubborn Danish background, that I don't easily—I get angry slowly but when I get mad it is not very easy to push me off or around or what. So I told Mr. Dondero, "All right, so you think I am a spy and you are going to investigate me and you are going to cause a hubbub about me and damage my reputation when I am looking for a job. You have ruined it already. You are going to listen to me." He said he didn't want to, so I followed him up and down the floor, and I put my arm on his shoulder. He resented that. I said, "Let's get together, Mr. Dondero, because I am a kind of—well, I have a little bit of the Chinese psychology. I can't help it, I grew up out there, and beware of me if I get hysterical. I could put you on the spot. I could refuse to leave this place, and you would have to call the marshal to throw me out, and that would be a nice scandal, and I would tell everything to the paper." I said, "You are a representative of the people in a democratic government. You like to make statements but you don't like to listen. You don't like to question a man. I am yours for questioning. Do you want to start or do

you want me to lie down on the floor and cause a scandal?" He said, "All right." He said, "By golly, I begin to believe you." "Mr. Dondero, some of your friends—Mr. H. Carl Andersen, he lived in Minnesota, he lives on Harvard Street, he is my very close friend, and he has told me of you as 'George.' I asked him, 'Who is this George?' 'George Dondero, of Michigan.'" I said, "Do you want to call Carl and ask him about me?" So he said "Yes." By golly he called. And he said, "Yes, I know Larsen and think very highly of him." I said, "Would you like to call another man who is a good friend of mine, I knew him when I was in China—Walter Judd?" "Oh," he said, "a very close friend of mine." I said, "Call him, let us not play around any more." And he got very nice to me and before I left he shook my hand and he promised me that he would do something to make good for what he had—what harm he had done to me, and he asked me would I be honest and tell him my story and would I go before his—it wasn't the Hobbs committee—but he said when a committee is appointed, tell what I knew, and I said "Yes." "Of course you know everything is secret and confidential"—it didn't turn out quite that way, but I went before the House committee and since then Dondero has to all purposes been extremely friendly toward me. He has called me on occasion, asked me what he could do, asked me if I was looking for a job. I said, "Yes, don't tell me you have a job." He said, "No, but if you are looking for a job I will permit you to give my name as a reference." "Thank you, Mr. Dondero." Those are my relations with Dondero.

My relations with Ray Richards turned out very similarly. Before I left there he said, "Well, I realize in other words that you are not the Communist you were made out to be." I said, "You are darn right I am not, I never was a Communist." "Well, did you consider these people in the State Department as pro-Communist?" I said, "No, I considered that many of them were anti-Chiang." And he said, "Well, they reported that the Communists were up and coming, that they were the right thing for China. Do you believe that?" I said, "No, I don't." And I have repeated this statement over and over when they have tried to trip me. They have said, "Well, don't you think they have sabotaged the State Department policy out in the Far East? Don't you think they are pro-Communist?" I have said, "Well, let's put it this way. If I have at any time felt that they were too anti-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Kuomintang, then it has been my personal opinion, but you must remember this: No statement to this effect on my part would stand up in court or stand up before any investigating committee. No statement of this kind would clinch the argument of whether there was a pro-Communist group in the State Department, for the simple reason that I sat in the State Department and I was not out there." If anyone asked me, "Mr. Larsen, could you state for certain whether your judgment was absolutely reliable in this matter inasmuch as you were in the State Department, not out in the field, and that this type of reporting was pro-Communist, or could you state that it was perhaps not pro-Communist and just realistic reporting?" I said I could not state that because I was not out there. It might have been real strict reporting.

Q. You are referring to the type of reporting that Mr. Service made?—A. Yes, that is what they always were after. I did not like to discuss this—

Q. You are referring to the type of reporting?—A. That Mr. Service and Mr. Davies and Mr. Emmerson and Mr. Ludden and so on made, the field officers at the time.

Q. So that you have always said that you had no basis for asserting that it was pro-Communist?—A. That is right, I can repeat that at any time.

Q. It might have been purely objective?—A. Yes.

Q. You told that to Dondero? And Richards?—A. Yes, and he did not like it and Richards did not like it and McCarthy did not like it, Mr. Wherry did not like it, and Mr. Ferguson just a few days ago did not like it either. They all gave me the impression, all these people, having question me once they don't seem to want to have much to do with me after that.

Q. Let us come back to the article here. We were trying to go through it. At this point I would like to introduce into the transcript Document 17-4.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-4

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 27)

"* * * In the course of my own explorations, I have uncovered sufficient material to convince me that further probing into the matter might assume proportions even more far reaching than those of the Pearl Harbor investigation."

Q. Now I draw your attention, Mr. Larsen, to the portion which begins, "In the course of my own explorations," and you state that you have uncovered enough material to convince you that further probing might assume proportions ever more far reaching than those of Pearl Harbor.—A. That is a lot of bunk, in my opinion. I know, yes, I have let that go in there. In the brief opportunity I had to look over that article that afternoon, the manuscript as it was rewritten by Don Levine, I was lax in putting my foot down. I pencil-marked many things.

Q. You did not write that?—A. I did not.

Q. That sentence?—A. I did not write that sentence.

Q. Now I would like to introduce document 17-5.

Mr. ACHILLES. That has been introduced.

Q. I want it in again.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-5

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 27)

"* * * It is the mysterious whitewash of the chief actors of the espionage case which the Congress has directed the Hobbs committee to investigate. But from behind that whitewash there emerges the pattern of a major operation performed upon Uncle Sam without his being conscious of it."

Q. I refer you to this part: "It is the mysterious whitewash of the—A. I never used "whitewash."

Q. Of the chief actors," etc.—A. I never used "whitewash." I never used it. I was not the author of that term, although I seemed to think at that time that someone was guilty because I had personally seen two very large heaps of documents that I had not given Mr. Jaffe, and I certainly thought that there must be someone who gave that to them. They did not walk there by themselves, and I felt that someone had been let off. This is a rewording of those bitter thoughts of mine, that I had been made a scapegoat and had been taken in and one of those fined \$500 and had gone down in history as the spy, the principal culprit in this case.

Q. I take it your testimony now is that you had no factual basis for believing that there was a mysterious whitewash of Mr. Service in any case?—A. No.

Q. Did you have any reason to believe that the failure of the grand jury to indict him was whitewash?—A. Yes; I did.

Q. Now will you tell us what your basis for that was?—A. That was a statement made to me when I was up in New York that time.

Q. You mean with Levine and Kohlberg?—A. Yes; in August 1946 in conversation with Mr. Levine and Mr. Kohlberg. I can't remember exactly which one of us said it, but we talked so much, we were together for lunch, and whenever we met we used the few moments available to us to discuss the case, and it was said to me at that time that the grand jury, before which I did not go for some reason or other—I never did know why my attorney did not take me before the grand jury. Before the grand jury Mr. Service appeared and was asked, "Did you or did you not give some documents to Mr. Jaffe?" According to what I was told, Mr. Service said, "Yes." And they asked him, "Will you then explain why you should not be prosecuted under such and such laws for giving classified material to unauthorized persons?" And Mr. Service is supposed to have taken out of his pocket a piece of paper on which the documents that he admitted giving to Jaffe—I don't know at all whether this is true or not, but I was told about it—they were listed and there was a date that somewhat preceded the date of the arrests, and the document was signed, I believe they told me, by one George Taylor in OWI. This document was a declassification certificate, namely making these documents or declassifying these documents as of the date on that letter, for which reason the transfer of the documents would not be a crime, and that there Mr. Service's case folded up.

And then I was told—possibly now that is conjecture on my part but I thought a lot over what they told me and I think they might have told me the following to incite me to some vicious feeling against Mr. Service, and I don't deny that I did have a darn bad feeling against Service after that story was told to me, namely that the grand jury asked Mr. Service, "All right, then, do you have any idea of who could possibly have done this?" And he said, "I can only imagine that the man responsible for transfer of all these documents is Emmanuel Larsen."

"Well," I thought, "that is a fine thing." I had no association with Service. I don't see how he could say a thing like that. He cleared himself, got a nice letter of congratulation, and here I am, hunted. There was considerable emotion involved in that case, so I don't have to beg your question but I will beg you gentlemen to pardon me if I have been dreaming about this and thinking about it unnecessarily. And finally, I have tried to pin these men down, and they have tried to deny even that they said it, and I say, "You know damn well, Don, you told me that one time." And he said, "Well, I remember hearing about it, but did I tell you that?" And I have thought to myself, maybe it wasn't so. And therefore when Service was ordered home from India, my wife and I talked it over, and I said to her, "I think it is tough on Service. I can appreciate it because of what we have gone through. It makes it very easy for us to appreciate what Service now is going to go through. He is going to be yanked home and I am not going to use any of that rubbish that was hearsay and rumor and so on, because the grand jury is secret and the proceedings cannot come out of the grand jury." I remember even that I went to James McInerney one time and asked him, "Is that true?" and he refused to answer me. He said, "You know that is secret. I couldn't tell you that." Anyway I doubt it very much.

Q. Did Levine tell you where he got this detailed account of Service's testimony before the grand jury?—A. No; he didn't. Unless—I can imagine he got it from Kirkpatrick, because they worked on the case in the FBI. I don't know if they would know about the grand jury testimony. I am not acquainted with the law in that way.

Q. As you understand it, Levine told you first of all that Service was able to show before the grand jury that someone by the name of George Taylor had declassified the documents he showed to Jaffe?—A. That is right.

Q. And secondly that Service testified before the grand jury that you were the person?—A. And implicated me by a—in a vague manner.

Q. And in this way you developed a considerable animosity toward Service?—A. I certainly did. I must say that right now it has worn off, and every day I am less inclined to believe—I had nothing to do with him, I have never been together with him, talked to him until today, and I have—

Q. Do you today have any reason to believe that Mr. Levine's account to you is anything but a lie?—A. I can't say that I am sure of it, but if I am testifying and his magazine turned out to be sensation seeking and not of my liking, and he on subsequent occasions was extremely insistent upon my altering my text. For instance, when I wrote the story in January 1948 of the Democratic League, which was a truly liberal group in China, that was infiltrated by Communists—I was one of the few who knew it at an early date, not through State Department information but through secret Chinese sources that gave me some documents from China in Chinese that proved that the Communists had the plan. In fact, it was the Communist plan to infiltrate it and use the front organization. So after I had left the State Department, years after, I dug into my file, I was showing Dekom that, and I said, "Let's write an article on that," and we wrote the article.

Now I found that Mr. Don Levine is not quite the trustworthy man in many of his human relations I first thought him to be. I hate to say this, but the fact is that I didn't—he didn't pay me the \$300, and he paid me \$200 and told me the expense account at my hotel, which we had not made quite clear, had run over \$100, including rent of the typewriter, and that therefore I would have to bear that, so I got only \$200 out of that article, and I paid my own way back to Washington and I billed him for it afterwards.

Q. Did you ever get that?—A. I got that; yes.

Q. Now let us turn back at the moment to this article, if we may.—A. Incidentally, he ordered me to write a number of other articles—this is just in substantiation of my statement that Mr. Levine is difficult to deal with. The agreement was if I ever wrote an article I was to get \$50. Well, in Christmas 1948 he still owed me \$95, and he came to Washington, and I went over to the Shoreham Hotel to see him, and we were to make up our minds where we were to go for eggnog, and so on. And then I said to him, "Don, do you have a check for me?" He said, "Oh Jimmy, I forgot that damn check. It will be in the mail when I go back. I will put it in the mail and you will get it just in time for the end of the Christmas days." That check I have not received yet. I compromised on the \$95 again about the—well, when did my article on the Far Eastern Commission appear? September 26 I mailed it to him.

Q. What year was that?—A. Last year—1949—and I said to him—he called me from New York and said, "You have until September 26 to get in your article

on the Far Eastern Commission." I said, "All right, what is the arrangement, Don?" He said, "Well, you know what I have been paying you"—I understood the normal sum—"this time it will be more. We are in better shape now." He always told me it was because they were about bankrupt. "We are in better shape now, I will make it double." So I thought that mean \$100, so I agreed, so I said, "Thank you, Don, that is O. K., I will write it for that." Then I said "Don, there is another little matter. I am going to write you a letter about it, but just let me mention it on the phone. You owe me 95 bucks. If you are not too broke, send me some of that. I am broke." So he said, "Well, all right, you write me a letter, see if you can compromise on that a little bit, and I might fix it." So I thought, "All right, I will get \$100, I won't strain those fellows, because if I make it \$50 I will wait a year and won't get it," so, believe it or not gentlemen, I said, "Don send me \$25 and we will call the whole account quits." So he did send me \$25, and when he got my manuscript he sent me \$50 for the article on the Far Eastern Commission and he has not paid me any more, and if he would give me a thousand dollars today I wouldn't write a darn word for him.

Q. I would like to introduce into the transcript—A. That perhaps is irrelevant but I want you to know my relations with him were not too pleasant.

Q. I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point document 17-6, 17-7, and 17-8.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-6

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 28)

"* * * How did it come to pass that Washington since 1944 has been seeking to foist Communist members upon the sole recognized and legitimate government of China, a maneuver equivalent to an attempt by a powerful China to introduce Earl Browder and William Z. Foster into key positions in the United States Government?"

DOCUMENT No. 17-7

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 28)

"* * * Whose was the hand which forced the sensational resignation of Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew and his replacement by Dean Acheson? And was the same hand responsible for driving Ambassador Patrick Hurley into a blind alley and retirement?"

DOCUMENT No. 17-8

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 28)

"* * * The answers to all of these questions came to me as I unraveled the main threads of the tangled State Department Espionage Case. But many more questions still remain to be solved."

Q. I would like to have you look at this document, Mr. Larsen. Now you state here that the answers to all of these questions came to you as you unraveled the main threads—A. Let's take this from the beginning, Mr. Rhett. "How did it come to pass," and so on, they want to introduce Earl Browder, William Z. Foster—take my word for it, I never mentioned those fellows, I am not the author of that.

"How did it transpire"—I never wrote anything about how it transpired—"that Marshall"—I did not mention Marshall. That is what I objected to.

Q. So you are not the author of the second paragraph?—A. That is right.

Q. And the next one is, "Whose was the hand which forced the sensational resignation of Under Secretary Grew?"—A. I did not worry the least bit about Mr. Grew's resignation. I never asked the questions.

Q. Did you write that paragraph?—A. I did not write that paragraph.

Q. Did Levine write it?—A. Undoubtedly, unless he had Mr. Toledano help him.

Q. Mr. who?—A. Ralph Toledano, the author of that recent sensational book—what is it?

Mr. ACHILLES. Seeds of Treason.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was Toledano—A. Yes; he was the rewrite man.

Q. I see.—A. To put it very crudely, Mr. Don Levine was a volcano of the oil well and Toledano was the engineer who harnessed the wealth. That is the way they worked together.

Q. So that, so far as the last paragraph here, the answer is, "The answer to all of these questions came to me," and so forth—I take it then that none of the answer to any of these questions came to you since you did not—A. I did not; they did not.

Q. Since the questions never occurred to you?—A. That is correct.

Q. Then you did not write that paragraph either?—A. No; I did not write that paragraph either. On this—or rather I would say that my discussion with Don Levine and Mr. Kohlberg tended to show that whereas I had tried to get to the bottom of this case—naturally I was interested in finding out who did perpetrate the principal transmitting of these documents, and although I had worked on that I had not arrived at any very clear conclusions. That I did not like. That was a bad story—a weak story, as he called it.

Q. Now I would like to introduce into the transcript Document 17-10.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-10

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 29)

"* * * The search in the offices of Amerasia yielded a trove of more than 100 files containing, according to Congressman Dondero, top secret and highly confidential papers stolen from the State Department, War Department, Navy Department, Office of Strategic Services, Office of Postal and Telegraph Censorship, and the OWI at a time when we were at war with both Germany and Japan."

Q. And I direct your attention, Mr. Larsen, to this material beginning here, "The search in the offices of Amerasia yielded a trove of more than 100 files—

A. I will ask you, how would I know what transpired in the search of Amerasia?

Q. That is the question I was going to ask you. [Laughter.] Did you know?—A. No; I did not know. Mr. Dondero, who is mentioned here, had apparently been in very close collaboration with Don Levine. In every detail of the discussions with Mr. Don Levine, Dondero's name was mentioned. "Dondero has a list of this," "Dondero," Dondero was his informant.

Q. He stated to you that Dondero was his source for some of the information?—A. Yes; he stated that, yes.

Q. Some of the information?—A. Yes. And therefore I permitted that to go in. He said, "Dondero said" because I had been up to Dondero's office and Dondero had said those things to me, too, but I didn't remember details of it, but Levine had very detailed lists and stacks of what, shall I say, recounts all the results found by Dondero.

Q. Now beginning at this point here and going all the way down that column—

The CHAIRMAN. That isn't very clear on the record.

Q. I know, I am going to offer the whole thing as an exhibit. Beginning with the material, the words, "The search in the offices of Amerasia"—this is on page 29 of the article—and the remainder of the first column, all of the second column—A. You see, these documents—

Q. First, second, third, fourth, and fifth.—A. Those are the lists that I saw up there, and that Dondero of course had called out to me too, and I said, "Yes, I haven't seen them, I don't know those, but go ahead, investigate—"

Q. You did not write those two columns?—A. No; I did not write those. I didn't know of those.

Q. Mr. Levine or Toledano wrote those?—A. One of those two.

Q. I ask that there be included in the transcript at this point Document 17-11—A. Incidentally, if you are interested in a remark on this paragraph here, "Fifth. Another stolen document, particularly illuminating, and of present great importance to our policy in China, was a lengthy detailed report showing com-

plete disposition of the units in the Army of Chiang Kai-shek, where located, how placed, under whose command, naming the units, division by division, and showing their military strength. It is easy to visualize the consequences of this information in the hands of the Communist forces in China, then and now," those documents were disseminated by the Military Intelligence in many printed copies—not printed but mimeographed copies—and they were interesting inasmuch as they showed the names of the commanders and the names of the subordinate commanders, division commanders, and vice division commanders, and so on.

But I told Mr. Don Levine that time, "Aha, so you got this information. I don't see why you bother to mention that. I will tell you one thing. Those documents, I saw them many times. They were spread all over the place. Damn little security regarding them, that was a fact. They were not the actual distribution. I discovered that many times because I had checked them very carefully with my boss, Major Bales, in the Naval Intelligence, and if one of those reached Jaffe, all right, whom was he spying for? If he was spying for, let us say, the Japanese, believe me, they knew very well where the Chinese units were much better than we knew here. Remember, they had Chou Fu-lai's puppets and so on, they had spies all the way through. They took over Tai Li's assistant No. 2, Tai Li's office, Ting Mo-tsun, and he became a spy for the puppets and they had the complete lay-out. Through him they got the complete Chinese intelligence set-up which had been rebuilt as of March 1938.

Q. You say you checked this with your boss at Naval Intelligence?—A. Yes; I checked these things back in 1936, 1938, 1940, 1943, and we always found them very inaccurate. There was another element of inaccuracy in those military statements, disposition statements, namely the time element. By the time they reached us, there had been large movements and they were not the same.

And may I finish this sentence. I told Don, If you think this is an important document, I could tell you a few things. If Jaffe were spying for the Japanese, it would have been unnecessary. They would have laughed at him if they had sent them that. If he were spying for the Russians, as apparently all the implications are, remember those were handed out to the military attachés, and Panyushkin in Chungking got copies of them to. They weren't worth a damn. The Russians had them all. They would get them in 2 months or so from Jaffe—they would not be worth a single penny in intelligence parlance."

Q. Now, have you finished on that point? I do not mean to interrupt.—A. No; that is quite right.

Q. I have asked that there be included in the transcript at this point Document 17-11.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-11

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 32)

"* * * The question as to whether Soviet Russia would enter the war against Japan was uppermost in Allied councils in these days. China's foreign minister, T. V. Soong, told our Ambassador Gauss that he was convinced that Russia would attack Japan when Germany was defeated, but would do so for the sole purpose of sovietizing the Far East. Soong warned that America's headaches would commence only then. It was a warning which Washington completely disregarded."

Q. I refer you, Mr. Larsen, to this material on page 32 of the article.—A. That is right; I gave that.

Q. You are the author of that?—A. I gave this to Don Levine; yes.

Q. How did you know about that conversation?—A. Oh, I knew about that from studying the reports while I was in the State Department.

Q. Well—A. That was, if you want my personal comments on that—

Q. We would be glad to have them.—A. That was a report which I considered rather interesting and I considered at that time when I read it as quite true. It gave a good picture of Russia's attitude. She would come into the war when Germany was defeated, or in other words very late, and only for her own sake. And I was only interested in the report. I only remembered it because it stuck in my mind as an important warning to the United States that had not been given any consideration at all here. It had not been publicized, it was not made the subject of a discussion in the Postwar Policy Committee—remember, I was

a member of the Postwar Policy Committee—and that referred to the end of the war and the postwar situation.

Q. Did you have any authority to disclose the contents of this dispatch?—A. No; I did not. You are right on that point. I was, of course, afterward not in the State Department, but still, you are right, I had no authority to discuss that or to disclose it.

Q. Now, I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point Document 17-12.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-12

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 32)

"* * * John Stewart Service, a junior colleague and friend of Mr. Davies, who was stationed as a field representative in China and acted as political adviser to General Stilwell, tried hard to convince Washington that the rebel Communists were pursuing a policy of avoiding civil war."

Q. I refer you now, Mr. Larsen, to this paragraph here [indicating].—A. That is correct. That is, as far as I remember that, the advice given from the field at that time to the State Department, or the information was that the Communists were pursuing a policy of avoidance of civil war. Mr. Gauss did not agree with that, but Mr. John Carter Vincent attached a note about the size of this here [indicating 5-by-8-inch paper], something like Mr. Chase's note that we saw on the dispatches, and that note said, roughly, Mr. Gauss is wrong. Mr. Gauss sent it in under covering dispatch, and said, "I do not agree with Mr. Service," and outlined the reasons. He said, "I cannot see, in view of the fact that the Communists are building turrets and fortresses along all the railways, and that they are infiltrating large areas of the Chiang Kai-shek-controlled parts of China—I cannot see that they are pursuing a policy of"—what was it he called it here?—"avoidance of civil war." But Mr. John Carter Vincent said Mr. Service is right, and Mr. Gauss is wrong, not exactly in those words, and a vague line to the effect that the real cause of all this trouble is that the Kuomintang or Nationalist Government is not bringing about the reforms that the Communists championed, and that it was not at all a case of Communists making trouble in China, but it was Chiang Kai-shek's backwardness that was causing the trouble.

Q. As a matter of fact, do you know what period of time you are talking about, that you were talking about here when you were reporting that Service—A. Yes; it was spring of 1945.

Q. And it is your impression that the report he was sending them was that the Chinese Communists were in the spring of 1945 trying to avoid the possibility of civil war?—A. It was my opinion that that report was not correct. I did not agree with that.

Q. You think that this was a report written by Service in the spring of 1945?—A. Yes. From memory, I would say that was a report.

Q. But not a report written much earlier?—A. No; it was written—all I can tell you approximately is Mr. Service probably wrote it in February.

Q. February of 1945?—A. Because I remember he came home at the end of March or early April and sat in on one of our morning meetings.

Q. Sat in on what?—A. On one of our early morning Far Eastern Division meetings. That is at the time Mr. Ballantine introduced me to him in the corridor.

Q. You mean a meeting of your unit or some staff meeting?—A. General staff meeting in the State Department. That is where I first saw him; that is where I figure the time he came home.

Q. What is it you recall? Something he said at this staff meeting?—A. No; but I recall that Mr. Service came home around the beginning of April—I am not sure—

Q. Yes, it was in April.—A. But I remember in April, somewhere around the 1st of April we had one of these Friday morning Far Eastern Division meetings where all officers and analysts got together, and I remember seeing Mr. Service in there.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not present at the meeting?—A. Oh, yes, I was always present at those meetings.

The CHAIRMAN. So you heard what he had to say?—A. I don't remember whether Mr. Service had anything to say that day or not. I think Mr. Emmerson gave a little talk that day.

Q. Did Mr. Service ever attend any meetings of your policy committee?—A. Not that I remember.

Q. Well, now, let us go along with this article here. I would like to introduce into the transcript document 17-14.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-14

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 33)

"The day before President Roosevelt announced that Stilwell had been relieved of his command, on October 30, 1944, John S. Service submitted his report No. 40 to the State Department. As disclosed months later by General Hurley in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that report was 'a general statement of how to let fall the government I was sent over there to sustain. The report was circulated among the Communists I was trying to harmonize with the Chiang Kai-shek government.'"

Q. I refer you to this [indicating].—A. I did not write that at all. I didn't know any No. 40. I had no record of any document. That is Mr. Don Levine's stuff.

Q. That is Mr. Levine's?—A. His authorship.

Q. I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point document 17-13, and—A. I strongly disagreed with the idea of writing the article this way and mentioning document or report No. 40 because it gave the impression that I still had documents or copies of them and could quote the number. I didn't.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-13

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 33)

"Then came the Stilwell incident. John S. Service, Stilwell's political adviser, accompanied a highly secret military commission to Communist headquarters at Yen-an. Upon the return of this mission, old 'Vinegar' Joe demanded that Chiang Kia-shek permit him to equip and arm some 300,000 Chinese Communists and put them in the field alongside the Nationalist armies against the Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek saw in this American proposal a Soviet plot to build up the very rebel forces which had been waging civil war against his government. He requested the recall of General Stilwell."

Q. Now I ask you to look at this document 17-13. I ask you whether you wrote that?—A. No, I did not.

Q. Mr. Levine wrote that?—A. Levine wrote that.

Q. I now ask that there be included in the transcript documents 17-16 and 17-17.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-16

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 34)

"The Espionage case itself had its origin with the appearance in the December 1944 issue of Amerasia of an article containing unadulterated passages from an extremely confidential report to the Office of Strategic Services. Two employees of the OSS were struck by the passages which they had read in the original and became curious as to how the information turned up in the columns of Amerasia. A preliminary investigation conducted by OSS disclosed that various other secret documents were in possession of Jaffe, Kate Mitchell, and Mark Gayn, all of Amerasia."

DOCUMENT NO. 17-17

(Article in Plain Talk, entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 34)

"The FBI then took charge of the affair. As established by Congressman Dondero, the Government agents spent several months on the case. In the course of their quest, it was found that John S. Service was in communication from China with Mr. Jaffe. The substance of some of Service's confidential messages to the State Department reached the offices of Amerasia in New York before they arrived in Washington. Among the papers found in possession of Mr. Jaffe was Document No. 58, one of Mr. Service's secret reports, entitled "Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek—Decline of His Prestige and Criticism of an Opposition to His Leadership."

Q. I am referring now to this [indicating].—A. In justifying the entry of these items regarding Stilwell, such as the one that we have just looked at. "Then came the Stilwell incident. John Service" and so on, about "Vinegar" Joe demanding Chiang Kai-shek permit him to equip and arm 300,000 Chinese Communists, with regard to those statements I said to him, "How do you know these things? I remember vaguely something about that, but how can we put this in, 'Report 40' and so on?" And he said, "I have this material here." And he showed me extracts and retyped items from dispatches, and he had a very voluminous steel file—remember, that is before anything was published about Stilwell. He also had in there even photostats of a letter written by General Stilwell to Mrs. Stilwell in which General Stilwell said, "I get so damned mad with these people that sometimes I feel I would love to take off my uniform and shoulder a rifle in the army of Chu Teh."

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that, army of—A. Gen Chu Teh. Now that was a photostat of a letter. It was in May, it seems to me.

Q. That Levine had in his file?—A. Yes. And I said to myself, "It is amazing. Maybe there was a plot, maybe there was a great pro-Communist element out there in China." If that letter was genuine—of course, it may be, Joe Stilwell was a man of terrific temper and maybe he wrote that not at all as a Communist but on the other hand he did write it to his wife, and it does make a bad impression when you see things like that.

I am mentioning that to give you gentlemen an idea of the extent to which they tried to substantiate and did substantiate many of the things they were telling me about and they were telling me that I ought to know and that they were surprised that I didn't know.

Q. Now referring back to this document 17-16 and 17-17, which is this material [indicating], will you look at that?—A. Yes. I don't know anything about that article which later has been mentioned as a transcript of a secret OSS report on Thailand that was the beginning of the Amerasia investigation that touched off the authorities to the fact that Jaffe had inside information. I don't know anything about that.

Q. Now the next paragraph—A. I may add that I never saw that report on Thailand and I never gave it to Jaffe, so it is out of the question. It was news to me when I went up there and I don't even know that Mr. Dondero had mentioned it to me, but I certainly read plenty about it later.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I take it you didn't write these two paragraphs you refer to?

A. I haven't seen the first paragraph.

Q. Document 17-16, you didn't write that, is that correct?—A. That is right. Now you see, that is also presented here in a manner that would indicate—

Q. You are referring now to the portion that begins, "The FBI then took charge"—A. Yes. "In the course of their quest, it was found that John S. Service was in communication from China with Mr. Jaffe."

Q. Did you write that?—A. I did not write that, that it was found, I did not write that at all, that Mr. Service was in communication with Mr. Jaffe. They told me about it and it is not in my original manuscript.

Q. Did they give you the facts which supported that assertion?—A. No, they did not.

Q. Nonetheless you permitted it to be published under your name?—A. Yes, on the grounds that my knowledge of the case was insufficient, and as Mr. Levine said, we were collaborating on the article. When two men collaborate on an article there inevitably will be information available or known to one and not to the other, and therefore correctly the article should have been signed by him with me.

Q. The fact is though that his name does not appear anywhere in connection with the article.—A. It does not appear.

Q. And he gave you no factual material?—A. No, he gave me no factual material on that score.

Q. To support this, nothing to support the assertion that it was found that Service was in communication—A. Not then and never since.

Q. In the course of any of your discussions with Congressman Dondero, did he ever give you any factual information tending to support this charge?—A. No, no. I may mention that Mr. Dondero, undoubtedly a very excellent man and good lawyer, and so on, he is totally blank when it comes to Far Eastern affairs and knowledge of what went on. He doesn't know the slightest about it. Neither did anybody on the House committee. They asked me the most asinine questions.

Q. Now, the next sentence in this paragraph states that "The substance of some of Service's confidential messages to the State Department reached the offices of Amerasia in New York before they arrived in Washington."—A. That is the same implication. That is not of my doing.

Q. You didn't write that?—A. No, sir.

Q. Mr. Levine wrote it?—A. I suppose so, either he or Mr. Toledano.

Q. Did they give you any information to support that, any factual information to support this statement?—A. No, they didn't.

Q. Now the next sentence states that among the papers found in the possession of Jaffe was document No. 58, and so forth.—A. What page is that on?

Q. The next sentence.—A. Fifty-eight. No, again just like Document 40, I knew of no documents under numbers, I didn't know what that was, that dispatch, Decline of his prestige and criticism of and opposition to his leadership, I did not know of that.

Q. You never heard of that?—A. No, I don't think so; I don't think I ever handled that dispatch.

Q. Did they show you a copy of that?—A. No, they did not; but Mr. Dondero showed me a photostat of the list that he had in his office.

Q. Did he tell you this Document 58 was one of Service's secret reports?—A. Yes, he said so.

Q. Dondero said?—A. Yes.

Q. Did he tell you what made him think it was one of Service's reports?—A. No, I don't remember his elaborating on that. He merely said that Document 58—and I have clippings and so on where I have them filed together and tried to piece it together so I know only from the newspaper reports and the lists that the congressional committee had, that they were such. I don't know, I haven't seen them myself. I haven't seen these documents myself.

The CHAIRMAN. I haven't seen them myself, you said?

A. I haven't seen them myself.

Q. Now I will ask to be included in the transcript Document 17-18.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-18

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 35)

"* * * and that at one time Jaffe had in his possession a message sent by Ambassador Hurley to his wife, advising her not to rent their home in Chesapeake Bay for the summer, inasmuch as he expected to return to the United States before the end of the summer."

A. All this about Lattimore I did not put in. I did not say a word about Lattimore. I don't know Lattimore at all.

Q. You are referring now to material appearing at the bottom of column 1, page 34, and top of column 2 of the article?—A. That is right.

Q. Now I ask you to look at this [indicating].—A. All this about Philip Jaffe, alias P'hillips, I didn't know about that. They had a complete file, dossier, on Jaffe.

Q. You are referring now to all of the remainder of column 2 on page 34?—A. That is right.

Q. And you said you were not the author of that either?—A. I was not the author of that.

Q. And now I ask you to look at Document 17-18, which is this material right here [indicating].—A. I did not know about any message sent by Ambassador

Hurley to his wife. I don't see how that possibly could ever come to me, but I was told about that.

Q. Did they show you the message?—A. No; I don't think they showed me the message. I still don't know what it was about, but they told me there was proof that he didn't expect to go back out.

Q. Well, that message, as I read the context here, was referred to merely to show what an extensive—A. File Jaffe had.

Q. File Jaffe had.—A. That is right.

Q. But you merely took Levine's word that Jaffe did have such files?—A. Yes; they told me, "We have been through the lists and, to a certain extent, transcripts of the documents"—

Q. Which documents?—A. All of the documents found in Jaffe's possession.

Q. Levine told you he had been through them?—A. Yes; they said they had been through them. There, you see, were the experts who had handled the case while I was mixing concrete in Florida. You don't learn much about the State Department by mixing concrete down there. In fact, I sweated out a lot of dates and details of things I had seen in the State Department when I worked down there.

Q. Where or did Levine indicate to you how he had obtained access to the files or the materials found in Jaffe's possession at the time of his arrest?—A. I don't remember how he told me that, but I remember he said he had together with Dondero had had access to lists and descriptions of the documents.

Q. At this time—this was August, after the Hobbs committee investigation, was it not?—A. Yes; because the Hobbs investigation was during the spring and—

Q. It was during May of that year, wasn't it?—A. Yes; 1946.

Q. And we are now talking about August 1946?—A. That is right. I don't know whether the official report was out or not. I would have to check that.

Q. No.—A. I think I have a copy of that at home.

Q. The official report, however, does not contain any of the testimony.—A. It doesn't? I see.

Q. Testimony or lists of the documents.—A. They still got them through friendly relations with their Congressmen.

Q. With Congressman Dondero.

(No response from the witness.)

Q. Now I ask that there be introduced into the transcript 17-19, 20.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT NOS. 17-19, 20

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 35.)

"When John Stewart Service returned from China, Miss Mitchell gave a party at which he was present. He had previously attended a special press conference held by the Institute of Pacific Relations in which he supported the position of the Chinese Communists."

Q. And I refer you to [indicating].—A. No, I didn't know that. I wasn't present. I certainly didn't know about it.

Q. You had no personal knowledge?—A. No personal knowledge whatsoever. You may put that down definitely. That is something he told me—

Q. "He" meaning Levine?—A. All right, if you say so, but I did not know of it.

Q. By "he" you mean Levine?—A. Levine.

Q. You are not the author of that?—A. I remember he had that in there, he had talked about it, and I said, "I don't know. If it is anything to you, Don, it is at least to me, it is a good item in proving that I did not conspire with Service."

Q. And did you know anything about the second sentence there, to the effect that Service had attended this—A. Special press conference?

Q. Press conference in which he supported the position—A. No, sir; I meant to say that but I thought it covered—

Q. You didn't write that in?—A. No, sir; not the least bit.

Q. That is also Levine or Toledano, correct?—A. That is right. Don Levine or Toledano. I am not sure which one of those two.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you meet that last gentleman during your conference up there.

A. Yes; I met him there. He was in the outer office and he was a very brilliant writer. I don't like the stuff he writes but he is a good writer. He is a Puerto Rican, a young fellow.

Q. Now I ask that there be included in the transcript Document 17-21.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-21

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case,"
by Emanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 38)

"The grand jury proceedings are, of course, secret. But it has been reported to me that John Service had accused me of furnishing Jaffe with documents found in his possession, which was a complete and vicious fabrication."

Q. I refer you to the bottom of column 1, on page 38, Mr. Larsen. You have already testified I believe, on this point [indicating].—A. Yes.

Q. I believe you have already testified that Levine described to you what purported to have occurred in the proceedings before the grand jury, in which Mr. Service—A. Yes.

Q. Incriminated you?—A. It was true what was written here. It had been reported to me that John Service had accused me. It had been reported. The fact is that it had been reported by Mr. Levine. It is typical of Mr. Levine's style.

Q. Now I ask that we introduce into the transcript document 17-22.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-22

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case,"
by Emanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 38)

"According to Congressman Dondero, for some unaccountable reasons the Government attorneys presented to the grand jury only a part of the evidence in their possession."

Q. I refer you to this sentence here [indicating].—A. How would I know that?

Q. Did you write that?—A. I didn't write that, I didn't write a single word about that.

Q. Did Mr. Levine or Mr. Toledano or Mr. Kohlberg?—A. One of them, one of them just have.

Q. Did they tell you all the evidence had not been introduced?—A. They said they had heard that and that they wrote that down in there, and I made some lines there in the original document, in the original of their rewrite.

Q. Would you think it fair to say, Mr. Larsen, that your willingness to accept these very damaging statements against Mr. Service and have them published under your name was due to the animosity which you had formed as a result of Mr. Jaffe's—A. I wanted to say a minute ago that was partly it. Second was that—

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't finish your sentence. Mr. Jaffe's what?

A. Due to the animosity created within me by the rumors that had been given me. I was, I dare say, unduly lax in criticizing the manuscript of the rewritten article. One reason—another reason for that was that I was under great pressure of time. I had less than 2 hours to catch my train. The last day—they served the finished document to me the last day. There was not even a chance to rewrite paragraphs. Also I was considerably worried about how I would get back, whether I would have money enough for the trip. They gave me my check in the last minute, and I was sick and in a great hurry to get away from the whole thing. I thought, "All right, they have these files here and they have this fulsome evidence and they have impressed me with the fact that it seems that they have gone into it very thoroughly, very thoroughly into it, whereas I have not had occasion to go into it." Where could I go if I went into it? Justice Department, Mr. McInerney, although he was very friendly toward me, he could take out documents, he didn't give me any information, he didn't show me anything. If I came to the State Department, I had been given the cold shoulder. In a remark John Carter Vincent said to me, "I wouldn't touch you with a 10-foot pole."

Q. He said that to you.—A. Yes, he did. Mr. Dondero turned to me—that was just after the arrest and when I was released—"I hear from Mortimer Graves they have collected a fund of \$5,000 to defend the State Department people in this case but Mr. Graves tells me, I am sorry I have had news, you are not to benefit from that fund." Oh, oh. I went to the phone when I got home and I called Mr. John Carter Vincent but Mr. Drumright answered the

phone and John Carter Vincent was right there at the desk, and I heard him say, "This is Larsen." "What does he want?" "He wants to know what are you going to do about this whole case? Are you going to do anything for him?" And then Drumright turned around to the phone and said, "John Carter Vincent says he wouldn't touch you with a 10-foot pole."

Q. This is who, Mr. Drumright?—A. Mr. Drumright was one of the State Department officers connected with far eastern affairs.

Q. You referred to the fact that a \$5,000 fund had been raised. Who told you any such fund had been raised?—A. Mr. Mortimer Graves of the American Council of Learned Societies.

Q. He told you they had raised a \$5,000 fund?—A. Yes, he said about \$5,000. I remember that figure.

Q. Are you sure it was not \$500?—A. It is a long way off. Five hundred is—I can ask him again. You see, Mr. Mortimer Graves was the one who granted me this scholarship to the Library of Congress and he was the one who recommended me for entry into the Naval Intelligence, and recommended to Admiral Zacharias that I be excused from serving the rest of my scholarship on that Rockefeller project. And therefore he considered me as one of his protégés. He was in that field of procuring far eastern men, men with far eastern knowledge for the various Government departments.

Therefore when the case broke and I came out from the District jail, I decided, "I am not going to answer any phones," because the reporters and women came to the door, and my wife held them all off. But finally the second or third day there was a phone call which rang so persistently that I took it. Mortimer Graves. He said, "Larsen, are you doing anything now?" I said, "Certainly not." He said, "All right, would you like to come down here and work on our card files and put them in order, classify the files on the various men in the far eastern field as you know them and as they are listed, collect all the material from their scholarship letters and put them on cards"; just like we do with Chinese personality cards. I said, "Sure, I would love to." He said, "I don't have much money but I know I have \$75 right now that would last you for a week or two, and then I will see if I can get up something." So I went down there, started to work at once, and it was the second or third day after I had been there that he called me up and said, "I have some bad news for you. There is a fund being collected and I am the custodian of that fund," and to the best of my knowledge he said that would run to about \$5,000 collected from various people within the State Department for the defense of the State Department men involved in this case, but that bad news was that I was not to benefit from that fund. My heart sort of sank within me, and I thought, "All right, another bad stroke."

At the end of the week he said, "How are you coming along?" I said, "I have finished that project." He said, "All right, now as to whether you can continue or not, I don't know, but say come in Monday, and let us see, or give me a ring first." So I gave him a ring Monday, and he said, "Well, come down tomorrow and I will see if I have some more for you." He said, "I have a little tail end of another fund, \$60. You do this little job." I had it done in about 3 days. He said, "Well, all right, don't worry. Don't come in for the rest of the week and don't come in until I call you again." And I thought I sensed a cooling in his attitude toward me, although I have always liked him very much.

I went in some time ago and told him, "You remember that time? I just wanted a little understanding with you because I am tired of this going around wondering, 'And how is that man toward me now?' I don't give a damn if I have a clash with you, let's have it out. If we are friends, and you still have decent regard for me, all right." He said, "I have very high regard. I will try to get you one of the Pakistan scholarships," and I am registered for that at present. I did mention to him this \$5,000 fund and he didn't deny it.

But I was rather bitter that time. I thought, "Here we go, we are excluded on every point." Even the defense, the lawyers don't want to get together with my lawyer on the defense. Roth's lawyer didn't want to have anything to do with us. Jaffe's lawyer would not have anything to do. And then I read later about the Lattimore invitation. Everyone has asked me, "Were you there?" I said, "No, I wasn't." I am very glad I wasn't. It is one link in my proof that there was no collusion, no conspiracy to remove documents.

Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. Larsen, you complained about why the Service lawyer and other lawyers wouldn't get together with your lawyers—it was your theory that you were not engaged in any conspiracy, why would you want to get together with the other lawyers?—A. We wanted to know what the case was

about. We thought they might know something about it. We didn't know—in any battle it is good to know something about your enemy, and we thought we might get something interesting. Now, if we had gotten together then—let's take it this way. If we had gotten together then I would have discussed with Jaffe the fact that I discovered that my apartment had been illegally entered and that my wire, my telephone had been tapped. As Fred Woltman said to me over the phone a few days ago, "Jimmie, you sure blew up that case when you made that motion that the evidence was all obtained illegally." And I told Fred Woltman, "Yes, I apparently did." I didn't know at that time anything about the others, and I had nothing to do with them. I had no inclination to go and tell them, "Look, boys, I found out something about my case." I thought, "To hell with them. They don't want to work with me, I don't want to work with them either."

Well, now Ferguson asks me, "What would you have done?"—

Q. This was Senator Homer Ferguson?—A. [Nodded] "What would you have done if you were an investigator?" I told him, "If I were an investigator and I thought that the Nation's security was at stake, I would enter illegally, because I have done so when I was an investigator for the Chinese in Peking." I violated all the treaties and extraterritoriality and everything. I went up to Kalgan with a couple men and pistols, took an army officer and shoved him on the train and took him down to Peking. One of Chu Lin's officers.

Q. So that you had no compunction about violating constitutional rights of individuals if you were investigating?—A. No. He asked me, "Why, then, did you make that motion?" I said, "Because I was fighting for my life and I was irritated by so many things that were asked me and said against me."

You know how I discovered that? My father bought a vase in Chengtu in 1908, or I think it was 1907, a black and white vase. He gave that vase to me, and I had it in a little box on top of a shelf in my closet. When the FBI men came to my residence on the night of June 6, they said, "Have you any documents?" And I said, "Yes." "Show them to us." I said, "Why should I show them to you?" They said, "By virtue of this" and I found I was taken in and I showed it to them. "Why do you have them?" "Because, to take stuff home to read it. Long-winded stuff, can't read it in the office." We went around. "Where is it?" "Here is one." I took it out of an envelope marked "Chou En-lai and Tung Pi-Wu"—and files on these Communists. And then one of the investigators, namely Mr.—I can't—oh, Sander, said, "What is in that box up there?" The other fellow said, "That is a vase." And I am hard of hearing but it just happens that although I had my back turned to him I heard that.

Q. It was in a box?—A. It was in that box, in the little box, what you call an old hat box my father had. My father had a top hat in that when I was a boy and it has been in that top-hat box ever since.

I heard that and I stopped dead. I could hardly get going again. I thought, "Oh!" And then, "If the other one knows, then he has been in there." So I let it go, and in my old Chinese way I went about it in a pretty easy way. And one day I went down to the house manager, Mr. Sager—he is a man who likes a drink. When I wanted something done in the apartment I bought him a drink. So I bought him a bottle of Southern Comfort. It always did the trick. I said, "Sager, I got a little stock of this in. I have one bottle for you." He said, "Oh." I sat down, smoked my cigarette, and said, "Say, tell me, Sager, how many times did those fellows from the FBI come in here and approximately when?" So he said, "Oh, you know about that?" I said, "Sure, I know about that. You tell me." So he told me how he let them in with a pass key and he mentioned something about wire tapping. I hadn't thought about that. I said, "Who was that?" There was a girl present when he fixed those wires. "It was Miss Garvey." I said, "I have to talk to her." She is a little lame on one side, just been married to one of Chennault's fliers who had come back, and she told me the story of how they wire-tapped, from what time, since when. So immediately I called Hilland, my lawyer, and I said "Here, I have something here. Now I am going to throw the muck back at them. Enough of this nonsense. I don't see how I can extricate myself. I have some faults but they have some, too. They will have it. If they want to fight, let's fight. I can't pay you but I have a Chinese who will put up \$10,000, a little Chinese laundryman I befriended one time." He forged a guy's name on a lease. He took it over and then he extended the lease on his own signature, whereas he should have had the man who had originally taken the lease over extend it.

Q. This was the Chinese laundryman?—A. Yes. I helped him get out of it, went to various people, the rent people, real-estate agent, and I told him, "This is done in China all of the time. He is not a crook, just scared he would lose

the place. Now you want to use this like a blackmail case, now you want to put a hell of a pressure on him to get \$35 more rent." He said, "O. K. put \$35 on, tear up this lease, and sign this one."

This Chin Chew, the Chinese, when my wife was away in her home, he said, "I am going back to China and I have sold my six laundries including my factories out in Front Royal"—he did laundry for all laundrymen here, most of them don't do the laundry, just ironing—and he said, "I have sold it all and I have \$43,000. I will put up \$10,000 for you, Jimmie, for your defense." And I really had a cheval de bataille there to go to see him with, and so I said to Mr. Hilland, my lawyer, "Let's go up and bruise him up a little." I said when I went up, "What are you going to prosecute me for? I am going to make a motion you got it all illegally. I have ten thousand bucks from a friend and I will go to the Supreme Court." He said, "You know, if you just had one Government pencil marked 'United States Government' in your house, we can slap you in jail for 1 year with a one-thousand-dollar fine." I said, "All right, that is why I am tried. Nevertheless, I still will fight the 'battle of the badge.'" I had the gold badge and I had a right to take stuff home and have it in my home. "It still doesn't make me a thief." All right, then. I didn't know that in the next room they had Jaffe in. They said, "Pardon me, just a minute." They went in and immediately made Jaffe agree to plead guilty before he would walk out on the street and discover I had filed a motion to fight it on the grounds that they had obtained the evidence illegally.

On the other hand, I went out and I think it was the next day I discovered that Chin Chew came with his passport and said he was going back to Canton and he was sorry but he had to withdraw the money to deposit it in some business in New York and I was left without funds. Then they started to work on me. "Will you enter a plea of nolo contendere?" I said, "No."

They discussed the merits of such a plea and finally, one day, I believe it must have been the early days of October—no, the latter part of October—the Justice Department attorney, Mr. Robert M. Hitchcock, said to me, "Jaffe's lawyer has come to us, and he says he feels very guilty about you. You are poor and he has some money and he realized that if he had never asked Roth to go and seek you out for that intercourse with those personality files, you would never have known him, never been involved in the case. Now you are run down, you have lost your reputation, your job, you have no money, etc., can't even pay your lawyer. So he says, 'If Larsen were to enter a plea of nolo contendere he might be fined, that is probably what was frightening him off from that plea,' but if he were to do that, Mr. Jaffe tells us he would be willing to pay this fine for you." I said, "Oh, no, and get linked up with him. No."

Mr. ACHILLES. It was Hitchcock who told you Jaffe would pay the fine?

A. Yes, I did not get that from Jaffe. So I said, "You are just eager to get a conviction, to get some sort of settlement of the case. I know every lawyer wants that. I make no bones about that. Now let me see, I would have him pay my fine and my lawyer; it would make me look pretty bad, I think."

So I went home and told my wife. At that time I had lost a lot of weight, couldn't sleep at night, never slept at night. I was so thin and nervous and we had no money for the groceries. After a few days of acute difficulties, a man came with a bill, and so on, and—well, I would be away, out of it, and I wouldn't have one or two thousand dollars that I owed Hilland and wouldn't have that hanging over me—

Q. He also agreed to pay your attorney's fees?—A. Attorney's fees and the fine and little incidentals such as transcript or report of what was the legal papers and, namely, we got a transcript of Jaffe's court papers, \$27 it cost. All right. Then we talked it over night after night, and one night my wife said to me, "Maybe that would be the way out of it." So I went to Hilland. He is a fine, honorable man. He said, "Now, Jimmie, don't do it because you owe me \$2,000," because that is what it was up to date. I said, "I know that. In other words, you are advising me not to do that." "Hitchcock told you all the fine things, and now I will tell you all the bad things I learned today from British case history, and so on." I said, "Nevertheless, I came here with my mind made up. I will enter a plea of nolo contendere and scam out of town, become a taxi driver somewhere, or something else." He said, "Don't do that. But all right, if you want to do it, let's do it." So that was October 22.

Then we did two things. He notified Hitchcock that day, October 22, "Larsen is going to enter a plea of nolo contendere." I went that day or next day, I went home, said, "I want to talk to Mr. Byrnes." I had trouble getting him—every-

body else but Mr. Byrnes. Finally I got him, told him I wanted to resign, and said I would send in a letter—

Q. You are referring to Secretary of State Byrnes?—A. Yes. "I want to send my resignation and will it be accepted without prejudice?" I said, "You don't have to accept it but I would like to have it accepted that way." He said, "Certainly. You send it in, say it is 'personal reasons,' and I will reply 'personal reasons.'" I said, "I understand that is the right etiquette in State Department: If you are going down to defeat or you have gone down to defeat not to compromise the Department." He said, "That is very nice of you, that is correct." Because I had agreed to go to court, I will admit risk, defeat, and also I knew if I got fined then I would more or less automatically be dismissed from the Department.

I am through with the story. I was permitted to resign and went to court November 2 after a sudden warning Friday afternoon, and in the session on November 2, 1945, I was not asked whether I had given any documents. I was not asked whether I knew about any Communist affiliations. I was merely asked whether I was E. Larsen, whether I had withdrawn—very emphatic—whether I had withdrawn my motion, whether I was now willing to enter a plea of nolo contendere. I said, "Yes." And he said, "I will not lecture to you. You are a grown man. I fine you \$500."

(A short recess was declared, after which the Board reconvened.)

The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished this particular line?

Mr. RHETTS. No I have not, General.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not finished?

Mr. RHETTS. I have not finished going over this article.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please go on with that then?

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. I believe you testified at the outset of the cross-examination, Mr. Larsen, that while you entertained the view that some of Mr. Service's reports were reporting favorable on the Chinese Communists, that you never had any reason to believe that it would be pro-Soviet communism?—A. That is right.

Q. I ask that there be introduced into the transcript at this point, Document 17-9.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 17-9

(Article in Plain Talk entitled "The State Department Espionage Case" by Emmanuel S. Larsen, October 1946, p. 28)

"* * * There I found myself sitting next to John Stewart Service, a leading figure in the pro-Soviet group in the China Section of the State Department * * *

Q. I refer you to this sentence here, "There I found myself sitting," etc.—A. I did not say "pro-Soviet group in the China Section of the State Department."

Q. You did not write that?—A. No; I did not write "pro-Soviet."

Q. Did Mr. Levine show you any evidence to indicate that Mr. Service was part of a pro-Soviet group?—A. No; he didn't, but he spoke of the "pro-Soviet group" continuously.

Q. I believe you testified you never did have any reason to believe that Service was pro-Soviet, let alone a leader of the State pro-Soviet group?—A. That is right.

Q. Yet you permitted this—A. Well—

Q. Yet you permitted this article to be published under your name although it represented a statement directly contrary to what you thought; is that correct?—A. That is right. May I advance a theory in my defense?

Q. Please do.—A. That I don't know—I have no copy of his manuscript, Mr. Don Levine's manuscript. I don't know whether I remember after seeing the manuscript during that short interval in the afternoon there before my departure from New York exactly what was left as it was and what was amended a little bit, a word changed here and there. I have no way of checking on that now.

Q. So that you don't even know whether you even saw this in the revision of the manuscript that was shown to you?—A. That is right.

Q. You think it may have been added?—A. He did not give me—yes; I am sure about some additions, some items. I didn't see them even in the revision. I am sure about some items. I can't say for sure about this one, that they

were added, because I didn't even remember seeing them when I saw the first issue of the Plain Talk magazine. I thought, "Now, where did he get that? He didn't even have that in his rewrite."

Q. Do you think you can point to any of those now that you know were not even in the revision that was shown to you?—A. I saw one here a little while ago. There was something in here about Mr. Jaffe, that he had paraded under the name, alias, of J. W. Phillips. I don't think he had that in the original rewrite manuscript. That is all on page 34, second column, just about in the middle of it. I didn't know the history of this, from 34 to 36. He had been a member of the editorial board of China Today. I don't think I ever saw China Today.

Q. The question is whether that was in the revision of the article which—A. That is what I referred to. I don't remember seeing anything about that story, that history of the evolution of the Amerasia magazine and the charges that as editor of China Today he has posed as Mr. Phillips.

Q. Now, coming back to this material on page 28, which is Document 17-9, that we were just talking about—A. Page 38?

Q. Yes, page 28.—A. Oh, 28, I see.

Q. Wherein it is stated that Mr. Service was a leader of the pro-Soviet group, will you try to recall whether or not that statement was in the article as revised, which Mr. Levine showed to you, and see whether you can recall anything about it?—A. To the best of my knowledge I do not remember seeing that in the text, because I would have objected to that. I would have said the group, the anti-Chiang group, or group favorable to the Chinese Communists who were at that time known as the Chinese Agrarian Reformers. We all fell for that at one time.

Q. You think that had you seen that in the revised text you would have objected to it?—A. Yes, I would have objected to it. I can only say that if it were in the text, if we could get Don Levine to reveal the text and he could show that that was in there, then it was gross carelessness on my part to overlook it. I do not subscribe to that statement. I do not believe and I did not believe then that there was a pro-Soviet group in the State Department. I do not believe there was a pro-Soviet group in any other sense in the State Department or in the United States, in any other sense than a group that was, like all other Americans, very happy that the Russians were our allies during the war.

Q. You are aware, are you not, Mr. Larsen, that this statement, like all the other statements in this article, have been repeated by Senator McCarthy as a part of the charges which have been made against Mr. Service?—A. Yes, I am aware of that; very much so.

Q. As I understand you, you repudiated the authorship of this and all other statements we have discussed?—A. Yes, I would. Yes, I would.

Q. Now I would like you to look at the material on page 32, column 2, beginning with "The pro-Soviet group in the China Section, whose views" and going down to the bottom of the column. Were you the author of that material?—A. Little bits here and there. He has taken a word and a clause here and there and—let us take it from the beginning. "The pro-Soviet group in the China Section, whose views were reflected by Amerasia, and whose members were in touch with Jaffe and Roth"—I didn't write that.

Q. You did not write that?—A. I did not write that.

Q. What you have just quoted?—A. I did not write that. "Secretary Ludden of"—I mentioned Ludden as one of those who reported that now we were ready to arm and equip the Communists in case of an invasion of north China coast. So far as I know there was no plan to invade the north China.

Q. But you had seen reports from Ludden to this effect?—A. I had seen reports from Ludden recommending the arming of the Chinese in north China, and I was very much amazed because I had worked in Naval Intelligence on a detail reporting and surveying of the leading beaches along the south China coast, south of Shanghai, south of the Yangtze River.

Q. Now you say you had mentioned Ludden's name?—A. Yes.

Q. But you didn't, did you, mention it—A. Not as a member of the pro-Soviet group, no.

Q. Now, then, you say in the next sentence, "So was John Davies, a native of Chengtu, who acted as State Department"—A. No; that is his wording, that is his authorship.

Q. Then the next paragraph, you state that "He"—referring to Davies—"seemed to believe and report almost anything in the way of information against the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek, swallowing whole and relaying nearly everything about the Chinese Communists" gave him. Were you the author of

that?—A. I had something to that effect, that everything that was against the reputation of the Kuomintang was carefully reported and that the dispatches in general carried laudatory remarks on the up-and-coming Communist Government.

Q. Was Mr. Davies reporting things that the Chinese Communists told him?—

A. Yes. Mr. Davies had—

Q. Was he in China?—A. Yes, he was in China. He had sent in a number of reports. I remember he was the author of the report stating that the Chinese Communists definitely had a non-Russian orientation. I was a little shocked at that report for a very simple reason.

Q. You are sure that this was a report of Davies?—A. Yes; I am sure. I was shocked that he reported that the Communists had a non-Russian orientation because I had in my hand since the latter part of 1943 the minutes of a congress held in Yen-an on the occasion of the dissolution of the Comintern. It is a printed document, printed on very poor paper, a kind of cheap Chinese bamboo paper and in very poor English and very obviously printed in Yen-an. And, I was told and I am quite ready to believe, printed for consumption in the English-speaking countries. But I was told by my Chinese friend who brought it home from China and gave it to me in 1943, that it was suppressed in this country because the Communist line as dictated by the Kremlin was to influence the people of the United States to believe that there was no Russian orientation among the Chinese Communists and that they were not Soviet, Russian Communists, but my document that I still have is a very valuable document, clearly said, "Now the Comintern is abolished." Mao Tse-tung made that speech May 26. The Comintern was abolished on May 23. He said, "It does not matter. Whereas we have received instructions from the Soviet Union over a long period of years, the change will not be very significant, but we will not any more receive instructions from the Comintern." He didn't say that they wouldn't receive any more instructions, but he said they would receive no more instructions from the Comintern. "Nevertheless," he said, "Communism is Marxist Leninism," and he said it over and over.

And when I read that, just like any person would reading it, I said, "Well, this was said by the Communists on May 26 in Yen-an, and it was printed and published, was labeled 'printed October 1946'"—what did I say, 1946? I meant 1943, in October 1943—"and yet our State Department men continued to report that there was no Soviet orientation and our popular writers on China, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and so on, continued to say the same thing." Was that then stupid, ignorant reporting or was it deliberate writing? That was a question that came to my mind again and again in 1944 and 1945 because the document was never sent in. I never saw it in the State Department when I went there. I never saw it in Naval Intelligence. No such document was ever given any publicity. I heard from the Chinese that it was suppressed in the United States. Therefore, gentlemen, will you excuse me if I had the effrontery to suspect that there was a deliberate attempt to confuse the American public and possibly the American Government on the subject of the Chinese Communists and their policies?

Q. Now, Mr. Larsen, I would like you to look at the last sentence of this article on page 39, where you are referring to a conference with Mr. Jaffe in October. "He dropped a remark which one could never forget."—A. What page was that?

Q. Page 39, the last paragraph, in the article, "Well, we've suffered a lot," he said, "but, anyhow, we got Grew out."

The CHAIRMAN. Do you offer—

Mr. RHETTS. There is no exhibit but the entire document.

A. That is right; that is what he told me. That was not October 1945; that was October 1946.

Q. You did write that portion?—A. That is right, I wrote that portion.

Q. That was in this manuscript?—A. No, no; let me see, that date is wrong. It was in 1946 after the case broke and after I had been sentenced, and the whole case was over, that I went to see Mr. Jaffe. I can't remember the date, but I went to see him to ask him, just man to man, "Philip, what was behind this case and what were all these charges against you and to what extent were you involved? Are you interested in telling me or not, and are you a Communist?" And he said, "I am not a Communist. I am not involved in the way they infer, and I would like to call myself a Socialist. I disagreed with Mr. Grew's policy and the idea of getting that damned Emperor back in Japan"—in a sense I disagreed with that too while I was in the State Department—and

he said, "After all, we did get Grew out." I said, "Uh huh." I said, "In other words, you did work on that." And of course if you know of Mr. Roth's book, that was an attack on Grew and Grew's policy and the postwar policy of putting the Emperor back, but remember, gentlemen, I have nothing to do with Japan, I didn't give a hoot one way or the other whether they put the Emperor back in Japan because it was not my official function, and I was not a sympathizer with them and ran around and helped them with material they were interested in.

Q. Were you interested to get Grew out of the Department?—A. No; I was not. I liked Grew. He was nice to me. I spoke to him personally on one occasion regarding Mr. Jaffe.

Q. You wrote this last paragraph of the article?—A. I wrote that in my story.

Q. That will appear somewhere in your manuscript?—A. That is right.

Q. Entitled "They Called Me a Spy"?—A. That is right.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did Mr. Jaffe indicate at all how he or anybody else got Mr. Grew out?

A. Well, by attacking his policy and publishing some magazines. My relations—

Q. Can you be more specific?—A. My relations with Grew were very pleasant. I only discussed Mr. Grew with Jaffe twice. At that time when he said, "We did get Grew out"—not meaning in "we" I, because I did not conspire with him, but "we," him, the group, Jaffe's group and his sympathizers. Jaffe never treated me as a sympathizer. I had many pointed arguments with him and told him, "That is nothing but the damned Kremlin line," in many things he said. He told me I was misguided and appeared too pro-Chiang Kai-shek and so on. I am not pro-Chiang Kai-shek. I know Chiang Kai-shek's regime's corruption better than many others. I have always challenged some of these people who spoke against Chiang Kai-shek. I have said, "All right, I will give you 2 hours fast talking, and you tell me what you know about Chiang's corruption, and you give me 2 hours and I will tell you a lot more, but I also know the good points in Chiang's regime."

Q. Mr. Larsen, I would like to read to you an excerpt from an article that appeared in Collier's magazine from March 19, 1949, over the signature of Mr. Louis Francis Budenz, where he states as follows:

"Jaffe, whose magazine faithfully followed the Moscow line on China, pleaded 'guilty.' After paying his fine, he entertained his codefendants (some of whose indictments had been dismissed) and members of the Daily Worker's staff at a party. Toasts were drunk that night to 'the coming victory of communism in China and the defeat of American imperialism.'"

Did you ever hear of any such victory celebration?—A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever attend any party?—A. Oh, no.

Q. That Jaffe had?—A. Oh, no, definitely no. If I had been invited I would never have gone.

Q. I would like to offer as an exhibit at this time document marked "17-X," which is a complete copy of the Plain Talk article.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be introduced.

(Document marked "17-X," article entitled "The State Department Espionage Case," Plain Talk magazine, entered in evidence as exhibit 20.)

Q. Now I would like to inquire from the Board, I have quite a number of other question that I would like to ask Mr. Larsen. It is now 5.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions you would like to ask on this phase of the examination?

Mr. STEVENS. No, sir; but I would like to ask one, however, which I failed to ask this morning, and I would like information on before we break up.

Mr. RHETTS. Yes; I was going to inquire, if I might, whether it would be possible for Mr. Larsen to come back tomorrow?

The CHAIRMAN. You have been very good to come voluntarily today.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, General, it is perfectly all right, so long as it is not too early in the morning. I would like to get after my check.

The CHAIRMAN. At 10, would 10 be all right?

Mr. LARSEN. 9?

The CHAIRMAN. 10?

Mr. LARSEN. Could you make it 11? That gives me a little extra time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; you can make it 11.

Mr. LARSEN. I haven't done quite my duty to Pathfinder magazine yet.

The CHAIRMAN. If you would like to make it 11, it would be satisfactory.

Mr. LARSEN. I am on their payroll this week and I feel I have absented myself too much.

The CHAIRMAN. 11 will be satisfactory.

Mr. LARSEN. 11. Thank you, sir, I will be here at 11.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you have a question?

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. I wonder if you would care to outline first, Mr. Larsen, the financial relationship that may have existed between you and Mr. Jaffe regarding use of your cards and other material. How did that develop? And give us a story on that.—A. He wanted to remove great numbers of my cards and I never lend them to anyone. If I loan one out, I generally have trouble getting it back, just like a book. So when I enumerated a lot of my cards, in 1944 before I was with the State Department, he said, "Could you bring these up to date and type them out for me and give me a set?" There were several hundred cards. And I said, "All right. I haven't got time to do it but I will have a stenographer"—my wife wasn't working at that time so she volunteered to do it, and he paid her. I think it was 50 cents apiece. I remember on several occasions he gave her \$20 and \$15 for the number of cards—there were stacks, but there was no—let me dispel any idea in your mind that there was a regular fee or a bribery for the theft of documents, for the delivery of documents. There was no such thing at all. And he in addition gave my daughter I believe \$2 in the period of 2 years, one Christmastime and one birthday, I think it was, and he gave my wife one or two boxes of chocolates. And if you want to ask me, as some of these fellows in the Senate and the congressional committees have asked me, "What did I think of Jaffe?" I want to make it very emphatic that I thought Mr. Jaffe was a very fine gentleman. I still today in spite of everything that has happened and every evil suspicion that has entered my mind about him utilizing me, I still have a soft spot in my mind—in my heart for that matter, because I thought he was considerate, gentle, not a lousy conspirator as it has been made out. He never on one occasion asked me, "Will you procure me that document?" In other words, "Will you commit a little crime for me?" He never did. I am guilty of showing him documents and loaning them to him voluntarily largely because I couldn't be bothered transcribing or going into it very extensively on a typewriter. I had enough of that.

Q. These are cards that he obtained from you. Were those ones he selected, that he requested, or did you supply him with some he would be interested in?—

A. He never selected or requested any. I want to repeat that again. He never selected or requested any. When I showed him voluntarily some dispatches, discussed them with him, he said to me, "Can I copy this, or can I take some notes?" "It will take a long time," I said, "I just don't feel like typing. I will get it into my cards and will give you the essence of it the next time you come." He said, "Would it be awfully bad if I took it with me. I will bring it back." That is where I made my mistake. I let him take such documents, with the exception of some that were found in Amerasia.

Q. Let me understand. Most of the cards you supplied to Mr. Jaffe were those he requested?—A. After I voluntarily showed them to him.

Q. I see. Did you have any idea—A. I am not trying to protect Jaffe, but that is a fact.

Q. Did you have any idea of what Jaffe was doing with your cards, where they reposed, what use he was making of them?—A. Not much. When I visited Amerasia once I saw the cards in a very prominent position on his library table. I opened the drawer and said, "What is this?" It was labeled "Chinese personalities."

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to read you a paragraph a part of a paragraph in this statement to the FBI of June 7, 1945, and ask you for your comment.

"Jaffe offered to compensate me for the work I did for him and presented me with amounts which averaged \$75 a month since March 1944."

A. No, you see.

The CHAIRMAN. By cash payment.

A. General, that is not a correct statement. That is a paraphrasing of a number of questions and answers, namely, these two FBI men, when they took me to the field office at about 2, 1 or 2 in the morning, they sat and belabored me with questions and then said, Do you remember how much that would be?" "Well," I said, "over a certain period when he was still building up his card file from mine, he almost got a duplicate of my card file. In fact, I gave him some. I wasn't interested in Chinese in America.

The CHAIRMAN. You started your answer before I quite finished reading. Let me finish the whole thing. I will read that sentence again.

"Jaffee offered to compensate me for the work I did for him and presented me with amounts which averaged \$75 a month since March 1944 by cash payment. The work involved for this payment included the typing of several thousand cards from my card file. Mr. Philip Jaffe never offered me any remuneration for any Government papers."

A. That is right, and how did we arrive at that \$75 average a month? Because there was no \$75 payment. I didn't rely on any \$75 payment. Fifty cents a card, and sometimes a card was actually two or three cards front and back. T. V. Soong's history, for instance, was 20 cards.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you state the same payment you have already testified about?

A. That is right. They asked me what would I say it averaged. My wife kept house, and when she typed, say 150 cards in a month, why that would average about 75, but there were months when she didn't type one card.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all. Do you have some questions?

Mr. ACHILLES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 10 minutes past 5 and we can go to 5:30. No we have a meeting at 5:15. We will have to adjourn at this point because we have a 5:15 meeting.

Mr. MORELAND. We can call that off.

The CHAIRMAN. You can call that off. We can go on until 5:30. Is that satisfactory?

A. That is all right with me.

Questioning by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. I believe you have testified, Mr. Larsen, or from something you said I gathered you had in recent times had conferences with Senator McCarthy and Senator Ferguson?—A. March 18, yes.

Q. What was March 18?—A. That was McCarthy. March 18. He sent for me.

Q. He sent for you?—A. Yes; he sent for me.

Q. I wonder if you would care to tell us about that.—A. It was a very brief conference. I went over and he received me very nicely, and then he started to ask me, "How did you get involved in the Amerasia case?" I barely got started when the phone rang. I started again, and the phone rang again, somebody came in with a message, he had a conversation with a woman about a cocktail party, and I remember him saying, "Tell them I am dead or gone to France or China, I have had a baby, or something." He said those things. "Tell them anything, I am busy." And then a few minutes later, we hadn't got anywhere yet, he mentioned the espionage case. And I started to say, "Mr. McCarthy, I don't like the word. I called it the 'Stolen Documents Case,'" and then a young man was introduced to me. "This is Don Surine." No remarks about that. And one of his young investigators. So I said, "All right, glad to meet you, Mr. Surine." He said, "Will you take Mr. Larsen downstairs?" So we went downstairs to room 5-A in the Senate Building, down in the basement. That is their chamber of horrors, or whatever you call it. It is bristling with dictaphones and recording machines. There must be 8 or 10 of them around there. We sat down at a desk, he sat on one side and I sat right opposite him. And then he started.

He said, "You might tell me something about yourself." I said, "Yes; with pleasure." And he started very much like McCarthy. "How in the world did you get involved in this case?" I said, "I didn't get a chance to tell the Senator, but I got involved in this case through an introduction from Roth," and so on. He said, "Now maybe we had better do this right." I noticed he had a piece of paper with a great number of questions, and he had loose-leaf paper, he was going to chalk up what he thought. He started, "How old are you, where were you born?" That is as far as he got, and then he said, "In this espionage case—" I said, "Pardon me, Mr. Surine, in this theft-of-document case, if you prefer to call it theft. I call it loan or transmission of official documents." He said, "Why?" I said, "Because, you remember, the Government stuck its neck out and withdrew it, were not able to prove espionage charges. I personally am not aware of any espionage angle and I would be a fool to call it 'the espionage case.'"

He stood up and he roared at me, "Are you defending Amerasia?" And I said, "No, Mr. Surine, I am not defending Amerasia, but I am sorry to say that I am defending myself. I consider that I came in here and I have to defend myself in spite of double jeopardy and whatever the good words are for those lovely laws that should protect me." And he kept standing up and

the phone rang, and obviously the master upstairs, namely Professor McCarthy, gave him some instructions, because he said—he took the phone—"Uh huh, uh huh, all right, all right," put it down, so almost simultaneously we said, "I think I'll have to go home." I thought, I am not subpoenaed, I don't have to take this stuff, I can walk out of there anytime, just like I could walk out of this place any time I please—I hope so. And he said, "Yes, I am leaving now, I will have to leave, I will have to talk to you later. Thank you very much for coming in, Mr. Larsen."

And I went out and I thought, the heck with that Gestapo stuff. There was another remark that I have forgotten to mention. He said, "Now, in giving your testimony, if you give me evidence we wanted—you are guilty just like the rest of them—" I said, "You called me in here to convince me of my guilt?" He said, "Well, I mean to say, if you string along with us, then it will go much easier with you." And that is what got me pretty hot, so when he mentioned the espionage case, I started on my version of it, of what it should be called. Then I walked out and I got on the streetcar right outside the Senate house door, and I was riding home about 5:30 or 6, and then I thought, "Yes, this is the bunch who want to go to work on me or any other member of the group. They will go ahead but I will not be a party."

Q. What group?—A. The group, the six people who were arrested, involved in that. "I will not be a party to any accusations, anything in the way of definite statements that will ruin them, and if I am hailed before the Tydings Committee I will get it out somehow that whereas I did one time think that their reports were strongly anti-Chiang and going extremely enthusiastic over the Communists, I am not sure whether I was right or not, whether it was realistic reporting." And I formed those thoughts in my head and I thought, Humm, maybe I should inform Mr. Peurifoy." Why did I think of Peurifoy? I haven't had so much to do with him. I had one or two things. I went and applied for a job—

Q. In that connection, I wonder if I might interrupt, did you discuss at all with either Senator McCarthy or Mr. Surine this Plain Talk article?—A. Didn't get to it. Didn't get to talk about it at all. I began to—he said, "Why, we are going to base the base on the Plain Talk article," and I wanted to say to Surine, "Don't you do that because I am going to kick about that article," but he ignored that and went on with this—

Q. Did you say that?—A. Yes, I did say that but I didn't get down to telling him how I had written it and he had written it different—

Q. You just told him?—A. He probably didn't know what it really involved, that statement by me, that I didn't think he ought to. I said the same thing in McCarthy's office but I got overruled with objections, with interruptions I mean.

Q. I wonder if you could just tell us, you said you did the same thing in McCarthy's office, can you recall?—A. It was very confusing. I got halfway into my statement about the statement that I didn't consider the Plain Talk article as a good basis for the attack because it was vulnerable, and we got no further. I tried it again with Surine. I was very disgusted I hadn't put over the point. When I got home I discussed it with my wife. I said I made the objection to the article being used but never got to the stage to explain why and they didn't seem interested. They said, "You don't need to worry" about one thing and another. McCarthy said, "We will ask the questions and you will answer them, and you will say nothing else."

Q. Did you have any further conferences with either Senator McCarthy or Mr. Surine?—A. Never.

Q. I believe you mentioned also something of Senator Wherry.—A. Yes, Mr. Dondero—

Q. Does that have any bearing on this?—A. Yes, Mr. Dondero went to the House Disbursing Office to get a check, and my wife from October until May 15 was working in the House Disbursing Office temporarily holding down a job of another girl, but of course they have local patronage so as soon as the other girl was available my wife had to go out. And Surine went in—I mean Dondero, Representative Dondero went in and met her and said, "Yes, yes, you are Mrs. Larsen. I know your husband. He is a fine man" and all that. She said, "That is certainly nice to hear somebody say that. Tell him I would like to see him. Tell him to get in touch with me tomorrow morning, come to see me." Next morning I called Dondero and he said, "Come up to my office." The person present besides Dondero was Kent Hunter. I don't know him, was introduced to him for the first time. He is a newspaperman, violently—

Mr. ACHILLES. When was this.

A. Oh, it was before May 15.

Mr. ACHILLES. Of this year?

A. Yes, while my wife was still up there, maybe about the first of May. And Kent Hunter seemed to know the story of John Service very well and he knew the story—for the first time I learned the story of the visit to Lattimore. He asked me, "Why weren't you invited?" I said, "That is easy, I don't know Lattimore." All right. Then Dondero said to me. "Would you care—I don't want to question you myself but a very good friend of mine is Senator Wherry." I said, "I have heard of him." He said, "He is particularly interested in the homosexual side of the attack on the State Department and he wants to ask you." So I told him, "Well, let's get this straight. I am no homosexual and I don't know any homosexual." "He is interested in Lattimore." I said, "I don't know Lattimore. I could give you no information on Lattimore, but I am willing to go over there lest you think I am scared." "Let's go over there." So we started over. He had to go to the Capitol for some documents, walked through and said "hello" to my wife, walked on over to the Senate, and when we got in there, Mr. Wherry told me in a rather humorous vein, "You know I am the expert on homosexuality." I said, "Uh huh, very interesting." He said, "Do you know what kind of a guy Lattimore is?" I said, "I am sorry, I don't know what kind of a guy Lattimore is, particularly with reference to homosexuality." "Well, what do you know about Lattimore?" I said, "That is a big order. I have read most of his books. I will tell you right frankly that a book called the Mongols of Manchuria is a famous textbook. It is nonpolitical, especially as regards the Communist-Kuomintang dispute, because it was written before that time. I consider it a very fine book. I have always used it. I lived in Mongolia, in that area where the Manchua who went up into Mongolia to fight Gol Dan during Kanghsi's time, they didn't return from that expedition and they settled down there and became Mongols, married Mongolian women, and they are still living there, and they are to all purposes Mongolian, and they speak Mandarin, fluent Peking Mandarin. I verified that statement. Nobody else in the world I knew knows about that. They are a very small group. I was among them and I admire Lattimore for his intimate knowledge of the Mongols."

That was not very interesting to them. I don't think it is so interesting to you either, but nevertheless the picture is that he was very disgusted with my lack of knowledge. Here I was in the State Department. "Had you ever seen Mr. Lattimore in the State Department?" "No, sir." "But you knew that he was connected with the State Department?" "No, sir, I never in the State Department heard anyone mention him as connected with the State Department. I never saw material in the State Department written by Lattimore, of any kind."

Q. Did he ask you about Mr. Service?—A. Oh, yes. "Do you know John Service?" I said, "No, I don't know him." "Could you say that he is a pro-Communist?" I said, "No." I said, "I have felt at one time that he leaned strongly toward the so-called agrarian reformers, as they were known, and I myself was guilty of the same thing. Yes, it looks like they are, but I will repeat the statement to you as I have made to others who have asked me: I don't think I could say for certain that Mr. Service's statements and reports were not realistic reports because I was not out there myself at that time." He said, "When in the hell were you out there?" "From 1906 to 1935, with certain intervals abroad." So the interview ended rather brusquely.

Mr. Wherry struck me as one of these very hearty old men, slapped me on the back, said, "Well, if I call you again you will come in?" I said, "Certainly I will." Goodbye and thank you very much. We hope you will cooperate with us in this case." "Yes, to the best of my ability." "Fine." He never called me back again.

Now the third one, Mr. Ferguson—

Q. Senator Ferguson?—A. Senator Ferguson of Michigan called me some time ago when I was not home and the following morning I got in touch with his office, and he asked me if I could come immediately. I went over there and we talked about 20 minutes, and it was roughly the same story. He asked me, he said to me, "Now, you won't be mad with me, Mr. Larsen, if I ask you a very humiliating question?" I said, "No, I won't get mad." He said, "All right. How could you have been so naïve—I am putting it mildly, but if I were to use the word that came to my mind, so stupid—as to deal with a man like that." I gave him the same answer. "I thought, very honestly, thought very highly of Mr. Jaffe, I did not suspect he was a Communist spy, still do not quite believe it. I had a common interest with him. I do not believe I was too stupid. I was indiscreet, yes, put me down for that, but I will answer your

question in this way. I was not stupid and I was not criminal in my dealings with Mr. Jaffe," and he didn't seem to like it very much. He said, "I don't think you have very much you can give me." I said, "That is up to you, Mr. Senator. You are perfectly welcome to ask me a lot more of embarrassing, humiliating, and pointed questions." He said, "I think I will have to get home. If we need you again, Mr. Reed, my assistant here, will call you." They have not called me.

Q. And you did not discuss the Plain Talk article with either Wherry or Ferguson?—A. No.

Q. Didn't attempt to?—A. No, I didn't attempt to. I answered their questions.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 5:30. We will adjourn. Thank you very much. We will see you again tomorrow at 11?

Mr. LARSEN. 11 o'clock.

(The Board adjourned at 5:30.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN S. SERVICE

Date: Thursday, June 1, 1950, 11:08 a. m. to 12:45 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State.

Reported by: E. L. Koontz, court stenographer, reporting.

Hearing in the above-entitled matter was reconvened at 11:08 a. m., Gen. Conrad E. Snow, chairman, presiding.

Board members present: Gen. Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles, member; Arthur G. Stevens, member.

Also present: Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Appearances: Charles Edward Rheets, Esq., for Reilly, Rhett & Ruckelshaus, appearing on behalf of Mr. Service.

(The meeting reconvened at 11:08 a. m.)

Mr. RHETTS. Is Mr. Larsen here this morning?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen advised us this morning that some other engagement prevented his being here this morning, but we could get in touch with him at 6 o'clock tonight as to the possibility of his appearance tomorrow morning.

Mr. RHETTS. His "possible" appearance tomorrow morning or probable? Does he intend to return?

Mr. MORELAND. Mr. Larsen phoned this morning and indicated that he had an appointment today with a prospective employer and that whether or not he could come tomorrow would depend on his conversation with his prospective employer and he indicated that if he couldn't come this week—this is a possibility—he could come next week.

Mr. RHETTS. Well, in that event, since we have to put off further cross-examination of Mr. Larsen I would like to call another witness. I assume that we shall proceed with other witnesses?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. RHETTS. In anticipation that Mr. Larsen will eventually return for further examination, I would like to call in Dr. Mortimer Graves at this time.

(Mr. Mortimer Graves, called as a witness in behalf of Mr. John S. Service, being duly sworn, testified as follows:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Will you state your full name and address, Mr. Graves?—A. Mortimer Graves; office address, 1219 Sixteenth Street, Washington, D. C.

Q. And what is your occupation, sir?—A. Administrative secretary of the American Council of Learned Societies and have been for 25 years almost.

Q. Now, are you acquainted with Mr. Service, Dr. Graves?—A. Yes, I am acquainted with him. We are not closely acquainted and never have been closely associated.

Q. At the time Mr. Service was arrested in June of 1945, did you participate in any way in the collection of any funds to assist Mr. Service in his defense at that time?—A. I acted as treasurer for a group of his friends who asked me if I would accept contributions from them and convey them to Mr. Service or his representative, in this case I believe his sister-in-law, all of which I did.

Q. Could you indicate to the Board how this came about?—A. When the notice of the six arrests appeared in the newspaper I realized, of course, that I really

knew three of them. Mr. Larson had held a fellowship under us about 1934, and I had followed his career. It was my job to know everybody who was working in the far eastern field—that was part of my field, Far East, Russian, Near East, and so forth. I knew Mr. Larson, I knew Mr. Roth, I knew who Mr. Service was. I think I have met him but I am not completely certain. I saw the opportunity to employ Mr. Larson, since he was free, on work of mine, which I did with the consent of my own superiors.

Q. This is after he resigned from the State Department?—A. Well, this was immediately after the business started and before we knew anything much about it. I happened to be discussing the question with a group of Mr. Service's friends at that time; naturally, people talked about this thing. This was exciting news, and they asked me if I would act in the way I have said, that's it.

Q. In other words, as I understand it, you happened to be with persons who were personal friends of Mr. Service's and they requested you to perform this function as treasurer of this fund?—A. Precisely. I was naturally in more or less constant touch with people in the far eastern field, that's my job.

Q. And how was the fund raised? Can you describe just briefly the mechanics of it?—A. Yes. The first suggestion was that 20 friends of John Service he discovered who would make themselves responsible for a sum of \$50 apiece, that is to say, a total of a thousand dollars. We—at least the friends, not so much I—began to find people who would take this responsibility, and found a number of them, and the \$50's began to come in. Now in some cases some of these people would just write out a personal check and send it in. In other cases it seemed to me they probably went around and collected it in smaller amounts from other friends of Mr. Service's because in some cases they came to me with the cash in hand in smaller bills and that is obviously what had happened. I kept no record because the group had said Mr. Service was sensitive about the matter. He didn't want to know who was helping him. There were, of course, people, friends of his, who couldn't afford to make contributions, at least couldn't afford to make substantial contributions and they wanted this element of anonymity preserved in the gift which presumably is the reason they asked me to act as treasurer. So that I never made available to Mr. Service, or any of his representatives, any information about who it was that was giving this money. It came into me in increments of \$50 and it certainly never reached the \$1,000 that we were shooting at, because Mr. Service refused to take—or at least his sister-in-law refused to take—the second installment that I tried to send her. I have in my mind a figure of \$775, that is sheer memory, but I have every reason to believe that it is substantially accurate.

Q. That is the total amount of money that was raised?—A. I am not quite certain whether that is the total amount or whether that is the amount that I turned over to Mr. Service's sister-in-law, whose name for the moment escapes me, in the amount of \$500, and I tried to make a subsequent payment and she sent the check back whereupon I found myself under the necessity of returning this fund to the donors, and since I kept no real record of it, aside from three or four persons whom I could remember, I spent most of the next year asking people whom I met: Did you contribute to this Service fund because if you did I owe you \$10, and giving them \$10 back.

Q. To the best of your recollection, then, you gave Mr. Service's sister-in-law, who is, I believe, Mrs. Service—A. Wright, naturally. I don't know what her first name is—

Q. To the best of your recollection you gave her one check for \$500 which she accepted?—A. Yes.

Q. And a subsequent check which she returned?—A. Yes—well, I'm not, I think that's the story. I might have given her two subsequent checks, but I don't believe so.

Q. Now, as I understand it from your testimony this fund was raised exclusively by personal friends of Mr. Service and was raised exclusively to be devoted to assistance to Mr. Service; is that correct?—A. Absolutely, there was never any other question. It was a John Service Friendship Club.

Mr. ACHILLES. It had nothing to do with Mr. Larsen?

A. Nothing at all to do with Mr. Larsen. I employed Mr. Larsen, because he was free, on records which I had to have brought up to date, but I employed him from other funds, funds in my own office, a small amount in my office which I could trace, but it was certainly not a very large amount.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. So there was no suggestion at any time that this fund was being raised to be devoted to anyone other than Mr. Service?—A. Not the slightest; no. This was a completely friendly effort on behalf of Mr. Service by his friends.

Q. I believe you also indicated a moment ago that the funds came in in varying amounts, the largest of which I believe you said was \$50?—A. Well, there were \$50 increments. It may have been that at sometime somebody gave me two of these increments, but certainly no larger sum than that.

Q. No larger sum than \$50.—A. As I say, the people—each member of the group made himself responsible for securing and giving to me \$50.

Q. You indicated that your original objective was to raise a thousand dollars and at some point Mr. Service through his sister-in-law declined to accept further funds, and you abandoned your original target.—A. Yes.

Q. Is that correct?—A. Yes.

Q. I wonder if you would care to tell the Board what occurred after this? You had some money left on your hands—what happened next?—A. You see, I had this two-hundred-odd dollars, and when Mr. Service refused to accept it he suggested that it be turned over to Mr. Larson. I asked the donors whether they would agree to that—I asked a couple of them, I don't think I asked all of them—and their reaction was immediately to the effect that they had raised it for Mr. Service and that they didn't want it paid to Mr. Larson.

Q. Did Mr. Service talk with you about this problem personally?—A. I think Mr. Service made this suggestion.

Q. Do you know what occasioned this suggestion that the balance of the funds be made available to Mr. Larson?—A. Well, I shouldn't know, excepting that he was the one person who at that time was still in serious difficulties, I suppose.

Q. Do you recall what Mr. Service may have said to you in that connection?—A. No. I think it was more or less in the nature of an off-hand remark on his part, and whether it was a telephone conversation or a conversation in my office I couldn't say at this time, but I have a very definite recollection of the fact that at least two of the donors said: "No, indeed, this is for Mr. Service, and for nobody else."

Q. Now, in a news story appearing in the Washington Post from May 6, 1950, it is said that Mr. Louis F. Budenz had stated on the previous day that the former treasurer of the Communist Party, one Robert W. Weiner, who was also known as Mr. Welwel Warsover, was active in leading a drive to raise funds for the defense of the six defendants in the Amerasia case. Did you ever hear of Mr. Weiner or Warsover?—A. To my recollection I had never heard of him until I read this news report, nor had the slightest connection with him, never knew that he had assisted in it.

Q. You have indicated that the donors of this fund expressed a desire for anonymity, but would you care to state to the Board whether any of the funds which came to you as treasurer were from Mr. Weiner or from Mr. Warsover either directly or indirectly according to your knowledge.—A. To my knowledge they could hardly have possibly been unless he paid a \$5 contribution to one of the people making the collections.

Q. I have no further questions.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. I think perhaps there is something in your testimony that escaped me, but as I understood your opening remarks Mr. Service was the least known of the three to you?—A. To me, yes.

Q. How did it then happen that he was the only one with whom you became concerned in the raising of funds?—A. He wasn't the only one with whom I became concerned, General. I knew, as I said, Mr. Larson and Mr. Roth. I could tell a longer story if you want to listen to it, but the fact is that my records on Chinese people due to the war—I mean Americans who know Chinese—were very much out of date, most of the people that I had recorded had gone into Government and I had no records. I was looking for somebody who knew the situation with respect to the Chinese people—American students of China, to bring my records up to date. When Mr. Larson and Mr. Roth were temporarily out of employment, and since I was not dealing with any secret matter of any kind, this was an opportunity for me to get a man who would bring my records up to date, so that I employed Mr. Larson, as I said before, for a short time, as long as I could afford it, from funds that I had for the purpose of my records and he did a good job. I asked Mr. Roth at the same

time if he would like to work on this operation and Mr. Roth said "No," that he had other things to do, and that sort of thing. Mr. Service I didn't know so well, but I did know, it is my business to know, most of these people in the Chinese field who happened to be friends of his, and in the course of my discussion of the matter with these people, whom I saw regularly more or less, this question of special assistance to Mr. Service arose. Now, the only reason to get the special operation in the case of Mr. Service is that Mr. Service did have this group of friends who wanted to do that for him and the others did not.

Q. They made the suggestion to you, I take it then?—They made the suggestion excepting that, in general, I probably said, as I usually do: "Well, is there anything we can do about this thing?"

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Had you known Mr. Larson and Mr. Roth for a long time?—A. Mr. Larson—in 1933 or '34 I put on an enterprise at the Library of Congress in the compilation of a biographical dictionary of China which appeared in two volumes and is called Eminent Chinese of the Ching Dynasty and is a major work in the Chinese field in the last quarter of a century. At that time I had a series of fellowships to give to people to work on this enterprise. Mr. Larson held one of those fellowships for a year or probably a year and a half, so that it was necessary at that time for me to have a dossier on him and to make the appointment for this fellowship. After that, of course, I more or less knew him because, again, it was my business to know these people and, in general, to discover what they were doing, so I had a dossier on him. From time to time he would come into my office, as he still does, as indeed most of these people still do.

Q. How about Lieutenant Roth?—A. Roth? Much the same story excepting that I followed his career. He probably had a couple of little fellowships from us for summertime study or something like that. So far as I can remember he had no such large fellowship. But, again, it was my business to know these youngsters, I still know most of them, and I would meet him probably once or twice a year. They would come into my office and talk over problems—when they were looking for jobs or for fellowships or publications I was the person to whom they would appeal.

Q. Were you concerned with the political orientation of these people?—A. No. Of course, we have never had the facilities for making any such investigations and, of course, in those days this wasn't the kind of thing that arose. Our concern was always with the development of a body of Americans scientifically competent in these areas and that still is my concern.

Q. You didn't consider the effect of their possible political orientations on the material that they were furnishing to the Council?—A. No; this was a question that would never arise with us, certainly, not then. I mean probably now when we are a little more awake to that kind of thing you would raise questions which you wouldn't have raised 15 years ago. I don't think the question ever occurred to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you aware, or did you have any knowledge of any other funds raised on behalf of any of the six persons arrested?

A. Not to my knowledge. I know of none.

The CHAIRMAN. No further questions?

Mr. RHETTS. I have none.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for coming in.

(Mr. Mortimer Graves after testifying left the meeting.)

Mr. RHETTS. Well, now, what is the pleasure of the Board? Shall we return to Mr. Service in connection with this phase of the case?

The CHAIRMAN. It is all right with the Board if that is what you would like.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to ask Mr. Service to take the stand and at the outset I would like to offer for inclusion in the transcript at this point Document 93-2, which is part 2 of Mr. Service's personal statement, and deals with the Amerasia phase of the case. This consists of page 34-a through 43 of the personal statement.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 93-2

"PERSONAL STATEMENT OF JOHN S. SERVICE—PART 2

"During my period of consultation after my return to the Department on April 12, 1945, I saw a number of newspapermen and writers on China. This was in the normal course of events and a part of the usual function of officers on consultation who have newly returned from the field and are in a position to give background information. One of the people I remember seeing was Lawrence Rosinger of the Foreign Policy Association. I recall that he was having an interview with one of the officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs and as their discussion apparently concerned recent events in China I was called in to answer some questions. Another contact, I remember, was Raymond Swing, who was referred to me by my superior, Mr. Vincent, for background information in regard to some news report of the day. After discussing the particular point, Mr. Swing asked me for some comment on General Hurley and an opinion as to whether his negotiations were proceeding successfully. This I declined to discuss and referred him back to Mr. Vincent. Another press contact was with two members of the editorial staff of *Fortune* magazine which was preparing an exhaustive article on China. These researchers had approached General Olmstead who was G-5 on General Wedemeyer's staff and was then in Washington. General Olmstead had referred them to me for political background.

"I mention these instances, and I know there were many others, as indication that it was current policy to permit responsible officers to give background information to the press. At this time, of course, I had just returned from Yenan and was in possession of a great deal of recent information of great interest.

"Shortly after my arrival I received an invitation to meet on an off-the-record basis with the research staff of the IPR in New York. This invitation was in a brief letter addressed to me by Edward C. Carter. I discussed it with Mr. E. F. Stanton, Deputy and then Acting Director of FE, who approved my accepting. This meeting with the IPR took place on April 25. I believe that there were ten or twelve people present. Practically all of them were writers, including T. A. Bisson, Lawrence Rosinger, and a New Zealander named Belshaw. I did not give a prepared talk and most of the time was spent in answering questions and in general discussion.

"About April 17 or 18 I was looked up in the Department of State by Mark Gayn. I had never previously met Gayn but we shared a China background and he had been at Claremont College with my brother. I had read at least one of his books and seen articles on the Far East which he had written for *Collier's*. On this occasion he told me that he had a contract for a series of articles for the *Saturday Evening Post* and I had no reason to doubt his *bona fides*. We had lunch together, and he said that he had an extra bed in his apartment in New York which he would be glad to have me use if I ever visited that city. As background to this meeting with Gayn it should be mentioned that soon after I left Washington the previous November I had received a letter from Gayn saying that he had hoped to see me in Washington but had missed me by a few days. This was our only previous contact. Gayn did not mention to me his close association with Jaffe.

"About this same time I had received an invitation from Lieutenant Roth, whom I had met the previous November on the occasion of my talk to the IPR at Washington, for supper at his home on the evening of April 19. During that day he telephoned me saying that Philip Jaffe was also going to be at his home that evening but was anxious to see me before then, since there would be a number of people at the party and probably little opportunity to talk. Roth asked that I telephone Jaffe at his hotel and I did so. I knew of Jaffe as the editor of *Amerasia* but I had never previously met him nor had any contact by correspondence or otherwise with him. However, as he was the editor of a well known specialist magazine on the Far East I saw no reason why I should not meet and talk to him on a background basis as with any other reputable newspaperman or writer.

"In view of the later unhappy consequences of my meeting with Mr. Jaffe, I think I should emphasize at this point that this was in no sense abnormal, since it was entirely conformable to the policy concerning relations with the press which I had pursued under instructions in the field attached to General Stilwell's Headquarters and also the policy of the Department permitting Foreign Service Officers to provide background information to members of the press.

"The only time that we found suitable was for me stop at his hotel in the late afternoon and to go together to Roth's.

"When I prepared to leave the office before going over to Jaffe's hotel I had on my desk a number of my personal copies of memoranda written during my last visit at Yen-an. My eye alighted on a report of an interview with Mao Tse-tung about the end of March in which Mao had given details of the current Communist position and the probable line to be taken at the imminent Communist Party Congress. It occurred to me that Jaffe would probably be especially interested in recent news from Yen-an and particularly in recent statements of the Communist position in the controversy going on in China. I therefore put in my pocket my personal copy of this memorandum which contained nothing except the Communists' own presentation of their position. I believe this was my memorandum of April 1, Document 226. During the conversation Mr. Jaffe, as I expected, asked concerning the present Communist attitude and instead of trying to remember in detail I let him read the memorandum which I had brought with me. Jaffe was extremely interested and asked at once if I did not have other similar reports about Yen-an which it would be possible to show him. Since many of these memos were purely reportorial, containing only statements or observations available to and continually being obtained by newspapermen on the spot, I agreed to let Mr. Jaffe see some of this type of material. It was agreed that I would have lunch with him the next day at the hotel. I remember very little about the evening at Roth's except that a number of people mostly interested in the Far East were there, and there was some discussion of a book on Japan which Lieutenant Roth was in the last stages of completing. I am under the impression that as the party at Roth's broke up he gave Jaffe a portion of the manuscript to read. This was later published, after Navy clearance, under the title of 'Dilemma in Japan.' There was also some discussion during the evening of a book on China which Jaffe was writing. This was published in the fall of 1945 as *New Frontiers in Asia*.

"The following day I went through my personal copies of my Yen-an memoranda and carefully selected several. I think about eight or ten, which were purely descriptive and did not contain discussion of American military or political policy. These I considered it would be appropriate to allow Jaffe, as a writer, to see. I took these with me to lunch, which I found that Jaffe had ordered in his room. Roth was also there. Jaffe surprised me by saying that he was leaving Washington that afternoon and wished to take the memoranda with him for several days. I hesitated, but after considerable discussion and in view of the nonpolicy and purely factual nature of the papers, allowed Jaffe to keep them. It was arranged that I would pick them up when I visited New York.

"It was not usual to allow writers to have access to this type of factual material for background purposes, since reading the material or taking notes on it was always more satisfactory from the viewpoint of accuracy than merely relying on one's memory and oral recital. It was not, however, customary to loan such material and I have always regretted having turned it over to Jaffe, although at that time I had no reason to doubt his responsibility.

"Gayn learned that I was coming to New York for the meeting with the IPR and telephoned me that he was planning a small party and wished me to spend the night and to arrive early enough for supper. I agreed to do this and found at his home on the evening of April 24 about ten or twelve people, including Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe, Miss Kate Mitchell, William Sloane, a newspaper correspondent who had been in China, named Pepper Martin, and his wife, and Mr. and Mrs. Geddes who had just completed a book on President Roosevelt, and the editor of the Sunday book review section of the *New York Times*.

"The next day I saw various old friends in New York, had my meeting with the research staff of the IPR, and stopped in at Mr. Jaffe's office to pick up my memoranda. I slept that night again at Gayn's and learned to my surprise that he had been shown my memoranda by Jaffe and that they worked very closely together and pooled their information.

"About May 3 Jaffe again visited Washington and got in touch with me to request my help in getting him a copy of an FCC monitor report of a broadcast summary from Yen-an of an important policy speech given by Mao Tse-tung to the Communist Party Congress. I told Jaffe that I did not handle such material and had no idea whether it was classified. I suggested that he come to the Department and that I would introduce him to the responsible officer who would be able to give him a copy if permissible. Jaffe came to see me and I took him in to the executive officer in the Division of Chinese Affairs, Mr. A. Sabin Chase, and explained what Jaffe wanted. Mr. Chase had a copy of the

monitor report, and said that it was quite customary to give such material to interested writers, and gave Jaffe a copy on the spot. The Yenon radio was very weak and the reception of its broadcasts often badly garbled. This was the case with this particular speech. Late in the afternoon Chase called me and said that FCC had received a much clearer second broadcast. Chase recalled that Jaffe had been interested and asked how he could contact him. I said that I knew where Jaffe was staying and would be glad to take it to him. This was just about closing time in the afternoon. I picked up the monitor report from Mr. Chase, walked over to the Statler Hotel where Jaffe was staying, and called him from the lobby. My recollection is that he came down in the elevator, I handed the report in an envelope to him, and left. The care with which the FBI interrogated me about this incident gave me the impression they had observed my handing Jaffe the envelope and had attached great significance to it.

"About May 8 Jaffe was again in Washington and called me up. I think it was during this visit that Jaffe said that he was well acquainted with T. A. Bisson and that Bisson hoped I would be able to come up to New York some week end and have a Sunday lunch at his home. I was already annoyed at Jaffe's rather aggressive manner and put him off with some statement that I would prefer to have an invitation direct from Bisson. A few days later Jaffe telephoned me and said that Bisson would like me to come up on Sunday, May 19. At the same time he gave some excuse why Bisson was unable to contact me directly. I agreed to go and arranged to spend the Saturday night at Gayn's. Later Jaffe telephoned again and said that the Gayns were spending the evening at Kate Mitchell's and that I should come there to meet them. I did not go up to New York until in the evening and arrived at Miss Mitchell's about 10 or 10:30 p. m. Although so described in *Plain Talk*, the party was certainly not for me. There were a number of people there whom I had never met and do not remember. They had already finished dinner and the party was watching a crap game (which I do not play). I had one or two drinks, and then went home with the Gayns.

"The plans, it developed, were that the Jaffes, Miss Mitchell, and the Gayns were also going to Bisson's. Jaffe picked us up the next morning and drove us all there in his car. The Sunday lunch was a picnic in the Bisson's garden at their home on Long Island. One of my few memories is that Gayn and Jaffe got into an argument over the relative freedom of the press in the United States and Russia. Jaffe followed the Party line while Gayn opposed it. During the afternoon we took a short walk down to a nearby beach. Miss Mitchell outlined a book which she was writing on China, and said that she was particularly interested in getting material on the recent trend of the Kuomintang toward greater emphasis on Chinese classical ethics and philosophy. She asked for suggestions on recent material and from memory I mentioned several publications and other public materials which I knew of. This was the only conversation with Miss Mitchell of which I have any specific recollection.

"On May 29 I was invited by a Miss Rose Yardounian, whom I had met at the Washington office of the IPR and at several social functions, to attend a farewell party for Andrew Roth, who had been transferred to the Hawaiian Islands. I had not known that Jaffe was coming, and was rather surprised when he again telephoned me and asked me to see him in his hotel and go with him to the party. I do not like to be "monopolized." I agreed, however, to stop by the hotel and go on to the party with Jaffe. Apparently his reason for wanting to see me was to press the request for information on the trend toward Confucianism of the Kuomintang. I recalled that a Confucius society had been established in Chungking under very high official auspices in 1942 or 1943 and suggested that he look up newspaper files, especially the Chinese News Service, as the event had been given great official publicity at the time. Jaffe was afraid that it would be difficult to find files that old and wanted me to look up any dispatches on the subject. I agreed that the Embassy had certainly reported on the matter but explained that I could not and would not think of taking from the files or turning over to him any official dispatches. I did agree that if I had an opportunity I would try to find the approximate dates to help him in a search of newspaper files (incidentally, I never did anything about it). Continuing the same line, I mentioned that he could get some material on this subject from a study of Kuomintang propaganda. This was a topic on which I had prepared a very exhaustive report while on duty in the Embassy. Jaffe again pressed me to allow him to see my report and again I explained to him that this would be impossible. I remembered a few common wall slogans which seemed pertinent to his subject and mentioned them to him. This party on

May 29 was the last time I ever saw Jaffe. I have had no communication with him since.

"It may seem unusual that I was so accessible to Jaffe, Gayn, and these other people. The fact, however, is that my family was still in California and I was staying alone in a small downtown apartment. I had most of my meals with friends and if I received an invitation and did not have a previous engagement I usually accepted.

"Since my return from China I had had several casual contacts with either Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore, whom I had known since 1936 in Peiping, and they had spoken of having me down for a week end during November 1-44. I was finally invited for the first week end in June. Without my knowing it in advance, Roth and Rose Yardoumian were also invited for the same week end and Mrs. Lattimore suggested that we come down together. Roth, I remember, was very pleased by the invitation because he was about to publish his book on Japan (it had already been cleared by ONI) and was very anxious to become better acquainted with Lattimore and to have Lattimore's comments on some sections of the book. We went to Baltimore on Saturday afternoon and that evening was spent in general discussion. As I recall it, Lattimore took the galley proofs of the book with him when he retired for the night. I do not remember ever reading the galley proofs myself. The next day we took a walk through the woods in the morning, and several friends of Lattimore's from Johns Hopkins University came for a picnic lunch. This is the incident described in McCarthy's statement of March 30 concerning Lattimore. I do not recall that we spent any of the time by ourselves; on the contrary I spent my time being sociable with people whom I had not previously met. I had no documents with me, but Owen had previously mentioned that some of his graduate students were doing research work on Chinese Communism and were searching for recent Communist publications. I had told Owen that I had a new edition of Mao's papers and he had asked if he could borrow it. I took the volume with me on this trip and left it with Lattimore. This book was my personal property.

"I was arrested by the FBI just after leaving the office on the evening of June 6. When informed of the charges, I told the arresting agents that I was not guilty and of course wished to do what I could to clear up the matter. I was forthwith interrogated extensively and gave a detailed voluntary statement. I have asked that this statement be made a part of the record. The following day my sister-in-law obtained the services of a bondsman and I was released from detention in the District jail. Subsequently a fund of \$500 was raised by various friends to cover the cost of the bondsman's services.

"With my attorney's approval I requested a personal hearing before the grand jury and appeared briefly on August 3 and again on August 6. On August 10 the Department of Justice announced that the grand jury had returned a no true bill in my case. On August 11 I appeared before the Personnel Board of the Foreign Service and immediately afterward was informed that I would be reinstated on active duty as of August 12 (I had been on leave with pay since the time of the arrest)."

(Mr. John S. Service, a witness in his own behalf, being duly sworn, testified as follows:)

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. RHETTS. The Board has supplied to Mr. Service typewritten copies of certain documents which were shown to Mr. Service when he appeared before the grand jury in the summer of 1945 and about which he was questioned before the grand jury. I should like to ask the Board at this time to furnish me with the actual documents which were shown to Mr. Service at that time, or such reproductions of them as the Board has in its possession.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you identify the documents?

A. Yes, sir. Documents consisting of Documents 216 through 220, and Documents 221, 223, and 227. They have been numbered in this proceeding.

Mr. RHETTS. In short, we were given typewritten copies of documents. I should now like to have the original documents which were in question, if the Board has them.

The CHAIRMAN. This will be done.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. As I understand it, the documents which Mr. Moreland has just handed me consist of photostats of ozalid reproduction, is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. Correct.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now, Mr. Service, I show you a photostat of an ozalid reproduction, Document 216, and I ask you whether the ozalid reproduction was one of the documents which were shown to you by the grand jury, and about which you were questioned?—A. I believe it was; yes.

Q. This, as I understand it, is one of the documents which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession at the time of his arrest?—A. That is what I was told by Mr. Hitchcock during a grand jury hearing.

Q. And I believe we have been further advised here by the Board that that was the case, is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. Correct.

Q. Now, did you give this ozalid to Mr. Jaffe at any time?—A. I did not.

Q. Had you ever seen this ozalid before it was shown to you in the grand jury?—A. No; I did not.

Q. That is an ozalid reproduction of one of your memoranda, is it not?—A. That is correct.

Mr. STEVENS. Had you seen any ozalid of that?

A. No; I had not. I had not had occasion to consult the files of the Division of Chinese Affairs where such ozalids would be kept. I was familiar with the subject matter since I myself had written it, and while I was on consultation in the Division of Chinese Affairs, or actually in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, I was not on the routing list, so that I did not have material going over my desk.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Did you have a typed carbon copy of this memoranda in your personal files?—A. Yes, I did.

Q. In it—and I am referring to the period from April 12, 1945, onward after your return here from China?—A. Yes. I had a personal copy which I had brought back with me from Chungking with authorization of the Army headquarters there.

Q. Now I show you a photostat of an ozalid reproduction of Document No. 217, Mr. Service, and I ask you whether this ozalid was one of the papers shown to you before the grand jury about which you were questioned there?—A. I believe it was; yes.

Q. This is a reproduction of one of your memoranda, is it not?—A. Yes.

Q. Did you give this ozalid or any ozalid reproduction of this memorandum to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir.

Q. Had you ever seen an ozalid reproduction of this memorandum before this ozalid was shown to you before the grand jury?—A. I am positive that I never did. As a matter of fact, I was very surprised when they showed me these ozalids because I had never realized how the Department had reproduced these memoranda. I brought them in in the form of typewritten originals without having placed a reverse carbon behind them, which is customary in making ozalids, and I was very surprised to see that they had succeeded in reproducing them by the ozalid process at that time.

Mr. ACHILLES. May I ask at that point whether these two documents, 216 and 217, were ones which had first been brought to the Department by you by hand?

A. Yes, sir. I brought them back with me from China, and immediately after my arrival in the Department of State—I arrived here on April 12, and probably that same day, or at the latest the next day, I delivered the originals myself by hand, as I remember it, to Mr. Sabin Chase, who was, I think, in the position of being executive officer for the Division of Chinese Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these two reports Yenian reports?

A. Yes they belong to the 1945 series of Yenian reports.

Mr. STEVENS. Is that the series which you brought back by hand?

A. I didn't bring the entire series, sir. I brought back, well, I couldn't tell you now. Some of the 1945 series were prepared in Chungking and some of the early ones which I prepared at Yenian were forwarded to Chungking. I brought back the latter part of the series, which had not previously been delivered to the Embassy in Chungking. I brought those back at the Embassy's suggestion since it was far faster.

Mr. STEVENS. Will you be able to identify those, Mr. Service, that you brought back?

A. I can't positively no. I don't believe so.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have stated these ones were ones you brought back?

A. Yes. I am not quite sure where the group would commence. It would commence, I think, after my Report No. 10. I am not sure, or it might even include my Report No. 10.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I show you the original of this Document No. 217, which we have just been discussing and I ask you to state what distribution was made of that document according to the handwriting appearing at the top of the paper?

The CHAIRMAN. Will you first indicate if it appears, please, the date of receipt of that original by the Department?

A. The earliest date I find stamped on here is April 27, 1945. There is a story back of that, sir, and I think that—I hope that Mr. Chase, if he arrives here in time, will be able to clarify it. These were handed to Mr. Chase and he was swamped with work, and I was told that they simply got to the bottom of his basket and stayed in the bottom of his basket for a long period before he did anything about putting them in circulation or getting them reproduced and it was only after some of the other officers of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs checked on the reports and what had happened to them that they were put into circulation. They did not go to DC/R first because I handed them directly to the officer on the desk and he did not put them into circulation and send them down to DC/R until the 27th, apparently.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Returning to my question about the distribution of the document, which is indicated. A. Well, there are two series of distribution symbols. Up at the top of the page I see the following: Copies to: MID, 2 ONI (with no number written after it, presumably one copy), OSS, 2; CA, 2. That distribution was normally written on by the responsible officer in the Division of Chinese Affairs who determined the number of copies that should be made to guide the Reproduction Section.

Q. That listing there would be the clue to how many copies the reproduction section would make of the document, is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. Presumably, as to this document, the reproduction section would have made seven ozalids of this original paper, is that it?—A. They would make at least that number. I believe it was customary to make a few extras because there are other offices that have authority to request copies and so on. Now, over at the top right-hand corner there is a series of personal initials and divisional symbols showing divisions to whom this was routed. I see the initials of: Everett F. Drumwright, Paul W. Meyer, Edwin F. Stanton, and then the initials of the divisional symbols, CA for China Affairs under it name of Mr. Chase; then the divisional symbol DC/L.

Q. What does that mean, if you know?—A. I would say it is a liaison division. I am not sure, liaison division of DC, I think.

Mr. ACHILLES. I believe that's correct.

Mr. RHETTS. Liaison between what and what?

A. I am sorry, I am not—

Mr. ACHILLES. As I understand it, that is the section of the Division of Communications and Records which is responsible for transmitting copies to other Government agencies.

Mr. RHETTS. I see. Thank you.

A. The next symbol is FC/L which is the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation. Under that divisional symbol there are these various personal initials: H. J. C.; V. A.; O. S., what appears to be "E. S." and C. P. E. Then, the last divisional symbol DC/R which is the Records Branch of the Division of Communications and Records.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do those same distribution symbols appear on the ozalid copy?

A. Some of them do. The ozalid copy clearly shows the series of distribution symbols which I mentioned first and they appear at the top closer to the left-hand side of the page. In other words, copies to MID, ONI, OSS, and CA.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. However, it shows two copies to MID, does it not? It does not reflect the numerals 2 beside OSS or beside CA, does it?—A. No; which would indicate that those might have been added later, the numerals there.

Q. Or that they did not come through in the ozalid reproduction?—A. Yes; since we know that the ozalid process reproduces rather poorly handwritten or pencil writing.

Mr. ACHILLES. In other words, the indications for distribution to MID and the other agencies were added to the original before it was reproduced?

A. That's correct.

Mr. ACHILLES. Whereas the others were added to the original afterward?

A. Probably, although we can't say with certainty because some of these initials here are written in pencil rather faintly and might not be reproduced by the ozalid process, but it is probably correct that the officer in the Division of Chinese Affairs received the document, wrote on the instructions for distribution to MID, ONI, OSS and CA, and it then probably went to the reproduction division.

Mr. ACHILLES. Presumably all of the ozalid copies would have those same indications of distribution which were penciled on the original before it was reproduced?

A. That's right.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. To complete your answer, do any of the divisional distribution which you described beginning with E. F. D. and ending with DC/R—do any of those appear on the ozalid reproduction?—A. They do not, but—

Q. And that, you suggest, is accounted for by the fact that they were added on the original after it was reproduced.

Mr. RHETTS. Is there anything further on that document the Board wishes to ask?

Mr. ACHILLES. Can you think of anything which would appear on any ozalid copy of that document which would indicate whether that particular ozalid copy was a State Department copy or one which was furnished to MID or another agency?

A. Just to check that we are looking at the same, this is document 217. Yes; written at the top is "return CA," this would tend to indicate to me that it is one of the two ozalid copies which were made for CA.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that also true of 216?

A. Yes, sir. It also appears on the ozalid, the writing at the top "return CA."

The CHAIRMAN. Now let me ask you as to 216 and 217—if you gave copies in any form to Mr. Jaffe of these two documents?

Mr. RHETTS. We can go into this now, General, or deal with that whole problem later.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to reserve that question for the moment?

Mr. RHETTS. It had been my intention to cover that phase of it after going over the actual documents found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, we will take it later.

Mr. ACHILLES. One further question on those distribution symbols: Is there anything to indicate those words "return to CA" were written on the original or only on the ozalid copy—do they appear on the original as well?

A. No, sir; they do not appear on the original and customarily such instructions would not be written on the original since the original must be sent eventually to DC/R for filing there. It would only be written on an ozalid copy or some reproduced copy which is to be retained in the files of a working division rather than DC/R.

Mr. ACHILLES. Then it appears that those words "return CA" were written on the ozalid and appear here due to photostatic reproduction and, therefore, those words would not appear on the ozalid copies furnished to other agencies.

A. No; they would appear only on the two ozalids, I assume, which were made for CA, and, in fact, I remember very clearly in the grand jury when I was shown these documents that the "return CA" was written on, as I remember, in red pencil. It was not a part of the reproduced document, the letters weren't on there as part of the ozalid.

Mr. ACHILLES. And you were shown before the grand jury the actual ozalid that was found?

A. That is my recollection.

Mr. ACHILLES. That was said to have been found in Jaffe's possession?

A. That is my recollection.

The CHAIRMAN. You conclude, then, from this marking that in the case of these two papers the ozalid copies which were before the grand jury were actually taken from CA files?

A. Well, they were intended to be a part of CA files. The very fact that "return to CA" was written on them implies that CA had sent them to some other unit or branch or office, otherwise there would be no necessity to write on them "return to CA."

Mr. RHETTS. Is that necessarily true? May that have been written on there in the Division of Reproduction?

A. That is possible. Of course, it is possible. I really can't give a positive answer to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Whoever put "return to CA" on there was probably somebody in CA who intended to get the paper back; right?

A. That's a hypothesis.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I show you, Mr. Service, a photostatic reproduction of an ozalid copy of document 216. That is a copy of one of your memoranda, is it not?—A. It is.

Q. Were you shown this ozalid before the grand jury and questioned about it?—A. I believe I was.

Q. Did you ever give that ozalid or any other ozalid reproduction of that document to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I did not.

Q. Had you ever seen an ozalid reproduction of that memorandum before it was shown to you by the grand jury?—A. No; I did not.

Q. Did you have a typed carbon copy of that memorandum in your own personal files?—A. I did.

Q. Will you state what distribution of the document is indicated by it?

The CHAIRMAN. Now is this going to be a repetition of what you have put in before?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just ask then, if it is the same distribution, to shorten the examination.

Mr. RHETTS. Well, I don't know if it is the same.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we need to go into the individual distribution list of each document separately?

Mr. RHETTS. Well, I proposed to, because one of the things I wish to show here is the opportunities for others than Mr. Service to have had an access.

The CHAIRMAN. My only object is to shorten the examination, not to engage in a debate. Do as you like, but make it as short as you can.

Mr. ACHILLES. Mr. Chairman, I think it might be useful to go into that in some detail because in the case of documents 216 and 217 I think we have established that the ozalid copy physically in Jaffe's possession was one of the two copies meant for CA.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if you can reach the same conclusion more rapidly in the other documents I would appreciate it.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now, directing your attention to the original of document 218, am I correct that this shows distribution: 2 copies to MID, 1 to ONI, 2 to OSS, 2 to CA?—A. That is correct.

Q. And then on the right-hand side of the paper it shows divisional distribution similar to that which you have indicated for document 217, is that correct?—A. It is generally similar except that a copy does not seem to have been sent to FC/L.

Q. Now on the photostatic reproduction of the ozalid, does this also indicate "return CA"?—A. It does.

Mr. ACHILLES. Thus indicating again, does it not, that the ozalid copy in Jaffe's possession was one of the CA copies.

Q. Now I show you a photostatic reproduction of an ozalid copy of Document No. 219 and I ask you whether this is a reproduction of one of your memoranda?—A. It is.

Q. Were you shown this ozalid by the grand jury and questioned about it?—A. I believe this is one of those I was shown.

Q. Did you ever give that ozalid or any ozalid reproduction of that memorandum to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I did not.

Q. Had you ever seen an ozalid reproduction of that memorandum before it was shown to you by the grand jury?—A. No; I had not.

Mr. STEVENS. You had had a copy of that in your own file?

A. I had a copy; yes.

Q. Now directing your attention to the original of this document it shows distribution: 2 copies to MID, 1 copy to ONI, 2 copies to OSS, and 2 copies to CA; does it not?—A. It does.

Q. And it also shows in the right-hand corner certain divisional distribution within the State Department; does it not?—A. Yes.

Q. Now does the ozalid reproduction of this document indicate "return CA"?—A. Yes; it does.

Q. Thus indicating that the ozalid found in Mr. Jaffe's possession was one of the two copies of the ozalids which were sent to CA?—A. That is correct.

Q. I now show you a photostatic reproduction of an ozalid reproduction of document No. 220 and ask you whether that is a reproduction of one of your memoranda?—A. It is.

Q. Were you shown this ozalid at the grand jury and questioned about it?—A. I believe I was; yes.

Q. Did you ever give this ozalid or any other ozalid to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I did not.

Q. Did you ever see this or any ozalid reproduction of that memorandum before it was shown to you in the grand jury?—A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have a typed carbon copy of that memorandum in your personal files?—A. Yes; I had a personal copy.

Q. Directing your attention to the original of the document 220 it shows distribution of 2 copies to MID, 1 to ONI, 2 to OSS, and 2 to CA; does it not?—A. It does.

Q. And it also shows certain divisional distribution within the State Department on the right-hand corner?—A. It does.

Q. Does the ozalid reproduction of this document indicate also the words "return CA"?—A. It does.

Q. Indicating that this ozalid also was one which was found in Jaffe's possession, was one of the two ozalids distributed to the CA; is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. Now in that connection two other copies of this same paper were found in Mr. Jaffe's possession—typed copies. Will you look at those and see if they can be identified?

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I show you a photostatic reproduction of two pages of typewriting and I identify it by referring to certain handwriting in the upper right-hand corner which shows 110b, that is to say, lower case "b", not capital "B", and ask you if you have ever seen the document of which this is a photostatic reproduction?—A. No; I have not.

Q. This is a copy of one of your memoranda, is it not?

The CHAIRMAN. Can you say more definite: This is a copy of your report which is Document No. 220?

A. Yes; it appears to be. At a glance it appears to be. I haven't checked it exactly, but it appears to be a copy my Report No. 17, which is Document 220. I have noticed a number of typing mistakes and so on. There may be other errors in copying.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. ACHILLES. I have got a question: Can it be told by comparing the reproduction of the typewritten copy with the original of the same document whether the typed copy was a carbon copy of the original or was typed subsequently? Can that be told by the arrangement of the paragraphs and spacing?

A. Oh, yes; this is definitely not a carbon copy of the original because it—For instance, take the very first words—the date and number are placed differently on the copy than they are on the original. It is on a different kind of paper. It is on short paper, whereas the original was on long paper. The margins are different and as I mentioned a while ago there are certain obvious typing mistakes, copying mistakes even in the title. The fourth word in the copy is "terkitorial" instead of "territorial".

Mr. ACHILLES. And the typed copy which you had in your possession was a carbon copy made when the original was made?

A. That is true; that is correct; it was an exact carbon copy of the original. I typed all those things myself on a portable typewriter and I never made any additional copies at all. I did them all at once.

Mr. ACHILLES. You never had an occasion to make a subsequent copy of that?

A. Never.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I show you a photostatic reproduction of two typewritten pages also bearing the words "March 17, 1945—No. 17" and on the right-hand side of this photostat there are in handwriting the figures 118a, lower case, and I ask you to tell the Board what that is?—A. I believe that is an exact duplicate of the copy which you have just shown me, a photostat of the typed paper.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that contain the same misspelling?—A. It does.

The CHAIRMAN. That answers my question.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I show you a photostatic reproduction of an old ozalid copy of Document 221 and I ask you if that is a reproduction of one of your memorandums?—A. It is.

Q. Were you shown this ozalid at the time of your questioning before the grand jury?—A. I believe I was.

Q. Did you ever give this ozalid or any ozalid reproduction of this memorandum to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I did not.

Q. Did you ever see this or any other ozalid reproduction of the memorandum before it was shown to you in the grand jury?—A. No; I did not.

Q. Directing your attention to the original document, this shows distribution as follows: MID, two copies; ONI, one presumably; OSS, two copies; CA, two copies; does it not?—A. It does.

Q. And it also in the right-hand corner shows certain divisional distribution within the State Department?—A. That's correct.

Q. Now directing your attention to the photostatic reproduction of the ozalid does this show "return CA" as on the other documents?—A. No; it does not.

Q. Did you have your carbon copy of this memorandum in your personal files?—A. Yes; I had a personal copy.

Mr. ACHILLES. Is there anything that you can see on that ozalid copy which would indicate in any way whether that came from CA or some other unit?

A. No, sir; I don't think I can see anything on here that would tie this particular ozalid or the ozalid from which this was copied to CA, or any other specific division.

Mr. ACHILLES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. May I look at it a minute?

(The Chairman read the ozalid.)

Mr. ACHILLES. I can see no indication from those copies as to which agency that might belong to.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now, Mr. Service, I show you the photostatic reproduction of an ozalid copy of Document 223, and ask you if that was one of the ozalids which was shown to you and about which you were questioned before the grand jury?—A. This is a reproduction of one of my reports, and I believe it is one of those concerning which I was interrogated by the grand jury.

Q. Did you furnish that or any other ozalid to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I did not.

Q. Had you ever seen that or any other ozalid reproduction of your memorandum before it was shown to you in the grand jury?—A. No.

Q. Did you have your own copy of that memorandum in your personal file?—A. I did.

Q. Directing your attention to the original of document 223, it shows distribution: Two copies to MID; one presumably to ONI; two, to OSS; and two, to CA; does it not?—A. It does.

Q. In the right-hand corner it also shows certain divisional distribution within the State Department of the original?—A. That's right.

Q. Does the ozalid copy indicate "return CA"?—A. It does.

Q. So that this indicates that this ozalid was one of the two ozalids made and distributed in CA?—A. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in that connection, are you going to go on to the typed copy?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say for the record that a typed copy of the same paper was found in the possession of Mr. Jaffe.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. I show you a four-page photostatic reproduction of certain typewritten material headed March 21, 1945, No. 21, and I ask you if you ever saw the typewritten material of which that is a photostatic reproduction?—A. I did not.

Q. Is that a copy of document No. 223?—A. It appears to be.

Q. It is not a carbon copy, however, is it?—A. No, sir; it is not.

Q. Of the original?—A. No, sir; it is not a carbon copy of the original.

Q. It is on different size paper, is it not?—A. It is on different size paper and different arrangement of the heading, and actually with the omission of some of the typewritten symbols on the original.

Q. That is to say it is not an exact copy of the original document?—A. Not an exact copy.

Q. Now I show you a photostatic reproduction of an ozalid copy of document 227. I wish to correct that—227 is not an original of Mr. Service's memorandum No. 18; it is a typed copy of the original, so that it is not correct to say that I have shown you a photostatic reproduction of an ozalid copy of document 227. Instead I show you a photostatic reproduction of an ozalid copy of your original memorandum No. 18, dated March 18, 1945, and ask you if that ozalid was shown to you in the grand jury.—A. I believe it was.

Q. Did you ever give that or any other ozalid copy of that memorandum to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I did not.

Q. Did you ever see that or any other ozalid reproduction of your memorandum before it was shown to you in the grand jury?—A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have your carbon copy of that memorandum in your personal files?—A. I did.

The CHAIRMAN. You haven't asked about the "CA"?

Mr. RHETTS. That's correct, excuse me, there is nothing on it. On the photostatic copy of the ozalid it shows distribution of two copies to MID; and one, presumably, if this is faithfully reproduced, the distribution on the original, one each to ONI, OSS, and CA, does it not?

A. Yes. But it should be noted that the ozalid reproduction is perhaps not complete there and not clear.

Q. That is, the numerals beside each of these symbols may not in every case have been reproduced by the ozalid?—A. That is right.

Q. Is there anything on this—does this bear the words "return CA" on it?—A. No, sir; it does not.

Q. Is there anything on the face of that document that indicates to what agency or division it was distributed?—A. I see nothing.

Mr. ACHILLES. May I examine that?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes.

Mr. ACHILLES. No, I see no indication.

Mr. RHETTS. Now, I would like at this point to ask the Board whether there is any allegation from the FBI or elsewhere that Mr. Service ever transmitted any documents other than the documents which have just been discussed to Mr. Jaffe?

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will recess.

(The meeting was recessed at 12:45 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY REVIEW BOARD MEETING IN THE MATTER OF JOHN S. SERVICE

Date: June 1, 1950, 2:30 to 5:35 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State.

Reported by: Elizabeth Wake, court stenographer, reporting.

Hearing in the above-entitled matter was reconvened at 2:30 p. m., Gen. Conrad E. Snow, chairman, presiding.

Board members present: Gen. Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles, member; Arthur G. Stevens, member.

Also present: A. B. Moreland, legal officer.

Representative for Mr. Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, firm of Reilly, Rhetts & Ruckelshaus.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you ready to ask your questions?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Ask your question again for the record and we will eliminate the question and answer at the end of the morning session.

Mr. RHETTS. Were you questioned before the grand jury about any other documents than the ones we have just discussed?

Mr. SERVICE. As far as I can remember, I wasn't.

Mr. RHETTS. Were you asked general questions as to whether you supplied any other documents, do you recall?

Mr. SERVICE. No, I don't recall.

Mr. RHETTS. I would like to ask the Board whether it has any evidence or whether there is any evidence that Mr. Service has transmitted to Mr. Jaffe any other documents found in Mr. Jaffe's possession?

The CHAIRMAN. The Board has evidence before it that some parts of Mr. Service's reports, or copies of them, were found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. The Board is interested as to what extent, if any, Mr. Service is responsible for these copies being in Mr. Jaffe's possession.

Mr. RHETTS. May I inquire, Does the Board refer to documents about which it questioned Mr. Larsen yesterday?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; the same.

Mr. RHETTS. Very well; I would like at this time to question Mr. Service about the remainder of those documents.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me add this: That I understand from Mr. Service's statement, which has been made part of the record this morning, that he admits he loaned to Mr. Jaffe copies of about 8 or 10 of his reports. The Board would like to have identified, if possible, the 8 or 10 reports of which copies were loaned to Mr. Jaffe.

Mr. RHETTS. I think, General, if you refer to Mr. Service's statement, I do not know of any place where he indicates he loaned Mr. Jaffe 8 or 10 of his personal copies of these reports. He does state that he recalls for certainty that—

The CHAIRMAN. I refer to page 38 of the statement: "The following day I went through my personal copies and carefully selected several, about 8 or 10." I understand from the rest of the statement that he loaned the 8 or 10 to Mr. Jaffe.

Mr. RHETTS. You are correct. I had not recalled whether he attempted to specify the number. What is your request?

The CHAIRMAN. As to the 8 or 10, we would like to have them identified as far as possible, and we would like to know whether or not Mr. Service had any connection with any of the other Service reports which were found in Mr. Jaffe's possession; and if so, under what circumstances?

Mr. RHETTS. Very well; I will undertake to elicit all that information as we go along in the examination of these documents.

In view of the request the Board has just made it may be well, before going on to additional documents, that I go back and ask Mr. Service some questions with respect to the first eight that we have just discussed, to cover one of the points which you raised.

(Continuation of testimony by Mr. Service:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now, Mr. Service, I believe you testified that you recall specifically having lent to Mr. Jaffe your personal copy of your memorandum reporting on a conversation with Mao Tse-tung. What date, do you recall, did that memorandum bear?—A. April 1, 1945.

Q. It would have been your number—A. It was my report No. 26.

Q. Now you have also testified that in response to Mr. Jaffe's request you also showed him certain additional memoranda which you had in your personal files. Are you able to recall which of your memoranda you showed Mr. Jaffe?—A. No; not with certainty. I could not recall it in 1945 and I cannot recall now exactly which ones I allowed him to see. I remember going through my reports and exercising a judgment in each case as to whether or not the material was such as would be appropriate to allow him to see it for background purposes; in other words, if the material was factual and was available to the other correspondents in Yenan and presumably was being incorporated in the books which at least two of them were writing at the time. I concluded that it would be permissible to allow Jaffe to see my personal copies, which were the only notes I had of my observations and conversations at Yenan.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the reports you allowed them to see exclusively Yenan reports?

A. Yes, sir, because I had no other personal copies in my possession except these personal copies of reports which I had written in Yenan.

The CHAIRMAN. Among the reports, copies of which were found in Mr. Jaffe's possession, could you indicate for the record how many of these were Yenan reports? I take it that the eight you already discussed this morning were all Yenan reports.

A. They were.

The CHAIRMAN. What other documents, among the list found in Mr. Jaffe's possession, were Yenan reports?

A. Would you like me to list them, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ACHILLES. Has Mr. Service been shown a complete set of the documents found in Jaffe's possession?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; Mr. Service has a list of the Service papers found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. This is the same list Mr. Larsen was examined on yesterday.

A. The list was not in any chronological order that I can see, sir, and in a little time I will straighten them out. Would you like me to straighten them?

The CHAIRMAN. You may go through the list as it is and indicate when you come to a Yenau report.

A. The first item on the list?

The CHAIRMAN. Following the part that you have testified about this morning.

(Off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. We have already Documents 217, 216, 218, 227, 219, 220, 223, and 221 as Yenau reports. What other Yenau reports are in your list of documents?

A. Suppose I just give the list of 1944 reports.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those Yenau reports? Let me ask you before you do that, did you have with you copies of the 1944 reports?

A. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not complete the list of 1945 reports first?

A. All right. My report No. 10, document 214; my report No. 20, document 222; my report No. 26, document 226; my report No. 22, document 224. I think that is all, sir, for 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. You also had with you, when you returned, copies of your 1944 Yenau reports?

A. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you show any of those?

A. I may have shown one or two of those.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the 1944 Yenau reports?

A. Report No. 3, document 166; report No. 7, document 167; report No. 5, document 168; report No. 1, document 164; report No. 2, document 165.

(Off the record.)

A. Report No. 13, document 174; report No. 31, document 185; report No. 40, document 193; report No. 15, document 177; report No. 34, document 188; report No. 38, document 191. Excuse me, sir, in that list the document appears twice. There is no need to list it twice. Report 39, document 192; report No. 16, document 177; report No. 20, document 177; report No. 19, document 180; report No. 22, document 182; report No. 37, document 190; report No. 26, document 183. That is all of the Yenau reports that I see, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was from among that group of reports that you showed him, as stated in your statement, some 10 or a dozen reports?

A. Yes, sir; the ones that I allowed him to see were from among those two lists.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you have at the time copies of other of your Yenau reports? Did you have in your possession at that time copies of others of your Yenau reports not on this list?

A. Yes, I had very nearly a complete file. There were some reports which I did not have. I am not sure just how many may have been missing but I had a number of reports in my own possession which are not listed here.

Mr. ACHILLES. Have you a complete file from the time you first went to Yenau with the military mission?

A. Yes, from the time of my arrival in Yenau on July 22, 1944, I think, until I left Yenau on about October 23, 1944, and again from the time of my arrival in Yenau, I think, in the spring of 1945 until my departure. I am not sure. I may have had in my possession my file copies of all the reports which I wrote—personal memoranda I wrote in the spring of 1945, from my arrival in Chungking until my departure.

Mr. ACHILLES. And you had those copies here in the Department with you?

A. Yes.

Mr. ACHILLES. What happened to those copies?

A. Well, I understood that the FBI had searched my office after my arrest and removed the entire contents, or practically the entire contents that seemed to pertain to me in any way. They returned some of the material to me fairly soon after the arrest and another batch of material was returned to me after the grand jury action, and a final batch was retained by the Department of Justice. I inquired of one of the attorneys handling the case about the matter and he said they would all be returned to me as my personal papers. They wished to retain them temporarily until the case was concluded against some

of the other men arrested, and he promised me they would be returned to me after that time.

I had to leave the country and the next time I returned to the United States I got in touch with the Department of Justice. They found the record and promised to return the papers, but they told me they were not able to locate the papers, so those papers are still in possession of the Department of Justice.

The other papers which were returned to me—I have a few packed amongst my effects—copies of any memoranda or anything of that sort that I had written, I left in the Department of State with the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in 1945 and search has been unsuccessful in locating these.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these personal copies that you retained marked with the classification indication?

A. Not with any official stamp. I simply typed it on when I put the paper in the machine and started typing. They had not been through any official hands—through any hands except my own. They had not been processed by the Army Headquarters or the Embassy, so they did not bear any official stamp.

The CHAIRMAN. Such classification as they bore was merely the classification you put on at the time you wrote the report?

A. That is correct, sir.

Mr. STEVENS. Were there any of those documents which you can recall in which you had two carbon copies in your file?

A. No, sir.

Mr. STEVENS. Only one?

A. If I can elaborate, I did all my own typing on a portable machine which is not too good for making copies. I am not a stenographer. I am a one-handed typist and it is quite a chore and I never made any extra copies. When I came back from Chungking I went through my files and tried to build a complete set as far as I could but there was only one copy of everything. I don't have any recollection of having more than one copy. I cannot conceive of any reason why I should. Most times I typed the four copies necessary for my distribution.

Mr. STEVENS. Did you have in any of those files—your personal files—any copies made from any other sources than your typewriter? Did you have anything prepared in the Department—any transmittal notes coming from the Embassy or G-2?

A. No, sir; not to my recollection at all. This is strictly a one-man operation. I did all my own typing and never received copies back from anyone. Could you elaborate what you mean?

Mr. STEVENS. My point is simply this: Were there in your personal files any of the critiques that had been prepared by the Embassy or G-2 or anyone else?

A. Absolutely not. In almost every case I never saw those transmitting despatches. I had no knowledge of those. I usually did not know if any use had been made of them.

Mr. STEVENS. But one of those was included in your personal files.

A. No; I am positive of it.

The CHAIRMAN. At the time of your arrest, did you have in your personal files all the papers you had originally come back with?

A. As far as I know, I believe I did. I occasionally loaned these reports to officers at other agencies, specialists who wanted to pursue some particular subject they were specializing in. I remember several people coming over from R. & A., Research and Analysis of OSS and if they were interested in one particular thing I would let them borrow it but as far as I know, those copies had been returned. I don't remember any being on loan.

Mr. STEVENS. Can you identify any people to whom you gave any of those copies, Mr. Service?

A. Yes, I loaned some to Mr. Wilber, who was head of the Political Branch—I am not sure of the exact title now—but head of the Political Branch of the Far Eastern Section of Research and Analysis—

Mr. RIETTS. Of OSS?

A. Yes; and there were at least two other men who came to the Department and had further consultation with me but I cannot identify their names. They were junior analysts—

Mr. STEVENS. From OSS?

A. I believe from OSS and I have a vague recollection also of somebody in MID but I met a great many people in those days and I went to interrogation sessions and there were three or four people and it was a case of quick introductions and I don't remember the names of these people. There was one

fellow, short and dark, as I remember, and bristling hair. I might recognize him if I saw him but that is as far as I can go.

(Off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. STEVENS. Before we get into detailed examination now, I wish Mr. Service would comment upon the statements which have been made as to his access to documents that were in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, which were not a part of his personal file. I would like you to put that in.

Mr. RHETTS. Would you like to put it in now? It is a topic I was going to cover later.

Mr. STEVENS. I would like it before we get into a detailed examination of this. We have taken up the fact that he has had his Yen-an reports and we would like the other point handled at this time.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. You returned to Washington on April 12, 1945. Is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. Will you describe in detail for the board what your assignment was—where you were physically and what you did from April 12 on to June 6, 1945?—A. I was placed on consultation with the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. As I remember, the Director of the Office, Mr. Ballantine, was away and I was told to sit at his desk, which was at the end of one of the corridors in the old State Department Building. It would be in the southeast corner. The set-up in those offices, you may remember, was that there was a small anteroom usually where there were two stenographers, right at the end of the hall, and two large offices opening off, one at each side.

Mr. Stanton, the Acting Director, had the office across the reception room, and I sat in Mr. Ballantine's office with a Mr. Turner, whom I believe was also in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on temporary status. I believe Mr. Turner took the desk and most of the time I simply used a large table in the office.

I wasn't assigned any specific duties or any regular duties. I wasn't a part of the permanent working organization. I was spending practically all my time outside of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, going over to various other Government agencies and I made several visits, for instance, to the Pentagon Building, Research and Analysis, ONI, etc., and therefore, it wasn't particularly necessary for me to have a desk, and I did not see the material that was normally circulated through the office.

Q. You did not?—A. I did not. I should explain that the Division of Chinese Affairs was about halfway down the hall from the suite of the Director and the Deputy Director where I was sitting. I have forgotten the room numbers but I have a very clear picture in my mind that I am sure could be verified.

The Division of Chinese Affairs is in a very large room opening off the hall with the Chief of the Division in a small office in one corner and the Assistant Chief in a small office off the other corner with three or four officers in the main room and three or four secretaries and stenographers.

Q. Were the files of the Chinese Affairs Division in that large room also?—A. Yes, sir. I was coming to that point. The working files of the Division of Chinese Affairs was in a bank of filing cabinets along the wall between this large office and the corridor that faced out into the room. There must have been 10 or 15 filing cabinets and there was a large table near one end of the room, I think.

As I was saying, I think I knew all the officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs, so I was in and out of the office for personal conversations, and occasionally called down for what might be called consultation, specific points that some officer was interested in. I could—theoretically I did have access to the files but I don't believe that I ever did go to the files to get out any material because I wasn't doing any research work. I wrote one or two memoranda during that period but they were just memoranda on spot things that came up on the day's business.

I remember writing a memorandum, for instance, on a broadcast that Mao Tse-tung made on May 1, pointing out the further development of the lines that were obvious lines. They were obvious when I was in Yen-an in March and April, but that was nothing that required my going to the file.

I think that if I had been going to the files to get any amount of material or going to the files fairly often, it would have been obvious and it would have been observed by some of the people in this large office since there were five or six people sitting in that large office in plain view of the files.

Q. Was there someone in charge of the files?—A. It was quite informal actually. If an officer was busy he might call his secretary and tell her to get something and she would go to the files and get it but generally somebody wanting something looked at the files, arranged by subject and each subject was defined, but most people working there knew the general lay-out so they would go and take what material they needed or return it or gave it to the secretaries to return. I had no secretary or stenographer and there was a woman named Mrs. Savage who worked there as one of the secretaries, who had something to do with the files but I don't believe anyone was commissioned as file clerk at all.

Q. Did you have any occasion during that period to obtain material from the Division of Communications and Records?—A. No, sir; not that I remember, on any occasion. I wasn't doing any work that required my going to the files.

Q. There again you would have had, theoretically, in fact, access to them as you desired material?—A. As a Foreign Service officer I was able to get material from the files but I was on consultation and the only thing that I was able to contribute—the only thing that people were interested in—the reason of my being on consultation was the fact that I had just come back from Communist territories and was the only person available who had had that experience and knew them by direct observation. That is the one subject on which people were consulting me and I had my own personal file of my reports which I continually referred to and used in those consultations and it was far easier for me to simply thumb through my own personal copies and pick out the one pertinent to our discussion.

I think there was one occasion when I did go to the files in CA, when Mr. Walter Robertson was being assigned to Chungking as Minister Counselor. Mr. Vincent asked me to talk to Mr. Robertson. He had never been to China; he wasn't a Foreign Service officer; he was new to the Government; he was a banker from Richmond, Va., and he asked me to give Mr. Robertson some fairly basic briefing, and on that occasion I remember digging out from the CA files one or two of the more comprehensive memoranda which I had written.

We could verify when Mr. Robertson left, and just a day or two before he left my recollection is that one of the things I dug out of the files and suggested he read was that memorandum I wrote in June 1944. I believe it is our Document 157. I believe that I did get that from the CA files and turned it over to Mr. Robertson.

I think if I might say a little more along that same line, the rather special character of my consultation—the fact that I did not have any duties in the Division or Office—for instance when I was in the Department on consultation in January 1943, I was given specific duties, and that is sometimes done. I was assigned to writing these summaries—tags—on some of the despatches coming in from the field and I was also assigned to writing one on the situation in China, which is Document 103. That was a project that required a great deal of research and I had a great deal of recourse to the CA files during the visit in 1943 but on neither my visit of 1944 of consultation or 1945 was I performing any research or other duties that would require access to the files.

Q. Now, Mr. Service, I show you Document 157 and ask you to tell us what that is.—A. Well, it is a hectograph document, apparently a copy of a memorandum which I wrote, I think, on June 20, 1944, and it is our Document 157.

Q. This is our Document 157. Do you have a copy of the document you actually wrote? Is this a copy of the document you wrote—an exact copy?—

A. As far as I can see, it is.

Q. Does it have your name on it?—A. No, sir; it does not.

Q. Did the document you wrote have your name on it anywhere?—A. It would have had my name on the end.

Q. This is not an exact copy of the document you wrote?—A. No, I don't have the original copy for comparison. Certainly the heading is different and leaves off everything at the end.

Q. This is not an exact copy of the document you prepared?—A. That is correct.

Q. I believe you indicated that your name does not appear anywhere on that document, does it?—A. No.

Q. And does the document indicate where it was prepared?—A. Well, there is written in handwriting at the top "Not to be shown outside OSS," and I know this was obtained from DRF and I believe from the files in their possession, Research and Analysis Branch of OSS.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say for the record that the document referred to has to do with three papers which were found in the possession of Mr. Jaffe, all

identical to typed copies and, one carbon of a document on the subject of a Kuomintang China and American policy.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did Mr. Service just state this was a hectograph copy; in other words, this is not the document found in Jaffe's office but a hectograph copy of which typed copies were found in Jaffe's possession?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Q. Even that is not correct. You say it appears on the face of it—it says, "Not to be distributed outside OSS."—A. "Not to be shown outside OSS."

Q. Now I show you photostatic copy of certain typewritten material headed "Kuomintang China and American Policy." Underneath that heading appears the wording: "Written in China June 24, 1944, by John S. Service." This document consists of 13 pages and in handwriting at the top right-hand corner appears the number "15." This, I understand, is a photostatic copy of a type-written copy found in Jaffe's possession.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Q. Referring back to Document 157, you attempted to locate, did you not, the original of the document which you prepared.—A. I requested the Department to locate it; yes, sir.

Q. And is Document 157 the best thing they could find—the nearest approximation to your original document they were able to locate?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. And it does contain, as far as you know, the substance of what you wrote?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. But does not bear anywhere an indication of your name or your authorship?—A. Yes.

Q. The document marked "15," which I have shown you, does indicate on its face that it was a report prepared by you; does it not?—A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever see the document?—A. I never saw the document from which this was copied or reproduced.

Q. Was the document, which you prepared, prepared in the format of your other reports and addressed to the "Commanding General, Military Headquarters"?—A. Memoranda were addressed in various ways. I don't know how this may have been addressed. Some of them were not addressed to anyone.

Q. Where were you when you wrote the memorandum of June 24, 1944?—A. I was in Chungking.

Q. And you were then attached to the military headquarters, were you not?—A. That is correct.

Q. You think you may or may not have addressed it to the military headquarters?—A. I cannot tell.

Q. You don't know?—A. No.

Q. Is there any indication on the face of this photostatic document, which I will refer to as Document 15, that it was copied from the Document 157?—A. Although the heading is different and the title is different, I notice repetition of several obvious mistakes, apparently copies of typing mistakes. About 2 inches from the bottom of the first page, for instance, both documents have the word "newsreel" where the obvious meaning was "reversal." It appeared one was copied from the other.

Q. Although the Document 15 has your name at the top of it, whereas Document 157 does not?—A. That's right.

Q. Is Document 15 an exact copy of Document 157?—A. No, not exactly.

Q. Is it, apart from the fact that it bears your name, an exact copy?—A. I just mentioned the heading and the subject are different.

Q. Did you ever see Document 157 until it was obtained in the course of these proceedings?—A. No sir.

Q. Did you ever see that document in any form other than the form in which you originally prepared it?—A. No sir.

Q. Now I show you two additional sets of papers, one of which is marked, in the upper right-hand corner "31B" and one of which is marked in handwriting "No. 93." Do these appear to be copies of the same document as No. 15?—A. Exactly the same.

Q. Your testimony with respect to that would be the same as with respect to document 13?—A. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they all three made of the same typing?

A. That seems to be. If you look at the very top of the page you have "Kuomintang China and American Policy—written in China" and if you look at the capital "C" of China you will see it is blurred in the same way in all three copies, indicating they are all of the same typewritten text.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have with you, on your return, a copy of your report on Kuomintang China and American Policy?

A. You are referring to the same document we have just discussed?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

A. No; I did not.

Mr. ACHILLES. If I might try to clarify the situation on that last document, Mr. Service, you have transmitted a report dated June 24, 1944, on that subject, "Kuomintang China and American Policy." You had prepared a report?

A. Yes, sir; I had prepared a report.

Mr. ACHILLES. The documents which we have here include one which is apparently an OSS reproduction or excerpt from the report which you have written?

A. That's right.

Mr. ACHILLES. And the others are reproductions in slightly different form apparently on the OSS report?

A. That is the assumption since it contains some of the same rather unusual mistakes.

Mr. ACHILLES. Is there anything on the photostatic reproduction to indicate that that might have been obtained by Mr. Jaffe from State Department or from OSS, either one?

A. I see nothing at all to indicate origin.

Mr. ACHILLES. In examining these documents I note from the fact that the hectograph copy bears the notation "Not to be shown outside of OSS," and from the fact that the same mistake of the word "newsreel" is used where it should obviously be "reversal" that the typewritten copy was presumably made from an OSS copy.

(Off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, I turn over to you from the files of the Board documents which have been numbered B-1 to B-52, inclusive, which are the various documents relating to Mr. Service, which have been found in the possession of Mr. Jaffe, or rather, they are photostatic copies of such documents. This morning you examined Mr. Service with reference to documents which have been numbered B-1 to B-11, inclusive, and in order to keep the records straight, I will indicate what those documents are.

B-1 is a photostat of the ozalid copy of your Document 217; B-2 is a photostat of the ozalid copy of your Document 260; B-3 is a photostat of the ozalid copy of your Document 218; B-4 is a photostat of the ozalid copy of your document 227; B-5 is a photostat of the ozalid copy of your Document 219; B-6 is a photostat of the ozalid copy of your Document 220; B-7 is a photostat of a typed copy of the same paper; B-8 is another photostat of the typed copy of the same paper; B-9 is a photostat of the ozalid copy of your document 223; B-10 is a photostat of the typed copy of the same paper; B-11 is a photostat of the ozalid copy of your Document 221.

These documents are turned over to you to enable you to examine Mr. Service with reference to the rest of the documents found in Mr. Jaffe's possession which related to Mr. Service.

Mr. RHETTS. Before going any further with the examination on these documents, I think I should go back and ask Mr. Service a series of questions relating to Documents B-1 through B-11, which I did not ask this morning and which I think should be asked.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. You testified, Mr. Service, that you recalled specifically giving Mr. Jaffe one document in particular which you have identified as a memorandum concerning the views of Mao Tse-tung—A. My memorandum No. 26 of April 1, 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you identify that by a "B" number?—A. That is B-35, sir.

Q. B-35 is the identifying symbol. B-35 is not the document you gave, or is it?

Let us come to that. Then you further testified that you recall giving some additional documents, possible 8 or 10, but that you could not now or could not in June 1945 identify precisely which of your personal copies you showed to Mr. Jaffe.—A. That is correct.

Q. I should like to show you document B-1, and ask you whether you have any recollection at all as to whether you might have shown that document to Mr. Jaffe?—A. That is not quite right, not that document.

Q. You answer that question and I will give you the next one.—A. I believe that I probably showed Mr. Jaffe my personal typed copy of this memorandum. The CHAIRMAN. That is all right.

Mr. ACHILLES. But not the ozalid copy of which that is a photostat—A. No sir. I never saw the ozalid. I never had it in my possession.

Q. I show you document B-2 and ask you whether you think you may have shown to Mr. Jaffe your personal copy of this memorandum?—A. I believe this is one of which I showed Mr. Jaffe my personal typed copy. It is the type of informative material derived entirely from Chinese Communist sources.

Q. When you say that you believe you did, you mean by that that you have any present recollection or do you mean it is of the type you would have shown?—A. I cannot say that I have any positive recollection. There was a series of reports—memoranda that I wrote dealing with Communist thinking about certain geographical areas. This one is on Sinkiang. The one we just discussed was on Mongolia. There was another I wrote on the minorities question and it is my recollection I allowed him to see the whole series, which is a group of informative descriptive memoranda or material entirely from communist sources and available to any correspondent or any other person in Yenan.

Q. I show you Document B-3 and ask you if that is one of the memoranda of which you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your personal carbon copy?—A. Yes; I think I may have shown him my personal carbon copy on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Just as a matter for the record, both B-1 and B-2 are unclassified.

Mr. ACHILLES. B-1 and B-3.

The CHAIRMAN. B-1 and B-3.

A. I may say, if I may, it is incomprehensible to me now, looking over these three, why I marked it "secret." The type of material is the same and the sources are the same and if I considered the suitability of giving the material—background information—to a writer on China, I would have been guided more by the content type of material than by the typed rating up there.

Q. Which you, yourself, put on it?—A. Yes.

Q. I show you Document B-4 and ask you whether you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your personal carbon copy of this memorandum?—A. I would say that I may have possibly shown him my typed one. I don't have the same certainty with this as with the three just mentioned.

(Off the record.)

Q. This Document B-4 is also unclassified; is it not?—A. I see no classification on it. It is quite likely this was amongst the group I showed him.

Q. I show you Document B-5 and ask you whether you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your personal carbon copy of this memorandum.—A. I cannot say. I rather think I did not. It discusses plans rather than events which had already taken place.

Q. I show you Document B-6. May I ask whether you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your personal carbon copy of this memorandum?—A. I do not believe I did.

(Off the record.)

Q. I show you Documents B-7 and B-8 and ask you whether or not they are merely copies of Document B-6?—A. Yes.

Q. So that your answer with respect to them would be the same that you gave with respect to B-6?—A. That is correct.

Q. I show you Document B-9 and ask you whether you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your personal carbon copy of this memorandum?—A. I may have. It is historical material. It does not discuss American policy.

Q. I show you Document B-10 and ask you if this is not a copy of Document B-9—A. It appears to be.

Q. So that your answer with respect to this would be the same?—A. Yes.

Q. Now I show you Document B-11 and ask you whether you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your personal carbon copy of this memorandum?—A. Yes, I think I did. This is a matter of public knowledge.

Q. The classification on this is what?—A. "Confidential."

Q. You placed that there yourself?—A. Yes.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. Service, what do you mean by "a matter of public knowledge"?

A. It is available to every newspaper man. It is no secret that they were setting up these exiled government organizations. They had similar organizations for the Manchurian Provinces, for instance.

Mr. ACHILLES. Why did you classify it "confidential"?

A. Well, because I make some comments on their probable motives for doing it which should not be attributed to me and should not be in the hands of the Chinese for circulation among all the various agencies and allies in Chungking.

Mr. ACHILLES. But you still thought your comments on that were not of such a nature as to make it improper to give to a newspaperman for background.

A. No, sir, I did not. I mention the Communist view which I state I think is extreme—the Communist view for preparation of civil war. I said it is much more likely that the Central Government would use them for selecting representatives to political bodies like the projected congress. By having a sort of dummy organization they would be able to nominate delegates to the Congress. It is common political usage.

Q. Now, Mr. Service, I show you Document B-12 which consists of a 2-page covering memorandum, dated Chungking, China, 13 February 1944, bearing the name "John S. Service" at the end together with an enclosure of 22 pages, which is entitled "Article Written by Theodore H. White for 'Time Magazine.'" This is a photostatic copy of typewritten material. Can you tell whether that is an exact copy of a memorandum which you prepared?

A. I cannot tell whether it is an exact copy without having the original here to compare it with. I do not have the original.

Q. Did you ever give the material, of which this is a photostatic copy, to Mr. Jaffe?—A. Absolutely not. I did not have any copy of this in my possession in 1945. This was written in Chungking, February 1944. I did not retain any personal copies of this memorandum.

Q. You had no personal copies of it?—A. No.

Q. And you never showed it to Mr. Jaffe in this form or any other form?—A. No, I did not see this until this time—after my writing.

Mr. ACHILLES. Was your memorandum transmitted to the Department?

A. There is apparently no record of its having been transmitted to the Department since DC/R did not locate any dispatch transmitting it.

Mr. ACHILLES. May I examine the document?

The CHAIRMAN. That being so, how did this document arrive in this country?

A. I have no idea unless it was reported through other channels such as the Army Joint Intelligence Collection Agency, which is part of the Army. Some of our reports in China, I believe, were given to OSS and OSS may have forwarded some of them.

Mr. ACHILLES. I see nothing on the document to say that it was transmitted officially either to the State Department or any other Department.

Q. I call your attention, Mr. Service, to a covering sheet on this document which bears the signature of James M. Horan, major, AGD, and ask you what that covering sheet states?—A. It states as follows: "This document comprises an excerpt from a confidential report now on file in the Intelligence Library, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, General Staff."

Q. That would suggest that your memorandum and enclosure was in fact transmitted by the military headquarters at Chungking to the War Department in Washington, would it not?—A. Yes, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. Where did you find that information that you have just given?—A. That was on a sheet attached to the photostat, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it, Mr. Achilles, you examined the photostat without looking at the cover sheet.

Mr. ACHILLES. That is correct.

Q. Now I show you Document B-13 and ask you if this does not appear to be a copy of Document B-12?—A. It appears to be an exact copy.

Q. And I show you document B-14 and ask you if it does not appear to be a copy of B-12?—A. It is an exact copy.

Q. So that the answers you have given with respect to Document B-12 apply equally to B-13 and B-14?—A. They do.

Q. Now I show you Document B-15—

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, I wish to say at this point that Documents B-15, B-16, and B-17 have already been covered in the testimony. The testimony was, as I recall, Mr. Service, that you did not have a copy of this document in your possession.—A. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And that you did not give a copy to Mr. Jaffe?

A. That is correct.

Mr. STEVENS. You did not have a copy so therefore you could not.

A. I didn't have one.

Q. Now I show you Document B-18 which consists of a photostatic copy of a typewritten copy of what appears to be all or some portion of a despatch from the American Embassy at Chungking to the State Department, together with 44 pages of material, including a photostat of a typewritten copy of a 1-page memorandum dated September 8, 1944; subject, "Communist Criticism of Chiang Kai-shek's Opening Address to the People's Political Council," and bearing the name "John S. Service" at the end, which encloses certain translations of a Chinese newspaper.

The CHAIRMAN. What number is this?

Mr. RHETTS. B-18.

Q. I ask you whether you ever showed any of this material to Mr. Jaffe?—A. If I understand your question correctly, the answer is "no." This is an Embassy despatch and I did not at any time ever show Mr. Jaffe, nor any other person outside the Government, an Embassy despatch. As for the part of this which appears as an enclosure memorandum I wrote, which I believe is my memorandum No. 25, that is the type of material which I would have considered quite proper to show to Mr. Jaffe. I don't have any specific recollection of whether I did or not. I would have shown him my own personal carbon copy of my memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of the memorandum?

A. September 8, 1944. It is simply reporting public newspaper criticism of a speech by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and I believe is unclassified, and although it may have been transmitted by classified despatch, I don't know, there is no indication here of the classification of the original despatch.

Q. Did you ever see any of this material—this translation?—A. No, sir.

Q. Called Status of Conversations on the Communist Issue.

A. I am sure I never saw the whole despatch or any part of it except of course my memorandum, which is an enclosure.

Q. But all this other material, consisting of some 20-odd pages of translation, did you ever see that before in your life?—A. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any indication as to what agency of the Government this despatch is addressed to?

A. It is addressed to the honorable, the Secretary of State.

Mr. RHETTS. It is a typewritten copy of a despatch and the first page of the typing is single spaced. The second page is single spaced and runs for a half page and continues on to the next page, which is typed and double spaced, and the fourth page is double-spaced typing down to the middle page, and stops in the middle of a sentence and goes on to the final page which is again in single-spaced typing and bearing at the end, in typing, "Respectfully yours, C. E. Gauss."

Mr. ACHILLES. May I examine that?

Mr. RHETTS. * * * indicating it was typed by a number of different people and in no sense an exact copy of an original dispatch, nor that the content may be exact.

Mr. ACHILLES. I notice no handwritten signature appears on this photostat. Mr. Service, were any dispatches from Chungking at that time sent in on 8 by 11 paper?

A. No, sir. All I have ever seen were sent on the long legal size paper.

Mr. ACHILLES. This appears, I believe, to be a copy subsequently made of a dispatch rather than a carbon copy of the original.

A. That is correct.

Q. Now I show you document B-19, Mr. Service, which consists of a one-page covering memorandum, dated October 4, 1944, Chungking, China, bearing in typewriting at the end "Joseph K. Dickey, Colonel, GSC, Forward Echelon, USAF/CBI," and enclosing an excerpt from a memorandum evidently prepared by you and bearing in typewriting at the bottom, the words "John S. Service," which memorandum encloses memorandum of interviews and conversations with prominent Communist political and military leaders held by Gunther Stein, Maurice Votaw, John Service, and Isaac Epstein, and I ask you if you ever saw the document of which this is a photostat?—A. No, sir; I never saw the document of which this is a photostat.

Q. The attachment is an excerpt from a memorandum which you prepared, is it not?—A. Yes, it appears to be practically the full text of my Memorandum No. 3 from Yen-an, dated July 30, 1944.

Q. And that is Document No. 166?—A. It is part of Document 166.

Q. This excerpt here leaves off the heading of your memorandum?—A. It leaves off all the heading.

Q. And retains the remainder of the text?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you ever show this material to Mr. Jaffe? I am referring to Document B-19, or the material of which it is a photostat.—A. No, sir; I never had it in my possession.

Q. Did you ever show your own carbon of your memorandum on this subject to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I am reasonably certain I did not because although it is merely interviews with correspondents and a couple of interviews with me of exactly the same character, it would have been, you might say, a violation of confidence to the newspaper correspondents for me to have given Mr. Jaffe access to the notes of Mr. Epstein or notes of other correspondents. They were generous in turning over their notebooks to me when I first arrived in Yenan so that I could very quickly get the advantage of their stay of 3 or 4 weeks in Yenan previously.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand from your testimony, Mr. Service, that you had carbon copies of your reports that appear as enclosures in both B-18 and B-19.

A. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But that you did not show either of those to Mr. Jaffe.

A. No, sir; and of course the carbon copy which I had in my possession—the memorandum—it was in different form.

Q. The carbon copy of your memorandum which is contained in B-19?—A. In 166.

Q. It was in a different form than it appears in B-19?—A. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice your report appears as an enclosure in B-19, your Document 166 in this proceeding. Is there any document number to your report which appears in B-18?

A. No, sir. No, I am sorry we have no document.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of 166?

Mr. RHETTS. The date of 166?

The CHAIRMAN. Your report which is Document 166.

A. My memorandum No. 3.

Q. No. 166 is a despatch enclosing— A. It encloses two reports.

The CHAIRMAN. I should have asked what is the date of your Report No. 3?

A. It is July 30, 1944. It was forwarded to the Department by a Chungking despatch 2923, dated September 1, 1944, and I see the stamp of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, indicating it was received in the Department prior to September 19, 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the classification of B-19? Is it unclassified?

Mr. RHETTS. B-19 itself bears no evidence of any classification. That may have been left off in the course of the copying.

Mr. ACHILLES. I notice a cover sheet to the effect that this is an excerpt from a secret report now on file in the Intelligence Library MID.

Q. Now I show you document B-20, Mr. Service, which is a photostatic copy of four typewritten pages of material headed, "Subject: China—Communist—Kuomintang Relations," which commences with a quote "Brief" and bears the typewritten words "V. F. Meisling, Major, Infantry, Acting Executive, JICA/CBI Branch." There follows certain material which is evidently an excerpt from a memorandum of yours and bears on the top of page 2 the words "John S. Service," and I ask you if you ever saw that before?—A. No, I never saw the report of which this is a reproduction.

Q. I take it you did not give the report, of which this is a reproduction, to Mr. Jaffe?—A. Certainly not. I never had it in my possession and never even saw it.

Q. Did you ever give to Mr. Jaffe your own copy or any copy of the substantive content of this document?—A. This appears to be a drastic condensation of a memorandum which I wrote in Chungking on November 3, 1943, which is our Document No. 120. I had no copy of that memorandum of November 3 in my possession and could not and did not show it to Mr. Jaffe.

Q. Now I show you Document B-21. This document consists of three separate sets of papers which are stapled together. One consists of four pages and is headed "Department of State, Division of Chinese Affairs," and bears the date, "September 26, 1944." The second page of this material bears the heading at the top of the page "U. S. Embassy, Chungking, September 8, 1944." It is addressed to the Secretary of State and bears the typewritten signature at the bottom of page 3, "Respectfully yours, C. E. Gauss." Can you indicate what the first page of this material is?—A. Well, the first page is a summary and comment on the dispatch, apparently drafted by Mr. Chase in the Division of Chinese Affairs. As Mr. Larsen mentioned yesterday, if a dispatch came in from the field that seemed to be of particular interest, one of the officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs, and I believe it is customary in other divisions,

was assigned the chore of digesting it and commenting on it before it was circulated. Mr. Larsen mentioned that he was particularly interested in these comments by the officers of CA since it gave a clue as to the policies or thinking of the Department on the policy.

Q. The first page of this material appears to be one of those summaries and comments?—A. That's right.

Q. And the remaining three pages appear to be copies of the dispatch?—A. The remaining three pages seem to be a typewritten copy. It isn't a carbon copy but a typewritten copy of dispatch 2944.

Q. Did you ever see that dispatch prior to June 6, 1945?—A. No, sir.

Q. Or this covering summary and comment?—A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any report of yours in there?

A. Yes, the dispatch No. 2944, enclosing my Report No. 5 as an enclosure.

Mr. ACHILLES. May I examine that a moment?

A. The dispatch and my report appear as our Document 168.

Mr. ACHILLES. I notice again that the copy of the dispatch is on short paper and indicates no handwritten signatures so I assume that that again is a copy subsequently made of the dispatch and presumably also of the summary memorandum on the first page.

A. That is correct. You can also see, by comparison with the summary memorandum, that it isn't an exact copy. The summary memorandum was typed on 5-by-8 paper whereas this is full-sized letter paper.

Mr. ACHILLES. That is correct.

Q. Now the second set of material, stapled together here, consists of five pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material which bears the heading, "U. S. Army Observer Section, APO 879, August 3, 1944, subject: Communist Policy Toward the Kuomintang," and bears at the end of the material, on page 6, the typewritten words "John S. Service." Does that appear to be the substance of your Report No. 5?—A. Yes, sir. It is not an exact copy.

Q. Does it bear the number?—A. It does not bear the number and omits the last paragraph.

Q. But otherwise it contains the substance of your Report No. 5, which was in fact transmitted by Dispatch No. 2944?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you ever seen the material, of which that is a photostatic copy?—A. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it the dispatch is your Document No. 168?

A. That is correct.

Q. And I take it, therefore, you never gave that material to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I did not.

Q. Did you ever give Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of your Report No. 5?—A. I don't think so; no.

The CHAIRMAN. You did have that in your possession?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now I show you the third set of papers that are a part of this document, B-21, consisting of four pages stapled together, bearing the heading, "Subject: The Communist Policy Toward the Kuomintang," in handwriting. At this material is a photostatic copy of handwriting and I ask you if you ever saw that before?—A. No, sir, I do not recognize the handwriting and I have never seen it.

Q. You did not give that to Mr. Jaffe, did you?—A. No, sir.

Q. What do these notes appear to be?—A. These handwritten notes appear to be excerpts from the memorandum—my Report No. 5.

Q. I show you Document B-22, which consists of two sets of papers, stapled together, one consisting of seven pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material headed, "Subject: First Informal Impressions of the North Shensi Communist Base." The material under this subject continues for the first 3½ pages and in the middle of page 4 appears the words, "Subject: Desire of Chairman of Communist Central Committee for Continued American Representation of Diplomatic Character at Yen-an." I ask you if you ever saw the material, of which this is a photostatic copy, before?—A. No, sir, I never have.

Q. Can you indicate to the Board what this material appears to be?—A. It appears to be a copy—I should say an excerpt from my Report No. 1, written at Yen-an on July 28, 1944.

Q. All of it?—A. I should say that the first 3½ pages are an excerpt from my Report No. 1. The second half—the lower half of page 4 is an excerpt of my Report No. 2, written at Yen-an on July 28, 1944, and the last two pages—

Q. Just a moment. I should add, in terms of my attempts to describe this document, that the last two pages are headed, "Subject: The Communist Policy

Toward the Kuomintang."—A. Which is an excerpt of my Report No. 5, which was described under B-21.

The CHAIRMAN. We are talking about B-22?

A. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That contains parts of—

A. Of three reports.

The CHAIRMAN. One, two, and five?

A. That is correct.

Mr. ACHILLES. And the document itself is a dispatch?

A. It is just a sheaf of excerpts without any identification—excerpts from three different reports.

The CHAIRMAN. These are carbon copies?

Mr. RHETTS. Those are photostatic reproductions of typewritten material.

Q. Does your name appear anywhere in this sheaf of excerpts, Mr. Service?—

A. I don't see it anywhere.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you prepare those excerpts?

A. No, sir; I have never seen them before.

Q. I take it, therefore, you did not give them to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I did not.

Q. In any form?—A. In any form.

Q. The other portion of this Document B-22 is a photostatic reproduction of two pages of handwritten material headed, subject: "First Informal Impressions of the North Shensi Communist Areas by an American Observer from Observer Group, July 1944." I ask you if you ever saw that before?—A. No, sir.

Q. Do you recognize the handwriting?—A. I do not.

Q. Are you satisfied it is not your own?—A. Absolutely.

Q. Does this refer to any memorandum or report that you have prepared?—A. Yes; this is an excerpt of my report No. 1, drafted in Yen-an on July 28, 1944.

Q. That is the same report that we have been referring to in the other portion of this Document B-22?—A. Yes.

Q. I believe you already testified you have never shown that report to Mr. Jaffe in any form?—A. Excuse me, I understood you to ask me if I had ever shown these documents (17 pages of typewritten material). I am sorry. I misunderstood your question because this memorandum, No. 1, of which I had a personal copy in my possession may be one I did show to Mr. Jaffe. It is purely first impressions and I might say that prior to this time it had already—some parts of it had already appeared in print.

Q. Some parts of what—your memorandum?—A. I would not say some parts. It was obvious from an article written in Life magazine that the author had read this memorandum. The similarity of language indicated someone had shown it to him.

Q. Who was the author of the article in Life magazine?—A. Theodore White.

Q. Did you show him your memorandum?—A. I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of your report No. 2?

A. July 28, 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. The same as No. 1?

A. I might say my impression of the classification of the early Yen-an reports is that when we first went to Yen-an—the Observer Group first went up—there was no release of information of the fact that we were there. The press correspondents were not, for instance, allowed in their dispatches during the first weeks we were there, to mention our presence. Therefore, there was an abnormally high classification on early reports. Later on it became general knowledge and it was allowed to be mentioned in the press and the need for classification of some of our reports was reduced. The classification of "secret" on this is influenced, I am sure, partly by the fact that the whole matter of our presence there was a secret at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. You have testified that you might have shown a copy of your report No. 1 to Mr. Jaffe. What about 2 and 5?

A. I think I already testified on 5 that I would not, and similarly on No. 2, that I would not show that. No. 2 was a conversation with Mao Tse-tung in which he indicated his desire to have continued American representation. That was as close to a diplomatic note up there that we had. It was a request from the head of the Communists which I was forwarding to the Embassy.

Q. I show you Document B-23 which is a photostatic reproduction of three pages of typewritten material, headed: "First Informal Impressions of the North Shensi Communist Areas by an American Observer from Observer Group," July 1944.

Mr. ACHILLES. Isn't that Document B-22?

Mr. RHETTS. B-23.

Q. Appearing above it in handwriting is the word "Service." I ask you if you ever saw that document before?—A. No, I never have.

Q. Or the document of which it is a reproduction?—A. No.

Q. What does that appear to be?—A. Well, actually, this is practically identical with B-22 in that it contains excerpts from three separate reports; from my report No. 1, "First Informal Impressions of the North Shensi Communist Area by an American Observer from the Observer Group"; from my report No. 2, "Desire of Chairman of Communist Central Committee for Continued American Representation of Diplomatic Character at Yen-an," and report No. 5, "Communist Policy Toward the Kuomintang." I haven't compared it to see if they are the identical excerpts but it may well be a copy of the handwritten excerpt.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this paper a copy of the same material that is in your Document 165?

A. Well it is excerpts, sir, from several documents, 165, 164, and 168.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Q. So that insofar as the substantive content of this Document B-23, your testimony relating to Document B-22 is applicable to this document?—A. That is right.

Q. You never saw the material of which this is a photostatic reproduction?—A. That's right.

Q. Now I show you Document B-24 which consists of what appears to be a photostatic reproduction of dispatch No. 2667 from Chungking, dated June 12, 1944, and signed by C. E. Gauss, which dispatch encloses a memorandum No. 76, dated June 2, 1944, bearing the typewritten words at the end, "John S. Service." Now, I ask you if you ever saw the dispatch of which this is a copy, prior to June 6, 1945?—A. I do not believe I ever did see the dispatch.

Q. In the handwriting on the first page of this dispatch, what is indicated there?—A. It isn't awfully clear, "2 War, 1 Navy, 1 FCL, 2 CA, 1 JA, 1 POL files." Also there is written on the face of it "Not sent to OWI," followed by the initials FPL."

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of an ozalid, isn't it?

Mr. RHETTS. I do not know. It could be the photostat of the original or it could be a photostat of an ozalid.

A. I would say it is more likely to be a photostat of the original because of the clarity of the signature at the end.

Mr. MORELAND. It is a photostat of an ozalid copy.

Mr. ACHILLES. If that was a photostat of an original, that would be the first original document we have yet found in Jaffe's possession.

A. Somebody who was in CA at that time may be able to tell us; for instance, "FPL," which is Frank Lockhart, who was liaison officer of OPI.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say for the record that this is a photostat of an ozalid in possession of the FBI.

Q. Did you ever show this dispatch, of which this is a copy, or the ozalid of which this is a copy, to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any indication on that paper as to whose copy this ozalid was?

A. No, sir. There again it might be a question of somebody, who was in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs or Chinese Affairs, knowing whether it was customary for these instructions regarding routing to OWI to be written on one of the FE copies or CA copies or the original. My own guess would be, and it is purely a guess, that it was probably written only on the ozalid that circulated in the Division of Chinese Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. This is probably one of the CA ozalids.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now attached to this dispatch is a copy of a memorandum of yours; is it not?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you ever give the copy, of which that is a reproduction, to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir; I did not have it in my possession. I did not have a copy of this memorandum with me.

Q. So that you could not have given Jaffe the substance of this?—A. No; I could not have—

Q. And did not?—A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have to adjourn at this point.

(Meeting adjourned at 5:35 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: Friday, June 2, 1950, 10: 10 a. m. to 12: 40 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building, Washington, D. C.

Reporter: Violet R. Voce, Department of State, C/S reporting.

Members of board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman, Theodore C. Achilles, Arthur G. Stevens, Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Representative for Mr. Service: Charles Edward Rhett, Reilly, Rhett & Ruckelshaus.

(The Board reconvened at 10: 10 a. m.)

The CHAIRMAN [Mr. Conrad E. Snow]. May we proceed?

Mr. MORELAND. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to say that Mr. Larsen has indicated that he will appear at 2 o'clock this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. You may proceed, Counsel.

Mr. RHETT. Will you take the stand, Mr. Service?

Thereupon, Mr. John Stewart Service, a witness previously produced and sworn in his own behalf, resumed the stand and testified further, as follows:

Questions by Mr. RHETT:

Q. Continuing our examination of the documents which were under discussion at the close of yesterday's session, I show you Document B-25, which is a photostat of an ozalid copy of dispatch No. 2986, dated September 21, 1944, and which consists of three pages and is signed by C. E. Gauss. Attached to this is a four-page memorandum which is report No. 13, dated August 19, 1944, and bears at the end the typewritten words "John S. Service," and attached to this memorandum are five pages of material headed "Hsin Hua News Agency, English Broadcasts." I show you this Document B-25, Mr. Service, and ask you whether you ever gave the ozalid, of which this is a reproduction, to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No; I did not.

Q. Did you ever see this dispatch prior to June 6, 1945?—A. To the best of my knowledge, I did not.

Q. I ask you to look at the original of this dispatch, which is document 174; this shows distribution: MID, 2 copies; ONI, 1 copy; Foreign Activity Correlation, 1 copy; Special Political Affairs, 1 copy; OSS, 2 copies; CA, 2 copies, does it not?—A. Yes. It also shows, Political File, 1 copy.

Q. Now, the enclosure to this report No. 13 is a memorandum prepared by you, is it not?—A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever show your own personal copy of this report to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I doubt very much whether I did. I believe I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a copy of it?

A. Yes, sir; I had a personal copy of this. It is based on published information, but I don't believe that I would have shown my personal copy of this to Mr. Jaffe.

Mr. MORELAND. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

A. I might mention that this dispatch No. 2986, which is our document No. 174, was received into the Department of State prior to October 11, 1944. It bears the stamp of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on that date.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there indication on the ozalid copy as to whose copy that was?

A. There is written up on the top "Not sent to OWI," with the initials "FPL." Mr. Achilles. Do you know whose initials "FPL" are?

A. Frank P. Lockhart, who was acting as the Office of Far Eastern Affairs liaison officer with OWI at that time, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that indicate to you whose copy this ozalid was?

A. I rather believe, sir, that sort of notation was written only to CA or FE copies, but I'm not positive on that point. That is a sort of question that Mr. Chase might be able to help us on, or somebody else who was in the Division of Chinese Affairs at that time.

Questions by Mr. RHETT:

Q. Now, Mr. Service, I show you document B-26, which consists of three pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material, the first page of which is labeled "Report No. 31," dated September 23, 1944, and various typewritten words at the bottom "John S. Service." Attached to this is a 2-page memorandum labeled "Memorandum of a Part of a Conversation With Po Ku on September

12, 1944." I ask you if you ever gave the material, of which this is a photostatic reproduction, to Mr. Jaffe?

In that connection I direct your attention to the material written by hand in the upper right-hand corner which says: "See: Okano, Susomo in Biographical Notes." Do you recognize that handwriting?—A. No, sir; I do not.

Q. Is it yours?—A. No; it's not.

Q. Now, to revert to my question, which I didn't give you an opportunity to answer, did you ever give the material, of which this is a photostatic reproduction, to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I'm sorry, I don't understand your question exactly.

Q. My question is whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the three pages of typing, of which this is a photostat?—A. No, I did not give him these three pages of typing, of which this is a photostat.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you explain what, if anything, you may have given him?

A. It's possible, sir, I may have allowed him to see my personal copy of this memorandum. This is a memorandum based entirely on statements by the Chinese Communists, which were not given in confidence to me and were available to other people, simply their statements and views regarding postwar treatment of Japan. This is the type of material which I think I would have been willing to allow Mr. Jaffe to see or any other interested writer.

Q. I take it that with respect to this, as with respect to all the others except the one memorandum you have no actual recollection that you gave them to Jaffe?—A. No; and I'm positive that I did not give him the original sheets of which this is a photostat because there are several typing mistakes, and so on, here.

Q. Is that an exact copy of your original memorandum as you prepared it?—A. Well, I don't know, sir, since I don't have my original copy here. But I don't believe it is.

Mr. ACHILLES. Is this the document which Mr. Larsen admitted having given to Jaffe? Is it the one where he recognized the handwriting as his own?

Q. Yes; it is one of those.—A. The dispatch 3092 which transmitted my memorandum, Memorandum No. 31, of which this is a copy, to the Department reached the Department prior to November 18, 1944, since I see it is stamped by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on that date.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Will you examine the photostat of the carbon copy which you have, which bears the handwriting identified by Mr. Larsen as his, and see if there is any indication where that copy was prepared?—A. I see no indication, sir.

Q. There are no marks on it indicating any division of the State Department?—A. No. It is merely a typewritten copy and, except for the handwriting on here, I see no other indication of origin.

Mr. RHETTS. May I inquire, according to the information in possession of the Board, this does not purport to be a photostat of an ozalid copy?

The CHAIRMAN. No. This is a photostat of a carbon copy.

Mr. RHETTS. A carbon copy of something?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; typed material.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Referring to the original dispatch which transmitted your report No. 13, the distribution of this dispatch is indicated as follows, is it not? MID, 2 copies; ONI, 1 copy; OSS, 2 copies; Foreign Activity Correlation, 2 copies; Political File, 1 copy; Japanese Affairs, 2 copies; and CA, 2 copies. Is that right?—A. That is correct.

Q. The stamp appearing on the face of the dispatch also indicates that this document, the original dispatch, went to the Division of Territorial Studies, does it not?—A. Yes, sir; it does.

Mr. ACHILLES. I can see no indication on the photostat as to the source of the carbon copy.

Q. Now I show you document B-27, which consist of six pages of photostatic reproduction of certain typewritten material. It is dated March 25, 1944, and after the first full paragraph of the material on page 1 are the typewritten words "V. F. Mesing, Major, Infantry."

The CHAIRMAN. This is the photostat of a carbon copy.

Q. Thank you. Now I ask you, Mr. Service, if you ever saw this material, of which this is a photostatic reproduction?—A. No, sir; I have never seen it before.

Q. Will you describe very briefly to the Board what it appears to be?—A. I believe it is a copy of a report forwarded by Joint Intelligence Collection Agency

at Chungking. I think that the name "V. F. Mesing" is a typing mistake and it should be "V. F. Meisling," whose name has appeared on several other copies of JICA reports.

Q. When you say "forwarded by JICA," where was it forwarded?—A. Forwarded to the War Department by JICA. The report itself appears to be an excerpt and extensive quotation of a memorandum which I prepared in Chungking on March 18, 1944, and which appears as our document No. 133 in the proceeding.

Q. Since you have never seen the material, of which this is a reproduction, I take it that you did not give that to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir; I did not; and I did not have a copy of my memorandum with me in the United States.

Q. So you did not give your personal copy of your memorandum or in any way give him this material in substance?—A. No, sir; I did not. I could not.

Q. I show you document B-28 and ask you if this appears to be another copy of the same material?—A. Yes, sir; it is.

Q. I invite your attention to the cover sheet on this document and ask you to indicate what it states?—A. The cover sheet is signed by James M. Horan, Major, AGD, and states, "This document comprises an excerpt from a secret report now on file in the Intelligence Library, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, General Staff."

The CHAIRMAN. Have you indicated that this is a copy of your document No. 133?

A. It's an excerpt, sir. The material is excerpted from our document 133.

Q. Now I invite your attention also, Mr. Service, to an additional page attached to this document B-28 which is headed, "Secret, Joint Intelligence Collection Agency, China-Burma-India, Intelligence Report," and I ask you to look at the material at the lower right-hand corner of this document which indicates the distribution of the document made by MID, and ask you to indicate what that is, the distribution shown here?—A. It shows the following distribution: FE/SEA, original; Special BR, 2 copies; CIG, 1 copy; ONI, 3 copies; OSS, 1 copy.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any indication on the photostat whose copy this was?

A. I see none, sir.

Q. I take it that, with respect to the material involved in B-28, your answers are the same with respect to B-27 of which it is a copy?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now I show you document B-29 which consists of five pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material, the first page of which is dated "Chungking, November 27, 1942, No. 758," and addressed to the Secretary of State and bearing the typewritten words at the bottom "C. E. Gauss."

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a carbon copy.

Q. Thank you. Attached to the first page are three pages headed "Subject: Chinese Trade in Strategic Materials with Japan," and bearing the typewritten words at the end "John S. Service." The last page of this material is headed "Wolfram," and at the bottom appears the words "Source: No. 758, Chungking, November 27, 1942, BEW File No. 520866," and I ask you if you ever saw the material of which this is a photostatic reproduction?

A. I never saw the material of which this is a photostatic reproduction because this is not typed in a way the Embassy submitted the original dispatch. It is typed on short paper instead of long paper.

Q. Do you think you ever saw the actual Embassy dispatch before June 6, 1945, the dispatch of which this appears to be a typewritten copy?—A. Yes, sir; I probably did, because this was prepared, the original dispatch, on November 27, 1942, when I believe I was still in the Embassy in Chungking, in which case I probably would have seen the dispatch when it was prepared. I can check the dates here. No, sir; I left Chungking on November 26, 1942, so that lets it out. Since the dispatch was dated November 27, 1942, I probably never even saw the original dispatch.

Q. I ask you whether you gave material, of which this is a photostatic copy, to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir; I did not.

Q. Referring to the attachment which appears to be a copy of a memorandum prepared by you, can you identify that as a memorandum you did prepare, Mr. Service?—A. Yes, sir; I remember the subject. It bears my initials. I believe it is a copy of a memorandum which I prepared after that long trip I took through the northwestern provinces of China in the summer and fall of 1942.

Q. Did you ever show your own personal copy or any other copy of this memorandum to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I had no personal copy of this memorandum. I never showed any copy to Mr. Jaffe.

Q. Will you look at the last page of this material and point out the portion which indicates the source and tell us whether that suggests where this material came from?—A. Well, this last line reads, or contains the words "BEW File No. 520866." BEW to me would indicate the Board of Economic Warfare. This type of file number is not a Department of State file number. And this would indicate that either the original—that it either originated in the Board of Economic Warfare or from someone who had access to their materials who know their file numbers. Nobody in the Department of State would ordinarily know their file numbers.

Q. Was there any Board of Economic Warfare in 1942, Mr. Service?—A. Certainly, sir.

Q. Did they have any offices in Chungking?—A. Well, I can't state with certainty whether they had established their offices in Chungking by that time. They certainly were represented. They certainly had representatives visiting Chungking by that time and they eventually had a fairly large office there. But, as of '42, I'm not sure.

Mr. ACHILLES [examining document]. This does appear to be a BEW copy, or at least to have been obtained from BEW. I note that it is typed on short paper and the photostat does not show the handwritten signature, so I assume that that is a copy made subsequent to the transmission of the dispatch.

Q. Now, Mr. Service, I show you Document B-30. It consists of four pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material. The first page is dated 10th of October 1944. In this case it is Report No. 40, and it bears the typewritten words "John S. Service" at the bottom. Attached to this are three pages of typewritten material headed "Memorandum" and bearing at the end the typewritten words "John S. Service." I ask you if you ever showed the material, of which this is a photostatic reproduction, to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I'm certain I did not.

Q. Did you ever show him your own personal copy of that memorandum?—A. I'm sorry, sir, I didn't understand the last question. You asked whether I had shown the paper, of which this is a photostatic copy, to Mr. Jaffe?

Q. Yes.—A. I did not.

Q. Did you ever show him your own personal copy of this memorandum?—A. I'm certain that I did not, sir.

Q. This is the report which has been also known in these proceedings as Document No. 193, is it not?—A. It is a part of 194138, sir; 193 is an Embassy dispatch which transmitted a copy of this memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a report of which you had a personal copy?

A. I believe I did.

Q. Actually, as Document 193 appears in the document book, it consists only of your report, does it not? And is not the transmitting dispatch?—A. Yes, sir; I should have said that this is the same material as appears in Document 193.

Q. Now I show you Document B-31.

Mr. ACHILLES. Before we leave B-30, may I examine it. I see no indication whether B-30 is a photostat of a carbon copy of the report or a copy made subsequently.

A. I might say at that point that my typing, I'm sure, is a lot cleaner than that typing there. I'm positive it is not a photostatic reproduction of my personal carbon copy because the typing is extremely amateurish there and even though I'm not a professional I would be sure that I had done a better job than that.

Q. I show you Document B-31, which consists of 11 pages of a photostatic reproduction of typewritten material. It is dated August 27, 1944, and is Report No. 15. At the bottom of the second page it bears the typewritten words "John S. Service." The remaining pages are headed "Interview with Mao Tse-tung" and are dated August 23, 1944. I ask the Board whether it has information as to precisely what this is?

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostatic copy of a carbon copy of typed material.

Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the material of which this is a photostatic reproduction?—A. No; I did not give him the material, the paper of which this is a photostatic copy.

Q. Do you have your own personal copy of this report?—A. I did at that time, sir; I do not know.

Q. That is, you had it on June 6, 1945?—A. Yes; I think so.

Q. Do you recall whether it was in this form, by which I mean can you ascertain whether this could be a carbon copy of the memorandum you prepared?—A. Well, I have already said, sir, that I did not give the paper, of

which this is a copy, a reproduction, a photostatic reproduction; does that not answer your question, sir?

Q. It does not answer the question I'm now asking. I'm asking you whether this material here appears to be an exact copy of the memorandum as you prepared it.—A. Well, I don't have any copy; that is, I don't have my own copy here to compare. It may be a copy, but it is certainly not an exact copy.

Q. I'm trying to find out whether it appears to be an exact copy, in short, a carbon copy or the original of the memorandum you actually prepared.—A. No, sir; it is not.

Q. It is not an exact copy?—A. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a personal copy of this report?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. This is now B-31. Do you think you may have shown to Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of this report?—A. No; I think I did not. I think I should mention, sir, if I may, that this is one of three, and the State Department received this memorandum of mine, as one of three enclosures to dispatch No. 3018. That dispatch was received in the Department prior to October 27, 1944, since I see the stamp by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on that date. I also notice that the other two enclosures to that dispatch also appear among the list which has been furnished to me of my reports which were found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. And it seems certainly a coincidence that he should have copies of all three enclosures to that single dispatch. This dispatch appears as our Document 177.

Mr. ACHILLES. It's a dispatch to the State Department?

Mr. RHETTS. No, sir. You mean B-31?

Mr. ACHILLES. Yes, B-31.

Mr. RHETTS. B-31 is not a copy of the dispatch to the State Department. It is merely a copy of Report No. 15, which I believe you will find gives no indication as to what its source is.

Mr. ACHILLES. I should like to examine that. Information in possession of the Board indicates that that is a copy of a document on file in MID.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I show you Document B-32, which consists of eight pages, photostatic reproduction of typewritten material, the first page of which is dated September 28, 1944, which is known to be Report No. 34 and bears at the bottom thereof the typewritten words "John S. Service." The remaining six pages are headed "Policies of the Chinese Communists affecting their attitudes toward the Soviet Union and the United States." There is also a cover sheet attached to this document signed by James M. Horan, major, AGD, stating that "this document comprises an excerpt from a secret report now on file in the intelligence library of Military Intelligence Division, War Department, General Staff." And attached to that is a small sheet of paper indicating distribution: POL, 1 copy; RUSS. SPC. LIB. HQAAF, SPEC. BR. I ask you whether you gave the material, of which this is a photostatic reproduction, to Mr. Jaffe?—A. Well, I'm not sure I understand your question.

Q. Before asking that question I'd like to ask the Board if it can identify what the material is which is reproduced here.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a photostat of a typed paper, a carbon copy.

A. I am sorry I am not sure I understood your question exactly.

Q. What I want to know is whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the paper which is photostatically reproduced here?—A. No, sir; I'm sure I did not.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Did you show him a personal copy of the report?—A. I may have allowed him to see my personal copy of this memorandum. It is a memorandum based entirely on Communist material and Communist sources. It's the same type of material which I had used in background talks, for instance, before the Institute of Pacific Relations here in Washington in November 1944 and on various other occasions. I'm sure it was alluded to in most of my talks and interrogations and questions.

Q. What is the classification of your report?—A. There is no indication at all of classification. The only copy that the Department of State has been able to locate came from the files of DRE, and I assume from the files of Research Analysis Branch of OSS. They have stamped it secret, but it is obviously their own stamp. Yes, I do see a typewritten "secret" at the top here.

Q. Then the report is classified "secret"?—A. Apparently it was.

Mr. RHETTS. But you do not know what classification you may have put on the report yourself?

A. Well, the only copy that we have now is this copy which apparently was made by OSS. It's not my original copy nor a carbon copy of my original copy.

Mr. ACHILLES. As to the material in the report, do you feel that you would have classified it secret?

A. Well, I may have, sir, in September 1944. At that time, of course, I had not been to the States, had not been discussing this material. By April of '45, when I first met Mr. Jaffe, a great deal had been written about the Chinese Communists. At least 10 or 12 correspondents had visited Yen'an and had come out or had written or sent out articles about it. The fact of our mission up there was no longer even restricted and, as I say, by that time this was old stuff, by April 1945.

So, even though it might have been reasonably classified fairly high in September, there was no longer any need for classification of that type of material by the spring of '45. You see, by April '45 Guenther Stein was on the verge of publishing his book, all of these correspondents had extensive articles, for example, Life magazine, the New York Times, and so on, had very much the same material.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I show you Document B-33, which consist of five pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material, dated March 13, 1945, Report No. 10, subject: "The views of Mao Tse-tung: America and China." It contains a short summary following which appears the typewritten words "John S. Service" and thereafter the remainder of the material which is headed "Memorandum, conversation with Mao Tse-tung." At the end are the typewritten initials "JSS."

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a typed copy.

Q. Thank you. Now I ask you whether you think you may have shown the material, of which this is a photostatic reproduction, to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir; I did not.

Q. Do you think you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of this memorandum?—A. It's quite possible; yes. It's merely an account of conversation in which General Mao discussed the situation in China in terms similar to the way he was discussing it fairly frequently with correspondents and other visitors to Yen'an.

Q. Is this the memorandum of conversation with Mao which you earlier testified that you recalled showing to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir.

Q. It is not?—A. No, sir.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. What is the classification of this document?—A. It does not appear on B-33, but I see the original was classified secret.

Q. I notice that that report is dated March 13, 1945. Could you indicate why you gave the secret classification at that date?—A. No, sir; I don't see any justification for such a high classification.

Q. Does it contain any comment by you on the views expressed or the situation indicated by Mao?—A. It contains a little, a very brief comment, but none which reflects on American policy or criticizes American policy.

Q. Does it contain any information of military value?—A. None whatever. Interestingly enough, this may be part of the reason—this is a quotation of Mao: "American's intentions have been good. We recognize that when Ambassador Hurley came to Yen'an and endorsed our basic five points he could not have endorsed them unless he knew that President Roosevelt thought likewise." That is just quoting Mr. Mao. At that time these basic five points in the draft agreement of November 10, 1944, were becoming general knowledge but had not yet been officially admitted. They had not been released by the two parties.

Now, I'm not quite sure when those facts were released. They were well known in Chungking and the Chinese Communists were talking about them fairly freely but I don't think that we had admitted the fact that Ambassador Hurley had endorsed them. When I say "endorsed them," shall we say "counter-signed them." That may have been the reason why I put some classification on it.

Q. Was the existence of those five points public knowledge in April?—A. Well, it was known to every correspondent, sir. I don't think that the American Government had officially admitted the fact that Ambassador Hurley had endorsed them in any way. I can't answer your question specifically, sir.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I show you document B-34, which consists of three pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material.—A. Excuse me. We have to do some research but you will find, certainly in the books that were written very soon after this period, the five points are mentioned and also Ambassador's Hurley's trip, and so on.

Q. I show you document B-34, which consists of three pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material bearing the date March 20, 1945, No. 20 and bearing the typewritten words "John S. Service." I ask the Board what further identification it has of this document.

Mr. MORELAND. This is a typed copy.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a typed copy.

Q. Did you give the typed copy, of which this is a photostat, to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir; this is in a different form from the copy which I had, the personal copy which I had in my possession.

Q. Did you prepare, from the personal copy you had, any further copy and give that to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir; I never gave any of my personal copies to anyone.

Q. Do you think you may shown your personal copy of this report to Mr. Jaffe?—A. It's possible, but I doubt it, sir. I don't think I did.

Mr. STEVENS. What is your reason for doubting that, Mr. Service?

A. There is nothing particularly secret about the information in it, but it wasn't the type of material which I understood Mr. Jaffe was interested in seeing. He was interested, as I remember, in mainly what the Communists were saying, what their policies were, what they were doing. And this is a different type of material.

Mr. ACHILLES. Yen Hsi-shan is not a Communist?

A. No, sir.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I show you document B-35, which consists of six pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material, dated April 1, 1945, No. 26, bearing toward the bottom of the first page the typewritten words "John S. Service," followed by "Memorandum of Conversation with Communist Leaders," and at the end the typewritten words "John S. Service." I ask the Board what further identification it has of this document.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a typed copy.

Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the typed copy of which this is a photostat?—A. No, sir; I did not. It's not typed in the form in which I prepared my memorandum.

Q. Do you think you may have shown him your own personal copy of this memorandum?—A. Yes; I think it was this memorandum which I showed him on my first meeting with him.

Q. This is the one, is it, that he asked to retain to read through?—A. Yes. Yes; I think he did retain it.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Did he retain that paper at your first meeting or did you afterward include it in the papers you allowed him to retain at the second meeting?—A. Well, I'm not positive on that point, sir. I think that probably I allowed him to keep it along with the others.

Q. Not at the first meeting, but at the second meeting?—A. Well, he just kept it after the first meeting and then retained it with the others after the second meeting. I believe that is what happened, but I can't state for certain.

Q. What is the classification of this document?—A. There is no classification appearing on document B-35.

Q. But that is a typed copy of a paper which bears the classification of what?—A. Of secret, sir.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Which document bears the classification secret?—A. The original, sir, which appears as our document No. 226.

Q. In other words, that was your own classification, Mr. Service?—A. Yes; it was my own classification.

Q. Would you explain why, having it classified as secret, you allowed Mr. Jaffe to keep a copy?—A. I'd say the reason probably was that this is in one sense advance information on issues that were probably going to be discussed and decisions made at the party congress, the imminent party congress of the Communist Party.

Q. When was the congress held?—A. The date of the congress was not definitely announced; but when I had the interview on April 1—actually the interview was on March 31—I say that “Chou En-lai twice made pointed remarks to the effect that it was unfortunate that I could not stay in Yenan another 10 days, that I would find the stay worth while and interesting. (I took this to be a hint the party congress is to be convened within that time.)”

We had been expecting the congress to be convened ever since about the 1st of March. That was the reason first why I had gone to Yenan. They would not announce a definite date—the reasons they didn't specify, but I understood they feared there might be Japanese bombings. They feared there might be a Kuo-mintang fomented disturbance, something of that sort. So the meetings were to be quiet, without any public announcement. I assumed by late April that the meetings probably had already taken place. Actually, we find that they didn't take place until a little bit later than that, about the 1st of May, possibly, although I'm not sure—they may have delayed the release of Mao Tse-tung's speech until the 1st of May, when the meetings were over. But there was every indication that they would be held within the next few days. And I imagine that was the only reason for a classification of secret at the time I wrote the report.

Q. Really, the essence of your answer is that you classified the document secret on April 1 because it related to an event which was expected to occur shortly?—A. That's right.

Q. And that by April 19 you believed the event had taken place?—A. April 20; yes, I thought it probably had. And it may have—I'm not sure. As far as I know, the first publicity was put out about the 1st of May, but because of the Communist tactics the congress may well have been over by that time.

(At this point, 11:30 a. m., the Board recessed and reconvened at 11:38 a. m.)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now, Mr. Service, I show you Document B-36, which consists of seven pages of photostatic material dated October 9, 1944, subject: American Officer and Foreign Correspondents Report Active Popular Support of the Eighth Route Army at Front. Toward the bottom of the first page appears the typewritten words “John S. Service,” followed by certain material prepared by M. A. Casberg, major, Medical Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a typed copy.

Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the typed copy of which this is a photostat?—A. No, I did not. This is not written in the same form in which I submitted my memoranda.

Q. Do you think you may have shown him your own personal copy of this memorandum and the enclosure?—A. May I hear that question again, sir?

Q. I say, do you think you may have shown to Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of this memorandum with the enclosure?—A. I very much doubt it. I think I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. You had a personal copy?

A. I had a personal copy; yes, sir.

Q. Would you indicate why you doubt that you would have shown him this?—

A. Well, I doubt it mainly because it contains at least an excerpt from Major Casberg's report. The other material, of course, is mainly by newspaper correspondents and their discussions, accounts of their trips. I have no idea of what classification was put on Major Casberg's original report.

Q. What classification did you put on yours?—A. I put secret on mine and I made most of them secret at the time. This report was dated in October, this report of correspondents.

Q. October of what year?—A. Of 1944. And the material in it had been written up and made public by the correspondents by the spring of 1945. This general material had been alluded to by me many times in conversations and interrogations and in the background talks which I had been authorized to give.

Q. But you do not believe you showed your own copy of this memorandum to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I think I did not.

Q. Now I show you Document B-37, which consists of seven pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material. I ask you whether or not Document B-37 appears to be identical with Document B-36?—A. It does.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of B-36.

Q. So that the discussion relating to B-36 is fully applicable to B-37?—A. That is correct.

Q. Now I show you Document B-38, which consists of two pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material dated March 22, 1945, No. 22, and at the bottom of the second page is the typewritten words "John S. Service." Will the Board tell us what identification it has for this document?

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a typed original copy.

Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the typed copy of which this is a photostat?—A. This is not in the form in which I prepared my memorandum.

Q. So that your answer to my question is?—A. No.

Q. Do you think you may have shown to Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of this memorandum, Mr. Service?—A. It's quite possible I did; yes. I can't say for sure, though. It simply lists a number of public appointments of officials in China.

Q. Do you know what classification you placed on your own memorandum?—A. Well, the only copy which we have been able to find was the Department of State file.

The CHAIRMAN. This is your Document No. 224?

A. Yes, sir. The Department has found my original copy and I notice it bears the typewritten classification, which was my own classification, of secret.

The CHAIRMAN. You say they found your report. Is this just as you prepared it or is it a copy that you are looking at, this Document 224?

A. Document 224 is the original document of my memorandum.

Q. And you typed that yourself?—A. Yes.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Why did you classify that secret if it just related to public announced appointments?—A. Well, because it is critical of the generalissimo and of the Central Government, and it was customary to put a classification on those to limit their circulation and to restrict attribution. However, it was the type of material which was discussed for background with the press in China. It was known to the press.

Q. Would the same critical comments be made by you and through the correspondents?—A. Yes.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I show you Document B-39, which consists of two pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material, dated October 9, 1944, Report No. 39, bearing at the bottom of the second page the typewritten words "John S. Service." Will the Board give us further identification of this?

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of the typewritten original.

Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave Mr. Jaffe the typewritten original, of which this is a photostat?—A. I did not. I say that because this is in a different form from the way I prepared my memoranda.

Q. Do you think you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of this report?—A. I may have, yes. This was exactly the same material which I had used repeatedly in background talks. The appraisal of the popular support and strength of the Chinese Communists—it was not American policy. It is purely an attempt to appraise the strength of the Communists in China.

Mr. STEVENS. Does that refer to the populace strength, military strength, or what?

A. The point was made their military strength depends on the popular support. Having the popular support they are able to wage guerrilla warfare and are therefore a military factor. But that was written, of course, in October 1944 and by April 1945 it was old stuff. I myself had probably said that almost verbatim in my background talks to the IPR twice; I said the same thing to numerous groups all over official Washington; the same things had been written by correspondents who had been out in China, and who had traveled through the country and you will find very much the same material written of course in the books and articles by the people up there which already appeared by April 1945.

Q. Do you know what classification you placed on this memorandum in October 1944, when you wrote it?—A. I do not have the original or a carbon copy of the original. I notice the Embassy which transmitted it as an enclosure to Despatch No. 3191 on November 24, 1944, classified it as secret.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that Document No. 192?

A. Yes, it's a part of Document 192.

Q. I show you Document B-40, which consists of three pages of photostatic reproductions of typewritten material, dated August 29, 1944, Report No. 16, and bearing the typewritten words at the end "John S. Service."

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a typewritten original.

Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the typewritten original, of which this is a photostat?—A. No, sir; I'm sure I did not. This is not exactly in the form in which I prepared my original memorandum.

Q. Do you think you may have shown him your own personal copy of this memorandum?—A. No, I'm quite sure I did not.

Q. Do you care to indicate why you're sure that you did not?—A. Well, I discussed the policy considerations and as I went through them and my memoranda and selected the ones which I thought would be appropriate to let Jaffe see, I exercised in each case judgment based on the subject matter. And I selected, to allow him to see, informative, descriptive ones and I eliminated ones which dealt with policy or recommended policy and, therefore, I think that I did not allow him to see this one. This one, of the three enclosures to Despatch No. 3018, which is our Document No. 177—I don't think I let him see that.

Q. Now I show you Document No. B-41, which consists of three pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material, dated September 3, 1944, Report No. 26, and bearing at the bottom of the third page the typewritten words "John S. Service."

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a typewritten original.

Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the typewritten original, of which this is a photostat?—A. No, sir, I'm sure I did not. I did not. It's not in the form in which I prepared my reports.

Q. Do you think you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of this memorandum?—A. No, I think I did not.

Q. Your basis for thinking that is what?—A. Well, this again is a memorandum discussing policy. The subject is a Need for American Policy Toward the Problems Created by the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party.

Q. Now I show you Document B-42, which consists of six pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material dated August 31, 1944, Report No. 19.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a typewritten original.

Q. At the bottom of the fourth page appears the typewritten words "John S. Service" and then there follows certain notes relating to a map which accompanies this Report No. 19. I ask you whether you ever showed Mr. Jaffe the typewritten original, of which this is a photostat?—A. No, sir, this is not in the same form in which I prepared my memorandum. I did not, sir.

Q. Do you think you may have shown Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of this memorandum?—A. I doubt very much whether I did. I think I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a copy of your document No. what?—A. Our Document No. 180, sir.

Q. I refer you to Document 180, which is the original of a Despatch No. 3020; the distribution of this despatch to which your Report No. 18 is an enclosure is shown as follows: MID, 2 copies; ONI, 1 copy; Foreign Activity Correlation, 1 copy; OSS, 2 copies; Political Files, 1 copy; and CA, 2 copies. Is that right?—A. That is correct.

Q. Now I show you Document B-43 which consists of six pages—

Mr. ACHILLES. I'm sorry. Could you repeat the answer on B-42, as to who you had shown this, whether you had shown Mr. Jaffe your copy of that?

A. I believe I did not.

Q. Document B-43, which consists of six pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material, dated September 4, 1944, Report No. 22, bearing at the bottom of the last page the words "John S. Service" in typewriting.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a typewritten original.

Q. I ask you whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the typewritten original of which this is a photostat, Mr. Service?—A. No, I did not.

Q. Do you think you showed him your personal copy of this memorandum?—A. It's possible that I might have. The material is entirely of a historical account or description or account of the development of the New Fourth Army. It is a type of material which I was using and had used in these background talks. I'm sure, for instance, that much of the subject matter was mentioned in those talks.

Mr. ACHILLES. Was the information contained in it of military significance at the time?

A. Well, only a sense that any discussion of the strength of Chinese Communist armies was of military significance. However, those were claims which they were advertising to the world as vigorously as they could by every means available.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a copy of your Document 182 and is classified as secret?

A. Yes, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. What was the date of this report?

A. My memorandum is dated on September 4, 1944. It was transmitted to the Department by Despatch No. 3058 from Chungking, dated October 13, 1944. The only copy that we have at present is an ozalid and it doesn't show the date stamps of the various divisions in the Department so it's impossible for us to say on what date it was received in the Department. But I assume it would be in late October 1944.

Mr. RHETTS. The ozalid, which is our Document 182, shows distribution, does it not, as follows: MID, 2 copies; OSS, 2 copies; ONI, 2 copies; foreign activity correlation, 1 copy; political file, 1 copy; and CA, 2 copies?

A. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. It's unfortunate that Mr. Jaffe did not use a date stamp.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I show you Document B-44, which consists of four pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material dated October 2, 1944, Report No. 37, and bearing in the middle of the first page the typewritten words "John S. Service," followed by material headed "Memorandum."

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a typewritten original.

Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the typewritten original, of which this is a photostat?—A. I did not. This is not the form in which I prepared my memorandum.

Q. Do you think you may have given Mr. Jaffe your own personal copy of this memorandum?—A. I quite possibly did. I can't say for certain.

Q. You quite possibly did?—A. Yes, I may have.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. What is the classification of this document which I take it is your Document No. 190?—A. We do not have my original memorandum, but it was transmitted to the Department by Chungking's dispatch No. 3094, dated October 25.

Q. 1944?—A. Yes, 1944. The dispatch carries the classification of "confidential."

Q. Is that probably the classification you gave the original? Is that what you classified it originally?—A. I assume so, sir; although there is no certainty on that. The Embassy sometimes raised the classification on my memoranda but I imagine that "confidential" was probably my original classification.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. I show you Document B-45, which consists of seven pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material dated September 10, 1944, Report No. 26, and bearing at the bottom of the last page the typewritten words "John S. Service."

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a carbon copy.

Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the carbon copy of which this is a photostat?—A. No, I did not. I did not. It is not in the form in which I prepared my memorandum.

Q. Do you think you may have shown him your own personal copy of this memorandum?—A. I may possibly have. I can't say for certain.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. In each case where you say you may have shown him, do you mean that you may have let him borrow the copy to take home with him, as you have testified in your statement?—A. That is correct, sir. This is again a descriptive report based entirely on Communist sources, discussing to some extent the success of the Communist Party in getting control in the guerrilla areas, their political methods used, etc. I don't consider it at all complimentary to the Communists. It's a type of material which was really the backbone of the briefing sessions in the background talks which I had given on the Communists.

Q. I take it that this is a copy of your Document No. 183. What is the classification of Document 183?

Mr. RHETTS. Document 183 is in the hands of the reporter, not this one.

Q. Can you tell from recollection what the classification is, or shall we await its return?—A. That, if I remember rightly, sir, may have been given a high classification by the Embassy. I'm only speaking from memory, sir. This was the only form in which we have the memorandum now, of course, which is as an enclosure to a dispatch from the Embassy in Chungking. And, as I remember it, the Embassy made considerable comment on my memorandum. They did not agree with it entirely. And they may have put a classification of "secret" on it. I rather imagine that they did. Of course, I had no knowledge of the Embassy dispatch, and it wasn't until these proceedings when I saw the Embassy dis-

patch that I learned that they had not agreed in all respects to agree with my memorandum.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. I show you Document B-46, which consists of four pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material; the first page is dated Chungking, May 27, 1944, and is addressed to the Secretary of State and bears the typed and handwritten signature of C. E. Gauss. Attached to this dispatch is a one-page memorandum bearing the typewritten words: "John S. Service" at the bottom, followed by two pages of material headed "Summary of new democracy," by Mao Tse-tung.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of an ozalid copy.

Q. Now, I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you gave to Mr. Jaffe the ozalid copy of this document, of which this is a photostat?—A. I did not. In fact, I have never seen the ozalid. This is a dispatch prepared by the Embassy, of which I did not have any knowledge.

Q. Have you ever seen the dispatch or an ozalid copy of it prior to June 6, 1945?—A. I'm sure I never had.

Q. The enclosed material is a copy of a report prepared by you; is it not?—A. That is correct. It's a copy of a memorandum which I prepared on May 14, 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that have a document number?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you think you ever showed to Mr. Jaffe your personal copy of your report, which is attached to this ozalid reproduction of the dispatch?—A. I did not and I could not have since I did not have in my possession a copy of this memorandum.

Q. Is there anything on the face of the dispatch here which suggests in any way what disposition or distribution might have been made of it from the State Department?—A. I see that the ozalid had on the face the writing "For background use only. Please return." followed by the initials "FPL," which I assume are the initials of Frank P. Lockhart, whom I believe at that time was the Office of Far Eastern Affairs liaison officer with OWI. And I might suggest, therefore, that this was a copy sent from the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to OWI, although that is just pure conjecture.

Mr. ACHILLES. May I examine that please. This document indicates that it was lent to someone by Mr. Lockhart and apparently there is no way of ascertaining whether or not it was returned to him.

The CHAIRMAN. It would indicate, would it not, that it was an OWI copy at one time?

Mr. ACHILLES. Owing to the fact that Mr. Lockhart was FE liaison officer with OWI.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that be a fair interpretation of that fact?

A. I suggest it, sir, I think so.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I show you document B-47, which consists of 4 pages of photostatic reproductions of typewritten material; the first page is dated Chungking, July 26, 1944, and is No. 2790 and is addressed to the Secretary of State and bears the typewritten words at the bottom "C. E. Gauss." Attached is a 1-page memorandum dated July 11, 1944, No. 94, and bears at the bottom the typewritten words "John S. Service." The remaining 2 pages of the document are dated July 3, 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of an ozalid copy, an ozalid copy of the dispatch with enclosures.

Q. I ask you whether you ever gave Mr. Jaffe the ozalid copy, of which this is a photostat, Mr. Service?—A. I did not, and I do not believe that I ever saw the original dispatch or any ozalid of it.

Q. Before now?—A. Before these proceedings, yes.

Q. Do you think you may have ever given Mr. Jaffe your personal copy of Report No. 94, which is an attachment to this dispatch?—A. I did not give him any copy of this and I could not have, since I had none in my possession.

Q. I invite your attention to document 162, which is the original of this dispatch. It shows distribution, does it not, as follows: MID, 2 copies; ONI, 1 copy; CA, 2 copies; Foreign Activity Correlation, 1 copy; Political files, 1 copy: is that correct?—A. That is correct, yes.

Q. It also bears the stamp on the face of it, does it not, of the Division of Territorial Studies?—A. It does.

Q. Indicating that the original was distributed to the Division of Territorial Studies?—A. That is correct.

Mr. ACHILLES. Does it indicate in any way that that particular ozalid was a copy which was furnished to the Division of Territorial Studies? I should like to examine it. I see a notation on here "Not sent to OWI," with the initials "FPL," but I see nothing to indicate whether the particular ozalid copy was in fact sent to the Division of Territorial Studies.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any indication on there as to whose particular paper this was?

Mr. ACHILLES. I see the initials "JWA." Do you know whose initials those were?—JWA initials appear on almost all of these dispatches filed in DC/R and I believe it to be someone in DC/R. You see it here, for instance, on this stamp "Division of Communications and Records."

Mr. ACHILLES. I see nothing that would indicate whose particular copy this was.

Mr. STEVENS. Is it not a fact, Mr. Achilles, that if this was the one in which the handwriting of JPL was on, it may very well have been the copy that CA had? JPL was in CA, was he?

Mr. RHETTS. You mean FPL.

A. FPL was in FE. That is Lockhart.

Mr. STEVENS. Would that be a fair interpretation, Mr. Achilles?

Mr. ACHILLES. It would be hard to say whether it was a FE copy or a CA copy or whether they both used the same copies. Ordinarily it would be the original to FE, would it?—A. As I understand it, sir, the original—and I think we can see that from the stamps on the face of the original dispatch—would be routed to FE, but none of the ozalids. The ozalids were made up according to those instructions: MID, 2 copies; ONI, 1 copy; CA, 2 copies, foreign activity correlation, 1 copy; political files, 1 copy. And those ozalids would go only to those offices and CA then forwarded copies generally to Territorial Studies perhaps, I'm not sure.

Mr. RHETTS. Well, this particular dispatch indicates that the original one went to Territorial Studies at some point, does it not?—A. It does.

Mr. MORELAND. (Off the record.)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. I show you document B-48, which consists of three pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material, bearing the date May 23, 1944, No. 2604, addressed to the Secretary of State and bearing on the first page the typewritten words "C. E. Gauss." And attached to—

Mr. ACHILLES. May I interrupt for a moment. Now that we have finished with the ozalid copies I'd be grateful if Counsel could read as briefly as he reasonably can the description of the remainder of these documents.

Q. Beginning at the bottom of the first page is the enclosure to the dispatch dated May 10, 1944, and at the end of the page appears the typewritten words "John S. Service." Will the Board state what this is?

Mr. MORELAND. It is a photostat of typed material.

Q. It is an original typed copy. I ask you if you ever gave Mr. Jaffe the original typed copy, of which this is a photostat?—A. I did not. I did not have any copy of my memorandum, which was included there, in my possession.

Q. Did you ever see the dispatch of which this is a copy before June 6, 1945?—A. To the best of my knowledge, I never did.

Q. Now I show you Document B-49, which is two pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material bearing the date "Chungking, May 23, 1944," and bearing at the end the typed and handwritten signature of "C. E. Gauss," and I ask the Board what this is?

Mr. MORELAND. It is a photostat of an original document.

Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you ever gave to Mr. Jaffe the original dispatch, of which this is a photostat?—A. I did not, definitely. I never saw the original document, as far as I know.

Q. This document, Document B-49, is a copy of the dispatch which was a part of Document B-48, is it not?—A. That is correct.

Q. Except it does not also have attached a copy of your memorandum.—A. That is right. I think it was interesting to note that it was distributed only to CA and was received in the Department on June 7, 1944.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. You say you did not have with you in 1945 your copy, any copies of that material?—A. I had no copies of that material.

Q. Therefore you could not have given them to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I could not.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I show you Document B-50, which consists of four pages of photostatic reproduction of certain typewritten material. The first page is dated March 23, 1944, and is addressed to the Secretary of State and bears the typewritten words at the bottom "C. E. Gauss." Attached is a three-page memorandum dated March 20 and bearing at the end the typewritten words "John S. Service." Will the Board tell us what this is?

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a typed copy.

Q. I ask you, Mr. Service, whether you ever gave to Mr. Jaffe the typed copy, of which this is a photostat?—A. I did not.

Q. I direct your attention to the handwriting, which appears in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this material, which says "Amerasia, Criticism on page 2 of Enclosure." Do you recognize that handwriting?—A. No, sir.

Q. Is it yours?—A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. For the record I'll state that that is the handwriting that has been identified by Mr. Larsen as his own.

Q. Do you think that you may have ever shown or given to Mr. Jaffe your personal copy of the memorandum which is attached to this dispatch?—A. I did not, and I could not have, since I did not have any personal copy of that memorandum.

Q. Now I show you Document B-51, which consists of six pages of photostatic reproduction of typewritten material. The first page is headed "Joint Intelligence Collection Agency," and part way down the page are the words "V. F. Meisling, Major, Infantry, Administrative Officer, JICA/CBI Branch." The second page bears the reproduction of the signature of Maj. James A. Horan, AGD, stating that "This document is an excerpt from a confidential report now on file in the Intelligence Library, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, General Staff." The third page is a reproduction of the first page and the fifth page bears at the bottom the words "John S. Service" in typewriting. The last page is mostly blank, evidently indicating a map was there, and certain notes appear at the bottom.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a carbon copy.

Q. Did you give to Mr. Jaffe the carbon copy of which this is a photostat?—A. I did not. I have never seen this document and had no copy in my possession and no copy of my memorandum which is excerpted here.

Q. So that you could not have given Mr. Jaffe this material in any form?—A. I could not have, and did not.

Q. Now I show you Document B-52, which consists of a large sheaf of papers, the cover sheet of which is dated October 4, 1944, and indicates that Joseph K. Dickey, Colonel, GSC, Forward Echelon, USAF/CBI, is transmitting attached reports obtained by Mr. John S. Service. These reports include notes of interviews furnished to Mr. Service by Guenther Stein, Maurice Votaw, I. Epstein, among other papers.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a typed copy.

Q. Mr. Service, I show you now Document B-19, and I ask you whether or not Document B-52 appears to be identical with Document B-19?—A. It does.

Q. Well, the testimony you gave yesterday with respect to B-19 is in all respects applicable to your testimony with respect to Document B-52?—A. That is correct.

Q. Document B-52 appears to contain more pages than Document B-19, does it not?—A. It does.

Q. I suggest the witness be given an opportunity to compare them in some detail since they are very bulky.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Did I understand Mr. Service to say that among his personal properties he had only one copy of each document?—A. That is the best of my recollection, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice that the FBI picked up from your residence at the time of your arrest more than one copy of some of the documents.

Mr. STEVENS. Not residence, his office.

A. I cannot explain that. I was not given any chance to confirm the list of material they had found in my desk, but I cannot recollect any instances and cannot think of any reason why I would have had more than one copy.

The CHAIRMAN. I'll have to give you a chance to reflect on your answer to this question.

(The Board adjourned at 12:40 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN S. SERVICE

Date: Friday, June 2, 1950, 2:07-5:30 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, NS.

Reported by: E. L. Koontz, CS/Reporting.

Hearing in the above-entitled matter was reconvened at 2:07 p. m., Gen. Conrad E. Snow, chairman, presiding.

Board members present: Gen. Conrad E. Snow, chairman, Theodore C. Achilles, member, Arthur G. Stevens, member.

Also present: Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Appearances: Charles Edward Rhett, Esq., for Reilly, Rhett & Ruckelshaus, appearing on behalf of Mr. Service.

(The meeting reconvened at 2:07 p. m.)

(Emmanuel S. Laren, called as a witness by the Board, being duly sworn, continued testifying as follows:)

Questions by Mr. RHETT:

Q. Now, Mr. Larsen, just after the close of the session 2 days ago I asked you if you would be good enough to bring with you today a copy of your manuscript entitled "They Called Me a Spy." Do you have that with you?—A. No; I don't have it with me.

Q. Do you not any longer have a copy?—A. Yes; I have a copy of it. I sent a very brief note to my father and asked him to return it immediately.

Q. I see. Your father has your only copy?—A. My father has it. Yes.

Q. And you have requested your father to return it to you?—A. Yes; I have requested him.

Q. I wonder if you would be good enough to make that available to the Board when you receive it?—A. Yes; I will, definitely.

Q. I will undertake to see that some copy of it is made so that you will still have a personal copy.—A. Thank you.

Q. But may we rely on you to supply a copy of that to the Board when you obtain it?—A. Yes; you may rely on me.

Q. Now, Mr. Larsen, do you know Mr. Frank Bielaski?—A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know a man by the name of Brooks?—A. Brooks? No.

Q. I should like to introduce into the transcript at this point Document 100-5. (The matter referred to is as follows:)

"DOCUMENT 100-5

"(EXCERPT FROM CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, HOUSE, MAY 22, 1950, P. 7544)

"Mr. BROOKS. I do not know. I think there is a man who can possibly cast some light on that. I think Larson, who was convicted will probably tell all he knows about it. I have never talked to Larson.

"Mr. FEIGHAN. Is he incarcerated?

"Mr. BROOKS. No. He got fined \$500. He stopped in Mr. Dondero's office. He was being blocked from getting another job with the Government. He was all set to be sent out by the Army, he was set to be sent to the Far East. They had hired him. The newspapers got hold of that, and with a little publicity they stopped him.

"I know that he would like to get back in the Government service. Right now he is in the humor to tell anything he knows with some reservations. He is not going to tell what all his own motives were. He can be helpful. He knows the relationship between Jaffe and Service. Service denies that he knew Jaffe. Larson said he knew him well. He said Jaffe had something to do with getting Roth's commission put through. How, I do not know."

Q. I show you, Mr. Larsen, the transcript of certain testimony given by the House committee on May 10, 1946, and direct your attention to this Document 100-5.—A. Apparently this Mr. Brooks is one of the members of the committee that questioned me in 19—no; I will tell you I haven't read—I haven't had time to read all of this here yet.

Q. I will advise you that Mr. Brooks was a witness before the committee?—

A. I see. I don't remember meeting any Mr. Brooks.

Q. Although he testified under that committee by the name of Brooks, it transpired that his name was Frank Bielaski.—A. I see.

Q. Now in this document that I have shown you, Mr. Brooks or Mr. Bielaski indicates that he knows you and has knowledge of your desire to testify before the Hobbs committee and also purports to state that you have particular knowledge of the relationship which existed between Mr. Service and Mr. Jaffe; does he not?—A. I don't know anything of that because I don't know Mr. Brooks, so I can't say what knowledge he had. I had never met him, had nothing to do with him. As far as this testimony of Mr. Brooks is concerned: "He got fined \$500"—if that refers to me, that's right. "He stopped in Mr. Dondero's office"—that's right. "He was being blocked from getting another job with the Government"—that's right. Do you remember I told you at the last—

Q. Yes; I am referring now particularly to his statement that you were in a humor to tell anything you know and that you are not going to tell what all your motives were, but that you do know the relationship between Jaffe and Service, and that you knew that Service knew Jaffe well.—A. No; I did not speak to Mr. Brooks and I did not say that to him.

Q. I want to show you a picture which appeared in the Washington Daily News for Monday, May 22.—A. I have that clipping.

Q. A picture showing Mr. Bielaski. Do you recognize the man we are discussing now from that picture?—A. No, sir.

Q. You never saw the man whose picture appears there?—A. Never saw him. As far as I know I have never seen Mr. Bielaski or the man in this picture here.

Q. I ask that this clipping be introduced as an exhibit.

(Received and marked "Document 328, Exhibit 21, clipping from the Washington Daily News of Monday, May 22, 1950, showing picture of Mr. Bielaski.")

Q. You are absolutely certain you never saw Mr. Bielaski or talked to him?—A. To the best of my knowledge I have never seen Mr. Bielaski alias Mr. Brooks.

Q. Did you ever tell anyone that you had personal knowledge that Jaffe knew Service well?—A. I don't have the testimony of the Hobbs committee, and off-hand I don't remember whether they asked me that question, but there is a possibility that I did state the fact that I once saw Mr. Service with Mr. Jaffe.

Q. Now Mr. Brooks testified before the Hobbs committee on May 10, 1946, and you testified before the Hobbs committee on May 13, 1946?—A. Yes.

Q. Did you at any time before your appearance in the Hobbs committee tell anyone that you had personal knowledge that Mr. Jaffe knew Mr. Service well?—A. Not that I remember.

Q. Did you, in fact, have any personal knowledge of how well Mr. Jaffe knew Mr. Service?—A. No; on the contrary, I knew only that I had seen Mr. Service at that brief moment with Mr. Jaffe in the Statler Hotel lobby, and I have very carefully pointed that out to everyone who has questioned me.

Q. And you had not further knowledge of any relationship between Jaffe and Service except your knowledge of seeing them together for that brief moment?—A. That's right.

Q. Do you know what Mr. Brooks or Bielaski would be referring to when he stated you were in a humor to tell anything you know, although not what your motives were for doing so?—A. No.

Q. Now I believe you also testified before the Hobbs committee on May 13, 1946, is that correct?—A. I am not sure, but I believe that was approximately—

Q. I refer you to page 7545 of the Congressional Record for May 22, 1950.—A. I presume they got the date right there?

Q. I ask that there be included in the transcript at this point, Document 100-9a.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be done.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"DOCUMENT No. 100-9

"(Excerpt from Congressional Record, House, May 22, 1950)

"(Document 100-9a, p. 7548:)

"Mr. LARSEN. I grew up with those boys, and many of them are now big generals. I went to school with some of them. I know them well, but I can judge them fairly and impartially, because I am not tied in with them in any particular way right now. I earn my money from the United States Government. I do not have to be partial to them, observing them at a distance. So I think I was much more impartial than these people in the State Department who are forcing a pro-Communist policy so as to enhance their own little group at the head of which I consider Dean Acheson stands as a leader. What his ambitions are, I do not know. I heard he wanted to become Secretary of State and

President of the United States, and that he hopes to do so with the aid of the liberal element and the CIO and all the people who are making our greatest miseries right now.

"Mr. HANCOCK. Did you ever hear him say anything to indicate his feelings, Dean Acheson?"

"Mr. LARSEN. I never met Dean Acheson, but in discussing official affairs, I was a member of the policy committee for China and Manchuria. We often discussed things which were pool-pooled as impossible. You could not put that over. Dean Acheson will never let that go over. Whatever that was, it was always not in favor of the Communists. He would not allow it to be put over. I will give you a concrete example. They are afraid of you gentlemen up there. We know that. We know that in all our policies. We have to not only consider the public, that is what they say, in America, but we have to consider what Congress would do to us if we went ahead with this.

"In April and May 1945, we had not invaded Japan yet. It was not known by anyone except the high command that we were going to invade Japan and not China. At that time it was all the time speculated upon which part of China we would invade, South China near Formosa and then fight our way up—but the geography is against it, or would we invade North China? If we did, we would come in contact, first, with the Chinese Communists. There was a good share in the State Department that was all in favor of arming the Communists. They were so keen on arming the Communists, when they consider that they were allied with the properly constituted government, I cannot understand; it would be aiding and abetting a regular party, and quite apart from their sympathies. They should have had a better understanding of the international relations and the possibilities. They pursued that policy. I felt day by day I was being pushed outside a little bit. They went to lunch. They had their meetings. I was with them at some lunch meetings where they talked openly about defeating this crowd like Hurley, do everything to get him out. They sabotaged Hurley. You may take my word for that. They sabotaged Hurley. I have given certain little notes and evidence to Hurley that I had committed to memory and helped him with his speech. It was a pity he did not launch it more systematically. He spoiled that for me.

"(Document 100-9b, p. 7552:)"

Mr. HANCOCK. Can it be true that Service has been sent out of the country?

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, indeed; that is true.

Mr. HANCOCK. Who would designate him? The Secretary of State?

Mr. LARSEN. Dean Acheson, who liked him.

"(Document 100-9c, p. 7553:)"

"Mr. LARSEN. I do not care if I never make money in this life. I have never made any. As a P-6, I got \$6,200 a year. I had to entertain Chinese officials. I have a little girl. I had to dress nicely. I managed to pay \$25 a month for a little piece of property. If I had not bought that, I never would have had anything. These fellows are selfish. I do not believe these men are truly pro-Communists. I do not think Vincent is really pro-Communist in his heart. He is just an ambitious person meaning to utilize that at some future date just like they say Acheson has schemed to use it.

"They have all ganged together. It is a pyramid where he is at the top."

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I draw your attention particularly to your statement—by the way, your testimony before the Hobbs committee, was that under oath, do you recall?—A. No; I don't think it was. It was a little—a very friendly little party. We sat around a small table all in easy chairs. I think we were six or seven altogether, and just chatter. There was no, as far as I remember—I was not at a committee testifying in the full sense of a committee being in session. It was more that they had invited me in to talk it over with me.

Q. They evidently made a transcript of the testimony, did they not?—A. Now, that, I don't know. I don't remember anyone there taking notes.

Q. Well, the material before you purports to be the questions and answers recorded at that time, does it not?—A. It appears so; yes.

Q. Now, in that you stated to the committee that the committee could take your word for that—you state: "You may take my word for that. They sabotaged Hurley." Now to whom were you referring by "they"?—A. I can't answer that because I am not sure what the conversation was about. I am reading back here: "You may take my word for that. They sabotaged Hurley." It is rather incoherent, some of this stuff here.

Q. Did you intend to refer to Mr. Service as one of the persons, one of the antecedents of this pronoun "they"?—A. I think that would be unwise for me to say now, inasmuch as I don't remember the details of this here.

Q. Well, why don't you read it over with some care and see?—A. Yes; I have read it over.

Q. You have read it over.—A. But there is a possibility that I referred to Mr. John Carter Vincent and Mr. Service, there is a possibility.

Q. Well, now, will you tell the board what evidence you had that Mr. Service, or anyone else for that matter, but Mr. Service in particular, sabotaged Hurley?—A. Well, I believe they asked me about Hurley's testimony before the Senate committee in December 1945, and they asked me whether I had any knowledge of conversations or other intentions to get rid of Hurley.

Q. Well, on that point there is no indication in that testimony that they asked you that, is there?—A. I have a feeling that this is written from memory and I think they should be asked to produce some sort of a statement before they put this down as legal and dependable testimony. I have not been through this, as I said, and I have been advised by an attorney to make no comments on it, and I think I shall follow that advice.

Q. Well, I ask you again what evidence did you have that Service did, in fact—well, I will ask you this: Did you or did you not make the statement that is ascribed to you here, namely: "You may take my word for that. They sabotaged Hurley." A. No; I don't think I will answer that question for the simple reason that I don't know for sure. If I had a copy of my testimony—and I am sure you gentlemen will agree with me—if I had a copy and I was certain that that was what I said I would say so, I would have to say so. But I am not certain and I don't want to incriminate myself and make a statement now about something which does not satisfy me.

Q. All right, let me ask you this: Did you, in fact, all apart from whether this is or is not an accurate transcript of the testimony you gave—did you, in fact, have any evidence that Mr. Service ever sabotaged Hurley?—A. I have no evidence that he did sabotage Mr. Hurley, but I have a slight indication that he didn't like Mr. Hurley.

Q. What indication did you have?—A. Well, for instance, he attended a lunch one time. We went to the Tally-Ho Restaurant. Mr. John Carter Vincent sent me a note and asked me whether I wanted to go to lunch with him, and I am not sure whether I walked over with Mr. Service or just with Mr. John Carter Vincent. But, anyway, we had lunch together and after we had put our trays down Mr. Vincent mentioned something to the effect that Hurley was making a thorough ass of himself, and that it was about time we thought of some way of getting rid of him. I don't remember my exact answer, but I believe I said something to the effect that, well, I was new in the State Department and I was only a country specialist, and that I would start to hire and fire ambassadors when I became Secretary of State.

Mr. STEVENS. Let me see. You went to lunch with Mr. Vincent. Who else was at that lunch?

A. I remember Mr. Service was there. I don't remember whether Mr. Emerson, or who it was—some third person went with us.

Mr. STEVENS. Have you any idea as to the time? Can you fix a time in there?

A. Sometime in April '45.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. What did Mr. Service say on that occasion?—A. I don't think he said anything.

Q. What basis can you have for the conclusion that Mr. Service didn't like Mr. Hurley?—A. Mr. Hurley had told me that he believed they had worked against him in the field.

Q. Well, on that occasion, on the occasion of this luncheon, there was nothing that occurred that led you to believe that Mr. Service didn't like Mr. Hurley?—A. Except the fact that he was present there.

Q. The fact that he was present at the luncheon at which Mr. Vincent made this remark?—A. And that I do not remember him making any statement to the effect that he didn't want to be a party to that.

Q. Did you have any other basis for believing that Mr. Service tried to sabotage Mr. Hurley?—A. No; I don't remember now any other basis.

Q. Now, you state in the next sentence of this document: "I have given certain little notes and evidence to Hurley that I had committed to memory and helped him with his speech." Will you tell us what little notes and evidence you gave

to Mr. Hurley and when?—A. I did not help him in his speech because his speech was made while I was in Florida.

Q. What speech are you referring to?—A. Well, I am not referring—they are referring to it, so we might ask them.

Q. "Them", who?—A. The members of the committee who made public this statement here. That would probably be the best manner of unraveling this question.

Q. Well, did you give certain little notes in evidence which you had committed to memory to General Hurley?—A. Well, yes, considerably later.

Q. When was that?—A. Oh, it was in December '45. It may have been a week or two after the testimony.

Q. Now what was that evidence and notes?—A. That I would have a hard time remembering now. Five years is a long time. It is easy to have this pop up, but it is difficult to remember. I wouldn't commit myself on it. It would be futile, I think.

Q. I wonder if you would tell us a little bit more about whatever assistance you rendered to General Hurley at that time?—A. No other assistance to General Hurley. You can be sure of that. You can verify that from General Hurley.

Q. You cannot recall at all now what the notes and evidence was that you gave to General Hurley?—A. No; maybe he can.

Q. In the next sentence you say here: "It was a pity he"—referring to General Hurley—"did not launch it more systematically. He spoiled that for me."—A. Yes; I am glad you asked that because I was just going to mention it. It seems to me that sentence is incomplete as far as I am concerned. It could not just pop out of me like that. It must have been in answer to questions posed to me by members of the committee. I presume that they asked me—well, it has been said to me since exactly those words, so I recall them and I recall them now; namely, recently by Senator Ferguson; It is too bad that Hurley went about his business of preferring charges against certain members of the State Department in a rather headlong manner in 1945. He didn't prepare anything and he simply went before the Senate and made a lot of statements that consisted mostly of generalities and brought no dispatches or no proof or anything with him, and on the spot he could not even mention a single—I believe he said "report" or "dispatch" or "incident" to substantiate his charges. Well, now that same thing I heard before. Mr. Dondero was the first man who was interested in the Hurley testimony of 1945, and when I first got the volcano out of Representative Dondero's mind and he settled down to talk to me in a friendly manner he poured out a long story of what he knew about the case beginning as of the Hurley testimony.

Q. What case is this you are referring to?—A. The Amerasia case, more popularly known as the State Department espionage case, thereby involving the State Department, and at that time we talked back and forth probably rather unguarded. It was more an enumeration of what we thought one way or another. I haven't read this here [indicating] and it is possible there will appear evidence in it when I read it, and it is possible that certain things I have said have been suppressed; namely, that I took quite a strong stand to explain that I knew of no espionage nor of any conspiracy or concerted action or special element in the State Department that was tolerated as such that General Hurley referred to.

Q. Well, when you say: "It was a pity he did not launch it more systematically"—A. It is quite possible I said "it was a pity" for him in the oriental sense of the word—I am sorry for him that he didn't make it in a better organized manner.

Q. Well, do you have any reason to believe that had he organized his case better, that he had a good case to make that he was being sabotaged by Mr. Service and others?—A. That I don't know.

Q. What did you mean when you said: "He spoiled that for me"?—A. I don't understand that sentence. That is supposed to be a quotation of my words, but I don't get that at all.

Q. Well, it suggests it meant that you were very disappointed that General Hurley was not very successful in his efforts.—A. I tell you what I will do—I will go into it very thoroughly. I will take my lawyer and go through this and have him demand the transcript, or whatever there is, and then I will answer you on it. I will ask your permission to do that, and, if you will excuse me then, I will leave today a little early and go into this matter.

Q. No. I would like to go ahead with some other questions, but I point out to you that Congressman Hobbs, of Alabama, who introduced this material into the record has stated that it was a transcript, a verbatim transcript, of the

testimony taken before his committee.—A. I don't think there was anyone present at that time taking a transcript, at least I didn't see anyone. He must have sat behind a screen then.

Mr. ACHILLES. There is one sentence on that same page of Congressional Record that catches my eye, a statement attributed to you: "So I think I was much more impartial than these people in the State Department who are forcing a pro-Communist policy so as to enhance their own little group at the head of which I consider Dean Acheson stands as a leader." Do you recall making that statement?

A. I do not recall that. I think those words are pretty well put together without being direct transcript; therefore, I prefer not to comment on them.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. If that is an accurate transcript of what you stated before the Hobbs committee, did you have any actual basis for making such a statement?—A. I don't think it would be wise to answer that question. I will be my own lawyer today for the time being until I bring my own attorney in here.

Q. Now, if you will refer to page 7550 of this Congressional Record that is before you, Mr. Larsen, in column 2 at the top you state that you will supplement your statement "by supplying additional names of persons who were in communication with Jaffe." Did you ever supply that additional information to the Hobbs committee?—A. Which one is that in, column 2, you mean, at the top there—Mr. Chelf?

Q. At the bottom of column 1 Mr. Chelf says: "I wish you would give us the names of these fellows from whom he was obtaining this information" and so forth, and then you state at the top of column 2: "I will supplement my statement with whatever I can remember on that point. I will do it at once today when I get home." Did you ever supply that subcommittee with information?—A. I never went back to the committee. They never sent for me either. I was there only once and that must be on that date here.

Q. Could you supply to this Board the names of additional persons of whom you have personal knowledge that Mr. Jaffe was communicating with and obtaining information from them?—A. Yes; I could do that. I believe I did that the other day in the course of questioning.

Q. Is that a complete list so far as your knowledge, the one that you—A. Well, let me reiterate the names. I knew from Mr. Jaffe himself that he frequently stayed at the home of John and Wilma Fairbank.

Q. No point in going over it again, if that testimony you gave the other day was complete.—A. I see. And another one was Benjamin Franklin Raye, and a third was Michael Lee. I don't think there were any others that I knew of.

Q. Now, I wonder if you would explain to the Board again in some detail, Mr. Larsen, the exact nature of the arrangements that you and Mr. Jaffe made together after you were introduced to Jaffe by Lieutenant Roth. I believe you testified in general that you agreed that you would supply him biographical information on Chinese personalities, is that correct?—A. That is correct; yes.

Q. And he was to supply you with what?—A. Biographical information on Chinese personalities.

Q. The same thing. Now what arrangements were made between you on that? Was Mr. Jaffe to pay you any money for your part of this?—A. No; there was no question of any payment.

Q. Was the arrangement confined exclusively to exchange of this biographical information?—A. That is right, exclusively.

Q. Now I believe in your testimony before the Hobbs committee you indicated that the only kind of information that you did in fact give to Mr. Jaffe was this type of biographical information on Chinese personalities, is that correct?—A. I think that's probably correct.

Mr. RHETTS: I will introduce at this point in the transcript Document 100-7—7a, 7b, and 7c:

(The matter referred to here follows:)

"Doc. No. 100-7

"(Excerpt from Congressional Record—House May 22, 1950)

"(Doc. 100-7a, p. 7546):

"Mr. HANCOCK. Did you remove any of those documents?

"Mr. LARSEN. No. I did take home a number of those that contained lists of personalities, the new Cabinet, and such lists I took home because I would not waste official time sitting doing it. I spent my time at home.

"Mr. SPRINGER. Did you prepare those cards to be left in the State Department?

"Mr. LARSEN. Yes. I prepared cards both for the Navy and State Departments, but I kept my own as a basic file.

"(Doc. 100-7b, p. 7549:)

"Mr. FELLOWS. Where did he get it from?

"Mr. LARSEN. Jaffe got it from all the contacts he had here. He never got anything from little personality material that I gave him, he never got anything else because I have not worked with any other material.

"Mr. FELLOWS. Jaffe had contacts in—

"Mr. LARSEN. In every important agency here. In the Office of Strategic Services, in the War Department, in the Navy Department—remember, I left the Navy Department September 1944, I went to the State Department.

"Roth was always with him. He is the man who introduced me to him, Jaffe, and then tried never to appear with Jaffe when I met him down here.

"(Doc. 100-7c, p. 7550:)

"Mr. HANCOCK. Did you return all of these documents, or did you keep some as a reference?

"Mr. LARSEN. Any list of any personality material or any story of any person, I took home, if I worked on it at all. Sometimes I would not take it, I would just make a note and say that so-and-so is connected with the Communist Party. I found out later he was a member of the Secret Service. Sometimes I went to the extent of typing them off.

"Mr. HANCOCK. And would you take all of those papers back?

"Mr. LARSEN. Of course. I let him see five documents that I listed one time for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They were fresh in my memory at that time. He had not returned them to me—they concerned only personalities. He was to comment on that particular subject."

A. Thereby meaning I remember that I insisted that I had given him no military and naval information such as is claimed, submarines, position of Japanese ships, and other items not related.

Q. Well, did you give him any information that was not related exclusively to material on personalities?—A. No; I don't think so. It was always related to how exclusively anything relates to or does not relate to personalities, a very debatable subject. I think we could stay until late tonight and still couldn't settle that question.

Q. Now, did you supply Mr. Jaffe with any documents originating in departments other than the State Department?—A. No; I don't think so. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Q. I believe at the time of your arrest a large quantity of documentary material, classified material, was found in your apartment, was it not?—A. Yes. That is quite another question.

Q. Did that all relate to personality information?—A. Now it is quite possible that it did not all relate to personality because I had geographical material there. I had myself written the geography of Hunan, Kweichow, Yunan, and various other provinces.

Q. Now in Document 100-7c you are testifying before the Hobbs committee. I believe you indicate some five documents, which you say you listed for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and which Mr. Jaffe had not returned to you.—A. Yes.

Q. Now, were those documents related to this personality information?—A. Yes.

Q. Now I show you, Mr. Larsen, Document B-2. This is a document which the Board showed you the other day. It is a photostat of a Report No. 13, of an ozalid copy of Report No. 13 prepared by Mr. Service, and I want to ask you whether there is anything in that document that relates to personality information?—[After reading:] The answer is "Yes."

Q. I wonder if you would call attention to what portion of it relates to personalities?—A. Very important, glad you showed it to me. It was the refusal of the Soviet Union to enter into a treaty with Sheng Shih-tsai when he asked for one in the face of growing central government pressure in the early summer of 1942. He was a warlord.

Q. Now does that cast any light—A. Yes, yes, very much.

Q. On this general biography or personality?—A. It is the vital point in his biography.

Q. Do you know whether you gave this document, the document of which this is a photostat, to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I don't know; I don't remember, but if I did it would have referred to that Sheng Shih-tsai problem. The history of Sheng

Shih-tsai, if I may say, is roughly as follows: He was a Manchurian warlord and not a native of Sinkiang. He ran away from Manchuria in 1932 after the Japanese had taken over. He fought a rear-guard action in Manchuria from later 1931 to the spring of 1932 together with a general known as Ma Chan-shan.

Q. Just one minute: Now I would like to show you a document—A. Just one second, this is important.

Q. It is not important to the history of this proceeding, the history of this General.—A. Yes: it is. It is important in my answer. Sheng Shih-tsai finally fled into Siberia and with about 4,000 Manchurian troops worked his way, with the knowledge and help of the Russian Communists—worked his way over to Sinkiang, then into Sinkiang with Russian knowledge and agreement, and set himself up as an independent warlord and governor of Sinkiang Province. In that capacity Sheng kept the authority of the Nationalist Government out of Sinkiang as much as he could. He was, therefore, one of the last warlords to openly oppose Sheng and, as such, he was of the greatest interest to all analysts in Far Eastern Affairs inasmuch as Sinkiang is a vast territory, was an integral part of China, and its loss to Russia would mean the beginning of gradual encroachment on China. Therefore, I follow Sheng Shih-tsai's biographical career very closely. I probably have more on him than any other American.

Q. Have you finished?—A. Yes.

Q. Now I would like to show you Document B-1, which is the photostat of an ozalid copy of a report by Mr. Service report No. 13. I believe you were shown this day before yesterday and I would like to ask you if there is any material in that document bearing upon personalities or relative to a biographical file.—A. [After reading.] I remember reading a report on Mao Tse-tung's views and Po-Ku's view in this connection. I presume that if I handled this it certainly had something to do with the personalities mentioned.

Q. Is that the type of document you might have given to Mr. Jaffe as within the category of personality information that you have described?—A. I would not have given it to him.

Q. Are you sure you did not?—A. I am not sure I did not loan it to him or allow him to see it, but I would not give it to him.

Q. Well, if you allowed him to see it, you did so because it was the type of personality information that you were exchanging with him?—A. That is right.

Q. In other words, it would be within the category?—A. Let's see the date on this.

Q. Within the category of information?—A. That's right.

Q. Which you describe as personality information?—A. Correct.

Q. Now I would like to show you Document B-3, which is a photostat of an ozalid copy of a report prepared by Mr. Service which is No. 15 dated March 16, 1945, and I would like to ask you whether that memorandum contains any personality information of the kind that you referred to.—A. [After reading.] Yes; it does. It does not mention any personalities but it gives the opposing views; namely, the views expressed by the Nationalist Government opposed to those of the freedom or autonomy leaders of Sinkiang and other northwestern provinces, but particularly the leader Mahsud who later became Governor of Sinkiang who was at the back—

Mr. STEVENS. Is that name mentioned in there, sir?

A. No; the name is not mentioned.

Questions by RHETTS:

Q. Is that the kind of information you entered on your personality card?—A. Extracts of it, the essence of the information, because one would hear much about a man who stirred up considerable trouble, but it would not always be easily discernible what his actual policy was. That would then come out in a general summary or policy statement.

Q. You knew that this related to some individual, even though his name is not mentioned there?—A. Oh, yes; I would know.

Q. Is that the type of information you exchanged with Mr. Jaffe?—A. An extract from that might have been put in Ma Pu-fang's file, who was the leader of the Mohammedan group in Kan su and Ch'inghai province.

Q. Would this document be the type that you would give to Mr. Jaffe as a personality document?—A. Not as a type of any document that I would give to Mr. Jaffe, or loan to him, but it would be typical of a good summary of what was going on in the northwestern part of China where they had these minority groups.

Q. You say it was not the type of document you would give or loan to Mr. Jaffe?—A. It would be the type of document from which I would extract the salient points whether they were for autonomy, whether they were for continued union with China, and that type of question.

Q. That is the type of information you entered on your own cards?—A. That's right.

Q. But is it the type of document that you would lend to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I would say no document is the type of document I would lend because, theoretically, I would not lend any document if I could possibly avoid it. I believe I explained that very carefully and lengthily last time I was here in my own defense.

Q. Let's get apart from the theoretical—A. And I don't see any particular point in trying to break me down on this question.

Q. Well, I am trying to find out, Mr. Larsen, is what all is—A. Yes, I—
Q. All is comprehended within the category that you use in your mind as—
A. Yes; I am very willing—

Q. As personality information.—A. I am very willing to help you and I am not here in any inimical mood, but I have to protect myself and I have been warned of Mindszenty methods, namely, of asking me the same question a great number of times, which eventually would or might involve me in statements that could be held against me, for instance—

Q. Well, I have only a desire to get from you the truth, I don't want to trick you into any statements.—A. That's right. For instance, last time you pointed out that I had made certain statements or certain statements were attributed to me in my article in Plain Talk of October 1946, and you asked me on three occasions, I think—it might have been four—whether I had any authority to mention those occurrences, or those affairs that I had become acquainted with through my association with the State Department. Is that right?

Q. I asked you in relation to one document, which was evidently a dispatch from Ambassador Ganss, relating the conversation with T. V. Soong.—A. Yes, Well, I very willingly agreed, and I will repeat, namely, that I had no authority to mention the State Department affairs in my article. However, you surely must be sufficiently well versed with the law and the routine matter of self-defense, and intelligent enough in general to understand that when a man is accused of being a Communist and being a spy and associating with Communists and spies, then it is his duty to himself to take everything at his disposal and place it before the public, because it was before the public that I was tried principally at that time, to show that he is not a Communist and that he did not agree with anything that had the least bit of a pro-Communist slant, and, therefore, and on those grounds I rather willingly agreed at that time to express some of those views regarding State Department matters which I now say again should not have gone into an article, should not have been brought before the public. Do you agree with that point of view?

Q. I understand, Mr. Larsen.—A. It is very serious for me, but not very much to you. You might be able to build up a legal point on that and my lawyer advised me they probably are building up a legal point, but then you can go before a committee and say: "Yes, I put those in the article, and I realize I should not have put them, but I was fighting for my life there."

Q. Now I would like to show you another document, Mr. Larsen, which is B-5, which is a photostatic copy of an ozalid copy of Service Report No. 16, dated March 17, 1945, and I would like to ask you whether there was any material in that might be called personality data or biographical data.—A. You showed me this document last time.

Q. Yes; you were shown that, I think, by General Snow.—A. Yes. [After reading.] Offhand I don't see any personality material in here, but I do see references to the Kuomintang's policies on the subject material, namely, relief and rehabilitation in Communist areas. I know the men of the organization from the very beginning right up to the end of the story when finally the Chinese established the collateral to UNRRA, namely, CINRRA, Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation, it starts with a C instead of a U. CINRRA eventually became an organization under Tung Pi-wu, and there was quite a story on that. I don't care to go into that, but if you want me to I will. It is a long story.

Q. No. All I am really interested in is finding out whether this document here appears to have any personality.—A. Yes, it does.

Q. Personality information within the meaning of that term as you use it?—A. Yes, it does; it does have some. The answer is yes, although it didn't mention

the personalities here. Involved in this were all the men on the Communist side from Tung Pi-wu, who handled UNRRA and CINRRA affairs, and all the men on the Nationalist Chinese side, and all the men in the United States who handled the UNRRA affairs, the chief of that out there being Benjamin Kizer and Benjamin Ray.

Q. Well, now, is the information in that document the kind of information that you supplied to Mr. Jaffe as a part of this exchange of personality data?—A. No, I wouldn't say so.

Q. Do you know whether you have supplied Mr. Jaffe with—A. No, I don't know.

Q. Ozalid copy of that?—A. No, I don't know. I might make a note or two for my own concerning Chou En-lai—it is the only name mentioned here, but it is very fleetingly mentioned—"preliminary discussions in Yen-an were conducted by Chou En-lai."

Q. What I am trying to find out, Mr. Larsen, is what is the kind of information which was comprehended within your arrangement with Mr. Jaffe. Now if this is personality information, as you use that term, I suppose that this is the kind of document that you would show or lend to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I think I see what you mean, and I should answer that quite clearly. Personality material in my sense and of value to me in making my cards more than merely a "Who's Who" would comprise data on the career of a person, his political affiliations, and wherever such affiliations cannot be immediately determined certain utterances, certain political steps he has taken, which when pieced together eventually form the complete jigsaw puzzle of his life. Right now no man could sit down and write the biography of General Snow because they do not know everything that has happened and they do not know what will happen in the near future of Mr. Snow. If anyone would have written my biography, let us say, prior to my arrest, I might have been painted as a very fine fellow and a very loyal American, but I doubt whether that picture would be painted of me now, to be quite frank. Therefore, the pieces are put together—I am not the final compiler of the biography of Mao Tse-tung or any other Chinese. That will be done by me if I outlive Mao, and by someone else if I should die before Mao.

Q. Now, is there the name of a single person mentioned in this Document B-5?—A. Oh, yes, yes, a single and very important person, Chou En-lai. I am not quibbling, but that was the first indication—

Q. Where it says the "preliminary"—A. First indication that it says there was top-notch approval of the idea.

Q. Just a minute—A. Yes.

Q. Are you referring to the place where it says: "preliminary discussions were conducted in Yen-an under the chairmanship of General Chou En-lai"?—A. That's right.

Q. Now is that the kind of personality information which you exchanged with Mr. Jaffe?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. So that you would say that this document is the type of document that was comprehended within your arrangements with Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, there was no arrangement with Mr. Jaffe for any document. The answer is "no" to that last question.

Q. Well, you had an arrangement to exchange information with Mr. Jaffe, did you not?—A. That's right, but not documents.

Q. And you carried out that arrangement by, from time to time, lending him documents, did you not?—A. No, that was extracurricular.

Q. Well, what do you mean by extracurricular?—A. That was incidental to the discussion of a certain personality that I made the indiscreet step—I think I mentioned that last time too—and let us not waste too much time or repetition—and allowed him to see it, for which I have taken considerable punishment.

Q. Well, can you tell us is this document, or is it not, one which contains the type of information which you exchanged with Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir, I cannot answer it that way. If you say: Does this document contain information, then I will answer it "yes."

Q. This document represents an example of the type of personality information which you were interested in and, I take it, that is correct?—A. That's right.

Q. And I take it that is the type of personality information that Mr. Jaffe was interested in?—A. Yes, he was.

Q. So that this is the type of document which you might have, as you say, as an extracurricular incident to your exchange of information supplied to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I don't remember that I ever showed him this document, I doubt it

very much. I don't know where he got this here. This is a State Department document, isn't it?

Q. Yes.—A. I will tell you I am extremely sorry I cannot answer you exactly on this. I am not trying to dodge an issue, but I am protecting myself against falling into a trap.

Q. Yes.—A. I was warned to curtail this meeting at any moment when I felt that I was about to fall into a trap that might incriminate me, and place me under double jeopardy and for that reason I shall curtail the interview at 3:30.

Q. You feel that you are going to be falling into a trap about 3:30?—A. Yes, I do feel on or about 3:30 I shall be dangerously exposed since you persist in this type of question.

Q. Well, do you feel that the type of questions which I am asking you are unfair to you, sir?—A. Yes, I think, considering that I am here without an attorney. I realize your point is to gather sufficient evidence to protect Mr. Service against very serious charges which I myself—and you may put that in the record and repeat it anywhere and quote me—I do not believe they are true. I will once more summarize what I have said at the past meeting—that I have undoubtedly, through questioning and pressure and promises, and through my personal animosity to Mr. Service, and Mr. John Carter Vincent—that stems from no personal clash with these two gentlemen, but that was fired within me by a lot of very poisonous talk that was poured into my ear and poured into my wife's ear—agreed that these two men were very much against me, and I believe that as a result of all this I have been extremely unfair to them, and have said many careless things that I should not have said, and that I will now clearly explain on the basis of what I believe at that time, and what I believe now of the general case against Mr. Service; namely, that I do not believe that Mr. Service is a Communist and I never believed he was a Communist. I did believe at a time that Mr. Service's reports were slanted very favorably towards the Chinese Communists, but my voluntary admission, and, mind you, gentlemen, I am not giving this for your sole pleasure—I have given it to Mr. Dondero, Mr. McCarthy, and his assistant, Mr. Ferguson, and the Republican Party's lawyer, I believe his name is Morris, he called on me once, I have his name here—I have stated that I cannot get out against Mr. Service. First, I don't know Mr. Service.

I know nothing about Mr. Service except that his reports seem to me slanted in favor of the Communists and strongly against Chiang Kai-shek, and as an expert, as they very kindly called me, what did I think of that. I pointed out—I was fair enough to point out to all of them, although I didn't have to—that I could very well have been wrong for the simple reason that I sat with my feet under a desk while he was in the field. I could not certify that that was not realistic reporting, and I warned them against building the case against Mr. Service on the Plain Talk magazine because it was not written by me as it is. It is very easy to change a paragraph and give it a different meaning, to add a few points, change the tense of a verb and so on. I have come between two very large wheels, namely, the Republican Party and the Democratic administration; as Mr. Service does not know—but as my friends all know, who know me—I have always been a liberal.

I don't know whether I mentioned to you that when I was in China I wrote in British and Chinese newspapers from time to time against the oppressive, unequal treaties of extraterritoriality. I had the spirit to write that because I went with Chinese boys in Cheng chow, and I grew up with them, slept with them, went and slept with them at their houses. I am not a homosexualist, but when my best friend's father died, then I attended the funeral feast, which lasted several days, and we slept in the same room and talked about what we would do for China when we grew up. I have always been a freedom-loving man, and I have hated many of the things that I came home here to America to see in the political life. I have never been a Communist. I can brag about this: that from the very earliest time I knew something about communism that many others did not know.

Q. I wonder if I might interrupt, Mr. Larsen?—A. Yes.

Q. I don't mean to be discourteous, but do you care to continue with the questioning that I would like to ask you?—A. No; I am not trying to filibuster you out of questioning. If you have an important question to ask, I don't mind stopping and you make your point.

Q. Well, I have a number of questions I would like to ask you.—A. Well, I can finish in one minute. The idea, or the reason for telling you this is that I voluntarily came to the rescue of Mr. Service. I don't want you to think that anyone put any pressure on me. What revolted me was McCarthy's assistant's

methods—he, himself, was kind enough—I spoke very little to him, and he spoke so very little to me. But his assistant's methods—he is pulling a raw one on me right now—I will handle that later. I will handle that personally—Don Surine—very personally in time. I volunteered by notifying Mr. Peurifoy that I had been called, and I didn't like the methods used by Mr. McCarthy's assistant, for which I hold Mr. McCarthy responsible, and I promptly told him that I would not testify to the detriment of Mr. Service, and I will tell you again my reasons for this.

Q. I might say, Mr. Larsen, you have already given sufficient testimony by your article and by your testimony before the Hobbs committee to the detriment of Mr. Service that would be rather hard to undo except by getting at the facts, which is what I have been trying to do.—A. I see. You are free to do that legally in any way you like. However, my reasons, to continue, were two: One, that I knew nothing for certain bad against Mr. Service. Second, that Mr. Peurifoy was put on the spot in a very nasty way. I observed the manner in which he was dragged up there, and the administration was embarrassed.

Q. I don't know.—A. And I could not forget that Mr. Peurifoy had been the first one in the United States Government to stand up for me in spite of everything that I had done to embarrass the State Department; namely, when General Wedemeyer wanted me to write a report for him he went to work and investigated me, and Mr. Peurifoy was the first one to give me clearance as far as not being a Communist, a traitor, and a disloyal this, that, and the other. The second one was the old Ma Perkins of the Civil Service who said that there is nothing against my record in the Civil Service.

The CHAIRMAN. What time are you referring to?

A. I am referring to March 19.

The CHAIRMAN. What year?

A. This year, when I immediately went to Mr. Peurifoy. The recommendation he gave me and the little lift he gave me, I might say, helped in my morale more than anything else, but I didn't get any job out of it yet—occurred in 1947, I think it was.

Questions by Mr. RIETTS:

Q. I would like, if possible, to return to this examination, if you would be willing.—A. I would prefer not to.

Q. I would like to ask you to look at this document B-6 which I have before you.—A. All right, let us have a look at it until 3:30. (After reading.) I don't remember this report here.

Q. Now what I want to ask you about it is whether it contains any of this personality information.—A. I only remember in this document a reference to the statement: "Over a hundred Americans crossing the Japanese-held railways have been made safe."

Q. Now what I am interested in is not what you remember about it, but in reading now.—A. That might involve the personality, the rather mysterious history of young Mr. Hummel, young Dr. Hummel, the son of Arthur W. Hummel, in the Library of Congress, for whom I worked, and who frequently contacted me on the matter of where his son was. His son was lost with these Communists for half a year—Mr. Service knows the story much better, I am sure. And I was interested in the subject, but I don't remember the dispatch itself.

Q. Well, would that be the kind of information that Mr. Jaffe was interested in?—A. No; I don't think I—

Q. Interested in as personality information?—A. No; I don't think so; I doubt it very much; don't remember it.

Q. Do you know whether you gave him that document?—A. I am pretty sure I didn't.

Q. Well, now, I would like to show you document B-4, which is a photostatic reproduction of an ozalid of Mr. Service's report No. 18 dated March 3, 1945.—A. Yes; you showed me that the other day.

Q. General Snow questioned you about it, I believe.—A. Yes.

Q. Now I would like to know whether there is any personality information in that document.—A. On the surface of it, you can state that there is practically nothing. I don't see any names. However, the labor problem in Nationalist China versus Communist China was one of great importance. I am not a Socialist, but I was interested in the very haphazard manner in which the labor problem was handled in China. There was no labor party, but there was a Government Office of Labor. In other words, labor was regimented, and I am in sympathy with whatever Mr. Service and others reported on that matter.

Then came this dispatch, namely, the counterpart: remember Communist China was also China. I was as much interested in Communist China as in Nationalist China, and here comes the establishment of unified labor and women's organization in Communist areas—it is a question I was very much interested in. The Nationalists—

Q. It will fall in the category of personality information?—A. Yes; it would. The labor leader Chu is now with the Communists. He was a Nationalist before. He was one of the first to quit.

Q. Is this the type of information that Mr. Jaffe was interested in?—A. I think he might have been interested in certain points in it. I for one knew—and the State Department did not seem to know—that Chu was a Communist. As late as 1940 I knew that Chu was a Communist. I knew a woman who knew him very well and she said he was a Communist.

Q. Do you think you may have given this document to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No; I don't think so. I doubt it very much.

Q. Why not?—A. Oh, because I think I would be able to extract the bit of vital information from that better than he would. I don't think he would know the connection. I wouldn't have any purpose in giving it to him unless I were at the time giving him a card specifically on labor leader Chu.

Q. Now I want to show you Document 193, which contains Mr. Service's Report No. 40, dated October 10, 1940.—A. I think I say that the other day.

Q. I want to ask you whether that type of document contains the personality information which you exchanged with Mr. Jaffe?—A. I don't think I ever had a copy of this here. I remember seeing this in the State Department.

Q. Do you think you ever gave a copy of that to Mr. Jaffe?—A. No, sir, I don't think so. To the best of my knowledge, I don't think I ever had a copy even at home of this here. I wish that could be verified from the material. Of course, it could not be verified. I might have taken it home and taken it back, but I don't think I ever had a copy of it. It is a very long, very interesting—I looked at it the last time. There were many things in here that I would have liked to have known.

Q. Certainly not personality information?—A. Oh, yes.

Q. Personality information as you use it?—A. Oh, yes, yes, sure.

Q. That document would be within the classification of personality information as you used it?—A. It could—"our dealings with Chiang Kai-shek"—what do you suppose that means? It means Chiang Kai-shek's dealings with us, too. [Reading:] "In fact, Chiang has lost the confidence and respect of most of the American Democratic"—you mean I should not be interested in that? I certainly was.

Q. Was that the kind of thing Jaffe wanted to exchange with you?—A. I have no doubt that he would be interested if I had given it to him.

Q. Well, do you know, as a matter of fact, whether or not you did give it to him?—A. I don't think I gave it to him. I am fairly positive I did not give that to him. I don't think I ever had a copy of that. I looked at it pretty carefully the last time I was here, and I glanced over it now again; no.

Now, Mr. Rhett, I am not simply trying to run away, but I will tell you I have been without a job for 5 years—I have my first job right now. I am getting about a hundred dollars a week for an analysis of the Pakistan-Kashmir-India dispute. There is one article out in Pathfinder this May 31, and I have not delivered as I should to them, and they have been extremely kind to me, although I understand they are largely a Republican outfit.

The CHAIRMAN. You would like to be excused at this time?

A. I would like to be excused on the grounds that I have been rather vague, considering that this is confidential—I have been rather vague about where I go at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of your request to the chairman—

A. I have simply said: "I am out to testify—some Government committee has asked me to testify."

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, the witness asked to be excused at 3:30 when he came in this afternoon, and in view of that request the chairman feels obliged to excuse him if he wishes to go at this time.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Might I ask you a few questions on a different phase of the matter?—A. Yes.

Q. The security regulations in effect in the Department in 1945 have been considerably criticized—A. That's right.

Q. Quite possibly with some justification, in the Hobbs committee report and elsewhere. I believe you had a gold pass at the time?—A. That is right.

Q. Which entitled you to take out documents without inspection?—A. Yes.

Q. When you had the documents at home what arrangements did you have for their safeguarding?—A. I had them in a steel cabinet that I bought specially. I bought it at an auction. I am sure you could pry it open, but it is a very good steel cabinet. It is just as good as the the one in the State Department that we had in the policy committee room. In fact, it is a little better. The one in the State Department—there were no keys for those three or four cabinets, so with Dr. Blakeslee's permission I personally brought a screwdriver and took out the whole lock mechanism, took it down to Fourteenth Street, and I think it was \$10 I paid. I was remunerated later. I had three keys made for each cabinet, and I bought them, and I gave one key to Dr. Blakeslee, one to Dr. Hugh Barton, and kept one myself, and I will tell you how long I had that key. I had that key until well after the time that I had been arrested. After I had been released—in fact, let's not bring us this subject because it isn't good for the State Department. But after I was released on bail, then I thought, uh-uh, I still have my papers, my personal papers in the cabinet in the State Department, and, although I had been arrested, I walked in through the State Department, walked upstairs, told Dr. Blakeslee: "Here I am to take my personal papers" and he said: "All right, go ahead." So I unlocked the cabinet, went into the lower drawer, took out all the papers that were mine—don't worry, I didn't take anything that was the Government's—I had, in the colloquial, a "belly full" of that, so I took strictly my own papers. I had many things there, I even had my own university document and so on. I took them, while Dr. Blakeslee was standing near by and working over something, and I said: "Now, I want to show you." He said: "That's all right." I took it, packed it up, it was a big bundle [indicating] about like that. I took them and walked out of the State Department. I surrendered my pass and got a receipt for that.

The CHAIRMAN. We don't want to hold you here.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. One or two questions on the same point. When you took documents home at night, did you bring them here the next day or did you leave them?—A. Sometimes I brought them the next day back to the State Department, the next morning. There were occasions when I sat up until 1 or 2 o'clock and read most of that material. My wife got a little bit fed up with me and she said: "I see you have a lot of stuff here. Don't read that tonight, let's go to a movie." Well, then one thing and another Saturday and Sunday, and they might have been at my house a week, then I brought them back. And there were copies, I must admit. You haven't asked me that question, I want to volunteer that. There were copies that were marked "retain or destroy" and I had kept copies of them, just simply kept them in my house intending sooner or later to make an entry—but how get around to homework when you have a family and a little daughter. So they were sort of permanently stuck there. I had some probably for a year, but they weren't of national, vital interest.

Mr. RHETTS. You understood that entitled—meant you personally "retain or destroy"?

A. No, I didn't misunderstand it as such, I understood that it meant in my official capacity to retain it in the office or destroy it, but I'm not the only one. All the Reserve officers in the Navy Department retained secret-confidential dispatches. There would be a hell of an exposure if we put all that out—what was done during the war. They took copies of everything, they even had the secretary make copies, if no copies available, and put them in their briefcase and took them home. On June 8 it was a fairly mild day, there was no cause for fires in many stoves, but there were lots of fires in Washington, documents were being destroyed.

Mr. ACHILLES. Well, I see in the Hobbs committee report, the statement:

"When Larsen was arrested at his home in Washington, D. C., the documents found in his possession and seized by the FBI included 93 from the files of or prepared by the State Department, including 14 originals or duplicate originals and 5 copies of a secret classification."

A. I doubt that. I don't think there were any originals. Originals you were never allowed to take out, you were never allowed to get your hands on.

Mr. ACHILLES (reading):

"Thirteen originals or duplicate originals and three copies of a confidential classification. One hundred and forty-four from the files of, or prepared by, ONI, including seven originals or duplicate originals of a secret classification—"

A. Yes; my own work.

Mr. ACHILLES (reading):

"And 24 originals or duplicate originals and 3 copies of a confidential classification; 8 from the files of, or prepared by MID, including 1 secret original or duplicate original and 1 copy of a secret classification and 2 copies of a confidential classification; 9 from the files of, or prepared by the War Department, including 2 copies of a secret classification and 3 originals or duplicate originals of a confidential classification; 8 from the files of, or prepared by, OSS, including 1 original or duplicate original of a confidential classification."

Could you tell me how you happened to have such an accumulation?

A. I believe I wrote more than 93 documents when I was in Naval Intelligence. I wrote a fortnightly review; remember I was 9 years there as naval attaché. By simple arithmetic you would arrive at quite a number of dispatches, hundreds of them, reports; I don't think I kept copies of any of them unless they dealt with personalities. I made some special points on personality a few times, reports, and they encouraged me to do that. I kept copies of them. I intended to keep them forever, not for my personal benefit, but in the hope that one day I could use them in a higher position. My ambition was to be Chief of the Biographical Section of the State Department, and I missed the boat. It was given to two men who knew nothing about it and who after the Amerasia affair approached me and asked me if the State Department could copy my cards. First, whether I would sell them the cards; then, whether they could copy them, and I volunteered the information, and I went to the State Department and I met Mr. Oss, O-s-s, that's his name, Van Oss. I met Mr. Van Oss outside the State Department when I was refused admittance to the State Department and gave him personality material from time to time that was vial to the State Department.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Well, did the security regulations in effect at the time permit people to keep classified documents outside the Department?—A. No, no; not in general. I would say the security regulations were maintained in a rather lax manner and I was myself a contributor to that laxity; there is no doubt about that. They were much better in ONI. For instance, in ONI I had no such thing as a gold badge, I had a green badge, all civilians had a green badge. Therefore, when I wanted to take a document out then I gave it to one of the officers and he carried it out and when we sat down on the streetcar together he said: "Here you are, my boy," and I took it back the next day or whenever I was through with it.

Q. But you still had 144 copies of ONI documents at home?—A. Yes; that is not a very great many considering how many I wrote there. They were not secret from an American security point of view—whether the Yangtze flows 30 miles or 31 miles from the Mekong and the Salween does not matter much to this country, it has been no secret for hundreds of thousands of years. That was the type of material I had; namely, the geographical write-ups, because this country lacked a complete military geography of China. I collaborated with the Army men on this type of work. I was loaned by ONI to the Army cartographers, a red-headed man by the name of Metz, M-e-t-z, or something like that, and we worked together over a period of quite a few years, and I gathered material, sometimes I took all my stuff, took it down, worked on it at the Navy Department, took it over to the War Department, and carried it back with me, with photostats and material he had given me.

Q. I think that's all I have to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. You wish to retire?

A. I wish to retire because I made an appointment with him and guaranteed that I would help him look over the final copy that has to be in before 6 o'clock this afternoon. I dare say I can do it in about an hour, but I don't want him to get desperate.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say again for the record at this point that the witness appeared voluntarily at the request of the Board, not of the counsel for Mr. Service, and the purpose of this appearing was not to defend Mr. Service, but to tell the Board such facts as he knew in the case.

A. That's right.

Mr. RHETTS. I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, if the witness will be able to return. I have not finished with the examination I would like to make of him.

The CHAIRMAN. You are entitled to an answer.

A. Yes; I will return. I have promised you that document and I will return with that, and I will return for other questioning, if you think it is important

to your case. I will not deny you anything that is of vital interest. Your business is distinct and separate from the Security Board's or Loyalty Board's, and I will return, but allow me to arrange it by telephone; I don't know what will go on tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. I think at this point we can go off the record.

Mr. RHETTS. I would prefer to stay on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. If you like.

A. I have another piece of business. It is no secret. It is a very voluminous job of 495 pages written by General Modelski, who was military attaché for the Polish Embassy, and he came to this country and immediately got in touch with General Eisenhower and told him that he had come here as Communist Polish military attaché source to be able to escape from Poland with his family and work together with the United States Government, and in the course of his story he tells how he collaborated with this Government and eventually helped the FBI steal the files of the Polish——

The CHAIRMAN. I think this material has no business on this record.

A. It does.

Mr. RHETTS. I just would like to know when the witness can come back.

A. It does; it has some bearing. That job is now nearing completion and I have been promised a fee of \$4,000 for it. I haven't had a fee for anything for an awful long time, so I want to impress upon you gentlemen that my time is extremely valuable to me. I have done practically nothing during the last few months but answering phone calls and being interviewed by correspondents and Loyalty Boards and so on, and I can't stand much more of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, your request is we arrange by telephone for the next meeting. We will do that.

A. And I will accommodate you to the best of my ability.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done. Thank you very much.

A. Even if Mr. Rhett's should want a private conference with me, that's all right too.

Mr. RHETTS. No; I would just like to question you further here in connection with the facts of certain of these matters that were testified to.

A. If I should find it necessary to bring an attorney with me, may I do that?

Mr. RHETTS. It is entirely agreeable to me. I don't know what the disposition of the Board is.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, you are not under any attack before this Board.

A. No; I don't like the word "attack." You gentlemen have——

The CHAIRMAN. What I mean by that, Mr ——

A. You gentleman have not taken that attitude.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not on trial here.

A. No. I feel as if I have been but I may be wrong on that point. I have been questioned in a much more thoroughgoing way than I have been by the others because they were not qualified; therefore, their testimony and their records are shabby and inaccurate, downright untruthful, and that is the background of my thorough disgust with all questionings.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we thank you for what you have done.

A. Thank you, sir. I hope I haven't offended you gentlemen in any manner whatsoever because it has not been intentional.

The CHAIRMAN. You certainly have not.

A. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much, Mr. Rhett's. I will get that document for you.

(Mr. Emmanuel S. Larsen, having duly testified, left the meeting at this time.)

(After a brief recess the meeting continued as follows:)

The CHAIRMAN. All right, proceed, Counsel.

Mr. RHETTS. Now at this point I should like to introduce into the transcript document 100-12d, which is an excerpt from the testimony of Mr. James McInerney, present Assistant Attorney General of the United States in charge of the Criminal Division, which was given before the Hobbs committee.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 100-12

"(Excerpt from Congressional Record—House, May 22, 1950)

"(Doc. 100-12d, p. 7558:)

"Mr. FEIGHAN. What prompted you to arrest Service?

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. Jim, I think you ought to answer that. I was out of town on trial when this feature of it broke.

"Mr. HOBBS. You mean on a trial.

"Mr. McINERNEY. The evidence on Service was thin. They said there was in Jaffe's office, as I recall it, copies of his confidential reports. When we arrested, or made the searches, we found copies of his report. We interviewed Larsen, and Larsen admitted he had given Service's copies to Jaffe, and Service had not given them. Service was very much surprised that Jaffe had that report. It was on that thin allegation that we authorized on Service, and the same way with Gayn.

"(Doc. 100-12e, p. 7559:)

"Mr. SPRINGER. From all of the investigations you made, from your grand-jury investigation and everything connected with it, do you feel that all of these secret documents that you came in possession of had come through Larsen?

"Mr. McINERNEY. I do not know whether I could go that far.

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. They did not. Take your FCC, Office of Strategic Service, or a few of them, the ONI, the BEW, and perhaps one or two others, they could not have come from Larsen. Larsen was never employed there. He had no access to them. So far as we know, he had never been near the places.

"Mr. HANCOCK. I asked that a moment ago. You said these documents were routed through the State Department.

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. Some of them, particularly the ONI documents, were routed to the State Department, and, insofar as they pertained to Chinese affairs, Larsen would have had access to them from September 1, 1944, not prior to that.

"Mr. SPRINGER. Have you been able to discover any other person who could have distributed these documents?

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. We had two of them before the grand jury. In Gayn's case, he told us they got them through the area director for area 3, authorizing this girl or woman in charge of the office to give them to Gayn. We immediately sent out subpoenas for those two people.

"Mr. FELLOWS. A fine system.

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. That completely left us stymied. These people were in position of authority. He said he classified them ad hoc, made no record of it, and after authorized the handing them out to Gayn.

"Mr. SPRINGER. Did you find anyone that had distributed any of these documents?

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. No.

"Mr. McINERNEY. I might add, at the time of the arrest, we told the agent who handled these as laboratory documents, to see if we could process a representative number of them for fingerprints and try to establish a chain of custody from the chief of Jaffe. They were all old documents. We came up with no principal. We did get a couple of prints on some documents we found in Gayn's apartment. They were Gayn's fingerprints on the OWI stuff. We did not get any evidence which would assist us in tracing the custody.

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. You realize that many of these documents, that they refer to, date to 1936, from there on. That is why I suggested that you may be interested in seeing them. We have boxes full of them. We have all of them, booklets on health in the Japanese Empire in 1938, for example, completely innocuous, and negative as regards any national defense character at all. Although there were some in the later period, referring principally to political matters in China, one man's judgment might say, when a nation is at war, that political matters pertain to national defense; others say it pertains to military operations, or manufacturing for military purposes or things of that character, those are questions of fact for the jury."

Mr. RHETTS. I should also like to offer at this point document No. 324, which is a mimeographed copy of the release of a "Statement of Robert M. Hitchcock before the Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee Investigating the State Department, May 26, 1950," and I should like to read into the transcript a paragraph appearing on page 4 of this release as follows: This is Mr. Hitchcock's testimony (reading):

"When Jaffe was arrested June 6, 1945, his brief case contained eight ozalids [copies similar to photostats] of Service's Yen'an reports which were clearly identified as State Department property. Before the grand jury, Service denied any knowledge of Jaffe having these copies and said there was no reason in the world why he [Service] would have given them to Jaffe because he could have given Jaffe his own personal copies.

"Furthermore, Larsen subsequently admitted that he had obtained the ozalids from the State Department and delivered them to Jaffe. The personal copies

which Service admitted lending to Jaffe never were part of the State Department files."

(Document 324, in full, is as follows:)

324

"STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. HITCHCOCK BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE STATE DEPARTMENT, MAY 26, 1950

The first I heard of the Amerasia case was June 7, 1945, the day after the FBI arrested the six defendants in New York and Washington. I read of it in the papers. I was assigned to the prosecution of the case about a week later by Mr. McInerney and was assisted by Donald B. Anderson, an attorney in the Criminal Division, a former FBI special agent, and a former district attorney and county judge.

"Victor Woerheide, another attorney in the Criminal Division, also was assigned to assist. The warrants for the arrest charged conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act.

"The FBI, in connection with the arrest of Jaffe and Kate Mitchell at the Amerasia offices, had seized several hundred papers, many of which were clearly the property of one or more Government agencies, most of them of the State Department. Many others of the seized papers later were clearly established to be copies of similar records. The bulk of them were classified, as, for example, restricted, confidential, secret, etc.

"In Gayn's apartment, when he was arrested, the FBI seized 60 items, of which 22 were Federal Communications Commission reports or copies pertaining to interrogation of Japanese prisoners of war. About 20 were typewritten copies of State Department papers, and 18 were correspondence or papers which were wholly personal.

"Copies of some of the items found in Gayn's apartment were found in the Amerasia offices. When Gayn was arrested, he made a statement that he knew some of the material seized was not generally available to the public.

"He said he intended using it for background and no other reason. When he was asked where he got it, he said that in some instance he did not recall, and that in others, as a reputable newspaperman he could not disclose the sources.

"Later, after Gayn had requested permission to appear before the second grand jury, Anderson and I interviewed him in the presence of his attorney. He told us that he received the FCC reports from the New York office of the Office of War Information, that the reports had been lent to him, that many other reports previously had been lent to him and returned by him and that he had intended to return those which were seized.

"We asked him from whom he had obtained the reports.

"He told us from or through George Edward Taylor, deputy director of Area 3, OWI, and from Taylor's subordinate, Elizabeth Downing. While the case was in progress, Miss Downing married and thereafter was referred to as Elizabeth Barker. Taylor and Elizabeth Barker were interviewed and corroborated Gayn's story. They were called before the second grand jury and again corroborated his story.

"Gayn testified before the second grand jury and was no-billed. FBI surveillance showed that Gayn and Jaffe were rather close.

"It further showed that between March 21, 1945, and May 31, 1945, Gayn met with Jaffe, Roth, and Mitchell separately and together on several occasions. On two occasions he was with Service. Service stayed at Gayn's New York apartment one night. At most of these meetings still others were present. Many of the meetings were obviously social. These meetings proved nothing except mere association.

"These reports of associations, together with the seized documents, made up the case against Gayn. There was no evidence that Gayn had ever received any material from any Government employee other than Taylor and Elizabeth Downing (Barker). Taylor testified that he had authority to release such documents as were lent to Gayn.

"Gayn was wholly unacquainted with Larsen. Furthermore, those FCC and OWI reports were somewhat generally available to writers on newspapers and other publications.

"Gayn appeared before the grand jury in the first week of August. He waived immunity, testified, and was examined thoroughly and was no-billed.

"Now as to the case of John Stewart Service.

"Service was a State Department employee who had spent most of his life in China. He was loaned to General Stilwell in August, 1943, and remained

with General Wedemeyer, successor to General Stilwell, until he was recalled through General Hurley in April 1945.

When he was arrested, the FBI obtained from him a written statement. In it he stated that, after he was assigned to the Army, he was engaged in general political reporting, consisting mostly of interviews with Chinese leaders. His reports, he stated, went to the Commander in Chief of the United States forces in China and the United States Embassy at Chungking. He stated that he kept a copy for himself with the full knowledge of the Embassy and Army headquarters.

In March 1945, he stated, he was sent to Yen-an, the headquarters of the Chinese Communists who were holding a party congress, and made further reports, largely of conversations with Chinese Communist leaders.

These reports, he stated, were distributed in the same fashion and in addition a copy was brought back to the State Department. When he left China in April 1945, he claimed he had permission from the adjutant general at Chungking to bring back his personal files and copies of his reports, which he kept in his own desk in the State Department.

Service stated that he met Jaffe for the first time on April 19, 1945, and that they were introduced by Roth. He said that he knew Jaffe was the editor of Amerasia and assumed that Jaffe wanted to learn the latest news from China. He took along his personal copy of the report of a conversation with Mao-tse-tung, chairman of the central committee of the Chinese Communists. This conversation took place March 31, 1945, at Yen-an and in it Mao-tse-tung detailed the policies expected to be adopted by the Party Congress.

Jaffe showed deep interest and asked if he had any other reports, Service stated. He explained that as he regarded them as simply "reportorial" and not involving United States policy, or affecting United States security, he supplied Jaffe the next day with more of his personal copies.

Jaffe said he did not have time to read the reports and asked if he could take them to New York. Service consented, saying that he was going to New York the next week and could pick them up then.

Service did go to New York and stayed at the Gayn apartment. He stated that he had first met Gayn April 18, 1945, but that he had previously had some correspondence with Gayn and that he had gone to college with Gayn's brother.

On April 25, Service stated, he called at the Amerasia office and picked up the reports that he had lent to Jaffe on April 19 and 20. He added that Jaffe was in Washington May 3 and that he communicated with Service and said he would like to get a copy of the FCC monitored report of a broadcast of Mao Tse-tung's recent speech at the party congress.

Service said he took Jaffe to the State Department, obtained permission, got a copy of the broadcast and gave it to Jaffe at the State Department. Later in the day, a corrected version came in, several copies were run off and one was given to Service. When he left his office, he said, he went to Jaffe's hotel, gave him the copy and left.

In the filing cabinets in her office—to which Jaffe had the keys—there were many items of Government origin. These were indexed in about 18 separate folders. The captions were in Kate Mitchell's handwriting or printing. Some of these were:

"Chinese Claims in Burma; Japanese Who's Who (Military and Diplomatic); War Prisoners' Comments; Kuomintang-Communist Relations; Chinese Communist Party; Sinkiang (Sino-Soviet Rel.); Interviews With Returned Visitors to China and Japan."

In addition to the presence of Kate Mitchell at places where other subjects were present, as already mentioned in connection with Gayn and Service, she was with Jaffe on many occasions, both at the Amerasia offices and at their respective homes.

One of these was of significance. On May 5, 1945, Kate Mitchell went by automobile with Jaffe to Mrs. Blumenthal's home in the Bronx. Jaffe went in alone. He came out about a quarter hour later with a large envelope. Jaffe let Miss Mitchell out near the Amerasia offices and she went into the building with the envelope. Mrs. Blumenthal testified before the grand jury that she had typed for Jaffe copies of Government documents.

When Miss Mitchell was arrested, she admitted that she had, or could have had, access to the various files and cabinets in the Amerasia offices where Government documents were found. When arrested, she initialed some documents and said that she knew the source of them but refused to divulge it. Later she told us and the grand jury that it was her understanding that Jaffe obtained them from Larsen.

"There was no evidence that she ever received a single document from any Government employee or from Gayn. She was not in Washington during 1945 at any time prior to her arrest.

"She signed a waiver of immunity, testified before the grand jury, was thoroughly examined, and she was no-billed.

"Now as to the case of Roth.

"When the arrests were made in the Amerasia offices on June 6 the FBI agents found a copy made on Roth's typewriter of a letter dated March 3, 1943.

"The letter was from William Phillips on a letterhead which read: 'Office of the Personal Representative of the President of the United States, New Delhi, India.' It was addressed to the Secretary of State and it enclosed a copy of a letter of the same date to President Roosevelt. The subject was the conflicting British and Indian points of view and the possibility of Indian freedom after the war, and it suggested a solution to the then present impasse as a 'step in furthering the ideals of the Atlantic Charter.'

"The agents also found two letters in Roth's handwriting on plain stationery. The date line of one was 'American Mission, New Delhi, January 21, 1944.' This letter was addressed to the Secretary of State and was signed 'Merrell.' It contained a summary of political comment in the Indian press for the week ended January 15, 1944. The other letter had an identical source and addressee. It was dated March 14, 1944, and contained reports on the vote of the Central Legislative Assembly on March 13, 1944, passing a motion, 50-48, calling for a reduction in the budget.

"They also found in Roth's handwriting, on Hotel Statler stationery, a copy of a letter bearing the date line 'American Mission, New Delhi, February 4, 1944.'

"It was addressed to the Secretary of State and was signed 'Merrell.' It referred to a resolution passed by an informal conference of Congress members of the Madras Legislature and made comments on it.

"They also found two sheets of plain stationery in Roth's handwriting with the date line 'Bombay, August 11, 1944, Subject: Congress socialist reaction to Mr. Gandhi's recent political moves.' It was signed 'George D. Lamont, American Consul.'

"In addition to associations and meetings previously mentioned, there were some meetings in Washington between Roth and Jaffe, between Roth and Larsen, and between Roth, Jaffe, and Larsen. Two of these had some significance.

"On March 21, 1945, Jaffe and Roth drove to a parking lot at the Library of Congress in Roth's car. They remained there about 25 minutes, talking and examining papers. They then went into the Library of Congress. After a few minutes, they came out, got back in Roth's car and drove to Roth's home in Arlington, Va.

"In addition, Roth introduced both Service and Larsen to Jaffe.

"The items of documentary evidence, as I have mentioned, were not of recent date, were innocuous in content, and there was no evidence as to who first secured copies from the State Department or where Roth got them. The ones on Hotel Statler stationery indicated that Roth may have obtained them from Jaffe, rather than Jaffe from Roth. Moreover, Roth never worked at the State Department and had no access to the files of the State Department.

"In addition, Roth published a book, Dilemma in Japan, in the summer of 1945 and, when he was arrested, he said it was the manuscript of that book that he and Jaffe had at the Library of Congress.

"In addition, Roth was never observed giving to or receiving from any of the subjects in the case any material of any kind.

"Both Larsen and Roth were at one time employed by the Office of Naval Intelligence. Larsen transferred to the State Department August 31, 1944. Not a single ONI document or copy after that date was recovered from any of the subjects. Approximately 50 ONI-source items were recovered at the Amerasia offices. Larsen had more than 100 such items in his apartment when he was arrested.

"After Jaffe and Larsen entered their pleas, I interviewed them both in the hope of making a case with which we could go to trial against Roth.

"Larsen, who manifested considerable animosity toward Roth and manifested no desire to protect him, could tell us not one thing detrimental to Roth that would assist us in prosecuting. Jaffe completely exonerated Roth. Jaffe was a close friend of Roth and may well have lied to me. However, the point is that we got nothing from either Jaffe or Larsen.

"We nolle prossed the indictment as to Roth on February 15, 1946. We had to do something then because Roth's attorneys had secured an order requiring us

to supply a bill of particulars of the case against Roth, and we were ordered to proceed to trial.

"It was my opinion then, and it is my opinion now, that we had no case against Roth with which we could have gone to trial with the slightest likelihood of success.

"On January 23, 1946, I wrote the FBI, reviewing all the evidence against Roth and stating that it was the opinion of all the attorneys who had worked on the case that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a trial and that a nolle presequi should be entered. I asked their opinion as to the proposed disposition. On January 28, the FBI replied in substance that it had no recommendation and, entirely properly, assigning as the reason that it was entirely within the province of the Department of Justice to make such decisions.

"Roth did not appear before the grand jury. The grand jury voted 13 to 7 to indict him. Twelve votes are necessary to indict.

"The proceeding before the grand jury disclosed that many documents were declassified for the purpose of releasing the information, although the documents on their face did not show that they had been declassified.

"In many instances no record was kept as to what documents had been declassified. One Government officer testified that ad hoc declassifications were made. Many of these documents had wide circulation. By that I mean that many duplicates were made—in one instance I recall 500—and distributed to various agencies.

"In this connection we were unable to determine in many instances from just what agency the seized document had been taken and in some instances it was not possible to determine whether or not any copies were missing from agencies to which copies had been routed.

"Testimony before the grand jury showed that classifications were not standardized. Usually this writer in a foreign country made the classification. In part, this was governed by his desire to have the matter transmitted, for example, by wire or plane, because top classifications had precedence.

"Apart from the records of the ONI and the State Department, where Larsen and Roth were employed, we were at a complete loss to ascribe to any of the subjects arrested the removal of records from the Office of Strategic Services, the Military Intelligence Division or the Bureau of Economic Warfare, for example.

"Several hundred documents were recovered in the Amerasia offices and Larsen's apartment when Jaffe and Larsen were arrested. Part of them showed clearly that they were the property of various Government agencies. Part clearly were established as being copies of documents originating in various Government agencies. Most of them were from the State Department. Some of these seized at the Amerasia offices had notations in Larsen's handwriting. Some bore his fingerprints.

"I never had the slightest doubt that if we could use these documents and copies in evidence at a trial, we had a better than good case against Jaffe and Larsen.

"The New York defendants, Kate Mitchell, Jaffe, and Gayn, after their arrest demanded hearings before a United States commissioner, and by law they were entitled to them.

"We did not want to present our evidence at that time in a public hearing because the tremendous work of tracing those documents back to their sources had by no means been completed, because of our disappointment that incriminating statements had not been made by the defendants when they were arrested, and because we did not want to show how little or how much we had against any defendant.

"To avoid preliminary hearings we decided to present what we had to a grand jury just as quickly as possible. This was done, as I recall, on June 21, 1945.

"About that time the attorneys representing the various defendants communicated with us and asked for a conference.

"The matter was discussed by Mr. Clark, Mr. McInerney and myself, and we mutually agreed that they should have the opportunity of conferring with us.

"I have never known an instance where such a request was made by reputable attorneys in or out of Government service and was denied.

"The conference was arranged for June 27, 1945, as I recall. The attorneys representing the defendants were there. The assistant attorney general in charge of the criminal division (Mr. Clark), Mr. McInerney, Mr. Woerheide and I were present.

"The defense attorneys made the claim that their clients had done nothing more than was the general practice, in that magazines, newspapers, radio commentators and columnists were constantly obtaining information from people in various Government agencies and that, this being so, if any agency was going to put a stop to the practice, there should be some warning short of prosecution.

"In this connection they argued that their clients were being discriminated against, in fact they claimed that their clients were being persecuted because they disagreed with the State Department policy relative to the Far East, particularly China.

"The claim was made that these defendants had done no more than many reputable writers were doing and had been doing in the past. They asserted that a great injustice had been done to their clients by arrest and the Nation-wide publicity attendant on the arrests. They argued that a further great injustice would be done if indictments were returned upon which convictions could not be obtained.

"The defense attorneys insisted that the information in many of the seized documents already had been published in whole or in part in many publications.

"They pleaded with us to look into the matter further and in connection with their claim of the innocence of their clients, they reminded us of our obligation to protect the innocent as well as to punish the guilty.

"The suggestion was made that if the grand jury then considering the case voted to indict any or all of the defendants, a sealed indictment might be reported, which would mean that there would be no immediate publicity on the indictment. Attorneys representing some defendants strenuously objected to this on the ground that even a sealed indictment would have to be opened sometime.

"In addition, one of the attorneys stated that he wanted to request that the grand jury permit his client to waive immunity and testify. Such requests are invariably granted, for it gives the prosecutor an opportunity to thoroughly question a defendant under oath without defense counsel being present and therefore without objections to questions. This procedure has at times resulted in making a strong case of a weak one.

"The grand jury considering the case was due to terminate its work July 2, and Mr. Clark, Mr. McInerney and I discussed the matter in full detail and mutually, without any disagreement, arrived at the conclusion that every defendant, through his attorney, should be advised that if he so desired, he would be permitted to testify before the grand jury on signing a waiver of immunity.

"We further mutually and without any disagreement arrived at the conclusion that we would either wait until the latter part of July, when the next grand jury would be in session, or would obtain an order extending the life of the grand jury then in session another month or 6 weeks, and that we would leave it to the grand jury as to which it preferred. This was done, and the case was withdrawn from that grand jury.

"In connection with this conference on June 27, we obtained the assurance of the defense attorneys that they would not insist on preliminary hearings and would produce their clients, if they decided to have them appear before the grand jury, for examination by us at the Department of Justice before their grand jury appearances.

"Kate Mitchell's attorneys formally requested that she be permitted to go before the grand jury and agreed that she would sign a waiver of immunity. We notified every other attorney that such a request had been made by one of the defendants and that if, under the same conditions, their clients wanted to waive immunity and testify before the grand jury, they would have the same opportunity.

"In addition to Kate Mitchell's request, such a request was made in behalf of Gayn, Service, and Jaffe. As to Larsen and Roth, one of them declined and the other did not reply. Which was which I don't remember.

"Jaffe's attorney later withdrew his request. Later in July, Mr. Anderson and I interviewed, at the Department of Justice, Gayn, Kate Mitchell, and Service. They were interviewed separately and on more than one occasion, always in the presence of their counsel.

"The second grand jury heard testimony for approximately 1 week. As I recall, it started on July 30 or 31 and continued until August 8.

"Every bit of evidence we had, including every document seized, was submitted to that grand jury. We presented all that was presented on the one day to the first grand jury and, in addition, all that had been developed since that day.

"Roth was indicted by a vote of 13 to 7. Jaffe and Larsen were indicted 14 to 6.

"The House Judiciary Subcommittee report in 1946 stated:

"The cases were ably presented before the grand jury, but the net result of months of hard work was indictment of only 3 of the 6 accused, and in no case was the Government able to muster more than 14 of the 20 votes of the grand jurors."

"Between March and June 6, the investigators had made several entries, not during office hours in the offices of Amerasia. These, of course, were without the permission and without the knowledge of Jaffe and Kate Mitchell.

"The investigators had also entered the apartment of Larsen and during the same period, surveillance of office and home telephones was maintained.

"Nothing is clearer under Federal law than that evidence secured as a result of illegal searches will be suppressed upon the application of those whose constitutional right to the privacy of their homes, their persons and their effects has been violated.

"Moreover, evidence obtained as the result of leads secured in this manner will be suppressed.

"We knew that once the story broke, Jaffe's counsel would undoubtedly conclude that similar entry had been made into the Amerasia offices. We had not the slightest doubt that similar motions would be made to suppress everything seized June 6 at the Amerasia offices.

"Mr. McInerney and I realized that the Amerasia case as regards successful prosecution was collapsing. We concluded that the only thing to do to save what could be saved, which was the result of at least 6 months' difficult and careful work by the FBI and more than 3 months' work by attorneys in the Criminal Division, was to see if Mr. Arent would agree that Jaffe plead guilty to the indictment upon the best terms the Government could get. Mr. McInerney called Mr. Arent and asked him to come over to the Department.

"In the meantime, we decided that we were under no obligations to tell Mr. Arent either that the motion papers had been served and filed by Larsen's attorney or that any searches without legal process had been made at the Amerasia offices prior to June 6.

"When Arent arrived we told him we had further considered his previous offers to plead Jaffe and asked if he had anything further in mind.

"He repeated the arguments made on June 27. He further argued that Jaffe's wife was seriously ill and could get no better while this case was pending.

"After considerable discussion, he said that Jaffe would plead guilty if the Department would recommend a fine and no jail sentence.

"We asked him if he had the authority to make a commitment to that effect and he assured us that he had the necessary authority. We told him that we would recommend acceptance of a plea of guilty and would recommend a substantial fine and no jail sentence.

"We asked if this was a firm commitment which under no circumstances would be withdrawn. He said that it was. He also said that he insisted that our recommendation as to the fine would not be perfunctory, but made in good faith to the court, with a genuine effort on our part to have the court follow our recommendation.

"We gave him that assurance, and we then asked him when he could get Jaffe down from New York City to enter the plea. He said he would do it any time we could arrange it. We asked if he could have Jaffe down the following morning for that purpose. He said he could.

"Mr. McInerney then called the district court and ascertained that Judge Proctor would be available the following morning, which was a Saturday.

"We concluded these arrangements in this manner because we did not want Mr. Arent to leave our office unless and until all arrangements had been completed, because he knew that once he left the office he would read in the newspapers that Larsen had filed a motion to suppress the evidence taken from him.

"In other words, we did everything possible within our powers to insure that there would be no withdrawal by Mr. Arent of commitments made with respect to Jaffe.

"The next morning, Jaffe appeared in court. Mr. Arent in substance implied that Mr. McInerney and I had maneuvered him into pleading Jaffe guilty whereas, had he known of the Larsen motion, he never would have done so.

"We asked him if he was going to keep his word. He said that he was and that he certainly expected we were going to keep ours as regards doing everything in our power to have the sentence consist of a fine.

"We secured adjournments of Larsen's motion. We took the position that legally we had enough evidence that had been secured from the Amerasia offices to make a case against Larsen.

"While Larsen might successfully suppress evidence taken from his own apartment on the claim that his constitutional rights had been violated, he had no standing in court to make any complaint as to the method by which the Government secured documents seized at the Amerasia offices. And Jaffe's plea of guilty was assurance that no motion would be made by him.

"By that I mean that it is only the person whose constitutional right to privacy has been violated who has any standing to assert his rights successfully. Consequently, we felt there was enough in the documents seized at the Amerasia offices, some of which had Larsen's handwriting on them and some of which bore his fingerprints, to warrant the belief that we had a fair chance to secure a guilty verdict against Larsen.

"After prolonged negotiation with Larsen's attorney, we agreed to recommend that the court accept a plea of nolo contendere and to recommend a small fine.

"We agreed to do this because our case was not what could be termed a strong case, but primarily because Jaffe was the principal figure in the case and he had corrupted Larsen. We felt that Larsen should not receive as much punishment as Jaffe. Moreover, Larsen had been discharged from the State Department in the meantime, was out of a job, and had few prospects of getting a job.

"I have never believed that Jaffe's sentence was adequate for what he did. I know that had we not disposed of Jaffe's case as we did, there would have been no conviction of Jaffe and, of course, no punishment, even to the extent of a fine.

"That same House Judiciary Report in 1946 stated:

"After a most painstaking study we certify that there is no evidence, nor hint, justifying adverse criticism of either grand jury, any prosecuting attorney, FBI, judicial, or other official."

"There was not the slightest connection between the Amerasia case and my association with my present firm. On the last day of 1946, Lyman M. Bass made an appointment to meet me. My family and I then resided at Dunkirk, some 45 miles from Buffalo. The courts were flooded at that time with portal-to-portal suits, and he asked me if I would be interested in coming with his firm to handle them. I said that I would, and on January 2, 1947, I agreed to come, and on January 24 did come into the firm.

"On January 2, 1947, Mr. Bass introduced me to various members of the firm. I can't remember whether Mr. Mitchell was there that day or not, but if he was, that was the first time I met him. I repeat that there was no connection of any character between me and my present firm or between me or any member of my present firm while the Amerasia cases were being processed, and for a period of fully 1 year and 4 months after the grand jury refused to indict Miss Mitchell."

(Mr. John S. Service, called as a witness in his own behalf, being duly sworn, continued testifying as follows:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now, Mr. Service, will you take the stand? Now, Mr. Service, you have just testified concerning a series of documents Nos. B-1 through B-52, and you have identified several of those documents as being copies of memoranda of yours which you may have shown to Mr. Jaffe, although you have stated you have no present recollection concerning them. Will you tell the Board whether you ever loaned or gave or otherwise showed Mr. Jaffe any other classified Government documents?—A. Well, I would say, sir, that I never gave or showed Mr. Jaffe any classified Government documents. I never showed him at any time any dispatch, telegram, or memoranda prepared in the Embassy or prepared in the headquarters or prepared by anyone other than myself.

Q. In other words, apart from your personal copies of your memoranda you never showed Mr. Jaffe any document of any kind whatsoever?—A. That's correct.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Well, just a minute, there was one case, one incident that I think you told about in your statement where you assisted him to procure under authority a document, I'm not sure whether it was classified or not. I refer to a document that you assisted him to get from CA.—A. Sir, my recollection of that incident is that he wanted this report of a broadcast.

Q. By Mao Tse-tung?—A. By Mao Tse-tung; and I took Mr. Jaffe to the Division of Chinese Affairs, introduced him to the office and my recollection is that the officer handed the paper to him.

Q. Yes; and then you afterward took a revised copy to him?—A. Yes, sir. I don't believe that was a classified document. It was a report of a news broadcast. I didn't think it came within the bounds of the original question.

Q. Now, have you recognized that paper anywhere among the papers found in Mr. Jaffe's possession?—A. It was not in those papers about which I was questioned this morning, sir. It would not be a Service report in any way.

Q. No.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Did you say that you had never given him copies of any classified Government documents? My question is prompted by the fact that your own copies of classified documents were in that sense classified Government documents.—A. Well, I was trying to make a distinction between my personal memoranda and a dispatch or an Army report transmitting—commenting upon, agreeing, or disagreeing or evaluating my memoranda, and that's why I went into detail to say that I had never shown him a dispatch coming from the Embassy or any paper originating in the State Department or any paper originating or bearing any official Army classification or term.

The CHAIRMAN. The classified papers that you did give him were all classifications put on those papers by you yourself?

A. That is correct.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did those include copies of any other of your own memoranda other than those about which you were questioned this morning?

A. If I understand your question correctly, sir, you are asking if I may have shown Mr. Jaffe some of my personal copies of memoranda about which I was not questioned this morning?

Mr. ACHILLES. Yes.

A. Well, it would take some time to review a complete list of my memoranda. I don't even have a complete list of my memoranda. I do not recall that I handed Mr. Jaffe any memoranda other than those about which I was questioned this morning. But so far as I know there is nowhere in existence, except possibly in the list of materials found in my desk, and even that is not absolutely complete. I don't have any list of all my memoranda.

Mr. STEVENS. The list found in your desk, sir, did not include the ones you prepared other than in Yen-an, did it?

A. No; it did not; and I did not show Mr. Jaffe any memoranda other than personal copies which I prepared in Yen-an because I did not have any copies other than Yen-an.

Mr. ACHILLES. Then, so far as you know, you did not show him copies of any other of your memoranda than those about which you were questioned this morning?

A. That's correct, sir, so far as I know. I can't answer the question with absolute definiteness because I can't remember with any certainty exactly what I showed him beyond one single paper. If I did show him anything else he apparently, shall I say, did not consider it of sufficient interest to make a copy. We might assume that.

Mr. ACHILLES. That's all I have now. I may wish to come back to that later because it is naturally relevant; that is, we are interested in ascertaining as nearly as we can exactly which reports you did show him.

A. Quite, sir.

Mr. STEVENS. And those, according to the records you had, would relate to the ones you prepared at Yen-an. You did not have other than those in your personal files?

A. As far as I remember, I had no copies of other memoranda other than the ones I prepared at Yen-an and I think I mentioned this point before: I had copies of the several memoranda I had prepared at Chungking in January or February of 1945 before I went to Yen-an. In other words, I had for 1944 the Yen-an series, and for 1945 the complete or very nearly complete series which included eight or nine which I prepared in Chungking before I went to Yen-an. Is that clear, sir?

Mr. STEVENS. Yes.

A. We have been speaking generally of all the 1945 memoranda as Yen-an memoranda, and technically there were eight or nine prepared before I went to Yen-an.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

four sheets, and includes various sections of an address by Mao Tse-tung, which that is?—A. Well, it is not labeled as coming from the FCC, but I recognize it as an FCC monitor report of a Yen-an broadcast in English Morse. It goes on for four sheets, and includes various sections of an address of Mao Tse-tung, which was broadcast on May 1.

The CHAIRMAN. What year?

A. 1945, sir. There are several sections.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to offer as an exhibit at this time, Document 34, although it is a document which, like the documents in the 101 to 227 series, has to be returned to the Department for their files.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received for identification for the moment. What use do you intend to make of it? What is the connection of it?

Mr. RHETTS. This is the copy of the FCC broadcast which Mr. Service—

The CHAIRMAN. Referred to in the statement?

Mr. RHETTS. This is the copy of the FCC broadcast which he delivered to Mr. Jaffe.

The CHAIRMAN. The paper I referred to a moment ago. O. K.; it may be admitted.

A. It bears no classification.

(Received and marked "Exhibit 22, Document 34":)

FAR EASTERN SECTION, FREE CHINA, *May 1, 1945.*

YENAN

CONGRESS OF COMMUNIST PARTY MEETS

Yenan reports the following in English Morse:

"YENAN, MAY 1.—The Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Yen-an in the latter part of April. This is one of the most important events in the history of modern China.

"The task of this Congress is to rally people throughout China on the eve of the counteroffensive to save the Nation from the crisis which is the consequence of the erroneous policy of the Kuomintang Government, and so thoroughly to defeat and annihilate the Japanese aggressors and set up an independent, free, democratic, unified, strong, and prosperous new China.

"There are 752 delegates representing 1,210,000 members of the Chinese Communist Party. Of these 544 are delegates and 208 are probationary delegates.

"Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Li Shao-Chi, Chou En-lai, Jen Pi-shih, Lin Po-hu, Pen Tah-huai, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, Ho Lung, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Kao Kang, Lo Fu, and Peng Chen were elected to the presidium of the Congress. Jen Pi-shih was elected secretary and Li Fu-chen assistant secretary of the Congress.

Agenda Items

"There were four items in the agenda: The political report by Comrade Chu Teh, the report on redrafting of the party statutes by Comrade Li Shao-chi, and the election of members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

"Since its foundation in 1921 the Chinese Communist Party held six national congresses. These congresses were held in July 1921, May 1922, June 1923, January 1925, April 1927, and July 1928. Because of the long period of war and struggle, 17 years have elapsed before the present Seventh Congress could be convened.

"At the convention of the present Congress, the power of the Chinese Communist Party, unity and solidarity within the party, and the party's prestige among the people of China are higher than at any period in the past.

Total Strength

"At present the Chinese Communist Party not only has over 1,200,000 members but also has under its leadership the 8th Route, New 4th, and other anti-Japanese regular armies, numbering 110,000 strong, over 2,200,000 people's volunteer corps, and 19 liberated areas distributed over 19 provinces in Manchuria, North, Central, and South China with a total population of 95,500,000.

"Because the war of resistance in the liberated areas is rapidly developing these figures are steadily increasing. Therefore the Chinese Communist party

and liberated areas under its leadership have really become the center of gravity of the Chinese people in the anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement and struggle for liberation. The present Congress will undoubtedly have an extremely important influence on the future development of the war of resistance and internal politics of China." (Yenan, in English Morse to North America, May 1, 1945, 9:30 a. m. EWT.)

COALITION GOVERNMENT NEEDED, SAYS MAO

Yenan reports the following in English Morse: "YENAN, MAY 1.—On the 'Coalition Government' was the title of the political report given by Chairman Moa Tze-tung, leader of the Chinese Communist Party to the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

"Mao Tze-tung pointed out that the 'unification of all parties and groups and nonparty representatives to form a provisional democratic coalition government so as to carry out democratic reform to overcome the present crisis, mobilize and unify the national forces of the war or resistance to effectively collaborate with the Allies in fighting and defeating the Japanese aggressor, and to secure the thorough liberation of the Chinese are the basic demands of the Chinese people at present.'

National Assembly

"China needs a coalition government, said Mao Tze-tung, not only during the war but also after the war. 'After the victory of the war of resistance, the National Assembly based on a broad, democratic foundation should be called to form a regular democratic government of a similar coalition nature, embracing more broadly all parties and groups and nonparty representatives. This Government will lead the liberated people of the entire Nation to build up an independent, free, unified, prosperous and strong new country. 'After China has had a democratic elective system, the Government should be a coalition working on the basis of a commonly recognized new democratic program, no matter whether the Communist Party is the majority or minority party in the National Assembly.'

Immediate Formation

"Mao Tse-tung repeatedly urged the necessity of immediate formation of a coalition government. One party, dictatorship, dictatorship of the anti-population group within the Kuomintang, said Mao Tse-tung, is not only 'a fundamental obstacle to the mobilization and unification or the strength of the Chinese people in the war of resistance, it is also the (colossal) embryo of the civil war.'

MAO REVEALS POSTWAR PLAN FOR CHINA

The following is Yen-an's continuation in English Morse of the political report given by Chairman Mao Tze-tung to the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in Yen-an, the first part of which was reported under the heading, "Coalition Government Needed, Says Mao," on Page PA 2 of yesterday's, May 2, Daily Report:

"In his report Mao Tze-tung brought forward a program for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and the establishment of a new China. This program is divided into two sections, namely general and specific, and furnishes the answers to many important wartime and postwar problems. Concerning the thorough annihilation of the Japanese aggressors and forbidding a half-way compromise, Mao Tze-tung called the people's attention to the secret understandings and dealings between the pro-Japanese elements in the Kuomintang Government and the Japanese secret emissaries.

No compromise

"He said: 'The Chinese people should demand that the Kuomintang Government must thoroughly annihilate the Japanese aggressors and forbid any compromise. At the same time the Chinese people should expand the 8th Route and New 4th Armies and other people's armies. Moreover, wherever the enemy has penetrated, the Chinese people should universally and voluntarily develop anti-Japanese armed forces ready to cooperate directly with our allies in the fighting.'

"To reactionary elements who want to steal the sacred right of armed resistance to the Japanese aggressors from them, 'The Chinese people should in self-defense resolutely deal a counterblow after remonstrances have proved futile

People's Freedom

"With regard to the people's freedom, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that in their struggle for freedom at the present the first and main effort of the Chinese people is directed against the Japanese aggressor. But the Kuomintang Government has deprived the people of their freedom and bound them hand and foot, rendering them unable to oppose the Japanese aggressors.

"Mao said that 'The people in China's liberated areas have gained their freedom, and the people in other areas are able to and should gain such freedom. The more the Chinese people have gained, the greater is the organized democratic force, and then there is the possibility of a coalition government.'

Unification of People

"With regard to the unification of the people, Mao pointed out that 'divided China must be changed into unified China.' But what Chinese people want is not 'absolutist unification by dictators' by the 'democratic unification by the people. The movement of the Chinese people striving for freedom, democracy, and a coalition government is actually a movement for unification.'

"With regard to the people's armies, Mao pointed out that without any army which stands on the side of the people a coalition government cannot be formed. The 8th Route and New 4th Armies are wholeheartedly on the side of the people. Mao also pointed out that many Kuomintang troops which frequently suffered (words missing) oppress the people and discriminate against other troops should be reformed. Mao Tse-tung declared: 'As soon as the new democratic coalition government and the united high command is formed in China, troops in the Chinese liberated areas will at once be handed over to them. But all Kuomintang troops must also be handed over to them at the same time.'

Private Capitalism

"Mao Tze-tung declared that the Chinese Communist Party in the entire period (words missing). The new democracy approves the development of private capitalism and ownership of private property, but this must follow the theory propounded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, namely to carry out the principle of 'tillers own their land' and to guarantee that private capitalism 'cannot control the life of the people in the country'.

"With regard to the land problem, Mao pointed out that in the liberated areas the reduction of rent and interest has been carried out so that the landlords and peasants jointly take part in the war of resistance.

"Mao also declared: 'If there is no particular hindrance, we shall continue to carry out this policy after the war. First of all, the reduction of rent and interest will be carried out throughout the country and then (words missing). Then appropriate means will be found to arrive systematically at the (words missing) "tillers own their land".' (Next paragraph garbled in transmission—Ed.)

"On the one hand 'workers' interest will be protected', while on the other hand 'guarantee's are given to (words missing) profits from proper commercial (enterprise—Ed.)' He declared that in this new democratic state 'facilities will certainly be (words missing) widespread (development—Ed.) of a private capitalistic economy' apart from the economy of state-owned business and cooperatives.

"Mao Tze-tung welcomes foreign investments in China. He said that the industrialization of China 'will (afford—Ed.) a very great amount of foreign investments.'

Culture and Education

"With regard to culture and education, Mao Tze-tung pointed out (words missing) respecting the intelligentsia who serve the people and have made (words missing). He also pointed out the various tasks such as the liquidation of illiteracy, and the popularization of public hygiene. He further pointed out that the ancient Chinese and foreign culture should be 'absorbed critically.'

National Minorities

"Concerning the national minorities problem Mao Tze-tung pointed out that national minorities should be helped (asterisks supplied by Yenau—Ed.) to attain liberation and development, politically, economically, and culturally. Their language, literature, customs, habits, and religious faith should be respected.

"With regard to the problem of religion, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that 'according to the principle of freedom of belief, China's liberated areas will allow every

school of religion to exist. Protestants, Catholics, Mohammedans, Buddhists, and other religious beliefs, provided they obey the Government laws and decrees, will be protected by the Government.'

"Mao Tze-tung in his report dwelt in detail on 'diplomatic problems' (words missing) principle of the Chinese Communist party in diplomatic policy, declared Mao Tze-tung, 'is the establishment and consolidation of the diplomatic relations with other countries, the solution of mutually related wartime and postwar problems, such as the cooperation in fighting, peace conference, commercial intercourse, investments, (words missing) of thorough extermination of the Japanese aggressors, upholding of world peace (words missing) for equal and independent status of the Nation (words missing) interests and friendship of nations and peoples.'

International Conferences

"Also the Atlantic Charter and resolutions was (words missing) Moscow, Cairo, Tehran and Crimea international conferences, Hao Tze-tung said, that the Chinese Communist party (words missing) the Crimea Conference on this question. The Chinese Communist party 'welcomes the San Francisco United Nations Conference and has sent its representative to join the Chinese delegation in order to express the will of the Chinese people.'

"Mao Tze-tung opined that the Crimea line accords (word missing) with the policy held by the Chinese Communist Party in the settlement of the Chinese and Oriental question. He is of the opinion that a policy similar to that of (word missing) be adopted in the Orient and China."

4-Point Program

"He said that, '(1) The Japanese aggressors must be ultimately defeated and the Japanese fascist military and the causes producing them thoroughly exterminated. There should be no half-way compromise; (2) (words missing) the vestiges of fascism in China must be exterminated without allowing the least trace to remain; (3) domestic peace must be established in China and civil war not allowed to recur; (4) the Kuomintang dictatorship (word missing) must be abolished (words missing) after its abolition it should at first be supplanted by a provisional democratic coalition government fully supported by the whole Nation. (Words missing) territories have been recovered the regular coalition government executing the popular will should be set up through free and unrestricted elections."

Soviet Union

"Speaking of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, '(We are of the opinion—Ed.) that the Kuomintang Government must stop its attitude of enmity towards the Soviet Union and swiftly improve (Sino-Ed.) Soviet diplomatic relations.' 'On behalf of the Chinese people Mao Tze-tung expressed (words missing) which has always been rendered to China by the Soviet Government and people in China's war (words missing) liberated and expressed welcome of Marshal Stalin's speech (words missing) and recent denouncement of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact by the Soviet Union.'

"Mao Tze-tung added: 'We believe that without the participation of the Soviet Union, it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific question.'"

Diplomatic Relations

"Regarding Sino-Anglo and Sino-American diplomatic relations Mao Tze-tung said: 'The great efforts made by the Great Powers, American and Great Britain, especially the former, in the common cause of fighting the Japanese aggressors and the sympathy and aid rendered by their governments and peoples to China, deserve our thanks. (Words missing) will or Chinese people and thereby injury and lose the friendship of the Chinese people. If any foreign Government helps China's reactionary group to oppose the democratic cause of the Chinese people, a gross mistake will have been committed.'

"Speaking of the abrogation of the unequal treaties with China by (words missing), Mao Tze-tung said that the Chinese people welcome (words missing) Chinese people on a footing of equality. But, he pointed out, China 'definitely cannot rely on an (words missing) equality (words missing) being given by the good will of foreign governments and peoples. (words missing) and actual footing of equality must in the main rely on the efforts of the Chinese people to build up politically, economically and culturally a new democratic country, which is independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous and strong.

China assuredly cannot gain real independence and equality according to the policy of the Kuomintang Government at present in force?

Far Eastern Countries

"Mao Tze-tung advocated the following policies to be adopted with regard to the countries in the Far East: After the (words missing) unconditional surrender of the Japanese aggressors all democratic (words missing) of the Japanese people should be aided to establish a democratic regime of the Japanese people. Without such a democratic regime of the Japanese people, thorough extermination of the Japanese (words missing) would not be possible to guarantee peace in the Pacific (asterisks supplied by Yen-an—Ed.). 'The decision of the Cairo Conference to grant independence to Korea is correct, and the Chinese people should so help the Korean people to attain liberation (words missing).' With regard to Thailand she 'should be dealt with according to the measures of dealing with a fascist touncoat'." (Yenan, in English Morse to North America, May 2, 1945, 9:30 a. m. EDT).

Mr. RHETTS. I would like to introduce at this point Document No. 20-3. (The matter referred to is as follows:)

"Document No. 20-3.

"(Remarks of Congressman Judd, Congressional Record, October 19, 1949, p. 15283)

"After Mr. Service was transferred from China at the insistence of our Ambassador, General Hurley, he was involved in the Amerasia case. Suitcases of documents from his office were found by the FBI in the office of a notoriously pro-Communist magazine. The case was hushed up under circumstances never yet disclosed or explained. Since then he has been promoted several times and is now chairman of the committee within the State Department which makes recommendations for all promotions."

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. In this document, Mr. Service, Congressman Judd says that suitcases of documents from your office were found by the FBI in the Amerasia office. Do you care to comment on that statement?—A. I don't know of any documents from my office found in Mr. Jaffe's office. He may mean my "office" there to refer to the Department of State. If we believe the press reports there were a large number of copies.

Q. Did you have suitcases of documents in your office?—A. I certainly did not.

Q. Your personal office?—A. No.

Q. Or in your desk?—A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The Board is perfectly well aware of the fact that no documents were found in Mr. Jaffe's office possession which came from Mr. Service's office; you don't need to labor that point.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like at this point to introduce into the transcript Document 100-16a, and Document 100-16b, the course of colloquy between Mr. Gurnea and Mr. Hancock in the testimony before the Hobbs committee.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"DOCUMENT 100-16

"(Excerpt from Congressional Record, House, May 22, 1950)

"(Doc. 100-16a, p. 7566:)

"Mr. HANCOCK. Were any of these papers found in the possession of Roth?

"Mr. GURNEA. Roth at the time of his apprehension was preparing to go to Honolulu on transfer. He had already given up his apartment. His wife had gone to New York, where she was staying with her parents, and Roth was waiting orders to proceed.

"He did not know at that time that the orders to proceed were being held up in view of this case. He was practically on the street with his clothing and suitcase.

"Mr. HANCOCK. Did you not say fingerprints were found on some of these documents?

"Mr. GURNEA. In Jaffe's possession. Some were in his handwriting. There were three documents in his own handwriting.

"Mr. CHELF. Of Service?

"Mr. GURNEA. Yes."

"(Doc. 100-16b, p. 7566:)

"Mr. GURNEA. I was afraid you might have that impression. However, let me correct it. They were not fingerprints of Roth. They contained latent fingerprints of Gayn, Jaffe, and Larsen. The handwriting examination disclosed numerous specimens of Larsen's handwriting on the documents and three of the reports, three of the documents were in Roth's handwriting, one of them, I recall, was a copy of a document in Roth's handwriting prepared on stationery of the Statler Hotel.

"Mr. HANCOCK. Were those documents copies of official reports?

"Mr. GURNEA. Found in Amerasia. Many were copies.

"Mr. HANCOCK. I mean the ones written by Roth, were they copies of State Department or Navy Department documents?

"Mr. GURNEA. That is true.

"Mr. HANCOCK. Apparently so, you do not——"

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. The testimony of Mr. Gurnea and Mr. Hancock before the Hobbs committee appears in document 100-16a and it appears, does it not, that Mr. Gurnea is referring, in general, to documents bearing the fingerprints or handwriting of Lieutenant Roth?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then, Mr. Chelf interjects with the question: "Of Service?" and Mr. Gurnea answers "Yes," does he not?—A. He does.

Q. Will you refer to document 100-16b, and I ask you whether it is not made clear there that Mr. Gurnea is, in fact, talking only about documents in Mr. Roth's handwriting?—A. That is correct.

Mr. RHETTS. I do this, Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of making clear that the reference to Service in this testimony is either a typographical or other mistake and that I believe, on the face of the testimony of the representative of the FBI, is evidence that he was not intending to refer to any documents found in Mr. Jaffe's possession bearing the handwriting of Mr. Service.

Mr. ACHILLES. It looks as if he were referring to Service documents, but Roth's handwriting.

Mr. RHETTS. I do not even draw that implication from it necessarily.

In that connection I will also draw the Board's attention to document 100-12d and the testimony of Mr. McInerney who states that the only evidence against Mr. Service was the fact that documents of memoranda prepared by Mr. Service were found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. I take it had any memoranda bearing either the handwriting or fingerprints of Mr. Service been found Mr. McInerney would have regarded that as evidence.

(Doc. 100-12d and doc. 100-12e were submitted for inclusion in the transcript as follows:)

"DOCUMENT No. 100-12

"(Excerpt from Congressional Record, House, May 22, 1950)

"(Doc. 100-12d, p. 7558:)

"Mr. FEIGHAN. What prompted you to arrest Service?

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. Jim, I think you ought to answer that. I was out of town on trial when this feature of it broke.

"Mr. HOBBS. You mean on a trial.

"Mr. MCINERNEY. The evidence on Service was thin. They said there was in Jaffe's office, as I recall it, copies of his confidential reports. When we arrested or made the searches, we found copies of his report. We interviewed Larsen, and Larsen admitted he had given Service's copies to Jaffe, and Service had not given them. Service was very much surprised that Jaffe had that report. It was on that thin allegation that we authorized on Service, and the same way with Gayn."

"(Doc. 100-12e, p. 7559:)

"Mr. SPRINGER. From all of the investigations you made, from your grand jury investigation and everything connected with it, do you feel that all of these secret documents that you came in possession of had come through Larsen?

"Mr. MCINERNEY. I do not know whether I could go that far.

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. They did not. Take your FCC, Office of Strategic Service, or a few of them, the ONI, the BEW, and perhaps one or two others, they could

not have come from Larsen. Larsen was never employed there. He had no access to them. So far as we knew, he had never been near the places.

"Mr. HANCOCK. I asked that a moment ago. You said these documents were routed through the State Department.

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. Some of them, particularly the ONI documents, were routed to the State Department, and insofar as they pertained to Chinese affairs, Larsen would have had access to them from September 1, 1944, not prior to that.

"Mr. SPRINGER. Have you been able to discover any other person who could have distributed these documents?

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. We had two of them before the grand jury. In Gayn's case, he told us they got them through the area director for area 3, authorizing this girl or woman in charge of the office to give them to Gayn. We immediately sent out subpoenas for those two people.

"Mr. FELLOWS. A fine system.

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. That completely left us stymied. These people were in position of authority. He said he classified them ad hoc, made no record of it, and after authorized the handing them out to Gayn.

"Mr. SPRINGER. Did you find anyone that had distributed any of these documents?

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. No.

"Mr. MCINERNEY. I might add, at the time of the arrest, we told the agent who handled these as laboratory documents to see if we could process a representative number of them for fingerprints and try to establish a chain of custody from the chief of Jaffe. They were all old documents. We came up with no principal. We did get a couple of prints on some documents we found in Gayn's apartment. They were Gayn's fingerprints on the OWI stuff. We did not get any evidence which would assist us in tracing the custody.

"Mr. HITCHCOCK. You realize that many of these documents, that they refer to, date to 1936, from there on. That is why I suggested that you may be interested in seeing them. We have boxes full of them. We have all of them, booklets on health in the Japanese Empire in 1938, for example, completely innocuous, and negative as regards any national-defense character at all. Although there were some in the later period, referring principally to political matters in China, one man's judgment might say, when a nation is at war, that political matters pertain to national defense; others say it pertains to military operations, or manufacturing for military purposes or things of that character, those are questions of fact for the jury."

The CHAIRMAN. If you will refer to document 100-16b you will note that Mr. Gurnea makes clear that he referred to Roth's handwriting, not Service's.

Mr. RHETTS. That is the question I just asked. It is document 100-16b.

I should like at this point to introduce as an exhibit, but not for inclusion in the transcript, document 100-3, which is the testimony of Mr. Brooks describing the circumstances under which he made a raid upon the offices of the Amerasia magazine on the night of, I believe he says, March 11, 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. What are you asking—to have something inserted in the transcript?

Mr. RHETTS. No, sir. I am asking to have it as an exhibit in the transcript.

CHAIRMAN. It may be made an exhibit.

(Received and marked "Document No. 100-3, Exhibit 23," excerpt from Congressional Record—House, May 22, 1950, testimony of Mr. Brooks.)

Mr. RHETTS. I should also like to introduce into the transcript at this point Document No. 83, which is a two-page affidavit signed by Archbold Van Beuren, dated May 1, 1950.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"DOCUMENT NO. 83

"AFFIDAVIT OF ARCHIBOLD VAN BEUREN

"STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

"I, Archbold Van Beuren, being first duly sworn, depose and state:

"1. During the year 1945 I was employed in Washington, D. C., by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and held the position of Security Officer of that organization. In that capacity I was responsible for maintaining a security system designed to assure that information and documents containing material affecting the national defense should not come into the hands of unauthorized persons.

"2. Some time during the latter part of February 1945 an employee in the Research and Analysis Division of OSS called to my attention that an article dealing with Southeast Asia had appeared in the magazine Amerasia and that this article bore evidence of having been based upon or in part copied from a classified OSS document.

"3. Upon receiving this information and after consultation with my superior officers, I caused an investigation to be made under the direction of Mr. Frank B. Bielaski, an investigator attached to my office, with a view to ascertaining how the information contained in this classified document might have become available for publication in the magazine Amerasia. It was discovered that the OSS document in question had been widely distributed among various government agencies and that many people had properly had access to it in different government agencies.

"4. On the night of March 10, 1945, Mr. Bielaski and others acting under his direction gained access to the offices of Amerasia in New York City and there discovered a large number of classified government documents. Inspection of these documents indicated that most of them were government-prepared copies of documents either originating in the State Department or which had been distributed to the State Department by other government agencies, such as OSS, MID, ONI, and others.

"5. At the time of this inspection on March 10, 1945, Mr. Bielaski removed certain of the documents and reported to me on the following day, March 11, 1945, as to the results of his investigation.

"6. I presented the results of Mr. Bielaski's investigation, together with the classified Government documents which he had removed from the offices of Amerasia, to my superior, Maj. Gen. William Donovan, the head of OSS, in the late afternoon of March 11, 1945, and later that evening, in company with General Donovan and another officer of the OSS, presented the results of Amerasia to Secretary of State Stettinius and Assistant Secretary of State, Julius Holmes.

"7. Thereafter, the Office of Strategic Services had no further connection with the investigation and I had no direct knowledge of any further developments in the case until it was publicly announced on June 6, 1945, that the FBI had arrested Philip Jaffe, Kate Mitchell, and Mark Gayn in New York City, Lt. (jg) Andrew Roth, Emmanuel Larsen, and John S. Service in Washington, D. C.

"(S) ARCHBOLD VAN BEUREN.

"Subscribed and sworn to before me, a notary public in and for the State and county aforesaid, by Archbold Van Beuren, to me personally known, this the 1st day of May 1950.

"My commission expires March 31, 1951.

"(S) VICKI REGAN,

"Notary Public in the State of New York. No. 24-3232725. Qualified in Kings County. Certificate filed with notary public, New York and Kings Counties Clerks and Registers. Commission Expires March 31, 1951."

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now, Mr. Service, where were you on March 10, 1945?—A. I was in Yenan, China.

Q. And you had been in China how long?—A. Well, I had been in China since sometime in January. I arrived at Chungking on January 18, 1945.

Q. And you returned to this country when?—A. I returned to this country on April 12, 1945.

Q. Now where were you prior to January 18, 1945?—A. Well, I was en route from Washington between January 7 and January 18. I was in Washington from January 2 to January 7, 1945; prior to that, for about 45 days, I was on leave in California.

Q. And prior to that you had been?—A. On consultation with the Department of State from about October 29, 1944, to November 18, or 19, 1944.

Q. And prior to October 29?—A. I had been in China.

Q. You had been in China?—A. For the year and a half preceding.

Mr. RHETTS. I offer these documents, if it pleases the Board for the purpose of showing that at a time when whatever arrangements Mr. Jaffe may have had for obtaining Government documents Mr. Service was out of the country.

Now I ask that there be introduced into the transcript at this point Documents 39-1, 39-18, and 39-25.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"DOCUMENT No. 39-1

"(Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950—remarks of Senator McCarthy)

"(P. 4437:) * * * I could not help but remember that at the time of the Service case we also had an apparently able Attorney General. It will be recalled that in that case the FBI, after months of painstaking work by scores, or perhaps hundreds of agents, developed what J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the Department, publicly referred to as 'a 100-percent airtight case' of espionage and treason.

"J. Edgar Hoover, as everyone knows, is not known for overstating his case. I am sure we all agree that he is the ablest law-enforcement officer in this Nation and, I think, in the world. When he stated that after the tremendous amount of labor put into that case, it was a 100-percent airtight case of treason and espionage, I believe most of us would be willing to rely on his judgment on the case.

"Strangely, however, after the arrest of six suspects in that case of treason, there was an unusual sequence of events, resulting in a most fantastic finale. The curtain was rung down when a young Department of Justice attorney disposed of Hoover's six 100-percent airtight cases of treason with a statement to the effect that he could cover all of the facts in that case in less than 5 minutes, and then proceeded to assure the court that there was not the slightest indication of disloyalty.

"Obviously, with that treatment by the administration of the carefully investigated and developed case which the head of the FBI called a 100-percent airtight case of treason, I felt that the Department of Justice was not the correct place to take what I consider an even more dangerous case."

DOCUMENT No. 39-18

"(Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950—remarks of Senator McCarthy)

"(P. 4440:) It will be recalled that J. Edgar Hoover at the time said this was a 100-percent airtight case against Service, Roth, and their codefendants."

"DOCUMENT No. 39-25

"(Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950—remarks of Senator McCarthy)

"(P. 4454:) Let me state in this connection that, as the Senator will recall, John Service was arrested. That is the case which Hoover says was a 100-percent airtight case. Joseph Grew, who was then Under Secretary of State, was very vigorous in insisting on the prosecution of Service. Grew resigned. Dean Acheson took over. A few days later John Service was reinstated. He is the man who was accused of stealing these documents. Subsequently, he was put in charge, so far as I can determine, of personnel, promotions, and placements in the Far East. The man who stole the documents for Amerasia, an outfit which is clearly Communist controlled, and who was the subject of this espionage case was picked up by Dean Acheson, and was not only reinstated but was placed in the position of controlling placements and promotions of personnel in the Far East. This may explain why men like Lattimore were assigned such important jobs in the East."

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I ask you, Mr. Service, do you have any knowledge of any public statement made by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover to the effect that there was a 100-percent airtight espionage case against you?—A. I have no knowledge of any such statement by Mr. Hoover.

Q. Have you attempted to obtain any information from Mr. Hoover as to whether he ever made such a statement?—A. I have.

Q. I show you document 53-1, and I ask you if this is a copy of a letter which you sent to Mr. Hoover on this subject?—A. It is a copy of a letter I addressed to him on April 12, 1950.

Mr. RHETS. I ask that document 53-1 be introduced into the transcript at this point.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 53-1

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 12, 1950.

J. EDGAR HOOVER,

*Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. HOOVER: As a result of a postaudit of the action of the Department of State Loyalty Security Board clearing me of any charges of disloyalty to the United States, the President's Loyalty Review Board recently remanded my case for further consideration and my personal appearance before the Loyalty Security Board.

At the time of this action I was en route to a post in India, and the Department notified me to return to Washington for a hearing before the Loyalty Security Board.

At about the same time, Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin made various charges against me on the floor of the Senate and before the Tydings subcommittee which was set up to consider Senator McCarthy's charges against various individuals.

Since my return to this country I have familiarized myself with the charges against me and I am presently engaged in assembling documentary and other materials so that I may establish before the Loyalty Security Board that these charges are without foundation in fact.

One of the charges made against me by Senator McCarthy occurred in the course of a speech delivered on the floor of the United States Senate on Wednesday, March 29, 1950. At this time Senator McCarthy attributed to you certain statements concerning the so-called Amerasia case. You may recall that I was one of the persons who was arrested in connection with that case and that after presentation of my case before the Grand Jury, that body returned a no true bill in my case.

Senator McCarthy attributed two statements to you. The first, appearing at 96 Daily Congressional Record, p. 4437, is as follows:

"* * * it will be recalled that in that case the FBI, after months of painstaking work by scores, or perhaps hundreds of agents, developed what J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the Department, publicly referred to as a '100-percent airtight case' of espionage and treason."

While I have been unable to locate any statement by you substantially to this effect, it may well be that you did express the view that there was a "100-percent airtight case" against some of the persons who were indicted in the Amerasia case.

The second statement attributed to you by Senator McCarthy is of a different and more specific character. This statement, appearing at p. 4440 of the Congressional Record for the same day, March 30, 1950, is as follows:

"It will be recalled that J. Edgar Hoover at the time said this was a '100-percent airtight case against Service, Roth, and their co-defendants'."

If Senator McCarthy's statement is true and you did in fact make this statement concerning a "100 percent airtight case against Service" it would, of course, be highly relevant to the departmental consideration of my loyalty to the United States.

You will, I am sure, appreciate that because of your official position any statement by you expressing an opinion that there was a "100-percent airtight case" or any other kind of case of espionage or other malfeasance against me would carry great weight, and that an improper attribution to you of any such an expression would necessarily be highly damaging to me.

I assume that you have never made any such statement as the one attributed to you by Senator McCarthy and in view of its great importance to me in the proceedings in which I am now involved, I would be grateful to you if you would advise me whether or not you ever made the statement concerning me which has been attributed to you by Senator McCarthy either in the form attributed to you or substantially to that effect. If this statement is untrue I should appreciate an expression from you which will make this unmistakably clear.

In view of the pendency of these proceedings at the present time, I would appreciate the favor of an early reply addressed to me in care of my attorneys, Reilly, Rhettts & Ruckelshaus, Tower Building, 1401 K Street, Washington, D. C.

Sincerely,

JOHN S. SERVICE.

Questions by Mr. RHETTTS :

Q. And I ask you if you received an answer to that letter [Doc. 53-1]?—A. I did.

Q. I show you Document 53-2, and ask you if this is the reply you received from Mr. Hoover?—A. It is.

Mr. RHETTTS. I ask that Document 53-2 be included in the transcript at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

Mr. RHETTTS. In this connection I should like to ask the board to inspect the document of which the original is there [indicating] and ask permission to introduce into this proceeding copies of the original.

CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 53-2

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Washington, D. C., April 18, 1950.

Mr. JOHN S. SERVICE,
*c/o Reilly, Rhettts, and Ruckelshaus,
Tower Building, 1401 K Street, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SIR: In response to your letter of April 12, 1950, I wish to advise that I have made no public statement on the Amerasia case since the period wherein the arrests occurred.

At the time of the arrests a release was issued by the Attorney General's Office wherein certain of the details of the case were attributed to me. The Federal Bureau of Investigation does not pass on the evidence it collects during its investigations, but this evidence is turned over to the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. I presume that they must have been satisfied with the evidence presented to them by the FBI as they authorized the arrests to be made in this case.

Very truly yours,

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, *Director.*

Mr. RHETTTS. I should like to introduce Document 53-3 for inclusion in the transcript at this point, a copy of a release by the Department of Justice, dated June 6, 1945, which I represent to the Board that I obtained from the Department of Justice within the last month.

"DOCUMENT No. 53-3

For immediate release
Wednesday, June 6, 1945

"DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

"The Department of Justice announces the arrest by Special Agents of the FBI of six persons, including a Naval Reserve Lieutenant, until recently on active duty, and two Department of State employees in Washington, and the editor of Amerasia magazine in New York City, on charges of conspiring to violate the Federal Espionage Statutes through theft of highly confidential documents.

"Director J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI stated that the investigation was undertaken at the request of the Departments of State and the Navy. Since receipt of the original complaint by the FBI, the three departments have fully cooperated in the investigation.

"Those in custody in Washington are Lieutenant Andrew Roth, U. S. N. R., who was formerly assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence; Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, specialist in the China Division of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; and John Stewart Service, Foreign Service Officer of the Department of State who, until recently, was stationed in China.

"Three others under arrest in New York are Philip Jacob Jaffe and Kate Louise Mitchell, coeditors of Amerasia, which printed information from the stolen

documents, and Mark Julius Gayn, nationally known writer who used some of the material in his articles.

"The documents recovered by the FBI include originals and copies of papers from the Departments of State, War, and Navy, the Office of Strategic Services, Office of War Information, and the Federal Communications Commission. Their security classification ranged from restricted to top secret.

"The arrests culminated two and one-half months of intensive investigation by the FBI. Investigation disclosed that data removed from the Government's confidential files usually was turned over to Jaffe at meetings in Washington and New York.

"The magazine's office is at 225 Fifth Avenue, New York. Established in 1937, Amerasia's announced purpose was to promote the study of Pacific affairs.

"Those in custody are to be taken before United States Commissioners immediately in Washington and New York on charges of conspiring to violate Section 31, Title 50, U. S. C. A., which covers the unauthorized possession or transmittal of national defense data. The maximum penalty upon conviction is two years' imprisonment and \$10,000 fine.

"BACKGROUND

"*Lieutenant Andrew Roth* was born April 23, 1919, in The Bronx, New York City. He received degrees from the City College of New York and Columbia University, and at the latter school he was an honor student. In the summer of 1939 Roth studied Chinese at the University of Michigan. He worked as a research associate for Amerasia in 1941 and in September of that year joined the United States Navy. Following a course of study in the Japanese language at Harvard University, he was commissioned as an ensign on August 28, 1942, and was transferred to Washington for duty with the Office of Naval Intelligence. Since January of this year he has been a full lieutenant, but is not presently on active duty. His most recent address was 1614 Queen Street, Arlington, Virginia.

"*Emanuel Sigurd Larsen* was born August 27, 1897, at San Rafael, California. He was educated in China and Denmark and received a Doctorate of Philosophy from the University of Copenhagen in 1916. From then until 1927 he worked for the Chinese Postal Administration at Peiping, after which he served a year as adviser to Teh-Ching-Mu, Chief of the Mongol Clans at Kokenmiao, Inner Mongolia. His next six years were spent as traffic manager for a British-American tobacco company in China. From October 1934 to February 1935 Larsen was with the Chinese Secret Service at Peiping, handling investigations of the illicit arms traffic and intelligence operations in Manchuria. Larsen returned to the United States and was employed until March 1943 by the ONI as a civilian senior analyst on affairs in China, Indo-China, Thailand, and India. On August 31, 1944, he became a specialist in the China Division of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State. His address is 1650 Harvard Street, Northwest, Washington.

"*John Stewart Service* was born at Chengtu, Szechwan, China, on August 3, 1909. His father, an American citizen, was engaged in social welfare work in Shanghai. A graduate of Oberlin College in Ohio, Service worked for a while for a bank in Shanghai, but since 1933 he has been with the Department of State in the Foreign Service. His posts have included duty at Yunnanfu, Peiping and Chungking, China, and until recently he had an assignment with the American military forces in that country. He resides in the 700 block of Eighteenth Street, Northwest, Washington.

"*Philip Jacob Jaffe* was born in 1897 at Mogilev, Ukraine, Russia, and was naturalized as a United States citizen in New York on May 4, 1923. In addition to being editor of Amerasia he is president of a printing firm specializing in stationery and greeting cards. For several years Jaffe had been active in organizations prominent in Far Eastern affairs. Jaffe lives at 49 East Ninth Street, New York.

"*Kate Louise Mitchell* was born September 1, 1908, at Buffalo, New York. She was graduated from Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania in 1932. During the 1930's, Miss Mitchell traveled extensively in Europe and the Far East and she has written several books, among them "Industrialization of the Western Pacific," "Japan's Industrial Strength," and "India Without Fable." Her address in New York is 127 East Fifty-fourth Street.

"*Mark Julius Gayn*, whose name originally was Mark Julius Ginsbourg, was born April 29, 1908, at Barim, Manchuria. He entered the United States for

permanent residence in October 1941, and was naturalized November 8, 1943, at New York. Gayn is a free-lance writer and his articles have appeared in several widely circulated magazines. At the time of his arrest he was planning to go to Russia, India, and China as a newspaper correspondent. His address is 302 West Twelfth Street, New York."

Mr. RHETTS. At this point I should like to introduce into the transcript copies of an exchange of correspondence between Mr. John E. Peurifoy and Mr. Peyton Ford; Mr. Peurifoy's letter being dated May 1, 1950, and Mr. Ford's letter being dated May 8, 1950; this exchange of correspondence having been released to the press by the Department of State as a part of its release No. 529, dated May 20, 1950.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

MAY 1, 1950.

The Honorable PEYTON FORD,

The Assistant to the Attorney General.

DEAR MR. FORD: In his address on April 20, 1950, to the American Society of Newspaper Editors at the Hotel Statler in Washington, Senator McCarthy said: "One of those arrested was John S. Service. He was never convicted; he was never tried; he was never indicted.

"J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, publicly stated at the time of the arrests that this case was a 100-percent airtight case of espionage. At the time the case broke John S. Service was picked up by the FBI, Mr. Hoover made that statement, and he seldom errs on the side of overstatement, as you well know."

The Department of State is naturally interested in whether or not this statement of Senator McCarthy is an accurate one. As a result, I would appreciate it if you would inform the Department as soon as possible whether the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation made any statement similar to that attributed to him by Senator McCarthy.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN E. PEURIFOY,
Deputy Under Secretary.

MAY 8, 1950.

JOHN E. PEURIFOY, Esq.,

*Deputy Under Secretary, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. PEURIFOY: This is in reply to your letter dated May 1, 1950, inquiring as to the accuracy of a statement alleged to have been made by J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, at the time of the arrest of John S. Service and other suspects involved in the so-called Amerasia case. You are advised that Mr. Hoover did not make the statement which has been attributed to him.

Yours sincerely,

PEYTON FORD,
The Assistant to the Attorney General.

Mr. RHETT. I should like at this point to introduce document No. 100-1.

DOCUMENT No. 100-1

"Excerpt from Congressional Record—House, May 22, 1950, p. 7538

"Mr. DONDERO. The Members will remember at the time that matter came up at least the public press indicated that some statement was made by the FBI that their case was airtight. We now discover that it was not airtight.

"Mr. HOBBS. I have no such recollection, and I do not believe that any reputable person would make such a statement.

"In compliance with my promise concerning the FBI I have since looked through my file and found this quotation from a memorandum furnished me by the FBI dated May 29, 1945:

"In addition to the above, there are many contacts and associates of this group who are known to have been instrumental in this conspiracy to extract confidential documents from the Government files in Washington. However, as yet it is not believed there is sufficient admissible evidence to prosecute these individuals at this time. It is anticipated that a considerable amount of additional evidence will, of course, be developed following such time and if prosecutive action is instituted against the above four principals."

"Six arrests were made on June 6, 1945.

"I can find no record of the witnesses from the FBI who appeared and testified before the grand jury. All these records were returned to the court.

"Mr. DONDERO. I only refer to the statement that appeared in the public press at the time; I do not say that it was made by the FBI; I do not know, of course.

"Mr. HOBBS. There are a great many statements appearing in the public press that I would not like to be called upon to vouch for."

Mr. RHETTS. I should like at this point to introduce document 100-12, and I should like to refer also at this point to document 100-12-d, which has already been introduced into the transcript.

(Please see page 63 of this transcript for Doc. 100-12, which includes Doc. 100-12d, p. 7558, and Doc. 100-12e, p. 7559, Excerpt from Congressional Record--House, May 22, 1950.)

Mr. RHETTS. I offer all these documents to show that not only did Mr. J. Edgar Hoover never say that he had a 100-percent airtight espionage or any other kind of a case against Mr. Service, but that the testimony of Mr. Hitchcock, the prosecutor in charge of the trial of the Amerasia case; Mr. McInerney, the then First Assistant and presently Assistant to Attorney General of the United States; and Mr. James McGranery, then Assistant to the Attorney General and presently United States district judge, testified before the House Judiciary Committee that there was no case at all against Mr. Service, and that the only possible evidence against him was the fact that some reports prepared by him were found in Jaffe's possession, and that Larsen admitted giving those to Jaffe.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now, Mr. Service, you have already testified in your personal statement concerning your acquaintance with the various persons who were arrested in connection with the Amerasia case. I would like to ask you to explain in somewhat further detail something about your association with some of these persons. I should like to ask you, first of all, about your associations with Lieutenant Roth? Will you undertake to explain to the Board in some detail the circumstances under which you first met Lieutenant Roth and of your subsequent association with him?—A. It is rather hard to do that, sir, without a good deal of repetition of what is already in my personal statement. I met Lieutenant Roth, for the first time, at the conclusion of the off-the-record session with the IPR in Washington about the middle of November 1944. There were a number of people that came up to greet me or meet me at the end of the affair, some of them were people whom I had met or known before and hadn't had a chance to speak to me. Several of them were people whom I had never met. Lieutenant Roth was one of those. He was wearing naval uniform, I remember, and simply introduced himself.

Mr. STEVENS. One of those whom you had not met before?

A. That's right. I had never met him before; I had never heard of him before. He introduced himself, said he was working in ONI on the Far East and made some polite remarks about having enjoyed my talk, or something of the sort, and said that he hoped he would meet me again. Actually, I left Washington a few days later and did not meet him during that visit in Washington. The next time that I met him was quite soon after my return to Washington in April 1945. I remember being somewhat surprised. He telephoned me, I think, asked me to come out to his house. He said he was having a group of people for supper. I remember being somewhat surprised he had found out how soon I had arrived, and he gave a quite reasonable explanation that it was through some associate that he was working with in the office at that time, the brother of Davies, who is the brother of the naval officer working in ONI. I accepted the invitation to supper. I had no reason to refuse. I think that the supper was to be on April 19, which would have been just a week after my arrival. It was during the day, I think—the morning of the party that Lieutenant Roth called me at the office and said that Mr. Jaffe was in town and was very anxious to have a chance to meet me and talk to me and was afraid there wouldn't be an opportunity at the party because there were going to be a large number of people there, a considerable number of people there, would I be able to see Jaffe, would I give Jaffe a ring. I gave Jaffe a ring at the hotel as requested.

The only arrangement we could make was for me to stop at the hotel early and we would go on to the party together. I saw Roth the next day.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you went to the party?

A. I went to the party; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That was on the 19th of April?

A. I must say, General, that—

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you so stated in your statement.

A. When I was interrogated by the FBI I told them I wanted to cooperate and assist as far as I could in clearing up the matter, and they, of course, wanted a full detailing of my contacts with Mr. Jaffe particularly, but also with some of the other people in the case, and I couldn't positively remember the dates. But the agents had little black books and I would say: "Well, after a few days I think I had supper at his house." The agent would look at the book and would say: "Would it have been April 19, for instance?" and since he obviously knew the date, and I couldn't disagree with him, I usually accepted his dates so that—

The CHAIRMAN. You went to the Statler Hotel first and saw Jaffe and then accompanied Jaffe to Roth's?

A. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you carrying a small brown bag at that time?

A. I imagine I was carrying a brief case. I practically always do. I was on consultation. I don't like loading my pockets and any officer recently arrived or on consultation working on travel and various other things—I often carry a newspaper or magazines. It is customary for me to carry a brief case, and I think that's what I had. I don't usually—

The CHAIRMAN. Was it a zipper case?

A. Yes; I usually have a zipper case. It is this type [indicating] of case that I like, sir.

Mr. RHETTS. You are exhibiting to the Board a leather brief case with a zipper, are you?

A. Yes, sir. The one I was carrying was not this identical one, but it was the same general type.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Was that the occasion on which you stated that you took a copy of one report you showed Mr. Jaffe?—A. That's correct.

Q. I suppose you carried that in your brief case?—A. Probably almost certain.

Q. And you think you may have left that report with Jaffe on that occasion?—

A. Yes; I believe I did.

Q. And did he put it in a manila envelope and carry it in his pocket?—A. That, I cannot say, sir; I don't remember. I don't believe I was at the hotel for very long before we went on to supper at Roth's and he didn't want to sit down and read it and study it in detail then and there.

Q. At any rate, you think you may have let him have it on that occasion?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. All right; go ahead.—A. The next day I had agreed to have lunch with Jaffe, and I remember being rather surprised that Roth was there. I didn't seem to remember that I had known of Roth being invited. Roth was present at the lunch with Jaffe at the Statler Hotel on the following day. Now I saw Roth—

The CHAIRMAN. You say Roth was present at that luncheon?

A. Yes, sir; as far as I can remember.

Mr. RHETTS. Was he in uniform?

A. Yes; he had to be in uniform during the war. I don't ever remember seeing him out of uniform. I remember at some social function—and I'm not sure where this was—he was not wearing a regulation necktie and there was some kidding about the fact that he didn't have a regulation necktie on, but so far as I know he always was in uniform.

The CHAIRMAN. Now this occasion, the next day, you are telling us about now, was it the occasion on which you left the other 8 or 10 memoranda that you told us about with Jaffe?

A. Yes.

Mr. RHETTS. May it please the Board, I have no objection here, but I rather had in mind to try to go through each of these individuals seriatim. We can scramble them up if you prefer.

The CHAIRMAN. We were asking about this occasion.

Mr. RHETTS. I was trying to delineate, if possible, all his associations with Roth and then I proposed to come back and also take you over the same ground so far as Jaffe. It is a matter of indifference to me.

The CHAIRMAN. In this case it would save a good deal of unnecessary duplication, I would think.

Mr. RHETTS: Very well. It seemed to me it might be easier to deal with the associations on a separate basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Since they were associated with these two gentlemen at the same time I don't see any point in doing it twice.

Mr. RHETTS. I am entirely agreeable and at the Board's disposal.

Mr. STEVENS. I had been delaying some questions about Roth expecting that we would get the story that way. If we are going to talk about Mr. Jaffe along with it too, I think maybe as these occurrences come along, General, I had better put in a question.

(Discussion off the record.)

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. I would like to know from Mr. Service if Lieutenant Roth related to you, when he telephoned you about having dinner with him, what his position was, whether he had any relationships with the Department of State? Were you aware of the capacity in which he was working in the Navy?—A. I remembered having met him the previous year at the IPR meeting at which he told me that he was working for ONI, and, of course, he was wearing a Navy uniform and the fact of his presence at an IPR meeting meant that he had to be at least a member of the IPR and probably a person working on far eastern matters because that was the type of person that attended. Subsequently, I made some enquiries about Roth, but I am not sure that I had made those previous to his inviting me to dinner.

Q. Was it a practice of yours then when you were back here on consultation to dine with people whom you knew so slightly?—A. Well, I was living downtown in a small apartment; if a person was interested in the Far East and officially connected and so on—I was quite used to having invitations from people that I had just barely met whom I didn't have any background of personal acquaintance with. And if I didn't accept an invitation I would go out and eat dinner by myself in some restaurant downtown and I usually accepted invitations I am afraid. I may have known something about Roth from somebody like Donald Davis, for instance, I did later, and I can't say positively whether I made any particular inquiry about Roth or whether I simply accepted his statements that he was an officer in the ONI interested in the Far East.

(Discussion off the record.)

(The meeting was adjourned at 5:30 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF MR. JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: Monday, June 5, 1950, 10:05 a. m.—12:35 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building, Washington, D. C.

Reporter: Violet R. Voce, Department of State, court stenographer, reporting.

Members of Board: Mr. Conrad E. Snow, Chairman; Mr. Theodore C. Achilles; Mr. Arthur G. Stevens; Mr. Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Representative for Mr. Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts & Ruckelshaus.

The Board reconvened at 10:05 a. m.

CHAIRMAN (Mr. Conrad E. Snow): The Board will be in session. At the close of the last session I believe Mr. Stevens was asking Mr. Service some questions. He would like to ask some further questions.

Thereupon Mr. JOHN STEWART SERVICE, a witness previously produced and sworn in his own behalf, resumed the stand and testified further as follows:

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. I believe you mentioned that Roth called you soon after you returned and suggested dinner. I believe you stated further that you're not sure whether you knew precisely the job that he had at that time but that you thought you had heard through John Davies' brother.—A. Well, I know that John Davies' brother was a mutual friend and that I saw John Davies' brother a good deal.

Q. Did you have any idea of who was going to be at dinner that night?—A. As I recollect he simply said that he was having a bunch of far-eastern people, and that sort of social activity was quite general. I mean far-eastern people run around in the same circles.

Q. I believe in answer also to a question from counsel you mentioned that Lieutenant Roth called you and said that Mr. Jaffe was going to be there and asked that you call prior to going out that night. Did you know who Mr. Jaffe was at that time?—A. Certainly I knew who he was. I never met him, but his name was quite well known.

Q. Can you recall the substance of that conversation with Roth, what led you to call this man on such short notice, and to go by?—A. Well, it's not a conversation which, of course, made any impression or meant anything to me at the time. As I stated the other day, my recollection is that Lieutenant Roth called me and said something about "Phil Jaffe is in town and is going to be at my house this evening. You know who Jaffe is, don't you?" And I said: "Yes; I heard of him." He said: "Jaffe would very much like to meet you and talk to you, but I'm afraid there won't be much time or opportunity tonight at my house, and he would very much like to see you sometime during the day." My recollection is that Roth suggested that I call Jaffe and that is my recollection of what happened. That's the way it happened.

Q. When he mentioned Jaffe's name, could you let us know something about what you knew about Mr. Jaffe at that time? Did you need an explanation from him as to what Jaffe's connections were?—A. No, I didn't need any explanation of Jaffe. He, of course, had been out in Peiping in 1936 or 1937. I didn't meet him at that time.

Q. How did you know he had been there, Mr. Service?—A. Because I met some of the other people who were in that—I'm not sure how I did. Peiping is just a small place and you see Owen Lattimore went up to the Communist territory with Jaffe and Bisson, as I remember, and I'm not sure whether I talked to Owen when he came out or whether I got a second-hand report of their trip. Also, of course, I was a subscriber to Amerasia for a while in those early days and I undoubtedly had read of Jaffe's trip. I think anybody working or specializing in the far-eastern field would know Jaffe's name quite well.

Q. Did you have any idea of Mr. Jaffe's political ideologies at that time?—A. No, I hadn't been reading Amerasia during the war really. At the time I got to Chungking in 1941 we would see occasional references to Amerasia, the sort of material that State Department sent out, summary of editorials and summary of material written about China. Well, a couple or three issues of Amerasia, maybe when I was here in 1944. I had been particularly, shall we say, pleased because Amerasia gave by far the fullest treatment to the whole Stilwell recall in a way which was very favorable to Stilwell and later gave very favorable comment on Ambassador Gauss. And I must admit that when Jaffe sought an introduction or when Roth put me in touch with Jaffe that was the idea that was perhaps paramount in my mind at the time that this was the guy that had done a very fine job on reporting the Stilwell recall.

Q. Did you know anything about his affiliations?—A. None whatever. I meant to answer that question more specifically. I didn't know the history of the Amerasia magazine at that time. I didn't know that this boiled down to just Mr. Jaffe, in fact. In fact, I was rather surprised to find that out from Lieutenant Roth. I think I was walking back from lunch the next day, on the 20th, and it was when I found out that Amerasia magazine had become Jaffe, with Kate Mitchell as his assistant.

Q. At the dinner, did you know many of the people who were there? Had you met them before?—A. I can't honestly tell you who was there, now. Most of the people—

The CHAIRMAN. What are you referring to now, the lunch?

Q. No, the dinner at Roth's home.—A. I believe that most of the people were juniors in the research field, working in the Navy and MID. MID had a huge research shop. I met an awful lot of these people casually. I had already met them in these sort of briefing sessions in 1944 and perhaps there in 1945 too.

Q. The people you had dinner with?—A. That is my recollection of the type of people. I can pull some names out of my head, but I couldn't say positively whether they were at Roth's that evening or whether they were at some other party I went to during that same period.

Q. One other question with respect to the telephone call that you made to Mr. Jaffe at Lieutenant Roth's suggestion. Can you recall the substance of that conversation, Mr. Service?—A. The telephone call with Jaffe?

Q. Yes, your call to Jaffe.—A. As I remember it, it was extremely brief and I was given a room number and he said that he thought that Jaffe was there right then. So I just called immediately. I said, "This is Jack Service. Andy Roth has just said that you were very anxious to get together with me and meet

me before this evening. What time do you have free?" or something of that sort. And I didn't have any time or he didn't have any time. There wasn't any arrangement that we could make except, well, to stop by the hotel and then we would go on together.

Q. Did he ask you during that conversation about any particular matters relating to China?—A. My recollection is that he did not. It was just a conversation to try and find some mutually convenient time to meet. It's very hard to be absolutely positive about any of these things because at the time they were just incidents that didn't mean anything. I'm quite positive there was no conversation except in an effort to find a mutual satisfactory place to meet.

Q. I'd like for us to be as clear as we can in citing these particular points, Mr. Service, because I would like to get from you whatever you can recall about these early associations.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you make any inquiries at all as to Roth's reputability in the Department?

A. Well, we will have to skip ahead a little bit in the chronological sequence here. It was some time, well, I don't remember the date, and I don't think it is specified here. I don't think I even tried to guess at it here [indicating the chronology]. It must have been fairly soon after this April 19 supper at Roth's. He called me one morning in the office and wanted to know if I could meet him. He suggested the park between the two Interior buildings. He seemed to be quite excited. I said, "Sure, Andy," and walked over there and he told me that he wanted to know if I knew of a telegram from Moscow warning the Department against accepting at face value everything that Hurley had reported that Stalin had said to him.

It's a telegram that I think is in the white paper here. I had not seen the telegram and knew nothing about it. And this struck me as so strange that as soon as I got back to the Department—I walked right back to the Department—I spoke to Mr. Stanton about it and he knew about Roth and he knew Roth was working over in ONI. And I told him what Roth had asked me and he said that it seemed very strange that a lieutenant over in ONI should know the telegram which I myself had not seen and which I think had a pretty high classification probably. And Mr. Stanton thought for a while and then he said that Harriman had just returned and had brought with him a young naval officer as an aide and that undoubtedly this young Navy officer, who was the assistant naval attaché, had, therefore, some sort of relation with ONI. He had discussed the matter with Roth and he dismissed it as far as I could see.

He certainly didn't give any appearance of being concerned about Roth or about Roth's having it. I knew that some of the other officers in China Affairs were acquainted with Roth. I'm not sure at what point I found that out. I knew that Friedman, for instance, was a good friend of his because they mentioned him.

Q. Did you make that telegram available to Roth?—A. I certainly did not, sir. I never saw it myself.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES :

Q. Stanton indicated no doubts as to Roth's reliability?—A. Absolutely none.

Q. Did you make any inquiries of anybody in the Department about Jaffe's reputability?—A. Not at that time, no. Somewhat later on I did.

Q. Do you remember about when?—A. It would be about the end of April, I think.

Q. What led you to make the inquiries then?—A. Well, it's hard to find the exact words that can express it. I wouldn't say that I was suspicious of Jaffe but I just didn't like Jaffe very much. I was perplexed by his rather aggressive, nosy manner, and I asked somebody, I'm not sure who it was, about Jaffe. And they said he was not a good guy to be around too much, or something of that sort. No, that isn't quite right.

Q. You don't remember who the person was that you asked?—A. No, sir; I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know when it was?

A. Well, I was saying a minute ago, sir, I think it was probably about the end of April or early May.

Q. Or whether it was one of the far eastern people or one of our press people?—A. No, it wasn't.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN :

Q. Was this after you let him see the copies of your report?—A. Yes, sir; yes, it was. At the same time I gained the impression that people knew Jaffe and

there wasn't anything very definite or positive. The person who I spoke to had pretty much the impression that I had at the time of Jaffe, that he was a nosy guy and overaggressive—and that was the impression I got.

Q. You regarded Jaffe as a member of the press, did you?—A. Certainly, entirely. And you might say a little bit more than that, a member of the research student expert branch of the press.

Mr. STEVENS. You can recall this conversation but you cannot recall with whom you had it?

A. No, sir; it's very, very hazy.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. I take it, from something you said, that you treated the members of the Newspaper Guild, that is the press, and writers on China as people in the same general category?—A. Yes.

Q. People who were entitled to background information?—A. That is right; sir, yes.

Q. Did you in your treatment of such people, or were you accustomed to give them as background information, information which they were not supposed to use which was classified in a sense but to which you thought they were entitled to as background information but were not supposed to publish?—A. Certainly. That is what background information very often is, sir; just exactly that, material which will give them an understanding and enable them to write intelligently without going off in a wrong tangent—which they cannot use directly or which they cannot quote.

Q. That is the definition of background information, is it?—A. Well, it's —

Q. Let's put it this way, how would you define this material?—A. It's a very important part of background information. I would say a good deal of background information is of that character.

Mr. ACHILLES. Would you ordinarily give background information to a newspaperman without getting some indication as to whether he could be trusted to observe the confidences?

A. Well, that of course is a matter of judgment in each case of reputation. I think if you inquired among people in the far eastern field and could have them put themselves mentally back to that period they would most of them say that Amerasia at that time had a pretty good reputation. I talked to Dr. Blakeslee recently and we were discussing the affair—because of course Mr. Larson was working for Dr. Blakeslee—and Dr. Blakeslee said, "You know, I used to read Amerasia and it had pretty good dope. It was a pretty authoritative magazine." And I think that most of us at time thought that it was a good magazine.

Q. In other words, his relationship with Amerasia was the key to his credibility with you?—A. Yes, sir; that is right. I knew nothing else about him except his connections with Amerasia.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. Service, from what we have heard during this hearing and the documents Jaffe, had, Amerasia should have been an authoritative magazine, should it not?

A. The answer is "Yes, sir."

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. I think, although the session on Friday started with this matter of Roth, it may be better to go back and deal really first with Jaffe, since he is the central character here. I wonder if you could, going back to your first meeting with Jaffe—you have testified that at Lieutenant Roth's suggestion you telephoned Jaffe and you made this arrangement to call at his hotel and proceed to Roth's for the dinner.—A. That is right.

Q. I wonder if you can tell the Board whether you can recall what the nature of your conversation with Jaffe was on that first occasion. Did you drive to Lieutenant Roth's name?—A. As I recall, we went by taxi.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you're referring to the dinner?—A. That is right.

Q. Can you recall anything of the nature of the conversation you had with Jaffe at that time?—A. When you say "at that time," are you referring to the conversation at the hotel before we went out, sir, or are you referring to the conversation at the dinner?

Q. From the time you went and picked him up, met him first at the hotel.—A. I hate to have to keep referring to the fact that this is 5 years ago and it's very hard to divide conversations or separate the different conversations. As I recall, Jaffe started out by asking me about some of the Communist leaders just personal information. He had been there and he knew them or had known them years before and he asked me about them—and I'm just, for instance,

I think he asked me about Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and the other people, how they were. Then he went on to inquire about what their current program or policies were, what their attitude was in the recent negotiations.

Q. Do you think this started right off at your very first meeting with him?—A. Yes; my recollection is that.

Q. You do have a recollection on the point?—A. I have a general recollection that the first thing he wanted to know is how are things in Yenan and he asked details referring back to his previous visit there, and how was so-and-so and he asked, for instance, about this American doctor who was up there, an American of Syrian extraction named Ma Hai-Teh. And after that sort of initial catching up on the personal news then he started asking for information on their current attitudes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the last syllable of that name?

A. Teh.

Q. Now, did this conversation take place at the hotel before you started to Roth's home, or was this something that was the running content of your conversation that night?—A. No; I think this was all at the hotel. I don't remember anything about any discussion with Jaffe during the evening at Roth's.

Q. Did you return from that dinner with Jaffe, or did you proceed alone at the end of the evening?—A. No; I think that a group of us came in a taxi together.

Q. Came back?—A. Yes; came back from Roth's.

Q. To downtown?—A. Yes; I think we probably took a taxi. We may have dropped off somebody, but we separated at the Statler Hotel, as I recollect it. I walked a few blocks over to where I was staying.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. Did you get no tip during the course of his questioning of you with regard to the more current events that the man might have been a little bit better informed than a normal correspondent might be who was sent in that area to work? In other words, were there no suspicions raised in your mind by any of his questions that indicated that he was very well informed indeed?—A. Well, that was April 1945, sir, and there was a fairly extensive amount of published material already available in articles and by conversations with newspaper people who had returned. No; I would say I didn't have any suspicion that he had unusual or illicit sources of information. He was obviously well informed. But that was one of his main interests.

Q. Will you reflect again on your return from the Roth's home. Did Mr. Jaffe go directly to the Statler Hotel and then you went your separate way, or were there any stops in between, do you know, can you recall?—A. I would say that if there were any stops it was only to drop off people who had joined the taxi, had come in the taxi party for a ride.

Mr. RHETTS. Do you have any recollection on the point?

A. No, sir; I don't have any positive recollection.

Q. Were you alone with him at all after you left Roth's house, just the two of you in a taxi, or can you recall?—A. I can't recall definitely, no. My belief is that I was not, but I just don't have any positive recollection and, after all, it was wartime and taxis were hard to get and on a number of similar occasions everybody who was going downtown in the direction would get the taxi together. And there was certainly no conversation with Jaffe that I had any recollection of.

Q. You had made arrangements with him during the earlier part of the evening to see him the next day, is that right?—A. I think it was in the early part of the evening, yes. As a matter of fact, I think it was probably while we were still at the Statler Hotel before we went to Roth's house.

Q. Did he make any specific requests for types of information or anything during that meeting which caused you to go through your records the next day for material?—A. Well, you see I had this memoranda, my personal copy of this memoranda, in which Mao had given a sort of preview of what the Congress was supposed to decide and Jaffe was a very enthusiastic sort of person who said "Don't you have anything more of this sort, any more material that it would be all right for me to see?" I didn't specify in very great detail. I wasn't in a position to specify in a very great detail.

Q. Did he say "it would be all right for me to see?"—A. "If you could show me" I think probably was the way he put it.

Mr. RHETTS. Are you now talking about a conversation you had on the night of the dinner?

A. That is right, sir.

Q. Why did you take this particular single document along with you? Remember I asked you earlier whether he made any specific requests. Why did you select this one?—A. He made no specific requests. And my recollection of it was it was just accidental. If I had not had the papers out on my desk, if I had not had to put them away, if I had not happened to alight on that thing I never would have. It's just a sort of a spur-of-the-moment idea—well, this is something that Jaffe is certainly going to be interested in and if he wants to know about the present Communist attitude I'll just take this along. That is the dope there. In fact when I put it in my pocket or put it in my briefcase—I don't know which—to take it with me I had no plan or thought-out intention of showing it to him or letting him read it. It was more simple to have it along for my own reference and guidance if he wanted detailed information on what the Communists were thinking as of that time.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Well, now, then, on this occasion, on the evening of the 19th you made a date to have lunch with him the next day at the Statler Hotel, is that correct?—A. That is right.

Q. Now, will you try to recall and describe to the Board and as completely as you can everything that went on at this luncheon, to the extent that you can recall what you said and what Jaffe said, try to tell the Board.

Mr. STEVENS. I believe Roth was there, too, is that right?

A. My recollection is that I was there, I arrived there first and then sometime later, maybe 10 minutes later or something, Aoth arrived there.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. What time did you arrive at the Statler Hotel?—A. I have no idea, except it was a luncheon engagement, sir.

Q. Did you arrive there just at lunch time, or did you arrive somewhat earlier?—A. Well, I arrived at whatever was the agreed time, but I'm sorry I can't remember what it was. It was not, as I remember it, particularly early.

Q. It was not a fairly early hour in the morning?—A. My recollection is that it was not; no. It was just a luncheon engagement. But the FBI undoubtedly knows, if they had Jaffe under surveillance they know all the facts of it. If you have some specific details that you would like me to confirm or to refute that may be easier for me because I have no positive recollection on the matter.

Q. Do you remember roughly what time you came down to the Department that morning?—A. I believe—

Q. You did come to the Department first, didn't you, before going over there?—A. No; I don't have any recollection of what time except I kept normal office hours, fairly normal office hours. I didn't have to get to a desk at a certain hour because I didn't have any regular duties. If I didn't have an appointment or an engagement until later in the morning I might do something else before I came into the office, but I don't have any positive recollection of what time I got to the office on April 20. I may have gone to some other place, I may have had a meeting in some other agency or some other place in the early morning. I may have gone direct to that before I came to the Department.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you may have gone to the hotel?

A. No; I may have gone to another meeting; for instance, if I had a meeting at OSS in the early part of the morning I may have gone directly there before coming to the State Department.

Mr. RHETTS. Do you have any recollection that you did such a thing, or are you just speculating here?

A. Yes; I don't have any recollection. Mr. Achilles asked me if I can remember what time I came to the office that day. The answer really is I don't remember what time I got to the office.

Mr. ACHILLES. I believe you said in your statement that the following day you went through your personal copies of other memoranda and selected several which you thought appropriate to allow Jaffe to see. I'm wondering about how long that took.

Mr. RHETTS. Might I ask, are you referring now to the morning of April 20?

Mr. ACHILLES. Yes; the morning of April 20.

A. Well, I was very familiar with the material. I didn't read each one over as I went through them. I remember very clearly going through them. I imagine I did it rather hurriedly. It wasn't a very involved or lengthy process. I was fairly familiar with the material.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Did you do anything else that you recall that morning, other than go through your papers and talk to Mr. Jaffe?—A. I'm sorry, sir, I can't remember what I did on the morning of April 20, 1945.

Q. How long would you say you had spent with Mr. Jaffe that morning before Roth arrived?—A. Well, I was thinking it was 10 or 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a guess on your part?

A. That is purely a guess, sir. I don't remember.

Q. Did you have lunch in Jaffe's room, or downstairs in the hotel?—A. My recollection is that the lunch was in his room. He ordered it in the room.

Q. How long would you say it was after Roth arrived before you had lunch?—A. I think it was quite a while because the service was rather slow. But there again—

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Did you go over these reports individually with Jaffe after you arrived at this place?—A. Yes: I think we went over some of them anyway.

Q. That would take quite a while, wouldn't it?—A. Well, going over them—I mean I showed Jaffe the report and told him roughly what it was about. I don't think we went over it by reading them or anything like that.

Q. Have you told us how many of these reports roughly you think you brought with you?—A. My recollection has been that it was, as I stated in here [indicating statement], 8 or 10, but I have no positive recollection. As I remember it, they were in one envelope and not a very bulky one.

Q. You brought them in your brief case?—A. Oh, I'm sure I did, since I always carried a brief case. But I wouldn't—I'm not in any position to—how should I say—argue the figure of 8 or 10.

Q. Did Roth bring any papers to that meeting?—A. I can't remember, sir. I don't remember whether he did or not.

Q. Did he leave with you at the time you left after the luncheon?—A. Roth? Yes; my recollection is that we left together and walked down toward the State Department building together.

Q. Was he carrying any packages at that time?—A. I don't know.

Q. Nothing that you noticed?—A. No. I just don't remember, sir. I don't remember whether he had a brief case or whether he had anything in his hands.

Mr. STEVENS. Well, then, if you left together, was Roth aware of the fact that you had left your copies with Mr. Jaffe for him to take to New York?

A. I believe he was, yes.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. There wasn't any interchange of papers either way, between Roth and Jaffe?—A. I don't remember any.

Q. Would you recount your conversation with Mr. Jaffe, leading up to your leaving the copies with him, Mr. Service?—A. My recollection was that at that time there was no statement, no understanding on my part that Jaffe was going to keep them or take them to New York.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. When you left this material with Mr. Jaffe on that occasion, did you give him any instructions as to whether or not he could use the material?—A. In what sense do you mean, use it, sir?

Q. I mean in the sense of instructions as to what to do with background material, whether he could use them in his publications, or whether you were giving them to him as background material, as to which you already testified.—A. I don't remember that that point was specifically discussed. I think it was just understood and taken for granted that I was allowing him to have the material for background information. I think he did ask me if I could write for the magazine and I told him of course I couldn't write any articles for him. And that itself was in effect saying the same thing that he couldn't use my writings directly.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Do you have any independent recollection about the conversation that took place at lunch that day?—A. I have little bits and pieces of recollections of conversations with Roth, with Jaffe, with other people, but it's very difficult to separate these out and to say "Now this was this conversation on this date and this was the conversation on that date." I cannot recall anything about that

particular conversation. I have a general recollection of bits and pieces of numerous conversations.

Q. This was all you can remember about that?—A. I remember only little bits and pieces of conversations I had.

Q. This is as good a time as any, if your recollection is of that character, to try to get what recollection of these bits and pieces of all your conversations with Jaffe you had. Will you try to tell the Board what you do recall, just the nature of the various types of conversations that you had with Jaffe, the Board bearing in mind that you cannot relate any particular item of conversation to any particular date?—A. Well, I believe, for instance, that one time Jaffe asked what was going on in China, what the news was, and I mentioned the very obvious fact, which is well known in China, that the Communists were spreading out, moving aggressively toward the southeast part of China—that was partly itself in self-defense and partly excused in their minds by the argument that they were helping the war effort by being ready to cooperate with our forces if we should ever land. That was a fact that was well known at the time. Certainly we discussed, or he asked me about their plans for setting up a more or less independent government. That is a subject that was mentioned in one of my late memoranda.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which he asked you to leave the copies with him?—A. How do you mean, sir, the circumstances?

Q. What led up to that request on his part? What conversations were there?—A. Well, about all I can remember is that he was very interested and very appreciative of my allowing him to see this material and, as I say, I thought I was just allowing him to read it and he would return it to me and later in the conversation apparently he said, "Well, I have got to go back to New York today and I really want to have a chance to look this over and I'm not going to be able to sit down right now and read them. I have got to do something else, see somebody"—I have forgotten what the excuse was—"so can't I take them back to New York with me?" And I had a great deal of hesitation. I did not like the idea of him taking them to New York with him. And there was some discussion about that and finally I agreed in view of the content and nature of the things, to allow him to take them up to New York and read them. I don't remember much more about that than what I have stated in my statement to the FBI and in my personal statement here.

Q. Do you recall at all how many of them he read in the hotel?—A. Well, as I say, I don't think he read any of them completely, because he looked them over and we looked them over together, discussed the contents of them very briefly there, but that was it. He didn't sit down and try to read or study any of them right then and there. I had supposed he was going to do that in the afternoon.

Q. When you were going over them with him, was Lieutenant Roth there, or was that before Roth arrived?—A. I believe it was before Roth arrived, sir, but I can't be positive because I think we did that as soon as I arrived there. Roth came in later.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you put together the bits and pieces of recollection you have? The counsel asked you that question. Can you do that?

A. I started out and I can't remember any more.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. You mentioned a moment ago that he asked you if you would write something for the magazine Amerasia. What was that conversation?—A. Well, I have just a very hazy recollection that he asked me if I would write for the magazine and I said, "No, of course I can't write for the magazine." For instance, he told me that the magazine was getting to be too much of a job for him and it would take up too much of his time and he would like to turn the magazine over to somebody. He asked me if I wouldn't be interested in taking over the magazine. I forget what the proposition was that he suggested. It was a sort of a partnership, or he would allow me to run it and he would be the financial angel, or something of that sort, some sort of a deal like that. And I said to him right away that I thought he was joking and when he returned to it I told him I wasn't interested in leaving the Foreign Service. I thought that he had jumped to the conclusion—apparently as a lot of other people had—that I was thinking of leaving or would be willing to leave the Foreign Service.

There was a general assumption that I had, shall we say, gotten a sort of a bad deal from Ambassador Hurley. The fact was well known that I had been jerked

out of China very suddenly and quickly. I told him that I had no intention at that time of resigning, of leaving the Foreign Service, and as long as I was in the Service I couldn't do anything for his magazine, or take over his magazine.

Q. Now, what other items, if any—

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. May I interrupt. I think you testified that when you were in China there were times when you used to make it possible for newspaper people occasionally to sit at your desk and read a document, but never to take one out. Now, if that was the general custom, will you express for the Board these discussions and the hesitations that arose in your mind in times of leaving these things with a person whom you did not know as well, for him to take them to New York or to keep in the afternoon for that matter?—A. Well, I believe when I testified before, sir, that I indicated that we would not insist on being physically present if a man was reading something. We didn't generally turn a paper over to him to keep or retain or keep overnight, but that we would say "You can look at this" and we might go off and do some other job or go down the hall or something like that.

Q. Yes. I gathered the inference from that, Mr. Service, that that was in your quarters, that that was either in your office or in some place like that, that you did not give to a correspondent a document to take out for his own personal use or perusal, to take out of your office or quarters.—A. Well, if I had said that it was always in my quarters I gave a mistaken impression. I didn't mean to say that. There were times when, for instance, I would go over to the press hostel—that is where the correspondents lived in Chungking—and there were occasions when I have let them see a paper in their room, when I was discussing a matter with them, hoping to get additional information from them on the same point.

I might say, "Well, here is what I have been able to get on this business. What have you got?" or "What can you get?" And those interviews were sometimes in Chungking because transportation would be extremely difficult and the correspondents generally had no means of getting around except by foot, really. And I would be over to the press hostel almost daily. And there have been occasions when I allowed a man to see a paper in his own quarters, his living quarters, for instance, in the press hostel.

Q. To come back to the point about this. Here you were not getting from Mr. Jaffe the same sort of information that you were seeking in Chungking or in Yenan. I take it, leaving documents in a hotel or allowing him to take them to New York. Will you just recall for us what—A. I can only say this, Mr. Stevens, that I hesitated a great deal at the time. I did not like doing it, and I have regretted for 5 years that I was talked into it.

Mr. ACHILLES. You realized, did you not, that allowing him to take the copies to New York would give him ample time to have other copies made?

A. I realized that later, sir. I didn't think of it at the time. I had been used to trusting people, I'm afraid, before that time. I had no idea that he was accumulating material in this form in which he was making copies.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. That is as I understand, you did not leave the copies with him for the express purpose of having copies made of them?—A. Absolutely and certainly not; I did not.

Q. That wasn't suggested?—A. No, sir, most definitely not. And I never would have agreed to it at all. I can't think of anything more foolish for a man to do than to make copies of things.

Q. Have you covered with your recollection the inclusive question that counsel asked? Will you put together all the bits and pieces you now recall?—A. I covered most of the specific things that I can remember.

The CHAIRMAN. The Board would like to have a short recess now.

(At this point, 11: 65 a. m., the Board recessed and reconvened at 11: 15 a. m.)

Mr. RHETTS. I wonder if I might just refer to one thing here, which relates to a line of questioning which Mr. Achilles was pursuing a short time ago. Referring to document 100-15B—and I'm referring particularly to page 7563 of the Congressional Record, the second column, about a quarter of the way down, I'm referring, Mr. Service, to the testimony of Mr. Gurnes, of the FBI, before the House committee, in which Mr. Gurnes states, "On April 20, 1945, Service was observed to enter the Statler Hotel carrying a brown brief case. On that occasion he remained in Jaffe's room all morning. At the time of his departure he was accompanied by Andrew Roth."

Now you recall Mr. Achilles was asking you a short time ago how early in the morning you thought you went to the Statler Hotel to meet Mr. Jaffe. Does this statement by Mr. Gurnes accord with your recollection of the occasion, Mr. Service?

A. No; it certainly does not. I do not recall any lengthy conversation with Mr. Jaffe on that occasion.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say to counsel the information of the Board is that Mr. Service arrived at 9:30 in the morning. I'd like to have his comments on that information.

Mr. RHETTS. Is it the Board's information that he arrived there at 9:30 and remained there throughout the morning?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. The information of the Board also is that Mr. Roth arrived slightly after noon, after 12.

A. I have not been trying to misstate the facts. I have been trying to recall them as to the best of my recollection, and that was my effort in 1945. And inevitably in going over those events again I have been guided a great deal by my statement which I made in 1945 when my memory was much fresher.

Now one thing that has perplexed me has been that I have had in my mind that my giving the documents, my loaning the personal copy of my memoranda, to Jaffe; and his talking me into allowing him to take them to New York were on two separate occasions and that has perplexed me. And I think that the answer may be that I went to the office early, sorted out—which I have indicated before I did rather hurriedly—the papers which I thought would be all right for Jaffe to see, took them over to the hotel, expecting to pick them up at lunch time. And that is why I was surprised and annoyed that at lunch time Jaffe had not gone over them and wanted to keep them for a further period of time. But I'm positive that I did not spend all the time from 9:30 until noon in the hotel with Jaffe.

Mr. ACHILLES. Are you positive of that?

A. I am. I'm really very sure, sir. I can't prove it except that I didn't spend any extended length of time with him.

Mr. RHETTS. When you say you're positive, on what do you base the determination that you have a present positive recollection?

A. Well, I'm only trying to reconstruct very hazily events of 5 years ago and I'm trying to arrive at the best reconstruction I can give, but I do not recall any extended conversation, as there would have been if I had spent the whole morning there.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. Mr. Service, you mentioned earlier that you did talk over some of your reports with him. Pick any of those which you say you may possibly have shown him and give us an idea as to how you might have talked over a document like that with him. What, in time, would it take to do that sort of thing? If you had as many as 8 to 10 documents, have you any recollection as to the degree of conversation you may have had, whether any of those reports that you showed him gave reason for questions being raised in his mind, which did not relate specifically to the report and that you had to discuss out?—A. No; I don't think there was any extended conversation of that type because you cannot have that kind of a conversation until after the other man has read it, has read the report, and I recollect I said "Here are series of articles, series of memoranda on their policies on different problems," such as Mongolia and Sinkiang.

Q. Did you take these off specifically with the purpose of letting him read them or talk from them as a matter of briefing Mr. Jaffe?—A. I took them over with the purpose of letting him read them.

Q. Could you take any report—take the one that you took over the night before, could you give us an idea as to how you would have discussed such a document with him?—A. That would be just pure speculation, sir.

Mr. RHETTS. Excuse me, are you referring to the document he took over the night before?

Mr. STEVENS. That is correct.

Mr. RHETTS. I wasn't aware there was any testimony that he took any document the night before.

Mr. STEVENS. My understanding is that the Mao document was taken the night before and was left overnight.

A. I think that is correct.

Mr. RHETTS. You mean you took the Mao interview on the very first occasion?

A. That is right. We mentioned that before.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. As the record states here, you would have gone earlier in the day and your recollection would be that you had. You do not know or remember whether you had any discussions with him about the contents of these papers before leaving them?—A. I recollect, sir, that we didn't discuss any of the papers in detail, that I more or less showed him what they were, gave him a brief idea of the contents, but there was no detailed discussion of any of them. But I can't remember any certain time.

Q. Mr. Service, I would like for you to reflect upon this point and maybe we can come back to it a little bit later in our questioning here. I would like, if you could recall, a little bit more detail about the discussions that you had with Mr. Jaffe either before leaving him, if you did in fact leave before Mr. Roth's arrival—how you may have spent your time that morning, if after you left—

A. I certainly would like to be able to remember, sir. I'll do my best. I have no specific memories right now.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Counsel may proceed with the next question.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. So far as the general question that I put to you a while ago and which has been recurrently before you as to whether you can recount for the board any other topics or subjects which you think you may have discussed with Mr. Jaffe on one or more of these occasions, have you now covered everything that you can presently recall?—A. Well, there are several points that are mentioned in my statement to the FBI and in my personal statement that I haven't mentioned.

Q. But apart from those?—A. Apart from those I don't remember any; no.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything in your statement to the FBI that is not in your present statement? If so, I think you ought to mention it for the record here.

A. I see nothing in the statement of the FBI which is not in my personal statement.

Q. Coming back to April 20, after you finished lunch, I believe you testified that you and Lieutenant Roth left the Statler Hotel together. Will you describe what then occurred from the time you left the Statler?—A. We walked back toward the State Department Building, the old State Department Building, and I remember expressing some surprise to Roth that Jaffe was so friendly and that he was so quick to try to interest me in taking over or managing or editing the magazine Amerasia. And he told me something about Jaffe's interest in the magazine as a sort of a hobby, and that he had gone out to China years before and had become very much interested in China and made a sort of a hobby out of the whole subject of China.

He mentioned that he himself had worked for Jaffe and Amerasia for a short while. He told me something about Jaffe. I asked him how Jaffe could afford it, and so on, and he said that Jaffe had a fairly prosperous business and that it didn't require a great deal of his time and attention. He had fun out of running the magazine. I asked him about Jaffe's political sympathies. Roth said he was a left winger but that he was not a member of the Communist Party. As I remember it, he said that he believed we should—I forget how he put it, but Russia was deserving of sympathy and, therefore, he was a member of some of these organizations like—what is it?—the Russian-American Institute of Friendship or some similar thing. He mentioned his connection with that. But he made a definite statement that Jaffe was not a Communist. I remember that very clearly.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. When Mr. Jaffe talked with you about possibly taking over the operation of the magazine, did Jaffe make you any financial offer?—A. I don't recall that any specific figure was mentioned at all. I didn't let him get that far. I wasn't seriously contemplating that. I seem to recall his saying that he would be sure that I would be better taken care of than I was at that time in the State Department. But I think it was entirely on those rather vague terms.

Q. To go back for a moment, with regard to the time when you indicated to Mr. Jaffe after hesitation that you were willing to leave the documents with him and pick them up in New York, did you have any specific date that you were going to pick those up in New York?—A. Yes, I think I did at that time. I think I had already been invited to go up to the IPR. I'm not sure.

Q. What lapse of time, do you recall, would that be from the time you agreed to let him have them until you were going to pick them up? How long was he going to be able to retain possession of those documents?—A. I think I went up to New York on the 24th.

Q. Five days?—A. Four days. There was simply no other way of returning them conveniently before that.

Q. Did you mention to anyone in the Department, when you got back, the fact that you had taken this particular step in leaving those documents with him for 4 days?—A. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. RHETTS. Have you completed your account of this conversation with Lieutenant Roth after your luncheon on the 20th of April?

A. Well, he said something about expecting to go back working for the magazine again, as I recall it. He intended to go back.

Mr. ACHILLES. Whose intention was that?

A. Roth's intention. I don't remember anything else. It wasn't a very long conversation. We were just walking down from the Statler to the old State Department Building.

Questions by Mr. RHETT:

Q. When you left Jaffe, did you then make any arrangements to see him again; that is, at that time did you make any engagement for any future meeting with him?—A. Not at that time. As I remember it, it was mentioned that I would be going up to talk to the L.R. and that I would get in touch with him then.

Q. To pick up these memoranda?—A. That is right.

Q. All right. When was the next time that you saw Jaffe or you had communication with him?—A. Well, actually the next time I saw him was the evening when I attended a party and spent the night at Gayn's house.

Q. When was that?—A. Let me refresh my memory, sir. That was the evening of the 24th.

Q. You had no communication with him in between times? That is, in between the 20th and the 24th, or do you recall?—A. Not as far as I can recall, I didn't. I hadn't known that he was going to be at that party, actually.

Q. You did not have any communication then?—A. I don't think so. But again, let's see, Gayn had telephoned me and said that he wanted me to come up early enough that evening to attend a small party which he was having at his apartment.

Q. And Jaffe was present at this party?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you have any recollection of having any particular conversations with Jaffe on that occasion that you can describe to the Board?—A. No, sir. We didn't have any. He made an arrangement for me to stop by at his office a certain time the next day, but I don't remember any separate conversation with him. There were about 10 or 12 people in a very small room all sitting around in a very small group.

Q. Can you tell us a little bit more about this party, since we are at that stage, this evening at the Gayn's on the 24th? Who was there, if you can recall?—A. I have listed the people attending as well as I could remember them.

Q. In other words, you have indicated the full extent of your knowledge in your statement?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. The next day when you went—you did go to Jaffe's office to pick up your memoranda the next day, didn't you?—A. Yes.

Q. Can you recall anything that occurred at that meeting? Tell us what occurred, to the best of your recollection.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the 25th?

Q. Yes.—A. Well, he showed me around their offices. They had a fairly large library workroom. I remember meeting a woman who happened to be there reading or working named Ralf Suess, I think, who had a year or two previously written a book called *Sharks Fins and Millet*. I had never met her before. We had a little conversation. I remember meeting and saying hello to Kate Mitchell, who was there.

Q. Is this the first time you had met her?—A. No, she had been at the party at the Gayn's the night before. Jaffe on this occasion was preparing an article on the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference and he wanted to know if I could tell him offhand the biographic information on several of the people. I didn't have much to contribute. I told him a few details from memory about their public records. But I didn't stay there very long. He said he had finished reading my papers and handed them back to me.

Q. Did he indicate that he made copies of them?—A. He certainly did not.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Did you see any photographic equipment?—A. No, sir, I did not. I can't remember Jaffe's office. I have quite a clear recollection of coming down a narrow corridor and on the right-hand side there was this library workroom

and at the end of the corridor was Miss Mitchell's office. But I didn't see any photographic equipment of any sort. I saw none at all.

Q. Do you recall, as of that occasion, any more fully the number of documents which he gave you back?—A. I asked him if they were all there and he said they were and I don't even recall opening the envelope.

Q. Reverting to your meeting with Jaffe on April 20, do you recall whether you let him take all of the copies which you had brought with you that day, or did you let him take only some of them?—A. No. I let him take all that I had taken over, sir. I had taken over only the ones that I thought it permissible for him to read and after we had the discussion and he had not read them that morning and wanted to retain them I let him retain them, all the copies.

Q. Coming back to the April 25 meeting, you presumably did at some point look in the envelope to ascertain whether they were all there or not, didn't you, Mr. Service?—A. Frankly, sir, I didn't even have a list of the ones I had given him.

Q. In other words, you did not check at any time to make sure that you had gotten them all back?—A. No, sir. But since I was using these and referring to them fairly frequently in the subsequent month and a half before the arrest, I think I would have noticed if they were missing. I think I would have noticed if any of them had been missing, and I didn't notice that any were missing.

Mr. STEVENS. Did you keep your records in your office in any particular order, or did you just keep all of your reports in a batch?—A. In a batch, sir. I originally had them all arranged in numerical order, I'm sure, but I usually was in a hurry to dig something out and put it back and I didn't keep them in any orderly way.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. At this point I'd like to recall to your recollection the fact that the FBI appear not to have found a copy of your Report No. 40 in your possession. Have you any comment to make on that?—A. I can't understand it, sir. I'm perplexed. But I have no explanation.

Q. That was one of the reports, I believe, you testified you did not give to Jaffe.—A. That is correct. I don't like to speculate—there was discussion about that report with several people in the Department. I can't remember who they were. One officer, for instance, had a discussion with me one time as to whether or not this recommended discontinuance of aid to the Central Government, and I said to that officer "No, it did not." And we dug up the report to look at it. Now, I'm not positive if we went to my copy or whether he had the Department's copy. But I remember on at least one occasion discussing this report, Report No. 40, with officers in the Department.

Q. Is it possible at that time that you let your copy go?—A. It's possible, sir. I can't say positively that I did. But I do remember discussing that report during that period.

Mr. ACHILLES. Having had some hesitation about allowing Jaffe to take the copies to New York, you must have had considerable confidence in him not to check through them when he gave them back to you to see that they were all there. Would you care to comment on that?

A. I would say I simply had confidence. I usually trust the people I'm dealing with. I had no list of the reports I let him see. I didn't prepare a list.

Mr. RHETTS. You prepared no list?

A. No.

Mr. STEVENS. Did you observe anything in the offices of Amerasia which would have flagged your mind as to the fact that they gave you any idea of the source of material they had for any articles? Did they discuss any of their methods of getting information with you? Was there any discussion of that sort with either Miss Mitchell or with Mr. Jaffe?

A. No, sir; there wasn't on that occasion. The only discussion I ever remember along that line was an inference I derived from Gayn one time that he was having some documents declassified for him.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. For whom?—A. For Gayn, by OWI.

Q. Who was having them declassified?—A. Gayn.

Q. For himself?—A. Yes.

Mr. STEVENS. Was there any discussion about exchanges of information between Gayn and Jaffe?

A. On this occasion when I stayed with Gayn he told me the first time that he and Jaffe were very close and were in effect pooling their information, that

anything that one of them got in the way of information they gave to the other, and so on. That's what Gayn told me the first time.

Q. Was Gayn supposed to be connected with Amerasia?—A. No, sir.

Q. Only in this way you just testified?—A. Gayn indicated that he had read these reports which I had loaned to Jaffe and I was rather surprised. He said, "Oh, well, we are very close friends and we work together." That was the first knowledge I had of that.

Q. What was Gayn supposed to be doing?—A. Gayn was a free-lance writer; had written articles for various magazines. Fairly recently he published a series of articles in Collier's magazine; and had one article published in Collier's shortly after the arrest, as a matter of fact.

Q. On China?—A. It was on the effects of the bombing in Japan. He made a study of the psychological and morale effects of the bombings, as I remember.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Would you recount at this point the extent of your association with Gayn up to that time?—A. I left Washington about November 19, 1944, and went out to California for leave and I think I was with my mother in Claremont when I received a note from Gayn saying that he had come down to Washington and hoped to meet me and was sorry that he just missed me and hoped he would have a chance again, or something of that sort.

Although I had never met Gayn personally, we shared a sort of common China background and he had been at Pomona College with my brother, which college my brother also attended. We had mutual friends. I don't recall whether I ever wrote back in reply to that note or not. I may have in a casual way, acknowledging it. I think on April 18, 1945, I received a telephone call from Gayn. He was here in Washington. It was the late forenoon and he wanted to know if I was busy and if I could have lunch with him. I said "Yes, I'm free."

He came over to the State Department and met me and we went up to one of the small eating places, the Tally-Ho or the Trianon, one of those eating places on Seventeenth Street, near the State Department building. And he was friendly. We talked about various people we knew. Recent news from China—and then he invited me to come up and stay with him in New York if I were ever going up there. He said he had this extra bed in his apartment. There is not much more I remember about that first meeting. When I accepted the invitation to attend this off-the-record session with the IPR research staff, I believe I sent a message up to Gayn inquiring whether or not it would be convenient—I probably telephoned—to spend the night there with him. My recollection is that a day or two later, perhaps the next day, he came back and asked me to come up early enough because he wanted to have a few China people in for a small party.

Q. But you had not seen him, as far as you can recall, between the time you had lunch with him and the time you spent the night with him?—A. No; I had not.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. Was that party for you, Mr. Service?—A. Well, I suppose presumably it was; I don't know.

Q. Did you know what people were going to be there?—A. No, I didn't, sir. I didn't know who was going to be there except I think he may have mentioned Pepper Martin. He was a correspondent whom I knew down in China when I was there. I can't say positively whether he told me. I'm sure he didn't tell me about Jaffe because I was surprised that Jaffe was there.

Q. When Mr. Gayn informed you that he had had an opportunity to see your documents that you had loaned to Mr. Jaffe, what was your reaction to that, Mr. Service? Can you recall?—A. Surprise. It surprised me.

Q. Did that cause you to have any further feelings one way or another about Mr. Jaffe, and the fact that you had loaned him the documents at all, as to his trustworthiness?—A. Well, I was a little annoyed. I would say that it did. I didn't show him any documents after that either, sir. It was not the kind of thing I would expect.

Q. Did Jaffe ever indicate to you that he had done that, that he had let Mr. Gayn see your documents?—A. I'm not sure that it was ever mentioned.

Mr. RNETTS. After this occasion on the 25th of April, when you picked up your memoranda, can you recall what was your next communication with Jaffe?

A. My recollection is that it was this occasion early in May when he wished to get a copy of the broadcast of Mao Tse-tung's speech to the Communist Congress. My recollection was that that was about May 3. I think that I had a phone call from Jaffe. I'm not sure. I seem to recollect that that was the occasion when I had breakfast with him. I'm not positive though. And Jaffe said, could I get him this. I said that I didn't know whether it was classified or not and in any case I didn't handle that sort of material and I thought he ought to come over to the State Department with me and I would introduce him to the man who handled it. And that man, if he could release it, probably would. And that was what happened. I took him over and introduced him to Mr. Chase. Mr. Chase said "certainly," and gave him a copy.

Q. You say you had breakfast with him? How was that arranged, Mr. Service?—A. By telephone.

Q. From New York or in Washington?—A. Oh, no; I'm sure it was here in Washington. I don't remember whether he called me up in the afternoon or evening or just when he called me.

Q. He requested no other report except this one at that breakfast?—A. As I recall, on this occasion that was the only thing that he wanted. I don't remember any other. On a later occasion he wanted something on this Confucius Society.

Q. Take them in order, please. That is all you can recall on this one; is that right?—A. That is right, sir. He was very anxious I think at this particular time to publish in Amerasia contrasting statements or policy statements which had recently been made by Chiang Kai-shek for the Central Government and Mao Tse-tung's statements for the Communists.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. This is on May 3?—A. Yes. Now, as I mentioned the other day, my memory of the date, identification of the date, was really based on the little black book that the FBI agent had, as I recall.

Q. You have stated in your statement, as I recollect, that Jaffe was in Washington on May 3 and again on May 8. Have you got the two occasions separated in your mind, or are they mixed? What occurred on each of those two occasions to identify them in your mind?—A. I cannot separate them. They may be the same occasion. I think that Mr. Guruea's testimony here indicates that it may have been the eighth.

Q. How do you happen to remember the date May 3?—A. Because the broadcast was about May 1.

Mr. RHETTS. The broadcast of Mao's speech?—A. Yes.

Q. Let's examine in some detail what you did on that occasion, whether it would be May 3 or May 8. Do you remember what time you went to the Statler Hotel that day—

Q. Was it in the morning?—A. In time for breakfast.

Q. Did you have breakfast with Jaffe?—A. Yes, I did.

Q. On this occasion?—A. Well, I remember having breakfast with Jaffe once.

Q. After breakfast what did you do?—A. As I remember it, he walked down with me to the State Department. He came down so that I could take him up to the Division of Chinese Affairs so that he could obtain a copy of this broadcast if it were available.

Q. At this time do you remember whether you were carrying an envelope or something of that sort?—A. I almost certainly was carrying a brief case, sir, but I have no positive recollection. It is my habit to carry a brief case.

Q. You went to the State Department, and then after that what did you do?—A. My recollection is that we had a very brief conversation in the hall. I don't remember any lengthy conversation. I don't even remember taking him to my office.

Q. What was the purpose of that?—A. Well; I think that it was on this occasion that he said that Mr. Bisson, who was a friend of his, hoped I would be able to come up to his place on Long Island some Sunday.

Q. Well, I mean that wasn't the purpose of you going with him to the State Department, was it?—A. No. The purpose of going to the State Department with him was just to introduce him to the Division of Chinese Affairs so he would be able to inquire about obtaining a copy of this broadcast.

Q. He made that inquiry on his own?—A. Well, I took him in and introduced him to the officer in the Division of Chinese Affairs.

Q. Did you then leave him?—A. No, I stayed by and we walked out into the hall afterward and my recollection is that we parted there in the hall, just outside of the Division of Chinese Affairs.

Q. Then he left the building?—A. I don't know where he went after that. He left me. Whether he called on anybody else in the Department I have no way of knowing.

Q. It is the information of the Board that these events you just described occurred on May 8?—A. That may very well be, sir; I have no positive way of identifying the date.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. You mentioned a few minutes ago that he expressed a great interest at this time—whether it was on May 3 or May 8—in the conflicting statements between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung.—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he ask for any other information, other than this FCC broadcast? Did he ask you to provide him more background information for him at that time?—A. I don't think he did. I don't recall that he did. He was just getting material for one article which he had in mind, which he wanted to put out in the next issue. The deadline was very close and he was in a hurry.

Q. Did you ever call his attention to the fact that you disliked this business of him showing your papers to Mr. Gayn?—A. Well, as I mentioned a while ago, I don't think we ever discussed it. That was water over the dam and I wasn't going to give him or show him anything more. I don't remember that I discussed it with him.

Q. You had made that determination at that time, Mr. Service?—A. I had.

Q. That you were not going to give him anything else?—A. Certainly I had.

Q. Mr. Service, I take it you mean that you were not going to let him see any additional reports, is that the substance of what you meant when you said you weren't going to give him anything else? You were not going to let him read any more of your reports? I'm trying to fix somehow in this chronology of events the suspicions that may have been in your mind as to his reliability as a person to whom you would provide background information. I would appreciate any help you may give me on that point.—A. Well, it's very hard for me to name a specific date or describe specific phases that my attitude toward him went through, but I was annoyed that he had apparently been so free as to show them to someone else. I was annoyed at his eagerness, shall we say. He was over-aggressive, overpressing. I was annoyed at the way he had handled the affair before, when I had thought to just let him read them and return them in a short while and when he had done this business of saying he hadn't had time to read them, so maybe borrow them and take them away.

Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Jaffe at any time about the report that was prepared for Mr. Wallace on his visit to China, Mr. Henry Wallace?—A. Well, it may well have been referred to in some connection. I don't remember it specifically. I don't remember specifically ever mentioning that. Also, it is a little incorrect to say it was actually prepared for Wallace. That is Document No. 157, which was prepared shortly before Wallace arrived. I have forgotten whether that was a purely voluntary effort or whether someone suggested it might be well to have available, for when Mr. Wallace arrived there, for the information of himself and his party, a rather complete up-to-date summary of the situation. Now, incidentally, I might tell the Board that when we discussed this Document 157 before, the Department of State could not locate its original copy.

Mr. RHETTS. When you say "We discussed this document" you mean when it was testified about here in this proceeding?

A. Yes, sir, that is correct. The original which was transmitted to the Department under cover of dispatch No. 2733 from the Embassy at Chungking on July 1, 1944, has now been located. It was located the other day in the Division of Chinese Affairs, I think. And the Board might be interested in seeing the original for several reasons. The peculiar mistakes that we noticed in the OSS copy and in Jaffe's copy do not occur in the original. That word which occurred in both the other copies as "newsreels" is clearly "reversal" in the original. Also it was rated excellent, this dispatch, and in its present form the dispatch has attached to it a memorandum signed by Mr. Grew to the Secretary calling it to the Secretary's attention.

Q. Was that report signed by you?—A. The original memorandum was, yes, Mr. RHETTS. But not the copy attached to the dispatch?

A. No, no. The original memorandum was signed by me.

Q. Do you remember Jaffe's telling you that he had obtained a copy of that report?—A. No, sir; I don't remember that. I do remember that in January 1945 the article was published in Collier's by Gayn, which seemed to indicate that at that time, in January or perhaps December, whenever he wrote the

article, Gayn had seen that memorandum. And I asked Gayn about this once, whether he had ever seen the copy, and I received a very evasive reply from him. But I don't have any positive recollection of discussing it with Jaffe. Can you give me any more details, sir?

Q. Well, there is evidence before the Board that Jaffe did discuss that report with you and told you that he had given a copy to Gayn.—A. I honestly must say that if he ever said that it has slipped my mind. I don't recall it. I have no recollection of ever having found out how Gayn had seen it, if Gayn had.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. Knowing the type of report that it was, would that not have flagged in your mind that something was wrong somewhere?—A. Well, no.

Q. Would you have thought that that sort of document would have been one that would have been discussed with Mr. Gayn by someone in the Department or in any department?—A. It would not have caused very great concern, particularly if it had been only my memorandum which was shown him and not the dispatch representing the views of the Embassy or the memoranda which were also written and attached giving the Department's views.

Q. You didn't know about that dispatch and so forth, I take it?—A. I had never seen the dispatch and I had never seen the memorandum. But the memorandum itself is a personal one and it's not really an official expression of the Embassy's views or the Army's views or anyone else's views.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the document number in that case? Do you know?

A. No. 157.

Q. Do you recall whether the memorandum found in Jaffe's possession was the memorandum or the dispatch?—A. It was just the memorandum.

Mr. RIETTS. That was the the one which was a hectograph reproduction, evidently prepared by the Research Analysis Branch of OSS.

A. To continue with your question, there was a very definite attitude on the part of some officials in Washington during the war that, because of Chinese censorship, because of the difficulties of getting very many correspondents to China, because of the success of Chinese propaganda in this country, and particularly visits like Mme. Chiang Kai-shek's, that information had to be given to the press, that background information, so they could give a complete picture of the situation in China which was bad and deteriorating.

Hanson Baldwin's article which was a famous one, for instance, well, Hanson Baldwin never went to China. This had to be based entirely on information which was given to Hanson Baldwin here. And there were numerous other articles written during the same period. There were other articles written then by people who didn't get to China but there were people in responsible positions who gave them the background information.

Now, I was fairly sure that Gayn and—judging by what the chairman has just told me—Jaffe also had some knowledge of the contents of that memorandum, but since I knew what was the policy in some very high quarters to give background information and since they didn't want to tell me where they got it, I assumed they were using their journalistic prerogative in not disclosing their sources, so I did not pursue the matter nor was I particularly alarmed about it.

Q. You say you knew of this policy, you knew it by seeing Baldwin's article, or had someone specifically expressed this policy to you when you returned, Mr. Service? How did you gain your knowledge?—A. I would say, first, that it was plain from the circumstances but also that I had direct knowledge from officials, some of them outside the State Department, that there was such a policy.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean "officials outside the State Department"? Do you mean United States officials?

A. Yes, sir.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. You mentioned that this practice was followed within high quarters. Would you care to elaborate in what particular quarters? Do you mean in the State Department or outside the State Department?—A. I was thinking particularly outside the State Department.

Q. Could you give any further indication of what those quarters were?—A. I'd very much prefer not to, sir, if I may be excused.

Mr. RIETTS. To continue, after this occasion, either May 3 or May 8, whichever it was, when Jaffe came to the State Department and obtained the release on the Mao broadcast and you then left him somewhere out in the corridor and

went on about your business, can you tell us about the next time you saw Jaffe?

A. Well, as I recall it, sir, at the time of our parting there we were standing at the top of the stairs and the conversation was to the effect that Mr. Bisson hoped very much I would be able to spend Sunday out at his home in Long Island and I tried to put Jaffe off by saying I would much rather have the invitation direct from Mr. Bisson rather than second hand. I don't remember how soon afterward it was, but my recollection is that Jaffe called by telephone and gave some excuse for Bisson's not calling me direct and said that Bisson would like to know if I could come up and have Sunday dinner with him, Sunday lunch, picnic, on May 19 I think it was.

Mr. ACHILLES. Could I interrupt at this point to ask if you would recount the extent of your association with T. A. Bisson up to this date?

Mr. RHETTS. I wonder if you would mind, before coming to that, just let us develop this one point.

Mr. ACHILLES. Yes, go ahead.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Actually didn't you see Jaffe that same day, whether it was May 3 or May 8?

Mr. STEVENS. You mean after the FCC broadcast thing was turned over?

Q. Yes.—A. Yes, sir, just before closing time that afternoon Mr. Chase, who was the officer from whom Jaffe had obtained a copy of the Mao broadcast that morning, telephoned me. I was at my desk in the State Department. And he said that a revised addition had come through. The first one was very badly garbled. The radio was very weak and it didn't come through good. A revised and much clearer text had come from the FCC and he recalled that Mr. Jaffe had been very much interested and had gotten a copy that morning. As I recall, he asked me if I knew how he could get in touch with Jaffe so he could let Jaffe know in case he wanted a copy of this revised text of it. I recollected that I said to him "I'm going to leave the office pretty soon. I know where Jaffe is staying and I'll pick it up and take it over to him," which I did. I went by Chase's office and picked up a copy and walked over to the Statler.

My recollection is that I called Jaffe on the phone from the lobby. He came down and I met him in front of the elevators and handed him the clean text and left him immediately. Jaffe had someone with him. I'm not sure who it was. Mr. Larsen mentioned he may have been there. I have no positive recollection that he was there with Jaffe. But it was just a momentary meeting handing him the text of Mao's speech.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Do you remember Rose Yardoumian being in that party?—A. Yes, I know her. It's possible, if she were there, she probably would have been there with Lieutenant Roth. But I don't have any positive recollection of who was there.

Q. Who was she?—A. Rose Yardoumian was the office secretary of the Washington branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations. She was the office manager or whatever you want to call it.

Q. Why would she have been there with Roth?—A. She was quite a good friend of Roth's. I just don't imagine she would have been there alone. I think almost every time I saw her Roth was around or at the same function.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Would you describe your association with Mr. Bisson?—A. Well, I testified earlier, you may remember, that in the fall or winter of 1937 in Peiping I had met Bisson. Mr. Haldore Hansen was staying temporarily with me and he particularly—I also for that matter—was anxious to talk to Bisson or hear from Bisson of his experiences and impressions of Manchuria, which I think he had just been visiting.

The next time I saw Bisson was at this background session with the research staff of the IPR on April 25, 1945. Bisson had attended that meeting and had taken a very prominent part in the discussion.

Q. You had not seen him between the time in Peiping and the meeting there, the IPR meeting?—A. I have no recollection of seeing him in between.

Q. Have you maintained any kind of correspondence with him?—A. None at all, sir. During the meeting of the IPR, as I said, he took quite a prominent part in the discussion. And he was particularly interested in the draft constitution which the Kuomintang was planning to promulgate, I think in November 1945 to go into effect, and he had obviously made a very thorough study

of it. I had not. He held forth at some length on the features of the constitution and the features of it which he thought were not in line with American ideas of democracy. Later he subsequently wrote an article incorporating many of the things he said, the things he said in that discussion.

Q. What was his occupation?—A. Well, he was a research man employed as a member of the staff of the—I think the IPR. He had been for years with the Foreign Policy Association. He received various grants and scholarships for his assistance in writing his various books. For instance, when he came to China his trip was financed by the Guggenheim Fellowship. He was originally, in his early days in China, a member of the faculty in the University of Nanking, a missionary institution. He met and married a missionary woman out there.

Q. And did you see him between that meeting of the IPR and the time you spent the week end with him?—A. No. As I say, the invitation was received in a rather annoying second-hand manner through Jaffe. I seem to remember being called by Jaffe several times preliminary to this May 19 luncheon at Bission's. The final arrangement was that—well, the final plans were made sort of by stages in different conversations. The final arrangement was that I would spend the previous night at Gayn's because he wanted to start out fairly early and it would be too late if I took a train.

Then the final arrangement was that there was going to be some sort of a party at Mitchell's place. The Gayn's would be at Kate Mitchell's and they hoped I would come up and go directly to Mitchell's to meet the Gayn's there, since they would not be at home. The party at Mitchell's was most definitely not for me. I arrived there late in the evening and, as I remember it, didn't stay very long. There were a number of people there I didn't know. I didn't pay much attention to them.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. On this occasion, on May 3 or May 8, which you mentioned as May 8 as I have stated, do you recall a conversation which you may have had with Jaffe on the subject of American cooperation with the Communists in the event of a landing by the Americans in China?—A. Well, the subject of course was one of very great interest. It was one that everyone was discussing. It was one of the primary problems. I stated awhile ago that I have a general recollection of talking to Mr. Jaffe at some time regarding the Communists' efforts to expand toward the Southeast, to be in control of the coast there, the areas there, in the event that we did make a landing. But the whole question of policy was still under debate at this time and I don't recall that I knew what it was myself. For instance, it was just about May sometime that one of the officers who was working in this same unit that Larsen worked in came to me and said that he was preparing a paper on whether or not we would cooperate with the forces we found on the ground if we went into Manchuria. Now, I never knew what decision was taken on that paper. I never saw it in final form. Is it suggested, sir, that I divulged to Mr. Jaffe what policy was?

Q. I'm trying to get your recollection, what discussion you had, if any, with Jaffe on the subject.—A. I'm sure we discussed it in general terms because everyone who was interested in China was discussing it in general terms. But I don't recall that I had any ideas myself of what American policy decisions were, so that I'm positive I didn't discuss it with him in any specific or definite terms.

Q. You were not advised as to what the American decision had been in that respect?—A. That is right. Does that answer your question?

Q. Yes; that answers my question.

(The Board adjourned at 12:35 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE MATTER OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: June 5, 1950—2:10 p. m. to 5 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building.

Reporter: Goodwin Shapiro, court stenographer, reporting.

Members of the board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles, Arthur G. Stevens, Mr. Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Counsel for Mr. Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts & Ruckelshaus.

(The Board reconvened at 2:10 p. m., June 5, 1950.)

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Mr. Service, I was asking you before lunch about some plans for United States cooperation with the Communists in China in the event of a United States landing. While you were with General Wedemeyer's staff there were some plans drawn up for cooperation with the Chinese Communists made up by the staff?—A. Well, there weren't any of which I had any knowledge. There was that proposal which I think was drawn up by General McClure, but that was in December 1944 and January 1945, before I was in Chungking. We made reference to that before this proceeding.

Q. Well, those were plans drawn up for the staff as to what to do if the United States made a landing in the territory of the Chinese Communists?—A. Not exactly. That was planned, as I remember it, but I have never seen the original text. That was a plan for a joint Chinese-American guerrilla operation in north China, I think. I don't know of any plans drawn up for joint action in landing. It was generally assumed as a matter of practicality that if there were to be any landing, which was frequently talked about—I mentioned a public press-release statement of Admiral Nimitz in the spring of 1945—it was assumed we would be forced to cooperate with whoever we found on the spot because of necessity.

Q. Do you recall discussing any such plan with this Mr. Jaffe?—A. I have no specific recollection of discussing it with Mr. Jaffe. The question, as I mentioned this morning, was one which was continually being talked about.

Q. Do you remember any proposition, any pressure that the Chungking Government had been putting on the United States to agree to take in Kuomintang officials wherever the United States landed in China?—A. Yes, I have a vague recollection. I think that may be mentioned in one of my reports. I am not sure. It may have been mentioned in that telegram of February 26 which we drafted. I would have to refresh my memory, but I have a general recollection that the Kuomintang was trying to get us to make that commitment that we would take in their officials if we landed at any point on the coast of China.

Q. Do you remember any discussion of that subject with Mr. Jaffe?—A. Of this particular desire of the Kuomintang Government to have us agree?

Q. Yes.—A. No, I don't have any specific recollection. I think that I should point out, if you don't mind, that I was discussing China all the time during this period. I was living and breathing China, and I was in contact with a great many different people, and it is extremely hard for me to pick out from one conversation to another—even my conversations with Jaffe or Gayn were not particularly unusual or different. I was having conversations along the same line with a great many people, and I have done my best to forget Amerasia. I would like to remember all these details, but I can't recall any conversation with Mr. Jaffe on this point.

Mr. RHETTS. On this point, I believe you indicated this morning that in terms of trying to recall general subjects that were discussed—I believe you indicated that you did recall discussing in general the problems of Chinese Communists' forces' movements toward the southeast.

A. Yes.

Mr. RHETTS. You recall that much?

A. Yes.

Mr. RHETTS. I take it that your last response to General Snow's question was simply that you have no specific recollection of this discussion of this proposal to have Kuomintang officials accompany any American landing forces.

A. I have no specific recollection of that point—discussing that with anyone. It is entirely possible, sir, that I might have. I have forgotten all about that whole business until you mentioned it—about the issue of that particular facet of the whole problem.

Mr. STEVENS. One question. When you talked in the IPR, in your off-the-record discussion, can you recall anything like this having come up there? Did you discuss this point about the rumor that the Chinese in the southeast—

A. I am sure that I gave a general summary of the situation in China, in which I certainly would have mentioned—I'm speculating, sir, but I would not have given a summary of China without mentioning the fact of the Communist push in that direction.

Mr. STEVENS. Well, would the fact that the Nationalist Government people desired to have representatives in the Communists' area—would that have been a part of the briefing? I think you have testified earlier that in some of your reports about Chiang Kai-shek wishing to have puppet forces in these areas for purposes of after the war—

A. That was the Communist argument, with which I didn't agree entirely. It might have been mentioned, sir. This question of pressure from Chiang Kai-shek to get us to agree to take in Kuomintang civil government representatives—it might have been mentioned as a part of the problem which we were facing—the policy issues which we had to confront. It would not have been unusual to mention it as background information that we were facing pressure on this point and we had to decide whether we were going to accede or whether we were going to cooperate with the forces we found in occupation. If the forces we found in occupation were anti-Kuomintang, we would certainly have gotten off on a very bad foot for cooperation with the local forces if we had arrived there carrying Kuomintang officials to take over. It was the same sort of argument that Mr. Larsen mentions and describes completely erroneously in his Plain Talk article in relation to Manchuria; and, as I mentioned this morning, that paper was being drafted in Mr. Larsen's unit in May, as to whether or not we would cooperate with whoever we found on the ground or whether we would take in the Kuomintang, and, as I said, somebody came to me in the early stages of the preparation of that paper, but I never saw it in final form and didn't know what the final decision was. I feel sure that if something like this subject of the KMT pressure on us—Kuomintang pressure on us—had been mentioned, it would have been mentioned purely as background information, and with specification.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean "specification"?

A. Well, specification that it wasn't something that could be attributed or written, but simply as a background to the policy problems that had to be decided. I have no recollection of mentioning it, however, but, as I say, it is quite possible that I might have.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Now I think this morning, in our attempt to go through chronologically here, we had got up to the occasion of your going to New York for the purpose of having Sunday lunch with Bisson. I believe you mentioned you arrived in New York on the night of —A. The 18th of May, I believe.

Q. The 18th of May, and that you went to Miss Mitchell's apartment to pick up the Gayns, or rather stayed a short time and then went home with the Gayns, where you stayed at their apartment.—A. That's right.

Q. Now was Jaffe at the party at Miss Mitchell's?—A. He was.

Q. Did you have any conversation with him on that occasion?—A. I don't remember any conversation at all. My only recollection of the party was that it was very dull and they were playing a game of dice on the floor and I stood on the outskirts and had a couple of drinks and said hello to people. I don't remember any real discussion going on at the party at the time I arrived or during the party.

Q. Then the next day, I believe you testified in your statement, Jaffe and Mitcheil came and picked you up in a car and took you and the Gayns and drove out to Long Island.—A. That is correct.

Q. Now will you describe the—first of all, was there any significant conversation or discussion on the trip out? By "significant conversation" what I mean is was there any discussion of Chinese affairs or far eastern affairs or policy matters, or any general subject matter with which we have been dealing?—A. No, I don't remember. There were six people in the car, rather crowded, and I had never seen that part of New York, and we went across one of the bridges and I was interested in looking around, and I asked a number of questions about the part of the city we were driving through—the buildings, and so on. Sometime during that day—it was either going out or perhaps coming back—Gayn was talking about the book he was writing, based on the experiences of a fellow in OWI named John Caldwell, but that isn't particularly relevant to our proceeding here.

Q. Well, tell us about the luncheon party at Mr. Bisson's—who was there, what was the nature of the discussion on that occasion.—A. Mr. and Mrs. Bisson, as I remember it, Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe, Miss Mitchell, the two Gayns, and myself. We sat out in the garden, I think we had several beers, discussed—I am not sure now just what we did discuss, except I am sure that this discussion dealt with China and the Far East. About the only thing I can remember about the conversation at Bisson's was that we got into an argument on the question of freedom of the press which turned into a rather violent, acrimonious discussion between Gayn and Jaffe, which I have mentioned in my statement. Jaffe surprised me by taking the straight party line—in other words, that they had real

freedom of the press in Russia, but they did not have real freedom of the press here. Gayn disagreed with him.

Q. Did you participate in that argument?—A. No. Well, I expressed my opinion that we had freedom of the press here as contrasted with Russia, but the two main participants got so heated that the rest of us became mere spectators. After lunch we took a short walk down to the beach.

Mr. STEVENS. Who do you mean by "we" now?

A. I think it was Miss Mitchell, Mr. Bisson, myself. I am not sure whether the Gayns went along or not. I'm quite sure that Mrs. Bisson and Mrs. Jaffe did not. The beach, as I remember it, was 2 or 3 blocks from the house. I never had visited it before, and haven't been back there since, but it is my recollection it was a short walk down to the beach to a couple of rowboats. We walked along the beach a while and Miss Mitchell told me about the book that she was working on—the philosophical development, trend of Kuomintang thinking, and particularly its increasing emphasis on the Chinese classical philosophy—a rejection of western social science thought—and she was discussing materials—possible sources of material on that general subject.

Q. Can you recall anything about the occasion? What did you do after you took this walk to the beach?—A. I am not sure that we stayed and had tea there or not. We went back to the house and left some time in the afternoon.

Q. Then what did you do? Drove back to the city?—A. Drove back to the city. It is my recollection they took me right to the railway station and I came back to Washington that evening, which would indicate that we probably got into town by 4 or 5 at the latest, if I came back by train that evening.

Q. Now what was the next occasion that you had any dealings with Jaffe?

Mr. STEVENS. Did Mr. Jaffe ask you for any reports or did he ask you for any additional information during these meetings?

A. No, sir; it is my recollection the only time he asked me for anything was at a later date—on or about the 29th. I don't remember him asking me for anything during this meeting.

Mr. STEVENS. You mentioned this morning how long you had known Mr. Bisson. Would you know anything about his political leanings? Do you have any idea about his affiliations?

A. None at all. I wouldn't have had any particular reason to be suspicious. He had a missionary-university background, he had worked for years with the Foreign Policy Association, his books, like American Policy in the Far East, had been textbooks.

Mr. STEVENS. But you had no reaction as to whether he was liberal conservative, or where he might fit?

A. Well, I would say he was liberal, but I thought you were particularly inquiring whether I had any indication of extreme left wing or Communist. I had no indication of that. I think that his writings clearly indicate that he took a liberal point of view, or at least that was my impression.

Mr. STEVENS. But not extreme liberal?

A. No.

Mr. STEVENS. You made no additional arrangement with Mr. Jaffe at that time? He did not make a future appointment with you?

A. No, sir, I do not think so.

Q. Now when did you next hear from Jaffe, if you recall?—A. Well, I think it was again in the evening—it was late in the afternoon on May 29.

Q. Incidentally, these dates—are they your present independent recollection or are they based on your reference to the statement that you gave the FBI 5 years ago?—A. This particular data is based on my statement to the FBI, but it has been confirmed, of course, by published accounts in the Hobbs committee transcript and so on. This party was being given by Miss Rose Yardounian and her housemate—I am not sure who the housemate was—as a farewell party for the Roths. Roth was being transferred to Pearl Harbor, and Miss Yardounian or someone suggested that there would be a combination of forces, because they lived way out in Fairlington, out beyond Park Fairfax, a place where I had never been at that time, and as I remember the suggestion was that a number of people who were going from downtown meet Jaffe or get in touch with Jaffe and ride out in the car with Jaffe. At any rate, I did that and we went out with the car full, as I remember it, and went out and came back with Jaffe.

Q. Do you remember any of the people who were in the car?—A. I can remember various people who were at the party, but I can't be sure of which ones were in the car. It may well be that the Roths might have been in the car. I am not sure.

Q. All right.—A. There were some people that went to that party, I think, named Burns, husband and wife, both of whom worked in MID. There was a man named Johnson, and his wife, who also worked in MID. There was quite a large group of 20 people or more in the party.

Mr. STEVENS. This lady who invited you to this farewell party—did Mr. Jaffe call you about going out with him?

A. Well, I have been trying here to remember whether Jaffe called me or whether Miss Yardoumian or someone else made the suggestion. I think—I am not sure whether it is mentioned here in my statement—at any rate, the suggestion was made. I couldn't say positively whether Jaffe called me and said, "Let's go out together," or whether the suggestion came from somebody who had been arranging the party.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that party in Fairlington Village?

A. Yes, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. Would you tell us the extent of your acquaintance with Miss Yardoumian up to that point?

A. Well, I had met her at a number of these functions. I met her first, I think, in 1944, when I had a meeting with the IPR here in Washington. I am reasonably sure that she must have been at Roth's party on the 19th of April. She was a close friend of Roth's and quite a part of the same group, more or less. I am sure that I saw her one or two other times, but I cannot recall the exact circumstances.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you ever have occasion to confer with her individually, or did you meet her only in groups?

A. I don't remember ever talking to her individually except once, after the arrests, when I stopped by the office of the IPR to simply inquire for news of Mr. Roth—whether he had gotten bail, whether he was out of jail, what had happened to him—and we had a very brief conversation there. She had been in contact with him, and his wife, I think, had succeeded in arranging bail, and it was just a very, very brief passing by. That is the only time I remember ever having seen her alone. I think on one occasion I may have seen her in the IPR. There was some visitor here in Washington down from New York. I think it was Miss Ida Pruitt, whom I had known in Peking, and who was connected with Chinese industrial cooperatives, and I think Miss Pruitt wanted to see me and she was over in the office of the IPR, and I went over, met her there and we went out to lunch, and we saw Miss Yardoumian on that occasion. I'm trying to give all the details I can. A lot of these seem to be rather irrelevant.

Q. What went on at the party at Miss Yardoumian's?—A. Nothing. It was just a great big bunch of people, and I helped out in the kitchen pouring drinks.

Q. Did you have any discussion on that occasion with Jaffe?—A. No, sir; I don't think so. I spent most of the evening over at one end of the room, and, as I remember it, Jaffe was at the other end of the room.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the relationship of this party and the conversation that I think you told us you had with Jaffe about Confucianism? Is that the next day?

A. I am not sure whether that was in the hotel before we started out, whether it may have been in the taxi or during the evening. I remember that it was some time during that evening when he brought this up. I think we had some discussion in the hotel before we started out, in which he asked specifically if I wouldn't give him some reports that had been written on the Confucian Society, and I told him of course not, that they were Embassy dispatches, and I had quite a discussion with him and explained to him the impossibility from my point of view or any point of view of taking material from the files and allowing him to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you dig up some?

A. No, sir; I never did.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't you say something about some slogans that you—

A. Oh, well, out of my memory there. He went on to the subject of this trend of the Knomintang on their propaganda, and it is true it is quite noticeable. They had a number of special slogans they used to paint upon the walls in big characters, and out of my memory at that time I recalled several of these slogans.

Q. These were slogans that were painted on the walls of buildings in China?—

A. Yes, they used to have them on the walls of the compounds. Chinese houses, of course, are all built facing in, with a wall all around them. It is built around a courtyard.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any discussion with Mr. Jaffe on that occasion about the whereabouts of Stilwell at that time?

A. The whereabouts of Stilwell?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, whether he was in the Pacific or not?

A. This would be in May?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

A. I had called on him on at least one occasion here that spring. He was commanding general of the Ground Forces.

The CHAIRMAN. He was in the District?

A. His headquarters were down at Fort McNair. He went out to the Pacific for some time, but I am not sure it was that early. Of course, he was out in the Pacific at the end of the war. He took over the Tenth Army on Okinawa.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any conversation with Jaffe on that subject?

A. I can't recall any. I don't understand what connection it would have had.

The CHAIRMAN. Was Stilwell known publicly to be here at that time?

A. Well, he had been commanding general of the Ground Forces.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do you remember when he was appointed to that position?

A. As commanding general of the Ground Forces?

Mr. ACHILLES. Yes.

A. Well, I'm only talking from memory now, but he came back from China in late October and then went out and took quite an extended vacation in California, his home, and it must have been fairly early in 1945 that he took over. I called on him at his office very soon after I came back from China, in April. Now Stilwell was very anxious to get a fighting job. He was unsatisfied and restless in the staff job and desk job, and he was determined to get a final crack at the Japanese, and I think that some time during the spring he did go out to the Pacific, and as a result of that he was more or less on the ground when General Buckner was killed, the commander of the Tenth Army, and General Stilwell was put in command. I don't remember whether he ever came back to Washington.

Mr. ACHILLES. But you did see him in Washington?

A. Yes, I saw him in April.

The CHAIRMAN. This is now May 29 which I am talking about.

A. Well, I don't recall whether General Stilwell was here or not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Wasn't he, as a matter of fact, on the Pacific at the time and due to have a meeting with MacArthur in Japan?

A. I would have to refresh my memory on the time. As I was just saying, he did go out there. When was the Okinawa campaign? I could remember if I could get some key dates here. I can't even remember now what his purpose was except to attempt to get himself a fighting command out in the Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. That was before the Japanese surrender?

A. Oh, yes; it was before the Japanese surrender. He was in command in Okinawa during the last stage of the Okinawa campaign. Since General Buckner was killed there in action, Stilwell was put in command.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recollect any conversation with Jaffe about Stilwell's whereabouts now?

A. I can't recall in what connection the subject would have come into the conversation.

The CHAIRMAN. At any rate, let me ask you this question: You were not informed particularly as to what Stilwell was doing at that time, or were you?

A. Well, I have been dredging my memory here, and I do remember that he was going out to the Far East to get himself a command, and I think that that probably came to me in the personal conversation with Stilwell; if not with Stilwell, then with one of Stilwell's close associates. Stilwell was a very frank, outspoken person. I remember him talking about his dissatisfaction with his job and how he wanted to get a fighting job to do.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you have any knowledge of General Stilwell's personal plans that was not public knowledge?—A. Well, I am not sure just what was public knowledge then. I am sure that whatever knowledge I had of his plans was on personal or through personal friendly contact with him. But as to what may have been, during wartime I assume that a four-star general's movements are usually not public knowledge. I don't remember.

Mr. STEVENS. Did you know precisely what he was going out to do?

A. My recollection is that he was going out to try to get a job. General Stilwell's hope always was—personal hope—that if there were to be any landing on China that he would be the man leading it, in north China or elsewhere. He never made any secret about that. That was sort of "Uncle Joe's" dream, and I

think he would have liked nothing better than to have been at the head of the troops marching back to Peking. But I don't remember discussing that point with Jaffe. It was pretty general knowledge—Stilwell's hopes of being in on the finish in China. After all, he had been there from the start. He made no secret of it himself.

Q. Well, now, coming back to the party of Miss Yardounian's, did you return from that party to Washington with Jaffe?—A. Yes, with a full taxi, as I remember it.

Q. Jaffe and others?—A. Jaffe and others.

Q. And what did you do when you got back to town? Did you disperse at that point or did you see anything further of Jaffe on that evening?—A. As I remember it, we dispersed in front of the hotel. I have a sort of vague recollection of Jaffe walking down toward my place with me. He wanted to get some night air or something. There was some discussion about getting a little exercise, and he walked down toward my rooming place with me.

Q. Any discussion take place on that occasion that you can recall—I mean what the nature of your conversation was?—A. No, sir.

Q. Then you left him that night, and when did you next see him?—A. I don't think I've ever seen Jaffe since then.

Q. You don't think you have ever seen him since this night of May 29?—A. No, sir. I didn't see him at the time of the arrest, I didn't see him between May 29 and the arrest, I have never seen him or had any contacts during the arrest, or any correspondence or any other communications with him.

Q. Now referring to Document 17-17, which has already been put in evidence here, you will recall that Mr. Larsen or Mr. Levine, as it now appears, stated in this Plain Talk article that it was discovered by the FBI that you were in communication from China with Mr. Jaffe. This charge has been repeated by Senator McCarthy. In that connection, I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point Document 39-26, which is an excerpt of certain remarks by Senator McCarthy on the floor of the Senate on March 30, 1950.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

“(Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950, remarks of Senator McCarthy, p. 4454)

“Another document stolen from Military Intelligence consisted of 22 pages; and 1 of the documents, of considerable interest, which was found in his possession and that apparently reached Jaffe before it reached the State Department, was John Service's Report No. 58, a report highly critical of Chiang Kai-shek. Does the Senator follow me? Before that document reached the State Department from Service, he had first mailed it to Philip Jaffe.”

This charge has been further repeated by one Joseph Kamp in a pamphlet entitled “America Betrayed,” and in that connection I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point Document 58-1.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT NO. 58-1

“KAMP—AMERICA BETRAYED

“The FBI evidence showed that Service had been in improper correspondence with Jaffe from China, and that Max Granich, a Russia agent, working under Vassili M. Zubelin, General Secretary of the Russian Embassy at Washington, had been assigned to act as go-between for Jaffe and Service.”

Q. Now you already testified, Mr. Service, that you first met Jaffe on April 19, 1945, is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. Did you ever have any communication of any kind with Mr. Jaffe prior to April 19, 1945?—A. I had no communication of any kind with Mr. Jaffe.

Q. Directly or indirectly?—A. Directly or indirectly, unless it could be called subscribing to his magazine for 2 years, but no direct personal contact of any sort prior to April 19, 1945.

Q. At the time you were interrogated by the FBI on June 6, 1945, were you questioned as to whether you had ever been in communication with Jaffe from China?—A. I don't remember any specific questioning on that point. I do remember that they seemed quite surprised when I insisted repeatedly to them that I had never met Jaffe before April 19, 1945. By “they” I mean the agents who interrogated me.

Q. Now with reference to Document 39-26 and Document 17-17, both of which have already been introduced, in which it is asserted that among the papers found among Jaffe's possessions was a Report No. 58 entitled "Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek—Decline of His Prestige and Criticism of, and Opposition to, His Leadership." Did you ever write a report bearing that title?—A. I have no recollection of ever having written such a report.

Q. Have you during the course of preparations for this proceeding discovered in the files of the State Department such a report?—A. No, sir, because we have requested the State Department to locate only the reports which I wrote, and they found no such report among the reports which I wrote.

Q. In the course of the list of documents which was inspected here the other day there did appear such a document so captioned, indicating that it was a despatch prepared by the consul in Kunming on August 1, 1944, did there not?—A. That is correct.

Q. And that is the document which Mr. Spronse testified was probably a report prepared by him, is it not?—A. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you about a visit you had to the home of Owen Lattimore in Baltimore? Could you tell us about that?

A. I was asked the other day, sir, about early contacts with Owen Lattimore, but I am not sure that we pursued the subject up to the point of the week end with him. We will have to check the testimony. However, I think that the week end is mentioned on page 42 of my personal statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; in June some time.

A. It was the first week end in June. I do not know the exact date.

The CHAIRMAN. At that meeting Roth was also present?

A. Roth was also present.

The CHAIRMAN. And Miss Yardoumian?

A. And Miss Yardoumian.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. ACHILLES. Had you seen Owen Lattimore after your return to April until this week end?

A. I'm under the impression that I had a very brief casual meeting at some time or other, but I do not know the exact circumstances. He was coming fairly frequently to Washington in those days. One of my very good friends was John Fairbank, and I have a vague recollection of going to a cocktail party or something that Fairbank may have given, that I may have seen Lattimore, but I'm under the impression that I did see Mr. Lattimore in some group in some very brief way during that period.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you have any private discussions with him?

A. I don't recall any. If you recall my statement, at the bottom of page 42, I mentioned that on some previous meeting—I don't recall the exact circumstances—Mr. Lattimore had mentioned one of the projects his research students were working on—a historical study of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese communism—and he wanted to know if I had any recently published materials that might be useful, and for that reason I took with me on this week end a collection of recently published—a collection of Mao Tse-tung's speeches in the papers that was published in Yenan, and I took that with me to Baltimore and left it with Mr. Lattimore.

Q. That was a book?—A. Yes, a very large, fat book.

Mr. STEVENS. But you did have no personal reports of your own at that time?

A. No, sir; none. If I could just say a word there, Mr. Lattimore has never been curious or never requested access to papers or documents. He has never asked me to show him anything. The only request I have ever had from him was this one—whether I had any recently published materials on Chinese Communists.

Q. Now referring to Document 58-1 and the statement in that booklet by Mr. Kamp that the FBI evidence showed that you had been in improper correspondence with Jaffe from China, and that Max Grenich, a Russian agent working under Vassili M. Zubelin, had been assigned to act as a go-between for you and Jaffe, do you know who Max Grenich is?—A. I did not know at the time I read this, a few weeks ago; I had to inquire. To my knowledge, I never met him and never heard of him before, nor do I know or have I heard of Mr. Zubelin.

Q. Now referring to document 92, which has already been discussed, and I refer particularly to the statement in this newspaper article attributed to Mr. Budenz to the effect that one Robert W. Weiner, alias Welwel Warzover, supplied money for the defense of the six persons arrested in the Amerasia case. Did you ever have any connection at all with Mr. Weiner or Mr. Warzover?—

A. No, sir; I never heard of him until Mr. Budenz publicized this—mentioned this.

Q. So far as any contribution to your defense, that statement is incorrect?—

A. Entirely incorrect. I received no funds whatever of which I did not know the origin in detail, except the \$500 which was raised anonymously, I was told by intimate friends, and was paid over to my sister-in-law to reimburse her for advancing the cost of my bond. I received no other assistance but only from from close personal friends. I can elaborate if the Board wishes.

Q. Now you testified that you never saw Jaffe again after this evening of May 29, 1945. Your testimony, I believe, has been that the last time you had seen Gayn was on the occasion of your visit to the Bissons on—A. 19th of May.

Q. On May 19. Will you tell the Board—have you seen Gayn since that time.—A. Yes, I have seen him several times since then.

Q. Well, would you describe those occasions, if you can?—A. Well, I saw him once. The next time after May 19 that I saw him was probably in late July 1945. His attorney was extremely anxious to have a brief consultation. He had understood that I was planning to request an appearance before the grand jury. I went up to New York and had that meeting. It was a brief one. They were chiefly concerned with finding out whether I had known any incriminating evidence against Gayn or had tended to incriminate him in my statement to the FBI. I told them that I had given the FBI a factual statement, as far as I was able to do so, without any effort to fasten the blame, whatever there was, on anyone. I did not see Gayn during the grand jury hearings, and the next time that I saw him was, I believe, toward the end of 1945, when he arrived in Tokyo as correspondent. He looked me up in the office, I had a very brief conversation with him. We had one or two other very casual contacts. He was living at the press club, and I was at the press club with friends on one or two occasions. So we had no extended conversations. In fact, I did my best to avoid any further contacts with him. He was rather anxious to establish himself on a basis of friendship and invited me to a meal. I eschewed any further contact with Mr. Gayn and I haven't seen him since about the end of 1945, as far as I can remember. It may have been early 1946. I can't state with absolute certainty the dates.

Q. Now Roth was present at the May 29 party at Miss Yardounian's, of course.—A. Yes.

Mr. ACHILLES. I think we started to trace Roth, but we left it somewhere before that.

Q. We can go back.

Mr. ACHILLES. Could we go back and review your contacts with Roth?

Mr. STEVENS. I think we took Roth through the luncheon in the room at the Statler and the conversation on that day. Now, any contact after that date?

A. I think the next contact I mentioned, there was that occasion when he wanted to meet me in the park between the two Interior buildings, and on that occasion I reported as being surprising that he should have knowledge of this telegram from Moscow about the interview between Stalin and Hurley. I recollect seeing Roth at a party which I believe was given by Donald Davies, who was then a lieutenant, and I may have seen Roth on at least one other social occasion.

The CHAIRMAN. You have already placed him at the party at Owen Lattimore's. A. I was working up to that.

The CHAIRMAN. This was before that?

A. Yes. I don't recall any other, you might say, significant or important contacts. He, of course, was at the party on the 29th of May at Miss Yardounian's, and it was fairly soon after that—the first week end in June—when I found that he had also been invited to the Lattimores; and as I recall, Mrs. Lattimore suggested and got in touch with me, saying that Roth and Miss Yardounian were coming down and it would be very much easier for their meeting us and taking us out to their house if we came together. The Lattimores lived in the far suburbs, a couple of miles or so from the end of the street-car line, as I remember it, and usually when people are coming out, the Lattimores meet them at the end of the line and drive them out to their house. So we got together and made arrangements, and I think we met at the railway station, at Union Station, trying to catch a certain train, and rode down together. I have discussed the week end in the personal statement. We came back early Monday morning, as I remember. The next time—I'm sure it was the next time—I saw Roth was the night of the arrest, when he was brought into the United States Commissioner's office some time after I had arrived there. I saw

him briefly, but I don't recall speaking to him, at a hearing before the Commissioner on the 14th of June 1945, and I don't believe I have ever seen Roth since that date. Roth wrote me a brief letter, or, perhaps 2 years ago, when I was in New Zealand. He had been in Indonesia for quite a while and had gotten very well acquainted with a New Zealand correspondent who worked with the Chicago Tribune, a fellow named Pope, and it may be that Pope was returning to New Zealand and brought this letter with him. It was a note saying how much he had enjoyed working with Pope and hearing the news about us—I should say "me" instead of "us"—he didn't know my wife—and it was probably the first time in history that the Nation and the Chicago Tribune had worked so closely together. He mentioned his wife—that his wife had divorced him. I don't think I replied to that note. That is the only subsequent contact I have had with Roth.

Mr. STEVENS. Did you ever exchange any information? Did he ever ask you to exchange any additional information after you met in the park?

A. Roth was interested in Japan; he wasn't interested in China. He tried to discuss Japan and particularly tried to discuss the Communists in Yenan—the Japanese People's Emancipation League—and I told Roth I didn't know much about the subject, and he had finally got in touch with other people, I think, and got some information which was used in the book from other sources. But I gave him no information at all. And I knew too little about Japan and wasn't particularly interested in Japan. I had no idea at that time I would ever serve in Japan.

Q. Now about Miss Mitchell. You testified, I believe, that you met her for the first time on the occasion when you visited Jaffe's office on April 25 or thereabouts.—A. Well, I think I met her the first time, actually, at Gayn's party the night before.

Q. And then you mentioned seeing her this next day at the office. You mentioned going to her apartment the night of approximately May 18.—A. Yes.

Q. And then she was with you the next day at Bisson's, on May 19.—A. Yes. And the only conversation with her of which I have any recollection at all was on that walk down to the beach, when she was talking about the new book she was writing.

Q. And have you seen her since May 19?—A. No, sir. I have no recollection of any meeting after that.

Q. Have you had any communications with her?—A. None whatever.

Q. Now about Mr. Larsen. Will you describe to the Board your contacts with him?—A. Well, I may say that I have no recollection of the childhood meeting that Mr. Larsen described, when I was an infant. My recollection of our first meeting here in Washington, which was the first meeting since my childhood, is roughly similar to Mr. Larsen's description the other day, except that as I remember it he had just come out of the office of the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, a Mr. Ballantine, and I was waiting to go in, and they walked to the door together. Mr. Ballantine introduced us and we said "How do you do," and Larsen said something about "You probably don't remember me when we were in Chengtu when you were a small boy." Now I must say that my recollection of this one luncheon with Larsen differs radically. I do not believe that Mr. John Carter Vincent was there. I don't know who I went out to lunch with, but, as I remember it, the eating place was one of those small places on Seventeenth Street that was quite crowded. Larsen was there with someone else and we joined forces and sat together at the same table. Mr. Vincent didn't usually go to that place. I have had lunch with Mr. Vincent, but usually at the Cosmos Club or some place like that. And there are several details which Mr. Larsen gave the other day that don't fit my recollection of the occasion at all. But that was, as I recollect, the only contact that we had between April and June—on this occasion when we at least sat at the same table in a group of four or six people at this eating place on Seventeenth Street. About May 8, when I took over in later afternoon a copy of the FCC report of Mao Tse-tung's broadcast, I have a vague recollection that Larsen was there with Jaffe, but that's something I would not be positive about.

Mr. ACHILES. Either at that luncheon or at any other time did Larsen ever question you about your reports to Yenan?

A. No. I believe that this luncheon meeting—the occasion when we happened to meet—was some days after I had seen Jaffe with Larsen in the Statler Hotel, in the lobby, and I have a vague recollection of mentioning the fact that I had seen him with Jaffe and his dropping the subject and not pursuing it. I said something about "I didn't realize you were a friend of Jaffe's," or something of that sort, and getting a very negative response from him.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did he indicate any particular knowledge of your reports—the substance of them?

A. No; we never had any discussion of them that I recall.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you have occasion in the Department to discuss your reports with Larsen?

A. Never, sir. And, incidentally, the statement which he makes in the Hobbs committee testimony, that I attended several meetings of his group, is completely untrue; I never attended any meetings of any group, and I think that he verified that point here the other day. He said the only meetings he knew I attended were meetings of the whole staff of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. ACHILLES. Julian Friedman had been mentioned once or twice. Was he in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs at that time?

A. Specifically, he was in the Division of Chinese Affairs.

Mr. ACHILLES. Could you tell us how well you knew him or how much you saw of him?

A. I knew him very slightly. I don't remember having any contact with him outside of the office, although I may have gone out to lunch with him. We often did go out with associates.

Mr. ACHILLES. You did not, therefore, know him personally other than casual contact in the office?

A. That's right. I don't remember his being present at any of these parties or social functions that I have attended.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did he indicate any particular knowledge of the substance of your reports?

A. Yes; a great deal. He was working with them and he was very much interested in discussing a number of them. He wrote a great many of these memoranda summarizing them.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did he indicate any particular political views of his own?

A. Well, in this sort of context, sir, one doesn't discuss very much except China. I don't have any idea of what his political views were with relation to the United States or Europe. Certainly, with regard to China, he took the same general view that I did. He was a person of a great deal of enthusiasm and perhaps likely to go to extremes. He used to follow the practice, for instance, of putting the word "Communist" in quotes, something which I never did. I don't think that is significant, but I think it is perhaps typical. Referring to the Chinese Communists.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did he have any Communist sympathies himself?

A. I don't remember any discussions that would disclose that. He was a friend of Andy Roth's.

Mr. ACHILLES. Was he also a friend of Jaffe's?

A. I am not positive of this point, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. I believe that earlier in your statement in connection with your consultation in the fall of 1944 you mentioned being asked to talk to various other Government officials outside the Department, one of whom was Dr. Currie. Was that Dr. Lauchlin Currie?

A. Yes, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. Could you tell us what you discussed with Dr. Currie then?

A. No; I can't recall any specific content of the conversation at that time.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do you recall whether you saw him again in 1945 or not?

A. Yes, I did.

Mr. ACHILLES. Once or more than once?

A. I believe more than once, sir. I knew him officially. I had known him since the beginning of 1943.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you have any particular discussions with him or was your contact with him purely social?

A. My guess is that I probably saw him more than once—perhaps twice or three times—in the office. I remember going out to his home on one occasion. I took a cab. I remember it was a terrible place to get to. I don't think I had as much contact with Dr. Currie in 1945 as I did earlier, because he wasn't primarily concerned with Chinese affairs in the late period in the war. In fact, he was just leaving or coming back from a trip to Switzerland in 1945.

Mr. ACHILLES. As far as you can recall, he wasn't particularly interested in China when you saw him in 1945?

A. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. You also mentioned talking to Harry Hopkins in 1944. Could you tell us the circumstances of your conversation or conversations with him?

A. Hopkins' office called up and asked if I could come over. I, of course, did

so, had about a 45-minute conversation with him almost entirely about my trip to the Communist areas. This, of course, was in 1944, when I had just returned. I went into complete details for him. He was interested in our impressions and views as to their program, probable strength.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you see him again in the spring of 1945?

A. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. ACHILLES. And in your statement you also mentioned talking to Harry White in 1944. Can you tell us about your conversation or conversations with him?

A. Yes. He asked me to come over. I was somewhat surprised. I never met him before. It was the time, as I recall, when we were having very, very serious difficulties with the Chinese Government with making any arrangements on exchange rates for financing our expenditures over there. In the early part of the war they had insisted on a very artificial exchange rate of 20 Chinese dollars to one United States dollar, which was absolutely impossible. They had no reverse lend-lease arrangements and it was becoming so expensive that it was very hard for us to justify. Later we made an agreement to renegotiate every 3 months, but there were a good many continuing frictions. Dean Acheson's brother, Edward Acheson, had been out there for a while as a sort of financial adviser to headquarters. We had a Treasury attaché out there, and there was, as I say, a continuing difficulty in negotiations over this financial problem. On this occasion when Mr. White asked me to come over, he was apparently at the end of his patience and he expressed himself very strongly on the Chinese attitude of lack of cooperativeness, wanting my opinion of why we shouldn't discontinue financial aid. I went into considerable detail. You can't drop an ally during the middle of a war. As uncooperative as they may have been, we must continue. He seemed to expect a more forceful answer from me. I think he was disappointed because I disagreed with him. I don't know.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did he suggest discontinuing lend-lease aid or just financial aid?

A. Just financial aid. We were paying the Chinese Government at that time something like \$25,000,000 a month to reimburse them for expenditures which they were making for us for feeding troops and things like that—building airfields and building barracks—and I think his idea was that the Chinese should do that and pay for it themselves and we should stop paying them for it. I don't recall that he had any suggestions of drastically stopping aid.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you see him in the spring of 1945?

A. No, sir; I only recall seeing him that once, which must have been 1944.

Q. Returning to Mr. Larsen, you may recall that Mr. Larsen testified here the other day that Isaac Dow Levine had told him what purported to be an account of your testimony before the grand jury, and in particular told him that you testified before the grand jury from some list, indicating that a document which you had shown to Jaffe had been declassified by a person by the name of Taylor.—A. Just a minute, sir. He didn't say that I had testified that.

Q. You were out of the room. Well, I'll tell you that Mr. Larsen so testified. I will also tell you that he testified further that Mr. Levine advised him that before the grand jury you testified that Mr. Larsen is the probable source of the documents found in Mr. Jaffe's possession. I will now ask you whether you did give such testimony before the grand jury?—A. I gave no testimony, sir, regarding declassification of documents by George Taylor, because I had no knowledge of them. With regard to the second part, I was asked by the FBI, by the Department of Justice, and, if I recollect correctly, by the grand jury or the prosecutor at the time of the grand jury hearing if I knew how Mr. Jaffe had received these documents, and I said I did not know—I mean for my sake, but I was unable to say that Mr. Larsen or anyone else had. Now they did ask me, I believe—of course, I have not seen my testimony there—I believe they asked me whether some of these documents particularly the ones that were shown to me—whether they would have been available or accessible to Mr. Larsen. I believe I answered that I assumed that in connection with his work he would have had some accessibility to them. I said that I could not say that he or any other particular person had given. That is the best of my recollection, sir.

Q. Now, turning to Mr. Bisson, you testified that in your earlier meetings with Mr. Bisson—your first meeting with him in Peking in 1937, and your next meeting with him at the luncheon on May 19—A. No, sir; the next meeting was the IPR.

Q. Yes.—A. On April 25, 1945. The next meeting after that was the luncheon on May 19.

Q. Yes. Will you describe to the Board what subsequent contacts you had with Mr. Bisson?—A. Late in 1945 I was in Tokyo as a member of the staff of the United States political adviser when the United States Strategic Bomb Survey Group arrived in Japan. This was a large group of experts, civilian and military, covering a great many fields, to make a detailed analysis of the effects of our bombing campaign against Japan, not only the physical effects, but the effects on the whole economy, morale, health, and so on. Bisson was a member of that group—the Strategic Bombing Survey—and I recall meeting him only once during that stay there. There were a number of, you might say, far-eastern experts assembled in Tokyo at that time. There was the Pauley Reparations Mission, of which Lattimore was a member, and several other people whom I had known previously. There was also the predecessor to the Far Eastern Commission—at that time it was called the Far Eastern Advisory Commission—which also contained a number of research people—old-time research people in the far-eastern field. And at somebody's suggestion we had a sort of get-together evening, at which I would say there were a dozen or fifteen of these people, all of whom had known each other earlier. Many of them had been connected with the IPR. There was an international group. There were several New Zealanders, several Americans, and Bisson was present at that evening. I don't recall any other meeting with him until perhaps March or April of 1946. He left Tokyo. As a matter of fact, he was billeted in an entirely different building and his officers were in an entirely different building. We had no physical chance for contact, really, during that first visit.

In April 1946, he returned to Tokyo as a civilian employee of the Government section of SCAP, and I believe that I happened to meet him just at the time of his arrival when he was checking in at headquarters. It was a purely accidental meeting. He was being assigned to a new billet, he didn't know where it was, and I volunteered to take him around to it. I took him there and saw him to his quarters and left him. To my recollection, that's the last contact I had with Bisson. We never corresponded with each other and never had any real friendship or intimacy at all.

Q. Now I would like to introduce document 39-6 into the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)

“DOCUMENT No. 39-6

“(Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950—Remarks of Senator McCarthy, p. 4438)

“He [Service] was a friend and associate of Frederick Vanderbilt Field, the Communist chairman of the editorial board of the infamous Amerasia.”

The CHAIRMAN. We might have a short recess.

(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Q. Now, with reference to this statement by Senator McCarthy that you were a friend and associate of Frederick Vanderbilt Field, do you care to make any comment on that statement, Mr. Service?—A. I believe I have already testified that I have never met Mr. Field; never had any contact or association with him in any way.

Mr. ACHILLES. Never corresponded with him?

A. Never corresponded with him or, as far as I know, attended a meeting where he was present.

Q. Do you know Mr. E. C. Carter?—A. Slightly.

Q. Will you tell the Board who he is and what the extent of your association with him has been.—A. I am not sure of what his actual title was. I believe that it was probably something like executive secretary of the International Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, or it may have been executive secretary of the American Council. At any rate, he was an influential administrative connection with the IPR. Well, I have known him so vaguely and so little that it is hard to detail the few times I have seen him actually. My first clear recollection of meeting him was sometime in Chungking, possibly in the summer of 1941 or 1942. We made a trip to China, I believe, in company with a Mr. William Holland, who was also working with the IPR, and as I remember the circumstances, Mr. Carter made a call on the American Embassy. At that time I think the Embassy was on the south bank of the Yangtze River, across the city from Chungking. And after lunch—at any rate, after his call—Mr. Carter was returning to the city to call on some Chinese officials, and I was also going to the city, so I took him along—I provided transportation for him, which was a

very difficult problem in Chungking. I wasn't with him on his calls. I simply provided transportation to whichever government office he was going. The next time I saw him was in late 1944, probably November. I visited New York and called on a very old friend of mine, a former Foreign Service officer named Lawrence Salisbury, who was at that time working part time with the IPR and editing their biweekly magazine called Far Eastern Survey.

During that call on Mr. Salisbury, I have a vague recollection of being shown around the office, stopping for a moment in Mr. Carter's office just to shake his hand and say "How do you do." We had no conversation beyond the social amenities. In April 1945, after I returned to Washington—quite soon after my return—I received a brief note from the IPR, signed by Mr. Carter, asking whether I would be able to give one of these off-the-record background talks to their research staff in New York. I discussed the matter, as I have testified here before, with the acting head of the Office of Far-Eastern Affairs, he approved my acceptance, I made a very brief reply to Mr. Carter accepting his invitation, and eventually saw him when I visited New York to give the talk—to have the meeting, rather. I don't believe that he attended this meeting of the research staff, but that I saw him either before or just afterward for a few minutes. He had some discussion with me about paying my expenses. I think he said that they did not usually pay any fee, which I understood and did not expect, but they would be willing to pay my actual out-of-pocket expenses. As I remember it, I told him I was staying with a friend—I had a bed with Gayn—I was having most of my meals with friends, and the only expense that I had incurred was the railway fare, and I think that he gave me a check to cover the railway fare. All that is rather indistinct memory, but I do seem to recall such a transaction. I have never seen Mr. Carter since that day in April 1945, as far as I know, nor have I had any other contact with him.

Q. Now turning to the subject of inquiry this morning, with particular reference to the morning of April 20, 1945, I believe you testified that to the best of your recollection you did not, as the report of the FBI surveillance indicates, according to the testimony of Mr. Gurnea before the Hobbs committee—that you did not spend the entire morning with Mr. Jaffe. That was your testimony.—A. That is correct.

Q. I should like to ask the Board whether it has any information available to it as to what may have occurred at that time which might be used to refresh the recollection of this witness, who has testified that he simply has no recollection that will substantiate this assertion.

The CHAIRMAN. The Board has no information as to what went on.

Mr. ACHILLES. There is clearly such a difference between spending 10 or 15 minutes with Jaffe before Roth's arrival for lunch, and spending the time from 9:30 until 12 o'clock or slightly thereafter, that I should think you would be able to recall in somewhat vague detail how that time was spent if you were there.

A. Well, I'm positive, sir, that I wasn't there, but I can't prove that I wasn't there by showing what else I was doing on that particular morning.

Q. I believe you testified that it may be that you did go by there at some earlier point in the morning.—A. I believe that that is correct.

Q. I believe you indicated that that possibility might well be the fact because of your recollection that you had supplied these memoranda to Mr. Jaffe on one occasion and expected to pick them up on the occasion of the luncheon.—A. The next immediate occasion, yes.

Q. So that I take it from your testimony this morning that you think it quite possible that you did in fact go there earlier in the morning—that is, well before the time you were there for lunch; is that correct?—A. Yes, I think it very likely that that is what actually happened.

Mr. ACHILLES. And yet neither in your statement to the FBI in 1945 nor in your statement for these hearings did you mention seeing Jaffe on that day except going to lunch with him.

A. There was, shall we say, nothing in my mind at the time unusual or exceptional about these contacts which would have impressed them firmly on my mind. It would be very hard for me to say now what I was doing 6 or 7 weeks ago. Now, frankly, as I have said here, I was very dependent on the notes that the FBI had as to dates, and I have no recollection of the FBI agent who was interrogating me saying, "Well, did you go there early in the morning?" If he had, I might have refreshed my memory and I could have confirmed the exact fact. But I do recollect strongly my disappointment and annoyance when Jaffe said well, he hadn't had a chance to read them and couldn't he keep them and

take them with him; he had to go back that afternoon. Now in trying to reconstruct the events during the past few weeks, my basis for recollection has been chiefly the statements I gave to the FBI when my recollection was relatively fresh, in 1945.

Q. You do not recall the FBI questioning you about any discussion with Jaffe during that morning?—A. No, sir. And if the FBI had the dates and times down there, I don't remember any argument at all. They actually supplied all of these dates, I think.

Q. By "all of these dates" you mean the dates used in your statement?—A. Yes. I'm positive that I never spent any such length of time. I have no recollection of any such lengthy conversation with Mr. Jaffe, and I do have some memory of my disappointment at the lunch that he had not read them and that he wasn't willing to return them then.

Mr. ACHILLES. Even after this questioning may have refreshed your memory, you are still positive that you had no such protracted conversation with him on that day?

A. That is correct; to the best of my recollection, I had no protracted conversation with him on that day.

Mr. ACHILLES. Again on the basis of refreshed recollection, can you recall going there at 9:30 in the morning briefly and leaving the hotel and returning for lunch?

A. No, I can't say that I have a definite recollection. My memory is that the conversation regarding the papers was very brief and more or less explanatory; that there wasn't and sitting down and reading them over and discussing them in detail.

Mr. ACHILLES. And still to the best of your recollection, it took only about 10 or 15 minutes going over the reports before Roth arrived?

A. Well, we didn't really go over them, sir, because he said well, he hadn't read them, he had been doing something else. I don't recall the details of the discussion, of course.

Mr. ACHILLES. He did say that he had not had time to read them?

A. That is my recollection, yes.

Mr. ACHILLES. Wouldn't that indicate that you probably had given them to him at an earlier time?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Mr. ACHILLES. And you testified that you had not given them to him the night before, except the one?

A. That is correct. I think it very likely, with the impression in my memory here, that what actually occurred was that I went to the office, selected the papers which I thought he would like to see, went to the hotel, left them with him, expecting that he would spend that morning perusing them and that I would pick them up at lunch. I arrived at lunch—he's a very bland and pleasant fellow; he was very sorry, he had done something or other, he hadn't had a chance to read them, he had read one or two, and couldn't he keep them a little while longer.

Mr. STEVENS. Are you rationalizing this, or do you remember?

A. As I said this morning, I have been puzzled ever since I saw my statement, which was only within the last few weeks.

Q. Are you referring to the statement you gave the FBI?—A. Yes. I have been puzzled because I have a memory that I had expected Jaffe to have returned those and to have returned those to me at the lunch, and I was disappointed that he had not read them and was unwilling to return them. Therefore, I must have given them to him at an earlier time, but my statement to the FBI does not mention any earlier time, and that is one point that has bothered me.

Q. Is it a fair statement, therefore, that you presently accept the hypothesis that you may have called on him earlier because it squares with your recollection that you expected to get them back at lunch time?—A. That is correct.

Q. But that that is not your present recollection of that event in the past?—A. That is correct. I did not give these papers, did not intend to loan them to him for him to take away; it was my expectation that he would look them over hurriedly while he was there—while he was at the hotel here in Washington. I had no expectation when I agreed to let him see them that he would take them away to New York.

Mr. ACHILLES. I am not trying to plant anything in your testimony, but merely trying to refresh your recollection on this point. Do you recall, if you saw Jaffe earlier in the morning, his saying anything to the effect that he would not then have time to read them, would you leave them with him in the morning and he would give them back at lunch time, or anything to that effect?

A. Well, that is the general impression that I have had—that he wished to read them for a short while; he wasn't able to read them and return them to me on the spot, because, after all, eight or ten reports would be quite a bit of reading. It was my expectation that they would be returned to me later in the day when I saw him again.

Q. If I may say so, sir, in terms of the precise question you have just asked, I understand it that is what his testimony has been; that that is why the hypothesis that he was there before the luncheon meeting makes sense to him. That is the way I understood it.

Mr. ACHILLES. But regardless of what time you actually gave the copies to Jaffe, you were anticipating that because of the length of the material it would be necessary to leave them with him rather than just to go over them with him?

A. Yes, I expected to leave them with him for a short while. I didn't expect to sit there beside him, and I think it highly unlikely that I had had the whole morning free, because I was fairly busy; I was meeting a good many engagements.

Mr. ACHILLES. You have no recollection whatever of anything else that you might have done that morning?

A. Nothing that I can pin to April 20, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. It was a fairly significant date—the day after you met Jaffe and the date that you did make available these reports to him.

A. If I had known at the time what the after effects would be, why the date might have been marked; but by the time it was marked in my memory, it was too late for me to remember the details.

Q. Can you recall, Mr. Service, what you did on the morning of April 20, 1950?—A. I don't have the slightest idea, sir.

Q. April 20, 1950, is almost exactly as many days ago as April 20, 1945, was prior to your arrest, is it not, this being June 5, 1950?—A. Yes.

Q. I'm serious in my question. I wish you would try to recall what you did on April 20, 1950.—A. No, sir, I don't remember. I wouldn't have any way of checking to find out what I was doing on that day.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, the memory of events, as to a specific date, has to be tied to some specific event in order to be remembered. If you had done anything on May 20 last, you would remember it if there had been anything special—any special event like, for instance, occurred at this particular time you testified on.

Q. I suggest to you, as a matter of outlook, that the witness' testimony has been that at the time the event occurred it wasn't an event of special significance; it only assumed significance after June 6, 1945.—A. I might say that I talked to the FBI agents there. Well, the arrest took place about 6 p. m., I think, and we must have talked until about 2 a. m. I don't recall any issues or discussion over this particular point as to whether I had spent the whole morning or a long period with Mr. Jaffe; and I submit that if we had gone over the reports together and had read them all and discussed each one, I would have a much better recollection of what reports I gave him: because if I were allowing a man to see something for background information, I wouldn't normally sit down and go over it with him line by line and point by point; I assume that he can read it and digest it; let him do it.

Q. I should like at this point to introduce into the transcript Document 39-14. (The matter referred to is as follows:)

"DOCUMENT 39-14

"(Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950, remarks of Senator McCarthy, p. 4439)

" * * * * This committee report indicates that a number of the members of the grand jury voted for the indictment of Service and Mitchell on the espionage charges, but that the required number of 12 did not so vote."

Q. And I should like to read to the Board a short excerpt from the Hobbs committee report, which is set forth in document 100. It appears particularly on page 7534, column one, of the Congressional Record for the date involved in Document 100:

"After the second grand jury had heard all of the oral evidence for or against all six of the defendants and considered all of the documentary evidence, fewer than half of the required 12 voted for the indictment of any one of the three, Mitchell, Gayn, and Service. * * *"

At this point I should like to refer to Document 324, which has already been introduced into the record. This is the testimony of Mr. Hitchcock, who was

the prosecuting attorney in charge of the Amerasia case, and this is the testimony Mr. Hitchcock gave before the Tydings subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 26, 1950. I quote from page 4 of Document 324:

"Service signed a waiver of immunity and testified before the second grand jury early in August, and he was no billed unanimously."

The Board will readily perceive I offer this as refutation of the charge by Senator McCarthy that some of the grand jurors at least voted for the indictment of Mr. Service. Now after your voluntary appearance before the grand jury and the grand jury's unanimous return of a no true bill against you, Mr. Service, you returned to active duty in the Foreign Service? A. That is correct, Sir.

Q. Now did you at that time receive a letter from Secretary Byrnes?—A. Yes, I was returned to active duty on August 12, 1945, and I believe that Secretary Byrnes' letter was dated August 14, 1945.

Q. I should like at this point to introduce into the transcript as Document 36-A a copy of the letter, dated August 14, 1945, addressed to John S. Service, Esq., and signed by James F. Byrnes. I do not have the original of this letter—Mr. Service has it among his personal effects somewhere—but this copy appeared in the hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations in the Eighty-first Congress, on pages 297-298.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"DOCUMENT NO. 36-A SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES F. BYRNES' LETTER TO SERVICE,
DATED AUGUST 14, 1945

(Excerpts from hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 81st Cong., State Department appropriation bill, 1950, pp. 297-298)

"AUGUST 14, 1945.

"JOHN S. SERVICE, Esq.,

American Foreign Service Officer,

Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

"MY DEAR MR. SERVICE: I am advised that the grand jury, after hearing the testimony of witnesses, has found nothing to warrant an indictment against you.

"One of the fundamentals of our democratic system is the investigation by a grand jury of criminal charges. By that process you have been cleared.

"I am advised that at the time of your arrest you were placed on leave of absence with pay. I am happy to approve the recommendation of the personnel board that you be returned to active duty. You have now been reassigned to duty in the Department for important work in connection with far eastern affairs.

"I congratulate you on this happy termination of your ordeal and predict for you a continuance of the splendid record I am advised you have maintained since first you entered the Foreign Service.

"With all good wishes,

"Sincerely yours,

"JAMES F. BYRNES."

Q. Did you also at that time, Mr. Service, receive a letter from Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew?—A. Yes, I did.

Q. I should like to introduce into the transcript at this point a copy of a letter, dated August 14, addressed to John S. Service, Esq., and signed by Joseph C. Grew. This letter also appears in the same hearings of the House Appropriations Subcommittee.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"DOCUMENT NO. 36 B JOSEPH C. GREW LETTER TO SERVICE DATED AUGUST 14, 1945

"(Excerpt from hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives—81st Cong., State Department appropriation bill, 1950, p. 298)

"AUGUST 14, 1945.

"JOHN S. SERVICE, Esq.,

American Foreign Service Officer,

Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

"DEAR SERVICE: The Secretary has just told me of the letter he has written you expressing his pleasure at your complete vindication. I just want to add a personal word of my own.

"When I learned, only a few days before your arrest, that your name had been coupled with thefts of official documents I was inexpressibly shocked. Having known you for some time and of the high caliber of your work I could not believe that you could be implicated in such an affair. As the Secretary has stated, you have been completely cleared of any such imputation by operation of our democratic machinery of investigation and law enforcement.

"I am particularly pleased that you are returning to duty in the field of your specialization, far eastern affairs, where you have established an enviable record for integrity and ability.

"With all good wishes,

"Sincerely yours,

"JOSEPH C. GREW."

A. No, we never had any discussion of them that I recall.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you have occasion in the Department to discuss your reports with Larsen?

A. Never, sir. And, incidentally, the statement which he makes in the Hobbs committee testimony, that I attended several meetings of his group, is completely untrue; I never attended any meetings of any group, and I think that he verified that point here the other day. He said the only meetings he knew I attended were meetings of the whole staff of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. ACHILLES. Julian Friedman had been mentioned once or twice. Was he in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs at that time?

A. Specifically, he was in the Division of Chinese Affairs.

Mr. ACHILLES. Could you tell us how well you knew him or how much you saw of him?

A. I knew him very slightly. I don't remember having any contact with him outside of the office, although I may have gone out to lunch with him. We often did go out with associates.

Mr. ACHILLES. You did not, therefore, know him personally other than casual contact in the office?

Q. Now I would like at this point to introduce Document 39-12 and to refer also to Document 39-17, which has already been introduced into the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 39-12

"(Congressional Record, Thursday, March 30, 1950, remarks of Senator McCarthy, p. 4439)

"Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew very urgently insisted upon a prosecution of the six individuals who were picked up by the FBI on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage. He thereupon immediately became a target in a campaign of vilification as the culprit in the case rather than the six who had been picked up by the FBI."

Q. I should like to, in connection with these two documents—39-12 and 39-17—I should like to ask you, Mr. Service, whether you have made any further inquiries from Mr. Grew concerning these charges by Senator McCarthy.—A. I have.

Q. In what form did you make those inquiries?—A. I made them by letter. He was out of the country at the time—in May, I think, of 1950.

Q. I show you Document 52-A and ask you if this is a copy of the letter which you sent to Mr. Grew.—A. This is. I notice it is dated April 13. My recollection was incorrect when I said it was in May.

Q. I ask that there be included in the transcript Document 52-A, which is a two-page letter dated April 13, 1950, addressed to the Honorable Joseph C. Grew, signed "John S. Service."

The CHAIRMAN. It may be so included.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 52-A

5700 BROAD BRANCH ROAD NW.,
Washington 15, D. C., April 13, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. GREW: After the Grand Jury in August 1945 cleared me of implication in the *Amerasia* case, I was deeply appreciative of a letter which you wrote me in which, as you will recall, you stated in part:

"When I learned, only a few days before your arrest, that your name had been coupled with thefts of official documents I was inexpressibly shocked. Having

known you for some time and of the high caliber of your work, I could not believe that you could be implicated in such an affair. As the Secretary has stated, you have been completely cleared of any such imputation by operation of our democratic machinery of investigation and law enforcement."

There is nothing I dislike more than having to refer to this whole unhappy episode. However, Senator McCarthy, in his charges against me on the floor of the Senate and before the Special Subcommittee investigating his charges, has repeatedly linked your name with the case in a manner which I know is wholly incorrect. For instance, on the floor of the Senate on February 20, 1950, Senator McCarthy said:

"Later this man, John Service, was picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for turning over to the Communists secret State Department information. Strangely, however, he was never prosecuted. However, Joseph Grew, the Under Secretary of State, who insisted on his prosecution, was forced to resign. Two days after Grew's successor, Dean Acheson, took over as Under Secretary of State, this man, John Service, who had been picked up by the FBI and who had previously urged that communism was the best hope of China, was not only reinstated in the State Department but promoted."

Variations of this statement, all to the effect that you insisted on my prosecution, have been repeated by Senator McCarthy on several occasions.

In view of what has been brought to light concerning the case, it is obvious that the duties of your position required you to approve having the fullest investigation and prosecution of those guilty. I cannot believe however, that prior to the completion of the investigation and Grand Jury action you could have insisted specifically on my prosecution. Certainly you could not have insisted on such prosecution after the Grand Jury action in returning a no true bill.

I realize that you have already, in a general way, refuted these false statements by your letter to me of August 14, 1945, which I have referred to above. However, in view of the continuing and irresponsible statements of such persons as Senator McCarthy, it would be of very great help to me and, I believe, also to the Department of State if you would be good enough to inform me that there is no basis for the statement that you at any time insisted on my prosecution.

If you feel in a position to give me any statement, I would like to use it in presenting my case to the Department's Loyalty Security Board, which has called me for a hearing on charges largely arising out of those made by Senator McCarthy. I would also like to use it in a possible hearing before the Senate Subcommittee, but, of course, will not do so unless you approve.

Very sincerely yours,

JOHN S. SERVICE.

Q. And did you receive an answer to this letter, Mr. Service?—A. I did.

Q. I show you Document 52-B and ask you whether this is the letter which you received in answer to document 52-A.—A. It is.

Q. I show to the Board the original of this letter, signed by Mr. Grew, as well as a copy thereof, and ask permission to introduce into the transcript at this point Document 52-B, which is a copy of the letter signed by Mr. Grew.

Mr. STEVENS. We have made a comparison with the original.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 52-B

BEAU RIVAGE, PALACE,
Ouchy-Lausanne, Switzerland, April 17, 1950.

Mr. JOHN S. SERVICE,

5700 Broad Branch Road NW.,

Washington 15, D. C.

DEAR MR. SERVICE: Your letter of April 13 has this moment reached me and I hasten to reply without delay.

My letter to you in August 1945, and that of the then Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, after the Grand Jury had cleared you in the *Amerasia* case, should be sufficient to clarify your position at that time and to substantiate the fact that you had been completely cleared, by due process of law, of the charges against you. My recollection is that I further stated that you would be reinstated in the Foreign Service without any implication of an adverse nature against your fine record, although I have not now the text of that letter before me other than the part you have quote. That is the way democracy works.

There are inaccuracies in the public statements quoted in your letter.

I did not "insist on your prosecution" apart from that of the other five persons involved. Having been informed as Acting Secretary of State by supposedly reliable authority that an agency of our Government had what it considered complete evidence of guilt, I quite properly ordered the arrests, which of course presumed prosecution. I did not at that time know the names of the persons involved, including yours, and I did not wish to know them until the order had been carried out, for justice must not discriminate. When I learned that you, who stood so well in the Foreign Service, were one of those charged with the theft of official documents, I was, as I later wrote you, inexpressibly shocked. It was a great relief to me when you were cleared by the Grand Jury, and a great satisfaction to see you reinstated in the Foreign Service with no stigma whatever on your record.

I was not "formed to resign" as Under Secretary of State. Myths about this have arisen. For some time I had wished to retire. The war was then over; I had completed 41 years of service; I had passed the usual age limit; and I was at that time in ill health and was facing a possible major operation. It was therefore entirely on my own initiative that I insisted on retiring, even though Secretary Byrnes strongly urged me to continue in service.

Those are the facts, and you may use this letter in any way you wish.

With the best of wishes to you,

Very sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW.

Q. I may say to the Board that I introduced this exchange of correspondence between Mr. Service and Mr. Grew to indicate that Senator McCarthy's charges in this respect are wholly without foundation. Have you recently been interrogated by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Service?—A. Yes; two agents called on me several weeks ago.

Q. And in the course of that interview did they—

Mr. ACHILLES. Could you describe more specifically the approximate times?

A. On which they called on me?

Mr. ACHILLES. Yes.

A. I would say the latter part of April, sir, but that's just a guess. Mr. Rhett informs me that it was just after his baby was born, which means that it was after May 8—perhaps about May 10 or 12.

Q. In the course of that interview were you questioned about your possible membership in or affiliation with an organization known as the International Workers Order?—A. Yes; I was.

Q. Will you describe the interview that you had on this point?—A. Well, the agent who mentioned it the first time used only the initials IWO and wanted to know whether I had at any time been affiliated with the organization. I had to ask him what IWO meant. I had never heard of it before. When he told me it was the International Workers Order, I still said I had never heard of it before, had no knowledge of it, and to my knowledge had never signed any subscription list or had in any way been affiliated with it at all.

Q. Did these agents indicate to you that they had information indicating that someone by the name of John Service had been a member of the IWO?—A. They did. I said, "Well, it must be some other John Service; it could not be me."

Q. I have no further questions relating to the Amerasia phase of this case.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. I believe you referred this morning to a doctor who was with the Communist forces in China, possibly of American origin, named Ma Hai-teh.—A. Yes.

Q. When you returned to the United States in April, did you bring anyone in the United States any communication of any kind from him? April of 1945.—

A. I have a vague recollection of Dr. Ma, and I think that this would have been in 1944, asking me to drop a note to his parents, with whom he had not communicated for years—they lived in some small town in South Carolina or North Carolina—just to say that he was well and we had seen him, and so on. I don't have any recollection of bringing any mail or communication, although I am sure that if I did it would have been censored.

Q. Do you know if Dr. Ma had a brother in the United States at that time?—A. Yes; I think he did.

Q. Do you remember his name?—A. Well, Ma's name originally was Hatim, perhaps.

Mr. RHETT: Do you know how to spell it?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever meet his brother?—A. Yes; I think I did. His brother must have been going through Washington and looked me up. I do have a vague recollection of his brother looking me up to talk about his brother out in China.

Q. Was his brother in the Armed Forces; do you recall?—A. I think so. I think he was. I can't remember where this meeting took place. It must have been here in Washington. I think.

Q. But you, to the best of your knowledge, did not bring any packages or communications of any kind from Dr. Ma to his brother?—A. All I can say is that if I did it would have been censored. I seem to remember bringing back a letter with photographs of Ma and his Chinese wife and little Chinese child. Now, the only way I would know the letter contained photographs would have been through censoring and inspection. But I do think that I did have his request to do something like that.

Q. When he gave you the letter, if there was such a letter, was it sealed or unsealed?—A. No; it would have been unsealed, I am quite sure. You see, there was no mail service out of Yen-an, and the Army planes were the only channel or the only facilities for contact with the outside world, really, and the Army permitted us—permitted the plane to go back and forth, and we carried with us for the Communist people in Yen-an, but it was all done on the basis of their delivering an open communication to us. It was Colonel Barrett in the early days who would have been the final censoring and approving authority.

Q. You say that any letters you may have had to Dr. Ma's brother were censored. Was that in Chungking or in the United States?—A. Well, I would say they were censored at the source there in Yen-an.

Q. Who would that have been done by?—A. Generally by the commanding officer. In 1944 it was Barrett. I think in 1945 it was Lieutenant Jones, who happened to be the senior officer when I was there in 1945.

Q. You stated that you may have brought such a letter. Can you recall in fact whether you did or did not?—A. Well, with this refreshing of my memory, I do remember meeting the brother, and I have a vague recollection of his showing me, and he was looking at these pictures, but I have no very clear recollection of the whole episode or of the details.

Q. Do you recall ever having seen the brother subsequent to that one occasion?—A. No; I don't believe I ever have. Wasn't his brother a doctor?

Q. I don't know.—A. He was a doctor or a medical corpsman or something like that.

Q. The information in the possession of the Board indicates that there was a person named Corp. Joseph M. Hatem. Is that the person?—A. That's probably it.

Q. If you did bring him a letter, have you any recollection as to whether it was a correspondence-size envelope or a package or larger envelope of any kind?—A. No; I don't.

Q. That is all.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Mr. Service, in the course of your testimony I think you stated that these personal copies of your reports were limited to one of each report. I note that the FBI appear to have seized and returned to you two copies of some of the reports. I refer to Report No. 13, dated March 16, 1945; No. 15, dated March 16, 1945; No. 16, dated March 17, 1945, No. 17 also dated March 17, 1945; No. 20, dated March 20, 1945; No. 21, dated March 21, 1945; No. 22, dated March 22, 1945; and No. 26, dated April 1, 1945. With the sole exception of Report No. 17, which I have just referred to, in which case there were three copies, I also note that there appear to have been two copies of report No. 26, dated September 10, 1944. I wonder if you would like to comment on that fact.—A. I believe, sir, that the explanation is that, whereas I had previously been in the practice of sending a copy of all these reports to Mr. Davies, that practice was discontinued after I left Chungking, in early March 1945, and went to Yen-an. I have a record of having transmitted to Mr. Davies his copy of my reports through March 6, 1945. I have no record of sending to him the later copies which I had intended for him at the time of writing.

Q. Then that would account for your having not only your own copy but the copy you made for him.—A. That's right. It does not account for there being three copies of that Report No. 17. That's inexplicable. I don't know why that might have been.

Q. No further questions on this subject.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. The one that was prepared in 1944, I take it you have no recollection as to why that may be either.—A. No, sir, I don't. I don't know why I just happened to have an extra copy of that one.

Q. I would like to ask one additional question. This morning, when you told us about Mr. Jaffe's suggestion that you might be interested in taking over the magazine editing, did he ever in any subsequent discussion with you raise that matter again?—A. No, I don't recall that he did, because I gave him a very definite reply—negative reply. I was asked by a number of people during that period if I would be interested in a job of one sort or another. There were two newspapers who indicated an interest in having me work for them. I had at least two publishing firms approach me to see if I wouldn't write a book, and my answers were negative in all cases.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be all on that subject. You may proceed. We will adjourn promptly at 5 tonight.

Mr. ACHILLES. Is my understanding correct that we have not finished this stage in the hearings on the Amerasia case? We are still on that.

Mr. RHETTS. I'm finished, as far as I'm concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. The Board has two witnesses that we would like to have on this phase of the question, but they won't be available until tomorrow; but otherwise, I understand this phase is finished.

Mr. STEVENS. I have one last question for this afternoon. When you were giving your briefing sessions here in Washington to various Government agencies and some correspondents you may have referred to, were you ever informed, directly or indirectly, from what we now know as SA-M here as to the type of information that was given to newspaper people in the United States or were you following the practice as you knew it to exist at the time you were abroad?

A. I never had any instructions on briefing from SA-M or any other office in the Department of State on that question. I was following the practice which I had followed in the field, which I was acquainted with while working for the Army.

Mr. RHETTS. In view of the fact that it is 10 until 5 now, Mr. Chairman, I would just as soon suggest that we recess 10 minutes early, since, so far as I am concerned, we should turn next to the Japanese phase of the case.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. ACHILLES. I still have a few more questions on this phase of the case, but I would be glad to let them go.

Mr. RHETTS. It is entirely all right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, tomorrow at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the hearing was adjourned, to resume at 10 a. m., June 6, 1950.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: June 6, 1950, 10:10 a. m. to 12:40 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building.

Reporter: Edna C. Moyer.

Members of the Board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles, Arthur G. Stevens; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Representative for Mr. Service: Charles Edward Rhettts, Reilly, Rhettts & Ruckelshaus.

(The Board reconvened at 10 a. m. to hear continuation of testimony by Mr. John S. Service.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Board will come to order. I think the first thing on the docket this morning is some questions you had in mind.

Mr. ACHILLES. Yes, but I would prefer to have them at a later point.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we will proceed by the introduction of photostats of certain documents that were found by the FBI in 1945 in Mr. Service's possession, as to which the Board would like some elucidation. I will say that for the record Mr. Service has had copies of these documents overnight, so that I would like now at this time to ask for the explanation, such explanation as he desires to give. I will take these documents in chronological order.

Mr. RHETTS. I wonder, General, should we number them so that we can talk about them?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; would you like to introduce them into your numbering system?

Mr. MORELAND. Our numbering system. The first one will be B-53.

The CHAIRMAN. B-53 will be the document dated March 7, 1945; B-54 the document dated March 31, 1945; B-55 the document dated April 2, 1945; B-56 the document dated April 16, 1945; B-57, the document dated April 19, 1945—

Mr. RHETTS. Just 1 second—56 is two things here.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it? Two papers in B-56; B-57 is the document dated April 19, 1945; B-58 is the document dated May 14, 1945.

Referring then to B-53, it appears to be a photostat of a letter dated March 7, 1945, signed "Max" with a typed signature, "Max Knight." This letter refers to a chance to see Mr. Service's reports in some office.

Will you—

Mr. RHETTS. Might the letter, General, be introduced into the transcript?

The CHAIRMAN. If you desire—well, all of these, if you desire. I see no objection to it. Yes; they may be introduced into the transcript inasmuch as there is to be testimony regarding it, it might be the more realistic way.

Mr. RHETTS. I thought since the whole paper is more revealing than references to it, it might be useful.

The CHAIRMAN. Since the questions are regarding the paper, I think it would be appropriate for it to go into the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

[Copy of photostat]

DOCUMENT No. B-53

FBI Laboratory

100-367360 0399

1350 EUCLID AVENUE, BERKELEY 8, CALIF.,

March 7, 1945.

Mr. JACK SERVICE,

Care of Neil Brown, O. W. I.,

APO 627, Care of PM, New York, N. Y.

DEAR JACK SERVICE: I do hope you don't resent that I now trouble you long distance. But my conscience bothers me; I know how I would feel if I were in Dr. Schwartz's shoes (and I would be in his shoes save for some fortunate circumstances, including J. S.).

I had hoped to have a chance to see you again before you left—you sure move fast, and it seems you get across the sea sooner than we get across the bay.

Actually I have little to add to Kurt's story; I just may add his address: 173 Route Mayen (Hwa Ting Lu)—that's the place where the kindergarten is. Perhaps you may want to add his address to your other addresses, in case there is a chance to use it. Kurt's name is also known to Carlson who used to work in Opintell, and to Fit h; and Lyman Hoover actually knows Kurt. I had a letter from Lyman a few weeks ago.

If you think it possible to write to Kurt, even just greetings so he sees he is not forgotten, I know it would be a great lift for him and Martha. He knows your name. I feel lousy to suggest this to you, and I would feel guilty if I didn't. So here you have my dilemma.

Next month I will celebrate the fourth anniversary of my arrival—and last week my folks (father and mother) arrived in the U. S. from England on the quota; it took me all these four years to get them here, but now I am the happiest guy between the two coasts.

From time to time in the office we have a chance to see reports which include your name, so we are currently reminded of you. What an interesting job you have!

Well, once again, I hope you won't mind all this too much—but I feel if anyone can appreciate the circumstances it's you.

Very sincerely yours,

(S) Max
MAX KNIGHT.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Would you explain who this Max Knight is and give us such comment as you desire to make on the letter?—A. I think it might be better if I try and tell the whole story rather than just limit it. Max Knight was originally a

Czech. I had met him in probably the very early months of 1941 in Shanghai when I was working in the visa section of the consulate general in Shanghai. He had, as I remember it, he had excellent credentials and papers indicating that he was an anti-Nazi refugee who had escaped from Prague just ahead of the German occupation. He had got to Shanghai and was applying for a visa and was very much afraid that if he did not get out of Shanghai he would suffer when the war started and Japan came into the war against us. Meeting all the qualifications, he did receive a visa in Shanghai.

I had forgotten all about him and he meant nothing to me at the time except a rather interesting visa case, and late in 1944 when I was out in California, I was asked by the OWI to consult with their office out there, and to talk to their office in San Francisco, and at a meeting in one of these interrogation sessions really, this man Knight appeared. I had forgotten him, I did not recognize him, but he introduced himself to me after the meeting and reminded me where we had met and said that, he told me that he work working there in the OWI office in San Francisco. He was very anxious to know whether it would be possible for me after my return to China to send just a message of greeting to some people who were fellow Czechs still in Shanghai. Those are the people referred to here. It was, of course, at that time perfectly possible to send letters from Chungking to Shanghai, although there was no way to send letters from the United States to Shanghai. He didn't give me any letter.

Mr. RHETTS. Will you explain why?

A. Well, the American post offices would not accept any letters for occupied territory.

Mr. RHETTS. Shanghai was in occupied territory?

A. That is right. He didn't ask me to send any letter. He didn't send any letter except in the hope that I might myself be able to write a little note—these things had to be addressed in Chinese usually to these people—saying that I had seen Mr. Knight and he was well, and so on. I have no recollection whether I ever did that or not. This letter is simply to remind me really of his request and to see—he apologizes for having bothered me.

Now the reference at the bottom, "From time to time in the office"—the office refers to the OWI in charge of Pacific operations out in San Francisco—"we have a chance to see reports which include your name." I am not sure whether he means that some of the reports which I had drafted were circulated to OWI; I know some of them were. I suppose all he is referring to—

Q. Was he working for OWI?—A. He was a staff member in the office in San Francisco; yes, sir. I do not know what has become of him. I have never seen him since that time. I have never heard from him. He was at that time in process of being naturalized.

I notice in the first paragraph, "I know how I would feel if I were in Dr. Schwarz's shoes, and I would be in his shoes save for some fortunate circumstances, including J. S." Dr. Schwarz is apparently his friend who is still stranded in Shanghai, and Mr. Knight is simply saying that the forces of circumstances—he refers to simply the success in receiving a visa in the consulate general in Shanghai, and I happened to be the visa officer.

Q. Thank you. The next paper—

Mr. RHETTS. I wonder if I might just ask one. You stated that it was possible—although it was impossible to send mail from the United States to Shanghai, it was possible to send it from Chungking to Shanghai?

A. That is right.

Mr. RHETTS. You mean that, although Shanghai was occupied by the Japanese, the Chinese mail system went right on working right across the enemy line; is that correct?

A. Well, it was—the administration was separate in the two areas, but they exchanged mail continuously. It was always possible to communicate from Shanghai to Chungking and even send telegrams.

Mr. RHETTS. In the regular course of events?

A. Yes. It was usually done through Macao or some place like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Macao being a Portuguese possession?

A. That is right.

Q. The next paper is B-54, dated March 31. Did you have anything further on that one? The earlier one?

Mr. RHETTS. No.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

[Copy of photostat]

DOCUMENT NO. B-54

FBI LABORATORY, 100-367360-0391

MARCH 31, 1945.

MR. JOHN S. SERVICE,

*U. S. Office of War Information.**APO No. 879, c/o Postmaster.*

DEAR JACK: Many thanks for yours of March 8th together with the power for Mr. Brooks which I have passed on together with the new manuscript, of which he also has the first version as well as the first copy of the new or supplemental version. The letters which you sent and which were most interesting have been delivered. Many thanks. Many people have come back, like John Davies, Ludd, and Emmerson, and we have had various discussions on a sad but not pessimistic note. Everything that you can send will, of course, be much appreciated. I suggest that you might cooperate with my colleague Bill, who is now in charge of the office.

With best regards,

Yours,

s/ JOHN.

2 enclosures.

Q. This appears to be a photostat of a letter to Mr. Service signed "John" and bearing the typed words "2 enclosures" at the bottom, which do not appear with the document. The paper refers to a "new manuscript." Can you explain what this letter is and from whom received?—A. Yes, sir. This letter is from Prof. John K. Fairbank, now professor of far eastern history at Harvard University, and at that time Deputy Director of the Far Eastern Branch of OWI. I am not sure of the exact title, but that was the substance of his position at that time.

I must say that this letter perhaps meant nothing to me when I saw it and I had to get in touch with Dr. Fairbank, and we have tried to piece out our memories and reconstruct it. The Mr. Brooks referred to is Brooks Atkinson, of the New York Times, who had been in China as foreign correspondent for the New York Times throughout most of the war.

The manuscript was a manuscript of a book which Atkinson and Fairbank were considering assisting in having published. It was a manuscript, a story of the life, you might say, of a woman in Chungking, Kung Peng. She was the daughter of a well-to-do family—in fact, as I remember it, an official family—who had gone to Yenching University, American missionary university in Peking, of which Ambassador Leighton Stuart was the president for many years. While there she became interested in communism and had broken with her family and during the war herself was attached to the office of the official Communist representative in Chungking and served largely as their contact or liaison with the foreign press. She was an intelligent, thoughtful person with a good command of English, and Atkinson particularly, I think, thought that there might be some interest in her story as to how she became a Communist, how a person with her background became attracted to this movement in China and really forsook, gave up her family, made for a Chinese girl a very serious break. I don't know how the other first sections of the manuscript reached the United States.

Q. It was written by Brooks Atkinson?—A. No; the manuscript was written by her. I think it was during the period when I was home in the United States from October 1944 to January 1945.

Q. What happened then?—A. The first section of the manuscript—I was in the United States then, but when it was turned over to a publisher who thought he might be interested, it developed that it was necessary for her to have an attorney or agent in the United States who could make agreements and sign contracts, and Brooks Atkinson agreed to act as her agent, but he would have to have a signed power of attorney from her, and this is the power that is referred to in the second line: "together with the power for Mr. Brooks." As I remember it, the unsigned power of attorney was sent out to me; I took it to her; and she signed it; and then I returned it to Mr. Fairbank through OWI channels.

The letter goes on here to say, "The letters which you sent and which were most interesting have been delivered."

Mr. ACHILLES. Could I interrupt to ask, Did you bring the manuscript, or was that already in this country?

A. I have no recollection of bringing the manuscript. I think that it was brought here, as I say, before I returned to China. It was after the manuscript had been read or looked over that this problem arose of her needing an attorney here in the United States. Now the sentence which I just read, neither John Fairbank nor I had any recollection of what specific letters may have been referred to. Dr. Fairbank was particularly concerned with while he was in China—he had been in China from I think 1942 and 1943 in the OWI there, and he was particularly concerned with assistance to academic figures, university professors, intellectuals who as a result of the long war were getting very much out of touch with the rest of the world, very discouraged, losing morale. They were perhaps suffering the most as members of the white-collar class with the inflation in China. They were practically on dole and very dependent on whatever largesse they might receive from the Kuomintang government. He helped a great many of these people through official grants from the OWI funds in cultural relations funds to come to the United States, and he has a continued interest in that and has maintained probably the most extensive contacts with non-Communist Chinese liberals.

Now one problem in relation to these people was that their families and associates and friends in China were really unable to write to them through Chinese postal channels. Chinese censorship was extremely rigid and severe. Most of these people were in some degree critics or accused of being critics of the Central Government, and as grantees of the United States Government we used to sometimes transmit mail for them, opened, and send it in unsealed envelopes; and that was usually done through OWI channels. We had some reference here the other day, I think, when Mr. Sprouse was testifying, to a Miss Yang Kang, who was one of these people whom Fairbanks had helped to come to the United States. She was in Radcliffe at that time, and I am sure that from time to time I forwarded to OWI, through OWI channels, some letters for her. These letters, I might say, being forwarded open, were a source of information to us as views of these people, their comments on what was happening in China, and even today the Division of Chinese Affairs finds the correspondence between the people like Fairbank and Yang Kang as liberals in China a very important source of information on what is going on in China. Fairbank has continued to cooperate in that way, and I myself have seen several letters over the past year which he has received from professors in Peiping, and so on. This refers to that type of letter, but we have no idea what specific letters may have been involved.

Mr. ACHILLES. Were those letters which you had brought with you or which you had sent from Chungking?

A. No; I am sure these are letters which I had sent from Chungking.

Mr. ACHILLES. Were any of them to Mr. Jaffe?

A. No, sir; no, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. Or Mr. Gayn?

A. No, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. Or anyone else connected with the Amerasia case?

A. No, no. Do you wish me to continue with this letter?

Mr. ACHILLES. Who is this "colleague, Bill"?

A. Bill Holland, who at that time was Chief of the OWI office in Chungking.

Mr. RHETTS. Before you go on to another letter, General, I would like at this time to have included in the transcript a telegram, which was just handed to me, which is from Professor Fairbank; and it deals with this letter.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted. Do you want it in the transcript?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Shall I read it so the Board can hear it?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. (reading):

"Western Union, Cambridge, Mass., Reilly, Rhett, and Ruckelshaus, Rm. 1120 Tower Bldg., Wash., D. C.:

"Attention Rhett's colon from description read to me over phone of mysterious-sounding letter of March 1945 and its contents and signature comma eye am inclined to think that eye wrote it, and while eye cannot recollect details very definitely eye believe it referred to an autobiographical manuscript written at my suggestion by Miss Kung Peng in Chungking beginning in 1943 and completed partially in 1944 and probably brought to this country by Miss Yang Kang in autumn 1944. Stop. Eye believe eye showed manuscript to one or more publishers but found it necessary to secure author's power of attorney which eye believe

was made for Brooks Atkinson of New York who also knew author and also necessary to secure supplemental manuscript to meet publisher's suggestions Stop. Reference to letters delivered does not recall anything to mind but I imagine any letter from above-mentioned author would have been sent me for delivery to Yang Kang then studying at Radcliffe College Stop. For your information during wartime eye frequently used indirect references in personal letters which would pass through hands of others and tone of this one does not surprise me Stop. Eye will be glad to come and testify to anyone any time at my expense. Just let me know. Regards.

"JOHN K. FAIRBANKS."

Any further questions?

I now pass to B-55, which appears to be a photostat of a hand-written letter dated April 2, 1945, to Mr. Service, signed "Jim."
(The matter referred to is as follows:)

[Copy of photostat]

DOCUMENT No. B-55

F. B. I. LABORATORY 100-367360-0401

Cinepac File

WJB

6/6/45

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET (& PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

STAFF, CINEPAC, Adv. Hqtrs. Box No. 5,
Fleet Postoffice, San Francisco, April 2, 1945.

DEAR JACK: Your returning boss gives me a chance to get this line off to you—I've been luxuriating here on Guam for almost 2 months. I'm in the Future Plans Section technically but mostly am getting an education in what goes on in the Pacific and trying to keep up in China—the former is fascinating, the latter difficult. If you could find a safe way to send me an occasional copy of your memos I'd be grateful—maybe you'll find it practical, maybe not. So far as I can find out this is the only opportunity I'll have to communicate with you—until and unless Lud and Emmerson come through.

What goes on these days in the old country? I got a chuckle out of the news this morning that old Tung Pi-wu is going to be a delegate to the S. F. conference.

Best to the boys—specially Sol, if he's about.

JIM.

Q. The letter refers to the possibility of a "safe way" to send him a copy of your memos. Will you explain this letter, please?—A. This letter is from James K. Penfield, a fellow Foreign Service officer. He is class 2 and has been counselor of Embassy at Prague for the last 2 years.

Mr. STEVENS. He is class 1.

A. Our list is out of date. At that time Mr. Penfield had been assigned for a brief period to the headquarters of Admiral Nimitz. The original motive for assigning him was that it might be useful to have on Admiral Nimitz's staff a Foreign Service officer familiar with China. Mr. Penfield is a China service officer who had previously been serving in Chungking and in the Division of Chinese Affairs here in the Department. Mr. Penfield of course didn't know on April 2 that I was on the verge of leaving China. In fact, it is rather interesting that he didn't know it from General Wedemeyer because his first words, "Your returning boss" I believe referred to General Wedemeyer who went back to China in April 1945 via the Pacific. Now in reference to—

Mr. ACHILLES. General Wedemeyer actually carried the letter? Is that what he means, "returning boss"?

A. I believe so, yes. I did not receive the letter in China, however. It must have been forwarded to me here, since I left China before General Wedemeyer arrived.

Mr. ACHILLES. Penfield was assigned as what? Political adviser?

A. I am not sure he had any title. He was just a Foreign Service officer attached to the staff of Admiral Nimitz. He didn't stay there very long. They didn't know just how to use him apparently, and there was not the opportunity for him as there had been for us in China to do much political reporting, as he was far removed from China. His headquarters were in Guam and I am not

sure but sometime in the summer of 1945, it must have been June or July, Mr. Penfield was returned to the Department.

Q. He had opportunity to see your reports through official sources?—A. Oh, certainly, while serving here in the Department. I think he had been Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. He was intimately familiar with what I had been doing in China and he is simply indicating the very obvious utility of his being supplied those reports in Guam since he was interested in China and he was there to assist the Navy in any way he could in regard to China, giving advice on conditions in China, and so on.

Q. What did he mean by "safe way"?—A. I think he simply means by a convenient, suitable way of forwarding these things—from Chungking. If they had simply gone Army channels they would have gone all the way back to the United States and then there would be a problem of transferring them to the Navy channels, and then getting them to him in Guam without perhaps getting stuck on the way by going through other hands. Normally the only distribution that I had done in Chungking had been to give them to the Embassy, which I did directly, or when I was in Yenan through G-2, but there it was a matter of physical transmission, somebody taking it over, and to John Davies, who was in the theater. When John Davies moved out of the theater in early 1945 we again had a problem of transmission, and they were sent to the Department, and then, as I showed Mr. Achilles or Mr. Moreland the other day, Mr. Bohlen forwarded them through the Department pouch, but it simply was a physical problem of forwarding anything from me in China to Penfield with the Navy in Guam.

Q. Did you ever forward anything?—A. No, sir; I didn't receive this letter until after I had returned from China. I wasn't writing any more reports and I never sent anything to him.

Q. Did you ever send any copies of your memoranda to anybody except as you have described through official channels?—A. No, sir.

Mr. RHETTS. Might I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Mr. ACHILLES. This "safe means" that he refers to, does that refer to official channels, that is, some safe official way of communicating from Chungking to Guam?

A. That is right. I am sure that is what it means. It not only means safe in that sense but also something which is not going to get tangled up and stopped en route by having to go through some uninformed low echelon G-2 or something like that that doesn't know what these things are, doesn't know where they are to go.

Mr. ACHILLES. He says, at the end of his letter, "I got a chuckle out of the news this morning that old Tung Pi-wu is going to be a delegate to the S. F. Conference." Is that the same person who I think has been referred to as a Communist member of the Chinese delegation?

A. That is correct, yes.

Mr. ACHILLES. Was that Pi-wu a friend of yours or Penfield, or what caused that reference?

A. Everybody who had been in China through the war knew him, since he had been the Chinese Communist representative in Chungking through most of the war. I think that the chuckle over that is because Mr. Tung was an old Chinese scholar type with a very scraggly moustache in Chinese style, rather slow, ponderous, not at all the quick, alert, intellectual type of somebody like Chou En-lai was. Of course, that is the reason why the Central Government nominated Tung Pi-wu, I assume, but he was not the person who was going to make the best impression or be the most forceful in debate.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you see him in the United States in 1945?

A. Yes, I saw him on one occasion.

Mr. ACHILLES. When was that and what were the circumstances?

A. I am not sure what the exact date is. It was some time in early August 1945.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Was that here in Washington?—A. Yes, here in Washington.

Q. How did you happen to see him?—A. His secretary called me up and asked if they could see me and they also had received an invitation from a Captain Linebarger, who had been in the Army in G-2 in Chungking and knew them, and as I remember it the final arrangement was that I would pick them up. I was also going to Captain Linebarger's dinner. I would go to their hotel, pick them up and escort them to Linebarger's dinner.

Q. It seems to have been almost a habit of yours in those days.

The CHAIRMAN. Which, go to dinner?

Q. Picking up people in hotels, taking them, going to dinner with them.

That was the only time that you saw him?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you have any particular conversation with him that evening or was it merely a sort of social function?—A. I had some conversation in the hotel. As a matter of fact, I discussed the whole question of whether I should see these people at all with the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs at this time, and he agreed that I should see them. There is quite a background to that. I of course had had a long and fairly close contact with Mr. Tung in China and with the secretary who was accompanying him. I had known them in Chungking when he was official representative. I of course had known him also in Yen-an, because he was in Yen-an all of the time that I was there and I had actually commenced the trip from Yen-an back to the States in April with these two men when they were coming to the United States to attend the San Francisco Conference as members of the Chinese Government delegation.

Q. Who was the other one?—A. The other man was Chen.

Q. Was he Tung Pi-wu's secretary?—A. Yes. Now having known these people for a long time and having made the start of the trip to the United States with them, they would have thought it very strange if I had avoided them or had not seen them. It was a matter of very elemental courtesy, you might say, involved. Also, my arrest and the whole case had been treated in China, particularly, as one having a political background.

The CHAIRMAN. Your arrest? Not at this time?

A. In June 1945; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This occurred in—

A. In August.

The CHAIRMAN. You are telling about an August occurrence?

A. Yes. And we felt that for me to pointedly avoid any contact with them would confirm those beliefs, particularly on the part of the Chinese Communists, so that we concluded that the thing to do was to simply see them in a normal way, not conspicuously, not go out of my way, but if they sought me, yes, I would see them.

Q. But you attended no other meeting at which—A. No, sir.

Q. In San Francisco or—A. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Finish your sentence?

Q. At which they were present.—A. No, sir.

Q. You said you started your trip to the United States with them. You did not arrive together?—A. No: we had a great deal of trouble with flying conditions. We came from Yen-an down to a place called Sian. This was in early April, and there was very heavy icing on the planes. We made several attempts. That is, we were flying in a C-47 headquarters plane. We made several attempts to get off the ground or really to get out, and at a certain elevation we got so much ice we couldn't get higher and couldn't get above it, so we finally had to go back to Sian. I managed during the day to get out alone on an empty troop carrier plane which was able to get above the icing conditions by flying at 21,000 feet, and we flew that for 2 or 3 hours, sharing an oxygen mask with the radio operator, but the rest of the party had to stay behind and they never did catch up to me. I came on through.

Q. Did you bring any documents for them?—A. No, sir; no, sir.

Q. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I refer now to No. B-56, which appears to be a photostat of a draft of a typed letter dated April 16, 1945, addressed to "Dear Annalee and Teddy," unsigned.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

[Copy of photostat]

DOCUMENT No. B-56

F. B. I. LABORATORY

100-367360 0397

WJB
6/6/45

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1945.

DEAR ANNALEE AND TEDDY: The optimistically pleasant speculations we allowed ourselves to indulge in on that last evening of mine~~aaa~~ at 879 Chungking were 180 degrees off.

The paper tiger roared loudly enough around here to drown out the ~~very~~ general opposition—but appreciably timid—opposition. And, based on ~~nothing~~ but the Tiger's modest account of his achievements, the big boss said: "Keep it up". After that, the table pounding in regard to yours truly was only a matter of course.

Especially disappointing was the "political sense" in the narrow meaning, by the man I had hoped would fight.

I am now assigned to a safe job here but have been urged to bide my time. The Tiger's support ended on the 12th, the day of my arrival. And there is now some a feeling that ~~Republican~~ office holders good jobs should go to good party members.

[Second sheet of B-56]

DEAR ANNALEE AND TEDDY: The optimistically pleasant speculations we allowed ourselves that last evening of mine at 879 were 180 degrees off.

The CHAIRMAN. It refers to a "paper tiger," to a "safe job," and to "good party members." Would you explain what this is all about?

A. This was a draft of a letter which I believe was never sent to Annalee Jacoby and Teddy White, who were correspondents for the Luce publications in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Who made the draft?

A. I did, sir. When I was ordered out of China we received at headquarters in Chungking very cryptic orders signed "Marshall" and saying that I was to be in the United States by a certain date. Nobody had any explanation, nobody knew what it meant. The fact that I was not simply detached from the Army—I might have been, you see, simply detached from headquarters and assigned to the Embassy, and the fact that I was to be in the United States by a certain date gave some basis for thinking that the Army had another job in mind for me, and we didn't know. Some people thought that I was being removed at Hurley's request, or demand, and other people thought, well this type of order from people in headquarters, this type of orders seems to indicate you are being taken home in a hurry for some other important rush job or could it be maybe something in the Pacific. It had been considered at one time that I would go out to Nimitz's headquarters, as Penfield later did.

Now the first paragraph refers to those conjectures, that perhaps I was being brought home for another job, possibly at Nimitz's. "The optimistically pleasant speculations we allowed ourselves to indulge in on that last evening of mine at 879"—that is Chungking, APO 879. We never could put names of places, we always had to use APO numbers. "* * * were 180 degrees off"—in other words, were completely wrong about this business. Now the next paragraph—

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the "paper tiger"?

A. "The paper tiger"—

The CHAIRMAN. That is the next paragraph.

A. Yes, sir. General Hurley was given a great many nicknames by the Chinese and this "paper tiger" and the phrase "small whiskers" which is used some place in this or one of these other letters were both Chinese nicknames for General Hurley.

Now what I am really saying in this paragraph is that when General Hurley returned in February of 1945 for consultations and decisions as to whether we would take a new tack in China or continue his attempts to negotiate on the same basis of acceding and following the wishes of Generalissimo Chiang, that Ambassador Hurley won the argument and that having won the argument it was only a matter of course for him to bring about the removal of myself or anyone else who he felt was not sympathetic with his approach to the problem.

Mr. ACHILLES. In other words, the argument between Hurley and yourself, or between Hurley and—

A. Well, it wasn't really an argument. It was differences, as Secretary Byrnes said, on tactics, not on policy, on ways of trying to achieve our objective.

Mr. ACHILLES. Was it a conflict again between General Hurley and yourself or General Hurley and the Department on tactics or whom?

A. Well, I am thinking here primarily of myself, sir, but I think that if the State Department on the working level, the Division of Chinese Affairs level or

Office of Far Eastern Affairs level was inclined probably—although I am not intimately informed on this—to rather accept the view which was expressed in the Atcheson telegram of February 26, but that the decision was made at much higher level. As I say, the big boss said, "Keep it up," and the President accepted General Hurley's accounts of the great progress which I think General Hurley quite sincerely thought he was making, and which we in our telegram of February 26 did not think was being made.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; what is the "safe job" you refer to?

A. The safe job simply refers to a job which would keep me out of arguments and debate. It was a job in the Office of Foreign Service doing this preliminary work for the revision of the Foreign Service Act.

The CHAIRMAN. Who were the "good party members"?

Mr. ACHILLES. Just a second. This letter is dated April 18. You had not then completed your consultation, had you?

A. No, sir, but I think that I had already been told that I would go into OFS when the consultation was over.

The CHAIRMAN. Who were the "good party members"?

A. I should finish the other sentence. I had been urged to bide my time. Of course, I had been living and breathing China, as I said yesterday. I was all wrapped up in China—felt very strongly about the whole issues involved. I yielded nothing to Mr. Judd of Mr. Bullitt or anyone else in my concern at that time over what I foresaw would be the loss of China, and frankly I was somewhat disappointed (a) that I could not have an active job in China or have a job connected with far-eastern affairs, but it was obvious that with General Hurley in China I could not go there and it would have been unwise for the Department if I had been put in any work here connected with the Far East.

Now I go on to say that "the Tiger's support ended on the 12th"—that refers of course to the death of the President who had appointed General Hurley, and the letter goes on to say, "And there is now some feeling that"—and you will see if you hold it up to the light that what I had typed and had crossed out there was that "Republican office holders," but I thought it unwise to say "Republicans" are going to lose their jobs, so I said a far worse thing and said, "good jobs should go to good party members," but what I mean was the feeling at that time, soon after President Truman came in, that the new administration would be a little more politically minded in making appointments and that some of the Republicans who were then holding very high jobs would probably be moved out in favor of Democrats.

Mr. ACHILLES. In other words, you were referring to the Republican Party and not the Communist Party?

A. Absolutely. Or Democratic Party. "Good jobs should go to good party members."

Mr. ACHILLES. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. I refer now to—

A. I think that if we could review the press and some of the columnists and political chit-chat of that period, I think we could confirm that that was common feeling when President Truman took over.

The CHAIRMAN. Referring now to B-57, which is a photostat of a typed letter from Arthur R. Ringwalt and signed "Arthur," to Mr. Service, dated April 19, this letter refers to a check for \$225.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

[Copy of photostat]

DOCUMENT No. B-57

FBI LABORATORY—100-367360 0398

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Chungking, April 19, 1945.

J. S. SERVICE, Esq.,

Department of State, Washington.

DEAR JACK: Enclosed is a Treasury check for \$225. I sold your stuff for U. S. \$425, the balance being the \$200 I advanced you just before you left Chungking. I hope this is satisfactory.

GA left today. Was sorry to miss him. Maybe he can get us home soon. I hope so as "Small Whiskers" is due in at any moment.

Wrote to Dick today complimenting him on some good work he has just completed in connection with keeping some missionary out of jail.

If the Dept. contemplates setting up some sort of organization dealing with world affairs which might grow out of the San Francisco Conference, I might be interested. If you think advisable, you might mention my name to the proper people.

Otherwise nothing much new.

Yours,

s/ Arthur,

ARTHUR R. RINGWALT.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you explain this letter?

A. Yes, sir. It was the invariable rule that no one took anything out of Chungking that was not absolutely essential and usually officers came out of Chungking with very little more than the clothes they wore. It was so hard to get any supplies of any kind in Chungking that it was in the first place an unfriendly act to deprive people there by taking out any clothes or toilet articles or supplies of any sort. In the second place, you could sell anything in Chungking at that time for a fantastic price. You could sell a used suit of clothes for \$100 equivalent, or a fountain pen for about \$90, a \$25 wrist watch for about 10 times its price.

Now in the Embassy we separated the sheep from the goats, shall we say, by whether or not they gave first chance at their things to their fellow officers. In other words, a man was transferred, and if he played ball he called in everybody in the Embassy and said, "Now, what do you need?" and he didn't charge them more than a replacement cost. What he did not sell or dispose of to his fellow officers, then he was by the rules of the game free to dispose of them to the Chinese second-hand man, and it was a very thriving business.

Now I came to Chungking very hurriedly, and the last night I was there we had one of these quite common affairs, everything was put out in my room and everybody in the Embassy came in and picked what they thought they could use, and everything that I had left I turned over to Arthur Ringwalt and asked him to call in the Chinese and dispose of it. Arthur advanced me \$200 and this letter was to forward me an additional \$225, since he had received \$425 from the Chinese second-hand man for whatever I had left with him.

MR. ACHILLES. The things you disposed of were solely personal effects?

A. Oh, yes; clothing and anything—shoelaces, shoe polish, toilet articles. We took out everything of that sort we could with us because it was extremely hard to obtain them there and the things you could get were usually very poor quality.

Now the next paragraph, if you wish me to continue, says, "GA left today." That is George Atcheson, George Atcheson had been transferred from Chungking very hurriedly because of Ambassador Hurley's resentment of the February 26 telegram and it was essential to get him out of Chungking before General Hurley arrived. The letter goes on to say, "Maybe he can get us home soon." That is a reflection of the morale of the Embassy at that time. They all wanted to get out and get home. He goes on to say, "I hope so as 'Small Whiskers' is due in at any moment." "Small Whiskers," I have already mentioned, was a Chinese nickname for General Hurley and this simply refers to the strong desire of practically all Foreign Service officers who had any contact with General Hurley during that period to avoid if possible working under him.

"Wrote to Dick today complimenting him on some good work he has just completed in connection with keeping some missionary out of jail." Dick is my younger brother who was a Foreign Service officer and I think at that time was in Cheng-tu.

The last paragraph simply mentions Mr. Ringwalt's interest in getting some job outside of the China field. He hoped that there might be some new branch set up which would be a broader one than simply a country division as a result of the San Francisco Conference, and he is inquiring whether I can help him on it. Mr. Ringwalt—I am not sure whether I identified him or not, he is a Foreign Service officer, class 3, and now first secretary in London.

MR. STEVENS. "If you think advisable, you might mention my name to the proper people." What does he mean by that, Mr. Service?

A. Well, he doesn't know whether or not there is going to be this sort of organization that he is thinking of, and he doesn't know of course who the people would be who would be heading it up. He is in Chungking and he is assuming that there will be something like the Bureau of UN Affairs; I imagine that is what he is thinking of.

MR. STEVENS. He means then, mention my name to whoever will be in charge.

A. Of setting up what he anticipates will be a new branch to deal with the United Nations affairs.

Mr. RHETTS. New branch of what?

A. Of the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. We refer finally to B-58, which is a photostat of a type-written letter addressed to Mr. Service and signed "Julian."

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

[Copy of photostat]

DOCUMENT No. B-58

FBI LABORATORY—100-367360 0404

THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

MAY 14, 1945.

DEAR JACK: I met your wife the other evening, and your delightful children as well. Phil had arranged with Carolyn to bring Messrs. Tung and Chen to Berkeley, and we had dinner together along with Martin Wilbur. During the course of conversation, Carolyn mentioned her need of a washing machine in Washington. I told her that if worse comes to worse you might be able to have my family's machine which is now up on Long Island. Carolyn got all excited about this suggestion, and she said that she would write you about it. If you have been looking for one in Washington, I suggest that you continue to do so. You should also inquire about the possibility of new machines coming on the market in the near future. If your efforts in Washington all lead up a blind alley, then it would be practical to consider shipping my family's machine—if you want it—from Long Island to Washington. I just thought that I should explain this to you in case Carolyn's letter discourages you from continuing your search for a machine.

The Conference is rather dull, and I find it very depressing. I imagine that this conference may go down as one of the most reactionary international gatherings in history. The only consolation I can find is that the fantastic views on international organization—views which are in essence quite contrary to real and sound international organization—may contribute to breaking down such outmoded concepts as sovereign equality and nation-state system of international relations. But they offer nothing in place of these traditional elements of world affairs.

Phil is keeping the most disgraceful company these days. It is practically certain now that he'll return to Chungking as Minister Counselor and Hurley's house boy. He's taking his job seriously and even shows some compassion over the inconveniences which members of the Chinese delegation occasionally have to endure. He is first-rate on seeing that T. V.'s car turns up at the right place at the right time.

John Carter has been introducing me around as the labor attaché for Chungking. The local liberal and labor groups have had me out for a party to meet the right-minded people. Saturday I was introduced to Taranov, Soviet trade-union representative on the World Trade Union Council. He told me that he didn't know that north China was called "Communist" China. He asked whether they were "Communists" or not. He stated that the Soviet Government favored unity in China and that United States and Soviet Union should cooperate in bringing about such unity. I am planning to bring John Carter together with Taranov and another Soviet trade-union leader, Kuznetsov (who is the head of the Soviet trade-union movement and an important figure in Soviet high policy). We may not learn much, but we might get some better line on Soviet psychology on the Pacific, specifically, the China question.

Not much else to say. I won't go into detail about the Conference. It isn't too difficult to read between the lines in the press to see what is happening here.

Best regards,

s/ Julian.

The CHAIRMAN. This letter refers to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco, speaks of it as "the most reactionary international gathering in history" and refers to what it calls an "outmoded concept," "sovereign equality and nation-state system of international relations," refers to somebody by the name of "Phil" "keeping the most disgraceful company" and also to "right-minded people." Will you explain those references, please?

A. I think that the Julian is Julian Friedman, but I had had no recollection of this letter until after I saw this photostat. If I had been asked whether or not I had ever received or written a letter to Friedman, I would have said no. The apparent purpose of this letter really is to tell me of this offer of his family's washing machine. Everybody in the Division of Chinese Affairs knew that I was trying to find a house for my family here in Washington, which was quite a problem here in Washington, which was quite a problem in 1945. My family was still out in California, and that I was trying to buy various things which we needed or expected to need for the house, like a washing machine. And then he goes on—or rather, I don't have any idea of what he means in the second paragraph. I don't recall ever discussing the matter with him. When he came back here after the conference was over I had already been arrested, I was not in the Department, and if I saw him during that period it was very, very briefly and probably just discussing my case, and so on. So that I can't offer any explanation of what he means here by this "most reactionary international gathering in history," or his views on "outmoded concepts as sovereign equality and nation-state system of international relations."

The third paragraph, the "Phil" I believe must be Phil Sprouse—it is just conjecture.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not Phil Jaffe?

A. Oh, no, sir. Phil Jaffe was not at San Francisco. Phil Jaffe was, as we know, in New York and Washington. Phil Sprouse was one of the liaison officers assigned to the Chinese delegation. I am not sure what Friedman's job out there was. He may have also been some sort of a liaison officer. I think that he is just poking some fun at Sprouse here because of the necessity of his spending most of his time looking after the physical needs and desires of the Chinese delegation, and some of them were rather demanding. T. V. Soong had a reputation of being a rather demanding and insistent person, and you see a reference to Phil Sprouse's being first-rate at making sure that T. V. Soong's car turns up at the right place at the right time.

The next paragraph, "John Carter" is John Carter Vincent, who was out there with the delegation. He says, "John Carter has been introducing me around as the labor attaché for Chungking." It was already the plan that Friedman would go out to China as labor attaché to the Embassy, which he subsequently did in September 1945, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Who were the "right-minded people" referred to?

A. CIO—I don't know. Certainly knowing Friedman I would assume that it is the liberal or left-wing group of labor people, but that is—

Mr. STEVENS. You don't know whether that is CIO or someone else?

A. No; that is purely a conjecture.

The CHAIRMAN. It did not, as you see it, refer to communism?

A. I am sorry; I don't, sir. I have no knowledge that Friedman was a Communist himself.

Mr. ACHILLES. Later in the same paragraph he refers to various members of the Soviet Delegation. Do you think those might have been the ones he was referring to as "right-minded people"?

A. Well, I doubt it, because the "right-minded people" is tied up with the local liberal and labor groups. I am sorry, I am just speculating here. I am not in a position to know.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever reply to this letter as far as you remember?

A. As far as I remember, I did not; no.

Mr. STEVENS. Did you not state a few minutes ago you do not remember receiving it?

A. Yes; as far as I recall I did not. I am a very poor correspondent.

Mr. ACHILLES. But you have no recollection of any kind of a reply to this?

A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a witness outside. That concludes this phase of the examination.

Mr. STEVENS. We have a witness outside, Mr. Chase.

(The witness was produced and, having been duly sworn, Mr. Augustus Sabin Chase testified as follows:)

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Mr. Chase will be asked to testify for the Board at this point. Now, would you give your full name and address, please?—A. Augustus Sabin Chase. My temporary address, you mean, in Washington?

Q. Yes.—A. University Club. I expect to be leaving today or tomorrow to go back to my home for a week and then return.

Q. Now, you would like to make some preliminary statement about your recollection as to the facts in this case. Would you make that for the record at this moment?—A. Well, yes, since my statements are under oath, I would like to have the following prefatory statement made part of my testimony, namely, that in 1945 in connection with this same case I testified twice before juries—

The CHAIRMAN. Grand juries?

A. That was my understanding, that they were grand juries, formally, and also informally before the FBI agents at a time when my recollection was much clearer than it is now of any details connected with the case, and that in order to protect myself against possible basis for charges of perjury, I would like to say that everything I say from now on is to the best of my recollection only and that in any case where it substantially differs from my previous testimony it is not due to any fault or intention but purely to lapse of memory. I think that is all I want to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Now I will ask Mr. Achilles to conduct the examination since he is more acquainted with the knowledge of this witness.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. I realize that you have been questioned about the case, as you say, twice before. The case has been examined several times, but it is again under examination and the purpose of these hearings is to develop every possible fact we can regardless of previous investigations. That is why we have asked you to come in since you were, I believe, in the Division of Chinese Affairs in the spring of 1945.—A. That is right.

Q. Would you tell us when you took up duty in the Division of Chinese Affairs?—A. I came back from internment on the exchange vessel in the autumn of 1943, took some leave, and then I think technically was assigned immediately to the Division of Chinese Affairs but actually physically I was loaned to the Pentagon. I was over at the Pentagon to work with the Army Intelligence for about 6 months, and as I recall I physically took up duties in CA about May 1943.

Q. What was your capacity in that Division in the beginning of April 1945?—

A. I think at just about that time I had been made a Deputy Chief of the Division. I forget the exact date. Up to about that time I had some title that I forget, which was just one of the desk officers in the Division, largely handling incoming political material from the field. And when I was appointed Assistant Chief of the Division, it really involved no change in my duties, as I recall it. There were, I think, two other Assistant Chiefs, Mr. Paul Meyer and Mr. Everett Drumright.

Q. Who was Chief of the Division at that time?—A. John Carter Vincent.

Q. And could you briefly describe what your duties were?—A. Well, I should say that the duties to which I gave at least 80 percent of my time were handling incoming communications from the field and other places, including both classified and unclassified material, a large amount of it was dispatches and reports from our Foreign Servicemen in China, and my duties consisted of reading the material and figuring out what sections of the Department and other departments of the Government should receive copies, and then indicating the distribution of the number of copies thereon. There was also a mass of other material, unclassified, such as newspapers and clippings and various things. I was handling a very large quantity of documents at that time.

Q. To what units of the Department or other agencies of the Government did you normally distribute the incoming documents?—A. There my memory is a little vague. As far as I can recall the Division of Chinese Affairs of course saw practically everything. The officers in the Division concerned saw it and then among the outside agencies I think we had a general rule that both MID and ONI received copies of everything, but if there was some reason for exception, such as something connected with the relations or the attitude of the Department toward the War Department, or some reason why we might not want to send a copy to MID, that might be considered separately, but as a general rule I think everything went to those two agencies. We sent a great deal of material to OSS but not everything, a lesser amount to OWI, and I think those were the principal offices. Of course matters that concerned finance or political, economic matters, we would send to the Departments or agencies, FEA.

Q. Would you also describe briefly the mechanics of that distribution? For example, when an original dispatch came into the Department from Chungking, would it come first to CA or where in the Department would it go?—A. My

recollection was that it would go first normally to an office which I think was DC/R or C/R—I was always confusing the two.

Q. DC/R.—A. I know there was a lady there named Miss Bradshaw that I worked a great deal with, and she would send down the originals, as I recall it, to CA, where they would be stamped, and then most of them I think would come immediately to my desk.

Q. You would indicate the distribution to be given to each dispatch?—A. I would.

Q. You would?—A. Yes. I am not sure but at some point we changed the procedure occasionally. I am not sure but at some point DC/R would automatically route copies because we had a standing rule, because I think at this time in question the originals came and I would put on all the distribution and the number of copies—

Q. You would classify both the units to receive copies and the number of copies to be made?—A. Yes.

Q. And then where in the Department would the copies actually be made?—A. I don't recall the name of the office. I remember going down, I think, to the basement in the Old State Department where they would reproduce ozalids. I don't remember the name of the office in which they were accepted.

Q. Was reproduction of these dispatches made only by the ozalid process or by any other process?—A. There were two processes that I remember, namely the ozalid and hectograph. As I recall the most of the dispatches from China at that time were the ozalid process.

Q. And then who was responsible for distributing the ozalid copies? Was that the unit which reproduced them or CA?—A. For distributing them?

Q. Yes.—A. As I recall it, we had nothing to do with the mechanics of distributing them. We merely indicated and DC/R would then distribute them, except that we got back to CA, I think, we normally had two copies made for our own Division purposes. Those would come to me, I guess, as I recall it, and I think I would send one copy then to the interested officer and the other, as far as I recall, but I am very vague on it, was put in a chronological file in the Division's files.

Q. How did other units of this Department who were concerned get copies? Would they be sent one of the CA copies or the original or some other copy?—A. As I recall it we would—let me see, I think we tried both methods. I think where it was essential that the fact that another Division, interested Division, had seen the original, where it was advisable to have that noted on the original, we would have the original routed, but we also as I recall it occasionally provided copies to other Divisions for working purposes, so that they could pass on the original quickly.

Q. When Mr. Service reported to the Department in April 1945, did he report to you?—A. There my memory is very vague. I recall being much interested to hear that he would be back, I had been interested in reading his dispatches. I have a feeling that I was absent for a week, perhaps for a few days about the time he came back. I also know that a bunch of his dispatches brought back by himself were given to me, and my guess is that Mr. Service handed them to me directly. I wouldn't swear to that—either handed them to me directly or some other officer in the Division, or gave them to me. I remember talking briefly with him and saying that I was interested in his reporting but not having any very extended conversation with him.

Q. Do you recall what was done with the copies of his reports that were given to you, whether those were put into the mill?—A. These are the originals you are speaking of?

Q. The originals of his reports.—A. I don't recall that point. It could have been. I was pretty well swamped with work at that time, as I recall it, and having these dispatches given to me directly was an exceptional procedure. I should say at first that my normal procedure when originals came in was to glance at them hastily to see if they were about any immediate matter of urgency requiring immediate action. If they were, if it was very urgent, I didn't even wait for copies but I would route it immediately to the officers who should take the action. If it was urgent but not quite that urgent, we would rush them to DC/R to have copies made. We had a priority basis whereby they would be made very rapidly. If they were not so urgent, more background interest, they would sometimes lie in my desk for a couple of weeks, possibly longer.

As I recall it, the CA stamp, the Divisional stamp was not put on by myself, presumably by one of the secretaries, perhaps Mr. Vincent's secretary or one of the clerks. In the case of these dispatches in question, the fact that they didn't

have the stamp on them might not have occurred to me and I could have—I looked at them and as I recall it none of them were of the type demanding action. They were all interesting. I had a habit of when there were several dispatches, all on related subjects, of trying to read them together. And I might add, one of my duties in the Division was to attach a tag commenting on the dispatches and suggesting, inviting attention to certain sections, sometimes summarizing them, and where there were several dispatches on a related subject, why, I would route them around together. For that reason, a large group of dispatches I might well have, having once seen there was nothing demanding urgent action in them, let them wait with the idea that I wanted to read them together and wanted to put together the different related dispatches. Whether I actually did that I don't know, but it would have been a very likely procedure.

Q. I would like to show you a photostat copy of an ozalid reproduction of some of the reports which Mr. Service brought back from China. The first document is B-1. Do you recall [showing the copy to Mr. Chase] seeing that report among Mr. Service's reports at the time?—A. I couldn't possibly say whether that was among those or not. I mean, just from the subject—you mean that—I have no clear—the separate topics of the dispatches are no longer clear in my mind.

Q. Could you recognize from the distribution indication?—A. That looks to me like my handwriting there. I would recognize the——

The CHAIRMAN. What does the handwriting say?

A. Copies to MID, 2; I think ONI; OSS; CA.

Q. And do you recall whether that is your handwriting, where it says, "Return to CA"?—A. I think it is.

Q. Do you recall who that was routed to and who was to return it to CA?—A. I can't possibly recall that. I might repeat that at that time I was swamped under an avalanche of documents and I didn't recall individual documents. Absolutely impossible.

Q. I know that it is difficult for you to recall after this lapse of time, but these particular documents are of considerable importance, because these are photostats of the ozalid copies of Mr. Service's reports actually found in Jaffe's possession, and we are anxious to ascertain who in the Department actually had possession of those ozalid copies.

I should like to show you Document B-2 and ask whether you recall or whether you saw that document, and if so, to whom it might have been distributed?—A. Well, I don't recall the document other than the fact that this writing looks like my writing, "Return to CA". Then it is the type of document which Mr. Service had turned in. I think it is his style of dispatch. Other than that, I couldn't say I specifically recall it.

Q. I should like to show you document B-3 and see if you have any recollection of the persons or units in the Department to whom that ozalid copy might have been sent.—A. Well, national minorities would include, I assume, Tibetans and Mongolians. I think it very likely would have gone to TS, or Territorial Studies.

Q. Division of Territorial Studies.—A. Division of Territorial Studies, and there were so many divisions and sections that I don't recall—there might have been others that I would have thought were interested in that. It is conceivable since it is Tibet bordering on India, it is conceivable that it might have gone to the office under which India was at that time.

Q. I show you Document B-4 and ask whether you have any recollection of whom that might have been distributed to.—A. Does it give the classification? It seems to be unclassified. I think it would have depended somewhat on the classification. If it had been secret, I don't know whether we would have sent it to the Department of Labor automatically or not. I can't recall what our policy was. I remember there was some Labor section in the Department. I don't remember the name of the office. I think we would have sent it there.

Q. If it had been sent to the Department of Labor, would there be any indication on that?—A. Yes. The fact that there is not one there makes me think that it was not sent there, unless it was sent after I left. This evidently was the routing that I had indicated at the time.

Q. Would that have gone to the Division of Territorial Studies?—A. Could that have gone?

Q. Do you think it would have?—A. Well, may I expand on that a little?

Q. Please.—A. I think it perhaps is a point of some importance. I recall that when the Division of Territorial Studies was formed, for a time we didn't send them much as far as I can recall. I also recall that there was some feeling among some of the offices in FE and CA that the officers of this new Territorial

Studies section had just gone in from outside and they were not as cognizant of the need for security, not security conscious.

Q. When was that established?—A. I don't know. I have forgotten. I think it was established, say, not longer than a year before April 1945. I also think that it changed its name once or twice, and I remember that our feeling was that some of the men were entirely trustworthy in the division, and that is the Division—from the point of view of intention but that they had not been schooled in security, and we had to be careful about routing stuff to them. I also remember that they approached someone, probably Mr. Vincent, about getting more material, and I have a vague recollection that we reached a new policy in regard to that, and under which we provided them with much more than we had been giving them.

Q. Was Dr. Blakeslee the head of that Division?—A. As I recall, he was.

Q. Do you recall approximately the time when it was decided to send more material than they had been receiving?—A. I don't—if you want me to try to guess?

Q. Approximately as to whether it was before or after the middle of April 1945?—A. I would say it was before that, probably February or March 1945.

Q. But you are not able to recall whether this particular document was sent to them?—A. No; I am not.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that?

Q. That was B-4.

I show you Document B-5 and ask whether you have any recollection of the agencies or the units or persons in the Department to whom you might have routed that document?—A. I am afraid I am even vaguer on that, but on the other side, I do recall what—I assume that there must have been some division in the Department interested in that relief and rehabilitation, but I don't recall what it was.

(Off-record discussion.)

Q. I show you Document B-6 and ask whether you have any recollection of whom in the Department that might have been distributed to.—A. It is marked "secret." I think at the time I would have certain qualms about sending it to TS, but on the other hand I think very likely having reached the agreement that we perhaps did let them see it.

Q. That was the type of material which might be sent to TS?—A. Yes; I think so. Possibly other divisions. I haven't read the dispatches now so I don't know whether it concerned territories bordering on other areas, so that I might have sent it to other political area divisions.

Q. I believe that refers to territorial claims by the Communists as to the areas under their control.—A. Internal, in other words. Well, then, I would not have.

Q. You don't think that you would have sent it to other geographical divisions?—A. Not under those circumstances.

Q. I show you document B-7 and ask whether you have any recollection or can tell to whom in the Department that might have been distributed?

The CHAIRMAN. B-7 is not an ozalid, or B-8. The next one is B-9.

Q. I am sorry, I meant to show you B-9, and ask you whether you have any recollection of the people or units to whom that might have been distributed.—A. Well, on the face of it, I can see no specific reason for routing it outside of FE and CA but I don't recall the type of material that TS requested from us, and it might have been sent to TS, but it would not logically to me now seem the type that they were specifically as interested in as they would have been in the others that we have discussed.

Q. That concludes this particular serious of ozalid documents.

The CHAIRMAN. That was B-9.

Q. I am sorry, I have one more, B-11, which I show you and ask whether you have any recollection of persons or units to whom that might have been distributed.—A. I should think this was somewhat between the last one mentioned and the others, with slightly greater possibilities that it might have been sent to TS, seeing that it is regional and involves a regional aspect.

Q. Would that have gone to any other units of the Department?—A. I can't say. I definitely would not want to say that it could not have gone but my recollection is too hazy as to what divisions there were in the Department then and what they were interested in.

Q. Several of these documents which I have shown you were marked "Return to CA." Was any sort of a check list kept as to whether copies sent to other units in the Department were actually returned by them?—A. As I recall it,

we had an informal method of putting in the files when CA copies were loaned out a slip of paper, such and such dispatches copies loaned to such and such a division, and those would be torn up when they were returned. We were pretty well swamped with work, and I would admit that I for one probably did not watch those things closely enough, as closely as I should have had I had more time to keep up with the procedure. It is not clear in my mind whether one of the girls working in the Division was assigned that duty or not. I am not certain.

Q. Do you recall any operation in the spring of 1945 that came to your attention that there were any substantial numbers of CA copies of documents which had not been returned to the files?—A. All I recall was that when the case first broke and an FBI inspector started talking to me about it, we looked in the files and there were a number missing, as I recall it, at that time. I had a great number of talks with the FBI inspectors who came to see me on many days.

Q. Was that subsequent to the arrest on June 6 or prior to that?—A. It was all subsequent.

Q. You spoke of several of those documents having been distributed to TS?—A. Well, just a minute. To the best of my recollection.

Q. Yes.—A. I would like to add that very definitely, because it is not clear in my mind what arrangement we did finally decide on for TS, but to the best of my recollection the ones which I indicated very likely did go to TS.

Q. Do you know who in TS those would have gone to?—A. I don't know, I wouldn't want to say. I didn't know enough about the TS organization.

Q. Was Mr. E. S. Larsen in TS at that time?—A. Yes.

Q. Have you any idea whether they would have gone to him or whether he would have had access to them?—A. I can't answer that definitely. My belief is that he did have access to some of them and I have what I think is a recollection of talking with him at one time about some of them, but I wouldn't swear to that.

Q. I show you document B-25, which is a photostatic copy of a dispatch from the Embassy in Chungking, China, the ozalid copy of which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession, but of which it has been established that Mr. Service did not have the copy. Do you recall or can you recall from examining this document whom in the Department or in other agencies that might have been distributed to?—A. Well, it would have naturally gone to MID and ONI, probably to OSS, and I see here in my own handwriting OSS. I see no other indication in the Department other than CA, and from the title I can see no reason why it should have gone outside CA, outside FE and CA.

Q. You can see no indication on the document itself as to anyone else that it might have been sent to?—A. It is MID two copies, ONI, I really can't make this out. FC—I don't know what that could have been. And OSS it was sent to, and CA. There is something else written here, just above, very faint, and I don't think that is the name of another office.

Q. Were original dispatches ordinarily sent to TS? Or only reproduced copies?—A. I don't recall that. If they were, if originals were sent to TS, I think it was rather late in the day, probably not before about the time we are speaking of.

Q. I show you document B-24, another photostatic reproduction of an ozalid copy of a dispatch from the Embassy in Chungking and ask whether you can indicate who in the Department might have received copies of that?—A. Well, I think we would obviously have sent it to the Division of Japanese Affairs and to presumably some economic section. I am not certain of that because it, as the context indicates, is partly economic in character, and I notice here that it was sent to JA, and that is Japanese Affairs Division. I am not quite clear what these other—this is not my writing here.

Q. Then you are unable to ascertain whether it was—A. Whether it was sent to an economic?

Q. To Japanese Affairs and Chinese Affairs?—A. I don't know now, I can't recall. Is that FE or FC? If it was FC, I don't know what it means. This first, to War and to Navy, FE, CA, and JA. The indications are that it was not sent to any other divisions within the Department other than those listed here.

Q. Thank you.

Mr. Chase, you have stated that the FBI inquired as to the distribution of a number of these and some of the documents shortly after the time of the arrests. As a result of the investigation which you presumably made at the time, did you

develop any information as to how the documents in question might have gotten into Mr. Jaffe's possession?—A. No, nothing that was definite.

Q. Were any steps taken at the time to increase the effectiveness of the security regulations?—A. Yes, as I recall it, at this particular period—it rather coincided with the movement in the Department to check up on security. I think there were two moves in that direction. One was perhaps a month or two before April, another one after April which was more rigid, involving the distribution of a pamphlet to everyone giving instructions on security, certain rules we were to follow, and as I recall it, it also involved a change in it where the keys to the cabinets were to be kept. I think after this move, which I am not sure was before April or after, the keys were then kept in Mr. Vincent's safe, if I recall correctly.

Q. Turning to another phase of the proceedings, can you tell the Board what the practice was in CA at the time concerning dealings with newspapermen. Did members of the Division ordinarily—were they expected as far as their duties to answer inquiries from the press?—A. My recollection is that we were pretty cautious in that respect and that we had instructions to clear with a certain division before—I think the press man was supposed to clear with some other division before he contacted us. I personally saw very few members of the press and I think usually they talked with other officers, Mr. Vincent.

Q. What was the policy with respect to officers returning from the field, their dealings with the press?—A. I don't recall any specific instructions with regard to that. There may have been, but that was not a matter that I was directly concerned with, that my desk particularly would have been—if there was such an instruction I don't know what it was.

Q. I was not so much interested in specific instructions as in the general policy.—A. I think as a matter of general policy that the division would have advised returning officers to be very circumspect in their talks with newspapermen.

Q. Did Mr. Service at any time in the spring of 1945 consult you as to any particular dealings with the press?—A. Not that I recall.

Q. Did he ever consult you as to the reliability of Mr. Jaffe?—A. Not that I recall. I think I can answer that question definitely "No."

Q. Were officers called in from the Far East on consultation expected to discuss the fields with which they were familiar with other Government agencies at this time?—A. I think our policy was to encourage them to talk with other Government agencies who had a legitimate specific interest in the matter.

Q. What was the policy with respect to their speaking on the subjects with which they were familiar with outside agencies, such as the Institute of Pacific Relations?—A. I don't recall. I think you are getting rather out of my field in these questions because my job there was more or almost all research. I was not one of the officers who primarily was concerned with handling personnel who came back.

Q. Would that normally have been the responsibility of someone higher up in FE?—A. I don't know. I should think it would be either Mr. Vincent or Mr. Paul Meyer. I remember Mr. Paul Meyer was also one of the Assistant Chiefs of CA, and as I recall it he had more to do with personnel than I did, but I can't say.

Mr. STEVENS. Territorial Studies, as you mentioned a number of times as special to you, Mr. Chase, did Territorial Studies get broken down and sections of it incorporated into the geographic divisions?

A. As far as I can recall it didn't; that is, up to the time that I left the Department. I left about July 1945, I think, to take leave at my home; and then I came back for a few days in September, as I recall it; and then went out to the field; and, as far as I can recall, up to the time of my departure for leave in July that had not happened.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. Blakeslee was concerned with matters relating to the Far East and research and statistical matters?

A. That is my understanding.

Mr. STEVENS. Was he during this entire time associated with Territorial Studies or Office of Far Eastern Affairs?

A. There again my memory may be wrong. As far as I can recall, he was organizationally with the Territorial Studies, but his relations were very close with FE and CA. We had—I remember there were a number of committees to discuss the formulation of policy to be advised on postwar problems, and many of those committees were attended by both Mr. Blakeslee and by members of FE and CA.

Could I add one thing there? I said that I am thinking primarily of the physical set-up because I can't recall in the rooms which FE and CA occupied any desks which were taken over by Mr. Blakeslee or other members of TS. Possibly they were made a part of FE and CA but remained physically where they had been. Of that I am not certain.

Mr. STEVENS. During the time when Mr. Service was in the Department on consultation, was it the practice to refer to him, or to others on consultation, as a matter of normal course materials coming from the field?

A. I don't think so. I remember personally finding Mr. Service's dispatches of great interest and thinking I would like to discuss them with him more at length. I also have, I think, a fairly good recollection that I saw very little of him; and I kind of wished he had come around more than he did. I don't recall having seen him very frequently. He dropped in—for a guess I can only imagine recalling his coming in perhaps a couple of times after he first came. That is, into the large room where I was working.

Mr. STEVENS. Can you remember on the documents on which you wrote "Return to CA"; would it have been the practice to have sent them to other units in the Department or were they confined pretty strictly to FE?

A. The copies marked "CA"?

Mr. STEVENS. Yes; the copies marked "CA."

A. I think we would usually do that only where there was a special call from some other division or an afterthought that some other division might be interested in it and it was not on the original routing, or possibly it may have been a method whereby we would want to insure that copies that were sent to Territorial Studies came back quickly. I don't recall.

Mr. STEVENS. That would have been principally when you were sending the document outside the FE channel, in other words?

A. Yes. I think that we usually would have been where some other division expressed a wish to see it; we might say, "We have an extra copy; you can take that for a while."

Q. That could have been because they had had the original routed to them or any other way to call their attention to the document?—A. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel would like to ask some questions.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. What was the administrative set-up of FE, Mr. Chase? It contained the Division of Chinese Affairs. Were there other divisions in the Office of—A. Yes; as I recall it there were four Divisions; Chinese Affairs; Japanese Affairs; Southeast Asia—or some such name—Affairs; and Philippine Affairs. And there were also some specialists, research, partly economic people who were attached to FE as FE. I think, rather than to the specific divisions.

Q. Was Territorial Studies not a division within FE?—A. I can't answer that point. I don't know. I always thought of it as a separate division, but I am not sure whether organizationally it was brought within the framework of FE or not.

Q. I may say to the Board that it would have been my impression that Territorial Studies was a part of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Does the Board have any exact information on the administrative situation at that time?

Mr. ACHILLES. I am also not clear. I was the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs; and I know that there was a similar British Division of Territorial Studies; but, as far as I can recall, it had nothing to do with the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs or the Office of European Affairs. I think they were separate research divisions which dealt with the geographic offices but which were not a part of them.

Q. And were administratively—

Mr. ACHILLES. Separate.

Q. Separate and under some other office rather than the geographical.

Mr. ACHILLES. Yes; that is my understanding.

Q. Do you recall, Mr. Chase, whether Territorial Studies developed out of or was formerly a part of Special Political Affairs Division?—A. I don't recall. It would be just pure surmise and guessing.

Q. Now in the early part of your testimony you referred to Mr. Service's dispatches. Am I correct that that is not technically correct. A dispatch, as I understand it, is a paper sent by an Ambassador?—A. Yes, you are right.

Q. And the papers to which you referred were simply memoranda, were they not?—A. Yes; a form of report.

Q. Yes. They were not technically dispatches, the group of papers which Mr. Service turned in in the spring of 1945?—A. I think that is right.

Q. Now, Mr. Achilles showed you certain documents and asked you whether—he showed you certain documents in the B series which are photostats of ozalid reproductions of Service's memoranda and asked you whether by examining the documents you could determine what distribution other than that indicated by copies to ONI, MID, and so forth, and I should like to refer now to Document B-1, and I show you Document 217, which is the original memorandum of which Document B-1 is a copy, and I direct your attention to the stamp which appears on the left-hand side of this document and ask if you can tell us what that is.—A. Well, it seems to be the receipt stamp which I suppose would have been put on by—it says "Department of State"—by DC/R or the mail room.

Q. Can you make out the letters here on the bottom of this stamp?—A. I need glasses for that. It looks to me like "II," two "I's" or two "L's"—there are two vertical lines.

Q. Let me show you also Document 216, which is the original of Document B-2, and I ask you if that bears a similar stamp on the left-hand side?—A. Yes; that is evidently the same liaison office.

Q. It is what?—A. Department of State, April 27, 1945, FC; it looks like FC/L, Liaison Office, it looks like.

Q. Now, is the stamp on 217—A. It is obviously the same.

Q. The same?—A. Yes.

Q. Do you know what the Liaison office was?—A. Well, if it is the Liaison Office that I think, I recall it was the office which was passing on material from State to War and Navy and back again, but I am not certain.

Q. I show you Document 218, which is the original of which Document B-3 is a copy, and that bears the same stamp, does it not?—A. Yes. Might I put in a statement here?

Q. Yes.—A. Which is extraneous to what you are speaking of but I would like to mention it. Seeing the original refreshes my memory in regard to distribution. I remember that on the right column here we also indicated individuals and sometimes other divisions that might see the original, I think might wish to see the original, but for whom there was no reason to supply copies, and as I recall it, not only myself but other people to whom this—other officials to whom this dispatch came in the process of its routing might think of some other office which was entitled to and interested in seeing it and they might add the name of an office.

Q. I show you Document 219, which is the original of which Document B-5 is a copy, and I ask you whether that also bears on the left-hand corner the stamp, "Department of State, Liaison Office"?—A. Yes; it does.

Q. Thus indicating that this document went there?—A. Yes; it does.

Q. Now I show you Document 220, which is the original of which Document B-6 is a copy, and I ask you if the same stamp appears on this document?—A. Yes; it does.

Q. Thus indicating that the original of this document also went to the Liaison Office?—A. Yes.

Q. I show you Document 223 which is the original of which Document B-9 is the copy and ask you if the same stamp appears on the left-hand side of this?—A. There seem to be two stamps here. Let's see—yes, that is the same stamp,

April 27, and there seems to be an additional stamp there.

Q. An additional stamp which is—A. Which is the same stamp apparently but at a later date, May 12.

Q. This would indicate that the document had gone to the Liaison Office on two separate occasions?—A. Yes, I should think so.

Q. Now, I show you Document 221, which is the original of which Document B-11 is a copy, and ask you if the same stamp appears on this document?—A. Yes; it does.

Q. Showing that it also was in some way distributed to the Liaison Office.

Now, Mr. Achilles questioned you about Document B-25, which was an ozalid reproduction of a dispatch, No. 2986. I now show you Document 174, which is the original of dispatch No. 2986, and I ask you whether or not the distribution symbols appearing on the face of this original indicate that it was distributed to the Special Political Affairs—whether it is a division or office, I don't know.—A. Yes, I also notice that the writing "SPA-1" is not my writing. It looks to me as if it was probably put in by DC/R, Miss Bradshaw—that is a guess—for the reason that sometimes I would forget to put an office on or she would phone me as to whether I might want to have included on the distribution some other office.

Q. Yes, and I direct your attention to the stamp in the upper left-hand corner and ask you whether that does not indicate that this original was in fact in the Office of Special Political Affairs?—A. The stamp would certainly indicate that.

Q. Can you make out the date?—A. I think it is November 2, 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have to adjourn at this point. Have you further questions you would like to ask?

Mr. RHETTS. If you would bear with me for just two questions—

The CHAIRMAN. O. K.

Q. Can you tell us, Mr. Chase, whether when an official had returned to the Department from the field and was on consultation, whether it was normal practice to route to such officers the incoming flow of materials that were distributed to the regular officers in the Division?—A. If he was detailed to the Division. Sometimes when they came back they were detailed for a time to the Division.

Q. I am asking about when you are on this so-called consultation?—A. Consultation? We would not have automatically have routed everything. I think any dispatch which concerned matters in which he had been reporting extensively or matters in which he would throw light, we might very well have called him and asked him to look over the dispatch and give his comment.

Q. But he was not on any regular distribution?—A. There was no regular distribution.

Q. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. No further questions.

A. I said, no regular distribution as far as he was concerned in any distribution.

Q. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Adjourned until 2:30.

(The Board adjourned at 12:40 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN S. SERVICE

Date: Tuesday, June 6, 1950—2:30 to 5:30 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State.

Reported by: E. Wake, CS/reporting.

Board members present: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles, member; Arthur G. Stevens, member; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Representative for Mr. Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, firm of Reilly, Rhetts & Ruckelshaus.

(The Board reconvened at 2:30 p. m.)

(Continuation of testimony by Mr. Augustus Sabin Chase.)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chase, during the time Mr. Service was in the Department on consultation, at the end of 1945, did he have access to the files of the Division of Chinese Affairs?

A. I would not say that he or any other officer had carte blanche access. I know that if he had come to me and asked to see certain papers that were in his field of duties, I certainly would have seen no reason to refuse him.

Mr. ACHILLES. Would he have had to come to you to obtain documents?

A. No; I don't think we had it systematized to such an extent. I think any officer of the Division that he would go to I think would have authorized him—

Mr. ACHILLES. But he would have had to go to some officer of the Division?

A. Normally it would have come through me or possibly Mr. Drumright, sitting next to me.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do you recall whether Mr. Service ever asked for ozalid copies of his reports?

A. No; I do not. He could have, because as I have said, there were such a large number of documents and so many people coming in, that I could not recall it but I certainly don't recall it.

Mr. ACHILLES. When the reports that Mr. Service brought back with him were turned over to you, either by Mr. Service or some other officer in the Division, do you recall how many copies there were of those reports.

A. As far as I know there was only one of each. I don't recall their being more than one copy. Certainly there were no ozalids made at that time.

Mr. ACHILLES. But you don't recall as to whether the reports which he actually brought with him were in more than one copy?

A. I don't recall.

Mr. STEVENS. If Mr. Service had wished to take a number of documents out of the files it certainly would have been observed, would it not, by the persons who were in the places where the files were? I mean there couldn't have been a large number removed without—

A. He would have had to ask the aid of one of us because there is a large number of filing cabinets and he would have had to come to one of us.

Mr. STEVENS. You don't recall which one?

A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember the date on which you received the originals of the reports that Mr. Service brought back with him?

A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be in April?

A. I don't even recall that. I assume it would have been in April—when he returned.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe your examination of the originals this morning showed that the ozalids were prepared about April 27.

A. Well, the only stamp, marked April 27, that I recall seeing is that of the Liaison Office. It could not have been later than that date. It might have been before.

The CHAIRMAN. The ozalids had been prepared by that day?

A. The stamp would indicate that. They reached the Liaison Officer on the 27th.

Mr. ACHILLES. That was the office that actually transmitted the reproduced copies to other agencies?

A. At least to War and Navy. I don't know about the other offices.

Mr. ACHILLES. Let me understand this—the fact that the original shows a stamp of the Liaison Office as of April 27—if that is the date—would not necessarily indicate the ozalid had been prepared by that time, would it?

A. That is correct.

Mr. ACHILLES. That is an original. I just ask you whether that is indicative of the fact to you?

A. Yes; it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you look at one of those ozalids shown you this morning, if counsel will produce one, it doesn't make any difference which one—No. B-1 for instance—and see if you can tell from it the date on which the ozalids were prepared as near as you can.

Mr. RHETTS. You want to show him B-1, the photostat?

The CHAIRMAN. The original too of the same date. Taking those two papers together, can you tell (a) when your office received the original, and (b) when the ozalids were prepared?

A. I don't think I can tell you offhand.

The CHAIRMAN. Doesn't it appear there what date the office received the original?

A. It is the date of the Division of Chinese Affairs, May 10.

The CHAIRMAN. That is when the original came to CA?

A. That is when it was recorded coming to CA.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it stamped by the Department?

A. It has the Department of State "Liaison" April 27. Now, as I think I said this morning, I guess this is one which was handed to me by another officer or Mr. Service. It was abnormal—it wasn't the usual way of doing things and I wasn't the one that usually put on the Chinese Affairs stamp. It might not have occurred to me that should be done immediately and this Chinese stamp could have been put on later I think. It is a matter of routine to show—

Mr. STEVENS. Was it customary for you to place that stamp on before it was sent to be reproduced, if these things were handed to you? I think you testified this morning you might have kept the copies together to read.

A. Yes; I might. As far as I know, I did not put the stamp, "Division of Chinese Affairs," on them. I am pretty certain I never did. I think they appeared in my box usually with the stamp, the stamp having been put on by one of the girls in CA.

Mr. STEVENS. But you had to take a look at them and put a stamp on before being sent to Reproduction?

A. Yes; but in this case, if delivered to me personally, I could have put the distribution on first without seeing that they had not been entered and recorded "Chinese Affairs Division."

The CHAIRMAN. What is your testimony as to the date of the preparation of the ozalids?

A. I don't think I could give any answer except by pretty careful study of the stamps and thinking back.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give two offside dates?

A. Well, I should judge that the copies were probably made sometime prior to April 27, because I don't think that we would have sent the original on to the liaison office to go to the Army and Navy without having copies made. I see up here the Division of Administration, Management, Reproduction stamped 2 days, April 27 and April 30. It could have been made on the 27th perhaps and the original immediately sent to the Liaison Section.

Mr. ACHILLES. May I examine that document.

A. Also it is not quite clear in my mind—the ozalid process—whether ozalids came in just the original or whether there was another copy that came in from the field of some sort from which other copies could have been made.

Mr. ACHILLES. From the fact that Document No. 217 is stamped by the Reproduction Section, Department of State, April 27, 1945, and by the Liaison Office also on April 27, 1945, I would assume that the ozalid copies were made on April 27 and sent to the Liaison Office for distribution the same day.

A. I should think so.

Mr. STEVENS. Could we possibly examine one or two of the others that were given at the same time to see if that same set of circumstances prevails.

Mr. RHETTS. At the risk of including argumentation in the record here, Mr. Achilles, I wonder if the fact that the original shows the stamp of the Liaison Section on that date, whether that is any indication ozalids were delivered to the Liaison Section on that date. I suggest perhaps only the original went to the Liaison Section on that date.

Mr. ACHILLES. My impression would be that the original and the ozalid copies were sent from the Reproduction Section to the Liaison Office, the original indicating the agencies and the number of copies to which the ozalids would be sent.

A. This communication has just the same stamps as the previous one.

Mr. ACHILLES. Are they both dated April 27?

A. They are both dated April 27.

Mr. RHETTS. What document is this?

The CHAIRMAN. B-2.

Mr. ACHILLES. Document 218 is the original document.

Mr. RHETTS. It is the original of which B-3 is a copy.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ACHILLES. Does Document No. 219 bear the same stamps?

A. Yes; just the same.

Mr. ACHILLES. The same dates?

A. Yes; both April 27th.

Mr. RHETTS. I might say that 219 is the original of which B-5 is a copy.

Mr. ACHILLES. And document 220?

A. Also the same two stamps—the same dates—April 27.

Mr. RHETTS. This is the original of which B-6 is a copy.

Mr. ACHILLES. And document 223?

A. Also the same.

Mr. RHETTS. This is the original of which B-29 is the copy.

A. I notice one of those is specifically marked "DC/R," Miss Bradshaw. I don't know if I am speaking out of turn but as far as record procedure is concerned, if she has not already been interviewed, she probably would have a pretty good idea of procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. Now then, your conclusion as to the date of the preparation of the ozalid copies, as shown you, is that they were made on the 27th of April?

A. I should think that was probable; yes, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. Mr. Chase, did you ever meet Mr. Philip Jaffe?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. ACHILLES. Mr. Service has testified that early in May he brought Mr. Jaffe to the Department to inquire concerning a copy of a report broadcast from Yenan, and that he at that time introduced Mr. Jaffe to an officer of the Division of Chinese Affairs, which he believed was yourself. Do you recall any incident like that?

A. I don't think so but it was 5 years ago, to begin with, and in the second place, I have a poor memory, and in the third place, such things were fairly common occurrences so the mere fact that I don't recollect it would not prove that is not the case. I just don't remember.

Mr. STEVENS. Do you mean it was a common occurrence for FCC broadcasts to be made available to press people?

A. I didn't mean that but I meant people coming in to see me of the type—I mean—Foreign Service officers bringing in journalists wasn't uncommon. As I said before, I didn't see newspapermen but there would probably be a large number of people who came in to see me during that period and about whom, if you asked me now if they came in, I wouldn't have any recollection.

Mr. ACHILLES. Were you familiar with Mr. Jaffe's case at that time?

A. I believe I was. I think I had already heard of him.

Mr. ACHILLES. Were you familiar with the magazine Amerasia?

A. I think I had seen it and read a few copies, yes. I didn't follow it closely.

Mr. ACHILLES. Were you aware that Mr. Jaffe was the editor at that time?

A. I don't think I can recall that clearly enough to say. The chances are I would have known he was connected with the paper. I am not sure.

Mr. ACHILLES. In other words, the name at that time did not mean anything in particular to you?

A. Not very much.

Mr. RHETTS. I might say to the Board that Document No. 34, which Mr. Moreland is now trying to reach, does not purport to be the form in which the monitor broadcast came from the FCC to the State Department. This document here is a State Department press summary.

Mr. SERVICE. This is taken from a weekly report put out by the FCC which contains all the reports—the significant material received during the week, whereas the actual paper which was requested by Jaffe was material that kept coming in, something similar to that where the physical form is different.

Mr. ACHILLES. Mr. Chase, I show you document 34 which is an excerpt of the transcript of a broadcast from Yenan dated May 1, and ask if you recall seeing that or a similar transcript of that broadcast.

A. No I do not and as far as I can recall, I wasn't aware any such thing was broadcast.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did the Division of Chinese Affairs at that time receive from the FCC transcripts of foreign broadcasts?

A. I don't recall this type of paper.

Mr. STEVENS. I would like to ask in particular about the type of paper. Did you receive FCC monitor broadcasts at that time?

A. May I ask a little bit more about the monitor broadcasts. What did that mean—stuff taken off the air by FCC? I do recall some type of monitoring material. I don't recall what type it was or what the agency was that put it out.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do you recall if such material was classified or unclassified?

A. I do not.

Mr. ACHILLES. Was such monitoring material from the FCC, do you recall, generally available to officers in the Division?

A. Well, if what I am thinking of was this FCC monitoring material, I think the probability there was that it was available to all officers of FE and CA.

Mr. ACHILLES. I recall, the classification on such material during the war was "Restricted." Do you have a recollection as to whether such material was made available to correspondents?

A. It certainly never was through my desk. Whether any of the other officers called for it and made it available, I do not know. I should qualify that by my original remark that everything I say is to the best of my recollection.

Mr. ACHILLES. But you don't recall dealing ordinarily with this type of material?

A. No; I do not. The only thing I do think I recall is that type of material—I would have given less attention to and less time to it than reports coming in from our officers in the field.

Mr. ACHILLES. Would such a broadcast as this by Mao Tse-tung have been considered of any particular significance by the Division of Chinese Affairs?—

A. I should think it would have, particularly if this was the first text of what he had said—that they had seen.

Mr. ACHILLES. But you don't have any recollection of seeing a recording of that particular broadcast?—A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. O. K.—A. I wonder if I could make one correction of a statement I made this morning?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

A. It has no particular bearing but I thought for the sake of accuracy in the record that I would like to make it; that is, when you asked me about my duties in CA, I think I said that 80 percent of my time about was given to these duties of

handling incoming material. It is true that was the largest—took up the most time of any single type of work I had but I think 80 percent is too much and it is probably nearer 40 or 50 percent and my other duties included preparing memoranda for Mr. Vincent and other officers and also I generally had the job of protocol statements when there were anniversaries and such things, and several other jobs.

I mention that for the sake of accuracy and also to indicate that I have been considering the mass of documents I have coming over my desk and I didn't have quite the time to handle them that my first statement would have indicated.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Mr. Chase, with reference to some questions that were put to you a short time ago concerning Mr. Service's access to the files of CA, the divisional files were physically located in a room which you occupied, weren't they?—A. They were in front of my desk.

Q. So had Mr. Service, for example, been a frequent visitor to those files, you likely would have noticed it?—A. I would certainly have noticed it and remembered it.

Q. Referring now to document No. 34, it was suggested by Mr. Achilles, according to his best recollection, that this type of material during the war was usually classified "Restricted." Does this Document No. 34 bear any indication that it bore any classification at all?—A. No; it does not.

Mr. ACHILLES. So that it appears to be an unclassified document?—A. Yes.

Q. Now with reference to the testimony of Mr. Service, as I believe was indicated to you, he has testified, according to his recollection, he brought Mr. Jaffe to the office of the Division of Chinese Affairs and there obtained from you a copy of this material, it appearing not to be restricted and material suitable for giving members of the press. I believe you testified that you have no recollection of that?—A. No.

Q. You haven't. By that, do you mean to testify that you have any recollection that the event did not occur, or do you merely mean to testify that you have no recollection that it did occur?—A. I have no recollection it did occur.

Q. If Mr. Service has so testified, would you think it likely the event may have occurred?—A. Certainly. I mean I have always had respect for Mr. Service's integrity and if he remembers it clearly I would think it must have occurred. That would be my honest opinion.

Q. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for coming in.

(Joseph W. Ballantine, being duly sworn testified as follows:)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Achilles will ask the questions.

Q. Mr. Ballantine, would you tell us what your official position was from the beginning of 1945 until July of that year?—A. I was Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.

Q. Of which the Division of Chinese Affairs was a unit, is that right?—A. Yes.

Q. During that period, as I recall, you were assigned to the delegation at the San Francisco conference?—A. That is correct.

Q. Do you remember when you left Washington for San Francisco?—A. I would have to refresh my memory. I went on the train with all that large group of people that went by train.

Q. Do you recall whether Mr. Service had returned to Washington before your departure?—A. Yes; I think he had, yes. I am not positive. I would have to refresh my memory.

Q. Do you recall whether he reported to you when he arrived in Washington?—A. No; I do not recall that he reported to me in particular. I had in my mind his reports in the field.

Q. But you don't recall whether he personally came in to see you on his return from China?—A. I don't recall but I will presume he did, but I have no definite recollection.

Q. Mr. Service testified he brought back from China with him certain copies of his report. Do you remember whether you actually saw the reports which he brought back?—A. I think I saw some reports that he brought back but whether they were reports he brought back or whether—my memor is confused as to whether I have in my mind reports he had written from the field previously or whether he had brought them back at that time.

Q. Have you any knowledge of the disposition by the Department of the reports which he brought back with him?—A. No; I have no knowledge other than that they were disposed of in the usual way and through the usual channels.

Q. When officers from the Far East were called to the Department for consultation, what were they generally expected to do while they were in Washington?—A. Well, they usually had them sit in on our weekly conferences of the staff or they would meet with the different people in the office and give their impressions and then we would try to bring them up to date on the different points of view.

Q. Were they normally expected to confer with far-eastern specialists in the other branches of Government while here on consultations?—A. I don't think so. I don't know. You see, there was such a tremendous amount of multiplicity of agencies at that time that had relations with the Far East and it had always been traditional for them to see people such as John Mosher in the Department of Commerce when opportunity permitted, and of course various offices in the Department not only in relation to political matters but in relation to their administrative concerns.

I don't recall to what extent individual officers called on OSS people. I don't think there was a practice of calling on ONI and MIS to any extent unless they were asked for by MIS or ONI.

Q. What was the FE policy at the time with respect to officers home on consultation addressing staffs of organizations such as the Institute of Pacific Relations?—A. I think the general policy of FE was that officers were expected to confine themselves to factual observations and to matters that were entirely consistent with official policy; that is to say, it was one thing for an officer to report his views to the Department—his own views on what should be done—but certainly it was never a part of the policy of FE or any part of the Department for officers to express, outside or to their superior officers or within departmental circles, policies that were inconsistent with policies that had been established by the Department of State.

Q. But was it the practice at the time for officers home on consultation to meet with the staffs of organizations such as the Institute of Pacific Relations?—A. No.

Q. Do you recall whether Mr. Service, during that period of consultation, did attend a meeting with the research staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations?—A. I do not know.

Q. Do you recall what the policy was for relations between officers home on consultation and members of the press?—A. The practice certainly wasn't—well, I will put it this way: Certainly there was no practice of officers here on consultation discussing matters of policy with the press.

Q. How about matters of a nonpolicy nature connected with the area in which they were stationed?—A. Well, insofar as I know, the same policy governed all officers of the Department at that time. At that time my recollection is that if the press representative wanted to see an official of the Department of State, he had to arrange for an interview through an officer of Current Information and the nature of the questions which the press correspondent wanted to ask would be cleared with the Office of Current Information before any action was taken with respect to such a request.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any specific instructions issued by your office on that subject to returning servicemen?

A. I don't know that any specific instructions were issued other than that the instructions that were based on arrangements made for Current Information were circulated all through the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. STEVENS. But not regularly, I take it, Mr. Ballantine. I think it is common practice, isn't it, for any new regulations to be circulated and once circulated, it becomes a part of the regular file of the office that received it. Now my question is: Was any effort made to instruct the people coming home from the field for brief periods here as to their course of action with respect to press representatives? Was any positive step taken?

A. I do not know of any positive step that was taken. Of course there was a provision in the Foreign Service regulations about discretion in talking with the press and I think it was assumed from the very inception of people entering the Service that they were supposed to be discreet at all times in talking with representatives of the press. That was so fundamental. I don't think there was any occasion for this as far as I know—for any specific injunctions to Foreign Service officers home on consultation.

Q. Did you ever meet Mr. Philip Jaffe?—A. No.

Q. Did you, in 1945, know his name or who he was?—A. Yes; I think I did know that he was editor of Amerasia.

Q. Do you recall Mr. Service ever consulting you as to Mr. Jaffe's reliability?—A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall what the provision of the Foreign Service regulations, that you refer to, was? Could you refer us to it?

A. I think that the reference is a little bit narrower perhaps, now that I recall it, than what I suggested. The provision related to making public utterances rather than interviews with the press—with correspondents—referring to speeches being cleared I think with the Department other than that of a purely ceremonial nature and of course there was always the sort of thing, the instructions that we could not write anything for publication without clearance from the Department. I would understand that to imply that we were not to talk.

Mr. STEVENS. That would have been your interpretation?

A. My own interpretation.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what is meant by "background information" so called?

A. Yes; I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

A. Background information is information that a person could get through publicly ascertainable sources if he had the time and the facilities and the know-how to get, and that background information was such that we frequently gave a fill-in to the press. If a correspondent would come up and see me, for example, and a Foreign Service officer, based on his knowledge of the country, acquired in the field, gave information on the career of some person who had just been made Prime Minister, that would be background information.

The CHAIRMAN. Background information given to the press sometimes included material which the press would agree not to publish?

A. I don't think so. I think whatever you told the press was material they could publish but the only restriction was that they would not father it on to you; that is, they would not quote and have it ascribed to an officer of the Department of State.

The CHAIRMAN. What about classified information? Does the press ever receive classified information with the instructions they can publish it as background information?

A. No, not that I know of, and I don't know of any case where classified information would be given to the press without specific authorization from the superior officer.

The CHAIRMAN. A superior officer would have the power to authorize it?

A. I would not consider myself superior enough to authorize it. I would want to take it to the Secretary of State. There might be some particular reason for giving it out.

The CHAIRMAN. At what echelon do you think it could be authorized?

A. I would say that an Assistant Secretary of State—he might himself—he would have to get clearance from the Secretary but if an Assistant Secretary of State would authorize it, I would feel that was his responsibility.

Mr. STEVENS. Was it general practice or your own general practice? Was that common in the Department?

A. I think it was general practice.

Mr. STEVENS. You mentioned a few moments ago that the officers who came in from the field were not to seek discussion with OSS, ONI, or somebody else. I believe that was your remark. Suppose OSS or MID or ONI were to request an officer to come over and discuss the situation he found in the field and the persons requesting were persons who were in a position to utilize—

A. I think you misunderstood me. I did not mean to imply that an officer from the field was not to seek discussion with the various agencies. I said the agencies had become so multiplied that it was difficult for a person in the field to have gone around. I don't think it is general practice for officers coming in from the field to go and see those various agencies but I certainly think that if one of those agencies had requested the presence of an officer that it would be only courteous to comply.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. Ballantine, what was the organization that Mr. Blakeslee had and what was its relationship to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs?

A. That relationship was different. It differed in two separate periods. In the earlier period that organization was headed under Mr. Pasvolski, Postwar Planning Committee. Later on that organization consisted of a large number of specialists from the educational fields that had been taken into the State Department in connection with postwar planning. Later on that organization was broken up and the specialists in the various fields were assigned to the respective regional divisions to which they belonged.

As a result, that group, under Mr. Blakeslee, came into the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Prior to their coming over there had been set up, however, a Far Eastern Interdivisional Area Committee which consisted of those specialists plus regular officers of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs plus other specialists for some ad hoc discussions of some particular problems about which they were concerned.

We often had officers from the Office of European Affairs come over in connection with matters relating to southeast Asia because they were colonial problems involved and there were sometimes economic experts that came in for a particular discussion.

Dr. Blakeslee was a special assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. After that reorganization took place, he served as chairman of that—

Mr. STEVENS. Can you tell us when that second phase was reached, when the group was picked out and a part of it came to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs?

A. I do not recall exactly when that—

Mr. STEVENS. You don't know whether it was in 1944 or 1945?

A. No, it would be rather difficult for me—I don't recall.

Mr. STEVENS. Did Dr. Blakeslee and his people have access to any usable information that came from the field that had a bearing on their problems?

A. They had access to most documentary material that had a bearing on their problems.

Mr. STEVENS. Would Mr. Service's reports have been made available to them as a matter of course?

A. I should think so, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel?

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Do you recall when the San Francisco Conference commenced—what time?—A. No, but I think it was the latter part of April that we left for San Francisco. It was in the last week of April.

Q. Would April 25 sound right to you?—A. Yes.

Q. So you presumably left Washington prior to April 25 for the opening?—A. About 5 days.

Q. About 5 days. So you would probably have left about April 20?—A. Yes.

Q. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. No further questions. Thank you very much, Mr. Ballantine. (Ten-minute recess.)

(Michael J. McDermott, being duly sworn, testified as follows:)

The CHAIRMAN. What is your full name, Mr. McDermott?

A. Michael James McDermott.

The CHAIRMAN. And your residence?

A. Washington, D. C.

The CHAIRMAN. Your position in the State Department is?

A. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you explain to the board what is meant by "background information" that is made available to the press as such?

A. There are really two categories of background information. There is a category that applies when you send a correspondent to an official of the Department. The official gives him information which is really of public knowledge and in the encyclopedia, and that sort of thing, which the expert is supposed to have at his fingertips and it saves the correspondent getting it out of the books.

Excluded from that is any indication of what action the Department will take on a particular matter. That is not cricket. Sometimes correspondents try to get that in a background category.

The other category—we very often have conferences with American correspondents whom you can depend on, and we want to give them information which they can use in their stories.

The CHAIRMAN. Which they cannot?

A. Which they can use in their stories but cannot divulge the source. It may be very desirable for the public to have the knowledge conveyed, but it would be bad in our relations with the foreign governments if it were known that a high official of the Department had actually said these things.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this latter category classified information from the technical sense?

A. No, it is not classified because there is no way of controlling it. The information is given with the expectation that it will be used and, therefore, it cannot be classified.

Mr. STEVENS. Let us see if we understand what that means. You mean by that the classified information—

A. My conception is information which falls in the category of "top secret," "secret," "confidential," and "restricted."

Mr. ACHILLES. But gives information in documents that have been so classified. Is that properly given to correspondents for background but not for publication?

A. I think it is apparent that when one is discussing a situation on the basis of his knowledge that he discusses it frankly and reading it off his mind and not off documents. The person doing the talking must of course have an awareness of what should or should not be said.

Mr. ACHILLES. I understand from that last information that at times information, although it may also be contained in documents that are classified "top secret," "secret," "confidential," or "restricted," may nevertheless be given to the press as background information not to be used.

A. Most certainly because in many documents classified as "secret" there is a great deal of information that is not secret.

Mr. ACHILLES. In other words, the mere fact that a document is classified as a whole does not mean that nothing in it can be told to the press. Is that right?

A. The document itself—the content of it cannot be divulged. If the information is available elsewhere it can certainly be discussed. Should a document pertaining to secret information also have a report of what appeared in the press, I would not be precluded from using the press information.

Mr. ACHILLES. Mr. McDermott, how long have you held your present position?

A. Since 1928.

Mr. ACHILLES. And the information you have just given us is applicable over that whole period?

A. Yes, I would say so. I would say that since the outbreak of the war everybody has been much more careful in not revealing information as he receives it.

The CHAIRMAN. And that decision you make on the basis of the information itself rather than on the basis of whether it happens to appear in a classified document?

A. If it is in a classified document, I don't use the document.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't use the document?

A. If it is within my general knowledge, I use my discretion whether it is secret or unclassified.

The CHAIRMAN. That information—

A. General information I have in my head. I don't deal with documents when dealing with the press unless a document has been declassified.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the rules of declassification?

A. No.

Mr. STEVENS. Your interpretation of what background information means, sir, as just given, has that ever become a part of the regulations for the guidance of people who either are in the Department or who come from the field to the Department on consultation?

A. It is for the possession of everybody who has had any dealings with the press.

Mr. STEVENS. Has it ever been written?

A. No, I don't recall that it has been written.

Mr. STEVENS. Have you ever served as a Foreign Service officer?

A. Not as a Foreign Service officer. I have served on special assignments for the Department.

Mr. STEVENS. People working for you, or you quite often, I believe sir, send correspondents to see particular people in the Department about subjects?

A. That is right.

Mr. STEVENS. Do you ever stipulate to those people precisely the type of questions that should be answered or do you leave that to the judgment of the officer?

A. It varies depending on how well I know the officer and if the officer has had similar contacts before.

The CHAIRMAN. But if you have confidence in the officer and he is a discreet officer, you do that?

A. I do that.

Mr. STEVENS. This particular judgment is exercised by you, and by the other persons that deal with the press under you?

A. That's right.

Mr. ACHILLES. In the course of your duties, do you ever have occasion to send correspondents to Foreign Service officers temporarily in the Department on consultation?

A. I don't recall that I have. When ambassadors and ministers return from abroad it is our present practice to contact them and arrange for a press conference.

Mr. STEVENS. If an individual newspaperman knew an ambassador was here, is there a stipulation that the newspaperman must come through your organization before contacting an ambassador or Foreign Service officer?

A. The ambassadors, having been through the mill a number of times, usually tell the correspondents they better contact me. Then the ambassador contacts me and we arrange, to save the ambassador's time, to get the correspondents in a group. There is nothing to prevent a correspondent from approaching a Foreign Service officer or approaching an ambassador and talking with them.

Mr. STEVENS. Is there anything to prevent correspondents from approaching an officer in the Department?

A. No.

Mr. STEVENS. They do it?

A. Yes.

Mr. STEVENS. Is there anything in writing that the officer is supposed to inform your office if he is contacted by a press man?

A. No, there is nothing.

Mr. STEVENS. Is it, therefore, in your judgment, left to the discretion of the office to which this person is to be assigned for consultation to give appropriate guidance in handling such matters?

A. I don't know. I have never gone into it.

The CHAIRMAN. In the last analysis it is a question of the discretion of the officer concerned, isn't it?

A. I would say in the first and last analysis that we have to put absolute dependence on the good judgment of our officers.

Mr. ACHILLES. You say you don't ordinarily arrange appointments between Foreign Service officers in the Department on consultation and press correspondents?

A. No, not ordinarily, no. Referring to the category of Foreign Service officer coming home for consultation, usually the press does not even know he is here. Unless there is something newsworthy in connection with an officer coming back to the United States, I am not interested either.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do officers in the Department or officers home for consultation generally or some times inquire of you as to the reliability of newspaper people?

A. Yes, they do very often.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did Mr. Service ever inquire of you as to the reliability of Philip Jaffe?

A. Not to my recollection.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. RHETTS. May I ask a few questions please?

The CHAIRMAN. Of course. Go ahead.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Mr. McDermott, I wonder if you can tell us—you have given us a description of what is called background information. Isn't it a fact that it is a regular common practice for officials of the Department of State to give to correspondents information of a charter which is definitely classified, subject to the restriction that they shall not print it but it is available to them so that they may interpret more properly known events? A. Do I understand your suggestion is that officers of the Department of State deliberately put classified information in the hands of correspondents?

Q. Yes.—A. No; it isn't done to my knowledge.

Q. It isn't done to your knowledge?—A. That's right.

Q. As I understand it, by classified information, you mean information that is embodied in a document that bears the stamp "top secret," "secret," "confidential," or "restricted."—A. You are asking if this is not a general practice?

Q. Yes.—A. It isn't a general practice. It may be an exception.

Q. Is it occasional?—A. It isn't a general practice and if there are violations I don't know of them.

Q. Can you tell us what is the term or origin, in the journalistic field, for information supplied to a correspondent which he may not use at all except for his own information and assistance to enable him to interpret other available information?—A. The Secretary of State may talk to correspondents off the record if there is any indication what his course will be, what his thinking is, and ask them not to publish that.

Q. That is not an uncommon practice?—A. It is done——

Q. That is called, technically, off the record?—A. That is off the record.

Q. Is it a frequent practice for officials of the Department to give the press off-the-record information, which information may very well be classified information?—A. The Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State occasionally discuss matters off the record with correspondents. It isn't a matter of divulging information that has been classified but a frank exposition of how they view a situation, and perhaps an indication of how they intend to handle it. If it were classified information they are the people who are competent to declassify the information. It isn't off-the-record background.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not from time to time?

A. The Secretary may do it and the Under Secretary may. The other officials in the Department don't.

Q. No other officials in the Department ever do that?—A. No.

Q. Do you not have occasion from time to time to arrange for officers in the Department to brief members of the press with off-the-record information so as to enable them to properly interpret events which may not yet have occurred?—A. No sir.

Q. You have never had any request to do that?—A. The Secretary has had off-the-record conferences and the Under Secretary——

Q. But nobody else?—A. The Secretary and the Under Secretary hold off-the-record conferences. The conferences I arrange with other officials of the Department are background conferences at which correspondents are given a picture of the situation as the official sees it and there is no divulging without authorization of classified information. We are not so rash as to tell a lot of people a lot of secret stuff for any purpose.

Q. Now you testified that normally you had no requests to refer correspondents to Foreign Service officers who were here on consultation and you later indicated that normally there was no news attached to it and a correspondent would not be interested. What about the situation of a Foreign Service officer who has recently returned from an area which is newsworthy? Is it not a common practice, under those circumstances, when the correspondents know that such an officer has returned from an area that is newsworthy—is it not common practice to refer correspondents to such officers for information?—A. I don't object to the wording but I want to set you right. It is common practice if a Foreign Service officer returns from a part of the world where he has newsworthy information, like Paxton, who left his post and traveled overland through the mountain passes into India. We arranged for him to see the correspondents. That was newsworthy.

Then there was the case of Angus Ward returning from Mukden. We arranged for him to see the correspondents. That was newsworthy.

Q. So when they come from an area that is newsworthy, you do arrange for them to see the correspondents?—A. Yes; and I usually run over with the officer what he will talk to them about.

Q. Is that an invariable practice?—A. It is normal practice.

Q. Do you recall, Mr. McDermott, during the war, during the years 1944 and 1945, when there was considerable public interest in the Chinese Communists and their activities and plans and programs?—A. I recall there was.

Q. Do you recall that certain Foreign Service officers had been assigned to be up in the Communist areas, and to learn what the Communists were doing?—A. I have some vague recollection. I had some knowledge of it.

Q. I wonder if you recall arranging a press conference for Mr. Ludden, some time in 1945, who had returned from observing some of the guerrilla warfare activities of the Chinese Communists?—A. No; I don't recall it.

Q. When you say you are quite sure you did not, you are referring to yourself personally, or are you referring to your office?—A. I have no recollection of such a press conference. I have no recollection of any press conference having been held at which the subject was activities of the Communists in China.

Q. Are records kept of press conferences that are arranged through your office?—A. They are now but they were not then. We did not have the stenographic assistance to do it. Also I might say that I am not a good witness for that period. I was too occupied in other things.

Q. Do you think, Mr. McDermott, that if it were a common practice for officials of the Department to brief members of the press, off-the-record discussions of material that is classified would come to your attention?—A. Yes; I think it would. I usually know what the officers tell the press even though the officers don't tell me.

Q. Are you familiar with the practice, in this respect, that is pursued in the field; that is, in the various Embassies and missions abroad?—A. No; I am not familiar with what they do abroad.

I would like to amend my previous statement about the background information. That is information I have given to the press for publication. It may be that if the Secretary or a qualified officer of the Department is holding such a background conference, that there might be in his remarks some information that has come out of classified documents. There is no indication to the press that the information had been so classified.

Q. Do you make any distinction here between press conferences and interviews with particular correspondents or does your testimony apply equally to large groups or single individual correspondents?—A. My testimony applies to things I arrange, and know about. What people do on the Q. T.—I don't pretend to know or keep tabs on what individual officers tell their friends.

Q. As I understand it, notwithstanding this suggestion or amendment to your earlier testimony, it is still your belief, is it, that the practice of disclosing to correspondents genuinely classified material; that is, material, the substantive content of which is classified for their use, not to be published, not alone to be attributed, is not ordinary common practice?—A. That is not an ordinary practice. I think the officer who would do that without authorization would run the very considerable risk of getting into difficulties.

Q. When you say "without authorization" that perhaps begs the question. What I am trying to get at, isn't it a common practice for officers to do it with authorization?—A. I doubt if any officers would do that.

Q. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. McDermott. You have been very helpful.

Can we clear up this issue with a few questions from the Board?

Mr. RHETTS. Which issue, the one we are on now?

The CHAIRMAN. Amerasia.

Mr. RHETTS. The issue now before the Board will take a long time to clear up as far as I can see. I feel we will have to get some witnesses here, General, to deal with the line of testimony that has been opened up by the last two witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. You probably want to bring in Mr. Emerson then. Where is he from?

Mr. RHETTS. He is a Foreign Service officer now at the National War College.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to introduce your statement?

Mr. RHETTS. I should like at this point to introduce into the transcript document No. 93-3, which is part 3 of Mr. Service's personal statement.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be introduced into the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"PERSONAL STATEMENT OF JOHN S. SERVICE—PART 3

"When I was returned to active duty in the Department on August 12, 1945, I was informed that I would probably be assigned to the staff of the United States Political Adviser in Tokyo. In the meantime I was detailed for temporary duty in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Here my job was to act as liaison between FE and various administrative offices of the Department in connection with the physical preparations for the imminent reopening of our Far Eastern offices in enemy and occupied territories. It was in no sense a policy job and I was not even reading telegrams and reports from China. My time was taken up with such problems as arranging for immediate shipment of supplies, copies of circular instructions and Foreign Service Regulations, consulting with the Division of Cryptography so that the offices would be equipped to receive and send telegrams, and discussing with the Division of Foreign Service Personnel the requirements and suggestions of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in regard to staffing problems.

"On September 7, 1945, I received my orders for Tokyo. I left Washington on September 14 with Mr. George Acheson, who had been appointed the United States Political Adviser, and arrived in Tokyo with him on September 22, 1945.

"There were already a number of Japanese specialists assigned to Mr. Acheson's staff and several arrived on the spot almost simultaneously with us. As the only officer without Japanese background I was assigned as administrative and executive officer. My first duties were to obtain office space and to procure equipment and supplies, to train new and inexperienced clerical staff, to set

up a filing system, and to perform all the other chores of organizing and running a new office under unusual and difficult conditions. After the office was set up and running I continued in this capacity of executive officer. I did no independent political reporting, which was left entirely to the Japan specialists on the staff, and I never at any time took part in policy discussions in Headquarters or between our office and Headquarters. The only reporting work I did, and this for only a short period, was to prepare a weekly summary of events in Japan compiled from press and other public sources. As soon as additional staff arrived, this was turned over to them.

"One of the duties assigned to our office by SCAP, and carried for a long time almost single-handedly by Mr. John K. Emmerson, was the preparation of a weekly report on the rapidly emerging new political parties of Japan. In connection with this work it was customary for the leaders of these parties to keep in touch with Mr. Emmerson and to call periodically on him at the Office of the Political Adviser. The Communist political prisoners had of course been released from prison in accordance with the SCAP directive soon after the occupation. One of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party, Nosaka, had spent most of the war at Yen-an with the Chinese Communists. Emmerson and I had become acquainted with him there in the course of our reporting work. Nosaka applied for and received permission to return to Japan. Neither Emmerson nor I had anything to do with this. Soon after his arrival, which was probably early in January, Nosaka called with one or two of the other Japanese Communist leaders at our office to see Emmerson. Having known me in Yen-an, Nosaka, while talking to Emmerson, inquired about me and Emmerson sent word to me. I came down to the office where Nosaka and Emmerson were and had a brief conversation devoted, as far as I can remember, to his experiences on his trip from Yen-an to Tokyo. There was nothing about this conversation to cause any comment nor was there anything noteworthy in Nosaka's calling at our office. Such calls and contacts between the Communists and our political reporting officers were occurring regularly as part of their political reporting work. I do not remember any occasion where I made statements which could be interpreted as expressing an extremely favorable view of the Japanese Communist Party, as being enamored of Communist theory, or as advocating support of the Japanese Communists. Indeed, I could not have made such statements because I did not hold these views.

"I continued as executive officer until I became ill in April 1946. After four months' hospitalization, I was transferred to Wellington, New Zealand, as First Secretary, where I arrived in October 1946.

"There is very little of pertinent interest concerning my tour in New Zealand. I appeared to gain the full confidence of the Minister, Avra M. Warren, and he came to leave most of the routine operation of the mission in my hands. For eight months after his transfer I served as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim until the arrival of his successor, Robert M. Scotten. In May 1948 I was promoted to Class II, an event of considerable satisfaction to me since I felt that in a sense it put a seal on the events of 1945.

"In December 1948 I was transferred to Washington and informed that I had been appointed to serve as a member of the Foreign Service Selection Board convening in Washington January 10, 1949. Following the completion of the Selection Board work, I was assigned to the Division of Foreign Service Personnel as Special Assistant to the Chief. Here my duties were chiefly to counsel Foreign Service Officers either by mail or personal interview concerning their personnel records. In November 1949 I was assigned as officer in charge of the Consulate General at Calcutta. Since I was engaged in assisting with the preparations for the convening of the 1950 Selection Boards I was not able to leave Washington until early February. I spent a month in California on leave and sailed from Seattle on March 11. On March 17, I received orders to return to Washington by air for this hearing."

Mr. RHETTS. While I had planned to have Mr. Service testify first, if Mr. Emmerson is here we will take him out of order.

(Mr. John K. Emmerson, being duly sworn, testified as follows:)

Question by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Will you state your full name and address for the record, Mr. Emmerson?—

A. John K. Emmerson, 4121 Jenifer Street NW.

Q. And what is your present position, sir?—A. Well, I am a Foreign Service officer on detail to the National War College.

Q. What was your position from the middle of 1945 until, say, September 1946?—A. Well, in the middle of 1945 I was here in the Department. On

September 1 I was assigned as a political adviser to Admiral Nimitz on Guam but on my arrival there, the first part of September, I was immediately detailed to Tokyo on the staff of the political adviser to General MacArthur, and remained until February 1946, when I was transferred back to the Department as Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs.

Q. Will you state in some additional detail the nature of your duties in Tokyo?—A. Yes. In Tokyo George Atcheson was the acting political adviser at that time and I was attached to his staff since I was a Japanese-language officer and had been in Japan for 6 years before the war. I performed the general duties of a political reporting officer. My principal work during that 5 months' period in Japan was political reporting on the beginnings of political party movements in Japan after the war and the personalities involved in various political parties, and by special order of General MacArthur our office prepared a weekly political party report which I wrote during the time I was in Tokyo.

Q. And in connection with that work, I take it you had occasion to maintain the contacts with the representatives of the various political parties in Japan?—A. That's right. Since I speak Japanese it was easy to make such contacts, and it seemed to be important at the time, so I made special efforts to get personally acquainted with the political leaders in all the parties which were active and operating at that time during the occupation.

Q. You are acquainted with Mr. Service, are you not?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long have you known Mr. Service, and describe, if you will, something of the nature of your relationship.—A. Well, I think—I don't know when we first met. It was one time in Tokyo when he was going through to China. But the time I actually served with him was in China when I was detailed to General Stilwell's staff at the end of 1943. I first met Mr. Service I believe in July of 1944 on that assignment when I was in Chungking and I went up to Chungking from New Delhi and then we saw each other intermittently over that period until I went to Yen-an in, I believe, October of 1944 where he had been for several months. He, however, left Yen-an, I believe, the day after I arrived so we were not in Yen-an at the same time.

Then he returned to Chungking I believe just a few days before I left to come back to the States in February of 1945, and then we were together again in Japan when I was assigned to Tokyo and he came out with George Atcheson the week or so after I had arrived.

Q. What was the name of the State Department office there or whatever your group was? What was it called?—A. At that time it was called Office of Political Adviser and then became known as Diplomatic Section, SCAP.

Q. What were Mr. Service's duties in the Office of Political Adviser?—A. His duties were those of executive officer. He became the executive officer of the Political Adviser's office and had all the duties that went with that, running the office and general administration.

Q. His duties were related to administration and not to direction of the substantive operations of the office?—A. That's right; in Tokyo, yes.

Q. Were those his duties throughout his stay in Tokyo?—A. As far as I know they were, until I left. He remained on in Tokyo after I left in February 1946.

Q. Mr. Emmerson, the Board has supplied information to Mr. Service that a confidential informant has stated that he knew Mr. Service while Mr. Service was serving in Tokyo and that Mr. Service and others had conversations in the Office of the Political Adviser with various leaders of the Japanese Communist Party and that these conversations aroused considerable comment. Can you give the Board any information on what the alleged conversations might have been?—A. Well, the only one that I know of was when Sanzo Nosaka arrived at the office. He, as you know, was the leader of the Japanese Communist group in Yen-an and had come to north China sometime in 1943—in 1942 or 1943—any way he was the leader of the group which organized the Japanese propaganda school in Yen-an.

When he arrived in Japan, either the end of December or the first part of January of 1946—1945 or 1946—I am not sure of the exact date, but there was a good deal of publicity in the Japanese press when he arrived.

Mr. Service and I had met him in Yen-an when he was running the propaganda school for Japanese prisoners. One of our projects was to get as much information as possible not only on the propaganda which that group was doing but also intelligence out of Japan. They were getting periodicals and magazines and other information right out of Japan at that time, so that both of us had personally met Mr. Nosaka in China.

The morning after his arrival in Tokyo he called on the Office of the Supreme Headquarters and then came to the Office of the Political Adviser and, as I recall it, asked to see me by name and I went out to the reception room and spoke to him. Then I believe Mr. Service came in and we chatted for a very few minutes and he departed.

I believe with him at that time there were one or two other Japanese. I believe one of the other Japanese Communists was with him at the time.

Q. Do you recall how Mr. Service happened to be present?—A. As I recall it, since he had met both of us in Yenan, he asked whether Mr. Service was there and I said he was and if I am not mistaken, I went to his office and said Mr. Nosaka wanted to say "Hello" and he came into the room and they exchanged a few words and that was it. There was certainly no discussion of any consequence at all. It was purely an exchange of greetings.

Q. Was Mr. Nosaka a frequent visitor to your office?—A. No; he wasn't a frequent visitor. I saw him several times and during that period I saw him at headquarters, in the office of the Government section, and also I would see him in our office once or twice. He came in company with Mr. Tokuda, one of the three other leaders of the Japanese party, and considerable information was obtained, which formed the basis for these various reports.

Mr. ACHILLES. Information was obtained by you?

A. By me, yes. They discussed their party programs and plans and policies. Those were all duly reported in the political party reports which I was sending in.

The CHAIRMAN. Plans—you mean the Japanese Communist Party?

A. Yes, the Japanese Communist Party.

Q. And the intelligence you obtained from them was what you embodied in these weekly reports to General MacArthur?—A. That's right, because I had a section on each one of the parties, beginning with the Democratic Liberals, the Socialist Party, and the Communist Party, and so on. That was a continuing report that went in every week and treated each of the political parties on the basis of the information obtained.

Q. So I take it that Mr. Nosaka's visits to the Office of the Political Adviser were strictly a matter of business and provided the source of intelligence which it was your function to supply to General MacArthur?—A. Yes, and they were known to Mr. Acheson and to headquarters. There was no secret about it.

Q. Do you have any recollection that this meeting between Mr. Service and Mr. Nosaka caused any comment amongst your colleagues in the Office of the Political Adviser?—A. Not that I know of. Nosaka had received a great deal of publicity in the Japanese press, on his return from China at that time, and everybody knew who he was.

Q. Have you ever heard it suggested that this visit, this occasion on which Mr. Service met Mr. Nosaka, aroused any unfavorable comment in any quarter?—A. Not that I know of.

Q. Did you ever hear there was any comment about it in military circles as distinguished from your office?—A. He called, at the same time, on the office of the Supreme Headquarters.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do you know whether Mr. Service ever had any other meetings with Mr. Nosaka?

A. Not that I know of. He may have been present at one other occasion when I saw Nosaka.

Mr. ACHILLES. Have you ever heard anything to the effect that Mr. Service and Mr. Nosaka held other meetings?

A. No.

Q. Now apparently the same informant who supplied the information, which I have just indicated to you, has also stated that Mr. Service took an extremely favorable view toward the Japanese Communists. Do you have any information on that subject?—A. I have no information on that subject at all.

Q. Did you ever hear Mr. Service express any extremely favorable views toward the Japanese Communists?—A. No.

Q. You were the political reporting officer of the office?—A. That's right. Since Mr. Service was a Chinese-language officer and had specialized in Chinese affairs before, he did not, as far as I know, do any political reporting during that period.

Q. You think it likely, had he been seeking to in any way to influence official policy in a manner favorable to the Japanese Communists, he would have made his views known to you?—A. I should think so because I was writing reports and they all of course went out under Mr. Acheson. He went over and approved all

political reports from the office, but Mr. Service never at any time came to me or tried to influence the reports in the office.

Q. During this period in Tokyo, did you see a great deal of Mr. Service?—A. Yes, we were in the office together. I mean we saw each other every day.

Q. Would you think that you saw enough of him so that you would be likely to be privy to his mind in terms of his views on such matters as this?—A. I should think so.

Q. It is my understanding this same informant indicated that Mr. Service seemed to be completely enamored of Communist theories while in Tokyo. Did you have any occasion to see any evidence that would support that assertion?—A. No; I saw no evidences of that.

Mr. ACHILLES. Have you ever been stationed in Moscow?—A. Yes; I have.

Mr. ACHILLES. Was that before or after this period in Tokyo?

A. That was after—from 1947 to 1949.

Mr. ACHILLES. As a result of your assignment in Moscow—I am assuming that you are familiar with Soviet Communist ideology and propaganda, the frequent expressions and use of words, etc.—A. Yes.

Mr. ACHILLES. On the basis of your present knowledge of Communist ideology and propaganda, would you say that Mr. Service at that time had indicated or given any evidences of thinking along those terms or shown sympathy for Communist control of China or Japan?

A. I don't know. Sympathy for Communist control of China or Japan—I don't think so.

Mr. ACHILLES. Or Soviet control?

A. Certainly not.

Mr. ACHILLES. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state the date on which you left Japan?

A. It was in February 1946. I have forgotten the date but I came with the Far Eastern Commission on the steamship *Mt. McKinley* in February 1946.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know, during the period while in Japan, of any other contacts Mr. Service had with the Japanese Communists than the one you have spoken of?

A. No, I do not. As I say, he may have been present at other interviews which I had with Nosaka.

The CHAIRMAN. Aside from these?

A. Aside from those in which I was present myself I know of no other contacts which he had.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you know of other cases other than these two instances in which he showed any interest in the Japanese Communists?

A. None except an academic interest which we all had in what was happening and what they were doing and the progress of their movement.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "academic interest" you mean factual interest?

A. Yes; from the point of view of a Foreign Service officer who is supposed to be extremely interested in all these political developments but he was no more interested in the Communist Party than in the Socialist Party or the Liberal Party or the others.

The CHAIRMAN. In the pursuit of the factual interest of which you spoke, he relied on your reports rather than seeking out his own information?

A. As far as I know, except the reports that came into our office from the Government and various other sources. It was, insofar as I know, an intellectual interest because he wasn't personally concerned with writing reports himself.

(At this point the Board went into executive session.)

Mr. RHETTS. I have no further questions.

Mr. ACHILLES. I would like to ask just one question. Did you ever meet a person by the name of Thomas A. Bisson?

A. Yes; I think I met him purely in a casual way when he talked about renting a house which I had at one time.

Mr. ACHILLES. Where was this?

A. In Washington in 1942. I may have met him at one time in Tokyo, but I certainly did not talk with him, and I don't know him except two casual meetings.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do you remember how long he was in Tokyo during the period Mr. Service was assigned there?

A. I do not, because I don't know when he went to Tokyo. I believe he was in Tokyo for quite some time.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do you recall whether Mr. Service knew him?

A. I don't know.

Mr. ACHILLES. Not to your knowledge?

A. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Emerson. Mr. Achilles, can you finish up your questions on the preceding issue?

(Testimony by Mr. Service as follows:)

Questions by Mr. Achilles:

Q. Mr. Service, you have testified, I believe, that you did not have in your possession at any time an ozalid copy of your reports. Is that correct?—A. That is correct. When you say "in my possession," you mean "to retain"?

Q. That is correct.—A. I may have had one or two in my hand at some time, but I never had any in my possession to retain.

Q. Did you ever give any one any ozalid copies of your reports?—A. I never gave any one ozalid copies of my reports at any time. I mentioned one instance, which I recall, when I was asked by Mr. Vincent to have a brief talk with Mr. Robertson, who was going out to China as Minister Counselor at Chungking, and I think at that time, according to my recollection, I had someone dig out, in the Division of Chinese Affairs, several of my earlier memoranda which I used in my conversation with Mr. Robertson and left with him, but I never gave any ozalid copies to people outside the Department.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "left with him"—

A. It took place in Mr. Vincent's office, and the long report I left with him to read.

Q. But you never gave Mr. Jaffe ozalid copies of your reports?—A. I did not.

Q. Or Mr. Larsen?—A. No, sir.

Q. Or Mr. Gayn?—A. No, sir.

Q. Or Lieutenant Roth?—A. No, sir.

Q. You have also testified, I believe, on Miss Mitchell?—A. I did not.

Q. You have also testified, I believe, that you did give a carbon copy of one of your reports to Mr. Jaffe on the evening of April 19, 1945, and that the following day you allowed him to keep perhaps 8 or 10 copies of other of your reports?—

A. That is correct. Those are my personal carbon copies.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Your testimony wasn't that you gave him copies or allowed him to keep copies but that you allowed him to take them for a limited period.

A. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you allow him to take that first report with him, to retain it?

A. Not to retain it.

The CHAIRMAN. To retain it overnight.

A. I believe I did. I wasn't positive on that point, but to the best of my recollection I did, there being no opportunity for him to read it at the time that I met him.

Q. Prior to your meeting with Mr. Jaffe on April 19th, you had no knowledge of whether or not he was editor of Amerasia?—A. That is correct.

Q. And you did not or did you make any inquiries of anyone in the Department, either in Mr. McDermott's office or the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, as to his reliability as a journalist?—A. I did not prior to that meeting on the 19th.

Q. Did you subsequently?—A. Yes; subsequently I made some inquiries. I am not sure exactly from whom.

Q. Someone in the Department?—A. Yes; and some people outside the Department.

Q. And do you recall what in general was the nature of their replies to your inquiries?—A. I think I testified regarding one inquiry I made to Lieutenant Roth, who assured me Mr. Jaffe was not a Communist. He called him, I believe, a left-winger. I remember specifically an inquiry of a newspaper correspondent, who I knew quite well out in China, who had at one time been a Trotskyite. As I remember, he did not believe that Jaffe was a Communist, but he did not like him. That inquiry was not made until sometime after these events took place.

Q. But you made no inquiry about him prior to April 20?—A. No, sir; I had not.

Q. Could you explain why you gave a journalist, about whose reliability you had no information, copies of your reports to read?—A. Part of the reason was the substantive nature of the reports. The material was of general knowledge and had been used repeatedly in talks and was already largely duplicated in writings by correspondents on visits to China and by other writers who visited China.

The second reason was, I believe, that I had been accustomed for at least 2 years previously, or very nearly 2 years previously, to dealing on the basis of mutual confidence with a large number of correspondents and members of the press, and I

had never had any reason to believe the confidences had been violated; and I think it should be borne in mind for 2 years previously, or very nearly 2 years previously, I had been in a very unusually independent position for a young Foreign Service officer.

Q. What criteria, if I might ask again, did you use in deciding which of your reports you felt it appropriate to show Mr. Jaffe?—A. The general criteria was that they were informative, factual, descriptive, and containing material describing the Chinese Communists, what they were doing, what their program and policy was, whether it was the type of material which had been used in such talks as the background talks to the research staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations, whether it was the type of information which was available to correspondents in Yenan.

Q. Have you ever, subsequent to June 6, 1945, shown any classified material to a correspondent whose reliability you had not inquired about?—A. I have never, since April 20, shown any classified information of any kind to any correspondent. I have never at any time shown any correspondent a copy of a dispatch or a telegram or an official memorandum of the State Department, or similar official papers of the United States Army or any other Government agency. The only papers I have ever shown a correspondent are these personal copies of my personal memoranda which did not purport to be other than my personal views or observations.

Q. And since that time you have not shown any unofficial person any copies of your own memoranda or similar memoranda?—A. I never have. I might say I have never followed the practice of keeping personal copies of dispatches which I wrote for anyone else's signature, and since these events I have had several occasions to warn junior officers and to dissuade them from keeping copies of dispatches which they have drafted.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. I believe you have testified, have you not, Mr. Service, that your instructions in the field with respect to your relationships with press representatives were oral?—A. That is correct.

Q. Were you ever informed by any person in the Department as to any oral rules or regulations with respect to your contacts with the press when you were in Washington on consultation?—A. I never received such instructions from anyone in any form.

Q. You did not seek them either?—A. No, sir; I did not. I might say also, if I may, that I have never, either during my period with the Army nor during my duty with the Department of State prior to my arrest, prior to June 1945, been criticized or reprimanded in any way concerning any relations with the press.

Q. When you were given authorization—I believe you stated you were given authorization to appear before the Institute of Pacific Relations?—A. Yes, sir; I did so testify.

Q. Were you instructed by the person who gave you authorization as to the substance of your talk?—A. I do not recall any instructions whatsoever concerning what I should say.

Q. Do you interpret that as meaning to use your discretion as to materials you may utilize; that is, the subject matter which you might utilize?—A. Yes. That is why there was no prepared text in any sense, and I was never asked for any.

The CHAIRMAN. For a moment that closes that phase of the case as far as the Board is concerned. Do you have anything more you wish to offer at this time, or do you wish to go ahead with the Chinese affairs?

Mr. RHETTS. Mr. Chairman, I am at a loss to know how to proceed here because of new materials that have come into the proceeding and into lines of testimony that have been given by Mr. Ballantine and Mr. McDermott. I feel now we must develop this subject matter at some length, so that I am not prepared to leave the present phase of this as it stands. I mean, we can go ahead with this Japanese material now.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel is at liberty to produce evidence at any time. I am inquiring as to the present disposition of this case, whether you wish to go ahead.

Mr. RHETTS. I will go ahead now with the further material on this. Will you take the stand, Mr. Service, please.

Mr. SERVICE. Yes.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. I should like to introduce into the transcript Document 10-3.
(The matter referred is as follows:)

"DOCUMENT No. 10-3

"(Remarks of Congressman Dondero, Congressional Record, October 10, 1945, p. 9553)

"From these known facts, the case bears all the earmarks of a whitewash. Congress should inquire into this case. Who is responsible for its liquidation? What is behind it? This is the same crowd who opposed our national defense program in 1940 and 1941. This means that from now on Soviet agents can carry on espionage with impunity. This is an open invitation to subversive elements in our Government to continue, expand, and increase their activities and defy all consideration of national security. This is the same crowd which is now vilifying General MacArthur. This is not the cause for which enormous sacrifices in blood and treasure were made unstintingly by our country. Congress must inquire into this matter. The people look to us for action."

Q. I should like to ask you, Mr. Service, whether you have ever had any occasion to vilify the work of General MacArthur, as is indicated in this statement by Congressman Dondero?—A. I certainly have not, and I think anyone who is acquainted with the status of the Office of the Political Adviser in Tokyo, during this period I was there, would realize that we were in no position whatever to vilify the activities of General MacArthur, who was the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, in any way. General MacArthur received his orders and instructions, as I recall it, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. ACHILLES. I believe the allegation made in this particular document is not that you were supervising General MacArthur but that you were vilifying him.

Q. I should like to refer further to Document 10-3 and ask you, Mr. Service, whether you ever at any time opposed the national defense program in 1940 and 1941?—A. I certainly did not. I wasn't in a position to write dispatches or other papers on the subject. I was a junior officer assigned to the consul general in Shanghai, and I believe all my friends who knew me at the time would be able to testify that my sympathies were entirely interventionist, you might say, during that period. I was extremely happy over the destroyer deal; I was privately critical, among my friends, because of the Neutrality Act which hampered our aid to Europe; I was an enthusiastic supporter of lend-lease; and I would have been willing for our Government to go much further if public opinion had supported it, since I believed we would have to be in the war eventually and that it was really in a sense our war. I did not, of course, make any public statements during that period nor write for publication.

Mr. ACHILLES. What was the Communist attitude toward the war during that period?

A. The Communist attitude at that time was that it was an imperialistic war, and the Communists attacked every step we progressively took to ready ourselves and bring ourselves into a position to enter the war.

Q. Have you ever at any time been engaged in any program vilifying General MacArthur?—A. I have never been engaged in any such program. I never have vilified him.

The CHAIRMAN. General MacArthur?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point Documents 58-3 and 84-3.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"KAMP—AMERICA BETRAYED

"Acheson and Service were sent to backstop General MacArthur in Japan, although MacArthur rejected Service."

"(Taylor, Henry J.—J/S Record—Congressional Record, May 1, 1950, pp. A3322—A3323)

"After all this, Service was assigned to Japan to tell General MacArthur, of all people, how to negotiate with Russia. General MacArthur reportedly rejected Service."

A. I might say I have been asked many times about General MacArthur by many people who know I have been in Japan, and I have always expressed my

honest opinion that he did a splendid job in Japan. The occupation was handled magnificently.

Q. Referring to Documents 58-3 and 84-3. Mr. Service, I believe you indicated you were transferred by the Department of State from Tokyo to a post in New Zealand largely because you had been in extremely ill health during the last 4 months of your stay in Tokyo?—A. That's right. I was hospitalized the last 4 months in Tokyo.

Q. Do you have any knowledge that General MacArthur either rejected you, when it was proposed to send you to Tokyo, or that he ever had any connection with your transfer from Tokyo to New Zealand?—A. No, sir; he could not have rejected me, because the Department of State would not have sent me if he had made any objection; and on the first day I was there he received me extremely cordially. I might say, when I was returning to Washington for these hearings, his headquarters was extremely kind in making available for myself and my family living quarters at the Imperial Hotel, which is a billet reserved for people of considerable rank, rooms in which are made available only by specific authorization of General MacArthur's own office.

Q. In connection with these charges that have been made by Mr. Kamp and Mr. Henry J. Taylor, did you make any effort to obtain an expression of facts from General MacArthur?—A. I did not personally, sir, but I understand the Department of State has made such an inquiry.

Q. And has a paraphrase of the reply, which the Department of State received, been made available to you?—A. It has.

Q. Is that document 322?—A. That is correct.

Q. I should like to ask at this time that Document 322 be included in the transcript at this point.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"PARAPHRASE OF PART OF A COMMUNICATION FROM TOKYO"

"With reference to the recall of Mr. John Service from Tokyo, General MacArthur has indicated that he was not connected in any way with that action which he understands was made on the Department of State's own initiative because of Mr. Service's prolonged illness. The General has stated also that he did not reject the proposal of the State Department that Mr. Service be assigned to Japan. He further indicated that he has not had personally any connection with this incident."

Q. Now, Mr. Service, in your personal statement, which has already been included in the transcript, you have described the circumstances of your meeting Mr. Nosaka in Tokyo. This, I take it, was an attempt to describe the incident of your meeting Mr. Nosaka in the office of the political adviser, as has been charged in one of the papers furnished to you by the Board. Is that correct?—A. That is correct.

Q. Did you ever, after this occasion which you have described, see Mr. Nosaka again?—A. Yes, very briefly, on two occasions. I might say here that I have no recollection of being present at any meetings with Mr. Nosaka at which Mr. Emmerson was present other than the initial one, which Mr. Emmerson described. I did not usually sit in or take part in these conversations which the political reporting officers were continually having with Japanese leaders. My own duties were extremely heavy and it wasn't part of my work to engage in political reporting, so the only time I remember seeing Mr. Nosaka in the office of the political adviser was this occasion when he made the initial or courtesy call and asked to see me since he had met me in Yenan. That is the occasion I describe here.

I remember some time after that passing him on the street. I remember exactly where it was and which street it was. I don't remember the name but it was one of the places where the main street goes under the elevated railways. I was walking very hurriedly toward the office and somebody said "Hello, Mr. Service." Mr. Nosaka spoke English quite well, and it was Mr. Nosaka, and we stepped on the sidewalk and shook hands, and the conversation was only a minute or two. I think he described the difficulties in locating office quarters. He was out trying to find an office or something of the sort.

Then when I was in the United States Army hospital in Tokyo—I have no idea of the date except it must have been the latter period of my stay there when I was convalescing—I had a call. One of the Japanese hospital orderlies came up from the reception room and said that there was a Japanese to see me and I went downstairs to the reception room lobby and to my surprise it was Mr. Nosaka, who said he heard I had been sick for a long time and in

the Japanese way said he was very sorry and that he hoped it was nothing about Japan or anything like that that caused my illness and he wanted to present to me a Japanese book which he had just written about his experiences in China during the war. I, of course, don't read Japanese so it was only a courtesy gift.

The conversation lasted a few minutes. He left and I have never seen him since but at none of the three meetings—they could not be designated as talks—did he discuss the political affairs of Japan or the activities of the Communist Party.

I might say that I had a number of calls in the hospital from Japanese whom I have met even though I have known them only slightly.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean Japanese who had been in China?

A. No; Japanese whom I had met in Tokyo.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you meet any Japanese Communists in Japan outside of Mr. Nosaka?

A. You may recall that Mr. Emmerson's recollection was that another Japanese Communist accompanied Mr. Nosaka at that initial call at the office of the political adviser. I have no recollection of meeting that other person or at any time meeting any other Japanese Communists. I think it quite likely that somebody may have brought Mr. Nosaka to our office and maybe accompanied him. He was the leader of the party and it would be quite normal for somebody to be accompanying him but in any case my own interest in the conversation was simply that he had asked to say "How do you do," and I greeted him and left after a few minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. But you made no connections with the official Japanese Communist Party of any sort?

A. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you speak Japanese?

A. No. I, of course, learned a few words while there but I did not study the language.

Q. I would like to introduce into the transcript at this point Document No. 48 which is a 2-page affidavit, dated April 20, 1950, signed by W. J. Sebald.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

"JAPAN.

City of Tokyo ss:

American Consular Service.

"Before me, Lora C. Bryning, Vice Consul of the United States of America in and for Tokyo, Japan, duly commissioned and qualified, personally appeared William J. Sebald, Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

"1. I arrived in Tokyo, Japan, on January 8, 1946, for the purpose of taking up my assignment as an Auxiliary Foreign Service Officer attached to the staff of the Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan. Among other Foreign Service Officers assigned to the United States Foreign Service establishment in Japan was John S. Service, whose duties in the Mission, to the best of my recollection, were primarily concerned with the general administration of the office with part time devoted to the duties of political liaison officer. Foreign Service Officer John K. Emmerson served in the capacity of political reporting officer.

"2. Sometime during January 1946 I recall Mr. Emmerson asking me, in view of the probability that I would succeed Mr. Emmerson as political reporting officer, whether I would be interested in meeting Sanzo NOSAKA alias Sanji OKANO, a Japanese communist leader who had recently returned to Japan from Yenai, China, via Korea. It appeared that Mr. Emmerson had previously met Nosaka at Yenai. While I was being introduced to Nosaka, Mr. Service entered the room for the purpose of discussing another matter with Mr. Emmerson, with the result that his meeting with Nosaka, whom I understand Mr. Service had also met at Yenai during the war years, was unexpected and casual. The conversation, as well as I can remember, was of a casual nature and did not go beyond the usual greetings which would normally be exchanged with an acquaintance whom one has not seen for a long period of time.

"3. I have no knowledge of any subsequent meeting between Mr. Service and Nosaka. I would most probably have learned of such meeting had one taken place.

"4. I did not consider the presence of Nosaka in Mr. Emmerson's office a circumstance of an unusual nature, as Mr. Emmerson was charged with preparing a weekly report for the Department of State with respect to the development

of Japanese political parties, copies of which were invariably forwarded to General Headquarters for information. Interviews of a similar nature were arranged by officers of General Headquarters and Mr. Emmerson with numerous party leaders of all shades of political opinion, a procedure which I would consider normal for any Foreign Service Officer engaged in political reporting.

"5. For approximately the first five months of 1946 (during the remainder of his stay in Japan Mr. Service was a patient at the 49th General Hospital) I was in almost daily contact with Mr. Service in the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan, and also was with him upon many social occasions. Furthermore, I saw many reports, telegrams, memoranda, and other documents drafted by Mr. Service during the course of discharge of his official duties, and had numerous official and unofficial conversations with him upon matters pertaining to the Japanese situation. In consequence, I have no reason whatsoever to believe that Mr. Service was other than a loyal officer of the United States Government. Nor was there any reason to consider that Mr. Service was not fully indoctrinated in and carried out the highest security requirements of the Foreign Service of the United States.

"Further deponent saith not.

"/S/ W. J. SEBALD.

"Subscribed and sworn to before me this twentieth day of April A. D. 1950.

"/S/ LORA C. BRYNING.

"Vice Consul of the United States of America."

Q. Now, after you became ill, I believe you were transferred from Tokyo to New Zealand?—A. That is correct. The original plan was to transfer me to Manila but when my illness continued, the Department apparently decided to move me entirely out of the Orient and try to put me in a healthier climate for a while so that I could recover my health.

Mr. ACHILLES. Before we leave Japan, you have stated, I believe, that Mr. Bisson came to Japan as a member of the bombing survey.

A. That is my recollection. I believe that is correct.

Q. Would you tell us the extent of your contacts with Mr. Bisson in Japan?—A. My recollection of his first stay in Japan is that I saw him only on one occasion and I believe that it was the evening of a reunion of quite a large number of people who had been interested in the Far East. The next time he was in Japan, and I think it was probably early April, I saw him once.

Mr. ACHILLES. You said "people interested in the Far East." Wasn't practically everybody in Japan at that point interested in the Far East? Could you specify further as to the nature of the gathering?

A. They were mostly academic—people of some academic background—research background in connection with the various organizations such as the Institute of Pacific Relations or foreign policy organizations. The group, for instance, included Americans. Owen Lattimore was there that evening. There was a Japanese who had been in IPR in New York before the war. There was a man from New Zealand. I am not sure whether a man named Boxer was there, an English former army officer. They were people mostly attached to the Far Eastern Advisory Commission or Pauley mission.

Mr. ACHILLES. Will you continue as to any other contacts you had with Mr. Bisson?

A. Those two are the only ones of which I have any recollection.

Mr. ACHILLES. Which was the second one? I think you were interrupted.

A. The first was the end of 1945 or the beginning of 1946.

Mr. ACHILLES. At this gathering?

A. Yes, at this informal gathering. The second one was in April 1946 when he had just arrived in Tokyo as a civilian employee of the Government section of SCAP. I may have passed him in the corridors or seen him in the hotel, that sort of casual contact, but I have no recollection of him—

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you have any close association with him during that latter period?

A. No, I did not. He was, as I say, working in the Government section of headquarters and my work did not put me in touch with that section of SCAP at all. Some of the political reporting officers had contact with the Government section but whatever contacts I had with SCAP were almost entirely with the Adjutant General's Office and some of the administrative officers whom we had to approach in connection with the transmission of our messages. All our intelligence, in and out, went through intelligence facilities and there were fairly frequent problems concerned with that.

We were dependent on the Army for supplies, quarters, billeting of our personnel, and, in the latter stage when commissaries were set up, to arrange for commissary privileges and I handled most of that generally through the Adjutant General's Office.

Mr. ACHILLES. But you did not have occasion to see Mr. Bisson either officially or unofficially?

A. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 5:30. Do you want to proceed with New Zealand?

A. He was in an entirely separate billet, located some distance from where I was living.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume New Zealand would be quiet short.

Mr. RHETTS. Yes, it would be quite short but I would be delighted to adjourn now.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn at this point.

(The meeting adjourned at 5:30 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETINGS IN THE MATTER OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: June 7, 1950—10 a. m. to 11:10 a. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building.

Reporter: Goodwin Shapiro.

Members of the board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles; Arthur G. Stevens; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Counsel for John Stewart Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhett, Reilly, Rhett & Ruckelshaus.

(The board reconvened at 10 a.m., June 7, 1950.)

The CHAIRMAN. The board will be in session.

(U. Alexis Johnson, a witness in behalf of John Stewart Service, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Will you state your full name and address for the record, Mr. Johnson.—

A. U. Alexis Johnson, 2019 Rosemount Avenue NW., Washington 10.

Q. What is your present position, sir?—A. Deputy Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, in the Department.

Q. And are you a Foreign Service officer?—A. I am a Foreign Service officer; yes, sir.

Q. Will you tell us what your post was or what your position was or positions were during the period from about September 1945 to September 1946.—A. In the latter part of August 1945, while consul at Manila, I was detailed by the Department to GHQ—that is, General MacArthur's headquarters—to accompany them to Japan, and came to Japan on September 2, 1945, at the time of the surrender. Under general headquarters orders I proceeded to Korea about 17 of September 1945, where I was attached to General Hodge's headquarters. I returned to Japan under orders of the Department during the middle of October 1945 to open and establish at Yokohama the Yokohama branch of the Office of the United States Political Adviser, at which post I was commissioned as consul in charge, and remained in that position throughout 1946.

Q. Now are you acquainted with Mr. Service?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. I wonder if you would tell the board how long you have known Mr. Service and something of the extent of your acquaintanceship and your relationship with him.—A. I wasn't personally acquainted with Mr. Service until I returned to Japan in October 1946. However, we had entered the Foreign Service at approximately the same time and I had met him casually before that time and knew him well by reputation in the Foreign Service as he was serving in China and I was serving in Japan roughly from the period of 1935 until the outbreak of the war.

Q. When you said you were not personally acquainted with him until you returned to Japan in 1946, I take it you meant 1945, did you not?—A. 1945; I'm sorry. That should be corrected to October 1945. When I returned to Japan in October 1945, he was serving as executive officer in the Office of the Political Adviser at Tokyo and I was serving as consul in charge of the office at Yokohama, and I had repeated and frequent contact with him officially in connection with the problems of reopening the office, personnel, and everything related thereto;

and the problems that he faced at Tokyo and the problems I faced at Yokohama being very parallel, I looked to him for my guidance and principal contact at Tokyo, our relations being, although not in name, being roughly similar to that of a diplomatic mission to a consulate.

Q. In that connection, when you say Mr. Service was the executive officer of the Office of the Political Adviser at Tokyo, was the executive officer purely an administrative officer or was he in charge of any of the substantive functions of the office?—A. Purely administrative in its broad sense—that is, everything having to do with the running and the operating of the office.

Q. The mechanical operations.—A. The mechanical operations, but not substantive operations; yes.

Q. During the period that you were consul at Yokohama did you have occasion to visit Tokyo from time to time?—A. I visited Tokyo frequently—at least several times a week, often daily throughout a week.

Q. That frequently?—A. Yes.

Q. Would you say that on the basis of that relationship that you have just described that you were reasonably familiar with what was going on in the Office of the Political Adviser in Tokyo?—A. Yes, in general.

Q. It has been charged by a person whose name we do not know who evidently must have been in Tokyo at the time, that Mr. Service took an extremely favorable view toward the Japanese Communists while he was serving in Tokyo. Did you ever have any occasion to hear Mr. Service express any views on that line?—A. None whatsoever. In that connection, if I may go on, I, of course, saw Mr. Service frequently, officially as well, we being officers interested in the same things, and to the best of my recollection, insofar as we ever discussed Japanese politics, the question of Japanese Communists was never raised in any way, and I had certainly no reason to believe that he adopted what you might term any favorable view toward Japanese Communists.

Q. This same person is also alleged to have said that during his duty in Tokyo Mr. Service seemed to be completely enamored of Communist theory. In any of your contacts with him did you every have any basis for believing he was enamored of Communist theory?—A. Most emphatically, no.

Q. In the course of any of your conversations did you have occasion to form any view as to what his general or his particular political outlook and views were?—A. No, none other than the objective view of a situation that you would expect any Foreign Service officer to take.

Q. Now this same source of information is reported to have said that Mr. Service and others talked to leaders of the Japanese Communist Party in the offices of the political adviser in Tokyo and that this conversation with these leaders of the Japanese Communist Party aroused very considerable comment. Do you recall any such conversation that you ever learned about which was the subject of any considerable comment around the office?—A. I have no recollection of anything of that nature.

Q. Do you, as a matter of fact, have any personal knowledge of whether leaders and other persons active in the various political parties did have occasion to come to the offices of the political adviser during this period?—A. I don't have personal knowledge of it, but simply from what I had when I was present in the office, I received the impression that leaders of all political parties in Japan were—let's say instead of all political parties, political leaders in Japan were visiting the Office of the Political Adviser in the same way that they would any United States mission abroad.

Q. Do you happen to know who was the political reporting officer for the office at that time?—A. Well, Ambassador Acheson was doing considerable of it himself, and I think Mr. Emerson was doing most of the working-level work at that time. I simply don't recall the organization clearly enough at the moment to say anything beyond that. Certainly, Mr. Service wasn't doing any political reporting insofar as I knew at that time.

Q. I have no further questions.

Mr. ACHILLES. As far as you know, Mr. Service indicated no intellectual or other sympathy of any kind either with Japanese communism or Soviet communism.

A. Certainly not.

The CHAIRMAN. No questions. Thank you very much.

(Robert A. Fearey, called as a witness in behalf of John Stewart Service, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Will you state your full name and address, Mr. Fearey.—A. Robert A. Fearey, 5422 Broad Branch Road NW.

Q. And what is your present position, Mr. Fearey?—A. I am a desk officer in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

Q. Are you a Foreign Service officer?—A. No, Department.

Q. Will you tell the Board what your position was roughly from September 1945 to September 1946.—A. My technical title was, I think, economic analyst, but the position I held in the register of the office of the political adviser was special assistant to the political adviser.

Q. Political adviser where?—A. Political adviser to General MacArthur in Tokyo.

Q. In Tokyo. And you were throughout the approximate period of a year that I have mentioned—you were in Tokyo?—A. I was in Tokyo from mid-October 1945 through May 1946.

Q. Now, are you acquainted with Mr. Service, Mr. Fearey?—A. Yes.

Q. Would you tell us when you first met Mr. Service and something of your acquaintanceship with him since that time?—A. I think I first met him—I couldn't be positive of this, but I think it was in 1945—the spring of 1945, when he came back from China, and I saw him occasionally at meetings or in the halls of the old State Department building. Since that time I knew him in the office of the political adviser in Tokyo, and I have seen him officially since his last return from India, and off and on during the last year or so.

Q. Now, during the period that you were in Tokyo, what was Mr. Service's position there?—A. He was executive officer—I believe was his formal title—in the office. His responsibilities were to administer the office, assign work, and keep things running.

Q. Now it has been charged by a person whose name is unknown to us that while Mr. Service was in Tokyo he took an extremely favorable view toward the Japanese Communists. Do you have any information which will either support or not support or in any way cast any light on the accuracy of this assertion?—A. No, I have no information that would support that at all.

Q. In the course of your work there did it ever come to your attention that Mr. Service was energetically or otherwise exhibiting an extremely favorable view toward the Japanese Communists?—A. Not at all.

Q. This same person is also alleged to have said that during his service in Tokyo Mr. Service seemed to be completely enamored of Communist theory. On the basis of your knowledge of Mr. Service during this period, do you have any evidence to support that assertion?—A. None whatsoever.

Q. Did you ever hear him express any views tending to indicate that he regarded communism as a desirable way of life?—A. No, I didn't.

Q. Now it has also been stated by this same anonymous source that Mr. Service and others talked to leaders of the Japanese Communist Party in the offices of the political adviser in Tokyo and that this conversation aroused very considerable comment. Did any such conversation ever come to your attention?—A. I can vaguely remember hearing that Nosaka had called the office and that some officers had seen him, but the information came to me in a purely incidental fashion. Nobody made anything of it and it just didn't strike me particularly at the time at all.

Q. As a matter of fact, did you have any knowledge whether Nosaka and other leaders of various political parties called at the office of the political adviser frequently or from time to time?—A. Yes, it was my impression—I wasn't working in that particular field, but it was my impression that political leaders in Japan called quite frequently on political officers in the office.

Q. But as far as you know, any conversation that Mr. Service may have had with Mr. Nosaka wasn't regarded as some untoward event which attracted widespread comment?—A. No, I never had any indication that it was attracting comment or was out of the ordinary.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, did he come to see Mr. Service or some other officer? The information I received didn't indicate that.

A. I just heard maybe in a luncheon conversation a day or two later that he had called and seen some officer. I don't think Mr. Service was even mentioned as having been one of those officers.

Q. I have no further questions.

Mr. ACHILLES. From your personal knowledge, you have no reason for believing that Mr. Service at that time was sympathetic in any way with communism?

A. No reason whatsoever.

Mr. ACHILLES. Was your association with him especially close so that you probably would have been conscious of that if he had been?

A. I think I would have been. I don't see much of Mr. Service outside of the office. Living in a rather tightly knit community, we saw each other rather frequently, but I wouldn't say he was a particularly close social friend; but being as closely knit as we were, I think anything of that sort would have come to my attention if it had been occurring.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to invite the Board's attention to a letter which I addressed to General Snow on April 26, 1950, in which I pointed out that in connection with these charges one of the persons who served in the office of the political adviser with Mr. Service at this time was Mr. Max Bishop, a Foreign Service officer now on duty in Washington, and I requested that because of his opportunity for knowledge relating to the very matters that are charged here—I requested that the Board call Mr. Bishop as a witness to testify under oath at this proceeding. I should like to ask the Board whether Mr. Bishop will be available to testify.

The CHAIRMAN. The Board has requested Mr. Bishop to give testimony, and he has declined to give it because he said he could add nothing to the case.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like at this point to ask the Board whether or not it has received a letter dated April 17 from Sir Patrick Duff.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we have such a letter.

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to ask that that be placed in the transcript at this point as document No. 45.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 45

DEVONSHIRE HOUSE,
MAYFAIR PLACE, LONDON, W. 1.
17 April, 1950.

Tel: Grosvenor 6101

DEAR SIR: May I introduce myself by saying that from 1945 till towards the end of last year, when I retired from the public service at my own request, after reaching the age of 60, I was High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in New Zealand. Since then, my Government has appointed me Chairman of a newly constituted body called the National Parks Commission: the Archbishop of Canterbury has nominated me a Church Commissioner for England: and I am a Director of the National Bank of New Zealand and of Dalgety and Co.

The successive American Ambassadors in New Zealand during my time there were Mr. Patten, Mr. Avra Warren, and Mr. Scotten, who all know me: and Mr. Ray Atherton has known me for many years both in London and in Canada.

I have learned today with deep concern that my friend Mr. John S. Service is shortly to face hearings before the Loyalty Security Board regarding imputations of his having had Communist associations. I hope that you, Sir, will not think it an intrusion on my part if I venture, as an outsider, to write you a few of my impressions of Mr. Service's record and performance in New Zealand.

We were often at one another's houses, and my wife and I met Mr. and Mrs. Service constantly at the various official and social occasions to which members of the Diplomatic Corps are subject in the capitals to which they are accredited. I have, myself, unusual affection and respect both for Mr. and Mrs. Service, and I doubt whether any two representatives of their country have ever been held in more general esteem than these two were in New Zealand. I cannot recall any particular incident demonstrating anti-communist feelings on his part: but his whole attitude to life and all his social relationships make any imputation of communist leanings on his part to my mind fantastic. New Zealanders, as you may know, are very far from being tainted with communism. Mr. Service, as I have mentioned, was universally popular; and, as one of your own Statesmen has said, "You cannot fool all the people all the time."

I hope that you will not feel that it is presumptuous or irregular of me to write to you in this manner. If I have been at fault in so doing I beg that you will not lay my fault at Mr. Service's door, but that you will attribute it to my affection for Mr. Service personally, and my esteem for one whom I regard as a most distinguished servant of his country and—I like to think—a friend of my own country.

Yours very truly,

PATRICK DUFF.

P. S.—I recall that Lady Duff and I were dining one night in Wellington with Mr. and Mrs. Service. It was a completely private and informal party; and it happened to be Her Royal Highness Princess Elizabeth's birthday. At the end of dinner, Mr. Service rose and invited his guests to drink the health of the Princess. This graceful act of courtesy, which touched my wife and myself not a little, may seem just the gesture of a diplomat, as I recount it in cold type. But it is hardly the type of gesture, I should fancy, which anyone of communist leanings would go out of his way to make!

Mr. RHETTS. I should like at this time to introduce into the transcript Document No. 55, which is an unclassified dispatch, dated March 28, 1950, and signed by Robert M. Scotten, Howard Elting, Jr., Osborn S. Watson, Meade T. Foster, and Armistead M. Lee.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be entered in the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 55

FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Security: Unclassified.

Priority: Air pouch.

To: Department of State.

From: Wellington. 163. March 28, 1950.

Ref.:

Subject: Statement in support of John S. Service.

The undersigned, who comprise all of the officers of the American Embassy, Wellington, who had the privilege of serving with John S. Service at this mission, wish to record our appreciation and support of the forthright statements made in his defense by Deputy Under Secretary Peurifoy, as reported in the Bulletin of the Department of State and in the Department's daily wireless bulletin.

During his tour of duty in Wellington as First Secretary and, for a time, Chargé d'Affaires, Jack and Caroline Service won the universal respect and affection of a wide circle of acquaintances, both New Zealanders and Americans, but more particularly of those who worked with him at this mission. We regarded him and his wife as ideal representatives of the United States abroad. This view has also been expressed to us on many occasions by officials of the New Zealand Government.

Since we had complete confidence not only in his ability and his discretion but also his unqualified loyalty to the United States, we feel that the aspersions that have been made against him affect the entire Foreign Service. Accordingly, we wish to add our wholehearted endorsement to Mr. Peurifoy's statement that "the sympathy and good wishes of the entire Department go out to them."

ROBERT M. SCOTTEN.

HOWARD ELTING, Jr.

OSBORN S. WATSON,

MEADE T. FOSTER.

ARMISTEAD M. LEE.

Mr. RHETTS. At this point I should like to introduce into the transcript Document No. 56, which is a dispatch dated April 3, 1950, signed by Robert M. Scotten.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be made a part of the transcript.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 56

FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Security: Restricted

Priority: Air pouch

To: Department of State

From: Wellington 212 April 3, 1950

Ref:

Subject: Reaction of New Zealand government officials to Senator McCarthy's attack on Mr. John S. Service

Previous reports have mentioned the dismay and indignation with which New Zealanders who knew Mr. John SERVICE when he was First Secretary at this

Embassy have reacted to the news of his sudden recall, while en route to India, to answer the charges of Senator Joseph McCARTHY. In view of the keen interest which this matter has aroused in official Wellington, a fuller report appears to be in order, particularly with regard to the comments made to officers of the Embassy by ranking officials of the New Zealand Government.

The gentlemen whose comments are summarized below are among the best-equipped individuals in New Zealand to judge the issues involved. They knew Mr. Service intimately during the period of his service in Wellington. They are thoroughly familiar with the facts and the arguments bearing on the current controversy over the China policy, in which Mr. Service's name is involved. In particular, they have all read, in whole or in part, the Department's "White Paper" on China, including despatches written by Mr. Service from Chungking. They were all fully acquainted with the Amerasia incident, in which Mr. Service was exonerated of the charge of having given classified information to a magazine editor. Finally, they were most of them personally acquainted with Brigadier General HURLEY when he was American Minister in Wellington.

It might be mentioned here that none of these officials, as far as the Embassy is aware, has ever been suspected of being sympathetic to Communism. They have, on the contrary, made it abundantly clear that they are genuinely alarmed over the growth of Communism in Asia. Moreover, they have all manifested on many occasions a sympathetic understanding of the United States and an approval of the broad objectives of American foreign policy.

Mr. A. D. MACINTOSH, Secretary of External Affairs, told an officer of the Embassy that his own reaction, and that of his associates, was one of intense indignation. He had felt so strongly on the subject that he had at first considered writing personally to friends in the Department of State, notably Mr. Hickerson, expressing his complete confidence in Mr. Service. He had decided, however, especially after reading Mr. Peurifoy's statement (which greatly cheered him) that this gesture would be superfluous, since it was evident that the Department was standing solidly behind Mr. Service.

It was scandalous, he thought, that the character and loyalty of capable public servants, such as Mr. Service, could be impugned without the slightest evidence, for the sake of domestic party politics. In his opinion, based on an intimate acquaintance, Mr. Service could never be classified as even a "fellow traveler." He was, said Mr. MacIntosh, a true liberal, in the best sense of the word.

The comment of Mr. FOSS SHANAHAN, Secretary of Cabinet and Deputy Secretary of External Affairs, although made at a separate time and place, was very similar to that of Mr. MacIntosh. Apart from the distress which he felt because of his own personal attachment and admiration for Mr. Service, he thought it scandalous that a diplomatic officer should be penalized, and his loyalty called into question, because his opinions did not agree with those of his chief. Mr. Shanahan made it clear that he was referring here to Mr. Service's position in the Embassy at Chungking under Brigadier General Hurley. In his opinion, history had vindicated the correctness of views expressed at that time by Mr. Service and his colleagues; the tragedy of the situation was that their advice was not taken. He noted that the Economist, in its review of the White Paper, had singled out the Service despatches for special quotation. (The fact that Mr. Shanahan was so explicit in his endorsement not only of Mr. Service's character and loyalty, but also of his judgment, as a political reporting officer in China, is especially interesting because: (a) Mr. Shanahan's own area specialty has been the Far East, (b) he is known to take more pessimistic view of the new regime in China than most of his colleagues; (c) his deep antipathy towards Communism is strengthened by his religious convictions, as a staunch Roman Catholic, and (d) he was a particularly close friend of Mr. Service during the latter's tour of duty in Wellington.)

Mr. Andrew SHARP, Second Secretary in the Department of External Affairs, took it for granted that the McCarthy indictment of Mr. Service was simply a revival of the Amerasia affair and that behind both was the figure of General Hurley, embittered by the fact that Mr. Service and those of his viewpoint had been proved correct in their judgments.

Mr. Leicester WEBB, Director of Stabilization and Marketing, confessed that having just finished reading the White Paper, he had been astonished that Mr. Service could now be attacked, for, in his view, the despatches of Mr. Service from Chungking were a complete vindication of his ability and judgment. Mr. Webb considered that the issue raised by Republican attacks on Service,

Vincent, Batterworth, and the other Far Eastern experts involved far more than the careers of the officers in question, and their immunity from domestic political skirmishing: it was a vital concern of Australia, New Zealand, and other Pacific countries if the very men who had seen the China situation correctly were now hounded from positions of influence by those who still identified China with Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. Webb was not alone in expressing this last sentiment. It was either stated or implicit in the comments of the other officials quoted above. They all spoke with an intensity of feeling which was based not merely on their personal attachment to Mr. Service, but on their concern over the effects on American foreign policy, and, by consequence, on the security of New Zealand, if the current Republican campaign against State Department personnel succeeds. They made it quite clear that they could not regard this whole controversy as a domestic affair, concerning only the United States.

In view of the apparent unanimity of these reactions, it might reasonably be suspected that these comments have been deliberately selected as coming from persons known to be admirers of Mr. Service and friendly to the present administration of the Department of State. It can be stated positively, however, that of the many New Zealand Government officials and private citizens who knew Mr. Service and who have, on various occasions, raised the matter in informal conversations with officers of the Embassy, not one has expressed the slightest degree of credence in the McCarthy charges.

This same reaction is evident in editorial and radio comments on Senator McCarthy's accusations. While these have not, so far touched in the individual case of Mr. Service, they have with one exception¹ expressed contemptuous disbelief in the Senator's charges against Departmental personnel.

Two of the most influential papers in the Dominion, the New Zealand Herald (Auckland) and the Christchurch Press, have remarked that the Senator has simply made himself ridiculous in suggesting that such men as Dr. Jessup and Professor Lattimore are pro-Communist, adding that he has recklessly endangered American prestige abroad in the hope of gaining partisan political advantages. In the weekly foreign affairs commentary over the New Zealand Broadcasting Service, Mr. Graham MILLER identified the McCarthy accusations with the campaign of Republican elements to replace Mr. Acheson's Far Eastern policy with what he described as "dangerous belligerency" as manifest in the campaign for military intervention in Formosa. If these elements succeeded, he thought the consequences for New Zealand might be disastrous.

A final comment seems to merit recording because it was made by one who, as Professor of Political Science at Victoria University College, Wellington, and as a frequent writer, public lecturer and radio commentator on international affairs, has a considerable influence on local public opinion. Professor Robert PARKER is not, of course, a Government official, nor did he know Mr. Service personally, having been in Australia at the time of the latter's tour of duty at this post. He is, however, a keen observer of American affairs and the controversy over China policy.

Professor Parker remarked that in his opinion the greatest danger in current Congressional inquisition lay in the possibility that it might drive independent and liberal minds out of the Department and the Foreign Service. Viewing the issue solely from the standpoint of efficient public administration (Professor Parker's specialty) and leaving aside the aspect of civil justice, he thought that this tendency would dangerously reduce the efficiency of the service as an instrument of national policy. Even if one were to consider American foreign policy in its narrowest interpretation, as one of combatting Communism, this could only be done, he said, by men who understood what they were fighting, which in turn required that they be able when the occasion demands, to associate with Communists. If officers were intimidated into limiting their associations and coloring their reports to fit the official "line" or the preconceptions of their superiors he felt that the result would be a diplomatic service quite asmonolithic, and just as inefficient as a source of objective intelligence, as that of the U. S. S. R.

ROBERT M. SCOTTEN.

¹The one exception was an editorial in the Grey River Argus (Labor) of Greymouth, which confined itself to observing that where there is smoke, there must be fire. This is a small provincial paper with strong Roman Catholic leanings.

Mr. ACHILLES. I note in both the documents signed by Mr. Scotten and others—
Mr. RHETTS. That is document 55.
The CHAIRMAN. And 56.

Mr. ACHILLES. In Document 55 there is a quotation from Mr. Peurifoy's statement that "the sympathy and good wishes of the entire Department go out to them," presumably Mr. and Mrs. Service; and the statement in Document 56 referring to Mr. Peurifoy's statement states "that the Department was standing solidly behind Mr. Service." Mr. Peurifoy's statement naturally does not, and cannot, relate to this Board, which, in these matters, is separate from the Department. Our function is to examine into all the facts in the case and to get at the truth of the matter. We can hardly be described as standing solidly behind the witness with whom we are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. That's entirely correct.

Mr. RHETTS. Now that is all I have on this latter phase of Japan and this relating to Mr. Service's duty in New Zealand.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything more to offer today?

Mr. RHETTS. So that it seems to me we are at a point where we need to go back now to—so far as I am concerned, at any rate, the next step would be to go back to some of the loose ends that are left from the so-called Amerasia phase of this inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. Have either of the other members of the Board any questions on the Japanese phase?

Mr. ACHILLES. I have a few questions on Mr. Service's career since New Zealand.

The CHAIRMAN. While you were in Japan, were you acquainted with one Philip Keeney, Mr. Service?

A. No, sir; I have no recollection of ever having met Mr. Keeney.

The CHAIRMAN. He was a member of the Reparations Commission, I understand.

A. No, sir; I do not recollect ever having met him.

Mr. RHETTS. I wonder if we could have a 10-minute recess. This has been a very long, drawn-out procedure.

(Whereupon, a 10-minute recess was taken.)

Mr. ACHILLES. Mr. Service, I notice in your opening statement that you state you were transferred to Washington in December 1948 to serve as a member of the Foreign Service Selection Board, convening in Washington January 10, 1949. What were your duties as a member of that Board?

A. Under the Foreign Service Act of 1946, promotions of all Foreign Service officers are to be based strictly on merit, and the machinery for determining merit provided by section 621 of the Foreign Service Act are to be selection boards to make recommendations on the basis of which the President shall nominate officers for promotion, to be confirmed by the Senate. Now the regulations which have been promulgated by the Secretary of State to implement the act have provided in the past that these selection boards are made up of five members—this was the case in 1949, when I served—of four Foreign Service officers and one public member from outside the Government service. There are entirely new boards convened each year, and the board serves, of course, only 1 year. It is a very carefully drawn up plan to insure as far as possible the most complete objectivity and fairness and elimination of any bias or favoritism.

I was appointed by the Secretary to be a member of what was called Selection Board B, which considered the records and recommended promotions of the lower three classes of Foreign Service officers—in other words, classes 6, 5, 4.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of those boards were there?

A. There were two boards, sir. Board A handled the two classes 2 and 3 and recommended promotion for classes 2 and 3, and the lower board, of which I was a member, recommended promotions for classes 4, 5, and 6. Now the regulations governing the setting up of the boards specified that the Foreign Service officers named for this duty shall be men of good record, representing as far as possible the most varied experience and who have demonstrated experience in the appraisal and handling of personnel. I might say that this is not a duty which anyone seeks. It is an extremely arduous and difficult task to rate your own fellow officers, and I had no previous knowledge of my choice for the job until I received a telegram appointing me.

Now the duties of the board members are to independently read the complete personnel efficiency files of all the officers in one class who are eligible for promotion. The board members do that independently, without consultation on particular cases. They give each officer whose record they read a rating varying

from 5, the highest rating, to 1, the bottom rating. After every member of the board has made his careful study and independent appraisal of the efficiency file of all the officers in the class, there is opportunity for discussion among the board members concerning the cases which each member has recommended for promotion. After that discussion the board members may alter their original ratings, but they must announce to all the board members and to the official observers from the other departments—Commerce, Labor, Agriculture—who are present their reasons for making these changes. When all of the individual ratings are finally fixed, the scores of the five members of the board are combined, and the men receiving the highest ratings are recommended for promotion in the order of the total score they have received. The recommendations of the selection board go next to the Board of the Foreign Service.

Mr. ACHILLES. May I interrupt a moment? There are five members of the board?

A. Yes, Sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. And the vote of each member of the board is equal?

A. The vote of each member of the board is exactly equal, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. And you were going to say what happens to the board's recommendations?

A. Yes. The recommendations of the board are next transmitted to the Board of the Foreign Service, as specified by section 211 of the Foreign Service Act, which is composed of the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of administration, two other Assistant Secretaries of State designated by the Secretary, the Director General for the Foreign Service, and one representative each, occupying positions with comparable responsibilities, from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. The Board of the Foreign Service considers the recommendations of the selection board and has the power to require the selection board to reconsider the whole list or to answer questions with regard to certain officers whose names have been placed on the promotion list. The selection board, if so required, must make appropriate reconsideration, but if it does not alter its recommendations the Board of the Foreign Service must either reject the list in toto or accept it in toto. If the Board of the Foreign Service approves the recommendations of the selection board, the recommendations then go to the Secretary of State, and if his approval is given, to the President, and if he approves, then to the Senate for confirmation and promotion.

Mr. ACHILLES. That's all.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we will go into recess until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the hearing was recessed until 2:30 p.m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: Wednesday, June 7, 1950, 2:35 p. m. to 3:55 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building, Washington, D. C.

Reporter: Violet R. Voce, Department of State, C/S, reporting.

Members of board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles; Arthur G. Stevens; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Counsel for Mr. Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts and Ruckelshaus.

(The board reconvened at 2:35 p. m.)

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Conrad E. Snow). The board will be in session.

Thereupon Mr. John K. Fairbank, being produced, sworn and examined as a witness in behalf of Mr. John Stewart Service, testified as follows:

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Would you state your name and address for the record, Mr. Fairbank?—

A. John K. Fairbank, living at 41 Winthrop Street, Cambridge, Mass.

Q. What is your present position?—A. Professor of history at Harvard University.

Q. Would you be good enough to indicate to the board your background of your general field of interests and activity?—A. I have been working on China as a subject of study since 1929. I began this study after graduating from Harvard and had a year at Oxford University, where I was a Rhodes Scholar. I then continued study of the Chinese language and Chinese history in Peiping in 1932 up to the end of 1935, the first year on the end of the Rhodes Scholarship,

the second year on savings, the third and fourth years on a Rockefeller scholarship. I then returned to Oxford in 1936 and got the degree of a D. Phil. and began teaching at Harvard in the fall of 1936. I continued there as an instructor in history, giving a course on the Modern Far East, until August of 1941, when I took leave to join Prof. James Phinney Baxter and Colonel Donovan in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, Research and Analysis Branch, which was then being set up.

I lived in Washington at 1306, Thirty-fourth Street NW., from October of 1941 until August of 1942, when I was sent to China. And that first year under COI I became especially attached to the office of Lauchlin Currie, who was handling the AVG.

The CHAIRMAN. Meaning?

A. American voluntary group in China. And acted as a sort of liaison between him and the Research and Analysis Branch. And also in the course of that year I made it a point to meet all workers on Chinese and far eastern studies in Washington, as I had made a point before that to meet all such people in academic life.

I then went to China in August 1942 under the Office of Strategic Services—that was the new name for the Coordinator of Information—and specifically under an organization called the Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications, which was operating as a subsidiary of OSS with OSS funds but representing all interested agencies in Washington so as to centralize the inflow of publications from foreign countries.

My job was to develop a flow from China of research materials which would help the war effort against Japan. Essentially that would be Japanese publications secured, we hoped, through occupied China. In order to secure publications more easily in China I arranged to be the representative of the Library of Congress in China and was given the title also of special assistant to the Ambassador in Chungking. On arrival in Chungking I set up an office under the Embassy called the American publications service of the American Embassy. My object being to secure materials, I knew that I must also give out materials and also I worked for the Cultural Relations Division of the State Department. The name of that department changed from time to time. It was under Mr. Willis Peck. My wife had become the second employee hired by him in that Division of the Department in the late fall of 1941 or the beginning of 1942. Consequently her work in Washington and mine in Chungking had some connection which was of interest to us both. Shall I continue with my activities in Chungking?

Q. Yes, do.—A. Having become established under Mr. Gauss—and I convinced him that I was not trying, as my predecessor had, to run an independent show or to be an intelligent service collecting information through non-Embassy channels, I proceeded to develop contact with the various branches of the Chinese Government and also with the communities, particularly in Chungking and in Kunning. It happened that, having taught one year in Tsinghua University in Peiping the year 1933-4, I had a wide acquaintance among Chinese professors. I proceeded to develop a number of projects for making American printed matter available to them, academic journals, mainly on microfilm.

This microfilm project was set up to obviate the difficulty of transportation over the Hump. We imported lenses, made microfilm projectors, and then imported microfilm. The project was not very successful. The microfilm was difficult to read and I don't think it accomplished its end. However, I worked hard on it for the 16 months or so that I was there. It did establish contact with the university professors very widely.

I returned from Chungking in December of 1943. I can go into details of the Chungking office later on if it is of interest. I was technically under some authority of Captain—later Commander and Admiral—Miles, who was my landlord, but who left me strictly alone, as I did him, much to the satisfaction of the Ambassador.

I traveled during that year to Chengtu, to Chungking, to Kweilin, had jaundice for a month or two and dysentery. I saw Mr. Service at those times when he was in Chungking, which were not very frequent, but I had a number of long talks with him.

Mr. ACHILLES. Had you known Mr. Service previously?

A. I think I met him first in Peiping. I won't swear to that: I had known most of the Foreign Service officers in Peiping when I was a student and they were too—Davies and Penfield. If I did meet him it was very briefly. I made his acquaintance really in Chungking at this time. I saw a good deal of Sprouse,

Clubb, and others in the Embassy, one of whom was always in charge of my operation, which was under the Embassy's aegis.

I then returned from China in December of 1943. Since the IDC operation had no need for personnel at home, I was open to transfer or to continuing in R and A of OSS. I decided to transfer to OWI and I entered the office of what was then called, I believe, area 3, meaning the Far East. In that office the position of Deputy Director for the Far East at that time I think was held by Owen Lattimore, who was in San Francisco with a bureau which produced the radio broadcasts out of San Francisco. The Assistant Deputy Director was George Taylor, who was in the Washington office in the Social Security Building and whose staff produced a weekly central directive draft which was then cleared with the Department of State and provided the policy guidance for the OWI operation. The operation itself was mainly in New York, where publications were broadcast to Europe, and so on.

I joined that in March 1944. For a long time I acted as head of this office off and on, signing myself as Acting Assistant Deputy Director. I continued in that job mainly in charge of contact between Washington and New York in the effort to get the New York people to follow the Washington directive week by week. During the rest of 1944 and until August 1945, I lived throughout this period at the same house mentioned above in Georgetown, 1306 Thirty-fourth Street, with my wife.

In May 1945 my wife was sent to Chungking as the first Cultural Relations Officer in the Embassy. In August 1945, after the end of the war, I was also sent back to China with a view to taking charge of the OWI operations there. I arrived there by way of Europe in late September or early October 1945 and had the position of, I think, executive director. William Holland, who had been head of the office, came home shortly after my arrival there. I took over from Mr. Darlington completely in December 1945 on the occasion of an unfortunate incident in the Shanghai office when an unauthorized news release was put out; and I was therefore in charge of this operation which was called the Interim Information Service—something with four letters—for a while and then it became the United States Information Service in 1946.

Our chief task was to reoccupy the cities on the coast, setting up offices. And I continued with that until July of 1946, part of the time in Shanghai, partly in Nanking under the Embassy, and partly traveling. I returned in July 1946 and took terminal leave and severed connections with the Department of State in August, I believe.

THE CHAIRMAN. When were you taken over by the Department of State from OWI?

A. Nominally, early in the autumn of 1945, but operationally we maintained an independent budget throughout that fiscal year and I was responsible for an operation which was not completely part of the Embassy until June 30, 1946. Well, that is the framework. You can go back over it.

Q. Just to complete it, after you withdrew from the Department in August of 1946, what did you do?—A. I resumed teaching at Harvard in September '46. I also published an article in the Atlantic Monthly called Our Chances in China, which I think was widely read. And I inaugurated at Harvard a program called regional studies, which is concerned with the application to China of all the social science disciplines as well as language and history. I had been doing this ever since. I was then associate professor and was made a full professor in 1948.

In 1948 I published a book The United States in China in a series edited by Sumner Welles and others called the American Foreign Policy Library put out by the Harvard University Press. My volume was given a prize, first prize I think.

Q. What was it?—A. The Wendell Willkie Memorial Building Award by the American Political Science Association as the best book published in the United States on the subject of international policy, international relations, in 1948. But fortunately only up to a period before the appearance of Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins.

In 1947 my wife and I went to Europe as delegates to the tenth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Stratford upon Avon. In the spring of 1947 I had become a trustee of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and have remained one ever since. In 1949 I was coauthor with three others, including Harlan Cleveland of ECA, of a small book called Next Step in Asia. I have written various articles and given various speeches.

THE CHAIRMAN. On that and related subjects?

A. On the subject of China invariably.

Q. Before coming back, while we are on your own personal background, Mr. Fairbank, have your writings—such as your book *The United States in China* or any of your other writings—had any attention in terms of their pro- or anti-Communist leanings?—A. I have been characterized by various epithets from both sides, the *China* magazine or the *China* monthly.

Mr. SERVICE. The *China* monthly.

A. In an article by Alfred Kohlberg I am listed with others with opprobrious epithets as a stooge of the Kremlin and the like. The publication of the American Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy of New York, which has now been listed by the Attorney General as subversive, in a review of my book characterized it as essentially imperialistic. And I have been sent a clipping of a magazine published in Moscow, called *New Times* I believe, which castigates me as a spy and intelligence agency for imperialism, something like that. That was with reference, I believe, to *The Next Step in Asia*. My section of that as galley proof I sent to Mr. Fosdick as my contribution of a memorandum in connection with the meeting, which I believe was in October last year, of specialists on the Far East in the Department of State. It happened that that galley proof was available just in time when we had been asked to submit statements and said as much as I could say at that time. I think that is all for your question.

Q. I believe you testified that you really became acquainted with Mr. Service in Chungking during the latter part of 1942 and early 1943.—A. Yes.

Q. I wonder if you could indicate to the board just what the nature of your acquaintance with Mr. Service was and how familiar you became with him?—

A. I knew Mr. Service as one of a number of friends in the Embassy, the American Government Service. John Davies I had known in Peiping. I saw Mr. Service a number of times. I don't recall the dates, and we had the usual type of conversations in which we were talking about the situation in China, giving our opinions.

Since I was not working on American policy I usually didn't try to press for secret information from my colleagues. But I never hesitated to raise the general questions of how things were going and where they were going. Since I have submitted a letter to Mr. Acheson on this subject, perhaps I could just repeat my general view here for the record.

In these conversations with Mr. Service I covered the usual range of questions—in one respect, what the evaluation of the Communists in China was, what their strength was, to what it might be attributed, what their future would be, and the valuation of the Kuomintang regime in the same way, the evaluation of the American interests in China, what we should try to do, our relations with the British, and everything else.

The CHAIRMAN. These are subjects of discussion, you're giving us, with Mr. Service?—A. Yes. I'm characterizing in a general way the type of discussion that I, in a general way, recall having had over this period of several sessions. I never received any indications in any of these discussions that Mr. Service had any doubts about the desirability of the American democratic system. I never had any impression that he favored the Chinese Communists in an emotional way. I felt that he was a man of strong feeling but his feelings were those of an American and these feelings were against the evil features which he saw around him in the nationalist regime against totalitarian features of government in general and in favor of the various types of freedoms that Americans generally believe in, the American institutions of civil liberties and law. In other words, I never had any feeling whatever that he was off base or he was emotionally committed or emotionally upset or, however you might like to phrase it, had come under the influence of communism or Chinese Communists.

Now, at that time the Chinese Communist line was always to harp on civil liberties in the Kuomintang area, always to inveigh against censorship, concentration camps, lack of election process, and all these things. And when the Communists expressed such criticisms which were all designed to appeal, of course, I for one—and I think the other Americans that I know there—tended to agree. So I could say as between the Communist delegation in Chungking and the journalists in the press hostel there was a common line in the sense that the journalists in the press hostel were against censorship and the Communist delegation in Chungking, who spent a great deal of time in contact with them through one or two people, were also, of course, against censorship on the part of the Kuomintang.

This is getting off the subject of Mr. Service, but our conversations were in that atmosphere and that is the characterization I would make of his attitude.

In other words, one of complete loyalty, and I would stake my reputation on his loyalty. I could state it in many ways but I think the idea is plain, I would back him up 100 percent. I would not think that he would be a disloyal American citizen. And I also believe that he was sufficiently intelligent to avoid being misled and avoid being a well-meaning but misguided American citizen.

Q. A few days ago, Mr. Fairbank, a Mr. Emmanuel Larsen testified here and, although I do not have the actual transcript of what he said before me, I'll undertake to try to the best of my recollection to tell you the substance of what he said and if I am incorrect perhaps the Board will check me if my recollection is faulty.

In the course of examination of Mr. Larsen I asked him whether he knew of any other persons from whom Mr. Jaffe, Mr. Philip Jaffe, obtained information in Washington. Mr. Larsen's response was that he knew of several people with whom Mr. Jaffe had contacts. As I recall it, he was not precise in asserting that these were people from whom he obtained information, although that was a permissible inference, I believe, from his response. He listed numerous people with whom he thought Mr. Jaffe was in contact and among other things he stated that he knew that on either some or several occasions Mr. Jaffe had indicated to him that he was staying with you and your wife here at Washington when Mr. Jaffe would be visiting Washington.

Mr. ACHILLES. That is, staying here with Mr. Fairbank?

Q. Yes, Mr. Jaffe, when he would visit Washington, would either frequently—or sometimes in any case—stay with Mr. Fairbank and his wife here in Washington. I wonder, Mr. Fairbank, if you would care to comment on that testimony of Mr. Larsen's?—A. I'd be very happy to. Now, that statement is a lie, and I'm very happy to have this opportunity to deal with it because I assume that I'm under oath and subject to laws of perjury and so on. My acquaintance with Mr. Jaffe, if such it may be called, has been limited to two casual meetings, as far as I can remember. I may have been in the same room with him more than twice. I do not regard him as a friend of mine. I wouldn't even call him an acquaintance. I have never liked the man, never made any effort to see him, and in fact never have seen him except on two occasions that I can recall at the moment and possibly certain others when we were at the same meeting somewhere.

He never, very definitely never stayed at my house in Georgetown. He never stayed at my house anywhere else. He never stayed at any place, any house that I have ever stayed at overnight, as far as I can remember. He has never been in a house in which I was living, has never been in my house, as far as I can remember.

I made a practice of getting my staff and people working on the Far East in Washington to come to cocktail parties in large numbers during the war as a means of contact and morale building. I don't recall that he was ever included in one of those cocktail parties or any other similar meeting. It may be that he walked into the office of OWI at some time and I may have seen him. I have no recollection of that. I have exchanged very few words with him.

As to the two times I do recollect, the first is when I first set eyes on him at Princeton University at a meeting which I think was under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations and I think that was before the war. This could be traced by looking at what meetings they may have had. I had heard his name and I remember meeting him at that time, conversing with him. That was perhaps in 1938 or 1939. It may be 1940. I had also previous to that, about 1937, contributed a brief article to a magazine, the second issue as I recall, of Amerasia. I haven't looked back at that article since the Amerasia question has been in the newspapers. But it was solicited from me by a professor at Columbia, and my recollection has been, ever since I find it erroneously, that this professor and the other professors like Professor Colegrove of North Western, were the actual inaugurators of Amerasia.

I had a discussion with my friend in Cambridge about 2 weeks ago and this friend said, "No, Amerasia was begun by Jaffe and Field." And he sent me a note giving the masthead of the magazine at the time when I published this article. So that my supposition that it was just professors and not Jaffe and Field, who I thought later took it over, was just wishful thinking on my part. At that time, however, my contact was not with Mr. Jaffe in relation to this article put in Amerasia. And, incidentally, my article in Amerasia was mainly a historical comparison of the Japanese invasion of China with the British and French wars of the century before on which I was a specialist at that time. That was in 1936 or 1937. It did not deal with policy that I recall.

That first recognition on the name of Jaffe was followed by a complete lack of any contact with him over the years, as far as I can recall.

The second meeting, which I referred to of the two, occurred in New York I think in the winter of 1948-49, at the apartment of Mildred Price, who has been the executive secretary of an organization called the China Aid Council. I had been giving some speeches in New York, I believe, and was invited by her to come to her apartment and see some people. Prof. Ernest Osborne was the chief person mentioned. Mr. Jaffe was also there. I did not like him any better at that time than I had before. We did not have very much of a conversation.

I may say that the China Aid Council, to which I had given my name as a sponsor about 1947 or 1948, had been an agency for sending some funds and some medical supplies to Madam Sun Yat-sen, who in turn sent some of these to the international peace hostels or hospitals in the so-called liberated areas. In other words, to Communist China. This China Aid Council operation, I believe, had Jaffe as its treasurer—who was connected with it. I let my name be used by this group, which was headed at that time by Mrs. E. C. Carter, because I believed in maintaining what contact we could and also I felt confident that Mildred Price, the executive secretary, and Mrs. Carter, the head of it, were not Communists. And it did not seem to me that they were being fellow travelers in the usual sense of trying to do Communist work for them.

In other words, this China Aid Council seemed to me a useful thing operating in the field of medical supplies and splitting its donations between the two parts of China. Mildred Price made a point of helping the Mui Tsai School, the head of which I met in China, Dr. H. C. Tao, and other worthy organizations which were not Communist but were trying to do things like mass education and were in the category of the Democratic League type of people before the Democratic League was put under pressure and became part of the Communist situation, in other words, as of 1946.

I may also add that in the last year the Communists or fellow travelers element in the China Aid Council have succeeded in taking it over and ejecting Mildred Price and Mrs. Carter and other such people. This take-over was effected by people I could mention who are active in the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy and who, to my view, are Communists. The take-over included taking over Madam Sun Yat-sen at the Peiping end, who to the best of my judgment was not an organized Communist disciplined member when I knew her in Chungking.

In other words, the China Aid Council has ceased to exist except as something in mothballs. I think there is two or three hundred dollars in a bank account; there is no office any more, and that is the end of it. It has been destroyed by the Communist element that were in it evidently before and decided to take it over. My connection with this new thing called the China Welfare Appeal has been entirely negative throughout. In other words, I have never responded to their requests nor had anything to do with them. It has consisted, my point of contact with Mr. Jaffe, of that one brief evening in which we did not converse.

Q. In connection with your remarks a little while ago in which you indicated that you had always supposed that Amerasia was started at least by a number of professors and your friend indicated the fact that it was started by Mr. Jaffe and Mr. Field, I show you Document No. 32, which is an exhibit in this case, and refer particularly to the column headed "March 1937", which is the masthead for the beginnings of Amerasia. You see there, of course, that your recollection was not entirely incorrect because it did have a number of the academic group that you had in mind.—A. Yes.

Mr. STEVENS. This Mrs. Carter, was that Mrs. Edward Carter?

A. Yes, Mrs. E. C. Carter. Mr. Carter was for a long time the Secretary General of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Were you acquainted at all with Mr. Frederick V. Field?—A. I met him twice at least and I should say my acquaintance with him is about as extensive as my acquaintance with Jaffe. I remember meeting him I believe in the IPR office, which was on Fifty-second Street, I think in 1936, when I first returned from China. At some time later I remember having a conversation with him over a drink in a bar. This may have been during a conference that we were both attending. I assume it is. I recall no contact with Frederick Field beyond these two specific instances and maybe one or two or three other casual meetings and one other that I can recall and no contact with him of a social nature.

The one other that I recall is a meeting of the trustees of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which I believe was early in 1947.

At that time an investigation had been made by the existing trustees prior to the meeting of Mr. Field and of the accusations raised by Mr. Kohlberg against the Institute of Pacific Relations American Council. On that investigating committee was Mr. Huntington Gilchrist of the American Cyanamid Co., a businessman, and other such persons. And I remember his stating at this meeting with reference to Mr. Field that he had found no evidence that Mr. Field in his activity in the Institute of Pacific Relations American Council had brought in any Communist bias or tried to deal with things from a leftist or Communist point of view as opposed to the best interests of the organization of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

At any rate, at that meeting there was discussion of what to do about Field and I participated in that discussion. And the discussion went along on two lines. On the one hand he obviously is a detriment to this organization and we as trustees owe it to the organization to really drop any connection with him. You can't have an organization with a man of that sort on the Board. On the other hand was the more human point that he had been such a staunch supporter of the organization and that he had occasionally given money or that he had worked hard and at one time was Secretary, which I believe myself was before he had moved entirely to the left, in the early 1930's. I believe this progress was gradual for a time.

And I remember making a statement myself which I later felt was not—well, I felt somewhat foolish about it because I felt I was rather emotional. I said that "We shouldn't, just because there is concern about leftists at this point, suddenly just scuttle this man who has been doing, according to the trustees, a proper job for the organization." Well, I had decided not long after that, in the course of not too many months, that that was an unwise and rather foolish view.

I may say that I have been in many discussions with my brother-in-law, Mr. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who is death on Communists in general and I have been working out, as I think my written articles indicate since my return from China, when I have had opportunity to express myself, a position which takes account of the Chinese Communists' good points but develops an American policy. I could go into that at length if you wish.

Q. You mentioned that Mr. Kohlberg had made some uncomplimentary remarks about you. Are you acquainted with Mr. Kohlberg?—A. I have met him on several occasions. One I remember chiefly was a radio television show of a "people's court," so-called, in which 12 individuals were brought in off the street. It was presided over by Mr. Basil O'Connor, who I was told had been Mr. Roosevelt's law partner. Mr. Kohlberg was on one side with two others and I on the other side. The issue was whether we should give increased military aid to the Chiang Kai-shek government. This, I believe, was in 1948. Our side got a twelve-to-nothing decision against Kohlberg.

The CHAIRMAN. Your side was maintaining what?

A. That we should not give military aid to the Chiang Kai-shek government any more beyond that amount already given.

Q. In what year?—A. In 1948. And I recall at the time telling Mr. O'Connor that if Mr. Kohlberg brought forward any of his libelous epithets concerning me I would retaliate in kind and they would have to put the show off the air. Mr. Kohlberg was very courteous all through and at the end of the show he paid me the compliment of saying "I don't think you and I really disagree," whatever that meant. I have seen him on one or two other occasions. I was in a debate with Senator Bridges on the Town Hall of the Air last December. Mr. Kohlberg was back stage and I saw him in the elevator or somewhere.

Mr. RHETTS. I'd like to show you what has been introduced as an exhibit in this case, document No. B-54.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your question about it?

Mr. RHETTS. I would like to know if that is your signature?

A. I would recognize this as my signature.

Mr. RHETTS. I should say this is a photostat of a letter found in Mr. Service's desk here in the State Department at the time he was arrested on June 6, 1945. You recognize the handwritten signature "John" there as your own?

A. Well, I would say it certainly is very similar to my signature. If I looked at it casually I would say it is. Of course any signature could be forged, but I don't see why it should be.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recollect writing the letter?

A. I wonder why this letter has no letterhead on it? It's addressed to the United States Office of War Information so presumably if I wrote it it was sent out through that channel. APO 879 was Chungking.

Mr. SERVICE. Yes.

A. I would be inclined to acknowledge this as my letter. The contents of it seem certainly mysterious and when I first heard about this, about a day ago, of course I had some difficulty in wondering what it dealt with. In thinking about it I have been able in my own mind to recall what I might call a project to which I think this refers and which I think will explain most of the aspects of it.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. I believe that you have forwarded a telegram addressed to me which outlined your reconstruction of that project.—A. Yes.

Q. And probably what the meaning of this letter was. That telegram has been introduced into the transcript as document 330. And I take it that your account of the reconstruction of the meaning of this is as you outlined it in that telegram.—A. Yes. I can explain this, I think, in a few words. It goes back to 1943 when I was in Chungking and it concerns making the acquaintance of the Chinese Communist, Miss Kung P'eng. Kung is the surname. This girl was a chief liaison officer between the Communist headquarters in Chungking and the press hostel and foreigners generally. I think almost any American who worked in Chungking at that time would recollect meeting her. I'm sure all journalists would. I did not make her acquaintance until June or July of 1943, after I had been in Chungking about 9 months. The circumstances were that I had been developing channels for Japanese-language publications from Japan and I had found most of these channels fairly dry.

There was a General Wang who was helpful and I therefore had come to the conclusion that I might do well to open out some relationship with the Chinese Communist delegation to see if they could get anything through their areas, which would be Japanese publications of the type we wanted to have in Washington. I had not seen consciously any Chinese Communist delegation members until that time, but in addition to those valid official reason for contact with them, I think I also had a personal motive of curiosity. I wanted to see what they were like or what they had to offer, what they had to say.

At any rate, on my own initiative about that time, June or July 1943, I passed the word, I think through my office manager, the way you do things in a Chinese office, that I would like to see one of these people. And this young woman came around. I, like the press hostel people I have mentioned, found her a very stimulating individual. She had gone to an English girl's college, St. Mary's in Shanghai, and later to Yenching University in Peiping. She was from a middle-class background but was an ardent and very idealistic Communist worker in constant danger of abduction, and so on, as she went about the city—something like a social worker in reverse.

She would come to the living quarters of the American foreign community and have hidden tracts in her handbag of the latest thing received by radio on some incident. I don't believe she made any converts for the cause of communism but she was a well-known figure in the city and she certainly represented the Communist views of the liberal ideals because she was full of righteous indignation against all the evils that could be mentioned.

I also became acquainted with her fiancé, whose name was Ch'iso Mu. His surname was Ch'iso. Her fiancé was even more a typical long-haired intellectual, fiery, Marxist, full of saving the world and a very attractive individual, a lively mind, full of ideas. In the course of this acquaintance, which was I might add perhaps unnecessarily one of the very great many acquaintances which I made in Chungking, I on my initiative again suggested to Miss Kung that she ought to write some biographical record of how she had become a Communist. It seemed to me that this would have a good deal of significant information for an American reader because it would be in first-person terms. It would be an example of Chinese youth, raised in the western type of educational institutions with a middle-class background, who—through idealism or the motives of revolution—became an ardent convert to communism. This occurred, I think, in the student movement of 1935.

Well, then her story went on to describe how she turned down a fellowship to come to the United States, which was the normal goal of all Chinese students, and went over to join the Communists in liberated areas to see if she could

qualify to be one of them. And then it went on to describe how she was farmed out to a peasant village and learned to live in peasantry. This whole thing was very graphic, in simple terms, and it seemed to me would have value in explaining how the Communists were getting their power and how they were building up with the youth of China.

Well, at my prompting she tried in the midst of a great deal of her activity to draft a biographical piece. And at the time I left China, in December 1943, she had shown me a copy of a couple of chapters which dealt with the subject I just mentioned, her education and her early experience and joining the Communists. After I left China I had expressed the hope that she would finish this and send it back. And these things I remember quite clearly.

Now, my recollection is—and this, of course, could be reconstruction, but I believe that this manuscript was brought back eventually by another Chinese girl, Miss Yang Kung, so I might briefly describe this other Chinese. She is a woman, of course, 40 or 50 now. This person was the literary editor of the independent newspaper in Chungking, the Ta Kung Pao. And, as the literary editor of this newspaper she got around always among the journalists and was interested in printed matter from the United States which my office was distributing. I made her acquaintance, I think, in the summer of 1943, not before. She appeared to be a vigorous Chinese liberal, as that word has been used; I mean a person who is not a Communist, not a Kuomintang member, but was interested in the ideals of the west, believed in the things of literacy and freedom of speech, and such things.

I imagine in retrospect she was probably more leftist than I realized, I don't know. But in any case, she had a respected position in the community in this newspaper job and I liked her as a friend. When I came back to this country in the spring of 1944—that is I arrived in January 1944—in some way a possibility came up for Miss Yang to receive a fellowship which was available at Radcliffe College in Cambridge for a Chinese woman student. I do not recall how that possibility came to my attention, whether I was asked to suggest someone or whether I took more initiative than that, I don't recollect. I haven't tried to get the file, which I suppose I could, really, if we had to do so. We could get it from Radcliffe College.

At any rate, there being almost no candidates and this girl being recommended by her teachers at Yenching University, the missionary teachers, she received this fellowship and arrived in the United States in the autumn of 1944. I believe it was by that means that this manuscript was brought. I'm making this awfully long-winded, I'm afraid. The point is that Brooks Atkinson, as I recollect, who was also in Chungking as a correspondent at this time, and also Miss Kung had expressed an interest in the manuscript she was writing.

I made this effort at this time in the spring of 1944 to see if any publishers would be interested in this story of a Chinese youth who had become a Communist. And I believe that I got in contact with William Sloane, now a publisher in New York, of Sloane Associates. That is more or less an assumption on my part. He was one person that I think I would have gone to. I don't recall definitely doing it, but he had been in China on an OWI arrangement for the American Publishers Association or a similar body in 1943 when I made his acquaintance.

In any case, no publisher could see possibilities in this manuscript without more being added to it. And even then, of course, it wouldn't be too good a bet because it was too brief and sketchy. But it was necessary—and this I believe I recall—to have a power of attorney to have any dealings with the publisher. And Brooks Atkinson, again to the best of my recollection, came to be the logical person to hold the power of attorney, he being a man from New York and easily in touch with publishers and outside government as a publicist. Well, I think that is my background and so on in this letter.

In reference to the text of it, Mr. Brooks—in other words, I believe refers to Brooks Atkinson, and “which I have passed on” I take it refers to giving him the power of attorney. “Together with the new manuscript” means that she sent something more; “of which he also has the first version as well as the first copy of the new or supplemental version” I assume that there may have been an editing effort made or something. That's just reconstruction. Nothing ever came of this manuscript. It eventually was returned to Miss Yang and Miss Yang went back to China in the autumn of 1948—no, in the summer of 1948 I think it was.

Now perhaps we can take it from here on questions on this letter.

There is one thing more I'd like to say. When I first heard this on the phone it seemed to me completely mysterious. So I was of course struck with the fact

that it had such indirect terminology and it was written in double talk. They are just talking about Mr. Brooks instead of Brooks Atkinson. And at first I thought it might be Brooks Darlington, this man in OWI. I'd like to say in reference to that and to my writing that letter in that way that my experience in China had given me a habit of avoiding making statements in a letter which could be seen casually and completely understood by outsiders because the Chinese office was wide open to all the secretaries and people you were working with.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Do I understand from your testimony that probably Mr. Service had sent you this new manuscript?—A. My assumption is, from this letter and to the best of my recollection, that I had probably taken the initiative and written to Miss Kung P'eng some way asking that more be sent back. Now, whether I involved Mr. Service in this problem I don't know. It may well be that I took the initiative and asked him as a favor to get this thing, that we thought it might be useful in this project.

Q. Do you recall what the letters were which it refers to "which you sent out and which were most interesting have been delivered"?—A. No; I don't.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do you recall who Bill was, who was referred to here?

A. I assume that would be Bill Holland. The reference is very plain, saying he is "my colleague," meaning OWI. And it says "he is with you," meaning in Chungking. He had been sent out in the fall or early spring, I guess he arrived in the early winter of 1944.

Q. And what do you refer to when you say "Everything that you can send will of course be much appreciated"?—A. Could you give me the reference just before that, please?

Q. Yes. "Many people have come back, like John Davies, Ludd, and Emerson, and we have had various discussions on a sad but not pessimistic note. Everything that you can send will of course be much appreciated."—A. I imagine this would refer to Mr. Service writing me a personal letter.

Q. About what?—A. About the situation, about how things were going. Now, as to "various discussions on the sad but not pessimistic note," this may have no reference to this particular situation, but if I recall correctly, I recollect spending an evening with three or four of the people who were working on China and just trying to face the problem. I think possibly some of those mentioned there were present, people who had come back recently. All of us were more or less in touch with what was going on because that was our business, but we were trying to face the problem of what could be done when we saw that we were stuck with the regime that was losing power. But the essential thing is what could be done to save American policy from getting into great difficulty.

Q. Had you read Mr. Service's reports on China? Had you read his reports on the Chinese situation?—A. Certainly not regularly. The reports of that type were not open to me as a regular thing. In the State Department where I had a contact, both as an official working on the Central Directive and also as a friend of people who lived there, I would sometimes be shown a document which had come in from the field.

Q. That is, the OWI was in possession of some reports through regular channels, were they not?—A. The OWI received some documentation from the Department of State, I believe.

Q. But you don't recall specific ones?—A. Maybe we received it only for us to see and return, not for our channels but only for us to see and return. And we did have a system of liaison officers who went to the Department to see what was there and then came back.

Q. But I judge you don't recall specifically Mr. Service's reports?—A. No. But I do recall, in my contact with Mr. Currie, his referring to having seen a report from Mr. Service. I mean I don't recall the particular instance but I would say that occurred, in the same way I'd contact John Carter Vincent and John Davies when they were in the Department.

Mr. STEVENS. You were then a Government official yourself?

A. Yes, I was. And I was in charge of policy directives for propaganda to China.

Q. Thank you very much.

(Witness excused.)

(The Board adjourned at 3:55 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE MATTER OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: June 8, 1950, 10:10 a. m. to 11:15 a. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building.

Reporter: Goodwin Shapiro.

Members of the Board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles; Arthur G. Stevens; and Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Counsel for John Stewart Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts & Ruckelshaus.

(The Board reconvened at 10:10 a. m., June 8, 1950.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Board will be in session. You are offering a witness this morning?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes.

(Congressman Richard Bolling, called as a witness in behalf of John Stewart Service, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Will you state your name and address, Mr. Bolling, for the record?—A. Richard Bolling, 524 Pierce Street, Kansas City, Mo.

Q. And will you state your present position, sir?—A. I am a Member of Congress from the Fifth District of Missouri.

Q. Roughly, between September 1945 and September 1946, could you tell the Board where you were and what your position then was?—A. In the latter part of 1945 I was for most of that period in Tokyo, Japan. I was an assistant to the adjutant general in the headquarters of the commander in chief of the Southwest Pacific—the Pacific—and the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General MacArthur. For a short period of about a month I was back in the United States, around Christmas and the early part of January, on leave, and when I returned to Tokyo I was an assistant to General MacArthur's chief of staff.

Q. You were in the Army at that time?—A. That is correct. I was a major in the Army.

Q. Now during this period did you become acquainted with Mr. Service?—A. Yes; I did.

Q. I wonder if you would indicate if you recall when you met Mr. Service and something of the nature of your acquaintance with him from that time onward.—

A. Well, my job as an assistant adjutant general was primarily dealing with personnel, and one of the things that I did was to process people as they came into the area—people who were assigned to the headquarters or merely to the area—and I met Mr. Service, as I remember—I do not remember the date, but it was fairly early in that period—as he came into Tokyo. My memory does not serve me well enough to say how soon our very brief acquaintance ripened, but I can say I knew him well enough so that I can say we had dinner, I think, once or twice, had several drinks together, and spent an evening or so together.

Q. So that I take it he was well enough known to you that any general discussion involving him would have been noted by you.—A. Yes; I believe so.

Q. Now it has been alleged by an unnamed person that during Mr. Service's duty in Tokyo he met with certain leaders of the Japanese Communist Party in the Office of the Political Adviser and had some conversation with these persons, and that this meeting and conversation attracted general comment. Can you tell the Board whether you ever heard of such a meeting and whether to your knowledge there was any widespread comment about any such meeting?—

A. When I first became aware of the alleged meeting, I think it was about 2 weeks ago. I had no consciousness of there having been a meeting nor of there having been any discussion of it.

Q. And would you mind stating how you became aware of it about 2 weeks ago?—A. Well, Mr. Service came to see me, and I subsequently talked to you. And in those two conversations I was informed of the—I guess the allegation.

Q. So that that being the case, I take it your testimony is that at the time no such meeting ever came to your attention?—A. No such meeting ever came to my attention. It could be. It is possible that it could be a fault in memory, but I think it is rather doubtful that it is, because at one time or another during my service as an assistant to the chief of staff I was somewhat involved in a rather notorious case at that time of an Army newspaper which was purported

to be heavily infiltrated by people who followed the Communist line, so I was at least somewhat conscious of the problem as it affected our headquarters.

Q. Now it has been testified here that a meeting did take place under roughly these circumstances: A Japanese Communist leader by the name of Nosaka did visit the offices of the political adviser, according to Mr. Emerson, who testified here the other day, not infrequently, and that Mr. Emerson had occasion to interview him along with other political leaders of other parties in connection with a weekly report which he submitted to the supreme commander on current developments among the political parties in Japan. It has been further testified that Mr. Nosaka called and that Mr. Service had known Mr. Nosaka in Yenan, China, where Mr. Service had previously served, and that when Mr. Nosaka called at the office, Mr. Service was called in and greeted him and exchanged amenities. From your knowledge of the situation in the headquarters at that time, would you regard it as particularly unusual for any members of the staff of the Office of the Political Adviser to meet Mr. Nosaka at that time?—A. To the contrary, it would have been unusual if they hadn't, I think.

Q. Now it has also been alleged that during his service in Tokyo Mr. Service was extremely enamored of Communist theory. On the basis of your association with him, did you ever hear him express any views which would suggest that this was true?—A. No, I recall no such views. If appropriate, I would like to enlarge a little on that.

Q. Do.—A. Aside from finding Mr. Service a pleasant person personally, I had spent at that time, I suppose, about almost 4 years in the Pacific, in the Army, and was staying on in Japan because I was interested in the problems of democratization of Japan, and I quite naturally had considerable interest in what was happening in China and what might happen in China; and one of the reasons that I pursued the acquaintance not only with Mr. Service but also with his chief of mission, Mr. George Atcheson, was to inform myself as much as I could from talking with people who had had some first-hand experience in the Chinese political scene, and it is a story that I have used a great many times since in discussing the Chinese problems, which is certainly with us, and I did talk with Atcheson at some length. I felt that, let's say, on domestic matters that he and Mr. Service might differ somewhat, one being what I would describe a conservative, and the other a liberal, but that in their assessment of what had happened factually in China and what was likely to happen, I have often repeated it as a story for political purposes that they agreed precisely as to what had happened, and my general conclusion from that was that both of them were pursuing what they thought to be an approach to the Chinese problem that was in the best interests of the United States, and they agreed, as I remember it, with some precision. That is the best way I can state that.

The CHAIRMAN. As to the facts?

A. As to the facts and the interpretation of the facts, I might say.

Q. Now it has also been asserted by the same anonymous source that I mentioned that Mr. Service exhibited an enthusiasm for the Japanese Communists while he was in Tokyo. Did any such manifestation ever come to your attention?—A. No.

Q. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you in any way come to associate Mr. Service with pro-Communist, either Japanese or Chinese or Russian—

A. No, sir; my impression of him was that he was consistently pro-American.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you ever have any indication that General MacArthur was dissatisfied with Mr. Service's work?

A. I did not, sir.

Mr. ACHILLES. Or any indication that Mr. Service was in any way disloyal to General MacArthur in the policies he was pursuing?

A. No, sir; I think not. I don't believe I had any conversation with him which concerned any policies, which was entirely apart from this, which was the Japanese constitution and the way it was given to the Japanese. I think he is one of the people I did not discuss that with.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't hear from him any vilification of General MacArthur?

A. No, sir; I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Or didn't hear from anybody else that he had been understood to vilify General MacArthur?

A. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No further questions. Thank you very much for coming up.
(The witness was excused.)

Mr. RIETTS. Now if the Board please, I would like to have included in the transcript at this point a 5-page affidavit, signed by Charles L. Kades, dated June 7, 1950.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be added to the transcript.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT No. 323

IN THE MATTER OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

STATE OF NEW YORK.

County of New York, ss.:

CHARLES L. KADES, being duly sworn, deposes and says, that :

1. I am a member of the bar of the State of New York with offices at 67 Wall Street in the City, County, and State of New York;

2. I was a Colonel, Infantry, assigned to duty with the United States Army Forces, Pacific, in Japan from August 26, 1945, until September 30, 1946, as deputy to Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, Chief of the Government Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and continued thereafter to serve as a civilian in that post from October 1, 1946, until May 3, 1949.

3. The primary mission of the Government Section was to advise the Supreme Commander on the status of and policies pertaining to military government in Korea and the internal structure of civil government in Japan. Specifically, it was the function of the Section to make recommendations for: the demilitarization of the Japanese Government; the decentralization of government and the encouragement of local responsibility; the elimination therefrom of feudal and totalitarian practices which tended to prevent government by the people; and the elimination of those relationships between government and business which tended to continue the Japanese war potential and to hamper the achievement of Occupation objectives.

4. The Government Section was also specifically charged with staff responsibility for all matters relating to the removal and exclusion of Japanese personnel from national and local elective and appointive posts and influential political and economic positions, and for the encouragement of the formation and activities of democratic political parties and the abolition of those whose activities were inconsistent with the requirements of the military occupation and the objectives of the United States.

5. Within the Government Section there was created in October 1945 an External Affairs Unit to effect: (1) the severance of Japanese governmental and administrative authority and control over areas outside of Japan proper formerly occupied or controlled by Japan; and (2) the severance of direct relations between the Japanese Government and other countries. Neither of these tasks was assigned to the Government Section in the General Order which established the Section. But the first fell within the Section's sphere under its responsibility to advise on the structure of civil government in Japan; the second task was assumed by Government Section because what was later to become the Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, SCAP, was at the time purely an United States Department of State mission serving as Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander but having no General Headquarters staff functions. Among the functions of this Department of State mission (commonly called "Polad") was the preparation of a weekly political report to Washington. This report was written generally by Mr. John Emmerson, a Foreign Service officer with Polad, and contained a comprehensive survey and analysis of the organization, platforms, and activities of political parties, political leaders, and other personalities who were participating in public affairs, as well as a summary of the political, economic, and social developments during the immediately preceding week. Because of the nature of this report and its relationship not only to political parties but also to the removal and exclusion of ultranationalists from public service, both of which functions were under the general supervision of the Government Section, and because of the external affairs function of the Government Section, during this period I was frequently in contact with various officials of Polad, including George Atcheson (the Political Advisor), John Stewart Service (his Executive Officer), Messrs. Max

Bishop and John Emmerson, and others, including U. Alexis Johnson, later Chief of the American Consulate at Yokohama.

6. Never did I hear from any person in Japan any statement that NOZAKA, Sanzo (one of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party) was often a visitor at the offices of Polad or any comment whatever concerning his appearances at the Polad office. Never did I hear from any person in Japan any statement connecting Nozaka or any other Communist with Mr. Service in any way in Japan. Never did I hear from any person in Japan any criticism of Mr. Service of any nature by reason of his associations. On the contrary, the opinion generally held of him was that he was devoting himself (until he became ill) to his duties of administration and that he had a reserved disposition, rarely associating outside of business hours with officers of staff sections at General Headquarters.

7. Actually, there would be no cause for comment among any Allied personnel if Nozaka had visited Polad. The reports by Mr. Emmerson required interviews and conferences with leading personalities in Japan, regardless of party or other affiliation. Moreover, Nozaka visited the Government Section at General Headquarters, conferring on numerous occasions with the Chief of the Political Affairs Division which was created early in the Occupation to make recommendations for Election Law revision, promote the development of democratic practices by political parties and to dissolve and prevent the formation of antidemocratic societies, associations, and organizations. Not only Nozaka, but also Tokuda, Shiga, and Dobashi (other leaders of the Communist Party) came to answer our inquiries, make reports for our use and to keep us generally informed on current developments, as well as to ask questions, to make complaints, and to object to certain occupation policies. Memorandums for the record were often made of the substance of these conversations. If Nozaka absented himself for any long period of time from such interviews and conferences because he was the scholarly type of Communist, spoke English, and was more voluble, but less militant and excitable than his colleagues, I would send for him to ascertain, if possible, why he had been absent and what he had been thinking about, and doing, what he was contemplating and generally obtain his view of events for whatever it was worth. Not until the very recent shift in Japanese Communist Party tactics toward terrorism and open defiance of the Occupation was there any disposition to ostracize Communist leaders. For example, when the Under Secretary of War, General William H. Draper, came to Tokyo, for an inspection of the Occupation, a round table with members of the National Diet of all political complexions was arranged at which Nozaka was present and at which both spoke freely and frankly. It is also perhaps worthy of note that it has always been customary for Japanese to come to General Headquarters and confer in offices of the Occupation, rather than for Occupation personnel to go to Japanese governmental or political party offices. Therefore, it would be expected that Nozaka would come to Polad or GHQ whatever the purpose of the visit.

8. Although I never heard any comment or criticism concerning any of the above-mentioned meetings, I have no doubt that certain Japanese, especially among those influential politicians and financiers removed or excluded from public service, would consider a visit by Nozaka or any Communist leader a cause for adverse comment which would quickly cast a shadow of suspicion upon anyone having any political intercourse with him. Such a state of mind is inherent in any police state, such as Japan was prior to the occupation, where even "dangerous thoughts" were prohibited and persons were punished severely for the commission of the crime of being suspected of having them. It is, therefore, within the realm of possibility that some politically gullible American having naive prewar ties with such Japanese lent his ear to their comment that it was not *comme il faut* to receive Nozaka and, being an indoctrinee of Japan's old and discredited order, was duly impressed.

CHARLES L. KADES.

Sworn to before me this 7th day of June 1950.

GRACE A. BEGGS.

Grace A. Beggs, Notary Public, State of New York, No. 24-0222800, Qualified in Kings County, Cert. Filed with Clerk of N. Y. County, Registers of Kings and N. Y. Counties, Commission Expires March 30, 1951.

Mr. RHETTS. If the Board please, several days ago when Mr. Larson was on the stand he referred to the original manuscript which he prepared, which was then extensively revised by Mr. Levine, and he referred to the fact that a copy of

this manuscript had been made available to the Department of State. Although Mr. Larsen agreed to obtain an additional copy and furnish it to me, I wonder if the Board has been able to obtain a copy to which Mr. Larsen referred.

The CHAIRMAN. A complete search has been made and no copy has been found, nor is there any information that the Department has ever had a copy.

Mr. RHETTS. The Board will also recall that when Mr. Larsen left, shall we say, prematurely in the course of his cross-examination, he indicated that he would be willing to return if arrangements could be made with him for that purpose. In view of the fact that we are now in the eleventh trial day on this case, I am not disposed to insist on Mr. Larsen's return for further cross-examination. If he is willing to come, fine, but I shall not be disposed to press the matter. I do not know whether the Board has had any further communication with him or not.

The CHAIRMAN. The Board has been in communication with Mr. Larsen, but he has not as yet been able to come before the Board because of his preoccupation with the Senate committee.

Mr. RHETTS. Well, I should like to ask leave to introduce into evidence in this case the original manuscript of his article if he supplies it to me, as he has promised to do.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be granted.

Mr. RHETTS. Now at this time I would like to ask Mr. Service to take the stand again.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS :

Q. Mr. Service, did you see an article which appeared in the Washington Daily News for 2 days ago, Tuesday, June 6, 1950, under the by-line of Frederick Woltman?—A. I did.

Q. This article refers to a so-called Amerasia document which is alleged—there does not appear to be any indication in this newspaper story as to precisely where a certain document was found. The document referred to appears to be certain notes on what is called an "Eyes Alone" message, and the news story indicates that you were referred to in these notes. Does this news story bring to your mind any aspect of this case which has not heretofore been touched on?—A. Yes; it brought to my mind that I had had some conversation with Mr. Gayn at one time touching on this general subject.

Q. I wonder if you would describe to the Board the whole background of this conversation and what occurred?—A. As I recall, the first day that I met Gayn, on April 19, 1945, he told me that he had a contract with The Saturday Evening Post for a series of articles, I think he said, dealing in general with the Stilwell recall, and he said that he was then in the process of collecting material. I told him that I had not been in Chungking at the time of General Stilwell's recall and had been out of Chungking for several months, as a matter of fact, that I did not know the details of the final events that led up to the recall. When I was in New York, on April 24 and April 25, 1945, you will recall that I testified I spent the night of April 24 with the Gayns in their apartment in New York. I remember that after we had had breakfast on the morning of the 25th—we had breakfast in the apartment there—in the Gayns' apartment—we were sitting around, and Gayn returned to this subject of his article—the articles which he was planning for The Saturday Evening Post—and he mentioned his difficulties getting the true story—accurate story. He referred to the fact that there had been a great number of versions of the Stilwell recall and the reasons for the Stilwell recall in various magazines. The Luce publications particularly had published extensive reviews and purportedly authoritative accounts of the reasons for the Stilwell recall. I think Congressman Judd has made a statement—if I remember rightly, it was in the House, but at least it was given great publicity—making some very misleading statements, and there had been over the previous 6 months since the recall a great deal of discussion and what amounted to a campaign of vilification, really, against General Stilwell over the whole matter.

The first American press reaction, of course, had been one of shock and surprise over the Stilwell recall, and it was quite apparent that the critics of the administration, critics of American policy, particularly the friends of China—the China lobby—had obscured the issue and put a great many half truths and untruths about General Stilwell and about the whole affair. I told Gayn again that I didn't know the late events that took place in Chungking, but I think I asked him whether he was familiar with the genesis of the final conflict or

issue. I was thinking particularly of the request or suggestion by the American Government that General Stilwell be placed in command of all the Chinese armies as a means of unifying and making more effective the Chinese war effort.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do you recall when that became public knowledge?

A. Yes, sir; that had become public knowledge at the time.

Mr. ACHILLES. In the fall of 1944?—A. In the fall of 1944. But the whole matter had since that time been obscured by this campaign of—I called it vilification; I think that's a fair word. He wasn't very thoroughly informed and he asked me if I could—

Q. You are referring to Gayn now?—A. Yes. He asked me if I could explain. So I mentioned the original exchange of telegrams, commencing in July, of which I had had some knowledge, pointing out that since those first telegrams I had had no knowledge at all. He asked if he could take some notes because he thought that it was very important, and I said to him at the time that this was material which I could tell him just so that he would have an accurate starting point or foundation, but that he could not use the material as coming from me or could not use it unless he got other substantiation; it was purely background information, so that he would not go off on a line as so many of the writers were doing in regard to the whole affair. I was interested in having this series of articles which were to be published by the Saturday Evening Post on the beam, out of fairness to General Stilwell, out of fairness to our own policy at the time, and, you might say, as an offset to a great deal of the incorrect speculative accounts that had come out. I told him about the early two messages, speaking entirely from memory, of course. I had no copies or notes or anything else. As I recall, his wife sat off to the side of the room and made some notes. Apparently, judging from this, she made extremely complete notes.

I never saw the notes that he had, and I do remember cautioning him on the question of the use of this as background material—cautioning him that these originally had been what were called "Eyes Alone" messages. Now I think I ought to say here that "Eyes Alone" is not a security classification. Security classifications are "Top Secret," "Secret," "Confidential," "Restricted," and "Unclassified." I have the security manuals here if anybody wishes to refer to them. "Eyes Alone" was a distribution instruction commonly used in the Army for messages which they did not wish to have widely distributed or some particular subject which they did not wish to have distributed to the staff of the headquarters, or something of that sort. Now, of course, "Eyes Alone" is a misleading term. Anyone knows that a message like this was prepared by various people in Washington, perhaps at a fairly low level, probably prepared in the War Department, O. K'd at various steps up to General Marshall. Secretary Stimson had taken it over to the White House, and there it went through I don't know how many channels, how many hands. Then, of course, you have all the procedure of putting it into the cryptographic machinery, transmitting it to China, decoding it, passing it through the code clerks, the stenographers, and the personnel of the headquarters, including the adjutant's office, the chief of staff, commanding general, and so on. A message of this sort, furthermore, is not transmitted in a highly secret code usually, because the message is given verbatim to a foreign government.

Mr. ACHILLES. Some messages may be. Not all "Eyes Alone" messages.

A. No, but at any rate there is, I think it is correct to say, a special category of code for one type of message since the full text is given to a foreign government, and after it goes to the foreign government the security in that sense is lost since there is no way of knowing what distribution it may receive after it gets into the hands of the foreign government. In this particular case we heard back through Chinese channels of these messages. Some of them reached the foreign correspondents in Chungking through Chinese Government channels.

The CHAIRMAN. By that you mean that although the original message bore an "Eyes Alone" characterization it had become widely known through other offices of the Government through Chinese sources?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean after it was once delivered.—A. Yes, that's right. Now, also, of course, these instructions on distribution—these instructions are more or less sometimes temporary. After it becomes generally known, the original instruction is not binding.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the whole concept is, isn't it, that it should be protected until its delivery to the foreign government?

A. That is correct; sir, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it reaches the foreign government before it reaches the general public.

A. That's what I'm trying to say.

Q. Now this was a discussion you had with Gayn?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you ever have any similar discussion of this matter with Jaffe?—A. Not to my knowledge, sir; no, not that I recall.

Q. I believe in response to a question from Mr. Achilles you have indicated that at the time when you had this discussion with Gayn in May of 1945.—A. With Gayn in late April.

Q. Late April—the matter had also—that is, the fact that the proposal had been to put General Stilwell in command of all Chinese armies was public knowledge.—A. It was, I'm sure, published in at least one of the stories—I think the New York Times carried the fact in a story of Stilwell's recall which was published at the end of October—October 31, 1944. That story was written by Brooks Atkinson, who was in Chungking at the time of Stilwell's recall, and I knew he had received very, very complete fill-in briefing on the whole series of events and exchange of messages leading up to the final recall.

Mr. ACHILLES. By whom was he given a briefing?

A. I wasn't present, and I don't have direct personal knowledge. I do know that it was a very authoritative, responsible fill-in briefing. Also, that there had been articles written by the United Press and by the Associated Press correspondents at New Delhi at the time of the recall which also, I believe, mentioned the essential fact, which was the American request, originating in telegrams from President Roosevelt, that the American commander, General Stilwell, be put in command of all Chinese armies. I know that those correspondents—I know from second-hand that those correspondents received similar complete briefing, and I read at least one of their stories. I know from Theodore White, who was in Chungking, that he also had a similar opportunity to learn all the facts and, I believe, to see the actual documents.

Mr. ACHILLES. Was there anything which you told Gayn at that time which had not been previously published or—

A. I think the only sort of things that I mentioned to Gayn—and this was just to tell him the story—were small details, such as the fact that I was interpreter and that we insisted on giving the message directly to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek rather than forwarding it through channels and allowing it to go through other hands. Those are the only facts, I believe, that had not been published, and those were just color; they weren't essential at all.

Mr. ACHILLES. In other words, there was nothing substantive that you told Gayn.

A. No, sir. I don't know whether it is pertinent to the account that Mr. Theodore White has written in his book, *Thunder Out of China*, published early in 1946, I believe, which indicates the extent to which he had been briefed. It refers to the language of the document, and so forth.

The CHAIRMEN. Will you refer us to that publication.

A. The book is *Thunder Out of China*, by Theodore H. White and Anna Lee Jacoby, published by William Sloan Associates, Inc., and I refer particularly to pages 218-225.

Q. I have no further questions on this point.

Mr. ACHILLES. I have no further questions now. I would like to take a look at the book.

(Brooks Atkinson, called as a witness in behalf of John Stewart Service, having been duly sworn, testified as follows:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Will you state your full name and address, Mr. Atkinson?—A. Brooks Atkinson, 120 Riverside Drive, New York City.

Q. And what is your present position, sir?—A. Drama critic of the New York Times.

Q. Now, did you serve in Chungking during the war years?—A. Yes; I was there from December 1942 until the end of October 1944.

Q. As a correspondent for the New York Times?—A. War correspondent for the Times.

Q. Now I should like to ask you whether in late October 1944 you obtained knowledge as a newspaperman of the circumstances—the details and the circumstances—leading up to General Stilwell's recall?—A. Yes, I knew that pretty completely.

Q. And did that include detailed knowledge concerning the proposal that General Stilwell be placed in command of all Chinese armies?—A. Yes.

Q. I wonder if you would care to explain in detail, if you will, the knowledge that you had on that subject.—A. Well, yes, I'll do the best I can. It was 6 years ago, so I can't remember in detail everything that went on, but I knew from several sources for a matter of a month or 6 weeks that negotiations were going on between Pat Hurley and Chiang Kai-shek for the purpose of putting Stilwell in practical command of the Chinese troops. In other words, Stilwell felt—we all felt, including myself—that the Chinese were not fighting the war and Stilwell was handicapped by not having command of the troops. I knew about those negotiations and I knew finally that the negotiations had broken down on account of a peremptory telegram from Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek which Stilwell delivered.

Now I would rather not divulge my sources, if that's agreeable to you people, for two reasons: One, that newspaper ethics traditionally protect sources. Another reason is that other people are involved, and I don't like to involve them unless they know about it. But the principal reason is that after all these years I really can't remember what one man said and what another man said. You can readily guess the nature of my sources. They were both American and Chinese. They were authentic and legitimate, and it was the practice of the American Army to keep American correspondents as well informed about the politics of the war and the economy of the war and things of that kind as was legitimate. So I feel that I had a very complete knowledge of what was going on at that time. In fact, I brought along here a story that I wrote when I came home. I came home for the specific purpose of writing a story about Stilwell's discharge from China, which I couldn't write in China on account of the Chinese censorship. And this story, which is in the Times for October 31, 1944, begins with a general summary of what the situation was between Stilwell, Chiang Kai-shek, Pat Hurley, and Roosevelt at that time, although it naturally does not go into the minute details of the negotiations, which I wasn't too familiar with anyway, and which, if I knew, I wouldn't feel at liberty to divulge.

The information I had was for background use. Now this story, you might be interested to know, was held up by the Army censor here in Washington for 3 or 4 days. Stilwell's retirement had been announced—I think I can remember the day—it was on a Saturday or a Sunday, because I just arrived on a Sunday. It seems to me Stilwell's retirement was announced in the papers on Sunday, but with a loose and very vague explanation of why. Now I had the story in my pocket—that's why I came home—and gave it to the New York Times, which sent it to the Army censor here in Washington. And it was "hot stuff" and he naturally avoided passing it, if possible, and it was finally passed and published on the 31st—that's Tuesday.

Mr. ACHILLES. Could we have that made a part of the record?

A. Yes, I brought that for evidence. The managing editor told me at that time that finally the censor took the story to Roosevelt together with another story by Preston Grover of the AP. Preston Grover was the AP correspondent in New Delhi. He had been briefed on what had happened to Stilwell before I left New Delhi. I wrote the story and I brought it home in my pocket to give to the AP. The managing editor told me that Roosevelt decided that the facts were substantially as I had stated them in this article, and that since I was in the country I was entitled to have the story censored and printed. But Preston Grover was still in New Delhi and they had to cable his story back to him in New Delhi and have it censored there and then recabled to this country. I remember that very vividly because it gave me about 10 hours' beat on him.

Q. I would like at this point to ask that a photostatic reproduction of two pages of the New York Times for October 31, 1944, be put in evidence as an exhibit, numbered document 334, and in that connection I should like to read two paragraphs from the story by Mr. Atkinson which has just been referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. The paper may be made an exhibit and you may read as you request.

A. This is merely an excerpt from the story, which is a long one, running over onto page 4:

"For the last 2 months negotiations had been going on between President Roosevelt's personal representative, Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to give General Stilwell full command of the Chinese ground and air forces under the generalissimo and to increase China's participation in the counter offensive against Japan.

"Although the generalissimo at first was inclined to agree to General Stilwell's appointment as commander, he decided later that he would accept any American commander except General Stilwell."

A. That next paragraph may be pertinent, if you will read that.

Q. The next one, yes:

"His attitude toward the American negotiations became stiff and hostile. At a private meeting of the standing committee of the Kuomintang [National Party] Central Executive Committee this month he announced the terms of his personal ultimatum to Americans who were pressing him for military and governmental reform.

"He declared that General Stilwell must go, that the control of American lend-lease materials must be put in his hands and that he would not be coerced by Americans into helping to unify China by making terms with the Chinese Communists. If America did not yield on these points, he said China would go back to fighting the Japanese alone, as she did before Pearl Harbor."

(Photostatic copy of New York Times, pages 1 and 4, dated October 31, 1944, marked "Exhibit 24" in evidence and appended to this transcript.)

A. I would like to add where I said about my sources—I said being vague about it, but I should say that about this particular episode nobody in the Embassy was a source, as far as I could remember. I know Mr. Service wasn't; he was in Yen-an at the time. I had no communication with him. The other people I knew in the Embassy, I can't remember that anybody gave me any information on this particular subject. My sources were outside of the Embassy on this particular point.

Mr. ACHILLES. But you were briefed by official sources in order, presumably, that the American people might get the facts?

A. Exactly.

Q. In that connection, Mr. Atkinson, is it a fact that your briefing included the fullest disclosure of all the facts leading up to the recall?—A. Yes; I believe so.

Q. Now, as a matter of fact, do you know whether General Stilwell had knowledge that you knew the full facts?—A. Oh, yes. In fact, I came out from Chungking as far as New Delhi in his party. We had two planes, and he knew why I was coming.

Q. And you were coming back for the express purpose of publishing this story?—A. I was. This story was known to many other people, too.

Q. I was going to ask you about that. I believe you mentioned Preston Grover. He was the AP correspondent in New Delhi?—A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether the UP correspondent in New Delhi was also fully briefed on this matter, as you were?—A. I'm quite sure. There was Derrel Berrigan, if I'm not mistaken. At least I knew that he knew it.

Q. And you were quite certain that he also?—A. He knew the story. I don't know the circumstances as well as I do about Preston Grover, who asked me to bring his story home for him.

Q. Now after you left New Delhi, was Mr. Service on the plane with you returning to the United States?—A. We met in New Delhi and had taken a plane that night, and I remember it because I was very surprised, but in a way I wasn't surprised because Service always turned up where things were hot, and as far as I knew, he was in Yen-an, but here he was on the plane on the way home, presumably on the same business I was.

Q. Do you know whether Mr. Service knew that you had been fully briefed on this story?—A. Well, I had my story written at that time and I showed it to him on the plane. I can't remember, naturally, all the conversation, but he knew why I was coming home, and I'm sure I must have told him everything I knew.

Q. One further question on this point. After you published the story on October 31, 1944, was the matter of the circumstances of the Stilwell recall thereafter a subject of wide public interest?—A. Yes.

Q. Would you be able to say whether by April 1945 the full details of the actual circumstances of the recall were widely known amongst persons knowledgeable?—A. I think the general story was available to the public in various forms, not only in what I had written myself and a series of articles that I wrote after this one article, but I remember Berrigan of the UP had a series of articles which covered the same material, and—well, I can't cite other instances now. The Saturday Evening Post had some kind of a story which more or less—it was the same story that I wrote. The reason I remember it is because the fellow who wrote it arrived in Chungking just about the day I was leaving, and when his story finally appeared—it seems to me it was in the spring of 1945—he wrote me a letter and said he apologized for telling the same story that I did, but after

all there was only one story and there wasn't very much more to be added to it. That's how it sticks in my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it?

A. I can't remember. His first name was Sam, but the rest of his name I have forgotten.

Q. Was it Mark Gayn?—A. No.

Q. I take it, when we refer to this story, that included particularly the fact that the President's proposal was that General Stilwell be placed in command of all Chinese armed forces under the generalissimo?—A. That's right.

Q. Now turning from this particular question, I believe you have already written a letter to the Board, Mr. Atkinson, but I wonder if you would care to state again your knowledge, based on your association with Mr. Service, of Mr. Service's general political orientation, with particular reference to whether you ever detected any disposition to be a Communist or a Communist sympathizer or otherwise oriented toward the Communists.—A. Well, I have already touched on that in an affidavit which I sent, which you may remember. But Jack and I were very close associates in China for 2 years, and there were two or three other members of the Embassy, and we were all very congenial and we were together all the time. Now I really can't remember any conversation we had on any subject. It just seems to me there was a complete intimacy on all political and intellectual, social, and artistic topics. Jack is 100 percent loyal to this country, he is a very keen collector of information, and it seems to me the facts have borne out that he is a very sound—he can produce very sound evaluations of evidence. As to communism, I can't remember anything we ever said on the subject. I can say for myself that I was much less bitter about the Communists at that time than I am now. We were war allies.

I admired very much the war that they were putting on, and it seemed to me after this association and after meetings that we had had that politically the relations with Russia might be happier after the war than they were before. Now I can see that was naive. Nevertheless, that was my attitude in those days. I think it was an attitude that many people had. My whole interest in the subject was winning the war as far as America was concerned. The reason I tell you what my opinions were is because I don't remember that Jack's conflicted with mine in any way. I am glad to have a chance to come here in case you want to discuss this in any more detail. But he wasn't a Communist then, I can swear, any more than I was, and I wasn't, and he is not now and never has been.

Q. In that connection, Mr. Atkinson, in connection with your own statement that you are not and never have been a Communist, do you know whether the Soviet Union looks on you with any particular favor?—A. Yes. I have been there twice—1936 and again in 1945 and 1946—and both times I had the honor of being denounced by the press as soon as I got home. It is a matter of record.

Mr. ACHILLES. By the press?

A. By the Soviet press. As a matter of record, they take a very dim view of me, which gives me a great deal of feeling of security.

Q. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask you something about the relationship between the press in the China-Burma theater and the military authorities. In other words, whether or not it was a custom there at that time for the authorities to brief the press on matters which the press wasn't permitted to publish.

A. Yes. In fact, we had a few—the accredited correspondents who are distinguished from those who are not accredited to the United States Army—we had a few press conferences in Chungking with General Stilwell and, when he wasn't there, with General Hearn, who was his deputy, and I would say most of that stuff was off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that include stuff that would normally be classified?

A. I think so; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And was that known as background information?

A. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you define "background information?"

A. Background information is information which you were not at liberty to use as such, but just intended to clarify your mind and put things in their real proportion.

The CHAIRMAN. Now that briefing was given you by the military authorities and also by their political observers attached to the military authorities?

A. Those were entirely with General Stilwell and General Hearn, and we had a few of those conferences, but they were finally given up for a plain reason: there was nothing to say, nothing was going on, and there wasn't any news.

We could never print the stuff because we had two censorships: we had the American Army censorship and the Chinese censorship, and only pretty routine stuff could get through those two censorships.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for coming down.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any other witnesses?

Mr. RHETTS. As far as I am concerned, we can take a recess.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until Wednesday of next week, at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:15 a. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., June 14, 1950.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE MATTER OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: June 14, 1950, 10:10 a. m. to 11:40 a. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building.

Reported by: H. B. Campbell, court stenographer, reporting.

Members of the board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore C. Achilles; Arthur G. Stevens; and Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Counsel for John Stewart Service: Charles Edward Rhett, Reilly, Rhett, & Ruckelshaus.

(The board reconvened at 10:10 a. m.)

The CHAIRMAN. The board will be in session.

(After being duly sworn, Col. John Owen Beaty testified in behalf of the loyalty security board as follows:)

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. What is your full name, Colonel?—A. John Owen Beaty.

Q. Are you a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army?—A. Colonel in the United States Army Reserve.

Q. Your present residence?—A. Dallas, Tex.

Q. And you have come here at the invitation of the board to testify in this case?—A. Yes.

Q. Colonel, would you give us a brief review of your military experience?—A. I volunteered at the outbreak of the World War I. I was a student at Columbia at the time that I sent my application in for the first officers' training camp. So many more Virginians volunteered than they could take into the training camp that they wrote me to stay on in New York and to come for the second training camp, so I actually entered the 27th of August 1917 in the Fort Myer officers' training camp, where I was commissioned second lieutenant in November 1917 and had many kinds of little jobs.

When the war ended I was commanding officer of the American detachment at Harling Road, Norfolk, England. I remained in France until August—the end of July or August—was discharged from the Army August 27, 1919, retained the commission with lapses and one thing or another, but essentially retained the commission, recalled as captain in 1941 for approximately 5 years, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, General Staff, advancing through the grades, and during several of those years was member of the General Staff Corps.

That is enough detail.

Q. Since then you have retained your commission?—A. Since then I have retained my commission and have been on active duty two periods of 3 and 2 months and several shorter periods, most recent of which was the 3rd and 4th of June in this current month. I was in uniform the 3rd and 4th of June.

Q. Now, referring to 1945, you were at that time on duty in the Pentagon?—A. That is correct, sir.

Q. In the Military Intelligence Division?—A. That is correct.

Q. What was your function?—A. I wish Chief of the Interview Section. The Interview Section was, as you know, designed to give us the information brought back by returning officers and members of the Navy Department, State Department, war correspondents, refugees, anybody we thought would give us late information on areas or topics in which we were interested.

Q. In that connection you had occasion to interview John Stewart Service?—A. Yes.

Q. Had you ever met him before?—A. To the best of my memory I didn't know he existed until our liaison said—he returned from China and he came over and was interviewed by a group upon my invitation.

Q. Do you remember who else was in the group?—A. No, sir. I interviewed more than 2,000 such people. My office was not an office of record. The people who came made the records. You see, we would invite people from appropriate services and branches. For instance, most interviews the Transportation Corps would have a representative present and Quartermaster and many of them and various experts would come according to their interests and they kept the records.

Q. So you took no notes?—A. No, sir. In the first few weeks or months I did do it but there seemed to be some belief, which I shared, that for us to maintain a little set of files would be a waste of time and duplicate effort and these other people who were making the notes and preparing intelligence didn't have us do it. So we had the function with regard to getting the people there. Notes were made by the North African Branch, the Far Eastern Branch, Transportation, or any of the various units that would come. Navy sometimes would come.

Q. Were all the people who were present military people?—A. No; they were properly qualified civilians.

Q. Who did the civilians represent?—A. Any of these, almost every intelligence branch or section would have a few officers in it and also some professional career people.

Q. Were the civilians all employees of the Army?—A. I am not quite sure. Perhaps Navy would send a civilian or not, but for the most part civilians were there. People coming in from the Navy were usually in uniform. I can't give you a positive answer on that.

Q. Were there any of the press there?—A. Oh, no; the interviews were always classified in some degree, "restricted" or up.

Q. Now, can you state of your own recollection anything that Mr. Service stated at this interview?—A. I remember it particularly well because we had previously interviewed returning from that area perhaps 20 individuals. They had not been connected—they were not working together, they would come at different times on different missions. I say approximately 20, I am not sure of the number. Naturally you understand that. From those interviews we had built up a picture of the area generally referred to as North China.

I was struck, and I remember that others I met—I mentioned it to others that the remarks of Mr. Service were so diametrically different from all the other information it was startling. I happened to remember saying something like this, "Well, you don't know what is on the other side of the mountain. Nineteen people tell you the oaks and one tells you the pines are on the other side of the mountain." I remember stating that and I have said that same thing several times since in discussing it.

Now, as I said, I can't guarantee that we had talked to 19 or 20, it might have been 15 or it might have been 22 or 23, but we had talked to many others returning from the area.

Q. Had you talked with any others who had been with the Communist forces in Yenan?—A. I couldn't trust my memory after this many years. I interviewed over 2,000 and I was present at almost all of them except possibly a few that were when I was on leave, and we didn't have much leave at that time.

Q. You can't recall anybody besides Mr. Service who had come from Yenan?—A. I couldn't say where individuals came from specifically after this many years.

Q. You were going to tell us what Mr. Service said.—A. Without presuming to quote exact words, the best of my memory is that we should not fool along with Chiang Kai-shek's Government, that the so-called Communist Government of North China, in his opinion, had no connection whatsoever with Soviet communism, was an independent, mature, well-functioning group, were only the best hope of China and collaboration with them was the best thing we could do in the China field—the sense is that. I am not presuming to quote the words he said because, as you know, the lapse of time is considerable.

Q. I may have misled you as to date. Was this 1944 or '45?—A. My memory is that it was the spring of '45, but as I said, I have no notes on it. To the best of my knowledge and belief it was the spring of '45.

Q. Mr. Service came back twice, once in '44 and once in '45 and I am not quite sure which is the occasion you refer to.—A. I can't swear to the date. The best of my knowledge and belief would be in the spring of '45.

Q. Just for your information, in an attempt to refresh your recollection, the first return was in October '44 and the second return was in April '45.—A. I think it was much more likely the second return. As I said, I can't swear to a date on it but my belief is that it was in the spring of '45.

Q. Have you told us all that you can recollect of this statement?—A. I think so.

Q. Did you have any further connection with Mr. Service after that?—

A. No, sir.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. Can you recall any person who was at this session with you, Mr. Beaty?—

A. I believe—understand the circumstances under which we met we might not all be present, by my principal assistant was Maj. Daniel Ryan. I think it likely that he was present.

Q. You do not know positively whether he was or not? You can't recall?—

A. I can't recall whether he was or not.

Q. Can you give us the names of any others of the 19 to 23 that you might have interviewed who had come from any area close to Yenan?—A. I am afraid I can't, sir. As I said before, we got these people in from this general area and much time has passed and many of them—I cannot say for certain.

Q. You say other parts of the War Department, or those who attended, kept notes. What do you mean by that, Colonel? Are their notes somewhere in the War Department to your knowledge?—A. I would say this, it is quite possible that some people attended these interviews without making notes. In other words, if they found something they thought useful they would make notes and add them to their intelligence files. If they didn't there would be no reason for their doing it.

Q. I believe you testified that you made the comment afterward about the 19—A. I recall that.

Q. Do you remember to whom you made that comment?—A. I believe I made it to Major Ryan, but whether or not I made it to him in discussing the interview that he had been at or in breaking information to him about the interview, I don't recall.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. In your capacity as head of the unit, that covered arranging interviews from all theaters?—A. Oh, yes, all theaters. Of course, we bothered only with strategic theaters. We didn't presume to be covering the whole world. To the best of my knowledge and belief we interviewed nobody from Dutch Guiana—only where the War Department was directly concerned.

Q. Did you by any chance arrange any interviews about that time with General Hurley when he came back from China?—A. I was ordered not to interview General Hurley. I want to say this in defense of the War Department, it was the only time I received that certain order. I was given carte blanche except in that one case.

Q. Did your interviews ordinarily include generals or did they start lower down?—A. We interviewed privates first class and sergeants and people who according to experience they had had, as represented to us, as reported to us by the people in position to know—no, rank had nothing to do with it. It was being in a strategic area or having been in experiences which would likely prove fruitful.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Did you interview General Stilwell when he came back?—A. No, sir.

Q. General Wedemeyer?—A. No, sir. Those are a little out of our reach. We interviewed higher ranking people outside than we did within the War Department. For instance, our chief was just a major general. We didn't go above major general in interviewing. We interviewed ambassadors and others of high rank, but within the War Department—

Q. Did you interview Ambassador Gauss?—A. No, sir.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Have you any idea of whether there should have been any special order not to interview General Hurley?—A. No, sir. I was just told by a man several steps above me, a couple steps above me, not to interview him. But I think he—I know he got it from higher up. I don't know that he did but the way he told me and everything was that he was told—he was a brigadier general, and he told me not to interview Hurley in the War Department.

Q. I know it is a long time ago, but you can't recall any further details of what Mr. Service may have said?—A. Not precisely, sir. I have given you essentially the idea, that this Communist development in North China was highly independent of any Russian connections and a much better bet for American collaboration and assistance and so forth than the Chiang Kai-shek Government. Beyond that at this time I couldn't presume to make a quotation.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN :

Q. In connection with your duties did you read any reports from the theaters—written reports?—A. I did occasionally, sir; not comprehensively.

Q. I wonder if you happened to have read any of Mr. Service's written reports.—A. I don't recall, sir. I did not study all the things coming in on any one area but I was from time to time, by people I was working with, furnished military attaché and other reports with marked passages on them. Sometimes I would read the entire report, you see, many of the intelligence documents for perusal, to keep me informed so I could do my interview work better. But I don't recall at this date whether I did or didn't read any one of them from that area at that time.

Q. Did Mr. Service state at the time that he had been to Yen-an among the Communist forces?—A. I don't recall whether he stated that or not.

Q. Did you know that to be a fact?—A. He was sent to us through liaison channels from the State Department as having been in the north China area.

Q. But you don't recall where in the area he was stationed?—A. I don't know his itinerary at this date. I don't recall his itinerary. He may have mentioned the route he followed or the stops he made, but I made no record of the Chinese names.

Q. You yourself have not been to China?—A. Not in that part of China, sir, and nowhere in China to amount to anything.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS :

Q. Did you have an interview with Colonel Dickey?—A. I am not sure, sir. As I said before, having interviewed 2,000 and more than 2,000—

Q. I am trying to identify some of the 23. Do you ever remember interviewing Col. Frank Dorn?—A. I don't think I remember the name, sir. The name is familiar to me but in what connection I don't know.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN :

Q. Do you remember ever interviewing any other State Department employees?—A. We interviewed a lot of State Department employees, but I don't recall them by name at this date, not having made any record whatsoever. Two thousand people passing through, there has to be something striking before you remember.

Q. Do you remember anybody by the name of Davies?—A. No, sir.

Q. Or Emmerson?—A. My memory is not—remembering or not remembering is not significant.

Q. Do you recall interviewing anybody who said they had been among the Communist forces in Yen-an?—A. Who specifically made that statement I could not say. My impression is yes, but I can't recall the name. We kept no diaries and made no notes. All that was discouraged.

Q. Colonel, the board is very much obliged to you for having come all the way from Texas to testify. We want you to understand we appreciate it.

I will now turn you over to Mr. Rhetts.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS :

Q. I wonder if you can explain to us in a little more detail, Colonel, what this Interview Section was. I don't understand it myself.—A. I will be happy to. It was to get foreign information on any subject in the world to people who needed it more quickly than through channels. For instance, a member of the Quartermaster Corps had representatives at all of our meetings of people from the South Pacific. Incidentally, gun rust and things of that sort, getting information of that sort by direct interview of a man who in many cases had flown in by plane got vital information to the people who needed it an estimated 6 weeks before it could have come in a roundabout process. In other words, we were a little short-cut to help out with last-minute information.

Q. You indicated that one function was to assist in obtaining information more quickly than you could get it through channels. Was this not a part—A. Put through ordinary printed reports, reported channels.

Q. What was the composition of this Interview Section? Could you tell us that?—A. There were two officers, a secretary, that was all, because we didn't make notes ourselves. We simply contacted the agencies to find the people and arranged an interview, usually in a room something like this, and all the records were made by the people who came to the interview.

Q. As I understand it the Interview Section was an administrative machinery designed to bring experts in particular fields who were in the Military Intelligence

Division in contact with individuals who had knowledge in those fields.—A. That is right.

Q. Are you yourself a far eastern expert in any sense, sir?—A. No, I have been there only casually. As I said, I don't claim to be an expert in any of these fields, but in the several areas which we worked in I read and interviewed for a period of over 3 years—developed a certain familiarity.

Q. I take it that, for example, in the case of Mr. Service that the people whom you would invite to attend an interview with him would be the people in your Far Eastern Branch of MID, whatever it was called, who were dealing with the substantive aspects of far eastern intelligence.—A. Yes, sir; that is essentially true. As I said before, we had contacts in seven branches. Finance, Quartermaster, Adjutant General, Transportation, Chemical, and so on, and several of those, such as Transportation and Quartermaster, attended a very large proportion of those interviews, I have no knowledge of how many. Others like Adjutant General attended very few. We would notify them according to whether we thought they would have an interest in the topic.

Q. Were these interviews primarily designed to elicit factual information about a particular area which a man had visited?—A. I should say so, to get the facts of an area or resources or equipment or any of the things thought generally necessary for an army.

Q. They were not primarily, or were they, designed to provide an occasion for discussion of what the United States policy, the political character, ought to be toward an area?—A. I can hardly answer that one. It is possible that some questions might have been of that nature. At one time in G-2—we reorganized rather frequently—we had a Political branch. It is possible that questions of a political nature were asked. I can't say.

Q. Can you tell us what you referred to, the fact that you had interviewed some approximately 20 other people who had come from what you described generally as North China? By that do you mean the areas controlled by the Chinese Communists? Is that what you had in mind when you referred to North China?—A. I am afraid at this time I couldn't answer an exact question on that. I couldn't put a line, and I don't know that I could then exactly, where controls went through.

Q. I believe you testified that the views which Mr. Service expressed in this interview that you referred to were diametrically opposed to the reports that you had received from those approximately 20 other people.—A. "Diametrically different from any" I said.

Q. "Diametrically different from"?—A. They were different.

Q. Can you tell us something of what these 20 others reported to you? What were the—A. Only the briefest summary, that this represented Russian penetration, Communist, Russian, Soviet penetration.

Q. What represented that?—A. The North China Communist movement was allied with Russia, Soviet Russia.

Q. In what sense do you recall that this alliance with Russia was described?—A. I couldn't say now.

Q. Was it your understanding that these approximately 20 other people had reported that the Chinese Communists were operating with Russian troops or under Russian command?—A. I am afraid I can't give you exact details after this much time.

Q. You can see what I am trying to find out. What were the views of the others?—A. The exact details as to how the Russian influence was originated or was operated, I don't know. But I got the general impression from interviews that North China Communists had been in touch with Moscow and hadn't grown up as an independent movement, as I gathered to be the case from Mr. Service.

Q. Now can you recall over what period these interviews with the approximately 20 other people from that area took place?—A. I began interviewing—I was named Chief of this Interview Section at the beginning of '43. I believe perhaps in January the set-up was made, perhaps in March before we were operating, so I shall say approximately March '43 to and beyond the spring of '45. I had been interviewing some 2 years at this time.

Q. You couldn't place interviews with this approximately 20 any more accurately than that it occurred during the period while you were Chief of this Section?—A. Two and a fraction years prior to that time.

Q. Do you have any recollection that this approximately 20 people who had been interviewed indicated that they had personal knowledge of the situation in the Communist areas of China?—A. No more than that if there had not been strong reason to believe they hadn't we wouldn't have invited them.

Q. You can't think of who any of those people were?—A. No, sir, I made no notes on the period.

Q. Now, I wonder—you have indicated that the best you can recall as to them is that they reported that the Chinese Communists were allied with or in some way under the control of the Soviet Government.—A. I didn't say "under control." I said "in communication with" or something of that sort. They had contacts, to the best of my knowledge and belief, derived from previous interviews.

Q. Did you understand Mr. Service to report to you at his interview that the Chinese Communists were not in communication?—A. No; his knowledge and belief they were not.

Q. That there was no communication?—A. I wouldn't say "communication" but no connection, no tie. The exact details again—

Q. What did you understand him to be reporting when you say that there was no tie? Do you mean that they were not under—did you understand him to say that they were not under the control or the dominance or the influence—A. Yes; I think he said that they were an independent movement, an independent and indigenous movement, not Moscow connected. That is to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Q. Not Moscow connected.—A. I think that is about all I can say on that.

Q. Apart from this aspect of the matter, that is to say, the relations between Moscow and the Chinese Communists, can you recall what any of these approximately 20 people reported to you on other subjects which differed so greatly from Mr. Service's report?—A. No.

Mr. ACHILLES. Can I get one thing clear? These 10 or 20 people approximately were specifically from North China Communist areas, not people from all over China, or were they people from any part of China?

A. As I understand it, these people I am referring to had some presumed knowledge of or connection with North China principally, of course, returning. It might be we would occasionally talk to a person who had derived knowledge but for the most part we dealt with people who had been in the areas. The details I cannot recall.

Q. I take it that the approximately 20 people that you are referring to here when they were interviewed, the people, we will say, from the far eastern area, MID, would probably have been invited to attend their interviews also.—A. There would have been no other purpose for holding them.

Q. I believe you testified you had never read any of Mr. Service's reports.—A. Not recalling by name, but these things came in and there would be no special reason for my recalling the name of the person who wrote them if they were submitted to me.

Q. Do you know whether any of the people in MID who were working on substantive aspects of far eastern intelligence were particularly impressed between the divergence of Mr. Service's reports and the reports of other people?—A. My impression is yes, but I can't give you names. I believe if you were to consult the roster of MID, the Military Intelligence Division, at approximately that time you might arrive at a lead as to who would have been the sort of person who would have been invited.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. You can't give that to us?—A. I don't have that; I didn't keep it. That would be in the Record Section over there. In other words, people came and went in all of the branches. Whether Colonel X was there at a given time I wouldn't know now.

Q. May I ask one question? With regard to the reports that you saw was it a normal practice for reports coming from the various areas of the world to come across your desk or did you receive selective ones, or what?—A. I received all of certain types of intelligence.

Q. What types were those?—A. Intelligence summaries and things of that sort. I saw them all, I think, or a large number. Reports sent in by military attachés and others, I certainly did not see them all because no one person could see them all. The volume of them was so great that it was—experts of certain areas, it was all that experts of a certain area in a certain subject could do. But I saw reports from those who thought for some purpose it would be desirable for me to see them. That is all I can say at this time.

Questions by Mr. RUETTS:

Q. Now, Colonel, you also indicated that your recollection of this interview with Mr. Service included a recollection of statements by him to the effect that

we shouldn't fool around any longer with Chiang Kai-shek. I wonder if you can elaborate a little bit on what you understood the substance to be.—A. Just that.

Q. When you say "fool around with him any longer."—A. Not give him any more help.

Q. Not give him any more help. You understood him to recommend complete abandonment of any aid to the Central Government of China?—A. To Chiang Kai-shek. He may not have expressed it in exactly those words but that is what I got from it.

Q. Now I wonder if in view of the fact that you were not dealing substantially with far eastern matters, I wonder if it is possible that you might have received an impression slightly different from that which one somewhat more expert in that field would have received.—A. I don't believe so, sir. This was considered a very sensitive spot that I held. I should say somewhere along the line I wouldn't have been there for 2,000 interviews—but I believe I can trust my judgment on my impressions.

Q. I take it it was not your function to record the results or the content of these interviews, but rather to arrange them, so that it was not part of your job to report accurately precisely what was said at these interviews to anyone.—A. If I were called in by a superior officer and asked what the score was I could have told him, certainly for a short time on any of them, but as a number of them passed and the years passed details have slipped except for a few which were very striking for some reason or another.

Q. I take it, then, that you are pretty satisfied that your recollection on this point could not be faulty.—A. Yes, I am sure.

Q. You are quite clear that his proposal in this group was to completely abandon American aid to the Central Government of which Chiang Kai-shek was the head.—[The witness nodded his head.]

The CHAIRMAN. The reporter cannot get your answer when you nod your head. Will you answer the question?

A. That was the substance. As I said before, I am not quoting words, but that was the impression I derived from his interview.

Q. That would have been a very startling proposal, would it not?—A. It was to this working group in the Military Intelligence; if I may express an opinion, it was to me.

Q. Was that the type of problem which was discussed in these interviews, such fundamental matters of high political policy?—A. I can't generalize on these interviews.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS.

Q. You said it was to the working group—A. I mean—when I said the "working group" I speak of colonels, lieutenant colonels.

Q. This was so startling as to cause discussion of it afterward?—A. When I said "the working group" I didn't mean to say for a moment that General Bissell was ever at one of these interviews. In other words, you asked what the people in MID did, whether there was any—whether it surprised them, meaning the working group, meaning the people who would come and make notes.

The CHAIRMAN. The point Mr. Stevens is making is, did you discuss it with the working group afterwards?

A. No, I discussed it with one, but I think it was Major Ryan.

Q. He is a member of your staff.—A. Yes. Whether I discussed it with others, I think it is likely, but I can't remember whether I spoke to A or B at that time on it.

Q. Can you remember that you did speak to A or B?—A. I can't remember whether I spoke to A or B on it, but I know I spoke to one person, making that figure of speech about the trees. I think that was probably to Major Ryan.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS.

Q. I would like to show you, Colonel, Document No. 204, which is a memorandum prepared by Mr. Service and Mr. Ludden, dated February 14, 1945, entitled "Military Weakness of Our Far Eastern Policy." I ask you to read through that document.

The CHAIRMAN. Take your time, Colonel, and read it. (The witness read the document referred to above.)

Q. For the information of the Board, this is in your document book.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question?

Q. Does that seem to express the general type of views that you recall Mr. Service expressing?—A. Well, the interview was in more detail. This—I am

not sure this particularly was brought in the interview or was not brought in the interview.

Q. Well, you have indicated, for example, that his proposal was to abandon Chiang Kai-shek, that is to withdraw all aid and support. My question is whether the general subject that is discussed here is in any sense—is in substance what you recall Mr. Service talking about at that time?—A. There is a relationship. This is more subtle, more carefully prepared, perhaps, than a question-and-answer interview, but the idea of a coalition government including the Communists was not approved of by people that I knew in Military Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it discussed at that interview?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Is it your understanding that the idea that the United States ought to promote and assist and encourage the formation in China of the coalition government was not in accordance with American policy?—A. Insofar as I recall the words "coalition government" did not come in at the interview. I can't say that it did or it didn't. I don't recall that it came up at the interview. In other instances it came up, especially with regard to Europe. The people I knew in military intelligence didn't believe in the coalition government including the Communists.

Q. Do you know what the policy of the United States Government on that question was at this time?—A. No, sir; I can't say.

Q. Was it your belief that such a coalition government would have been consistent with what you understood American policy to be?—A. I don't know whether I ought to say anything about the policy of the Government. Should I?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think it is really germane to this issue. I don't think we need to trouble the witness.

Q. I suggest, General, since what we are discussing here is policy and Mr. Service's alleged views—

The CHAIRMAN. Ask your question if you wish, but I would suggest what we need is the witness's recollection of what was said at the time.

Q. I should like to—as I understood you to say a moment ago, Colonel, the idea of a coalition government which would include Communists was not a part of your understanding consistent with American policy.—A. You showed me this paper. There is something in here—if we would say a certain thing the internal effect in China would be so profound that the generalissimo would be forced to make concessions of power and permit a united front to make a coalition. That is taken from this paper.

Q. Now what were you saying about that?—A. I said I didn't think that was by any means the same thing. It was merely allied to and might be sort of corollary—in other words, it was nothing shockingly different between this and the interview, not the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Consistent, you mean?

A. Consistent, yes; consistent with the interview.

Q. Did you regard this suggestion for using American officers to encourage such a coalition as some departure from American policy?—A. That is Government policy. Should I answer that question?

The CHAIRMAN. You can use your discretion.

A. I wouldn't be considered disloyal if I answer that question?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no.

A. That was regarded by us, by myself—I say "by myself," certainly by many people around me—as being an entering wedge of communism into the areas.

Q. Now, I invite your attention, Colonel, to page 2 of this document, of this Document 204.—A. The same one I have?

Q. Yes, the third full paragraph.—A. At the bottom?

Q. No, the next to the last paragraph.—A. "We cannot hope—"

Q. No, "A similar public statement—" —A. Page 2 on mine is different.

Q. I am sorry, page 3, "A similar public statement by the Commander in Chief with regard to China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessation of military aid to the Central Government; that would be both unnecessary and unwise." Now this was a memorandum written on February 14, 1945. That hardly squares with your suggestion of Mr. Service's views that we should completely withdraw from Chiang Kai-shek, does it?—A. As I said, I am not sure that he said in those words we must completely withdraw aid.

Q. Or in substance?—A. What I gained in substance, we wouldn't lose anything if we would withdraw from the non-Communists.

Q. Here he says it would not only be unnecessary to do that but would be unwise to do so.—A. Well, what about that? That, to me—understand, I may be an artless man—that is inconsistent with the portion of the paper which suggests the coalition government, because the coalition government lets the Communists in. So to me, as I say, I am not saying it for other people but to me those two parts of the paper look in different directions.

Q. Now is it your view that the suggestions embodied in this document and the suggestions which you recall Mr. Service as having made in this connection were some evidence of his disloyalty to the United States Government?—A. As I see it—but of course I am a Virginian-born, Texas brought up—again what the policy of the United States was, as I said a while ago, was something that I don't think we should undertake to determine, but from considering what I consider the merit to be and having read and studied documents such as Mr. Stalin's great speech on the 10th of March 1939 and other documents, and having known others in the War Department who did, the honesty and fervor with which he expressed his methods of penetration which you can see yourself if you care to read that book, "Leninism," the last document in that book published in New York, then you can see the coalition government is one of Stalin's penetration methods. In other words, a coalition government, including Communists is the kind of Americanism that I feel, with the kind of international knowledge as I have, recommending the coalition government was a startling—including communism—was a startling thing. Whether the man is innocent or duped or unpatriotic I will not judge. But it was a startling thing for a man to propose a coalition government including Communists when he knows the history and doctrine of communism.

Mr. ACHILLES. Your recollection is that Mr. Service proposed that as a part—

A. You mean the coalition government? I don't recall that. That is suggested here.

Q. Now, I take it that the answer to my question is that in substance that such a proposal did evidence in your mind at least some departure from what you regarded as Americanism.

A. Or from good judgment. I am not going to say more than that the thing was wrong according to my knowledge and training and experience—it is wrong.

Q. Were you familiar during that time or are you now familiar with the views held by General Stilwell on this same question?

A. I don't think I ought to go into the General Stilwell issue. I wouldn't like to say how much I knew or didn't know at that time. We did not interview General Stilwell. But I decline to answer on General Stilwell. I didn't interview him myself.

The CHAIRMAN. The only question was whether you are familiar with it or not.

A. Not in enough detail to give answers. I am afraid what I could give on General Stilwell would be not valuable.

Q. Have you read the so-called white paper, accurately called "United States Relations with China"?—A. No.

Q. Published by the State Department.—A. When was that published?

Q. It was published in August 1949.—A. No; I have not. I can say positively I have not if it was published then.

Q. Were you familiar during this period with the views of General Hurley on this same question?—A. I didn't see him.

Q. Were you familiar with his views?—A. Not then.

Q. Are you now?—A. Incidentally only. He has been making speeches and so on so that I am aware of his views.

Q. As a matter of fact, are you aware that one of the principal purposes for which General Hurley was sent to China by the President of the United States was to bring about just such a coalition government?—A. I don't know. I am not aware what the purpose was.

Q. I would like to show you, Colonel, Document 225, which is a memorandum prepared by Mr. Service on March 23, 1945, and is entitled "Contact Between the Chinese Communists and Moscow." I ask you to read through that document. It is not in the document book.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you got a report number?

Mr. SERVICE. My number is 23 of the 1945 series.

(The witness read the document referred to above.)

Q. Does the factual material contained in that memorandum relating to connections between the Chinese Communists and Moscow accord with your general recollection of what Mr. Service reported at this interview a short time later?—A.

The details here of which I have no recollection whether they were or were not satisfied at the interview, I don't know, but remarks such as "There is now no travel between the Soviet Union and Yen-an. The Kuomintang bogey of Soviet military supplies to Chinese Communists is now dead." I should say that things like that are in accord with the interview.

Q. Do you have any reason to believe that that factual reporting was not accurate?—A. I couldn't say so. As I said, I wasn't there.

Q. I take it that the substance of the reporting in that memorandum corresponds in general with what you have testified to.—A. Not in full, I should say, but certain places like that "bogey of Soviet military supplies to Chinese Communists is now dead," "no travel between the Soviet Union and Yen-an," certain statements like that correspond to the gist of the interview, as I recall. I don't recall, though it may have well been said at the interview, some of these other things.

Q. What I am trying to get at, Colonel, is whether the substance of what you recall Mr. Service reporting at this interview corresponds with or differs from the report set forth in this memorandum.—A. It corresponds in part.

Q. In what part does it not correspond?—A. When I say it doesn't correspond I don't claim to remember everything in these interviews which were customarily from an hour to 2½ hours long. We met at various times of the day, often to 2 o'clock, and would talk back and forth and back and forth for a couple of hours.

Q. Let me see if I can make myself a little clearer in my question. What I am trying to find out is whether there is anything in this memorandum which differs in substance from what you can recall Mr. Service as having reported at this interview.—A. I can't undertake to answer that, sir.

Q. Is it your recollection that he reported something different at the interview from the substance of what is set forth here?—A. All I can say is that the general impression given at the interview was there was no connection whatsoever that he knew of between the Communist authorities in North China and Moscow. That was the general impression of the interview.

Q. How would you characterize this report here?—A. Well, certain parts of it might indicate that, like "No travel between the Soviet Union and Yen-an" and "military supplies to Chinese Communists is now dead," "It is probably impossible for any planes to fly from bases in Outer Mongolia to North Shensi," and so on. Now all that, I would say, is in harmony with my impression. On the other hand, toward the end when he drops a hint that while there is no contact between the governments, there may be some contact he doesn't know about between the parties, I don't recall that as having been brought into the interview, but I am not saying it wasn't. The question might not have been asked. It may have been brought in; I have forgotten.

Q. Let me ask you about that memorandum. Would you say that this memorandum reflected a writer who was trying to, if you like, sell the proposition that there was no connection between the Chinese Communists and Moscow?—A. I don't wish to comment on this memorandum at the present time.

Q. Is there anything inconsistent between the views and reports set forth in this memorandum and your recollection as you have testified to it here of Mr. Service's statements in the course of his interview?—A. I answered that—just answered it. Almost the same question I just finished answering.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the witness has answered that question before. He went to some extent to explain the two parts that you wanted him to recollect was in accord, and the other he didn't recollect.

Q. I am now asking a different question, as to whether there is anything here inconsistent as to what he recalled Mr. Service to have reported at the interview?—A. I answered that, too. I said with regard to this question about the parties that I didn't recall that that had been brought out at the interview. Whether it was or was not I didn't recall.

Q. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. No further questions, Colonel. We are very much obliged to you and thank you for coming.

A. I am through now and can return to my family?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; thank you very much. I am very glad to have seen you, Colonel.

(The witness was dismissed.)

(Recess.)

(After being duly sworn Josiah W. Bennett testified in behalf of Mr. Service as follows:)

The CHAIRMAN. State your full name and address.

A. Josiah W. Bennett; I am now living at 2713 Seventy-third Place, Hyattsville, Md.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. What is your position, sir?—A. I am on the public affairs staff of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

Q. Of the State Department?—A. Of the State Department.

Q. Now, will you tell us what your position was in the spring of 1945, that is to say, roughly from January to June, if you like?—A. I was employed by the War Department as a military intelligence research analyst. That was my official title. I was working in the Economic Branch of MIS in the War Department, and that branch handled intelligence matters concerning political and economic affairs in the entire Far East.

The CHAIRMAN. In the entire Far East?

A. In the entire Far East.

Q. And were you devoting your attention primarily to far eastern intelligence?—A. Entirely.

Q. Entirely. In the course of your work did you have occasion to see reports and memoranda prepared by Mr. Service in China?—A. Yes. MIS received, I think, the most pertinent reports from the State Department. There was regular machinery set up whereby extra copies were made and circulated to us and since during most of the period I was working on China, or matters related to China, I had an opportunity to see Mr. Service's reports.

Q. Now during the spring of 1945 did you have occasion to attend any interviews which had been arranged by the Interview Section of Military Intelligence with Mr. Service?—A. I can't be sure of the date but I do remember I attended at least one. One remains in my mind because it was the time I first met him.

Q. When you first met him, and you may have attended more than one of these interviews if they occurred?—A. I may have, but I can't be at all certain. To explain why, there was a never-ending series of these interviews. Everyone returning from the Far East in any capacity at all, in the Army or in private capacity, if it was thought he had some information which he might be able to give us, would be brought in and one or more of us from the office was busy almost every day attending one of these functions.

Q. In that connection how long had you been in this work in the office of Military Intelligence?—A. I joined it at the end of June, I believe, in 1942, if my memory serves me. I know it was in the early summer.

Q. And you remained there until when?—A. Until August 1946.

Q. Now you have just indicated that throughout this period there was a never-ending series of interviews with all types of people returning from China. Did you either at the interview with Mr. Service, which you attended, or at any other interview form the impression that the information or the views expressed by Mr. Service during the course of this interview were different or in conflict with the views of other persons whom you had interviewed and who had returned from the Chinese Communist areas?—A. My recollection of the interview is not very accurate, I mean not very exact. It was the function of these interviews to provide information and intelligence and if there were controversies they would be more about points of fact, because it wasn't normal for views to be expressed. So far as my recollection of Mr. Service's interview goes, I remember it only as being more or less as what he said in his report earlier. There is nothing I can remember as being different from what he said in his reports.

Q. From what he said in his reports, and either on factual or on policy views did you form any impression of any violent difference between Mr. Service's reports and the reports of others who had opportunities for knowledge about the Chinese Communist territory?—A. No.

Q. It has been testified in this meeting, Mr. Bennett, that at some interview in the spring of 1945, held in the Military Intelligence Division, or Service, whatever it is, that Mr. Service expressed the view that we should quit fooling around with Chiang Kai-shek and should withdraw all aid from the Kuomintang or Central Government. Did you ever hear Mr. Service express such a view?—A. I certainly don't remember it.

Q. Do you think such a view, if expressed, would have stuck in your memory?—A. It probably would. It was a rather drastic statement to make and I should think personally Mr. Service's position making such a statement would have made an impression on my memory and the others there.

Q. Do you think that even had you not attended the interview where such a statement or expression was made that it likely would have come to your attention from others of your colleagues who had attended the interview?—A. Very likely.

Q. That, again, because of the drastic nature of such proposal if it had been made?—A. Yes.

Q. Now, it has also been testified here that at this interview, which I have referred to, Mr. Service expressed the view that in substance that there was no connection between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Communists. Did you ever hear Mr. Service express a view to that effect?—A. No. As a matter of fact, I am not sure whether it was from his reports or not, but it seems to me I remember constant references to a Tass mission, to various other people who might possibly be a liaison with the Russians. As I say, I don't know whether it is in Mr. Service's reports.

Q. Did you, in the course of the one interview that you are certain that you attended during the spring of 1945, take any notes on the discussion?—A. No; I don't think so. I am pretty certain.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN :

Q. Who was chairman of the meeting?—A. Well, there was the regular procedure in MIS and it was a gentleman whose name I don't remember, whose job was to organize these interviews. He usually acted as the man who introduced the speaker.

Q. Was it Colonel Peaty?—A. It could be. I am sorry I don't remember the name. I don't think it was a general.

Q. Not Colonel Peaty?—A. It was a colonel.

Q. It was a lieutenant colonel?—A. I think so, but I am sorry I am not sure. The man I remember was a rather oldish man.

Q. White hair?—A. Yes.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS :

Q. And the work of this colonel was exclusively administrative, was it, that is, to arrange, set up the meeting at which substantive experts in technical fields would then attend and ask questions?—A. He used to pop in the office or call up and say such-and-such a person would be available at such-and-such a time, who was going to go, and then he might be there and he might not. If he was there he would act as chairman of the meetings.

Q. I believe you have indicated that you did not take notes at this interview that you asserted you attended. Was it not your practice ever to make notes on these interviews?—A. It was quite commonly done and I think maybe notes were taken by someone else in our office, but I don't remember them taking notes on this interview.

Q. Was that because there was nothing particularly noteworthy in it?—A. Well, I wouldn't exactly say that. It was a very interesting discussion of first-hand experience with the Chinese Communists, but it wasn't anything that I remember that was worth recording. It was more or less supplementing what we had read.

Q. In other words, there was nothing new there that you had not already seen in his reports?—A. Yes.

Q. I have no further questions.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN :

Q. You attended all of these meetings on the Far East, did you?—A. No, I didn't attend all of them.

Q. I was wondering whether there was anyone else besides Mr. Service who came back after having had experience with the Communist procedures in Yenan?—A. There was one of our colleagues.

Q. Who was that?—A. Captain Donke.

Q. Any others?—A. I don't know whether Colonel Barrett came in or not. Colonel Barrett was there. I have seen him; I can't remember whether I saw him at that time.

Q. As far as you can recollect did the observations of Mr. Service differ in any material way from the observations of these others you have spoken of?—A. No, not as far as I can remember.

Q. No further questions. Thank you very much.

(The witness was dismissed and the Board adjourned at 11 : 40 a. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE MATTER OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: June 15, 1950, 10:10 a. m. to 11:50 a. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building.

Reporter: Goodwin Shapiro, CS/Reporting.

Members of the board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman, Theodore C. Achilles, Arthur G. Stevens, Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Counsel for John Stewart Service: Charles Edward Rhett, Esq., for Reilly, Rhett & Ruckelshaus.

(The Board reconvened at 10:10 a. m., June 15, 1950.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Board will be in session.

(Thomas Dawes Blake, called as a witness.)

Questions by Mr. RHETT:

Q. Will you state your full name and address, Mr. Blake.—A. My name is Thomas Dawes Blake. I live at 3026 N Street NW.

Q. And will you state what your present position is.—A. I am the Washington representative of the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. of New York.

Q. Now were you formerly employed by the State Department?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. When were you with the State Department?—A. I joined the State Department in March of 1942.

Q. I wonder if you would describe for the Board your work with the State Department from that time until you left.—A. When I joined the Department I was hired by Mr. Howard Bucknell, who was then the No. 2 man in what we called then the Division of Current Information, which was the Press Relations Division of the Department, and still is, under a new name; I think it is special Assistant to the Secretary—McDermott's office—now. From March of 1942 until June of 1943 I was on what you might call a rotating shift. That Division maintained 24-hour service, and one week I would work from 4 o'clock in the afternoon to 1 or 2 in the morning; another week from midnight until 9 or 10 in the morning; and a third week from 10 o'clock in the morning until 7 or 8 at night. The night side—we were primarily concerned with handling the queries of reporters that came in after hours, watching the tickers. Any news developments that came over the tickers we would notify the appropriate officials of the Department. In many cases the press knew about it before you would catch it on the ticker, and to endeavor to get an answer, if possible, would require getting, of course, the proper clearance either from the official himself or further up the line. The day side of the shift was concerned with putting out the Department's Radio Bulletin.

In June of 1943 I was put in full charge of the Radio Bulletin and taken off the night shift, and later that year, in September, I developed the so-called News Digest, which, I believe, is still circulated throughout the Department. I had those two jobs up until January of 1944. Mr. Marvin McIntyre, who had been secretary to President Roosevelt, died in December, and in January Mr. Roosevelt picked Mr. William Hassett, who had been Mr. Early's assistant, to succeed Mr. McIntyre. Mr. Early asked me to come to the White House as his assistant; the State Department consented, and I spent from the end of January until after the inauguration in 1945 as Mr. Early's assistant. After the inauguration, Mr. Stettinius, who was then Secretary of State, requested Mr. Early to release me back to the State Department, and I came back here charged with two specific jobs: one was the attempt to get news out of the Department. In other words, we had found in the past that in many cases the news—I won't say it was forced out, but it was sort of thrust upon us. The press would ask a question and we would give the story, and this was an attempt to get as much information in the hands of the press without waiting for them to ask us about it. The other job I had was what you might call press agent for the Department in the legislative program of that year, which included renewal of the trade agreements, the Mexican water treaty, Bretton Woods, British loan, and so forth.

That job consisted in endeavoring to get the State Department and the administration side of the picture presented to the public through the press and radio. On top of that, in April of 1945, when the United Nations Conference opened, I was in charge of the the press relations end of things back here, as Mr. McDermott and Mr. Bucknell, who was the second man, were out at San Francisco. I did those three jobs through, I would say, the end of July through the

1st of August, when the other boys came back, and in August Justice Jackson requested the State Department to loan me to him to set up the press relations end at the Nuremburg trials, which I did, and spent about 6 weeks abroad. My work was purely on a physical basis. I did not stay for the trials themselves. It was a question of picking the proper rooms, getting the equipment—a house-keeping job. When I returned, the Far Eastern Commission was just being formed, and General McCoy, who was the first Chairman of it, asked me to serve as the press relations officer on the Commission. I did that along with my work of press relations as No. 2 man to Mr. McDermott. Actually, Mr. White and myself about divided the responsibilities, and I continued in that work up until April of 1946, when I resigned from the Department.

Q. Now during the entire period of your actual service in the Department were you administratively part of Mr. McDermott's division or office or whatever it was?—A. Let's put it this way: when I was out on loan to these other Government agencies, I was still on the State Department payroll, and I assume such.

Q. When you were here, you were under Mr. McDermott?—A. Oh, absolutely; when I was here I was under Mr. McDermott.

Q. I gather that your activities were primarily concerned with relations between the press and the Department.—A. That's correct.

Q. Incidentally, was Mr. McDermott during this period primarily active on the matter of relations between the press and the Department or was he concerned on a broader front?—A. Well, of course, Mr. McDermott was the head of the Division, but during the period that—practically that entire period the actual relations with the press—the setting up of the Secretary's press conference, the handling of the various individuals in the office who were, like myself, dealing with the press—were in the hands of the No. 2 man. The first one was Mr. Bucknell, the Foreign Service officer, and then Mr. Homer Byington, Jr., and later on during that period at San Francisco, by me. Mr. McDermott and Mr. White were primarily concerned with the relations with the OWI, with censorship, and, as you put it, on a somewhat higher plane than direct conversation with the press.

Q. Now, as I understand it, from approximately April 1945 on until—A. The end of July.

Q. The end of July, you were the man in charge in the Department on matters of dealings with the press.—A. That's right.

Q. I wonder if you could tell the Board some of the general methods by which news was dealt with—methods by which relations between the press and various officers in the Department—A. Of course, the first obvious relation with the press was through the Secretary—in that particular period with the Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew—in his press conferences, and secondarily, of course, by the issuance of the State Department releases, which in many cases required explanation, which would be handled either by the Secretary or by the press officer of the Department or, in the case of a rather complicated release, the appropriate officials of the Department would be present when the release was given out to answer any questions that were brought up. In many cases they might give what we call a background discussion of what led up to the release so that the correspondents would have a better idea of what lay behind it, rather than just a brief account of the actual happening in the release. Then, of course, where you were constantly busy—but constantly, I mean—around the clock—because newspapermen don't know any hours, without any regard for a 9 to 5 routine here. There were queries coming in here by person or telephone, and those were handled mainly through my office, through me or one of the subordinates. Where the answer was known, if we could dig it out as a matter of policy, why we would quote it to the man, refer him to the source. If there was no knowledge of the past policy, why then we would endeavor to get it for the reporter either ourselves or, in many cases, sending the reporter direct to the official in the Department who could give him the direct answer.

Q. In that connection, Mr. Blake, was it in your experience a common practice for members of the press to deal directly with a particular officer in the Department whom they knew would have particular knowledge of the matter in which they were interested?—A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether there were any regulations indicating that the press people should not go directly to particular officers or, similarly, that particular officers should not deal with members of the press who came directly to them?—A. I know of no such regulations. Perhaps I can best describe the work of the office as a service organization. We tried to run it in order to get

the information to the press in the quickest way possible. If one of the old-time correspondents who knew his way around the Department wanted information, he would in many cases go to the man on the desk, and the man on the desk, having known the man before, would never bother to let us know.

Q. By "the man on the desk" I take it you mean—A. The appropriate person in the Department.

Q. The departmental officer dealing with the substantive affairs.—A. That's right. In many cases, of course, reporters are inclined to be somewhat lazy and they would use us to dig out information for them and more or less condense them and present them to them. We were there as a service organization. In other words, if the press wanted something, it was up to us to get it for them if it was humanly possible. And that is true also as far as the officers of the Department were concerned. They knew that that was our function and they cooperated with us to the fullest extent.

Q. Would you think it fair to say that it was a common and regular practice for officers of the State Department, including Foreign Service officers, to talk to members of the press about matters about which they had knowledge?—A. That is correct.

Q. Would you also think it fair to say that the range of matters that could appropriately be discussed with members of the press was something which was left to the discretion of the officer involved?—A. Absolutely; it is the only way you could do it.

Q. In that connection, I wonder if you could tell us what the general practice was at this time concerning the extent and range of the matters which officers of the Department could appropriately discuss with the press. I have in mind particularly this question: Was it a frequent practice for officers of the Department to discuss with members of the press and to disclose to them information of a character which they were not at liberty to publish but which was given to them for their background information so as to enable them to interpret known events more properly?—A. That was what I myself strove to do constantly. In my talks with departmental officers I urged them to adopt that policy, the reason being that it has been my experience that you can't keep anything secret. I think that that is very difficult. And if a situation arises in which the Government has two alternative methods of handling it or two alternative policies, it is much better to take the press into your confidence and outline to them the danger of one policy, the advisability of possibly taking the other one, just to keep the press from getting off on the wrong foot and stirring up a hornets' nest. That was a very successful method of handling the matter. I can cite numerous instances.

Perhaps the one that comes to my mind now is the matter of our relations with Spain. There was some opposition in the press to the fact that we were giving aid to Spain. Spain was getting oil, when the eastern seaboard motorists were down to 2 gallons a week, whatever the ration was. Well, you couldn't come up as a State Department and say that the reason we are doing it is because the stuff we get from Spain not only helps us in the war but keeps them out of German hands. We don't like them, we think they are terrible, but we have to do it. But you could tell that to the press as a reason for your policy, which would keep particularly the good, sound press away from hammering at you for sleeping in the same bed with a man like Franco.

Q. Now in that connection, would you say that it was a frequent and common practice to disclose to the members of the press material which was in fact classified in the sense that it was recorded in a classified document somewhere, but with the admonition that it could not be printed but was available only for background information?—A. Yes, yes. I'm quite certain that it was very seldom that the press saw an actual document, unless in a paraphrased version. But, obviously, the expert in the Department who knew all the facts was able to talk of his own knowledge, which was based on material presumably obtained in classified documents.

Q. In that connection, would you say that it was a common practice for officers below the level of the Secretary and the Under Secretary to have discussions of this character with the press?—A. Oh, yes; they would have to. I mean, putting it this way, if they are discussing a problem that is based on classified material, they would obviously have to use that to make any intelligent discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. The question had to do more with the status of the officer. Would an officer below the rank of Secretary—A. Very definitely, sir; that

goes right down the line to certainly the chiefs of the various divisions and to the men on the particular desk, as we called it then.

Q. One further question. Do you recall, Mr. Blake, whether it was a customary practice when, we'll say, a Foreign Service officer returned from some area which was of great public interest to arrange press conferences for such officers?—A. Well, that was my particular job when I came back in 1945—one of the two jobs I had. Harlan Clark made a trip up into Yemen, certainly one of the first United States officials and one of the few white men to get up there, and when he came back I arranged a press conference for Clark. And Raymond Ludden came back from China, where he had been with the Communist forces, and I arranged a press conference for Ludden. That was in line with the specific job given me, as I say, to get the news out of the Department. Those press conferences, particularly Ludden's, were well covered by the press. There were several others. I can't remember offhand. It wasn't with every Foreign Service officer who came back, but certainly Ludden's trip with the Communists behind the Japanese lines, and Clark's trip into Yemen was of definite news interest.

Q. Do you happen to know, Mr. Blake, whether it was a regular practice for persons who came back from the field, again from areas where there was great public interest, to hold discussions with other groups outside the Government? I have in mind particularly, for example, the Institute of Pacific Relations, which has a research staff, which, of course, was primarily interested in matters of the Far East. Do you happen to know whether officers of the Department had frequent occasion to hold discussions with such groups to bring them up to date on events that were occurring?—A. Of my own knowledge, I don't know whether that is true, because that did not come within the scope of the activities of the division I was associated with.

Q. I have no further questions.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Do you recall making any arrangements for Mr. Service to speak to the press or to have contact with the press?—A. I myself recall no such occurrence. Whether the people below me made it, I don't know.

Q. Assuming that Mr. Service came back from Yenan, from behind the Japanese lines in Yenan, in April 1945, would it have been natural for your office to refer correspondents to him?—A. It would have been, sir.

Q. You don't recall any such incident?—A. I don't recall, no. At that particular moment I was up to my neck in the legislative program and I was running the office by more or less remote control; let's put it that way.

Q. It would have been natural, I take it, from what you have told us for press people or literary people—writers—to approach Mr. Service.—A. It would have been very natural; yes, sir.

Q. And it would not have been discountenanced by the Department?—A. No, sir. I know of no regulations at all which would prevent either the press from talking to a returned Foreign Service officer or a Foreign Service officer talking to the press.

Q. That officer, under the practices of which you have spoken, would have been free to reveal at his discretion such information as he thought would make proper background material for their use?—A. Entirely up to his discretion; you had to rely on the officer.

Q. And he was free to tell them things which he could not, under an injunction, publish?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Blake.

(The witness was excused.)

Mr. RHETTS. I would like at this point to introduce as an exhibit document 338, which is a photostatic copy of a news article appearing in the New York Times for Friday, March 23, 1945, which reports a press conference held by Mr. Raymond P. Ludden.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be introduced.

(Photostat of news article appearing in the New York Times, Friday, March 23, 1945, reporting a press conference held by Mr. Raymond P. Ludden, marked "Exhibit 25" and appended to this transcript.)

(John Paton Davies, recalled as a witness in behalf of John Stewart Service, having been previously duly sworn, testified as follows:)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Mr. Davies, you recall that you testified earlier in this hearing, on Saturday, May 27, 1950. In the course of your testimony you referred—and I am now

referring in part to pages 98 and 99 of the transcript for the afternoon session of May 27, 1950, and also at page 117 of the transcript—you referred to an early occasion on which you were assigned to the consulate general at Mukden, and under the instructions of your consul general you maintained a very active policy of informing the press very fully as to events that were occurring at that time; and I believe you testified "Japanese propaganda was trying to build up a certain picture of Manchukuo. My consul general at that time and later authorized me whenever we had visiting Americans—William Henry Chamberlain, for example; there are several others that slip my mind—J. P. McAvoy, John Gunther. Our files were open to them, with discrimination, but material that was classified. The highest classification at that time was strictly confidential and it was put down on the table, and they were left to take notes on it, and they were told: 'The only thing you must not do is to reveal that you got it from the American consulate.'" I wonder if you could tell us who was your consul general at that time.—A. At the time I went to Mukden it was Joseph Ballantine, and Mr. Ballantine was my consul general for about a year during my tour at Mukden. It may have been more than a year. I don't recollect, but the records will show. He was succeeded by Mr. William R. Langdon, who is now consul general in Singapore. The correspondents whose names I gave there, I do not recall whether all of them were briefed there during the period of Mr. Ballantine or whether during the period of Mr. Langdon, but it was a procedure into which I was inducted by Mr. Ballantine, first he himself briefing such American correspondents as came there, and then later turning the job over to me in cooperation with him; and finally when Mr. Langdon came there, he continued the same procedure.

Q. So that the policy you referred to was a continuing one and was not in any way altered by one man or the other?—A. Oh, no; it became the policy of the consul as long as I was there.

Q. Incidentally, Mr. Davies, in your testimony and others we refer to the term "briefing the press." I'm not sure that we have been entirely clear what we intended to embrace for that term. The type of dealings with the press that you have testified to earlier—were those so-called briefings confined to formal meetings with correspondents as a group or does that include the kind of dealings that you have individually with a correspondent, perhaps at luncheon or in an informal way, not characterized by a press conference?—A. Well, my experience is that the terminology used for official contacts with the press is pretty loose. Insofar as this situation about which we have just been talking, the so-called briefings, if we use that term, were in the office, they would be over the lunches, they would be in the afternoon at tea parties, or they would be at dinners; it depended on the circumstances; and what they were told was dependent on the judgment of the officer who was imparting information to them.

The CHAIRMAN. The question also included this phrase: Would it also cover individually the press correspondents as well as in a group?

A. Yes, it was individually. In most of these cases—these Manchurian situations—there was no real press call, and the names that I have mentioned were visiting correspondents whom we did see individually.

The CHAIRMAN. So they were briefed individually generally.

A. In the case of Mukden, they were briefed individually.

Q. And I take it, referring to the later phase, during the period of your service with General Stilwell during the war—I take it your comments are equally applicable there; that is, the circumstances under which you would impart information to representatives of the press varied from the most informal type, over luncheon, to a meeting in your office.—A. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's be a little more definite about that. This practice into which you were inducted at Mukden—did you carry that same practice into your relationships on the staff in the China-Burma-India theater when you went there?

A. Yes, sir; I believe that I testified that it was General Stilwell's wish that I perform that function.

The CHAIRMAN. That was definitely indicated to you by General Stilwell?

A. Definitely indicated to me by General Stilwell. In fact, it was orders that we should operate that way. I might carry that on down as I did in my earlier testimony. I believe I referred to a period in Moscow in 1947, under Gen. Bedell Smith. In that period also the contacts were with groups of correspondents and again with individual correspondents.

Q. During the period of Mukden to which you referred, General Stilwell was then Colonel Stilwell and was in Mukden at that time, was he not?—A. He was in Peking at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you have already testified that in the carrying out of this practice on the staff of the China-Burma-India theater you instructed Mr. Service definitely to perform this function with reference to the knowledge which he possessed.

A. I passed on General Stilwell's desires in that respect to Mr. Service.

Q. I have no further questions.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Would you repeat—it has come up in various ways, but I wonder if you could state again the primary purpose of these briefings of the press.—A. They go back to really a broad interpretation of the functions of American officials abroad—American representatives abroad. And, incidentally, I might say that as I recall it, this philosophy was developed for me by Mr. Ballantine; that is, that it is the duty of an American official not only to represent his Government in dealings with foreign governments, foreign officials, but it is also to report to his own Government about conditions in the country in which he is operating; and, secondarily, inasmuch as we are a democracy, it is desirable; and inasmuch as the efficient and sound operation of foreign policy is based on an informed American public, it is not only desirable, it is necessary, that the American public have as many of the facts of the situation abroad which the American Government is confronted with so that they can form intelligent judgments. It goes rather deeply and profoundly into the whole democratic concept of governmental operation. With a blind public, the American Government's hands in endeavoring to cope with a situation abroad are very badly tied.

Q. Essentially, you would put it that the purpose was to see that the American people got as accurate and truthful information as possible?—A. That is exactly right. We may have made errors in judgment in the interpretation, but this was our honest, best effort to interpret for American correspondents and the American public what we thought was the objective situation that we were confronted with.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

Mr. RHETTS. At this time I would like to introduce two documents, one of which is document 339-A, which is a letter dated June 11, addressed to Joseph C. Grew and signed by Raymond Dennett, secretary of the American council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think you gave the year.

Mr. RHETTS. Dated June 11, 1945. I show the Board the original of this letter and ask permission to introduce as an exhibit a copy of this letter.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be done.

(Copy of letter dated June 11, 1945, addressed to Joseph C. Grew, signed by Raymond Dennett, secretary, American council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., marked "Exhibit 26," and appended to this transcript.)

Mr. RHETTS. I also would like to introduce document 339-B, which is a letter dated June 18, 1945, addressed to Mr. Dennett and signed by Joseph C. Grew, and I show the Board the State Department copy of that letter and ask permission to introduce a copy of that copy as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be done.

(Copy of letter dated June 18, 1945, addressed to Raymond Dennett, signed by Joseph C. Grew, marked "Exhibit 27," and appended to this transcript.)

Mr. RHETTS. I offer these letters, Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of indicating that meetings with the IPR staff such as had been testified to here were a common and frequent practice.

(Joseph Close Harsch, called as a witness.)

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Will you state your full name and address, Mr. Harsch?—A. Joseph Close Harsch, 2808 N Street NW., Washington, D. C.

Q. And what is your position, sir?—A. I am at present acting chief of the Washington Bureau of the Christian Science Monitor.

Q. In that capacity or in your earlier capacities as a journalist have you had occasion to deal with officers of the State Department in an effort to obtain news in the field of foreign affairs?—A. Yes.

Q. I wonder if you could describe to the Board something of the general nature of the type of relations which you have had with officers of the State Department as an incident to your getting of news.—A. I wonder if it would be in order for me to preface that by saying that I have been off and on a Washington

correspondent for roughly 20 years, during which time I have tended to write more in the field of foreign affairs than any other field, and that, while I have never limited my activities exclusively to foreign affairs, and therefore the State Department, except for a brief period back about, I should say, 1935, 1936, 1937, when I was exclusively covering the State Department, I have nevertheless during that period of 20 years devoted, I should say, over half my time to the field of foreign affairs and have followed it constantly.

The CHAIRMAN. In the course of that time have you worked for several publications?

A. Not several, sir. I have been connected with the Monitor constantly since 1929, except for a brief period of 9 months in 1939, when I was on leave of absence, serving with the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees, and from 1943 to 1949, when my principal connection was with the Columbia Broadcasting System, although I continued to retain a relationship with the Monitor and write for them principally in foreign affairs. In the course of this work I have frequently known members of the State Department staff, both in Washington and overseas. I have many personal acquaintances, and I think I can say friends, in both the Department and the Foreign Service. I have seen them frequently in their offices, over the luncheon table, in their homes, and in my own home, as my guest and as their guest, here and abroad.

Q. Now in the course of your normal activities as a news gatherer, do you have occasion to get in touch with officers of the Department to obtain news from them about particular events or situations?—A. Oh, yes; frequently.

Q. In that connection, do you always go through the press office of the State Department or do you frequently communicate directly with the man whom you know is the officer who has knowledge of a particular matter?—A. May I divide the answer in two parts? There are two phases to the task of reporting what goes on in the field of foreign affairs. One side is gathering and using the routine information—that is, the information which comes from the formal press conference and from the formal release. In that field it is my custom to attend press conferences when possible, and I frequently go to the formal—what do you call it—press conference section? I don't know what the technical term is.

I go there to obtain handouts, I go there to ask what speeches are coming, when; what Ambassador is returning from overseas. For the routine information I go to that office. Otherwise I have virtually no occasion to go to that office. That is, if I am interested, say, in the question whether there is going to be a Japanese peace treaty and what the views may be of different people involved, my method of procedure in that case would be, if I had the time to do it in such a thorough manner, to talk to several people in several different places. For example, I might well call Mr. Graves at the British Embassy and invite him to lunch or something and chat over with him the problem. Then I might well go to the Pentagon Building and talk with someone there on the military side of the matter. And then I would either come to see or invite to have lunch with me someone in our Far Eastern Division and discuss it with him. In that kind of operation my activities would be purely direct, from myself to the individual in question whom I wanted to see.

Q. Now in the course of dealings of this latter type that you have just discussed, has it been your experience that officers of the Department frequently discuss freely with you information of a character which they admonish you may not be printed or published but which they give to you for your background information to assist you to interpret known events?—A. Can you specify that question a little more?

Q. Well, is it in your experience to have an officer of the Department—of the State Department—discuss with you matters which are, we'll say, classified in the sense that they are not available to the general public, but which they discuss with you freely so that you may orient yourself to the situation under discussion, without being able to print the matter that has been disclosed to you?—A. Yes; that is one of the principal forms of contact between Government officials and—I hate to sound snobbish, but what you might call the—what would be a fair and accurate word? It is very difficult. What level of the press? The distinction, I suppose, would be in the British sense between the reporter and the correspondent. The reporter is the man who merely takes official published information and records it. The correspondent is the man who seeks the perspective behind the official news. In obtaining that kind of information and doing that kind of writing, you are constantly going to people in responsible positions and seeking and obtaining from them what we usually call guidance.

That is the kind of information which cannot be, for many and varied reasons, attributed to specific authority.

I will give you several examples, if you like, of how that operates. Before the Secretary of State went to London on his last foreign trip, he was kind enough to accept an invitation from a group of Washington correspondents to dine at the home of one of them. There were about 15 of us present. At the end of dinner he gave what you could call a briefing, in which he told us a great deal which could not possibly be attributed to him or published in factual form, but which made it possible for those present to write more intelligently about what was going on. He was very free with us. All during the war there were a series of meetings of that type with General Bradley, with General Marshall, with Admiral King, at which we were told a great deal of information which in written form would, I assume, have been highly classified. That is, we were taken into the confidence of the highest authorities in order that we could more accurately convey to the public the true proportion and inclination of our affairs in the war. That is a very common practice.

This type of information gathering is, of course, not limited to relations between a correspondent and the highest officials of Government of the type I have described. In my work, in the work of anyone working as I do, you are constantly talking to all kinds of people at levels of Government. I am constantly being put in possession of ideas, pieces of factual information which could not in the general interests be attributed to an individual or to the Government, and my writing is based on that kind of information frequently; yes.

Q. And I take it that it is common that when such information is given to you, you are told, "Now this is off the record; you cannot print this."—A. I am told what can be used and what cannot; yes; of course.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice you were careful to say cannot be "attributed" to any person. Does it also include information which you cannot publish at all?

A. Yes. Oh, yes. Oh, heavens, yes! In those sessions during the war with men like General Marshall and Admiral King, we were constantly given information which could not be published in any form, and we were specifically told that it could not be published in any form. I will give you a recent example of how this works. In connection with the incident of the shooting down of the American plane in the Baltic, I received a query from my editor, after the State Department note said that the plane had been shot down over the Baltic, inquiring of me what did I know or could I discover what could be printed about why the plane was over the Baltic. I proceeded to telephone to individuals in the Defense Department who are authorized to speak to the press. I posed to them all the questions I could think of pertinent to the affair. I received answers. In some cases the answer was, "I will tell you this off the record; it may not be used." That is, the individual talking to me specified what information he was giving me which was usable without attribution and what information he was giving me which was for my own information only in order that I might in my own mind have a better sense of perspective about the affair. And when I wrote my story on that I was very careful, of course, to use only that information which was usable without attribution but not the information that was given me exclusively for my own information and guidance.

Q. And there again I take it, Mr. Harsch, that you have indicated this type of information comes not merely from top Government officials but others down the line, and that there, too, you are frequently given information which you may not publish at all.—A. Oh, yes; from all levels. May I cite an example, not directly connected with the Department itself, of how that operates? When I have made trips overseas it has been my practice to call first upon the American Ambassador wherever I went. If I went to a specific country in which I was interested and about which I wished to write, I would go to the Ambassador. I would go from the Ambassador to other members of his staff. I have obtained by that method a great deal of extremely valuable information, much of which is confidential, much of which is totally off the record, most of which could not be attributed. I have written many stories, without attribution, based on material given to me by junior officials of an Embassy. Sometimes, because I thought it was in the general public interest, I haven't even specified the country in which some particular incident took place. I have brought in many sources of information. It has been information used in the interest of, I think I'm justified in saying, public enlightenment. In the course of that, I might add that I have been shown documents which are confidential documents, in order that I might be better informed and could write more intelligently.

Q. And in your experience, would you say that this was a practice not confined to yourself but to correspondents generally in whom officers of the Government thought they could repose confidence?—A. Of course.

Q. I have no further questions.

Mr. ACHILLES. Mr. Harsch, how would you describe the purpose, as you see it, for which officials brief correspondents, as you described? What would be the essential purpose of that operation?

A. The essential purpose on the part of the official?

Mr. ACHILLES. Yes.

A. In order that the activities of the Government of the United States might be more accurately presented to the public. If I may volunteer a thought which there seemed to be in the question and to which I may not have responded adequately or fully, this matter of the extent to which a correspondent of my type uses the conventional facilities of the press information office—the office of public information—I think I told you in sufficient detail that I use it for obtaining hand-outs, for going to press conferences, and for that kind of thing. In my search for what we call, in the profession, background information or guidance, I don't think it would occur to me to use it. I suppose that if I were a cub reporter starting out in Washington, as the State Department is now constituted, I would go there first and seek to make my contacts with individuals through that agency. The agency did exist, of course, in the days when I first covered the State Department. And I can recall one instance recently when I was seeking, with the object to publish, certain specific information which wasn't on the public record, and because I was seeking for publication information not on the public record, I thought it a consideration to the individual I wanted to see to clear through the official agency. That is the only occasion I can recall on which I have ever gone to see someone via the official channel of information; on all the other occasions I have telephoned the individual directly.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

JAMES B. RESTON, called as a witness.

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Will you state your full name and address, Mr. Reston?—A. My full name is James B. Reston, 3340 Dent Place.

Q. And will you state your present position?—A. My position is diplomatic correspondent of the New York Times, in the Washington bureau.

Q. How long have you been engaged in newspaper work, Mr. Reston?—A. Oh, since 1934, as full-time employment.

Q. And have you been in Washington throughout your career?—A. No, I have been here since 1941, with many assignments abroad for periods of up to a year, 6 months.

Q. You say you have been here since 1941. Have you been with the New York Times all during that period?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. And as diplomatic correspondent for the Times, I take it you are largely preoccupied with reporting on foreign affairs.—A. That's right, sir.

Q. In the course of your work, I suppose you have frequent occasion to communicate with officials of the State Department in an effort to obtain news of interest. I wonder if you could describe to the Board something of the general character of your dealings with officials of the Department.—A. Yes, I would be glad to. I think I should say before I do so, however, that my job is not a typical job, in that my job is not to report primarily the spot-news announcements out of the Department of State; it is a job primarily of explanatory reporting, and therefore does not concern itself in the normal way with merely taking the announcements of the Department of State; it is rather a job of trying to explain, perhaps, the background of some particular announcement that may have been made by the Department of State. With that in mind, my job is a job of contacting perhaps the person who knows most about the area or the problem which happens to be news at that time. If at the present time one is concerned about the reaction here to the Schuman plan and the prospects of how far the British reaction to that plan might influence the relations between this country and Britain, why I would go direct to the man in charge of the British section who is concerned and make a primary study of the problem and talk to him on what we call a background basis; that is to say, that he would explain, to the extent of his ability and with the limitations placed upon him by his own job, what the facts in the situation were, but not for attribution to the Department of State. That is the normal course that one follows.

Q. And I take it that in the course of conducting operations such as you have described, it would not be your normal practice to go through the Press Relations Office of the State Department, but rather go directly to the man who knew—A. Well, it would differ a great deal. For example, a case came up last week where there was a question of a report from London that the United States Government had promised to give military aid to the British in Malaya. Well, I did not happen to know the man who was on the Malayan desk. Therefore, in that instance I did go through the press department and ask who is the man who is on the Malayan desk and asked them if they would advise him that I did wish to talk to him. But that I would not say is the normal procedure for someone who has been doing this as long as I have. We usually have run into somebody like Ted (Mr. Achilles) in an assignment overseas, and if it affects something like the North Atlantic Treaty, on which Ted has been working, why we go to Ted directly, and that would be on my job 90 percent of the time.

Q. In other words, when you know who the man is who is the expert in the field, you go directly to him.—A. That's right. Most news develops in certain fields and one does get to know these men quite well.

Q. Now in the course of your dealings with officers of the Department, do you have occasion, Mr. Reston, to have furnished to you information of a character which is classified in some way and which you are admonished that you may not perhaps even publish at all, but which is nonetheless furnished you for your guidance?—A. Well, that has happened, but it is certainly not a normal procedure. I mean it has happened from time to time. I have handed to me clippings of the New York Times with things marked "classified" on them, for that matter. One example of when a classified document was made available to us, although I don't think—maybe it wasn't classified—I'll tell you what it was and you would know about it: On the day after the Schuman plan was announced, for some reason or other it wasn't apparent to us why the text of that announcement wasn't made available—wasn't published in the following morning's papers. That seemed to be quite a journalistic oversight to a member of this Department, who called up to inquire if I knew of any reason why a record like the Times would not publish a document of that importance. I said I had assumed that the document had not been made available; that Mr. Schuman had put it in but had not made it available for publication. I was told that that wasn't true; that if I wanted the document I could have the document. I came here and I was given the document. That document, however, wasn't a classified document.

Q. Apart from documents, is it a frequent practice for you to receive information with the admonition that this information can't be published, but that you were told about it for your background information?—A. Well, that happens from time to time, although in my own operation I always try to resist that because I'm in the job of disclosing information; I'm not paid to carry around in my head information which may amuse or give me a sense of being in on things but which I can't publish. I think it is the normal procedure for most journalists to say, when somebody suggests that you be told something off the record, that you would rather not discuss the matter in that context. What is much more likely is that you will be given the background of a situation, which is understood to mean by people who cover this Department or other that one may use the information on one's own responsibility, but one may not attribute it to the source which gives you the information nor attribute it to the Department of State or to Government sources.

Q. Do you know whether some of the information that is given to you in that manner is information which is embodied somewhere in so-called classified documents?—A. Oh, yes, I'm sure that much of that information is. I am not aware now—I don't even know what the classification order of this Department is, but by the very nature of it, much of it—some of it would be bound to come from embassies, and I would assume that material which came from embassies would be classified in one category or another.

Q. In the course of your activities, do you have occasion to maintain contacts with officers of the Department at various levels—that is, below the level of Secretary or Assistant Secretary and chiefs of divisions?—A. Yes, I do.

Q. And you maintain such contacts as a normal course of your operations?—A. You mean do I see people like Achilles and people like that in sort of normal social contacts from time to time?

Q. Yes, and do you see officials below the level such as is occupied by Mr. Achilles in your efforts to obtain news?—A. Well, I do from time to time, but

it isn't the normal procedure. I usually go either to the head of a section of the Department or the head of a desk. That would depend a great deal on the kind of story. I mean, for example, when there was difficulty about Panama, when we were asked to withdraw our forces from Panama, that carried me into a field where I wasn't well acquainted, and therefore I went wherever I could get information, which meant precisely to this level you are talking about—the level of the man at the desk area rather than at the—

The CHAIRMAN. Do you sometimes talk with members of the Foreign Service who have returned from abroad, for that purpose?

A. Well, not as a normal thing, unless I happened to know the man personally and knew he was back and particularly interested in the place from which he had come. That would not be a normal thing.

The CHAIRMAN. But it would not be extraordinary.

A. It wouldn't be at all extraordinary, no. As a matter of fact, especially when a man gets back from abroad, usually his associates will give a party for him of some kind, and one very often runs into people and talks to people who are just back. But it wouldn't be a normal thing for me to search out that person unless one of two things were true: either he were a close personal friend or he were coming from an area which happened to be very much in the news at the time. In either of those events, of course, one would try to see him.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, would you suppose, for example, a man who in the spring of 1945 just returned to this country from the headquarters of the Chinese Communists in Yen-an, China, would be such a person as people might well seek out because of the news value of the area from which he had just returned?—A. Oh, yes; I would think very definitely, because of the controversial issue at that time—very definitely.

Mr. ACHILLES. How would you define your purpose in seeking background information from officials?

A. Well, I think that we are coming more and more into a time when issues are becoming more complex and of more concern to the people of this country, and therefore I think we in the newspaper business, or any of us who reflect very much about it, are pretty unhappy about the ability of the traditional classic methods of reporting news to convey to intelligent people the true nature of many of these issues. Therefore, those things are happening, I think. I think we are, on the one hand experimenting—we on the Times are certainly experimenting—with the very thing that I'm trying to do. We are experimenting with going away from the normal method of presenting news. Instead of the staccato, rather overdramatic tendency of taking the most striking fact and throwing it into the first paragraph and basing one's headline on that, we are trying to experiment with the gathering of the background information and presenting the sense of the issue, the sense of the meeting, whatever it is. One cannot do that by the normal method any more.

Well, let's take the situation at the present time. Supposing Mr. Acheson had just come back from London and made the series of speeches that he has made, the whole sense of what he is trying to do might very well be lost unless we were told in a perfectly proper manner, it seems to me, that when Mr. Jessup got to London he found that people were disturbed about all the war talk in this country, that there was some tendency toward neutrality among certain sections of the European people, and that therefore we felt that it was essential to try to develop that the purpose of our policy was peace and not conflict. Well, unless somebody says that to you, in the hurly-burly of our business one might just go on reporting what Acheson said each day, and the tendency would be, very likely, to report almost the very opposite of what Mr. Acheson is trying to make clear. For example, in all these speeches that have been made since the Secretary got back, as you look at them, there is inevitably a section in which the Secretary says our purpose is peace, but we are really responding to what seems to us an outrageous and somewhat aggressive policy of the Soviet Union. Well, under the classic way of reporting that, unless you know what it is that Acheson was trying to convey, the tendency is to put the lead sentence on "Acheson says Russia has outrageous, aggressive policy," and thereby you are doing precisely the opposite of what the Secretary of State is trying to do. Therefore, there must be, it seems to me—you and I have batted this around many times before—there must be, it seems to me, a recognition on the part of a department whose policy depends upon the consent of the people that the job of the responsible official and the newspaper reporter and complementary 90 to 95 percent of the time and absolutely antithetic the other 5 percent or 10 percent of the time. But unless we have some cooperation—and I

might add we do not get nearly as much as I think we ought to get—I do not see how you can get consent for an effective foreign policy in a democracy. That's my own judgment.

Mr. ACHILLES. There are occasional slips, are there not, when some correspondent misuses information given him in confidence?

A. Yes, there are.

Mr. ACHILLES. Roughly, what would be your guess as to what percentage of information given to newspapermen in confidence was misused?

A. My guess would be a very, very small percentage—a small percentage. We are beginning to see certain bad things developing, I think, Ted, in the sense that your so-called scoop artists in our business are the people who make their living by trying to convey the idea that “you cannot get the truth by reading your press, but if you will listen to me on Sunday night, everything will be all right.” There is a tendency for those people to trade upon the good relationship which has been built up over the years between a responsible official and a responsible journalist. For example, we have had certain institutions in this city for a long time which rested upon a realization that there had to be this area of confidence between officials and reporters, such as the Overseas Writers Organization, such as smaller background conferences—10, 15 men—and at those conferences we would be told things that could not be attributed publicly to officials. There we have been seeing a tendency for that information not to be misused by the persons who were there, but for other persons, who, perhaps, worked for people like Drew Pearson, to find out from some correspondent what was said off the record to somebody else and then by that means eventually to get it out to the public. But the percentage of men who are given information in confidence and the percentage of information given in confidence which is then put out publicly is, I would say, infinitesimal.

Mr. ACHILLES. You would feel, therefore, that the public interest required this interchange of background information between officials and the press despite the risk of occasional misuse of information?

A. Oh, yes; I think you have got to take many more chances than you are taking on that. I think we can illustrate these things in many, many ways, but that is certainly my conviction: that if we keep our mind on the 5 percent where the job of the official is antithetic with the job of the reporter, I should have thought that we would have distorted the whole process. I mean, after all, under our system, as I understand it, we are the direct contact between the Executive and the people, or certainly one of the direct—the major direct contacts, and unless that contact is maintained and rests upon a basis of confidence, I don't think the system will work effectively.

Mr. ACHILLES. That's all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. That closes your presentation of evidence?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn until Monday for a very few questions which the Board would like to ask, which it is not in a position to ask at the moment. We will adjourn until Monday at 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:50 a. m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p. m., Monday, June 19, 1950.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: June 19, 1950, 10:10 a. m. to 12:25 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building.

Reported by: H. B. Campbell, C/S, reported.

Members of the Board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman; Theodore Achilles, Arthur G. Stevens, Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Representative for Mr. Service: Charles Edward Rhett, Reilly, Rhett & Ruckelshaus.

(The Board reconvened at 10:10 a. m.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Board will be in session.

At this point we will introduce into the record Documents Nos. B-59 through B-77, which are photostatic copies of documents found by the FBI in Mr. Service's office on June 6, 1945.

(Discussion off the record.)

Thereupon Mr. John Stewart Service, witness previously produced and sworn in his own behalf, resumed the stand and testified further as follows:

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. The Board wishes to ask certain questions with reference to these documents. I show you first Document No. B-59, which is a photostat of a sheet of paper bearing handwritten notation "John S. Service 14-1/2-S." The notation "Mr. Macatee" has been crossed out. Can you tell us what this document was?

A. The writing is not in my handwriting. The name at the top which has been crossed out is "Mr. Macatee" who at that time was Assistant Chief of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel. The number appearing under my name is the room number which I was occupying at that time in the Old State Department Building. This is apparently a slip of paper which has been attached to some letters or something else which had been forwarded to me through the Department of State messenger service. I assume that it came from FP. It was quite likely that my mail was being sent to the Foreign Service mail room and they had simply clipped or tied a piece of paper to it.

Q. I pass you No. B-60, which is a photostat of a letterhead of "The Road House, Chattanooga Hotel of Distinction, Chattanooga, Tenn." on which is a memorandum referring to some hopes of a deal with the Soviet. Would you explain what that document is?—A. At that time, in May and June 1945, I was occupying a small one-room apartment of a woman who was working in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. She was a secretary there, married to a man in the army, an officer, I believe at officers' training school, and she had gone down there, down to some place near the camp, where he was in training to visit him. Since the apartment was empty she suggested I occupy it and pay the rent while she was away. I think that this camp where her husband was was Fort Benning and I think that this is undoubtedly a paper which was in her apartment, either that she had picked up on some previous trip down there or something of that sort. It was an odd piece of paper which I found in the apartment. Now during this period I was trying to write a rather comprehensive memorandum of my thinking about China and about Chinese policy.

Mr. ACHILES. The handwriting is yours?

A. The handwriting is in my writing and this apparently—these are apparently scribbles of ideas or thoughts that occurred to me some evening while I was there in the apartment.

Q. What is the reference to a "deal with the Soviet"?—A. I say that the "Sino hopes"—this was at a time when it was being suggested, proposed that the Chinese Government should try and make a treaty with Russia, and I say the Sino hopes to make a deal with the Soviet. I indicate I don't think there is very much hope in their success of making this deal unless it is on the basis of giving the Chinese Communists some participation in the Government. If this is done Russia will have the credit with the Chinese Communists of getting them—giving them a share in the Government.

Q. That was stated in there?—A. I perhaps would have to read the whole thing. I am trying to explain it as I go along.

Q. It is in your handwriting. Perhaps you should read the item you are explaining first and then explain it.—A. I will read it. "Sino hopes of deal with Soviet. Not much hope—can only be on basis of letting CP in. Russia will have the credit—not us."

Then there is a line drawn across the page indicating a new thought. I again quote: "China in revolution—still fluid—uncrystallized—incomplete. In this situation Russia's attraction is greater."

There is another line drawn and again I quote: "In China we meet—we must accommodate ourselves." Now to go back to my attempt to explain the thoughts here, I am referring to the fact that the Central Government was currently hoping to make a deal, in other words, to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union settling the outstanding issues between them. I say that I do not think there is very much hope of Chinese success in doing this unless it is on the basis of giving Chinese Communist Party a share in the Government. If this is done Russia will gain the credit of broadening the base of the Government and unifying the country and we will not have the credit.

Q. I think that takes care of it. I pass you Document B-61, which appears to be a photostat in triplicate of a letter of May 16, 1945, addressed "My dear P'eng," and also a letter of the same date addressed "Dear Jo-Fei," which also appears to be in triplicate, and a handwritten letter "Dear Jack," dated May 27. Would you explain who that correspondence is from and how it happens to be

in triplicate? What it concerns?—A. I might, sir; on this matter of being in triplicate, I think that there were not three originals but these are simply identical, but these are duplicate photostats of the same paper. That happens very often in this material. If you examine these carefully you will see that the material that is photographed is identical, so that really it is only one copy. I think the Board will recall that when Mr. Philip Sprouse testified before the Board we touched on these letters. The last paper here is a letter from Mr. Sprouse concerning which he testified. He was at that time a liaison officer at the San Francisco Conference, taking charge of liaison with the Chinese delegation. I am referring to the handwritten note dated May 27, starting "Dear Jack, First Kung Hsi, Kung Hsi on the latest promotion" and signed "Yours, Phil."

Mr. ACHILLES. What does that "Kung Hsi" mean?

A. That is Chinese for "congratulations." He is saying congratulations on the latest promotion I received on May 15 of that year. Mr. Sprouse goes on to say in the next paragraph "Enclosed a letter which CK wishes passed on to Kung Peng." That CK refers to Chen Kang who was in San Francisco with the Chinese delegation.

Q. Was he a Communist?—A. Yes, he was the secretary to the Communist member of the Chinese delegation there.

"Trust you can do the necessary." Well, these are the letters, one of them is from Chia Kang and apparently on the back of the same page is a letter to a man in Chungking named Jo-Fei. It also concerns an invitation to a World Youth Council and World Trade Union Conference. I apparently did nothing about forwarding these letters since they were found in my desk. I don't remember having taken any action on forwarding them. I don't know how I would have.

Q. You had no means of communication which enabled you to forward them?—A. That is correct.

Mr. ACHILLES. These letters were intended for someone in San Francisco?

A. No, they were forwarded by this man Chen in San Francisco and he wished them forwarded to Chungking but I had no appropriate means of having them forwarded to Chungking and I had done nothing about them.

Mr. ACHILLES. Apparently he gave them to Mr. Sprouse in San Francisco.

A. And asked Mr. Sprouse if he could send them on somewhere.

Q. I pass you now—

Mr. ACHILLES. What was the date of Mr. Sprouse's letter?

A. May 27. The date of the letters which he was forwarding were May 16. Apparently Sprouse himself had held them for a considerable time.

Q. I pass you B-62, which is a photostat of a handwritten note dated June 4, 1945, addressed "Dear Jack" and signed by "Rose." I ask you what that document is.—A. This, I believe, is a brief note from Miss Rose Yardoumian. This is written on June 4, 1945, which, I believe, would be the Monday after the week end at Owen Lattimore's where Miss Yardoumian and Mr. Roth and myself had been the guests who had spent that week end with the Lattimores. She says, "I took four tickets from you and paid you for three. Here's the money for the fourth and thanks very much for getting them for us." I have no recollection of what the tickets were, whether they were theater tickets or concert tickets or what it was, but I assume I had been buying some tickets for myself and since I knew—she told me she wanted some and I must have picked up some tickets for her at the same time.

Q. I pass you B-63, which is a photostat of a check on the Commonwealth Bank of Detroit, payable to you in the amount of \$20, signed by Inez E. Larson. Would you explain this check, please?—A. Miss Larson was a recently employed Foreign Service clerk who was assigned to the office in which I was working for training purposes before going out to her first field post. The office where I had been working was the Office of Foreign Service.

Mr. ACHILLES. That is not Mrs. E. S. Larsen?

A. No connection in any way with Emmanuel Larsen or his wife. She was acting as my stenographer and she had needed cash one day. It was too late to get to a bank. I happened to have some cash in my pocket so I gave her \$20 and she paid me by writing this check. I was questioned very thoroughly on this point by the Department of Justice in 1945. That is why my memory happens to be so clear. Miss Larson went soon after this to Stockholm. I don't know where she is now, but I am sure she would be able to affirm it.

Q. I pass you—A. Incidentally, if I may interrupt, Miss Larson I mentioned had just come to the State Department. She had been employed by the FBI just prior to her employment by the Department of State.

Q. I pass you B-64, which is a photostat of a piece of paper containing the handwritten address "Corp. Joseph N. Hatem." Will you explain that reference?—A. We touched on this matter before. My recollection is not very clear whether I brought a letter home or whether I simply brought an oral message which I wrote to the family in the United States of this American doctor who had been in Yenan for some years. I do remember that his younger brother, I think, who was a Medical Corps man, I believe an enlisted man in the Army, came to see me to inquire of his brother in China. I assume that I suggested that he give me his address. I notice that this is not in my writing, and I am sure that this is simply the slip of paper on which he wrote out his full name and address.

Mr. ACHILLES. You don't remember whether you did actually transmit a letter from China to him or whether you wrote him one based on news of his brother?

A. My memory is not clear, sir, because you remember I came back to the United States twice, once in '44 and once in '45. My belief is that in 1944 Dr. Hatem in China asked me to drop his family a line and say that I had seen him and he was well, and I did that. In 1945, I may have brought back a letter. I remember, for instance, the pictures I mentioned before, pictures of this doctor and his Chinese wife and Chinese child. As I said before, any letter that I brought would have been opened and would have been approved by censorship in China.

Q. I pass you B-65, which is a photostat of a two-page handwritten letter dated March 16, addressed to "Dear SP." It is unsigned unless it would be the initial "K." I will ask you what that is.—A. I believe that this is a letter written by Miss Yang Kang, who has been mentioned several times in testimony before the Board here by Mr. Sprouse and by Mr. Fairbank. She was at that time on a scholarship at Radcliffe. She had formerly been the literary editor of the leading independent Chinese newspaper.

Q. Where?—A. In Chungking. Her coming to the United States had been assisted and facilitated by Dr. Fairbank as part of our cultural relations program. I am not sure who the person is that she is addressing here. The initials "SP" don't mean anything to me after a long lapse of time. But it is obviously a letter to some friend in China which she hoped that I would have some means of forwarding. I notice the letter is dated March 16 and I very obviously did not forward it.

Q. Did you forward any letters over that period? Was this a custom of yours or was it just a vain hope on the part of the writers?—A. Well, I think—I don't have any specific recollection of forwarding any letters. It is obvious, I think, that letters occasionally were forwarded, but I don't remember that I forwarded any at all.

Q. I pass you B-66, which is a photostat of a 3-page handwritten letter dated March 16, '45, addressed "Dear P and M" and signed by the letter "K." Is that the same person?—A. The handwriting is the same and of course the signature initial "K" is the same, so I believe that this letter is also written by Miss Yang Kang to friends in Chungking which she hoped to have forwarded.

Q. Which you did not forward.—A. I did not.

Q. If anything had been forwarded, as you suggested a moment ago that perhaps something was forwarded by somebody, would that be through the diplomatic pouch?—A. No sir, it would probably have been—well, you say "through the diplomatic pouch," the OWI, as I mentioned the other day, and officers of the OWI sometimes transmitted open communications to and from the people who were in the United States on grants from them. Now presumably that would have gone through the diplomatic pouch as a semiofficial communication.

Q. And in the case of this girl it might have?—A. Yes.

Mr. STEVENS. Would that have been subject to censorship?

A. Well, it is subject to censorship by the officers. It is subject to the judgment of the officers transmitting it. You might call that censorship. You see, we could send all of our personal letters those days through the pouch, but they had to be left open and they were subject, I believe, to some sort of censorship here in the Department.

Mr. STEVENS. Subject to review as to whether they were to be transmitted? Is that correct? Both here and overseas?

A. That is correct.

Q. I pass you B-67, which is a photostat of a one-page handwritten letter dated February 2, 1945, Chungking, addressed "Dear Jack". The signature is illegible to me. Would you explain this letter?—A. This letter is from a man named Shafer. He was an old friend of my family's, Czech by nationality, who had fought in the Austro-Hungarian Army, had been drafted in the Austro-Hun-

garian Army in the First World War, taken prisoner by the Russians and escaped and made his way across Central Asia into China where he arrived in 1919 or 1920.. He had worked in Shanghai as an architectural draftsman and, as I say, was an old friend of my family's. During the period I was in Yen-an I found that he was there in the Communist territory under detention. He had decided to get out of Shanghai and get into free China and his sympathies were entirely on the allied side and he had been having some difficulties in Shanghai. He had been actually acting as providing cover for some Chinese secret activity in Shanghai. Because of the rather unusual route that he took and because of his Czech nationality the Chinese Communists were suspicious of him, and as I say, had him under detention. They finally released him, they could find no reason to continue to hold him, and he was absolutely destitute and penniless, had nothing but the clothes he was wearing. So I loaned him some money out there in China so that he could outfit himself and live for a while until he got a job, and he finally got a job in the American Army. This is simply a note to me telling me that he has written a letter to his brother Charles who was living in the United States as an American citizen, asking his brother Charles to pay this money to my wife, who was here in the States.

Q. I pass you B-68, which is a photostat of a one-page handwritten letter from 77 Brattle Street, Cambridge, Mass., on December 11, 1944, addressed to "Dear Jack", signature again appears to be "Yang Kang." This is the same girl you previously testified about?—A. Yes; and this letter is also alluded to in previous testimony by Mr. Sprouse. This letter is from Miss Yang Kang who, as I have already said, was a Chinese woman in the United States on a fellowship at Radcliffe College.

Q. Did this have any connection with the letters which she had forwarded to you for transmittal?—A. I don't think so since this is dated December 11, 1944, and the ones she sent me were March 19, 1945. The postscript is as follows: "Heard that Phil is on way here unless he has arrived." As Mr. Sprouse stated before, he is the Phil referred to.

Q. I pass you B-69, which is a photostat of a letter addressed to "Dear Jack" from Mark Gayn, dated May 1, 1945, in which there is a reference to a mutual friend, "Mr. H. in Chungking." Will you explain the reference in the letter?—A. Well, the letter concerns his negotiations with the editors of the Saturday Evening Post magazine concerning this story which he was expecting to write for them concerning the situation in China and Stilwell's recall. "Mr. H." refers to Ambassador Hurley, I assume.

Q. Did he ever write that article?—A. No, sir; he did not.

Q. Did you furnish any information to him for that article?—A. As I testified here before, I discussed with him some of the early background of the events leading up to General Stilwell's recall, the American suggestion that General Stilwell be placed in command of all Chinese forces.

Q. I pass you B-70, which is a photostat of a 1-page typewritten letter dated May 7, 1945, on stationery of the Manhattan Co. of 40 Wall Street, New York, addressed "Dear Mr. Service," signed by "A."—A. Pronounced Suehsdorf. Mr. Suehsdorf, the writer of this letter, was vice president of the Bank of Manhattan Co. and was the father of a man named Adolph Suehsdorf, who was employed by the OWI and had been stationed at Yen-an. During my second stay in Yen-an, in March 1945, I had shared a room with this man's son. I got to know him very well, sharing a room with him for a month, and when I got back to the United States I dropped a short note to his parents saying that I had known their son and liked him, that he was well, and so on. It was quite a customary thing during the war, particularly when people were in remote, isolated places like Yen-an where mail communications were very slow and difficult and infrequent, when I got back and knew somebody and thought probably their wife or their family would appreciate recent news I got in touch with them. It was simply the elder Mr. Suehsdorf's thanks for my having written him.

Q. I pass you B-71, which is a photostat of a 1-page typewritten letter dated May 24, 1945, from West Roxbury, Boston, Mass., addressed "Dear Jack" and signed by the initials which appear to be "R. L." or "R. V. L."—A. The initials are R. P. L. and are the initials of Raymond P. Ludden, a Foreign Service officer who had been, like me, attached to the Army in China and who had also been a member of the observer group in the Communist areas. The first part of the letter discusses a proposal that he might be sent to the Army-Navy Staff College. The assignment had actually been offered to me but there was some technical difficulty because my family was on the West Coast and it would

have been difficult for the State Department to order them here on the basis of this assignment. It was therefore decided to give me a permanent assignment to Washington so I could be reunited with my family. I suggested that Mr. Luden might be a good man for this Army-Navy Staff College assignment. The Department accepted the suggestion and he eventually did go to that Army-Navy Staff College.

Q. I pass you B-72, which is a photostat of a typewritten note on stationery of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated May 22, 1945, and signed "Larry," and ask you to explain that communication.—A. The signer of this note is Mr. Lawrence E. Salisbury, who had been a Foreign Service officer and whom I had known very well in the Far East and here in the Department. He had retired from the Foreign Service a short time prior to writing this letter and was spending part time lecturing at Yale and part time editing Far Eastern Survey magazine for the Institute of Pacific Relations. This note is simply a congratulatory note after my promotion in May 1945.

Q. I pass you B-73, which is a photostat of a letter addressed "Dear Jack" from Mark Gayn, dated May 22, 1945.—A. The letter starts off in a rather misleading way. He said, "This letter is completely off the record." The background is that Mr. Gayn was expecting to be sent out as a foreign correspondent by the Sun, apparently, and he wanted very much to have his wife either accompany him or spend sometime in the same area since he expected to be abroad for a year or longer, or perhaps on a semipermanent basis. At this time, 1945, it was very difficult, in fact almost impossible, to get approval for travel of wives as such. A few people were successful in getting their wives to India or to China if their wives had their own separate employment. Apparently, reading the letter, Mr. Gayn was hoping to have his wife go out to India as a correspondent, but he wanted his efforts to have his wife get out to India kept off the record since if it were known by passport granting authorities that both he and his wife were trying to get in the same place they would probably be less willing to grant the rule for her. I believe in the papers found in Mr. Gayn's possession there should be a reply from me in which I declined to give him any assistance, to give him any channels.

Q. At this point I will read into the record from among the papers found in Mark Gayn's apartment the following, which is taken from a photostat of a typewritten letter signed "Jack":

"Good news that you may be heading for my old stamping grounds!

"Regarding the passport for Sally. Unfortunately, I don't know anyone personally over in Mrs. S' menage. Failing the direct contact, I know the State Department well enough to know that there is not much use asking. They refuse to answer hypothetical questions and will take the attitude: the case must be decided on its merits—let the person apply directly.

"However, I did talk to the people in the appropriate geographical branch, including an officer just back from India. The view was that the passport would probably be issued (at least they would raise no objection—and they would normally be consulted) as long as the woman has a reasonable reason for going (which they agree she does in this case) and can arrange her own transportation (as you say Sally can).

"So I would say that the prospects are hopeful.

"How are the Chinese reacting?

"My breakfast was ruined this morning by reading J. B. Powell and Max Eastman in the Reader's Digest. What a stinker!

"Be sure to let me know when you are coming down to Washington.

"Cheers.

JACK."

I pass you B-74, which is a photostat of a Chinese map and charts on which all the writing is in Chinese. Will you explain this document?—A. This is unheaded but it is apparently a chart, a table, really, prepared by the Communists, of Americans who had traveled through their different areas. They give the dates and places and transliteration as closely as they could do it in Chinese of the names of the Americans.

Q. What is the purpose of the map?—A. Well, this was simply to show the number of their areas which they control which had been visited by Americans.

Q. Do you recall how you got that and what you proposed to do with it?—A. It was simply given to me by the Communists and I didn't do anything with it really. It was just a part of this tremendous compilation of material which—

Q. Did you incorporate it in any report?—A. Some of the material may have been referred to in a general way. I wrote one report, my Memorandum No. 17, March 17, 1945, which is our Document No. 220 in these proceedings, entitled "Verification of Communist Territorial Claims by Direct American Observation." In that I made some reference in a general way to the areas under Communist control which had been visited in one way or another by Americans.

Q. I pass you B-75, which is a photostat of two sheets of paper bearing Chinese characters set up in the form of a table, and ask you what that is?—

A. These are rough statistics which were given me by one of the officials of the government district in which Yen-an was located. I had had a long interview with him and the notes will be found, I think, also in this material that was in my desk. These are statistics of the various government subdivisions of the various counties which comprised the Yen-an area.

Q. The source of this is from the National Government?—A. No, the source is one of the Communist government officials for that area. The second chart here is the population figures for the various counties.

Q. We will have a 5-minute recess at this point.

(Recess.)

Q. I now show you certain documents which were found in your apartment by the FBI on June 6, 1945. I show you first Document B-78, which is a photostat of a small book entitled "Our Task in 1945," containing Chinese characters. The contents of the book appear to be a speech given by Mao Tse-tung before the People's Congress on December 5, 1944. Will you explain that document?—

A. As I testified before, I had been assigned the duty of political intelligence, concerning political reporting of the Chinese Communists, for a considerable period and particularly during my stays at Yen-an in the summer-fall of '44 and again in the spring of '45 that was my full-time job. I therefore made every effort, in connection with this work, to collect all of the materials concerning the Chinese Communists that I could get. I had—and I think the material that was found in my desk, for instance, will bear me out—probably the most complete collection in existence at that time of translated and some untranslated materials concerning the Chinese Communists, their own speeches, publications, party publications and so on. This belongs to the same category and is a booklet which was put out by the Chinese Communists and is the text of a speech given by the leader of the party before a meeting in Yen-an in December 1944, which was simply part of the reference material concerning the Chinese Communists which I had been collecting.

Q. I pass you B-79, which appears to be a photostat of a typed copy of a State Department code and ask you to explain how that happened to be in your possession. A. It is most definitely not a State Department code. There were, as the Board will recall, four Foreign Service officers who were assigned to the Army in the Far East, in the China-Burma-India theater. We were stationed in widely separate places. Mr. Davies was in India most of the time, I was in Chungking, another man was in Burma very much of the time, and another man was in Yunnan. All mail had to pass over what was called the "hump" and over what was at one time Japanese-occupied territory. So there was some need for care in using names of people and places. There was some correspondence between us. Mr. Davies, for instance, would write us through Army channels or would communicate with us by telegram, sometimes giving us instructions or suggesting certain things that we should do, certain reports that we should write, and this was a list of pseudonyms for us to use in such correspondence.

Mr. ACHILLES. This was purely for use in correspondence? It had no connection with cryptography?

A. None whatsoever.

Q. And the results were given you by the Army for your personal retention?—

A. This had nothing to do with our official reports.

Q. I mean this was a copy you were supposed to have in your possession and was furnished you by the Army?—A. It was a list of names which we simply made out and arranged among ourselves mutually.

Q. So it was not given you by anybody, it was simply an arrangement which you made?—A. That is right.

Mr. ACHILLES. May I see that a minute?

Q. Yes. I note that the document is not classified.

Mr. ACHILLES. Who does "Snow White" refer to?

A. "Snow White" was Madam Chiang Kai-shek. That was not a suitable name to use, however, because that is the common theater nickname, so we adopted a second pseudonym rather than using the obvious one.

Mr. ACHILLES. Was there any particular significance in using "Harvard" as a code for "Communist"?

A. None whatsoever. This is simply a list of names that John Davies and Ray Ludden and John Emmerson and I arranged between ourselves for use in correspondence since that correspondence might conceivably fall into enemy hands if a plane was lost over the hump.

Mr. ACHILLES. Or using "asylum" as the code word for Washington?

A. None whatever, sir. It is sophomoric perhaps.

Q. I pass you Document No. B-80, which is a photostat of a card index of Chinese personalities. What is this index?—A. When I arrived at Yen'an we were starting out on a completely new field. There were a few of the leading Communists whose names were known on the outside but there had been no American contact with the main group of Communists in Yen'an for many years and there had never been any systematic biographic information or reporting done. As I moved around and got acquainted and learned about this man or that man by reading a paper, by reading a Chinese Communist newspaper or publication, or interviewing them I simply made up these little sheets of paper, jotting down on each card under a man's name what pertinent information I picked up on him. It was a biographic file on Chinese Communist personalities. Most of the information I have here is simply the positions a man held as far as I could find out. Sometimes I would put down other details, although they are hard to come by, such as a date or background and so on. That date of his birth, I mean.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you and Mr. Larsen collaborate in any way either with this card file or—A. We did not. I have never seen Mr. Larsen's identity file—never heard of it before this case. As far as I know he has never seen my very rudimentary file which I had prepared for my own use.

Q. I pass you document B-81, which is a photostat of an address book of yours. I notice a reference to Lattimore "Supper for Rose," the address of Mark Gayn's 302 West Twelfth, the address of Corporal Hatem and of Phil Jaffe, 225 Fifth Avenue, another address of Lattimore at Roland View Road, Ruxton, Baltimore; Eugene Vinogradoff, Commissariat of the Chinese Department, Moscow; and Rose Yardumian, which appears to be a telephone number. Would you explain those addresses?—A. The first item which you mentioned, "Supper for Rose," is written apparently on what was an engagement pad, a date book, opposite the 3d of June. Now that date I was spending a weekend at Mr. Lattimore's and the supper for Rose is incomprehensible because we all had supper together at the Lattimores'. I wonder if there hasn't been a typing mistake. I notice there are certain obvious typing mistakes on the copy.

Q. Wasn't this copy as it was in your possession?—A. No sir.

Q. This is copied from a notebook—A. This is copied from something written by hand.

Q. This is not a photostat of the notebook?—A. No, it is a three-by-five pad. These pages are simply copies of addresses, people whom I knew or might be needing at some time, wishing at some time to get in touch with. They are all arranged alphabetically, as is normal in an address book.

Q. I think they are all people with whom we are familiar except that one from Moscow, if you will explain that.—A. The man Vinogradoff was a member of the staff of the Russian Embassy in Chungking. He was called a press attaché for the Russian Embassy but was generally understood to be rather important, a more important official than his title or status would indicate. I got to know him quite well in Chungking. In fact, had success in becoming acquainted with several of the Russian officials there who gave me information from time to time that I reported. I see that a memorandum which I wrote on February 16, 1945, which is our Document 206 in these proceedings, mentions some conversations with Mr. Vinogradoff in which, for instance, he expresses a diametrically opposite view on China and China policy from that which Ambassador Hurley was almost at the same time getting from high Russian officials in Moscow. Mr. Vinogradoff, for instance, was telling me, "We will do nothing to assist, support, or encourage the present Government in China." He was talking to me with considerable frankness. When I left Chungking Mr. Vinogradoff insisted on giving me his address, his permanent address at the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, in the hope that at some future time we might resume our acquaintance.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you ever communicate with him afterward?—A. I never communicated with him or heard from him. I never had any contact with him of any sort. I may say, however, it was a useful contact while it existed in Chungking for information and for views as to Russian Soviet attitudes.

Q. I now show you certain documents which were found in the apartment of Mark Gayn by the FBI on June 6, 1945. The first of these is a photostat of a typed carbon copy of a letter of transmittal of October 4, 1944, and of certain enclosed reports prepared by John S. Service on Chinese Communist political views, and ask if any of these papers came from your files or were in any way communicated by you to Mark Gayn.

Mr. RIETTS. Does this document have a number?

Q. I should have referred to its as Document No. B-82.—A. I notice that the first page of this document indicates that it is a military report forwarded to, I assume, the War Department by Joseph K. Dickey, colonel, GSC. I believe that it will be found that this was identical with a document which was also found in Mr. Jaffe's possession and concerning which I have already been questioned under the Document No. B-19 and also B-52. I think that the answers which I gave on a previous occasion I will also repeat for this, that I did not transmit this document either to Mr. Jaffe or Mr. Gayn.

Mr. ACHILLES. May I examine that?

Q. Could you tell us what the source appears to be, Mr. Achilles?

Mr. ACHILLES. It appears to be a War Department document transmitted from Chungking by Colonel Dickey. It appears to be a typed carbon copy. Do we have Document B-19 here? Is that an ozalid or a carbon?

Q. That was a typed copy—ozalid.

Mr. MORELAND. Both B-19 and B-52 were typed copies.

Mr. ACHILLES. As I recall, this is a document of which you did not have any copies, did you?—A. I had no copies, I had never seen this document in this form and, as I said, never had any copies.

Q. I show you B-83, which appears to be a photostat of typed copies of nine documents, beginning September 8, 1941, and various other dates in 1944. I will ask you if any of these appear to be copies of your reports? If they are, whether or not you were instrumental in those copies getting to Mr. Mark Gayn.—A. It appears to be a very heterogeneous collection of all sorts of material, including what seems to be typewritten copies of comment by the Division of Chinese Affairs concerning despatches forwarded from Chungking. It contains also what would appear to be excerpts or perhaps the full text of copies of Embassy despatches and in a few cases what seem to be copies of reports, memoranda, which I wrote. However, none of these are exact copies, none of them are in the form in which I originally prepared them. Also, it contains various other material which I had no connection with whatsoever. There is, for instance, a memorandum of a conversation between our Ambassador in China and Chiang Kai-shek. There is a copy of a despatch from Kweilin. There are notes concerning smuggling in the Chinese province of Fukien. There seems to be a copy of an inter-OWI message and there seems to be a copy of a report by Mr. Caldwell who was employed at the OWI. Finally, there is what seems to be a photostat of an original despatch—

Mr. ACHILLES. May I examine that?

A. Attached to the original commenting memorandum prepared by the Division of Chinese Affairs.

Mr. ACHILLES. What is it that indicates that that is a photostat of an original despatch?

A. It has the file numbers on it, all the stamps, distribution stamps, and distribution symbols come out very clearly. Many of these stamps, for instance, would not have appeared on duplicate copies. They appear only on the original or ozalid copies.

Mr. ACHILLES. Have you any idea how that original despatch got in Mr. Gayn's possession?

A. I have no idea whatsoever, none whatsoever, from State Department files?—A. No, sir; I was not. To answer your original question, sir, I would say that—well, there is nothing here which I gave Mr. Gayn.

Q. Did you give Mr. Gayn anything?—A. No, sir; I do not believe I ever showed him any document.

(Discussion off the record.)

Q. For the record, the Chairman notes that in the cover sheet of the FBI attached to this document it appears that the original of the item 2944 was located in the State Department. It appears that it was received on 9-22-44 and routed to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on the same day. This information and other information which appears following that indicates that the photostat which was found in the file is actually a photostat of the original document found in the State Department files and loaned to the FBI by the State

Department for identification purposes merely.—A. To return to your original question, sir, this material is apparently copies of State Department memoranda, Embassy and consulate despatches, and certain OWI papers. I never had any of these papers in my possession, as far as I know, had never seen them.

Q. Excepting, of course, the reports which are prepared.—A. Yes, but those are enclosures to despatches. I did not give them to Mr. Gayn.

Q. I pass you now document B-84, which appears to be a photostat of a typed original copy of a Service report dated September 26, 1944. I asked you if you have made that available to Mr. Gayn?—A. This is the same type of paper, sir. It is a copy, a typewritten copy, of a Department of State—rather a Division of Chinese Affairs memorandum and of an Embassy despatch which, in turn, transmitted a report which I originally wrote. Actually this is identical with a part of the papers which we just examined under the previous number, Document No. B-83. It is a paper of which I never had a copy in my possession and did not give it to Mr. Gayn. This is a copy—appears to be a copy of Chungking Embassy Despatch No. 2944, dated September 8, with a covering memorandum by the Division of Chinese Affairs, dated September 26, 1944.

Q. Is that by any chance identical with anything we have introduced?—A. It is identical with the first part of the papers which were included under the last document number.

Q. I mean at previous hearings.—A. Yes sir, it is apparently identical with document B-21, which was one of the papers found, I understand, in Mr. Jaffe's possession.

Q. I show you now B-85, which is a photostat of a typed original despatch enclosing a Service report and ask if you will give us the same sort of information about that paper?—A. I should have said in regard to the last document, B-84, that it is identical with a part of document B-21, which was previously introduced in these proceedings and which was found in Mr. Jaffe's possession.

This document B-85 appears to be identical with a portion of document B-22. The material is apparently taken from the reports which I wrote. However, it is not in the form in which I prepared my reports and I did not give these to Mr. Gayn. I did not give them to Mr. Gayn in this or any other form.

Q. I pass you B-86, which appears to be a photostat of a typed original and two pages of handwritten material. The typed material contains extracts, apparently, of a Service report and I will ask if you will explain that document?—A. This appears to be notes or excerpts from various sources. The first part, for instance, is stated here to be from a report to the Secretary of State from the Embassy in Chungking. The next part is obviously an excerpt from a translation of a newspaper report which I transmitted at one time.

Q. Transmitted to whom?—A. I transmitted it in one of my memoranda which I prepared.

Q. You mean transmitted to whom?—A. To the Army or the Embassy.

Q. Not to Gayn?—A. No, sir. I did not recognize the material and in any event I did not give this to Mr. Gayn.

Q. Do you recognize the handwriting in the handwritten material?—A. No, I do not.

Q. Was Mr. Gayn, to your knowledge, in 1945, engaged in any writing or anything of that sort which would have necessitated this information that you have just seen in these last few documents?—A. Well, he does do magazine writing, free-lance writing on the Far East, on China, and Japan. The material in this particular paper seems to be mainly excerpts from speeches or statements by Communist leaders giving Communist views on events in China. It is the type of material which I assume a newspaper and magazine writer would be interested in.

Q. As far as your knowledge is concerned at the time in 1945 when you spent a couple nights in Gayn's apartment did you know he was doing anything that would require information of this sort? Did you then know it?—A. I knew then he was a magazine writer specializing in the Far East.

Q. I mean the specific project. Did you know of any specific projects he was engaged on?—A. Well, he was engaged in writing an article on the morale effects of the American bombing of Japan. That was published in Collier's about the middle of June. He was assembling material for a projected series of articles on China and Stilwell. I can't relate this particular material to any particular article that I remember.

Mr. STEVENS. He did not show you any such material that he had in his possession during the time that you stayed with him?

A. He did not. I had no idea that he had copies of Embassy or other classified material, Embassy despatches and other classified material.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did Gayn ever ask you for any copies of your reports or other material?

A. No, sir; not that I recollect.

Q. No further questions on this. Can we now adjourn?

Mr. ACHILLES. There is one other matter I would like to ask a question or two on. Have you ever known anyone by the name of Grace Granich?

A. I can't recall ever having known anyone by the name of Granich.

Mr. ACHILLES. Or Max Granich?

A. As I testified before, I had to inquire who that man was when I saw his name mentioned in that article by Kamp.

Mr. ACHILLES. You had never heard that doctor in Yenan, Mahatem, speak of a Mr. or Mrs. Granich?

A. No, Dr. Mahatem—well, he had an obsession, a reticence about his background and people he had known and how he got to China and so on. I don't remember his ever discussing the Graniches.

Mr. ACHILLES. Did you ever bring or send any messages from him to Mr. or Mrs. Granich?

A. I don't recall bringing any messages except for his own immediate family.

Q. No further questions. We will adjourn until further call of the chairman. (Discussion off the record.)

Q. I note that in my introduction of items found in Mr. Service's office I did not refer to B-76, which is a photostat of a typed original—I don't know whether it is a Service report or not. Perhaps you can tell me.—A. I refer to document B-60, which was discussed earlier and which was a piece of paper with some handwritten notes. During this period of April and May 1945, soon after my return from China, it was suggested to me by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs that it might be useful if I would prepare a rather comprehensive memorandum concerning the situation in China and my opinions regarding policy in that country, the policy we should adopt toward that country. In the material that was found in my desk I think you will note that there are quite a few fragmentary memoranda, fragmentary notes. They all deal with this memorandum which I was in the process of writing in my spare time and which I never actually did complete. However, this document B-76 is the most complete draft which I finally ended up with. It is still only a partial text of the memorandum that I had projected, but it may be of interest to the Board members as reflecting my opinions as of May 1945.

Q. I also failed to refer to B-77, which is a photostat of a carbon copy of Report No. 85, June 26, 1944, written by Mr. Service, and other papers. Perhaps you will comment on that.—A. This is a translation of a book by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek called "Chinese Economic Theory." This was a book which I think was written in 1944 and was used as a textbook in the party schools in China. It was the Kuomintang Party schools in China. It is interesting as reflecting the official economic thinking of Chiang Kai-shek and of at least an important part of the Kuomintang Party. I had been instrumental in obtaining a copy of the Chinese book and assisted in translating it. There was no official Chinese translation into English. Attached to the translation is a summary of the book and a memorandum of comment on the probable actual authorship not by Chiang Kai-shek himself, but by two ghost writers, and some comment on the type of economic thinking represented.

Q. Was that prepared by you?—A. I worked on the translation and also provided some of the material and assisted in drafting the memorandum of comment on the book. However, the major part of the comment and the summary was done by Mr. Adler, who was the United States Treasury attaché in China with whom I was living at the time. The two of us collaborated, really, on this project which was an independent and voluntary one.

Q. Anything further?

Mr. RHETTS. No.

Q. May we adjourn until the call of the chairman.

(The Board adjourned at 12:25 p. m.)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

Date: Saturday, June 24, 1950, 10:20 a. m. to 12:50 p. m.

Place: Room 2254, New State Building, Washington, D. C.

Reporter: Violet R. Voce, Department of State, C/S, reporting.

Members of Board: Conrad E. Snow, chairman, Theodore C. Achilles, Arthur G. Stevens; Allen B. Moreland, legal officer.

Counsel for Mr. Service: Mr. Charles Edward Rhetts, Reilly, Rhetts & Ruckelshaus.

(The Board reconvened at 10:20 a. m.)

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Conrad E. Snow). The Board will be in session.

(Thereupon Mr. John Stewart Service, a witness previously produced and sworn in his own behalf, resumed the stand and testified further as follows:)

Questions by CHAIRMAN:

Q. Mr. Service, the Board, as you have been informed, has evidence before it that you did make on May 8, 1945, certain statements to Mr. Jaffe at a meeting which you had on that date and the Board would like to ask you a few questions on that. We have not been able to secure a transcript of the exact statements which you are supposed to have made, but in the course of the questions the Board will give you its best knowledge of what these statements consisted of.

It is stated that you told Mr. Jaffe that a plan had been made by General Wedemeyer's staff after they got orders to make recommendations as to what we should do if the United States made a landing in territory held by the Chinese Communists. Do you recall making such a statement?—A. Can you tell me something more about the context?

Q. No. Apparently the discussion may have had something to do with military planning of the United States so far as China was concerned. And the first statement that I call your attention to is a statement that a plan had been made, simply that a plan had been made by General Wedemeyer's staff. Perhaps I can add the next question for what value it may have.—A. Please.

Q. It is stated that Mr. Jaffe questioned you as to whether or not this plan indicated that we would cooperate with the Chinese Communists in that eventuality. And your answer was that this was the plan.—A. I certainly remember that the whole subject was under consideration and study.

Q. You mean in Wedemeyer's headquarters?—A. Yes; in Chungking. And I have a hazy recollection of one of the staff officers talking to me about the subject. I assume that he was one of the officers working on a memorandum or a plan. I do not remember that I ever saw the plan or saw a finished plan or knew what the final decision was. I think that—I'm sure that the general thinking in Chungking, as I believe in Washington and certainly my own thinking at the time was that the only plan, the only practical thing was that we would cooperate with whatever forces we found organized and able to assist us. I don't remember that any plan was ever couched in the terms of cooperating with the Communists.

Q. Now, were you aware that some sort of a plan had been discussed in General Wedemeyer's headquarters?—A. I was aware that the subject had been discussed.

Q. Was the fact that such a plan had been discussed in any way secret?—A. I would not say it was because it was a subject that everybody had to be thinking about in those days.

Q. In other words—A. I do not remember in terms of concrete or specific plans. I remember in terms of discussion.

Q. If, then, you had told Mr. Jaffe that a plan had been discussed or had been made up in General Wedemeyer's headquarters there was nothing, as I understand your testimony, about such a fact that would have been secret?—A. No, sir. I have no positive recollection. I have no positive recollection, sir, of having made such a statement. But certainly the fact that the subject was being discussed was something that everybody could take for granted. Everybody knew we had to be considering that problem.

Q. Will you state whether or not the mere fact that we would probably cooperate with whatever forces we found when we landed was a secret?—A. Well, I don't believe that anyone knew the answer to that. Certainly I did not know definitely what the answer was at that time.

Q. You mean, by the answer, what the actual plan was, what the actual decision was?—A. It would be a decision that would have to be made here in Washington at the very highest level. The theater might have recommended one course but it was a decision that would have been made here in Washington at the top level.

Q. I'm trying to find out whether or not you had ever been instructed that the recommendation of General Wedemeyer's staff was secret, that we should cooperate with whatever forces we found, or whether it as anything that you shouldn't

have divulged?—A. That is one of the reasons why I think it is important for us to know the full context of the thing, of the beginning of the conversation.

Q. Unfortunately we haven't that context.—A. I would say that I might well have said—and again I'm not speaking from actual memory—that the thinking of the headquarters in Chungking, as far as I know from the people I had been working with, was that we should cooperate with whatever forces we found. That also was my thinking, as expressed in several papers I wrote, in my memorandum, and in Document 204, and I think in an earlier one. If I had made the positive statement that that was the final decision I was indiscreet. But I did not know what the final American Government decision was on that question.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. Can you recall ever having reviewed any such plan, or did you hear it discussed? Were you in a position in Chungking to be taken into counsel for a review of military plans?—A. No, sir, I was not. My recollection is—and as I say it is a very hazy one—that an officer in the headquarters who was assigned to write a memorandum or a recommendation had talked to me at one time about the matter while he was drafting it, while he was preparing it. That was in much the same way as Mr. Gearey came and talked to me here in the Department when he was assigned to draft a paper on what our policy should be in Manchuria if we landed there. That was a subsequent date in May. I never saw the final paper that Mr. Fearey drew up. To answer your question, I did not see the war plans or final papers of the headquarters in Chungking.

Q. Can you recall whether—if you did have such a discussion with Mr. Jaffe—it would have been with regard to general plans and thinking or whether it would have been with respect to some specific plan that you may have had more clearly in mind?—A. No, sir; I'm sorry I do not. The reason I was mentioning the necessity of knowing the full background of the conversation is there was a feeling among some groups in the United States that we were already by this time thorough committed to support only the Kuomintang. American policy had not committed itself, and I on certain occasions tried to explain to people that we had not, as that section of the press thought, committed ourselves entirely to support one group. For instance, President Roosevelt, a few days before his death, had told a well-known writer something to this effect. The President had been asked by this writer whether or not it was true that we had committed ourselves completely to support the Kuomintang and President Roosevelt replied—and I have heard this from the writer himself—"No; I'm dealing now with both parties in China and I expect to go on dealing with both sides."

If Jaffe started an argument or a line of discussion along the line that we were completely committed to military support of the Kuomintang, I might possibly in the discussion have said, "Well, I don't think that is true at all. We are not so committed. We are keeping ourselves in a more neutral position. We are trying to win the war and I happen to know that the thinking in headquarters in Chungking is that if and when we do land"—those were facts I know something about; I didn't know when we were going to land or where or whether we would—"we will have to cooperate with whatever organized forces we find on the spot."

Q. Your remarks just made rest on an analysis made 5 years after the fact, or are they as you recollect?—A. No, sir, I'm simply trying to reconstruct what might have been the background. That is why I was saying if we knew the whole conversation in exact detail we might be able to understand certain isolated statements such as this.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Now, it is stated that the conversation went on as follows: That you told Mr. Jaffe that you had seen the plans which had been drawn up and that the plans provided that when we were in Nationalist territory we would go on cooperating with the Chinese Nationalists but that if the United States troops landed in Chinese Communist territory without any question the Communists would be the dominant force. Those are the exact words "the dominant force," whatever that may have meant. Does that in any way refresh your recollection as to any actual conversation? I know that it is very nearly in the words that you have put, as to your reconstruction of what might have occurred.—A. It doesn't refresh my memory of any actual conversations or statements of that. In fact even that, I think, is only a partial résumé of what was probably said. It would be quite obvious that if we landed in Communist territory the Communists would be the dominant force. I may have been expending on

the general idea of the thinking of headquarters that if we landed in Communist territory it would be the dominant force, therefore, we would be forced for practical reasons to recognize and work with them for military purposes. But I don't remember seeing any particular plan setting that out. I may have been explaining the rational behind the thinking of headquarters.

Q. To complete the subject, it is stated that you told Mr. Jaffe that the Chungking government had been putting pressure on trying to get the United States to agree to take in Kuomintang officials whenever the United States troops landed in China during the war but, as far as you knew, such assurance had not been given to the Nationalist Government.—A. Yes. Well, I do not think, sir, that was any secret because the Kuomintang government itself made no secret of its desire to have its officials go in with our forces whenever we landed or wherever we went. And I simply state that "we have not made any decision on that question, as far as I knew."

Q. Now, if you made the statements which I have outlined to you on the subject, can you tell me whether or not such information was common knowledge among the newspapermen in China at that time?—A. Yes; I would say the fact that the Kuomintang wanted us to take in its officials and assist it in setting up its government was a commonly known fact. It was referred to and stated by Chinese officials themselves that they expected to reassert their authority as we captured Chinese territory.

Q. Now, it is also said that in the course of this discussion you cautioned Mr. Jaffe that what you said about the military plans was very secret. Can you recall saying that, or what it could have applied to? What there was about such a discussion that was very secret?—A. No, sir; I can't remember. I would question very much whether I used the word "plan" but I certainly would have been—I was hypersensitive, very sensitive. I wouldn't say hypersensitive, but I was very sensitive about talking about things that were outside of my own strict province. If I said to him that the thinking of headquarters at present, or as far as I know, is that we should cooperate with whatever forces are on the spot, I was, as I said a little while ago, indiscreet and it would be inappropriate for Mr. Jaffe to print or for me to allow him to print that information which I had given him for background news. And I would certainly have cautioned him against using in his publication such a statement by me that the thinking of the Chungking headquarters was that we should cooperate with whatever forces are on the ground. That information should come from some source other than me.

Q. And that would be the meaning of saying that the information was secret? In other words, it was given in secrecy?—A. Yes. In confidence, yes.

Q. I understand from your testimony today and previously that you were not in possession of any document classified as secret which contained this information?—A. That is correct, I was not in possession of any such documents.

Q. Nor had you seen such a document?—A. As far as I can remember, sir, I had not seen any. I may have, in this discussion which I have a vague recollection of having with the staff officer in Chungking, seen the draft on which he was working or something of that sort.

Q. But that was before it had received its classification?—A. That is correct, sir.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. In your capacity as political adviser on General Wedemeyer's staff, to what extent was your advice sought in connection with military planning, on the political aspect of the military planning?—A. I would like to object, Mr. Achilles, to the words "political adviser" because I never had that title officially. That is a title that has grown up. I was a Foreign Service officer attached to General Wedemeyer's staff. I can't recall any occasion, sir, that my advice was sought in that connection.

Q. Wasn't that your function, though, to serve as political adviser?—A. Well, no; because I cannot remember any occasion on which my advice was sought in connection with military planning. In fact there were very few occasions when my advice specifically was sought. I was used quite often—particularly under General Stilwell, of course I was working for General Wedemeyer for a very short period, only a few weeks. I was actually in Chungking with General Wedemeyer only for a few weeks. I was quite often used as what you might call a consultant to agencies such as OSS which might have certain projects in mind, certain plans for intelligence collection, and they might talk to me about the problems they might meet, the feasibility of what they were doing, what would be the probable relations between this war area commander

and the Chungking Chinese military headquarters, whether or not they would be able to work independently as they hoped to be able to do in such-and-such an area without too rigid control by the Central Chinese Secret Police Organization and things like that. But on military planning in a real sense I was never a participant.

Q. Your advice was not specifically sought on the political aspects of certain military plans?—A. No, sir. I was used by General Wedemeyer for the drafting of some correspondence and a few telegrams on semipolitical matters. We had some problems in relation to the various French organizations that were trying to work in Indochina. There was a Free French organization and there was a French group in Indochina that claimed to be opposing the Japanese and it was a question of American policy toward Indochina. I functioned on some of those matters as a political adviser, the liaison between headquarters and the Embassy.

I acted as an adviser on several occasions for General Stilwell but they were matters on which my specialized knowledge of China was useful. For instance, if you have read the memoranda which we have accumulated you will notice a series of them concerning problems connected with the building of very large air bases in the Chengtu. I was sent up there by General Stilwell's headquarters because there were some riots, there was a good deal of anti-American feeling, there were a lot of problems concerned with the sudden influx of several thousands, I remember over 10,000 Americans, and I was sent up there as political officer to look over the situation and recommend what they might do.

The headquarters was also asked, for instance, by the Chinese to send military observers to the Sinkiang Province because of a rumored border incident between Sinkiang and Mongolia. And there is also a series of memoranda which I wrote on that recommending that we do not send American military observers, to avoid getting ourselves embroiled in that incident.

But the occasions on which I was adviser were very, very few and they were these sort of things where I had particular specialized knowledge. I was never a party to, nor ever a consultant, or never asked to advise on, strictly military plans.

Q. You did not participate in any way in the drafting of military plans?—A. No, sir.

Q. Were you consulted on the political aspects of this particular problem; viz, as to whom we should cooperate with when we landed, or whether we should take in Kuomintang officials with our forces wherever we landed?—A. I do not remember that we—either I or the other Foreign Service officers—were specifically consulted. As I think I have testified before, Mr. Ludden and I were in Chungking in February 1945 and we ourselves felt that there was danger in our becoming too limited in our choice of action; that our hands were being tied; and we went on our own initiative to General Wedemeyer and talked to him about the situation. And he said in general that he agreed with us and that he would like to have us list some of the factors involved. Mr. Ludden and I then drew up on one page here [indicating] the reasons why we thought the American military commander in the theater required freedom of action. We classified those reasons in a second group and these are—

Q. Pardon me, is that document 204?—A. No, 203. The second category of reasons is "to plan to supply and cooperate with whatever Chinese forces we met, wherever and whenever we land on the mainland." Now, this was, as I say, a list of the reasons which we submitted after discussion with General Wedemeyer, which we did on our own initiative.

Q. To what extent were the plans, say for landings in China, the responsibility of headquarters in Chungking?—A. I have no knowledge, sir. I'm sorry, I don't know. I have never known definitely whether we planned to land, where or when. And I don't know whether the decision was one for Chungking or one for Washington. I assume that it would be one for Washington. Certainly the landing would have to come from the Pacific and, therefore, it would involve the Pacific theaters. It would not, I should imagine, be one for Chungking headquarters to make alone. It would involve in a way a union or a fusion of General MacArthur's theater with the China theater, I suppose. I don't know.

Q. You personally had knowledge that the question of landings in China was under active consideration. I think that was general knowledge; was it not?—A. It was general assumption through public statements which had been made by numerous people. That is, basic assumption of the whole war period and of our presence in China.

Q. You also had personal knowledge that the Kuomintang was recommending that we take in their officials wherever we landed. That was also general knowledge?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. You just stated that you and Mr. Ludden had made these recommendations—that we should cooperate with whatever forces there were.—A. That is correct.

Q. Have you any further personal knowledge?—A. I said that we should be free to cooperate.

Q. Had you any further personal knowledge as to the nature of the plans which were being prepared in this respect?—A. I do not recall that I had any specific knowledge; no, sir. Well, I have referred already to a vague recollection of discussion with one or more staff officers.

Q. Do you recall any more specific information concerning the plans which he may have conveyed to you?—A. No, sir.

Q. Whatever you may have told Jaffe on this subject was along the lines of what you have just discussed?—A. I believe so, sir, but I have no definite specific knowledge or recollection of the conversation.

Q. To the best of your recollection you had no further specific knowledge as to the nature of these military plans?—A. That is the best of my recollection, sir.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. On this problem of political adviser, I take it from your previous testimony that you would probably classify yourself as a political observer and reporter with such advice as was sought, or such advice as you sought to give, or very largely along those lines. If I recall your earlier testimony correctly, no more than one or two of the reports that you wrote were specifically requested of you by anyone; is that right?—A. That is correct. I would say there are two or three short series of reports on specific local problems—that is what you would call them.

Q. I have in mind such documents as your memorandum No. 40 and the one that you and Mr. Ludden prepared. Now, I take it that your memorandum No. 40 was not one that was sought.—A. Absolutely not, sir; it was completely voluntary, as most of my reporting was, and an expression of my own personal views of a particular aspect of the situation.

Q. And the principal one that you could say was—at least where you were asked to put your remarks on paper—was the memorandum referred to in your numbering system as 203?—A. Yes, and 204. General Wedemeyer suggested that we put our views in more complete form.

Q. Did you have any knowledge after those two documents were prepared for General Wedemeyer whether he agreed with them or did not agree with them or what use he intended to make of them?—A. No, sir; although in conversations with us he gave me the impression that, as military commander, he in general agreed with our belief that his hands should not be tied and that for the sake of the prosecution of the war he should be free to use whatever forces or take whatever actions he thought necessary for a more effective attack on Japan.

Q. But the details of your reports, you have no idea whether he specifically concurred with your statements and your summary of the situation?—A. No, sir; I did not. May I bring in another example of the sort of thing that I did from time to time. It's as what you might call a political adviser. Our document No. 154 which is dispatch No. 2636, dated May 31, 1944, from the Embassy, Chungking, to the Department of State.

Q. Mr. Service, what is the subject?—A. The subject is Complaint of French Delegation Against American Intelligence Services in Connection With Alleged Agreement Between the Chinese and Indochinese [Vichy French] Authorities, that has some enclosures of various correspondence between the Army headquarters and the Embassy, between the Embassy and the Free French representative in Chungking, and a memorandum of a conversation between Colonel Dickey, who was G-2 of the headquarters, and Mr. Clarac, who was the counselor of the French delegation.

Now, I was instructed to accompany Colonel Dickey during that meeting and to advise him in his conversations with the French representatives, I being familiar with the American policy and having consulted with the Embassy, and so on. I assisted from time to time in that way as an adviser but there are various other ways, also, minor ways, in which as a diplomatic officer or as one who had intimate background and knowledge of China, I was an adviser on particular local problems. But I was never an adviser on high-level military planning.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Now, Mr. Service, I want to turn to another occasion. This has reference to a meeting between you and Mr. Jaffe on May 29, 1945. On this occasion it is stated that Mr. Jaffe informed you that Kate Mitchell was writing a book for which the publisher had suggested the title "China Without Confucius." It is stated that you told Mr. Jaffe that you yourself had written a report on the setting up of the Confucian Society in China and that you asked Mr. Jaffe if he had ever seen this report of yours. Do you remember such a conversation, Mr. Service?—A. I remember such a conversation; yes, sir.

Q. What report would that be? Is that one of your reports that we have before this board?—A. No, sir; because it would have been a report, I assume, written while I was in the Embassy attached directly to the Embassy. It would have been a dispatch for the Ambassador's signature, of which—of course, as I have testified before—I never retained any copies. I believe that that Confucian Society was established in 1941 or early 1942. And we made no effort to have the State Department assemble all of those early dispatches which I drafted for the Ambassador's signature while I was in the Embassy.

Q. Why would you have assumed that Jaffe would have seen such a report?—A. Perhaps I didn't hear your question.

Q. I said that, at the end of my question, you asked Mr. Jaffe if he ever saw your report on the matter.—A. I'm sorry; I didn't hear that.

Q. Why would you have asked him that question if, as a matter of fact, the report was one which you yourself had never seen which was made by the Ambassador?—A. Well, of course I had seen it since I drafted it, but I don't remember asking Mr. Jaffe whether or not he had seen it. I don't understand that statement.

Q. Did you have any basis for assuming that Jaffe had seen any of your reports previous to the time of your meeting?—A. Yes, I had some basis to believe that some types of material were being made available; the information in some types of reports were being made available to writers here. I mentioned earlier the fact that it seemed to me that Mr. Gayn had certainly had a chance to read my memorandum of June 20, since there was similarity between his article in Collier's and some of the things that had been said in that report.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. Service, did you at that time have any knowledge of the fact that Mr. Jaffe had in his possession United States Government documents?

A. No, sir; I did not. I'm not sure whether I made myself clear. My feeling, my assumption, was that a good deal of background information was being made known to writers generally. I had no reason to assume or believe that Jaffe had any copies of any documents.

Q. Or any more information than was being made generally available to other writers?—A. That is correct; yes. A great deal of the writing on China by magazine writers and other people in the United States had to be and was obviously based on information which they could not obtain directly since they were not in China, which I assume was made available to them in one form or another as was the policy at that time.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Hadn't Jaffe told you on at least one occasion that he had obtained a copy of one of your reports and given it to Gayn?—A. I can't recall any such statement at the moment. Can you give me more information on it, sir?

Q. I believe it was the report which had been prepared in connection with Mr. Wallace's visit to China and Mr. Jaffe is stated to have told you that the report had been passed around at the Institute of Pacific Relations conference and that he had obtained a copy of it and had given it to Gayn. Do you recall him ever telling you that?—A. I think that may be true. I do have a hazy recollection now of my surprise that this thing had been passed around and I think you're right, sir, that I did hear that it had been passed around at the IPR Conference which I think was held down at White Sulphur Springs, or some place like that. I'm not sure, but I had forgotten all about that, but I think I did hear that this report had been passed around.

The CHAIRMAN. To go on with this statement, it is stated that Mr. Jaffe told you that he had not seen the report and that you told him that, because of your work in writing that report on the Confucian Society, you had gotten an excellent rating from the State Department and that, as a matter of fact, in that work you had made a collection of about 300 slogans used by the society and that you told Mr. Jaffe you would try to dig up the report for him?

A. I think there is a very great condensation and telescoping here. This concerns two entirely separate reports. The report on the Confucian Society, as I recall it—and as I say I haven't seen it since it was drafted back in 1941 or early 1942—was quite a routine report from public sources. The Confucian Society was inaugurated with great publicity and the patrons were H. H. Kung, who was a lineal descendant of Confucius, and Chen Li-Fu, Minister of Education, and a number of other important figures in the Government. And, as I remember, I simply transmitted the published accounts and some of the published material about the objectives and purposes of the organization and made some brief comment.

Q. Was that a classified dispatch?—A. I don't recall.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. You said you didn't see the dispatch?—A. No; I drafted the dispatch, sir, but I had no copy of it.

Q. Would you have known whether or not it was classified?—A. Yes. In 1941 and 1942 I was an officer in the Embassy, and was simply drafting it as the political reporting officer. I would have to look up the matter, whether we wrote one unclassified dispatch simply sending in the public material and then wrote another dispatch commenting on it or whether we simply wrote one dispatch with both public information and comment. In any case, as I remember the comment very vaguely, it would not be very highly classified.

Mr. STEVENS. This was in 1941 or 1942?

A. Yes; I think so. Now, the other report, which is apparently referred to here, was a dispatch which I wrote from Lanchow when I was an Embassy observer up there in the summer of 1943. It would be probably June or July 1943. That is a dispatch which, as I say, consisted really of a compilation of these propaganda slogans with some comment on them. The dispatch which I wrote earlier on the Confucian Society was not one I received any commendation on. The one I received the commendation on was the one on wall slogans. This may be an unintelligible phrase.

Newspapers are scarce in China. Movies, radio, other media of propaganda don't reach very many people so that one very common propaganda media is to paint these very large slogans, these large characters, on walls of a building or the wall along a street, or particularly facing a Chinese gateway there is always a wall. The superstition is that evil spirits can only go in a straight line so that opposite any important entrance there is a sort of spirit screen, so that you have to go around the wall to go into the gate and these walls or screens are favorite places for painting a four-character slogan.

I had in my travels all through North China in 1942 and again in 1943 made a practice of jotting down these various slogans, of noting the relative frequency of different slogans, or noting as far as I could the date on which they were painted, because usually down below them there would be in small writing the name of the organization which put it up and the date. So that I was able to trace, I think with some accuracy, the trend of the propaganda line and to note the various organizations which were active in painting the slogans and to some extent the different lines adopted by the different propaganda organizations. As I say, this was a report which I sent in from Lanchow, which was transmitted to the Department by the Embassy and on which I received the rating of excellent. But it is an entirely different one from the one that this material starts talking about.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. Was it a classified report?—A. I do not remember, sir. It may have been classified "confidential" or "restricted" because of my comments on the propaganda lines indicated there.

Q. It is stated that you told Mr. Jaffe that it might be sort of hard for you to get this report because it was kept in a section where you were not assigned and where you did not work and that Mr. Jaffe asked you, if you were successful in obtaining the material, to mail it to him in New York or whether you would rather wait until he came to Washington in 2 or 3 weeks and you told Mr. Jaffe, if you could dig up a copy of it, it would be the Far Eastern Division copy and they might not be willing to part with it. But you were sure you would be able to run off a copy for him?—A. I must say that that is very different from my recollection of the conversation. I remember the conversation because I was quite annoyed at Mr. Jaffe and I went into considerable detail to explain to him first why I did not have any copy of my own, any personal copies of these dispatches.

He thought that I would of course have a personal copy. And I explained in considerable detail, as I recall, the difference between an Embassy dispatch which was signed by the Ambassador and the type of memoranda which I had had in my possession, as he knew and which I had allowed him to see some of. I also went into considerable detail why I could not turn them over to him, why I could not remove these from the files and turn them over to him.

My recollection is that I said that I would try to look the dispatch up if I could find it. I pointed out, as I remember it, that that might be difficult because the files in the China Division were quite chaotic and this was a very old dispatch. My recollection is that I told him I would try to look it up and give him the dates of the events, the establishment of the Confucian Society, so that he would have some guide in searching through published materials. It's quite possible that I may also have said that if I found that it was not classified and the Division of Chinese Affairs was willing that it might have been possible for him to see it. But I don't recollect saying that at all.

My chief recollection of the conversation is that my explanation—I remember a rather lengthy explanation as to the difference in character between the Embassy dispatch and the papers I had shown him and the reason why I could not give him copies of the Embassy dispatches. I certainly have no recollection of ever offering to run off a copy for him. I may have said I would copy some of these wall slogans. I told him some wall slogans from memory. I may have said that I would try to copy off some of the more common wall slogans.

Q. Your recollection is in part confirmed by the final statement on this subject that Mr. Jaffe said that it was funny that you did not keep a copy of the report since you had written it and that you said that it was against regulations to keep copies of your reports.—A. I remember considerable discussion and quite a bit of annoyance on my part. This was the first time I think that he ever asked me to obtain copies for him of dispatches.

Q. Now to turn to another subject on the discussion on the same occasion it is stated that you and Mr. Jaffe talked about the "lowdown" on the Hurley story and that Mr. Jaffe told you that Ambassador Gauss told Randall Gould that Gauss resigned because Hurley broke his pledge to Britain by "monkeying" with politics in China.

Mr. RHETTS. Will you read that again, please?

Q. This is a statement that Jaffe is alleged to have told Mr. Service, that Ambassador Gauss had told one Randall Gould that Mr. Gauss had resigned because Mr. Hurley broke his pledge to Britain by "monkeying" around with politics in China and that Mr. Gauss and Mr. Gould never got along well and discussed the possibility of Mr. Gauss giving Mr. Gould some wrong "dope" and that General Stilwell was down in the Pacific and Mr. Jaffe asked you if this were true or whether you could verify the information.

Now I give you all that as background for the statement that you're alleged to have made, which was that it was heard confidentially but "you weren't supposed to talk about it." Thereupon, Mr. Jaffe stated that Gauss had told this fact to an OSS man and that the OSS man had told it to Gayn. Whereupon it is alleged that you told Mr. Jaffe that, so far as you knew, the whereabouts of General Stilwell was very confidential. Mr. Jaffe is alleged then to have stated that whether or not General Stilwell was in the Pacific would be known shortly, would be known on Saturday night, because he was due to speak at some gathering and later to have a meeting with General MacArthur. It is then alleged that you said, "That is how top secrets get out."

Now will you explain what you said on that occasion? Can you recollect any such discussion and can you state what you said?

To review the several statements in the course of this conversation you are supposed to have made, they are in substance: (1) that the fact that Stilwell was down in the Pacific was heard confidentially but you weren't supposed to talk about it; (2) that the whereabouts of General Stilwell was very confidential; and (3) that if it got out, as Jaffe had stated, "that is how top secrets get out." Those are the statements you are alleged to have made. Perhaps you might explain what information, if any, you had about the whereabouts of Stilwell and what you may have said or can recollect having said on the subject.

A. Well, I don't recall this conversation. I think I have already testified that, since it is all a mystery to me, perhaps if we had the complete text—but it seems to me that, if this is a correct and complete text, I was being very discreet. I don't have any recollection of hearing of this alleged conversation or conversations between Gauss, Gould as relayed to Gayn and as repeated to

Jaffe. Nor do I remember anything about this conversation, or hearing anything about this conversation of the OSS men and Gayn. It seems to me I avoided saying anything definitely about the whereabouts of General Stilwell except that people were saying he is in the Pacific. But the whereabouts of high officers during wartime is a secret.

Q. Did you, as a matter of fact, know where he was, Mr. Service?—A. I knew that he was going out to the Pacific. I don't know when or where. I knew it first from General Stilwell himself. I think that he was planning to go. I was seeing his associates all the time. Now, this business of Saturday night confuses me except that he was expected to speak to a meeting in New York and the reference to that may simply have been that if he is unable to appear on Saturday night why it would be obvious that he is away some place.

Q. That was, of course, the remark that Jaffe was supposed to have said.—A. But my statement of this, "that is how top secrets get out," I suppose was referring to all the various rumors and statements by OSS people and Randall Gould and so on and so on.

Q. Who was Randall Gould?—A. Randall Gould had been for many years the editor of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, a newspaper published in Shanghai by C. V. Starr. During the war he was in the United States. He wrote a book on China. And then later he went to Chungking and set up the Chungking edition of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury which came out weekly for a while in Chungking. After the war he returned to Shanghai and was finally, I think, forced to close down publication after the Communists occupied Shanghai and imprisoned him in his offices and that caused a great deal of trouble for him.

Mr. ACHILLES. Do you recall whether on that same occasion you again discussed the possibility of American landings in China and the location of those landings?

A. I have no recollection, sir, but it's quite possible that in a speculative way there might have been some such discussion. I think by this time we were finding probably in the middle of the Okinawa campaign that there was general speculation that any landing, if we made one, would be further north in China than it might have been at an earlier stage of the war. If we held Okinawa it might seem more logical to any armchair strategist to hit straight across in North China.

Mr. STEVENS. Do you recall any?

A. No sir, I have no such recollection.

Q. I should complete my statement of this alleged conversation you are supposed to have had with Jaffe by saying it is stated that Mr. Jaffe asked you whether you thought that the United States would land on the shores of China, and that you told him, "I don't believe it has been decided. I can tell you in a couple of weeks when Stilwell gets back. I rather think we will." It is then stated that Mr. Jaffe remarked that, if we did land in China, it would probably be in Shanghai and that then we would accept aid from anybody, Communist or non-Communist.—A. This is Mr. Jaffe?

Q. Yes; and you agreed with Mr. Jaffe that that was correct.—A. I don't remember making any such statement and I don't see how I could have made a statement like that, that "I can tell you in a few weeks when General Stilwell gets back," because that assumes in the first place that General Stilwell was going to tell me what his plans were and General Stilwell never confided in me. He confided in very few people.

Mr. STEVENS. Do you know whether General Stilwell was going to get back in 2 or 3 weeks?

A. No, sir; I don't recall that I did know it. As a matter of fact, he didn't come back. He stayed out there. That statement is rather incomprehensible.

Mr. ACHILLES. That statement carries the implication that you were offering voluntary information as to the whereabouts of General Stilwell, which is obviously a serious implication.

A. It's just incomprehensible to me. I don't have any such recollection of such statements and I don't see how I could be in any position to promise, since I never received any information on high military plans from General Stilwell ever.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you said a minute ago that General Stilwell had told you something; what was it?

A. Well, I saw General Stilwell some time in that spring after I came back. And he said that he wanted to go out in the Pacific and get himself a job.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is what you referred to.

A. He wanted to get a fighting job. He didn't want to be sitting in a desk here in Washington. But that is the sum total of what I remember that General Stilwell told me.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. Had you discussed any military plans, anything of that nature, with General Stilwell?—A. No, sir.

Q. At that time did you not know where General Stilwell was?—A. My recollection is that all I knew was that he was going out in the Pacific. Of course he was going to see General MacArthur, wherever General MacArthur was. That could be assumed. I don't know that I had any specific knowledge as to where he was at any particular time.

Q. So far as you know, all that General Stilwell was doing was looking for a fighting job?—A. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RHETTS. I wonder if the Board can tell me what this purports to be. Does this purport to be an account given by Mr. Jaffe? Does this purport to be a recording of a conversation made by some mechanical device? Does it purport to be the notes made by some person listening to the conversation? Is there any way that the Board can enlighten us at all on that? My reason for asking the Board this question is this: Of course Mr. Service was questioned earlier in these proceedings on this same general subject matter. He has been questioned again in these vague terms within the past 2 days before the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and it is obviously of the greatest importance to ascertain precisely what source, what reportorial source, the Board has available to it. Because it seems to me I think anyone who has any dealings with these matters will recognize that an actual recording of a conversation is one thing. Notes taken by a person listening with earphones and a person who may or may not be familiar with the subject matter of the discussion is another thing. And a summary prepared by another person, someone who had no knowledge of the matter is still a third and different thing.

The material which General Snow has been referring to here so obviously suggests condensations, epitomizations, and the like, which makes it, it seems to me, extremely important that we try to ascertain the exact source of the material which the Board is using.

The CHAIRMAN. I'll say for the record that the Board has only the reports of the FBI on which to rely. We do not have the exact texts of these supposed statements. The source, as far as the Board is free to reveal, is a confidential source from the FBI. We have nothing further. It is a source which is unavailable for appearance before the Board. According to the public press in yesterday's hearing the actual source of these statements is a recording. As to the facts, the Board is unable to make a statement.

Mr. RHETTS. In that connection, if I might comment, I too am aware of the report in the public press. On the other hand, I'm still not enlightened as to whether it is an actual recording or whether it is notes purported to have been made by someone who was listening or whether they are stenographic transcripts or what.

The CHAIRMAN. The reports of the FBI do not advise the Board on that subject.

Mr. SERVICE. It seems to me that even if there is a recording we still have the question of the completeness and clarity and the perfection of those recordings because in a conversation which I'm alleged to have had on May 19—

The CHAIRMAN. May 29.

Mr. SERVICE. May 29; yes, sir. It would appear that they have exactly reversed the intent of what I seem to recall saying possibly by the omission of a few words or failing to catch a few words.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Board is unable to give you any further enlightenment on the subject.

Mr. ACHILLES. To return to the specific statements that you are supposed to have made to Mr. Jaffe, Mr. Service, that you did not believe it is decided whether we would land on the shores of China but that you would be able to tell him in a couple of weeks when General Stilwell got back, would you have told Mr. Jaffe such information had you known it, as to whether or not the United States would in fact in future land on the shores of China?

A. It all depends. I mean—I'm trying to just speculate as to what was in my own mind if I made such a statement, which I don't recall making.

Mr. ACHILLES. Would you please read the question again.

(Whereupon the reporter reread the previous question.)

A. No; I would not have told him if they were secret plans. I would not have told him any secret war plans. The reason I was trying to speculate what was in the back of my mind was that I understood that the whole subject was under discussion and that if there had been a large open build-up for a landing such as, shall we say, on the Normandy coast—and that was no secret about the fact that we were going to land in Europe—I believe that what I was thinking was that after General Stilwell came back that it would probably become obvious, because presumably he wanted to be in command of a preparation for a large-scale operation, whether or not we were preparing to build up for an operation on the mainland. That is the only basis I can think of that I would have been able to tell anyone whether or not—

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. This is pure speculation?—A. This is pure speculation. I certainly would not have told him any secret plan. I probably wouldn't have known any secret plan. If I had known any I never would have told him.

Q. If you had known that we were going to land in China would you have told him?—A. It all depends on the circumstances. That is, what I'm trying to say, I would not have told him anything which was not well known. But there was no secret that we were going to land on Sicily long before we did. There was no secret that we were going to land in Italy. There was no secret that we were going to land somewhere on the coast of France. That is the only basis on which I can think that I would have any way of knowing or telling anyone.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES:

Q. As I recall, those cases of where we were going to land was a matter of vital secrecy.—A. Where, yes, but am I not purported to have said that I simply would not be able to tell him whether we were going to land in China?

Q. That is correct.—A. And Jaffe goes on to speculate that it would be in the vicinity of Shanghai, I don't know where.

Q. Mr. Jaffe is purported to have said if we did land in China it would probably be in Shanghai and that then we would accept aid from anybody, Communist or non-Communist. And you are said to have agreed that that was correct. It does not indicate which of Mr. Jaffe's statements you agreed was correct. It could be either the landing in Shanghai or if we did land in Shanghai we would accept aid from anybody there.—A. If I remember, I mentioned earlier it was General Stilwell's hope—I think I used the word "dream" before—that he would have the chance to be in command of a landing operation in China. It was his private hope that he would be able to march back to Peiping, and so on. And I may have assumed that after his return there would be public indication of, as I say, a build-up for a large-scale landing. But that is just pure speculation. I think that I ought to make that clear.

I think I ought to make it clear to the Board that I would never have known any of the secret plans, never did know them, and never would have revealed them to Mr. Jaffe or anyone else, that the only conceivable basis for this statement was that possibly within a few weeks—since the progress of the war was rapid at that time—that it would become obvious whether or not we were preparing to mount a large-scale-offensive landing in China.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. Service, in your experience out there or anywhere with respect to the war, was it ever common knowledge as to whether a build-up was for one area in the Pacific or another? If I recall correctly, the assembly lines were sending things out. We knew that material was going out to the west coast, as far as the United States was concerned, but I don't think it was common knowledge in the United States as to where any material was going which left the west coast. And that was something that was considered rather secret here, as to whether we were going into any particular section of the Pacific. I doubt very much, if my memory serves me correctly, that that was ever common knowledge here, whether there was a build-up in China or for some other place. In your experience was it otherwise?

A. I have only been speculating here, sir, because I have no positive recollection.

Questions by the CHAIRMAN:

Q. As a matter of fact, you were also speculating, weren't you, when you referred to the common knowledge of the landing in Sicily? As a matter of fact, that never was common knowledge. Sicily is a small place. If it had been

common knowledge that we were going to land in Sicily the landing place would have been pretty well known.—A. Well, I was speculating.

Q. You weren't here and didn't know whether it was or was not common knowledge, did you?

A. My recollection of the chain of events at that time was that we knocked out Pantelleris and did other actions, bombing preparations, and so on, which pointed toward the occupation of Sicily before we went on to attempt an occupation in Italy. It was generally assumed, I imagine, that it would be dangerous for us to attack Italy directly without first taking Sicily.

Questions by Mr. STEVENS:

Q. I think if you look back, Mr. Service, none of this, as far as the United States was concerned, was common knowledge at any time until after the matter was an accomplished fact. I think that is true with regard to the build-up that took effect in the United Kingdom with regard to North Africa, if I'm right. All of it, there was a speculation in the United States, but there was never any common knowledge as to whether it was likely to be in a theater of war. I'd just like for you to search back and see if in any of your visits to the United States, of which there were not many, you could get anything which you would have considered common knowledge of an act before that act occurred. Certainly in my memory, being in Washington all during the war, I cannot recall any such thing.

A. I'm not sure that I understand your question, Mr. Stevens.

Q. I'm not just sure that in your speculation you used the word "common knowledge" advisedly, Mr. Service.—A. Common knowledge?

Q. Yes.—A. Common assumption, perhaps.

Q. It is necessary for the Board to get that clarified a bit. If you speculated about Sicily and Normandy and others—A. I should have limited it to Normandy, I suppose. I should have included the whole coast of France.

Q. Was there any common knowledge as to what the plans of General MacArthur and the people—Admiral Nimitz and others—where we were going to strike next?—A. Well, we get into a problem of what point. Certainly I would say that our maneuvers toward the Philippines indicated at a very early point our intention to recapture the Philippines.

Mr. ACHILLES. On the occasion of one of your conversations with Jaffe, I believe you discussed with him a report which you and a Mr. Adler worked on jointly. Who was Mr. Adler?

A. Mr. Adler was the United States Treasury attaché in Chungking from about 1942 through to the end of the war. I believe he remained Treasury attaché until 1946 or '47. I'm not sure just when he came back to the United States. He was also the American member of the Chinese Stabilization Board.

Q. I believe you testified you lived with him.—A. I lived with him for a period in Chungking, I believe for about a year. That was chiefly because living in Army officer's quarters had been very hampering to my work which involved a great deal of contact with the Chinese. I could not entertain Chinese in the Army mess. There was no sitting room or other place available where I could meet people and talk with them. Mr. Adler had an apartment, had an extra room, which he offered to me, so I shared his apartment with him.

Q. Do you have any particular impression as to his political views at that time?—A. Well, it's very hard to describe the word "Liberal." I would say he is a liberal. I had no indication or ever any reason to believe he was a Communist or even close to a Communist.

Q. That follows now as well as then?—A. Yes, sir.

Questions by Mr. ACHILLES.

Q. You did know him, I assume, quite well, having lived with him for a year?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. In the nature of your duties and his duties, did you and he have occasion to collaborate in preparing reports on more than this one particular occasion?

Mr. RHETTS. On what particular occasion are we referring to now, sir?

Q. This was a report prepared in connection with Mr. Wallace's visit to China, which I believe Mr. Service stated he and Mr. Adler worked on together.—A. Mr. Adler was a very active person and lived in the city away from the Embassy. He spent a great deal of his time with the Chinese and particularly with Chinese people in financial and economic fields, bankers, government officials, in those fields. And he developed an unusually broad circle of Chinese contacts along those lines.

I also developed an unusually broad circle of contacts, an entirely different one, among entirely different ones, among entirely different groups, so that we had very little overlapping. But between the two of us—how shall I say—we covered a good deal of ground. So that we, living together, seeing each other usually in the latter part of every evening, talked to each other, exchanged views, news, and we did, I think you might say, work together continually. Certainly the news which he obtained from me entered in a way into his reports and the information which I got from him was at times invaluable to me in broadening my own knowledge and perspective of what was going on.

Mr. Adler was, as I say, in an independent position. He had weekly or monthly reports for the Treasury and occasionally if negotiations were going on he had more frequent reporting in connection with those negotiations. Similarly I had only a limited number of required duties. Both of us spent a good deal of time picking up information, doing some voluntary reporting. A great deal of his information went through conversations, and so on, to the Embassy. Mine also, of course, went to the Embassy eventually.

But on our own initiative we did undertake what you might call several projects. One of them was this memorandum, which is our Document 157, which as I have said was written shortly before Mr. Wallace's visit—Vice President Wallace's visit. I did most of the initial drafting and then I would go over it with him and he would suggest some changes. Perhaps he would work over a draft and then I would rework it, and so on, so that both of us made some contributions.

Now, another independent voluntary enterprise that we undertook was the translation and summarization and comment on the Generalissimo's book of the Chinese economic theory. We introduced that into the proceedings here a few days ago. I have forgotten the B number.

Q. Adler was at that time recognized, was he not, as probably the best informed person on the Chinese economic situation?—A. I believe he certainly was, sir. He was extremely well informed. And he was the only man we had in Chungking who was well informed on Chinese finance and economics. He was invaluable to the Embassy and he assisted the Embassy a great deal. He was in the closest, most intimate contact with the Chinese economic figures from H. H. Kung on down.

Q. Turning to a different matter, some days ago I remember questioning you concerning your discussion with Jaffe of April 20, 1945; as I recall you stated that you had arrived at Mr. Jaffe's room in the Statler Hotel only shortly before luncheon and that I advised you according to the FBI you were reported to have gone to Mr. Jaffe's room at the Statler Hotel at about 9:30 o'clock that morning, that you were unable to recollect having done so or having gone there earlier than shortly before lunch. I wonder in the meantime if you had a chance to recollect anything further about that morning? Where you might have spent the morning?—A. I'm still unable to recollect, sir, having spent any long time in conversation with Mr. Jaffe on that morning. And, therefore, I'm still of the belief that my hypothesis was correct that I may have taken these memoranda to his hotel in the early forenoon, perhaps at the time 9:30, which has been mentioned, and that I left them with him. I left the hotel and returned there shortly before lunch, expecting to have them returned to me. There is one recollection—it's a vague recollection—which may relate to that day.

Q. What is that recollection?—A. That is that I believe at some time in my early association with Mr. Jaffe this book of the generalissimo's on the Chinese economic theory was mentioned and that he said that he had not seen it and that I took to him, among the papers, memoranda and so on, a translation of the book and this summary and comment and that Jaffe was interested and asked me if he could make some use of the material. I told him that he could not, meaning he could not use the summary and analysis which had been prepared in the major part by Mr. Adler, which I had no authority to allow him to use.

Q. The point is of some interest because it is the only point, as I recall, at which the statements you have made—both to the FBI in 1945 and to the board—differ from information furnished by the FBI. But I take it that your best recollection is still that you did not spend that morning in Mr. Jaffe's room at the Statler Hotel?—A. That is correct. Might I suggest, sir, if in fact I did remain the whole morning in conversation with Mr. Jaffe, which I have no recollection of doing, there should be substantial evidence of the fact since Mr. Jaffe was under such close surveillance. And if there is such evidence I would appreciate having it made known to me.

Q. We have no such evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. I'd like to ask you, Mr. Service, if you care to give us a comprehensive statement of your attitude with reference to communism as a dogma with application to the United States. Are you a Communist or do you believe in the Communist theory of government and social and economic order or not? Or do you believe in what we call the capitalist system? I don't know that you have given us anywhere in your statement a comprehensive statement of your personal beliefs on that.

The board would like a short recess.

(Whereupon the board recessed at 12 noon and reconvened at 12:05 p. m.)

Mr. RHETT. I'd like to make a preliminary statement. When Mr. Kennan testified here on May 29, 1950, in the afternoon session, the board may recall that at the conclusion of his testimony he submitted to the board the notes he had made on the various reports. The board will also recall that while most of these papers consisted of actual reports written by Mr. Service there were a few memoranda included in this group which constituted memoranda made by other agencies concerning interviews with Mr. Service.

One of these reports, which is our Document No. 200, is a memorandum dated November 8, 1944, and entitled "Interview with John Service" and under that "Japanese Communists." This memorandum is a memorandum of notes of an interview held with Mr. Service evidently at the offices of the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS. In the course of this memorandum or notes is stated at the top of page 2 in connection with the discussion of the extent of contact with the Japanese Communists have with the outside world—this is the Japanese Communists who were then in Yen-an—"Material cannot be sent through Russia, although they undoubtedly have contact with a Russian station. Actually, they can get no information out except by radio, although Service mentioned that he himself had helped in carrying information. Material going out of Yen-an is heavily censored by the Chinese."

Now, amongst the notes which Mr. Kennan prepared on these documents we have noted two references to this particular statement which I have just read from Document 200. Mr. Kennan's notes on this appear on page 15 of his notes which are attached to the transcript for the afternoon session, May 29, 1950. In view of the implications of that statement, it seemed desirable for us to attempt to clarify it.

The CHAIRMAN. What did Mr. Kennan say about it?

Mr. RHETTS. Mr. Kennan merely noted with respect to this Document No. 200. His notes are as follows:

"Interrogation of Service while on consultation in Washington. Views on Japanese Communists. Appears to be purely factual information. Service states that he himself helped carry information for Japanese Communists, apparently out of Yen-an to Chungking for relay elsewhere. No elaboration."

Now, it is in connection with this matter that I would like to interrogate Mr. Fisher briefly and then Mr. Service again.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

Thereupon Mr. Francis McCracken Fisher, being produced, sworn and examined as a witness for and in behalf of Mr. John Stewart Service, testified as follows:

Questions by Mr. RHETTS:

Q. Will you please state your full name for the record?—A. Francis McCracken Fisher.

Q. And your address?—A. 2313 South June Street, Arlington.

Q. What is your present position, sir?—A. A student at the National War College, detailed from the State Department.

Q. Were you in China during the period approximately of July to October 1944, Mr. Fisher?—A. Continuously.

Q. What was your position there at that time?—A. The head of the Office of War Information activities throughout China. Might I add to that, I had been told unofficially by General Stilwell soon after he arrived there that he wanted me to be in charge or at least pass on all matters of psychological warfare against the Japanese.

Q. So that you were particularly concerned with that range of matters in relation to the Japs?—A. Certainly.

Q. During that period did you have occasion to visit Yen-an?—A. I was asked to do so by the commanding general. Might I add to that?

Q. Yes.—A. We had heard rumors that the Japanese and the Communists themselves were having some considerable effect in securing the surrender of

Japanese prisoners. This was rather unique in 1944 and it was felt apparently worth while exploring the methods and means and so forth that they were using in their psychological approach to the Japanese. Therefore, I was instructed in my capacity that I just mentioned to go to Yen-an and contact those people I could find who were engaged in the psychological warfare against the Japanese, to study their methods as fully as possible and report thereon.

Q. During what period were you in Yen-an, sir?—A. Approximately 2 weeks, from the latter part of August to early September. I can't give you the exact dates.

Q. In 1944?—A. Yes, 1944.

Q. And did you know Mr. Service there, at that time?—A. I did.

Q. Did you have occasion to work with him in Yen-an?—A. I took occasion to, sir. May I explain that?

Q. Yes.—A. Very soon after I had talked to the various Chinese Communists, the Army people in charge of psychological warfare, they put me on to Okano, who was the head of the Japanese People's Emancipation League and was mainly the main spring or brain of the psychological-warfare effort. I had long interviews with him. On numerous occasions I had long talks with him. At one point he said that tomorrow he would be glad to tell me what the postwar Japanese Communist program was. I felt that this was something outside my particular range and should be of interest politically to the Government as a whole and suggested to Mr. Service that he sit in on that interview. That is why, on the occasion, I sought his help on a matter outside my range. But I thought it would be of importance to the United States Government.

Q. Were there also Japanese located in Chungking who were also working in the general area of attempting to convert the Japanese away from support of the Japanese war efforts?—A. There were two groups in general. They were under two Japanese. One was named Kaji Watan and his wife. There was another group working under a man named Ao Yama. I don't recall the rest of his name. These two groups or cliques or factions had been in China for a considerable period of time. They had been working, some of them, with the Chinese Government and the Kuomintang even before the war. And they were in touch with or had been contacted, had been sought by the OSS in particular during the preceding months there in Chungking.

These two groups appeared to be somewhat ineffectual. Their activities seemed to be mostly directed toward news sheets and pamphlets. I never knew just what the circulation of them was. But some of them were in contact with the very small number of Japanese prisoners captured by the Chinese and were attempting to, under the direction of the Chinese Government, utilize these prisoners in psychological warfare in that realm.

Q. That was also one of the activities in which Mr. Okano was engaged in and around Yen-an?—A. As far as I know, principally he was engaged in that, yes.

Q. Now, do you have any knowledge whether there was any communication between Mr. Okano and his group in Yen-an and the groups in Chungking, of which you just spoke?—A. I noticed that the transcript stated that the Chinese severely censored all material going out of Yen-an—that is of course, as you know, the Chinese Government, the Kuomintang secret police, and so forth established more or less a blockade there and as a result of that there was very little communication as far as I knew between them. Occasionally some publication or some leaflet would get across and there was vague knowledge on both sides, if you want to call them sides, between the Japanese group in Chungking and the Japanese group in Yen-an. There was vague knowledge about what the other group was doing and what it was interested in.

Q. Do you know whether you or the American Government officials had any occasion or interest in attempting to permit some communication between Okano and his group from Yen-an with the other groups in Chungking?—A. I can't testify as to a specific instance but I can testify as to background. The answer in general is "yes," that would be parallel to the general theory at that time, and I want you to mark that time, early September 1944, in uniting all elements available in fighting effectively against the Japanese. I think shortly after I came back from Yen-an General Hurley went to Yen-an with exactly, precisely the same mission.

There was interest in seeing whether increased effectiveness could be obtained in psychological warfare effort by an increase in communication between these two groups. I know that on one occasion at least—I can't testify as to the exact time, but my impression is that it was October or November of 1944—there came through the regular communications channels some sort of communication, either

a statement or a letter or something, from Okano which was made available to Kaji and Aoyama in Chungking in the hopes there would be coalescence—not coalescence but it would be increased effectiveness through cooperation.

Q. Now, as I understand it, Kaji and Aoyama were working for the American forces? Or was it for the Chinese?—A. Cooperating. It's a little hard to describe the exact part—

Q. Perhaps I may make my question a little clearer. They were working in cooperation with your group which was interested in promoting the psychological warfare?—A. They were. When we would evolve a leaflet in Japanese to be dropped we would naturally seek to get the best critique from the Japanese viewpoint as was possible and we would ask them to criticize it, as we would the group in Yen-an.

And, may I add one more thing. I gathered there was perhaps a closer relationship on the part of the morale operations branch of the Office of Strategic Services in Chungking with these two groups. I don't know how effective or useful it was, but I know they sought to maintain contact with these two groups.

Q. When you referred a moment ago to your general recollection of some communication coming through the regular official channels from Okano in Yen-an to the group in Chungking, would that have been through Army channels?—A. All channels. I should describe the set-up as far as I know it, and that is that the observer mission in Yen-an transmitted documents and so forth, reports, to headquarters, to Army headquarters in Chungking. It was an Army mission there. We maintained an observer with it from time to time. But, as far as I know, all communications coming from Yen-an were screened at the input end. The chief or his designated authority in Yen-an would receive them at headquarters in Chungking—whether they were checked or not I don't know, I assume they were all checked. We got them I believe, as I recall, from the G-2 office. When some things were addressed to us they came through that channel and we picked them up through G-2. The regular practice was that everything was checked at both ends.

Q. During the period that you were either in Chungking or Yen-an, did you ever have any knowledge that any communications were being sent out by Okano other than this limited communication with the Kaji group in Chungking that you referred to?—A. Well, I should refer here to one general means of communication they had in a sense, and that was the Japanese People's Emancipation League and Okano frequently published articles and reviews and things in the Chieh Fang Jih Pao.

MR. SERVICE. It means the Liberation Daily.

A. That was the official Communist newspaper.

Q. Where?—A. In Yen-an. And, as I recall, from time to time some of these articles were broadcast. I would have assumed that some of them would have been broadcast by the Eighth Route Army radio in their daily news through the Communist newspapers through all the liberated areas. So I assume in addition to this limited communication that we just referred to that there was a certain amount of sort of semipublic broadcast of articles and information and things from that source. I don't know if that adds anything. I don't know of any other specific direct communication, nor do I have any knowledge or suspicion that there was any, what you might term, irregular communication.

THE CHAIRMAN. Surreptitious communication?

A. Surreptitious. It was not subject to the complete approval or screening of headquarters.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Fisher.

(Witness excused.)

MR. RHETTS. Will you take the stand, Mr. Service.

Thereupon Mr. John Stewart Service, a witness previously produced and sworn in his own behalf, resumed the stand and testified further as follows:

Question by MR. RHETTS:

Q. Can you shed any further light on this quotation from Document 200 which I have read into the record?—A. Well, I think that I'm perhaps a victim in a way of extreme condensation. This was an interview which undoubtedly lasted for 2 or 3 hours, which has been condensed into 3 pages. And I believe that what I said was something that we or the observer mission had allowed some communication with these other Japanese groups. I'm sure that there was some explanation and further on in the paper I mention Ao Yama and the other Japanese who were cooperating with us on psychological warfare work in Chungking. My recollection is that fairly soon after the arrival of the observer mission in Yen-an—that would be in July.

The CHAIRMAN. 1944?

A. Yes, 1944. There were a number of people in the group who were Japanese specialists who came in contact with Okano and had to find out as part of their work what the Japanese were doing with the prisoners and Okano asked whether or not it would be possible for him to send a letter to these other free Japanese groups in Chungking. I remember his intent was to establish some sort of consultation on the work they were doing, their objectives; I think perhaps to explore the possibility of whether or not they could more or less agree on their objectives.

We agreed—I say “we,” I mean the observer group—to allow such a letter to be sent. I remember the group I was living with—Colonel Barrett, the Commander, I remember having a translation made and carefully studied by some of our Japanese experts and we agreed to forward it through official channels over the G-2 in Chungking for transmission, if G-2 thought wise, to the Japanese groups. That is the only occasion that I can remember of having any knowledge or where I was in any way connected with the transmitting of messages for these Japanese Communist leaders to anyone outside.

Q. As far as you recall, did you ever personally carry any communication of any kind from Okano or any of the Japanese Communists out of Yensen?—A. No, sir, I have no recollection of every carrying any messages.

Q. So far as you know?—A. I was concerned only in consultation as to whether or not the group would transmit, by official channels through G-2, this letter.

Q. So it is your belief that this reference in the memo, this assertion that you mentioned that you yourself had helped carry information merely refers to the fact that the observer mission officially permitted Okano to transmit written communication through official channels to Chungking for delivery to the other Japanese groups there?—A. That is correct.

Q. And the inferences which Mr. Kennan may have drawn in his notes on the document are not proper inferences?—A. Let's say they go even beyond this. They are not proper inferences. Even this [indicating] I think is incorrect.

Q. By “this” you mean the document, Document 200?—A. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now could you answer the question asked before the recess, the general question as to your respect for communism, as to theory?—A. It's difficult to talk about a man's philosophy. That is something I'm not used to doing. I'm not a deeply religious man in a conventional sense of the word. But I think that I could sum it up by saying that it is my belief that life was not created accidentally, that there is a divine cause, and that man was not created accidentally but created as the ultimate and highest form of life.

I think that man's responsibility, or his destiny if you wish, is to seek to achieve or live up to his highest potentialities, not only as individuals but as a race. We have not succeeded in doing that. We are very far from doing it. There have been certain individuals in history—Jesus Christ was one—who have given us an insight into the qualities of mind and spirit for which man is unique and which makes him the highest product of creation, which serve as examples of what we should seek to achieve.

Now, this whole basic philosophy is built on the idea of, shall we say, the dignity of man. Man cannot advance toward this goal of perfection without the greatest freedom of expression, greatest freedom of experiment, greatest freedom to improve and develop himself. That whole idea is absolutely contrary to a fixed and rigid dogma.

I don't believe that there is any fixed dogma which is the ultimate truth. I'm sure that communism is not because it is completely contrary to human nature and would put us in a strait-jacket and instead of giving the fullest scope for individual development it puts man in a strait-jacket and subordinates him to a monolithic state or a completely monolithic totalitarian party.

The political expression, of course, of this kind of philosophy is democracy, democracy of a very complete developed sort which must be centered about the recognition of the dignity and rights of the individual.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the basis of the philosophy which you are expounding?

A. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not the basis of communism?

A. No, the philosophy which I'm expounding, which is the antithesis of my view of communism. Related to my own view of the rights and dignity of men and the political expression which I think is democracy, is my idea on economics, because the kind of democracy which I believe in must be based on free enterprise. It must be based on the opportunity of the individual. I think that com-

petition is necessary and is basic for this whole process of self improvement, of trying to develop ourselves, that complete controls stifle, restrain our own efforts at progress.

I think that one of the strengths of the American system is that we ourselves are not tied to any rigid plan, or dogma—I use this word “dogma” over much perhaps. What I’m saying is that I’m not a complete believer in unrestricted capitalism, that my deep feeling about protection of the rights of the individual necessitates some restrictions and control on capitalism. But we in the United States have been able to achieve a balance between the protection of the rights of the individual and the affording of the fullest opportunity for improvement and advancement with competition and encouragement and free enterprise, all of which I think are important.

I think it’s obvious, from this clumsy effort to state what I believe, that I am not a Communist, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. ACHILLES. In my opinion, that is a very fine statement.

Mr. SERVICE. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Board is adjourned.

The Board adjourned at 12:50 p. m.

EXHIBITS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD— PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

EXHIBIT No. 1

This exhibit not available.

This was a compilation of material collected for reference use of members of the Loyalty Security Board which retained all copies. All important material has been incorporated in the transcript.

Contents were:

Chronology of movements and events relating to John S. Service, 1941–49.

Quotations from material containing charges against Mr. Service.

The texts of a number of significant reports drafted by Mr. Service.

The transcript of testimony before the subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee (Hobbs committee) during its investigation of the Amerasia case (from Congressional Record, May 22, 1950).

Excerpts from the China white paper including annex 47 which was largely made up of quotations from Mr. Service’s reports.

EXHIBIT No. 2

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK

[NEW YORK 27, N. Y.]

EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE

433 West One Hundred and Seventieth Street

MARCH 28, 1950.

Mr. JOHN R. PEURIFOY,

*Assistant Secretary of State, United States Department of State,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR Mr. PEURIFOY: Allow me to offer myself as a character witness for Mr. John S. Service in the event this is necessary in the forthcoming investigation. Mr. Service and I have been closest friends since boyhood days in Shanghai, we roomed together in college, and have kept in close touch with one another ever since. I should count it an honor to testify as to his absolute integrity and loyalty to the United States, as well as pay tribute to his intellectual honesty and idealism.

If there is any way in which I can assist in this matter of clearing up his record in the public mind please call upon me. No such clearance is necessary so far as the Department is concerned, I am sure.

Very truly yours,

C. MARTIN WILBUR,

Associate Professor of Chinese History, Columbia University.

EXHIBIT No. 3

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Washington, D. C., January 2, 1943.

Mr. MAX THORNBURG,

*Petroleum Adviser, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. THORNBURG: This is in reference to a report from Third Secretary John S. Service, at Chungking, dated November 11, 1942, and entitled "The Kansu Oil Wells." This report comprised several enclosures to Report No. 755 from Chungking, which bears the date November 24.

The Petroleum Division of this Branch has asked that I request you to transmit our particular thanks and appreciation to Mr. Service. His despatch is exceedingly thorough and comprehensive, and is all the more commendable since it was not written by an oil technician.

All phases of the subject covered by Mr. Service have been of marked interest to us. We will be grateful if we are given any further information on this subject which may become available from time to time.

With my very best regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES B. RAYNOR,
Chief, Technical Branch.

EXHIBIT No. 4

CHUNGKING, August 16, 1943.

JOHN S. SERVICE, Esquire,

*Second Secretary of Embassy,
Care of General Stilwell's Headquarters, Chungking.*

SIR: Upon the termination of your detail to Lanchow and your detachment from the Embassy to service on the staff of General Stilwell, the Embassy wishes to express to you its appreciation of the political and other reports it has received from you during your tour of duty at Lanchow.

Your reports were clearly and concisely written, they reflected ingenuity in observation and in the gathering of information under difficult circumstances, and industry and awareness of developments and trends of interest and of the importance thereof. Your reports contained information of much interest and value to the Embassy and the Embassy considers that your reports, and your activities in connection with reporting, were of high quality and may in general be characterized as excellent.

A copy of this letter is being forwarded to the Department of State.

Very truly yours,

GEORGE ATCHESON, Jr.
American Chargé d'Affaires a. i.

A true copy of the signed original.

EXHIBIT No. 5

Copy: ap.
No. 411.

OCTOBER 1, 1943.

The Honorable CLARENCE E. GAUSS,

American Ambassador, Chungking.

SIR: The Department has noted with gratification the quality of the reporting from Second Secretary Service while he was on detail at Lanchow. In particular, the reports submitted under cover of the Embassy's despatches no. 1485 of August 18 and no. 1493 of August 20 have impressed officers of the Department with their value and timeliness, as has also the report which formed the subject of the Embassy's commendatory despatch no. 1411 of July 31, 1943. The thorough and objective manner in which Mr. Service covered "The Political Situation in Kansu" in his despatch no. 9 (Embassy's no. 1485) has afforded officers of the Department a very useful guide to an understanding of conditions in Kansu, and his report on "Treatment of Foreigners in the Northwest," no. 21 (Embassy's no. 1493), contains evidence not only of careful study of the subject but also

of successful activity on the part of Mr. Service in ameliorating difficulties encountered by American citizens.

The Department requests that the Embassy bring this expression of appreciation of his work to the attention of Mr. Service.

Very truly yours,

G. HOWLAND SHAW
(For the Secretary of State).

FE:JCV:ALM/MS. FE.
9-28-43.

EXHIBIT No. 6

Copy for FP.
No. 431.

The Honorable CLARENCE E. GAUSS,
American Ambassador, Chungking.

SIR: In acknowledging the receipt of the Embassy's despatch no. 1410, dated July 31, 1943, enclosing despatch no. 6, dated July 5, 1943, entitled: "Chinese Propaganda as Shown by Wall Slogans in the Northwest" prepared by Mr. John S. Service, American Foreign Service Officer on detail at Lanchow, it is a pleasure to inform you that the Department has accorded to the latter despatch a rating of EXCELLENT, in view of the timeliness and value of the information contained therein and the careful analysis it presents of the subject matter.

The contents of this instruction should be brought to the notice of Mr. Service who should be commended for his initiative in preparing a report on this subject.

Very truly yours,

(For the Secretary of State).

DCR:GHK:AGH. FE. FP. 10/14/43.

EXHIBIT No. 7

Copy: ap.

JUNE 21, 1944.

Unrestricted.
No. 698.

The Honorable CLARENCE E. GAUSS,
American Ambassador, Chungking.

SIR: In connection with current developments in Sinkiang having an important bearing on Sino-Soviet relations, the Department has found of much interest and value the report on the situation in Sinkiang submitted under cover of the Embassy's despatch no. 2461 of April 21, 1944, by Second Secretary John S. Service, on detail to General Stilwell's staff. This report has been given the grade of "Excellent."

The timeliness and high standard of Mr. Service's reporting continues to be a cause of satisfaction to the Department.

It is requested that you inform Mr. Service of this further commendation of his work.

Very truly yours,

G. HOWLAND SHAW
(For the Secretary of State).

761.93/171.
CA:ASC:MHP.
6/13/44. FE.

EXHIBIT No. 8

Copy: ap.

JANUARY 13, 1945.

No. 5.

The Honorable PATRICK J. HURLEY,
American Ambassador, Chungking.

SIR: Officers in the Department have read with interest and appreciation the report entitled "The Development of Communist Political Control in the Guerilla Bases," which was prepared by Second Secretary of Embassy John S. Service

and transmitted under cover of the Embassy's despatch no. 3022 of September 29, 1944.

In view of the importance of the subject matter of this report, of the thoughtful and comprehensive character of the study, and of the clear and logical manner in which the information and views are presented, it is considered that the report is of outstanding merit and usefulness to the Department. It has been given the grade of "Excellent."

Mr. Service, who is now in Washington, has been informed of this commendation of his work.

Very truly yours,

(JGE)

(For the Secretary of State).

CA:ASC:MS.

1/4/45.

EXHIBIT No. 9

CHUNGKING, CHINA, May 10, 1945.

Subject: Letter of commendation.

To: The honorable the Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. John S. Service is highly commended for outstanding aid rendered Headquarters, United States Forces, China Theater, in advising the Commanding General on political matters which have direct and important bearing on the military situation in China. Mr. Service was influential in the establishment of a Military Observer Group in Yen-an, accompanying the initial group there himself. His thorough knowledge of Chinese customs and language enabled him to develop and maintain cordial relations with Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and other Communist leaders. During his extended residence in Yen-an he wrote a great number of detailed reports on military, economic, and political conditions in areas under Communist control, a field in which the American Government had previously had almost no reliable information. He prepared valuable analyses of the political situation as it affected the war potential of the Chinese Government and by correlation that of the United States Forces in China.

In recognition of his outstanding performance of duty, the Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater, expresses to Mr. Service the appreciation of the United States Forces in China.

A. C. WEDEMAYER,

Lieutenant General, U. S. A., Commanding.

EXHIBIT No. 10

Standard Form No. 64

OFFICE MEMORANDUM—UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Date: June 16, 1947

To: FP—Mr. G. Ackerson, Jr.

From: BC—Mr. E. T. Wailes.

Subject: John S. Service.

I quote the following excerpt from a personal letter received by Mr. Richards from the Minister to New Zealand, Avra Warren:

"Service is doing a splendid job of work and is moving among people in an eminently desirable way. While he has only made a few public addresses so far, he presents himself in an entirely representative manner. His remarks at the Memorial Day service held at the Anglo-Cathedral in Wellington, with the Prime Minister present, were so well phrased and had such widespread support they were carried in the editorial space of the not so friendly Wellington Evening Post."

We agree with Mr. Warren that John Service is doing an outstanding job as First Secretary of the Legation at Wellington.

T. W.

E. T. WAILES.

A. L. R.

BC: ALRichards: vg.

EXHIBIT No. 11

APRIL 1, 1949.

Mr. DONALD W. SMITH,
Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel, Department of State.

DEAR MR. SMITH: On the eve of my departure from the States, I wish to express my appreciation at having been given the valuable experience of serving on a Selection Board, and to express my high regard for the performance and ability and character of the other members of Selection Board "B" 1949. Dr. Gordon A. Craig of Princeton University was an almost ideal public member, bringing to his task a profound knowledge of international affairs and the importance therein of a competent Foreign Service.

Foreign Service Officers Clarence C. Brooks, Parker T. Hart, and John S. Service were also ideal. Brooks, with his long service experience and wide acquaintance, his common sense and spirit of justice, was very helpful to the Board in its deliberations.

Both Hart and Service worked almost double time in their determination to insure that the Board would give a correct and just rating to the Foreign Service officers available for promotion and in studying and drafting recommendations which might be helpful to FP and the Board of Foreign Service for improving the work of future Selection Boards.

These three men are splendid types of the American Foreign Service Officer.

Sincerely yours,

DONALD R. HEATH,
American Minister to Bulgaria.

EXHIBIT No. 12

APRIL 4, 1949.

JOHN S. SERVICE, Esquire,
*American Foreign Service Officer,
 % Department of State, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. SERVICE: I wish to thank you for the work which you completed as a member of the 1949 Foreign Service Selection Board B.

In choosing the members of the Selection Boards, the Office of the Foreign Service was fully aware that the arduous and exacting nature of the work that would confront them, and its supreme importance, constituted a challenge to the best that the Service could produce in the way of intelligence, fairmindedness, and a realistic grasp of personnel problems. I am happy to say that you met this challenge with complete success.

The very existence of a career service such as ours is dependent upon the confidence of its members in the absolute fairness and utter impartiality of the manner in which promotions are made in it. You and your colleagues on the 1949 Selection Boards have done much to enhance that confidence, and you have earned the gratitude of the entire Foreign Service Officer corps.

Sincerely yours,

CHRISTIAN M. RAYNAL,
Director General of the Foreign Service.

OFS:FP:SHBrowne:mgc.

EXHIBIT No. 13

Copy: ap.

GRAND LODGE OF FREE AND ACCEPTED MASONS OF CHINA,
April 18, 1950.

The Honorable, the CHAIRMAN OF THE LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: As an American-born Chinese, I have known for some thirty years Mr. and Mrs. Robert Roy Service, parents of the Hon. John Stewart Service, and also him for over ten years in the United States and in China.

The late Mr. Robert R. Service was for probably two decades a secretary of the International Committee of Y. M. C. A.'s (headquarters in New York) and served most of that time as a Y. M. C. A. secretary in West China and Shanghai. He had traveled widely in all parts of China, beloved by thousands of Chinese of

all classes, Christian and non. My family and I have been for many years intimates of the Service family in Y. M. C. A., Y. W. C. A., Church and Masonic activities in China. In all these organizations, both father and son, the Services, showed sympathetic understanding, and had a genius for friendship with the Chinese people, especially with the underprivileged. These qualities characterize the whole Service family. I had come to know Robert and John Service quite closely in community church and Masonic lodges, and admire them for their genuine humanitarian spirit, their devotion to the Protestant missionary enterprise in China and their love of the Masonic Craft.

I write this unsought testimonial, Sir, not just as a gesture of confidence in a brother Mason, nor yet as a friend of Mr. John S. Service and his truly Christian family, but fundamentally as one who keenly appreciates his character to be utterly alien to anything approaching Communist leanings, for I am firmly convinced that his proud educational, cultural, family, and religious background and professional career negate everything Communism stands for. I feel it is due to Mr. Service, as well as to your Board, interested in ascertaining the facts of that background, that I address you, for that background speaks louder than words his loyalty to his country and the Protestant faith, of which all the Services have been such outstanding exponents all their lives.

Very respectfully,

Dr. H. C. Mei.

HCM: JMT.

EXHIBIT No. 14

March 1937

Frederick V. Field
Philip J. Jaffe
T. A. Bisson
Ch'ao-ting Chi
Kenneth W. Colegrove

Owen Lattimore
Cyrus H. Peake
Robert K. Reischauer
William T. Stone
Hester Lorn

March 1940

Frederick V. Field
Philip J. Jaffe
T. A. Bisson
Lillian Pepper
Ch'ao-ting Chi
Kenneth W. Colegrove

Owen Lattimore
William W. Lockwood
Kate Mitchell
Cyrus H. Peake
David H. Popper
William T. Stone

March 1941

Frederick V. Field
Philip J. Jaffe
T. T. Bisson
Kenneth W. Colegrove
Owen Lattimore

William W. Lockwood
Kate Mitchell
David H. Popper
William T. Stone

March 1942

Frederick V. Field
T. A. Bisson
Kenneth W. Colegrove
William W. Lockwood

Kate Mitchell
G. Nye Steiger
Harold M. Vinacke
Benjamin H. Kizer

March 1943

Frederick V. Field
Philip J. Jaffe
T. A. Bisson
Kenneth W. Colegrove
William W. Lockwood

Kat Mitchell
G. Nye Steiger
Harold M. Vinacke
Benjamin H. Kizer
Harriet Moore

January 1944

Philip J. Jaffe

Kate Mitchell

EXHIBIT 15

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMERICAN EMBASSY

102.91/6-349.

No. 218.

Unclassified.

STOCKHOLM, June 3, 1949.

Rec'd Jun. 13. Action Labor Enc. Info. FR. ITP. EUR. C.

Subject: Transmittal of Swedish text of 1949 agreement and English text of 1948 agreement with changes.

The honorable the SECRETARY OF STATE, *Washington*.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's A-102 dated April 16, 1949, and A-144 dated May 27, 1949, requesting text of agreement reached between Swedish Shipowners' Association and Swedish Seaman's Union, March 1949, and to transmit the Swedish text of the 1949 agreement and the English text of the 1948 agreement with marginal notations of all changes from the 1948 to the 1949 agreements.

This Embassy has had repeated assurances from the offices in Gothenburg that the English text of the 1949 agreement would be in our hands shortly. Copies will be forwarded in quantity as soon as possible.

Respectfully yours,

HUGH S. CUMMING, Jr.,
Counselor of Embassy,
(For the Ambassador).

Enclosures:

1948 Agreement between Swedish Shipowners' and Seamen's Union

1949 Avtal Mellan Sveriges Redareförening och Svenska Sjöfolksförbundet

OAPeterson:rep.

File No. 560.1.

DE.

ACTION COPY. Return to DC/R files within 14 days, with a notation of action taken.

AB.

EXHIBIT No. 16

Unclassified.

No. 13.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Tientsin, China, April 12, 1950.

Subject: Accounting Transactions of American Consulate General, Tientsin.
123 Wellborn, Alfred T.

17 Rec'd May 16. Action FE. Info. DCR. DS. DF. CS/P. CS. c.

The honorable the SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to this Consulate General's despatch no. 11, March 17, 1950 entitled "Final Accounting Transactions of American Consulate General, Tientsin."

At the time despatch no. 11 was written it was believed that the last remaining American member of the staff of this Consulate General would have left Tientsin by the afternoon of March 17. However, two hours before my scheduled embarkation, the local authorities revoked my exit permit because of a claim made on March 16 by the People's Government to certain furniture in the United States Government premises here (see despatch no. 14, April 12, 1950). The settlement of this issue took to April 8 and during that period certain additional transactions occurred.

As the duration of my enforced stay in Tientsin was indefinite and depended entirely on the length of time necessary to come to terms with the local authorities, the arrangement made with the British Consulate General, Tientsin, for payment of last minute expenditures of this Consulate General was continued. This arrangement was made inasmuch as the accounts of Disbursing Officer Gordon Tullock were closed March 13 preparatory to his departure which actually took place early on the morning of March 15. As I was to have left on March 17, it was deemed preferable not to transfer to me the accounts for such a short period.

Bills paid in behalf of this Consulate General by the British Consulate General, supported by vouchers and signed receipts, will be presented to the Department for settlement through the British Foreign Office.

There has also been in this period a number of receipts of funds obtained from the sale of United States Government property. A tabulation of these transactions is as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 17

See transcript of proceeding for afternoon of May 27, 1950, commencing at page 81.

EXHIBIT No. 18

SERVICE

1. 5-14-42. Chungking.

Two memos.

The first is solely report to Con. Gen. of conversation.

Second is a similar report but with some interpretive comment, which is factual and does not reveal bias.

Subject of both memos is the "Chinese Industrial Cooperatives."

2. 7-24-42. Chungking.

Despatch (called for) on propaganda and psychological warfare by Chinese Gov't.

Generally factual and detailed. Received commendation from Dep't. Repeats some Communist criticism of Chinese Government organs, which was probably accurate, as commies have generally been perceptive and keen as critics of others, even when (and especially when) they were guilty of the same things, or worse.

3. 1-23-43.

Memo prepared in Dep't. A key document.

This is a thoughtful and well-written memo, pointing to the danger of impending civil war in China, from both military and political standpoints. While it relays, perhaps somewhat naively, certain Communist suggestions for bettering the situation, it does not recommend that these suggestions be accepted and followed up. On the contrary, it recommends that U. S. officials be detailed to the Communist-held area to provide the answers to a number of questions concerning the Communists and conditions in the area they hold. There was obviously no intent to influence the Government along pro-Communist lines, for the author complains that such information as is available stemmed in part from journalists "who appear to have a bias favorable to the Communists." And he warns against any brief visits during which our representatives "would be under the influence of official guides."

4. 2-11-43.

Interdepartmental memo drafted by S. and Smyth. Repeats briefly warning of unfavorable course of events in China and points out that "one possible course of action" might be sending U. S. representatives to Communist areas. Warns that Chinese Gov't will probably not sanction this, but will be resentful if it is done without its consent.

5. 8-6-43.

Despatch from Lanchow.

Called for report on Gold Market and Trading. Purely factual. No political implications.

6. 8-6-43. Lanchow.

Reporting experiences of an American agricultural expert. Completely nonpolitical. Points out exaggerated hopes for Chinese government organs for U. S. aid and tendency to enlist that aid even when they have no real need for it.

7. 8-16-43. Lanchow.

Reporting forced organization of professional people in Lanchow, for purposes of extortion and political supervision. Unsparing of Party, but factual. Essentially nonpolitical.

8. 8-17-43. Lanchow.

On evidences of anti-Russian and anti-communist feeling in Chinese officialdom. Seems to be purely factual. In describing the restrictions placed upon the local Soviet consul, Service was perhaps unaware that this sort of treatment had been accepted general practise in the Soviet Union for at least a decade. Nevertheless, despatch contains no statement condemning Chinese Gov't for this treatment.

9. 8-17-43. Lanchow.

Service states that Soviet diplomatic representative has been very friendly to himself and to Capt. Tolstoy "and has been willing to discuss general problems with an openness and apparent frankness rather unusual for our Russian colleagues". Otherwise, report contains no independent comment by Service, and is restricted to a re-counting of the views expressed by the Soviet representative.

10. 8-18-43. Lanchow.

Military notes. Purely factual. Describes deplorable state of Chinese troops passing through city, and brutality with which they were treated; but description is impassive, and without independent comment.

11. 8-18-43. Lanchow.

A report on political unrest and banditry in Kansu. Little relation to communists. Report is detailed and factual.

12. 8-19-43.

Embassy at Chungking refers in a despatch to certain of Service's reports. No comment on communists involved. Service speculates on Chinese Government's plans with respect to communists. No bias apparent.

13. 8-20-43. Lanchow.

On reception of U. S. broadcasts in Kansu. Factual and objective.

A long report on activities of local Chinese police with regard to foreigners: restrictions of movement, observation, curiosity, suspicion, etc. Speaks of Chinese police using "Russian treatment of aliens as a model."

115. 9-10-43. Stilwell mission.

Reporting statements made to Stilwell by Chinese (Nationalist) General, obviously sympathetic to communists. No independent comment. Views expressed by General are somewhat similar to those expressed by Service in item 3.

116. 9-23-43. Chungking.

Two interpretative memos by Service concerning Eleventh Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. The memos subject the decisions of the gathering to a searching and skeptical scrutiny, but the conclusions were borne out by subsequent events.

(NOTE.—These memos should be compared with communist publicity at the time).

117. 9-29-43. Chungking. Stilwell.

Describes the circumstances of the withdrawal of the communist representative from a meeting of the People's Political Council, as represented by a communist source. Service adds no comment of his own.

118. 10-27-43. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo asserting, and stating reasons why Chinese public opinion will be offended if Burma campaign is not soon inaugurated. No apparent relation to communist problem.

119. 10-28-43. Chungking. Stilwell.

Describes the bickering and bad blood between the Government and the minority groups over the composition of the Committee for the Establishment of Constitutional Government. Report is objective and describes the Committee as "not a bad one; but states that "it is a rather unfortunate omen that the committee is starting its existence with a background of petty and acrimonious politics."

120. 11-13-43. Stilwell. (Military report).

Report on "willingness of Chinese Military leaders to become puppets." An important memo, which should be compared with communist line of the same period. Service rejects the communist thesis that the Kuomintang was encouraging defection to the Japanese-occupied area in order to improve their prospects for combatting the communists after the war. Says this is the result rather than the design. Says

large-scale defections are due primarily to Chiang's policy of placing in front line war-lord forces which are of doubtful loyalty to himself and which, being mercenaries from the beginning, are naturally amenable to Japanese promises of better pay and treatment.

121. 2-2-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Unimportant. Relaying of report that airport construction is causing discontent in a certain district.

122. 2-3-44.

Memo from Kuomintang source about conspiracy against Chiang. Questions Kuomintang tendency to blame communists.

123. 2-15-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Also about plot against Chiang. Adduces further proof that plot existed, and that it was an inner-army affair.

124. 2-15-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

A further report about the dissatisfaction caused by airport construction and Government's policies concerning compensation to land owners and conscription of labor. Factual.

125. 2-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Giving background on certain feelers for direct negotiations between Government and communists. Factual. Reflects, like all of this reporting, good contacts in the communist camp.

126. 2-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Reporting information released to correspondent by Government on extent of Jap-controlled area. Points out that Government spokesman listed certain communist-controlled areas as entirely Jap-controlled, evidently communist domination the more humiliating. Service points to this as indication of bitterness now existing between two factions.

127. 2-16-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Reporting interview with Madame Sun-yat-sen. Factual.

128. 3-2-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Further report, detailed and objective, on Chinese unrest in Chengtu arising out of construction of U. S. air bases. It is evident that Chinese officials somewhere along the line are pocketing funds appropriated for compensation of conscripted labor, knowing that resulting bitterness will attach largely to Americans; but Service does not charge this directly.

129 3-14-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Commentary on a report submitted by an OWI official from Kweilin. Contains following significant passage:

"The war in China has stimulated political consciousness to the point where loose separatism, which is the goal of the provincialists and which will means a return to the chaos of the early years of the Republic, is impossible. By present indications it *does not* seem likely that the existing Kuomintang Government will collapse during the war. But if the present conflict is followed, as *does* seem likely, by civil war * * * out of this civil war * * * there can be expected to emerge either a more progressive Kuomintang Government or a communist state, probably of the present modified Chinese communist type."

130. 3-14-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Another interview with Madame Sun Yat-Sen. Purely factual. No independent comment.

131. 3-17-44. Chungking. Stillwell.

An excellent analysis of T. V. Soong's position—thoughtful and objective—acknowledged with special commendation by the Department.

132. 3-14-44. Chungking. Stillwell.

Commentary on another personal incident in the Chiang entourage. Extremely moderate in tone, ending with the suggestion that "the real importance of this story, and of the many similar ones regarding the misdoings of the Soong-Kung family, is the readiness of the public to believe them.

133. 3-14-44. Military.

Review of second edition of Chiang's book—"China's Destiny." Points out changes since first edition. Severely critical of book ("a bigoted, narrow, strongly nationalistic effort at a special interpretation of history")—says that it reflects "unchanged a bitter anti-communist bias."

134. 3-24-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo on Chinese Territorial Claims in North Burma. Detailed, authoritative, analytical. "Chiang may have great ambition and vision. But his statesmanship does not ordinarily go far beyond shrewd, realistic, but often short-sighted bargaining."

135. 3-23-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo on the rumored plan to reduce China's armies. Service is skeptical about this.

"China remains a country where life is valued very little, where corruption is deep-rooted and prevalent, where economics have been consistently ignored or not understood, where power derives from military strength and that strength is measured in numbers, where the interests and welfare of the people have not (except perhaps in Communist North China) been a concern of their rulers and where the basic, overriding consideration is the struggle for power."

Discusses incident of bombing of Chinese forces in Sinkiang, obviously by planes having something to do with the Soviet Union. Reflects a certain naiveté about Soviet Union in assumption that Soviet Kazakhs might have taken initiative in Sinkiang and that Soviet Government might have been "willing to lend a little unofficial assistance."

137. 3-23-44. Military.

Reporting views of Chiang Kai-shek; critical of Chang's attitude but offers explanation for it. Concludes Chiang is responsible for situation in China and will continue in his present ways until the U. S. formulates and applies a strong China policy. Analysis appears objective and unbiased. (Chiang mentions *Amerasia*.)

138. 3-22-44. Military.

More about bombing incident in Sinkiang. Warns against U. S. involvement, particularly if we want to run convoy through that area.

139. 4-5-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

More on bombing incident. Without particular interest.

140. 3-26-44. Military.

Transmitting report prepared by Englishman who had been residing in communist area.

141. 4-4-44. Military.

Memorandum. Miscellaneous news items. Purely factual.

142. 4-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Chungking Embassy despatch transmitting memo on situation in Sinkiang. Specially commended by Department. Objective analysis of Chinese Nationalist Government's motives in the Sinkiang incidents and the success of the move. Service's recommendations include: "We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are. A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a careful first-hand study of the strength, attitudes, and popular support of the Chinese communists. But in determining our policy toward Russia in Asia we should avoid being swayed by China. The initiative must be kept firmly in our hands." . . . "Chiang unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in Eastern Asia by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too weak to serve as a possible counterweight to Russia. By doing so, Chiang may be digging his own grave; not only North China and Manchuria, but also national groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets."

143. 4-17-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Transmitting text of an interview with General Lung Yun. No comments.

144. 4-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo reporting views held by leaders of some of the minor parties of China. Service's comments relate only to the relative importance of these minor parties and are purely factual.

145. 5-18-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Service's critique of a Military Intelligence Dispatch. Objectively points out fallacies in the MI dispatch. Outlines activities of Nationalist Government in attempting to discredit the Communists in a purely factual manner. Makes three points: (1) that there is a fundamental conflict between Communists and Japanese and puppets;

- (2) Kuomintang is attempting to convince foreign opinion that Communists are in league with Japs and puppets; (3) that Kuomintang actually is in contact with Japs and expects puppet support. Justifies his points factually. (Rated Very Good in Department.)
146. 5-20-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo on plan to bring Chinese-American technicians to China. States objections to plan factually. Totally nonpolitical.
147. 5-20-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo offering possible drawbacks to U. S. Army plan to pay benefits to families of Chinese soldiers killed in Burma. Nonpolitical.
148. 5-23-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo recounting rumors of domestic trouble in the Chiang Household. Factual reporting.
149. 5-11-44. Military.
Transmitting a speech of Chou En-Lai; summary without comment.
150. 5-12-44. Military.
Memo on effects of Japanese victories in Honan. States objectively various interpretations which will be placed upon this in Chinese circles.
151. 5-24-44. Chungking. Stilwell. Military.
Transmitting translation of statement of League of Democratic Parties. Summary without comment.
152. 5-25-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Recounting views of Lin Tsu-han, Chairman of Yen-an Border Government. Presented without comment.
153. 5-25-44. Military.
Transmitting information on the status of communist negotiations with the Central Government as received from the Communists. Presented without comment.
154. 5-31-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Factual account of an interview with Counselor of French Delegation at Chungking. Reported without comment of political nature.
155. 6-9-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo of interview with Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, presenting Marshal's views without comment as to their validity. Purely factual.
156. 6-7-44. Military.
Presentation of the views of David An on Chinese Treatment of Koreans. Reported without comment or interpretation.
157. 6-20-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Important memo, widely circulated with favorable comment in Department. Strong denunciation of the weakness, corruption, and venality of Kuomintang. Apparently written partly from exasperation at the Nationalist Government but criticism appears to be justified. Only political bias visible is that of American official trying to turn China into an asset to the American war effort. Encourages American contact with Communists as with other minor parties and liberal elements to stimulate the Kuomintang to a reform program. No interest displayed in Communism as a movement in itself. Contact with Communist areas desirable from an intelligence standpoint in the war effort. * * * "We should select men of known liberal view to represent us in OWI, cultural relations and other lines of work in China."
158. 6-23-44. Military.
Memo of conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and V. P. Wallace, J. C. Vincent, Gen. Ferris, Owen Lattimore, and JSS. Factual account.
159. 6-24-44. Military.
Reporting communist agreement to the sending of a U. S. "observers' section" to Yen-an. Objective report of communist views on the matter, presented without bias or comment.
160. 7-6-44. Chungking. Stilwell.
Memo on communist map showing contraction of communist-held territory. Service cites contemporary Central Government map which contradicts Communist claim. Illustrates distortions of Central Government map and comments that communist map may not be more than generally true and may not give whole picture. Objective, without political coloration.

161. 7-11-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo transmitting a report from communist sources on communist military operations against Japan during May 1944. Relayed without evaluation although several Japanese news items are submitted in conjunction with the report as some possible confirmation of communist claims. No political implications.

162. 7-20-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Memo transmitting a personal letter from Chinese intellectual expressing disillusionment with present Chinese regime and hopes of constructive American aid. JSS feels letter reflects present state of mind of large part of Chinese intellectuals and liberals. Objective presentation, pointing out strength as well as weakness of viewpoint.

163. 7-21-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Transmitting a statement of Chinese intellectuals "Appeal for Revolutionary Democratic Rights." Covering memo indicates approval of intellectuals' denunciation of Kuomintang suppression of freedom of speech, thought, study, and expression.

164. 8-26-44. Chungking. Stillwell. Yen-an.

Memo of first impressions of Yen-an. Is highly favorable in comparison with Kuomintang-held areas. "There is a bit of smugness, self-righteousness, and conscious fellowship" * * * but "most modern place in China." "What is seen in Yen-an is a well-integrated movement, with a political and economic program which it is successfully carrying out under competent leaders. * * * One cannot help coming to feel that this movement is strong and successful and that it has such drive behind it and has tied itself so closely to the people that it will not easily be killed." Service understandably favorably impressed by comparison between Yen-an and Kuomintang areas in matter of material conditions, morale, and efficiency.

165. 8-26-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yen-an.

Memo of conversation with Mao Tse-Tung in Yen-an in which Mao sounded Service on the possibility of opening an American consulate in Yen-an. Factual reporting.

166. 9-1-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yen-an.

Transmitting reports of interviews with various Chinese communist leaders. Factual.

167. 9-1-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Transmitting report of interview with Chief of Chinese General Staff. Factual account of diametrical opposition of views between communists and National Government.

168. 9-8-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yen-an.

Important memo outlining Service's interpretation of communist motives. Inclines to think the best of communists. Offers arguments in opposition to this attitude but explains why he does not feel the opposing arguments are justifiable. Believes the CCP aims for orderly prolonged progress to eventual socialism, not violent revolution, and in achieving that aim will not seek an early monopoly of political power but considers first the long-term interests of China. Service shows a certain naiveté in his grasp of Marxist doctrine and ignorance of some changes incorporated in that doctrine during and after Lenin's time, e. g., that capitalist development is an unavoidable stage of economic development. Service believes the CCP will initiate (or had initiated) a type of NEP program which will last indefinitely into the future—ignoring or ignorant of the fate of NEP in the U. S. S. R. Appears to be an objective analysis of the situation. (The conclusions appear to be what might be expected from one judging on the basis of Chinese experience only, not with reference to experience with communist seizures of power elsewhere.) The Chungking Embassy takes issue with Service's views that the CCP is not aiming for a monopoly of power in the near future.

169. 8-29-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yen-an.

Memo reporting on economic conditions in communist-controlled North Shensi. Tone is favorable toward achievement but information is presented in factual manner without comment.

170. 9-19-44. Chungking Observer Section in Yen-an.

Memo on *Chieh Fang Jih Pao*, communist newspaper in Yen-an.

Submitted without comment save that the paper was well edited and of high caliber. Unimportant.

171. 10-11-44. Chungking. Observer Section in Yenan.
Memo summarizing lectures given by the Communist General, Chief of Staff of 18th Group, to officers of U. S. Army Observers Section regarding the situation behind the enemy lines in North China. Service comments only on the fact that the communist army is a political army as much as it is military. Factual.
172. 9-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report designating communist-controlled areas of China. No political comment.
173. 9-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Transmitting report of a reception given the Observers Section. No political comment. Unimportant.
174. 9-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report on communist charges against Gen. Yen Hsi-shan. Details given factual without apparent bias.
175. 7-21-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Reporting on inauguration of daily news broadcasts from Yenan. Purely factual.
176. 8-24-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Transmitting map of communist border area. No comments.
177. 9-8-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Well conceived analysis of the strength of the communist movement with the recommendation that American military aid be extended to the Communist forces, to aid in the struggle against Japan. Service expects the Kuomintang will object to such aid and stated the U. S. must soon formulate a policy to decide the question of this aid, keeping in mind that "the nature, policies and objectives of the CCP are of vital long-term concern to the U. S."; the "CCP under any circumstances must be counted a continuing and important influence in China." Arguments in favor of extending aid are presented factually. The interview with Mao transmitted with this dispatch indicates Service's views regarding the question of U. S. relationship with the CCP parallel to a certain extent those of Mao himself. Service specifies his reasons.
178. 10-11-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Memo of lecture by communist military leader on strength, distribution and arms of communist forces. Factual account.
179. 10-13-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Memo of lectures by communist military leader on operations of 8th Route Army. Factual account without comment other than to point out the importance the communists attach to political programs as the basis of their military strength and success.
180. 9-29-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report on possible usefulness of old communist bases in Southeast China. Objective account of facts. Specifies in connection with communist reasoning on matter that "it would be a mistake to assume that the communist consideration of the problem is all on the high-minded and unselfish plane." No political bias apparent.
181. 10-2-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Memo on personal impressions of communist leaders. Highly favorable of the personal qualities of these men. (Strikingly like the impressions of the old Bolsheviks which foreign observers acquired at the time of the Russian Revolution). Service's favorable attitude obviously in part stems from the contrast with Kuomintang leaders. Apparently unaware of the potential dangerousness of the type of character molded in the communist school, especially when the CCP holds the reins of power. Objective in all.
182. 10-13-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.
Report on the popular appeal of the communist party. Outlines tactics employed by the communists which win popular support, i. e. reduced rents, elimination of banditry, popular election of officials, and converting the army from instrument of oppression to one of aid to peasantry. Service views the accomplishments with favor tempered with reserve. Can find no other explanation of popular backing of the communists. (NB. Service apparently consider "democracy" as synonymous with popular support, a definition which would apply to Hitler's regime as well. On basis of this definition, Service's opinion that the CCP is democratic is justifiable.)

183. 9-29-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.

Extremely well-balanced report on the development of communist political control in areas under their domination. (Rated Excellent in Department.) Report is well-rounded, presents a factual picture and appears to be very perceptive in divining the purpose of communist actions in many fields. Explains both how the communist program wins popular support and at the same time serves communist interests. No political bias evident and no effort to condemn or praise. Factual reporting. (Should be noted that CA's comments in Department on Service's reporting consistently put communist in quotation marks, implying something distinct from the Soviet brand. No evidence of this attitude has yet appeared in any of Service's work.)

184. 10-9-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.

Reports decision of CCP to change its name in foreign publicity to avoid the stigma of "communism." Service interprets it as a desire "to allay any foreign fears and to win foreign good-will." No political comment otherwise.

185. 10-25-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.

Transmitting communist views on treatment of Japan. No comment made but appears to be evident that Service accepts sincerity of communist spokesman and feels views expressed are honest aims of CCP.

186. 10-25-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.

Interview with CIC of communist military forces. Service states "I am in general agreement with the views expressed by such communist leaders as Gen. Chu. Every effort, however, has been made to avoid encouraging any high expectations, to point out the practical difficulties in the way of direct cooperation and to suggest that Japan may be defeated in other ways than as the communists insist, a slow process of liquidating the armies on the Asian mainland." Chu's views followed the usual pattern that cooperation with the Kuomintang was impossible and U. S. strong role necessary in China.

187. 9-27-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.

Report of interview with Hungarian national. No political content.

188. 9-28-44. Yenan.

Memo on the orientation of the Chinese communists toward the USSR and toward the U. S. Key document. Essentially, reasons that CCP orientation is exclusively pro-China. Ties with the USSR are of the past. Interests of the CCP are best served by cultivating ties with the U. S. which can aid the industrialization of China. USSR can't and China can't do it alone. Service states "I believe that the Chinese Communists are at present sincere in seeking Chinese unity on the basis of American support. This does not preclude their turning back toward Soviet Russia if they are forced to in order to survive American-supported Kuomintang attack." Service's account appears to be an eminently fair statement of communist views as evident at that time—his conclusions, a reasoned choice between the lesser of two evils. Reveals ignorance of some of the finer points of communist doctrine, particularly in regard to the manner in which Marxism is to be applied outside the USSR.

189. 10-1-44. Yenan.

Transmission of communist newspapers. No comments.

190. 10-25-44. Chungking. Observers Section in Yenan.

Memo on communist success in eliminating banditry. Cites communist explanation for this situation—economic improvement, mobilization of entire population in the war effort and removal of feudal basis of banditry—as only apparent explanation for its elimination. Objective reporting.

191. 11-24-44. Yenan.

Reports of imprisonments of American medical officer and several foreign correspondents on popular support in communist areas. Presented without comment.

192. 11-24-44. Yenan.

Transmission of memos on conditions in communist areas and on Communist-Kuomintang relations. Service's observations are, that the communists are fighting the Japanese, successfully because they have the people behind them mobilized. Mobilization based on economic, political and social revolution, gains of which the people will fight

to keep. Kuomintang will be unable to repress these mobilized people or the communists as long as the latter have popular support. Communists will continue to be important part of China's future and unless Kuomintang institutes extensive reforms (unlikely) Communists will be dominant force in China in a few years. Service's observations have been borne out by subsequent events.

193. 10-10-44. Chungking. Stilwell.

Important memo on need for realism in U. S. relations with Chiang. Anti-Chiang, not pro-communist. Holds Kuomintang dependent on U. S., U. S. not dependent on Kuomintang. We do not need it militarily, we do not need to fear its opposition or fall or its international importance. Chiang does not represent pro-American or democratic groups, we owe him no gratitude and he understands only force. Need hard-boiled policy toward him to aid U. S. war effort. Only reference made to communists is that "we cannot hope to solve China's problems without consideration of the opposition forces, Communist, Provincial, and liberal." Service's denunciation is strong but based exclusively on the urgency of aiding the American war effort in the Pacific. No indication of political bias towards any faction, only against Kuomintang corruption and power politics. A tendency to underplay usefulness of Kuomintang to the U. S. war effort and discount any worth in the movement.

194. 10-10-44. Yen-an.

Memo on communist interception of State Department radio bulletin. No political comments.

195. 11-24-44. Yen-an.

Memo on present communist attitude toward relations with Kuomintang. Service displays great insight into tactics of communists in increasing demands as the situation turns more in their favor. Reveals acute observation and understanding of the power politics involved. No personal comments of political nature appended.

196. 10-15-44. Yen-an.

Memo regarding censorship of escape stories coming out of communist territory. Unimportant.

197. 10-17-44. Yen-an.

Memo transmitting the published policies and administrative program of the CCP. No comments.

198. 10-18-44. Yen-an.

Memo on communist propaganda use of statements of foreign correspondents. Deplores the extravagant statements made by some promising American aid to the communists, but comments on the fact that many correspondents have been converted to a pro-communist attitude. Unimportant.

199. 10-21-44. Yen-an.

Transmitting communist newspapers. No comments.

200. 11-8-44. Washington.

Interrogation of Service while on consultation in Washington. Views on Japanese communists. Appears to be purely factual information. Service states that he himself helped carry information for Japanese communists, apparently out of Yen-an to Chungking for relay elsewhere. No elaboration.

201. 11-44. Washington.

Interrogation of Service on Washington consultation. Views on probable developments in North China in the event of a U. S. landing. States that communists will cooperate with allied troops as long as allies do not interfere with their politics. Will not allow military considerations to prejudice their political program. Service suggests however "that it would be well to put out a rather large number of U. S. officers," since the communist area is decentralized. Chiefly factual evaluations.

202. 11-8-44. Washington.

Interrogation of Service while on Washington consultation. Predominantly factual information. Service states "China's first need is economic development, and U. S. must do it. Russian help would divide China, but U. S. will unite them." * * * "Chinese communists are not radical at present. They are still Marxists, but are against subjectivism. Marxism points to ideal socialism." Little political comment.

203. 2-12-45. Chungking—for Wedemeyer.

Military only.

204. 2-14-45. Chungking—for Wedemeyer.

Memo on military weakness of our Far Eastern policy. States recommendations to aid communists parallel Churchill's policy in Yugoslavia, aiding the faction which would assist most in the war effort. Support of Chiang is only a means to an end but we tend to confuse the means with the end. We must clarify issue to restore our primary objective, defeat of Japan with smallest possible loss of life. Well-constructed analysis of situation.

205. 2-14-45. Chungking.

Recount of the current status of Kuomintang-Communist negotiations. Purely factual reporting.

206. 2-16-45. Chungking.

Views of Russian officials in China. No comments.

207. 2-17-45. Chungking.

Memo on Kuomintang hopes to make a deal with Russia. Service's opinions are contradicted by later events but analysis is interesting. Feels USSR will not deal with Kuomintang in view of its decided objections to the regime, no likely quid pro quo exists and besides Chinese Communists are stronger than Kuomintang. Unaware that USSR would be willing to sacrifice interests of a local communist party for Soviet interests.

208. 2-17-45. Chungking.

View of Sun Fo. No comments or analysis.

209. 2-19-45. Chungking.

Memo on Chinese feelers regarding Formosa. Purely factual.

210. 8-28-45. Chungking.

Criticism of proposal to declare Shanghai an open city. Military interest primarily. Good analysis. No political application.

211. 2-28-45. Chungking.

Views of Captain (Joseph) Alsop. Diametrically opposed to Service's opinions. Alsop argued on the line that U. S. long-range interests were more important than the immediate ones of winning the war; that long-range interests involved allying China on our side as a balance against Soviet influence—our greatest threat—and destruction of the Chinese communists. Believed in necessity of getting involved in the inevitable civil war which would follow from U. S. complete backing of Kuomintang against communists.

212. 3-4-45. Chungking. Military.

Request to visit Yenai. No political coloration.

213. 3-21-45. Chungking.

Memo of communist attitude toward Central Government. Notes change in CCP attitude toward U. S. cooperation in China and possibility of cooperation with Kuomintang. Service notes this change dates from Stilwell's departure. Communist expansions southward followed belief that U. S. would support only Chiang. Notes communists seem to be expecting large-scale Japanese activity in North China and are getting out of way of these Japanese efforts to consolidate on mainland. Communist determination to control China proper growing.

214. 3-13-45. Yenai.

Views of Mao Tse-tung. Factual reporting. Opinions similar to those expressed in earlier papers.

215. 3-14-45. Yenai.

Memo on communist expectations of Soviet aid and participation in the Pacific war at a late date. Probable course of military tactics to be followed by communists. Notes that communists will strive to gain control of Manchuria, that they have already infiltrated the area, because of its industrial importance. (Feeling that CCP did not expect USSR to strip Manchuria, as CCP intended to have benefits of its industrial potential.) Factual analysis.

216. 3-16-45. Yenai.

Transmission of communist views regarding Sinkiang. Relayed without comment.

217. 3-16-45. Yenai.

Communist views on Mongolia. Transmitted without comment.

218. 3-16-45. Yenau.

Policy of the Chinese communists toward the problem of national minorities. Service states that while communists claim their program is based on Sun Yat-Sen's, in actuality it is based directly on that of the Russian communists (from whom Sun got most of his ideas). Service feels that some of these ideas (Stalin's "Marxism and National Question") may be unworkable in China because some of China's minority nations exist close to other strong states and because China is weaker than Russia was at time of 1917 revolution.

219. 3-17-45. Yenau.

Communist plans for a relief and rehabilitation organization in communist liberated areas. No comments. Purely factual.

220. 3-17-45. Yenau.

Evidence to substantiate communist claims as to the extent of territory under their control. American observers evidence. No political comment. Purely factual reporting.

221. 3-19-45. Yenau.

Comments on communist report of Kuomintang exile government organizations in parts of China. Analysis of moves shows no political bias. Factual reporting.

222. 3-20-45. Yenau.

Transmitting information regarding dealings of Chinese Central Government military official with the Japanese. No political coloration evident.

223. 3-21-45. Yenau.

Memo on Chian Kai-shek's treatment of the Kwangsi Clique. Decidedly critical of Chiang's activities. Service's interpretation not necessarily accurate—CA disputes some points. Memo involves no mention of our references to communist movement. Factual reporting.

224. 3-22-45. Yenau.

Significance of personnel appointments made by Chiang. Service interprets these appointments are signs that Chiang is preparing for civil war with the communists, rather than peaceful cooperation. Factual.

225. 3-23-45. Yenau.

Memo on contact between the Chinese communists and Moscow. Service's interpretation is good. Gives known facts and distinguishes between governmental contacts and contact between communist parties. Appears to be a realistic view of situation. Service feels communists probably do not have relations with Soviet Government but contact between the Soviet CP and the Chinese is likely to exist.

226. 4-1-45. Yenau.

Statement of communist policy to be adopted by the communist congress as given by Mao and other leaders. Offered without political observations other than to point out highlights.

227. 3-18-45. Yenau.

Memo on establishment of unified labor organizations and women's groups for the communist liberated areas. Factual account with comment that this step constituted a direct challenge to the Central Government, almost bringing the future conflict into the open. No political bias evident.

EXHIBIT No. 19

[Doc. 327]

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INCORPORATED

1 EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Membership Card of

Mr. JOHN S. SERVICE,
American Consulate General
Calcutta, India

For year ending February 1951.
Amount \$15.00.

DONALD B. STRAUS, *Treasurer.*
Per TILLIE S. SLADE,
Assistant Treasurer.

This card serves as your receipt

EXHIBIT No. 20

THE STATE DEPARTMENT ESPIONAGE CASE

(By Emmanuel S. Larsen)

WHO IS LARSEN?

Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen was catapulted into the international lime-light early in June 1945, when as an official of the State Department he was one of the six arrested by the FBI under the provisions of the Espionage Act. Born in 1897 in San Rafael, California, of Danish parentage, Larsen was taken to China in 1906 by his father who went there to teach at the Imperial University in Chengtu. After a boyhood in China, Larsen completed his college education in Copenhagen. Returning to China he spent nearly twenty years in private and government service. Back in the United States in 1935, he soon joined the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington as a civilian expert on Far Eastern affairs.

Behind the now-famous State Department Espionage Case, involving the arrest of six persons of whom I was one, an arrest which shocked the nation on June 7, 1945, is the story of a highly organized campaign to switch American policy in the Far East from its long-tested course to the Soviet line. It is a story which has never been told before in full. Many sensational though little-explained developments, such as the General Stilwell Affair, the resignation of Undersecretary Joseph C. Grew and Ambassador Patrick Hurley and the emergence of a pro-Soviet bloc in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, are interlaced with the Case of the Six, as the episode became known.

I have devoted many months to a plodding investigation of the case in which I had become entangled, primarily to rehabilitate my reputation and to establish my complete innocence. I have collaborated with Congressman George Dondero of Michigan, who sponsored the creation of the House Committee which is about to undertake an inquiry into all the circumstances of the disposition of the State Department Espionage Case, and have offered my fullest cooperation to the chairman of that committee, Congressman Samuel Hobbs. In the course of my own explorations, I have uncovered sufficient material to convince me that further probing into the matter might assume proportions even more far-reaching than those of the Pearl Harbor Investigation.

It is the mysterious whitewash of the chief actors of the Espionage Case which the Congress has directed the Hobbs Committee to investigate. But from behind that whitewash there emerges the pattern of a major operation performed upon Uncle Sam without his being conscious of it. That operation vitally affects our main ramparts in the Pacific. In consequence of this operation General Marshall was sent on a foredoomed mission to China designed to promote Soviet expansion on our Asiatic frontier. It was a mission which could not but come to grief and which may yet bring untold sorrow to the American people.

How did it happen that the United States began to turn in 1944 upon its loyal ally, the Chiang Kai-shek Government, which had for seven years fought Japan, and to assume the sponsorship of the rebel Communist regime which collaborated with the Japanese during the period of the Stalin-Hitler Pact?

How did it come to pass that Washington since 1944 has been seeking to foist Communist members upon the sole recognized and legitimate government of China, a maneuver equivalent to an attempt by a powerful China to introduce Earl Browder and William Z Foster into key positions in the United States government?

How did it transpire that our top-ranking military leader, General Marshall, should have promoted an agreement in China under which American officers would be training and equipping rebel Chinese Communist units at the very time when they were ambushing our marines and when Communists the world over were waging a war of nerves upon the United States?

Whose was the hand which forced the sensational resignation of Undersecretary of State Joseph C. Grew and his replacement by Dean Acheson? And was the same hand responsible for driving Ambassador Patrick Hurley into a blind alley and retirement?

The answers to all of these questions came to me as I unraveled the main threads of the tangled State Department Espionage Case. But many more questions still remain to be solved.

On June 7, 1945, while a tense nation was entering upon the climax of the war with Japan, and exactly five weeks before the atomic bomb was dropped upon

Hiroshima, our country was shaken by an announcement from Washington: the FBI had the previous night arrested on charges of violating the Espionage Act two State Department officials, one Naval Intelligence officer and three New York journalists.

I was arrested in my home in Washington the evening of June 6, after a hard day's work in the State Department where I was employed as a research expert in Chinese affairs. When two FBI agents knocked at the door of our modest apartment as I sat down to dinner with my wife Thelma and our little daughter Linda, I could not believe it and thought it was some sort of a joke when they informed me that I was under arrest.

The search of my home lasted late into the night, and it provided the saddest hours of our lives. After a gruelling interrogation, I was brought, still in a state of utter bewilderment, to the office of the United States Commissioner.

There I found myself sitting next to John Stewart Service, a leading figure in the pro-Soviet group in the China Section of the State Department, and to Lieut. Andrew Roth, liaison officer between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the State Department, whom I also knew as an adherent of pro-Soviet policies. Both of them were arrested separately the same night in Washington.

In New York that night of June 6 three other arrests were made simultaneously. Philip Jacob Jaffe, publisher and editor of the obscure magazine *Amerasia*, specializing in Far Eastern affairs, was picked up after a raid on his offices. At the same time Kate Louise Mitchell, coeditor of *Amerasia*, a companion and intimate collaborator of Jaffe's for years, was put under arrest. Another colleague of Jaffe, the journalist Mark Julius Gayn, a contributor on the Far East to *Amerasia* and leading national magazines, was also taken into custody in New York.

The search in the offices of *Amerasia* yielded a trove of more than 100 files containing, according to Congressman Dondero, top secret and highly confidential papers stolen from the State Department, War Department, Navy Department, Office of Strategic Services, Office of Postal and Telegraph Censorship, and the OWI at a time when we were at war with both Germany and Japan. Mr. Dondero described some of these documents before the House of Representatives on April 18th last as follows:

"First. One document marked 'secret' and obviously originating in the Navy Department dealt with the schedule and the targets for the bombing of Japan. This particular document was known to be in the possession of Philip Jaffe during the early spring of 1945 and before the program had been effected. That information in the hands of our enemies could have cost us many precious American lives.

"Second. Another document, marked 'top secret' and likewise originating in the Navy Department, dealt with the disposition of the Japanese fleet subsequent to the major naval battle of October 1944 and gave the location and class of each Japanese warship.

"Third. Another document, stolen from the Office of Postal and Telegraph Censorship, was a secret report on the Far East and so stamped as to leave no doubt in anybody's mind that the mere possession of it by an unauthorized person was a clear violation of the Espionage Act.

"Fourth. Another document was stolen from the Office of Military Intelligence and consisted of 22 pages containing information obtained from Japanese prisoners of war. When our military officials question prisoners of war, it is for the purpose of getting secret military information of the enemy's plans.

"Fifth. Another stolen document, particularly illuminating, and of present great importance to our policy in China, was a lengthy detailed report showing complete disposition of the units in the army of Chiang Kai-shek, where located, how placed, under whose command, naming the units, division by division, and showing their military strength. It is easy to visualize the consequences of this information in the hands of the Communist forces in China, then and now."

As disclosed by Congressman Dondero, one of the documents was "of such exceptional military importance and so closely guarded in its limited transmission that it was delivered personally into the hands of the Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence." Many of the confidential papers bore this imprint:

"This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50, United States Code 31-32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

In the offices of *Amerasia*, which boasted a total circulation of 1,700, the government agents found a large photocopying department, the operation of which,

according to Congressman Dondero, could not possibly have been an essential part of the business of such a limited publication. "This department," stated Mr. Dondero, "was working through the night, in the small hours of morning and even on Sundays." Where these photostats went and how far they traveled is one of the several pivotal mysteries awaiting solution in the whole case.

Probably not one informed American in 20,000 had ever heard of *Amerasia*. But those of us who had to do with research or policy-making in the field of our international relations in Asia were well aware of the potent influence this almost unknown publication exercised upon the conduct of American foreign policy.

The magazine first came to my attention during my employment as an analyst in Chinese affairs in the Office of Naval Intelligence, where I had served for about nine years from October 1935, to September 1944. After having spent nearly twenty-five years of my life in China, where my father was a university instructor and where I grew up and mastered Chinese like a native, I returned to the United States. Before entering the government service, I did post-graduate work at the University of Chicago and later at Columbia University on a Rockefeller scholarship.

It was during the war, while working in the Office of Naval Intelligence as a civilian, that circumstances led me unsuspectingly to my fateful meeting with Philip Jaffe, the dominant figure in the Espionage Case.

One of the officers I had met in the Far Eastern branch of the Naval Intelligence was a brilliant young man, Andrew Roth, who had been commissioned a junior lieutenant after completing a special course in the Japanese language. My friendship with Roth, who was a youth of 26, never became intimate. We frequently lunched together. Occasionally we met in the evening for a pot-luck dinner and a good argument.

Roth knew my special hobby, as did many of my associates and acquaintances. Ever since 1923 I had been collecting patiently from every conceivable source biographical data on Chinese personalities, military and political, and my file of several thousand cards contained off-the-record material about the careers of the chief figures in the great drama of modern China.

* * *

One day Roth came to my desk in the Navy Department around noon time and asked me whether I had had my lunch. As I was free, I accepted his invitation to join him for a snack. While we walked up Pennsylvania Avenue, Roth asked me whether I knew Philip Jaffe, the publisher and editor of *Amerasia*. My answer being in the negative, he remarked that Jaffe was a friend of his and that he was interested in the biographies of Chinese leaders, so that the two of us should have a lot in common.

Roth suggested that I get together with Jaffe who was in a position to trade information with me about personalities. When asked how I could meet Jaffe, he smilingly informed me that Jaffe was in Washington that day, that he, Roth, was just then on his way to meet him for luncheon, and that he would be glad to take me along and introduce me.

We walked over to the Statler Hotel and met Jaffe in the lobby. First we had a cocktail in his room and then we had lunch in the restaurant. We discussed the conditions under which we could exchange information about Chinese leaders. Jaffe said that he visited Washington about once a month and that he would ask me on these visits for certain biographical material. If I didn't have it ready on my cards, I would prepare it for him and he would pick it up on his next trip. In return, he would supply me with information about the individuals I was studying. I was quite happy to have this new source of information, especially since I expected to get data on the Communist figures in China, a little-known field.

Most of the China experts in the Office of Naval Intelligence were satisfied with the superficial and generally negligible official biographies, whereas what I sought for my collection was the "dirt" about a man's career, the unpublished facts about his past and the real reasons for his switching from one faction to another. I had a hard time explaining to my superiors the importance of collecting such data about China, which was governed not so much by ideologies as by personalities.

It was not until after my arrest a year later, when I went over in my mind again and again the various conversations I had had with Roth, that I began to question the seeming coincidence of my meeting with Jaffe. I asked myself why Roth, who had been so interested in bringing us together for the exchange of information, never once inquired afterwards about my relations with Jaffe.

It now occurred to me that Roth's avoidance of the subject was not quite normal. And ever since I have been pestered by the thought: "Had not that casual meeting with Jaffe, which brought so much distress to me, been carefully pre-arranged?"

After meeting Jaffe, I naturally began to follow *Amerasia* with increased interest. Often I was surprised to discover how closely the situation in Asia as presented in Jaffe's magazine corresponded to that given by our naval and military attachés and by the State Department's field representatives in China.

In June 1944 *Amerasia* came out with a sharp attack on Undersecretary Grew, who was opposed to the proposed bombing of Emperor Hirohito's palace and who was reputed to favor the retention of the monarchy after the defeat of Japan as a stabilizing element in the Far East. This view of Mr. Grew's, which General MacArthur later put into effect, was a challenge to the pro-Soviet group in the China Section, whose objective was internal revolution in Japan.

Never having been identified with any Communist organization or "front," I did not suspect anything untoward in the attack upon Mr. Grew. I did notice, however, that Roth had taken a deep interest in Jaffe's criticism of the Undersecretary. Roth told me that he was working on a book in which he would arraign Grew's policies.

I ascribe the anti-Grew campaign to the differences between the Grew school in the State Department which favored a stable Japan as the keystone of American postwar policy in the Pacific and the school which favored a strong China as our best security in Asia.

When Jaffe came to Washington on his next trip, he invited me and my wife to dinner at a Chinese restaurant. In the course of our conversation he told me that he was worried by a report that Undersecretary Grew had been angered by the attack in *Amerasia*. It was obvious that the report had come to him from an inside source in the State Department.

At the same time Vice President Henry A. Wallace was dispatched on a mission to China, the main purpose of which was to induce Chiang Kai-shek to form a united front with the Communist insurgents. The mission followed upon the outbreak of the so-called Kazak incident in the early part of 1944 in which Soviet Russia was involved.

The American public was not allowed to know the facts reported by American observers in China, namely, that Moscow had come to the aid of the Chinese Communists in the remote Sinkiang province by engineering an uprising there. This was two years before the Iran Incident. It was done to divert Nationalist troops from the Communist areas. Five full divisions were sent by Chiang Kai-shek into Sinkiang, thus weakening the front against the Japanese and opening the gates of the northwestern Shensi and Kansu provinces to the Communists.

Even before Wallace returned from the Far East, Moscow which was not at war with Japan, launched a propaganda drive against the recognized government of China. On July 18, the mouthpiece of the Kremlin, *War and the Working Class*, published a warning to Chungking to end its conflict with the Communist forces.

This was the opening gun in a smear campaign which soon was reflected in the so-called liberal press in the United States. Our veteran ally Chiang Kai-shek was denounced as a Fascist. Correspondents and commentators who had never raised their voices against the dictatorship in Russia now echoed the Soviet-inspired vituperation of the Kuomintang regime as a dangerous dictatorship.

The question as to whether Soviet Russia would enter the war against Japan was uppermost in Allied councils in those days. China's foreign minister, T. V. Soong, told our Ambassador Gauss that he was convinced that Russia would attack Japan when Germany was defeated, but would do so for the sole purpose of sovietizing the Far East. Soong warned that America's headaches would commence only then. It was a warning which Washington completely disregarded.

* * *

On September 1, 1944, I was transferred from the Naval Intelligence to the State Department, where I was attached to the planning and research unit entrusted with the drafting of basic post-war policy toward China, Japan, Korea, Siam, and other Far Eastern zones. I discovered to my amazement that the State Department had no clear-cut general policy, but was run by cliques which pursued their own preconceived aims and were often in violent conflict.

The pro-Soviet group in the China Section, whose views were reflected by *Amerasia*, and whose members were in touch with Jaffe and Roth, formed a particularly compact clique. Secretary Ludden of the American Embassy in

Chungking was a leading figure in the group. So was John Davies, a native of Chengtu, who acted as State Department attaché with our military observers in China.

He seemed to believe and report almost anything in the way of information against the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek, swallowing whole and relaying nearly everything that the Communists gave him. Mr. Davies held the view that the Chinese Communists were a breed apart from the Soviet elements and had no intention of aligning themselves with Soviet Russia.

John Stewart Service, a junior colleague and friend of Mr. Davies, who was stationed as a field representative in China and acted as political adviser to General Stilwell, tried hard to convince Washington that the rebel Communists were pursuing a policy of avoiding civil war. I remember that Ambassador Gauss did not quite subscribe to this theory. I also recall that in an attempt to discredit Ambassador Gauss's analysis of the Communist-Kuomintang conflict, Mr. John Carter Vincent, chief of the China Section, suggested that it was the failure of the Kuomintang to back the reforms championed by the Communists that was largely responsible for the difficulties in China.

Playing the part of a lone wolf, although one hundred percent in accord with the pro-Soviet China Group, was John W. Emmerson, who served as political adviser to Admiral Chester Nimitz in both Chinese and Japanese affairs.

I remember how our Consul in Kweilin had interviewed General Li Chi-shen on the subject of the Democratic League which was represented in official dispatches as a liberal organization, and how he waxed hot in his report in an effort to impress Washington with all the abuses heaped by General Li upon the Chungking government. It appeared strange to me that a United States official should have been so receptive to violent criticism of the government to which he was accredited. At no time did any of these field representatives report upon the Communists who had helped create the Democratic League and who manipulated it as a leftist "front."

The encouragement extended to the Chinese Communists by many of our officials there and by some of the writers whom they were inspiring was such that the Reds in China declared they would sit back and wait for stronger United States pressure upon Chiang Kai-shek. This pressure did not fail to be forthcoming.

In the early fall of 1944 Donald M. Nelson and General Patrick Hurley were dispatched to China as the President's special envoys to inform Chiang Kai-shek of American disappointment over his failure to form a united front with the Communists. The two envoys requested the Generalissimo to reorganize his Cabinet and to place an American general in command of the Chinese armies. It was understood that General Stilwell would be the American commander.

Chiang Kai-shek was at first inclined to make some compromise for the sake of Allied unity but not at the expense of Chinese sovereignty. President Roosevelt exerted his own direct pressure on the Generalissimo to back up his envoy's demands.

Then came the Stilwell incident. John S. Service, Stilwell's political adviser, accompanied a highly secret military commission to Communist headquarters at Yen-an. Upon the return of this mission, old "Vinegar" Joe demanded that Chiang Kai-shek permit him to equip and arm some 300,000 Chinese Communists and put them in the field alongside the Nationalist armies against the Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek saw in this American proposal a Soviet plot to build up the very rebel forces which had been waging civil war against his government. He requested the recall of General Stilwell.

The day before President Roosevelt announced that Stilwell had been relieved of his command, on October 30, 1944, John S. Service submitted his report No. 40 to the State Department. As disclosed months later by General Hurley in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that report was "a general statement of how to let fall the government I was sent over there to sustain. The report was circulated among the Communists I was trying to harmonize with the Chiang Kai-shek government."

During these and the ensuing months Philip Jaffe and Kate Mitchell made numerous trips from New York to Washington. Mr. Jaffe would call me and collect whatever biographical data on Chinese personalities I had, but I found it increasingly strange that he would not reciprocate with the promised biographical information on the Communist figures that I needed.

* * *

The Espionage Case itself had its origin with the appearance in the December 1944 issue of *Amerasia* of an article containing unadulterated passages from

an extremely confidential report to the Office of Strategic Services. Two employees of the OSS were struck by the passages which they had read in the original and became curious as to how the information turned up in the columns of *Amerasia*. A preliminary investigation conducted by OSS disclosed that various other secret documents were in possession of Jaffe, Kate Mitchell, and Mark Gayn, all of *Amerasia*.

The FBI then took charge of the affair. As established by Congressman Dondero, the government agents spent several months on the case. In the course of their quest, it was found that John S. Service was in communication from China with Mr. Jaffe. The substance of some of Service's confidential messages to the State Department reached the offices of *Amerasia* in New York before they arrived in Washington. Among the papers found in possession of Mr. Jaffe was Document No. 58, one of Mr. Service's secret reports, entitled "Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek—Decline of his Prestige and Criticism of and Opposition to his Leadership."

In the course of the FBI investigation *Amerasia* was revealed as the center of a constellation of Communist zealots and their satellite fellow-travellers. The ramifications of *Amerasia* reached far beyond those of a modest academic publication. It appeared, for instance, that Owen Lattimore, consultant to OWI and to the State Department on Far Eastern affairs, was formerly an editor of *Amerasia*. Another former editor was Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a columnist for *The Daily Worker* and secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, with which Kate Mitchell had been affiliated in various capacities since 1933.

The publisher of *Amerasia* was a prosperous manufacturer of greeting cards who had a rather unusual record for a well-to-do businessman. Mr. Philip Jacob Jaffe, naturalized in 1923, had served as contributing editor of *Labor Defender*, monthly magazine of the International Labor Defense, a Communist organization, in 1933. From 1934 to 1936 he had been a member of the editorial board of *China Today*, publication of the pro-Soviet American Friends of the Chinese people, under his admitted alias of J. W. Phillips. Under that name he presided in 1935 over a banquet at which Earl Browder was a speaker. He had lectured at the Jefferson School of Social Science, an avowed Communist Party institution. In addition to several other pro-Soviet organizations, he was a member of the Board of Directors of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. *The New York Times* described him on June 7, 1945 (subsequent to his arrest) as "an active supporter of pro-Communist and pro-Soviet movements for a number of years."

What *The New York Times* did not know and what I could not possibly know, but what was established during the investigation, according to the information gathered by Congressman Dondero, was the following: that Jaffe is known to have visited Earl Browder's apartment several times in the spring of 1945; that he dined on more than one occasion at the Soviet consulate in New York; that when the Chinese Communist delegate, Tung Pi-Wu, while in the United States in April 1945 to attend the San Francisco Conference, visited New York, he met Earl Browder one day in Jaffe's apartment; that Jaffe had been a liberal contributor to pro-Soviet causes and funds; and that at one time Jaffe had in his possession a message sent by Ambassador Hurley to his wife, advising her not to rent their home in Chesapeake Bay for the summer, inasmuch as he expected to return to the United States before the end of the summer.

How this strictly personal message fell into Jaffe's hands was never ascertained. But Congressional sources did establish the remarkable fact that Mr. Jaffe once reserved two tables at a hotel banquet held to launch a pro-Communist China front in the name of "The fifth floor, 35 East 12th Street," the national headquarters of the American Communist Party.

Kate L. Mitchell, co-editor of *Amerasia*, was a Buffalo heiress whose income from a trust fund has been estimated to run as high as \$15,000 a year. Born in 1908, a graduate of Bryn Mawr, widely traveled and a student of Asiatic problems, Miss Mitchell was so close to Jaffe that she had in her possession keys to all the files in the office of *Amerasia*. When John Stewart Service returned from China, Miss Mitchell gave a party at which he was present. He had previously attended a special press conference held by the Institute of Pacific Relations in which he supported the position of the Chinese Communists.

Lieutenant Andrew Roth, a rising *Amerasia* star and protégé of Jaffe's is a native New Yorker who had attended City College. Mr. Dondero disclosed that Roth had been placed in his key post of liaison officer between Naval Intelligence and the State Department "despite a totally unfavorable report result-

ing from an investigation by the Office of Naval Intelligence itself when he first applied for his commission."

Mark J. Gayn, a native of Manchuria, whose articles in leading magazines were based upon confidential documents supplied by Jaffe, was frequently consulted by the latter after his Washington trips, particularly in Japanese affairs. On at least one occasion John S. Service was known to have visited Gayn in his apartment. I have never met Gayn and was barely acquainted with Service.

* * *

Of many of these vital facts I was ignorant before my arrest. The political background of Jaffe and Miss Mitchell and their confreres was completely foreign to me. I knew Jaffe and his group as the editor of a magazine which had almost semi-official standing among the left-wingers in the State Department. In spite of the fact that I was gathering biographical material on Chinese leaders for Mr. Jaffe, I did not do along with the *Amerasia* circle in questions of our policy in the Far East.

In the spring of 1945, when it was generally believed that our next step in the war would be an invasion of China, the problem of Manchuria came up for discussion and analysis in the State Department. In the event of our seizure of Manchuria, were we to hand it over eventually to any local Chinese faction, even the Communists? Mr. Robert Feary, a well-meaning former official of our Embassy in Japan, who drew his knowledge of China largely from the field dispatches of the pro-Soviet school, proposed that we turn over Manchuria to the Chinese Communists if Chiang Kai-shek's troops were not there to take it over immediately.

This proposal struck me as outrageous, since President Roosevelt had promised Chiang Kai-shek at the Cairo Conference that Manchuria would revert to his nation, by which we unmistakably meant the properly constituted government of China. I launched the initial protest against this and was able to bring about the defeat of the plan.

Shortly after this meeting on Manchurian policy, I was warned by a young foreign service officer of Scandinavian extraction in a friendly way that I would soon get into trouble if I opposed the anti-Kuomintang group in the China Section. Soon afterwards I ran into Lieutenant Roth in the street, and he told me that John Carter Vincent, head of the China Section, suspected me of being "too close to the Chiang Kai-shek crowd." I resented the remark, since I had but purely social relations with the Chinese Embassy in Washington. I wondered afterwards whether Roth had used a fabricated story merely to test me.

Late in May, I was surprised to find Andrew Roth in my apartment when I returned home from the office. He was in an extremely nervous state. He told me that he and his wife had intended to drop in upon us that evening, that she had gone shopping, and that in the meanwhile he had received some upsetting news which he was anxious to convey to her. It appeared that he had been ordered to go to Honolulu and that he was making preparations to leave when suddenly his orders were canceled. He evinced so much uneasiness and seemed so reluctant to talk about the matter that I was somewhat baffled.

When his charming wife Renee arrived about an hour or so later, happy and smiling, she was dumbfounded and put out by the bad news. I tried to comfort her by saying that the Navy probably would have a better job for her husband, but she brushed my remark aside in a peeved manner that indicated anxiety and fear.

Is it possible that both Roth and his wife were already aware then that they were being shadowed and investigated, but said nothing about it to me? I myself felt perfectly at ease, for I had not the faintest notion that I was standing on the brink of disaster.

* * *

It was just about this time that Mark Gayn, who had made his plans the previous year, prepared to go abroad as a foreign correspondent for the *Chicago Sun*. He suddenly called upon George Taylor, in charge of the Far Eastern Section at the OWI in Washington, and asked him to authorize the decontrol of some confidential government documents which Gayn claimed to have used for current articles.

Mr. Taylor issued a letter decontrolling certain papers. This letter Mr. Gayn presented at the New York office of the OWI, and is alleged to have persuaded the person in charge of the files there to interpret Mr. Taylor's authorization so broadly as to cover all the documents Gayn had in his possession.

My arrest in the evening of June 6 came to me like a bolt from the blue. The FBI agents found in my apartment three to four thousand cards of my collection

of data on Chinese personalities, and half a dozen folders of reports and memoranda dealing with political and geographic problems in Asia. Some of these were confidential papers I had taken home to study. None of the documents was of a military character which would affect national security. It was a common practice in Washington among overworked government employees to take home confidential papers to work on.

When word of our arrests had spread through Washington, there was general burning of official papers, taken home innocently or otherwise, all over the Capital.

The strange course which the Espionage Case took from the moment of our arrests became evident to me that night, even when I was led into the office of the United States Commissioner for arraignment. On June 6 Andrew Roth was still a uniformed lieutenant in the service of the United States Navy. That night, as I beheld him a fellow-prisoner, I was surprised to find him wearing civilian clothes. Upon inquiry I learned that literally overnight Lieutenant Roth had been mustered out of the service. It was not until later that it had dawned on me how grave it might have been for Roth to face charges under the Espionage Act in wartime while still an officer in the Naval Intelligence.

When Kate Mitchell was arrested in New York that night she had in her possession, according to Congressman Dondero, a highly confidential military document entitled "Plan of Battle Operations for Soldiers." It was a paper of such importance that army officers were subject to courtmartial if they lost their copies. Also in the possession of Miss Mitchell were found documents from the OSS and the Office of Naval Intelligence. These were part of the huge files of top secret material gathered by Jaffe.

Mark Gayn, who had made use at various time of *Amerasia* files, had more than 200 secret documents in his apartment at the time of his arrest. Mr. Gayn was the only one of the *Amerasia* group to admit on the night of his arrest in a signed statement that he had been found in possession of confidential government papers.

Mr. Jaffe, either before the arrest or upon his release on bail, is known to have used the authorization to decontrol certain papers issued to Gayn by the OWI in some inexplicable manner so as to claim exemption for all the documents found in his own possession.

* * *

On June 8, the day after the arrests, Mr. Joseph C. Grew, then Acting Secretary of State, announced to the country that "a comprehensive security program is to be continued unrelentingly in order to stop completely the illegal and disloyal conveyance of confidential and other secret information to unauthorized persons."

Philip Jaffe, speaking for himself and Miss Mitchell the following day, upon their release on bail, countered with a statement to the press: "The Red-baiting character of this case is scandalous and often libelous."

Mark Gayn raised the cry of the freedom of the press, which certain so-called liberal publications took up so as to eclipse in the public mind the charges under the Espionage Act. Popular radio commentators echoed the cry.

Undersecretary Grew became a target for a campaign of vilification as chief culprit in the case. The former Lieutenant Andrew Roth wrote a series of article in a New York evening paper and published a book in which he attacked Grew as the father of a dangerous State Department policy in the Far East and as the main prop of the throne in Japan which was represented as being in the way of a "democratic" transformation in that country.

While public attention was largely focused upon extraneous issues, the Espionage Case itself was following a special course behind the scenes. It appeared that Kate Mitchell had an influential uncle in Buffalo, a reputable attorney by the name of James M. Mitchell, former President of the New York State Bar Association. Mr. Mitchell was a member of a very influential law firm in Buffalo, Kenefick, Cooke, Mitchell, Bass & Letchworth. The New York City correspondents of that law firm included the most redoubtable Colonel Joseph M. Hartfield, extremely well-known and extremely influential in government circles in Washington. Colonel Hartfield, who is regarded by some as one of the most powerful political lawyers in the country, made at least four trips to Washington where he called on top officials of the Department of Justice in the matter.

At the same time Congressman Emanuel Celler, of New York, interested himself in the defense of the New York figures involved in the case. To what extent he exerted his influence has never been determined. It was perhaps only a coincidence that his law partner, Mr. Arthur Sheinberg, appeared as Jaffe's New York attorney when his case was called before the Criminal Division No. 1 of the District Court of the District of Columbia.

My own attorney was Arthur J. Hilland, whose first demand on me was that I tell him the truth and nothing but the truth. As I had nothing to conceal, my principal worry was my wife's difficulty in raising the \$10,000 bail, for we were people of most modest means.

The grand jury heard first the testimony of Service, Gayn, and Miss Mitchell. At the end of June it was announced that new evidence would be presented by the Justice Department and additional persons would be charged with espionage.

The grand jury proceedings are, of course, secret. But it has been reported to me that John Service had accused me of furnishing Jaffe with documents found in his possession, which was a complete and vicious fabrication. According to Congressman Dondero, for some unaccountable reasons the government attorneys presented to the grand jury only a part of the evidence in their possession.

On August 10 came the sensational announcement that the grand jury had dropped the indictments against Service, Gayn, and Miss Mitchell. The clearing of these three was the signal for a renewed campaign against Under Secretary Grew in the press. Within the State Department, it was generally known, Dean Acheson headed the anti-Grew faction.

The evening of August 13, J. Raymond Walsh, research director of CIO-PAC, outspoken Soviet partisan, made over the radio a strong plea for the defendants in the Espionage Case. Of John Service he said: "His arrest brought some exceedingly powerful people within the government to his defense. Again one can easily infer that those who began this affair wished they hadn't. * * *

A substantial fund for the defense of Mr. Service had been raised with the help of Mortimer Graves, Secretary of The American Council of Learned Societies. No one of the pro-Soviet group bothered about my defense.

On August 14, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson tendered his resignation to Secretary Byrnes. For a moment it looked as if Mr. Grew had won out. But that same day, August 14, the newly installed Secretary Byrnes addressed a letter to John Service, congratulating him on the "happy termination" of his ordeal and reinstating him to active duty "for important work in connection with Far Eastern affairs." At the same time, Under Secretary Grew wrote to Service a more formal letter expressing his pleasure at being returned to duty and praising his enviable record.

* * *

It was about this time that Joseph E. Davies, of Mission to Moscow fame, was alleged to have declared that Acheson made Grew's resignation from the service a condition of his returning to the State Department.

Two days later Under Secretary Grew, after a lifetime in the diplomatic service, resigned and President Truman announced that Dean Acheson would take over the post of Under Secretary of State.

On September 29 the news that Jaffe had changed his plea from "not guilty" to that of "guilty" of the unauthorized possession of Government documents and was fined \$2,500 hit me like a bombshell. It appeared that by some strange coincidence Jaffe's case had been called before Justice Proctor of the District Court on a Saturday morning. Robert Hitchcock, of Buffalo, had presented the case for the Department of Justice. The court asked for a brief statement of the Government's case, which Mr. Hitchcock promised to do in "less than five minutes."

The FBI has the authority to make arrests only upon the presentation of adequate evidence, but it has nothing to do with the court's disposal of such evidence.

"I have heretofore charged and reiterate now," declared Congressman Dondero on the floor of the House, "that the Court before whom these cases were brought was not fully informed of the facts. A summary of the court proceedings had been furnished to me, which shows no evidence or exhibit obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation presented to the court. Jaffe's counsel told the court that Jaffe had no intention of harming the government, and United States Attorney Hitchcock told the court there was no element of disloyalty in connection with the case."

My own situation was growing more deplorable and my financial circumstances more straitened. I had been put "on leave-without-pay" status pending the outcome of the case. I had no means to cover the expenses of my defense. For weeks I had lain awake nights hoping for a speedy trial, expecting an acquittal.

I now resolved to go to New York to look up Mr. Jaffe. I telephoned the office of *Amerasia* and he somewhat reluctantly agreed to see me. I told him of my financial plight and he agreed to defray the costs of my defense as well as to pay

the fine which might be imposed upon me. At this time, in October, the only two of the Case of Six left on the calendar, were those of myself and of Andrew Roth.

To run ahead of the story, my own case came up on November 2. Upon insistent advice, I decided not to contest it as I had planned, and pleaded *nolo contendere*. The court imposed a fine of five hundred dollars, which was paid by Mr. Jaffe's representative. He also paid all other expenses in my case, which ran to an additional three thousand dollars. As for Andrew Roth, the indictment against him was dismissed in February 1946 for insufficient evidence.

During my conference with Mr. Jaffe in October, he dropped a remark which one could never forget.

"Well, we've suffered a lot," he said, "but, anyhow, we got Grew out."

Ambassador Hurley was next to go. The road was clear for the pro-Soviet China bloc to take over the Far Eastern Division of the State Department. The policy which General Stilwell attempted to force down the throat of our ally Chiang Kai-shek as a means of defeating Japan was entrusted to General Marshall *after* Japan's defeat by America and *after* the rape of Manchuria by Soviet forces.—EDITOR'S NOTE.

EXHIBIT No. 21

[From the Washington Daily News, Monday, May 22, 1950]

TYDINGS SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERASIA CASE—AMERASIA PROBE PROSPECTS DIM— ONLY TWO WITNESSES HEARD IN MONTH

(By Frederick Woltman, Scripps-Howard staff writer)

The Tydings Senate subcommittee, which on April 17 promised a new investigation of the Amerasia case, more than one month later has done virtually nothing about it.

Only two witnesses have been questioned, both in closed session. And the subcommittee's legal staff has not yet got around to looking at the 1700 exhibits which lay the groundwork of the case of the stolen Government documents.

One of the two witnesses was the spokesman for the Justice Department, which is under fire for the way it handled the case. He is James M. McInerney, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the criminal division.

BELITTLED BY SPOKESMAN FOR JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

The effect of his testimony, it was learned, was to belittle the Amerasia incident and play down the need for a thoro investigation.

Mr. McInerney told the senators May 4 there was little of importance in the 1700 records recovered by the FBI on June 6, 1945.

Contrary to the stand taken by the FBI and State Department at that time, the Justice Department dismissed the contents of the stolen documents as mostly "teacup gossip."

The other witness was Frank Bielaski, chief investigator of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), who made the first wartime raid on Amerasia and discovered a treasure trove of stolen State Department records. His testimony has never been made public.

But yesterday, over NBC Television's "Meet the Press," Mr. Bielaski declared that the Hiss-Chambers case was "chicken feed" compared with the Amerasia.

FEELS THERE WAS "EFFORT TO WHITEWASH"

He said he felt "very definitely" there was "a concerted effort on the part of someone to whitewash the Amerasia case."

"I do not think the case was ever properly or thoroly investigated," added Mr. Bielaski.

Many important witnesses have never been called, he said, listing the names of six, all ex-FBI agents. He himself was never interviewed by the Department of Justice until last week, the former OSS official stated.

In the interview, Mr. Bielaski struck back at the Tydings subcommittee's only other witness, Assistant Attorney General McInerney.

Mr. McInerney, he was told, testified that the Justice Department was handicapped because evidence had been "burglarized" and "obtained by theft from the Amerasia office by OSS."

"ARGUMENT FALLACIOUS AND * * * POORLY CHOSEN"

"That argument is entirely fallacious and, I think, poorly chosen by the Assistant Attorney General," said Mr. Bielaski.

"OSS was created by executive order and authorized to provide its own security. It was an espionage and counter-espionage agency. Our search, without a warrant, was entirely reasonable in time of war. We were trying to recover OSS property.

"If we had tried to get a search warrant, it would have ruined the whole affair."

The FBI, he pointed out, had "13 volumes of exhibits" to bolster the Amerasia prosecution.

"3,000 DOCUMENTS INVOLVED IN CASE"

"We calculated that a total of 3,000 documents were involved in the Amerasia case in a three-months period," Mr. Bielaski said: "In that time every State Department document concerning the Far East passed thru the magazine."

Because of its secrecy requirements, he declined to reveal what he testified at the Tydings subcommittee closed session. Asked if his former boss, William J. Donovan, OSS chief, would be willing to testify if called, Mr. Bielaski replied: "General Donovan is very willing and, I think, somewhat anxious to testify as to the seriousness of the documents."

So far as it is known, neither General Donovan nor any other witness has been called by the Senate subcommittee.

Meanwhile, the Amerasia case has become one of the most-talked-of issues on Capitol Hill and in official Washington.

Among both Republicans and Democrats in Congress the feeling is widespread that this is the time, for once and always, to clear up the Amerasia mystery.

They are depending on the assurance of a thoro inquiry made by Senator Millard E. Tydings (Democrat, Maryland), chairman of the subcommittee.

LOYALTY FILE INSPECTION HAS TOP PRIORITY

Up to now, tho, the Amerasia case has been allowed to bog down in the subcommittee's overall job of investigating charges of disloyalty in the State Department.

The legal staff has given top priority to the examination of the 81 State Department loyalty files. Until that's completed the Amerasia case will get little attention.

The loyalty file inspection itself is in danger of bogging down. Because of Sen. Tydings' restrictions, the Republican minority has concluded that the entire inspection procedure is farcical. They may walk out on it any time.

So the immediate prospects of an Amerasia inquiry by the Tydings group are not too bright.

EXHIBIT No. 22

See transcript of proceedings for afternoon of June 2, commencing at page 87.

EXHIBIT No. 23

[Doc. 100-3]

EXCERPT FROM CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE, MAY 22, 1950

(Pages 7543-44)

Mr. BROOKS. That office at 225 Fifth Avenue. It was under surveillance for a week or 10 days. The office, was operating every night until late at night. There were lights in there. We could not get in to take a look at it for that reason.

Then we made plans to enter the place under a subterfuge, not by force.

When the time came, we were let in, but we did deceive the people in the buildings as to who we were, and what our purpose was. We entered the building Sunday night, March 11, at about close to midnight. We were let into the office.

Mr. CHIEF. Of what year?

Mr. Brooks. Nineteen hundred and forty-five. We were let into the office of Amerasia magazine. I went myself because I did not believe in sending somebody else to do something that I would not do. We had a party of five. I personally, when we entered the office, devoted my time to looking through the office, the front office, hoping to find this dummy I have described.

I did not find it. About all I found was a lot of information on circulation. I looked over this information with some degree of care because I wanted to know about how big an operation the Amerasia magazine was.

I found, at best, their circulation had been some 2,500 copies, and it had steadily decreased. It was about 1,700. Dealer distribution had dropped from 500 to 300. It was losing money, I could tell from correspondence, and looking at the accounts.

It was perfectly obvious it was not a paying venture.

About the time I had come to the conclusion there was nothing in the front office of interest to me—while I was in the front office, I had sent some of my agents back through the rear part of this office. It is quite a nice office, and very well furnished. One of them came and said, "We think you better come back here. We found some stuff you ought to see."

I started back. Before I went back to the rooms where they were, I observed on the right side of the main corridor there was a room; to be conservative, I would say it is half as big as this. It was devoted, exclusively, to photo copy work. They had a photo copy machine, and developer pans all around on the shelves. The place was equipped to make photo copies, and make them in large quantities.

I did not know what function that was for for a little magazine like Amerasia. There it was, and I looked it over.

I went to the end of the corridor. On the end over to the left was the room of the associate editor who was Kate Mitchell.

On the right was a smaller office of Philip Jaffe, who was the editor. Just before you came to those offices, on the right, was a large library twice as big as this with volumes all over the place dealing, principally, with the Far East, and many of them were works on communism and Communist movements, etc.

It was a library of several thousand volumes. I went into the office of Jaffe. He had a desk about like this.

It was covered with originals and freshly made photo copies of documents, every one of which was secret in its character. Some of them were directed, personally, to the Secretary of State. Some of them were from military attachés in China and other places, confidential. All of them were marked "Not to be shown OWI." That was evidence of the confidential nature.

Some were from Naval Intelligence. There were a good many on his desk. It would seem from the freshness of the copies that those photo copies had just been made. They accounted for the fact that the office was working so late at night.

Mr. HANCOCK. To whom were they addressed?

Mr. BROOKS. The State Department documents were addressed to the Secretary for his personal attention.

Mr. SPRINGER. Were they all photostatic copies, or were there any originals?

Mr. BROOKS. The originals were in there, and the photostatic copies. Everybody was astounded at this stuff.

While we were looking it over, a man happened to look behind a door. Behind the door he found a suitcase and two briefcases. The suitcase was a bellows-type suitcase that was probably that thick [indicating].

Mr. HANCOCK. Two feet?

Mr. BROOKS. About 18 inches. The briefcases were very heavy with documents. I had along an expert who opened all sorts of locks. He had opened all the locks. He opened the suitcase, the briefcases. When he opened the suitcase, it seemed to be a specially constructed affair with about 10 to 15 pockets in it. It was a bellows-type suitcase spread out in this way. It was literally loaded with secret documents of all sorts from all departments of the Government.

Mr. HANCOCK. Originals?

Mr. BROOKS. Yes. These were all originals. There were no copies in the suitcase. There was one exception: in that suitcase I found an original, a typewritten original, and four copies of the particular document that I was after, that was the Office of Strategic Service document on Siam.

In addition to that, I think there were five more secret documents on the Office of Strategic Service which we had not missed, one of which was "top secret," and extremely valuable and confidential.

I took this stuff out and spread it around. It covered almost every department in the Government with the exception of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. There were no documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. There were documents from the British Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, G-2, State Department, Office of Censorship, Office of Strategic Service, and probably others. There were so many of them, at that moment, I started to have a list made. There were so many we could not list them. These documents had from 3 to 4 to 150 pages. There were 300 documents.

Mr. CHELF. Either confidential, secret, or top secret?

Mr. BROOKS. Everyone of them bore the stamp that the possession of these documents is a violation of the Espionage Act. It was stamped all over them.

About that time, one of my men who had gone into the library came in and said he found something in the library.

He had an envelope which was not sealed. It was a large manila envelope. In that envelope were, I should say, 15 or 20 documents. I could not tell whether they came mimeographed or whether they were photo copied on this machine. They were a little blurred. They were not photostats. They must have been photo copies. In between these documents, every other one, we found six top-secret documents of the Navy Department. I looked at these myself. I do not recall all six of them. I am sorry I did not make more notes about them, but I remember distinctly two, probably the first two that I read. One of them was entitled, and I do not know the exact words, but one was entitled, "The bombing program for Japan." It was top secret. I read it. It showed how Japan was to be bombed progressively in the industrial centers, and it named the cities.

The second one that I read gave the location of all the ships of the Japanese fleet, subsequent to the battle of Leyte; I guess it was October 1944. It gave the ships by name and where they were hiding.

I might say, off the record, at that time I did not know anything about the atomic bomb. I had never heard of it. I have since been very curious trying to wrack my memory whether there was anything in those other four top secret documents. It would not have meant anything to me if it had. I had never heard of the atomic bomb. I do not remember the other information. We did not take the documents. We put them back where we got them.

We went back out into the other room. We look over this stuff. I came to the conclusion, if I came down here to the Office of Strategic Service and told them what I had seen, they just would not believe me. I, therefore, determined to take 12 to 14 of the documents and bring them down and show them to them as proof.

I picked out all of the Office of Strategic Service documents, including the five copies of the one that I was after, and either seven or eight additional documents. I picked documents that had marks of some sort on them to indicate through whose hands they had gone.

I put those in my pocket. I felt sure that there were so many there that they could not possibly miss those documents for a week, anyhow. I put those in my pocket. We left that place. We put everything back the way we found it. We left there about 2:30 in the morning.

I took a plane and came to Washington. I had a meeting the first thing Monday morning with the security officer. I did not, myself, make a list of those 12 or 14 documents. He did. He prepared a memorandum which is at the present time on file with the Office of Strategic Services describing those documents and the nature of them, what is in them.

There is a memo showing exactly what I brought down here as evidence for my own office.

They were so startling that we lost sight of the first document we were searching for. The others were so much more important.

Doc. 100-3

Before I could even deliver all of them, which I did one at a time because it gave me a little pleasure to do it, they had gotten in touch with General Donovan. They had the chief of the secretariat down in the office when I delivered all these papers to them. Donovan and I think the security officer. Mr. Van Beuren went immediately over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to show them this stuff.

If not then, then that night or the following morning, Mr. Van Beuren, the security officer, went to a meeting where this stuff was shown to the Secretary of State.

I am telling you that because that was the disposition made, and because Mr. Van Beuren, to whom I was adviser at the time, was perfectly willing to come here and tell you what he knows about it and the character of the documents, and what he did with them, and what they decided to do about the case.

I made only one stipulation when I turned the stuff over to them, that was that I and my men were so apprehensive about this whole thing, that somebody must do something about it. We did not want to sit by and see this thing go on. We wanted action. We wanted it in a hurry. We thought something should be done within a week. They promised action would be taken within a week. It was only 6 days later that the Federal Bureau of Investigation moved in in New York.

Mr. Gurnea, who was an inspector for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was sent up to take charge. He organized the various groups. He placed various persons in the Amerasia magazine, offices and staff under surveillance. They tapped the telephones. They entered the premises. I am sure they photostated all of the documents that we saw there less only those which I delivered down here to my home office.

* * * * *

Mr. Brooks. We felt the men who were in this place, that we had cut off or found a principal channel of information from the Government files down here into some hands which we suspected were Communist hands. We never knew where this stuff went after it got out of there. I think it was when the Peace Conference was on in San Francisco that I entered a complaint with the Office of Strategic Services. It seemed to me a terrible thing that certain persons out there attending the conference had secret information from our State Department and were informed on what our State Department planned to do and what the State Department thought about. Nothing was done about that.

It was shortly after that that they did shut down on these people and arrested six of them. I knew, also, that during this period, a second lot of stuff was brought out from Washington; that Jaffe came down, or someone came down. My impression was that it was Jaffe. They got another suitcase full of it and brought it back. The Federal Bureau of Investigation also photographed all of that. In their exhibit, they must have all of the first lot and all of the second lot. We were told the second lot was just as important as the first lot.

EXHIBIT No. 24

[From the New York Times, Tuesday, October 31, 1944]

ALLIES HERD 40,000 NAZIS TOWARD MEUSE; 3 JAPANESE CRUISERS BOMBED AT MANILA; STILWELL RECALL BARES RIFT WITH CHIANG—LONG SCHISM SEEN—STILWELL BREAK STEMS FROM CHIANG REFUSAL TO PRESS WAR FULLY—PEACE WITH REDS BARRED—GENERALISSIMO REGARDS THEIR ARMIES FIGHTING JAPANESE AS THREAT TO HIS RULE

The following account of the recall of Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell is by the Chungking correspondent of the New York Times, who has just returned to this country. It was delayed and finally cleared by the War Department censorship in Washington.

(By Brooks Atkinson)

Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, relieved of his command in China, Burma and India, before leaving Chungking on Oct. 21 made a final swift tour of some of the military bases in his command and then flew directly toward Washington in his silver-colored transport plane facetiously dubbed "Uncle Joe's Chariot."

For the last two months negotiations had been going on between President Roosevelt's personal representative, Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to give General Stilwell full command of the Chinese ground and air forces under the Generalissimo and to increase China's participation in the counter-offensive against Japan.

Although the Generalissimo at first was inclined to agree to General Stilwell's appointment as commander, he decided later that he would accept any American commander except General Stilwell.

PRESSED FOR REFORM

His attitude toward the American negotiations became stiff and hostile. At a private meeting of the standing committee of the Kuomintang [National party] Central Executive Committee this month he announced the terms of his personal ultimatum to Americans who were pressing him for military and governmental reform.

He declared that General Stilwell must go, that the control of American lend-lease materials must be put in his hands and that he would not be coerced by Americans into helping to unify China by making terms with the Chinese Communists. If America did not yield on these points, he said China would go back to fighting the Japanese alone, as she did before Pearl Harbor.

President Roosevelt agreed to the Generalissimo's demand for General Stilwell's recall. Dividing the huge China-Burma-India war sector in two, the War Department appointed Maj. Gen. Albert G. Wedemeyer, now Deputy Chief of Staff to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, as Commander of United States Army Forces in China and Lieut. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, General Stilwell's Chief of Staff in India, as Commander of United States Army Forces in India and Burma.

After a career of more than twenty years largely devoted to military affairs in China and two years and eight months as commander of the United States Army Forces in China, Burma, and India and as Allied Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell has now concluded a busy and constantly frustrated attempt to help China stay in the war and to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese forces.

Uncle Joe speaks Chinese. He knows more about China than most foreigners. He is more intimately acquainted with the needs and capacities of the Chinese Army than the Generalissimo and Gen. Ho. Ying-chin, Minister of War and Chief of Staff, because he has repeatedly been in the field with the troops.

He is commonly regarded as the ablest field commander in China since "Chinese" Gordon. The second retreat with Stilwell seemed the final one. It was not from the enemy but from an ally.

The decision to relieve General Stilwell has the most profound implications for China as well as American policy toward China and the Allied war effort in the Far East. It may mean that the United States has decided from now on to discount China's part in a counter-offensive.

Inside China it represents the political triumph of a moribund anti-democratic regime than is more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in driving the Japanese out of China. America is now committed to at least passively supporting a regime that has become increasingly unpopular and distrusted in China, that maintains three secret police services and concentration camps for political prisoners, that stifles free speech and resists democratic forces.

THE MAIN DIFFERENCE

The fundamental difference between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell has been that the latter has been eager to fight the Japanese in China without delay and the Generalissimo has hoped that he would not have to.

In no other way is it possible to understand the long series of obstructions and delays that have made it impossible for General Stilwell to fulfill his original mission of equipping and training the "unlimited manpower" resources of the Chinese Army.

The Generalissimo has one positive virtue for which America is now indebted: he has never made peace with the Japanese, although there have been times when his Ministers thought the future looked hopeless. But the technique of preserving his ticklish balance of political power in China keeps him a passive man.

Although he is the acknowledged leader of China, he has no record of personal military achievement and his basic ideas for political leadership are those of a war lord. He conceives of armies as political forces.

In an enormous, loosely strung country populated chiefly by ignorant peasantry he maintains his authority by preventing any group from becoming too powerful. A few well equipped armies under a command not entirely loyal to him personally might upset the military and political balance inside China and curtail his authority.

The Chinese Communists, whom the generalissimo started trying to liquidate in 1927, have good armies that are now fighting guerrilla warfare against the

Japanese in northeast China. The generalissimo regards these armies as the chief threat to his supremacy. For several years he has immobilized 300,000 to 500,000 (no one knows just how many) Central Government troops to blockade the Communists and keep them from expanding.

Distrusting the Communists, the generalissimo has made no sincere attempt to arrange at least a truce with them for the duration of the war. The generalissimo's regime, based on the support and subservience of General Ho, Dr. H. H. Kung, Minister of Finance, and Dr. Chen Li-fu, Minister of Education, has remained fundamentally unchanged over a long period and has become bureaucratic, inefficient, and corrupt.

Most of the armies are poorly fed and shockingly maltreated. In some parts of the country the peasants regard the armies as bandits and thieves. In Honan last Spring the peasants turned against the Chinese armies during the Japanese offensive in revenge for the ruthlessness with which the armies collected rice during the famine years.

Most of China's troubles now are the result of her having been at war with Japan for more than seven years and totally blockaded for two and one-half.

The reason nothing is done to alleviate the miseries is that the generalissimo is determined to maintain his group of aging reactionaries in power until the war is over, when, it is commonly believed, he will resume his war against the Chinese Communists without distraction.

Bewildered and alarmed by the rapidity with which China is now falling apart, he feels secure only with associates who obey him implicitly. His rages become more and more ungovernable and attack the symptoms rather than the causes of China's troubles.

ACQUIESCENCE IN REGIME

Since the negotiations with General Hurley began the generalissimo's attitude toward America has become more resentful and American criticisms of China is hotly rebuked. Relieving General Stilwell and appointing a successor has the effect of making us acquiesce in an unenlightened, cold-hearted autocratic political regime.

Into this stagnant, baleful atmosphere General Stilwell came in February 1942, animated by the single idea of fighting the Japanese immediately. Like most foreigners who know the Chinese people, he loved them, for they are the glory of China. From long experience Stilwell had great confidence in the capacities of the Chinese soldiers, who even then were fighting on nothing.

In November, 1941, the Magruder Military Mission had already made an agreement with the generalissimo to train and equip the Chinese Army on the theory that it would then become unnecessary to ship thousands of doughboys to fight on Chinese soil. The war in China was initially handicapped by the decision to fight Germany first and Japan second. General Stilwell was never able to get 1 per cent of the American Army for use in his C-B-I theatre and was never able to get all the equipment he has wanted, because it has always been needed elsewhere.

On March 3, 1942, less than a month after he had arrived in China, General Stilwell was plunged into the calamitous Burma campaign without notice. He had to return to Chungking to induce the generalissimo to come to the front to vest him with sufficient authority to command the troops.

Even then the command was never secure or efficient. There were other troubles. At a time when the troops needed transport, most of China's trucks were hauling civilian loot out of Burma up the road into China, where goods were worth huge sums of money.

When at last Stilwell got out of Burma into India he did persuade the generalissimo to let him feed, train and equip the Chinese soldiers who finally arrived. After training of a year and a half, those soldiers were the backbone of the Chinese divisions who got Myitkyina back last August and are now pushing toward Bhamo to free the Burma road. Inside China everything Stilwell has tried to do has been obstructed and delayed.

The generalissimo and his staff like the United States Air Force, which they get free and which asks for nothing except food and airfields, which we equip with buildings and installations. But the Chinese Government hedges and hesitates over anything involving the use of its armies. Foreigners can only conclude that the Chinese Government wants to save its armies to secure its political power after the war.

A nervous and driving field officer whose is impatient with administrative details and political tangles, General Stilwell is no diplomat. He goes straight

to the point in his dealings with anybody. He is plain and salty. He is personally incapable of assuming a reverential mood toward the generalissimo and he is impatient with incompetent meddling in military command. Although General Stilwell is anything but arrogant, the generalissimo complained that the American was trying to subjugate him.

But with the situation in China as it is, no diplomatic genius could have overcome the generalissimo's basic unwillingness to risk his armies in battle with the Japanese. Amid the intrigue and corruption of China's political and military administration, General Stilwell has been a lone man trying to follow orders, improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army, force open the Burma Road and get China back into the war.

Now he has been forced out of China by the political system that has been consistently blocking him and America is acquiescing in a system that is undemocratic in spirit as well as fact and is also unrepresentative of the Chinese people, who are good allies.

EXHIBIT No. 25

[From the New York Times, Friday, March 23, 1945]

CHINESE REDS SEEN HOPEFUL OF UNITY—U. S. POLITICAL AIDE BACK FROM AREA DECLARES COMMUNISTS HAVE POPULAR SUPPORT

WASHINGTON, March 22.—Raymond P. Ludden, foreign service officer attached to Lieut. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer's staff as political adviser, returning from an eight-month stay in the Communist territory in China, reported today that these Communists are fighting the Japanese, that they have popular support in their area, and that the people of the region all hope to obtain national unity in China.

Mr. Ludden was one of two State Department officials to accompany a United States Army observer section into the Communist areas last July to observe and report on conditions there. The mission was primarily military—to obtain military intelligence relating to such matters as order of battle, air fields, and numerical strength, as well as such correlated matters as weather reports and topography. They wore the Chinese Communist uniforms on the trip.

Traveling mostly by muleback and afoot, the party went over mountain trails and forest tracks, crossing and recrossing the Japanese lines, always accompanied by a strong escort of Chinese guerrillas. The mission went by plane from Chungking to Yenan and then by mule crossed the Yellow River into the Communist area that forms part of the region supposed to be occupied by the Japanese. The party traversed Shansi and spent a long period in Hopei, and from there various sections of the party made side trips, one pushing as far as Peiping. The return trip was more direct, but over more difficult country, and was made almost 70 percent of the way afoot.

MEMBERS OF ROUTE ARMY

Mr. Ludden said the officers and men who accompanied them all were of what the Chinese in the region call the Eighth Route Army, the chief binding link for the various separate administrative groups in the different sections where the Communist bands are active. He said the Chinese considered part of their forces as regulars and part as guerrillas, but that all were what we would call guerrillas, both for their way of life in fastness retreats and their raids and skirmishes with their enemies, the Japanese. One member of the party was killed during one of these skirmishes, and at another time the group was obliged to make a forced march of twenty-six hours without food or rest to escape being intercepted by the Japanese.

Mr. Ludden did not wish to comment on the political situation, but said they all hope for a unified China, and that he found a great admiration for the United States among the soldiers and the people that he encountered in this area.

He said the program supported by the peasants was not particularly Communist in character, but that it was indigenous to the peasantry of China. In its simplest terms the program preached by all these local leaders was in terms that everyone could understand:

"A full belly, a warm back, and nobody knocking them around."

In this period of continuous skirmishing he said the feeling is among these people that "the man who has no gun gets pushed around."

EXHIBIT No. 26

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.
NEW YORK-WASHINGTON, D. C.-CHICAGO-SAN FRANCISCO-HONOLULU

1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

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JUNE 11, 1945.

The Honorable JOSEPH C. GREW,

Department of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. GREW: My attention has been drawn to reports in the press alleging that Mr. John S. Service, recently arrested in connection with the release of unauthorized information, held a "press conference under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations" in our Washington office on his return from China. For your information, I would like to state that this report is completely inaccurate, as the Institute of Pacific Relations does not hold press conferences of this character. Mr. Service was one of some seventeen people who had been asked as guests of honor at small sherry parties given by the Washington office for the benefit of members of the American Council living in the Washington area. It is customary on these occasions to ask the guest to talk in as frank a manner as he feels free to about matters of interest to members of the organization, and most of those whom we have invited have complied.

In addition to Mr. Service, we have had such people as Sir Frederick Eggleston, Mr. George Yeh, Mrs. Pandit, Ambassador Paul Naggiar, Senator Carlos Garcia, the Honorable Walter Nash, Mr. Edmund Clubb, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, and others.

Since both you and Dr. Hornbeck have attended these meetings from time to time, I am sure that you, personally, realize that these press reports about Mr. Service's participation in the press conference were inaccurate, but I did want to set the record straight.

With cordial best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

(s) Raymond Dennett

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 27

In reply refer to CA.

JUNE 18, 1945.

Mr. RAYMOND DENNETT,

Secretary, American Council,

Institute of Pacific Relations,

1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. DENNETT: I have received your letter of June 11, 1945, in which you notify me that press reports alleging that Mr. John S. Service had held a press conference under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations in your Washington office are completely inaccurate.

I wish to thank you for your courtesy in bringing the foregoing information to my attention.

Sincerely yours,

(s) JOSEPH C. GREW,

Acting Secretary.

CA: EFDrumright: MS.

6-14-45.

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