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STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION
PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO

S. Res. 40

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERN-
MENT OPERATIONS TO EMPLOY TEMPORARY ADDI-
TIONAL PERSONNEL AND INCREASING THE
LIMIT OF EXPENDITURES

PART 5

MARCH 3, 1953

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations



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CONTENTS

	Page
Index.....	i
Testimony of—	
Ford, John W., Director, Office of Security, Department of State.....	389
Harris, Reed, Deputy Administrator, United States International Information Administration.....	331
Kimball, Arthur A., Assistant Administrator for Management, United States International Information Administration.....	387

SCHEDULE OF EXHIBITS

	Introduced on page	Appears on page
32. King Football, by Reed Harris.....	344	(*)
33. Memorandum from Reed Harris to Mr. Henry G. Alsberg, November 12, 1937.....	387	(*)

*May be found in the files of the subcommittee.

STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA

TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Resolution 40, agreed to January 30, 1953, at 10:30 a. m., in room 357 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Everett M. Dirksen, Republican, Illinois; John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.

Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel; Donald Surine, assistant counsel; David Schine, chief consultant; Herbert Hawkins, investigator; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Reed Harris, will you raise your right hand?

Mr. HARRIS. I will, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HARRIS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Your name is Reed Harris?

TESTIMONY OF REED HARRIS, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. HARRIS. It is.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us what your position is, Mr. Harris.

Mr. HARRIS. My position is Deputy Administrator of the International Information Administration of the Department of State.

The CHAIRMAN. And in the absence of Mr. Compton, you are Acting Administrator; is that correct?

Mr. HARRIS. I believe I am Acting Administrator until some hour today when Dr. Robert Johnson will become the Administrator.

The CHAIRMAN. And when Dr. Compton has been out of the country or away from the office, you have been the Acting Administrator. Is that right?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that you have a statement that you would like to read in defense of two individuals whom you had previously defended. You may read that statement if you care to.

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will read this statement.

Senator McCLELLAN. Are copies of it available?

Mr. HARRIS. I have a copy available for the stenographer, Mr. Chairman. I have not extra copies. I did send copies up last night. I don't know whether they are in the hands of the committee at this moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you send the copies last night?

Mr. HARRIS. Directly to you, sir. I don't know what room it was sent to. I believe 160.

Senator McCLELLAN. This will be a short statement?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes. This is not a long statement.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. HARRIS. Before proceeding with such questions as the committee may have, I would like to make a statement which, because it will correct an injustice occasioned by certain testimony before your committee last Saturday afternoon, is important both to the individuals concerned and to your committee.

At the public hearings in New York last Saturday, Mr. James F. Thompson of the International Broadcasting Service testified that proposed transfers to the Voice of America of Mr. Theodore Kaghan and Mr. Edmund Schechter of the Public Affairs staff of HICOG, Germany, were canceled because they failed to pass security. While under existing Presidential and departmental directives and regulations such matters are not supposed to be discussed, I have been specifically authorized by Mr. Jack Tate, the Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State that in view of Mr. Thompson's incorrect testimony it is only fair to point out that both Messrs. Kaghan and Schechter have been investigated, as required by Public Law 402, and have full clearance as to loyalty and security. The fact that these individuals did have a clean bill of health should be given publicity equal to that of Mr. Thompson's erroneous charges.

The CHAIRMAN. Your testimony is that Mr. Jack Tate authorized you to state today that both Kaghan and Schechter had been cleared. Is that correct?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Tate was Adrian Fisher's assistant, was he?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And appointed by Dean Acheson to that job?

Mr. HARRIS. I would assume so.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what Kaghan's real name is? Do you know that Kaghan is not going under his own name?

Mr. HARRIS. I have no such information, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not seen the file yourself?

Mr. HARRIS. I have never seen any security file on these individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether that file shows that Mr. Kaghan signed Communist Party nominating petitions?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I do not know. I have not seen the file. I could not testify in any way about the security file of these individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, this committee has been trying to find the key to all of the gross mismanagement, the unusual things, that have been going on in the Voice. I know the majority of the staff and a number of the Senators feel that this could not be merely the result of incompetence or stupidity; that the mismanagement has been deliberate; and we have been trying to get the key to that and find the individuals responsible. Of necessity, we must go into the past history of some of the men and try and bring their records down to date. We are going to go into your background a bit today. I want to make it clear that I don't think anyone in this committee thinks because a man may have made some serious mistakes 20 years ago he may not have fully reformed and may not be an outstanding American at this time. But we must start with the record and bring it down to date and find out whether there has been any change in heart.

Now, you attended Columbia University in the early thirties; is that correct?

Mr. HARRIS. I did, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you speak a little louder?

Mr. HARRIS. I did, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And were you expelled from Columbia?

Mr. HARRIS. I was suspended from classes on April 1, 1932. I was later reinstated, and I resigned from the university.

The CHAIRMAN. You resigned from the university. Did the Civil Liberties Union provide you with an attorney at that time?

Mr. HARRIS. I had many offers of attorneys, and one of those was from the American Civil Liberties Union; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did the Civil Liberties Union supply you with an attorney?

Mr. HARRIS. They did supply me with an attorney.

The CHAIRMAN. The answer is "Yes"?

Mr. HARRIS. The answer is "Yes."

The CHAIRMAN. You know that the American Civil Liberties Union has been listed as a front of the Communist Party?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, this was 1932.

The CHAIRMAN. I know this was 1932. Do you know that they since have been listed as a front doing the work of the Communist Party?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not know that they have been listed so. I have heard that mentioned, or read that mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, shortly after you were suspended, a Mr. Donald Henderson was removed as a professor at Columbia. Is that correct?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct. Mr. Donald Henderson, who had played a considerable part in protests that were made at the time I was suspended, was suspended from the college faculty, and I was told that a major reason for his being so disciplined was that he had supported me in a freedom of the press and democratic freedom fight.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. And did you know that Mr. Henderson was a Communist at that time?

Mr. HARRIS. I knew that he believed in some Marxist ideas, because I had heard him express them in classes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know he was a Communist?

Mr. HARRIS. I did not know that he had any connection with the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know he was a Communist?

Mr. HARRIS. No; I did not, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You wrote a book in 1932. Is that correct?

Mr. HARRIS. I wrote a book and a lot of us have written books 20 or 25 years ago which we are not proud of any more and which we wish we had not written. But I think you will find that almost anybody who has made statements in public, who has written, has some books of that kind or magazine articles of that kind going back several years that they are not particularly proud about. And as I testified in executive session—

The CHAIRMAN. At the time you wrote the book—pardon me. Go ahead.

Mr. HARRIS. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

At the time I wrote the book, the atmosphere in the universities of the United States was greatly affected by the great depression then in existence. The attitudes of students, the attitudes of the general public, were considerably different than they are at this moment. And for one thing, there certainly was no awareness to the degree that there is today, of the way the Communist Party works, the way the international Communists do their business.

The CHAIRMAN. What question are you answering now?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I am giving you background in connection with the book that you have referred to here.

The CHAIRMAN. When I ask for the background you can give it.

Mr. HARRIS. All right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Or you may interrupt if you want to give the background before that. The question was: Did you write a book? The answer was "Yes"?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, I wrote a book.

The CHAIRMAN. At the time you wrote the book, did you know Donald Henderson was a Communist?

Mr. HARRIS. I knew he was a Marxist and not an announced Socialist Party member. I therefore would have referred to him as a Communist with a lower case "c." But I had no knowledge that he had anything to do with the Communist Party. There is a difference there, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As I recall, the other day you told us you did not know he was a Communist until 5 days after he had left school. One of the Senators called your attention to the fact that you referred to him as a Communist in the book. You then said you were referring to him as a Communist with a small "c." You did not quite make clear to us the difference between a Communist with a large "C" and a Communist with a small "c." Is that still your testimony today, that you knew him as a Communist with a small "c" when he defended you, when you defended him, and it was only 5 years later that you found he was a Communist with a large "C." using your language? Is that your testimony today?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I did not know that this man had any connection whatsoever with the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. The other day you talked at great length about the difference between a Communist with a small "c" and one with a

large "C." I would like to have you try and explain that, too, because I, frankly, did not understand you the other day.

Mr. HARRIS. That is not surprising, in view of the situation today, when the word "Communist" has a very clear and understandable connotation. It simply means a Communist Party member, a person who follows the international Communist line, as dictated by Soviet Russia.

If you will refer to dictionaries, you will find that a Communist with a lower case "c" was any person who believed in Marxist philosophy in the broad sense, as the dictionaries were written in those days. I tried to make that distinction before the committee in the executive session, and I must admit that the testimony as I read it is not particularly clear.

The CHAIRMAN. No; it is not.

Mr. HARRIS. But I still insist on my answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you checked the book to find that actually you used "Communist" with a large "C" in the book?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I am sure you will remember that I mentioned specifically that it was a large "C" as far as the book was concerned, and that I had mentioned that to the proofreaders at my publishing house, that I did not have a large "C" in my manuscript.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you very actively defended the right of Henderson to teach at Columbia at that time?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, 2 weeks ago, Senator Taft took the position that I took 21 years ago, that Communists and Socialists should be allowed to teach in the schools. It so happens that nowadays I do not agree with Senator Taft as far as Communists teaching in the schools is concerned, because I think Communists are in effect a plainclothes auxiliary of the Red army, the Soviet Red army, and I don't want to see them in any of our schools teaching.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you claim you have changed your mind very substantially since 1933?

Mr. HARRIS. I declare that I have changed my mind. I am not merely claiming. I can prove it.

The CHAIRMAN. At the time that you defended Henderson, and he defended you, you now know that he was an active Communist?

Mr. HARRIS. I now have information published in the press about 5 years after I got out of Columbia that Henderson was top official of a union that was identified in the paper as a Communist union. That would appear to indicate that he was at least very, very close to the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that all of the Communist-front organizations came wholeheartedly to your defense at the time you were being expelled?

Mr. HARRIS. I rather object to the way you put that, Mr. Chairman, because there were thousands of people who came to my defense. I can show you clippings from papers as far as Shanghai, China, who supported me, all parts, right, left, and middle, and people of all classes and all walks of life. They saw this as a disciplining of a student editor, in connection with editorials that appeared in a student newspaper. They also knew that I was a chairman of a board of several editors, that some of the things that I was criticized for were

not necessarily my own. But they also believed in the basic American idea of a free press, as we all do here.

The CHAIRMAN. Now will you try and answer the question? Is it correct that all of the Communist-front organizations that you knew at that time came wholeheartedly to your defense? After you answer that, we will be glad to have you give us the names of any other organizations that defended you.

First I want to know whether it is true that the Communist-led organizations came to your defense at that time.

Mr. HARRIS. I do not know that, and I am not aware—I don't know of any Communist organizations, at that time; I just simply don't know them.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you could not recognize a Communist at that time?

Mr. HARRIS. I couldn't recognize an actual Communist Party controlled group. No; I could not.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, at that time you were associated with Mr. Henderson, Nathaniel Weyl. Is that right?

Mr. HARRIS. I had no association with Nathaniel Weyl beyond the fact that I appeared on the platform with him for approximately 3 minutes, in order to say, in Mr. Henderson's case, that I did not think he should be disciplined or removed from the faculty for the part he played in my situation at Columbia. That was a mistaken sense of loyalty, and that was the way that was made. I have never seen Mr. Henderson since. I am not anxious to see him, ever.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, this meeting that you appeared at, and defended Henderson, was also addressed by Mr. Nathaniel Weyl. Correct?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You have learned since then—you did not know it then—that Weyl was a member of the Communist Party at that time?

Mr. HARRIS. You so stated in the executive session held last Monday.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you learned it, aside from what we told you? Have you not read the newspaper accounts, interviews with Weyl, where Weyl tells about his activity in the Communist Party at the time he was at Columbia?

Mr. HARRIS. No, I don't think I have read that anywhere.

The CHAIRMAN. At any event, you say at that time you did not recognize any of these associates of yours as Communists?

Mr. HARRIS. Well, I certainly know that the most prominent of the speakers there was no Communist. He was Mr. Heywood Broun, who was a convert to the Catholic Church, who was a man who had nationwide reputation as a columnist and commentator and book reviewer. I considered him a very able writer. And it seemed to me very good to be on the platform with Heywood Broun. I did not know of any Communist connections of these other people on the platform, and I say that I spoke for 3 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that you know that Heywood Broun never was a Communist?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't say I know that. I don't have that kind of information. If I said, "never," I don't know what he may have gone

through at some time of his life. But certainly he was a prominent Socialist Party nominee. He had run for Congress at about that time. He was very well known for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I asked you whether you could recognize a Communist at that time, and you said one of the men who appeared on the platform certainly was not a Communist. You said Heywood Broun was that man.

Mr. HARRIS. I said that because he was clearly identified as a member of the Socialist Party, which is in no way a supporter of the Communist Party line.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we will get back to my question. Did you recognize any of the young men with whom you associated at that time as being Communists?

Mr. HARRIS. I recognized none of them as connected with the Soviet-dominated Communist Party. There were Marxists on the campus at that time, as there were on all campuses. Some of them identified themselves as Socialists with a capital "S." They belonged to the Socialist Party. The other Marxists, of varying shades, did not identify themselves as belonging to some specific organization. And you would have had to be a mindreader to know which people were necessarily members of the Communist Party or exact followers.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the Social Problems Club?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have not had an opportunity to check any records to see whether in the month or so after I was disciplined by Columbia I signed up temporarily with the Social Problems Club. It is possible that I did. But I am not aware of having been a member, and I certainly was not a member for any large portion of the year.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your testimony is you do not know whether you were or were not a member, but you were not a member for a large portion of the year?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you do not know at this time whether you were a member of that club?

Mr. HARRIS. No, I certainly don't. And I am quite sure that the people who are sitting at their receivers at home in the television audience, when they realize that you are asking me questions about things that happened 21 and 22 years ago, in college, which were perfectly proper and legal and common at the time, which had no significance of the kind that is now being put upon them by this committee—I say that I am sure that if they thought back and tried to remember every little thing they did, everything they said, every person they talked to, every organization and meeting they might have attended, I am sure they might have the same difficulty I have had. I think that should be made clear.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us make it perfectly clear, then, that the Social Problems Club has been identified by its members as completely Communist controlled. I think you should remember whether you were a member of a Communist-controlled club. You say it is perfectly proper to belong?

Mr. HARRIS. I said it was——

The CHAIRMAN. You have your right to decide whether it is proper to belong to a Communist-controlled club or not.

Mr. HARRIS. Today it would not be, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. My question is: Do you know whether you belonged to this Communist-controlled club?

Mr. HARRIS. I gave you a very straight and honest answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Your answer is that you do not remember?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not remember. I am aware that the Social Problems Club was the spearhead in the protests that were held, the protest meetings, and a 1-day strike, held at Columbia, when I was dismissed.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to read you a passage and see if you recognize it.

With his case as a point of departure, I made a further study of the situation at Columbia. My first discovery was that 2 young instructors, 1 a militant Socialist and the other a Communist, both graduates of Columbia, were slated for dismissal at the end of the year for being too radical. I further learned that appointments of instructors are made for 1 year only at Columbia, and that any man may be quietly dropped at the end of an academic year, without explanation—a system obviously designed to avoid unpleasant controversy over intolerance and regimentation of thought within an allegedly liberal university.

Do you recognize that writing as yours?

Mr. HARRIS. That sounds very much like that book I wrote in 3 weeks and have regretted ever since, Mr. Chairman. Yes, it does.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have an extra copy of the book?

Mr. HARRIS. I will not contest, if that is quoted from my book, I am not contesting it. That is certainly approximately what I said at that time, and as I said, I am sorry that I did say it. I took Senator Taft's position then. I don't agree with it now.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not recall Senator Taft ever having any of the background that you have, sir.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I consider that a most unfair innuendo.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, let us continue to read your own writings.

Mr. HARRIS. Twenty-one years ago, again.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but we will try to bring you down to date if we can. You have got to start some place, somewhere. Some place there is a starting point.

This is on page 151 of your book—

First, let me ask: Who was that Communist you were referring to?

Mr. HARRIS. Again I say that the word "Communist" should have a lower case "c" on it; that I was referring to Mr. Donald Henderson in that respect; that I had no way of knowing whether or not he had anything to do with the Communist Party. If I knew even half what I have learned in recent years about the Communist Party, I would have been far more suspicious. I would have had nothing to do with Donald Henderson. And you will note that I have had nothing to do with him since that meeting that you talk about, that protest meeting, over his dismissal.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your answer is that the Communist referred to in this passage of your book was Donald Henderson?

Mr. HARRIS. That was what I meant by that passage.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the same Donald Henderson, a head of a union which was expelled from the CIO because it was Communist controlled?

Mr. HARRIS. Several years later; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the Socialist, the "militant Socialist," you referred to?

Mr. HARRIS. I have tried to check back the records on that to see what that was, and I find difficulty in recalling. I think it was a son of Upton Sinclair.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know his name?

Mr. HARRIS. I am sorry. I do not remember his first name.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you go on to applaud the fact that the fuss raised about your expulsion resulted in this Communist and this Socialist having their contracts renewed. At that time, I gather you felt you had scored a considerable victory by continuing the contract of this Communist for a year. Or is that the correct analysis?

Mr. HARRIS. I considered at that time, as Senator Taft does now, that academic freedom should allow Communists and Socialists to be on faculties. I do not think so today. I have repeated that. I would not support that position in the case of a Communist at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Again, on page 147, in condemning the universities for denying academic freedom, freedom of expression of professors, you have this to say:

There is, for instance, a professor at Princeton with whom I am intimately acquainted. For 3 years this middle-aged savant has been a Communist in personal conviction. In his teaching, in which he must make frequent mention of things political, he dares not suggest that the fundamental basis of American Government may be utterly wrong. From his lectures, even from his magazine articles, one might guess that he was a fairly regular old-school Democrat. This veneer of respectability was adopted because, one day in the spring of 1931, he told a class of freshmen that he was watching the Russian experiment with interest and that he believed that the new form of government was ideal at least in theory. One freshman wrote home to mama. Mama wrote to Princeton. And 2 weeks after this particular lecture was delivered, the head of my friend's department called him in and suggested that he keep his thoughts on subjects political to himself unless he desired to discontinue teaching.

Now will you tell us who that professor was, and whether he is still teaching?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, if this were a simple fact-finding hearing, you would rely on the testimony I gave in executive session more than a week ago, a week ago Monday. But I will repeat the statement I made then.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt you there. I hardly think we can rely on it, when we got a letter this morning that you want to correct parts of that testimony. You will be given that privilege, but in view of the fact that you say you want to correct that testimony, we must reask you those questions under oath and find out what you want to correct. We told you and told all witnesses whom we heard in executive session that they would have the right to examine their testimony and if they found any typographical or stenographic errors they could correct them. Now, I gather from your letter that your correction is intended to go further than that. And I am inclined to think the committee will be extremely lenient and allow you to make such corrections as you want to, perhaps even in substance, but in view of the fact that you say you want to make corrections we must rely on what you have to say after you have thought it over.

Mr. HARRIS. If I had only my own neck to think about, Mr. Chairman, I would have devoted the last days——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

(Brief consultation among committee members.)

The CHAIRMAN. O. K., sir.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, if I had only my own neck in mind here, I would have devoted the last 8 days, every hour of them, to going back into such records as I could dig up, calling people up to find the exact dates and places of things going back 21 years ago or 17 years ago or 15 years ago. But you will realize, sir, that I have been holding down the top post in an organization of 8,000 people.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you a simple question: who the Communist at Princeton was. Do you know?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I will admit that I was talking about a broader issue at that point.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, who is the Communist friend? You say you were intimately acquainted with this Communist at Princeton. Then you go on to tell his difficulties. You relate them in detail. The question is: Do you know who that Communist was, or do you not?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, as I testified in executive session, I used what was called author's license. I had information on a Princeton professor that had been published in a publication. I can't remember where the clipping came from, probably from some compilation of academic freedom cases. And I suggested in the book that this was a close friend of mine and this was not true.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, when you say you had an intimate friend at Princeton who was a Communist, when you related his difficulties, you were not telling the truth, then?

Mr. HARRIS. I was not telling the truth in that respect in that book; no, I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, is it your testimony today that you did not intimately know a Communist professor at Princeton at that time?

Mr. HARRIS. That is my testimony today, as it was Monday, and will be hereafter at any time.

The CHAIRMAN. Now let me read you from another page of your book, page 140.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, could we perhaps save a little time of the committee and everything else if I summarized some of the things that that book says that are not good?

For instance, there is criticism of the American Legion in there. There is an implication that post commanders are not always the finest men in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall the passage?

Mr. HARRIS. I can't recall it at this minute, exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Could I recall the passage to you?

Mr. HARRIS. I am bitterly unhappy about having made that statement, because I now know many men who hold posts in the American Legion who are among the finest men in this country. I have two close friends right now who are commanders of American Legion posts. It was a mistake to characterize the whole American Legion by the few little clippings that had been given to me at that time or that I had picked up from researchers at that time. That was a mistake. It is part of the thing that I regret. It goes back 21 years, I repeat; 21 years ago.

I say that a man's mind can change a great deal in 21 years. I say that I have now been in the Government for a long time; that I have

been investigated by six investigative agencies; that I have been cleared right and left.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not true, sir. I have asked for your file, and in view of the fact that you said your file cleared you, I asked whether there was anything in the file which would indicate a clearance, and the answer has been "No." Mr. McLeod has taken over as security officer, and we hope that he will give us your file. So when you say you were cleared—

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I resent very much that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether you resent it or not, I am relating the facts. I must relate the facts as they are. I talked to the Department this morning, and I asked whether there was anything in your file which would indicate that you were cleared, and the information was, "No, there was not," and I have asked for your file. You, the other day, after a bit of questioning, rather reluctantly consented—

Mr. HARRIS. Not reluctantly at all, sir. That is absolutely false. There was not a bit of reluctance in it. I even offered to let you look at that file.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get down to the question again.

Mr. HARRIS. All right; but I think, when you are casting innuendoes and aspersions here without any support, it is not fair. I think you should let me tell what I have to say. I say that I was cleared by the Department of State—

The CHAIRMAN. Will counsel get the executive session testimony when we asked this witness whether his file should be reviewed? I think, in fairness to the witness, it should be read into the record. All the Senators were not there.

As soon as we find that, we will read it into the record.

I want to read another passage from your book, page 149. There you say that another member of the faculty—

is like my Princeton friend, in that he, too, has had definite warnings by his departmental head. His two strongest convictions are that America should now be under Fascist control and that marriages should be cast out of our civilization as antiquated and stupid religious phenomena. One day, in an informal talk with three sophomores, he stated and enlarged upon his two pet theories. Within a month he was notified that he must cease expression of his views or cease lecturing entirely.

Now, is it correct that at that time you felt a professor should be entitled to lecture sophomores to the effect that "marriages should be cast out of our civilization as antiquated and stupid religious phenomena." Was that your thought at that time?

Mr. HARRIS. It was my thought that anyone should be allowed to teach in a university who had not committed an actual crime and been convicted of the same. That is not my view now, as I have said several times. I think that teaching of a thing of that sort would be very unfortunate.

I might add that I have been happily married since 1931 to the same wife; that I do believe in the institution of marriage; that I have three fine children at home; that I think my conduct will stand examination by any impartial group; that if this particular proceeding were held in a court of law, where it were possible to question the questions, as it were, where the legal counsel could be on both sides of the table and not merely on the prosecution side, I could satisfy anybody in these United States that I am a loyal American citizen.

I resent the tone of this inquiry very much, Mr. Chairman. I resent it not only because it is my neck, my public neck, that you are, I think, very skillfully trying to wring, but I say it because there are thousands of able and loyal employees in the Federal Government of the United States who have been properly cleared according to the laws and the security practices of their agencies, as I was—unless the new regime says “No”—I was before. I am sure that any previous official would say so. I am sure that I have had two full field FBI investigations. Can Mr. Cohn say that? Has he had two full field investigations, been examined all the way back to his birth? I have. And I have by Military Intelligence, by Naval Intelligence, by the Office for Emergency Management, and by the Civil Service Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us get down to the Naval Intelligence investigation, since you brought it up. Is it correct that in 1942 Naval Intelligence investigated you when you applied for a commission, and that you were turned down after that investigation? That is correct; is it not?

Mr. HARRIS. I am saying that they investigated me thoroughly. I am saying that they did turn me down, they said, for physical reasons. If they turned me down for security, I don't know that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they tell you they turned you down for physical reasons?

Mr. HARRIS. They did. I have a letter to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. And would Security turn you down for physical reasons?

Mr. HARRIS. Of course, Security would not turn me down for physical reasons, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know now that you were turned down as a result of the security investigation?

Mr. HARRIS. You were certainly implying that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that is the truth?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask that the counsel at this time check with the man on my staff who was in the Navy at that time, conducted the investigation, and we will have him testify as to the reasons for the turndown, so that there can be no doubt in your mind. As I say, seeing you brought that up, we will make that clear.

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Chairman, is there a record that is available? I think that would be the best evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, Senator McClellan; I have asked the State Department for the entire file on this individual. A new man has taken over as security officer, an outstanding man, Mr. McLeod. I assume that he will give us that file. We do not have it at this time.

Senator McCLELLAN. My only point is that if there is a record, an official record, that is the best evidence, and I would rather have that, personally, than to have someone's comment about it. If it is available and it can be made available to us, I think that is the best evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. If the file is not available, we will call the man who made the investigation. We can let him testify. I did not intend to bring this up, except that the witness said he was cleared by Naval Intelligence.

Mr. HARRIS. I have not said I was cleared by Naval Intelligence. I said I was investigated very thoroughly. I certainly was cleared by the Civil Service Commission back as far as 1940. They read

every page of the book you are now quoting from. They read every page of the *Columbia Spectator* at the time I was there. They studied everything I had done up to 1940. They did it very thoroughly, and they had a file this thick [indicating] when they interviewed me, and they were satisfied as to my loyalty, and so I was cleared.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. HARRIS, we do not care who read what. This committee has found fantastic conditions in the *Voice of America*. Two of the Senators have publicly expressed themselves that the conditions found there could not have been the result of stupidity but must have been the result of design.

Mr. HARRIS. I am sure that is not true.

The CHAIRMAN. You say we are after your neck. Before you came before this committee, I had never seen you before. I have the duty, as chairman of this committee, to try to bring before the committee all of this material—

Mr. HARRIS. All of it, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. We will give you all the time in the world to talk. You will not be cut off. But, while I am speaking, I will have to insist that you remain quiet. Is that all right?

You wrote a book in 1932. I assume that expressed your feelings as of that date. You were editor of the *Spectator*. That is the *Columbia* newspaper. I assume what you wrote then expressed your feelings as of that time.

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if you still feel the way you felt then, you would be the most incompetent man conceivable for this job, and I am sure you would agree. If you have reformed, we are going to give you a chance to tell where along the line you changed your mind. You will have full opportunity to do that, even if we stay here all week.

I am going to ask you again. At the time you wrote this book, did you feel that professors should be given the right to teach sophomores that "marriages should be cast out of our civilization as antiquated and stupid religious phenomena"? Was that your feeling at that time?

Mr. HARRIS. My feeling was that professors should have the right to express their considered opinions on any subject, whatever they were, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me ask you this question again.

Mr. HARRIS. That includes that quotation; any considered opinion they had, they would have a right to express to their students. That was my view then.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. HARRIS, I do not think he is asking you whether you have got the right. I think he is asking you whether you agreed with what that professor said.

Mr. HARRIS. Well, I certainly do not. I never have, Senator. I never have.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not my question. My question was whether he felt then that it was an infringement upon academic freedom—that is what he is talking about through this book—to deny a professor the right to teach sophomores that "marriages should be

cast out of our civilization as antiquated and stupid religious phenomena."

I understand your answer to be that at that time you felt professors should have that right. Is that right?

Mr. HARRIS. They should have the right to teach anything that came to their minds as proper to teach.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to make you answer this—

Mr. HARRIS. My answer is "Yes," but you put an implication on it, and you feature this particular point in the book, which is quite out of context and does not give the proper impression of the book as a whole. The American public does not gain an honest impression of that book, bad as it is, from what you are quoting from it.

The CHAIRMAN. We will mark the book as an exhibit in its entirety. I intend to read other passages from it. I thought you would have a copy of this book along with you, to make sure we were not taking it out of context.

(The book referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 32," and will be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Harris, as I understand you, at the time you wrote the book and expressed these views, they were truly your views at the time. You actually believed that a professor had a right to teach what you quoted here in the book.

Mr. HARRIS. He had a right to teach anything, sir. Yes. That was what I had been taught.

Senator McCLELLAN. Not only what you quoted in the book, but he had a right to teach any theory of life or philosophy of life or government or anything else he thought he believed in?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. That was the position you took then?

Mr. HARRIS. That is right, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. Do you still hold that view?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. When did you change?

Mr. HARRIS. That was a molding process, as I learned more about life. I think it was clearly—

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. Can you give us any indication of at what time, at what period in your life, your views began to change on these subjects?

Mr. HARRIS. Recounting mental processes and trying to to probe those back in your mind is a very difficult thing to do.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, you have some general idea. You say you have changed. Now, it is 21 years later. What I am trying to determine: Was that change just recently, or immediately afterward?

Mr. HARRIS. It would certainly go back as far as 1935 or 1934. Something like that.

Senator McCLELLAN. All right. 1934 or 1935. Within 2 or 3 years after you wrote the book, your views changed on these subjects. Is that correct?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. And you entertain diametrically opposite views now?

Mr. HARRIS. On the matter of Communists on college faculties, I certainly have diametrically opposed views now. Yes, I do.

Senator McCLELLAN. Just one other question. Do you think this book that you wrote then did considerable harm, that is publication might have had adverse influence on the public, by expression of the views contained in it?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, if you saw a flicker of a smile even in this serious proceeding when you asked that question, I will tell you why.

Senator McCLELLAN. I am not trying to get a smile.

Mr. HARRIS. No. Forgive me.

Senator McCLELLAN. I am trying to be helpful. If you want to present your case, I want to hear it.

Mr. HARRIS. You are quite right, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. But I want to weigh it in the light of all of the testimony and all of the facts.

Mr. HARRIS. I appreciate your question. The only reason I mentioned the smile is simply that the sale of that book was so abysmally small, it was so unsuccessful, that the question of its influence—really, you can go back to the publisher. You can see it was one of the most unsuccessful books he ever put out. He is still sorry about it, just as I am.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, I think that is a compliment to American intelligence.

I want to ask you one other question. Have you since considered writing another book that might be a good seller to repudiate the ideology and the views that you expressed in the book that we are discussing?

Mr. HARRIS. I would be glad to write such a book if I had the opportunity, sir. I have been in the Federal service almost continuously since 1934, and there has been no opportunity to do much book writing in my jobs.

Senator McCLELLAN. I think there have been a great many books written by people in the Federal service.

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir; I know.

Senator McCLELLAN. I think you have overlooked an opportunity, possibly, to correct those mistakes.

Mr. HARRIS. If you can produce the publisher, sir, I will write the book, beginning tomorrow.

Senator McCLELLAN. I do not know whether anyone can produce a publisher or not for this kind of a book again.

Mr. HARRIS. No, not this kind of a book. That was written in 3 weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry. I would not take the responsibility of trying to get you a publisher.

Mr. HARRIS, let me read to you another passage from the book. I want to ask you if this was your honest feeling at that time, and if so, when you changed.

You were again talking about academic freedom in connection, of course, as you say, with your Communist friend at Princeton and your Communist friend at Columbia. You say this:

The colleges supported wholly by Protestant sects lead the way in creating the worst atmosphere of university fear in America. State colleges follow close behind. The Catholic institutions must be placed next. Last, but still intolerant, are the privately endowed colleges unattached to any religious organization.

The religious institutions can hardly be censured. Their intolerance is obvious in their very nature.

Is that the way you honestly felt at that time?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, that was a summary of statistics, in effect, simply, that showed at that time that these particular categories of universities seemed to discharge instructors or students for their beliefs, in that descending order of importance. That has nothing to do with my beliefs today. It was simply a summary of an existing situation then.

The CHAIRMAN. You said that they were inclined to discharge students because of their beliefs. Do you know of any Protestant or Catholic college or university which discharged anyone because of his beliefs, except for Communist activities?

Mr. HARRIS. Oh, certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. When you talk about beliefs, you are speaking about the type of Communist activities for which Henderson was discharged, are you not?

Mr. HARRIS. I am not talking about Communist activity at all. I am talking about expressions of strong beliefs in all sorts of directions, beliefs that were not popular with the particular faculty or administration.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of a single student who was expelled for his beliefs during that period of time?

Mr. HARRIS. As I said, I haven't had time to do a lot of research, but I could produce a lot of cases, sir. I remember the editor of the Daily Tarheel of the University of North Carolina was disciplined in that. For something that had nothing to do with communism or any other kind of "ism." And there have been others. As a matter of fact, I was not disciplined for communism. I hope that that is clear.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us see what you were disciplined for.

Let me read one of the editorials, which you wrote, as editor of the Spectator—

Mr. HARRIS. Wouldn't it be more—

The CHAIRMAN. One that apparently served as a basis for your expulsion. Let me read it to you.

The Stars and Stripes represent those things which every American holds dear, those things which his blood has been spilled to consecrate, namely, the American Legion, the Ku Klux Klan, Gastonia, Harlan County, and the Daughters and the Sons of the American Revolution. * * *

Mr. HARRIS. Twenty-one years ago that editorial was written by a member of my editorial board, and not by me.

The CHAIRMAN. Who wrote it?

Mr. HARRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, if it is permissible, I would prefer not to bring additional names into this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not permissible. You must answer every question. You must answer, or refuse to answer on the grounds that it would incriminate you.

Mr. HARRIS. I believe a Mr. D. D. Ross wrote it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. D. D. Ross. And where is Mr. Ross today?

Mr. HARRIS. I think he is a reporter at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether he is connected with the Government in any manner?

Mr. HARRIS. No, he is not connected with the Government in any manner, unless he has joined in a recent week.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you brought up the matter of the Legion in this editorial, and also in the book, and you raised the question yourself. I quote from page 122. This is not a direct quote, I may say, from you. You are quoting another student.

I remember (him) as a sadistic butcher—

Is that a direct quote? Counsel tells me this is a direct quote from you. I thought you were quoting another student at the time. Let us check it.

Mr. HARRIS. That is a fictional section of the book, I might point out, a sort of passage from a short-story section.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you were quoting someone else at this time. I know that the entire paragraph is within quotes. But, at any event, let me quote it to you.

I remember (him) as a sadistic butcher who is now probably the commander of some American Legion post.

Did you honestly feel that way at that time?

Mr. HARRIS. That was not my view, but it was reflected in certain press articles, unfair press articles, which were being run at that time, about the American Legion and its part in stopping various demonstrations of what appeared to be legitimate unemployed people and things of that sort. Nowadays we would know that most of those demonstrations were led by the Communist Party, but people did not recognize that then. They did not see the pattern.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say that some people did, apparently. Your testimony is that you did not recognize those demonstrations that you now say were Communist-led demonstrations as such, but the Legion did.

Now, I would like to know when you arrived at a point where you could recognize Communists, where you could recognize Communist groups. Being the top man in the Voice as of today, it is rather important that you be able to recognize Communists and Communist organizations.

Mr. HARRIS. I began to be able to recognize their thoroughly dirty methods, their idea that the ends—the means, whatever they are, however dirty, however criminal—that the end justifies these means. I began to discover that just about the time that I was pushed out of Columbia, because I began to see these people who apparently were in some manner affiliated with Communist groups, completely distorting the truth in all sorts of situations, lying about things that I knew about personally. And when I see people consistently lying in a political situation, I am highly suspicious of them. That is when the education started. That experience at Columbia was one of the greatest educational experiences one could have. I think I learned more in about 3 weeks of that thing than I learned in the other 3½ years at Columbia about the political realities.

The CHAIRMAN. You wrote the book after you had learned about those political realities, did you not?

Mr. HARRIS. I said after I had begun to learn. I can't say that I knew it all then, but I learned—

The CHAIRMAN. You said that 3 weeks at Columbia was the best education you had, that you learned a lot about political realities. It was after that that you wrote this book?

Mr. HARRIS. Quite right. But I hadn't learned all the tricks of the Communist Party at that time. It would take a long time to learn those things.

The CHAIRMAN. By 1942 would you say that you could recognize a Communist?

Mr. HARRIS. I should think I could recognize anybody who is following a clear-cut Communist line. I don't say that you can go down a street and look at a man and say he is a Communist, of course. I know that nobody can in this room or any other.

The CHAIRMAN. I am referring to those men who are active in Communist work. We will take Don Henderson. By 1942, would you say you recognized him as an active member of the Communist conspiracy?

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly recognized that he had been identified as such. I had not observed him personally from the time that I left Columbia in that protest meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. You said you never saw him from the time you left Columbia up to the present date?

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly never remember seeing his face anywhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us why in 1942, if you had not seen him for some 10 or 11 years—we will strike that.

Mr. HARRIS. The implications of a thing of that sort left hanging in the air are that I had something to do with Donald Henderson in 1942.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, if you want us to bring out Henderson's testimony, we will. I do not think, in fairness to you, we should. Henderson testified before this committee, and if you think it is fair to recite what he testified, I will. Do you think you should be present when he testifies?

Mr. HARRIS. Certainly I think I should be present when he testifies. If I am given a clear-cut opportunity, under these conditions, to be where Donald Henderson is when he makes his testimony, I should prefer that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Good.

Let us go back to this book for one minute. On page 253, you say:

Mediocrity has been the apparent goal of education, although such a situation ought never to have prevailed. Change the system, and thereby bring about progress toward new intellectual heights.

Then you give your formula. You tell how you think the system should be changed.

I am curious to know, No. 1, whether you honestly felt that way then, and when you changed your mind.

You say this, on page 249. You say: "It is my plan"—in other words, this is a Harris plan. You say:

The existing private institutions would be converted into public organizations and would be added to the present system of public educational facilities. This could be done, although with some difficulty, by the usual methods in use in our Government today, by negotiations, or by condemnation proceedings.

In other words, as I read this, you say:

Let us have no educational institutions run by any religious organizations, by any private individuals. And you say:

If they will not consent to have them converted to public institutions, then we will start condemnation proceedings.

That is the Harris plan of that time to improve education. You say if we change the system we can bring about "progress toward new intellectual heights."

Did you honestly feel that way at that time, and if so, have you changed your mind? And if so, if you changed, when did you change?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I was rather bitter at a large private institution of learning at that time. I think that any statements I made in that book, written in great haste, after that event, were affected considerably by my emotional feeling about private educational institutions. And I did believe at that time that it would be a good idea for all colleges to be open to the general public, just as our public schools are, so that the broadest possible education could come to the broadest possible number of people; that I think that would lead to progress in education. I would doubt it very much, having studied the situation more in recent years.

The CHAIRMAN. My question is: At that time, did you think—

Mr. HARRIS. I said "Yes, sir," in other words perhaps.

The CHAIRMAN. This was submitted as the Harris plan, so I assume you gave it considerable thought.

Mr. HARRIS. I wrote that book in 3 weeks, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, At that time, did you feel that the Government should condemn and forcibly take over all colleges and schools that were not public schools and colleges?

Mr. HARRIS. No; only I thought that there should be a law passed that they should become a part of the public educational system, and that if the thing was not done quickly and simply by normal negotiation it would require condemnation. Twenty-one years ago, in a book written in 3 weeks, in an emotional state, after having been pushed around by a very large educational institution, I said those things. I don't believe them now. I regret having said them. And I find it hard to see that they have a great bearing on my proven conduct over the last several years when I have been a Federal employee.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, we intend to get into your proven conduct over the past several years, also, you understand. Now, you have been in a position where you could have done a tremendous job with the Voice of America. You had unlimited funds. You were the Acting Director when Mr. Compton was away. We will want to go into in some detail what you have done and what you have failed to do. But the only way we can get a complete picture, we are trying to find the key to this fantastic picture in the Voice. You may not be the key. We do not know. But we must examine your background. And certainly you start out with an unusual record.

Now, when do you say that you became anti-Communist? Or do you say you always were anti-Communist?

Mr. HARRIS. I have always been opposed to the Communist Party, to the Soviet-controlled mechanisms, the way they have worked.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you always been anti-Communist? Let us forget about this Soviet mechanism.

Mr. HARRIS. Not as long as that word is defined as it was in those days. I have not rechecked the dictionary recently, but that referred to collectivist philosophy, even as applied in convents and monasteries, and so on. I was not opposed to communism at that time, the broad theory; no.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not talking about communism in monasteries and convents.

Mr. HARRIS. I know that, Mr. Chairman, but I have to keep the thing in context.

The CHAIRMAN. We want to know what you understand communism to be.

Mr. HARRIS. Right today, you mean?

The CHAIRMAN. Have you always been opposed to communism?

Mr. HARRIS. The word as it is said today, I certainly have been opposed to; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you always been opposed to Marxism? If not, when did you become opposed?

Mr. HARRIS. I was not, in that college year. No; I wasn't, and probably not for a year after.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not opposed to Marxism in those days.

Mr. HARRIS. Not to the broad principles of Marxism; no.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you say the broad principles of Marxism are different from the broad principles of communism?

Mr. HARRIS. I am saying that Marxism was a very broad theoretical concept; that the practicalities of the communism of today are the international Soviet Communist line.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to get your thought. You say you are opposed to communism as it is known today. As I understand Karl Marx and Lenin were the fathers of communism. To a great extent, their books are the bible of the present day Communists. Now, you indicate that you were at some time in favor of the teachings of Karl Marx, whom many of us consider the No. 1 Communist. But you say you were against communism as known today. Do you still believe in the teachings of Karl Marx?

Mr. HARRIS. I never did believe in all the teachings of Karl Marx. You asked me if I were opposed to all the teachings of Karl Marx at the time I was in college, and I said I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you if you were opposed to communism.

Mr. HARRIS. I have been opposed to the Communist Party and what it does, from the very first minute.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, have you changed your thoughts about the teachings of Karl Marx since you were writing at Columbia?

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly have.

The CHAIRMAN. And which of his teachings did you believe in then that you do not believe in now?

Mr. HARRIS. I believe in none of his teachings now.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. All right. Which of his teachings did you believe in then?

Mr. HARRIS. I believed that a civilization that gives each person what he needs, and takes from him according to his ability would be a very fine Christian society. I did not recognize what the practicalities

of such a situation were. That has nothing to do with the Soviet communism of today. There is no more relation to it than the man in the moon.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, I hold in my hand a document entitled "Alumni Home-Coming Dinner," dated Sunday, March 21—what year is this, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. COHN. 1937.

The CHAIRMAN. 1937. That is 5 years after you wrote this book. The alumni referred to are apparently the alumni of the American Student Union. You are aware of the fact that the American Student Union has been named by the House Committee as a tool of the Communist Party; in other words, a front for and doing the work of the Communist Party; that the function of this American Student Union was to take over and subvert the minds of the youth in college. You are aware of that, are you not?

Mr. HARRIS. In recent years, I understand that it has been so identified. I doubt very much whether it was so identified at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you aware of the fact that this is one of the organizations that has been identified as having been Communist controlled from the beginning?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not know that.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know that?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, in view of the fact that you were listed as a sponsor, in view of the fact that you were questioned about that, do you not think it might be well for you to check into the background of that organization now, if you did not know then?

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly think I should check into the background. And I will report what was said in the executive session, that I do not recollect having any part in a dinner or anything else for the American Student Union.

I will return to the fact that I stated earlier, that a man does a great many things over a period of years, and does not remember everything. I think that the members of the TV audience, if they were requested right now to tell what they did 15 years ago—Perhaps somebody came around and said, "Would you give us \$3 or \$5 to have a little dinner of some students who want to get together and help the cause of youth?" You might easily have given that money, and thereafter your name may have been listed somewhere.

I am not aware of having participated in any way in this thing, but you have held up a document which presumably is authentic. I deny ever having supported in any major sense the American Student Union.

Senator MUNDT. Did you attend that alumni dinner?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't think it would have been possible that I could have attended a dinner and not remember it, Senator. I don't think my memory is that poor. But I might have given some money or something of that sort for it and not remembered it.

Senator MUNDT. You did not answer the question. Did you attend that alumni dinner?

Mr. HARRIS. I say to the best of my recollection, I didn't.

Senator MUNDT. To the best of your recollection, your testimony is, you did not attend?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct, Senator, absolutely. I would be very glad to have that checked back as far as you wish.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why they used your name not merely as a member but as a sponsor?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, if they came around and collected some money, whether it was \$3 or \$5 or something of that sort, those people made a great specialty of coming around and giving you a sort of a garbled version of what they were going to do, and then they collected money and called you a sponsor.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you ever on the editorial staff of any publication known as a Communist-controlled publication?

Mr. HARRIS. I was never on the editorial staff, I was never on the regular editorial staff, of any publication of that kind. I know what you are talking about. I am perfectly willing to testify at full length. A single issue of a magazine called Direction was in effect brought out, at the suggestion of the Director of the Federal Writers Project of WPA to publish the creative writings of a number of people on the WPA Writers Project; a single issue, in no way connected with their regular series, and not edited by their regular board.

The director of the project, who made these arrangements, as a courtesy to a number of his associates in the office of the Federal Writers Project, an official project of the Government of the United States in Washington, did list a group of the top executives of the Federal Writers Project, the American Guide Project, in the front of that single issue of that magazine. And I was so listed. It was an honorary editorial board, not an actual editorial board, and it had no connection with the regular management of this magazine. And I am sure that can be established 15 ways.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there no question in your mind but what that was a Communist-controlled magazine?

Mr. HARRIS. I had no knowledge of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that now?

Mr. HARRIS. No; I don't know it now. I heard it so identified at the executive session on last Monday.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, did you know the editor right well?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't think I have ever known the editor. Who is listed as editor?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the man who put you on the editorial board or listed you on the editorial board?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Henry Alsberg, the director of the project, listed me as a member of the honorary editorial board for this single special issue. He was not the editor of that publication.

The CHAIRMAN. Was Alsberg a good friend of yours?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Alsberg was a very kind and good——

The CHAIRMAN. Was he a good friend of yours?

Mr. HARRIS. I would consider him not a very good friend, but he was a friendly person. He was very kind to all of his associates. We worked together in the same office. I was not a good friend in the social sense.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you consider him a Communist?

Mr. HARRIS. No; I certainly did not consider him a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you consider him the type of communist with a small "c" that you said you thought Henderson was at the time you first met him?

Mr. HARRIS. I did not consider him a Communist in any sense of the term.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, is it correct that Alsberg resigned while under a loyalty investigation?

Mr. COHN. Yes; while he was at OWI, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. No, how about Jerre Mangione? He was also listed on the editorial board with you?

Mr. HARRIS. He was one of the editors, too. This is a semiofficial duty. We were listed on that board together. He was an employee of the American Guide Series like myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know he was a Communist at the time?

Mr. HARRIS. I had no such information.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you learned since then that he belonged to the John Reed club?

Mr. HARRIS. I had not known it until the executive session last Monday, when you so stated, or I believe the counsel so stated; I don't remember which one.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you testified that you did not belong to the John Reed club yourself.

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly did.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you certainly did testify?

Mr. HARRIS. I testified that I was never a member of that club. I don't know where the club is or what it was.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not know now that it is a Communist Party club?

Mr. HARRIS. I have heard a John Reed club identified. I don't know where or what. There may be several of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, I think you wanted to read to the witness some of his editorials from the Spectator. If you have any questions along that line, you may proceed.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt only this much—

The CHAIRMAN. You may interrupt at any time you care to and make any statement you care to, sir.

Mr. HARRIS. I think that is a very generous offer.

During the time you started this particular set of question, you made a statement that you were trying to get at the bottom of the troubles in the Voice of America, which I consider have been exceedingly exaggerated by witnesses here. But during that statement, you said that we, the command of this International Information Administration, had had unlimited funds at our disposal.

I should like to point out that we have had the most serious cuts in the amounts that we have requested to carry on the work; that we have had to make adjustments constantly to stay within what to us has seemed to be a very small budget for a large cold-war effort.

And may I add, too, sir, that much of this testimony which seems to indicate a mismanagement or inefficiency in the operation of the Voice can be refuted if the expert witnesses we have requested to be called are brought before this group. And may I give you one specific and very important example?

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt you there? Any witness that you feel should be called—within limits, of course; we cannot call hundreds of witnesses—any of the important witnesses that you think should be called, in order to give us a complete, accurate picture of

the workings of the Voice, will be called. I am going to ask you to do this, however. Some witnesses have been wiring the staffs of other Senators. I am not clairvoyant. Unless I receive word from you or from someone else that you want certain witnesses called, I cannot look into your mind, you see, and determine which should be called.

Mr. HARRIS. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You can make a list. You can change that list from time to time. We want to get to the bottom of this. I personally think that the situation is fantastic beyond words. I cannot conceive of the things that have been going on in the Voice and going on in American institutions. I would be very happy if the testimony taken so far is proved to be wrong, and this has been well run. So we will call any witnesses you want to submit.

Mr. HARRIS. May I state that the list of witnesses I am talking about was submitted to this committee by Dr. Compton approximately 2 weeks ago.

The CHAIRMAN. We have called about five or six of those witnesses up to this time. The others will be called in due course.

How many of the witnesses submitted by Compton have been called? Do you know, Counsel?

Mr. COHN. Dr. Compton, General Stoner, Bradley Connors, Mr. Carrigan—I would say four or five, Mr. Chairman. We have communicated with some others, who have stated they do not desire to be heard.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, some of those suggested by Compton say they do not want to be heard?

Mr. COHN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think the test is whether they want to be heard or not. If Compton wants to have some reluctant witnesses called, if he thinks they have important testimony, I think they should be called, if we find they have some information.

Mr. COHN. Well, I have reference to those who felt they had no information whatever to contribute that would be at variance with information already furnished. Then, in the case of the bulk of the witnesses, they were members of this advisory board which was cited as having approved the directive authorizing the use of Howard Fast's works, in the International Information Program, and you sent telegrams to each one of them, Mr. Chairman, and received telegrams and letters in reply expressing the position of each one of those, which are being assembled, for the purpose of having them entered in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, we have either contacted by telephone or by wire everyone suggested by Dr. Compton?

Mr. COHN. I would say seven-eighths of the people, anyway, up to this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you forgive me? I had not completed this small statement I wish to make.

There is one very important fact, I think, should get on the record before the television audience and everyone else. That is, early during these hearings, headlines came out which seemed to be based on testimony here which said that we had wasted \$31 million on a transmitter construction program. We went back, and we checked our

expenditure records, and we found that the absolute total spent on this transmitter construction program that was being described was \$27 million.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt you there, Doctor—I mean, Mr. Harris. I notice that Dr. Compton made substantially the same statement in a national magazine a short time ago. In arriving at the figure of \$31 million, as I recall, the witnesses took into account the amount that was to have been expended on Baker East and Baker West. You may recall that the testimony was that the Voice, instead of going to the Bureau of Standards, where they could have gotten expert information free, hired the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to make a study as to where the Baker East and Baker West should be located. Those were the two key transmitters.

Our staff tells me that without exception all the competent engineers now apparently agree that it is a tremendous mistake to put Baker East where it is located, and Baker West also, for the reason that they are located within the magnetic storm area, or the Auroral Absorption Belt. The testimony has been that while the cost for building Baker West would be about \$11 million up in the Seattle area, if it were located out of that magnetic storm area and built farther south, it would be about a million and a half, meaning a saving of \$9,500,000. The testimony has been that likewise, insofar as Baker East is concerned, if, instead of building it in a North Carolina swamp, it were built south, out of the magnetic storm area, there would be a saving there of about \$9 million. That is \$18 million. Now, I know you can go over your books, and you will find that \$18 million has not been spent, because the new Secretary of State took speedy, intelligent action when this was exposed, and called for a halt on the construction of these two programs.

I may say in that connection, in view of the fact that you are discussing the money situation, that we asked the Bureau of Standards for the same kind of report which you could have gotten from them 2 years ago, which was never gotten from them. The sworn testimony is that you never asked for a report from the Bureau of Standards. Here is their report:

To deliver a satisfactory signal on at least 90 percent of the days at a given time of the day, a transmitter located at Seattle would require 50 times the power of a transmitter at San Francisco or San Diego. San Francisco and San Diego do not possess any appreciable advantage with respect to each other.

In other words, the Bureau of Standards said that in addition to the original cost, the original saving of around \$9 million or \$9½ million on that Baker West project, there would also be a tremendous saving in power, because it would take 50 times as much power.

Now, I may say this is not the testimony of any member of this committee, not the testimony of any disgruntled Federal employee. This is the top man of the Bureau of Standards who made this study; and the Bureau of Standards is apparently recognized as the best qualified organization to make that study.

Now you may proceed.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, the MIT group—

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? I am not sure if I have told the committee that Mr. Jack Leahy has been designated by the State Department to sit in on all the hearings. He is with us today. I have

told him that if the Senators have no objection he will have the right to examine any witness at any time he cares to, and, if the Senators have no objection, I have accorded him the right to sit in on any executive sessions. I have asked the staff to keep Mr. Leahy fully informed as to the progress of any investigation or any proposed investigation, so that the State Department, our new team in the State Department, for whom I have tremendous respect—I think they are doing an excellent job—will be fully informed at all times.

We want to welcome you here, Mr. Leahy.

Mr. LEAHY. Thank you. I might say I am here as an observer for the State Department. I do not want it understood that I am acting as counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. We understand that you have no control over the committee. That should be clear. We do not get your consent before we do anything. We merely have you here so that you can know what is going on. And you are in no way placing your stamp of approval or disapproval upon what we do. You are merely here to keep the State Department, the new team in the State Department, fully informed as to what the committee is doing, what witnesses will be called, and you are not responsible for any mistakes that the chairman or any member of the committee may make.

Mr. LEAHY. May I say, Mr. Chairman, that I appreciate the opportunity and the friendly spirit of cooperation that has been shown, but I want it understood that I am not acting as counsel for any witness who appears here.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

You were in the middle of a statement, I believe.

Mr. HARRIS. I wish to make the statement that the MIT group to which you refer had on it a prominent member of the Bureau of Standards; that he did draw, according to the best information we have, upon all of the facilities of the Bureau of Standards when he made his recommendations.

I say also that we have expert witnesses who apparently don't agree with your staff's contention that all the best engineers say that those are bad locations.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us the names of those witnesses, so that we may call them?

Mr. HARRIS. We have given those to you, sir. One is Colonel Andrews, who was in charge of the Alaska network for the Army, Army Signal Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Andrews?

Mr. HARRIS. Colonel Andrews.

The CHAIRMAN. You would like to have him called, would you?

Mr. HARRIS. We would, and have requested it. Two weeks ago we requested it.

The CHAIRMAN. Give us the names of the others.

Mr. HARRIS. Another man would be Mr. Carr of the engineering firm of Weldon & Carr.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your understanding that they will testify that it would be better to locate Baker East and Baker West within the magnetic storm area? Is that your understanding? I have not found a single engineer, and I have talked with many of them, who have even remotely suggested that. They all say it is a tremendous mistake, an

obvious mistake, to locate the two key transmitters right in this magnetic storm area. Now, is it your understanding that both Andrews and Carr will testify that they should be located there? If so, we want to get them down here immediately.

Mr. HARRIS. I think that Mr. Weldon—that Mr. Carr and Colonel Andrews will certainly so testify with respect to the Baker East site. I do not know whether they would both so testify with regard to the Baker West site. Naturally, I can't predict the testimony of an expert.

The CHAIRMAN. For your benefit, then, maybe we can help you predict it.

I beg your pardon. Did you mention Mr. Weldon?

Mr. HARRIS. I intended to mention only Mr. Carr at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want Mr. Weldon down? Your office suggested we call Weldon.

Mr. HARRIS. If we so suggested, I think he should come. He is a highly competent engineer.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I have a memorandum from General Stoner to Dr. Compton referring to Baker West. In this memorandum, which either has been or will be made a part of the record today, he says that Weldon, who has been suggested by Compton as a witness, Mr. Weldon, the designer and builder of the megawatt transmitter, "has recommended moving to the southern site in order to obtain maximum efficiency."

May I ask whether you are aware of this memorandum? Let me read some pertinent sections to you. I assume, as Acting Director, this has been called to your attention:

If the decision is to move to California, we must be prepared to explain fully to Congress and to the press our reasons for doing so. Such exposure may result in congressional investigations and would not be conducive to our obtaining additional construction funds in the near future. If we remain at Seattle, and install our megawatt at that point, we also must be prepared to be continuously under surveillance concerning our output efficiency.

Then he goes on to say: "I recommend that we stay at Seattle."

At that time, a very small amount of money had been spent; since then, hundreds of thousands. My question is: Were you aware of that memorandum?

Mr. HARRIS. I was not aware of it until about 2 weeks ago, when it was brought up in connection with these hearings. That was a direct communication from General Stoner to Dr. Compton. He is a special consultant to the Administrator.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you think this is a valid reason for refusing to change to a more desirable site? He says: "If we change, we will have to explain to the press. We will have to explain to Congress. We might be investigated by Congress. We might not get funds." He says, "If we stay where we are we will have difficulty from now on, because of the output efficiency." He says for these political reasons, in effect, "I think we should not move." Do you think that indicates good business management, or not, and as Acting Director, do you approve of that?

Mr. HARRIS. That was only the recommendation of a consultant to the Administrator.

The CHAIRMAN. The recommendation was followed, incidentally.

Mr. HARRIS. The recommendation was followed. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, would you agree that that was an unjustified waste of money?

Mr. HARRIS. I would not agree that the location of Baker West in Washington was a waste of the taxpayers' money, and I think that Colonel Andrews, who has operated stations from that part of the world very effectively across the Pacific, in spite of the auroral absorption zone, can indicate that the experience is remarkably good.

The CHAIRMAN. You disagree, then, with the Bureau of Standards report?

Mr. HARRIS. I am not a technician. I can't agree or disagree with those reports. I am merely stating that I have as yet to see sufficient clear-cut evidence that that site should be abandoned. Right now, the Defense Department has informally asked us whether we are going to abandon, so that they could pick it up. There must be some value in that site, or they wouldn't be talking that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you disagree with the suspension of Baker East and Baker West?

Mr. HARRIS. I think the suspension of Baker East was particularly unfortunate and will cost the Government more money than if it had been allowed to proceed. Because I think that after sober reflection and careful judgment and an examination of all the engineering reports, Baker East will probably be constructed where planned. I do not know about Baker West. There is more difference of opinion there.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the suspension of Baker West was wise, or unwise?

Mr. HARRIS. I think it was a wise thing to do under the circumstances then existing, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, the same circumstances existed a year ago. Since then, you have spent several hundreds of thousands of dollars. If it was wise to suspend it when this committee started to take a look-see, would it not have been wise at the time General Stoner said to Dr. Compton, "It may be the thing to do, except that Congress may hear about it"?

Mr. HARRIS. I didn't know that General Stoner made that sort of a statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let us see. We do not want to misquote General Stoner.

Mr. HARRIS. I think he said if we did move we would have to explain it to the Congress, meaning particularly the House Appropriations Committee, which objects very much to these changes in plans, naturally enough.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, you say it is wise to suspend it now. At that time you had all the information you have now.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I do not feel we had all the information we have now. We have obtained some.

The CHAIRMAN. It was available by calling the Bureau of Standards and asking for it, was it not?

Mr. HARRIS. The MIT people had the same access.

The CHAIRMAN. Who decided to pay MIT \$600,000 for information which you could have gotten from the Bureau of Standards free?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is a completely false implication. The CHAIRMAN. Who decided, then, to make this contract, which cost about \$600,000? Put it that way. This contract with MIT.

Mr. HARRIS. I think that the decision was a joint one of Mr. James Webb, the Under Secretary of State, and Mr. Edward Barrett, the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have anything to do with it?

Mr. HARRIS. I had practically nothing to do with it. I had no control, no part, in the process of developing or passing on that contract. And I might point out, sir, that that so-called Troy Project handled a great many items that are not in any way related to the location of transmitters. It went into electronics. It went into various methods that must be kept off the record and are highly classified, for carrying on the whole psychological warfare program. They did a great deal of work and covered a great deal of ground. And the implication that they only did what you say we could have had done for nothing by the Bureau of Standards is simply not correct, Mr Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, as the Acting Director of the International Information Program, do you know how much was paid to MIT?

Mr. HARRIS. I would have to look that up. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. For this study? Do you have any idea?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't at this moment know what payments were made.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in view of the fact that it runs into hundreds of thousands, do you not think you normally should know that? If you are the head of a plant run by private industry—

Mr. HARRIS. I was not head of the plant at that time, Mr. Chairman, when those expenditures were made. And, furthermore, there are a great many payments made under contracts that one cannot become familiar with, as to each one made. It is just not a possibility for any manager.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in any event, is it correct to state that the Bureau of Standards was qualified to do this work, that the Bureau of Standards would not have charged you for doing the work?

Mr. HARRIS. I suppose, if they had been willing to do it, they would not have charged. But I do not know that they were willing to do it. There may have been a request made, and they may not have been willing to. I don't know that.

The CHAIRMAN. The chief engineer has testified under oath that they never had been requested to do it; that if they had been requested they would have been willing and able to do the work.

Mr. HARRIS. They were certainly requested through the Troy-Project people. One Bureau of Standards man was on that project staff and certainly drew on everything that the Bureau of Standards could give him.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 12 o'clock. I think we should take a recess.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a part of the record two of the conclusions that General Stoner stated in his recommendations to Dr. Compton. The first conclusion, No. 1, was that a more southerly location would greatly improve the propagation of the transmitters, as it removed the path of the electromagnetic waves

from the absorption action of the north auroral zone. The second conclusion was that "by remaining at the present site, we are taking more than a calculated risk."

Do you not think, with two conclusions like that before you or before your group, it would have been wise to suspend operations until you could get more engineering data?

Mr. HARRIS. I do think so; yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. It was not your decision to have this done?

Mr. HARRIS. It was not my decision.

Senator MUNDT. It was Dr. Compton's decision, was it?

Mr. HARRIS. It was Dr. Compton's decision.

Senator MUNDT. May I ask just one more question in that connection? I would like to get the true facts about this engineering situation. Up to now it looks pretty bad for Baker East and Baker West on the basis of the engineers who have testified. As against that, you have given us two engineers, one of whom is on record in the conclusion as supporting the position that Baker East and Baker West do not seem to be very optimum choices. Have you other engineers that you can recommend be heard by this committee, or just this one, Colonel?

Mr. HARRIS. I believe we have a considerable list, Senator. They are not at my fingertips at this time.

Senator MUNDT. You are not prepared? Are you prepared to suggest other engineers?

Mr. HARRIS. We are prepared, but I cannot do it at this point. I am not prepared at this meeting.

Senator MUNDT. That is what I mean.

Mr. HARRIS. No; I am not, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. There was some criticism, I thought, on your part that we had not called engineers to present the point of view of the State Department. So, I wanted it in the record that, as of now, you are not prepared to suggest the names of those. We would like to find out.

Mr. HARRIS. Senator, we suggested them 2 weeks ago. They were not called. We did not add to that list, because we assumed we were not going to have a chance to have them on here. It has been 2 weeks, sir. I think it is fair to say that you could have the presumption that we were not going to have—

Senator MUNDT. One is already on the record refusing the position you expected him to present. So, it was not very conducive to calling him. And we have suggested by writing, and we have suggested in personal consultation, and I have personally told the State Department's representative, Ben Crosby, who was with Dr. Compton as his aide, that we would be glad to hear these witnesses. I had a list from him that I thought was one which should be acceptable to present to the committee, but you do not now seem willing to present those names.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Crosby, who is in the room, has now handed me a list of the witnesses, and I do have, therefore, an additional name at least.

Senator MUNDT. You have a list of five names?

Mr. HARRIS. I think I can give you such a list. I have given you the name of Lester H. Carr, the radio-engineering consultant of Wash-

ington. I wish to give you the name of Andrew Ring, of Washington, a radio-engineering consultant, the name of Col. Fred Andrews, who is a retired Army officer and former chief of the Alaskan Communications System of the Signal Corps of the United States Army. I should like to have called Mr. R. Maurice Pierce, a consulting engineer of New York. And I should like to have called a representative of MIT, preferably one agreeable to that organization, but a name which might be suitable would be Dr. Jerry Wiesner, W-i-e-s-n-e-r.

Mr. COHN. I might say that immediately following the submission of this list the staff contacted Dr. Jerry Wiesner of MIT. We talked to him, three of us on the line, for over 1 hour. Dr. Wiesner stated it was his conclusion that he still felt there was uncertainty; that it was his conclusion that Baker West, from a standpoint of efficiency and reliability, should be moved south and away from Seattle, and that he would just as soon not come down and testify, as that would be his conclusion. If there is any change, and they want to have Dr. Wiesner communicate with us, or if they want us to talk to him again and see if there has been any change of heart on his part, we would be certainly happy to have him.

With reference to Mr. Ring, who was the next person we were to contact, I believe we were advised he was making a trip to the Pacific. Mr. Crosby indicates that is correct. And we would be advised when he returned and would be available. We would be glad to go over the list, even though we have just gotten this report from the Bureau of Standards, which would seem to settle the issue, and Mr. Harris himself states that he thinks the decision to suspend Baker West was a wise one.

If they think it is still profitable to go into it, after all those things, we would be willing to contact them and have them down here.

Senator MUNDT. We want to leave the invitation open, if you have some other engineers. Out of the 5, there are 2 who are not willing to support that. Kindly get the facts.

Mr. HARRIS. We appreciate that, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. Even though we had the recommendation of Dr. Compton, I am not willing to accept that as Holy Writ. We want to get the best advice we can get, and if you can get some witnesses who are firm and will stand up and, when we contact them, support your position, rather than tell us over the telephone "Actually, we do not think they are in the right spots," we shall be glad to call them.

Mr. HARRIS. Senator Mundt, I certainly agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say I have just been notified by the staff that they also conferred with Mr. Ring, the fourth of the five men you suggested, and that he fully agrees that the southern location would have been better; that the northern location is not satisfactory.

So, it appears that 4 of your 5 witnesses will confirm substantially the testimony as it has been taken. I think you should check on that before you suggest the names of engineers and find out if they will add anything to this picture. If they are going to merely confirm what has been already established by other engineers, merely that you made a mistake by going up to Seattle, that it is better to move south, there is not much sense in wasting the money and the time of the committee.

Mr. Crosby, I wish you would exercise a little more care. Do not ask us to contact a witness who is out in the Pacific, and then have

someone come here and scream because we have not called him. You know where this man is. He is out in the Pacific and not available. So, do not give us names like that.

Before you ask us to call other engineers, check with them and see if they have other information available. My staff has talked to these engineers, 3 of the 5, and they find that they will confirm the testimony that has been given.

Mr. CROSBY (Ben Crosby, State Department). Mr. Chairman, when the list was submitted, sir, Ring was in the country. And I did not know at the time the list was submitted that he was planning to leave the country. Those names were prepared and given to you by the competent technical engineering staff of the engineering program.

The CHAIRMAN. We will not have any further hit-or-miss submission of names about whom you know nothing, and then have a witness come up here and start to complain because those witnesses have not been called. We find that my staff has checked with those witnesses and has found that they agree with the Bureau of Standards. If that is the case, they will not be called. We will not waste the time of the committee. The Bureau of Standards has submitted a report; not Dr. Compton, incidentally.

So, in the future, when you ask us to call a witness, know something about him. Know whether he is available.

Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Harris, I would like to ask you a couple of questions here.

I cannot be here this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, on account of Armed Services. They have a meeting this morning, and I want to go over to that meeting.

In New York there was discussion of people in Europe who were working for the Voice, or for the Government, and were not cleared over here. One resigned, and so on. There were two of them, Mr. Schechter and Mr. Kaghan. And I asked Mr. Thompson if he knew whether or not for sure they had been cleared for security, and he said his opinion was that they had not been cleared for security. He felt in one case he had seen it and in the other case he had not. They came back here, and his testimony, I felt, made it appear as if you would like to have them back here, or there was something about it, and that they could not come back because of security. Now, would you care to comment on that?

Mr. HARRIS. Senator Symington, in opening my testimony, I believe, before you were here, sir, I testified that with the approval of Mr. Jack Tate, the Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department, I was able to state that Mr. Schechter and Mr. Kaghan, the two names mentioned, had indeed been cleared. I find no evidence in our files that we were trying to bring them back here. As far as I know, they are people who have been wanted in Germany, and they are being used in Germany, and they are cleared employees according to the standards of Public Law 402 as administered by the Department of State.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, would you get in touch with Mr. Thompson and clear up that part of the testimony?

Mr. HARRIS. I will be pleased to do that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, my next question is that there has been a lot of talk about you at Columbia. What was your other education? Would you give us a rough picture of that?

Mr. HARRIS. Well, I think I could start with perhaps high school. I was a student at Cambridge High School in upper New York State, Cambridge, N. Y. I was an honor student there. I won the DAR prize for history essay, and all that kind of thing.

In the summer of 1927, I went to a CMTC camp, Citizens Military Training Camp. In the fall of 1927, I entered Staunton Military Academy, down here in Virginia, which has an ROTC unit; and, incidentally, one of the best cadet officers there is the present Senator from Arizona, junior Senator, Senator Barry Goldwater.

I graduated from Staunton in 1928.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Barry Goldwater?

Mr. HARRIS. Senator Barry Goldwater.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you know him there?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think he would be a character witness for you?

Mr. HARRIS. He could only testify as to my character at the time I was there. I have had practically no contact with him since.

The CHAIRMAN. He just went to the same college you were at. In other words, the only contact was that he happened to be going to the same school.

Mr. HARRIS. He was one of my company cadet officers and knew a good deal about my conduct in the academy.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was no particular friend of yours. I notice you bring in the names of Bob Taft and Barry Goldwater. When you bring in their names I just wonder whether you know them, whether they are friends of yours. I understand you do not know Goldwater, that he is no special friend of yours. Have you seen him, over the last 10 or 15 years?

Mr. HARRIS. I am not trying to claim that I am a close friend of either of these Senators. I have not said in any respect that Senator Taft is somebody that I know particularly. I quoted an opinion of his that has been expressed in the public prints, that Communists and Socialists should have the right to serve on college faculties if they wish. That is what I stated about Senator Taft.

As far as Senator Barry Goldwater is concerned, I mention him only because it helps to establish the character and type of school which I was attending at that time, and he certainly at least would be able to indicate whether I was a so-called subversive character when I was a cadet, with an honorable record, at ROTC, in Staunton Military Academy.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you write this book before, or after, you graduated?

Mr. HARRIS. After I graduated.

The CHAIRMAN. You wrote it after you graduated?

Mr. HARRIS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. So that when you were going to this particular college you referred to, your feelings were expressed in this book, I assume?

Mr. HARRIS. Of course not: they were not.

The CHAIRMAN. You said "of course not"?

Mr. HARRIS. That is what I said, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You said "of course not."

Mr. HARRIS. They are not the same as expressed in the book. Is that the question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRIS. They were not the same when I was in high school. It was a process of what we were taught in college and the things that we heard about the depression. That led a great many of us to make statements of the kind I did in that book.

The CHAIRMAN. You were talking about high school. You said you went to high school with Senator Goldwater.

Mr. HARRIS. I went to Staunton Military Academy, a preparatory school in Virginia.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said you went to college with him.

Mr. HARRIS. I did not, and I am not making any such statement.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you go to Staunton Military Academy in 1927?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, in 1927-28, except that during the summer I went to a military training camp, Fort Hancock, N. J., where my record can be checked also.

Senator SYMINGTON. One more question: As I understand it, Mr. Harris, when you were an undergraduate, or just after you left Columbia, you wrote a book called King Football?

Mr. HARRIS. I did, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. And in that book you expressed a lot of things which you no longer believe in. Is that correct?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. And Senator McClellan asked you when you changed your mind with respect to the things that you wrote in that book, and you said 1934-35. Is that correct?

Mr. HARRIS. I did.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to say for the benefit of the Senator that it appears that Jack Tate, who is one of the appointees of my very dear friend Acheson, when he was called, said, "You can give clearance to Schechter and Kaghan." That is a violation of the Presidential orders. I may say I am not endorsing those orders that Truman has made, but they apparently are still in effect until the Attorney General's Office can make a study of them and have them properly changed. In view of the fact that Tate takes the liberty of telling us these two men have been cleared, I am going to subpoena him, unless the committee objects, and put him under oath and have him testify as to what was in the files, upon what basis they were cleared. We will not take half the story by hearsay on clearance. We have the positive testimony on these two men, that they failed, they flunked, the security check.

Mr. HARRIS. By one man, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have the specific information on them; that subsequently one of them was promoted and made head of the Radio Branch in HICOG; that he is still there. And now you have a man who called you and says you can violate the order in order to give a clean bill of health. We will put Mr. Tate under oath, then, and make him give us the rest of the picture, if the Senators agree to that. He will not be allowed to use any Presidential order which he has already violated as a defense in refusing to answer.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out the original violation was by Mr. James Thompson, an employee of the Voice of America,

who made those statements before this committee in New York on Saturday.

Senator McCLELLAN. Let me ask you a question. Is it a violation of the order to say that a man has been cleared or has not been cleared?

The CHAIRMAN. The President issued an order in September of last year, and it is interpreted to mean that the Congress is not entitled to any information whatsoever in regard to a security clearance; that they are not entitled to information as to the status of the case, whether it has been cleared or has not been cleared. Mr. Humelsine has testified repeatedly before the committee. When that was questioned before the Appropriations Committee, he came back and told us he had contacted his superior and he was not entitled to give that information.

In view of the fact that Mr. Tate sees fit, without any authority, I understand, from Mr. Lourie or anyone else, to violate that order, he will be called to testify, and he will not be allowed to use that order as a grounds for refusing to answer questions, in view of the fact that he has already violated it. And if I have the approval of the committee—

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a matter we could take up in executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is something that should be taken up now, Senator McClellan, to some extent, in view of this statement here, which, on the face of it, appears to be incorrect because of the positive testimony we have had. I would be glad to take it up in executive session.

You had some further questions in regard to the Spectator?

While counsel is checking through the Spectator to read some of your editorial to you, let me read another passage from your book. I think we will run for another 10 minutes, and then we will adjourn until 2:30.

Mr. Harris, let me read another passage from your book. [Reading:]

Soviet Russia, a young nation which, whatever else may be said about her, is searching the world over for the best technical methods and the best ideas, has recently begun stimulation of a program of competitive sports. Realizing that war spirit is developed by bodily contact games, and wishing sports for exercise rather than injury, Russia has barred football from her new athletic program, even though she has imported American baseball with enthusiasm. The official who made the announcement concerning the exclusion of football said that Russia saw no reason for killing off a number of her best young men each season in the pursuit of a sport which appeals in the first place to the least desirable emotions.

Do you recognize that passage as coming from your book?

Mr. HARRIS. I think that is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Counsel.

Mr. SCHINE. This is an editorial entitled "Thanksgiving."

Mr. HARRIS. May I know the date, sir?

Mr. SCHINE. The date is November 25, 1931. [Reading:]

Although the newspapers of the Nation have been pretty well muzzled by their capitalist owners, no method has yet been devised to keep living beings from thinking. The unfortunate standees in the city soup lines are experiencing the fine manifestations of this great democracy. They are watching gangsters and corrupt politicians gulp joyously from the horn of plenty. Perhaps they will decide that even the horrors of those days of fighting which inaugurated

the era of communism in Russia would be preferable to the present state of affairs. They have intelligence, and as for bravery, well, hunger will take care of that.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the question?

Do you recognize that as your work?

Mr. HARRIS. I looked it up the other day, and it is mine. It is a similar sentiment to a great many being expressed by all sorts of people in 1932. It has nothing to do with the kind of sentiment I have now, and it was 21 years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us jump the gap of 20 years, then, and come down to date.

Mr. HARRIS. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you generally approve of the operations of the Voice as conducted today? I am not asking you whether you approve of every detail, no matter how well it is run. There are some things you could not approve. But you do generally approve the operations of the Voice as conducted today?

Mr. HARRIS. In general, I approve of the Voice as it is operated today.

The CHAIRMAN. You do.

Pardon me. Senator Mundt has a question.

Senator MUNDT. I am interested in the fact that you have changed your point of view since 1932, and I can understand that perfectly. You said you changed it about 1934 to 1937 sometime. I am wondering whether, in view of the fact that you were out in print with this rather strange array of commentaries, and you were out in print with some of the editors in the Spectator, whether, when you changed your mind, you also made statements in the public print, that you might insert in the record, in which you repudiated this book or the ideas you had in the book, or whether you perhaps repudiated some of the ideas expressed in the Spectator. Or did you do good by stealth in this changeover, without making any public changeover of any kind.

Mr. HARRIS. Senator, I think I did good by doing loyal service to the United States Government. I did not write something that would repudiate the book or the editorials in the Spectator. It is a strange thing, but when anyone is a parent, even if it is a pretty ugly child, he is a little bit slow about going out in public and saying, "This is an ugly and dirty child." That is about the sentiment I had about that.

This book had very little circulation, which can be proved. I was not proud of it. I would rather not have had at that time any attention called to it. If I had then put out some book repudiating it specifically, it would have been—

Senator MUNDT. I thought it would be very logical that in some public speech or statement or broadcast you might have referred to the fact that as a young "liberal" at Columbia University you came under certain influences which upset you emotionally, and you made some statements which you no longer believed in. I thought you might have said something which you could put in the record about the time and date and manner in which you changed from a position rather sympathetic, let us say, to socialism, to one which I hope is no longer sympathetic to that point of view.

Mr. HARRIS. Senator, if I had been in the writing business at the time, or in a position where I had access to some kind of public forum as a standard thing, I am quite sure that I would have had such state-

ments out. At this minute, I have not traced any actual pieces of paper that will prove this. I have made talks here and there that would indicate it. I think for instance that the board of directors of the National Self-Government Committee in New York, on which I have now been sitting for some several years, would remember my position on these things. I think that there are other people who would clearly understand my position and would have heard it expressed often enough to be pretty clear about it. But, not being in a position where I made regular contributions to a column or anything—I was not writing anything or doing any speaking outside of the Government service—I found no opportunity to do anything very spectacular along that line. I think I can prove it by deeds, given time and given an opportunity to develop the material.

I have explained to the chairman—and you will forgive me for being a little long winded at this time—that this past week, when, probably, for my own sake I should have been checking back on every record that I could, I have been carrying the full responsibility for an agency that has been in a rather demoralized condition, upset and worried, by investigations, changes of directives, and things of that sort, an understandable condition. I have wanted it to keep going properly, because I believe that it serves the people of the United States properly. And I think that the only patriotic and honest thing to do is to keep it going until the new chief can take over. For that reason, I have not done the kind of defense job that probably I should, in view of the fact that I seemed to feel, on the part of the staff at least, that this is nothing but prosecution. I don't hear any defense statements coming out of the staff.

Senator MUNDT. I do not think you have the justification for any such statement at all. We did not write the book or the editorials. We did not make the context. Our job is to investigate what we find.

Senator JACKSON. Will the gentleman yield for one question? I have to leave.

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. I do not think it is any crime that you expressed very liberal views during the depths of the depression.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you call this "liberal," Senator?

Senator JACKSON. Well, I will come to the point in a minute.

Willkie did that when he was in college, as history bears out. And I think Willkie later became a big man in Wall Street and a highly respected American. I think what Senator Mundt and I are interested in is any contradictory evidence, anything that contradicts this book and your views as there expressed. That is the point that I am interested in. I believe—what is the name of the columnist that writes in one of the newspaper columns every day?—Westbrook Pegler was a Socialist, was he not, at one time? I believe that is correct.

Senator MUNDT. He probably will advise you as to the truth of it in his column.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I do not think there is any crime in that. But I think what all of us are concerned about is the record subsequent to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Also, one of the things I am very serious about is that this witness has said that he never had a loyalty hearing. With this book in existence, I cannot conceive of there not being a hearing to determine whether he had changed.

Let me put this in the form of a question. Would you agree with me that if you still held the ideas which you held when you wrote this book, you would be entirely unfitted for your present job?

Mr. HARRIS. No, I wouldn't even agree to that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you think if you still held the ideas you held when you wrote the book, you still would be fitted for this job you now hold as acting head of the Voice?

Mr. HARRIS. No, I wouldn't be fitted for this job, but I wouldn't be entirely unfitted. You used the word "entirely," and I think that is a very broad one.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me ask you this: If you still held the views you held when you wrote this book, would you agree that you would be unfitted for your job?

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly would not appoint myself, if I had the choice, into that job, if I still held those views. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you feel that your appointment was only because you convinced your superiors that you had changed your mind?

Mr. HARRIS. Convinced a great many people, Mr. Chairman, beginning with the Civil Service Commission, in 1940, or early '41, when they investigated that very, very thoroughly, and got all the information and read the book and read the editorials and did clear me.

Senator JACKSON. Were you in any organizations at any time that were contrary to the Communist Party line? Let us take the period between August 1939, when the Germans entered into the pact with the Russians on neutrality, until June 21, 1941—I think that is about the date, or thereabouts—when the Germans invaded Russia. Were you with any group? I am trying to get some evidence here which, if you had it, would indicate a contrary position.

Mr. HARRIS. I think I have that much evidence. I was a member of the Committee To Defend America by Aiding the Allies. I believe that that committee was entirely—

Senator JACKSON. You were a member of the committee?

Mr. HARRIS. I was a member. As I remember it, they sent invitations to contribute, which asked support moneywise, and by signing a little slip of paper. That was the William Allen White committee. I am not sure of that title a hundred percent, but it was known as the William Allen White committee at that time.

Senator JACKSON. There was a committee headed by William Allen White, of Kansas, the editor of the Emporia Gazette.

Mr. HARRIS. That is it, yes.

Senator JACKSON. You were a member of that committee?

Mr. HARRIS. They had an overall top committee, but I wasn't a member of the top committee. I was one of the many people around the country who signed up. I made at least one talk for them. I made a talk, if I remember it right, at the Advertising Club of New York.

Senator JACKSON. You made a talk to the Advertising Club of New York?

Mr. HARRIS. At the Advertising Club of New York. It wasn't to the whole club. I will try very hard to find out what that occasion was and what the group was, but I talked in favor—

Senator JACKSON. Have you the record on that?

Mr. HARRIS. I will try very, very hard to find such a record.

Senator JACKSON. I think the committee would like to have that. I am not saying that at that time the people who were on the other side, were, of course, subversive, because you did have the America First Committee. But it will indicate very clearly, if that is the committee, what your position at that time was on foreign policy.

Mr. HARRIS. Well, another indication would be, if I could establish it—I know I did it. I contributed to this organization called Bundles for Britain, which was helping out the British people in their fight.

Senator JACKSON. When was that? During 1939–40, or in 1941?

Mr. HARRIS. Along in there, about '40. I would have to look it up again. I suppose a man should have his whole history, all his views, everything he ever thought about or did, documented in some document. But how can you predict—

Senator MUNDT. That was not a very good one, because that was the time when Russia was one of our allies. I do not know when you joined that committee.

Senator JACKSON. If it was the Committee To Aid the Allies, headed by William Allen White, I am sure that was during the pact period.

Mr. HARRIS. That was my impression.

Senator MUNDT. That was dissolved in 1941, so it would depend on when he joined.

Senator JACKSON. Yes. What I meant, Karl, was with reference to the period between August 1939, whenever the war broke out, and up to the time of the invasion of Russia, just during that period. I am not talking about subsequent to June 21, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand your testimony to be, Mr. Harris, that you belonged to this Committee To Aid the Allies, or whatever you call it, after the invasion of Russia? Or before the invasion of Russia?

Mr. HARRIS. It would have been before the invasion of Russia.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it would have been. Was it?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, it was.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what do you have to show that?

Mr. HARRIS. I will have to see what I do have. I haven't anything here to produce at this minute.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know if you have it in your office?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't have it in my office. I will have to look back and see if my very poorly organized personal files have any scrap of paper that will prove it, or if I can find somebody who was with me at that time, or something of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you think you joined that committee while the Hitler-Stalin pact was in existence?

Mr. HARRIS. I would think there was no doubt about that. Because that was one of the most horrible, reprehensible things that has happened in the history of mankind.

The CHAIRMAN. We will take a recess until 3 this afternoon.

I am going to ask the counsel to have Mr. Tate down here at 2 o'clock in executive session.

Mr. Harris, how well do you know Mr. Tate?

Mr. HARRIS. I know him fairly well. I know him by his first name.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know him socially?

Mr. HARRIS. No, I don't think I have ever had any social contact with him of any kind.

The CHAIRMAN. When is the last time you contacted him before today?

Mr. HARRIS. I talked to him on the phone when I asked this question about the security problem. His office was designated by Mr. Lourie's office to give advice on these things, and I called him.

The CHAIRMAN. O. K.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., a recess was taken until 3 p. m., this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, there was a witness in executive session, Mr. Tate. You were not present, of course, to hear him testify. The reason he was called in executive session was because we ordered him to produce certain files. We were to introduce those on the theory that if he had already violated a Presidential directive he could not use that as an excuse for not bringing the files. His testimony under oath conflicted directly with yours.

I think if you want Mr. Tate recalled to testify in public session, in fairness to you, the Senate will recall him. Otherwise, you are being given a copy of his testimony.

Would you prefer having him recalled to testify in public session?

Mr. HARRIS. May I consider it?

The CHAIRMAN. You certainly may. And also may I say this. I am not sure if we notified you. I think we did in executive session. Wherever any employer, or anyone, is under fire by other witnesses, if you have any questions that you want asked of that witness, you can submit those questions to the chairman, and normally they will be asked. I think you have been informed also that at any time in these proceedings you care to, you may have counsel, and you will be entitled to consult with your counsel at any time during your testimony.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I make a short statement with regard to this situation right now?

The CHAIRMAN. Make it as short or as long as you care to.

Mr. HARRIS. I will make it short, because I wish to look into this thing with Mr. Tate.

But I find, on page 3 of the transcript you handed me, his statement that—

I think you would be at liberty to state that fact, namely, that the people on my program have been cleared, but not to go into individual cases.

I considered that an authorization. I do not consider that I have gone into individual cases. I think that in stating that two men on the program are cleared, I am merely stating the covering fact that all employees on our program now are cleared. They have to be by law, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schechter and Mr. Kagan are in your Department?

Mr. HARRIS. They are under our direction, because they are in the Public Affairs Branch of HICOG, which is administered by the International Information Administration.

The CHAIRMAN. Now will you tell us at this time: Did Mr. Tate ever tell you that those two men had been cleared?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Tate did not tell me that those two men had been cleared. That information came in the standard way from the security area of the Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Who told you they had been cleared?

Mr. HARRIS. That information came from Mr. Ford, the head of SY, through our Assistant Administrator for Management, Mr. Arthur Kimball.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the staff order Mr. Ford to appear today? At 4 o'clock today?

Now, are you sure it is Mr. Ford, or not? We are going to call Mr. Ford down here. Did Ford tell you they had been cleared?

Mr. HARRIS. Ford did not tell me. Ford told Mr. Arthur Kimball, and he told me. My normal channel to Mr. Ford is through Mr. Arthur Kimball.

The CHAIRMAN. Ford told Kimball, and Kimball told you?

Mr. HARRIS. That is a perfectly normal and proper procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. When did Kimball tell you that these two people had been cleared?

Mr. HARRIS. The matter had not come to my attention in any direction until this testimony of Mr. Thompson on Saturday.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, your statement was made under oath to the question:

Your testimony is that Mr. Jack Tate authorized you to state today that both Kagan and Schechter had been cleared. Is that correct?

The answer:

That is correct, sir.

liberty, as it says here in the transcript, to state here the fact that all about the status of Schechter's or Kagan's case?

Mr. HARRIS. Not as individuals, but he said that I would be at liberty, as it says here in the transcript, to state here the fact that all people on our program have been cleared.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he ask you first whether they had been cleared?

Mr. HARRIS. He asked me whether I had that information. I stated that I did have, from the security area.

The CHAIRMAN. So, instead of Tate giving you the information, you gave Tate the information?

Mr. HARRIS. I have never said that Mr. Tate gave me the information. I have said that Mr. Tate was the authority for mentioning cases, for mentioning this matter before this committee. And I still consider that there is a clear permission here to state that these two men, since they are among the people on duty in the Public Affairs program of HICOG, are cleared persons.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, do you have in your possession or in your Department now, a written memorandum from the Director of Operations of the Voice advising you that Schechter has not been cleared, and that he had requested a transfer to the Voice?

Mr. HARRIS. I have never seen such a memo, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether such a memo exists?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did Kimball tell you that Kagan and Schechter had been cleared?

Mr. HARRIS. It was some time yesterday, after he had checked with Mr. Ford of SY.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is Mr. Kimball?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Kimball is not present at this time. He is the Assistant Administrator for Management in our IIA.

The CHAIRMAN. In New York?

Mr. HARRIS. No; right here.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the staff call Mr. Kimball?

And you say that he told you that Mr. Ford told him?

Mr. HARRIS. That is the normal channel, the security area.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he tell you that Mr. Ford told him that Schechter and Kaghan had been cleared?

Mr. HARRIS. That is as I recollect it, that Mr. Ford told him.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, you talked to him a couple of days ago, and you come in here very indignantly to defend those two men. Do you not remember?

Mr. HARRIS. These two men are on our program.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember what he told you?

Mr. HARRIS. I do remember what he told me.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember what Ford told him about Kaghan and Schechter having been cleared?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not remember his mentioning that Mr. Ford had stated it to him personally. He did state that Mr. Ford had run a check to make sure the information was clear, that he had obtained the information from the security area, and that the men had been shown cleared. Whether he talked to Mr. Ford's assistant or to Mr. Ford personally, I don't see why I should know. The facts are there, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say now you do not know whether he talked to Mr. Ford personally or not?

Mr. HARRIS. No, I don't know whether he talked to Ford personally or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he tell you to whom he did talk?

Mr. HARRIS. He did not mention a name, except that he did mention that Mr. Ford had run a check. In other words, Mr. Ford had ordered a check of the records to ascertain the facts about these two employees mentioned in the Saturday testimony.

We are under law, Mr. Chairman, Public Law 402, which requires that we have no one on our program who has not been cleared after a full FBI investigation. The fact that these two men are on duty is conclusive proof, if we are obeying the law, that these men are cleared, and that was exactly what I intended to imply and to state. I think I did have that permission from Mr. Tate. I do not wish to put him in any false light, and I did not wish to imply that he gave me information on two specific cases.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, in what you said this forenoon, when you were answering the question put to you, you were not trying to imply that Tate had told you that Kaghan and Schechter had been cleared?

Mr. HARRIS. I was trying to state, and I thought I did state, that Mr. Tate was the person who gave me authority to mention the fact that employees in this program were cleared.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Counsel.

Senator MUNDT. I have a question, Mr. Chairman.

Have you personally seen the files of these two people in question?

Mr. HARRIS. I have not, Senator Mundt. As a matter of fact, I have seen very few security files in my experience in the Department of State. That has not been in my line of duty. That is done by the Security Division or the personnel people.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say that we are producing a witness in public session to show that Schechter and Kaghan had flunked the security clearance.

Mr. COHN. We have received that information, Mr. Chairman, and we have sent a telegram to three different persons whom we understand have official written information to that effect in the form of rejection slips, and asked them to be here tomorrow morning at 10:30.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask whether the counsel is saying that these gentlemen are not currently cleared?

The CHAIRMAN. You can come and listen to the testimony, sir.

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. COHN. Further, Mr. Chairman, we have asked witnesses to come down with reference to Mr. Harris' statement, that he finds no evidence in the files "that we were trying to bring them back here," meaning an attempt to bring them back from Germany to work in New York.

That is what you said, is it not, Mr. Harris?

Mr. HARRIS. We found no evidence here in Washington of those things. In New York, we haven't had time to check.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. When you say you found no evidence in the files, are you now telling us you did examine the files?

Mr. HARRIS. I am saying we examined the files available to us right here in Washington, that a telephone check was made with New York, but we have not personally examined the New York files. There hasn't been time to.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Whom did you call in New York to ask them to check the New York files?

Mr. HARRIS. I did not make the call, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who made the call?

Mr. HARRIS. I believe Mr. Kimball or one of his associates, perhaps the head of the personnel area, made the check.

The CHAIRMAN. When did they undertake that check?

Mr. HARRIS. Saturday and yesterday, probably most of it yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. On whose orders?

Mr. HARRIS. On Mr. Kimball's orders; a normal thing to do when any employee would be mentioned adversely in a public hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what did Kimball report to you?

Mr. HARRIS. He reported that there was no evidence in the files, according to the information received by him, that either Schechter or Kaghan had been requested by the Voice.

The CHAIRMAN. Or that they had applied?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't know that he looked into the matter of whether they had ever applied, Mr. Chairman. It was a question of desire. I think that was the question this morning; that, as I understood it, it was a question of whether the Voice had requested them.

The CHAIRMAN. The question before the committee is whether or not they had applied to come to the Voice in New York and thereby

had to undergo a security check. Now, have you checked the files to see whether or not there was any application by them which would occasion a security check?

You understand what we are talking about, Mr. Harris.

Mr. HARRIS. Of course I do, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness in New York testified there was a security check on those two men, because they were either about to be employed by the Voice or had applied for a job. You came in this morning, and you said, No. 1, they had clearance; and No. 2, there was nothing in the files to indicate that you were trying to get them back here.

Mr. HARRIS. I will still stand by that.

The CHAIRMAN. Now do you know whether there is anything in the files to show that they have applied?

Mr. HARRIS. I have assurance that they were not requested by the Voice. I do not know whether there is any application of any kind some time in the past. Some time in the past they may have applied. I don't know. I don't think that was checked.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether anyone in the Voice had asked for a security check under Public Law 402?

Mr. HARRIS. That I believe was checked by Mr. Kimball.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he tell you that was checked by him?

Mr. HARRIS. Not in those terms, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he in any terms?

Mr. HARRIS. He told me that those people—there had been no attempt to bring them to the Voice of America. He also told me that he had secured information from the security area that they were indeed cleared employees in their present assignment. Those are the only things I intended to state or imply. Any attempt to try to make it look as if I am saying something else is just not correct, as I see it, Mr. Chairman. I am not trying to mislead this committee. I am giving this committee every bit of information it asks for, and I will continue to do so.

Senator MUNDT. Are these two men presently employed under your jurisdiction?

Mr. HARRIS. Senator, they are employed in the Public Affairs Branch of HICOG, which is under the supervision of the International Information Administration; yes.

Senator MUNDT. Are all the people in HICOG required to be checked under that provision of Public Law 402?

Mr. HARRIS. No, Senator, they are not. It is those people who are engaged in public-affairs activities, that being the work of the International Information Administration, also called the United States Information Service, in accordance with the law of which you were coauthor, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Have you personally checked to see whether these two men in question were checked under that provision of the law, or did you just assume that they were, because they were working in that department?

Mr. HARRIS. I have not made a personal check, if by that you mean: Have I examined any security files?

Senator MUNDT. Have you asked Mr. Kimball the question whether they were checked in conformity with that section of the law?

Mr. HARRIS. The specific question was asked of Mr. Kimball, and the information in the statement this morning is based on that; the answer to that, "Yes, sir."

Senator MUNDT. You said they were checked under that provision?

Mr. HARRIS. That is my understanding, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt, you asked about Schechter and Kaghan. Kaghan is the Acting Deputy Director for Public Affairs in HICOG. Schechter is the Chief of the Radio Branch at HICOG. They are both in Bonn, Germany.

Senator MUNDT. I would like to pursue another angle, if I may.

I was interested in your testimony this morning, Mr. Harris, when you said that as a young cadet at Staunton Military Academy, you did not then have the views which you later expressed in a book called—

Mr. HARRIS. King Football, sir.

Senator MUNDT. King Football. Did I understand that testimony correctly?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. So that, apparently, something happened at the time you were in Columbia University, which gave you the views which you later expressed in that book?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. And I am wondering whether, like some other witnesses that we have had before this committee, you could enlighten us as to what happened to give you those views. Did some professor try to mislead you in that direction? Was there some influence on the campus? What was there that changed you in a period of a couple of years?

Mr. HARRIS. This would be a period of 4 years, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. All right.

Mr. HARRIS. It is simply the process of a college education, under which a man undergoes a number of changes in points of view. It was a college education in a time of depression, a time when there was great ferment in the world, and when many of the young instructors, particularly, that we listened to—there were a number of them, but I can't identify 1, or 2, or 6—did stir up our minds, and perhaps they did cause us to question some of the existing standards of the times. That was the spirit of inquiry, the spirit of questioning.

Senator MUNDT. I asked you that question for two reasons. In the first place, in about that period I also was a student at Columbia University. I ran into exactly the kind of situation that you have described. And in interrogating Miss Elizabeth Bentley, who was a student at Columbia University at about that time, she mentioned specifically several instances in which influences there employed destroyed her faith in the American Constitution, the Holy Bible, the marriage institution. It was helpful to get that information. And I think if you want to be helpful there are two committees of the Congress that are studying that influence in university campuses that I think would find it very interesting that a high official in Government testifies that at Columbia University at that time certain professors, certain instructors, did destroy certain American convictions which he held at the time he went on the campus, so that at least for a short period of his life he started writing books and editorials which were rather derogatory of the whole American pattern.

Now, if you could be a little more specific, I think it would be extremely helpful.

Mr. HARRIS. Senator, I will be as specific as I can. I don't want to be unfair to Columbia College. I think that it is a very fine institution, and I think that the thing that was going on then was less a deliberate Red pattern than a business of questioning most of the standard situations, whatever existed at that time, the economic system, the social system, the ways of people, and so on.

Now, one person I can remember, who gave me no impression of being in the least left wing, but who did undermine, by his approach, and sort of destroy, the old basis of thinking of many students; that was a Mr. Casey in the sociological side. He was teaching sociology. I think it was his theory that it was a healthy thing to sort of wipe out all the things the students had learned by early conditioning, and let them start fresh with a new set of facts as presented in college. Now, if he was serving any Red pattern, I doubt whether it was a conscious one. It may have been. I can remember his influence more than that of anybody else, I should say, in that respect.

There were others. There was a French professor, who is really the man I identified in the book *King Football* as having rather Fascist ideas and strange ideas about marriage.

There were one or two men, of course, who did show a Marxist attitude, and the outstanding one of those would have been Donald Henderson, who has also been mentioned in the testimony.

Now, there may have been others who taught in ways that would have had that effect, but not too many of them. I don't know that any of them were among my instructors.

May I say I don't want to go on too far, Senator, but I want to answer your question as fully as you want me to.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, I think you have done that. The upshot is, at least, that the impact of the instruction that you received in part at Columbia University was responsible for your change of positions from the way in which you thought and believed at Staunton Military Academy and the Cambridge High School and the position which you later took, still as a young man, in the book, *King Football*, and some of your editorials in the *Spectator*.

Mr. HARRIS. I think that is a perfectly fair statement, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. I believe Miss Elizabeth Bentley recorded that at about the same time she did come in contact with these Communist professors, who later took her and put her in a Communist cell in the Communist movement. She was a little more aggressive than you, but perhaps she was more receptive to the indoctrination also.

I do want to say this, Mr. Chairman, that the testimony of Mr. Harris, coming as it does from a high Government official, is a pretty strong indication that the Senate committee and the House committee which are presently investigating these Red influences is doing a constructive piece of work; because if they still continue, we have a demonstration here of how they can pretty well pollute the clear thinking of the young American of average parentage who goes to a university and finds himself confused at least in a temporary period of his life because of that kind of thing.

Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. HARRIS. I am only sad that this would seem to be critical of a university for which I have such high regard, and in which I learned so many useful and helpful things.

Senator MUNDT. Although I guess your education was interrupted there, anything I can do with the alumni of that institution to be sure that new generations of students do not find themselves indoctrinated by Communist agents, I feel will certainly elevate the reputation of a very fine institution.

Mr. HARRIS. That is certainly a good and proper approach.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think that you have answered one of the Senator's questions, and that is: Do you think it is a good idea for a congressional committee to investigate the teachers in the schools?

Mr. HARRIS. I didn't realize the Senator had asked me that question.

The CHAIRMAN. You are being asked it now, then.

Mr. HARRIS. I think that if such an inquiry is carried on in a way that will not hurt the personal reputations in public of innocent people, if it is primarily done, I should say, in executive session, so that its clear-cut purpose is to detect genuine Communists and to eliminate them from the faculties, it is a useful and proper enterprise.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that if it is done so that it does not hurt innocent people. We always hear the claim, of course, whenever you start to expose Communists, that we are hurting innocent people. Do you know of any innocent people that have been hurt by either the Jenner or the Velde committees up to this time when they have been engaged in exposing Communists?

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly read of a very unfortunate article about the wife of the publisher of the Washington Post.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, will you answer my question? The question is: Do you know of any teachers, any innocent teachers, who have been hurt by any of these two committees?

May I say now: I have heard so much said about this statement about the wife of the publisher of the Washington Post. I understand Mr. Velde got two Meyers confused. I might say that if I were to pick up a paper, a letter, and find that a Mrs. Meyer was coming to the defense of any Communist cause, without any further identification, I think that I might easily make the mistake of assuming it was the wife of the editor of the Daily Worker, the local Daily Worker. These people have defended every Communist cause, every Communist that has been accused, since I have been following this matter, so I think Mr. Velde's mistake, when he found a letter to Pravda or some place signed by Mrs. Meyer, in assuming it was this Mrs. Meyer, was a logical mistake. And when he found it was the wrong Mrs. Meyer, he corrected that.

I am going to ask you again. You have been talking about how your mind was affected by the teachers at Columbia, and in your book you talked about your friends who were Communists and teachers. Do you think that up to this time the Velde or the Jenner committee have injured any innocent teachers?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I certainly would hesitate to say "no" at this time. I have not followed the testimony closely enough. But I think that the process of putting people in public hearings, many of whom have only slight charges made against them, and subjecting them to public degradation, when they may easily be proved innocent

at a later time, is not an American way to carry on the work, by Congress.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me first ask this question, if I may, Senator Mundt.

Name one of those individuals against whom very slight charges have been made, who has been degraded by a public session of either the Jenner or the Velde committee.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I can't do that at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know of any at this time?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not know of any at this time. I do think that the Mrs. Meyer incident was reprehensible. I cannot, as an American citizen, feel anything but sadness that you should so characterize what I consider to be one of the best papers in the United States, the Washington Post.

The CHAIRMAN. I would assume you would.

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, I am sure.

Senator MUNDT. This is a related question that I wanted to ask you, because you must find yourself, as an administrator, in the same position as the college president in regard to this. Do you consider it a fair or an unfair question for a committee of Congress to ask a college instructor against whom it had received derogatory information in private session—to ask him in public session the question: Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HARRIS. I should hope that he would be asked first in a private session. But if the proper safeguards are preserved, I suppose it might be possible to do it in such a way as not to hurt the man. It is perfectly proper to ask the man. The question of whether it is a public hearing or a private hearing disturbs me somewhat, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you this. Is it proper for a man who has been asked that question to refuse to answer, if he intends to serve the public in that type of a responsible position?

Mr. HARRIS. No, I don't think that a man should refuse to answer. As you, I think, will remember, when I came before your executive session the other day, that kind of a question was put to me, and I said that I had no desire to do any claiming of some sort of a constitutional right on a question of that kind, and I stated very firmly that I was not and never had been a member of the Communist Party.

Senator MUNDT. If one of these Communist professors came to you and said, "Mr. Harris, I would like to get a job with the Voice of America," would you ask that question? And if he refused to answer on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate him, would you think he would be a good employee?

Mr. HARRIS. He could not come in. He just automatically could not come in. That would cause him to have, I would say, a negative security record from the word "go."

Senator MUNDT. Not necessarily. There are some people who are not Communists who refuse to answer that, and could perhaps still pass a security test. I am asking you whether you think that attitude is such that you would then consider him fit for employment in the Voice of America.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I perhaps made a very hasty statement there. It is obvious that some people turn to legal advisers, who, in

their particular approach to things, feel that it is a good idea to put that kind of what they call safeguard around their client. A person conceivably could be misled into taking that position. But I should say that I would have to have very convincing proof, if a man had made that kind of denial at the current time, when I was trying to employ him. If he had taken a stand of that kind, I would feel that I couldn't bring him into our organization. It would just be taking chances with the cold-war apparatus of this Nation.

Mr. COHN. I wanted to take up this question, Mr. Harris, of accusations against innocent people. You came in here this morning with a prepared statement in which you branded the testimony of Mr. James F. Thompson, one of the top officials of IBS, the International Broadcasting System, the Voice of America in New York, as erroneous, incorrect, and actually untrue, is that not a fact?

Mr. HARRIS. In saying that these employees were not cleared, it was untrue; yes, sir.

Mr. COHN. And even more than that, you went on to say that as a matter of fact, you found no evidence in your files, and you are the Acting Administrator, that there was even an attempt to bring any of these people from Germany over to New York, as Mr. Thompson had testified.

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct.

Mr. COHN. That is quite a serious thing to say about somebody, is it not?

Mr. HARRIS. It is quite serious to say about somebody, yes sir.

Mr. COHN. I imagine that you would feel quite keenly about it if you turn out to be completely wrong on both counts, is that not the fact?

Mr. HARRIS. I would, of course, feel very badly if I turned out to be completely wrong on both counts.

Mr. COHN. I would submit to you that you are, sir, and I want to ask you this: Don't you know for a fact that 5 people, as testified to by Mr. Thompson, namely, Mr. Kaghan, Mr. Schechter, Mr. Charles Lewis, Mr. Shepard Stone, and Mr. Harold Wright were in fact requested by New York to be transferred from Germany, from the State Department in Germany, to the Voice of America in New York; that all 5 of those people filed Form 579 seeking employment in New York, and that a security investigation was instituted as to each 1 of those 5; and that only 1, Mr. Harold Wright, survived that investigation, and that he is now employed in New York. And Mr. Kaghan and Mr. Schechter remain in Germany. Mr. Lewis and Mr. Stone have resigned since the completion of the investigation. Do you now know my statement to be inaccurate?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't know your statement to be inaccurate.

Mr. COHN. What check have you made to find out whether or not Mr. Thompson was correct and was telling the truth before you came in here and said that the files indicate that there was not even any consideration of bringing these people from Germany to New York, and Mr. Thompson was telling an untruth when he said that?

Mr. HARRIS. I have fully testified on that, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. COHN. Did you talk to Mr. Thompson and ask him what the basis of his information was?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Thompson was not available.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Thompson's name is in the telephone book in New York, and he can be reached through the switchboard at the Voice of America 7 days a week. I asked him if he heard from you, and he said he did not. I asked him if he heard from anyone in your office, and he said he had not.

May I ask you this: Did you communicate with Mr. Alfred Puhan, the Directors of Operations of the Voice, who has jurisdiction?

Mr. HARRIS. The jurisdiction would be in the hands of the personnel man in New York, and not in either of those gentlemen.

Mr. COHN. Did you communicate with Mr. Edward Macy, the personnel man?

The CHAIRMAN. Did you communicate with Mr. Thompson or Mr. Puhan?

Mr. HARRIS. I have not, and I have not communicated with any of these individuals.

Mr. COHN. You say jurisdiction is in the hands of the personnel man, Mr. Edward Macy; and have you talked with Mr. Edward Macy, and did you talk to him before you came in here and made this statement?

Mr. HARRIS. I did not talk to Mr. Macy.

Mr. COHN. I would suggest to you, sir, if you had, Mr. Macy might have been able to tell you that all 4 of these people, or all 5 including Mr. Wright, who is with the Voice, did file Form 579, which were processed, to transfer from Germany to New York, and that as late as the last 6 weeks Mr. Macy, in behalf of the personnel office of your agency, sent a written slip to Mr. Puhan indicating that Mr. Schechter was not to be employed in New York and was turned down.

Now, your testimony is that you did not consult with anybody in New York, the Director of Operations, Mr. Thompson, who made a sworn statement, a statement under oath, or Mr. Macy, the personnel man, before you came in here this morning and made this charge against Mr. James Thompson?

Mr. HARRIS. I say I checked through Mr. Arthur Kimball, my assistant administrator for management, which is the proper and regular channel for doing that checking, and that he supplied the information on which the statement was based, and did in fact write the statement; and that I have no reason not to trust the absolute integrity of Colonel Kimball.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not hear the last part.

Mr. HARRIS. I have no reason whatsoever not to trust the absolute integrity of Col. Arthur Kimball, who was the gentleman who furnished that information to me.

Mr. COHN. Did you advise the committee that these charges you made were made on the basis of hearsay; that you had not personally spoken with Mr. Thompson or anyone in New York to ascertain whether or not there was a basis for what you told this committee under oath?

Mr. HARRIS. I think there was a perfectly solid basis.

The CHAIRMAN. If what you say is true—and I should make it clear at this time that we think it is completely untrue—if what you say is true, it would mean that Mr. Thompson was guilty of perjury. That is a very, very serious charge, especially to one who talks about the great care he takes in not smearing innocent people. You came

before the committee this morning and every member of the committee understood you to tell them that Kaghan and Schechter had been cleared and that Jack Tate had told you—I will read the question:

Senator McCLELLAN. Your testimony is Mr. Jack Tate authorized you to state today that both Kaghan and Schechter had been cleared. Is that correct?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct.

If we had not called Mr. Tate down here and put him under oath, the impression would have gone out that Mr. Tate, the assistant legal officer, had told you these two men were completely cleared.

Now, at this time, Mr. Harris, I will read into the record a number of excerpts from your book, a book which would indicate to me that anyone who has the ideas expressed therein would be completely unfitted for the job that you hold. You may have reformed or changed since then, and we hope to settle whether you have or not before we are through. I will read these into the record, and if you care to have a copy of the record, you can decide whether anything I read is unfairly taken out of context and if you want to add to it, you may do so. The entire book will be marked as an exhibit.

Before we do that, may I ask, does counsel have any other questions he would like to ask at this time? I understand that he will be a witness tomorrow morning.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Harris, what date did you give us as the date when you say you completely broke with the ideas and ideology you expressed in this book and in the editorials inspected; what year?

Mr. HARRIS. These things are not done on a specific date, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. COHN. Give us your best estimate. I understand you cannot give it exactly.

Mr. HARRIS. Substantially it was by 1934, most of that atmosphere had gone, those beliefs. Certainly before 1940 there would have been not the slightest vestige of any piece of the things that are in King Football.

Mr. COHN. Would you say the vestiges continued until 1940?

Mr. HARRIS. Probably on the subject of football, I think some of them would carry over that far.

Mr. COHN. How about on the subject of what we might call radical views expressed on the question of things other than athletics?

Mr. HARRIS. Anything that I would call a radical view in there was out of the way by the fall of 1934.

Mr. COHN. I will now ask you whether or not, in the year 1938, you had any connection with the League of American Writers—and before I ask that, Mr. Chairman, if I may, may I state for the record that the League of American Writers has been cited by the Attorney General of the United States as a subversive and Communist organization; that Attorney General Biddle stated on September 24, 1942, and I quote:

The League of American Writers was founded under Communist auspices in 1935. In 1939 it began openly to follow the Communist Party line as dictated by the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

Then, of course, it has been cited, I believe, by the Committee on Un-American Activities and every other Government agency, and it has been officially cited by Attorney General Clark.

I will now ask you whether or not in 1938 you had any connection with the League of American Writers?

Mr. HARRIS. As you well know from my testimony in executive session, I was a member of that organization for a matter of days in 1938, and it had not been cited by any Government organization at that time as a Communist organization. There was no way that a person would necessarily know that it was a Communist organization.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not believe the Communist Party has been cited yet. Is it your testimony that unless some other Government agency told you this was a group of Communists banding together, that you, the acting head of the information program, could not recognize it as a Communist front? Must someone tell you?

Mr. HARRIS. Of course not, they must not tell me, but I am just pointing out that it was not publicly recognized as a Communist organization at the time.

I will further testify as I did in executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you recognize it at the time as a Communist organization?

Mr. HARRIS. I had considerable reservations about it. I had doubt about some of the people whose names showed on their board, as I stated, I believe, in executive session.

I also pointed out that the entrance into membership of the League of American Writers was in effect made for me by a person who thought that he was doing me a favor.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the man?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Jerre Mangione, as I previously testified.

The CHAIRMAN. You know he is a Communist?

Mr. HARRIS. I know that you so stated in executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider him one?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have had no clear-cut evidence that Mr. Jerre Mangione is a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think he is a Communist? You are the man directing our information program, to fight communism. Do you consider Mangione a Communist?

Mr. HARRIS. If you would allow me to examine his record, I would be pleased to give you my judgment. I have not seen Mr. Mangione for a good many years, and I don't know what his activities have been, and I am not dealing with him at this particular time. And it is, I think, quite unfair to expect me to characterize him as one thing or another at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. When he did you this favor, putting you into this Communist-front organization, did you consider him a Communist then?

Mr. HARRIS. I thought he was certainly being misled somewhat by them, in his great eagerness to corral people into this organization.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you think he was a Communist? It is an easy question. Either you did or you did not think he was a Communist.

Mr. HARRIS. I don't have any way of knowing that this man was a member of the Communist Party. I saw him being easy with a Communist organization.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, can you tell us whether you thought he was or was not a Communist? Or don't you have any idea?

Mr. HARRIS. I thought I testified a moment ago that I had no way of knowing whether he was a Communist or not. I said that he appeared to be easily led by Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. What Communists were leading him?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the then head of the League of American Writers has been cited in a lot of public testimony as a probable Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. What is his name?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Donald Ogden Stewart.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he a friend of yours?

Mr. HARRIS. I have never met the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. You said he worked with Communist organizations. What Communist organizations did he work with?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't know what organizations he worked with. I remember reading somewhere that he had been cited by, I believe, the House Un-American Activities Committee. But I certainly hate to get into recollections as slight as that. You have access to all of the indexes and the records and the lists, and I think it is hardly fair for me to hazard semiguesses on a thing as serious as this.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, I have one more question. We find your name listed as being on the editorial board of a Communist paper in 1937 or 1938, and you tell us that was done by a friend of yours who did you a favor without your knowledge; and we find that you were listed as one of the members of the League of American Writers, an organization named as a Communist front, and you tell us that that was done by a friend of yours to do you a favor, Jerre Mangione, who seems to be well known as a Communist by everybody except yourself. We find that in 1937 you were the sponsor of another Communist front, the American Students Union, named by the Attorney General, and again you tell us you do not know; that maybe someone might have collected money from you or you may have contributed, and you know nothing about it.

I just wonder, if you were a head of the Security Division, if you found a man who had written such a book, King Football, belonging to these various Communist fronts, would you not think it was wise to call him up for a hearing and put him under oath and get the story from him? You told us last week that you never had a loyalty hearing.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think that such a person should be very, very fully investigated by whatever means seemed to be appropriate to the investigative agency doing the work. If that involved calling the person himself before a security officer, I think that that is perfectly proper and desirable. I believe the Federal Bureau of Investigation rarely does that type of thing, and I think most of the other investigative agencies seem to prefer to draw upon written sources, comments of informants, and so on, and not to question the individual at hand.

May I say that I consider the juxtaposition of these things, one in 1932 and one alleged in 1937, or two alleged in 1937, and one in 1938, as creating what is certainly a very false impression. I think given time, I could produce a juxtaposition of 5 or 6 events of the same period that would prove the opposite implication to be perfectly justified.

The reference to a so-called Communist publication, I resent a great deal, Mr. Chairman, because this was a single issue; all it had of the regular format of the magazine Direction, if Red it was, it had this format, and it was entirely made up of material especially selected as a semiofficial part of the Federal Writers Project work. All of the articles in it came from such sources; and the board listed, on which you say my name appears, on which my name does appear, was an honorary board and not an actual controlling board of any Red publication. This was a single special issue put out as a semiofficial duty as part of the work of the American Guide Series Project, the Federal Writers Project.

The CHAIRMAN. You may step down.

Senator McCLELLAN. One moment.

Mr. Harris, the testimony before us regarding this book, which you admit, is very impressive. You say, as I understand you, that you have changed your views, and you no longer entertain those views?

Mr. HARRIS. I do say so, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. I should like to ask you whether, since you wrote the book, you have written any articles for publication or that have been published, that refute the philosophy and the views you expressed in the book?

Mr. HARRIS. I think that I can produce articles or statements that refute in general those things, and they are not specifically directed to the points in the book, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. Here is what I am concerned about. In the first place, I will ask you this: If it should be established that a person entertained the views and philosophies that you expressed in that book, would you consider that person suitable or fit to hold a position in the Voice of America which you now hold?

Mr. HARRIS. I would not.

Senator McCLELLAN. You would not employ such a person, would you?

Mr. HARRIS. I would not, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now we find you in that position.

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct.

Senator McCLELLAN. So I think that in view of these hearings and what has been developed, it behooves you, certainly insofar as you can, to present to this committee and to the public such affirmative evidence as will corroborate your statement that you have completely repudiated the views you then expressed; and since you gave publication to those views and that philosophy that you then entertained, I think one of the most impressive ways you could do it, if you have done so, is to produce articles that you have written and had published since, which clearly indicate or prove or establish the fact that your views have changed and that you no longer entertain such a philosophy.

Mr. HARRIS. Senator, I think that—

Senator McCLELLAN. I would like personally to see you have that opportunity to present such documentary evidence to this committee, if you are in a position to do so.

Mr. HARRIS. Senator, I will do everything I can.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked the witness to do that in executive session, and we are still waiting for it.

Senator McCLELLAN. I wanted to ask him now, because I think that this is a serious thing, and I do not want the witness done any injustice. But I think, on the face of it, certainly we should have conclusive proof that he no longer entertains such views; that he has done whatever he could by publishing articles or writings to repudiate what he published as his philosophy in 1932. He admits, he says, that he would not himself employ anyone for the position he now holds if he knew they entertained such views as he there expressed. I should like, if he has made such a record by writing articles and publishing views that completely contradict and repudiate those expressed in the book, for him to have the opportunity to present them to this committee and for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to ask the witness to take his book *King Football* and mark the parts which he now repudiates, and the parts with which he still agrees. That will be a sizable job, and I know you cannot do it overnight. How much time would you want, Mr. Harris?

Mr. HARRIS. I think, assuming no hearings are being held to exhaust this witness, I could probably do it in 2 days with considerable ease.

The CHAIRMAN. Today is Tuesday.

Mr. HARRIS. I could produce that information.

The CHAIRMAN. We will give you until next Monday. Will that be all right?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes. And may I say, in part answer to this question, I think that it must be made a fair situation, and it must be remembered that I have been a Government employee since November 11, 1934, and that my work has not normally permitted me to write outside my Government work, and that I have not been on the staff of some regular publication where I would normally have writings. I think that my affirmative record with the agencies with which I have worked should have a bearing on the judgments of this committee and the judgments of the American public. I think I can prove by the testimony of a large number of people, if that is necessary, that I have served loyally in the Government agencies in which I have served, and that I have cooperated at all times with the properly constituted investigative agencies, such as the FBI, volunteering information to them when it seemed to be of any use to them, and cooperating always in any investigation they have conducted, and insisting on the proper carrying out of security and loyalty rules, both in the sense of personnel and documentary security; and that this affirmative record was very clearly demonstrated early in 1938 when I privately rather than publicly broke with the head of the Federal Writers Project over his habit of being too generous, too easy on members of obvious Communist-dominated unions in three of the major projects—New York, Chicago, and St. Louis. I am referring to Mr. Henry G. Alsberg, a man of very great kindness and a man who would give the shirt off his back to his fellow man, but who in my opinion was far too easy on these tough, lying people.

The CHAIRMAN. You said that you broke with Mr. Alsberg privately in 1938 because of his softness toward Communist causes. Do you know that Mr. Alsberg gave you as a reference for a job in 1942?

Mr. HARRIS. I know that the counsel so stated. I only know it from what the counsel stated, as far as any recollection of mine is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think it is rather unusual if you had a break with this man because he was following the Communist line, and you told him that, that he would give you as a reference for a job 4 years later?

Mr. HARRIS. There are two or three things here—I did not say he was following the Communist line. I said he was “too easy.”

The CHAIRMAN. Did you think he was following the Communist line?

Mr. HARRIS. I think he was much too easy on Communist-dominated unions who were controlling the units of the project in New York City, St. Louis, and Chicago. I even wrote him a memorandum to that effect. I do have a copy of that memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this a man whom you would recommend for a job in Government?

Mr. HARRIS. Under present standards, I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the standards, to your way of thinking, have changed? In other words, did you not require the degree of loyalty in 1938 that you do in 1952? Was it as high or a little higher?

Mr. HARRIS. As high a degree of loyalty, certainly, as loyal to the United States Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have recommended him for a job in 1938 when you say you broke with him?

Mr. HARRIS. No; I would not.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you recommend him for a job in 1942?

Mr. HARRIS. Not most types of jobs.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you recommend him for a job in 1942?

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly don't remember recommending him for a job in 1942.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't remember recommending him, if indeed I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you recommend him for a job in OWI in 1942?

Mr. HARRIS. I have just said that I do not recollect making any such recommendation. It is possible that Mr. Alsberg could have been used very effectively at that time out in the area of Turkey or something of that kind, because of his intimate knowledge of situations over there, because he would have no supervisory authority and would be working as a writer or editor, for which he was eminently qualified. The difficulties that I consider he had with words was caused by his supervision and the supervision assignment. I have never seen any sign and I have never had any evidence that he was a Communist, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. I wanted to state this: that my purpose in suggesting or making the suggestions about the articles was an effort to be helpful to you, and not to restrict the evidence you might submit solely to articles or things that you may have published since; but I think, and I say this to you frankly, that if you have done so, and if you have written and published articles since that clearly repudiate the views you expressed in that book, they would be very conclusive with me. If you have not, then of course we have got to go to other factors and other sources to determine about your sincerity now when you say that you no longer retain such views.

Mr. HARRIS. May I enter in the record just before I step down a memorandum that I addressed to Mr. Alsberg, a copy that I will certify to be mine, of November 12, 1937, in which I speak of operations in New York, Chicago, and St. Louis, and say that the Communist domination of the projects—

is scandalous and should be stopped somehow. In view of the law—that was the law at that time—

the Communist feature is not what we should base action upon. We should insist that no political group has the right to run the project over the heads of the constituted officials.

I said it that way, Mr. Chairman, because we were under clear-cut legal instructions.

The CHAIRMAN. You will be back at 10 o'clock in the morning, Mr. Harris, and your memorandum will be received at this point.

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 33," and will be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you raise your right hand, Mr. Kimball?

In this matter before the committee, do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KIMBALL. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR A. KIMBALL, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANAGEMENT, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMIN- ISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The CHAIRMAN. What is your job at the present time?

Mr. KIMBALL. Assistant Administrator for Management.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you checked the files of Mr. Kaghan and Mr. Schechter to determine whether or not they were either cleared or rejected for a job with the Voice of America?

Mr. KIMBALL. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that I have not checked the files.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen the files?

Mr. KIMBALL. I have not seen the files; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you gotten a report from anyone on the files?

Mr. KIMBALL. I have gotten a report; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From whom did you get the report?

Mr. KIMBALL. In both cases, I received the report from Mr. J. Albert Bush, who is the Chief of the Manpower Utilization Division part of my staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me?

Mr. KIMBALL. The man who is in charge of personnel on my particular staff, Mr. J. Albert Bush.

The CHAIRMAN. That is J. Albert Bush?

Mr. KIMBALL. B-u-s-h.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he tell you that he had personally checked the files?

Mr. KIMBALL. He told me that he had written evidence concerning the files; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you transmitted that written evidence—did you complete your answer?

Mr. KIMBALL. Yes, sir; I believe at that point.

The CHAIRMAN. You transmitted the information you got from Bush to Mr. HARRIS, did you?

Mr. KIMBALL. I transmitted it orally, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you do that?

Mr. KIMBALL. I would say that it might have been at some earlier time, also, but I did so within the last week.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you tell Mr. HARRIS that Mr. KAGHAN and Mr. SCHECHTER had been cleared by Security for jobs with the Voice?

Mr. KIMBALL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say—I may be mistaken—but it is my understanding that, as to the nature of a conversation which is based on security files, I am not permitted to answer that question under the Presidential directive of March 13, 1948.

The CHAIRMAN. You are ordered to answer that, in view of the fact that Mr. HARRIS has testified as to what you told him. The question is: Did you tell him that Mr. BUSH said Mr. KAGHAN and Mr. SCHECHTER had been cleared under Public Law 402 for a job with the Voice? You will be ordered to answer that.

Mr. KIMBALL. If it is proper, I will be glad to answer it.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that you may want to discuss this with your superior officers, we will give you time to go back and discuss that with them. In other words, we are not going to order you to answer it instantly. Your feeling is that under the present secrecy orders, you cannot tell us that?

Mr. KIMBALL. That is my understanding, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will give you an opportunity to discuss that with the new team over in the Department, and you can tell them you have been ordered to answer that, and you will be asked to return tomorrow morning.

I do not think we should order an answer instantly without his discussing it with his superiors. However, in view of the fact that HARRIS comes in and uses this conversation as a clearance, and the constant shifting—first it is FORD, and then it is KIMBALL, and then it is TATE—I believe we have got to get to the bottom of this.

Senator McCLELLAN. I think before you proceed, it is all right and I think it is quite proper to permit the witness to consult with his superiors before you order him to answer, but in the meantime I think you should call the subcommittee together for a conference and determine procedure in executive session in the event his superiors refuse to permit him to testify.

Here is the position the witness is placed in. He probably will be perfectly willing himself to answer the question and give the committee the information it seeks, and at the same time he could not very well violate the order of his superiors. Since this order actually comes from the President of the United States, and if the order is wrong it was made by another President and not the present President of the United States, this President should have the opportunity to revoke it if he cares to do so.

Mr. KIMBALL. I would appreciate the opportunity to consult.

The CHAIRMAN. You will definitely have that opportunity. Will you return at 10:30 tomorrow morning?

Mr. KIMBALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If your superior officer orders you not to answer this question, will you tell him that he is requested to appear with you?

Mr. KIMBALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will take Mr. Ford very briefly, I believe.

Will you raise your right hand, Mr. Ford?

In this matter before the committee, do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FORD. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN W. FORD, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ford, has anyone consulted you in the past few weeks or months in regard to a security clearance for Mr. Kaghan or Mr. Schechter?

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, to my knowledge, the first time those cases ever came to my attention was about Sunday, when I read some testimony in the paper, at which time I prepared a memorandum for Mr. Lourie.

The CHAIRMAN. The time is short, and from past experience I know you are rather a long-winded witness. I have just a few very brief questions, and will you try to answer those:

No. 1. Has anyone consulted you recently, in the past 2 weeks, in regard to whether Mr. Kaghan, Theodore Kaghan, and Mr. Schechter, who is now in HICOG, secured security clearance under Public Law 402 for employment with the Voice?

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir, they have. There have been several discussions on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you personally examined their security files to see if they had flunked that security test?

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir; I have, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, may I say the previous witness has refused to tell us whether they received clearance or not, under the Presidential directive, and he was ordered to answer that question but we gave him an opportunity to return to the Department and discuss the matter with his superiors.

Do you take the position you can tell us whether those two men were cleared, or if you are barred from doing that under the secrecy order?

Mr. FORD. I would give anything in the world if I could tell you. I would love to tell you, but it is my understanding that I am barred, sir, and I would like to ask that privilege.

The CHAIRMAN. Who called upon you or who asked you about the specific clearance? Was it Mr. Harris or Mr. Kimball? Just give us their names.

Mr. FORD. I am just trying to recall definitely, sir.

I initiated the thing by a memorandum, and then after that I believe someone I had a conversation with—I am trying as hard as I can to recall the circumstances. There are so many cases, you know.

Other than Mr. Tate, I believe I discussed it with him, but I could not possibly be positive with reference to Mr. Kimball.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you discuss it with Mr. Tate?

Mr. FORD. I believe it was discussion, sir, of the memorandum that I had written to Mr. Lourie, and I could not be positive about that. It was just a statement as to whether or not they had clearance.

The CHAIRMAN. You discussed this with Mr. Tate, who is the assistant legal officer?

Mr. FORD. No, it wasn't Mr. Tate. It was another man in his office. I am mistaken on that. Probably Mr. Bushon.

The CHAIRMAN. And you sent Mr. Lourie a memorandum?

Mr. FORD. Giving the full details of each case.

The CHAIRMAN. Who besides yourself had access to the security file of Kagan and Schechter?

Mr. FORD. Just the people in my own office, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How many people are in your office?

Mr. FORD. In my own office—

The CHAIRMAN. How many people in your office have access to that file?

Mr. FORD. I would say five file clerks that work in the area where it is stored, and my deputy, and my special assistant, and myself; and Mr. Boykin, who is above me. The only other one I could think of would be Legal, occasionally, and very seldom we have had occasion to send a file over to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone in your office could see the files?

Mr. FORD. Not anyone.

The CHAIRMAN. Not any more?

Mr. FORD. No.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you change the rule?

Mr. FORD. I didn't change the rule, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will start all over. I asked you if everyone in your office had access to the files, and you said not any more, and I assumed you meant that at one time they had access.

Mr. FORD. No. I am trying to be fair with you, sir. You are speaking to a man that has eliminated 75 security risks from the Department of State in the past 2½ years, and I am just as anxious as you are to help out.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you if anyone in your office had access to the files, and I understood you to say "Not any more."

Mr. FORD. I didn't intend to say that if I did, but I don't recall what I said at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Then does everyone in your office have access to the file?

Mr. FORD. No.

The CHAIRMAN. So if anyone got information on the clearance of these two men, they would have to get the information from either you—

Mr. FORD. My deputy—

The CHAIRMAN. Of 1 of the 5 file clerks?

Mr. FORD. The five file clerks would never actually have occasion to give a clearance, and they wouldn't know from an examination of the file whether a clearance was outstanding or just what the procedure was.

The CHAIRMAN. Those files contain FBI reports?

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are the man who does the evaluating?

Mr. FORD. Not per se. We have a staff of officers in the Evaluations Branch who do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Who are on that staff which does the evaluating?

Mr. FORD. Mr. Thomas Hoffman is the Chief of that Branch, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thomas Hoffman?

Mr. FORD. H-o-f-f-m-a-n.

The CHAIRMAN. Who are the other members of that staff?

Mr. FORD. It is pretty large, sir. I couldn't give you all of the names. Mr. David Tenney—

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that under Public Law 402, anyone who goes with the Voice of America needs clearance.

Mr. FORD. They had an FBI investigation; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And then a clearance by someone?

Mr. FORD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Who gives the clearance, after the FBI has finished investigating? The FBI, of course, do not clear.

Mr. FORD. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Someone must go over all of the files and say, "This man is all right," or "This man is not." Who does that?

Mr. FORD. Well, this is some years ago when these people came in here, and at the present time it would be Mr. Hoffman, and he is the final person. During those dates, I don't know who. It depended upon the year that they entered on the rolls, sir, and I don't know who was there at the time they gave these clearances.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have that job yourself?

Mr. FORD. Not per se. Any difficult case that would come up, where there are questions involved, I would be the one who would pass on them. For example, it might have been Mr. Nicholson, whom you remember, Mr. Chairman. It might have been Mr. Nicholson, but I frankly don't know, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. May I ask you one question. I understand from your testimony that you do have the information, and you could tell the committee, if you were permitted to, whether they were cleared or not cleared?

Mr. FORD. I could, sir, very definitely.

Senator McCLELLAN. That is all.

Mr. FORD. I would be glad to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say that you will be ordered to answer that question tomorrow, and you can discuss the matter with your superior officers and tell them that you are ordered to do it because the head of the information program has discussed the question of whether or not they have been cleared; and you can also inform them that we will subpoena the documents upon which you base your clearance, and we will not merely take your word for that.

Mr. FORD. Surely.

The CHAIRMAN. As I told Mr. Kimball, if you are ordered not to give that information, we will want the superior officer who orders you not to give it to come with you tomorrow.

Mr. FORD. Surely.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, March 4, 1953.)

INDEX

	Page
Acheson, Dean.....	332, 364
Advertising Club of New York.....	368
Alsberg, Henry G.....	352-353, 385-387
America First Committee.....	369
American Guide Series Project.....	352, 384
American Legion.....	340, 347
American Student Union.....	351, 383
Andrews, Col. Fred.....	356-358, 360-361
Barrett, Edward.....	359
Bentley, Elizabeth.....	375-376
Boykin, Mr.....	390
Brown, Heywood.....	336, 337
Bundles for Britain.....	369
Bureau of Standards.....	355, 358-359, 362
Bush, J. Albert.....	387-388
Bushon, Mr.....	390
Carr, Lester H.....	356-357, 360
Carrigan.....	354
Casey, Mr.....	376
Clark, Thomas.....	381
Columbia Spectator.....	343, 346, 353, 365-366, 376
Columbia University.....	333, 335, 336, 338, 345, 347, 348, 350, 362, 366, 375-376
Committee To Defend America by Aiding the Allies.....	368-369
Compton, Mr.....	331, 349, 354-355, 357, 359, 360-361-362
Connors, Bradley.....	354
Crosby, Ben.....	360-361, 362
Daily Tarheel of the University of North Carolina.....	346
Direction (publication).....	352, 384
Fast, Howard.....	354
Federal Writers Project, WPA.....	352, 384-385
Fisher, Adrian.....	332
Ford, John W.....	371-372, 388, 389
Testimony of.....	389-391
Goldwater, Senator Barry.....	363
Harris plan.....	348, 349
Harris, Reed.....	388, 389
Testimony of.....	331-387
Henderson, Donald.....	333, 334, 335, 336, 338, 348, 352, 376
Hoffman, Thomas.....	391
Humelsine, Mr.....	365
John Reed Club.....	353
Johnson, Dr. Robert.....	331
Kaghan, Theodore.....	332, 362, 364, 370-373, 375, 379, 381, 387-390
Kimball, Arthur A.....	371-375, 380, 387, 391
Testimony of.....	387-389
King Football, by Reed Harris.....	364, 375-376, 381, 383, 385
Introduced, Exhibit No. 32.....	344
League of American Writers.....	381-383
Leahy, Jack.....	355, 356
Lenin.....	350
Lewis, Charles.....	379
Lourie, Mr.....	365, 370, 389-390
Macy, Edward.....	380
Mangione, Jerre.....	353, 382-383
Marx, Karl.....	350
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.....	355, 358-359

	Page
McLeod, Mr.....	341-342
Meyers, Mrs.....	377-378
National Self-Government Committee, New York.....	367
Nicholson, Mr.....	391
OWI.....	353
Pegler, Westbrook.....	367
Pierce, R. Maurice.....	361
Pulham, Alfred.....	380
Ring, Andrew.....	361, 362
Ross, D. D.....	346
Schechter, Edmund..... 332, 362, 364, 370-373, 375, 379-380-381, 387-390	339
Sinclair, Upton.....	337, 338
Spectator. (<i>See</i> Columbia Spectator.).....	363, 375-376
Staunton Military Academy.....	383
Stewart, Donald Ogden.....	354, 357, 358, 359
Stoner, General.....	379
Stone, Shepard.....	335, 339, 363
Taft, Senator Robert A.....	332, 362, 364, 365, 369-372, 381, 388, 389-390
Tate, Jack.....	391
Tenney, David.....	332, 362, 364, 371, 379-380
Thompson, James F.....	359
Webb, James.....	357
Weldon, Mr.....	356
Weldon & Carr.....	336
Weyl, Nathaniel.....	368-369
White, William Allen.....	361
Wiesner, Dr. Jerry.....	368
William Allen White Committee.....	367
Willkie, Wendell.....	379-380
Wright, Harold.....	



STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION
PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Res. 40

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERN-
MENT OPERATIONS TO EMPLOY TEMPORARY ADDI-
TIONAL PERSONNEL AND INCREASING THE
LIMIT OF EXPENDITURES

PART 6

MARCH 4, 1953

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CONTENTS

	Page
Appendix.....	469
Index.....	I
Testimony of—	
Dooher, Gerald F. P., Acting Chief, Near East, South Asia, and African Division, Voice of America.....	397
Francis, Robert J., Controller, Voice of America.....	413
Glazer, Dr. Sidney, Chief, Hebrew Service, Voice of America.....	397
Harris, Reed, Deputy Administrator, United States International Information Administration.....	394
Johnstone, William C., Jr., Deputy Administrator, Field Programs, United States International Information Administration.....	419
Puhan, Alfred, Program Manager, Voice of America.....	394
Sims, Albert G.....	419
Thompson, James F., Facilities Manager, Voice of America.....	418

SCHEDULE OF EXHIBITS

	Introduced on page	Appears on page
34. Summary re Hebrew language broadcasts, December 10, 1952.....	402	469
35. Annual report from American Embassy at Tel Aviv to Hebrew Desk, Voice of America, January 9, 1953.....	449	(*)
36. Report of scientific panel, December 17, 1952, submitted by Reed Harris.....	449	(*)
37. Letter from United States Civil Service, Region I, to Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.....	463	(*)
38. Statement by Col. Fred P. Andrews, February 17, 1953.....	467	(*)

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

1. Letter from William C. Johnstone, Jr., Deputy Administrator for Field Programs, United States International Information Administration, to Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, chairman, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.....	471
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*May be found in the files of the subcommittee.



STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM—VOICE OF AMERICA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Resolution 40, agreed to January 30, 1953, at 10:30 a. m., in Room 357 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington; and Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.

Present also: Roy Cohn, chief counsel; Donald Surine, assistant counsel; David Schine, chief consultant; Herbert Hawkins, investigator; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk; and John S. Leahy, Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State for Administration.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Do I correctly understand, Mr. Counsel, that the security officer is sending us a report on the files of the two individuals in question?

Mr. COHN. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That was to be delivered by Mr. Leahy?

Mr. COHN. We understand Mr. Leahy will produce a report from the State Department containing a summary of those two cases.

The CHAIRMAN. Ruth, will you call the security officer of the State Department? He was supposed to report over here at 10:30.

In the meantime, Mr. Harris will take the stand again.

Mr. Harris, yesterday we were going into your background. I believe you agreed with us that if your thinking was the same as it was when you wrote this book, you would be unfit to hold the job which you now hold. One of the problems before the committee is to bring your record down to date, to see if you have changed to the point that you would now be fit.

There has been considerable evidence with regard to what happened when the Communists became openly anti-Semitic, when they started to persecute Jewish people because they were Jewish. There has been testimony from the head of the Hebrew desk, testimony from Mr. Dooher, who is head of the Near East, Asian, and African desks, to the effect that they felt what was done at that time under your orders was a great service to the Communist cause. And I would like to get into that with you at this time.

Is it correct that along in December of last year, shortly after the Slansky trials, you ordered that the Hebrew language desk be closed?

**FURTHER TESTIMONY OF REED HARRIS, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, the answer to that is "Yes." And I consider that it was no service to the Communist cause, because we did not cut out anti-Communist broadcasts to Israel in any manner. We did not so order. We ordered just one thing. We ordered that the language, Hebrew, not be carried, as soon after that date as the orderly closing down would permit. And we based that on the sound management consideration that that was a very ineffective way of reaching the population in Israel. We were stepping up, at the same time, the comments about the anti-Semitic activity of the Soviets and their satellites, and that news was getting into Israel very, very effectively, through the American news services, through our own press services, through broadcasts in a number of other languages by the Voice. It was simply our impression, since our job is to do a world-wide fight against international communism, using what we consider to be relatively limited funds to the best advantage—we felt, in fairness to the taxpayers and in honesty, we had to cut down the Hebrew-language broadcasts, a step that had been recommended to us or had been agreed to by the International Broadcasting Service itself in earlier months.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, there were 46 different language desks. Is that correct?

Mr. HARRIS. There were 46 different language desks; that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you enumerate those 46?

Mr. HARRIS. I could not do that from memory, Mr. Chairman, and I do not have a document here that covers all of them. I could give you the names of those languages that were going into Israel at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. No, the 46. How can you get that for 46? Do you have any man here who could give you that? We are interested in why you picked out the Hebrew-language desk at the time you had this present propaganda weapon, why you let the other 45 desks continue.

Mr. HARRIS. I am sure Mr. Puhon could give that information.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Puhon, are you in the audience?

TESTIMONY OF ALFRED PUHAN, PROGRAM MANAGER, VOICE OF AMERICA (PROCEEDING CONCURRENTLY WITH TESTIMONY OF MR. HARRIS)

Mr. PUHAN. I am.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Puhon, I assume you could hardly remember the 46, offhand?

Mr. PUHAN. I will try, sir, if you would like.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you try and list the 46, if you will?

Mr. Puhon, you are reminded that you were previously placed under oath, and the oath is still in effect.

You may sit down.

First, will you identify yourself? What is your first name?

Mr. PUHAN. My name is Alfred Puhan.

The CHAIRMAN. P-u-h-a-n?

Mr. PUHAN. P-u-h-a-n.

The CHAIRMAN. And your job with the Voice?

Mr. PUHAN. I am the program manager of the Voice of America in New York.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, can you try and list the 46 different languages?

Mr. PUHAN. I will try to the best of my ability, sir.

English, to Western Europe; French, to France—

The CHAIRMAN. You need not give us the target area. Just the language.

Mr. PUHAN. Portuguese, Spanish, German to Germany and German to Austria, Italian, Russian to the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Just the language.

Mr. PUHAN. Ukrainian, Azerbaijani.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't get that.

Mr. PUHAN. A-z-e-r-b-a-i-j-a-n-i.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you do that again?

Mr. PUHAN. A-z-e-r-b-a-i-j-a-n-i.

The CHAIRMAN. And if I may interrupt you there, what is the target area for this particular language?

Mr. PUHAN. That is the south of the Soviet Union, the area of the Caspian and Black Seas, what is known as Soviet east and trans-Caucasia.

The CHAIRMAN. O. K. Go ahead.

Mr. PUHAN. Armenian.

The CHAIRMAN. That is also of the Russian dialects?

Mr. PUHAN. Yes. Tatar, T-a-t-a-r.

The CHAIRMAN. That is also a Russian dialect?

Mr. PUHAN. Yes. Georgian.

The CHAIRMAN. Georgian. That is another Russian language?

Mr. PUHAN. Turkestani, T-u-r-k-e-s-t-a-n-i.

The CHAIRMAN. That is principally to Turkey?

Mr. PUHAN. No; that is also to the Soviet east and trans-Caucasia, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a number of people in the Soviet that speak Turkestani?

Mr. PUHAN. Yes. Polish, Czech, and Slovak, Rumanian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Albanian, Serbo-Croatian, Slovene, Turkish, Hebrew, Arabic, Iranian, or Persian, Hindi.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't get that.

Mr. PUHAN. Hindi, to India. Urdu, U-r-d-u, the official language of Pakistan; Malayan; Thai, T-h-a-i, to Thailand, Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the one after Thai?

Mr. PUHAN. No. I am sorry. I say that is to Viet-Nam. Thai is the official language of Thailand, I believe. Indonesian, Mandarin, Cantonese, Amoy.

The CHAIRMAN. Amoy?

Mr. PUHAN. Amoy.

The CHAIRMAN. To what part of China is that beamed?

Mr. PUHAN. The islands, Formosa, Southern China. Swatow.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you spell that?

Mr. PUHAN. S-w-a-t-o-w. Korean, Japanese.

The CHAIRMAN. You are doing rather well.

Mr. PUHAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. That is 36.

Mr. PUHAN. Spanish.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have that already.

Mr. PUHAN. May I make a point here, Mr. Chairman?

When they refer to 46 desks, it refers to 46 language services. For instance, Spanish to Spain is one service; Spanish to Latin America is still another. There is a difference, actually, in the speech, somewhat, one being the Castilian Spanish and the other the South American Spanish.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, some of the Spanish is the kind that my staff would speak. I might say I was down in Mexico 2 weeks ago, and after I had learned to speak Spanish, I discovered that the Spanish could not speak the language.

Is that the kind of Spanish?

Mr. PUHAN. Well, there is some difference. One is a purer form of Spanish, the Castilian in Spain. And then Portuguese to Brazil, and then again that is quite different from the Portuguese spoken in Portugal.

The CHAIRMAN. That is 38. Just, offhand, do you remember any others?

Mr. PUHAN. No; I think probably what happens is that we have three, I believe, separate English services, one going to Europe, one going to the Near East and Middle East, and one to the Far East. We have no English to Latin America. But I believe, and I am speaking here from memory, that what I have given you are the ones that I recall now, unless I have left out some important area of the world. I believe I have gone through Europe, the Near East, the Far East, and Latin America.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I asked you for these: In checking them over, I wonder why Hebrew was picked out of the 46? Take for example the desk dealing with Urdu going to Pakistan? Do we know how many people in Pakistan have radio-receiving sets, as compared to the Hebrew people?

Mr. PUHAN. Mr. Chairman, we have such information. I do not have it with me, however. I could develop that for you, but I would have to check my office.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have any idea?

Mr. PUHAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume the number of radio stations in Pakistan equipped to receive short-wave broadcasts is very low. Would you not think so?

Mr. PUHAN. I just don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. You may step down.

Mr. PUHAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Will Dr. Glazer and Mr. Dooher step forward?

Dr. Glazer, you have been sworn; and Mr. Dooher, you have been sworn. You are reminded your oath is still in effect.

Dr. Glazer, what is your first name?

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF DR. SIDNEY GLAZER, CHIEF, HEBREW SERVICE, AND GERALD F. P. DOOHER, ACTING CHIEF, NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIAN, AND AFRICAN DIVISION, VOICE OF AMERICA (TAKEN CONCURRENTLY WITH THAT OF MR. HARRIS)

Dr. GLAZER. Sidney.

The CHAIRMAN. Sidney Glazer. That is spelled G-l-a-z-e-r.

And Mr. Gerald Dooher. That is spelled?

Mr. DOOHER. D-o-o-h-e-r.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Glazer, you are head of the Hebrew desk. Is that correct, sir?

Dr. GLAZER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And Mr. Dooher?

Mr. DOOHER. Acting Chief of the Near East, South Asian, and African desks.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, we have had considerable testimony from witnesses and statements from another great number. So far the only man who has been found who tries to justify closing the Hebrew desk, among all of the other desks at the time when you were handed a counterpropaganda weapon, was Mr. Harris. I would like to get the comment of you gentlemen on that, if I may.

Did you hear what the witness had to say this morning about closing that desk?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir. There is one point I would like to make on that. I consider it a very inaccurate implication that other languages are being broadcast to Israel. The only language being brought to Israel is the Hebrew language. There is an English language to the Near East, but, because of the language proportion in the area, that program is patterned mostly to the Moslem world. Other languages are heard in Israel, but not directed to the people of Israel; for example, German. The German broadcasts are patterned for the people of Germany, and naturally will emphasize German news. Our German language broadcast to Australia naturally emphasizes Australian news. But the only language that is delivered every day for the people of Israel, that depends to a large extent on American Jews, for example, as interviewees, is the Hebrew language broadcast of the Voice of America. So I thought I had better correct that implication that there are other languages going to Israel. There are not.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this. Have you made a survey to determine the number of people in Israel who can understand only the Hebrew language?

Mr. DOOHER. Mr. Glazer, sir, has those figures.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, could you give us a rough estimate of the number of people in Israel, No. 1, who can understand only the Israel language; No. 2, those who may be able to understand some other language also but can also understand the Hebrew language?

Dr. GLAZER. Yes. There is only one official statistic available on the subject. Unfortunately, it dates back to 1948. It is found in the Government of Israel Yearbook. It states that 54 percent of the population as of 1948 knew Hebrew as their exclusive language.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they did not understand any broadcast except a Hebrew broadcast?

Dr. GLAZER. That is right. In addition, 20 percent knew Hebrew as well as another language, Hebrew being their first and most effective language.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume that that figure would not be too accurate today, because there is a large influx of refugees into Israel.

Dr. GLAZER. The figure as such would be clouded today because no recent surveys have been taken. However, owing to the tremendous efforts made to teach the language to new immigrants, in order to hasten their absorption into the country, I would estimate that the figure is not only the same as that of 1948 but perhaps even higher, perhaps as close as 85 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your testimony is that you estimate about 85 percent of the people of Israel could understand the Hebrew language?

Dr. GLAZER. Could understand the bulk of what we are trying to say, assuming they had the general intellectual background to grasp the ideas.

Now, may I read one very short statement on this subject, bearing on the language?

Since that has been an important point, I think it worth including in the record. This is from a magazine called *Israel Life and Letters*, published January-April 1952, wherein it was stated as follows:

With the establishment of the state and the influx of a large immigration, Hebrew has become more widely used and more urgently necessary than before. It is the exclusive language of all national and local government authorities (except in Arab villages and towns) and serves as the one medium for an extremely polyglot population, more heterogeneous than Jewish immigration into Palestine 20, 10, or even 5 years ago.

Hebrew is Israel's chief cultural medium. Israel has a multitude of Hebrew newspapers and periodicals, Hebrew theaters, Hebrew schools, including higher institutions of learning and agricultural schools. It is the constant at the base, the unique spirit of the newspaper, the periodical, the theater, opera, the trade school, the university, the short story, the novel. * * *

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this, Dr. Glazer: Did you feel that when the Communists became openly anti-Semitic, as evidenced by the Slansky trial and subsequent events, you were then given a tremendous counterpropaganda weapon?

Dr. GLAZER. I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Especially in view of the fact that the Communists have been preaching over and over and over that the rights of every minority group, are fully protected, that there is no racial or religious discrimination under Communist domination. Did you feel that you had a tremendous propaganda weapon not merely to the Jewish people but to all minority groups who had been sold on this idea of racial and religious equality in Russia?

Dr. GLAZER. I thought that it was a spectacular opportunity for the worldwide exploitation, and in particular for what you might call the specific minority group with which I was primarily concerned, that is, the people of Israel and the Jews elsewhere in the world. To them, of course, it applied very specifically at this given moment.

The CHAIRMAN. If the order of Mr. Harris to discontinue the Hebrew desk had been followed through, I understand that there would have been some lag between the time the order was issued and the time that you had been able to conform to it. Is that correct, that

the order would have been actually put into effect almost coincident with the inauguration of the new President?

Dr. GLAZER. Well, there were two dates actually. The first hard date would have come about 10 days after the Slansky trial. Owing to the protest put up by my superiors, the decision was delayed, and a new date, mid-January, I think January 15, was then set as the effective cutoff date.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it correct that when this order was issued to discontinue the Hebrew language desk, Dr. Compton and Mr. Morton were both out of the country; that you got in touch with them; and that they ordered Mr. Harris' order countermanded?

Dr. GLAZER. I did not, sir. It was done by my superiors, as I understand, by Mr. Puhan, in consultation with colleagues of the VOA staff. I was told this subsequently.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I understand Mr. Harris has given two reasons for the discontinuance of the Hebrew desk. One is budgetary, for budgetary reasons, to save the taxpayers' money. The other, not given today but given in executive session, was that the signal reaching the target area was weak.

Did you send him a memorandum on that particular matter, or did Mr. Dooher?

Mr. DOOHER. Mr. Puhan sent him a memorandum, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And did that memorandum point out that neither of those arguments were valid?

Mr. DOOHER. It did, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That your contract obligations, the return of the people to their homes, who were under contract, would have consumed most of the saving that otherwise would have been accomplished?

Mr. DOOHER. I don't believe the budgetary matter was covered in the original memorandum, sir. I believe that was covered later on. However, I should like to point out that if I had been consulted on this matter, as Chief of the Near East, South Asian, and African desks, and if I had been ordered to make that \$30,000 saving, I could have made that saving elsewhere, and I would have done it, because of the terribly crucial situation as regards the Soviet Union and Israel. I was not, however, consulted by the IIA on that matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you feel that if this order had been put into effect, we would have been performing a considerable service for the Communist cause?

Mr. DOOHER. I felt, sir, that the result of that order, if the Hebrew broadcasts had been ended, would have been an aid to the Communist cause. I think I called it a well struck blow for the Communist cause, in my Saturday testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you would call that a well struck blow for the Communist cause if your order had been put into effect?

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Going back to Mr. Harris, I understood you to say that we had been previously ordered to do this, or something to that effect, or it had been agreed upon. Did someone order you to take this action?

Mr. HARRIS. I did not say, sir, I don't think, or I certainly didn't intend to say that we had ever been ordered to do it. I did say that it had been considered before and actually agreed to by the headquarters of the Voice in New York on a previous date.

The CHAIRMAN. By "the headquarters of the Voice," who do you mean?

Mr. HARRIS. I am talking about at that time. It would have been Mr. Kohler.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Foy Kohler?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Foy Kohler, and Mr. Puhan.

The CHAIRMAN. You say Mr. Puhan agreed with you to discontinue the Hebrew desk?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Puhan and Mr. Kohler submitted—I believe it was their own product—a list of particular services that they would feel should be cut if certain budgetary cuts had to take place. On that list, which I believe had 15 items on it, the Hebrew broadcast was one item. That whole order was considered, that whole list was considered, at a meeting of the Program Allocations Board, which would have been in July 1952, and as a result of that meeting, after the results of the meeting were discussed with Dr. Compton, he sent a teletyped memorandum to the New York office of the Voice and included in that the statement that certain items—I must paraphrase; this is a classified document. But it merely said that IBS may safely undertake to put into effect—

The CHAIRMAN. A little louder, sir.

Mr. HARRIS. IBS may safely undertake to put into effect Items 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the revised reductions recommended in Mr. Johnstone's memorandum to Mr. Harris of July 21.

The CHAIRMAN. So that we may know what memorandum you are discussing, will you glance at this and tell me whether the paper I now hand you is the memorandum you refer to?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want you to identify it as the memorandum.

Mr. HARRIS. If I may compare these numbers, I can tell whether it is or not, I think.

Yes, this would be. And may I read those items, or do you wish to do so?

The CHAIRMAN. One, two, three, six, seven, and ten? Is that what you said?

Mr. HARRIS. One, two, three, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are referring now to an order from Dr. Compton?

Mr. HARRIS. That is an order from Dr. Compton to Mr. Kohler dated July 22. It is classified and can only be paraphrased in open hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, this memorandum lists the elimination of the Hebrew language service only next to reducing the Russian broadcast. It is away down the list. No. 13 in priority. You now tell us that the order was to first follow recommendations 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. None of those have to do with the Hebrew language desk. No. 1 is Russian, in the English language service, from 9 hours and 30 minutes to 5 hours and 45 minutes, eliminating 1 hour and 15 minutes to Latin America, 1 hour and 15 minutes to Europe, 1 hour and 15 minutes to the Far East. That is No. 1 priority.

No. 2 is reduction in the programing from Munich, from 10 hours to 1 hour and 45 minutes. And on down the line. It does not include any elimination of the Hebrew desk, so that the order which you

read to us would seem to agree with Dr. Glazer and Mr. Dooher that other action should be taken before you eliminated this Hebrew desk. And may I say also, from the date on this memorandum, that it apparently was prepared in July, and that was before the Communists became openly anti-Semitic, and even at that time you placed the elimination of the Hebrew service 13 down on the list by way of priority.

I am curious to know why you, or if not you someone else, agreed that you should make elimination of the Hebrew language desk No. 1 in priority at this particular time.

Mr. HARRIS. I wish to preface my remark with one important thing, Mr. Chairman, and that is that I have high respect for Mr. Dooher and Dr. Glazer, here on my right. I think they are men who have great knowledge of that region of the world about which they are talking, and that they have great knowledge of radio as a medium.

I must point out, however, that they do not normally have any relation to the overall program of even the international broadcasting service.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? One of the Senators has suggested an excellent question, and that is this:

Mr. Puhon, will you stand up?

Did you agree at any time that the Hebrew desk should be discontinued?

Mr. PUHAN. In the early summer of 1952, when the International Broadcasting Service in New York, the Voice of America, was ordered by the International Information Administration in Washington to make certain reductions in programming, I, under orders from my superior officer, prepared a list of 15 reductions which could be made at that time if they had to be made. I listed on this list, in 13th position, the Hebrew service, signifying that it meant that it was neither the most important nor the least important of the 46 language services. I might add, however, that Mr. Kohler and I, and I believe Mr. Francis, the Comptroller, appeared in Washington to argue against the reduction of these steps we were asked to list. We did agree, in the interest of equality and sacrifice, because of the fiscal reduction, to eliminate the English service as read by you, a portion of the English service, and a breakfast operation, because the breakfast operation did not hit the target area at a particularly useful time. We agreed to that.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? You said "eliminate the English service." You mean reduce the English service?

Mr. PUHAN. Reduce. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: You may want to look at this document, which lists the 15 steps that could be taken. These are listed in the order of importance, and you give priority to the elimination of certain operations and put others down in the list. My question is: Does the position on the list have any significance?

Mr. PUHAN. Yes, it does, sir. Because I stated in that particular memorandum that we started with the least significant in our opinion, the least significant service.

The CHAIRMAN. So that before we get down to No. 14, for example, which has to do with the Russian broadcast, before you get down to 14, you would feel that from 1 to 13 should be followed?

Mr. PUHAN. That was my opinion. I felt that if I carried this list to the logical conclusion, the last service that I would have recommended for abandoning, or if the Voice of America were to be killed, of course, would be the Russian service.

The CHAIRMAN. So you at no time ever agreed to the elimination of the Hebrew desk. Your only connection with this, I understand, was the preparation of this document, which we will mark "Exhibit No. 34," which places the elimination of the Hebrew desk down in 13th position. Is that correct?

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 34" and will be found in the appendix on p. 469.)

Mr. PUHAN. That is correct. I think it is in 13th position.

The CHAIRMAN. So that when Mr. Harris says that you agreed that the Hebrew desk should be eliminated, that is not correct?

Mr. PUHAN. Would you repeat your question, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. I say: So when Mr. Harris says that you agreed that the Hebrew desk should be eliminated, that is not correct.

Mr. PUHAN. Well, when this was proposed, in December, I was, as reported here, the man who protested the order.

The CHAIRMAN. When the order came through, you were the man who protested. You were the man who contacted Dr. Compton and Mr. Morton and persuaded them to rescind the Acting Director's order?

Mr. PUHAN. Mr. Francis and I were in charge of the Voice of America in New York at that time. My superior officer, Mr. Morton, was in Europe, and Dr. Compton was in Europe. I was under orders to eliminate the Hebrew service. I therefore, under orders, prepared to eliminate this service. But before doing so, I called my superior officer, Mr. Morton, in France, in Paris, and I told him of the order, and he asked me to stay the order until he would be back on Monday. I believe it was in the middle of the week, if I remember correctly. And he told me to hold off until he reported back.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel asks the question: What was your opinion of the attempt to close it down in December?

I think that is very obvious from your previous answer, that you did everything to keep it from being closed down.

Mr. PUHAN. I believe I did, sir. Since I was under orders, I would have had to carry out the orders.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, will you tell us now who other than yourself decided upon the elimination of the Hebrew service at this particular time? Were you under another's orders, or did you make this decision upon your own?

Mr. HARRIS. I was under no orders whatsoever to close down the Hebrew desk. I sent the order. I think it was a proper order. I am prepared to defend it and bring out the facts on which I based my decision.

The CHAIRMAN. Could I see that memorandum from which you were reading?

Mr. HARRIS. I will say, sir, in submitting this to you, or showing this to you, that in that hasty glance I gave to the paper you had, I apparently was wrong in the particular one that I was referring to, because the numbers are not jibing. You must have referred to Mr. Puhan's memorandum to us, Mr. Kohler's memorandum, rather than Dr. Johnstone's memorandum to me.

Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Johnson?

Mr. HARRIS. Dr. Johnstone. Not the new Administrator, but the Deputy Administrator for Field Operations, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This gives you no authority to discontinue the Hebrew desk, does it?

Mr. HARRIS. It was my understanding at that time that it did. It has nothing to do with the December situation, except as background.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, will you point out to the committee just where in this order you find any authority to discontinue the Hebrew desk? It specifically gives you authority to put into effect recommendation 1, which has to do with the English desk; 2, which has to do with the program from Munich; 3, which has to do with the elimination of a breakfast program; 6 which has to do with the reduction of the French broadcast; 7, which has to do with the elimination of IBS programming from Washington; 8, which has to do with the reduction of the Austrian language service, not elimination but reduction; 9, which has to do with the reduction of Italian language service, and 10, which has to do with the reduction of the German language service.

Now, if there is anything in here which gives you authority to discontinue the Hebrew desk, even at this early date, which was long before the Slansky trials, long before the Communists were becoming openly and publicly anti-Semitic—even then I would like to know if there is anything in there that gives you authority to discontinue the Hebrew desk.

Mr. HARRIS. We were reading from a single item, and I have not had an opportunity adequately to compare the documents, but there are references here to item 4 and 5 also.

The CHAIRMAN. We will give you this document also so that you may compare. I thought you were reading that as authority for discontinuing the Hebrew desk.

Mr. HARRIS. I was reading this item, as having a bearing on this discontinuance of the Hebrew desk.

This is actually a summary of a meeting. This paper you are handing me is a summary of a meeting. This had to do with a meeting of Alfred Puhau and James Thompson, Edwin Macy, and others in New York City, and reference is made to a memorandum. I was assuming that the items listed in this summary of a conversation is the same as the thing talked about here but this is not the document that is referred to in my order. My order here—I call it my order; I mean the order I am holding in my hand—was done by Dr. Compton. It refers specifically to Dr. Johnstone's memorandum to Mr. Harris on July 21, copy of which is being mailed to you tonight as it is stated in this thing. I would like permission to produce that memorandum, which I do not have here at this minute.

That memorandum included as one of the items on it, and I think you will find it is one of the items identified by number here, the reduction of the Hebrew service.

Now, I say I take absolute responsibility for the decision made in December.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us stop right there. Did you ever put into effect recommendations 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10?

Mr. HARRIS. I think that all those recommendations were put into effect on a phased basis.

The CHAIRMAN. On a phased basis?

Mr. HARRIS. A phased basis, yes. That is, they didn't all go into effect at the same time, because the people in IBS discussed them further with us.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a second and let us see if that is true.

Mr. Puhán, may I ask you again: recommendation No. 1, reduction in English language service from 9 hours 30 minutes to 5 hours 40 minutes. Eliminating 1 hour 15 minutes to Latin America, 1 hour 15 minutes to Europe and 1 hour and 15 minutes to the Far East. Was that followed before Mr. Harris' order to discontinue the Hebrew desk?

Mr. PUHAN. Yes; it was, to the best of my recollection, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

No. 2, reduction in programing from Munich from 10 hours 30 minutes to 1 hour and 45 minutes.

Mr. PUHAN. This item as it is shown here, reduction in programing from Munich, from 10 hours and 30 minutes to 1 hour and 45 minutes, did not represent an actual reduction in programing. Munich was then doing 1 hour and 45 minutes, and the plans were at that time to go ahead, to raise it to 10 hours and 30 minutes. It was not carried out. The net effect of the order, as I remember it, was that we could not go ahead at that time to raise programing in Munich to the time that we had planned.

The CHAIRMAN. So that in effect you did follow out recommendation No. 2. Is that correct? Except it was not a reduction.

Mr. PUHAN. Yes. There was no reduction in programing from Munich.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no reduction, but we are only broadcasting 1 hour and 45 minutes now.

Mr. PUHAN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. No. 3, the elimination of this breakfast program.

Mr. PUHAN. That was done. It was eliminated.

The CHAIRMAN. And No. 6, the reduction of the French language service from 1 hour to 30 minutes.

Mr. PUHAN. That was done.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that done?

Mr. PUHAN. I think, sir, the date was September 7, but I am speaking from memory.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say from the testimony we have had about the French desk so far, it could stand a further reduction or different personnel.

No. 7, elimination of IBS programing from Washington? Was that done?

Mr. PUHAN. No; that was not done. That is English operations.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. And do you agree, Mr. Harris, that that was not done?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes; I agree that was not done. I say substantially these things were carried out. Some of them are still disputed by the IBS people.

The CHAIRMAN. No. 7 was not done.

How about No. 8, reduction of Austrian language service from the proposed 1 hour to 30 minutes?

Mr. PUHAN. I believe, sir, that that was done. May I make one comment? You will notice most of these steps were reduction in air time. They did not involve the elimination of an entire broadcasting service. If my memory serves me correctly, that was done.

The CHAIRMAN. And No. 9?

Mr. PUHAN. I believe so.

The CHAIRMAN. And No. 10?

Mr. PUHAN. Was reduced, but I don't believe to 1 hour; I think to 1 hour and 15 minutes, if I am not mistaken.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, No. 12 was listed before the elimination of the Hebrew desk; the elimination of the Portuguese service. Has that been eliminated?

Mr. PUHAN. No, sir; it has not.

The CHAIRMAN. It was your recommendation, the recommendation of your board, that that be eliminated before the Hebrew language desk be eliminated. Is that right?

Mr. PUHAN. I have it in 13th position on my paper, and Hebrew was in 14th position. You see, in both cases, sir, in the Portuguese and Hebrew, it would have meant that we would not have been broadcasting in Portuguese to Portugal, and we would not have been broadcasting in Hebrew to Israel.

The CHAIRMAN. My question is: Your recommendation was that you eliminate the Portuguese language desk before you eliminated the Hebrew language desk?

Mr. PUHAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that done?

Mr. PUHAN. No; it was not done.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, you have heard Mr. Puhán's statement that he never agreed with you upon the elimination of the Hebrew desk. I understood you to say that he had so agreed. Both of you are under oath.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, he testified that he did not agree to the December order. When that question was asked a minute ago, he said that he did not agree to the December order. If I understood Mr. Puhán correctly, he did not say that he had not agreed that one of the steps to be taken, if we made budget cuts, back in July, should be the elimination of the Hebrew desk. Because that is on record. And I am sure he didn't intend to convey that impression.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's get this clear. I believe Mr. Puhán's testimony is that he put the elimination of the Hebrew language desk down in 14th position, that you raised that position and decided it should be done in December.

Mr. HARRIS. I personally did not raise it to first position.

The CHAIRMAN. Who did, then?

Mr. HARRIS. That was done by a number of people. It was done on the recommendation of competent regional experts, consulted by the Office of Field Operations of our area.

The CHAIRMAN. Give us the names of those field experts.

Mr. HARRIS. That information was collected for me by the Deputy Administrator for Field Operations, Dr. Johnstone, who in turn consulted his chief at that time of Near East Operations, who would have been—now, I don't have knowledge of which one was on duty that day—would have been Mr. Fisk or Mr. Clark.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever discuss this with the head of the Hebrew language desk or with Mr. Dooher, who is head of the Near East, Asia, and African desks?

Mr. HARRIS. He is head of that for the Voice of America only, the radio arm, out of an information program which has five major arms.

The CHAIRMAN. My question was: Did you ever discuss it with either of those men?

Mr. HARRIS. I did not. It would not be up to me to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. And you say Dr. Johnstone discussed this with certain experts.

Mr. HARRIS. He made the usual checks with the regional experts in the Department, including his own regional experts.

The CHAIRMAN. And then he made certain recommendations to you?

Mr. HARRIS. Recommendations to the Program Allocations Board, of whom I am a member.

The CHAIRMAN. And who made the final decision?

Mr. HARRIS. The final decision in July was made by Dr. Compton.

The CHAIRMAN. Who made the final decision? Now, you are talking about the decision in July, at the time it was put 14th on the list. You know what I am talking about? The question is: Who made the decision to take it out of that 14th position and cancel out the Hebrew desk at the time of the Slansky trials? Who made that decision?

Mr. HARRIS. Now you have changed it again to December. Is that right, sir?

I have said already that I am responsible for that order in December, and I have said I have got good justification for it. I have said that the implication that it had any effect whatsoever on our fight against international communism is just not true. And I am prepared to defend the position we took before the taxpayers of the United States for whom we were working in order to save money and make sure that we had an effective fight worldwide against international communism.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, the PAB, the Program Allocations Board, gave you this document.

Mr. HARRIS. In July, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Putting the Hebrew desk in 14th place. Is that right, sir?

Mr. HARRIS. In July, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In July. Later, when the Communists became openly anti-Semitic, you say you were the man who decided to discontinue the Hebrew desk. I would like to know why you did not eliminate the items recommended by the PAB before the elimination of the Hebrew desk. Why did you not follow their recommendation?

Mr. HARRIS. On analysis, that is a somewhat twisted thing. The position, No. 14 or 13, that you are talking about, was a recommendation of the International Broadcasting Service. The Program Allocations Board never put that in 13th position at any time, in any of its discussions. It received a memorandum from the Voice of America people suggesting that Hebrew item No. 13 on that list in July. On examining it, with regional study in the Department, and overall consideration of the entire program worldwide, it was

determined to move that into a different position on the list. And given an opportunity, I can show you the pertinent documents which moved it to a different position on the list, in July—Now, I am not talking about December. It was one of the items that Dr. Compton intended to be carried out during that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall that you testified in regards to this in executive session, and is it correct that you told us then that it was the decision of the PAB and not your decision to eliminate the Hebrew desk?

Mr. HARRIS. If you are being technical about how the PAB works, it makes a recommendation to the Administrator, who actually makes the decision. What he does is simply sign the document that PAB has prepared. PAB did prepare the order that was developed, which included Hebrew as one of the things to be eliminated, in July. It was signed by Dr. Compton. Therefore the decision, technically, is made by Dr. Compton. If I said that the PAB made it, I was in effect slurring over a step of procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you slurred over the step of procedure, you were telling the Senators that you did not make the decision—

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly would.

The CHAIRMAN. To eliminate the Hebrew desk; that it was done by a Board. Is that your testimony now that that was incorrect, that the Board did not make the decision; that you, Reed Harris, made the decision?

You see, it is rather important that we know. When you tell us one thing one day, we would like to know whether your story is the same the next day.

Mr. HARRIS. I object to the implication, sir. I have not, at any time, attempted to conceal any truth from this group.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you tell us in executive session that it was not your decision but the decision of the PAB to eliminate the Hebrew desk?

Mr. HARRIS. I probably did use the word, since you say I did, on the matter of the Board making the decision. The Board wrote the decision, which was signed by Dr. Compton, so that technically, Dr. Compton was the decision maker at that time. Now, if you jump over to December, sir, when I was in charge, I repeated that decision, and I issued the necessary order, and I will take full responsibility. And even disregarding the facts that have been in support of my position up to now, I am perfectly willing right now, here and now, to justify that decision on Hebrew at that time, December 5.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, you say Dr. Compton signed the order. That is not correct, is it? Dr. Compton was in Europe. Dr. Compton countermanded your order.

Mr. HARRIS. This is July, sir. I testified that Dr. Compton signed it in July. I testified I signed it in December. Now, why is that kind of a question being asked of me?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, because we are trying to get the truth from you, Mr. Harris. Now, do you say that the same kind of order was signed in December?

Senator SYMINGTON. Would the chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get this answer, if you will just give me 1 minute.

Did Dr. Compton sign the type of order in July that you signed in December?

Mr. HARRIS. He signed an overall order that included the elimination of the Hebrew language as one of the items. I signed a specific order to carry out a piece of that intention in December. But I am not trying to go back to Dr. Compton as far as taking responsibility.

I am saying right here, Mr. Chairman: I am taking responsibility for that Hebrew decision, and I will defend it right here and now. I have got the facts, and I will be glad to.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us have it clear what Dr. Compton signed in July. He signed an order putting the elimination of the Hebrew language desk down to No. 13 in the list.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, he did not sign such an order. That is simply the material that was submitted to us by the International Broadcasting Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what priority did Dr. Compton give for the elimination of the Hebrew language desk?

Mr. HARRIS. I shall have to look it up. I don't have that document here. It is probably well upon the list. I think it was item 3, 4, or 5, somewhere along in there.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know?

Mr. HARRIS. I think it was item 4, if I remember correctly, but I will have to look it up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington, you have a question?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes; I have a couple of questions.

Mr. HARRIS, in July 1952, when they were considering cutting the budget, as I understand it, one of the places that they agreed to cut was the Hebrew broadcasting. Is that correct?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. And you say now that that was about No. 4 on the list?

Mr. HARRIS. That is my recollection at this moment of the position on the priority list as agreed to by the Board.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right. Now, the Board that discussed this matter: was that an advisory board to Dr. Compton or did Dr. Compton have a decision with respect to that Board?

Mr. HARRIS. He sits as the Chairman of the Board, and therefore the Board, which is sort of advising him as he sits there, may go through the motions of really collaborating in his decision. But I think if you were being absolutely technical about it, the Board is advisory, and he is the decision maker.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, as Chairman, he nevertheless can make the decision by agreeing with the Board or overruling the Board?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct, sir. Yes, that can be done.

Senator SYMINGTON. And what he did then, as I understand it, was that he accepted from this Board, which was in effect an advisory board, a recommendation that included the Hebrew desk elimination, as a possibility for cutting the budget. Is that correct?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. And that was in July. Correct?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. In December, you decided on your own, based on recommendations that you say you obtained from the field, that it would be well to cut out the Hebrew desk? Is that right?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, one other question. When you did that, did you not think about the fact that it might be misinterpreted because of recent Slansky troubles and so forth? Was that discussed by you with the people involved?

Mr. HARRIS. Senator, I must admit that specific point was not discussed. But it seemed to me transparently obvious that if the Soviet Union and its satellites were attacking Semitic people everywhere, obviously all the people of Israel would become anti-Communist just like that. They would hardly need any more of our needling to gain that position. And there is plenty of evidence that they did so become. The local radio over there, their own radio, started to have anti-Communist material in the way they had never had it in the past. Some of their officials put out statements that were strictly and strongly anti-Communist, which they hadn't done before. I have here, for instance, a clipping from the New York Times, which was put out—this is January 20. And this simply illustrates the kind of thing that was going on, and is going on.

“Government action against Communists and fellow travelers supporting the Soviet anti-Jewish campaign was threatened in the Parliament tonight by Foreign Minister Mosh Sherritt.” And they go on to talk about—

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I interrupt you to ask one more question? You bring up now a new point, which I have frankly never heard before and have never seen before, and that is that you felt that canceling the Hebrew desk was justified in effect because the entire Semitic world had become anti-Communist due to the Slansky trial. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. HARRIS. I am saying that it went through my mind at the time. I was operating actually on clearances from the regional desk in the Department, and so on. I do not trust myself to have enough regional knowledge to make a decision of that kind, Senator. But since you asked whether it went through my head—it did go through my head, and I assumed that part. That seems just transparently obvious, and it has been borne out by events.

Senator, will you forgive me if I go on just a little longer.

At the same time we were stepping up worldwide exploitation of that theme—that anti-Semitism of the Soviet people was a threat to all the principles that we hold dear. And we were saying that to every country. We were saying it in all the languages. And we were saying it in languages that were reaching Israel.

Furthermore, the information about this anti-Semitic campaign was reaching Israel in a very full measure through the regular news services. They have regular, I believe, both AP and UP service in there. They have our own service, that is, the International Press Service of the IIA, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Glazer wanted to comment, but first, Senator McClellan has a question.

Senator McCLELLAN. I just want to ask you one question. Did it occur to you that the fact that you were suspending this desk and this

service might be indicative of the general attitude of the Voice of America and our Government that when some people, some minority, some race is attacked, as was being done by Russia then against the Hebrew people, it was the policy of our Government when that happened to discontinue the Voice in the area where the people were most affected by such action? In other words, it looked like we were running from the issue. Instead of standing up and fighting against it, we close down the desk. What kind of an impression does that give to the world?

Mr. HARRIS. If it were interpreted that way, it would be bad.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, I am not saying that it was interpreted that way, but I can very well see that you could indulge that assumption just as well as the assumption that went through your mind, and that you indulged, that, oh, well, they are going to react unfavorably over there anyway. There is no use in continuing the service. I think there is just as much ground and logic in assuming that that is the very time when you should step it up and give the information to the world.

Mr. HARRIS. Well, if the information would get to the world through this Hebrew broadcast, sir. But the information we have on the effectiveness of that program, that is, the number of listeners, and so forth—

Senator McCLELLAN. I understand you then. You contend that the effectiveness of that broadcast was such, or that particular service, that you did not feel it was justified to any longer continue the service?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. Irrespective of whether these atrocities had happened or not?

Mr. HARRIS. I didn't feel that the use of the Hebrew language to Israel was effective. Because our reports showed otherwise. I will be able to produce those as we go on here.

Senator McCLELLAN. Well, may I ask you this: Do you think that the service would have been discontinued and that service closed irrespective of these other events that transpired?

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly do, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. And it was your intention to discontinue it irrespective?

Mr. HARRIS. It certainly was, as we show by the fact that we were considering it back in July. And there is earlier consideration given to that thing.

Senator McCLELLAN. That was a consideration back in July as to probable economies that might be effected?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir. That is the purpose of this. It is economy. We do not have as much money as we would need to operate everything that we have had in mind.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now, following these conditions that developed in connection with the persecution of the Jews, what other desk did you discontinue at the same time you discontinued the Hebrew desk in order to effect some economy?

Mr. HARRIS. The only other economy being made at that time in the Voice, ordered at the same period, was to make a change in the program booklet that they had, their program schedule they distribute all over the world.

Senator McCLELLAN. What do you mean by "their"?

Mr. HARRIS. I mean the Voice of America has a booklet, a program booklet that they are sending around the world.

The only reason that this thing turned up in December, as it did, in spite of the nasty implications that have been cast around so freely, was that we did not feel, in a domestic sense, that it was wise to cut out the Hebrew desk during the period before our own national elections, back there in July, August, September, and so forth, because both sides, both the Republicans and Democrats, in the election, might have misinterpreted either way. They might have said we were helping the election or harming the election on one side or the other, and we felt that we didn't want to get into that kind of domestic controversy.

Senator McCLELLAN. May I ask you this: These events that preceded the closing of this desk, or the order to close it: were they exploited and taken full advantage of in all of the other broadcasts and all the other services to all peoples of the world?

Mr. HARRIS. That is what our policy directives called for. I have not individually checked scripts, but I am quite confident that it was played very, very strongly.

Senator McCLELLAN. It does seem that it afforded a marvelous opportunity and gave us something with which we could refute their contention that they were protectors of minorities and so forth. It certainly gave us an opportunity to do a great service.

Mr. HARRIS. We have exploited it all over the world, sir, strongly, firmly, and we will continue to do so. We have not in any way pretended to support this fiendish anti-Semitism of the Soviet Government, believe me. Any implication of that is just plain dirty pool.

The CHAIRMAN. You have referred to your policy directives, Mr. Harris. You are ordered to produce No. 228, dated January 4, 1954, and 239, dated February 2, 1953. You are also ordered to produce the list that you said was signed by Dr. Compton, which placed the elimination of the Hebrew desk, I believe you said, third or fourth on that list. That will be produced at 1:30 this afternoon. And the staff will order Mr. Johnstone to be present at 1:30 this afternoon. And, so that there can be no question about this, your testimony now is that Mr. Johnstone advised you to discontinue the Hebrew desk at the time it was discontinued?

Mr. HARRIS. He was among the members who did. He gave the regional advice. We have a policy adviser on there, Mr. Bradley Connors.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, we are not talking about July. We are talking about December, when you ordered the Hebrew desk discontinued.

Mr. HARRIS. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. Did this man Johnstone advise you to take that action?

Mr. HARRIS. We took the usual checks—

The CHAIRMAN. Did Dr. Johnstone advise you to take that action? I understood you to say that he had.

Mr. HARRIS. If you mean did he in some voluntary manner come forward and say "Please be sure they discontinue the Hebrew desk," that is not the case.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the case?

Mr. HARRIS. I will tell you exactly what did happen: simply that we had an understanding here that the Hebrew desk would be discontinued immediately after the domestic elections.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. HARRIS. We had that understanding in Washington. Dr. Compton had the understanding. Bradley Connors had the understanding. Mr. Johnstone had the understanding. Mr. Gedalecia had the understanding—that that would be done immediately after the national elections. It was not done by the Voice.

The CHAIRMAN. What did the national elections have to do with discontinuance of the Hebrew desk?

Mr. HARRIS. I have explained very carefully what it had to do. Simply as a Federal agency, of the Federal Government, we are not supposed to take steps that will encourage or discourage the fortunes of either of the national parties in a major election. And it was felt that if we discontinued Hebrew at that time some domestic organization with a desire to stir up some sort of fuss would use that event either pro or con for either of the parties. It was not clear how it might be used. But the subject of Semitism and anti-Semitism is also an explosive issue, as everyone in this room well knows, and we did hold off the implementation of an agreed position because of that. When December rolled around, we found that the Voice had not gone ahead with that pattern; in our routine checks of what economies had been established they hadn't. We found the situation was getting worse. We had an additional cut in our budget in terms of being required to transfer additional money to the main part of the State Department for services. We therefore had to urge that these steps be implemented immediately. And that is what that order was.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us get down to the time when the original decision was made then to discontinue the Hebrew desk; you say, "immediately after election." Did you ever tell the head of the Hebrew desk, Dr. Glazer, that he was to discontinue the Hebrew desk as soon as the elections were over?

Mr. HARRIS. I did not. I had no contact with Mr. Doohar or Dr. Glazer.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that anyone ever sent an order to them saying to discontinue?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not. I do not know whether those gentlemen got a direct order or not. I know that the head of the Voice must have understood it. I can't understand that he didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Tell us: Did you have conversation with Dr. Compton and did you and Compton agree that the Voice should be discontinued once the elections were over?

Mr. HARRIS. That was justified actually in this same PAB meeting, going back some time.

The CHAIRMAN. And was a decision made at this PAB meeting that you would discontinue the Hebrew desk after the elections?

Mr. HARRIS. In one of the PAB meetings, that decision was made; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That decision was made.

Mr. HARRIS. That position was taken; since we are saying that the PAB does not make the final decisions, it probably is incorrect to say they made the decision.

The CHAIRMAN. You say the PAB met and they talked about the Hebrew-language desk, and they decided it should be discontinued after the elections were over?

Mr. HARRIS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know when that meeting was held?

Mr. HARRIS. I am trying to determine that now, sir. I guess it would have been October 1952, October 21.

The CHAIRMAN. October 21, 1952. Then you want this committee to understand that the Voice felt that the Hebrew desk should be discontinued; that for political reasons you continued to spend the money until after the election. Obviously, of course, the discontinuance of the Voice could not have adversely affected Eisenhower's vote. The only vote it could have adversely affected would have been Stevenson's. I hate to think that the Voice was spending money which they felt should not be spent merely to affect an election in this country. I thought it was to fight communism in other countries.

Mr. HARRIS. There is no question here of affecting one side or the other. The subject of anti-Semitism is open to misinterpretation on both sides of the House, and always has been. It was impossible to assess at all what that situation might be. And that subject was discussed—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Harris, you did not think the Voice voters would accuse Eisenhower of having discontinued the Hebrew desk, do you?

You knew if there was any accusation to be made against the men in power. So that your testimony is that you continued that desk for fear you might adversely affect Stevenson's campaign.

Mr. HARRIS. That is not my testimony, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, is there anyone here from the PAB?

Mr. FRANCIS?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Francis sat in at least one of these meetings.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Francis, I am going to ask you to come forward, if you will.

Will you raise your right hand, Mr. Francis?

In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FRANCIS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your first name, Mr. Francis?

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. FRANCIS, CONTROLLER, VOICE OF AMERICA (TAKEN CONCURRENTLY WITH THAT OF MR. HARRIS)

Mr. FRANCIS. Robert J. Francis.

The CHAIRMAN. Robert J. Francis. And your position is what on the Voice?

Mr. FRANCIS. I am the Controller.

The CHAIRMAN. You are Controller of the Voice, and you are a member of PAB. Right?

Mr. FRANCIS. I am not a member of the PAB.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not a member. Did you sit in on meetings with the PAB?

Mr. FRANCIS. I have sat in on 3 or 4 meetings of the PAB.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us whether or not the PAB made this decision to discontinue the Hebrew desk after the elections?

Mr. FRANCIS. To the best of my recollection, there was a discussion at a PAB meeting in July, which I attended with Alfred Puhon and Foy Kohler. At that time, the recommendation had been made by Dr. Johnstone's office to change the priority of the Hebrew service from the listing we had given it, No. 13, I believe, or No. 14, up to position No. 3.

We objected to that recommendation in the meeting, took a very strong position on it. Mr. Kohler led that discussion on behalf of the Voice. He was not a member of the PAB either. We were simply invited to discuss it with the PAB.

The CHAIRMAN. You said that he led the discussion on behalf of the Voice. Did he object to moving this from position No. 13 to position No. 3, or did he agree it should be moved?

Mr. FRANCIS. He objected, very strongly.

Thereafter, we were given a memorandum. I believe it was transmitted on July 22, if my memory serves me, and I have checked my files on this. A memorandum came by teletype to the Voice of America. And the wording of it we considered to be quite important. The wording went something like this: "The Voice may safely take certain steps." We did not consider that an order. One of those steps recommended was the elimination of the Hebrew service.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that on the list? Was that No. 3?

Mr. FRANCIS. I believe it was No. 3 at that time. The list had then changed. Our priorities had been rearranged by the PAB.

The CHAIRMAN. This order, of course, was before the Communists became openly anti-Semitic?

Mr. FRANCIS. That is correct.

At that time, we did not accept that as an instruction, and Mr. Kohler went to see Dr. Compton. I do not know what he said there, but when he returned to New York, he told us that the decision had been killed, that the Hebrew service was not to be discontinued, and that no order had been issued.

Subsequently, we prepared another appeal, giving our suggestions as to what could be done. We presented that to Dr. Compton. Mr. Kohler sent it to him.

Then there was another meeting of the PAB in August, I believe August 15, and certain discussions took place. All I know is what resulted from it. In the meeting in August, a decision definitely was made not to suspend the Hebrew service.

The CHAIRMAN. That was a meeting of the PAB?

Mr. FRANCIS. That is correct. The discussion was, I believe, that this is an item that we had protested, and so on, and they felt it should receive further study.

The CHAIRMAN. And as far as you know, the PAB never made any decision to discontinue the Hebrew language desk after the elections?

Mr. FRANCIS. That I can't say, sir. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall that in these discussions of the PAB, there was any mention of the effect of your operations upon the elections? In other words, was that part of the governing force, the effect of any action you might take upon the elections?

Mr. FRANCIS. If there was such a discussion, sir, it did not play an important part in the discussion at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: Would you consider it entirely improper to guide the actions of the Voice on the basis of how it might affect an election in this country?

Mr. FRANCIS. Absolutely. It would be incorrect to do that. And we have never, in the Voice of America—the position all of us have is that we are completely impartial with respect to politics. We must be.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you feel it would be an improper use of the taxpayers' money to guide your activities by the effect that it might have on any election in this country?

Mr. FRANCIS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Glazer was about to make a comment about half an hour ago when I stopped him for one of the Senators, on the statement by Mr. Harris that when you had this counterpropaganda weapon it was unnecessary for the Voice to use it, that the people of Israel would hear it anyway. You raised your hand at that time, Doctor.

Dr. GLAZER. Yes; I was quite delighted by Senator McClellan's comment. Senator McClellan anticipated the very point I was going to make in answer to the argument that just at this time, when Israel was already amply supplied with news and comment, we could safely disregard it. I thought, as the Senator evidently did too, that it would have exactly the opposite effect. It seems to me that if we were the citizens of a small country, surrounded by essentially unfriendly nations, and then a major power located not too far away committed an act that we thought threatened our very existence, wouldn't it be our first impulse to try to find out what our great friend, the one who had helped us so much, who was the enemy of our enemy—wouldn't we like to find out what he was thinking about and how he was reacting to that event? Would we then feel pleased and flattered to know that presumably at this moment, for the sake of the saving of a few dollars, this friend decided he no longer desired to communicate with us every day by radio, had been so encouraged as to think that we were "in the pocket" and could safely be taken for granted? Or was it more likely that we would be distressed and discouraged into feeling neutralist, with the beginning of a plague-on-your-house thought creeping into our minds?

More than that, it seems to me this development would have been inimical to our interests, in that it would have encouraged the almost completely crushed Communists and leftwingers in Israel, crushed by the Prague trial, and the like. They had to lay low. And just at this time, we would encourage them to rise up and say: "See, we told you. America doesn't care for you at all." And thereby give a new impetus toward trying to find an accommodation with the Soviet Union. After all, we mustn't forget that the Soviet Union supported the idea of partition and the State of Israel for purely cynical reasons, in anticipation of favors to be derived, and when it became clear to them that these favors were not to be had, they abandoned this State completely.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, I just wondered if this impression might not have been gained from the discontinuance of the service, that America was in effect abandoning Israel to whatever fate might befall it.

Dr. GLAZER. It certainly would.

Senator McCLELLAN. I am asking for information, I am not trying to be critical of what was done. I am trying to ascertain what the truth is and what the possible effects might have been.

Dr. GLAZER. I am positive that this might have had precisely that effect. It seemed to us also that the other great objective of our broadcasts was completely overlooked, namely, an attempt to lead to an achievement of peace between Israel and the Arab neighbors. How by any stretch of the imagination could we hope to advance this cause by suddenly deciding that we were no longer going to talk to one of the two sides involved; what would the other side have thought at this moment?

Senator McCLELLAN. What was the reaction that you got from over there when this reaction went out? Or what request or what suggestions did you get from Israel with respect to how you should handle this or take advantage of this weapon that had been given to you?

Dr. GLAZER. Well, I—

Senator McCLELLAN. I do not know that there was anything, but I just wonder what you sensed the reaction was over there?

Dr. GLAZER. Well, the spectacular nature of the opportunity given to us was seen independently by our mission overseas, when, for the first time since we inaugurated our broadcasts, they sent us a specific directive on a purely counterpropaganda theme. We had gotten many from them before, but this was the first on propoganda.

May I just read a line here?

Senator McCLELLAN. That I understand is from your own representatives over there, the representatives of the Voice of America?

Dr. GLAZER. No, no. From the American Embassy. From the American Embassy in Tel-Aviv. And I will just give the idea of it, because it is a classified document.

The Embassy felt very strongly that radio should go all out in an effort to exploit this opportunity, and they listed a few specific suggestions, which we carried out within 24 hours.

Senator JACKSON. You mean in Hebrew?

Dr. GLAZER. In Hebrew. They specifically referred to Hebrew.

Senator McCLELLAN. Now, did you get any suggestions or any reaction, from the people of the State of Israel?

Dr. GLAZER. Yes, we did.

Senator McCLELLAN. I mean people not associated with you, not interested in the program, or not representatives from our Government. I am trying to get what the reaction was.

Dr. GLAZER. Exactly. Within a few weeks we got a considerable number of letters that indicated that this news and our handling of it had achieved a considerable impact. I read portions of those letters into the record Saturday, and I shall refrain from doing it again today.

Senator McCLELLAN. I think Dr. Harris should be given a chance now to comment on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McClellan, some of the Senators are going down to a luncheon with the Democrats, some of the Democrats, I understand also, and they have asked that we adjourn now and reconvene at 2:30. So we will do that.

In the meantime, a question arose last night as to the clearance of the two individuals that Dr. Harris said had been cleared. I got in touch with the new Security and Personnel Officer in the State Department, Mr. McLeod, in whom I have the utmost confidence, and asked him if they could check the files and let us know whether those two individuals have been cleared or not.

We have received a memorandum from him, in which he states that it is difficult to be helpful to the committee at this time because much of the material in the files is outside of Washington; that he would want to review all of the files before he gave us any definite answer. He says that from what he has, it appears that there is a question of the suitability of one of the individuals. On the other one, he wants to make no comment until he can get the files from New York. He has indicated that he would be glad to go into the matter in detail with the committee in executive session when he has a chance to study the files. And he ends by saying that he wants to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with this committee.

I am satisfied he does. I think it would be impossible for him to give us the information we want until he has seen all of the files. When that is done, I will make arrangements to have a meeting of the committee and Mr. McLeod, if that is agreeable.

Senator McCLELLAN. What did we do with the witnesses that were on the stand yesterday and we ordered to come back this morning?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in view of the fact that even Mr. McLeod cannot determine whether there was clearance or not, says that the files show there was a question of the suitability in one, and the other he does not want to make any comment on, I am afraid his subordinates would not be in a position to give us more information than he can.

I would like to have the security officer have the opportunity to have a complete review of the files. The witnesses who were ordered back, if they are in the room, are notified that they are considered under subpoena to be called at such time as they are notified to be present by the staff.

Senator McCLELLAN. In other words, the whole question or issue of the clearance of the two parties is being deferred until the new security officer has an opportunity to determine from the records what action has been taken, and will report to this committee?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and he says from the files they have in Washington, it is impossible to give us a complete answer.

You gentlemen will return at 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m., this same day.)

AFTER RECESS

(The hearings resumed at 2:30 p. m.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I believe we should hear Mr. Thompson. He was accused yesterday by one of the witnesses as having given us false information, a rather serious charge and accusation that he gave false information under oath. I may say that from the staff's investigation they feel that Mr. Thompson was extremely accurate in his information, and he will be permitted to go on the stand and deny the charge made against him yesterday.

Mr. Thompson, would you take the stand? You have been sworn previously.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES F. THOMPSON

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thompson, yesterday Reed Harris accused you of having unfairly stated that either Mr. Schechter or Mr. Kaghan had received security clearance. He made the further statement that there had been no attempt to bring either one of them over to the Voice.

In view of the fact that you were accused of having given false information under oath, which is a very serious accusation, we felt that you should be entitled to answer that.

I may say that my staff tells me that they are firmly convinced from their investigation that you gave them the accurate information and what you said was completely true, but that you might want to add something to it.

First, do you know for a fact that the International Information Program did attempt to arrange to have both Mr. Kaghan and Mr. Schechter come with the New York Voice?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you know?

Mr. THOMPSON. Because I placed Mr. Kaghan's name in process in the spring of 1949 myself, and in late 1951 I placed Mr. Schechter's name in process. I did it myself.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you personally put their names in. Did you know that they filed a form 57 as an application?

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Schechter filed a form 57. Mr. Kaghan did not. His name came to me—I don't at the moment know how his name came to me—but as a man qualified in the news field and at that time we had many operations in the newsroom and we were looking for people with his experience, so he was put in. As a matter of fact, when I was in Germany in October 1951, he asked me how his application was coming.

The CHAIRMAN. So that any statement that the files failed to show that both Kaghan and Schechter were prospective employees of the Voice would be a false statement; is that correct?

Mr. THOMPSON. I would say, sir, if the files are complete they will show it.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say that we have asked the new security officer, Mr. McLeod, to go through the files and give us the information on whether or not Schechter and Kaghan received clearance under Public Law 402. Mr. McLeod, the security officer, has informed us that the files in Washington are in such shape that it is impossible for him to give us a definite answer. He said that he will have to get the files from other places, New York, et cetera. He does state, "It appears that the question of suitability was raised with respect to one of the individuals." This is from the files in Washington, without getting the New York files. He has told us he will come before the committee when he has gone through the files. Do you care to give at this time any information in addition to what you gave us in New York with regard to the question of security?

Mr. THOMPSON. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you are satisfied to let Mr. McLeod's study of the file completely uphold you?

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Puhán, you have in your possession, I understand, the rejection slip on Schechter, but you feel in view of the fact that Mr. McLeod is studying this matter, and in view of the various secrecy orders, that you would rather not produce that at this time?

Mr. PUHÁN. Senator, I have the utmost confidence in Mr. McLeod's judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. In that case you will not be asked to produce that rejection slip today.

Mr. PUHÁN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would make sure that there is a copy of it in the files so that when Mr. McLeod studies the files, the rejection slip will be in there.

Mr. PUHÁN. I will turn my file over to Mr. McLeod.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not believe we will need either of you gentlemen any further. If you care to, the staff will be glad to arrange plane transportation back to New York. I understand you want to go back this afternoon.

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, sir. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McClellan, I have just been handed a letter from Reed Harris, which I have not had a chance to read. I will read it out loud now:

In rechecking background information here, following the hearing this morning, I find that I inadvertently used the name of Dr. William C. Johnstone, Jr., Deputy Administrator for Field Programs, as a person who was present and advising me in early December, whereas the Acting Deputy for Field Programs at that time was Mr. Albert G. Sims. We normally think in terms of assignments rather than individuals, and the Deputy Administrator for Field Programs or the Acting Deputy Administrator for Field Programs always takes part in the work of the Program Allocations Board. Mr. Sims happened to be acting at the time that some of these matters were being considered. I will desire permission to change the transcript when it is available to cover the point made here.

During this afternoon's session Dr. Johnstone will be available but will be accompanied by Mr. Sims in order that Mr. Sims may be questioned if the committee so desires.

Sincerely yours,

REED HARRIS, *Deputy Administrator.*

Mr. Johnstone and Mr. Sims. Both of you gentlemen raise your right hands. In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I do.

Mr. SIMS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE, JR., AND ALBERT G. SIMS

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. William C. Johnstone, Jr.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is spelled Johnstone and not Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sims, what is your first name?

Mr. SIMS. Albert G.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your present position, Dr. Johnstone?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Deputy Administrator for Field Programs, International Information Administration.

The CHAIRMAN. And that covers not only the Voice but the other information programs?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. It covers the operation of the USIS or United States Information Services overseas; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not believe that we have a record of all of the descriptions of the various functions of the IIA. Perhaps we should do that at this time.

No. 1 is the Voice, which, of course, you oversee. Will you give us the other operations?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Mr. Chairman, could I say that I have no direct authority over the Voice in New York? My position is with respect to the programs that are in operation in the 88 countries, I think it is, overseas.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything to do with the library?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir, only in respect as they are operated overseas. We have media divisions, as you know. If you wish, I can give you a brief description of those or simply give the names of the media divisions.

The CHAIRMAN. This forenoon, Mr. Harris indicated, I believe, that you were the man that advised discontinuance of the Hebrew desk. In this letter he indicates that he made a mistake in the name. That actually you were not holding that job at the time, that Mr. Sims advised him. Is that the intent of your letter, Mr. Harris?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, in July Dr. Johnstone was here. In December Mr. Sims was performing his duties.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason we called Dr. Johnstone up here today is because you said he was the man that advised you on the discontinuance of the Hebrew desk. Is it your statement now that it was Mr. Sims and not Dr. Johnstone?

Mr. HARRIS. It is my statement that in July Dr. Johnstone and his division advised us on that point, and in December Mr. Sims, carrying on the normal duties, continued that advice, or reiterated that advice.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, when the order was issued in December, it was on the advice of Mr. Sims; is that correct?

Mr. HARRIS. He was one of the people that checked it or his organization did through him.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sims, did you advise discontinuance of the Hebrew desk in December?

Mr. SIMS. Yes; I did so. I would like to make plain, if I may, the basis upon which this advice was given. As Dr. Johnstone has explained, our Office of Field Programs is not responsible for the Voice or for any of its broadcasts, but being represented on the PAB, our advice is consulted because the PAB wants to know how our public-affairs officer in Israel and the program in Israel considers reception and impact of the Voice in Israel. From that point of view I gave this advice.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you just give us the function of the PAB? By that you mean the Program Allocation Board?

Mr. SIMS. Yes; that is correct. The Program Allocation Board is a group set up to advise the Administrator on budget and program matters. Most typical of the kinds of questions it handles is how much of our resources should go to this media division, all of which are asserting strong claims against limited funds.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you decide how much money should go to the Voice as against libraries?

Mr. SIMS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us the names of all of the divisions over which the PAB has jurisdiction?

Mr. SIMS. PAB has no jurisdiction in that sense, sir. It advises the Administrator who makes the decisions himself.

The CHAIRMAN. All its functions is with regard to advice, then. Do you understand me?

Mr. SIMS. I am sorry, sir. I don't think I do.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say that the PAB advises on how much budget should be divided up within the international information program. I want the names of the various branches to which funds are allocated. For example, you have the Voice of America. You have a press section. Give us a list.

Mr. SIMS. There are the five media divisions.

The CHAIRMAN. Give us the names.

Mr. SIMS. The radio or Voice of America or International Broadcasting Service, as it is properly known. The Information Center Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you describe that last one?

Mr. SIMS. That is the media service which administers the book program and supports the Information Centers overseas.

The CHAIRMAN. The third?

Mr. SIMS. International Motion Pictures Service. Do you want me to describe that briefly?

The CHAIRMAN. It is not necessary. The next one.

Mr. SIMS. The International Educational Exchange Service, which administers the exchange program.

The CHAIRMAN. What type of exchange program?

Mr. SIMS. These are exchange-of-persons programs. The Fulbright program is included among them.

The International Press Service is another of the media services. In addition to those five services, there is a separate part of the budget which goes for overseas missions or the operations of our staffs carrying on public-affairs responsibilities overseas. This is a sixth major element in our budget among our budget claimants.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the title of that again?

Mr. SIMS. Our overseas missions. They are the public-affairs organizations attached to each diplomatic mission in the countries in which we operate.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what you call a publicity or public-relations officer attached—

Mr. SIMS. They are the means through which our program gets articulated except for the Voice program.

The four media services in Washington support these overseas missions and feed them materials and program assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know roughly how much in the way of counterpart funds the IIA uses per year, or say over the last year? In other words, in addition to the money appropriated to you, how much counterpart money have you used during the past year?

Mr. SIMS. I would not be qualified to say offhand.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you not on the board that decides how the funds should be allocated or advises how they should be allocated?

Would you not be interested in knowing how much counterpart money was available?

Mr. SIMS. Yes, sir. Our functions, however, were primarily with respect to the allocation of our dollar resources, the moneys appropriated by the Congress for our use.

The CHAIRMAN. But if you want to intelligently do that, is it not necessary that you know how much counterpart money is available? Do you follow me, Mr. Sims? If you are sitting on a board and your task is to decide how such money should go to the Voice, how much to the overseas missions, how much to the international exchange program, before you can intelligently perform that task would it not be necessary for you to know how much by way of counterpart funds were available to you?

Mr. SIMS. Our primary use of counterpart funds, I believe, is in the Fulbright program. The International Exchange Service programs its Fulbright program annually and claims the necessary amount of counterpart to run the program. There is no adjudication function in that respect as between media services.

The CHAIRMAN. The Voice uses counterpart funds; does it not?

Mr. SIMS. I am not aware of the extent to which it does, if at all.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Mr. SIMS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. HARRIS, can you tell us whether the Voice utilizes counterpart funds?

Mr. HARRIS. I could not without checking with our budget officer. It is not a normal thing for the Voice to do unless it uses it in some form of construction money.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean at this time you do not know whether it uses counterpart funds?

Mr. HARRIS. That is correct; I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the International Motion-Picture Section uses counterpart funds?

Mr. HARRIS. The International Motion-Picture Service does not normally use those funds.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether they have been using them?

Mr. HARRIS. They do not use them. There is an MSA information program closely tied to us which uses counterpart funds extensively. We work together very closely. We could give you a detailed report on that by consulting MSA, but it would take some time to prepare.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any type of supervision over MSA information program?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not have any direct supervision over MSA operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any indirect?

Mr. HARRIS. I should say we have an indirect influence on them, because in Europe the MSA program, like the United States Information Service, which is our side of the house, has combined direction. Each public-affairs officer in the mission supervises both programs.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the International Press Service use any of the counterpart funds?

Mr. HARRIS. They do not use such funds either, unless you consider the fact that our press people can work with MSA and thereby make indirect use of counterpart funds. Our press people do not have coun-

terpart funds made available to them and they cannot use such funds directly.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how much in dollars you have used from the counterpart funds in the past year, that is, the IIA?

Mr. HARRIS. Is it all right if I take the stand?

The CHAIRMAN. Would you rather come up here?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes; I would, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. HARRIS. The question had to do with the use by the press service, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. No; the entire international information program.

Mr. HARRIS. I would have to check the budget officer to give you exact figures. You will recognize, sir, for instance—

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want an exact figure. Just give me some rough idea of how much of these funds you have utilized over the past year. As Acting Director you must have some faint idea, I assume.

Mr. HARRIS. If all types of foreign funds available to us are included in the total, whether they can technically be called counterpart in all cases, I would have to discover by going back and checking the records, but over and above our \$87 million of appropriated dollars, we have about \$13 million more available to us principally for the Fulbright program and related exchange programs, the Finnish program. Mr. Sims points out that the India program takes the form of dollars, but is money that is available to us above the standard appropriation as now administered.

I therefore included it in the total. We can give you detailed breakdowns on this thing any way you want them.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your testimony is that in addition to the money appropriated by the Congress for the past fiscal year you had available roughly \$13 million in foreign funds, but whether they can be technically called counterpart funds or not you are not prepared to say?

Mr. HARRIS. I am not. The German program, which we have just recently taken over, had some \$20 million available from sources of this kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get back to Mr. Johnstone.

Mr. Johnstone, did you advise in July that the Hebrew-language desk should be discontinued?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I advised that on the basis of our field reports, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise that it should be continued until after election because a discontinuance might have some effect upon the elections?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I participated in the discussion at the PAB at which we raised the question of the public relations involved in this, both domestic and foreign, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The question was, Did you advise that the desk should be continued until the election and then discontinued because you feared that a discontinuance prior to the elections might have some effect upon our elections in the United States?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I did not so specifically advise. I raised the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that agreed to by the PAB?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. The first action of the board was taken on a whole series of budgetary reductions, one of which was the elimination of

the Hebrew broadcasts. There was a recommendation and it was my understanding—

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to ask you to answer this question. The question is, Did the Board agree that the Hebrew desk should be discontinued, but that it should be continued until after the elections because you felt that a discontinuance before the national elections in this country might have an adverse effect upon some candidates?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that decision made?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir; not in those terms.

The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that it was not?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Not to my recollection, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it is your testimony that the PAB made no decision to continue until the elections? That there was no discussion upon the effect of a discontinuance prior to the election?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Excuse me, sir; there was discussion. Your question, I take it, refers to the decision. The recommendation of the PAB I do not recollect was made in the terms as you stated them, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What terms was it made in? Mr. Harris has testified this forenoon that it was decided to continue the program until the day after the elections, and then discontinue it. He gave us a reason, the fact that the PAB felt that if the Hebrew language desk were discontinued before the elections, it might have an adverse effect upon some candidate.

My question is, Is that true? You were a member of the board. Or is that untrue?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Sir, I was not on the board. I was with Dr. Compton in Europe from the end of October until December. Therefore I did not participate in the discussions during that period. Therefore, I can only testify prior to the end of October, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you present when anyone urged that the Hebrew desk should be continued until elections and then discontinued?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I do not recollect any such statement as that being made, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sims, you have been a member of the Board also?

Mr. SIMS. I am an alternate member, Senator, when Mr. Johnstone is out.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you present when Mr. Harris testified this forenoon?

Mr. SIMS. No, sir, I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: Were you ever present when anyone urged this particular desk be continued until election day, and then discontinued, giving as a reason that a discontinuance prior to the election might have an adverse effect upon some candidate?

Mr. SIMS. I do not recollect that.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: Would you consider it highly improper for the Board to have decided to continue a desk until the day after election on the ground that a discontinuance before that might have an adverse effect upon some candidate in an election in the United States. Would you consider that a highly improper use of funds?

Mr. SIMS. I think this was part of the consideration that the administrator himself had to take. This was not part of the consideration for which we in the field programs office had a responsibility. In other words, we were being asked: Does this program from the field point of view, from the point of view of our staff in Israel, have validity. Our answer was "No," and in terms of the budget urgencies that confronted us, our point of view was that this should be discontinued as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you listen to my questions?

Mr. SIMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony this forenoon by Mr. Harris was to the effect that they had decided to continue the Hebrew desk until the day after election. That the reason that they felt that was that if they discontinued the Hebrew desk before the election, it might have an adverse effect upon some candidate in the United States election.

My question to you is, would you consider that a highly improper use of the Voice funds, or do you think that is proper?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Are you having some difficulty answering that?

Mr. SIMS. I have, because it is not my responsibility to make that kind of decision. If you want a personal judgment of mine, I would say that was the kind of decision that the administrator could well have taken properly, and that would not necessarily have been a misuse of the Voice funds.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your testimony is that even though the administrator felt the program being beamed to Israel in the Hebrew language was of no benefit and should be discontinued, you say it would have been proper for him to have continued nevertheless to spend money because of the effect of a discontinuance on an election in the United States?

Mr. SIMS. I can conceive that would have been so, although that was not my responsibility to make that decision and I did not investigate all of the factors that would have been pertinent in coming to that conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that would have been a proper use of the funds?

Mr. SIMS. It could have been; I am not prepared to say that it was.

The CHAIRMAN. You nodded your head, Mr. Johnstone. I assume you agree?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. We are constantly aware, Senator, that any action or use of funds in this program must not reflect any attempt to be partisan as far as the United States is concerned. I can conceive that some action of this sort might have an adverse effect or might have had some public relations effect in terms of the United States elections. I think that should have been considered. Like Mr. Sims, that was not a consideration with which I was concerned, and therefore I did not go into all the factors which might have gone into such a determination.

The CHAIRMAN. You think as well as fighting communism you should take into consideration the effect that your actions might have upon elections in this country?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. May I answer that fully, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. I may say this is a fantastic concept. You feel that running the Voice, when you have been appropriated money by the Congress to fight communism, that you feel that you must take into consideration the effect that your spending may have upon national elections?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. May I answer that fully, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. I cannot conceive Mr. Sims answering that. And I cannot see Mr. Harris having made the decision based on that.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. May I answer that?

The CHAIRMAN. You certainly may.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. A discontinuance of the Hebrew broadcast could have laid us open overseas to a charge of anti-Semitism. I don't think we should have laid ourselves open to that kind of charge either overseas or domestically.

The CHAIRMAN. Could the charge be any different the day before election from the day after election?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir, I do not think so. I may not have understood your question correctly, sir. As far as the action of the Voice of America or any other part of this program being determined by the question of the effect on the United States elections, that should not be a consideration, in my opinion. That is, we should take the consideration on the purposes of the program and what we are trying to do with it.

The CHAIRMAN. You are William C. Johnstone, J-o-h-n-s-t-o-n-e?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You know something about the McCarran committee, I assume?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. May I ask a question right there, Mr. Chairman? Along the line of the questioning, if I may interrupt, Mr. Chairman, you pointed out that to discontinue the Voice or to discontinue the Hebrew desk during the time of the presidential campaign might subject you to criticism of anti-Semitism; is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. That is what I tried to convey, I think, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. Did you give any consideration to that when the order was issued to discontinue that immediately after Russia had demonstrated her anti-Semitism? Did you give consideration to that action in discontinuing it at that time, that that might be the reaction over in Israel?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. As I have testified, I was not here at the time the final decision was made in December, but prior to that time—I will answer your question, sir—that we did consider the public-relations effect in Israel.

Senator McCLELLAN. That had not occurred in Russia at that time?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. We were aware of it.

Senator McCLELLAN. Understand, I am not trying to be too critical. But it does occur to me that immediately after the Russian actions that gave to us an opportunity to show our friendship for Israel and Hebrew people, to then immediately discontinue the desk that was serving Israel would indicate to me that we were probably laying ourselves liable to the criticism that you say you thought should have been avoided during the presidential campaign.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. May I answer that, sir?

Senator McCLELLAN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. The whole United States Information Service in Israel consists of a lot of activities in addition to the Hebrew-language broadcast. The persons in Israel whom we talked to, and who know the kind of material we are putting out, and who know the kind of things we are saying through this Information Service, advised us that the Voice of America in Hebrew was not listened to to any large extent, and consequently was considered, and is so considered by our Ambassador there, as a marginal activity.

Senator McCLELLAN. I cannot quite understand why we would say it would not be listened to in the Hebrew language when apparently from the best evidence before the committee about 85 percent of the people do understand the Hebrew language, whereas not that large a percent understands any other language.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I was basing my recommendation on what we have received from our officers in Tel Aviv as to the listening habits of the population of Israel. A great many apparently listened to the English-language broadcast and to our other broadcasts, as well as read the newspapers and get the material which we are distributing in the form of pamphlets and press material, and the evidence that we were basing our recommendation on was that the number of listeners to the Hebrew-language broadcast was relatively small, and therefore that was a less effective means of reaching the people of Israel than some of the other means which we were using, and have continued to use.

Senator McCLELLAN. I was just trying to follow your reasoning for not wanting to discontinue it during a presidential campaign over here, and for being willing to discontinue it immediately after the Russian demonstrations and their antagonism toward the Hebrew people.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. As I said, I was not present at the time that the decision was made for discontinuance in December.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Glazer and Mr. Dooher, will you come forward?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask something at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. We will give you all the time in the world.

Senator MUNDT. I would like to ask whichever one of you gentlemen it was, to repeat what you said this morning about the advice you received from the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, because if I understood you correctly, it is in conflict with what Mr. Johnstone just said. Maybe I did not understand you correctly.

Mr. GLAZER. Sometime late in November 1952 we got the first message from our Embassy in Israel giving us a directive, you might call it, or advice on how to capitalize on this tremendous opportunity presented to us. I underline the word "first," because we had gotten a number of messages from them before on various other aspects of the program. But they, as we, quite independently saw in this a superb opportunity to drive home the force of all the things that we had been trying to say against the Communists and to do it in a way they considered to be most effective.

Senator MUNDT. I am trying to figure out what way did they consider most effective? Did they consider that broadcasts over the Voice in the Hebrew language or just discussing the anti-Semitism?

Mr. GLAZER. No; in regard to the Voice they specified the Hebrew language. They made a number of suggestions that only point to that. I can give you the exact text of that message.

Senator MUNDT. Did that come from our American Ambassador?

Mr. GLAZER. Yes, sir; over the signature of our Ambassador to Israel.

Senator MUNDT. From whom did you get your information?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Ambassador Monet Davis replied in 1952 to a telegram estimating the effectiveness of all the various media which we were using in Israel. At the end of this telegram—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, first. If you are going to read classified wires, you may do it, but if so I want it understood if you read any classified document, I shall demand all the other related classified documents. We are not going to let you come down here and pick a part of the classified document and say, "I cannot give you the rest because of a Presidential order." If you read a part of a classified document, and refuse to bring down all other related documents, I will recommend contempt action on that ground. Do you follow me?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not going to ask you to violate any Presidential order, let me repeat that, until the new President has a chance to go over those orders, and decide how he wants them changed. But if you violate any of those orders by reading sections of classified documents, then the Presidential order will be no defense in a contempt proceeding against you.

Senator MUNDT. Is that a classified document that you are working on there?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have had too much of that already. Witnesses have come here and taken out of context a section of a classified document, and when we order the entire document produced, the defense is we cannot do that under the Presidential directive. We are all through with that from now on. I think the Senators will agree with me.

Senator McCLELLAN. I make this observation, that if classified documents are denied to the committee, their contents of course should be used in every instance. I do not agree, frankly, with the order denying them.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not, either.

Senator McCLELLAN. I mean to this extent. Certain information should not be made available to the public. But there is certain information in classified documents I feel the Congress is entitled to have in weighing certain issues that come before it.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say I have taken no issue with the new administration on these orders because I know the tremendous burden of taking over the administration. I know that they cannot overnight undo everything that has been done over 20 years. I assume that these orders are under study. But I will not have any witness reading part of a classified directive, and then refusing the entire directive on the ground it is classified.

I may say, and repeat for emphasis, if that is done, if a witness reads part of a classified document and refuses to submit all the related documents, I will move strongly for contempt action against the witness.

Senator McCLELLAN. Let me ask this question of the chairman. If the witness has the information that is contained in the classified document that supports his position, is he prevented from expressing or giving the committee the information he has simply because it is contained in a classified document?

The CHAIRMAN. I think he should not be, Mr. McClellan, but that is the interpretation of the present order.

Senator McCLELLAN. If so, you get in this situation. You may ask the witness a question which he can answer definitely and conclusively so far as his point of view is by reference to a classified document. If you do not let him refer to it or give the information the document contains, then he is not in position to answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McClellan, I have never favored the Truman secrecy orders.

Senator McCLELLAN. I may agree with you on that.

The CHAIRMAN. I have never favored them. I have not interpreted as the Department has that the witness can give no information from a classified document. I assume that the new administration is presently looking over those orders. The position that I am taking in notifying the witnesses—I hope the committee will go along with me—is this: That no witness can come up here and read selected portions of a classified document and then refuse to submit the entire document and all related documents on the ground he is violating a Presidential order. I just think that is completely improper, and ties the hands of the committee, and I personally will do everything I can to prevent that from being done.

Let me make it very clear that I am not placing any stamp of approval on those secrecy orders, except I say if they are going to be followed to prove one point, then the entire material must be available.

Senator McCLELLAN. I am not necessarily disagreeing with the chairman on that point of view, but I am pointing out if you ask the witness why did he do this, and why did he do that, and his answer is in a classified document, the information contained in a classified document that was considered in arriving at the decision to take a certain action, then it is manifestly unfair to the witness, because he cannot give his answer without reference to those documents.

The CHAIRMAN. That is one of the reasons that I assume that those ridiculous secrecy orders will be amended by the new team in power. I am not responsible for the drafting of those orders.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, let us get back to where we were this morning, and let me inquire first of Dr. Glazer whether he was reading from a classified document this morning, and repeating from a classified document this afternoon when you were quoting what came to you from the American Embassy in Tel Aviv.

Mr. GLAZER. I read a paraphrased version of a classified document.

Senator MUNDT. I wonder if we could not get an equally paraphrased version of whether the American Embassy was advising one of our officials one way and another one another way? There is a direct conflict in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say that I think the three Senators here are fairly good security risks. May I see the document you are reading from?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. This is a summary of the document, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is your summary of the document?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have the document there?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No; I don't have the document here, sir, but that has been furnished to one congressional committee, and we have arrangements I understand with your committee, Senator, for the furnishing of certain classified documents to your committee.

Senator MUNDT. It seems we are getting in an awful bad fix. When we ask the question, one man says he is going to paraphrase a classified document, and another witness says, "I want to paraphrase something that refutes it." Personally I have very little confidence in anyone's paraphrasing. Since we have accepted this morning one paraphrased version, we should find out if this is the same Ambassador and if he is making two different statements, and if we can find out anything that will make his statements consistent.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, Mr. Glazer, that you have the entire document with you, the document which you read and paraphrased. I think if the witness can give us a summary of the document, the document should be available to the committee so the committee can tell whether that gives an accurate summary.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I would be very glad to. I do not have the document with me to which I referred.

Senator MUNDT. Pardon?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I do not have the dispatch to which I referred, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we should accept a summary of a document without being able to see the document, especially in view of the very conflicting and changing testimony we have had here. Just to properly identify you, Dr. Johnstone, you are the same William C. Johnstone who was officially listed by the report of the McCarran committee as a result of hearings held June 25 to July 20 on page 100 as part of a pro-Communist group, entitled group P? Are you the same William C. Johnstone?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I have never seen that, but I was never a member of a pro-Communist group.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me read this and see if we have the same man:

At least 59 of the individuals listed were identified by one or more witnesses testifying under oath before the subcommittee, or by documentary evidence on record before the subcommittee, as having been affiliated with one or more Communist-controlled organizations * * * and these, with one exception, have not been included in Mr. Holland's list of anti-Communists.

Then they give a list of names, including yours, William Johnstone, and add to the fact that William Holland, who was listed as one of the pro-Communists, has stated that he feels you were not a pro-Communist. He feels you are anti-Communist. Are you the same man, or would you know?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I presume that refers to me. I am certainly not a pro-Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether you are the man officially listed by the McCarran committee as in group P, pro-Communist?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I assume that is.

The CHAIRMAN. You think they did this without any basis?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that they did it without any basis in fact?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I don't know of any basis in fact that they would do that.

Senator McCLELLAN. Were you given an opportunity to appear before that committee and refute any testimony that was presented?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir; I was not. I did not know that such testimony had been presented.

Senator McCLELLAN. This is the first you knew about it?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir; because I have not read that report, sir. I read a summary of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the board of Indusco—

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir; I was never a member of the board of Indusco.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN (reading):

Mr. Johnstone was not only a member of the board of Indusco which has been cited in the hearings as a Communist-controlled organization, but he was also the man who, on January 20, 1944, arranged the luncheon meeting at the Cosmos Club for the Tass correspondent, Vladimir Rogov, who was identified as an agent of Soviet military intelligence.

When they say you were a member of the board of Indusco, this is a false statement?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I was a member of what was called an advisory board, and I resigned from it as soon as I felt Indusco became a Communist front.

The CHAIRMAN. How long were you a member of the board?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I would have to check the dates, but my memory is that I resigned late in 1944 or early 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. Up until that time you did not feel it was a Communist-controlled organization?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I did not feel it was. I did not have any direct information. As a matter of fact, I did not serve in any active capacity on that advisory group. It was not the board of directors.

The CHAIRMAN. What action did you take insofar as resigning?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I resigned because I said I felt that the purposes of that organization had been subverted.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you write a letter?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a copy of that letter?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I think I do, sir. I would have to check my files.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you arrange this luncheon for the Tass correspondent whom the McCarran committee said was identified as an agent in the Soviet Intelligence?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes; I did so at the request of E. C. Carter, and I attended the luncheon because I wanted to find out whether a Tass correspondent would admit he was a Soviet agent.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask him if he was an agent?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. My best recollection is I asked him and he said "No." My interest was to see what his line was.

The CHAIRMAN. You said you arranged the lunch because Mr. Carter requested it and No. 2, because you wanted to find out if he would admit he was a Soviet agent.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I always felt that Tass correspondents were agents, and I wanted to see what he would say. I never met one before.

The CHAIRMAN. His name was Vladimir Rogov; is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. My recollection is something like that, sir. I do not have the name.

The CHAIRMAN. Who else was at that meeting that you arranged?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. My recollection is that it was arranged by Mr. Carter and Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. John Carter Vincent were at the luncheon, and I was asked by Mr. Carter because I was a member of the Cosmos Club, and they wanted to have a place to have the luncheon. I agreed to go because I was interested to see what a Tass correspondent would say and what line he was peddling.

The CHAIRMAN. The report says you arranged the luncheon.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I merely used my membership in the Cosmos Club to collect the money from the others and sign the check.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make arrangements with the Cosmos Club for the luncheon?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir; it was held in the public dining room in the club.

The CHAIRMAN. Who were present? Was Owen Lattimore present?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. John Carter Vincent?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. E. C. Carter?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any others present?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. That was all, and myself.

The CHAIRMAN. How many hours did the luncheon last?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. It is my recollection that the luncheon was about an hour and a half, and I had another engagement and left. We left the luncheon table, and I don't know how long the rest talked to Mr. Rogov, because I had to leave.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you say you left at the end of an hour and a half?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. That is my best recollection, sir. It was about that. I remember that I had another engagement and couldn't stay.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, that was more than a luncheon. It was a conference; is that right?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. That is what it apparently turned out to be. As I have just said, my interest was to see what a Tass correspondent, what kind of line he would peddle and ask him the specific question if he was an agent of military intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you not actually spend 2½ hours with this man and with Lattimore and Vincent?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Sir, I am just giving you my best recollection. It may have been longer than an hour and a half. I do recollect I had another engagement. My recollection on the time may not be clear.

Senator MUNDT. What did the Tass man say when you asked him—

Mr. JOHNSTONE. My best recollection is that he laughed and said, "Of course not, I am just a newspaper correspondent." My best recollection is that I said, "That does not seem the way you operate."

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Rose Yardumian?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir; I know she was a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know she was a Communist?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I so reported to the FBI.

The CHAIRMAN. Was she a close friend of yours?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say the reason I mention the figure of 21½ hours, it has to do with exhibit No. 26 produced before the McCarran committee. I shall read it. It was written to Edward C. Carter.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I received your letter of January 17 with copies of the telegrams you sent Mr. Hiss and Mr. Currie. I called Alger Hiss yesterday morning and he told me that he had received your wire but was sure that I would understand that he could not make the first advance in arranging a private talk with Rogov. He mentioned the Rogov articles in War and the Working Class and that Rogov's material had caused considerable controversy in circles here. He said that if Larry Todd wanted to bring Rogov to Hornbeck's office, they would not refuse to see him. I am not sure that I understand the machinations of our State Department. Bill Johnstone saw no point in my trying to get in touch with Mr. Hornbeck directly, since presumably Hiss had consulted with Hornbeck.

Mr. Curria has arranged to see Rogov at 12 o'clock today. Colonel Faymonville is returning to Washington from New York this morning and is supposed to get in touch with our office then.

Rogov visited our offices yesterday afternoon and Bill and I had a little talk with him about the small meeting which we had hoped to hold Thursday at 5:30.

Is that correct? Did you and Rose Yardumian and Rogov have a conference in the office or a little talk, as she says?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I have no recollection of that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No; I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall how often you saw Rose Yardumian?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. She was the secretary in the IPR office here in Washington. I was at work at that time conducting a series of study groups with representatives of Nationalist China and various other foreign officials and other people trying to study the effects of the war. I saw her quite frequently because she did typing and that sort of material. It was that luncheon that is one of the reasons that I left the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you leave the IPR?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. And the question was, roughly, how often did you see Rose Yardumian?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Quite frequently, sir, because she was the secretary and arranging the meeting which I was responsible for calling.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew she was a Communist at that time?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir; I did not know she was a Communist at that time, but I began to suspect it the longer I associated with her and the more I suspected it. Later I gave the information to the FBI.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you learn she was a Communist?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I never learned through any direct means she was a Communist. She simply talked like one and acted like one. I have no knowledge of her actually being a Communist Party member. I reported my impressions.

The CHAIRMAN. Actually you gave the FBI no information about her until after she had been publicly labeled as a Communist, did you?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I am not sure of dates on that, Senator McCarthy.

The CHAIRMAN. Try to think hard, will you? You see if you can recall if you ever gave them any information about Rose Yardumian before it was well known she was a Communist.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I gave information on her as I recall, I think, the fall of 1945. And I was told that she was being accused of being a Communist at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know this, that you never did give the FBI any information to the effect that she was a Communist until it was general knowledge that she was a Communist?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I think that is probably correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So you were performing no service when it is already known she was a Communist.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. Did you go to the FBI voluntarily with this information, or did they come to you with interrogation?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. They came to me with interrogations.

Senator MUNDT. Were you a member of this Amerasia group we heard so much about in the McCarran committee?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Did you contribute any articles to them?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I contributed two articles, and I think it was in 1940 or 1941, and that was done after I talked with Mr. Charles Moser at the Department of Commerce, and various other people. It was on the question of our war shipments to Japan. That was done in a sense as a kind of a test whether they would publish a thing like that. I was fully aware of Amerasia and what it stood for, and informed my students when I was at the university what kind of magazine it was.

The CHAIRMAN. One line of the magazine was that the Chinese Communists were agrarian reformers. Did you say that?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I have checked my writings and I called them Communist with a capital "C." I have never called them agrarian reformers.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you sure of that, now?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I have recently checked all of my books, and I do not find that, sir. I never regarded them, certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you check their writings in 1943? Did you not write a pamphlet in 1943 in which you called that line, that they were agrarian reformers?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I don't know what pamphlet you might be referring to, Senator, but I don't recall that. I would be glad to check it.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you did not refer to them as agrarian reformers.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I reread one of my pamphlets the other evening and I recollect, I can check it, but I recollect that I had a sentence that these were sometimes called agrarian reformers. I called them Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you wrote a pamphlet saying that they were sometimes called agrarian reformers?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I think that was the sentence. I would have to check them.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one question on an altogether unrelated subject because I have a call from my office.

Will you make an effort to get the entire document from which you were about to paraphrase an answer, and you get your entire document so the committee can have the two documents, so we can find out what Telaviv actually did say to the State Department?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me read this letter which I started to read, on which I based my questions with respect to Rogov.

Rogov visited our office yesterday afternoon and Bill and I had a little talk with him about the small meeting which we had hoped to hold Thursday at 5:30. Rogov said that he thought that it was unwise for us to hold the meeting; that certain Chinese groups in Washington were very distressed at the fact that he was talking so much. He thinks that it would be bad for the Institute of Pacific Relations to have him speak under its auspices. Bill and Anne Johnstone—

That is your wife?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. It must be. That is not her correct name.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that her first name?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Anne.

The CHAIRMAN. A-n-n-e?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN (reading):

Bill and Anne Johnstone had hoped to get a small group of people together at their home this evening—the Hornbecks, Remers, Blakeslees, and a few others—but time is very short and many of these people have already made plans for this evening, so the Johnstone idea will probably not come off. However, Rogov is coming in to our office at 2 o'clock today; Bill is planning to take him to the Cosmos Club to talk with Owen Lattimore, Carl Remer, and John Carter Vincent. After he talks with these people, we are making arrangements to take him to the Library of Congress and a few other places.

I am sorry that our meeting did not work out for him as I know that there are many people here who would have enjoyed hearing him.

Sincerely yours,

ROSE YARDUMIAN.

P. S.—I am enclosing a list of the Army-Navy people who have accepted the date.

P. P. S.—Rogov and Bill have been at the Cosmos Club for the last 2½ hours talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent.

Does that refresh your recollection so that you can say you had at least a two and a half hour conference?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. It may be true. I don't believe I went back to the office. I had another engagement. I said an hour and a half, but it could have been two and a half hours. I wouldn't want to say an hour and a half under oath. I know that I went there.

The CHAIRMAN. May I quote from your article, Mr. Johnstone, dated August 1943, published by the Foreign Policy Association, entitled "The Changing Far East" by William C. Johnstone.

Chinese Communists were also Nationalists and their main objectives were agrarian reform and an economic democracy that they practiced as well as preached.

Does that refresh your recollection that you now know you did refer to them as agrarian reformers?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Sir, I said Chinese Communists—

The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to see it?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I would, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Before reading that, may I ask you, Do we both agree that that was the Communist line in 1943, that they were agrarian reformers interested in agrarian reform and practicing democracy?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes; that was the Communist line and I didn't agree with it.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not agree with it?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I cannot.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1943, you did not?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. In 1943 or any time.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, Mr. Johnstone, I do not intend to intimate because you may have agreed that you were purposefully carrying the Communist line.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. I think a sizable number of good Americans were thoroughly deceived at times by Communists. I think many of them were deceived by the motives of the Chinese Communists. I am just trying to get at your thinking at that time.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir. May I say, Senator, the sentence reads: Chinese Communists were also Nationalists and their main objectives were agrarian reform and an economic democracy that they practiced as well as preached.

I did not call them agrarian reformers, but their objectives were agrarian reform. I assume that the rest of that sentence could be taken—

The CHAIRMAN. If you say their objectives were agrarian reform, would not that be calling them agrarian reformers?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Well, they did try to institute agrarian reform, but I called them Communists, Senator. In my other writings you can find I called them Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to spend any additional time on this, but let me read this:

Chinese Communist were also Nationalists and their main objectives were agrarian reform and an economic democracy that they practiced as well as preached.

Did you believe that was true in 1943?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I believe that was partially true, yes, sir, in the areas that they were in. That does not, however, mean that I agreed that that was what should happen or agreed with them.

The CHAIRMAN. You have incidentally been in charge of the exchange-of-persons program?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I was from 1948 to 1952, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The only other article I find in this book is by Lawrence K. Rosinger. Do you consider Rosinger a Communist?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I have no knowledge that he is a member of the Communist Party. I did not agree with his views and so stated, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that he appeared before the McCarran committee and refused on the grounds of self-incrimination to answer whether or not he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that give you any idea—

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I would assume that he was, sir, from that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it might be significant that this book contain only your writing which did follow the Communist line—I am not saying you were a Communist.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your book which followed the Communist line and also the article by Rosinger, the man who refused to say whether he was a Communist or not. Do you think that has any significance?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I think it has some significance. I thought so after the book was published. I think you will see some other statements in the pamphlet which are fairly clear, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you notice the suggested reading in this book?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes. Those readings were done by the Foreign Policy Association.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to look at the authors suggested as suggested reading and tell us how many Communists you recognize among that list of authors?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Mr. T. A. Bisson, I know, has been called by the McCarran committee. I have testified I disagree with Mr. Bisson. I have no personal knowledge that he was a Communist, but I do know I disagreed with his line.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say for your information that he has been named several times before congressional committees as an espionage agent as well as a Communist.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I know that information from press reports.

The CHAIRMAN. Just pick out the ones that you would consider to be Communists now, not those that were necessarily Communists then, and tell us which and any you thought were Communists then also?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. E. Herbert Norman, Mr. Rosinger, Mr. Edgar Snow, have all been before various committees.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you not a bit disturbed to find this article of yours put out in a book which contained an article by Rosinger, and recommended the writings of known Communists as recommended reading?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I did not have information at that time, Senator; that has since been revealed by all those people. I would certainly be disturbed now. I must say I was not as disturbed then because I did not have information about their leanings. I knew I disagreed with them on practically every point.

The CHAIRMAN. I will certainly agree with you that many people who are well-known Communists now may not have been considered such at that time. The FBI has been quoted as referring to Amerasia as a tool for Soviet espionage in a Washington paper, the Washington Daily News. Would you agree that is the correct description of Amerasia?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I would say yes, it was very close to it if it wasn't actually. That is based on the reports that I have seen and the McCarran investigation.

The CHAIRMAN. Your testimony is that while you contributed certain articles to that magazine, you did not contribute any after you suspected this was a Communist organization?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know when you first contributed articles to Amerasia and when you last contributed articles?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. There were two articles—I would have to check my files—on the shipment of war materials to Japan, which I wrote. As I recall, it was a series of two articles, one in 1940, and I believe the other in 1941. I think I have copies of those articles.

The CHAIRMAN. Who did you contact in Amerasia?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I think I have correspondence on that, sir. My recollection is very dim as to who received the articles.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know Phil Jaffe?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I have met him, I think, not more than 2 or 3 times, and that very briefly.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Mark Gayn?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I think I have met him twice.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you talk to him about your articles?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir; I did not talk to anybody in the Amerasia staff about these articles.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you merely send the articles to them for publication?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No one had recommended that you send the articles?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get paid for the articles?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I don't believe so, sir. I would have to check that to be sure, but I don't believe so.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure if I follow you. Is that a normal practice on your part, to write articles and send them to a magazine gratuitously and not receive any pay?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Senator, at this time I was most concerned with the possibility of Japanese aggression. I was studying, I was writing about it, and I felt that certain facts ought to be made public and it was a practice among college professors who are not paid very large sums for their articles, particularly a technical article, to send articles to magazines without asking for compensation.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that Amerasia was purchased by the State Department and distributed to its officials?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I was not in the State Department at the time. I didn't know that for a fact at that time. I have only been in the State Department since 1946.

The CHAIRMAN. I was not suggesting you were responsible for the purchase.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that to be a fact now?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes; I have seen that stated.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Andrew Roth?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know him very well?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir; fairly well.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you consider him a Communist?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first learn he was a Communist?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I did not know him to the best of my recollection—I can check my statement—until about the end of 1944, or the early part of 1945, when he was around the IPR offices here in Washington. He was at that time working on a book on Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you questioned by the FBI in connection with the Amerasia case?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I was questioned by the FBI on individuals and I assume it was in connection with the Amerasia case, sir. That is, the FBI did not say specifically it was that case.

The CHAIRMAN. Andrew Roth was one of those accused of having obtained classified documents and turning them over to Amerasia.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever live with Roth?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever stay with him?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How many times, roughly, would you say you were at his home and he at yours?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I was never at his home, and I don't remember that he was ever at mine.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you knew him very well socially?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Not very well, sir. I knew him in the sense that he used to come around to the IPR offices quite often. Also when I was in the American Embassy in New Delhi he came there and at that time I wrote a memorandum to the Ambassador saying who he was and his background and warned the Ambassador we should not give him—

The CHAIRMAN. The committee has described the IPR. I believe the quotation is correct, as a cover shop for Soviet espionage. That may not be the exact description. Would you agree with that description of the IPR?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I would have to say from my own knowledge that it was certainly infiltrated by Communists, that it was used as a front. A lot of that information has since come out in the McCarran subcommittee. I began to feel that the organization was being subverted, that the organization was not what it appeared to be, and what its objectives said it was, and that was one of the reasons I disassociated myself from the IPR in 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. How well did you know Owen Lattimore?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. I met him I think first in the late thirties and since my professional interest at that time as a professor of far-eastern politics took me to a number of conferences, meetings, and so forth, I saw him at various conferences and meetings up to 1940 or 1941. I was at two IPR conferences where he was present.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever submit any of your writings to him and he ever submit any to you?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. He never submitted any to me and I never submitted any to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Getting back to this question of the Hebrew desk, your testimony is that you did advise that the Hebrew desk be discontinued?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, sir; we did advise that, reflecting in my job the opinion of the public affairs officer in Israel, who had returned in July 1952, and who knew the situation in Israel, that it was a marginal operation since the people of Israel could get information from a great many sources in addition to the Hebrew-language broadcast.

What we were trying to do was to reduce our budget in accordance with the amount of money we had. There was a whole series of recommendations on which we were acting, this being one of them, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, getting into some of your so-called classified information, the thing that concerns me is how Dr. Glazer could get a recommendation from the Embassy in Israel, Tel Aviv, saying this is an excellent operation, give us more of it, and you could get a recommendation saying that it is marginal. Is this correct, Mr. Johnstone, that you were advised it was marginal because the signals were weak, that is, the radio signals?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. That was part of the reason. That was one reason in July-August. That was before the *Courier* went into operation.

The CHAIRMAN. That may explain the difference between the advice given to you and Dr. Glazer, because I understand *Courier* went into operation later in the year, and the word was that you were getting a good strong signal into Israel.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. That is right, sir. I was in Salonika in November and saw the reports on both the *Courier* operation and the Salonika relay. We were getting a good signal in through Hebrew, German, and English, and the various languages beamed to that area.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: You advised in July that the desk be closed and part of the basis for your recommendation was the weak signal which was getting into the area. Would your recommendation have been the same in December, at which time you were getting a good strong signal as a result of the *Courier* ship being located in that area?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. On the basis of reports we got from Tel Aviv in November, the same recommendation went in from my office through Mr. Sims in December. It was based on these considerations, if I may state them, sir. It was based on the considerations, first of all, that the listening audience as far as could be determined on the spot, was very, very small. There was a large listening audience for the English-language broadcast. The Embassy's recommendation was that of the various ways in which we had to tell our story and to tell the story of what the Russians were doing and to get out anti-Communist material to the people of Israel, this particular method of the Hebrew-language broadcast was least effective of the ways we had to get our story across.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Glazer, you were head of the Hebrew desk; do you care to comment on that? May I say that we perhaps would not take as much time on this one particular desk if it were not for a number of reasons: No. 1, we have this book written by Mr. Harris and Mr. Harris admits that if he were to feel the way today as when he wrote the book, he would be unfit to hold his job. It follows the Communist line. He says he does not believe it any more. It refers to the right of Communists to teach in colleges. It refers to the right to teach that marriage is outmoded and should be thrown into the ashcan because of outmoded religious phenomenon, suggests that all schools be made public schools, that where the private interests object, that the schools be condemned. So you find it following the line quite strictly.

As I say, Mr. Harris admits if he still felt the same way he would be incompetent to hold his job. We find such a fantastic picture in the Voice that we know there is some one some place responsible for it. I for one, and I know other members of the committee agree with me that this cannot be the result merely of stupidity. It is by design. We are trying to find out who is responsible. I feel that if I were trying to aid the Communist cause, and some of the witnesses have made this statement, one of the excellent ways to aid the cause would be to cut off the Hebrew desk at the time they were handed this excellent counterpropaganda weapon, that is, when the Communists became anti-Semitic.

For that reason it is very important to us to try to find the reasoning behind this. We find that neither the head of the Hebrew desk,

nor the head of the Near East Division, were ever consulted. We have had testimony to the effect that this was continued until the elections because otherwise it might have an adverse effect on some candidate in this country. For that reason we are keeping you here longer, Dr. Glazer, than we would normally on this subject.

Would you comment on that, and then Mr. Harris will comment on the subject.

Mr. GLAZER. I would like to say that as late as December 5, 1952, Washington maintained that the reason for suspending broadcasts was "proved ineffectiveness of our signal." I would like at this moment to read another cable from the field.

Senator MUNDT. No more cables unless you read them all.

Mr. GLAZER. This is unclassified, and I don't believe it was referred to here, and was the reason for my great puzzlement, using ineffectualness on the one hand or the fact that the signal was not audible on the other as justification for the suspension. This cable, unclassified, dated November 17, states:

VOA coverage presidential elections excellent. Signal strength satisfactory, reception very good, press, official and private comment over Israel indicate heavy listenership Hebrew and English broadcast. Detailed operation memorandum follows.

Senator MUNDT. Signed by whom?

Mr. GLAZER. Signed by Mr. Russell. Mr. Russell was counsel of the Embassy who had arrived in Israel, I think a month or so prior to the election. He was a brand new man, and frankly I was a little bit puzzled to find a comment about the Voice of America over his signature. All material dealing with the Voice normally would come over the signature of the public-affairs officer or one of his subordinates.

Two days later we got the detailed account of our election coverage, also an unclassified document. I would like, if I may, to quote 2 or 3 paragraphs from it, indicating very significantly the impact we were making in terms of propaganda value, not to mention the fact that we were actually heard.

Press coverage. Mr. Nathan Gurdus, correspondent of Agence France Presse and of Haboker, a leading local daily, stated that USIS coverage was a splendid example of American efficiency. He had particular praise for the Voice of America, stating that VOA made it unnecessary for any reporter to move from his radio. Mr. Gurdus' sentiments were reflected by representatives of virtually all significant local newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. What would you say about Mr. Johnstone's statement that there are other ways of better reaching the people of Israel?

Mr. GLAZER. I do not agree with it. I would like to say, however, that my disagreement is on technical ground. It is my personal opinion that one medium is not a substitute for another under special circumstances. They are not transferrable and sometimes the discontinuance of one media, particularly one that requires a highly trained staff, radio, is fraught with the greatest danger that cannot be compensated even with the intensification of another medium.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: Has there been a fairly strong Communist Party in Israel?

Mr. GLAZER. It has been strong out of proportion to its numbers. In terms of the formal representation in the country's parliament where, as you know, the party is still legal, it has had no more than eight members at its high point. It now has five. However, in coop-

eration with an extreme leftist party, it has managed to exert a very considerable influence, not so much in promoting pro-Communist sentiment as such, but to equally dangerous neutral sentiments, and I think it was that that was to us one of the greatest tasks to which we had to address ourselves, and would, it seemed to me, have been promoted by an evidence of American dissent implicit in the suspension of Voice broadcasts.

The CHAIRMAN. Am I correct in this, that the Communists were using to fairly good advantage the fact that they had favored the creation of the Israel state and also propagandizing the people of Israel to the effect that there was no discrimination because of race or color under Communist control; is that correct?

Mr. GLAZER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. They were making fairly good headway in that?

Mr. GLAZER. Very much so.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume there is no question but what their open anti-Semitism would have been extremely effective as a weapon of counterpropaganda to show that they were not telling the truth when they were saying there was no racial or religious discrimination.

Dr. GLAZER. Quite.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you see any reason at all when you were handed that effective counterpropaganda weapon you desk should be closed? Can you think of a single reason?

Dr. GLAZER. I can't think of any reason, but I can think of about a dozen reasons why we should have given additional time.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure whether you covered this or not this morning, but, as I recall, you or Mr. Dooher stated in New York that you felt that the closing of the desk would have been a tremendous service to the Communist cause.

Mr. DOOHER. I stated that, sir. Could I comment a little further?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; you may.

Mr. DOOHER. This morning there were remarks made about dirty pool and nasty implications.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get that.

Mr. DOOHER. This morning there were statements made by Mr. Harris about nasty implications or dirty pool. I did not make any implications. I made a statement of fact. I consider that this closing of the Hebrew desk was part of a pattern. For reasons of high policy I cannot go at this moment into the pattern step by step. I cannot develop it. I hope to be able to do so later, possibly next week or 2 weeks from now. However, I can read from an interview which was given by Dr. Compton to a national magazine this week. I have the highest respect for Dr. Compton and do not think that these are his ideas. I think that these ideas are the result of advice he has received.

In the interview the question was asked: "What changes, if any, do you think should be made in the operation of the voice?" Answer—and this is a partial answer—I will not take it out of context. I have the entire article here for anyone. The first paragraph of the answer is:

It should be concentrated on the countries behind the Iron Curtain. It is not only the best but the only means of reaching them. The Voice broadcasts to the free countries—those that can be reached by other means which are generally more effective—should be reduced to a standby basis or eliminated.

I would like to leave for a while this statement: "those that can be reached by other means which are generally more effective." That is a point which I would like to develop after this policy consideration is over. I would like to comment upon the statement with this interpolation out. "The Voice broadcasts to free countries should be reduced to a standby basis or eliminated."

That means that this recommendation by Dr. Compton means that we should continue the struggle behind the Iron Curtain and the area where the battle was lost. We should retreat from the field in those areas where the battle should be won by psychological warfare. This is a recommendation that we decrease our psychological warfare potential in those areas where it is important to increase it.

That is my statement, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Anything further, Doctor? In other words, I gather you feel strongly, Mr. Dooher, if the Voice is properly run, it can be of tremendous benefit.

Mr. DOOHER. Sir, I can prove it.

The CHAIRMAN. And you feel that Communist Russia is engaging in an all-out propaganda war, and that we should engage in a counter-propaganda war ourselves.

Mr. DOOHER. I do, and I would personally like to develop the reasons why Dr. Compton made these recommendations, where he got the advice, who concurred in this advice, or was it simply an idea he got after he resigned. I do not believe that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You said that the attempted cancellation of the Hebrew desk follows the pattern.

Mr. DOOHER. Yes, sir. I cannot develop the step of the pattern, but I can develop the conclusion which is stated in public print.

The CHAIRMAN. And your conclusion is that there is a deliberate pattern of attempting to keep the Voice from being an effective anti-Communist weapon.

Mr. DOOHER. A deliberate pattern to destroy or nullify the Voice as a broadcast to the free world. I do not know whether the pattern will go further and eventually destroy the Voice broadcast to the nonfree world. But as far as I can develop it, it can be developed here very clearly, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the various unusual aspects of the Voice we have discovered are the result of stupidity or design?

Mr. DOOHER. As I testified in New York, sir, I do not believe it could be stupidity, because stupidity does not fall into a design.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if a man is stupid, he normally does not follow a consistent pattern.

Mr. DOOHER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. He may make a mistake that is right once in a while.

Mr. DOOHER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Mr. DOOHER. No, sir. I felt I had to make this statement in view of the fact that these remarks had been made this morning, which I believe reflected not upon my implications of last week, but my statement of last week.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, I assume you have a statement.

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly have, Mr. Chairman. You have given the witnesses who are supporting your thesis the utmost freedom. This morning at the end of the session they were testifying on this same line, and the senior minority member, Senator McClellan, said he assumed that Mr. Harris would have something to say, and the hearing was ended like that. When it opened this afternoon I did not have an opportunity to present my position on it.

The CHAIRMAN. You will be on here a few more days yet. Do you prefer having a chance to speak earlier in the day and the other witness later? I would like to accommodate you. It is 4 o'clock now. Do you think we are unfair to you if you did not speak at 12 but at 4? We will put you on at 12 tomorrow.

Mr. HARRIS. It has nothing to do with the particular part of the day. It has to do with the juxtaposition of the charges. They are put on the record, and they go on for 2 or 3 hours, and, if I am lucky, I get a chance to say something in rebuttal thereto. I do not feel that is basically fair.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, let us have it clear right now, that you will have unlimited time to say whatever you want to. This committee is interested in arriving at the facts. You agree that your background is such that unless you have reformed, you would not be competent to hold your job. I am interested in finding some evidence of reform. I have not seen it yet. So for that reason you will be given unlimited time to give the committee any proof that you have to show you do not feel the same or stronger than when you wrote that book. You can have any time of the day you want.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, you repeatedly use words like "incompetent" or "unqualified" when you say that I admit that I would not be the person to take this job if I still had the views in that book.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you one question. If I misquoted you, do you feel today that if you held the ideas you had when you wrote that book, that you would be either competent or qualified to hold the job you now hold?

Mr. HARRIS. If I held all the views in that book today, I would not be qualified on security grounds to hold this position. The question of my competence as an editor or writer and that sort of thing would not be involved in any manner, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. HARRIS. I would like to point out to this committee, my job, the job of Dr. Compton, the job of the top people here, is to promote the maximum effectiveness of our whole worldwide campaign against international communism, using all media as economically as possible. Let us get this situation in perspective.

The chairman said this morning that I am the only man who defended the decision to stop ineffective Hebrew broadcasts as an economy measure. That has already been shown to be a little strong. And the chairman has implied also that I was aiding international communism by making such a decision. Yet the persons that he has produced who keep saying that it is part of a pattern, that there was no reason whatsoever to cut off Hebrew, and so on, are gentlemen of the Voice of America, perfectly competent gentlemen, as I said this morning. I have respect for Mr. Dooher and Mr. Glazer for their knowledge of the areas of the world they serve and their media, but they have a

vested interest in the thing. That is their baby. It is close to their heart. I can't imagine that Dr. Glazer, no matter how much scholarly competence he has, would concur in a recommendation to abolish his unit. Of course he would not. He feels that is important. He is fighting for it.

Mr. Dooher is fighting for his area of the Voice. It is a proper thing to do. But to imply that it is some part of a pattern supporting international communism, I say, is just absolutely incorrect. It is unfair to the people of the top command of IIA, and it should never have gone on the public record. If anybody had that kind of suspicion rather than to hurt the Voice all over the world by this open struggle in public with lots of people being attacked and called names, I think it should have been discussed in private until it was developed to the point where the facts were pretty clear. I do not think that there is any evidence that that has happened.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? Your thought is that this should not be in public session. It should be in secret session.

Mr. HARRIS. It is my thought that this feeling Mr. Dooher has been led to say he has, and Dr. Glazer has been led to say, that there is some pattern of favoring international communism here, that would be a serious matter. That would involve, I think, treason. It would involve the type of thing that should be handled in a very careful, cautious way of this kind of an extremely delicate subject which can be damaging to our war effort all over the world, and we have evidence that it has been. I am leaving out the question of reputation.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say while we welcome your views, the committee feels that the country is entitled to this information and it should not be in secret session. We shall continue to hold public sessions, but thank you for the advice anyway.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, to that remark I would like to make this comment, that my motivation in making that statement has to do with the national security of the United States, and a desire to see this cold war prosecuted as effectively as possible. We are fighting international communism all over the world, not just in one country. We don't like to see papers overseas, the Communist radio and so forth, able to laugh at the Voice of America, which they have been doing in the last few days. That cuts deep for all of us, not just for the gentlemen up in New York, believe me.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt. In other words, you feel by exposing the facts they can laugh at the Voice for making a mistake. I think that is the attitude that should be corrected in such a position as yours. You think it is the district attorney that catches the crook who is to blame or the committee that exposes wrongdoing and waste is to blame. That is our job. It is not a pleasant job. As I explained to you the other day, I do not think a single member of this committee ever met you or saw you or knew anything about you until we got evidence concerning you. Then we took much of it in executive session, and because some of your friends seemed to feel it would be unfair to develop all the adverse evidence before you had a chance to testify, we decided to give you the substance of what was received in executive session and let you testify first. We are not going to hold these sessions secret. We feel that the American people who are paying for this program are entitled to know whether it is a Voice of America,

or whether, in the words of one of the witnesses the other day, it is the voice of international communism.

May I say that I do think some of the Voice desks have been doing an excellent job of counterpropaganda. I think in certain echelons we find some very good people. But we do intend to continue this in public session and let the people know what is going on. And if the people laugh at any of the Voice operations, I think it is the job of the new heads to make sure they remove the cause of the laughing matter.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I am sure that the public is entitled to know the facts about the Voice of America, and about the International Information Administration. I do not feel that the very one-sided presentations that have been made in these hearings can be called a factual presentation. I do not think that the methods used would stand up in any court of law of the United States, as I have said before.

But we will go on to the matter of Hebrew. It has not been suspended at the minute, as you know.

The CHAIRMAN. Before going into that—

Mr. HARRIS. Dr. Compton—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. You said this would not stand up in a court of law. You have been informed you can have a lawyer. You have been informed that while in a court of law you could not consult with your lawyer while testifying, you will be given that privilege here. You can have your lawyer sitting beside you to advise you at any time. You have been told you can submit any questions you care to ask any witness. You have been told to submit the names of any witnesses you want to call, and they will be called. You cannot defend your position, Mr. Harris, by screaming at this committee. You must present the facts.

Mr. HARRIS. The facts will be presented.

The CHAIRMAN. Good. Could we get down to some of the facts which show that you have changed since you wrote this book, that you now are anti-Communist? I would like to get down to those facts.

Mr. HARRIS. That particular question is not the one we are discussing right now. We are discussing the Hebrew language to Israel. I think it is proper to go with that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is only one part of the picture.

Mr. HARRIS. I say each time you hold up that book and wave it and make comments about it, you make it sound just a little worse; 75 percent of that book, sir, at the very minimum, is on commercialism in college football. A large part of the rest is perfectly good today or any other day. But there are some statements of opinion in there that I have repudiated as I told you many times, and those are not good statements. I said I was ashamed of them, that they go back 21 years, and you should not bring it up. Now I would like to go on with this Hebrew business.

I say that Hebrew is not suspended at this moment, and you have pointed out that that was because of a decision by Dr. Compton. I will point out, however, that Dr. Compton as late as February 5 was still considering dropping Hebrew and not on my advice, and not in any way connected with anything I was doing. You will find the letter addressed to Senator Wiley available to you, which includes this statement:

If these activities (referring to IIA media services other than radio) give sufficient coverage to Israel at less cost, discontinuance of broadcasting in the Hebrew language would be a prudent step to take.

Now, Dr. Compton has had a number of talks with Representatives Taber and Clevenger, the gentlemen who deal with our appropriations in the House. They have constantly stated they felt the Voice was not as good as it should be and they have urged economies. Therefore, Dr. Compton has been very vigorous in his efforts to make sure we were not in any case wasting money through Voice programs.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to tell the two witnesses that you may stay if you care to, but you are no longer under orders of the committee.

Now, with respect to the document, if you want to submit the résumé of the document, we will want to see the document. That does not mean we will make it a part of the record. We want to compare your résumé with the document.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, in one sense every cut we make in the Voice of America, or any other medias of the IIA, could be called a blow in favor of communism. But those cuts are necessary because we get reduced amounts of money. They are not necessary because of some strange plan in the minds of people in our organization. We can prove where the cuts have come from, what they were caused by, believe me.

Let us again talk about Hebrews. Our office of field programs recommended the elimination of Hebrew broadcasts to Israel as a marginal activity. We do have a document that shows that the Ambassador stated that it was a marginal activity. Our evaluation staff, on the basis of studies made by the Chief and Mr. Goldberg, recommended suspension in December. Mr. Goldberg discovered that we had been getting fewer letters from Israel since Hebrew broadcasting began than we got before when there were other languages only getting into Israel from the Voice of America.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you supply that information?

Mr. HARRIS. I can supply detailed tabulations.

The CHAIRMAN. No; the document. You say Mr. Goldberg and the Chief recommended discontinuance in December.

Mr. HARRIS. They have not done it by document. I have the basic study on which the recommendations were made, and I would like to read some of it because it is very pertinent here. We have a tabulation of audience mail which is an important measure of the effectiveness of our programs. It is one of the things we draw on for our information.

In December 1952, this crucial month we have been talking about, there were exactly 16 letters from Israel in the regular Voice reception, and with respect to the Turkish program, 1,577.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? This is in conflict with testimony heretofore received.

Mr. HARRIS. I do not think, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. I have to interrupt you, Mr. Harris.

Mr. HARRIS says we have only 16 letters from Israel in December. I believe you testified on that, Dr. Glazer.

Dr. GLAZER. We gave testimony of figures for a longer period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yours do not merely cover the month of December?

Dr. GLAZER. No; that covered since the inception of the broadcasts. The CHAIRMAN. I think you referred to the tremendous increase since the anti-Semitic purges in Russia?

Dr. GLAZER. Yes, sir. I said we had a terrific increase of listeners. I did not say we had a terrific increase in the number of letters.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry.

Dr. GLAZER. I would like to mention at this time that I agree with the figure of 16 just quoted for the month of December. However, for the same month the country of Egypt, with a population 18 times the size of Israel, also had the figure of 16 letters for the month. I bring this up to show that audience mail is only a factor in evaluation.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to ask you to refrain at this moment. I thought you had some other figures. Proceed, Mr. Harris.

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. When Mr. Harris gets through, I want to hear from you, Dr. Glazer.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, since Dr. Glazer has mentioned Egypt, I would point out that there is no separate special program that goes to Egypt equivalent to the Hebrew. The Arabic, which also serves Egypt, goes to a number of countries through the Near East, and the letters that came in on all Arabic programs for all Arabic broadcasts in December numbered 300 letters. I will submit this. I will be glad to give it to the committee. This is a perfectly provable statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say for that to have some value, you should have the comparative population figures from which that mail comes. You say there are 16 from Israel and 309 from the entire Arabic world. What is the comparison?

Mr. HARRIS. I can't give you that now. But let us have some other comparisons right now. The Israel letters, as I say, were 16 in December. From Turkey we had 1,577; from Greece, we had 1,301; from Iran we had 712. Now, 16 from Israel does not suggest that the Hebrew language program was getting to some tremendous number of people. Furthermore, I have here an annual report of the restricted classification, and therefore it can be turned over to the committee without question. It is not security information but I will quote from it and I will turn the whole document over to you. This is dated January 9. It comes from our Embassy over there, and it says:

The VOA Hebrew broadcasts to Israel still fail to evoke any great listener interest. As the Embassy sees the situation, a regular continuing press campaign is the only remaining hope to create a *raison d'être* for the VOA Hebrew broadcasts.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that January 1953?

Mr. HARRIS. That is January 9, 1953.

Funds for such a project would, of necessity, come from VOA allocations and would constitute a minuscule portion of the total sum spent on programs.

They are talking about a press campaign that would be necessary to build up listenership. That is another type of information.

I repeat that our letters show that this is one of the least effective services, and we have fewer letters.

I want to repeat my statement. When the Voice of America was broadcasting to Israel only in languages other than Hebrew, we

would get more letters. The letters went down when we started the Hebrew broadcasts, which certainly does not suggest a great increase in listenership as a result of putting on Hebrew broadcasts.

Now, another thing. Dr. Glazer in his testimony in New York said that there had been a number of surveys made and they had several types of information available proving the effectiveness of Hebrew, and he referred for one thing to the work of a scientific panel that had been convened and had been asked how the Voice of America could best program in Hebrew or in other languages in Israel, and here is a quote from that, and I will also furnish that full document. It says:

Language choice—English preferred; Hebrew second.

Many respondents had listened to foreign broadcasts in more than one language. English led with 32 mentions, followed by Hebrew with 15, German with 10, Russian with 7, and French with 6.

My job is to be a manager of public funds so they are used to the maximum effect in the battle against worldwide communism, and not merely to meet a very special need in a single country, if need there be. We do not feel that need exists. If we did, we would have ruled otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through with that document that you are reading from?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir, I am.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume you want these marked as exhibits, Mr. Harris?

Mr. HARRIS. I would like to have them marked as exhibits. I would appreciate it very much.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 35 and 36" and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. HARRIS. Dr. Glazer, as I say, naturally fighting for the life of his desk on the Voice of America, although he would certainly be used in our anti-Communist unit up there with the knowledge he has, has quoted from a number of things here, and he was just reading a minute ago from a report from the Embassy in which they lumped English and Hebrew, and the impression might have been given that he was talking only about Hebrew.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? May I see the document you read from last?

Mr. HARRIS. The one I read from last is there among those exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. You are reading a report from the Embassy?

Mr. HARRIS. That is in my hands. I want to make another reference to it. Do you wish to look at it and hand it back?

The CHAIRMAN. May I have it a second so I can follow your testimony? That is committee's exhibit No. 35.

Mr. HARRIS. Yes.

Now, I would like to ask, if I could, through this committee or directly to this committee, what would the American taxpayers say if they knew we were using between \$80,000 and \$100,000 a year, and that is the yearly cost of the Hebrew desk, on a service reaching so few people that only 16 write to us in a crucial month like December? And that is all mail from Israel. I say that the Israelis need nothing from us to be persuaded to be anti-Soviet. I am sure that you would know that one of the Soviet consulates there was bombed by the people

of Israel. I am sure you know they cut off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government. I find it very hard to see—

Senator MUNDT. Were those decisions made before or after the decision was made to abandon the Hebrew desk?

Mr. HARRIS. They were made recently but the reason is to show that the Israeli people were getting thoroughly anti-Communist. I don't believe the small Communist Party there has a Chinaman's chance. I think they are probably well boxed in and locked out of the way. I am practically certain of that, because no country is going to put up with this vicious anti-Semitic campaign.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, from the testimony we previously had we understand that this Hebrew service is more than merely with respect to Israel. That covers other areas of the world. I do not follow your reasoning to the effect that when you have a tremendous counterpropaganda weapon, such as you have here, that there is no need to use it because the people will know about it anyway. If that were true, the only time you would use the Voice is when you had to manufacture counterpropaganda.

Mr. HARRIS. I don't follow your reasoning on that. I don't agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN. You say we can discontinue the Hebrew broadcasts because the Jewish people throughout the world—not using your language, but trying to get your idea—will of necessity be anti-Communist now that the Communists are so publicly anti-Semitic. In other words, when you were handed a tremendous propaganda weapon, we do not need to use it over the Voice because the people of the world will know about it. Is that not the reasoning?

Mr. HARRIS. No; not in the way you said it; because we are using that weapon, and very hard, all over the world in every language. But we did propose to take out the least of the effective languages because it was not serving the purpose. We have less money than we need to do all the things we would like to do. That applies to the Voice as well as the rest of the organization.

The CHAIRMAN. You say the least effective of the languages. You say that the man who is head of the Hebrew desk is saying that because he is fighting for his job. I do not believe that is true. He seems to me to be a very sincere American. It seems to me that he is fighting for America. He says that his survey shows that 60 percent of the people can understand Hebrew. From the number of letters received from Israel, I do not know whether the people who cannot speak or write English would be inclined to write us if they did not know where or how to write. One of the recommendations made was that you cancel the Portuguese desk before you canceled the Hebrew desk. If it is a question of how many letters are important, can you tell us how many letters you got from Portugal?

Mr. HARRIS. I can't at this minute. I will be glad to check it.

The CHAIRMAN. If this matter of letters is important, we should check with the other desks which you kept on instead of canceling the Hebrew desk.

Dr. Glazer, you had a comment to make on this. Will you make it briefly? I want to give Mr. Harris plenty of time.

Dr. GLAZER. I would like to comment specifically on the point he mentioned with regard to using audience mail as a criterion of effec-

tiveness. First, I would like to say that there is only one device known to us that will give us such a criterion, and that is a scientific survey, using established, tested procedures that were very largely developed in this country and applied overseas. Such an organization, by the way, does exist in Israel. We are very much interested in having them do the survey until we found out that it would have cost \$10,000. We couldn't afford it; so we never did contract for this survey.

I submit that anything other than that, a fair sampling using scientific methods, does not indicate in any way, except the most tentative fashion, the degree of effectiveness or the success in carrying over our message. We recognize that mail does have significance, particularly in very large quantities and with reference to certain external factors. However, we cannot assume from the absence of mail that the contrary is the case, because in the very nature of things only a tiny fraction of the people write. Until you can assess the habits of a population of a country, the circumstances under which they are struggling, I submit you can't tell from the absence or presence of letters what that really means.

You take a country like Israel, where it costs something like 30 cents to write a letter, where you have to wait in line half an hour or more in order to buy a stamp; that might discourage them from writing. That does not mean that you will be willing to go through all the hazards of posting a letter to a foreign nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask both of you gentlemen this: Mr. HARRIS, as I understood, said the Hebrew broadcast was the least effective. In support of that, you gave us exhibit No. 4, which compares the mail received from Israel, Turkey, Greece, and Iran. I understand there are 46 different language desks. When you say the Hebrew desk is the least effective, have you compared the mail from the other 45 desks, or do you mean merely the least effective of the 4 you gave here?

Mr. HARRIS. I mean least effective of the number of programs carried by the Voice.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you base that on the letters you receive?

Mr. HARRIS. On a great many things. The reports from the Embassy, the comments of the public-affairs officer who served there for 2 years and is in touch with the Embassy all the time, Mr. Leonard Ware, a member of Mr. Johnstone's staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, when you give us the number of letters received, do you take into consideration the factors mentioned by Dr. Glazer—namely, a cost of 30 cents to send a letter and that people might have to stand in line to get a stamp for a half-hour or more—and, therefore, they may not be free in their letterwriting?

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly do, because the same situation obtains in Turkey and several other Arabic areas, and Iran.

The CHAIRMAN. What does it cost to send a letter in Turkey?

Mr. HARRIS. I can't give you the exact figure, and I don't think Dr. Glazer could give you the same exact figure for Israel.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you say it is the same situation in Turkey?

Mr. HARRIS. Because I have heard people say that it is not cheap to get mail out of those Near East countries. It is not limited to Israel. The cost of transportation is involved.

The CHAIRMAN. You can submit any exhibits you care to; but, if you are going to submit an exhibit such as this, and on the basis of

that—that the Israel desk is the least effective—it will not have much meaning unless you submit the same figures on all 46 desks.

Mr. HARRIS. That can be done. But I did not state on the basis of this alone, as I have repeatedly said. I didn't state it on the basis of this alone. I stated it on the basis of information which we have developed here to some extent, and more of which is available. I think that the case rests on far more than this audience mail. I bring this up because Dr. Glazer made a considerable point this morning, or rather in New York, about the audience mail. Your transcript, as a matter of fact, said that he said "600,000 letters," and I am sure he did not. I think they took the statement "600" and misinterpreted it in the stenotype transcript. But even that 600 which he used, at least the people who listened with me and watched the television performance, suggested that that meant that they got 600 letters in a recent period. Actually, that was all the letters they received since the thing began.

Dr. GLAZER. There are 881.

Mr. HARRIS. Excuse me. I didn't try to add this up; 881 is still a low figure.

Mr. Chairman, forgive me; I have only respect for Mr. Glazer, but you have encouraged him to say whatever he wants to say at great freedom. You have not permitted interruptions of any kind by me while he was talking, and I should hope that you would not permit interruptions by Dr. Glazer while I am talking, simply in the interest of getting a coherent story.

Now, Dr. Glazer has talked about the seriousness of cutting off Hebrew, and he implied, at least, that there would be very little, if any, radio getting in there by the Voice of America if Hebrew were cut off. That is certainly not true on the basis of the scientific evidence. For one thing, the beams that go into the Near East and cover Israel include the following languages: English, Arabic, Greek, as well as Hebrew, Persian, and Turkish. Those programs reach the area both in shortwave and in mediumwave.

Additionally, it may be assumed that all languages relayed by the "Courier" on its present omnidirectional antennae can be heard in the Near East, which do not beam into a particular area. These languages include, in addition to the ones I mentioned, Armenian, Azerbaijan, Georgian, Tatar, Russian, Ukrainian, Albanian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian.

Lest anybody say that I am talking about languages that they don't speak in Israel, I am sure Dr. Glazer would admit that most of these languages have at least a small splinter representation in Israel.

There are languages, in addition to these, that are broadcast from Munich in shortwave which can be heard by good receivers in that area of Israel. These include French, German, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Albanian, Slovene, Serbo-Croat, Hungarian, and Russian.

We have even heard of reception by a few people of Urdu and Hindi because they have come up from Ceylon. Every one of those languages is carrying this story about the Soviet anti-Semitism. It is carrying the same hard-fighting anti-international-Communist message. The idea that somehow we favor international communism by reducing—

The CHAIRMAN. Are you stressing Soviet anti-Semitism in the broadcasts to Arabia?

Mr. HARRIS. We are playing it down in that area because the situation with the Arabic-speaking peoples is obviously that they do not care for Jewish people, and it should not be played up. We have mentioned it, but it is not the same degree that we would mention it on other programs, certainly. There are a great many other things going on.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me see if I follow you. You mentioned the fact that you have the Arabic broadcasts beamed at Israel, also, and therefore, for that reason you could cut off the Hebrew broadcasts. I would imagine that the content of your Arabic broadcasts would be entirely different from that in Hebrew; is that right?

Mr. HARRIS. That is lifting one single language out of a whole list that I read. I said English, too; didn't I? English is preferred by the listeners in Israel, preferred by scientific surveys that I submitted to you. I mentioned Greek, I mentioned Persian, I mentioned Turkish. I mentioned a number of languages that get in there from the Voice of America transmitters at various points.

I don't want to appear to duck your question, but I don't see why the single language, Arabic, is lifted out of the context and raised as a question. Naturally, the Arabic content is not as strong on the theme of anti-Semitism.

The CHAIRMAN. In fact, in beaming a Voice program to the Arabic world, I would assume you would spend practically no time at all on the anti-Semitism of the Soviet Union; would you?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't know what the exact amount of content is at this minute. I have not had a report for the last few days.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the important things we are interested in is to have the friendship of the Arabic world and the friendship of Israel.

Mr. HARRIS. It certainly is.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been considerable speculation that Communist Russia may have started this anti-Semitic program to gain the favor of the Arabic world.

Mr. HARRIS. I have read that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, as Director of the Voice, you should be very deeply interested in knowing exactly what you are beaming to the 400 million Moslem people.

Mr. HARRIS. I would. I am not Director of the Voice.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not know? I am not trying to cross-examine you, but here you have a tremendous job—

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, I have a very important job.

The CHAIRMAN. And I would imagine that one of the all-important things you have in mind is how can we gain the friendship of the Arabic world, the roughly 400 million people. We know the Communists are going all-out to try to gain their friendship. The question is, Do you not take the time to examine the scripts to find out what we are beaming to them? Naturally, in Israel we will play up the anti-Semitism of international communism. Naturally, we will play that up anyplace where Russia has been successful in her propaganda effort to create the impression that there is racial and religious freedom in Russia. I wonder why you, as Acting Director, do not know what you beam to the Arabic world since this anti-Semitic program started in Russia?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think that is the kind of question if it were examined fairly, people would consider to be strange on the face of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you try to answer it, even if it is strange?

Mr. HARRIS. Of course I will answer it. I am not attempting not to answer it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, it is very hard to sit here and have a person try very hard to show a lack of understanding on a single item of a single part of a great big program of this kind. You know, sir, that I sit here in Washington in an office that is responsible for five major media, that we have 87 countries, we have 8,000 employees, we have all kinds of things going out to various parts of the world, and you ask me, do I know about the exact content of a few Arabic scripts right now. Of course I don't know the exact content. I know the general directives.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking you about the exact content of a few Arabic scripts. You are in charge, while Dr. Compton is away, of this battle of words. I want to know whether you can tell us generally what type of program you are beaming to the Arabic world. Are you advertising the anti-Semitism of the Soviet Union?

Mr. HARRIS. I have said we are not.

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking you if you can tell us that.

Mr. HARRIS. I have testified to that and said that we are not playing it up in a strong way. We are mentioning it.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you mentioning it?

Mr. HARRIS. It has been mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the policy?

Mr. HARRIS. I cannot give you policy directives because I am not permitted to do so. That would give our cold-war strategy away and this public hearing should not have it laid before it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, you are ordered to state whether you have a policy of beaming information about Russia's anti-Semitism to the Arabic world or not.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I will consult my superiors and be glad to give you the answer to that. Earlier today you asked me to produce two guidances which are of the same nature in general which you are asking me about now. I specifically consulted Mr. Donald Lourie. I had a telephone call from him. He specifically stated that I was not at liberty to produce these classified directives which have to do with our strategy in the cold war, because if we did get them out in the open we would be hurting the national security and hurting our cold-war effort. I will make the same request regarding this, but I think the answer will be that that information should not be given to this committee in this way.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, you will be ordered to tell us whether or not you are beaming information about Russia's anti-Semitism to the Arabic world. If so, we will want to know why, and this committee will have to make recommendations to the Appropriations Committee. We must know what you are trying to do and what you are accomplishing, and that will be the order of the chairman at this time.

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If anyone else feels that that information is information to which the committee is not entitled, we will want him to give the reasons for it, and if the reasons seem sound we will honor them.

Mr. HARRIS. All right, Mr. Chairman, that is the way it will be handled. Now, while we are talking about this Hebrew problem, Dr. Glazer used figures referring to the number of people who speak Hebrew in Israel. We have had a quick examination made of the information available to us and the gentleman who has compiled some information for me simply said that Dr. Glazer's figures and mine are both estimates. There is a question that the only reliable information, as I think Dr. Glazer says, is information that goes back to 1948. That is a long time. There were 700,000 people or so, living in Israel at that time, and of this number half, or 350,000, spoke Hebrew as a mother tongue, and about 150,000 as a second language. Since 1948, the Jewish population has more than doubled, owing to immigration, of course. It hardly seems likely that a greater percentage of the newcomers speak Hebrew than of the old settlers.

Let us forget for a moment that this teaching program that they now have probably is aimed at schoolchildren, and that as a new country Israel is also a young country. It was estimated in 1951 that more than 40 percent of the population was under 15 years of age and hardly a potential audience for foreign political broadcasts. What that means is that the people who would listen seriously to our programs, Hebrew, English, or something, are the people who would be beyond 20, and in all probability beyond 25. We can't very well justify the expenditure of very limited funds to reach a small audience, and one already so firmly established in the anti-Communist camp. For instance, let us speak about the language—Russian—that we use. That goes to 160 million people. A comparison, I think, suggests that we are reaching a very, very small audience at a rather large cost with Hebrew.

I say that if I had not made a recommendation that Hebrew be cut out I would be derelict in my duty as a public official. I have been constantly admonished by Dr. Compton, and when I have been before committees in Congress, even before the committee on which you did sit last year, the Senate Appropriations Committee, that there is no question but what they want greater economy. They want proof that they are getting effective use out of every dollar we spend. We have been trying to achieve that, but when we do it, we get assailed here with fantastic charges of following the Communist line. Would you charge the Appropriations Committees with following the Communist line because they cut our appropriations?

The CHAIRMAN. We have had evidence, Mr. Harris, before this committee that you are proceeding with a program that has involved the waste of \$9,500,000 in one project in the west. Now you make a plea for economy to the effect that you can save \$10,000 or \$15,000 on this program. It does not greatly impress us when we find you are wasting millions in one phase of the operations and then pleading that you are trying to practice economy and cutting out the desk at a particular time when you are handed the propaganda. That desk was in existence for quite some time.

I would also like to have you explain sometime your reasoning why that was continued, that which was a waste of money, until

election, and cut out after the election. I am curious to know why the International Information Program heads felt that they should spend money on what you call a wasteful program so as to affect our election in this country.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have never stated that we made any decision that was based on our wishing to affect the election. We are under strict orders that we take no action. Federal agencies that would favor either side in a political controversy——

The CHAIRMAN. Did I misunderstand you this morning when I thought I heard you say that you decided to continue the Hebrew desk until after the election?

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly did.

The CHAIRMAN. Because you were afraid if you discontinued it before the election you might adversely affect one or the other of the candidates?

Mr. HARRIS. I said that to raise the issue of anti-Semitism would, among other things, affect one or the other of the candidates. That it would also put words into the campaign that could be used to great damage. The arousing of the issue of anti-Semitism on a broad scale in a national election is a very dangerous thing, both domestically and overseas. It gives people an opportunity to make pro- and anti-Semitic statements that are violent, that cause the people overseas who want to use them, to use them to our detriment. It gives them wonderful ammunition. We were very much aware that any suggestion at that time of cutting out the Hebrew desk might have that kind of effect. Let me point out something else.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us stick to that for the time being.

Mr. HARRIS. This is the same point. I wish to continue with the same point, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. You may. Proceed.

Mr. HARRIS. I am sure we are aware in this room that anti-Semitism was used in the campaign against President Eisenhower in the pre-convention period when he was seeking the Republican nomination, and like many others we saw the scurrilous hate sheets which were making anti-Semitic attacks on General Eisenhower at that time. Attempts to inject this type of race hatred into the campaign failed because of the good sense of the American people, but they might not have failed if we got this subject out where everybody was talking Semitism and anti-Semitism in the campaign.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your testimony, then, that if the Truman administration would have discontinued the Hebrew desk, you were afraid that this might be used against General Eisenhower? I do not quite follow that.

Mr. HARRIS. I am saying that injecting the issue of anti-Semitism into a large public discussion, which is what the campaign is——

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your thought that cutting off the Hebrew desk would indicate anti-Semitism?

Mr. HARRIS. It was my impression that there might be people in the period of heightened excitement of a campaign who might claim that. They might be anti-Semitic themselves and pull that information out and make something of it. During a campaign, the idea of pro- or anti-Semitism can become absolutely explosive, as everyone in this room knows.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it is clear then that you did continue what you thought was a wasteful practice because the issue might be used in the election?

Mr. HARRIS. The issue might be used in the discussions around the election to our disadvantage, both overseas and domestically.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that is a proper use of the funds?

Mr. HARRIS. Where national security is involved, where it involves both parties; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go back to just one point, and that is that during the month before we began broadcasts in Hebrew, which was March 1951, we got more mail from Israel than we got during any month of 1952. And during the 7 months ending with December 1952, our mail from Israel always contained far more letters in the English language than in Hebrew, suggesting that English is used with freedom and is the popular language in Israel.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say that the fact that you had more letters in English indicated to you that the English broadcasts were more popular?

Mr. HARRIS. I say that is one of the factors that suggests that English is used there. I have produced, as the testimony will show, a scientific study showing that a panel technique used out there—one of the scientific techniques that Dr. Glazer refers to—resulted in a finding that English was preferred to Hebrew as a language for listeners to the VOA. I have submitted that for the record, as you know. I am not saying that getting letters in English necessarily proves that all the people who write them prefer to listen in English.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? You said you submitted that for the record?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir; I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the one entitled "Israeli Listener Panel"?

Mr. HARRIS. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. HARRIS. Earlier, when you spoke of Dr. Glazer, I mentioned I had respect for him, that he was an able man, but I said he was naturally fighting for the life of his desk, and you said you thought to the contrary, that he was fighting for the good of America. There was nothing in my statement that would suggest that he was not trying to fight for the good of the United States, just as I am. We are in the same business. We believe in fighting the cold war against international communism and in favor of the principles of this Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, there is a big difference when you say a man is fighting for his own job and for that reason his testimony should not be given much weight. It is a rather serious accusation. I had never met Dr. Glazer until I saw him in New York. I may say I have been favorably impressed by him and Mr. Dooher, and I have been impressed with the record they have had in the Voice for many years. I have checked their records. The only thing Mr. Dooher said that made him worry about himself is the fact that he rose so rapidly in the State Department.

Mr. HARRIS. I think the fact that Mr. Dooher rose is proof that there is no conspiracy to hold people back in the IIA. This question of saying that Dr. Glazer was motivated to some extent by his natural

instincts to fight for his own desk is simply a statement of psychological fact. No matter how far you try to disassociate yourself, you naturally have a desire to fight for your own desk. That is no reflection, that is a tribute. The considerations that motivate us are necessarily broader by the nature of our jobs. We have to think about five media and the entire world. Dr. Glazer does not. He, therefore, sees such a thing as this in a far narrower context. He cannot help but be in that position. That is no reflection on him whatsoever. That is merely to show that his area of interest is necessarily somewhat limited in respect to this program. I would like to point out further that in the nature of things a great many of the persons who serve on particular parts of our media, that is, on a single desk of the Voice, on a single desk of our press service, on a single selection group of our information-center service, on our motion-picture program, and so on, are not given the overall highly classified directives of certain kinds, and some of the highly classified information that we must draw on when we are making decisions in headquarters.

I contend that the entire high command of IIA, and I include myself in that, has been motivated entirely by patriotic, loyal, American motives, that we have at no time supported any international Communist line, directly or indirectly, in this work.

The CHAIRMAN. You say as far as you know everyone——

Mr. HARRIS. In the top command.

The CHAIRMAN. In the top command?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir; that is what I said.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the second and third echelons?

Mr. HARRIS. I should say that everybody that I know anything about, that I ever met, that I have worked with in the International Information Administration, is strongly anti-Communist and is working together as a fine team to carry out our cold-war objectives all over the world.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you are quite thoroughly satisfied with both the personnel and the performance of the IIA?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I feel the performance is very high under the conditions given. I think the performance of the Voice is excellent, and the rest of our media perform excellently. I do not believe in your contention that anything has been proved before this committee suggesting these great amounts of waste that you talk about. I think before the end of these hearings, or at least before the ultimate public judgments have been made, that there has not been this waste will be proven.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you responsible for the hiring of the chief engineer, Mr. Herrick?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Herrick was in the organization long before I ever got into it.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not reflecting on his loyalty or security or anything of the kind, but do you think he was the type of individual who should have held that job as chief engineer?

Mr. HARRIS. I think he is one of the most able development engineers in the country, and part of his duties were development of new techniques and apparatus to deal with this problem. He turned out to be somewhat less effective as a supervisor, and therefore we had to break down the work in additional parts so the supervision would

be in other hands and Mr. Herrick, who has had a citation and honor award in the Department of State for his outstanding work as a development engineer, should continue exclusively on that type of business. It is true that we sometimes have to make people double in brass, and one side of that doubling might not be as effective as the other.

The CHAIRMAN. You think he was found unsatisfactory in supervising construction work?

Mr. HARRIS. He was less effective as a construction supervisor than as an engineer.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you find him unsatisfactory?

Mr. HARRIS. I have made no finding on those accounts at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not, as acting director, have something to say about people you put in or take out of key jobs?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, when I am Acting Director that is the case.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you approve the removal of Mr. Herrick as chief engineer?

Mr. HARRIS. I had nothing to do with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you approve of it now?

Mr. HARRIS. I think it was a good idea to move him entirely into development work where he can do his best work and put a person who is a specialist in construction in that job. I think it was a wise thing to do, just as we always do in the case of specialists.

The CHAIRMAN. As acting head of IIA, did you ever check into the background of your chief engineer?

Mr. HARRIS. I had no occasion to do that but I knew his performance, and I knew what other professional engineers say about him, and it was all very, very fine.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you knew his performance. You said he selected the site Baker West, which you think should be suspended. I am curious. The committee heard Mr. Herrick in New York. He seemed to be a very nice sociable individual. We checked his school record and found that he had gotten D's or flunked everything in his preengineering work, except public speaking. We found that he had never taken any actual engineering work in college. This is not being said as a criticism of Mr. Herrick. Many people would flunk engineering, as other people might flunk other studies.

But I wonder why you, as Acting Director, or whoever happened to be Director, would not check into the background of an engineer, especially when he is supervising this very, very costly program. I may say he was removed the day after we went to New York and took evidence in public session showing—I say showing, all the engineers who have testified so far have agreed that it would have been a great waste of money with respect to the original construction as you constructed Baker West—and according to the Bureau of Standards it would have taken 50 times as much power to get the same signal to the target area about 90 percent of the day. You say you were satisfied with his performance. I wonder what he would have to do to make you dissatisfied with his performance.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, if I had information presented to me in the exact form you did, and nothing else, I probably would have felt very badly about Mr. Herrick. Mr. Herrick had excellent practical engineering experience. A great many engineers who have worked with us, consultants, and so on, so far speak highly of him. Mr. Carr, for instance; Mr. Ring, for instance.

The CHAIRMAN. Have there been complaints made to you that the antenna has been extremely wasteful and the wrong type selected? Have you received complaints to that effect?

Mr. HARRIS. I have heard two or three engineers advance opinions that one type of antenna is preferable to the other. But the consensus of opinion, which we must draw on, the best opinion we can get, says that the curtain antenna, which has been under criticism, give us a far more powerful directional signal than any other type available at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, when you found this great question about whether a serious mistake had been made in the location of Baker West and Baker East, do you not think that normally it would have been your duty to check into the background of your chief engineer, check his schooling, find out what he had done as an engineer, to see if he was qualified, or were you too busy, or why did you not do it?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, it was in no way my province to do that. General Stoner made the checks of the location of Baker East and Baker West after new engineering evidence suggested that there may have been a question about the location of Baker West. No one in our organization has ever conceded that there was a reason for suspending Baker East, except the public controversy aroused by this committee. Baker East we will probably wish to continue. On the best scientific evidence we have, it ought to continue.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us take Baker West. Do you agree that to continue that would result in a waste of \$9 million?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. What would you set the waste at?

Mr. HARRIS. I am not sure there would be any waste. I know there is a difference of opinion among scientific people about whether the location is the best location under the circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. You say there is a difference of opinion. Do you know that the Bureau of Standards has issued a report saying that the original site was undesirable and that a site farther south, either San Francisco or San Diego, would mean that you could get by with one-fiftieth as much power in certain parts 90 percent of the day? Do you disagree with the Bureau of Standards on that?

Mr. HARRIS. I am not competent to go into details on this thing. I know we have had the statements of various engineers that they do not subscribe with the original recommendations made to us, which were supposed to have included the information from the Bureau of Standards at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. You have repeated that over several times.

Mr. HARRIS. I have, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have the head of the Bureau of Standards under oath before the committee, and he said that you have never requested any information from them.

Mr. HARRIS. We said we did not. MIT did it for us. I don't know how that particular kind of evasion got into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That kind of what?

Mr. HARRIS. What I would say would be an evasion.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not hear you. That particular kind of what got into the record?

Mr. HARRIS. I would say that was an evasion because the Massachusetts Institute of Technology requested that information for us. We did not request it. The man who so testified is testifying quite truthfully that we did not request information from the Bureau of Standards. But when MIT requested the information for us, I hardly see that that indicates that we didn't have the information, or that we haven't used the Bureau of Standards information.

The CHAIRMAN. You paid MIT, and you say MIT got the information from the Bureau of Standards.

Mr. HARRIS. I say one of many kinds of information that they had was information from the Bureau of Standards.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you question the fact that the Bureau of Standards is better equipped to conduct the study than the Massachusetts Institute of Technology? While the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is excellently qualified for many studies, this was rather unusual. This was a type of work the Bureau of Standards was equipped to do.

I am curious as to why you hired the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to get the information from the Bureau of Standards. It seems rather roundabout.

Mr. HARRIS. The Bureau of Standards was but one of many areas and people who were consulted by the people on this survey. They were not limited to the Bureau. We certainly do agree that the Central Propagation Laboratory of the Bureau of Standards is very well equipped. They did not have a report of that nature available at the time we were doing this work, from what the MIT people tell us.

The CHAIRMAN. We are talking about the propagation of a signal.

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Bureau of Standards is fully equipped to conduct such a study.

Mr. HARRIS. It is.

The CHAIRMAN. The Bureau of Standards did conduct such a study for this committee.

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They have testified under oath that you have never asked them to conduct this propagation study.

Mr. HARRIS. We did not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony is that you hired MIT to do it.

Mr. HARRIS. A number of things, including that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you not have this work done for free by the Bureau of Standards?

Mr. HARRIS. There was no charge made by the MIT for information obtained by them from the Bureau of Standards.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any charge by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for this propagation study?

Mr. HARRIS. They made far more than a propagation study. They went into all factors.

The CHAIRMAN. You know what I am asking you.

Mr. HARRIS. I know. They made a large charge for the total project. But they did not charge for any information they got free.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they charge you for this propagation study? Do you know what I mean by propagation study?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes; I understand what a propagation study is.

The CHAIRMAN. You know you had to have that study conducted before you could intelligently decide to locate those two key broadcasting stations.

Mr. HARRIS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And the propagation study made by the Bureau of Standards indicates your selection of Baker West was wrong. My question was this: Did you pay MIT for this propagation study, and, if so, how much?

Mr. HARRIS. The propagation study I could not give you a figure on unless we got a breakdown. The project of which it was a part, which would cover something like 50 items, cost a good deal. It cost between \$500,000 and \$600,000, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell us why you did not have the Bureau of Standards conduct this all-important propagation study?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not know why the Voice did not do that. I think the feeling was that they needed more information than the Bureau of Standards could furnish. We may have found by informal inquiry that they were not ready to do it at that time. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. In any event, some \$3 or \$4 million has been spent on Baker West, which has now been discontinued, and as far as you know the Bureau of Standards said it never should have been located where you have located it.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, you have made such a statement, and I certainly have no reason to question it, but I would like to point out here that I have a statement prepared by Col. Fred P. Andrews of the United States Signal Corps, retired, who has had experience in making use of radio communications from the State of Washington between Seattle and Tokyo, and I would like to have permission to read that and also submit it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider Colonel Andrews as a qualified engineer?

Mr. HARRIS. I consider that he knows about the practical experience. It is not a question of theoretical engineering. It is a question of actual experience in operating radio circuits, which he did have.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel he is a qualified engineer?

Mr. HARRIS. I know nothing about whether he is a qualified engineer or not. I know he is a colonel of the United States Signal Corps. I know that he was in charge of the Alaska Communications System, which included radio-telegraph circuits, and Voice circuits beyond Seattle to Tokyo.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you try to appoint him as Chief Engineer of IIA?

Mr. HARRIS. General Stoner says he believes he might be one of the good candidates.

The CHAIRMAN. You suggested that he be appointed chief engineer; did you not?

Mr. HARRIS. I had nothing to do with it unless I signed a recommendation that General Stoner developed.

The CHAIRMAN. You did sign a recommendation that he be appointed chief engineer; did you not?

Mr. HARRIS. I would have to check my files to see whether I signed a recommendation that Colonel Andrews become chief engineer.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know at this time whether you recommended him as chief engineer?

Mr. HARRIS. I know he was recommended to me by General Stoner as a person who would be qualified. I don't know whether we actually went through and asked for his services or not.

The CHAIRMAN. I will introduce the document which you were going to introduce on this expert, a letter dated March 3, 1953, special delivery from the United States Civil Service, region 1, addressed to Mr. Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel, Senate Investigation Subcommittee, Room 160, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. COHN: At the telephoned request of Miss Lawrence, we are sending you by special delivery a photostat of the application of Mr. Fred Page Andrews who, you will note, received an ineligible rating under "Announcement No. 2-8 (52)" for the position of engineer.

The ineligible rating was based on the fact that Mr. Andrews failed to show the required qualifying experience.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES E. ROSSELL, *Regional Director.*

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 37" and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let us hear about this expert.

Mr. HARRIS. I should say as far as his experience from the point of view of the Civil Service Commission is concerned, that is pretty well disposed of. I have the statement that he has 14 years of experience on the Alaskan Communications System, in the capacity of commanding officer for 9 years and 5 years as officer in charge of engineering. I should hate to think that the Signal Corps of the United States Army would agree with that appraisal by the Civil Service Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. When you were offering him to us as the authority that the Bureau of Standards was wrong, did you know that he had been declared ineligible for the position of engineer, not the chief engineer?

Mr. HARRIS. I had heard nothing of that kind until you read that letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Until this time you did not know that he was declared ineligible?

Mr. HARRIS. I certainly did not know it. I will point out once more that we have clear-cut evidence that he successfully operated the Alaskan Communications System for the United States Army Signal Corps. I don't know what goes into the judgment sometimes of the Civil Service Commission. Sometimes they make me wonder. But I can say that certainly a man who successfully operated a communications system as big as that should be considered a person who knows what he did and what happened. He is not making this statement on the basis of some general engineering competence. He is making it on the basis of actual experience.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, before you recommended this man Andrews for the job of chief engineer, did you check his background to see if he had ever gone to an engineering college, if he had ever graduated, if he had flunked as the other chief engineer had?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, our method of selecting personnel—

The CHAIRMAN. Did you or did you not?

Mr. HARRIS. I had it done by my personnel division, which is the proper way to do it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you find that his educational background was?

Mr. HARRIS. I do not have the report. I have not had it reported to me.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not?

Mr. HARRIS. It has not been reported.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not get a report, and as of today you do not know whether you recommended him as chief engineer or not?

Mr. HARRIS. The thing you are calling a recommendation may have consisted of a routine request that our personnel office make a check as to his availability for the position. That does not constitute actually a recommendation, if such a document exists. It indicates that we have heard that this man has the qualifications, but we want the normal checking done. That means that both the civil-service type of checking of his background and the security checking must be made on our program before any man can work for it, including a full FBI field investigation. That is all that means. That work shall be undertaken by our personnel and security people.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not your recommendation mean that he would have had the job of chief engineer unless the Civil Service Commission had turned him down?

Mr. HARRIS. Unless civil service or security had turned him down he certainly would have had the job.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you think we should leave it up to the Civil Service Commission to determine whether your chief engineer is competent or not. It is not up to you.

Mr. HARRIS. As a matter of fact, we are by law required to have civil service do this part of the job. After we get the details from civil service, then we can make the choice as between people. He would not have gone on duty if the report had come back that he was not qualified, or something of that kind. I think the Civil Service Commission with its excellent ways of investigating and checking records certainly should be able to give us as much information as anybody can.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you check to see if Mr. Herrick, who had flunked engineering, had passed the civil-service test?

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I don't see why that is really relevant because I came into this program in August 1950, when Mr. Herrick had long been on the Voice. I had no reason to go back and recheck the records of each of the officials with whom I was working. They were performing in a way that appeared competent, was reported to be competent, and we carried them.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, you knew that Mr. Herrick had been demoted and that he was no longer chief engineer. You knew that this project on the west coast that cost millions of dollars had been discontinued. I assume you read the record and knew that he had 1 year of preengineering and had flunked.

Did not that sort of put you on your guard and make you say to yourself, "Harris, before we get a new chief engineer, let us be sure we get a good man."

Mr. HARRIS. I should certainly say so. And when the former Chief of Army Communications, General Stoner, comes in and says that a man is a person who is qualified, we certainly send his name in and find out what the details are through the normal channels. I think that is a proper and sensible thing to do. Certainly you wouldn't contest that the man who was Chief of the Army Communications Service during the war, and was a high-ranking general in the Signal Corps, would be lacking in any judgment on what kind of people made good chief engineers?

The CHAIRMAN. You refer to General Stoner's judgment. You know that General Stoner wrote a memorandum to Dr. Compton pointing out that Baker West was located in the wrong location and to continue operations there was more than a calculated risk. He said, "If we move it, we will get in trouble and will have to explain to the press and Congress may investigate us. Therefore, let us continue on with this and compound the error." Would you say you are willing to rely on his judgment?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't think that is an accurate paraphrase of the memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we will read it to you. First the conclusions:

(1) That a more southerly location would greatly improve the propagation of the transmitter as it removes the path of the electromagnetic waves from the absorption action of the north auroral zone.

(2) That by remaining at the present site we are taking more than a calculated risk.

I may say at that time, according to the testimony, there had been spent only about \$200,000 in the project. Here is the advice of the man upon whom you rely.

If the decision is to move to California, we must be prepared to explain fully to the Congress and to the press our reasons for doing so. Such exposure may result in congressional investigation and would not be conducive to our obtaining additional construction funds in the near future. If we remain at Seattle and install our megowatt at that point we also must be prepared to be continuously under surveillance concerning our output in efficiency.

Now, the final recommendation:

I recommend that there be no change in the present site of Baker West.

Since then, as you know, several million dollars have been spent. Some of it can be reclaimed, of course, because it is equipment which can be used some place else.

I understand your testimony is that you are relying upon this man to select a chief engineer for you.

Mr. HARRIS. Dr. Compton thought highly of him. I think highly of him. He made this memorandum to Dr. Compton at the time and I did not see it until it came up in this investigation. But we had every reason to trust the judgment of General Stoner on all counts I knew.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you trust his judgment now after hearing this memorandum read?

Mr. HARRIS. I would not think well of the sequence suggested there. I don't understand that particular approach to a thing. It does not seem to be very well thought through.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. HARRIS. But I had no knowledge of that memorandum, I might say, at the time there was talk about the possibility of a new

chief engineer. Dr. Compton did suggest that General Stoner find an appropriate person and start finding out through the normal personnel mechanism whether he would be available and the proper person to go on the job. There is probably no doubt that a routine memorandum went in to have that check made. I still feel, Mr. Chairman, that a colonel who has served for a year and a half in charge of the Alaskan communications system radio-telegraph circuits between Seattle and Tokyo, and had additional experience in that system for a whole 9 years, can certainly state accurately what his experience was there, regardless of whatever General Stoner said in the memorandum, or whatever the Civil Service Commission said about Colonel Andrews.

This statement about what actually happened under this command would certainly seem to stand up. There has been no question here of the veracity of Colonel Andrews, and I don't think we could ever wish to question it. I don't think you would.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris, you need more than truth to be a good engineer.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I say that this gentleman is making a statement on the basis of his experience, his experience in a particular situation, namely, operating radio facilities out of the State of Washington area toward the Far East. And that therefore his experience has relevance and that it makes very good sense to have in the record a statement by such a person in order to help bring balance into the consideration of whether or not the Baker West location had some reason for being.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you aware of the fact that Colonel Andrews had recommended the present location of Baker West?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. I say when you tried to appoint him as chief engineer, were you aware of the fact that he had agreed that Baker West should be located where it is located?

Mr. HARRIS. I have no information on that, but I should assume that General Stoner, knowing him and working with him and his experience in the Alaskan Communications System, would have gone to him when he was making his check. That is a supposition only.

The CHAIRMAN. The question that occurs to me is this, that if General Stoner knew, as he did know from his memorandum, that Mr. Herick and Colonel Andrews both agreed that Baker West should be located where it was located, and decided that was a serious mistake, in view of the fact that he made that one mistake, don't you think he should have checked further into his background? The memorandum on page 3 shows that Col. Fred P. Andrews was one of those who recommended Baker West to be put in this bad location.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have testified before and you have demonstrated by showing a letter from the Civil Service Commission that we did indeed check very deeply into him, and the fact is that the Civil Service Commission would have looked at it very thoroughly. We would get all the information necessary. I can't undertake personally all of these personnel checks, of course. You know that, and you wouldn't expect me to. We do have mechanism for doing it, and the mechanism went to work, as it should. I still return to my statement, sir, that Colonel Andrews, having had practical experience in

operating circuits between Seattle and Tokyo—in other words, out of the State of Washington not far from the site of Baker West as it was chosen—that his experience there has some bearing on deciding what will really happen in a radio circuit.

It is one of the strange things about radio that very often the theoretical engineers turn out to be wrong and that the practical men find ways to go around a particular theoretical problem that the engineers have raised. That is one of the reasons that Mr. Herrick has been very successful. He has not gotten this detailed engineering training, and he is a person who thinks in practical terms.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you want that statement to be made an exhibit?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be accepted as committee exhibit No. 38.

(The document referred to was marked "Committee Exhibit No. 38" and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn until 10:30 tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m., the committee was recessed to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Thursday, March 5, 1953.)



APPENDIX

EXHIBIT No. 34

SUMMARY OF A MEETING

Present: Alfred Puhan, Chairman, James F. Thompson, Gerald Doohar, Howard Hotchner, John Taliaferro, Edward W. Macy, and Idris Rossell

Subject: Hebrew Language Broadcasts

Time and place: Room 1631, 3:00 P. M., December 10, 1952

Mr. Puhan stated that he had called this group together to apprise them of the order received from Mr. Reed Harris to discontinue the VOA Hebrew broadcasts. He read the memorandum dated December 5 received in New York on December 9 as follows:

"Confirming my conversation with Sidney Sulkin and in accordance with discussions held in the PAB with regard to the effectiveness of Hebrew language broadcasts, you are requested to suspend such broadcasts as soon as possible. The Bureau of Near Eastern and African Affairs has been consulted and agrees with this decision, as does IFI/N.

"I am aware of the public relations problems which could result. However, the proven weakness of the signal we can get into Israel with existing transmitters makes the Jewish programs so markedly ineffective that we cannot justify continuation in the face of the \$600,000 cut in the IBS budget."

Mr. Puhan then stated that for the record he wished to trace the course of events which had led up to this order. It was recalled that in April during Mr. Puhan's absence on a trip a request had come from Washington to perform certain "arithmetical exercises" which would reduce programming of the VOA. Certain recommendations were proposed by Washington, but they were reviewed and amended by IBS. At that time the question of Hebrew had not arisen.

In July specific instructions were received from Washington to the effect that programming would have to be cut and we were requested to come up with programming cuts. In the middle of July a paper was prepared by IBS spelling out in detail programming reductions which could be made in the order of minimum damage to IBS objectives. If carried to its logical conclusion the last item for an orderly reduction of VOA programming would have been the discontinuance of Russian language programs. IBS at that time was prepared to undertake steps #1 and #2 of the suggested steps. The steps are as follows:

- 1) Reduction in English Language Service from 9 hours 30 minutes to 5 hours 45 minutes, eliminating:
 - 1 hour 15 minutes to Latin America
 - 1 hour 15 minutes to Europe
 - 1 hour 15 minutes to Far East
- 2) Reduction in programming from Munich from 10 hours 30 minutes to 1 hour 45 minutes.
- 3) Elimination of "Breakfast" programming to Europe and Middle East, except for 11:15—11:45 P. M. Russian transmission to be carried on point-to-point facilities (eliminating 4 hours of daily broadcasting).
- 4) Reduction of Spanish broadcasting to Latin America from 2 hours twenty-five minutes to 1 hour twenty-five minutes.
- 5) Reduction of Mandarin from 3 hours to 2 hours.
- 6) Reduction of French Language Service from 1 hour to 30 minutes.
- 7) Elimination of IBS *programming operations* from Washington.
- 8) Reduction of Austrian Language Service from proposed 1 hour (current 45 minutes) to 30 minutes.
- 9) Reduction of Italian Language Service from 1 hour twenty-five minutes to 35 minutes (5 minute daily RAI relay to be retained).

10) Reduction in German Language Service from 1 hour 45 minutes to 1 hour.
 11) Reduction in Spanish Language Service to Spain from 45 minutes to 30 minutes.

12) Elimination of Portuguese Language Service to Portugal.

13) Elimination of Hebrew Language Service to Israel.

14) Elimination of "Breakfast" programming to Far East except for 11:15-11:45 P. M. Russian transmission as listed in Item #2 (eliminating 3 hours 15 minutes of daily broadcasting).

15) Elimination of all remaining programming operations of Inter-American Branch: (1 hour twenty-five minutes in Spanish and 45 minutes Brazilian).

It was noted that the elimination of the Hebrew Language Service was No. #13 in this list.

An excerpt from a memorandum from Mr. Kohler to Dr. Compton of July 24 was read:

"... Actually, as you will recall from our appeal presentation of July 17 in your office, IBS asked for a limitation of VOA programming reductions to the first two items of some fourteen steps required if we were given no budget relief, these two steps being the ones mentioned above. IBS made it clear at that meeting that it was reluctant to agree to any reduction of its program, but that in the interest of equality of sacrifice, it was prepared to take these two steps, thereby reducing VOA programming by 15 percent. . . ."

In another memorandum of August 11 Mr. Kohler wrote to Mr. Reed Harris as follows:

"... These additional 5 steps would cover the remaining deficit. Note that the Hebrew Language Service has not been eliminated. IBS recommends against this step, not for programming reasons, but rather as a matter of public relations. . . ."

In PAB Action Paper No. 1, dated August 15, 1952, which was cleared with Messrs. Reed Harris, A. G. Sims, Ben Gedalecia, W. Bradley Connors, Arthur A. Kimball, and which was signed and approved by Dr. Compton, the following point was made:

"... Portuguese and Hebrew language service will be continued until final evaluation of data from missions, etc.; the discontinuation of either service or both, or any other change in IBS programs or operations subsequently developing, will be accompanied by adjustments in the IBS allocation. . . ."

No further word on the Hebrew Language broadcasts was heard until December 2, 1952, when Mr. Micocci wrote to Mr. Puhon with copies to Messrs. Sulkin, Hamilton, Sims, Carolan, Gedalecia, as follows:

"You will recall PAB's decision to suspend Hebrew broadcasts by VOA soon after November 4. This is a reminder of that decision and a request to proceed with the suspension

"With the thought that some new factors might have entered the picture, I have made a partial check here of the people concerned with Israel (NEA, IFI, etc.) I have found no change even though it is now assumed that with the Courier in operation the strength of the signal is not an issue. If you wish you may make a recheck of your own. But in view of the time that has elapsed since November 4, I suggest that you do it quickly—if you do it.

"I understand that Mr. Gedalecia can and is willing to help with some public-relations aspects of the discontinuance. I am sure you will keep him informed of the timing on your program action so that he can do his part at the proper time."

Mr. Puhon pointed out that IBS had been unaware of the PAB decision to suspend Hebrew programs soon after November 4 until the December 2 memorandum had been received.

On December 4 Mr. Sulkin sent a teletype to IBS, an excerpt of which follows:

"... Hebrew: Harris will send memorandum instructing suspension of Hebrew Language broadcasts as soon as possible. He states that this was clearly a PAB decision and that nothing new has happened to change that decision. The cable from Tel Aviv regarding Prague trials does not alter decision particularly in the light of current budget situation . . ."

On the same day, December 4, Messrs. Puhon and Francis sent a memorandum on the Budget, to Reed Harris which contained the following excerpts on the Hebrew broadcasts:

"... IBS has been ordered to suspend Hebrew broadcasts leaving the decision to take such action to IBS. (See wording of Micocci memorandum to Puhon dated December 2.) Allowance was made for IBS to make a recheck of

our own. The question is whether IBS has taken into account the following factors:

"A). Tel Aviv has just asked us to use VOA full blast on the recent Czech Anti-Semitism purges:

"B). While anti-Semitism flourishes behind the curtain and where a tremendously important political issue has been handed the Hebrew desk, is this the time to suspend Hebrew broadcasts?

"C). With the Israeli-Arabic issue about to come up in the U. N. and both sides jockeying for support of us, will the abandonment of Hebrew at this time not be falsely interpreted?

"Please reply urgently."

On December 5, Mr. Sulkin sent another teletype to IBS on the budget with the following pertaining to the Hebrew programs:

"* * * I asked Harris to look at the Puhon teletype, particularly the section on the Hebrew broadcast since it raised certain cautions which should be kept in mind by IIA."

The December 5 memorandum which was read at the beginning of the meeting was the final word to date on this subject. Mr. Puhon pointed out that IBS was now under an order and that he had asked the people present at the meeting to sit down and discuss ways and means to carry out this order. Mr. Puhon asked that Mr. Taliaferro determine the precise figure for the savings which would be made in cutting out the Hebrew programs, taking into account civil service rules and regulations, the payment of leave, the return of contract employees to Israel, any savings in facilities, etc. He also asked Mr. Hotchner to obtain a report on reception of Hebrew programs in Israel, since there is a distinct contradiction as to the reception of the program in Israel. The date for the cutting out of the Hebrew programs was set as January 15. There was considerable discussion as to the serious effects of cutting out this program, not only from a domestic public relations point of view, but from the international political viewpoint. There was also considerable discussion on the mechanics of carrying out the personnel reduction in force.

It was decided that another memorandum would be prepared by Mr. Puhon to be sent from IBS to Mr. Harris stating that the necessary steps were being taken, but that IBS felt it must go on record again with its objections to this step. At the same time it was agreed to place a call to Mr. Morton, recommending that the final order not be issued to the staff of the Hebrew unit until Mr. Morton's return to the office on Monday. Mr. Dooher was requested not to transmit this information to the Hebrew desk until specifically ordered to.

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA No. 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
Washington, March 9, 1953.

The Honorable JOSEPH R. McCARTHY,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR McCARTHY: In reviewing the transcript of my testimony before your committee on Wednesday, March 4, 1953, I find I made two factual mistakes which I should like to correct:

1. In response to your questions, I stated (p. 11583) that Mr. E. C. Carter was at the luncheon for Mr. Rogov. Miss Rose Yardumian's letter to Mr. Carter, which you read into the record, does not include Mr. Carter's name as in attendance at the luncheon, and does not include that of Mr. Carl F. Remer. I do not recall Mr. Remer's attendance, but accept the above statement as fact that the persons at the luncheon for Mr. Rogov were Mr. Owen Lattimore, Mr. Carl F. Remer, Mr. John Carter Vincent, and myself.

2. In response to your question as to when I left the IPR (p. 11586), I stated "1945" and again I stated (p. 11601) "and that was one of the reasons I dissociated myself from the IPR in 1945." My recollection is clear that I did, in fact, cease active participation in IPR activities in 1945. On checking my records, I find that I was elected to the board of trustees of the American Council IPR in 1946. I am certain, however, that on receiving notice of this action, I resigned, but I have not been able to find the correspondence in my files. In 1948, I was again elected to the board of trustees and I again tendered my resignation, which was accepted by Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, chairman of the board of trustees.

3. In my testimony (pp. 11580-11581) I stated that it was my recollection that I resigned from the advisory board of Indusco late in 1944 or early in 1945. I find, on checking my files, that actually I resigned sometime in 1946, at which time I requested that my name be removed from the list of the advisory board.

I would appreciate it if the committee would include this letter in the record, or take such other steps as it deems proper in order that the record may reflect the corrections contained herein.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE, Jr.,
Deputy Administrator for Field Programs.


INDEX

	Page
Andrews, Col. Fred Page.....	462, 463, 466
Bisson, T. A.....	437
Blakeslee.....	435
Carolan, Mr.....	470
Carr, Mr.....	459
Carter, Edward C.....	431, 432, 433, 471
Clark, Mr.....	405
Clevenger, Hon. Cliff.....	447
Cohn, Roy M.....	463
Compton, Dr.....	400, 402, 403, 406, 407, 408, 411, 412, 414, 424, 442, 443, 444, 446, 447, 454, 455, 465, 466, 470
Connors, W. Bradley.....	412, 470
Curria, Mr.....	433
Currie, Mr.....	433
Davis, Monet.....	428
Dooher, Gerald F. P.....	393, 396, 401, 406, 412, 427, 444, 445, 457, 469, 471
Testimony of.....	397, 399, 442-443
Eisenhower, Dwight.....	413, (428), 456
Faymonville, Colonel.....	433
Fisk, Mr.....	405
Francis, Robert J.....	401, 402, 470
Testimony of.....	413-415
Gayn, Mark.....	438
Gedalecia, Ben.....	412, 470
Glazer, Dr. Sidney.....	396, 401, 409, 412, 430, 439, 440, 444, 445, 449, 455, 457, 458
Testimony of.....	397-399, 415-416, 427-429, 441-442, 447-448, 450-452
Goldberg, Mr.....	447
Gurdus, Nathan.....	441
Hamilton, Mr.....	470
Harris, Reed.....	393, 398, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 424, 425, 440, 441, 442, 443, 469, 470, 471
Testimony of.....	394, 399-413, 420, 422-423, 427, 444-467
Herrick, Mr.....	458, 459, 464, 466
Hiss, Alger.....	433
Holland, William.....	430
Hornbeck.....	433, 435
Hotchner, Howard.....	469, 471
Jaffe, Phil.....	437
Johnstone, Anne.....	435
Johnstone, William C., Jr.....	400, 402, 403, 405, 406, 411, 412, 414, 441, 451, 472
Testimony of.....	419-420, 423-440
Kaghan, Mr.....	418
Kimball, Arthur A.....	470
Kohler, Foy.....	400, 401, 402, 414, 470
Lattimore, Owen.....	432, 435, 439, 471
Lawrence, Miss.....	463
Leahy, John S.....	393
Lourie, Donald.....	454
McCarran committee.....	426, 430, 431, 433, 434, 436, 437, 439
McLeod, Mr.....	417, 418, 419
Macy, Edward W.....	469
Macy, Edwin.....	403
Micocci, Mr.....	470
Morton, Mr.....	402, 471
Moser, Charles.....	434
Norman, E. Herbert.....	437

	Page
Puhan, Alfred	399, 400, 403, 469, 470, 471
Testimony of	394-396, 401-402, 404-405, 414, 419
Remer, Carl F	435, 471
Ring, Mr	459
Rogov, Vladimir	431, 432, 433, 435, 471
Rosinger, Mr	436, 437
Rossell, Idris	469
Rossell, James E	463
Roth, Andrew	438
Russell, Mr	441
Schechter, Mr	418
Sheritt, Mosh	409
Sims, Albert G	426, 440, 470
Testimony of	419-422, 424-425
Slansky trials	393, 406
Snow, Edgar	437
Stevenson, Adlai	413
Stoner, General	460, 462, 463, 465, 466
Sulkin, Sidney	469, 470, 471
Taber, Hon. John	447
Taliaferro, John	469, 471
Thompson, James F	403, 417, 469
Testimony of	418-419
Todd, Larry	433
Truman, Harry	456
Vincent, John Carter	432, 435, 471
Ware, Leonard	451
Wilbur, Dr. Ray Lyman	471
Wiley, Hon. Alexander	446
Yardumian, Rose	432, 433, 434, 435, 471



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