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Statement... in review of the
evidence before the military
commission appointed by the
War department.





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Book B92



STATEMENT

OF

MAJOR GENERAL BUELL,

IN REVIEW

OF THE

EVIDENCE BEFORE THE MILITARY COMMISSION,

APPOINTED BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT,

IN NOVEMBER, 1862.



CAMPAIGN IN KENTUCKY, TENNESSEE, NORTHERN MISSISSIPPI
AND NORTH ALABAMA IN 1861 AND 1862.

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ERRATA.

Page 6, commencing on fifth line, read: "If the expeditions should be threatened by a superior force, they were to unite under the protection of the gunboats and make themselves secure until released by my advance upon Nashville."

Page 10, sixth line, fifth word, read "that" instead of "the."

Page 11, fifteenth line, read "June" instead of "April."

Page 13, fifteenth line, read "Tennessee" instead of "Mississippi."

Page 36, twenty-third line, read "Salvisa" instead of "Saliva."

Page 46, seventh line, omit "of the enemy."

Page 65, second line, read "Captain N. Michler" instead of "Captain M. Mickler."

Page 65, sixth line, after "Adjutant General," add "Lieutenant C. L. Fitzhugh, Aid-de-camp."



STATEMENT
OF
MAJOR GENERAL BUELL,
IN REVIEW
OF THE
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE MILITARY COMMISSION.

The investigations of this Commission have not gone further back than shortly after the evacuation of Corinth by the rebel army, in May last; and it might, perhaps, be expected that this review of my ^{operations} command in Kentucky and Tennessee would not go beyond that period; but I have, for more than a year, remained silent, under misrepresentations which have misled the public mind with reference to the administration of my command. I deem it proper, therefore, to sketch, briefly, the history of the army I recently commanded, and of my connection with it, for the period anterior to the time to which this investigation has extended. It is proper, also, as bearing on subjects that have been investigated, because many circumstances connected with it shaped or affected the subsequent operations under my command.

In the early part of November, 1861, the condition of affairs in Kentucky became the subject of the most anxious solicitude to the Government and throughout the country. One-third of the state was in the possession of the rebel forces, under whose protection a provisional government was inaugurated at Russellville. It was supposed that the Union element was confined, for the most part, to the old men; that the mass of the young men were on the eve of joining the rebel cause, and that nothing but extraordinary exertion and judicious management could rescue the state from the vortex toward which the excitement of revolution was rapidly carrying her. This was certainly an unjust reflection on the loyalty of the state; but there is no doubt that the presence of a large rebel force rendered the occasion critical.

It was unexpectedly announced to me, about the 9th of November, that I was to be charged with this weighty responsibility. I received general instructions from the General-in-Chief, Major-General McClellan, on the night of the 12th, and on the 15th of November I assumed command, at Louisville, of the new department of the Ohio, embracing the states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, that portion of Kentucky east of the Cumberland river, and the State of Tennessee.

The enemy, under the command of General Sidney Johnson, was in possession of Bowling Green, with, according to the best information, about twenty-five thousand men, his advance guard extending to Munfordsville. Including Hopkinsville and other points, his force north of the Cumberland amounted probably to thirty-five thousand men. He had a small force at Fort Henry, on the Tennessee river, and Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland; and he had railroad communication with Columbus, on the Mississippi, where he had a large force, and with Nashville and all points south and east. These facilities enabled him to concentrate at any point, in a very short time, all the force in the Confederacy not required for defence elsewhere. At that time he could hardly be said to be threatened in any quarter except in front of Washington. The Coast expeditions had not been inaugurated, and our force in Missouri was not yet prepared to operate beyond the limits of that state. He had also a small force, not probably exceeding two thousand five hundred men, under Humphrey Marshall, threatening the north-eastern part of Kentucky, through Pound Gap, and a considerable force under General Zollicoffer, at Cumberland Gap and on the road north of it. These last had recently been compelled to fall back from an attempt to invade the central part of the State, but they were still in a position to renew the effort. In addition to this, the population was in a state of great disquiet. Bands were constantly organizing to join the rebel ranks and intimidate the loyal people; and in some parts of the state the Union element scarcely dared to express itself.

Kentucky at this time was the point which offered to the enemy the best prospect of advantage. His intention to have possession of Louisville within a limited period was constantly avowed. The disloyal element confidently expected it, and if the Government force had not been speedily increased, the attempt would no doubt have been made. As soon, however, as the re-enforcements began to arrive, he commenced fortifying strongly at Bowling Green and other points.

In reality, the effective Government force which I found in Kentucky consisted of two divisions, about twenty-three thousand men, on the Cumberland Gap road and the Nashville road, and about four thousand men on the Big Sandy, in the north-east part of the State; but there were besides some forty or more Kentucky regiments or fractions of regiments scattered over the

State in recruiting districts, that were more or less available for local service. Very many, in fact nearly all, of them were not yet mustered in; many without arms, equipments or proper organization; some of them embracing various arms of service, artillery, cavalry and infantry. In the whole force were included about eight field batteries and four regiments of cavalry. The latter were all without any suitable arms—some had pistols only, and some muskets. There was not, I believe, a carbine in the hands of the troops. In the infantry, arms of two or three different calibers could frequently be found in the same regiment, and many of these were of foreign make and unfit for service from various defects which rendered them unsafe or unreliable. The troops were but little instructed, some of them not at all, and four or five General and perhaps as many staff officers embraced the whole military experience in the Department. Officers having no rank whatever were acting as Generals and staff officers under conditioned promises of appointment; and the supplies and equipment were in many respects deficient and defective. There was not transportation enough not already employed to serve twenty thousand men two days' march from a depot or line of railroad.

The first thing to be done was to organize, arm, equip and mobilize this heterogeneous mass; and this was both a difficult and tedious work. The Kentucky troops had to be collected from remote quarters and the fractions consolidated and organized—a work which the Military Board of the State had commenced before my arrival. Supplies of every kind had to be procured—a difficult matter, owing to the quantity suddenly required to supply the enormous force the Government was calling into service. In a word, pretty much every thing necessary to make an army of soldiers had to be done. But little assistance could be obtained from abroad. Experienced staff officers could not be obtained. I expected two regular batteries from Missouri. About the first of January two companies of artillery, without batteries, making together about seventy men, with one officer, reported to me. The expectation of a regiment of regular cavalry resulted even worse than that. After my arrival at Nashville two companies reported with about seventy men. New regiments began to report occasionally very soon after my arrival, and from the 26th of November to the 1st of January several regiments that had seen some service joined from Western Virginia. About the last of December some fourteen raw regiments were received from Ohio and Indiana. The force was afterward further increased from time to time. In the mean time, the enemy had also received considerable accessions to his strength.

The organization of the troops into Brigades and Divisions was effected without delay as fast as they arrived. It was made a rule in the organization not to group the regiments by states, but to represent as many States

as possible in each brigade—an arrangement which was attended with the happiest results in the discipline and tone of the army.

The instructions which I received, on leaving Washington, pressed upon me the importance of sending a column into East Tennessee. While the organization of my army, and the preparation of transportation to enable it to move, were going on, I studied the subject very carefully, and also suggested a plan of campaign against Nashville, and expressed my views very fully to the General-in-Chief with reference to both. I said that the campaign to East Tennessee would give occupation to thirty thousand men—twenty thousand to enter the State, with a reserve of ten thousand on the line of communications; and I stated what means would be required to supply the force at such a distance—two hundred miles by wagon transportation, a good part of the way through a barren mountainous region. For a campaign against Nashville, I proposed to march rapidly against that city, passing to the left of Bowling Green, through Glasgow and Gallatin, while a force from Missouri should ascend the Cumberland river under the protection of gunboats. This was essential, because, to make the movement successful, it would be necessary to move very light, and depend on receiving supplies by the Cumberland river after getting through. In organizing my troops, I disposed them so that they could be directed upon either or both of these objects. By the last of December I had collected troops enough to organize four divisions—about forty thousand men. I had thrown one division forward to Munfordsville, one to Bacon creek, on the same road, one near Green river, on the New Haven turnpike, and had one at Lebanon. Many of the Kentucky troops were yet scattered and not mustered in, but in some cases two or more regiments had been brought together for local service, with as many regiments added from other states—as at Calhoun, where there were perhaps six thousand men for the protection of the Green river country, and at Columbia perhaps three thousand. Other new regiments were rendezvousing at Bardstown for organization and preparation for service. As yet the most strenuous efforts had not succeeded in obtaining the necessary means of transportation for an advance.

About the middle of December Humphrey Marshall again invaded the state through Pikeville, with about twenty-five hundred men, though his force was represented at six or seven thousand. On the 17th I sent Colonel Garfield to take charge of a force of five regiments of infantry and about a regiment of cavalry, and operate against him. Marshall was defeated in two sharp engagements on the Big Sandy, near Prestonburg, and by about the middle of February was driven out of the State.

Simultaneously with the advance of Marshall into North-eastern Kentucky General Zollicoffer made his appearance on the Cumberland River, near

Somerset. His force was represented at twelve thousand men, but probably did not exceed eight thousand. The force sent for that purpose and to observe his movements failed to prevent him from crossing. I had previously kept a regiment at Somerset, and ordered the erection of a small work, both to watch that route into the State and to prevent the shipment of coal to Nashville. Zollicoffer crossed at Mill Spring and intrenched himself on the north bank of the river. On the 27th of December I ordered General Thomas to march from Lebanon and attack him in conjunction with the force already at Somerset, and at the same time sent two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery to Jamestown to blockade the river, a steamer having already passed up with supplies for the enemy at Mill Spring.

Want of transportation delayed General Thomas' departure until the 1st of January. The weather had previously been tolerably good, but that very day the rainy season set in, and from that time until near the end of March the earth was thoroughly saturated, and every stream was flooded. The season in that respect was remarkable. The difficulties of the march were so great that General Thomas only arrived at a position twelve miles from Mill Spring, and about seventy-five miles from Lebanon, on the 18th. The enemy came out and attacked him at daylight on the morning of the 19th. The result was a signal victory to our arms. The enemy was pursued to his intrenchments, and during the night crossed the river. He lost a considerable number of men in killed, wounded and prisoners, fourteen pieces of artillery, some fourteen hundred animals, and a large amount of other property and stores. General Zollicoffer was among the killed.

The battle of Mill Spring was at that time one of the most important that had occurred during the war, and the victory was, I believe, the first the Union arms achieved where the forces engaged were so large; but the lack of transportation, and the condition of the roads rendered it impossible to follow it up.

Owing to the delay in procuring sufficient transportation for the expedition to East Tennessee, I had regarded the campaign against Nashville as the one which it would be necessary to enter upon first, in order to save time. I was waiting for the arrangement of the necessary concert between the forces on the Mississippi and my own to commence it, when, owing to the illness of the General-in-Chief, and at the request of the President, I wrote, on the 3d of January, to Major General Halleck, who was in command in Missouri, and proposed substantially the same plan I had submitted to the General-in-Chief, and substantially the same as that which afterwards resulted in the capture of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson and Nashville. It contemplated an advance upon Nashville through Kentucky, a strong demonstration, which might be converted into a real attack against Columbus, if the enemy should weaken that point to strengthen

others that were threatened, and an advance of twenty thousand men up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, under the protection of gunboats. Such a force I deemed sufficient, at that time, for the works at Forts Henry and Donnelson had as yet no great strength, and were but feebly armed and garrisoned. If, under the protection of the gunboats, the expeditions should be threatened by a superior force, they were to unite and make themselves secure until released by my advance upon Nashville. At that time I expected that the expedition already commenced against the enemy at Mill Spring would be fully accomplished in ten days, and General Thomas' troops in a position to be available for other service.

General Halleck replied to my proposition that he had not spare force enough to undertake it, and suggested the objection that the proposed operation was one upon outer lines, but he offered to make a demonstration from Paducah toward Columbus. These facts explain in part why I was not prepared to act as promptly as I could otherwise have done when General Hallack subsequently commenced his advance up the Tennessee river. He stated, also, that he hoped in a few weeks to be able to render me material assistance. A mere demonstration, not in sufficient force to take a decided part in the campaign would have been of no avail, because either my advance must be rapid directly against Nashville by flanking Bowling Green—an essential condition of which would be that I should meet supplies transported up the Cumberland—or else it must be deliberate, and with heavy artillery, against Bowling Green, strengthened as that position was by fortifications on both sides of Barren river; and I had not then the means necessary for such an operation. Besides, I received, about the same time, communications from the President and the General-in-Chief, urging the expedition to East Tennessee as of primary importance. I therefore gave my attention to it, intending to start that expedition from Somerset, with the troops that were moving against the enemy at Mill Spring. The preparation of transportation was urged forward, and a strong force was set to work to *corduroy* the road to render it practicable. Nevertheless it was barely possible to subsist the ten thousand men at Somerset. The experiment demonstrated the impracticability of sending an expedition to East Tennessee in such force as to insure success in the present condition of the roads; and on the 1st of February I so advised the General-in-Chief in a letter with full explanations, and expressed my purpose to proceed against Bowling Green.

I had had no communication with General Halleck since his reply to my letter of the 3d of January, but on the 30th I received a dispatch from him, saying, without giving particulars, that he had ordered an expedition against Fort Henry. The same day I ^{had} suggested to him, by let-
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ter, a rapid gunboat expedition up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers to destroy bridges over those streams. Although Forts Henry and Donelson had been considerably strengthened, I believed the gunboats could pass them without any great risk. On the 6th, I ordered one brigade from the mouth of Green River, and eight new regiments, to reinforce General Halleck's expedition. They did not, however, arrive until after the capture of that place, which occurred on the 7th, but took part in the subsequent operations against Fort Donelson.

General Halleck found great difficulty in the movement against Fort Donelson, although the distance from Fort Henry was only about twelve miles. The enemy had greatly strengthened the works, and increased the garrison. Protected as Bowling Green was by fortifications, the formidable river in front, and by the condition of the roads, I apprehended that my operations against that place could not be rapid enough to prevent the enemy from reinforcing Fort Donelson so strongly as to endanger the success of General Halleck's operations. Upon consultation with him, therefore, I commenced, on the 13th, the movement of three divisions to reinforce him by water, which would not only make the reduction of the place certain, but give force enough to operate against Nashville on that line, while the rest of my force was threatening Bowling Green in front. The advance of General Mitchel's division arrived opposite Bowling Green on the morning of the 14th, and found the bridge in flames and the enemy evacuating the place. That officer was directed to cross rapidly and throw a force forward towards Nashville; and the advance on that line was strengthened by a division which was to have gone to the Cumberland.

The operation of passing the river at Bowling Green, in its swollen condition, was difficult and tedious. The advanced division, General Mitchel's, did not get entirely over for ten days, notwithstanding the energy of that officer. While this was going on, the troops in rear were employed in repairing the railroad. On the 24th, the river was so high that small steamers were taken over the broken dams, and reached Bowling Green with supplies and to assist in ferrying. About the same time a pontoon bridge was laid, and, although the overflow of the banks seriously interfered, yet the troops were able to pass with comparative rapidity.

In the meantime I was informed, about the 17th, of the surrender of Fort Donelson. I arrived at Bowling Green on the 20th, and on the 21st learned that the enemy had evacuated Clarksville and fallen back on Nashville; and that he had burned the bridges at Nashville. On the morning of the 22d, the troops that had crossed the river at Bowling Green, two brigades and a half, started for Nashville without wagons, very few having yet been got across. With about 1,000 men on cars, which the enemy

had not succeeded in carrying off or destroying, I expected to reach within nine miles of Nashville that night; but a heavy rain destroyed the road in advance of us, and I did not reach the river opposite Nashville until the night of the 24th. The remainder of the troops arrived at the same time by marching. I had telegraphed General Halleck, and sent a courier through to Clarksville, giving information of my movements, and requesting that the gunboats should proceed at once up the river. I apprehended that they would meet one battery on the way, but they arrived without molestation on the night of the 24th, conveying the transports with the troops of General Nelson and General Crittenden, three brigades; and, on the morning of the 25th, the troops entered Nashville, and took position beyond the city, towards Murfreesboro, the enemy having retired to that place.

The river was out of its banks, and the work of crossing was tedious. General Mitchel's Division passed over on the 25th and 26th, and the other Divisions as rapidly as possible, but the whole had not crossed until about the 5th of March. General Thomas' Division arrived by water on the 2d. The troops moved by forced marches, without baggage, owing to the difficulty of getting their wagons over the streams. The trains did not, therefore, arrive for several days after. Those that could arrive more rapidly that way were transported by water up the Cumberland.

The strength of the enemy at Murfreesboro, after the evacuation of Nashville, was estimated at the time, and has since been stated by persons who had means of judging, at about thirty thousand men. This force included what was collected of the troops that were defeated at Mill Spring, and the force that had been at Bowling Green and other points north of the Cumberland River, excepting what was captured at Fort Donelson. It commenced moving South from Murfreesboro in a very few days after my arrival at Nashville, and, as is well known, eventually formed a junction with the forces of General Beuregard, at Corinth. A pursuit with the hope of overtaking it on its line of march, would have been futile for that object, even if the force had been up to commence it at once; for every stream was flooded, and every bridge was destroyed as the enemy retired. The only alternative was to operate deliberately against some line or point which it was his object to defend, and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad presented such an object. It was the same for the forces that were operating up the Tennessee River, under the orders of Major General Halleck, more particularly against the enemy's forces that by the recent operations had been compelled to evacuate the principal part of West Tennessee. It was necessary that our forces should act in concert against that object; better still that they should act under one direction; and the order of the War Department, which I received on

the 12th of March, placing the whole force under General Halleck's command, was, therefore, eminently proper. On the 15th I commenced the movement toward the Tennessee River, in pursuance of the understanding which had voluntarily taken place between us before the orders of the War Department were received. General Halleck's dispatch of the 16th designated Savannah as the point where I was to form a junction with the force already assembling on the Tennessee River.

Before leaving Nashville I sent Brigadier General G. W. Morgan to take command of a column I had left on the Cumberland Gap road, which was increased to a division by scattered regiments that remained in Kentucky. He was instructed to pursue with energy and discretion the object of taking Cumberland Gap, and for his further progress to be governed by circumstances in East Tennessee, or to hold the enemy in check in that quarter, if his force should prove insufficient to advance. The operations of this column have been investigated partially by the Commission, and I shall allude to them again in that connection. I also moved General Mitchel's Division forward to Fayetteville, twenty-six miles from Huntsville, for the purpose of seizing the Memphis and Charleston Road. The enemy withdrew his troops from that line, excepting small guards, and General Mitchel on the 12th of April, five days after the battle of Shiloh, entered Huntsville. Various other dispositions and instructions were made with reference to the troops that were to occupy Middle Tennessee during my absence with the main army. The latter numbered about thirty-seven thousand men: the former about eighteen thousand.

The march toward the Tennessee river, on the 15th of March, commenced with one division, preceded by a rapid movement of cavalry, to get possession of the bridges as far as Columbia before the enemy could destroy them. It succeeded with all of the bridges excepting the one over Duck river, at Columbia, and one four miles north of that place. The work of preparing the means of crossing Duck river was urged forward by all possible means, and was under the charge of zealous and energetic officers; but it was not completed until the 31st of March. The river, which, at first forty feet deep, had been gradually receding, was watched day by day, and finally became fordable for cavalry the very day the bridges were completed. The army then moved forward steadily, the advance and myself reaching Savannah, about ninety miles from Columbia, on the evening of the 5th of April. The other divisions followed, with intervals of six miles from the head of one division to the head of the next.

The battle of Shiloh, which occurred on the 6th and 7th of April, has been justly considered one of the most remarkable of the war, in regard

to the numbers engaged, the reverses of the first day and the success of the second. The particulars, so far as my command was concerned, have been given in my official report of that battle, hereunto appended, and it is not necessary to repeat them. I believe that report states, in very moderate terms, the part which my command took in the incidents of that field. It has been conceded the my army rescued our forces, on the west bank of the Tennessee, from certain destruction or capture; and the movement which preceded the battle was prompt and even rapid. I marched from Nashville not to rescue those forces, but to form a junction with them to operate against the enemy's position at Corinth; and it was desirable, and General Halleck's instructions required me, to effect the junction as promptly as possible. I was informed that I should find General Grant's army at Savannah, on the east side of the river, and I was surprised, and even concerned, when I heard, during the march, that it was on the west bank; but I was relieved from anxiety by the information that it was so protected by high water in the streams which interposed between it and the enemy, and nearly surrounded it, as to be perfectly secure.

It is not necessary to go into the particulars of the campaign against Corinth. My command formed the center in the advance on that place. By General Halleck's order, one of my divisions—General Thomas'—served with General Grant's command in that advance, and did not again come under my supervision, or actually under my control, until about the last of July. The enemy's works were entered about daylight on the morning of the 29th, having been evacuated the previous night.

I come now to the period embraced in the investigations of the Commission, and proceed to a general review of the more material facts which have been developed in the evidence. I shall do this without pretending to offer at present a nice analysis of the testimony, or, as a general rule, even citing that which bears on the points which I claim to be established by it. No other course could well be pursued, because otherwise much time would be consumed in illustrating facts to which no importance might attach, as no specific charges or allegations have been submitted for trial. Such an analysis could only be made by me after knowing what points the Commission may give importance to. That I have no means of knowing now, a vast amount of evidence, oral and documentary, having been submitted without any explained purpose, and which may be important or not, according to the interpretation or bearing given to it. Nor shall I remark upon any of the incidents of this investigation.

The subjects submitted to the Commission by the War Department are as follows:

First. "In reference to General Buell suffering the State of Kentucky to be invaded by the Rebel forces under General Bragg."

Second. "In his failing to relieve Munfordville, and suffering it to be captured."

Third. "In reference to the battle of Perryville and General Buell's conduct during that battle, and afterward suffering the Rebel forces to escape from Kentucky without loss or capture."

Fourth. "Such other matters touching the military operations aforesaid, as in the judgment of the Commission shall be beneficial to the service."

On the 30th of May, after the evacuation of Corinth by the rebel forces, I received a communication from Major-General Halleck, informing me that his first object was to open the lines of railroad centering at that point from our rear and flanks, and directing me to put one of my divisions on that duty on the Memphis and Charleston road east of Corinth. I accordingly detached the division of General Wood on that service. The army of General Pope was following up the retiring enemy in the direction of Baldwin. On the 4th of ^{April} April I received instructions to re-enforce General Pope, near Boonville, with two divisions, in anticipation of an attack from the enemy. I accompanied those divisions myself. The enemy, however, continued his retreat toward Okalona; and on the 9th I received intimation that a part of the force under my command would return to Tennessee, and that I could make my arrangements accordingly. At my request I was authorized to start the two divisions (Nelson's and Crittenden's) that were with me, in that direction. General McCook's division, then at Corinth, was to remain there until relieved by General Thomas's division, which had also been sent to re-enforce General Pope. General Thomas's division originally formed part of my army, but had been detached from my command since the commencement of the advance upon Corinth. I was informed that it would probably rejoin me at a future day for the movement toward Tennessee.

I stopped at General Halleck's headquarters on my return from Boonville, on the 10th, and visited them again on the 11th; and during those visits received his oral instructions with reference to the campaign I was to enter upon. Its object was the occupation of East Tennessee and certain important points on the railroad through that region of country—Chattanooga, Dalton and Knoxville were points which it was considered important to occupy. I requested that I might be allowed to choose my own route; and at that interview General Halleck assented, though he had been in favor of moving directly on Chattanooga through North Alabama; but on the 12th I received a dispatch from him, saying that, on further reflection, he deemed it best that the route he had suggested should be pursued. My own idea had been to strike a little further north, through Middle Tennessee and McMinnville.

General Halleck desired that the movement should be made as promptly as possible, but it was a condition that the railroad from Corinth east should

be repaired, and it was his idea that I should draw my supplies by that route. I did not concur in his views in regard to the advantages of that route, and I immediately gave orders for repairing the roads from Nashville through Tennessee, and for procuring supplies in that way; but I placed the superintendence of the Memphis and Charleston Road under an energetic and experienced engineer, Brigadier-General Smith, put troops on the route, and gave orders for pushing the repairs as rapidly as possible. Subsequently I suggested the inexpediency of repairing the road. It was for eighty miles parallel with the enemy's front, and peculiarly exposed to attack. This objection was realized in the end, and, in addition, it was found impossible to get stock enough on the road to make it of material use, even while it was kept open; so that substantially we derived no advantage from it. It, however, occupied the troops until about the last of June in opening it, and detained General Thomas' Division a month longer in guarding it; so that that division did not reach Athens and Huntsville until the last of July.

As soon as my destination was pointed out to me, instructions were given to my engineer officer, Captain Morton, to prepare the means of crossing the river at Florence, and similar instructions were given to General Mitchel, then commanding at Huntsville, for crossing a portion of my force at Decatur, so as to have the advantage of two roads and two crossings. A very efficient ferry was prepared at Florence, and a very inefficient one at Decatur.

General McCook's division marched from Corinth on the 11th, and reached Florence on the 15th of June. It was followed closely by Crittenden's division, which had come into the road at Iuka from Boonville. General Wood's was advanced to and beyond Tusculumbia to repair and guard the road, while General Nelson's took its place between Iuka and Tusculumbia. The few boats that were of light enough draft were employed in forwarding supplies by water to Florence; and in order to make up for the deficiency, wagon trains were put on the road from Eastport to Iuka to connect with the single half-servicable locomotive and the few cars that were available on the railroad. The boats were only able to carry from thirty to forty tons over the shoals, and after a few trips could not run at all; after which wagon trains were started on the north side of the river between Florence and Waterloo, nearly opposite Eastport. The ferry at Florence was ready for use on the 22d of June, and the crossing was commenced, but rumors of a movement of the enemy toward Iuka suspended the forward movement from the opposite side until the 25th. Wagon trains were first put across and dispatched to Reynold's Station, where they connected with the railroad trains from Nashville, to convey supplies over the gap in the road to Athens. General Mitchel had pre-

viously been instructed to have supplies for a certain number of days, until the trains should be established, to meet the troops on their arrival at Athens and Decatur. The divisions moved forward in close succession by marches of about fourteen miles a day—Nelson's and Wood's, as soon as they were relieved from the road by other troops. Wood's Division finished crossing at Decatur on the 6th of July. The other three divisions, crossing at Florence, commenced arriving at Athens on the 27th of June. The troops halted at these points momentarily, and their trains were thrown into the gap on the railroad to push forward supplies.

The problem of advancing into East Tennessee was now fairly before me. The force which I brought along numbered between twenty-four and twenty-five thousand effective men; and there were besides about sixteen thousand more scattered through Middle Tennessee and North Alabama, that I had left behind for service in that region when I marched to form the junction with General Grant's army on the Mississippi river in April. That force, mainly under the command of General Mitchel, has been generally awarded praise for the service it performed, and very justly, yet not more than two thousand men ever appeared on the field of its operations to oppose it. It was not the numbers of the enemy that made its service difficult and creditable, but it was the large extent of country it occupied, the length of the lines it had to guard, and the difficulty of supplying it. Those lines had still to be held in a further advance, and with no less force to make them secure, for the force which endangered them had been largely increased by the transfer of a large part of the enemy's cavalry to the north side of the Tennessee river after the evacuation of Corinth, and by the organization of an additional force of guerrillas throughout Middle Tennessee and North Alabama, and in the south-western portion of Kentucky.

The limited force available for a further advance into the enemy's country, was not, however, at the time of my arrival, the difficulty; for undoubtedly, it was superior to the force which the enemy at that moment had in East Tennessee. Experience has shown what might have been deduced from reason, that if the movement could have been made without serious resistance, while the enemy was yet inferior in force, it could have had no permanent result with no more troops than I had. The advance of sixty thousand veteran rebel troops through a friendly population into Kentucky, where they undoubtedly met many friends, has been considered bold, and must have proved fatally disastrous to them but for their precipitate retreat. I know no reason why twenty-five or thirty thousand men should be sufficient to advance with any greater prospect of a permanent advantage, into an exhausted and comparatively barren country, and in as close proximity to the whole

power of the enemy. It was my error to believe at that time that the thing was practicable, and I did not represent it otherwise when I was assigned to the execution of it; but I must say also, in extenuation, that I did not anticipate that the enemy was to be left so unemployed at other points, that he could devote his greatest effort against my enterprise. Besides, I regarded it as in the highest degree important, and I supposed that no larger force could be spared for it.

However, at the time of my arrival with my army in North Alabama, the immediate obstacle to the execution of the first step, the capture of Chattanooga, was that of supplies and the means of crossing the Tennessee River. The means to overcome these difficulties had to be created, for they did not exist. The lumber had to be sawed and a bridge built, and supplies for the troops had to be brought, for the country was destitute of them. The country between Decatur and Huntsville, and extending up into Middle Tennessee, is a cultivated and productive one; but as far north as the Tennessee line, and even including the southern tier of the counties of Tennessee, it is cultivated mainly in cotton. The planters never produce more than an ample supply of meat and corn for their own use, and not always that. Further north, Tennessee produces considerable quantities of surplus provisions, but not enough to supply the demand further South, as is shown by the fact that large quantities of produce from the North-western States have annually found a market at Nashville. The demand upon the surplus provisions of Tennessee had been increased by the rebellion, which cut off the supply from the north-west, and by the armies, rebel and Union, which during the Winter and Spring of 1862, fed upon the country to a considerable extent. North Alabama particularly was left in a condition to need the necessaries of life, instead of affording subsistence for an army. East of Huntsville the spurs of the Cumberland Mountain run down nearly to the river, leaving only here and there a narrow valley or cove of arable land. The whole country is rough and almost barren, producing no more than is necessary for the support of a poor and sparse population. East of Stevenson, as far as Chattanooga, it may be said to be destitute both of population and supplies. Beyond Chattanooga the productive region of East Tennessee commences; but during last Summer, it was exhausted of supplies, and the people themselves were, as they are now, notwithstanding the new crop they have since gathered, suffering for food. These facts go to the extent of rendering it impossible for my army to have advanced and depend on the resources of the country. The alternative of drawing its supplies from its principal base, the Ohio River, was imperative, and my wagon transportation was not sufficient to cover breaks in the railroads north of Huntsville, and to advance beyond Bridgeport at the same time.

The first essential, therefore, was the opening of the railroads from Nashville; and to that end the force which General Mitchell had been ordered to put at that work was increased by engineer and other troops to the whole force that could be employed. Hired mechanics, under the military superintendent of railroads, an able and efficient man at such work, were also employed; and orders were given to push forward the repairs with all possible dispatch. But the work was much more formidable than had been supposed, and the work which I had expected to see completed in ten or fifteen days, was not finished until the 31st of July, on the Nashville and Decatur road. The Nashville and Chattanooga road was completed on the 12th of July; the trains started through on the 13th, and were stopped by the attack and surrender at Murfreesboro, by which, and by subsequent successful attacks, the completion of that road was delayed until the 28th of July.

In order to conceal the object, or at least the progress, of my campaign as much as possible, it was desirable not to concentrate ^{any} force at a point which immediately threatened the enemy's position until I was prepared to move against him. This was also expedient from the necessity of placing the troops in positions where they could be most conveniently subsisted, and where they could give the necessary assistance in repairing the roads, and in guarding them until they should be securely established, and protected at the more vulnerable points by stockades or other defenses which would enable a small force to maintain itself against a larger one. Prior to my arrival in North Alabama, however, General Mitchel had entertained serious apprehensions of an attack on the positions which he occupied in that region, particularly at Battle Creek and along the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad; and repeated dispatches from him urged the pressing importance of reinforcements to guard against the supposed danger. These reports of a probable attack at Battle Creek were repeated just after my arrival, and rendered it proper to increase the force at that point. McCook's and Crittenden's divisions were accordingly ordered there. They marched from Athens about the 4th, and arrived at Battle Creek about the 14th of July. One brigade from the former was put at work on the road from Stevenson to Dechard. Nelson's division still remained at Athens, furnishing a strong working party on that road. Wood's division was stopped near Decatur, where it protected the ferry and the small garrison on the opposite side of the river; the idea not having been yet abandoned of making the Memphis and Chattanooga road west of that point available for supplying my troops and communicating with the forces about Corinth. With these dispositions, orders were given for establishing the regular road guards, and for getting together again the fragments of brigades and regiments previously

there, which were found scattered in very great confusion; a brigade was organized to move from Murfreesboro and Tullahoma and occupy McMinnville; intelligent and energetic officers were put in charge of the road guards and road repairs; mills were set to work to get out lumber for a ponton bridge; horses were ordered for the cavalry, which had been left in Middle Tennessee, and was in bad condition; and various other preparations ordered to enable the troops to move promptly and effectively as soon as the roads were completed so that supplies could be provided.

The first raid of Morgan into Kentucky took place early in July. He threatened Bowling Green and Munfordsville about the 8th of July; defeated three companies of cavalry at Burksville about the same time, and then went to Lebanon, where he destroyed the depot and hospital buildings. Thence he proceeded north through Lexington, as far as Paris. He was engaged at Paris and other points during his expedition, but with no important result. He finally recrossed the Cumberland River at or near Mill Spring, about the 23d of July, and made his way to Knoxville.

The force which made this incursion has been said not to have exceeded one thousand men, though at the time it was estimated as high as twenty-five hundred or three thousand. It produced a good deal of alarm in the state, and many apprehended that the force would receive large accessions to its ranks, and that the sympathizing part of the population would become troublesome; but those apprehensions were not realized. The injury was confined mainly to the inconvenience and suffering inflicted on individuals, and I have no doubt that the effect on the population was to strengthen its adhesion to the Union.

A good deal of censure was cast on the troops and the military officers in the state, that Morgan should have escaped without capture or greater loss, but not with much justice, when the circumstances are considered. The objects to be aimed at by my army, after the occupation of Nashville in February, made it necessary to carry forward, for further operations, nearly the whole of the force at my disposal; and, indeed, the high stage of water in the Cumberland river afforded security at that time against such invasions, even if the rebel force had not left that region of country to concentrate for the struggle on the south side of the Tennessee. For these reasons, except the column which was operating against Cumberland Gap, not more than about four thousand troops, mostly infantry, were left behind, and these were scattered over the principal part of the state, more as a police force and to guard railroads, than to prevent invasion.

The probable result of our operations against Corinth developed to my mind the advantage the enemy could derive from the employment of a large cavalry force in Middle Tennessee and Kentucky, and on the 12th of May I advised the Secretary of War of the necessity of having at least

five more cavalry regiments in those two states. I was answered that there was not at the time any cavalry to spare for that service, but that an additional force was to be raised, and that a part of it would be sent to me. None came, though authority was given to the officer commanding in Kentucky to raise some cavalry regiments. These, however, were in no condition to render much service at the time of Morgan's first raid. Subsequent events have shown what might have been evident enough without the experiment, that, to prevent such incursions and carry on the operations in front which the progress of our arms had rendered necessary, was physically impossible with the force that was available. I had a front extending from Corinth to Cumberland Gap, through a hostile population, a distance of three hundred miles; in fact, it extended to Picketon, in the north-east corner of Kentucky, one hundred miles further, with lines of communication varying from two hundred to three hundred miles in depth. To press successfully against the rebel armies along the line of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, it had been necessary to denude the lines and the whole country in my rear almost entirely of troops. The front, from Battle Creek to Cumberland Gap, it was not possible to occupy at all. Is it astonishing that one thousand cavalry, familiar with every path, should be able to penetrate this vast extent of country, and escape without capture?

Morgan had not yet disappeared from Kentucky, after his first inroad, when Forrest with a large force suddenly appeared at Murfreesboro', on the 13th of July, surprised and captured the garrison, consisting of some fourteen hundred men—cavalry, artillery and infantry—forming part of the force which was about to march from that place and Tullahoma to occupy McMinnville, and did serious damage to the railroad. Two other regiments which had been designed as a permanent garrison for Murfreesboro' had been detached and sent into Kentucky on the occasion of Morgan's incursion. The consequence of this disaster was serious. The use of the railroad from Nashville, which had been completed the very day before, and which I was depending on to throw supplies into Stevenson for a forward movement, was set back two weeks; the force of Forrest threatened Nashville itself and the whole line of railroad through Tennessee; and the occupation of McMinnville was delayed two weeks. It became necessary to move northward some of the troops in North Alabama, to drive out the rebel force, and guard against further embarrassment. Nelson's Division was ordered by rapid marches to Murfreesboro', one brigade going by railroad through Nashville; two brigades of Wood's Division were ordered from Decatur to Shelbyville by forced marches, and subsequently to Dechard, to give greater security to Elk River Bridge, and guard the important route from the mountains into North Alabama through Winchester. A little later the remaining brigade of Wood's Division was ordered to Stevenson to erect

defensive works for the depot which was to be established at that point for the movement against Chattanooga. The excitement caused by Morgan's raid into Kentucky had been so great, and the call for troops so urgent, that I apprehended I should be compelled to send a division there; but to do that was to put an advance into East Tennessee out of the question, and I determined to trust Kentucky to the few troops already there, rather than abandon the object for which I had started.

The movement of General Nelson toward Nashville was delayed somewhat by injury to the Duck River Bridge by high water. He arrived at Murfreesboro' on the 18th. The enemy left as he advanced, threw himself on the road between that place and Nashville, and captured a guard of about eighty men and destroyed two more bridges. The efforts of General Nelson to intercept him were unsuccessful. After throwing up some field works for a small force at Murfreesboro', to protect the depot which it was necessary to establish there, General Nelson started, on the 2d of August, with two brigades and arrived at McMinnville on the 3d of August. One brigade remained at Murfreesboro', but on the arrival of the force which had been designated to occupy the place, that brigade joined him at McMinnville.

The railroad from Nashville to Stevenson was completed on the 28th of July; that from Nashville to Decatur on the 31st, and preparations commenced for an advance. Supplies were pushed forward to the depot at Stevenson, the ponton bridge was gotten ready to be laid, the wagon trains which had been in use on the Decatur road were thrown across to Dechard, from which point they could be moved rapidly to Stevenson; and the troops, including General Thomas' division, which arrived at Athens and Huntsville about the 31st of July, were moved so as to be in convenient positions for the same object. In the mean time the enemy continued his operations with large bodies of cavalry against our long lines of communication through Tennessee and Kentucky, seconded in Tennessee by the organization of guerrilla bands which swarmed in every part of the country. These latter were frequently encountered and defeated by detachments of our small cavalry force; but the former, moving in superior force, and striking at vulnerable points, were generally successful, and finally, on the 10th of August, severed effectually our communications between Nashville and Louisville. In addition to the destruction of our lines of communication, the effect of these operations, and of the formidable preparations which were reported and believed to be in progress for the invasion of Middle Tennessee and the capture of Nashville, was to intimidate our friends and embolden our enemies among the people, who not only would not bring in supplies voluntarily, but used every means to prevent us from finding them; so that nothing could be

obtained from the country except by means of our own trains under the protection of strong escorts. On the 6th of August I gave orders for fortifying Nashville, to make it secure with a small garrison against any attack from cavalry.

On the 10th of August Morgan again made his appearance at Gallatin, surprised and captured the garrison, amounting to one hundred and fifty infantry; then moved toward Nashville, destroying several bridges and capturing the guards; then toward Bowling Green, destroying the tunnel seven miles north of Gallatin, and several tressel works and small bridges in that region. He was, however, handsomely repulsed in some instances by the small force opposed to him in these attacks. Simultaneously with this, Forrest, with a large force, moved toward the Cumberland river to be in a position to support Morgan, or threaten Nashville, if it should diminish its garrison, which consisted of about two thousand men. Immediately after the occurrence of the first raid, I determined to withdraw my cavalry as much as possible from its service in detachments against the bands of guerrillas which infested the roads, and concentrate it in large bodies. By supporting them with infantry, equipped to move lightly, I hoped to be able to drive the enemy's heavy cavalry force from the lines. One of these commands I designed should operate from Murfreesboro, and another from McMinnville. An experienced cavalry officer was assigned to the command of the former, with general instructions which allowed him a good deal of discretion. The zeal of this officer caused him to move in pursuit of the enemy with about seven hundred men, before the whole of his command had joined. On hearing of this, and knowing that he was outnumbered by the enemy, I dispatched instructions for reinforcing him with infantry from McMinnville, if he could be reached, and to ^{assist} ~~sustain~~ him until he had sufficient strength. The instructions did not, however, reach him, nor could his whereabouts be ascertained so as to reinforce him. Hearing that Morgan had again appeared in the neighborhood of Gallatin, he crossed the river at Hartsville in pursuit, engaged Morgan's force not far from that place about the middle of August, was defeated, and himself and some one hundred and fifty of his men taken prisoners. The remainder made their escape, in stragglers and small bodies, to Nashville. The strength of Morgan's band at this time was estimated at from fifteen hundred to three thousand.

Work was immediately commenced to repair again the road north of Nashville, but the continued presence of Morgan's force in that quarter made it impossible to carry it beyond Gallatin, except by withdrawing from the front so large a force as to preclude the idea of an advance; and I, therefore, determined to defer it until it could be protected by a force which I hoped might come from Louisville, of the new troops that were

being called out. On the 16th of August I ordered Major-General Nelson to Kentucky to command, and sent with him three General and some other officers of experience, and two batteries of artillery. The position required an officer of his rank, and I had great confidence in his energy and ability.

While the enemy was producing this serious embarrassment by the operations of his large cavalry force, regular and irregular, on our long lines of communication, he was collecting a large army at various points in Tennessee, from Chattanooga eastward. For a considerable time the main point of concentration was doubtful, and the railroad facilities which the enemy possessed enabled him to concentrate speedily at any point. General Bragg arrived in person at Chattanooga on the 28th of July, by which time his whole force was within easy reach of that point; and from that time reports were current of his intention to assume the offensive. Sometimes they were quite positive that he was already crossing the river at Chattanooga, Kingston and other points.

The lowest estimate that could be made of the force with which the enemy was prepared to advance, according to the best sources of information, was sixty thousand men. That has, I think, been more than confirmed by the evidence before the Commission. Eye-witnesses estimated the force as high as one hundred thousand. My dispatch of the 7th of August to the General-in-Chief, Major-General Halleck, gave information on this subject somewhat in detail, and not in a discouraging tone; for I was continuing my preparation to advance, and was, in my own mind, disposed to make perhaps more than due allowance for exaggeration in the information that reached me. I was the more confident, when, on the 10th of August, General Halleck authorized me to call on General Grant for two divisions, if I should find it absolutely necessary. On the 12th, I requested General Grant to send the divisions, intending to use one of them to protect my communications with Louisville, and bring the other to the front; but their movements were at first involved in some uncertainty. At a later period I could get no information of them at all, and feared that General Grant had not been able to spare them, as he was himself threatened. One of them reached Murfreesboro on the 1st, and the other Nashville about the 12th of September.

Very soon the information of the enemy's intention took such shape as to leave no doubt that he was about to invade Middle Tennessee with a superior force, and to make it proper to suspend the accumulation of supplies at Stevenson, and establish a depot at Decherd, as being most suitable for that disposition of my troops which the designs of the enemy, as far as they could be divined, rendered proper to oppose him. The information pointed to Nashville as his principal aim, and justified the

conclusion that at least he believed he had force enough to accomplish his object. It was ascertained that the number of my troops was quite accurately known to him. The route which he would take was altogether a matter of conjecture, to be founded on probabilities. McMinnville was mentioned very often, in the information which reached me, as the first point of attack, and they were so frequent that I deemed it proper to strengthen the force in that quarter; but the difficulty of crossing the mountain weakened the probability of an advance in that direction, while an advance into North Alabama was not only spoken of in connection with the enemy's plans, but offered many advantages. By crossing Waldron's Ridge into the Sequatchy Valley, he had a good, level road down that valley to Battle Creek, which was an indefensible position for us while he occupied the opposite side of the Tennessee river with his artillery. This would keep him in constant communication with his supplies at Chattanooga, by means of the railroad on the opposite bank and the steamers which he had; his large cavalry force operating against Nashville, and on my lines of communication, would compel me to employ at least twenty thousand men to protect them even that far, leaving about twenty-five thousand men to oppose his advance in front. If the column from Kingston should advance on Nashville, I should be compelled to fall back in the face of even an inferior force, for the protection of that place; and thus both Alabama and the principal part of Middle Tennessee could be reclaimed by the enemy without necessarily risking a battle. It is not too much to say that fifty thousand men thus employed on this theater of operations, with the superior cavalry force which the enemy had, would be an over-match for sixty thousand operating upon lines of such depth, in the midst of an unfriendly population.

Such were the inducements which an advance upon Battle Creek offered to the enemy, even supposing that I was entirely on the north side of the Cumberland ridge, say at Decherd; but, in fact, he was well aware that I still occupied North Alabama, with some twelve thousand men at Battle Creek, while the rest of my force extended as far north and east as McMinnville. If he could reach Battle Creek before the force at that place should extricate itself by moving to the east, it would have to go around by the way of Huntsville, and thus make a march of one hundred and twenty miles to reach Decherd, the nearest point at which it could possibly form a junction with the forces north of the mountain, while he, by a march of twenty-five miles from Jasper, could reach the same point, and thus throw his whole force between my scattered troops. The position at Battle Creek is, for a force whose communications are on the north side of the mountain, one of the worst that can be imagined against an enemy coming from the Sequatchy Valley and holding the opposite

bank of the Tennessee River. A spur of the Cumberland ridge comes to within two hundred yards of the river; Battle Creek runs at the foot of this spur, on the east side, emptying into the river near the point; the only position for troops is west of the spur; the road to Dechard, a distance of twenty-five miles, passes around the point of this spur and along its side up Battle Creek, in full view from the opposite side of the river and the creek; and there is no other road to the north side of the mountain practicable for loaded wagons short of Huntsville, distant seventy-five miles. For the double purpose of guarding against an attack in this faulty position, and of observing the movements and checking the advance of the enemy in the Sequatchy Valley, I issued the instructions of the 19th of August, to Major General McCook; my purpose then being to attack the enemy in the Sequatchy Valley if possible, or to give him battle at the first point on his route where I could concentrate my troops. Those orders required General McCook, upon the first intelligence of an advance of the enemy toward the Sequatchy Valley, to move promptly up the valley to the Anderson and Therman road, with the two brigades of his division which were with him, to check the progress of the enemy and observe his movements. If pressed he was to fall back on the Therman road deliberately, until he should form a junction with the main force coming from the side of McMinnville. The other division which was with him at Battle Creek, General Crittenden's, was also to move up the valley to the Tracy City and Altamont road, which enters the valley ten miles below the Therman road. He was to support General McCook in the valley, watching the old Nashville and Chattanooga stage road, which enters it from the Tennessee River at the point designated, and under like circumstances, he was to fall back for a similar purpose on the Higginbottom road toward Tracy City and Altamont, where the junction would be formed. On the 20th I learned that the enemy was certainly crossing at Chattanooga and other points, and I immediately directed General McCook to execute the orders already described. On the same day I left Huntsville, visited the posts at Stevenson and Battle Creek, and the following day went to Dechard to direct the movements for the proposed junction. I deemed it of the highest importance, for political as well as military reasons, to maintain my position in North Alabama if possible, in connection with those movements; for which the instructions of the 19th of August, given to General Rousseau, the officer in command in North Alabama, in anticipation of my advance upon Chattanooga, were equally applicable; but I reduced the force in that quarter somewhat, leaving a regiment in fortifications at Battle Creek, one at Stevenson, and two at Huntsville; besides the road guards and the force on the Nashville and Decatur line. The orders for the concentration at Altamont—see the

instructions of the 23d of August to General Thomas—had reference to the plan of operations above referred to, for opposing the movements of the enemy, except that the information rendered it apparently certain that the enemy would certainly advance on the Therman road, and that Altamont was the point farthest to the front at which he could be met. On the first supposition I had expected to intercept him in the Sequatchy Valley.

In moving up the valley on the 20th, General McCook received information from his spies and scouts which made him believe that the enemy would be in the Sequatchy valley, and therefore in a position to intercept him, before he could march to the Therman road; and he therefore returned down the valley to the Higginbottom road. That road was found to be impracticable for his artillery, and he moved still nearer to Battle Creek, and put himself on the road which follows up Battle Creek and then crosses the mountain. I there sent him orders, on the 23d, to move to Pelham for the purpose of effecting the concentration at Altamont. The difficulties of the route prevented the concentration at the time appointed, and in the mean time information in regard to the movements of the enemy made it a matter of very great doubt whether it could be effected at that point at all before the enemy would anticipate it. The only alternative seemed to be to concentrate there or at Murfreesboro. I determined to attempt the former, and gave the orders accordingly. Those orders anticipated that from the greater difficulties General McCook had to overcome, the troops moving from McMinnville, under Major General Thomas, would reach Altamont first. The latter was instructed to attack the enemy's advance, if it should have reached there, and hold his position, if possible, until the other troops came up; and in the event of being unable to do that, the various columns were instructed as to the roads by which they should fall back to form a junction in rear. General Thomas marched to Altamont with a portion of his force at the time appointed. He found no enemy, and believing that he could not remain there for want of water, returned immediately to McMinnville. On his report, and in consequence of his action, I stopped the movement of all except General McCook's division, which remained at Altamont in observation until the final concentration at Murfreesboro.

The information which I received still pointed clearly to the Thurman road as the one by which the enemy would advance, if at all; it is the best road across the mountain, and has the advantage of branching at Altamont into no less than four roads, which descend the mountain to an arc forty miles long, from McMinnville on one flank to Deckerd on the other. Still, the movements of the enemy were less rapid than was expected, and placed him in a position to use that road or those further east. Many

officers doubted that he meant to cross out of the Sequatchey valley at all, but supposed that his movements were only intended as demonstrations to cover the advance of his columns into Kentucky from Knoxville. In the meantime our supplies were diminishing rapidly, with no prospect of renewal until a sufficient force was detached to restore our broken communications. This pressing necessity left no time either to advance, or to await the arrival of an enemy who could choose his time and route, with the certainty that the necessity of subsistence would very soon compel me to fall back, in whole or in part, whether there was an enemy in front or not, as long as his cavalry continued its operations in rear. The news from Kentucky was unsatisfactory. The rebel force under Kirby Smith was coming into the State, there was nothing but new levies to oppose him, and it was not known what number of them had been collected. So far from being able to open the communication between Nashville and Louisville, and from Cumberland Gap to Lexington, it was not improbable that those places themselves might soon be seized by the rebel forces. Under these circumstances, I determined to concentrate my army at Murfreesboro, and set to work to open the railroad north of Nashville. That object had already been delayed too long upon the hope of having it done by a force from Louisville. Orders were accordingly given on the 30th of August to the various commands and guards, distributed over an area of about one hundred and fifty by one hundred miles of territory and some three hundred miles of railroad, so as to concentrate on the 5th of September. The routes and marches were prescribed, and the movement was executed simultaneously and with perfect precision. With the exception of the force on the Decatur road, which was ordered to Nashville, the whole army, coming from various quarters and different distances, on four roads, concentrated at Murfreesboro on the 5th of September, bringing with it whatever supplies could be collected from the country. A small remnant of provisions, for which there was insufficient transportation, was destroyed at Huntsville, and, with that exception, not a pound of supplies was lost by the movement. After it was ordered, I learned that a considerable quantity of cotton, belonging to persons who had purchased it in the country, was at Athens, awaiting transportation. In order to give them an opportunity to remove it, I delayed the evacuation of that place perhaps a day or so.

On the 1st of September I learned that a large rebel force, under General Kirby Smith, had actually appeared in Central Kentucky, having defeated and routed the force under General Nelson at Richmond. This effectually cut off the division at Cumberland Gap from its base. I was anxious to rescue that force, and the shortest route by which it could be done was to direct a column from McMinnville, by the way of Somerset,

upon the rear of Kirby Smith's army. I supposed that that might be done and still keep a front about McMinnville toward the army of General Bragg in the Sequatchy valley; while the two divisions, one of which had arrived that day, from Corinth should open the communications between Nashville and Louisville. The forces at McMinnville and in that vicinity had not yet withdrawn from their position, and I accordingly suspended their movement, leaving its execution, however, to General Thomas, who was at McMinnville, and had the best opportunity to know any movements of the enemy in the Sequatchy valley that would affect it. He answered, stating the advantages of a concentration at Murfreesboro, and advising me that he would march the following day, and so the concentration was executed as originally ordered.

I proceed now to notice certain theories and opinions that have been advanced, concerning a plan of operations to oppose the movement of the rebel army across the mountain. As evidence they are of no more value than though they had been expressed in idle discussion around a camp fire, and are only entitled to credit according as they are correct in their premises and rational in their conclusions. They were new to me until this investigation had made some progress, and it appears that one of them in particular, was promulgated after the arrival of my army in Louisville, where it was used as a text for criticism by officers who have not appeared as friendly witnesses before this Commission.

Neither my own feelings, nor any fact that I am aware of would justify me in assuming that General Thomas has entertained any other than the most friendly disposition towards me; but I was surprised at the opinion expressed by him before the Commission, that Bragg's army might have been attacked at Sparta; and more astonished at the statement that he had urged upon me to concentrate at that place. My inquiries elicited the information that this proposition was communicated to me by telegraph on the 28th of August. At my request the dispatch was subsequently presented. It proved to have been written on the 22d instead of the 28th. It will be better understood after a brief review of the circumstances that gave rise to it.

General Thomas took command at McMinnville on the 19th of August. About that time I received very positive intelligence that the rebel forces were crossing the Tennessee River at three points at least: about ten thousand at Kingston, at least ten thousand at Harrison, and a force variously estimated at from forty to sixty thousand at Chattanooga. I telegraphed General Thomas and other officers on the 19th and 20th, in regard to this information, and prepared them for the further movements the enemy might be expected to make. I told him to look to Sparta and Smithville,

anticipating that the column from Kingston might advance on that route against McMinnville, while we were threatened by the larger force elsewhere, or else towards Nashville to threaten our communications. This column he evidently kept in his mind, and it seemed to me that it was the only one he seriously regarded. The Chattanooga force proper, as he called it, he appeared either to doubt the existence of, or, at least, its purpose to cross the mountain. On the contrary I had reasons which he probably did not know, to believe that it would advance by the Therman road. I, therefore telegraphed General Thomas on the 22d of August, as follows :

“From McCook’s information this morning, it seems almost certain that Bragg is marching on McMinnville. His advance was at the top of Waldron’s ridge last night. McCown is said to be crossing at Kingston, and Withers at Harrison. Of course they will expect to unite. What sort of ground can we take by concentrating at McMinnville? How would it do at Altamont? Is the ground such as to give us the advantage of our artillery? How many days rations have you? Are you provided with Ammunition? Be ready to march in the morning. Answer immediately.”

And again as follows:

“Of course you will instantly recall your absent troops. I will probably bring the Second Kentucky by rail to march from here. We will advance to attack in the Sequatchey valley. I can hardly think the enemy will attempt the march across to McMinnville—at least not immediately. It appears to me that he will rather endeavor to get into North Alabama, and perhaps strike across to Decherd. If we advance to Altamont we may thwart him in both, and preserve our communications with Decherd and Nashville. If we concentrate at McMinnville we lose North Alabama and Decherd? What think you? The great difficulty is in moving in the mountains with our trains. Of course we must cut loose from everything but our ammunition trains and subsistence for about six days, most of it in haversacks.”

His answer to the first is the dispatch dated the 22d at McMinnville, referred to in his testimony, and is in these words:

“By all means concentrate here. The enemy can not reach Nashville by any other route across the mountains, unless by Sparta. At Altamont I am positively informed the enemy would have an equal advantage with ourselves. Here we will have a most decided advantage; and by being here, should he march by Sparta, we can meet him either there or at Allen’s ford across Cane Fork. He is obliged to pass this place or Sparta to reach Nashville. I have six day’s rations and plenty of ammunition. Did you get my dispatch of to-day? I can not think that Bragg is coming here either by the Hill or Therman road. My reconnoitering party went into Duulap yesterday.”

His answer, of the same date, to the second, is as follows:

“We can get neither forage nor water at Altamont. It will be as difficult for us to march across the mountains as the enemy to come either to Altamont or this place. I would not advise concentrating here, except for battle, or for an advance into East Tennessee. I think our communications with Nashville will be better preserved by holding Decherd with a

division to enable us to concentrate either there, if threatened, or at this place. I have also information that Tupello has been abandoned, and the most of the enemy at that place have been sent to Chattanooga. I therefore do not apprehend an attempt to regain North Alabama."

Upon further information that the enemy was advancing rapidly on the Thrumman road, I answered him, on the 23d, as follows:

"There is no possibility of our concentrating at McMinnville. We must concentrate in advance, and assume the offensive, or fall back at last to Murfreesboro. I deem the former the wisest, and we will act accordingly. I wish you therefore to move by a forced march to Altamont, there to form a junction with McCook, Crittenden and Schoepf. McCook and Crittenden started for Tracy City from Jasper Yesterday. I presume they are now at Tracy City, though possibly not. Schoepf will march at once. The junction must be formed to-morrow, and any division meeting the head of the enemy's column first, must at least hold it in check until a larger force arrives.

"One battery to a division will, I think, be ample in the mountains. McCook and Crittenden have with them six batteries. Leave all of yours, therefore—at least don't take more than two. It will be necessary to leave some force with them—at least two regiments; and they should be covered with breast-works to-night without fail.

"I shall order Schoepf's batteries here to be similarly disposed of. There must be no delay or failure. The enemy's advance was at the top of Waldron's Ridge, ten miles from Chattanooga, night before last, and talked of being at McMinnville tomorrow. That is hardly possible, but they must be met at the earliest possible moment. Communicate with McCook to-night by a trusty scout. The distance is thirty-two miles. He may possibly not be at Tracy City. If not, look for him on the road to Battle Creek. If you think best, you may send your artillery to this place, which will release the force that would be required to protect them there; though if they will be safe, there is some advantage in having a force at McMinnville. Take no wagons except what will be necessary to carry rations and cooking utensils. I shall probably leave here with Sill's brigade to-morrow for Tracy City to join you. Communicate always in cypher by telegraph to this place, and by courier through Tracy City. Schoepf sends a report that Hardee is advancing on the Dunlap road. Answer, so that I may know exactly what you do. Your staff officers make mistakes in the use of the cypher."

I apprehend that further comment on this subject is unnecessary. The dispatch in question was in answer to my own inquiry, and had reference to the relative merits of McMinnville and Altamont as battle-grounds. It is certain that General Thomas has not consciously laid claim to an idea which did not possess him; but I apprehend that developed facts have been so mingled in his mind with impressions coincident in some particulars, though essentially different in the material points, that his memory has failed to draw the exact distinction between them. It is, however, due to him to say that the idea may have been in his mind that Bragg might cross the mountain to Sparta, and that he did not distinctly express it to me, imagining that I also entertained it myself.

But I do not propose to draw any advantage from the question whether or not a proposition was made to me to concentrate at Sparta. If it had been made, I should have judged it according to its merits, with the lights before me at the time, and I do not doubt that I should have rejected it on grounds which I will state.

Besides the road which crosses from Jasper to Decherd, and the one which ascends the valley and thence goes to Crossville, there are no less than three roads by which the enemy could ascend the mountain to debouch from the Sequatchy valley: First, the Therman road, which passes through or near Altamont, and then branches into at least four roads that descend the mountain into the plains of Middle Tennessee, between Decherd and McMinnville, a distance of about forty miles; second, a road which ascends the mountain at Dunlap and passes to McMinnville; third, a road which ascends the mountain a short distance below Pikeville, and branches on the mountain, the left hand branch going to McMinnville, and the right hand forking again some twenty miles from McMinnville, one fork going to the latter place and the other to Sparta. There is also a road on the top of the mountain, connecting all these roads. These geographical features would enable the enemy to arrive within twenty miles of McMinnville by not less than two roads, before determining whether he would move on that point or Sparta, and by covering his movements with his superior cavalry force, he could easily arrive within six or eight miles of either of these points before his destination could be known at all; and it is twenty-two miles at least from McMinnville to Sparta. If I had been at Sparta, he could have been at McMinnville and in possession of my line of supplies before I could have known it. If I awaited at McMinnville the development of his plan, he could have gone to Sparta and pursued his course as he did. If I had divided my force between McMinnville and Sparta to anticipate him at both points, he could have advanced with reasonable probability of success against either of them; and if the fractions should have been so strongly fortified as not to warrant an attack, he could have avoided them, thrown himself between the two, and thus have forced them to retreat separately, or attempt the offensive against a concentrated force. General Thomas' own experience at McMinnville in obtaining information on which success would have depended, confirms my answer to one phase of this proposition, and is applicable to all of them.

On the 31st he reports: "The general impression is that the enemy is advancing, but I have yet to see the person who has seen any of the Chattanooga forces proper;" and on the 2d of August, in reply to the discretionary instructions heretofore alluded to, he says: "I will start to-morrow. I have heard again that the enemy intends advancing on this place by the Therman, Dunlap and Sparta roads. By concentrating at Murfreesboro' we

shall be within striking distance of this place. By convenient roads our main force can be thrown upon the enemy between this and Decherd or Hillsboro', overcome him, and drive him toward Sparta, his longest line of retreat. A large force of cavalry and light infantry can be pushed across the mountains by the Dunlap and Therman roads, attack him in rear, and completely rout his whole force. I have studied the roads, and am now convinced that this is our best plan of attack." It was afterward ascertained that the Rebel forces under General Bragg actually commenced to arrive at Sparta the day after the date of this dispatch!

The reasons which made the concentration at Murfreesboro' necessary and proper may now be briefly summed up:

It had been supposed that for the lack of supplies on the route the enemy would make his march across the mountains rapidly. Several days had already elapsed since, from the best information that could be obtained of his movements, it was supposed he would have arrived within striking distance, and he was still not nearer than the Sequatchy Valley.

My supplies had been cut off for twenty days, and the expectation that the force in Kentucky would reopen the railroad on which they were dependent was frustrated by the invasion of the state by Kirby Smith, which, as the result proved, gave more than ample occupation to the raw troops that were there. I did not even know what force of that kind could be expected, for its organization had only very recently been commenced; and the State had recently been organized into a separate department not under my command. I was already reduced to about ten days' supply—a little more than that of breadstuff and some minor articles, and a good deal less of meat and other articles scarcely less essential. The quantity was increased at Nashville a little by the collection of flour and meat in the country. General Thomas reported on the 28th, from McMinnville, that no provisions could be procured in that region, and that for forage he could get fodder, but no corn; and his statement in regard to the scarcity in the country is confirmed by testimony before the Commission. Such straits did not admit of any further delay to await an enemy who could choose his own time for the meeting, and who had already been eight days behind the time at which I had reason to expect him. An immediate concentration at a point nearer the source of supply, from which I was separated two hundred and sixty miles, was clearly necessary. It promised the only means of opening the railroad, and still holding Nashville, the possession of which was believed to be the enemy's first object.

But the concentration at Murfreesboro' was expedient on other grounds. I could not have concentrated at any point as far in advance as McMinnville more than about thirty-one thousand men, and that force was not suf-

ficient to attack Bragg's army united at any point. If I could have taken any position in which I could force or induce him to attack without delay, it would have been well; but such was not the case. In this uncertainty as to the time he might delay, and as to the route on which he would strike in force, while perhaps threatening by other routes, screened as he was by a range of mountains; with our communications with Louisville completely severed, and our supplies already reduced to a narrow margin, perhaps to be entirely exhausted when the advance of the enemy would make rapid operations necessary, it was plainly necessary to concentrate at some point nearer our base, by which means my effective force would be increased so as to be sufficient to meet the enemy whenever he should come, and still have enough to open our communications.

The plan of operations presented in the evidence of another witness of rank before the Commission, was to concentrate the army at Murfreesboro' as soon as the Rebel army commenced its advance from Chattanooga. This, except as to the time of the concentration, is the plan that was actually executed. The earlier execution of it would not have affected the result, but the distribution of my small cavalry force to guard the various passes across the mountains, from forty to sixty miles distant—which was one feature of the plan,—could only have resulted in the capture or dispersion of the whole of them whenever the enemy chose to effect it. As for the idea of first concentrating at Murfreesboro, and then advancing to attack the enemy at Sparta, it must suppose that the enemy would wait seven or eight days at that place to be attacked, which he did not do. I do not, therefore, see any advantage in this variation of the plan that was adopted; and if it had been submitted to my judgment, I should have rejected it.

Two witnesses of high rank, in answer to a question as to points north of the Cumberland river at which Bragg's army "could have been attacked with a prospect of success," expressed the opinion that it might have been done at Glasgow. This opinion was undoubtedly expressed without reflection, unless it referred to the advantage which the locality of Glasgow would have afforded for the attacking army, in case of a collision there, and not to the possibility of intercepting Bragg's army at that point; for the testimony of these two witnesses shows, and the map shows, that until Bragg's army crossed the Cumberland river and took up its march northward, it was impossible to know from its movements whether its plan was to go into Kentucky, or turn to the west against Nashville; that it is fifty miles from the Cumberland River where Bragg crossed it to Glasgow, while it is ninety-five miles from Nashville, where my army was, to Glasgow; and from these facts the witnesses admit that it was not possible to have intercepted Bragg's army at that point, unless he had tarried there. In point of fact, the evidence shows that on the 7th of September

I learned that a portion of Bragg's army had crossed the Cumberland river at Carthage, and was moving northward, probably towards Bowling Green, where I had caused some supplies to be accumulated by the way of Green river; and that I immediately ordered a portion of my army to march for that point. That, on the 10th, I learned what was before unknown, if not improbable, that another portion had crossed at Gainesboro, and had probably marched in the same direction; and that I ordered other divisions, making six, for the same point, accompanying them myself. That this movement was made rapidly, the last of the six divisions arriving at Bowling Green Monday morning, the 15th, which was the time at which the rear of Bragg's army passed Glasgow. Thus, after gaining intelligence of his passage over the Cumberland River, I moved my army sixty-five miles, while he was moving fifty with the advantage of two roads, and I was still thirty miles in rear of him.

The same process of demonstration will show that, even if I had known he was going by Munfordsville, and if there had been nothing to delay me an hour at Bowling Green, I could not have intercepted him at Munfordsville, because I had one hundred and five miles to march, while he had but sixty-eight—the distance from Glasgow to Munfordsville being eighteen miles. In fact, his advance actually attacked the latter place the day before my sixth division reached Bowling Green. But, furthermore, it was not yet to be assumed that his destination was Central Kentucky; on the contrary, Glasgow was an important position for him. It effectually commanded my line of communication with my base of supplies, while he had two lines open—one with the East Tennessee Railroad, which was his permanent base, and also with the valley of the Cumberland; and the other with Central Kentucky, where the occupation of Kirby Smith had established for him a second base.

Munfordsville did not offer the same advantages; for, although a much stronger natural position, yet in taking it he gave up his communications with Tennessee, and rendered those with Kirby Smith less secure against a force operating from the Ohio River, supposing Louisville to be secure to us. At Munfordsville his communication with Kirby Smith must have been along the Louisville Turnpike, and thence across to Bardstown; while at Glasgow it would be along the old Lexington road through Summerville and Lebanon, or through Columbia and Lebanon or Liberty, by all of which roads I have moved large bodies of troops. Besides, at Munfordsville he would have been in a much less productive region than at Glasgow. These considerations, taken in connection with the risk he would run by advancing further into Kentucky, made it at least reasonably doubtful whether he would not halt at Glasgow. The fact that his purpose was to penetrate still further into Kentucky, and that he had designs on

Louisville, was only known when it was ascertained that he had left Glasgow, and through correspondence which was captured subsequent to that time. But supposing it had been reasonably certain that Bardstown was his destination, it was not to be assumed that he would go by the way of Munfordsville; on the contrary, it is undoubtedly true that but for the bait which was offered to him in the garrison at that place, he would not have gone there at all; for the simple reason that without any object whatever it would have taken ten or twelve miles off the direct and excellent turnpike from Glasgow to Bardstown and thrown him on another road not so good, and twelve miles longer. This brings me naturally to the question of the relief of Munfordsville.

The foregoing explanations show that I could not have reached Munfordsville in advance of the rebel force, even if it had been desirable to leave it between me and Nashville. The first information received at Bowling Green that Munfordsville was attacked or threatened was on the 14th, and the report was that it had been captured, though that was not certain. On the same day the last of five of my divisions arrived at Bowling Green; and on the same day, as was afterward ascertained, the main body of the rebel army marched from Glasgow, eighteen miles from Munfordsville, with the advantage of two roads. If I had moved forward at once I could not have reached Munfordsville in less than four days, for, considering that I must march on one road, it would, for the rear of my column, have been equivalent in time to a march of sixty miles; and in the presence of an enemy whose position was not known, the march could not well have been made more rapidly. As for reinforcing the garrison by the first of my divisions which arrived at Bowling Green, even if the necessity of it could have been known, it would have been out of the question; for those divisions would have been thrown into the midst of the whole rebel force, a folly which, it appears, the enemy actually anticipated, and prepared to reap the fruit of.

But I propose to inquire also what necessity there was for such relief, and on what grounds it could reasonably have been expected that I would furnish it. It is apparent from a study of the map, and the evidence shows, that the possession of Munfordsville was not essential to Bragg's army in a strategical point of view. At least two other preferable routes were open to him; whether his object was to attack Louisville directly, or to advance into Central Kentucky for other purposes: First, the shorter and better road from Glasgow to Bardstown and thence on to Louisville; second, the old Lexington road to Lebanon; third, the road through Columbia, Liberty and Danville. He would not in any event take the road to the mouth of Salt River, because it threw him more away from the base of supplies which Kirby Smith's presence had established in Central

Kentucky; because it made his junction with Kirby Smith more difficult and uncertain; and because it placed him in the angle between the Ohio and Salt rivers, neither of which could he cross without ferrying or bridging. The same facts made the possession of Munfordsville a matter of no strategical value to us. Its importance, therefore, was determined by the value of the bridge, which alone it was intended to protect as a link in the chain of communication between the troops farther South, and Louisville, their base of supplies. The bridge, if destroyed, could be rebuilt in a week—was actually rebuilt in about ten days; and as the principal part of the force which drew supplies across the bridge was coming north, its preservation was not of immediate importance. I have been disposed to say, therefore, that the determination to hold the bridge was an error of judgment; but I will not now assert that it was so, seeing that doubt existed as to the probability of Bragg's coming that way, and that the commander considered himself able to hold his position against the force which at first threatened him. If it was evident that Bragg would come against the place with his whole or any considerable part of his army, then it is certain that to attempt to hold it was an error, for no position could be less tenable for a small force against a very large one. It must be apparent that the possession of Munfordsville was of no importance that would justify the jeopardizing any considerable force to hold it, and the evidence shows that for two days and a half after the first attack the way was open for the withdrawal of the garrison. Its relief from the direction of Bowling Green was, therefore, unnecessary, if it had been possible. Let us see now how far the place was considered to be in jeopardy, and on what ground it was reasonable to expect relief from Bowling Green.

It appears that on Saturday, the 13th, the commanding officer learned that a force, represented to be seven thousand strong, was advancing upon his post from the direction of Glasgow; that he reported the fact to his superiors at Louisville, saying, "If I had one more good regiment and a few more pieces of artillery that force could not take me. As it is I shall do my best to prevent it. Can you send me reinforcements to-night? I shall send train to Salt River for them." To which he received in reply, "I send you what you ask." The same day he also reports, "Some indications that the main rebel force are going toward Lebanon," and that his entrenchments would be finished that night. These reports were certainly not alarming, and did not indicate that he expected or required assistance from Bowling Green, however desirous he might be to see a force coming from that quarter. On the same day he sent scouts to Bowling Green with verbal messages. These scouts could not have carried word that he was in jeopardy and required help from there, for his superiors had given him all he thought necessary at that time, and as yet

no force had appeared in front of him. I now remember that the scout Miller came to me, but so little was there in his communications to me different from the information I derived from unauthorized persons, that I had forgotten, nor do I now remember, that he came as a messenger. He knew less about the enemy, and scarcely if any more about the garrison than others, especially one who came from the vicinity of the fort the morning of the attack and reported quite confidently that the garrison had surrendered. Those persons reported first to the commanding officer at Bowling Green, and he had no better recollection of the special object and importance of their mission than myself. Nor could it at any rate have altered the case. I must of necessity have operated against the rebel army, which was already virtually between me and Munfordsville. There was no communication between me and the commander in Kentucky, and knowing that the rebel army was between me and Munfordsville, he had no reasonable assurance that I could succor that place. It was not under my command, I really knew nothing of its condition, and I could not suppose that it would be needlessly exposed to so large a force.

All the information I had led to the supposition that Bragg's army was probably yet at Glasgow, and on Tuesday afternoon, the 16th, I marched with six divisions, (one being still in the rear) in three columns, to attack the enemy if he should be at that place. The facts shown in evidence that the last of those six divisions had only arrived after a march of fifteen miles the day before, with very rapid and fatiguing ones on previous days; that some time was necessarily required to make arrangements with reference to the garrison and trains that were to remain; that supplies had to be distributed, and that the supply of provisions was imperfect, making it necessary to collect breadstuffs from the country to supply the troops, will amply justify this short delay. The troops in three columns had to start upon the main turnpike road from Bowling Green to Munfordsville, but successively turned upon roads which converge on Glasgow. The cavalry thrown in advance reported on Tuesday night that the enemy had left Glasgow, and the following day my army marched to Cave City and Horsewell, within ten miles of Munfordsville. During that day I heard of the surrender of Munfordsville, and on the night of that day the commanding officer of the post reported to me at Preuit's Knobb, with his troops on parole.

The position at Munfordsville is one of great natural strength for a large force. I understand that it was the subject of dissatisfaction that the rebel army was not attacked in that position; but I have never heard that the feeling was concurred in by the officers of higher rank, several of whom, distinguished before and since for

gallant conduct, have testified that such an attack would not have been judicious under the circumstances. The advantage of position in favor of the enemy must have made the result at least doubtful, and even a very serious check, in the exhausted condition of our supplies, would have been disastrous. I could have avoided the enemy by passing to either side of him, but I deemed it all important to force him further into the state, instead of allowing him to fall back upon Bowling Green and Nashville; and I matured a plan and determined to attack there rather than allow him that course. I believed that the condition of his supplies would compel him to abandon his position; and I was very well satisfied when that proved to be the case. He commenced to withdraw on the night of the 20th, and my advance drove out his rear guard, after some skirmishing, on the 21st. The march was continued, and skirmishing was kept up with his rear guard until he turned off towards Bardstown.

Many considerations rendered it proper to direct my march on Louisville, instead of following his route. The want of supplies made it necessary, many of the troops being out by the time they reached the mouth of Salt river. This reason would have been insuperable if, as was not improbable, the enemy should concentrate his force and throw himself rapidly between me and Louisville. The junction of Bragg and Kirby Smith was not only possible but probable. It would have made their combined force greatly superior to me in strength, and such a disposition would have placed him between two inferior forces, which, from their positions, could not have acted in concert against him, and which, therefore, were liable to be beaten in detail. One of these forces, that occupying Louisville, was composed of perfectly raw, undisciplined and in a measure unarmed troops, with but very little artillery, and very few officers of rank or experience. It could not have withstood the veteran rebel army two hours, and the consequence of its defeat and the capture of Louisville would have been disastrous in the extreme. That force, however, mixed judiciously with my old troops, could be made to render good service, as the result proved.

These considerations determined me to concentrate rapidly at Louisville. The last division reached that point on the 29th of September. On the same day the incorporation of the new troops with the old, and other preparations which a long and fatiguing march of the old troops and the inefficiency of the new rendered necessary, were completed, and on the morning of the 30th the consolidated army was prepared to march against the rebel forces which occupied the principal part of Kentucky. The campaign which ensued, and which resulted in the expulsion of the enemy from the State, has been sketched in my

official report of the 4th of November, herewith appended. As far as the facts are concerned, the investigations of this Commission have shown, perhaps, that I did not make allowance enough for the diminution of my force by absentees, and stragglers from the new regiments; and that, therefore, I probably over-estimated my own strength at and after the battle of Perryville, if I did not also under-estimate the combined strength of the enemy. These investigations also give reason to believe that the aggregate loss of the enemy during the campaign was greater than I represented, and they have developed additional interesting incidents; but they point to no statement which I could now desire to alter. I shall limit myself, therefore, to the elucidation of certain particulars in which the wisdom of my acts would seem to have been called into question by the course of the investigation.

The battle of Perryville, although but a partial, and by no means as fruitful a contest as I had expected, was not without important and gratifying results. I shall notice very briefly the causes which prevented it from being more so.

When, on the 5th of October, Bragg's army proper retired from Bardstown, it was uncertain where it would unite with the force of Kirby Smith, though Danville was the point where I most expected to find them, and my corps were accordingly directed on Perryville and Harrodsburg. When, on the night of the 6th, I ascertained that Kirby Smith had crossed the Kentucky River at Saliva, Harrodsburg or Perryville became the most probable point of concentration, and the destination of the corps which was marching on Harrodsburg, had to be changed to Perryville. Information during the 7th, that the enemy were turning towards Harrodsburg, inclined me to suppose, though not confidently, that Harrodsburg, and not Perryville, would be the point. In the movement on that place, the center corps, with which I was, marched by a shorter and better road, and therefore arrived within about three miles of Perryville on the evening of the 7th, while the other corps were expected to be still about seven miles in rear, on their respective roads to the right and left.

Finding a sufficient force at Perryville on the evening of the 7th to stop our progress without a general engagement of the corps, it was presumed that the enemy had determined to make his stand there; and the following instructions were sent to General McCook :

“OCTOBER 7—8 P. M.

“GENERAL—The Third Corps (Gilbert's) is within three and a half miles of Perryville, the cavalry being nearer—probably within two and a half miles. From all the information gained to-day, it seems probable that the enemy will resist our advance into the town. They are said to have a strong force in and near the place. There is no water here, and we will get but little, if any, until we get it at Perryville. We expect to attack

and early the place tomorrow. *March at three o'clock precisely to-morrow morning*, without fail, and move up till the head of your column gets to within about three or three and a half miles of Perryville; that is to say, until you are abreast of the Third Corps. The left of this corps rests near Bottom's place. Perhaps Captain Williams, Jackson's cavalry, will know where it is. From the point of the road Gilbert is now on across direct to your road is about two and a half or three miles. When the head of your column gets to the vicinity designated, (three or three and a half miles from town) halt and form it in order of battle, and let the rear close well up; then let the men rest in position and be made as comfortable as possible, but do not permit them to scatter. Have the country on your front examined, a reconnoissance made, and collect all the information possible in regard to the enemy, and the country and roads in your vicinity, and then *report in person*, as quickly as practicable, to these headquarters. If your men have an opportunity to get water of any kind, they must fill their canteens, and the officers must caution them particularly to use it in the most sparing manner. Send to the rear every wagon and animal which is not required with your column. All the usual precautions must be taken, and preparations made for action. Keep all teams back except ammunition and ambulances. Nothing has been heard from you to-day. Send orderlies by bearer to learn the locality of these headquarters. The General desires to see Captain Williams, Jackson's cavalry, by seven o'clock in the morning at these headquarters.

“Respectfully, &c.,

[Signed]

“JAMES B. FRY, Colonel and Chief of Staff.”

Similar instructions, but suited to the locality on which he was to form for the attack, were given to General Thomas, who, as second in command, was with the right corps.

It was expected that these instructions would get these two corps into position for the attack by seven or eight o'clock in the morning; whereas, in consequence of delays which were more or less unavoidable, the heads of the columns did not come up until between ten and eleven o'clock, and the rear division of the right corps did not get into position until about four o'clock. This rendered it improbable that the attack could be made until next morning; and was one of the causes which marred the success I confidently expected. Afterward the lateness of the hour at which I received intelligence of the condition of affairs on the left, rendered it impossible to reap the fruit that would otherwise still have remained.

It has been a matter of surprise that so severe an engagement could have taken place within two miles and a half of my headquarters without my knowledge. The commander of an army covering a line six or seven miles long, interspersed with woods and hills, must of necessity depend on the reports of his Generals for information of what is transpiring on different parts of the field. After the failure to get into position as soon as I had expected, I no longer anticipated a battle that day; but a good deal of artillery firing had been going on between the advanced guards of the two armies since our arrival the evening before, excepting at night.

The cause of this was well understood, and the greater or less rapidity of the firing at intervals was not a matter to attract particular attention; especially as it was to be expected that information of any thing of serious import would be promptly conveyed to me. For that reason I received with astonishment the intelligence of the severe fighting that commenced at two o'clock. Not a musket shot had been heard, nor did the sound of artillery indicate any thing like a battle. This was probably caused by the configuration of the ground, which broke the sound, and by the heavy wind which it appears blew from the right to the left during the day, though the latter I had not thought of until it was established in evidence before the Commission. Be that as it may, many witnesses, without exception, have testified to the absence of all reason to suppose at my headquarters that a battle was raging, and the testimony of hundreds more could have been adduced to the same effect.

It has been asked why, after the battle of Perryville, I did not immediately follow the enemy to Harrodsburg, without waiting for Sill's Division to come up. That the entire rebel army could have been brought to battle there I have no doubt. The forces were nearly equal on both sides—on one side nearly all veteran troops under perfect discipline; on the other a portion, the "Old Army of the Ohio," equally good, but more than one-third of the whole raw and undisciplined. The enemy would have had the advantage of the strong position which he selected. The result of a conflict under such circumstances is not to be predicted. I am not willing to admit that I might have failed; and yet no man can assert that the result ought certainly to have been otherwise under the circumstances. It was sufficient for me that I could make it reasonably certain by waiting for my troops to come up.

My studies have taught me that battles are only to be fought for some important object; that success must be rendered reasonably certain if possible—the more certain the better; that if the result is reasonably uncertain, battle is only to be sought when very serious disadvantage must result from a failure to fight, or when the advantages of a possible victory far outweigh the consequences of probable defeat. These rules suppose that war has a higher object than that of mere bloodshed; and military history points for study and commendation to campaigns which have been conducted over a large field of operations with important results, and without a single general engagement. In my judgment the commander merits condemnation who, from ambition or ignorance, or a weak submission to the dictation of popular clamor, and without necessity or profit, has squandered the lives of his soldiers. In this connection it is proper to review the circumstances which should have weight upon the question of hastening a battle at the particular juncture referred to.

There is not, I venture to say, a particle of evidence upon the records of this Commission which does not lead to the conclusion that the object and intention of the rebel Government, in the invasion of Kentucky last summer, was to hold possession of the State by force of arms, and secure it to the cause of the rebellion. The circumstances of the invasion, and the formidable force employed in it; the advance of the smaller force, under Kirby Smith, which established depots and collected supplies, that made comparatively easy and safe the subsequent advance of the main force under General Bragg to a point so remote from its original base; the further reinforcement of this large force by the column under Breckinridge, at the very time when, if a temporary raid had been the object, the main force should have been rapidly withdrawing instead of reinforcing; the deliberation and permanency with which the invading army maintained its position in the face of the force which was preparing to drive it out; the inauguration of a provisional State government under the authority of the Confederate Government; the enforcement of the conscription and other Confederate laws; the avowal of the Confederate authorities; the plan of campaign sketched in the letter of General Beauregard to his Government; the convictions of the people of Kentucky from what they saw, and the assurance of the rebel authorities; the constant and confident declarations of all persons connected with the invading force; the disappointment and disapprobation which the whole Southern press expressed at the result—all go to show that the object of the invasion was permanent occupation. That object could only be secured by giving battle to and destroying or driving from the field the army which was opposed to it.

Such a plan and determination was also clearly indicated by the movements of the enemy after the commencement of my march from Louisville. If his object had been to retreat without a struggle, as soon as I moved against him, the force of Kirby Smith, which was then at various points north of the Kentucky river, would at once have moved by the roads concentrating at Richmond, and thence on to Cumberland Gap. It was for that force the shortest and best road, and a better route for supplies than the one it pursued. The main force under Bragg would have moved on one or more of the roads which converge upon Glasgow, through New Haven, Lebanon and other points. This line would have given him the advantage of marching by several of the best roads in the state, converging at convenient distances. It would have taken him through a region of country where supplies were comparatively abundant; it would have enabled him to concentrate his army at Bowling Green, and perhaps capture that place before he could be overtaken; or, if not, to move upon Murfreesboro, where he would have railroad communication

with Chattanooga, and good lines of retreat to the other side of the Tennessee river, if necessary, or the opportunity of capturing Nashville, if he should deem that feasible. Or, if he desired to retreat through Cumberland Gap, he would go on through Danville and Stanford. Instead, however, of starting upon these natural lines of retreat toward Tennessee, Kirby Smith moved west, entirely off his line of retreat, and crossed the Kentucky river near Salvisa; and Bragg, after turning the angle at Perryville, moved northward, the very opposite of his direction of retreat. That the original object of this movement was to concentrate the whole rebel force at Harrodsburg, instead of Camp Dick Robinson, is evident, from the fact that if the latter had been the object, Kirby Smith would have moved directly to that point, over the Hickman bridge, instead of fording the river lower down to go out of his way, and Bragg would have marched through Danville to the same point. Thus the circumstances of the invasion indicated that there would be a formidable struggle for the possession of the state; and the movements of the rebel forces to meet the operations that were in progress against them, pointed to a great battle at or near Harrodsburg.

The battle of Perryville, by every reasonable explanation, increased instead of weakening the probability of a great battle at Harrodsburg. It has been asserted that General Bragg fought the battle of Perryville with portions of three divisions, only about fifteen thousand men. It is certain that he fought it with only a part of his whole force. His motive, therefore, may be supposed to have been either to check my advance to give time to take up a position with his main force beyond, or else because he hoped to gain some advantage by striking the head of my column; supposing I was moving on only one road, before I could get a superior force up to oppose him. In either case, he could not have expected to accomplish much more than he did in this partial engagement. He was repulsed, it is true, but not until night protected him from very serious consequences, and there was nothing in the result that should have decided the fate of so important a campaign. His loss was probably much less than mine, from the fact that the attack was made when my troops were in column, and to that extent unprepared.

That General Bragg moved to Camp Dick Robinson, instead of awaiting an attack by my whole force, at Harrodsburg, is no evidence that he would not have been willing to give battle to the part of it which I had at Perryville. With an equal force he could safely risk a battle in the strong position he could have taken, and in fact did select, when the result would by no means be as certain there, against a superior force, as it would be in the still stronger position of Camp Dick Robinson, which had the further advantage of being a depot for his supplies. For these reasons,

and on account of its inaccessibility and superior strength, neither did his withdrawal to Camp Dick Robinson indicate an intention to abandon the object of his campaign and retreat precipitately from the state. These reasons justified the conclusion that the rebel army was to be encountered in battle, notwithstanding critics after the fact may answer that the result contradicts the conclusion; and they justify every reasonable precaution to have made the success of such a struggle certain. They afford an interpretation to the movements of the army under my command subsequently to the battle of Perryville.

Pending the arrival of General Sill's division, the left corps, General McCook's, laid near Dicksville, from which a road extends to Harrodsburg; the center, General Gilbert's, was abreast of the left on the direct road from Perryville to Harrodsburg; and the right, General Crittenden's, was on Salt River about four miles from Danville. Cavalry was in front on the Harrodsburg and Danville roads. A good deal of the ammunition of McCook's corps and some in the center corps, had been expended in the battle of the 8th, and so much of the means of transportation had been required for provisions, that wagons could not be spared for a sufficient supply of reserve ammunition, on starting from Louisville. This was hurried forward, and other matters attended to in the condition of the army which had resulted from the battle. These of themselves would not have delayed my movements, though they were important.

General Sill's division arrived on the evening of the 11th, and the army was ordered to move on the 12th. Strong cavalry reconnoissances had been kept out every day, but on the evening of the 10th, I ordered out three brigades of infantry with cavalry to move on the 11th to discover more of the position or movements of the enemy. One moved beyond Danville toward Camp Dick Robinson; one on the Danville and Harrodsburg road toward the latter point; and the third, toward the same point on the Perryville and Harrodsburg road. About daylight, an officer, just in from Harrodsburg, came to my tent and reported to me with great earnestness that the enemy was moving against us in force from Harrodsburg, distant about eight miles. The troops were put in position to be prepared, if the report should prove true, and in the meantime the several reconnoissances proceeded as ordered. The one on the left discovered and reported the enemy apparently in force about two miles south of Harrodsburg early in the morning; but he withdrew during the day, and the two reconnoissances which were ordered toward Harrodsburg entered that place in the evening, capturing some property and a large number of sick, wounded and some other prisoners.

It was probable that the enemy had retired to Camp Dick Robinson, but

it was reported that some at least had gone in the direction of the Kentucky river, and it was necessary to ascertain the fact. It would require a day to do that by reconnoissance. If the reconnoissance were supported in force, we should be prepared to take advantage of the contingency of the enemy still being this side of Dick's River; and, in any event, no time would be lost in the movement to turn the position at Camp Dick Robinson, if it should be found that the enemy had actually retired to that place. On the 12th, therefore, the whole army swung around on Danville as a pivot—the right and center on the Danville and Harrodsburg road, and the left near Harrodsburg on the Perryville and Harrodsburg road, while a reconnoissance was pushed forward to gain the desired information. It ascertained that the enemy had crossed Dick's River.

If it should be said that these dispositions proved to have been unnecessary by the withdrawal of the enemy, it may be answered that such may be the case with nine out of ten of the dispositions that are made in every campaign; that battles occur only occasionally in the movements of opposing armies; but that preparation for battle may be necessary every day. Without such preparation battles may be multiplied; and so in most cases are defeats to the careless.

The enemy's position in rear of Dick's River being, from the character of that stream, impregnable in front, I moved on the 13th to turn it by the south. On the night of that day I heard that the enemy was retreating from Camp Dick Robinson toward the south, and I immediately ordered pursuit. The leading division marched at twelve o'clock that night, and the others following in rapid succession. Crittenden's and McCook's corps, the former leading, took the road to Stanford and Crab Orchard, while Gilbert's took the road to Lancaster and Crab Orchard. On both roads the enemy's rear guards were overtaken the next day, and were pressed continually as far as Loudon. No general battle occurred between the two armies, though the enemy was foiled in his object and driven from the State. Anticipating a movement of the Rebel army into Middle Tennessee, the Army of the Ohio moved promptly in that direction, and on the 31st of October had, under my orders, advanced as far as Bowling Green and Glasgow. It was my intention to have reached Murfreesboro' by the 10th of November. On the 30th of October I turned over the command to Major-General Rosecrans, in obedience to orders from the General-in-Chief.

A careful study of the topography of Central Kentucky shows it to be a region possessing remarkable strategical features for defensive operations, especially for a force whose line of retreat is toward the state of Tennessee. The Kentucky river, running across the state from east to west, with its clifty banks, makes a strong line of defense; while its somewhat frequent fords, opposing but slight obstacles to the movements of an

army when the river is low, yet easily defended from the opposite bank, make it an admirable line for a retreating army to take shelter behind, and a perfect curtain to cover ulterior movements. Its advantages in this respect are very greatly increased by the character and position of Dick's river, which, coming from the south, empties into the Kentucky river where the latter makes a strong bend to the north. Dick's river has the same characteristics of cliffy banks, and its fewer crossings make it a much stronger line of defense than the Kentucky River.

Together these streams make the position of Camp Dick Robinson in the fork almost impregnable for a large army, except from the south-east. In that case the defensive army, with its right flank protected by Dick River and its left by the broken ground to the east, may fall back easily and securely to the north side of the Kentucky, and by a short march either to the east or the west recross to the south side, and fall upon good lines of retreat; and these movements can only be counteracted by considerable detours, or by previous detachments, which would weaken the opposing army so much as to endanger the main attack, unless the army is very greatly superior in strength. On the north side of the Kentucky River the country is traversable by good roads between the Lexington and Richmond road, and any of the roads crossing the river lower down; but on the south side the country bordering the river between the mouth of Dick's River and the Lexington and Richmond road is destitute of practicable roads parallel with the river. Besides the advantages already alluded to, the whole of that region of country abounds in strong positions commanding the only water for an army within several miles; so that the attacking force is forced to fight under all the disadvantage of exhaustion for the want of it, as was the case at Perryville.

These details make it easy to answer the theories that have been advanced for the annihilation or capture of the entire rebel army under General Bragg. One of those theories assumes that that army might have been destroyed in crossing Dick's River.

A defile, if it does not retard the march materially, is always a benefit to a retreating army; and the line of Dick's River is admirably adapted to such an object. It is only necessary for the retreating army to make demonstrations of battle with a strong rear guard, which will require corresponding preparations and delay on the part of the pursuer. In the mean time, it throws its artillery across rapidly to take positions to sweep the opposite bank, and under such protection the remainder of the retiring army crosses with safety.

Great stress has been laid on the importance of Danville to cut off the retreat of the rebel army from Perryville. My right rested after the battle within four or five miles of Danville, and my cavalry watched and went

beyond that place. Danville controlled no line of retreat for the enemy, except through that point and thence on toward Somerset or Columbia. That was as well covered by being four or five miles from Danville, with a perfectly open and unobstructed country between, as it would have been at Danville itself; and the enemy did not attempt to use it at all. Danville is eight miles at the nearest point from the road going from Camp Dick Robinson to Cumberland Gap, and the strong line of Dick's River between, prevents Danville from having any command of that road.

The first point at which the enemy's retreat on the Cumberland Gap road could be intercepted is Lancaster, ten miles from Danville. If the Army of the Ohio moved to Lancaster in force, in advance of the rebel army, it threw its communications into the hands of the enemy; if, before being assured that the enemy had crossed Dick's River, it divided its force over the twenty miles from Perryville to Lancaster to protect its communications and intercept the retreat of the enemy through Lancaster, it rendered itself liable to be beaten in detail; and if, after being assured that the enemy had crossed Dick's River, it left small detachments sufficient to guard the passes over that river, and then moved with the main body on Lancaster, there is no reason why the enemy should not have been able to hold it in check on the line of Dick's River long enough to secure his line through Lancaster if he was determined to retreat.

An army on ordinary marches, continued for many days, will average about two miles an hour; but in a forced march for twenty, and at least for ten miles, it can average three miles an hour. If the rebel army had sixty thousand men, with artillery, and fifteen hundred wagons for baggage, supplies, &c., it would, in marching, occupy thirty-nine miles along the road in one column, or nineteen and a half miles each in two columns. It would therefore require six hours and a half to clear its camp on two roads; the whole of it will have arrived at or passed a point twenty miles distant in fourteen hours, or a point ten miles distant in ten hours. Thus the rebel army, moving from Camp Dick Robinson in two columns, would clear its camp in six hours and a half, and arrive at Lancaster, ten miles distant, in ten hours; or, if it continued on without stopping, would arrive at Crab Orchard, twenty miles distant, in fourteen hours.

It appears that the retreating army actually marched in three columns, from its camp at Dick Robinson, the country along its route being open and practicable. From Lancaster it took two roads, the one to the left going by the way of Lowell, and coming into the Cumberland Gap road at Big Hill, and the other going through Crab Orchard, Mount Vernon and London. The latter is intersected at Crab Orchard, twenty miles from Danville, by the road from Danville through Stanford. The reasons which would render it injudicious to expose my communications and leave open

a better line of retreat to the enemy, by anticipating his possible retreat through Lancaster, apply with greater force to Crab Orchard. If the rebel army would retreat without accepting battle, the topography of the country made it entirely possible for it to do so. Being once established on its line of retreat beyond any point where it could by any possibility be intercepted, the rebel army made good its retreat, as other armies have done in this and other wars, under less favorable circumstances.

There are few circumstances under which a disciplined and well managed army can be forced to a general battle against its will; though the occasions are multiplied, if the opposing army has a greatly superior force of good cavalry, or is so greatly superior in strength that it can divide its force with reasonable prospects of success to each fraction. A disciplined army, moving on its line of communication, can always retreat more rapidly than it can be pursued. It meets or overtakes its supplies on the road, or finds them at temporary depots previously established, or it collects them from the country as much as possible on its line of march. The pursuing army, on the other hand, finds the country stripped; it has nothing in advance to rely on; it must carry everything along, with the hindrance of enormous trains; and the difficulties are increased with every day's march. The retreating army prepares a front of resistance more rapidly than the pursuer can prepare a front for attack. The strong positions are reconnoitered in advance, on which the requisite force forms as rapidly as on a drill ground; while the pursuer, ignorant of the ground, and of the force that awaits him, must inform himself of both in order to develop a corresponding force, or else find the head of his column beaten back. In the meantime the main body of the retiring army has gained some hours march; the rear guard watches the enemy's preparation, awaits his attack and repulses it if it is made injudiciously or with insufficient force; or else, at dark, resumes its march to repeat the same operation whenever it is necessary and the occasion is favorable. A single tree felled judiciously across the road will delay the pursuer perhaps fifteen minutes; four of them at intervals will delay him an hour; and thus the distance between him and his adversary is increased.

These advantages to defensive operations do not exist in the same degree in all descriptions of country. They are particularly marked in a broken and wooded country, where the movements and position and strength of an enemy are only to be ascertained by feeling him, and especially where there are no parallel roads by which the retreating army can be attacked in flank. The advantages alluded to make it wise, frequently, for a commander to fall back to a chosen ground when his adversary advances; and the battle of Perryville affords an illustration of this principle. The rebel army was moving for concentration at some point which could

not be known to its adversary. A portion of it took advantage of the strong position at Perryville, commanding the only water within a distance of several miles, over which the Army of the Ohio must march to attack. That position afforded also the advantage of several lines of retreat. With these combined advantages, when it was discovered that a part of the rebel army was making a stand, it was as reasonable to expect to find its combined force ~~of the enemy~~ there as at any other point, and dispositions had to be made accordingly. I believe that a sound and unprejudiced criticism will show that the movement of the Army of the Ohio was executed promptly and judiciously; that it arrived more simultaneously and in better order than the enemy could have expected, considering that the point which he would choose for battle could not be foreseen; and that but for the lack of timely information of the condition of things on the afternoon of the 8th, the main portion of the enemy's force at Perryville would have been captured.

Contests between unequal forces result sometimes, but very rarely, from the fact that the inferior has no alternative but to fight or surrender. In by far the greatest number of cases, however, the conflict results from a lack of ability on the part of the inferior to avail himself of the means of extricating his army; or from a contempt for, or ignorance of, the strength of his adversary; or from an advantage of position which, in his opinion, will outweigh that of superiority of numbers, and a corresponding ignorance of that advantage, or faulty dispositions on the part of the superior army; and these last are the cases in which most frequently the inferior army is victorious. When the armies are about equal, they maneuver so as to deceive and cause each other to make detachments, or force each other to battle on ground unfavorable to the adversary. In all these cases the object is not merely to give battle for the sake of fighting, but to fight for victory, or at least safety, and with such advantages as will make success reasonably certain; and the more serious the consequences of defeat, the greater the caution to be observed. Ignorance and error multiply battles far more than valor, and generally with the penalty of disaster. If precaution and the observance of rule diminish the number of battles, and sometimes miss the accidental success which folly and recklessness might have gained, it is nevertheless true that in the end they usually triumph.

The operations of the column under the command of General G. W. Morgan at Cumberland Gap have been brought before the Commission. The deposition of Colonel DeCoureey, an officer under General Morgan's command, introduced as evidence for the Government, alleges that after General ~~G. W.~~ Morgan commenced his advance upon Cumberland Gap in May last, he was suddenly arrested by a telegraphic dispatch from me, ordering a retrograde movement, and stopping all further proceedings on the Tennessee side against the Gap.

General Morgan commenced his advance against Cumberland Gap in pursuance of the orders which I gave him in March preceeding, about the 2^d ~~24~~ of May. He had repeatedly represented that he was operating against a superior force of the enemy, and on the 8th of ~~May~~ ^{April} he telegraphed that the enemy had "over five thousand at Cumberland Gap, eight thousand at Big Creek Gap, with troops at Clinton and Knoxville. Should their force concentrate the enemy will outnumber us nearly three to one. What is General Negley doing?" Seeing no reason why I should expect him to advance by difficult mountains roads and defeat three to one of the enemy; and supposing that he may have regarded my orders for him to advance as more imperative than I meant them to be, without regard to the force opposed to him, I telegraphed him on the 9th as follows: "General Negley is fully employed in Tennessee and can give you no direct assistance. The force now in Tennessee is so small that no operations against East Tennessee can be attempted. You must, therefore, depend mainly on your own resources." And on the 10th I telegraphed him as follows: "Considering your force and that opposed to you, it will probably not be safe for you to undertake any extended operations. Other operations will soon have an influence on your designs, and it is, therefore, better for you to run no risk at present."

These are the dispatches which caused the retrograde movement referred to. I leave them to speak for themselves, in connection with the dispatches which elicited them.

But, furthermore, on the same day, the 10th, I received a dispatch from General Morgan, giving a rumor that the Gap was evacuated; to which I replied the same day: "If Cumberland Gap is evacuated, you should "seize and hold it, and take any other advantage that may present itself, "but not advance to a point from which you would have to fall back."

About this time General Mitchel, considering himself in danger from an anticipated advance upon him, was urging the necessity of a stronger force in Middle Tennessee, and I was about commencing my march from Corinth in that direction.

Cumberland Gap was occupied on the 18th of June. General Morgan had about seven thousand five hundred men. His dispatches report the strength of the enemy opposed to him at not less than ten or twelve thousand; and I have no reason to doubt that he reported correctly. At no time did he represent that he was able to hold East Tennessee with the force he had, or the wish to attempt it, nor do I believe that he could have done it. It is true that on the 20th he telegraphed: "My telegraph "orders from Major-General Buell of the 10th instant do not permit me "to advance upon Knoxville, and I will not, until further instructions, "advance further than Tazewell;" and he also stated the preparation he

had made to destroy bridges, but had countermanded in consequence of that dispatch. He was answered on the 22d, four days after his arrival at the Gap, as follows :

“It is impossible at present to send you any cavalry. The General has not intended his orders to prevent such expeditions for special purposes as you refer to in your dispatch of the 20th; on the contrary, he approves them. His wish is for you to make yourself secure in the Gap and accomplish all the results you can by rapid expeditions; but not to attempt a deliberate advance on Knoxville, as long as it seems probable that you would not be able to maintain your position there. The General wishes to make no actual advance which he cannot maintain. It brings our friends among the people into trouble, and is injurious otherwise to our interests.
JAMES B. FRY, Chief of Staff.”

I have no doubt that General Morgan acted wisely, and that he had not force enough to attack the enemy in force. He certainly was not restrained from doing anything that duty and honor demanded.

The policy which I observed toward the people of the territory occupied by my army has been vehemently and bitterly assailed by a portion of the press; but I believe that reason and justice will sustain it on every score, whether of expediency or humanity. In entering on my command, it was with an earnest willingness to devote my life to the object of restoring the Union, and I never doubted as to the course my duty required me to pursue. It was to defeat the rebels in arms whenever I could; and to respect the Constitution and laws, and the rights of the people under them, as far as was possible, consistently with a state of things which rendered military success a matter of primary importance for the restoration of the authority of the Government. This has been my rule of action from first to last. I did not undertake to punish men for opinion's sake, or even for past acts; for Congress had prescribed the penalty for their offenses, and the mode of proceeding against them. Men in arms I treated as enemies; persons not in arms I treated as citizens of the United States; but I allowed no man to preach or act treason after the progress of my army had brought him again under the protection, as well as the authority, of the Government.

I have, when necessary, given protection to the persons and property of peaceable citizens; and this I have done both to preserve the discipline of my troops, and out of respect for the just rights of the people under the laws of war, if not under the civil law. When the public interest ~~has~~ required the use of private property for public purposes, I ~~have~~ so used it, allowing just compensation for it as far as practicable; and this I did not only on the ground of justice, but as a measure of military expediency; for it enabled me to secure for my army necessaries, which otherwise would have been concealed or destroyed.

The bearing of this question on the success of my military operations is something which I was bound to weigh well. It is recognized as one of great importance to the success of an invading army. Wars of invasion, always difficult, become tenfold so when the people of the invaded territory take an active part against the invading army. A system of plunder and outrage in such cases will produce the same effect of hatred and revenge that such treatment does under other circumstances among men; and the embarrassments resulting from them to the invading army become of the most serious nature.

These considerations are of such importance to success, that there is no exception to the rule of securing the neutrality, if not the friendship, of the population as much as possible, by just and kind treatment; and then—having given no good cause for hostility—to treat with kindness those who behave well, and with severity those who misbehave.

Some months ago a statement appeared in the newspapers, on the reported authority of Governor Andrew Johnson, that I had only been prevented by his resolute expostulations from abandoning Nashville when I moved north with my army in September last. He has since made the same assertion in a deposition. Whenever I have spoken on this subject I have denounced the statement as false; and I now repeat that denunciation. I am very willing to bear the responsibility of my own acts or intentions; and it gives me sincere pleasure at all times to acknowledge any assistance I may receive from others either in counsel or action. If I had determined to abandon Nashville it would have been upon my best judgment, and I should cheerfully have submitted to a verdict on the wisdom of my course. I assert that I never intimated to Governor Johnson an intention or wish to leave Nashville without a garrison; that there was no discussion between us *pro* and *con* on the subject, and that the determination to hold the place was my own, uninfluenced by him in any manner. I had not that confidence in his judgment, or that distrust of my own which would have induced me to seek his counsel. On account of his official position I called on him first to inform him what I meant to do, and last to tell him what garrison I had concluded to leave. On both occasions, as far as my plans were concerned, I was the speaker and he the listener. My officers were far more likely to know my views than he; and they have stated that I said always that the political importance of the occupation far outweighed any purely military bearing of the question, and that I should hold the city.

D. C. BUELL,
Major-General.

Barnet House, May 5, 1863.

REPORT OF THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO, }
Field of Shiloh, April 15, 1862. }

Captain N. H. McClain:

SIR—The rear division of the army under my command, which had been delayed a considerable time in rebuilding the Duck river bridge, left Columbia on the 2d inst. I left the evening of that day, and arrived at Savanna on the evening of the 5th. General Nelson, with his division, which formed the advance, arrived the same day. The other divisions marched with intervals of about six miles.

On the morning of the 6th the firing of cannon and musketry was heard in the direction of this place. Apprehending that a serious engagement had commenced, I went to General Grant's headquarters to get information as to the best means of reaching the battle-field with the division that had arrived. At the same time orders were dispatched to the divisions in rear to leave their trains and push forward by forced marches. I learned that General Grant had just started, leaving orders for General Nelson to march to the river opposite Pittsburg Landing, to be ferried across. An examination of the road up the river discovered it to be impracticable for artillery, and General Nelson was directed to leave his to be carried forward by steamers.

The impression existed at Savanna that the firing was only an affair of outposts, the same thing having occurred for the two or three previous days; but as it continued, I determined to go to the scene of action, and accordingly started with my Chief of Staff, Colonel Fry, on a steamer which I had ordered to get under steam. As we proceeded up the river groups of soldiers were seen upon the west bank, and it soon became evident that they were stragglers from the army that was engaged. The groups increased in size and frequency until, as we approached the landing, they amounted to whole companies, and almost regiments; and at the landing the bank swarmed with a confused mass of men of various regiments. The number could not have been less than four or five thousand, and later in the day it became much greater. Finding General Grant at the landing, I requested him to send steamers to Savanna to bring up General Crittenden's division, which had arrived during the morning, and then went ashore with him. The throng of disorganized and demoralized troops increased continually by fresh fugitives from the battle which steadily drew nearer the landing, and with these were mingled great numbers of teams, all striving to get as near as possible to the river. With few exceptions, all efforts to form the troops and move them forward to the fight utterly failed.

In the mean time the enemy had made such progress against our

troops that his artillery and musketry began to play into the vital spot of the position, and some persons were killed on the bank at the very landing. General Nelson arrived with Colonel Ammen's brigade at this opportune moment. It was immediately posted to meet the attack at that point, and with a battery of artillery which happened to be on the ground, and was brought into action, opened fire on the enemy and repulsed him. The action of the gunboats also contributed very much to that result. The attack at that point was not renewed, night having come on, and the firing ceased on both sides. In the mean time the remainder of General Nelson's division crossed, and General Crittenden's arrived from Savanna by steamers. After examining the ground as well as was possible at night in front of the line on which General Grant's troops had formed, and as far to the right as General Sherman's division, I directed Nelson's and Crittenden's divisions to form in front of that line, and move forward as soon as it was light in the morning. During the night, and early the following morning, Captain Bartlett's Ohio Battery, Captain Mendenhall's Regular Battery, and Captain Terrill's Battery, Fifth Artillery, arrived. General McCook, by a forced march, arrived at Savanna during the night of the 6th, and reached the field of battle early in the morning of the 7th. I knew that the other divisions could not arrive in time for the action that day.

The patch of country on which the battles of the 6th and 7th were fought is called Shiloh from the little church of that name, which stands in its midst. It consists of an undulating table land, elevated some eighty or one hundred feet above the river bottom. Along the Tennessee River to the east it breaks into abrupt ravines, and toward the south along Lick Creek, which empties into the Tennessee River some three miles above Pittsburg Landing, rises into a range of hills of some height, whose slopes are gradual toward Lick Creek. Owl Creek, rising near the source of Lick Creek, flows to the north-west around the battle field into Snake Creek, which empties into Tennessee River three miles below Lick Creek. The drainage is mainly from the Lick Creek ridge and the table land into Owl Creek. Coming from Corinth the principal road crosses Lick Creek at two points some twelve miles from its mouth and separates into three or four principal branches which enter the table land from the south, at the distance of about a mile apart. Generally the face of the country is covered with woods through which troops can pass without great difficulty, though occasionally the undergrowth is dense. Small farms or cultivated fields of from twenty to eighty acres occur now and then, but as a general thing the country is in forest. My entire ignorance of the various roads and of the character of the country at the time, rendered it impossible to anticipate the probable dispositions of the enemy, and the woods were always sufficient to screen his preparatory movements from observation.

Soon after five o'clock on the morning of the 7th, General Nelson's and General Crittenden's Divisions, the only ones yet arrived on the ground, moved promptly forward to meet the enemy. Nelson's Division marching in line of battle, soon came upon his pickets, drove them in and at about six o'clock received the fire of his artillery. The division was here halted and Mendenhall's Battery brought into action to reply, while Crittenden's Division was being put into position on the right of Nelson's. Bartlett's Battery was posted in the center of Crittenden's Division in a commanding position, opposite which the enemy was discovered to be formed in force. By this time McCook's Division arrived on the ground and was immediately formed on the right of Crittenden's; skirmishers were thrown to the front and a strong body of them to guard our left flank, which though somewhat protected by rough ground, it was supposed the enemy might attempt to turn, and, in fact, did, but was handsomely repulsed with great loss. Each brigade furnished its own reserve, and in addition Boyle's brigade, from Crittenden's division, though it formed at first in the line, was kept somewhat back when the line advanced, to be used as occasion might require. I found on the ground parts of about two regiments, perhaps one thousand men, and subsequently a similar fragment came up of General Grant's force. The first I directed to act with General McCook's attack, and the second was similarly employed on the left. I saw other straggling troops of General Grant's force immediately on General McCook's right, and some firing had already commenced there. I have no direct knowledge of the disposition of the remainder of General Grant's force, nor is it my province to speak of them. Those that came under my direction in the way I have stated rendered willing and efficient service during the day.

The force under my command occupied a line of about a mile and a half. In front of Nelson's division was an open field partially screened towards his right by a skirt of woods, which extended through to the enemy's line, with a thick undergrowth in front of the left brigade of Crittenden's division; then an open field in front of Crittenden's right and McCook's left; and in front of McCook's right, woods again with a dense undergrowth. The ground, nearly level in front of Nelson, formed a hollow in front of Crittenden, and fell into a small creek or ravine which empties into Owl Creek in front of McCook. What I afterwards learned was the Hamburg road, which crosses Lick Creek a mile from its mouth, passed perpendicularly through the line of battle near Nelson's left. On a line slightly oblique to us and beyond the open fields the enemy was formed with a battery in front of Nelson's left; a battery commanding the woods in front of Crittenden's left, and flanking the field in front of Nelson; a battery commanding the same woods and the field in front of Crittenden's

right and McCook's left; and a battery in front of McCook's right. A short distance in rear of the enemy's left were the encampments of McClernand's and Sherman's divisions, which the enemy held.

While my troops were getting into position, the fire was kept up between Mendenhall's battery and the enemy's second battery, with some effect. Bartlett's battery was hardly in position before the enemy's third battery opened fire on that part of the line; and when, very soon after, our line advanced with strong bodies of skirmishers in front, the action became general, and continued with severity during the greater part of the day, and until the enemy was driven from the field. The obliquity of our line, the left being thrown forward, brought Nelson's division first into action, and it became very hotly engaged at an early hour. A charge of the Nineteenth brigade, from Nelson's right, led by its commander, Colonel Hazen, reached the enemy's second battery, but the brigade sustained a heavy loss by a cross fire of the enemy's batteries, and was unable to maintain its advantage against the heavy infantry force that came forward to oppose it. The enemy recovered the battery, and followed up his momentary advantage by throwing a heavy force of infantry into the woods in front of Crittenden's left. The left brigade, Colonel W. S. Smith, of that division, advanced into the woods, repulsed the enemy handsomely, and took several prisoners. In the meantime Captain Terrill's battery, Fifth artillery, which had just landed, reached the field, and was ordered into action near the left with Nelson's division, which was very heavily pressed by the greater numbers of the enemy. It belonged properly to McCook's division. It took position near the Hamburg road, in the open ground, in front of the enemy's right, and at once began to act with decided effect upon the tide of battle in that quarter. The enemy's right battery was silenced. Ammen's brigade, which was on the left, advanced in good order on the enemy's right, but was checked for some time by his endeavor to turn our left flank, and by his strong counter attack in front. Captain Terrill, who, in the meantime, had taken an advanced position, was compelled to retire, leaving one caisson, at which every horse was killed or disabled. It was very soon recovered. Having been reinforced by a regiment from General Boyle's brigade, Nelson's division again moved forward, and forced the enemy to abandon entirely his position. This success flanked the enemy's position at his second and third batteries, from which he was soon driven, with the loss of several pieces of artillery, by the concentrated fire of Terrill's and Mendenhall's batteries and an attack from Crittenden's division in front. The enemy made a second stand, some eight hundred yards in rear of this position, and opened fire with his artillery. Mendenhall's battery was thrown forward, silenced the battery, and it was captured by Crittenden's division, the enemy retreating

from it. In the meantime the division of General McCook, on the right, which became engaged somewhat later in the morning on the left, had made steady progress until it drove the enemy's left from the hotly-contested field. The action was commenced in this division by General Rousseau's brigade, which drove the enemy in front of it from the first position and captured a battery. The line of attack of this position caused a considerable widening of the space between it and Crittenden's right. It was also out-flanked on its right by the line of the enemy, who made repeated strong attacks on its flanks, but was always gallantly repulsed. The enemy made his last stand in front of this division in the woods beyond Sherman's camp.

Two brigades of General Wood's division arrived just at the close of the battle, but only one of them, Colonel Wagner's, in time to participate actively in the pursuit, which it continued for about a mile and until halted by my order. Its skirmishers became engaged for a few minutes with skirmishers covering the enemy's rear guard, which made a momentary stand. It was also fired upon by the enemy's artillery on its right flank, but without effect. It was well conducted by its commander, and showed great steadiness.

The pursuit was continued no further that day. I was without cavalry, and the different corps had become a good deal scattered on a pursuit over a country which screened the movements of the enemy, and the roads of which I knew practically nothing. In the beginning of the pursuit, thinking it probable the enemy had retired partly by the Hamburg road, I had ordered Nelson's division forward as far as Lick Creek on that road, from which I afterward learned the direct Corinth road was separated by a difficult ravine which empties into Lick Creek. I therefore occupied myself with examining the ground and getting the different divisions into position, which was not effected until some time after dark.

The following morning, in pursuance of the directions of General Grant, General Wood was sent forward with two of his brigades and a battery of artillery to discover the position of the enemy and press him, if he should be found in retreat. General Sherman with about the same force from General Grant's army was on the same service, and had a spirited skirmish with the enemy's cavalry, driving it back. The main force was found to have retreated beyond Lick Creek, and our troops returned at night.

There were no idlers in the battle of the 7th. Every portion of the army did its work. The batteries of Captains Terrill and Mendenhall were splendidly handled and served; that of Captain Bartlett was served with great spirit and gallantly, though with less decisive results. I especially commend to the favor of the Government for distinguished gallantry and good conduct, Brigadier-General A. McD. McCook, commanding Second Division; Briga-

dier-General Wm. Nelson, commanding Fourth Division; Brigadier-General Thomas L. Crittenden, commanding Fifth Division; Brigadier-General Lovell H. Rousseau, commanding Fourth Brigade; Brigadier-General J. T. Boyle, commanding the Sixteenth Brigade; Colonel J. Ammen, Twenty-fourth Ohio Volunteers, commanding Tenth Brigade; Colonel W. S. Smith, Thirteenth Ohio Volunteers, commanding Fourteenth Brigade; Colonel E. N. Kirk, Thirty-fourth Illinois Volunteers, commanding Fifth Brigade; Colonel W. H. Gibson, Forty-ninth Ohio Volunteers, temporarily commanding Sixth Brigade; Captain W. A. Terrill, Fifth Artillery; Captain John Mendenhall, Fourth Artillery; Captain Bartlett, Ohio Volunteer Battery. For the many other officers who won honorable distinction, I refer to the reports of the division, brigade and regimental commanders transmitted herewith; as also for more detailed information of the services of the different corps. I join cordially in the commendation bestowed by these officers on those under their command.

The loss of the force under my command is 263 killed, 1,816 wounded, and 88 missing. Total, 2,167. The trophies are twenty pieces of artillery, a greater number of caissons, and a considerable number of small arms. Many of the cannon were recaptured from the loss of the previous day. Several stands of colors were also recaptured.

The members of my Staff, Colonel James B. Fry, Chief of Staff; Captain J. M. Wright, Assistant Adjutant General; Lieutenant C. L. Fitzhugh, Fourth Artillery, Aid-de-camp; Lieutenant A. F. Rockwell, New York Chasseurs, Aid-de-camp; Lieutenant T. J. Bush, Twenty-fourth Kentucky, Aid-de-camp; Captain J. H. Gilman, Nineteenth Infantry, Inspector of Artillery; Captain E. Gay, Sixteenth Infantry, Inspector of Cavalry; Captain H. C. Bankhead, Fifth Infantry, Inspector of Infantry; Captain Nathaniel Michler, Topographical Engineers; were distinguished for their gallant bearing throughout the battle, and rendered valuable service. The gallant deportment of my orderlies, Privates A. J. Williamson, Fourth Cavalry, and N. M. Smith, J. R. Hewitt, J. A. Stevenson, V. B. Hammell, of the Anderson Troop, also deserves to be mentioned. I am particularly indebted to Colonel Fry, Chief of Staff, for valuable assistance in the battle, as well as for the ability and industry with which he has at all times performed the important duties of his position. Surgeon Murray, Medical Director, always assiduous in the discharge of his duties, was actively engaged on the field, in taking the best care of the wounded that the circumstances admitted of. Captain Gillem, Assistant Quartermaster, is entitled to great credit for his energy and industry in providing transportation for the troops from Savanna. Lieutenant Colonel James Oaks, Fourth Cavalry, Inspector of Cavalry, and Captain C. C. Gilbert, First Infantry, Acting Inspector General, who have rendered zealous and val-

able service in their positions, were detained at Savanna and unable to be present in the action.

The troops which did not arrive in time for the battle, General Thomas' and part of General Wood's divisions, (a portion of the latter, as I have previously stated, took part in the pursuit and the remainder arrived in the evening,) are entitled to the highest praise for the untiring energy with which they pressed forward night and day, to share the dangers of their comrades. One of these divisions, General Thomas', had already, under his command, made its name honorable by one of the most memorable victories of the war, "Mill Spring," on which the tide of success seemed to turn steadily in favor of the Union.

(Signed)

D. C. BUELL, Major General Commanding.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE.

LOUISVILLE, November 4, 1862.

General L. Thomas, Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:

SIR—It is due to the army which I have commanded for the last twelve months, and perhaps due to myself, that I should make a circumstantial report of its operations during the past summer. Such a report requires data not now at hand, and would occupy more time than can be spared at present from the subject of more immediate interest, namely, the operations from Louisville against the rebel forces in Kentucky under the command of General Bragg. I therefore commence this report from that period, premising only in a general way, that my attention to the condition of affairs in Kentucky was demanded first by the minor operations of the enemy, which, by the destruction of the railroad, had completely severed the communications of my army, and left it at a distance of three hundred miles from its base with very limited supplies; and second by the formidable invasion which not only threatened the permanent occupation of the state, but exposed the states north of the Ohio river to invasion.

Leaving a sufficient force to hold Nashville, the remainder of the army, under my command was put in march for Kentucky. The rear division left Nashville on the 15th, and arrived at Louisville, a distance of one hundred and seventy miles, on the 29th of September. The advance arrived on the 25th. The particulars of the march will, as I have said, be given in a subsequent report in connection with other matters. I found in and about the city a considerable force of raw troops hurriedly thrown in from Illinois, Indiana and Ohio, for the defense of the city against the formidable force that had invaded the state under Generals Bragg and Kirby Smith. Under the command of Major General Nelson,

whose untimely death can not be too much deplored; these troops had been organized into brigades and divisions, and they had some able and experienced officers in Generals Boyle, Jackson, Crufts, Gilbert, Terrill and others; but the troops were as yet undisciplined, unprovided with a suitable artillery, and in every way unfit for active operations against a disciplined foe. It was necessary to reorganize the whole force. This was done, as far as possible, by intermixing the new troops with the old, without changing the old organization. The troops were supplied with shoes and other essentials, of which they were greatly in need, among them certain light cooking utensils, which the men could carry and dispense with wagons, the allowance of which was reduced to one for each regiment to carry a few necessary articles for officers, and one for hospital supplies, besides the ambulances. The army was to have marched on the 30th of September, but an order, which was subsequently suspended, relieving me from the command, delayed the movement till the following day. The army marched on the 1st ultimo in five columns. The left moved toward Frankfort to hold in check the force of the enemy which still remained at or near that place. The other columns marching by different routes, finally fell respectively into the roads leading from Shepherdsville, Mt. Washington, Fairfield and Bloomfield to Bardstown, where the main force of the enemy under General Bragg was known to be. These roads converge upon Bardstown at an angle of about fifteen degrees from each other.

Skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry and artillery marked the movement of each column from within a few miles of Louisville. It was more stubborn and formidable near Bardstown; but the rear of the enemy's infantry retired from that place eight hours before our arrival, when his rear guard of cavalry and artillery retreated, after a sharp engagement with my cavalry. The pursuit and skirmishing with the enemy's rear guard continued towards Springfield.

The information which I received indicated that the enemy would concentrate his forces at Danville. The first corps, under Major General McCook, was therefore ordered to march from Bloomfield on Harrodsburg, while the second corps, under Major General Crittenden, moved on the Lebanon road, which passes four miles to the south of Perryville, with a branch to the latter place; and the third corps on the direct road to Perryville. My headquarters accompanied the third, or center corps; Major General Thomas, second in command, accompanied the right or second corps. After leaving Bardstown, I learned that the force of Kirby Smith had crossed to the west side of the Kentucky river, near Salvisa, and that the enemy was moving to concentrate either at Harrodsburg or Perryville. Gen. McCook's route was therefore changed from Harrodsburg to Perryville.

The center corps arrived on the afternoon of the 7th, and was drawn up in order of battle about three miles from Perryville, where the enemy appeared to be in force. The advanced guard, under Captain Gay, consisting of cavalry and artillery, supported towards evening by two regiments of infantry, pressed successfully upon the enemy's rear guard to within two miles of the town, against a somewhat stubborn opposition.

The whole army had for three days or more suffered from a scarcity of water. The last day, particularly, the troops and animals suffered exceedingly for want of it, and from hot weather and dusty roads. In the bed of Doctor's Creek, a tributary of Chaplin River, about two and a half miles from Perryville, some pools of water were discovered, which the enemy showed a determination to prevent us from gaining possession of. The thirty-sixth brigade, under the command of Colonel Daniel McCook, from Sheridan's division, was ordered forward to seize and hold a commanding position which covered these pools. It executed the order that night, and a supply of bad water was secured for the troops.

On discovering that the enemy was concentrating for battle at Perryville, I sent orders, on the night of the 7th, to General McCook and General Crittenden to march at three o'clock the following morning, so as to take position respectively, as early as possible on the right and left of the center corps; the commanders themselves to report in person for orders on their arrival, my intention being to make the attack that day if possible. The orders did not reach General McCook until two and a half o'clock, and he marched at five. The second corps failing to find water where it was expected to encamp the night of the 7th, had to move off the road for that purpose, and consequently was some six miles or more further off than it would otherwise have been. The orders did not reach it in time, and these two causes delayed its arrival several hours. Still it was far enough advanced to have been pressed into the action of the 8th, if the necessity for it had been known early enough.

The engagement which terminated at night the previous day, was renewed early on the morning of the 8th, by an attempt of the enemy to drive the brigade of Colonel McCook from the position taken to cover the water in Doctor's Creek. The design had been discovered, and the divisions of Generals Mitchell and Sheridan were moved into position to defeat it and hold the ground until the army was prepared to attack in force. A spirited attack was made on Colonel McCook's position, and was handsomely repulsed. Between ten and eleven o'clock the left corps arrived on the Maxville road. General McCook was instructed to get it promptly into position on the left of the center corps, and to make a reconnoissance to his front and left. The reconnoissance had been continued by Captain Gay toward his front and right, and sharp firing with

artillery was then going on. I had somewhat expected an attack early in the morning on Gilbert's corps, while it was isolated, but as it did not take place, no formidable attack was apprehended after the arrival of the left corps. The disposition of the troops was made mainly with a view to a combined attack on the enemy's position at daylight the following morning, as the time required to get all the troops into position after the unexpected delay would probably make it too late to attack that day.

The cannonading which commenced with the partial engagement in the center, followed by the reconnoissance of the cavalry under Captain Gay, extended toward the left and became brisker as the day advanced, but was not supposed to proceed from any serious engagement as no report to that effect was received. At four o'clock, however, Major General McCook's aid-de-camp arrived and reported to me that the General was sustaining a severe attack, which he would not be able to withstand unless reinforced—that his flanks were already giving way. He added, to my astonishment, that the left corps had actually been engaged in a severe battle for several hours—perhaps since twelve o'clock. It was so difficult to credit the latter that I thought there must even be some misapprehension in regard to the former. I sent word to him that I should rely on his being able to hold his ground, though I should probably send him reinforcements. I at once sent orders for two brigades from the center corps, (Schœpff's division,) to move promptly to reinforce the left. Orders were also sent to General Crittenden to move a division in to strengthen the center, and to move with the rest of his corps energetically against the enemy's left flank. The distance from one flank of the army to the other was not, perhaps, less than six miles, and before the orders could be delivered and the right corps make the attack, night came on and terminated the engagement.

The roads going from Maxville and Springfield enter Perryville at an angle of about fifteen degrees with each other. The road from Lebanon runs nearly parallel to the Springfield road to within five miles of Perryville, and there forks—the left hand fork going to Perryville, and the right continuing straight on to Danville, leaving Perryville four miles to the north. There is also a direct road from Perryville to Danville. Perryville, Danville and Harrodsburg occupy the vertices of an equilateral triangle, and are ten miles apart. Salt River rises midway between Perryville and Danville, and runs northward two miles west of Harrodsburg. Chaplin Fork rises near and passes through Perryville, bending in its course so as to run obliquely away from the Maxville and Perryville road, on which the left corps advanced. Doctor's Creek running north crosses the Perryville and Springfield road at right angles about two and a half miles west of Perryville, and empties into Chaplin Fork about three miles from town.

The ground bordering the Chaplin is hilly, with alternate patches of timber and cleared land. The hills, though in some places steep, are generally practicable for infantry and cavalry, and in many places for artillery. The ground afforded the enemy great advantages for attacking a force on the Maxville road, taken in the act of forming, as was the case in the battle of the 8th. General McCook's line ran nearly parallel with Chaplin Fork, the right resting on the road and the left to the north of it. Two of General Rousseau's brigades, the Seventeenth under Colonel Lytle, and the Fourth under Colonel Harris, were on the right; then the Thirty-third Brigade under General Terrill, of Jackson's Division; then on the extreme left and to the rear of Terrill the Twenty-eighth Brigade, under Colonel Starkweather, of Rousseau's Division. The other brigade of Jackson's Division, under Colonel Webster, was at first in rear of Rousseau's two right brigades, and in the course of the battle was brought into action on the right. General Gilbert's corps was on the right of Rousseau, but the space between them was somewhat too great—first Sheridan's Division, then Mitchell's, and Schoepf's in reserve, opposite the left of the corps.

The fight commenced early in the day, as has been described, with a feeble attack on the center corps; then later the attack fell with severity and pertinacity on Rousseau's right brigades; then somewhat later on Terrill's brigade and on Rousseau's third brigade, on the extreme left. It was successful against Terrill's brigade, composed of new regiments. The gallant commander of the division, General J. S. Jackson, was killed almost instantly. The heroic young Brigadier, Terrill, lost his life in endeavoring to rally his troops, and ten pieces of artillery were left on the ground. Two of them were carried off by the enemy the next morning; the rest were recovered. The main weight of the battle thus fell upon the Third division, under General Rousseau. No troops could have met it with more heroism. The left brigade, compelled at first to fall back somewhat, at length maintained its ground and repulsed the attack at that point. Taking advantage of the opening between Gilbert's left and Rousseau's right, the enemy pressed his attack at that point with an overwhelming force. Rousseau's right was being turned, and was forced to fall back, which it did in excellent order, until reinforced by Godding's and Steadman's brigades, from Gilbert's corps, when the enemy was repulsed. That result was also promoted by the fire which the artillery of Sheridan's division poured into the left enemy's flank. Simultaneously with the heaviest attack on Rousseau's division, the enemy made a strong attack on Sheridan's right. Sheridan was reinforced from Mitchell's division, by Colonel Carlin's brigade, which charged the enemy with intrepidity, and drove him through the town to his position beyond, capturing, in the town, two caissons and fifteen wagons loaded with am-

munition, and the guard that was with them, consisting of three officers and one hundred and thirty-eight men. This occurred about nightfall, which terminated the battle. The corps of General Crittenden closed in, and Wagner's brigade, of Wood's division, became engaged, and did good service on the right of Mitchel's division; but, knowing nothing of the severity of the fight on the extreme left, the rest of the corps did not get into action.

No doubt was entertained that the enemy would endeavor to hold his position. Accordingly, orders were sent to the commanders of corps to be prepared to attack at daylight in the morning. They received instructions in person at my headquarters that night, except General Crittenden, for whom instructions were given to Major General Thomas, second in command. General McCook supposed from indications in his front that the enemy would throw a formidable force against his corps, in pursuance of the original attempt to turn our left. He represented, also, that his corps was very much crippled, the new division of General Jackson having in fact almost entirely disappeared as a body. He was instructed to move in during the night and close the opening between his right and General Gibert's left. His orders for the following day were to hold his position, taking advantage of any opportunity that the events of the day might present. The corps of Generals Crittenden and Gilbert were to move forward at six o'clock and attack the enemy's front and left flank. The advance the following morning, in pursuance of these orders discovered that the enemy's main body had retired during the night, but without any indications of haste or disorder, except that his dead and wounded were left upon the field. The reconnoissance during the day showed that his whole force had fallen back on Harribsburg, where the indications seemed to be that he would make a stand.

It will be impossible to form any correct judgment of the operations from this time particularly, without considering the condition of the two armies, and the probable intentions of the enemy. The rebel army has been driven from the borders of Kentucky without a decisive battle. It is spoken of as if it were a comparatively insignificant force pursued by an overwhelming one, which had nothing to do but send out patrols and gather in the fragments of a routed and disorganized army. The very reverse was the case. The rebel force which invaded Kentucky, at the lowest estimates, has been rated at from fifty-five to sixty-five thousand men. It was composed of veteran troops, well armed and thoroughly inured to hardship. Every circumstance of its march, and the concurrent testimony of all who came within reach of its lines, attest that it was under perfect discipline. It had entered Kentucky with the avowed purpose of holding the state. Its commanders declared that to be their intention to

the last; intercepted communications disclosing their plans, and the disappointment expressed by the Southern press at the result, show that to have been their purpose. The enterprise certainly seemed desperate, but it was entered upon deliberately, was conducted by the best talent in the rebel service, and there was nothing to indicate that it would be abandoned lightly. Some maneuvering for advantage, and one decisive battle were to be expected before Kentucky could be rid of her invader. Everything goes to show that the final retreat of the enemy was suddenly determined on, and that it was not at the time to be calculated upon as a matter of course. Any movements on my part solely in anticipation of it would only have turned the enemy in a different direction, and any presumptuous attempt to capture a superior force by detachments would, according to all probabilities, have been more likely to result in defeat than in success.

The effective force which advanced on Perryville on the 7th and 8th, under my command, was about fifty-eight thousand infantry, artillery and cavalry. Of these about twenty-two thousand were raw troops, with very little instruction or none at all. The reports show an actual loss of upward of four thousand killed, wounded and missing in the battle, which would leave the effective force about fifty-four thousand after it. I did not hesitate, therefore, after crossing Chaplin River and finding the enemy had fallen back, to await the arrival of General Sill's division, which had marched to Frankfort and had been ordered to join via Lawrenceburg and Chaplinton, when it was ascertained that Kirby Smith's force had marched to form a junction with Bragg. That division on the march from Louisville encountered a strong outpost of the enemy on the Frankfort road, about twelve miles out, and skirmishing was kept up until its arrival at Frankfort. It was followed closely by General Dumont's division, which remained at Frankfort. In marching from Frankfort to join the main body Sill's division was attacked near Lawrenceburg by a portion of Kirby Smith's force, which it drove off, and then continued its march, arriving at Perryville on the evening of the 11th. Pending its arrival the army took position with its right four miles from Danville, its center on the Perryville and Harrodsburg pike, and the left near Dicksville, on roads converging on Harrodsburg. On the 11th three brigades from Crittenden's and Gilbert's corps, with Gay's and McCook's cavalry brigades, were sent out to reconnoiter the enemy's position. He was found in force two miles south of Harrodsburg, in the morning, but retired during the day, and his rear guard was driven out in the evening with the loss of some stores and about twelve hundred prisoners, mostly sick and wounded. It was probable he would retire his whole force to Camp Dick Robinson, though it was not certainly ascertained what portion of it had crossed Dick's River. To

compel him to take at once one side or the other, and either give battle on this side or be prevented from recrossing to attack our communications when a move was made to turn his position, the left corps moved on the 12th to Harrodsburg, (General Sill's division having arrived the night before;) the right corps moving forward and resting near and to the left of Danville, and the center midway on the Danville and Harrodsburg road; while a reconnoissance was sent forward to the crossing of Dick's River. The enemy was found to have crossed with his whole force.

The ground between the Kentucky River and Dicks River, as a military position, is rendered almost impregnable on the north and west by the rocky cliffs which border those streams, and which are only passable at a few points easily defended. Such is the character of Dicks River from its mouth to where the Danville and Lexington road crosses it, a distance of about twelve miles. It could only be reached by turning it to the south, while the passes to the west by which our line of communications would be exposed, were suitably guarded. The army was moving with that view when I learned, on the evening of the 13th, at Danville, that the enemy was retiring from his position towards the south. Pursuit was immediately ordered for the purpose of overtaking him, or intercepting him if he should attempt to pass towards Somerset. General Wood's division marched at twelve o'clock that night, and engaged the enemy's cavalry and artillery at Stanford at daylight the next morning. The remainder of General Crittenden's corps, and General McCook's corps followed on that road, and General Gilbert marched on the Lancaster road. The enemy kept the road towards Cumberland Gap, opposing with cavalry and artillery the advance of both of the pursuing columns, which, however, progressed steadily.

At Crab Orchard, the character of the country suddenly changes. It becomes rough and barren, affording scarcely more than enough corn for its sparse population; and the road passes through defiles where a small force can resist with great effect a large one—where, in fact, the use of a large force is impracticable. The little forage the country afforded was consumed by the enemy in his retreat, rendering it impossible to subsist any considerable number of animals. The corps of General McCook and General Gilbert were therefore halted at Crab Orchard, while that of General Crittenden, with General W. S. Smith's division in advance, continued the pursuit as far as London on the direct road, and on the branch road to Manchester. I have not yet received the formal report of the operations of this corps; but the pursuit was conducted by its commander according to my orders with judgment and energy. The road was cleared of the trees felled across it by the enemy, and his rear guard attacked successfully at several points. Some prisoners were taken, and about three hundred head of cattle, and other property to no very great amount captured.

It was not expedient to continue the pursuit beyond London—partly because it was impracticable in a manner to afford any material advantage; partly because without advantage it took the troops out of the way, when they were likely to be required elsewhere. They were therefore promptly turned upon other routes towards Tennessee. A portion were to be at Bowling Green and the rest at Glasgow, on the 31st ultimo, and thence continue their march by certain routes. In that position I relinquished the command of the army on the 30th to Major General Rosecrans, in obedience to instructions from the General-in-Chief. In the meantime the railroads which had been broken up by the enemy and suspended for two months, had been repaired as far as Bowling Green, to carry forward supplies.

I have no means at this time of reporting the casualties that occurred in the minor engagements or skirmishes that took place during the campaign, nor is it possible for me to do justice to the services of the officers and soldiers engaged in them, as the subsequent movements of the troops and my separation from them have prevented me from obtaining detailed reports except concerning the battle of the 8th. The particulars referred to outside of the battle, are based upon the brief and sometimes oral reports made at the time, and are unavoidably less complete and definite than I could wish. For the same reason many such I am unable to mention at all. In regard to the battle of the 8th, the reports of the several commanders go much more into detail than is necessary in this report, and I beg leave to commend them to your consideration, especially in relation to the services of many officers whose names are not herein mentioned. When I have mentioned troops by the name of their commander, I wish to be understood as commending him for their good conduct.

The daily services of officers in an active campaign, though less brilliant are often more arduous and important than those of the battle-field; and in this respect also the commanders of corps, Major General McCook, Major General Crittenden, and Brigadier General Gilbert are entitled to my thanks and the approbation of the Government. This commendation should extend also to many other officers in proportion to their responsibilities, particularly to the commanders of divisions. I am indebted in the highest degree to the members of my staff for their assistance, especially to my chief of staff, Colonel James B. Fry, whose efficient aid I have had during the whole period of my command in Kentucky and Tennessee. The difficult and responsible duty of supplying a large force by wagon transportation over a line of almost one hundred and forty miles, has been zealously and ably performed by Captain J. G. Chandler, Chief Quartermaster, and Captain Francis Darr, Chief Commissary. Captain H. C.

Bankhead, Acting Inspector General, Captain J. H. Gilman, Chief of Artillery, and acting ordnance officer, and Captain M. Mickler, Topographical Engineers, discharged their duties in the most satisfactory manner. At Perryville they were active and useful in reconnoitering the ground with a view to posting troops for battle. Major J. M. Wright, Assistant Adjutant General, Lieutenant T. J. Bush, Aid-de-camp, conveyed my orders to different commanders during the 8th, and at all times performed their duties with intelligence and zeal. The duties of his office have been ably and faithfully performed by Surgeon Robert Murray, Medical Director. The intelligent officers of the Signal Corps, Captain Jesse Merrill, and Lieutenants Meeker, Sheridan and Fitch, attached to my headquarters, rendered good service at Perryville and other points. Private Oakford, of the Anderson Troop, in carrying orders late on the evening of the 8th, fell into the enemy's lines and was captured, but had the presence of mind to destroy his dispatches.

I can not omit to make honorable mention of the Michigan regiment of Mechanics and Engineers. It has not only rendered invaluable service in its appropriate duties during the past year, but at Chaplin Hills and on other occasions it has in whole or in part gallantly engaged the enemy. I especially commend Colonel Innis, Lieutenant Colonel Hunton, and Major Hopkins for the efficient services of this fine regiment. The cavalry under Colonel John Kennett, Fourth Ohio, commanding a division, Colonel Lewis Zahm, Third Ohio, commanding a brigade, Colonel E. L. McCook, Second Indiana, commanding a brigade, and Captain E. Gay, commanding a brigade, rendered excellent service. The brigade of Captain Gay was conducted with gallantry and effect by that officer at Perryville on the 7th and 8th. The other brigades were not in the battle, but came in contact with the enemy on other occasions during the campaign. When the army marched on Louisville they were left on the south side of Salt River, under the command of Colonel Kennett, to escort the train of the army from Bowling Green, and watch the enemy in the direction of Bardstown. The train was conducted in the most successful manner by Colonel Zahm. The brigade of Colonel E. L. McCook also acquitted itself in the most satisfactory manner. A portion of it, under Lieutenant R. R. Stewart, Second Indiana Cavalry, captured Colonel Crawford and the principal part of his regiment of Georgia cavalry, near New Haven, on the 29th of September. Colonel Kennett, with Colonel McCook's brigade, rejoined the army at Bardstown on the 5th. Colonel Zahm marched across from the mouth of Salt River to join the column at Frankfort, thence to the main body at Danville.

The campaign whose history I have sketched occupied a period of about twenty days. The result can be stated in a few words. An army pre-

pared for the conquest and occupation of Kentucky, with full knowledge of our means of resistance, and with a confident expectation of prevailing over them, has been driven back, baffled and dispirited^{ed} from the borders of the state. It is true that only one serious battle has been fought, and that was incomplete and less decisive than it might have been. That it was so, is due partly to unavoidable difficulties which prevented the troops, marching on different roads, from getting upon the ground simultaneously, but more to the fact that I was not apprised early enough of the condition of affairs on my left. I can find no fault with the former, nor am I disposed at this time to censure the latter, though it must be admitted to have been a grave error. I ascribe it to the too great confidence of the General commanding the left corps (Major-General McCook), which made him believe that he could manage the difficulty without the aid or control of his commander. As before stated, there was skirmishing along the whole front, but after a certain hour, for the reason stated, no general engagement was anticipated that day, and no sound of musketry reached my headquarters by which the sharpness of the action on the left could be known or even suspected; and when the fact was ascertained it was too late to do more than throw in succor before night set in. But although this lack of information was attended with disappointment and unfortunate circumstances, yet the unequal struggle was marked by no disaster, and conspicuously displayed the courage and discipline of the troops.

From first to last, I suppose four or five thousand prisoners, sick, wounded and well, were taken; and at various points some stores and property fell into our hands, among them twenty-five hundred barrels of pork and two pieces of cannon abandoned at Camp Dick Robinson. I do not believe that the enemy carried off in his retreat any large amount of stores; he may have sent off a good deal from first to last, while he was in quiet occupation of so much of the state.

The reports show a loss of 916 killed, 2,943 wounded and 489 missing. Total, 4,348 in the battle of the 8th. It includes many valuable lives. The loss of such men as James S. Jackson, Wm. R. Terrill, George P. Jouett, George Webster, W. P. Campbell, Alexander D. Berryhill, and John Harrell, would be mourned in any army and any cause where true manliness and earnest devotion are appreciated.

I inclose herewith the reports of subordinate commanders as far as received, and a map showing the lines of operation of the army.

Major-General Thomas acted as second in command during the campaign, and I am indebted to him for the most valuable assistance.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL, Major-General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, }
 Louisville, Ky., December 27, 1861. }

General Orders, No. 23.]

The General commanding takes pleasure in bringing to notice the gallant conduct of a portion of Colonel Willich's regiment, Thirty-second Indiana, at Rowlett's Station, in front of Munfordsville, on the 17th instant.

Four companies of the regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Von Trebra, on outpost duty, were attacked by a column of the enemy, consisting of one regiment of cavalry, a battery of artillery and two regiments of infantry. They defended themselves until reinforced by other companies of the regiment, and the fight was continued with such effect that the enemy at length retreated precipitately.

The attack of the enemy was mainly with his cavalry and artillery. Our troops fought as skirmishers, rallying rapidly into squares when charged by the cavalry—sometimes even defending themselves singly, and killing their assailants with the bayonet.

The General tenders his thanks to the officers and soldiers of the regiment for their gallant and efficient conduct on this occasion. He commends it as a study and example to all other troops under his command, and enjoins them to emulate the discipline and instruction which insure such results.

The name of "Rowlett's Station" will be inscribed on the regimental colors of the Thirty-second Indiana regiment.

By command of Brigadier-General BUELL.

JAMES B. FRY, A. A. G., Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, }
 Louisville, Kentucky, January 20, 1862. }

General Orders, No. 4a.]

The General Commanding takes occasion to thank Colonel Garfield and his troops for their successful campaign against the rebel force under General Marshall on the Big Sandy, and their gallant conduct in battle. They have overcome formidable difficulties in the character of the country, the condition of the roads, and the inclemency of the season; and, without artillery, have in several engagements, terminating with the battle on Middle Creek on the 11th inst., driven the enemy from his entrenched positions, and forced him back into the mountains with the loss of a large amount of baggage and stores, and many of his men killed or captured.

These services have called into action the highest qualities of a soldier—fortitude, perseverance, courage.

By command of General BUELL.

JAMES B. FRY, A. A. G., Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, }
Louisville, Kentucky, January 23, 1862. }

General Orders, No. 4b.]

The General Commanding has the gratification of announcing the achievement of an important victory, on the 19th inst., at Mill Spring, by the troops under General Thomas, over the rebel forces, some twelve thousand strong, under General George B. Crittenden and General Zollicoffer.

The defeat of the enemy was thorough and complete, and his loss in killed and wounded was great. Night alone, under cover of which his troops crossed the river from their intrenched camp and dispersed, prevented the capture of his entire force. Fourteen or more pieces of artillery, some fifteen hundred horses and mules, his entire camp equipage, together with wagons, arms, ammunition, and other stores to a large amount, fell into our hands.

The General has been charged by the General-in-Chief to convey his thanks to General Thomas and his troops for their brilliant victory. No task could be more grateful to him, seconded as it is by his own cordial approbation of their conduct.

By command of Brigadier-General BUELL.

JAMES B. FRY, A. A. G., Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, }
Nashville, Tennessee, February 26, 1862. }

General Orders No. 13a.]

The General Commanding congratulates his troops that it has been their privilege to restore the national banner to the Capital of Tennessee. He believes that thousands of hearts in every part of the State will swell with joy to see that honored flag reinstated in a position from which it was removed in the excitement and folly of an evil hour; that the voice of her own people will soon proclaim its welcome, and that their manhood and patriotism will protect and perpetuate it.

The General does not deem it necessary, though the occasion is a fit one, to remind his troops of the rule of conduct they have hitherto observed and are still to pursue. We are in arms, not for the purpose of invading the rights of our fellow-countrymen anywhere, but to maintain the integrity of the Union, and protect the Constitution under which its people have been prosperous and happy. We cannot, therefore, look with indifference on any conduct which is designed to give aid and comfort to those who are endeavoring to defeat these objects; but the action to be taken in such cases rests with certain authorized persons, and is not to be assumed by individual officers or soldiers. Peaceable citizens are not to be molested in their persons or property. Any wrongs to either are to be promptly

corrected and the offenders brought to punishment. To this end all persons are desired to make complaint to the immediate commander of officers or soldiers so offending, and if justice be not done promptly, then to the next commander, and so on until the wrong is redressed. If the necessities of the public service should require the use of private property for public purposes, fair compensation is to be allowed. No such appropriation of private property is to be made except by the authority of the highest commander present, and any other officer or soldier who shall presume to exercise such privilege shall be brought to trial. Soldiers are forbidden to enter the residences or grounds of citizens on any plea without authority.

No arrests are to be made without the authority of the Commanding General, except in case of actual offense against the authority of the Government; and in all such cases the fact and circumstances will immediately be reported in writing to headquarters through the intermediate commanders.

The General reminds his officers that the most frequent depredations are those which are committed by worthless characters who straggle from the ranks on the plea of being unable to march; and where the inability really exists, it will be found in most instances that the soldier has overloaded himself with useless and unauthorized articles. The orders already published on this subject must be enforced.

The condition and behavior of a corps are sure indications of the efficiency and fitness of its officers. If any regiment shall be found to disregard that propriety of conduct which belongs to soldiers as well as citizens, they must not expect to occupy the posts of honor, but may rest assured that they will be placed in positions where they cannot bring shame on their comrades and the cause they are engaged in. The Government supplies with liberality all the wants of the soldier. The occasional deprivations and hardships incident to rapid marches must be borne with patience and fortitude. Any officer who neglects to provide properly for his troops, or separates himself from them to seek his own comfort, will be held to a rigid accountability.

By command of General BUELL.

JAMES B. FRY, A. A. G., Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO, }
Field of Shiloh, Tenn., April 8, 1862. }

General Orders No. 6.]

The General congratulates the army under his command on the imperishable honor won yesterday by a portion of it on the battlefield of Shiloh, near Pittsburg Landing. The alacrity and zeal with which they pressed forward by forced marches to the succor of their comrades of a sister army

imperiled by the attack of an overwhelming force; the gallantry with which they assaulted the enemy; and the persevering courage with which they maintained an incessant conflict against superior numbers from six o'clock in the morning until evening, when the enemy was driven from the field, are incidents which point to a great service nobly performed.

The General reminds his troops again that such results are not attained by individual prowess alone; that subordination and careful training are essential to the efficiency of every army; and that the success which has given them a brilliant page in history is greatly due to the readiness with which they have seconded the labors of their division, brigade and regimental commanders, who first disciplined them in camp, and then led them judiciously and gallantly in battle.

By command of Major-General BUELL.

JAMES B. FRY, A. A. G., Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO, October 12, 1862.

General Orders, No. 476.]

The battle of Chaplin Hills, fought near Perryville, on the 8th instant, will stand conspicuous for its severity in the history of the rebellion. It deserves to be commemorated for the determined valor displayed by the portion of the army that was engaged.

The principal force of the enemy, on chosen ground, under General Bragg, attacked our left wing as it was moving into position after a fatiguing march. The suddenness and strength of the attack, and the fall of two of their gallant leaders, Jackson and Terrill, caused some of the new troops of the Tenth division to fall into disorder, and threw the weight of the battle mainly on the Third division. This was subsequently reinforced by two brigades from the center corps, which itself had met with considerable opposition in moving into position. The enemy was repulsed with heavy loss, and, when the army advanced to the attack at six o'clock the following morning, was found to have retreated during the night.

The good conduct exhibited by the troops on this field only realized that which the General has always confidently expected from them. Fortuitous circumstances, which so often affect the incidents of war, screened the enemy from a combined effort of the different corps, until night intervened to prevent his defeat from terminating in the destruction of his army; but the thanks of the General are not less due to the gallant officers and men under his command. In the battle, and on the march, the old troops have given the highest proofs of discipline and courage. The new troops already vie with them. Let them preserve order, remembering that lawlessness in an army is both disgraceful and fatal. The

sacredness and dignity of the cause for which they are battling demand nothing less. The nation will mourn the loss of the heroes who fell at Chaplin Hills; it will honor those who prove worthy to fill their places.

By command of Major General BUELL.

JAMES B. FRY, Colonel and Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO, }
 Louisville, Ky., October 30, 1862. }

General Orders, No. 150.]

In obedience to orders from the headquarters of the army, Major-General Buell relinquishes the command of the district and Army of the Ohio to Major-General W. S. Rosecrans.

It is impossible for the General without feelings of regard and a warm interest in their future success, to part with troops whom he has been the instrument of converting for the most part from raw levies into a powerful army, honored by common consent for its discipline and efficient organization, for its *esprit de corps*, and for victories unqualified by a single reverse; and whose fortunes he has followed for a twelve month over a field of operations embracing considerable portions of four States, through difficulties and dangers which its fortitude and courage have mastered without accident or failure. It has recently by a rapid march of some five hundred miles with limited subsistence, often with an inadequate supply of water, returned to Kentucky and driven from her borders a powerful army; and having re-established its communications is now well on its way to meet the enemy at other points. The occasion is not convenient for recounting its services during the past twelve months, but the army may safely recur to them with pride. If any thing has not been accomplished which was practicable within the sphere of its duty, the General cheerfully holds himself responsible for the failure.

The General reflects with pride that the army under his command has for the most part been free from petty jealousies and intrigues—that it has neither indulged in vain boasting, nor tarnished its high character by bickerings and low eliminations. It will enhance his gratification if it shall carry to its new commander—who already has earned its confidence and respect by distinguished service—the same noble qualities which have characterized it since its organization. He will pray that it may be the instrument of speedily restoring the Union to its integrity; and there is no individual in its ranks in whose honor and welfare he will not feel a special interest.

By command of Major-General BUELL.

JAMES B. FRY, Colonel and Chief of Staff.

ERRATA.


Page 10, sixth line, fifth word, read "that" instead of "the."

Page 11, fifteenth line, read "June" instead of "April."

Page 13, fifteenth line, read "Tennessee" instead of "Mississippi."

Page 46, seventh line, omit "of the enemy."

D. C. BUELL.





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