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Williams
The state of Israel

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The Suez crisis refocused the world's attention on one of the most fascinating —and most important—experiments in nation-building that has ever been undertaken. Israel is unique. About its past, its present, its future there is room for endless controversy and endless speculation—controversy and speculation that have recently become infinitely more urgent and more intensified. Is Israel essentially and fundamentally Western; or will it become just another small Asiastic state? Can it absorb and weld into a nation immigrants of widely differing backgrounds and ways of life? Can it maintain its democratic institutions? Can it, in the face of implacable Arab opposition, survive at all?

To these questions—and to many others—*The State of Israel* suggests answers. And it provides, too, a vivid and stimulating picture of the country itself; of its achievements and failures; and of its politics and political personalities. Professor Rushbrook Williams, a former Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, and for many years a member of *The Times* editorial staff, has long and very varied experience of Asian affairs. He first visited Palestine when it was under Turkish rule and saw it again under the British mandate. To find out for himself the realities of the situation today he has twice been to the independent State of Israel; and has carried out there his own independent, personal investigations. This book is the result.



Jerusalem, on the border, is Israel's Capital

THE STATE OF ISRAEL

by

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To my Wife

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The author wishes to acknowledge the courtesy of the Israel Government in making available the photographs reproduced in this book

Foreword

I have written this book because I looked in vain for something like it when I first became interested in Israel. Many books have been written about Israel—and, no doubt, many more will be written as a result of what happened in October and November 1956. But I could not find out from them how this little state manages to maintain itself as an independent entity. The territory which it occupies seems cut off from all its natural hinterland, such as existed when I knew the area long ago under Ottoman rule, and, more recently, under the British Mandate.

The only way to find out what I wanted to know seemed to be to go and look at things for myself. By the kindness of the Israel Government, I have done this twice; and my purpose in writing this book has been to share my experiences with those who have not visited Israel but are interested to learn what kind of a place it is, and what its people are trying to make it.

I have only given just enough of the historical background to make clear how deeply the present is rooted in the past. Readers who consider that 'History is bunk'—with Mr. Henry Ford—can begin at Chapter IV.

To avoid controversial topics has been impossible, particularly for an observer writing at the end of 1956. But I have done my best to remain objective.

I have written mainly of what I saw and heard. This has been amplified by information collected from official and unofficial sources, and put at my disposal by the Israel Government and by many friends.

The Israel Government has been kindness personified in helping me with my researches, and providing me with illus-

trations and maps. But everything which I have written repre sents my own independent conclusion.

Silchester.

December 1956–January 1957.

PART ONE

The Past

I

A Glance Backwards

The modern State of Israel occupies part of territory which in ancient times formed a link between the civilizations of Egypt, Asia Minor and Mesopotamia; and therefore held the unenviable position of a cockpit in which all three contended for control. It was by turns an important trade route for which the great Powers of the day fought; and a gateway to be seized and held to keep it out of the hands of traditional enemies. Accordingly it was continually passing from one master to another. It became successively a province of Egypt, of Asshur, of Babylon, and of Persia, before it passed under the rule first of Rome, then of Byzantium, then of Islam, whose followers held it for many centuries. At length it passed to British administration under a Mandate from the League of Nations, and finally it assumed the fantastically divided shape which is shown on the maps of to-day. In all this wide sweep of history, stretching from the time when the Canaanite city-states flourished in the fourth millenium before Christ, right down to living memory, the land which now houses the State of Israel has enjoyed only three short periods of separate political existence. Nearly always it has formed part of neighbouring territories.

The foundation of the longest of these periods of independence began to be laid about 1300 B.C. when the nomadic, pastoral tribes of Israel, after colonizing Edom, Moab and Ammon, invaded Canaan—as the land was then called—from the east of the River Jordan, occupied the thinly populated hill regions of Judaea, and set themselves up as a separate community, held together and distinguished from their neighbours by a rigid code of customary law and by their stern monotheistic faith in the One God. During this period the land was subject to Egypt;

and if it is to this epoch that the royal Egyptian archives found at Tell-el-Amarna belong, we can form a clear picture of the gradual weakening of Egyptian authority. The subordinate kings of the Canaanite city-states and the local Egyptian representatives complain of the raids of the Hittites and of the 'Habira'—are these the Hebrews? They implored assistance which the central government of Egypt was unable to give them.

As Egyptian authority crumbled, the Israel tribes found two main adversaries to their expansion—the Canaanite city-states of the lowlands; and the Philistines—now thought to be Pelasgian Greeks settled by Rameses II about 1200 B.C. as a mercenary force to police the country—in the coastal plain. The Canaanites were the first to be defeated after a hard struggle; and the Israel tribes spread into the north. It was not until the eleventh century B.C. that the Philistines were finally beaten by the military skill of King Saul and King David. This victory followed a period during which they occupied most of the territory held by the Israelites, and indeed, at one time looked like driving them out altogether. It was after this that the Philistines remained quietly in their coastal cities, without interfering with the Israel tribes now dominant throughout the country; and their superior skill in craftsmanship and in the arts of peace made important contributions to the developing Israel culture. It was King David who made the old Jebusite city of Jerusalem his capital; he brought to it the Ark of the Covenant, upon which the worship of all the Israelite tribes was centred; and he made it for the first time the symbol of the Jewish occupation of the 'Promised Land'—a significance which it has retained through the centuries.

Circumstances were propitious for the emergence of the new Jewish state. The Hittite power had declined; Egypt and Mesopotamia were both weak. The land now ruled by the Israelite tribes became independent of its neighbours for the first time in history from about 1013 B.C. to 933 B.C. Under David's son, Solomon, it became wealthy and prosperous; although there were ominous signs that neighbours too powerful to be resisted were regaining their strength. It seems probable that Solomon, preoccupied with his building and commercial programme, and anxious for peace, admitted Egypt as his suzerain. After his death the state split into two parts under separate rule—Israel

in the north and Judaea in the south. Both in the long run fell victims to invasions from the east, in spite of their efforts to secure Egyptian protection. Assyria conquered Israel in 722 B.C. and Babylon destroyed Judaea in 586 B.C. A substantial part of the Israelite inhabitants of both kingdoms were carried away into captivity and their settlements were destroyed. With the capture of Babylon by Cyrus, King of Persia, some fifty years later, the Jews gradually returned, the temple in Jerusalem was rebuilt, and the land began to flourish again under the peace of Persia. With the destruction of the Persian Empire by Alexander, the country passed first under the rule of the Ptolomies of Egypt, and then to the Seleucids of Syria. A successful revolt under Judas Maccabaeus against Syrian religious persecution led to a second brief period of independence between 168 B.C. and 63 B.C. It was fortunately timed because of the political confusion caused by rival claimants to the Syrian throne and by the rise of Parthian power. But again, the land proved too weak to stand long alone in face of powerful neighbours, whose wealth and resources were greater than its own.

This period of independence came to an end when rival Jewish factions sought the support of Pompey, who had conquered Syria. For some years, Rome was content to establish a protectorate over local princes, rather like that which the British raj in India much later exercised over the Indian princely states: but before long Roman administrative officers were appointed, and Roman control tightened, as records of the life of Christ show. Friction resulted; and in reprisal for the three fierce revolts against Roman domination (A.D. 66–73; A.D. 115–17; A.D. 132–35) much of the Jewish population was killed, dispersed and exiled. Jerusalem became a Roman colony; Jews were forbidden to dwell there, and the remnant of the Chosen People ceased to count politically, concentrating their energies upon pursuing their ancient traditional learning in settlements in Galilee. Westernizing influences, and the introduction of Greek civilization from Egypt, Syria, and from across the sea, produced a population which was a cosmopolitan mixture, devoid of territorial loyalties or political identity. When the Roman Empire split, 'Palestine' passed into the Eastern Empire of Byzantium.

The rivalry between Byzantium and Parthia made the land

which was now holy to Christians as well as to Jews into a cockpit for some centuries. Its final reconquest from Parthian hands by the Emperor Heraclius in 628 led to fresh persecutions of the Jewish remnant, who had welcomed Parthian rule as a relief from Christian hostility. When the Muslim conquerors took control of the country (636–40) very few Jews were to be found. But during the 460 years which separated the Muslim conquest from the First Crusade, the Jewish population, though still in an insignificant minority, seems to have increased slightly. Even so, the population of the Holy Land became predominantly Muslim, and so remained until our own times.

The establishment of the Crusader Kingdoms heralded a further, if brief period, of Palestine's independence of the surrounding countries. From 1099 to 1291 the weakness of the decaying Seljak Empire, the rivalry between Fatimid Egypt and Turkish Damascus, and the Sunni-Shia feud which split Islam, permitted the setting up of a model Christian feudal state on Western lines, in which the King of Jerusalem was given only shadowy authority, real power resting with the tenants-in-chief and their vassals. As time went on, the western feudal lords became more and more orientalized. At first, they were reinforced periodically from overseas; but as the Muslim world rallied from its confusion, and Syria and Egypt became united, the Crusader barons grew more and more dependent upon the toleration of their Muslim neighbours. Newcomers to Palestine brought by the successive Crusades imperilled this relationship: and by degrees Islam swept once again over the Holy Land. The Emperor Frederick II, who thoroughly understood the situation, negotiated a treaty with the Sultan of Egypt, Malik-ul-Kamil, in 1229 which secured for a reduced Latin kingdom more than half a century of fresh life. But the Frankish lords became too weak to hold their position; and the defence of the country fell more and more to the Christian military orders, the Hospitallers and the Templars, whose main interest lay in fighting. Between them and the Muslim Powers, no accommodation was possible. The end was inevitable, and the last garrison departed from Pilgrim Castle, whose ruins still stand on the coast south of Haifa, in 1291.

From that time forward the land of Palestine, overwhelmingly Muslim in its population, remained under Muslim rule as

part, first of the Egyptian Mameluke, and then of the Ottoman Turkish, Empire. Occasional efforts were made by local leaders, some Druze, some Bedouin, some Albanian, to build up a semi-independent state based upon good government; but the dead hand of the Turks always intervened. The rivalries of the western Powers secured the continued hold of the Ottomans over Syria, of which Palestine had become a dependency, until the end of the first world war. At that time Palestine passed under the British mandate, and become once again a separate political unit. This development presented an opportunity which the Jews all over the world were now ready to seize.

II

Early Movements of Jewish Return

This rapid glance back across the centuries suggests certain conclusions. First, it is clear that by the time that the Mandate was instituted, the Holy Land had been under unchallenged Muslim rule for the best part of a thousand years. Next, throughout its long history right up to the time of the Mandate, the territory of which modern Israel forms part has only had a separate political existence for three short periods, two under Jewish, and one under Frankish, rule. Thirdly, in spite of all the tragedies which overtook the Jews in the Holy Land—conquest, massacre, expulsion—some of them have always remained there, even if at times their numbers were insignificant in relation to the masses of the Muslim population. Finally, these three conclusions must be viewed against the background of the whole position of the Jewish people. The dispersal of the bulk of these people over almost every portion of the habitable globe had done little to weaken their attachment to their traditional culture and their traditional way of life. Both were intimately connected with the 'Promised Land' in which they had been developed; and the connection was kept alive by ancient prophecies foretelling return, and the Ingathering of the Exiles. Thus through the centuries two parallel streams of Jewish activity can be discerned: one among the continuing Jewish community in the Holy Land, and the other among the Jewish communities in exile. During the time which we must now survey, these two streams began to meet.

During Muslim rule, the Jewish population of Palestine was slowly built up again. Jews from the west—mainly Sefardim from Spain—started to trickle back during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries; and the Holy Land began to resume its importance not only as a centre of Jewish traditional

culture and learning, but also as a focus of Jewish hopes and Jewish aspirations. But it was not until the nineteenth century that the idea of building a new Jewish state by Jewish efforts took firm hold of the imagination of large numbers of Jews all over the world, but particularly of the Ashkenazi Jewish population of northern and central Europe. This idea was partly a response to the recurrent waves of anti-Semitism which broke out, notably in Russia and in Poland, but also occasionally in France and Germany; and partly a defensive movement against what was regarded as the dangerous 'assimilation' of Jewry into the now enlightened societies of the United States and Britain. Many Jewish thinkers and publicists, chief among whom was Theodore Herzl, sought some means of establishing a territorial home in which Jews, who were unhappy in their surroundings, could live in a Jewish society inspired by Jewish traditions. Eventually it was found that only Palestine was suitable; for only Palestine was the Promised Land of Jewish sacred literature: only immigration into Palestine could fulfil the ancient prophecies foretelling the Ingathering of the Exiles. The first Zionist Congress was called together by Herzl in Basel in 1897.

Meanwhile, apart from the political Zionism which began to take shape under the leadership of the intellectuals, a movement had sprung up among Russian and Polish Jewry to persuade Jews to emigrate to the Holy Land, there to engage themselves, not in pious meditation in the seclusion of ghettos, but in practical agricultural work, in emulation of their predecessors who had lived in the kingdom of David and Solomon. Only by this means, many felt, could the foundations be laid of a Jewish nation on the historic soil of the Promised Land. So long as Turkish rule of the traditional kind persisted, it was difficult to arrange anything like a large-scale settlement of those Jews who wanted to return to Palestine under the conditions which they now deemed important—namely, those which offered the possibility of building up self-supporting and self-respecting communities deriving their living from the land. It was no longer considered right that Jewish immigrants into the Promised Land should subsist on charity, or on the funds which they had brought with them. But it needed the improvement in law and order which came in the train of the western Powers' new

interest in the Holy Land from about 1830 to make pioneering efforts possible.

What is termed by Jewish historians the first Aliyah, or wave of immigration, came from a number of sources. A group called Lovers of Zion founded the colony of Rishon-le-Zion in 1882; and although they were few in numbers, they laid the foundation of future productive work, not only in agriculture, but also in handicrafts and the liberal professions. Other groups came from Russia and founded Rehovoth and similar settlements. But the movement towards the land was not confined to immigrant Jews: the doctrine of productive work also caught the imagination of the resident Jewish community: and Petah Tikva had already been established by a group of Ashkenazi Jews from Jerusalem in 1878. These early colonists had a very hard time, struggling to make a livelihood with little experience of agriculture, often dependent upon indifferent or sullen Arab labour, and handicapped by the hostility of corrupt Turkish officials. Had it not been for the help given by Baron Edmond de Rothschild, and the Palestine Colonization Association which he founded, the whole effort might have failed, just as the far earlier attempt of Don Joseph Nassi to set up a Jewish agricultural settlement in Tiberias in 1563 had been defeated by the continued effects of an inhospitable climate and Arab opposition. As it was, the colonists succeeded in hanging on; but remained almost entirely dependent upon Baron Edmond and his Association.

Shortly after the turn of the century, a second Ashkenazi wave of immigration started, mainly from Russia; and this is important because it brought with it new ideas about the type of colonization which was wanted. These immigrants determined to dispense with Arab labour, to do everything themselves, to live under communal institutions without private property, and to organize a system of watch and ward to provide the security which the Turkish authorities did not trouble themselves to enforce. Colonies of this type, of which the first was Deganya, became islands, as it were, of traditional Jewish culture and of the Hebrew language in the middle of the Arab population. But up to the outbreak of the first world war, that is to say, between the foundation of Rishon-le-Zion and 1914, the best estimates put the total number of Jewish immigrants

arriving in Palestine at between 55,000 and 70,000—an average of fewer than 2,000 a year. When the British Mandatory Government took its first general census in the autumn of 1922, there were only about 84,000 Jews in mandated territory, of whom no fewer than 34,000 were concentrated in Jerusalem, living a 'traditional' life far removed from colonizing efforts.

The passing of Palestine under a British mandate from the League of Nations marked the beginning of a new epoch in this small corner of western Asia. For the fourth time in its history Palestine became a separate political unit. But unlike the three previous occasions, Palestine's independence of its neighbours was now accompanied by the institution of well-defined frontiers which had been confirmed by international authority, clearly marking it off from Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan and Egypt. Owing to the complicated negotiations stemming from Anglo-French rivalry, the newly-demarcated area was a good deal smaller than the historic land of the Bible, which had included the headwaters of the Jordan as well as the desert land east of that river. But the important point was that the area included within these new frontiers became the responsibility of a single centralized administration, whose authority was derived from the League of Nations *via* the British Government. More significant still, that Government was now in a position, and became bound by the terms of its mandate for Palestine, to honour a pledge which it had given to Dr. Weizmann and other leading members of the Zionist movement in 1917 in return for Jewish support at a critical stage of the war. The 'Balfour Declaration' recorded the British Government's decision to favour 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people' and to 'use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.'

At the time, few people realized that these British commitments to Jews and Arabs would prove incompatible to a point at which they were to become the source of much strife and misery. In 1922, the Jews constituted only 11 per cent of the total population; and even nine years later, this proportion had risen only to 17 per cent—a total of 175,000. But of this popula-

tion less than one-third now lived in Jerusalem; the others had spread over the country into old and new agricultural settlements, where they formed compact groups apart from the Arabs, and into the new Jewish commercial centre of Tel-Aviv, which had been founded in 1909. The Jewish Agency for Palestine, established in 1922, was the authority which negotiated with the Mandatory Government on behalf of Jewish interests. Although it may be considered the embryo of the present State of Israel, it was founded later than the General Labour Federation (Histadruth) and the Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod), both of which had been set up in 1920. During this period, in fact, the Jewish community in Palestine was mainly concerned, not so much with laying the foundations of an independent state, as with organizing new agricultural settlements; looking after the health and education of its people through its own separate funds; and making the best of the facilities which the Mandatory administration provided for the winning of a peaceful livelihood. The Arabs, secure in their majority, showed little serious hostility; although in 1921, when they rioted in sympathy with King Faisul's expulsion from Syria, they turned on some of the Jewish settlements. This episode was important because it led to the establishment of Hagana—a Jewish organization for self-defence that became the precursor of the present Defence Forces of Israel.

The Mandatory Government was able to keep the balance even between Jews and Arabs—although both sides criticized it—so long as Jewish immigration into Palestine remained relatively small. The Jewish population increased, it is true; but the Arab population increased faster, partly naturally, and partly by immigration, attracted from surrounding countries by the economic opportunities which Palestine began to offer. But the situation held all the possibilities of future tragedy because of factors external to Palestine. Already the growing force of Arab nationalism in western Asia was counting Palestine among the Arab countries, and regarding Jewish colonizing efforts with a suspicious eye. Any grievances which the Arabs in Palestine might feel against the Mandatory Government, or against the Jews, were quickly taken up and supported by pro-Arab movements outside the country, fostered as they were by Nazi and Fascist intrigue against British influence in the Middle East.

Accordingly, serious trouble occurred as soon as the balance between the two sides became decidedly upset when the persecution of German Jews by Hitler set in motion a great wave of Jewish immigration, which began in 1933. The year 1935 brought with it 60,000 Jewish immigrants; and the Arabs, not only in Palestine, but in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, became alarmed. In 1936 a fierce Arab revolt broke out, partly against the Mandatory Government and partly against the Jews, which was with some difficulty suppressed by British troops, with whom Hagana, reorganized by Orde Wingate, stoutly co-operated. But even when order was restored, friction continued, not only between Jews and Arabs, but also between the Arabs, who accused the British of failure to prevent Arab interests from suffering, and the Mandatory Government. When that government tried to limit Jewish immigration by a quota system, it encountered fierce opposition from the Jewish side also, especially when the pressure to escape from the Hitlerite régime became so irresistible that under-cover Jewish immigration on a large scale defied every effort to control it. In 1939, on the eve of the second world war, Britain attempted to reassure the Arabs of Palestine, and their sympathizers in other Arab states, by imposing stricter controls upon Jewish immigration; but opinion in the Arab world remained convinced that British and American policy was playing into the hands of the Zionist movement.

Since Jewish immigrants were by now thickly settled in particular parts of Palestine, the possibility of partitioning the country into a Jewish and an Arab State had already been suggested more than once by commissions and committees, notably by the Peel Commission in 1937. Britain considered the idea impracticable. The Arabs bitterly opposed it, consistently maintaining that Palestine ought to be granted independent status under the ruling Arab majority like the other Arab countries surrounding it. But more and more Jews began to believe that the only solution which offered any hope for their security was to convert the 'national home' promised by the Balfour Declaration into an independent state. As this attitude hardened, the Mandatory Government came to be regarded, along with the Arabs, as an obstacle to Zionist aspirations. During the war, when Jews all over the world supported the

Allies, a tacit Anglo-Jewish truce became the order of the day in Palestine. Many Jews joined the armed forces; and Jewish industry in Palestine expanded greatly in supplying the war-needs of the Allies in western Asia. When victory came, this truce broke down; under-cover immigration was immensely increased; and Jewish underground military organizations fiercely attacked the Mandatory Government, whose counter-measures added to Jewish bitterness. Jewish terrorism raised its ugly head: murders of British civil and military officials shocked many British sympathizers with Jewish aspirations. At the same time, the Arabs of Palestine were inspired by the new independence of Lebanon and Syria to redouble their efforts to make Palestine into an independent Arab state. Britain's position as the Mandatory Power became more and more difficult when President Truman brought American influence to bear in favour of fresh large-scale admissions of Jewish immigrants, which further increased Arab apprehension and fanned Arab anger to white heat. After a final abortive effort to bring about Jewish-Arab agreement on some settlement which both could accept, the British Government submitted the whole question to the United Nations. The resulting inquiry commission recommended a plan of partition and the ending of the British Mandate—both of which were accepted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at the end of November 1947. Britain declared her reluctance to enforce any arrangement which was not approved by both sides: and as she was the Power on the spot, this attitude was the reverse of helpful to anyone. The Jews did not really like the plan, complaining that it was based too much on existing conditions and paid insufficient regard to their future needs: but they agreed to work it in the cause of peace. The Arabs both inside and outside Palestine wholeheartedly opposed it, and Palestine Arabs began forthwith to attack Jewish settlements. Thus started what Israelis call the War of Liberation, out of which the present State of Israel was born.

III

The Shaping of Israel

The part played by international opinion in the formation of the Jewish State must now be described in slightly more detailed fashion. The plan of partition produced by the United Nations was based upon the idea of dividing mandatory Palestine between the existing Arab-majority and Jewish-majority areas, with an international enclave for Jerusalem. By this time there was a Jewish population of 650,000, concentrated in well-marked patches and areas which were not contiguous, surrounded by territory which contained over a million Arabs. In the partition plan an attempt was made to connect the Jewish-majority areas in one part of the country with the Jewish-majority areas in other parts. The result was a nightmare patchwork of blocks linked by bottlenecks, which still left some Jews living in what was to be the Arab State and many Arabs in what was to be the Jewish State. The whole plan depended upon two conditions, neither of which was ultimately satisfied. The first was that political partition should not obstruct economy unity—for if it did, neither of the states marked out by the United Nations planners would be viable. The second was that the Jews and Arabs inside Palestine would so far agree upon their community of interest in the peaceful development of the country that they would decide to work the plan amicably, in spite of the practical difficulties which it presented.

From the first, the Arabs had announced that they would fight rather than accept the plan, because it seemed to them a monstrous denial of the right of the majority community to determine the future of the country: and because they feared that it opened the door to unrestrained Zionist territorial expansion in the future. In fact they never have accepted it, although

they continue to invoke it for controversial purposes where they consider that Israel has departed from it. But it is still important, first because it represents formal recognition, by the majority of the countries forming the United Nations, of the Jewish claim to an independent state; and secondly, because the territory which it allotted to that state has largely dictated Israel's present extraordinary shape, which consists mainly of frontiers. The plan gave to Israel a narrow northern strip, stretching from Metulla, in the tongue of land between Syria and Lebanon, round Lake Tiberias and so to just south of Beisan. This strip was flanked on the west by the Arab territory of West Galilee, but was connected by a bottle-neck near Affula to a coastal strip which ran from south of Haifa to just beyond Rehovoth, where it was connected by another bottle-neck with the main block of the Negev—uninhabited except for some wandering Bedouin and a few Jewish settlements near Beersheba—in the south. Israel territory was cut off from Jerusalem, which was to become an international enclave well inside the Arab State; and communications between the three main Jewish blocks were liable to interruption whenever the Arabs chose to cut them. But the fortunes of the war which broke out between Jews and Arabs because of the Arab determination to resist by force the United Nations plan have resulted in some slight modifications of the boundaries of Israel, as outlined therein, in favour of the Jewish State.

The fighting fell into definite stages. The first began on the last day of November 1947 and lasted until the end of January 1948. During this period, the initiative came from the Palestine Arab side; there were widespread guerrilla attacks upon individual Jewish settlements, upon Jewish quarters in the larger towns, and upon the communications between Jewish colonies. Arab forays, which often took the form of hit-and-run tactics, did a great deal of harm to Jewish lives and property. There was much looting, much burning of Jewish road transport, much damage to buildings and other installations. But all this did not seriously weaken the strength of the Jewish position in Palestine. Jewish resistance was determined, and in most cases successful: partly because of the care which had been taken after the Arab revolt of 1936 to concentrate the settlements into particular areas with the object of forming something like a

defensible 'internal frontier' to protect Jewish colonizing efforts: and partly because of the efficiency of the Jewish national defence organization, Hagana, in which many Jewish veterans of the last war were now serving, in spite of the fact that it had been declared illegal by the Mandatory Government. There were bitter Jewish complaints that the authorities were more concerned to curb the activities of Hagana than to repress the anti-Jewish attacks staged by the Arabs. The Mandatory Government, in accordance with British policy, made no secret of its refusal to enforce the scheme of partition approved by the United Nations; and this attitude unquestionably encouraged the Arabs in efforts to upset it, more especially as they, like the rest of the world, were informed in January that Britain had decided unilaterally to terminate her Mandatory administration of Palestine on 14th May 1948.

In February 1948, the fighting took a more serious turn. A force calling itself the Arab Liberation Army entered Palestine from the north. Although it consisted largely of Palestinian Arabs, these were not mere civilians, but trained men who had learned discipline and had acquired arms in camps organized in Syria and Lebanon. Along with them came volunteers from other Arab States, and a certain number of soldiers of fortune from central Europe, including some Nazi veterans. The invading force operated in a wide area from the Lebanese border down to the vicinity of Nablus. Attacks upon Jewish settlements began to take the form of planned military operations, particularly in the regions of Galilee, Sharon and Jerusalem. By this time, Jewish defence forces too had been increased and organized on a full-time basis: vehicles were being armoured: airplanes had been procured: and a counter-offensive was set on foot. An attack on Mishmar Haemek by the Arab Liberation Army, using artillery for the first time in the war, was beaten off. The Arabs were driven from several of their positions in Galilee. Haifa was captured by Jewish forces. A considerable proportion of the territory marked out for the Jewish State under the United Nations plan was brought under effective Jewish control. The Arab quarters in the New City of Jerusalem were occupied, and the land to the west was taken over. But the Jewish community in the Old City of Jerusalem, which had survived consistently, sometimes small and sometimes large,

since 1267—when Jews came from Catalonia to replace those exterminated by the Mongols in 1260—was entirely cut off and could not be relieved in spite of the efforts of the Jewish forces, which fought their way along the road from Tel-Aviv to within a dozen miles of their objective.

The third phase of the war began with the withdrawal of the British on 14th May 1948. The State of Israel was immediately proclaimed: a provisional government and a provisional administration were set up. Next day, regular forces from Lebanon, Syria, Trans-Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, supported by contingents from Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, advanced upon the new state, occupying the Arab half of Palestine and striking against the Jewish half from many directions. Egypt and Lebanon declared a naval blockade of the coast.

Considering that the new State of Israel was faced with the bitter and active hostility not only of a Palestinian Arab population superior in numbers, but also of seven neighbouring Arab States, its destruction seemed assured to many outside observers. But to the astonishment of the world, and also, as the visitor to Israel to-day discovers, of many Israelis themselves, this did not happen. The Arab attack was ill-co-ordinated except in the Jerusalem area. The Jewish people threw themselves unitedly into the struggle, co-operating both intelligently and bravely with their rapidly developing defence services. A series of heavy reverses was inflicted upon the invading forces, which were brought to a standstill except round Jerusalem (where the Israel army and the Arab Legion from Trans-Jordan fought fiercely for mastery after the Jews in the Old City had been forced to surrender) and round Migdal Gad and Faluja, where Egyptian forces, advancing from Gaza, cut off the rest of Israel from the Negev.

Meanwhile, confronted with the deterioration of the situation in Palestine prior to the British withdrawal, the Security Council had appointed a Truce Commission and had called a special session of the General Assembly in April, which authorized the appointment of a United Nations Mediator. After patient appeals to both sides, which had little effect, the Security Council at last gave expression to the shame and grief caused throughout the world by the desperate fighting in the Holy City. It peremptorily ordered a cessation of hostilities on 29th May

1948. It succeeded, after some difficulty, in imposing on both sides a thirty-day truce from June 11th to July 9th. When this truce expired, the Arab States refused to renew it, but found themselves confronted by an Israel which was now organized as a nation in arms. A week of fierce fighting followed, which went badly for the Arabs. Israel forces completed the conquest of Galilee, captured Lydda and Ramleh from the Arab Legion, and beat off Egyptian counter-attacks in the south. The sole success of the Arabs was an advance in the Jenin area. This fresh outbreak of hostilities impelled the Security Council to order a second cease-fire on July 18th in stern terms, which threatened any state disobeying them with the sanctions provided in the United Nations Charter for punishing a deliberate breach of the peace. The Security Council's action brought large-scale fighting in Palestine to an end.

The truce thus imposed sought to stabilize the military situation existing at the moment when it came into force; it was intended only as a step towards the settlement of the Israel-Arab war by mediation. But no term was set to it: and a situation which was neither war nor peace resulted. Passions were bitterly inflamed not only between Arabs and Jews, but also between each side and the United Nations representatives. Jewish terrorists, fearing that Count Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator, would compromise Israel's territorial interests for the sake of peace, murdered him brutally, to the horror of the civilized world and to the dismay of their own government. Friction between Jews and Arabs continued. Each side accused the other of breaking the terms of the truce; and in October 1948 severe but localized fighting broke out between Egyptian forces, occupying in the Negev positions round Gaza and Beersheba secured to them under the truce, and Israel forces whom they tried to prevent from conveying food and supplies to the scattered Israel settlements in that area. It should be noted that convoys of this kind were sanctioned by the United Nations Truce Supervision Board, and had not before been interfered with. The Israel army thereupon captured the advanced positions which had enabled the Egyptians to interrupt communications with the Negev, occupying Beersheba and Migdal Gad and leaving the Egyptians with only the Gaza strip and a pocket round Faluja. This operation brought

the Negev—the larger desert part of the territory assigned to Israel—under her effective control. Fighting also broke out in Galilee, where Israel forces, after clearing that area of Lebanese troops, followed them across their border and occupied some posts inside it.

The Security Council intervened, and on November 14th it instructed Dr. Bunche, who had succeeded Count Bernadotte, first, to see that both sides withdrew their forces from any positions in advance of those they had occupied on 14th October 1948; and next, to set up permanent truce lines. Failing Arab and Jewish agreement on these lines, and upon such demilitarized zones as Dr. Bunche might consider necessary, he was authorized to fix them himself. This instruction was followed on November 16th by a resolution calling on all parties to agree, either directly or through Dr. Bunche, to mark out defined armistice lines beyond which their forces might not move; to withdraw their forces to the rear of these lines; and to reduce these forces so that the armistice would not be broken during the transition period leading up to a permanent peace. The Provisional Government of Israel accepted these terms on 23rd November 1948; the Arab states hesitated. Before the beginning of the New Year, renewed fighting broke out in the Negev, where the Egyptian forces fared so badly that the Egyptian Government entered on immediate armistice negotiations. Between January and July 1949 armistice agreements, defining the boundaries to separate the late combatants, were concluded by Israel with Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria. These boundaries enlarged the Jewish area in the north to include almost the whole of Galilee except for a demilitarized strip along the Syrian frontier; and in the centre, broadened out the original bottle-neck to bring Israel territory right up to the New City of Jerusalem. The Jerusalem area was divided between Transjordan and Israel by the armistice line which gave Transjordan the Old City and Israel the New City. But between this main southern block of Israel, now linked to the Negev by a widened strip of territory, and the main northern block, there is a narrow corridor which averages only twelve miles across. The result is that although Israel is a little country of 8,000 square miles, she has a frontier by land and sea 750 miles long; and except in the Negev, no Jewish settlement is more than 20

miles from the nearest Arab territory. It is hardly to be wondered at that the Israelis are as frontier-conscious as a beleaguered garrison; especially as the surrounding Arab states show no signs of modifying their original hostility to the very idea of the establishment of a Jewish body-politic: still firmly refuse to recognize its existence: have imposed upon it a strict economic boycott: and continually utter threats that they are about to destroy it by force of arms.

The United Nations, having arranged the armistice agreements, set up an elaborate machinery of mixed armistice commissions to preserve the frontier between Israel and each Arab state; and in May 1950 Britain, the United States, and France gave general support to the armistice agreements by publicly declaring that they would take any necessary action, whether inside or outside the United Nations, to safeguard the frontiers from forcible alteration by either side. The mixed armistice commissions were not authorized to exercise general supervisory powers: their function was to deal in post-mortem fashion, as it were, with complaints by each side of frontier violations and other breaches of the armistice agreements. They were kept very busy, because feeling on both sides of the frontier remained bitter; and 'incidents' have frequently occurred. But, broadly speaking, the settlement reached in November 1948 continued effective, although subject to increasing strains and stresses, for the next eight years—until the closing months of 1956.

The effects of this settlement upon Israel and her people will be examined on later pages. It suffices to remark here that the manner in which the frontiers were fixed, although perhaps inevitable under the conditions prevailing at the time, caused a great deal of practical inconvenience both to Israel and to her neighbours. While Israel territory cut off one Arab district from another, and frequently interrupted what used to be main highways, Arab territory loomed threateningly over the principal arteries of Israel's communications between north and south, and formed awkward salients into the heart of Israel's part of Palestine.

It is within the boundaries laid down by these frontiers, across which the Arab world has gazed at her with seemingly implacable hostility, that Israel has so far been working out her

destiny. What, if any, changes in these frontiers will result from United Nations action following on the Israel expulsion of Egyptian forces from Sinai and the Gaza strip in October–November 1956; and on the simultaneous Franco–British initiative to arrest the possible spread of hostilities by pressure on Egypt, cannot at the moment of writing be foreseen in detail. It seems certain, however, that the pattern of society which Israel has been working out, the institutions which she has set up, and the State which her people have established, have all assumed the characteristics which might have been expected from the nature of the influences which have shaped them. So long as these influences persist, their resultant effects are unlikely to alter substantially.

PART TWO

The Present

IV

Europe in Asia

In many parts of Asia, from the China Sea to the Mediterranean, the visible developments of the last few years are making nonsense of the old legend that the East does not change. All Asian countries, with the possible exceptions of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen which seem, for reasons of their own, to be following a 'minimum change' policy, are now altering fast. Even those in remote and inaccessible situations, like Nepal, Afghanistan, and Tibet, are experiencing vigorous reactions to the stimulus of new influences favouring political and economic advance. Air communications are breaking down old barriers: ideas spread quickly: privilege is becoming unfashionable: the age of the Common Man is dawning. In every great city of Asia new airports, new hotels, new roads, new shops appear, all with some convergence towards a cosmopolitan pattern. Often the traveller has, as it were, to make a deliberate effort to penetrate below the glass-and-chromium-plated surface which confronts him before he can find anything characteristic of the particular country which he is visiting. Yet his search turns out as a rule to be a short one. The glittering new façade is neither widespread nor deep: below it and beyond it much—although by no means all—of the ordinary life of the country goes on in the way in which it has been accustomed to do for centuries.

The traveller's first view of Israel, therefore, will not surprise him if he has some knowledge of post-war Asia. As the air-liner strikes inland from the blue margin of the Mediterranean, his vision can range from Natanya in the north to the mouth of the Rubin river in the south. His eye takes in mile after mile of intensive cultivation, interspersed with townships made up of buildings in symmetrical blocks. There are glimpses of large,

well-sited industrial establishments, standing in green plots like the new Indian model enterprises of Sindri and Chittaranjan, neat and orderly as though magically transported from the planner's drawing-board. Yet something of the same kind—if less precisely ordered—can be seen from the air over Bombay, Delhi, Lahore, Karachi, Calcutta, Cairo, and a dozen other Asian centres; and it is not until the traveller remembers that only twenty years ago he saw all this coastal stretch as a sandy waste that he finds anything very remarkable in the spectacle. Certainly, he reflects, these Israel engineers and agricultural experts know their job. This sight would encourage the Pakistani pioneers who are now toiling to harness the shifting sands of the Thal reclamation area, and to bring agriculture, light industry, and colonists to what has been for centuries sheer waste land. They could learn something from the ordered beauty of the Israel lay-out. But there is little here to be seen which, at first sight at least, marks out the land of Israel as anything more than a very advanced example of the kind of planned development which is going on in many parts of Asia.

To land at the airport of Lod, the old Lydda, is to capture for the first time the sense of something unusual. Its great area and its well-equipped buildings—both so much enlarged since the time of the mandate—look, it is true, much like any other international airport in Asia. There are the same flock of airliners from all over the world; there is the usual crowd of passengers, obedient to the Tannoy system, awaiting instructions to depart; there are the customary new arrivals, lining up before presenting themselves to the usual passport, health, immigration and preventive authorities. But there is an efficient precision about everything which gratifies Western sensibilities. The loud-speaker system works clearly instead of suddenly dying out into unintelligible squawks and gurgles. Announcements are made in several languages. There are enough officials, but not so many that they get underneath each other's feet—or the feet of the passengers. Moreover, they go about their duties with an entire absence of bustle or fuss. Their uniforms are workmanlike. There are neither swords nor gold lace; but there are also no sloppy, ill-fitting tunics, and no unlaced, unpolished boots. As the officers, so the airport. There is no hubbub, no confusion, no shouting of the kinds which too

often remind the new arrival at an Asian airport that he is no longer in Britain or the United States. Everything is quick, competent and courteous. Even the incoming passengers, although on the air-liner they exchanged bewildered and anxious inquiries in some dozen different languages, seem to catch the prevailing spirit of orderly calm, as everyone quickly finds an official who can speak his own language even if he does not happen to understand Hebrew, English, French or German. All connected with the working of the airport who are not in uniform, down to the porter who handles the luggage, wear European clothes—in the hot weather, a shirt and shorts; in the cold weather, a wind-breaker jacket and trousers. On the ground, the Orient seems to have vanished.

The growing impression that Israel is, to say the least of it, an unusual part of west Asia is strengthened as soon as the airport is left behind. Asian airports generally stand a long way off from the centres of population which they serve: a drive through open country lasting anything up to thirty minutes is not unusual. But Lod, like London Airport, stands almost next door to thickly-settled areas; and to drive from it to Tel-Aviv on the north-west or to Jerusalem on the south-east is to see at a glance that this part of Israel is densely settled. Now it is precisely in these densely settled areas of Asia that the knowledgeable traveller expects to find some real characteristics of the country which he is visiting. Beyond the range of the spit-and-polish of cosmopolitan hotels and international airports, the old Adam of the traditional East can often be discovered in the form of broken-down shacks: pools of scummy water: swarms of children, driving cows and goats which roam at large through narrow, unpaved, unswept alleyways: poverty: smells: flies. There is nothing of this to be seen near Lod. Everything is neat, clean and sanitary—a testimony to the efficiency of the local government authorities. The people do not go barefoot: they are well shod and well clad in European style: their clothing has nothing in common with the dingy white-grey, amorphous cotton garments which the masses of Asia favour as their traditional garb. Few children above the age of toddlers are to be seen—inquiry shows that all the older ones are at school. Those still too young for school do not play in the road, but in neat little gardens surrounding the trim cottages where they

live. This is all the more remarkable because, by physique and even by colour, many of the men and women are obviously of non-European origin. Some have the dark complexion which North Africa brings: others show the lighter but swarthy colouring of Arabia. Two men break off for a moment from swinging the engine of a tractor to hail the driver of a passing lorry. All three begin to exchange greetings, and the news of the day, in Arabic, but as soon as the conversation takes a professional turn (the tractor-men seem to be asking the lorry-driver's advice on some technical point of engine-maintenance) all three quickly break off into Hebrew, which is now the official language of a country whose inhabitants count between them a score of mother-tongues, according to their land of origin.

Not far away stands another village—plainly older than the first because of the shade-trees and well-grown orchards which surround it—where the inhabitants seem obviously European in physical type, with nothing of Asia in their features. This settlement is plainly prospering: a large fish-pond, well-tilled fields and the puffing of a diesel engine in a new building show that agriculture and light industry of some kind are combining together. Yet there is nothing in the way of life of the second village to distinguish it from the first except that it has had longer to develop; and one is told that the children of both villages, one of Asian Jews and the other of European Jews, go to the same school and learn the same things, with Hebrew as the language of their instruction.

The roads by which these children go to school, whether trunk or feeder roads, are excellently surfaced with asphalt, well cambered, well banked, and with neatly maintained edges. Many of them show signs of being recently widened, and work to straighten out curves is going on in a number of places. When a feeder road joins a trunk road, there is generally a shelter for waiting passengers, or a clean, bright roadside café, or both. Direction-posts and warning-signs abound—those which tell of the proximity of a school, a hospital, or a works entrance being particularly noticeable. Cat's eyes or white lines divide the traffic streams at every curve and road junction.

The volume of traffic is enormous: indeed most of the people of Israel seem to travel by road. In comparison with, say,

Britain, there are comparatively few pedal cyclists; but motor cyclists seem to abound. Private cars of all kinds—large Americans, smaller British, French or German—form a high proportion of the traffic, particularly near the large towns: and since the reparations agreement was concluded with West Germany, the Volkswagen seems increasingly popular.

Jeeps are everywhere, not only in the rural areas, but also in the cities, and, with their convenient trailers to carry farm produce, are rapidly displacing horse-drawn carts. In fact, animal-drawn vehicles, though still forming the mainstay of rural transport throughout West Asia, are vanishing from Israel. The few dozen new ones which appear each year are more than offset by those which are scrapped in favour of mechanical transport.

New private cars come on the road at the rate of about a thousand a year: and motor cycles are not far behind this figure. It is not surprising to learn that there are stiff official tests, both for road-worthiness and for driving, enforced by the Government. There are driving schools under state control: the police are vigilant in detecting, and the courts in punishing, offenders: and there is an excellent plan under which those who are convicted of traffic offences are invited to attend day-courses in which common driving mistakes, and common violations of the traffic laws, are discussed and analysed by experienced traffic officials. The safety of the public is further watched over by a National Council for the Prevention of Accidents, which organizes and conducts road safety campaigns. There are some twenty local branches of the Council in different parts of Israel; and special 'weeks' to promote safety under winter driving conditions, and to inculcate care and courtesy in the use of the roads among motorists and pedestrians alike, are energetically conducted. School teachers are enlisted as 'safety first' instructors: boys and girls are taught to act as safety pickets: educational films are distributed to show how accidents happen and how they can be prevented: and a very popular 'draw' is the institution of mock trials of offenders against the transport laws. Thanks to these precautions, the accident-rate is diminishing. Fatal accidents are something under ten a month—a small figure in view of the total number of vehicles, the mileage they travel, and the crowds of passengers that they carry.

The outstanding impression which the traveller gathers on the roads of Israel is of ubiquitous, highly-organized, and remarkably swift public transport and merchant traffic. There are so many omnibuses to be seen, both on the country roads and in the cities, that it is not surprising to learn that Israel has almost two thousand of them—mostly modern, streamlined, and smart in appearance. Between them, including the coaches which are primarily intended for tourists, but which carry domestic traffic in the off-season, they convey more than 320,000,000 passengers every year over a distance of over 50,000,000 miles. Divided among a total population of just over a million and three-quarters, these figures give a very high average of trips and mileage per head, thus confirming the impression that Israelis do not mind travelling considerable distances for work. The long procession of omnibuses and lorries which convey workers homewards after their days in the fields or factories reminds the traveller of conditions in Britain; and there is no doubt that the roads of Israel, like those of Britain, are becoming highly congested by the amount of long-distance and short-distance passenger traffic which they carry.

This congestion is further increased by the immense volume of inter-urban commercial traffic. There are more than 20,000 commercial goods vehicles in Israel; they are increasing at the rate of about 1,600 a year—far faster than private cars or motor cycles. They are to be seen in every part of the country: great articulated vehicles loaded with construction materials, with ponderous agricultural machines which look like prehistoric monsters, with tractors heavy and light; enormous trucks laden with farm produce going to the towns, or with crated consumer-goods and spare machine-parts going to the country. The roads leading to the ports of Haifa and Jaffa swarm with lorries carrying for shipment abroad the oranges, citrus fruits and bananas which are Israel's most valuable export; and bringing into the country the wheat, oilseeds, sugar and other foodstuffs, which she needs to supplement her home-grown food supply, along with the raw materials required by her expanding heavy and light industries.

Road development naturally ranks high among the responsibilities of the Government. At present Israel has more than 2,000 miles of road. During the past eight years, nearly 400

miles of new and reconstructed trunk roads, and some 300 miles of feeder roads have been built: while 700 miles of existing roads have been widened and improved. Some of these roads are strategic, like the 'Road of Valour', built under desperate conditions during the War of Liberation to link Jerusalem to the coastal plain—and the new parallel all-weather road which matches it: or like the road south from Beersheba to Eilat, still being improved, which runs through the central Negev instead of along the Arab border. Others shorten distances, like the Tel-Aviv–Natanya road, which forms a direct route to Haifa; and the Faluja–Beersheba road, which brings the capital of the Negev within two hours' travel from Tel-Aviv. But all of them open up new country, and make possible new settlements and more intensive development. Perhaps the most dramatic of them is the road from Beersheba to Sodom, which crosses a mountain range and then drops to the level of the Dead Sea, and, by a major engineering feat which excites the wonder of all who travel by it, links up the Dead Sea potash works with the outside world.

Mechanized road transport is the main circulatory system of Israel, and its interruption would spell decay and death for agriculture, industry, and almost every national activity. At present, petrol and diesel oil are the life-blood of the entire economy. Since the cutting of the pipeline from Kirkuk to the Haifa refineries after the War of Liberation, Israel has been hard put to it to supply her requirements in petrol and fuel oil. Yearly about a million tons of crude oil has to be purchased abroad, to the detriment of her over-burdened foreign exchange resources; and the refineries can now be kept partially operating only by these imports from overseas. For a long time, every Israeli has hoped that oil would be found in commercially-profitable quantities in the Negev. For oil is there, so much has been known for many years. But is there enough of it to help the country? No one yet knows for certain; Israel has never ceased to hope. The Government's policy, as laid down in the Petroleum Law of 1952, is to open the country's oil resource to free and competitive enterprise. Under regulations framed in 1953, extensive exploratory work has been undertaken by nearly a dozen companies, whose licences cover about three million acres. Drilling operations are in progress in a number of places,

and after many disappointments, oil was 'struck' at Heletz, in Israel territory not very far from the Gaza strip, in 1955; and by the end of 1956, a dozen wells were operating. A very exciting strike was made in June 1956, when an oil-bearing layer was located at a depth of some 5,000 feet. By the end of 1957, an output of 200,000 tons a year is hoped for. Experts agree that the prospects, though still not wholly proven, are very promising: and it has become the fashion among school-children to wear little round lockets which contain a drop of the precious black, viscous, fluid produced by Israel's own oil wells.

As might be expected, a good deal of attention has been paid to the restoration and development of rail transport, with the double object of giving relief to the roads and of making possible the more economical carriage of phosphates, potash and other bulky materials from the Negev desert to ports of shipment. In the days of the Mandate, the Palestinian railways system was highly developed, and although it was mainly planned to link the country with the outside world, it served the then-existing internal needs pretty well. A line along the coast connected Lebanon and Syria with the Suez Canal at Kantara: there was a rail connection to the Hejaz: and a line linked Jerusalem to Jaffa and the coastal lines. But only a few sections of this system, amounting to less than a quarter of the original mileage, remained in Israel hands after the partition of Palestine: there was no rail communication between the principal cities—Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv–Jaffa, and Haifa—and many of the bridges and culverts, together with much of the track, was badly damaged in the fighting. The rolling-stock was mostly unserviceable. Worse still, out of 7,000 railway employees who worked under the Mandatory régime, there were only some 400 Jews who remained available for the new government. Most of these were clerks or fitters; few engine-drivers, plate-layers or shunters were found among them.

Work on the railways began promptly. Before the end of 1949—within eighteen months of the Israel declaration of independence—a train reached Jerusalem from Tel-Aviv. The Haifa–Tel-Aviv and Haifa–Jerusalem lines were reopened, in spite of the difficulties caused by the necessity of by-passing Arab territory. The railway system has now been considerably extended. The original 150 miles' length of broad-gauge track

which remained in Israel has been more than doubled; it will soon be trebled, with heavier rails and a better permanent way. A new coastal line from Hadera to Tel-Aviv North has recently been extended to a new terminal, the Arlosoroff station, leaving the North station available as a goods station with sheds and silos. The Haifa–Tel-Aviv line is being provided with a by-pass which will cut out Tel-Aviv and connect it directly with the Jerusalem line. A new line links Beersheba with the northern railway system; and there are to be further developments inside the Negev. Already the Israel railway system carries nearly four million passenger and 130 million tons of freight every year: and port extension lines are steadily adding to the facilities for handling heavy shipments by rail. Diesel locomotives and fast, streamlined diesel rail-cars, have replaced steam engines: extensive railway workshops now look after the assembly, rebuilding, construction and maintenance of locomotives, passenger and goods wagons. A railway training school has been opened: selected personnel are sent abroad for instruction in specialized branches of line maintenance, freight-wagon building, and the repair of diesel engines: visiting foreign experts are summoned to advise the Director of the Railways; and the now flourishing system, some 400 miles in length, has already more than 1,600 permanent employees.

The impression that Israel ranks with the West rather than with Asia in the immense importance which she attaches to the development and maintenance of a first-class system of communications is reinforced by the spectacle of what she is doing on the sea and in the air. Both those channels have acquired major significance since the Arab states have cut off all communications by land between Israel and the outside world. The country has been obliged, by force of circumstances, to concern itself actively with the expansion of its sea-borne trade, and with the development of air transport.

Great attention has been paid to the improvement of the port facilities which were inherited from the Mandatory régime. The best harbour in Israel is Haifa, which now handles over a million tons of imports, and half a million tons of exports, every year, and ranks among the largest and best-equipped ports of the eastern Mediterranean. Quays have been extended and rebuilt: an auxiliary port capable of accommodating vessels up

to 3,000 tons has been constructed in the mouth of the Kishon river, with separate accommodation for fishing craft. The dredging and canalization of the river have provided a large reclaimed area of more than a thousand acres, which is being zoned between light industries, stores and shipyards, and fisheries. At the same time, the facilities available to firms dealing with the oil, fertilizer and chemical industries within the area have been substantially increased. This development has come just in time to enable full advantage to be taken of the increased flow of raw material for phosphorus fertilizers from the Negev. The production of superphosphates in the Haifa plants reaches 600 tons daily in the peak season—which is sufficient to cover all local needs and to provide 12,000 tons for export. New plants have been built to produce phosphoric acid, dicalcium phosphate, and potassium phosphate. When viewed from the heights of Mount Carmel, Haifa harbour displays all the characteristics of one of the major ports of the world within a miniature compass, with its extensive industrial area, modern, well-planned lay-out, rail and road network. Giant cranes: an enormous grain elevator with 29,000-ton capacity: and a floating dock combine to complete a satisfying picture of initiative, energy, and intelligent exploitation of great natural advantages. In comparison with Haifa, the now-united ports of Jaffa and Tel-Aviv, which lack the splendid harbour of the northern port, are less impressive: but they too now possess thoroughly modern equipment which enables them to handle their main business—the citrus export trade—with efficiency and despatch. Although ships loading and discharging have to lie for the most part in an open roadstead, and to make use of lighters—a circumstance which exposes the working of the ports to interruption in the event of storms—new equipment, enlarged warehouses, and an extended road system enable them to handle half a million tons of cargo every year.

Israel's main maritime trade is at present conducted through these three outlets on to the Mediterranean: but she has another port at the most southerly part of her territory, Eilat, at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, an inlet of the Red Sea. Eilat is near the site of King Solomon's naval station of Ezion-Geber, and was an important harbour in classical times for the export of copper and other minerals from the southern Negev. It is well

situated for trade with Aden, Abyssinia, East Africa and the Sudan: but its commercial possibilities have lain dormant for many centuries. The desert has encroached upon the cultivation of the hinterland which it once served. It is now surrounded by a wilderness of desolation, from which all sign of life has departed. Its remoteness, together with the lack of adequate water supplies, have opposed serious obstacles to the Government of Israel's determination to develop it. But Israel is not daunted by difficulties, and steady progress is being made towards Eilat's rehabilitation. A trunk highway connects it with Beersheba—now the Paris of the Negev settlements—regular passenger and freight services link it by air with the north. A jetty which can handle vessels up to 2,000 tons, has been built. A neatly laid-out settlement, with a small but up-to-date air-conditioned hotel: a municipal garden (conjured by some apparent miracle out of the desert: sand) an excellent marine museum· a new cultural centre—named after the great American labour leader, Philip Murray—and several cafés, together provide accommodation and some strictly limited amenities to a hardy pioneering community which makes light of adversity. They number together several hundred souls: everyone, children included, looks healthy, cheerful, and proud of the successful reclamation work which is steadily increasing the cultivated area round the port. Every year sees a substantial enlargement of the population, as local light industry—diamond polishing is an example—springs up.

From Eilat, explorers set out to locate new mineral deposits: fishermen ply their trade (the fish is excellent and abundant, but needs a special technique for its capture on account of the astonishing depth of the water even close inshore and the abundant coral reefs): and vigorous young men and women band together in groups to dig wells and set up new pioneering settlements. This intense activity is all the more admirable because Eilat has been for eight years entirely cut off, by the Arab blockade, from the maritime trade which rightly belongs to it. The nine-kilometre strip of coast on which it stands is pocketed by Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. Ships bound for Eilat have had to run the gauntlet of the Egyptian guns located on Tiran and Snefir, at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba—

guns which have been known to fire, out of excess of zeal, even upon British shipping bound for the ancient, now decaying, Jordanian port of Aqaba, which is plainly visible from Eilat itself.

The result is that everything which the people of Eilat and the surrounding country need has so far had to be brought down by road from the north—a journey, as the guide-books frankly say, which cannot be recommended except to the most hardy. Even so, no one has lost heart. Belief in the future of Eilat is as strong with the Government as with those who live there—which is saying a great deal. It has long been obvious that this interruption of maritime communications cannot last for ever; the commerce of the civilized world will be the poorer if the mineral wealth of the southern Negev is not allowed to find its natural outlet: and the recent expulsion of Egyptian troops from Sinai has prepared the way for a more rational set-up. The ancient copper workings at Timna are being restored with the help of modern techniques, and plans for setting up a copper reduction plant are complete. There is active prospecting for iron ore; and there are indications that local production of iron may soon become practicable. The longer jetty, to handle the increased traffic which is confidently expected at some future date, will assuredly come into full use ere much time has passed. Meanwhile, all Israel is proud of the pioneers of Eilat, who are living embodiments of what Dave Crockett is to American boys in the admiring estimation of many youngsters. Citizens of Eilat are given special privileges as pioneers, including exemption from income-tax. Expectant mothers receive free air-passages to Lod and back, so that their babies can be born in the optimum conditions provided by Israel's best hospitals. Electrical appliances, such as air-conditioning and refrigeration plant, are freed from purchase-tax when bought for use in Eilat. There are many visitors to Eilat; schoolgirls and schoolboys often choose a trip there as a Hanukah present: co-operative societies, organizations of war veterans, and tourist companies arrange frequent excursions, so that the modern inhabitants of the ancient port, in spite of their remoteness from the larger centres of Israel's life, are far from feeling isolated. They will have even less reason to feel so in future; for the flights to Eilat are being increased to eight a

week; and enlarged hotel accommodation is being planned for the benefit of the growing number of visitors.

The Israel knack of finding inspiration for the present in the remote past of national history, of which the development of Eilat is an example, is further illustrated by the modern determination to revive an ancient seafaring tradition which has lain dormant since the time of the Maccabees. Israelis are bold and skilful fishermen, as one would expect from their diet; but the planned creation of a national mercantile marine and of an embryo navy must have been something in the nature of an act of faith by the men responsible for taking the decision. In 1948, there was a negligible amount of Israel-owned and-operated shipping—one ancient passenger steamer, four small coasters, and a few crazy vessels on which under-cover immigrants had risked their lives to run the blockade imposed by the Mandatory Government—totalling in all about 6,000 tons. Only some 100 officers and men were available. To-day, in spite of the periodical withdrawal of old ships from service, and their replacement by new vessels, the mercantile marine of Israel numbers between 30 and 40 craft with a displacement of well over 100,000 tons. Another 16 craft, with a total displacement of more than 136,000 tons are due to come into service as they arrive from German shipyards under the reparations agreement. The majority of the ships are cargo vessels: but there are also a number of passenger steamers, which between them carry about 40,000 people every year. In the face of keen competition from foreign shipping lines, Israel's mercantile marine now operates regular passenger and cargo routes to Cyprus, France, Italy and Turkey in the Mediterranean; to Dutch, Belgian and British ports in the north; and to the east coast of Canada and the United States. Within eight years of her creation, Israel has come to rank with the leading maritime countries of the Middle East.

Out of the original nucleus of 100 officers and men, there has grown a roster of more than 1,200 Israel seamen. Some foreign nationals are employed in the higher posts to supply the experience which the young mercantile marine has still to build up: but good progress is being made in solving the problem of qualified manpower. The Nautical School attached to the Haifa Technion has been converted into a Secondary Naval

Officers' School and transferred to Acre, where it will work under the joint auspices of several Ministries of the Government and of the Israel Maritime League—an organization which has been set up to encourage interest in Israel's revived seafaring traditions. The school carries on a five-year course which provides for 380 students. From 1958, sixty students will graduate annually as commissioned officers, half in the Merchant Marine and half in the Navy. The Naval establishment is still small, consisting, so far, of a few frigates and destroyers: even so, the responsibilities which it exercises in the defence of Israel's coastline—long for so small a country—are attracting to it a fine type of young man.

But in Israel, as in many other countries, it is aviation which catches the imagination of most of the rising generation. Apart altogether from the romantic appeal which flying makes to modern youth, there are special circumstances which have brought aviation into prominence with all Israelis. When the War of Liberation broke out, the country was cut off from the rest of the world except by air; and even to-day, air remains *par excellence* the lifeline between Israel and her friends overseas. One of the first acts of the Provisional Government, when it took office in the teeth of a grave national emergency, was to set up the Israel Air Line, which is now known in so many of the world's airports by its Hebrew name of El-Al. A network of air routes is operated over four continents—Asia, Europe, North America and Africa; and regular services ply between Israel, London, Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Zurich, Vienna, Rome, Athens, Johannesburg, New York, Nicosia and Istambul. The company has its base at Lod (Lydda) airport, which now possesses runways suitable for jet aircraft, electronic navigational and approach aids, and extensive facilities for overhaul. The Government Aircraft Repair Institute has been approved as a base for the maintenance, repair and overhaul of civil aircraft. It undertakes the examination and licensing of engineers and mechanics, and employs a staff of 400. Lod now ranks in the International 'B' class of airports—in the same category as London and Paris. There are up-to-date arrangements for the instruction of air crew and ground personnel, under the supervision of experts from the International Civil Aviation Organization. There are smaller airports at Haifa, Tel-Aviv and Eilat;

from which the Arkia internal services to Eilat, the Israel Aero Club, and a company which specializes in the chemical spraying of crops and trees, also operate. Gliding has become very popular, and Israelis are now thoroughly air-minded. The country is so small that the scope for operating internal services is limited to the flights, now on a regular schedule, between Eilat and the north, and to a possible shuttle-service, to save busy men's time, between Tel-Aviv and Haifa. But the expanding network of El-Al, which carries between thirty and forty thousand passengers every year; and the needs of the Air Force both for regulars and reservists, as more and more jet and other aircraft are acquired by the Ministry of Defence, together ensure that there is no lack of opportunities in the air for the young men of Israel.

Another branch of communications which has been built up from scratch to a degree of efficiency which compares very favourably with the best practice of Britain and the United States, is the service of posts, telegraphs and telephones. This had been entirely in the hand of the Mandatory Government, and the Jewish Agency had no 'shadow' department for dealing with it. When Israel was proclaimed an independent state, post offices, telephone exchanges, and telegraph lines had ceased to function. All were quickly built up again: contracts abroad for the conveyance of air and surface mail were renewed: trunk lines were restored: and in 1949 Israel was admitted both to the International Telecommunications Union and to the Universal Postal Union.

A network of postal, telegraph and telephone services now covers the country. The number of post offices and post agencies—now 96 and 106—has been more than doubled since the time of the mandate: and there are 15 mobile post offices which serve 353 settlements. The number of telephone exchanges has increased from 36 in 1948 to 69, and the number of telephone instruments from 18,400 to 50,000. An electronic master clock gives the time for the postal services, the scientific institutes and the broadcasting stations all over the country. Great importance is attached to broadcasting as a means of cultural diffusion and of popular education; and the Israel State station 'Kol Israel' is on the air for eighteen hours daily from Jerusalem, parts of its programme being broadcast from

Tel-Aviv and Haifa. The bulk of the transmissions are in Hebrew—some in specially easy Hebrew for new immigrants. But there are also transmissions in Arabic, English, French, Yiddish, Ladino, Rumanian and Hungarian, with occasional broadcasts in Turkish and Persian. There is an Army station broadcasting a special programme of 3½ hours daily for the Defence Forces; and there are also short-wave transmissions for overseas listeners.

All in all, the standard which Israel has achieved in the development of communications and telecommunications by land, sea, and air is very impressive. It shows what can be done by a small population, even in the face of grave difficulties, with the help of patriotism, hard work, and careful planning. Intensive progress of this order, when achieved in so short a space of time, is something quite novel in West Asia. To the observer, it seems to set Israel clearly apart from the more leisurely tempo of life in the countries which surround her.

V

Unity out of Diversity

Perhaps the most astonishing thing about Israel is the way in which Jews from almost every country in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas, with widely differing traditions, habits and ways of life, contrive to dwell amicably together within her borders. It is a wonderful sight to see the great variety of national costumes which the people of Israel can muster between them on the occasions of popular rejoicing, like Independence Day parades. Men and girls in the gala dress of Poland, Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Roumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia mingle with their fellows from Turkey, Iraq, the Yemen, Algeria, Morocco and India. The streets are gay with bright-coloured skirts and blouses, with scarves and head-dresses, with every variety of Asian, African, European and American traditional costumes. Even on everyday occasions, the same mixture of races—though less colourful and less dramatic—remains uniquely impressive. To watch the workers going in or out of one of the many big industrial establishments or blocks of offices in Tel-Aviv or Haifa is to see a variety of physical types which looks almost like a cross section of the world's population. Their clothes, it is true, do not distinguish them from similar collections of men and women going about their business in the big urban centres of Europe or America, except, perhaps, for a certain leaning towards utility rather than towards embellishment—although there is nothing in the nature of the drab uniformity which workers in some other parts of West Asia seem to copy from the Iron Curtain countries. But it is in the facial types, the varieties of complexion, and the physical characteristics that the present inhabitants of Israel display such marked differences to the eye of the observer.

This mixture of races is to be seen most dramatically in the

main urban centres—Tel-Aviv–Jaffa, Greater Haifa, Jerusalem, Ramat Gan, Petah Tikva and Natanya. Here Jews from North Africa walk side by side with Jews from the Yemen and Iraq: Russian, Polish and Rumanian Jews brush against Jews from Britain and the United States in the crowded streets, and stand in the same bus queue with Jews from India, South Africa, Egypt and Australasia. Moreover—surprising in West Asia—women move about everywhere unveiled, the civic equals of men, sharing in commerce and industry and working side by side with men in factories and offices. They form a substantial proportion of the bus passengers, and of the crowds which enter and leave the factories. On the streets everyone, man or woman, seems intent on his or her business. There is plenty of bustle on the crowded pavements, but neither turmoil nor confusion. There are no beggars, whether picturesque or repulsive, of the sort which swarm in so many Asian cities: no one is curled up asleep on the pavement, or is taking a siesta in the shade. Yet it is certain that quite a number of these Jews come from countries where such practices are a daily custom with the bulk of the population. Here in Israel, the tempo of life rules out these easy-going habits, although one has only to cross over one of Israel's many frontiers to find them in full swing.

In the countryside, the racial diversity which to-day makes up Israel is not so immediately obvious; partly because most of the settlements, worked as they are by people who originally came together because of general compatibility of habits and outlook, tend to be broadly either European, or Asian, or African, or New World, in their main composition. It is true that within each settlement there may be—and generally is—a considerable diversity in countries of origin; but each group of settlers has at least some affiliation to a particular cultural tradition in addition to their new Israel nationality. This is to be expected, and, indeed, is officially encouraged: for pioneering enterprises in particular, as well as agricultural operations in general, work better when members of the group concerned have a common background and a shared way of life. But it is only necessary to travel from village to village, from settlement to settlement, to find in the countryside the same mixture of races which exists in the towns. A new Yemeni village lies next door to an older settlement of Russians or Rumanians: immi-

grants from Morocco or Iraq till their fields within sight of a neighbouring Austrian or Polish or Argentine community.

The new plan of siting outlying settlements round a centre, which can provide marketing facilities and additional amenities to an entire rural area, breaks down all tendency to isolation even among the remoter villages, and teaches them to know their neighbours of differing races and cultures. Beersheba, now the hub from which spokes radiate to all parts of the Negev, presents an outstanding example of this type of meeting-place. The men and women who are to be seen on its streets, in its cinemas, and in its cafés are an interesting study for the observer. Although they plainly belong to many different races, most of them seem of the pioneering type, sturdy, well set-up and self-reliant. Some are farmers, who have come in for a breath of companionship to relieve the monotony of small-community life; to take their girl friends or wives to a cinema, or to sell their produce to the Co-operatives and to make purchases for their village. Others are plainly engineers or miners, complete with surveys and plans which they produce from neat brief-cases and pore over on a café table. Almost all of them, though obviously civilians, are armed with a revolver which they take off and sling over the back of a chair for greater ease; or with a rifle which they stand carefully in a corner. All of them, men and women alike, look young and vigorous, bringing with them something of the romantic atmosphere of the frontier settlement as depicted in American 'western' films, but with the jeep in place of the mustang. Here, however, there is no Hollywood glamour, but a purposeful, if gay, acceptance of the hazards of frontier life, and an immense capacity for enjoyment during the rare hours of relaxation. There are to be seen a good many men and girls in the uniform of the Defence Forces, meeting relations or civilian friends, and enjoying the unusual experience of being for the moment out of rifle-shot of the Arab border. They are smartly turned out, with well-brushed uniforms; cheerful, confident, and high-spirited, with a strong resemblance, by no means confined to a similarity in uniform, to the young National Service men and women in Britain. But among them, also, a wide variety of racial types is found—although it has to be sought more closely than in the case of their civilian contemporaries, because of the standardiz-

ing effect of their uniform and their disciplined bearing. In the towns, as in the countryside, this fusion of so many races and cultures into a common nationhood is a most remarkable achievement, which must be studied on the spot if its full implications are to be appreciated. Two things in particular impress the observer: the speed with which the process has been stepped up to yield tangible results; and the immense difficulties which have been faced and overcome.

Perhaps the only parallel which the modern world affords to this creation of a new nation out of so many diverse elements is the United States. But there the process has been going on for over a couple of centuries: Israel has been obliged to compress it into less than a decade. Moreover the United States enjoyed two advantages denied to Israel: an immense stretch of territory, enriched by abundant natural resources which offered almost unlimited prospects of advancement for the able and for the adventurous; and unfettered freedom to select immigrants on the score of their desirability as future citizens. It has thus been possible for the United States, not only to build up its population by something like scientific selection of the racial elements of its choice; but also to limit the numbers entering the country at any given period, so that newcomers become assimilated into the pattern of national life without any risk of a serious alteration of the existing structure of society.

Israel, on the other hand, is a small country, with limited natural resources, which hold out only a modest prospect of livelihood to the great majority of her inhabitants. Opportunities there are, no doubt; but most immigrants are attracted by considerations other than those of mere economic self-improvement. Moreover, a considerable proportion of newcomers during the last half-century were not in a position to make any positive material contribution to building up the Jewish State until they had been trained for this purpose. The machinery for giving such training, which has been functioning abroad, through such institutions as the Youth Aliyah, for a considerable time, and has existed in Palestine for many years in the shape of numerous Jewish foundations, was built up primarily to deal with hand-picked immigrants who came to the country, under the influence of Zionist idealism, with definite notions of starting a new life along lines that had been predetermined. It

was not designed to handle the mass-immigration of entire communities, who had been reduced by persecution to the level of destitution: who were fleeing, in fear of their lives: and who were in large measure bewildered, helpless, and almost hopeless.

The first great wave of strictly refugee immigration came from Germany under the impulse of Hitler's persecution. The Jewish Agency and its kindred bodies, with the help of the World Zionist Organization and the support of the Jewish community in many parts of the world, handled this wave successfully, even when the numbers of immigrants, after showing a spectacular increase year by year, reached the unprecedented figure of 60,000 in 1935. Yet without decrying the magnitude of the work of reception, resettlement, and absorption—which was impressively competent—the observer will not fail to note that this work was aided by two circumstances. One was the character of the immigrants themselves; a proportion of whom were of a highly desirable type of citizen for any country, possessing a variety of trained skills, and very often some modest resources, to help them to start life anew. The other was the restrictive policy pursued (as has been noted in an earlier chapter) by the Mandatory Government. Although there was a highly-organized system of under-cover immigration, the official restrictions did in fact interpose a breakwater between the specialized Jewish rehabilitation-machinery and the flood of Jewish refugees which might, in other circumstances, have exposed it to an almost impossible strain.

The end of the second world war was to change altogether the type of immigrant who wished to enter Israel; and, indeed, radically to alter the problems connected with the resettlement of newcomers. There were large numbers of Jews in the Displaced Persons camps in Germany, Italy and Austria (and latterly in Cyprus) to whom Palestine seemed to offer their last hope of security. In Bulgaria and Yugoslavia there seemed to be no future for the local Jewish communities, ancient as they were. Further, the upsurge of Arab nationalism, and the increasingly bitter conflict between Zionist aspirations in Israel and Arab determination to preserve Palestine as an Arab country, had set in motion reactions which were adversely affecting the security of the Jewish population in Yemen, Libya,

Tripolitania and Iraq. This rising tide of Jewish determination to find in Palestine a refuge from misery, persecution, and maltreatment, beat with ever-increasing force against the breakwater erected by the Mandatory Government in its efforts to hold an even balance between the interests of Jews and Arabs.

With the proclamation of Israel's independence, it became possible for the first time to throw the country open, in the historic words of the proclamation, 'to the immigration of Jews from all the countries of their dispersion'. The barriers against the flood-tide disappeared with the dramatic completeness of the downfall of the walls of Jericho. For the next three and a half years, Jews entered Israel at the rate of twenty-three every hour for twenty-four hours of the day without intermission. They came from 74 different countries and from all five continents. Within four years, some 700,000 Jewish immigrants arrived, more than doubling the Jewish population. Between May and December 1948, more than 100,000 came. In 1949, which was the peak year, the numbers rose to 239,000. In 1950 and 1951, each year brought about 170,000. By 1952, the figure had fallen sharply to 23,000: 1953 saw a further decline to 10,000. But in 1954, 1955, and 1956, there was a sharp rise first to 17,000 and then to 36,000, of whom four-fifths came from North Africa because of the anti-Jewish feeling which developed in connection with the outburst of Arab nationalism in that area.

The new immigrants fall into two broadly marked groups. One, which mostly arrived in the first two years of Israel's statehood, came from European countries. From the point of view of the receiving nation, these may be sharply divided between young and vigorous men and women with enthusiasm, a variety of aptitudes, and a certain measure of training on the one hand; and, on the other, the pathetic relics of the internment camps, many of whom had been broken in body, and sometimes even in mind, by their suffering. Yet they had two things in common: a fervent determination to make a success of their return to the Land of Promise: and a solid background, however much it may have been blurred by maltreatment in many cases, of western culture and a western way of life.

The second group is entirely different. It came from Oriental countries like the Yemen and Iraq in the shape of complete communities, transported *en masse* to the land of Israel. Perhaps

the classical example of this kind of immigration is that known as 'Operation Magic Carpet'. Almost the entire Jewish population of the Yemen, to the number of 50,000, left their homes and migrated to Aden, where they emplaned and were taken to Israel by the Israel Government. For them, as for the majority of the Jewish community in Iraq, this way of travelling, though unfamiliar, was not alarming. Had not the Biblical prophecy laid down that they were to return to the Promised Land 'on the wings of eagles'? Indeed, they felt themselves so much at home when airborne that some of them began to light fires in the plane to cook their meals—to the horror of the aircrew, who were fortunately on the alert. Far more surprising to them was the manner of life which awaited them in Israel. They were overcome with terror when they were asked to enter motor-buses. Their background was wholly medieval. Though devout and industrious, possessing in high degree a variety of traditional skills and handicrafts they were unfamiliar even with the elements of the social, political and economic pattern of a western state like Israel. Their notions of hygiene belonged to the Middle Ages: the ratio of preventable disease among them was appallingly high. Their attitude towards authority, their conception of the relations between the individual and the community, and their entire outlook on life had nothing in common with the ideas basic to a progressive society.

The responsibility of dealing with these two streams of immigrants whose numbers exceeded their own, fell upon little more than half a million Jews who had built up by their own efforts during the time of the Mandate an enlightened and dynamic body politic, inspired by the most advanced social-democratic traditions. By the end of the Mandatory period, the Jewish community in Palestine possessed a complete 'Shadow State' of its own. The Jewish Agency had become an organization capable, not only of controlling Jewish affairs, but of providing at a moment's notice a fully departmentalized Government for the new State, complete with Cabinet and Legislature. Its leaders had acquired experience both in domestic administration and in diplomatic negotiations. They were thoroughly familiar, not only with the problems presented by the transport, reception and settlement of immigrants, and their integration into the existing highly organized community; but also with

the mobilization of the necessary support, moral and financial, from the Jewish population of the Diaspora. Their original breadth of outlook, springing from their membership of a people spread over every country of the civilized world, had been continually enlarged by the currents of international thought set in motion by the World Zionist organization. Under the guidance of these leaders, and with the help of funds largely raised overseas, the Jewish community of Palestine had achieved standards of health, education, and social welfare which could successfully challenge comparison with those of advanced western countries.

Although, like other inhabitants of Palestine, the Jews paid the taxes imposed by the Mandatory Government for the general welfare, they had established and financed their own separate arrangements for their own social services. They had their own system of primary, secondary, technical and higher education, culminating in the renowned Hebrew University of Jerusalem. They had their own health services, of which the twin pillars were the Hadassah Medical Organization and Kupat Holim —the Workers' Sick Fund—in which Histadruth, the General Federation of Labour, had organized the Jewish working population in a comprehensive health insurance scheme. Histadruth, besides, bound together in one single democratically controlled organization the collective and co-operative settlements: the trade unions of the clerical workers, the working women, the working youth, the railway, post and telegraph workers, and many others: and a large number of separate funds and institutions for mutual aid. It further embarked, in its own right, as it were, on numerous large-scale co-operative enterprises, covering marketing, distribution, and building construction.

Nor did these activities exhaust the potential of the embryo Jewish State which had evolved during the Mandatory period. Industry, like agriculture, was highly organized and prosperous. During the 1939–45 war, Palestine had become the workshop of the Allied forces in the Middle East. Jewish enterprise had built up numerous industrial establishments to meet the new and pressing demands for a wide variety of products: new skills and new techniques multiplied among the Jewish community. The result was that in 1948, the Jewish State-to-be was not only well organized to undertake the responsibilities of governing the

Jewish community in Israel, but further possessed the means of equipping, disciplining, and defending its future citizens. Principal among these means was Hagana, a highly organized, although clandestine, defence force; manned by enthusiastic and patriotic citizens, many of them with military training in the Allied armies: led by experienced commanders who had held responsible positions on many of the Allied staffs in the late war.

It was upon this small, compact, well-organized community that the two great streams of immigration descended in the years between 1948 and 1956. The manner in which these streams have been canalized into productive channels is proof that the new Government of Israel has set before itself two complementary guiding principles in facing the enormous task of assimilation which has fallen to its lot. The first is to honour fully the pledge, given both in the Declaration of Independence and in the fundamental law of the State—the 'Law of the Return'—that every Jew has the right to enter Israel. The second is to ensure that the high standards successfully attained by 1948 in every branch of national activity shall serve as the norms to which all immigrants, no matter what their handicaps may be, are to be raised by degrees: that these norms shall represent a starting point (below which no one will be allowed to fall if intelligent leadership, devoted enthusiasm, and tireless effort can help him to attain it) for the continued progress upon which the future of Israel depends. In other words, while austerity, hardship and inconvenience are to be expected and to be endured, there is to be no lowering of the standards towards which the national effort is directed.

That these two principles have been broadly observed, and are still firmly upheld, is clear to any inquirer who talks with officials of the Jewish Agency and Histadruth—the two organizations which, in close liaison with the Government, have taken the main strain of the work of transporting, receiving and resettling the immigrants. The only modification which has been permitted in the application of the first principle is the introduction of priorities among the different countries whose Jewish communities wish to enter Israel under schemes financed by the State or by the Jewish Agency. When the Jewish population is under no physical or moral pressure to leave its home, but is

free to do so at any time, less urgency attaches to its immediate return to Israel; and, in view of economic difficulties, and the expense of transporting and settling immigrants, preference has had to be given to intending Jewish immigrants from countries where their position is insecure. But the policy of priorities is kept under constant review; and is liable to be replaced at any time by the encouragement of mass immigration whenever circumstances change. North Africa is a case in point. For the first few years of Israel's existence, the conditions of Jewry in that area caused no anxiety: Jews were not persecuted, and were quite free to come to Israel. Accordingly, the Israel Government did not finance mass-immigration, although it was always ready to help particular families. As soon as conditions took a less favourable turn, mass-immigration was instituted: and, as we have seen, began with a trickle in 1954, increased considerably in 1955, and has increased again in 1956. Moreover, although the policy governing assisted immigration has remained flexible, the unqualified right of every Jew reaching Israel to enter the country has remained unaffected.

The second principle—the refusal to allow living-standards to be lowered permanently, merely because the population has been doubled within a few years—has on the whole presented greater difficulties than the first. This is due to the general character of the immigration, which, because of the physical and moral stresses that inspired it, remained as a whole entirely unselective in content. A study of age-groups is important as illustrating some of the difficulties which had to be faced by the Israel authorities. In a typical pre-Independence period, 1946–48 (May), in every hundred immigrants, no fewer than 60 belonged to what is generally considered the most desirable age-group, that is, between 15 years and 29 years: while 16 fell into the group which is almost as good, namely from 30 to 44 years. Children under 14 numbered only about 13: the older group from 45 to 59 numbered only 5: the really aged—60 and over, were only 4. In such a sample, both the earning-capacity and the potentiality for rapid assimilation and absorption are obviously high; and it was out of immigration-reinforcements of this general character that the embryo Israel State had built up its remarkable strength in the days of the mandate. But in the period from May 1948 onwards, the composition of immi-

grant groups has been quite different. Children under 14 constitute nearly 29 per cent: the age-groups from 45 onwards make up 22 per cent: the 'optimum' age-group from 15 to 29 has been halved to 30 per cent. Only the 'next best' group—30 to 44—shows an increase to 21 per cent. The comparison can be summarized by saying that since the establishment of the State, half the immigrants have been under 14 or over 55, as compared with a quarter during the earlier periods.

This change in the age-groups meant that the number of people of working age, who could contribute substantially to the productivity of the country, fell off sharply. It further aggravated certain difficulties inherent in the social composition of the immigrants. Large numbers of them proved to be incapable of working, not only for reasons of age, but because of disabilities of various kinds—chronic environmental illnesses, preventable diseases, and the scars left on mind and body by frightful suffering in concentration camps. Special provision, outside the ordinary run of settlement operations, has had to be made for these unfortunates, who between them have formed no less than 15 per cent of the total immigrants. The efforts of the Ministry of Social Services have been supplemented by the work of the Jewish Agency, of Histadruth, of the Hadassah Medical Organization, and above all, perhaps, of Malben, the Central Organization for the Care of Handicapped Immigrants, founded and maintained by the American Joint Distribution Committee. Malben runs not only special institutions for the aged, the invalids, the blind, and the mentally afflicted, but also special villages peopled by those whose disabilities do not debar them entirely from making some contribution to their own support. Many women's organizations, such as the Women's International Zionist Organization, are also doing magnificent work in this field.

Women's voluntary organizations, and the State-organized service of women social workers, have proved particularly useful in dealing with the flood of Oriental immigrants. Among the immigrants as a whole, only about one-third are gainfully employed in their early residence period: and their arrival has reduced the gainfully-employed percentage in the country as a whole from the pre-independence figure of 41 per cent to something like 37 per cent. For this reason, it is a serious matter

if women free from domestic responsibilities are discouraged by their social background from working outside the family circle. Yet it is precisely in this circumstance that the great majority of women immigrants from Oriental countries find themselves. Not only does their traditional seclusion cut them off both from the 'western-style' women around them, and from the currents which quicken and enrich women's life in an advanced community: but, in addition, the state loses the badly-needed contribution, which it is in their power to make, towards the increased production upon which the national economy depends. There is another danger. The practice of seclusion or semi-seclusion among Jewish women from Oriental countries tends to mark out sharply the large, 'joint family' type of household, to which they belong, from the 'equal-partnership-between-husband-and-wife' type of establishment characteristic of the more westernized elements in the community. It is vitally important to prevent the people of Israel from being divided, even temporarily, into two social strata—a westernized, progressive *élite*, and a conservatively static, Oriental mass—which react differently to national burdens and national emergencies. This risk is largely obviated among the rising generation by a national system of education which brings up the immigrant and the *sabra* (native-born) child side by side; but it necessitates special precautions among adults. Thanks to the work now being done among women immigrants by State and by voluntary organizations, and to the provision of sensible practical facilities like crèches for babies when mothers are working, the younger, and even the middle-aged, among them are now beginning to take an increased part in the national life around them; and in the agricultural settlements, many of them are working side by side with their menfolk in a way which their families would have thought impossible a very short time ago. Yet, this process of 'westernization' among the Oriental immigrants needs to be carefully watched. While there is great room among the Oriental Jews in Israel for improved standards of education, hygiene, and civic outlook, they are custodians of an ancient tradition of Jewish culture which has its own part to play in the constructive effort through which the nation is being built: and this tradition is not lightly to be sacrificed to an indiscriminate passion for secularization along western lines.

The physical problem of accommodating the influx of immigrants has been enormous: and the expedients for solving it have been constantly improved as the result of trial and error. To begin with, the Jewish Agency, which has continued, even after the proclamation of the State of Israel, to bear the main burden of dealing with immigration, housed the newcomers in great camps. Some of these establishments were old immigrant and detention installations, which had been built specially for the purpose by the Mandatory régime; others were former barracks which had been used by the British Army. Here immigrants were sorted out into groups, given some introduction to the life of the community which they had come to join, and taught elementary Hebrew—the *lingua franca* common to so many Jews in the Diaspora, and now the official language of Israel. But the 'camp' system, although inevitable in the circumstances which prevailed in 1948 and 1949, did not work too well. The camp populations grew unwieldy because their final settlement turned out to be unexpectedly difficult and slow. At one period, there were 100,000 people under canvas. Many immigrants had no craft or trade, and were totally unskilled except in petty huckstering and other occupations, traditional to the ghetto, which were useless in a free society like that of Israel. It was hard to find a place for them until they had undergone a process of 'conditioning', which seemed likely to keep them in training camps far longer than had been originally expected by the directing agencies: and even then, the instruction which they were given to fit them for their future careers in agriculture or industry left them with many unoccupied hours of frustrated idleness. Discontent grew: the newcomers, herded together, showed signs of developing an inferiority complex as compared with the earlier settlers, with whom their opportunities of contact were undesirably limited by camp conditions.

It was to remedy the deficiencies of this 'camp' system that the plan of *maabaroth* (transitional villages) was instituted in 1950. The underlying idea was to bring immigrants straight to the places where work of some kind is immediately available, either near existing towns and villages; or in development areas, where large-scale public works, such as road- and dam-building, or drainage and irrigation schemes, are in progress. Instead of tents (the total disappearance of which was soon justifiably

hailed as a great step forward) there have grown up neat aluminium, tin, or canvas-walled huts, rather like the 'pre-fabs' of Britain immediately after the last war; each the temporary home of an immigrant family. From the first, each family is encouraged to become economically independent, although it continues to be the object of special attention on the part of a host of authorities. Medical care, schools for children and adults, and vocational training, are all provided; together with tools, materials, and the necessary elements for subsistence. Instruction proceeds side by side with useful work which encourages self-respect; and immigrant workers find themselves toiling, shoulder to shoulder, with earlier settlers on building and reclamation projects of great national importance. The network of *maabaroth* stretches from the northern borders of Israel to the central Negev: some of them have already been rebuilt as permanent settlements. The whole plan has proved a great success from two points of view. Immigrants can begin at once to make their contribution to the general welfare; while the process of absorbing them into the community is eased. At the same time, the Government can direct them away from the congested areas round Tel-Aviv, and other parts of the coastal plain, into those places where they can be most useful either as productive workers or as farmer-guardians of Israel's long frontiers.

The *maabaroth* system has proved itself flexible enough to give substantial help in the development of the country. Its settlements are laying the foundation of new suburbs round cities like Beersheba and Migdal Ashkelon in the Negev; Affula, Tiberias and Safed in the north; as well as round some twenty new towns scattered all over the country from Kiryat Shmone in the north to Eilat in the south. The result has been a rapid expansion of national production, as new industrial enterprises spring up to provide work for the newcomers. At the same time, the Government has seen to it that there has been a great shift to farming life and to semi-rural pursuits on the part of the immigrant population, in spite of their original urban background and tradition. Between 1948 and the beginning of last year, the proportion of the population living in rural settlements increased from 16 per cent to 24 per cent—a change brought about entirely by the new immigrants. Corresponding to this,

the proportion of the population living in the 'three major cities'—Tel-Aviv–Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem—has fallen within the same period from 70 per cent to 40 per cent; while those living in the smaller towns and in semi-rural conditions now constitute 34 per cent of the population as against 23 per cent in 1948. A notable result of this 'back to the land' movement is that the area under cultivation throughout Israel has risen from 410,000 acres to 920,000 acres: while a network of new settlements, with the local manpower which they make available, adds to the security of the frontiers. Of late, even the *maabaroth* plan has been improved upon by the 'Ship to Village' scheme, which enables immigrants, even before they embark from their port of departure, to know exactly where their ultimate destination in Israel will be. They are taken straight from their ship to their settlements, where their training goes on side by side with their absorption into communities which already exist. But this new plan, which has proved particularly serviceable in dealing with the recent flow of immigrants from North Africa, would have been impossible without the general expansion of facilities for industrial employment and agricultural resettlement which has followed the success of the *maabaroth* scheme.

It has been an exacting task to provide permanent housing for the immigrants, especially as those *maabaroth* which have been located near projects of national importance, to provide the labour immediately necessary, do not always occupy sites affording opportunities for permanent settlement. But the problem of housing was tackled with so much success that prior to the present wave of renewed immigration from North Africa, nearly 90 per cent of the total number of immigrants had been permanently or semi-permanently settled. By and large, this has meant new construction, because only a few immigrants were able to find accommodation in abandoned villages. The master-plan of settling the majority of newcomers in agricultural areas is reflected in the fact that half the new housing units built by the Government since 1948 are located in these areas, and five-sixths of those so located are already inhabited by immigrants.

Along with the economic absorption of the immigrants into the pattern of Israel's daily life and toil has gone their cultural absorption into the modern democratic society in which Zionist

ideals now find expression. There are two strong bonds of unity which underlie all the immense differences in background and approach to life that make the Jew from Pittsburg and the Jew from Sana'a seem at first sight inhabitants of different planets. One is the prophetic tradition of the return to the Promised Land: the other is the common heritage of sacred literature in the Hebrew tongue. It is on these two bonds that Israel is relying in her efforts to inspire her immigrants with the spirit of citizenship on which her survival as a nation depends.

The agencies which she employs in the task are manifold, but three call for particular mention. The first is Histadruth, the General Confederation of Labour, whose work in the physical resettlement and economic absorption of the immigrants has already been noticed. Every immigrant who is gainfully employed finds himself automatically surrounded, helped, and advised by one or more of the almost innumerable organs of Histadruth activity. In joining the trade union which protects his interests as a worker, he automatically becomes a member of Histadruth. It is Histadruth which finds him work; which helps him build his house; which looks after him and his family when he is sick; which helps him to exist if he is unemployed; which provides him with social contacts; and which brings him into fellowship with longer-settled workers in his own craft, occupation or profession. It is Histadruth which is the immigrant's main shield against any dangers arising from his unfamiliarity with strange economic conditions, which might lead him to acquiesce in lower wages or in sub-standard working conditions. As a member of Histadruth, the immigrant becomes forthwith part and parcel of the Israel socio-economic structure.

The second of the great agencies for the assimilation of immigrants is the Army. The immigrant is brought into friendly contact with the Army at an early stage of his entry into Israel; for the Army has had a hand in the actual organization and direction of the reception camps and the *maabaroth*. But it is to the immigrant of military age that the Army means most. In Israel, all men take part in national service. They begin two and a half years with the colours at the age of 18; and afterwards put in service in the reserve, with annual training periods and refresher courses, until the age of 45. Single women serve for two years, and remain in the reserve until they

reach 34; but no woman is conscripted who has not at least completed a primary school education. Most women are engaged in office, communications, or hospital work connected with the Army; but they also received military training, and, as the War of Liberation and the hostilities of 1956 alike showed, they can acquit themselves well on the battlefield side by side with their menfolk. The immigrant who enters the Army finds something quite different from an ordinary defence force; he becomes a member of a great organization, which is as much a national university and a school of citizenship, as it is a fighting instrument in the conventional sense of the term. He is taught the elements of hygiene as well as of discipline: he learns to use a toothbrush and to sleep on a bed: he is taught to accept women as equals: and to recognize the dignity of labour. His military training is accompanied by formal education: a quarter of the time spent on his basic Army instruction is devoted to study pure and simple. The subjects are Hebrew, history, geography, Israel's renaissance, and similar branches of learning which will help him to find his own place in Israel and to appreciate Israel's place in the world. Moreover, any fifteen recruits who wish to study some special subject—scientific agriculture, plant-breeding, chemistry, physics and the like—are entitled, as of right, to study-time in the evening, with books and teachers provided free by the authorities.

Service in the Army is thus for the Oriental immigrant an unequalled opportunity for entering into the life of his new country. He works and learns side by side with the *sabra*—the boy or girl born in Israel—and with his fellow immigrants from Britain, France and the United States. He shares with them the experiences of the barracks, the training-field, and the canteen. He learns that community of taste and ambition can override all the differences arising from contrasting environment. Within the broad comradeship of the Army he finds his way into a group of men like-minded with himself; and if his ambitions lie in pioneer activities, he may well become a member of a *Nahal* unit, a group which, after intensive military training, will go to set up a new village in some strategic situation close to the border. Even if pioneering enterprises of this kind do not attract him, he will find himself before long in a batch which has been told off for agricultural work in a nearby established

settlement, probably not far from a frontier—for frontiers seem everywhere present in Israel. Although under full military discipline, he will work side by side with civilian farmers and engineers; or he may be sent to break new ground under 'tough' living conditions, and to prepare the way for civilian settlers who will take over from him when initial dangers and difficulties have been overcome. In every case, whatever his work, he will come to realize that as a member of Israel's defence force he is still an active participant in the productive effort of the country as a whole.

His training is devised to make him not only a soldier, but a thinking soldier, conscious of his responsibilities for defending his home: a man who, in Cromwell's phrase, 'knows what he fights for and loves what he knows'. He learns of the external dangers against which Israel must guard herself: he comes to appreciate the unifying effects upon himself and his fellows of the intense pressure of Arab hostility: and the importance to himself and to his country of the soldierly virtues of exertion, discipline and valour. Perhaps more important than all, he learns what it means to be a full citizen of a free state. He comes to realize that the Army, like other organs of such a State, belongs to him, and he to it. It is no remote instrument of oppression controlled by forces alien to him: it is the people—*his* people—in a posture of defence: ready to fight to the uttermost to safeguard the way of life which they and he have freely chosen for themselves.

Third among the agencies which are playing a notable part in fitting the immigrant to take his part in the new Israel are voluntary organizations such as the Youth Aliyah; which not only bring young people of many different nations to Israel, but also provide for their training and acclimatization inside the country. Immigrants who enter under these auspices are a valuable reinforcement for those influences which work for the cultural assimilation of immigrants who are initially less fitted to take their full share in creative activities; and, coming as they mainly do from western countries, Youth Aliyah contingents constitute an element among the newcomers which is notably stable, disciplined, and progressive.

A potent instrument in the success of all these constructive activities is the revived Hebrew tongue, which is now the official

language of Israel. Without its help, the task of integrating into a single nation the Jews who come from so many different countries would have been difficult to the point of impossibility. A single class in an Israel school may easily contain children who speak eighteen or twenty different languages; but all know at least some Hebrew words and expressions; and in learning to use it as a spoken language, all are drawn more closely together. Within the last half-century, Hebrew has ceased to be solely the language of religious ritual, and has developed into a flexible instrument of speech and writing, now elaborated to a pitch of perfection which enables it to convey without difficulty the most precise shades of meaning in all the modern arts and sciences. Everyone learns it—adults as well as children; for there are evening schools, in which grown-ups can take intensive courses, in all the large centres throughout the country; and university students go out to the villages to help newly arrived immigrants to master the elements of the language. In 1954 a special 'Hebrew Year' Campaign was inaugurated by the Ministry of Education; and about 50,000 students attended classes conducted by volunteer teachers.

People whose mother-tongue is a western language share instruction in Hebrew with Oriental immigrants; more and more is Hebrew becoming the language spoken in the home as well as in Ministries, offices and business establishments. Parents find themselves learning Hebrew so that they can talk to, and share the studies of, their children of school-going age; more newspapers and more books are published in Hebrew than in all the many languages known in Israel. There is a great and growing literature in modern Hebrew: there is a Hebrew drama: Hebrew is the main medium of the national broadcasting organization: and is the language in which almost every public activity from parliamentary debates and trade union conferences, to scientific symposia, is conducted. A knowledge of Hebrew is now an essential part of the equipment of every Israeli; and high Government officials have been known to take extended study leave with the object of improving their mastery of its capabilities. The adoption of Hebrew, due originally to Zionist idealism, as the language of Israel, is now seen to have been a step of the highest practical importance. Not only has it stilled the confusion of tongues which mass immigration would

inevitably have introduced into the country had Hebrew been lacking as a common medium; but, in addition, the prestige enjoyed by the language of Jewish sacred literature effectively rules out the competing claims which other tongues, if left to themselves, would have put forward. This fact is of particular significance now that the mother-tongue of half the population of Israel is Arabic.

VI

Back to the Land

To travel through the coastal plain and the 'three cities'—Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv–Jaffa and Haifa—with their wide streets, modern buildings, and impressive evidences of up-to-the-moment, highly organized, industrial life, and into the country beyond them, is to receive the clear impression that Israel is now in process of becoming both an industrial country and an agricultural country as well. This is noteworthy, because for many centuries the Jews of Diaspora, like the surviving remnant in the Holy Land, were essentially city dwellers, partly because they tended everywhere to herd together for protection against a hostile environment; and partly because it was only in the cities that they could find a livelihood. Many occupations were closed to Jews; sometimes through formal restrictions imposed by the State; sometimes through racial prejudices which effectively prevented their success in pursuits theoretically open to them. In particular, they were commonly barred from owning or tilling the soil. As a result, they were driven back upon avocations which became traditionally associated with them—trading and money-lending. Thus with their racial heritage of high intelligence and artistic capabilities, they gradually came to look down upon the agricultural pursuits which they had been debarred from following; to regard the countryside as essentially backward, and fitted only to remain subordinated to the higher potentialities of urban existence.

In an earlier chapter, the growth of a reaction against this point of view was briefly traced from its sources. This reaction was partly based upon a shrewd estimate of what a return to the Holy Land would demand from those who undertook it; and partly upon an almost mystical addiction to the ideal of a simple, frugal life, deriving its needs from direct work upon the

land, and deliberately renouncing the so-called 'parasitic' activities and the exploitation of the labour of others which traditional Jewish avocations had for long made inevitable. Both lines of thought were reinforced and underlined by the ideals to which the Zionist movement gave tangible expression. They are still strong to-day, both in their influence upon the individual immigrant and in their effect on the settlement policy pursued by the Israel Government. Moreover their importance has been further emphasized by considerations which could not emerge until the State of Israel took shape in circumstances of bitter strife.

The earlier efforts of individual pioneering groups were reinforced over the last thirty years by the activities of organizations like the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association founded by Baron Edmond de Rothschild, and the Jewish Agency, with its central financial institution, Keren Hayesod. The financial sacrifices of the Diaspora made possible the success of the devoted labours of immigrants who, in the face of hardship and danger, spread a network of 'tower and stockade' settlements over many parts of Palestine. Steadfast labour and high courage built up a bulwark of defence which proved strong enough to weather the storm which broke in 1948 and 1949. But when the State of Israel emerged, the original idealistic appeal of the movement back to the land was strengthened by two urgent requirements arising out of the problems with which the new policy was immediately confronted. The first was the pressing necessity of increasing food production. During Mandatory times most of the food grown in Palestine was grown by Arab farmers. The bulk of these had gone away. Nor was this all. The Arab boycott cut off Israel from her former external sources of food supply, and obliged her to deplete her available foreign exchange—so badly needed for machinery, raw materials, and all the innumerable other requirements for intensive national development—in order to feed her rapidly-increasing population. The more money that could be released from buying food abroad, the more could be devoted to strengthening Israel's internal economy, both by increasing imports directly favouring additional productivity, and by hastening forward large-scale projects of irrigation, water-conservation, and the exploitation of natural resources. Thus sheer necessity obliged the Israel

Government to put intensive settlement of the land high on its list of priorities.

The second consideration was equally imperative. Continuing Arab hostility, and the accompanying danger of a second concerted attack upon Israel, gave immediate urgency to the manning of Israel's frontiers in such a way as to provide, wherever geography allowed, defence in depth. This could only be done by settling along these frontiers groups of hardy pioneers, who could be relied upon to hold out, even against overwhelming odds, until the defence forces came to their rescue. Pioneer settlements of this type had shown their value in the War of Liberation; they could be trusted to render a good account of themselves again if a similar emergency should arise. At the same time, their labours in peace-time would assist the development of the country, increase its capacity to support a growing population, and further augment the supply of home-grown foodstuffs.

The older motive-power of idealism, reinforced as it has been by state necessity, has worked the near-miracle of turning shopmen, clerks, merchants, petty trades and middlemen into farmers proud of their ability to toil successfully at manual occupations. It is true that there is a long road yet to be traversed.

Nearly 40 per cent of the entire population of 1,827,000 in 1956 (Jews 1,625,000, non-Jews 202,000) still lives in the three cities; but this proportion has fallen dramatically from the 70 per cent which was the original figure only eight years ago. The bulk of the population is being systematically spread out in accordance with a master plan drawn up by the Government to achieve a well-balanced relationship between town and countryside. The success already achieved is clear from the fact that the percentage of people living in purely rural conditions has risen from 16 per cent in 1948 to something like 24 per cent to-day; and that emphasis can now be laid upon the establishment, side by side with rural settlements, of semi-urban settlements which can serve as the natural economic and cultural centres for the villages which radiate from them like spokes from a hub. Within the last eight years, thanks largely to the agency of the *maabaroth*, semi-urban centres have increased their share of the population from less than one-quarter to more

than one-third; and all up and down the country the importance of the small country town is on the increase.

To visit a town like Beersheba or Migdal Ashkelon in the south, or Affula, Tiberias and Safed in the north, is to find that the astonishing expansion which has followed the impact of waves of mass-immigration is of a special kind. These and similar semi-urban centres derive their importance not from their size; not even from the light industries which are springing up in them; but from their function as nuclei of the intensive agricultural development which surrounds them. They are not drawing away life and vigour from the countryside; they are enriching the countryside by the stimuli which they impart, and by the creative energy which they generate. The life which pulses in them is not distinctively urban; it is a mixture of town and country. In the amenities which they provide, and in the cultural activities—music, drama, cinemas, discussion groups, art exhibitions—which they make available, they are urban; but they remain essentially rural in their close links with the settlements around them, and in their consciousness that their responsibility is not confined to those who dwell within their limits, but embraces also the farmer-settlers living even in the remoter regions of the area which they serve.

It is fascinating to watch this mixed town and country type of development being started from scratch, as it were, in such enterprises as 'Operation Lachish'. Lachish is a very ancient city site, once almost as strongly fortified as Jerusalem, lying in the foothills of Judaea almost due east from Ashkelon and south-west of Beit Guvrin. It was first identified in 1932 by a British archaeologist, Mr. J. L. Starkey, who was tragically murdered by Arabs in 1938; and, since his day, further exploration has shown it to be a treasure-house of Biblical history from the time of its destruction by Joshua onwards, although there are also evidences of a pre-Canaanitish occupation which may extend as far back as 4000 B.C. The area which it formerly protected and commanded was once extremely fertile, apart from its strategic position on Jerusalem's southern approaches: but productivity depended upon elaborate works of terracing and irrigation, whose neglect, following the Arab conquest of Palestine in A.D. 638, reduced everything to a deserted wilderness. The fighting in 1948 and 1949 showed Israel that the Lachish

area had lost nothing of its former importance as a bulwark for the defence of Judaea; and its proximity both to the Jordan border and to the Egyptian-held Gaza strip further reinforced the necessity of consolidating it by intensive settlement. But the task presented such obvious difficulties because of damage caused by erosion, because of the lack of all communications, and because of the constant danger of violence from marauders, that it could be tackled only on the basis of a comprehensive plan backed by the most elaborate preparations.

Following a thorough soil survey, the whole area has been divided into four sub-districts. The north-east sub-district has been found suitable for intensive cultivation of apples, almonds, figs and grain crops; there should also be good grazing. The eastern sub-district holds promise of dry farming and good grazing. Both these districts border on Jordan territory; and their strategic importance depends on their capacity to provide defence in depth for the less exposed central sub-district, which will be irrigated to provide facilities for industrial crops like cotton and sugar-beet; and for the west sub-district, which is suitable for orange cultivation and for mixed farms. The lay-out of the entire region is based upon the simultaneous development of rural and urban facilities for settlement; and calls for eventual occupation by some 5,000 families within the next few years. Their labours will bring under intensive cultivation 70,000 acres and utilize approximately another 100,000 acres for pasture. Every detail for their prosperity and well-being has been thought out in advance. Here, as in other parts of the country, the initial unit is the individual settlement, which will include houses, barns, livestock sheds, a store, a kindergarten, and everything else required for day-to-day operation. Each settlement is to be grouped with four or five others, all being served by a rural community centre, which will provide facilities for meeting, for exchanging products, and for simple social services of the kind which it would be uneconomical for the individual settlements to provide for themselves. There will be a school, a tractor station, a clinic; and buildings of the kind which are likely to be used only about once a week. Thus each block of settlements, with its rural centre, will form a self-contained unit, functioning at its own level. All the blocks throughout the region will be grouped round a regional centre,

which will provide for their top-level integration by affording advanced administrative, educational, medical and cultural facilities: and will also constitute the home of light industries and of factories for processing crops for the market. Here will be located the technical high school, the hospital, and the municipal and Government offices.

'Operation Lachish' is being conducted by a special section of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, which is located in Ashkelon. Here are being worked out all the essential points which must be considered in setting up new villages: proximity to sources of water or to channels from the new pipeline which brings the life-giving water of the Yarkon river down to the thirsty Negev: the road which will link them to their particular centre, to the tractor station, to the dispensary, to the market. It is necessary to foresee how far children will have to walk to school: where the synagogue is to be located: how schools, hospitals and dispensaries are to be staffed. Such matters as these, vital for the happiness and well-being of the settlers, have all to be viewed in relation to larger problems. Among them is the overriding consideration of security. Will a village in such-and-such a place, which would be the best site, if other things were equal, meet the requirements of the Defence authorities, concerned with the safety of a particular frontier area? And what type of village organization will be most appropriate for the dual task of developing the land and providing a 'strong point' either against planned invasion, or against casual marauding bands? Is it to be a *kibbutz* (collective settlement) or a *moshav* (small-holders' settlement)? or one of the intermediate types which blend together certain characteristics of both these two main varieties?

Scarcely less important than the question of security is the highly practical problem of ensuring that the new immigrants who come to Israel under the direct 'Ship to Village' scheme not only find awaiting them the requirements of the fresh life upon which they are entering, but are also themselves selected from the standpoint of their suitability for the tasks on which they can be most usefully employed according to the immediate needs of a particular phase of the overall 'operation'. Some must be sent to villages whose main task is to grow food crops; others must be allocated to the areas from which Kiryat Gath's

new ginning and molasses factories will draw industrial crops like cotton and sugar-beet for processing: others must go to Dimona, the new town twenty miles from the phosphate deposits at Sodom, to be employed in mining and other development projects.

Most of the new settlers are now being sent to the north-eastern and eastern sub-districts. Those in the former find themselves on farms of about twenty acres, of which half is devoted to intensive fruit cultivation and grain crops, while half is used for grazing land. Those in the latter are mostly on larger allocations, suitable for dry farming and grazing; some of them very close to the border. On the whole, the majority of farmers on the border seem to be *sabras* (Israel-born), tough youngsters trained to the dangers and hardships of their situation in *Nahal* units, and often reinforced by contingents of National Service men and women putting in their time with the colours by lending a hand with the reclamation of the land, and by watching over the security of the new settlement. To visit a village of this kind is to recapture for a moment the spirit of the early pioneers of the westward march of Americans in the last century. The village entrance is sand-bagged: its perimeter is defended by barbed wire: the buildings are stout and serviceable for defence. Every man has his rifle ready to hand; the tractor-drivers' operations are 'covered' as carefully against Arab marauders as were the American ploughmen's against raiding Red Indians. But a new and macabre touch has been added by the village's deep-dug air-raid shelter, complete with its chute for the instant despatch to safety underground of the children too young to walk. It is a hard life, and in some places a dangerous one; but there is plenty of gaiety about it too. Everyone is proud of the part which he is playing in making the Zionist dream come true, and in building for himself and for others, with his own hands and by his own toil, and with the comradeship and help of his fellows, a bright future in the Promised Land. If the crops have to be reaped in the face of instant danger, is that not also among the prophecies? Read 'rifle' for 'sword' and 'combine-harvester' for 'reaping-hook', and the ancestral parallel is complete.

The various phases of 'Operation Lachish' were from the first planned in broad outline according to a time-table; but plenty of room has been left for details which are filled in, step

by step as the work goes forward, by the team of planners, engineers, soil experts, transport advisors, and agronomists. Following the preparation of the 'Blue Print for Action' timed for 1954–55 came the 'initial implementation' of 1955–56, which saw the first wave of settlement, with work begun on half the new villages, homes, barns, kindergartens and clinics: with deep ploughing in progress, soil conservation work in hand, arterial roads under construction, and feeder pipes being laid to connect with the main arteries of water coming from the north. Sub-district centres have begun to grow up, with their school, library, cultural hall, sports ground, provisional clinic, tractor-station, refrigeration plant, and garage, and living quarters for the service personnel and other experts who will be working in these institutions. More than a dozen new settlements have already been set up: 'Operation Lachish' is well up to time-table. In 1956–57 the phase of 'secondary implementation' is being reached. The remainder of the settlers are being brought in; more technicians and specialists are arriving. The new villages which represent the second half of the entire settlement project are growing up, and are being linked by road to the existing settlements and to the sub-district centres. These centres with their various institutions have already begun to serve their blocks of settlements; to provide cultural, technical and athletic facilities; and to enrich the life of the communities around them. Work has also begun upon the regional centre which will be the economic and administrative focus of the whole Lachish area, and will eventually take over the processing of industrial crops and become the seat of many new associated industrial undertakings.

The fourth and final stage is expected to be complete by 1959–60, or even earlier, if all goes well. About the time when this book is published (1957), the border defence system will be complete; thus adding to the security, as well as to the productivity, of the whole Lachish region. All the agricultural settlements should by then be functioning effectively, the sub-district centres will be well established; the regional centre will be expanding to meet the growing needs which intensive development of the surrounding areas will bring in its train. In this final phase, the emphasis will be laid not so much on actual construction—for that will be complete—as on close integration;

on the linking of all the resources and all the activities of the entire region into a coherent entity, which will both meet its own local needs, and will also be capable of contributing, to the economy of Israel as a whole, its expected quota of agricultural and semi-industrial production. With this end in view, more cattle and sheep will be brought in to complete the herds which the pasture land can support both for meat supplies and for dairy-farming; the last water pipelines will be laid to carry to its destination whatever proportion of the available piped supply from the north is finally allocated to Lachish; and the irrigated area will be enlarged to the optimum-point for efficient utilization by the labour available.

'Operation Lachish', in the magnitude of its conception and in the completeness of its planning, seems likely to remain for some time to come the show-piece, the *chef d'œuvre*, as it were, of Israel's resettlement policy. Nothing of this magnitude has been undertaken before in the whole history of Jewish colonization of the Holy Land; and to finance it has required a supreme effort both from the Israelis themselves and from the contributors in the Diaspora to the Keren Hayesod United Israel campaign. It has been necessary to envisage the construction of about 5,000 complete housing units, and to provide for the support of the individual families inhabiting each unit until they can look after themselves. Since the average expense of this double process works out between £4,000 and £5,000 per family, the sum required under this head alone is probably over rather than under £20 millions. To that must be added the cost of laying out the forty or so villages in which the housing units are located, with their schools, roads, water-supply and other necessities of civilized life: and the cost of providing the trained personnel, both temporary—for the initial stages of construction, soil analysis, water conservation, drainage and the like; and permanent—school teachers, doctors, nurses, mechanics, artisans—who will be required to supply the expert services which the new communities will need. Even allowing for the plentiful, enthusiastic manpower which Israel can muster during the process of resettlement, the overall cost in money alone of 'Operation Lachish' must work out at something like £30 million. Yet it is only fair to say that nowhere else in the world to-day could better results be achieved for this sum.

Hard work, determination, courage, idealism, although they may need the facilities which only money can provide before they can accomplish the near-miracle now beginning in the Lachish region, are not to be purchased for money alone. It is these qualities in the Lachish planners, pioneers and settlers which are bringing success into view.

It seems specially appropriate that 'Operation Lachish' is being worked out in Ashkelon, a town which itself has undergone a complete rebirth since Israel became a state. The recent developments there provide another example of Israel's instinctive habit of founding her future upon her past, and of discovering inspiration for her present-day planning in the records of her ancient greatness. The old Ashkelon of the Philistines, which figured so largely in Biblical history, is mainly covered by the sand of centuries; but its magnificent site, on a hill overlooking the only important harbour in Philistia, justifies its famous reputation. Its capture by Rameses II of Egypt was regarded as sufficiently significant to earn a place in the memorial of his victories recorded at Karnak; later, it was one of the main centres of Philistine resistance to the Israelite conquest of the Promised Land. In Roman times it prospered wonderfully: Herod the Great counted it as his birthplace, and enriched it with magnificent buildings. Sculptured pediments, marble columns, and fragments of statuary are scattered over a wide area occupied by the Greco-Roman settlements of the third and fourth centuries. Its importance continued after the Muslim conquest of Palestine: it fiercely resisted the Crusaders who, after its fall, re-fortified it with the walls whose surviving masses of enormous masonry are still to be seen. They developed its harbour and turned it into one of their principal ports. When the famous Jewish traveller, Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela, visited it about A.D. 1170, he found it an emporium for merchants from many countries of the east and west, among whom were 200 Jews. Its strength became a threat to the growing power of Saladin after the end of the Third Crusade: he dismantled its walls, and insisted, as a term of his truce with Richard I of England, that it should remain an open city. Ashkelon did not lose its position as a mercantile centre until it was finally destroyed, and its harbour works ruined, by the Mameluke Sultan Beybars of Egypt in 1270.

The fact that it should have remained deserted from that time almost until our own day is a very poor advertisement for the economic insight of the Ottoman Turks, in whose dominions it remained until the end of the first world war. For the country in which it stands is extremely fertile: an oasis of semi-tropical vegetation: a paradise for vines, fruit trees and dates. It seems to have been the original home of the delicate variety of onion known as shalott, which the Romans were delighted to discover there under cultivation. Through them, the shalott was introduced to the western world; and its original connection with Ashkelon is preserved in its botanical name—*allium escalonium.* In the days of the Mandate, the district round Ashkelon was intensively cultivated, mainly by Arabs: but little was done to revive the importance of Ashkelon itself, except to take advantage of its fine natural fisheries. All this has been changed since 1949, when a development company named Afridar, started by Jews from South Africa, began to lay out a modern town not far from the ancient site. This intervention helped to solve a difficult problem facing the Israel Government, which was anxious, for strategic as well as for demographical reasons, to rebuild Ashkelon as the natural centre of a potentially wealthy area; but could not easily find the money for capital outlay upon the necessary scale. Under the aegis of Afridar, New Ashkelon is in process of becoming one of the most beautiful cities of the eastern Mediterranean; and the visitor has no difficulty in understanding its growing popularity among tourists, who take advantage of the mild and genial climate which it enjoys all the year round. It is a very healthy place, and has been selected as the site of the biggest rest-home and holiday camp for the fighting services, where thousands of men and women enjoy ten days' leave (which does not count against the normal leave due to them) after any particularly strenuous period of manœuvres or of active service. The lay-out of the site has been planned on thoroughly modern lines as a garden city; with 'neighbourhood units', magnificent well-shaded avenues, and beautiful public gardens. The architecture is dignified without being overpowering: houses set in gardens radiate from a charmingly designed city centre with rows of shops in arcades, roomy public buildings, and cafés looking upon a broad piazza, bright with flowers, distinguished by an impressive clock-tower with clean and simple lines.

There is a separate industrial quarter, in which modern plants and factories have grown up. These bid fair to play an important part in supplying some at least of the industrial needs of the Lachish settlement area: and the inhabitants of Ashkelon seem justified in hoping that the development, now in process, of its natural hinterland will increase the importance of their city and quicken its rise to prosperity. Its shopping centre has begun to attract customers from many miles around, and tourists are bringing more and more business. The municipality has ambitious plans both for reviving the fishing industry—which in the days of the Mandatory Government provided half the total catch landed in Palestine—and for improving the ancient harbour to handle the phosphates and ore of the northern Negev. How far these plans can be fitted in with the programme which is being worked out for Haifa, remains to be seen; but to use Ashkelon as a shipment-point for the carriage by sea of the Negev minerals might prove economical in shortening the long expensive railway haul between Beersheba and the processing plants at Haifa.

There is one industrial enterprise in Ashkelon which already occupies a key position in the economy of the whole country, and that is the great concrete-pipe factory at Migdal Gad. Here are manufactured the pre-stressed pipes which, stronger and more durable than steel, carry Israel's precious water from its different sources to the eagerly expectant settlements which, with its help, are covering parched and barren land with splendid crops. The factory is an impressive establishment, operating on the latest western lines, and turning out pipes which range in diameter from a couple of feet to the height of a fair-sized man. The craftsmen who work the elaborate machinery imported from the United States, are an interesting cross-section of the population of Israel. Bearded Yemeni Jews, their patriarchal visages framed by the traditional long ringlets, toil side by side with clean-shaven youngsters from Pittsburgh, Manchester and Paris, using with equal skill the most up-to-date electric welding apparatus. At the end of their shift, they all go home together to a modern and well-planned seaside suburb, where flowers are beginning to brighten the gardens and trees are growing up to cast a welcome shade.

The pipes made at Migdal Gad travel all over the country:

they can be seen everywhere on the roads from Dan to Beersheba—and even farther south. The giant sizes, built for the 'trunk' lines, are most impressive. In length twice as high as a tall man, and nearly six feet in diameter, each section is a complete load for one heavy lorry. Other traffic respectfully gives way to the passage of these monsters, not only because of their ponderous bulk, but because everyone knows that water supplies must have top priority if Israel is to provide a good life for the exiles, and to grow the food which a self-supporting economy demands. It is upon irrigation that the future of agriculture in the south mainly depends; and it is through the pipes of Migdal Gad that the irrigated area is being increased so rapidly. In 1948, the total irrigated area in Israel was about 70,000 acres; now it is topping the quarter of a million mark. But the water experts will not rest content until this area is trebled; only then will they feel that the agricultural possibilities of the country are in a fair way towards being realized. Nor is it only strictly agricultural needs which have to be borne in mind. There are the growing industrial and household requirements of a rapidly increasing population in the cities, the country towns, and the villages to be provided for; as well as the fish-ponds, which enable even bad and otherwise useless land to yield valuable food supplies if only the necessary water is forthcoming. Almost every settlement in irrigated land now has its communal fish-pond—in all they cover 10,000 acres—where excellent carp are bred; and it has been found that several 'crops' can be raised every year even in water which is unfit for human consumption. But water of some kind or other is essential. When this can be made available, fish 'crops' on very poor soil are sometimes more profitable, taken year by year, than 'marginal' cultivation on soil of considerably better quality. But the growth of fish-ponds has been so rapid that there have been some heart-searchings about the desirability of thus using land which could produce other crops; and an official committee has been set up to examine the whole question.

Perhaps the most spectacular use of water, however, still remains the extension of the cultivated area which it makes possible. No one who has watched good but water-starved soil in the Negev being transformed by irrigation into a vast prairie of food and industrial crops can ever forget the sight. In July

1955 the great seventy-mile pipeline carrying the waters of the Yarkon river to the south was opened; and nearly 50,000 acres of land will ultimately reap the benefit. Already branch lines are distributing the water far and wide, bringing an additional £4 to £5 millions worth of crops into sight. In some places, the crops now stretch on both sides of the road to the far horizon with hardly a break, a sight scarcely to be seen elsewhere to-day outside the New World. Section by section, the almost limitless prairie receives its ordained quota of water. The steel sprinkler-pipes are coupled up; the hydrant-cock is turned; the water leaps high into the air. The drops wheel and turn in great arcs and crescents; flashing rainbow-like in the sunlight with all the colours of the spectrum; and forming intricate lace-like patterns, against the bright blue of the cloudless sky, before they fall to earth like the rain which unassisted Nature denies. The sheer beauty of the spectacle holds the onlooker spellbound, quite apart from its significance as a milestone on the road of Israel's progress to economic security. One of Israel's artists might well find inspiration in this sight for a picture which would be prized by posterity.

Water ranks with petrol as the *sine qua non* of the expanding productivity which Israel's economy requires; and it is not surprising that much hard work has been devoted to planning the best use of the supplies which are available. Like petrol, water is almost useless until it is taken where it is most wanted, and in Israel this often involves covering comparatively long distances. The country has a long dry summer, and a short rainy season in the winter. There is but one river of any size—the Jordan: and only its northern half flows through Israel territory. The second most important river, the Yarkon, rises from an accumulation of springs near Tel-Aviv. There are underground water supplies and some perennial springs; these, with stored winter rains, and flood waters, make up with the rivers the sum total of the water sources on which Israel must rely to meet the needs of her economy throughout the rainless season. Broadly speaking, in the north there is more water, but the land available for cultivation is limited and largely taken up; while in the south, where most of the best agricultural land is located, there is hardly any water available. The main problem, therefore, is to bring water from the north to the south, and at the

same time to regulate its supply throughout the whole country. If it were possible to solve this problem by developing the potentialities of the whole Jordan valley region in a scientific way, regardless of political considerations, everyone concerned —Jordan, Israel and Lebanon—would benefit. But Arab hostility has so far obstructed progress. The original Hays plan, drawn up in 1945 on the basis of a study by Dr. Walter Lowdermilk (formerly chief of the United States Soil Conservation Service and now on the staff of the Haifa Technion), could provide all three countries with ample electric power as well as with sufficient water for a complete irrigation system. But a part of the plan depends upon making use of the water which now runs to waste from the Litani and other Lebanese rivers; and the Arab States concerned would not even look at it. Similarly the much more modest project sponsored by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Jordan Valley Development, which Mr. Eric Johnston has been trying to persuade the Arab States and Israel to work jointly, has so far been held up by the reluctance of the Arab States to engage upon any scheme which might give any benefit at all, however insignificant in relation to its total scope, to Israel: and might thus carry with it some implied recognition of the existence of that state.

The Israel Government has therefore been obliged to do the best that it can for the country from the water resources directly under its control, although always keeping in mind the possibilities of the larger regional developments which would become feasible if and when Arab hostility abates at some future time. The utilization and improvement of the available water resources forms an important part of the overall seven years' scheme for agricultural development, prepared in 1953 jointly by the Ministry of Agriculture's Planning Council and by the Agricultural Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. The planning and execution are being carried out by a combination of State and private enterprise, such as is now favoured in Israel. The Ministry of Agriculture exercises supervisory powers over the national water policy and its general administration. Tahal (Water Planning for Israel) looks after the details of large-scale water projects: the Mekoroth Water Company executes and operates such of them as are too large for local enterprise.

Water development in Israel calls for three stages. The first stage, now complete, carried on the work which had been put in hand by Jewish settlements prior to 1948 in the exploitation of surface and underground water supplies. During the last seven years, the underground resources of the coastal plain have been developed to meet the requirements of the increasing population; progress has been made in using springs and rivers to irrigate land in their immediate neighbourhood: and a beginning has been made with the larger task of bringing water from distant sources to the places where it can best be used. Within this period, about 170,000 acres of fresh land came under irrigation. The country is now in the second stage, which forms part of a ten-years' National Water Project drawn up in 1955–56 with the aim of ensuring, at the end of the period, an annual water supply of 1,800 million cubic metres. Of this total, 1,500 million cubic metres will be earmarked for agriculture; it is expected to increase the irrigated area to three-quarters of a million acres, or nearly three times the present figure, which itself needed 500 million cubic metres in 1956.

The main features of the present, second, stage are the reclamation of the Huleh swamps in the north: the irrigation of the Huleh valley from the Dan river: the use of canal water from the Sea of Galilee further to develop land in the Jordan and Beit Shemesh valleys: the supplementing of natural supplies from springs, underground sources and storage tanks with purified sewage water from Haifa to increase intensive cultivation in the western Galilee and Jezreel valley region: and the first and second pipelines for transferring water from the Yarkon river to the Negev and the south. The third stage will complete the All-Israel Water Project by further utilization of flood water in various parts of the country, and by taking the waters of the Jordan river down to the Negev. To ensure continuity of supplies even during a year of drought, the flow of the Jordan will be supplemented by storage dams and artificial lakes. One of the lakes will be situated in the Beit Netufa valley in lower Galilee; and the other at Wadi Sarar in the south. The water from the Jordan will be led by a conduit to the Beit Netufa lake, being pumped to lake-level by power generated through the fall of a branch canal into the Sea of Galilee. From the Beit Netufa lake, water will be passed through a great 108-

inch pipeline to a pumping station in the northern Negev, from which it will be guided over a wide area by 66-inch lines ending in smaller distributaries. The lakes and storage dams, particularly those which will absorb coastal rivulets, will be useful both for flood protection and for increasing local water supplies to lands nearby, in addition to their general function of supplementing the supply to the main Jordan–Negev conduit in case of need.

The reader who has some personal knowledge of the gap which too often separates planning from execution in Asian countries may be inclined to ask at this point what guarantee there is that projects of such magnitude will ever go beyond the stages of the hopeful drawing-board and the doleful pigeon-hole. But from this aspect Israel is an extraordinarily satisfactory country to revisit at short intervals. The observer finds that within the space of, say, twenty-four or thirty-six months, projects which existed only on paper at the time of his first visit have become tangible realities at the time of his second. Mention has already been made of the Yarkon–Negev project, which is already in full operation in spite of its cost and magnitude. The change which it has brought about in the Negev has been noted on an earlier page. There is no reason to doubt that similar success will attend the continuation of the second Yarkon–Negev pipeline, which will convey southwards not only water from the Yarkon river, but also purified sewage water from Tel-Aviv and the surrounding area. To see Israelis actively engaged—often in three shifts, working all round the clock—in giving concrete shape to the designs of the planning authorities is a heartening experience.

The Huleh project is a case in point. It has a long and not uninteresting history. The Huleh basin is a low-lying tract of about 45,000 acres in the north-east of Israel on the Syrian border. Through it run the three streams which eventually make up the river Jordan. The area was thickly populated in Roman times: but neglect of the old drainage system has made it malarious as well as marshy. In the south of the Huleh valley lies a 7,000-acre swamp; south of the swamp is Lake Huleh, a shallow, muddy expanse of 3,500 acres. From the southern end of Lake Huleh flows the Jordan in its recognizable shape. The whole valley had long cried aloud for reclamation and intensive settlement. The

humus is deep; water supplies are ample; and it had been a nuisance for centuries because of the diseases which it spread around. Mortality was very high among people living in the neighbourhood: malignant malaria struck perpetually, particularly at children. Towards the end of the last century, heroic Jewish pioneers founded the settlement of Yesod Hamaala in the face of sickness and danger: but even when more Jewish settlements joined them, the slow progress of their reclamation work showed that no real advance could be made unless the whole area was brought under control.

During the Mandatory times, the Jewish Agency wanted to undertake large-scale reclamation, but was obstructed by Syrian concessionaries, whose original grant from the Ottoman Government was extended from time to time by the Mandatory administration, although they made no efforts at all to satisfy the repeated condition that work should be commenced within a fixed time-limit. In 1934 these concessionaries were bought out by a Jewish concern for forty times their original payment to Istambul; but the experience of the early Jewish pioneers was repeated on a larger scale. It became clear that nothing useful could be done if work were limited to the immediate concession area—the whole region must be cleared according to a master plan. Arab hostility, and the restrictions imposed in 1939 on Jewish land settlement, combined to hold things up for a further period; but after the end of the second world war, the pioneering work which the Jews had already carried out induced the United Nations to include the Huleh basin within the limits of the Jewish portion of partitioned Palestine. In the course of the War of Liberation, Syrian forces advanced into north-eastern Galilee; but when the second truce imposed by the Security Council stopped further fighting, they only retained a salient between Lake Huleh and the Sea of Galilee. The demilitarized zone resulting from the armistice agreement between Israel and Syria, though it included several Jewish settlements like Ein Gev on the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee, as well as the waterway of the Jordan between Lake Huleh and the Sea of Galilee, excluded the Huleh Valley and its marshes. But the Syrian Government has always maintained that Israel is taking an unfair advantage in reclaiming the Huleh region because of the alteration in the terrain that

will result. This contention has been authoritatively refuted by the Mixed Armistice Commission; but Syrian hostility remains unabated, and there have been a number of ugly frontier incidents.

It has been worth while to recount this story because the gratuitous addition of Syrian hostility to grave material obstacles might well have discouraged the Israelis from going further with the Huleh project. Even if there had been no obstruction from the Syrian side, the task might easily have daunted the most intrepid souls. First the Jordan river south of Lake Huleh had to be widened and deepened to lower the level of the lake and drain off part of the marshes. Next, two deep channels had to be dredged, through the marshes and into the lake, to increase the flow away from the marshes, and to assist the drainage process provided by the first stage. These channels meet in the centre of Lake Huleh; and the task of cutting them on the bed of the lake has necessitated the use of special American equipment. Finally additional drainage channels had to be dug through the marshes to dry out the land. At every stage, new difficulties were encountered and overcome. For example, in deepening and widening the bed of the canal in which the river Jordan finds its new and unobstructed flow, it was found necessary to take a detour round about six acres of Arab-owned land, at great trouble and expense, because the owners, now in Syria, would not sell. Again, when reclaimed but water-logged land was being deep ploughed, there was constant sniping at the tractor-drivers from the Syrian side. But the work has gone on steadily. Three years ago there was little to be seen on the spot, except the great mechanical grabs and excavating machines, which were clearing and straightening the channel of the river Jordan south of Lake Huleh, under the suspicious gaze of the Syrian forces, occupying strong points in the hills which overlooked the scene of the operations. To-day the visitor who looks down upon the Huleh valley from the heights to its west realizes that the first two stages of the project have been completed. In place of the former expanse of marshes, there is good, drained land, of which nearly 3,000 acres are already under cultivation. Lake Huleh itself has become visibly smaller, deeper, and more sharply defined, without straggling edges. Among other new crops, rice is being grown: and the natural

peat deposits uncovered by the drainage operations are being used as organic fertilizer. The anopheles mosquito has been banished, and malaria conquered. It is true that the hydro-electric project for the utilization of the flow of the deepened Jordan is still held up by Syrian objections. But the whole Huleh basin has been entirely transformed; a Huleh Authority has been established with a capital of £200,000 to develop the whole area, financed by the Government, the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish National Fund. An annual production valued at more than £1 million is expected. One more of Israel's 'paper projects' has now come into effective being to realize the hopes of the planners.

It would be a mistake to think that the progress of Israel's agriculture depends entirely on great projects, like the irrigation of the Negev and the Huleh reclamation work. The steady expansion of the cultivated area to about a million acres—and further expansion takes place every year—is the result of steady, ceaseless effort along a wide front. Soil conservation, essential to repair centuries of neglect, which had caused the denudation of hills once covered with woods and vegetation, is being undertaken everywhere as a local rather than a national enterprise. Terraces, diversion ditches, regrassing, contour ploughing (compulsory on hillside fields) and the damming of the torrent beds which carry good soil into the sea in times of spate, are also changing the face of the land. Thanks to such enterprises, local and national, the Ministry of Agriculture is making perceptible progress towards national self-sufficiency in food supplies. In terms of world prices, more than half the food consumed in the country is now locally produced. The vitamins necessary for the health of the population are completely supplied by local fruit and vegetables. Half the proteins consumed are also locally produced, and this proportion will increase as the extension of pasturage enables more cattle, sheep and goats to be reared for meat. But the two main sources of calories—sugar and wheat—are still largely imported; little more than a quarter of the annual requirements are produced in Israel. The outlook for sugar, however, is good. Sugar-beet grows well, and already produces enough alcohol to save a great deal of foreign exchange. The acreage devoted to it is being rapidly extended as water becomes available; and two processing factories are

now producing nearly half the 40,000 tons of sugar which Israel needs every year. New sugar-beet fields and new processing factories in the Negev should make the country self-sufficient in sugar within the next few years: and there are good possibilities of an export trade.

Sugar is a good example of one of the industrial crops upon which increasing stress is being laid as the goal of self-sufficiency in food begins to draw nearer. Others are tobacco: oilseeds like sunflower and saff-flower: ground nuts: flax: and—an extraordinarily promising newcomer—cotton. The area under ground nuts, like that under sugar, is rapidly expanding; there are good prospects of profitably exporting both commodities. Cotton, however, is now generally regarded as the 'winner'; Californian varieties grow so well that within a couple of years the acreage under them has been increased tenfold. If the same figures can be maintained, the country will be self-sufficing in raw cotton and oil in about three years: and here again, the outlook for future exports is good. The great advantage of these commercial crops is that they combine the *desiderata* of saving foreign exchange and of providing the raw material for the local industries which bulk so large in Israel's mixed 'town and country' economy. A good many experiments are going on in such places as the Agricultural Research Station at Rehovoth to improve the yield and quality of this kind of crop, and to find commercial uses for wild plants like the juncus, which seems to thrive in saline water and has a fibre which could be used for making paper or jute substitutes. A satisfactory feature of such investigations is the eagerness with which any pioneering results are followed up by the Government, and applied as quickly as possible to the improvement of agricultural production.

Side by side with the industrial crops, field crops and plantation crops are being greatly increased. Progress in extending the area under flour cereals and fodder depends mainly upon the advance of irrigation: at the moment too much turns upon the season. A bad drought, such as that of 1955, can wreak havoc unless water can be brought to save the crops; and when this can be done, as in parts of the Negev, farmers take new heart. The area under wheat is being steadily enlarged: this crop now occupies more than 100,000 acres; but is only about one half the area under barley and oats. Maize (also produced for

bread-making), sorghum and pulses, hay and fodder, so essential for animal husbandry, expand steadily. Enough green fodder is already grown for the needs of livestock; and three-quarters of the fodder grains consumed is locally grown. Vegetables are particularly important in Israel's economy because they are the main source of vitamins, as well as the staple of home-grown food, for many households. When meat was severely rationed a short while ago, much of the population lived mainly on vegetables, fruit, and milk products; and even to-day, when things are a good deal easier, vegetables represent a far more important part of the diet of the ordinary citizen of Israel than they do, for example, in Britain. Vegetable production steadily increases year by year: more than a quarter of a million tons are now marketed annually, half of it from the market gardens of new settlements. It is interesting to find, however, that the acreage devoted to vegetable cultivation tends to remain steady, or even to decrease a little, owing to the heavier crops which better varieties and improved skill produce. To encourage vegetable-growing, the Government maintains a Minimum Prices Fund which provides economic security for the growers; and gives added incentive to raising vegetables in new settlements, thus freeing older settlements to turn to cash crops.

There seems now to be a good and growing market abroad for Israel's melons, tomatoes, carrots, egg-plants, green peppers, and even potatoes, in countries where the winters are more severe than in Israel. But from the point of view of the country's exports, citrus is still the most important commodity, as well as being the basis of an important bottling and concentrates industry. The plantations are extended every year: they now occupy about 50,000 acres, and the purchase of new plots is encouraged by an organized savings movement. Much attention is being paid to grading, packaging and marketing, and there is increasing mechanization to speed up picking and packaging. In 1953–54 eleven and a half million cases were produced, of which over eight million were exported. Such exceptionally heavy crops in one year seem to fatigue the trees; next year the quantity available fell to nine and a half million cases, which seems about the average for the present. Britain is easily Israel's best customer for citrus products—particularly



1. On the way to the Southern Negev

2. Nahal members establish a new settlement in the Negev. The erection of a barbed-wire fence is one of the first jobs

3. Organizing the new settlement

4. Tamar distributes clothing for the week at her Kibbutz in the Negev

5. Sprinkler irrigation in the Negev, on recently arid desert

6. Harvest season



7. The blessed fields of Emek Yizr'el



8. From Roumania to a citrus grove in the Sharon



9. Another immigrant from Roumania



10. Eilat fishermen set their nets for drying



11. Fisherman working at Haifa



12. Haifa

13. Yemenite women weaving baskets

14. This textile spinner is an immigrant from Egypt



15. Oil men in action on the rig at Heletz in the Negev

16. This German-born drill-hand is now a veteran Israeli



17. Welder working on the hull of a ship



18. Mechanic at the Bedek aircraft factory overhauling an aero engine

19. Working on a 66-inch pipe section for the Yarkon-Negev pipe-line

20. Laying the Yarkon-Negev pipeline

21. Immigrant from North Africa

22. Boy from the Yemen

23. Immigrant from America

24. Member of the Habanium Tribe from Hadhramaut

25. Women too, defend new settlements



26. Member of Nahal at Ein Gedi in the Negev entertains her fellow members

27. Independence Day, Tel-Aviv, 1952

oranges—consuming between a third and a half of the total exports. Very large quantities of oranges are used inside Israel: and orange juice, which is both tinned and bottled to provide adequate supplies in the off-season, has become Israel's national drink. Israelis say that no one who has not tasted a fresh Jaffa orange knows to what perfection an orange can attain: and even American visitors, accustomed as they are to the excellent varieties grown in California, seem to agree with them more often than not. Israel, in fact, is a kind of paradise for fruits of many kinds: she grows about 14,000 tons of table grapes and the same quantity of wine grapes every year. Sub-tropical fruit like avocados, mangoes, guavas, loquats and pomegranates do well: some are exported. There is also a promising market for Israel's bananas, now that winter-ripening varieties are being planted in warmer areas for earlier ripening: and some 3,000 tons are exported, while about 13,000 tons are locally consumed.

A very important part of the national programme to improve the diet of the citizen from locally grown products is represented by improvements in animal husbandry. Until 1954, cattle were raised in Israel mainly for milk production, partly because mass immigration greatly increased milk consumption. Thoroughbred dairy cattle were imported to improve the supplies available from the predominating type of cow in the country, which is a cross between the indigenous Syrian and the Friesland. There are now more than 80,000 head of dairy cattle, which give enough milk to cover local consumption. The tendency now is to provide feed from local resources by laying greater stress on grazing, green fodder and silage; and reducing the amount of concentrates in the ration. Mechanization is making good progress both in milking and in marketing operations. At the same time, the development of natural pasturage in the south has given an opportunity for breeding cattle for meat production. The former practice of slaughtering bull calves soon after birth has been stopped—this by itself should give an annual herd of at least 10,000 cattle; for beef and beef cattle, mainly Herefords, have been imported to form the nucleus of a stock of high quality meat cattle. The importance of the stud farm at Acre is growing. A parallel development is taking place with sheep, which until lately were reared mainly for milk and

wool. To the 85,000 sheep which Israel feeds there are being added new breeds, such as Corriedales, which produce good mutton as well as good wool, so that full advantage can be taken of the possibilities of extended grazing on the newly opened Lachish and other regions of the Negev.

In Israel, as in so many other parts of West Asia, the goat presents a real problem. Goat's milk is a great asset to the auxiliary farm: and indeed ranks among the necessities of life in *maabaroth* where the lack of irrigation facilities rules out for the present the development of dairy herds. At the same time the goat, particularly the indigenous variety, is the *bête noir* of the Forest Officer and of everyone else who is trying to clothe barren land with herbage, because of its habit of cropping down to ground level every growing thing which it can find. The policy of the Government is to replace as rapidly as possible the local breed by improved imported varieties like the Zaanen, which are good both for milk and for meat. The process will take time because there are more than 100,000 goats in Israel; but the imported breeds are gaining ground; and, being valuable animals, are better looked after and so do far less damage than the original Arab herds.

Poultry have from the first played a very important part in the domestic economy of Israel. Their meat, and above all their eggs, rank among the best sources of locally produced foods which are available to the population as a whole. The climate favours poultry farming; already there are between three and four million laying hens and a million geese, ducks and turkeys in the country. The favourite breeds of hen are Leghorns for egg production, and crosses with heavier breeds for meat. It has been found far more economical to import these meat breeds than to spend foreign currency on importing frozen meat in the usual way: and a good deal of money has been saved thus during recent years. Poultry meat is still the most important item in the public's meat supply: and there are now dressing plants to supply plucked, cleaned, cellophane-wrapped poultry to the market. The Government aims to keep the poultry population at a level which will provide about 200 eggs a year for every citizen of Israel, and leave a surplus for export. This figure has been pretty well attained, now that egg production has topped the 475 million mark, and about 6 mil-

lion eggs are exported. The hen, moreover, is the pivot of the Government's 'Green Star of David' campaign to encourage 'auxiliary farming' by which the householder grows food in his spare time for his domestic needs on allotments ranging from one-eighth to about half an acre. The poultry, eggs, vegetables and fruit so produced are a valuable supplementary source of food supply; and the Government takes care to help the campaign forward with special seed allocations and supplies of fertilizers.

Of all the factors which have changed the landscape during the last eight years, few make a more immediate impression upon the observer than the progress of reafforestation. There is a national tree-planting plan under which more than 15 million saplings have been planted. These are all raised in tree nurseries up and down the country. Hillsides once bare, as in the Judaean hills near Jerusalem, are now covered with woods. Acre after acre of sand dunes has been pinned down by planting trees, to enable future forests to grow in spots which have been barren for centuries. Trees are grown for shade, for wind-breaking, and for the protection of plantation crops in thickly populated areas; while on lands still sterile they are checking erosion, restoring soil fertility, and altering for the better the whole contour of the landscape. Along all the highways and roads, avenues are growing up: saplings, carefully protected and tended, are seen everywhere by the roadside. The forest area controlled by the Government is now more than 110,000 acres, of which some 17,000 acres has been planted. Natural afforestation, now controlled, covers about 90,000 acres. Even this represents only a beginning of what will eventually be achieved; for 144,000 acres in all are to be brought under intensive reafforestation in course of time. The Jewish National Fund has established forests as national memorials to preserve the names of those who have deserved well of the state: and these are things of beauty which make their own direct contribution to the agricultural renaissance of Israel. Every possible encouragement is given to tree planting, which has become a patriotic duty —and something like a national hobby—in addition to giving a large amount of paid employment. All public bodies, the Army, the Police, colleges and schools, take part in the work. Pine, cypress, eucalyptus, acacia, and carob saplings

are widely distributed to Army and Police camps, to communal and private villages, and to the general public. The Forest Department, with its headquarters at Ilanot, and its eight regional offices, follows the same lines, but on a larger scale, as those laid down during the time of the Mandate. Grazing is controlled, fires are kept under, new species are introduced, forest products—logs, fuel wood, charcoal, props and poles, carob fruit for animal fodder—are scientifically extracted and marketed.

All these developments, from the great national irrigation projects to the elaborate provision for professional agricultural education—24 agricultural schools, 53 extension branches in rural areas, many tuition classes in secondary schools, 16 agricultural training establishments—are giving Israelis, whether *sabra* (native born) or immigrants, a magnificent opportunity to find a prosperous and healthy career on the land. Lectures, newspaper columns, wireless talks, all specially devoted to the farming interests, continue to keep the importance of agricultural settlement, and the prospects now open to pioneering work, prominently in the public eye. At the same time, extensive mechanization serves both to make practicable farming operations in areas which have always hitherto defeated the draught cattle commonly employed for ploughing in Middle Eastern countries, and to relieve the farmer of much sheer manual drudgery, thereby enabling him to lead a fuller life. Since 1948, the number of tractors in the country has multiplied fivefold—there are now about 4,000, three times as many, for example, as there are in Syria and Iraq put together. Combine harvesters, now numbering more than eight hundred, are four times as numerous as when the state was founded. The increase in drills and balers is in proportion. As a result, agriculture ranks among the professions in modern Israel; it offers excellent practical prospects for ambitious young men and women, and it engrosses a very considerable share of the brains, energy and aptitudes of the nation. Yet there still remains discernible a strong strain of the old mystical attraction to the land, which is unconcerned with prospects of material profit, and seeks agricultural pursuits primarily as a means of serving both God and the Nation.

This devoutly religious turn of mind is found most strongly, perhaps, in the *Kibbutzim*, the collective communal villages

which still number one-third (although the proportion shows some signs of decreasing) of all the 720 or so Jewish agricultural settlements in Israel. The characteristic of these organizations is that there is no private property in the ordinary sense: no paid labour is permitted, and everything is held in common. Each man and woman is fed and clothed from the resources of the *Kibbutz*, which finds, according to its means, all that is needed: at first, bare essentials like tools: then books, radios and even scholarships for higher study. As the settlement prospers, so does the lot of the individual become more comfortable. Loans from the Government are paid off first: then the *Kibbutz* can build up its economic life on less austere lines. Everyone contributes the labour for which he is best fitted in the view of the council of management, which is elected, generally for a year at a time, by the whole body of the inhabitants, and has separate committees to deal with each aspect of village life. In return, each individual draws so far as possible what he needs from a common stock. There is a common kitchen, sometimes with a division between milk and meat foods: there is a common dining-room: a common cultural centre. Children are catered for quite separately: first in the village crèche: next in the village kindergarten, and then in the village school. They have their own living accommodation. Each married couple has separate quarters: but the responsibility of educating and bringing up their children is undertaken by the village. Parents and children meet under the 'parental roof' after the parents' working hours, and on Saturdays and holidays.

This type of organization demands a great deal of sacrifice from its members, but has proved itself extraordinarily efficient in conditions of danger and hardship. The ingredients of almost Puritanical fervour, untiring industry, and keen intelligence, so strangely mixed in the members of the *Kibbutzim*, combine to produce an impressive type of pioneers, frugal, hardy and enterprising, as handy with the rifle as they are with the tractor, ready at any moment to fight for their community and their country. The *Kibbutzim* were the rocks against which the violence of the Arab attacks in 1936, 1947 and 1948 spent themselves, mainly in vain. Most of the settlements resisted successfully: the few which were overwhelmed sold their lives dearly.

Each *Kibbutz* thinks, plans and acts as a unit: so that the responsibility of directing the combined energies, and making the best use of the available resources—which to begin with are almost pitiably meagre—is a heavy one. But the general success of the system up and down Israel shows that the direction and guidance given by the management committees are very adequate. Some of the *Kibbutzim* which are long established have built up, by their own exertions, a property of great value in land, stock, implements, machinery, communal and even factory buildings; for the members, though farmers first and foremost, show great aptitude for starting and running light industries and modern processing plants. These older and larger settlements, which may have as many as two thousand members, are show-places of which the whole country is proud. Among the best known is Ein Gev, south-east of Lake Galilee, near the Syrian frontier. Its title to fame rests not only on its reputation as a strong point, whose defenders have stoutly beaten off many attacks, but on the great annual musical festival which it stages, to which foreign as well as Israel artists flock.

It is an exciting experience to visit a *Kibbutz* in its early stages, when the laying-out is barely completed, the roads are still rough, and most of the buildings are still of a temporary nature. To catch the note of proud confidence in the voice which explains how *that* permanent structure is replacing *this* collection of 'pre-fabs': to learn of the difficulties already overcome, and of far-reaching plans for the future: to watch the tireless, round-the-clock work; to see the children, whose buildings are always the first to be finished, fired with the enthusiasm of their elders in pride of the new settlement—all this to realize how enthusiasm and zeal can be canalized into a formidable, purposeful driving force, which defies and vanquishes every obstacle.

Not everyone in Israel agrees with the ideas which inspire the *Kibbutzim*; some people, indeed, reject their austere view of life, find their villages utilitarian and unlovely, and their interference with family life repellent. At the other end of the scale from the *Kibbutzim* are the co-operative smallholder settlements, where each family has its separate holding, leased to it either by the Jewish National Fund, or some other trust company, at a nominal price. Generally hired labour is not

allowed: but neighbours help each other extensively, and there is a strong sense of common interest. Purchases and sales of goods are arranged by a co-operative society; and the same means are used to acquire tractors and other machinery for common use. This mixture of individual ownership and mutual assistance seems to be gaining popularity in Israel, especially among new immigrants, at the expense of the *Kibbutzim*. To enter a settlement is to see neat, well-painted houses, trim gardens full of flowers, and all the evidences of the pride which is taken in a thing personally and permanently owned. If Arthur Young were to visit Israel to-day, he would find in the settlements of this type a further proof of his conviction that it is the 'magic of ownership' which turns sand into gold.

Between the *Kibbutzim* and the *Moshavot* there are several intermediate gradations which seek to combine the good points of both. The *Moshav Shittufi* comes nearest to the *Kibbutz*, which it resembles in accepting strict discipline, communal ownership, and collective work. The difference is that in the *Moshavim Shittufiim* the households are separate establishments like ordinary families, arranging their own meals, bringing up their own children, and doing their own household (as distinguished from the communal) work. In this arrangement large families do best, because they are entitled to draw from the communal resources for each of their members. More numerous than the *Moshavim Shittufiim* are the *Moshve Ovdim*, villages of smallholders cultivating farms of equal size, and differing from *Moshavot* smallholder settlements because each *Moshav Ovdim* is a closed unit, to which newcomers can only be admitted by general consent. Village affairs are controlled, as in the *Kibbutzim*, by a council elected by a mass meeting of the whole village. In the *Moshve Ovdim* no hired labour is allowed; but there is a variant named *Moshavim*—the so-called middle class villages—based on free-enterprise farming and hired labour, with the advantages of co-operative purchasing and marketing (which, indeed, are the common feature of almost every type of settlement). So far the *Moshavim* are less numerous than the *Kibbutzim* or *Moshve Ovdim*; but they are conspicuously well laid out, obviously flourishing, and their houses make greater provision for a gracious life than a purely peasant economy contemplates.

These experiments in kinds of settlement form an interesting study. Differences in type provide for the variations in outlook and in methods which are to be expected when immigrants are drawn from so many nationalities and from such widely removed cultural levels. But one thing all these types share in common—a determination to give of their best in converting Israel once again into a land 'flowing with milk and honey'.

VII

Towards a Balanced Economy

A shrewd observer, who has himself played an important part in shaping the financial policy of the Government, remarked to the present writer that when the State of Israel was established, two problems in particular loomed ahead. One looked very difficult, the other looked comparatively easy. The difficult one seemed to be how to persuade Israelis, whether *sabra* or immigrants, to revolutionize their traditional way of life, and to discard all their ingrained habits, in order to take up manual work, particularly on the land. The problem had to be faced; but looked insoluble. How could shopmen, clerks, financiers, traders and professional men be turned into farmers, industrial workers, builders and pioneers? In comparison with this, the second problem looked easy: it was how to develop the country by loan capital in such a way that Israel would find herself on a sound economic basis before the loans had to be repaid. In fact, the original estimates regarding the relative difficulty of these two problems have been completely reversed. As has been made clear in earlier pages, the people of Israel have taken to manual work, whether on the fields or in the factories, with marked enthusiasm and considerable aptitude; while the management of the country's finances, in spite of all the hereditary skill and instinct which Jews are popularly supposed to possess in such matters, has proved extremely difficult. It is the second problem which must now be briefly examined.

In one way and another, the State of Israel inherited a good deal from the Mandatory régime which was extremely valuable —excellent roads, serviceable buildings, a respectable communication system, reliable statistics, adequate official records, and all the outward trappings of a civilized administration.

These facilities were, it is true, a good deal knocked about and disrupted by the time that the War of Liberation ended: even so, the new skeleton Government which the Jewish Agency was immediately able to provide was much better off than, say, the new Government of Pakistan, which had to extemporize an administration without typewriters, telephones, office furniture and even records. By comparison, Israel was far more fortunate. Indeed, although the new provisional Government would in any case have wanted to make many changes in the machinery which it had inherited, it could easily have built up a balanced economy with the help of the Jews in the Diaspora had no new burdens fallen upon it. The heaviest of these was the increase of the Jewish population by 140 per cent in a few years by immigration. This introduced a major complication, because enormous sums had to be found for resettling and supporting the immigrants until such time as they were able to make some contribution of their own to national development. In the interval, as we have noticed in an earlier chapter, the proportion of the population which was gainfully employed fell alarmingly, with a corresponding increase in the burden which had to be borne by the 650,000 or so Jews who were already in the country in 1948. For this reason, the early years of Israel's independence were a period of great austerity—high taxation: strict rationing: shortage of houses, of meat, of luxuries of all kinds. Hard work, Zionist idealism, and the unifying effect upon the whole community of the hostile attitude of the surrounding Arab countries, combined to carry the young state through danger and difficulty into calmer waters. Not everyone who came to Israel full of high hopes could face the tests of character and fortitude which the situation exacted from them; but the number of those who leave Israel never represents more than a small proportion of those who come to her; and as the years go on, this proportion steadily declines. Since the foundation of the State, 92 per cent of the immigrants have made their permanent homes in Israel.

Without the help of the Jewish community of the Diaspora, Israel could not have coped successfully with the dual task of resettling the immigrants and of building up the enlarged economy which their incorporation necessitated. The Jewish community in the United States, now the most numerous and

the wealthiest in the world, has played a conspicuous part in raising sums far exceeding the thousand million dollars originally contemplated in 1950 through the sale of bonds and the mobilization of private investments. The United States Government has given large grants and liberal technical aid, amounting to more than four hundred million dollars. The Jews of Britain, France and other countries of western Europe have been equally active in proportion to their own resources; countries of the British Commonwealth such as South Africa, Australia and New Zealand have also contributed. The Israel Government has at the same time been careful to provide its own quota, through the financial sacrifices of its people, to the raising of the capital sums required by far-reaching plans for agricultural resettlement and for the exploitation of the natural resources of the country.

The older industries which had been set up by the Jewish community in the time of the Mandate were mainly concerned with the production of consumer goods for local consumption: and with the final processing of articles imported in a partly finished condition. During the second world war, however, industrial development received a marked impetus from the demands of the Allied armies in the Middle East, because only in Palestine were the necessary skills available to make the best use of local materials at the time when the normal sources of overseas supply had been cut off by the dislocation of the shipping routes. For some months, indeed, Palestine remained the only source of such essentials of large-scale industry as industrial diamonds; and valuable experience was acquired in the exploitation and development of the natural resources which were later to pass to the State of Israel. But this expansion was on too small a scale to meet the needs which arose after independence; as late as 1947 there were only some 67,000 Jews employed in industry and handicrafts; and the annual use of electric power by industrial undertakings in terms of kilowatt hours was as small as 84 millions.

From the moment that the State of Israel came into being, it was clear that its survival depended upon a great increase of productivity. Until the day-to-day needs of the rapidly increasing immigrant population could be locally supplied, imports of food and other necessities were required to keep them alive.

Yet such imports were a heavy and constant drain upon the external credits built up in the United States and elsewhere for development purposes. These credits were really intended to be used for the supply of capital goods and raw materials for industry, and for large projects of irrigation, reclamation and resettlement. They were the foundation upon which the national economy was to be erected. They would not last for ever; and it was vital to devote them to their main purpose.

The situation called for a new approach by means of overall planning. Since Israel now possessed its own Government, a national policy for increasing production could be put in hand under the direction of the State. The available resources could be channelled where they were most needed; new industries could be sheltered by protective barriers until they were strong enough to stand alone. Accordingly, the expansion of production was set on foot along a wide front. Foreign and domestic investment capital was to be encouraged to create basic industries to supply local needs and reduce hard currency imports. Government help was to be given to develop primary industries based on natural resources. The goal of self-sufficiency in food was to be sought by intensive resettlement of the land, by the reclamation of tracts hitherto uncultivated, and by a scientific programme of irrigation, backed up by the application of every known device of modern agricultural research to ensure heavier yields of food—and of industrial crops.

The steady progress that has been made in diminishing the gap between total food requirements and local supplies, which has been described in earlier pages, has been parallelled by a corresponding advance on the industrial front. Here the increase in the use of electric power by industry is a useful index to overall progress. The original annual figure of 84 million kilowatt hours in 1947 would not keep Israel's industry to-day in operation even for three months; and every year there are fresh demands upon electric power by new enterprises. Since 1948 these have included establishments for manufacturing steel, pipes, tyres and rubber goods, electrical appliances, paper products, fertilizers, refrigerators, radio sets and diesel engines. Among the more recent enterprises are a lumber mill, three cotton gins, two spinning mills, sugar factories and a large diesel motor factory. A big motor-assembly plant has been operating for some time.

The total investment in industry alone since 1948 is more than £500 million: and in view of the strong attraction which the ideals of the Welfare State exercises in Israel, it is interesting to find that more than nine-tenths of all the industrial enterprises and about four-fifths of the total labour employed fall into the 'private' sector. Half the enterprises, indeed, are owned by private individuals: one-third are owned by partnerships: about one-tenth are owned by co-operative organizations. Among these last is the big Solel Boneh industrial complex owned by Histadruth, which controls a string of enterprises manufacturing building materials, and concerned in the development of heavy industry. This industrial giant controls 148 enterprises employing 23,000 permanent and 30,000 seasonal workers; and includes within its scope foundries, a rolling mill, glass and cement works.

The Government offers liberal facilities to investors. In accordance with a law passed in 1951 for the encouragement of capital investment, an Investment Centre has been set up to supervise the investment procedure in projects which have been approved as desirable for the national economy. Between 1952, when the centre began to function, and 1955, it approved more than five hundred industrial enterprises, representing a capital investment of some £15 millions. Among the concessions which such projects may be given are the exemption of imported capital goods (such as machinery, plant, equipment, tools and other requisites for new factories) from customs duty: exemption, for five years, from the payment of property tax on new buildings and new additions to existing buildings: relief from local authority's taxation: and impressive income-tax concessions, which include special rates of depreciation on buildings and plant: guaranteed maximum rating for five years: and facilities to foreign investors to take out profits and dividends in the currency of the original investment up to a fixed proportion of its value in any one year. Moreover, through the Development Budget, allocations of loan capital are made every year to industry for development purposes: to factories for working capital: to industrial areas for expanded facilities: to enterprises exploiting the natural resources of the Negev in mines, quarries, and chemical deposits: and to electricity undertakings for the extension of services. These allocations are financed

partly from the Independence Bond Issue and partly from internal and external loans. All told, they represent about 17 per cent of the total gross investment in industry during the last few years.

These injections of capital, domestic and foreign, have given a great impetus to the development of basic industries using local raw materials, the prospects before which are very bright because of the natural mineral resources of the Negev. There are now between four and five hundred undertakings connected with the chemical industry, all based more or less directly on the Dead Sea works, with their limitless resources of potash, bromine and other salts: on the phosphate quarries: and on the by-products of the petroleum refineries in Haifa. The market at home and abroad for chemical products is expanding; the pharmaceutical industry, and enterprises manufacturing paints, oils, soaps, and detergents are beginning to share in the increasing opportunities arising out of the local production of basic chemicals. The plastics industry, too, will benefit when its dependence upon foreign sources of raw materials is reduced by the manufacture of resinous chemicals in Israel. The discovery of large deposits of high-grade glass sands in the Negev holds out new prospects of expansion to the glass industry, which already supplies all local needs in sheet glass, bottles and containers; and is now developing table glassware and hotel equipment for the export as well as for the local market. Another valuable industry which has been built up on the basis of purely local materials, and which has excellent prospects for increasing exports to many places abroad, is that which handles food-processing of different kinds. There are now ninety factories producing fruit juices, jams, preserved fruits and vegetables: and the fruit juices prepared in Israel, like the wines—one of the oldest products of the country—which come from Rishon-le-Zion and Zikhron Yaakov, are steadily winning favour in Britain and other countries overseas because of their excellent quality. Paper manufactories and sugar mills, besides meeting all local needs, are expected soon to have an exportable surplus to contribute their own modest share to improving the balance-of-payments position.

The metal industry (including machinery and electrical appliances) is also geared for export as well as for the satisfac-

tion of local requirements. Large and small, there are between three and four thousand establishments, which range from undertakings employing a few highly-skilled craftsmen to big workshops for steel rolling and for the production of seamless and welded steel pipes of many different dimensions. Industrial machinery and equipment is now produced for export as well as for home industry: and although extensive use is made of imported industrial equipment for the most efficient expansion of Israel's industrial enterprises, the home production is steadily increasing its share of the market. Altogether the metal industry employs about 20,000 workers; and the output per head steadily rises in value. The building material industry, as might be expected from the necessity of satisfying the demand arising from mass-immigration, has greatly expanded since the country became independent. Here again the establishments vary in size from great undertakings like Solel Boneh (the Histadruth network which has been already mentioned) to small tile-making factories. The brick manufacturers can now turn out 80 to 85 million bricks a year; the production of plaster has been multiplied sevenfold since 1949. There is a tremendous demand for cement; the single factory near Haifa which could turn out 300,000 tons a year in 1949 has been modernized and re-equipped to produce nearly 450,000 tons. A second factory has started at Ramleh with an annual production of 300,000 tons; a third has been set up of nearly the same capacity. The whole of Israel's needs can now be met; and, in addition, large quantities of cement are exported. There is also a considerable textile industry, with sixteen large mills and about twelve hundred smaller establishments, which, it is hoped, will in course of time satisfy the local demand. There is already some considerable export of cotton goods, as well as of knitwear; and great efforts are being made, through modernization of machinery, and improvements in dyeing and printing, to better the quality—already high in many lines—of the finished articles.

Thanks to this energetic parallel development of industry with agriculture, and to the planning which is designed to increase the effective linking of the one with the other, the national income is steadily increasing. During the last five years, the real income, allowing for changing cost of living, has risen by 70 per cent and the real *per capita* income by about 30 per

cent. Considering that within the same period the population has increased by 50 per cent, the increase in the level of productivity is remarkable. The average *per capita* income expressed in dollars is now 520, which may be compared with 170 in Turkey, 270 in Italy, 450 in the Netherlands and 650 in France. Moreover this increase has been achieved in circumstances which permitted only 40 per cent of the net national investments of £111 million to be devoted to industry, agriculture, irrigation and mining, while no less than 45 per cent had to be allocated to construction and transportation. All this has entailed heavy sacrifices by the people of Israel. The sums collected in taxation by the Government have risen from between £4 million and £5 million in 1948–49 to more than £40 million in 1954–55, with an increase of real value per head of the population from £5 to nearly £20.

There is one specialized industry for the development of which Israel possesses great natural advantages, and that is tourism. For many centuries the land of Palestine has been a centre of pilgrimage for the pious of three great faiths—Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Throughout the years, Christians of every race and sect have flocked to the scenes of the birth, mission and passion of Our Lord: to Bethlehem, to Nazareth, to the green Mount of the Beatitudes, to the lakeside shores of the Sea of Galilee. But above all have they resorted to the Holy City, with its imperishable associations with His boyhood, His manhood, and His passion. Jerusalem is filled with the pious foundations set up by kings and saints on the site of every spot which the life of Christ has made famous: every great church of Christendom has its jealously-guarded rights and prerogatives in the custody of the Holy Places. Muslims, too, have for centuries made pilgrimage to the City which, with the Haram-es-Sharif and the memories of the Last of the Prophets, stands to them second in esteem only to Mecca itself. Finally, to Jews all over the world, Jerusalem is the cynosure of every eye: the symbol of the fulfilment of the ancient prophecies concerning the Ingathering of the Exiles: a unique embodiment of past glories, present sacrifices and future hopes. To all these religions, Palestine is at once sacred and immortal in its significance; and each of the three has erected its own memorials to piety and faith. Crusader castles, Muslim shrines,

and Jewish mausoleums testify in their beauty and magnificence to the devotion of countless millions of pilgrims. Truly the Holy Land has no peer elsewhere in the world. Even while the country lay under the dead hand of Ottoman rule, every year brought many thousands of visitors by sea and by land at the seasons of the great religious festivals; while throughout the nineteenth century a tour of the Holy Land ranked as part of the education prescribed for wealthy young men of almost every country. The peaceful conditions and the improved communications characteristic of the Mandatory period led to an immediate increase of the tourist traffic; and in 1935, the peak year, more than ninety thousand visitors came to Palestine. It has been calculated that perhaps a tenth of this number were Jewish immigrants, who travelled on a tourist visa to bypass the official restrictions on entry; while more than half of the total were residents of neighbouring Arab countries who came on pilgrimage, on family visits to relations, or for commercial purposes. But even when these deductions are made, the number of true tourists must have amounted to some thirty thousand, who brought in foreign currency, swelled the takings of the transport services and of the hotels, and provided a living for that section of the population which attended to their requirements.

When Israel became independent, and Palestine was partitioned between Jews and Arabs, the situation altered radically. Most of the Jewish and Christian, and practically all the Muslim, sacred places, fell outside Israel, and could be visited only from the side of the Arab countries, which refused, except in special circumstances and on special occasions, to sanction traffic across the Israel frontier. Thus the stream of Arab visitors dropped, so far as Israel is concerned, to nothing; while the number of visitors of all kinds arriving by land—until then by far the largest proportion of the total—dried up altogether. On the other hand, the new State of Israel had a strong attraction of its own for Jews from all over the world; and by 1951 the number of visitors, largely Jewish, coming from overseas was only just under thirty-six thousand. This seems to have been a spontaneous unorganized movement of individuals; but it is important, not only because of the assistance which it gave in relieving the country's need for foreign exchange, but also

because it aroused the Government to make special efforts to promote the tourist industry.

As a result of these efforts, which took the form of systematic advertisement abroad, of the provision of additional facilities for travel and accommodation, of concessions to ease both entry and temporary residence, the number of tourists had risen to more than thirty-eight thousand in 1954, and the income derived from them exceeded £3 millions. Since then, progress has continued: in 1955 the number of tourists exceeded forty-eight thousand, bringing more than £2 millions to the Treasury alone, without counting either currency paid for air and sea passages, or other subsidiary expenditure in the country. February 1956 was a landmark, because it brought to the country the 250,000th tourist since Israel became a state. The main feature of this expansion has been the steady growth of the number of organized parties—which are almost everywhere the mainstay of any tourist industry—as contrasted with individual or casual visitors. Excellent hotel accommodation is now available, and the expansion of tourist accommodation is being helped by the Government, with the result that new hotels, new hostels, and new facilities for tourists of every economic stratum steadily increase. Sites of historical and archaeological interest are being made more attractive and easier of access: explanatory tablets are being multiplied for the instruction of the visitor: local museums are springing up. Much still remains to be done; but the present energetic policy and Israel's natural wealth of beauty and interest seem likely to make the tourist industry an increasingly valuable economic asset—particularly in earning foreign exchange.

How have all these developments affected the critical balance-of-payments position, upon which the health of Israel's economy depends? The leeway to be made up can be estimated from the fact that in 1949, exports covered only 11 per cent of imports. As recently as 1951, imports reached a peak of about £114 millions, while exports again lagged alarmingly behind. But by 1954, imports had declined to about £97 millions, while exports crept up to nearly £30 millions, which was double the figure of the previous year. Since 1954, unfortunately, there has been no such marked progress towards closing the gap, for in 1955, although exports remained at about the same level

(itself a tribute to Israel's productivity) they accounted only for 26 per cent of imports, which again increased; partly because of new waves of immigration and larger investments; and partly because funds and resources had to be diverted from commercial and industrial needs to defence and other security requirements owing to renewed evidence of the hostility of Israel's neighbours. In common with many other countries, Israel finds the burden of maintaining adequate armaments a great handicap to her efforts to secure for her people the improved living standards and the increasing amenities which distinguish the Welfare State from less advanced forms of social organization.

Any reduction in the level of armaments, any improvement in her relations with the Arab world, would immediately affect Israel's position for the better. Her export trade now covers some eighty countries, with many of whom she has commercial agreements. As her productivity in agriculture and industry increases, so does the character of her exports alter. In 1949, no less than three-fourths of her exports were in fruit, wine, tobacco and raw materials. The picture has changed; more than half her exports—and the proportion is growing—now consist of articles wholly or mainly manufactured: while food and drink, in spite of the value of the citrus trade and ancillary fruit extracts, have definitely taken second place. There is still a long way to go before Israel achieves the balanced economy, domestic and international, at which she is aiming; but in the policy which she has laid down for herself and in the means which she uses for executing it, she is showing herself both courageous and far-seeing.

VIII

Building a Welfare State

Since the bulk of the population of Israel—about seventy in every hundred—has not been born in the country, the cement which binds the newcomers, with all their different backgrounds and cultural levels, to one another and to the *sabras*—the Israel-born—is all-important. If it is too weak, this nation, made up of so many diverse elements, cannot hope to hold together. It is, therefore, the policy of the Government to strengthen by every possible means the ties of common idealism, common outlook and common interest that already exist; and to create those which may happen to be lacking in particular sections of the population. The main instrument of this policy is the educational system which has been worked out to meet the needs of children and of adults—and very successful it is.

Every child in Israel, whether immigrant or *sabra*, has the right to enter a kindergarten at the age of five free of cost. Those whose parents so desire, and can pay a small fee, may go earlier; but five years is the age when compulsory education begins. Since children under 14 years make up by far the largest age-group of the population of Israel—nearly one-third of the total—the problem of finding educational accommodation for all of them has been difficult. In some West Asian countries, classes under trees have been found useful to make up for the absence of indoor accommodation; but this will not do in Israel. First, the climate is against it: the winter is too cold and wet. Next, Israelis demand that their children must have the best that can be given them: and 'the best' means, at a minimum, proper desks, chairs, and blackboards under a good stout roof. Israel children do not squat on the ground: they sit on chairs or forms. Child immigrants from Oriental countries have to be taught to do this: it is an important step—almost as

important as lessons in elementary hygiene and Hebrew—in fitting them to take their place in the new community which they have entered.

Even so, the differences between the types of kindergarten and elementary school buildings to be found, say, in a new immigrant settlement, in a prosperous and long-established *Kibbutz*, and in one of the 'three cities' are noticeable. In the first, although the arrangements are efficient and work well, there is still a certain amount of extemporization to be observed both in buildings and furniture as compared with the other two. But the crèches and kindergartens opened in immigrant settlements by the Women's International Zionist Organization, and similar bodies, are of a very high standard indeed—at least equivalent to anything in the 'three cities': and the level which they reach sets the norm which the rest are working to attain. As a general rule, the proportion of teachers to children is lower than is theoretically desirable, and elementary school classes are still very large. This is due entirely to the rapid expansion of the educational system which has followed something like a threefold multiplication of the child population; and it is being corrected as quickly as circumstances allow. But the general order and good discipline observed in class, which is characteristic of the Israel child, eases the task of the teachers, relatively few as they are. It seems that elementary school-children in Israel are more anxious to learn than the corresponding age-group in many other countries. Their orderliness in class must be largely self-imposed, because it is certainly not the result of repression: and, out of class, they play as boisterously and as naturally as children anywhere in the world.

The most impressive aspect of the kindergartens and elementary schools up and down Israel is the complete equality which reigns throughout each small community regardless of race or even of economic background. There is no trace of inhibition or sense of inferiority because of colour or of other obvious physical differences among the children. This sense of equality is undoubtedly encouraged by a tendency to something like uniformity in dress—a shirt and shorts for boys, gym-dress for girls—which is almost universal. Many 'private' schools have smart school clothes; but even these follow the general pattern which has become accepted throughout the country. It is in

the schools of Israel that the future cohesion of the country is being shaped; and the form which it is taking must inspire every observer with confidence.

The present educational system was not invented on the spur of the moment—it is the result of evolution and experiment. It has taken its shape partly in response to the needs of to-day, and partly in conformity to traditional attitudes deeply rooted in the Jewish people.

The Jewish people everywhere reverence learning and those who profess it; partly as an end in itself, but also as a means whereby man can approach more closely to the goal of fulfilling the purposes of his Creator by intelligent understanding of His will. In many communities of the Diaspora, learning was for centuries primarily religious in its content, with the Law and its interpretation as the principal subject of study. As successive waves of immigrants entered Palestine, each wave brought with it some of its own characteristic ideas of what the purpose of education ought to be, and of the institutions which ought to be set up if this end were to be satisfactorily achieved. In the time of the Mandate, there was little difficulty in operating such a plan; there were no 'State' schools in the ordinary sense of the term, since the Jewish community looked after its own educational needs; and there was wide latitude about the type of school which could be set up and the subjects which were taught. Education was pretty well diffused; there were already nearly 100,000 pupils in Jewish elementary and secondary schools by 1948–49. Most of these schools were locally maintained, with some help from the Jewish Agency; and with the exception of the teaching arrangements for such traditional subjects as Jewish history and the Law, there was a great deal of local variation in the methods of instruction as well as in the curriculum.

Soon after Israel became a State, the Government's basic policy, as approved by the Knesset in the Act of 1949, called for free compulsory education for all children from the age of 5 to the age of 14; and for all boys aged 14 to 18 who did not finish elementary school. But of what should this education consist? The variety of local and sectional opinion was embarrassing. Some parents wanted to lay stress upon compulsory religious instruction: others (though fewer) objected to this on

principle: yet others were equally determined that overriding emphasis should be laid upon secular subjects. Even sharper was the cleavage between those who wanted their children to be brought up in accordance with their own ideas, social, political and economic: and those who insisted that the state must lay down a universal standard curriculum which every embryo citizen of Israel should study, regardless of the political or other tenets of the parents. There was general agreement, of course, that the Arab community in Israel required separate, though parallel and not inferior, arrangements.

The basic policy contemplated the ultimate development of a standard system of education in all elementary schools, through the medium of a compulsory minimum curriculum; but to avoid too abrupt a break with the past, this was not, in the initial stages, to impair the right of the parents to decide the general trend of their childrens' education. The State also guaranteed to provide religious education for the children of all parents who demand it, but not to make such instruction compulsory. The prevalent variety in the kinds of education given in different schools all over Israel was recognized by accepting the co-existence of 'trends' embodying the particular types of education given in the institutions maintained by such organized bodies of politico-religious opinion as Labour, General Zionists, Mizrahi and Agudath Israel. The first and second groups are distinguished by primarily political differences, the one moderate Socialist, the other Liberal. The third and fourth are religious: both advocate the strict observance of the Torah as a guide for the institutions of Israel; but the former is less traditional in its outlook, especially in its demand for the social and economic equality of women, than the latter. Meanwhile, the foundations of a national system of education were laid down; arrangements were made to impose local education levies, to determine the dates of registration of five-year-olds for compulsory elementary schooling, and to regulate the transfer of children from the schools of one 'trend' to the schools of another. Shortage of teachers caused a good deal of difficulty at first, particularly in elementary schools; but the normal period of training was shortened to enable students entering the teaching profession to begin their active work before taking the final examination which would set the seal upon their qualifications.

Thanks to a certain amount of extemporization, the system began to function sooner than could reasonably have been expected: and the 'trends' were given administrative powers over their particular schools, even when these schools were State-maintained.

In 1953, there was a tightening up; and the outlines of a State educational structure were firmly limned by the State Education Law which the Knesset adopted in August. The administrative powers hitherto exercised by the 'trends'—including their special Teachers' Training Colleges—were abolished; the supervision and organization of all State schools were vested in the Ministry of Education. That Ministry further laid down a standard curriculum for all elementary schools; providing also for the necessary local variations by allowing the inclusion of supplementary subjects up to one-quarter of the whole time-table. There has been no attempt to prevent privately-owned schools and schools maintained by municipalities and other public bodies from functioning autonomously. But while they remain free to work outside the network of State schools, their curriculum, their standard of teaching, and their buildings must be approved by the Ministry. These standards are reasonably fixed and fairly operated, so that there has been no forcible 'ironing-out' of differences springing from the different demands of conscience among particular groups of opinion. Moreover, outside the field of primary education, there has so far been no attempt to secure uniformity by legislation.

This judicious mixture of central control combined with local flexibility seems well suited to the needs of Israel's varied child-population. Since it was instituted, the number of pupils under instruction has grown by twenty-five thousand or thirty thousand every year, and is now more than three hundred thousand—a high figure for a country whose total population is still well under two millions. There are now more than 15,000 teachers, and their numbers are being rapidly increased as the output of old and new training colleges enlarges every year. The language of instruction is Hebrew except in the case of the Arab schools; and the majority of schools at all levels are co-educational, boys and girls sharing the same instruction, with different emphasis upon handicrafts and games.

We have already noticed that it is in the elementary schools

that the unity of the many racial components now present in Israel is being achieved: and common instruction in Hebrew is among the most effective of the agencies employed in the process. While most of the children who begin their education at the age of five know some Hebrew words, or at least are familiar with the sound of them from prayers, very few, except those born in Israel of Israel parents, can use Hebrew as a written or spoken language. Since all learn it together, and since the advertisements of consumer goods on hoardings, sky-signs, and in the markets, are all in the Hebrew language, boys and girls quickly find it the key to everything which either interests them or concerns them. Hebrew is the first step on a staircase of learning which enables any bright boy or girl in the elementary school to win a scholarship, awarded by the Government or by local authority, which will take him or her through the secondary school, the agricultural school, the vocational school, and so on to the Hebrew University, or the Haifa Technion—which is the 'Massachusetts Institute of Technology' of Israel. Throughout the entire educational structure there runs a definite philosophy, which is defined by the Education Law of 1953 as the determination to base fundamental education in the State on 'values of the heritage of Israel and the achievements of science, on love for the country and loyalty to the State of Israel and the Jewish people, on training in agriculture and manual labour, on pioneering, and on striving towards the creation of a society built on freedom, equality, tolerance, mutual help and love of humanity'. This is a noble ideal; and there are those in Israel who argue that the time has come when it should be applied in legislative form to the whole educational structure, and not only to elementary education, as is the case to-day.

The educational curriculum of most schools in Israel has a strongly practical bent, with emphasis upon the local conditions in which the pupils are growing up. Manual work in the school gardens and in the workshop is co-related with present-day needs and with the basic materials and agricultural problems to be found in Israel. Children are taught to acquire a thorough knowledge of their country, including the conditions which prevail in different regions of it; and their basic training prepares them efficiently for later studies, which will equip them

to enter agriculture, industry, commerce or the learned professions. To judge from the type of boy and girl to be encountered both in the secondary and the vocational schools, this system of training is very successful. The teen-agers of both sexes are alert and lively, cheerful, high-spirited, full of intellectual curiosity, able to talk to visitors easily and without inhibition, proud of their school and proud of their country.

Since Israel's reliance must be placed, for so far ahead as can be seen, rather upon the quality than upon the numbers of her population, there is general agreement upon the immense importance of her facilities for higher education. Her future prosperity, nay more, her very existence, may depend upon the success of her men of science and her men of learning in finding ways to make the best use of her national resources, material and spiritual. It is as vital that boys and girls of outstanding talent should be encouraged to fit themselves to become pioneers in the intellectual field as that their classmates, less gifted in such specialized activities, should take their full part in pushing forward into the waste places the physical frontiers of ordered development.

The urgency of this matter is shown by the experience of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, whose importance in the life of Israel has greatly increased with the emergence of the State into independence. The Hebrew University was opened in 1925 in the time of the Mandate. Before the outbreak of the second world war it had already acquired an international reputation for specialized studies in science and in the humanities. In addition to these two faculties, it contained schools of Agriculture and Education: the Jewish National and University Library of half a million volumes: and a University Press, which published works in Hebrew and English dealing with Jewish and Oriental studies, as well as with a wide range of scientific and philosophical treatises. By 1948 it had become a real focus of Jewish national pride and, had shown itself successful in keeping the intellectual life of the Jewish community in Mandated Palestine in close touch with the currents of international learning throughout the world. But at the very moment when it might have been expected to play an invaluable part in providing the new State of Israel with the doctors, jurists, teachers, research workers and administrators which were

needed, the University suffered a crippling blow. Its splendid site on Mount Scopus became inaccessible in the course of the War of Liberation: its library, its laboratories, its press had all to be left behind. As a result, it had to meet the new demands which came upon it from every quarter by means of a difficult process of extemporization. Side by side with the serious problem of finding buildings for laboratory work and class work within the overcrowded conditions of Jewish Jerusalem, it had also to make available to Government many teachers whose services were urgently required for the new technical departments of the State, concerned with agricultural development, the survey of natural resources, the increase of food production, and many other practical problems.

Undaunted by these difficulties, and aided by the loyal support of Jews everywhere inside and outside Israel, the University authorities not only maintained continuity of existence, but extemporized new ways for meeting the new demands upon them. Hired buildings, to the number of more than forty, were taken into use where they could be found; police stations, residential flats, offices, shops, basements, were all pressed into service. The students crammed themselves into small cubicles, overflowing on to staircases and into the streets. Not only did teaching go on, but the number of students steadily increased. In 1948 there were fewer than nine hundred, to-day there are more than three thousand on the rolls, of whom nearly a thousand are women. The demand for new faculties was boldly met. In 1949 the Hebrew University Hadasseh Medical School was established: to it a School of Dentistry and a School of Pharmacy have since been added: a faculty of law was opened. Since then the School of Education has been reorganized to meet the growing need for secondary school teachers, created by the influx of immigrant children and the introduction of compulsory education—an immensely important task which has been helped by the National Council of Jewish Women in the United States. The University School of Education has now become the Department of Secondary and Higher Education in the Central Institution for Teacher-Training established by the Ministry of Education and Culture. By 1952 the School of Agriculture had developed into a full-fledged faculty, in which students proceed through an eighteen-months' course in the

natural sciences at Jerusalem to three years practical work at the establishment at Rehovoth; the last year being devoted to specialization in some branch of agriculture. Part of the course covers agricultural engineering, which is jointly taught by the University and by the Haifa Technion. In 1953 a faculty of Social Services, identical with the Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences, became the latest addition to the Hebrew University. The University is also among the foremost agencies in promoting adult education; working in close co-operation with the Ministry, the Jewish Agency, and Histadruth, it conducts a widespread campaign of classes, lectures, and study-circles arranged to suit many different needs and aspirations. The Ulpanim (academies), designed specially for the cultural integration of adult immigrants in their spare time, have many thousands of students throughout the country.

Although handicapped by inadequate accommodation, congested classes, and the absence of any adequate provision for students' residence, the Hebrew University is showing itself fully capable of playing a great part in building up the cultural and intellectual life of the country. But its services are not limited to this function, indispensable as it is for a sound and healthy national life. The University can claim, and with justice, that it is not only the University of Israel, but also the University of the Jewish people everywhere. Many students from the Diaspora come to its Institute of Jewish Studies for which it lays down proficiency-standards. Professors and lecturers from a number of countries serve upon its faculties on exchange programmes and under various trusts and grants, such as those arranged by the English Friends of the Hebrew University. It is typical of this close connection between the Hebrew University and the Jewish communities outside Israel that the books in the University library left behind on Mount Scopus are being steadily replaced with their help. Like the University itself, the library is split up—actually between no fewer than eight buildings.

The provision of better accommodation has long been a pressing need, and some time ago it was decided to build a new campus on a 125-acre site at the hill of Givath Ram, in one of the most beautiful parts of Jerusalem. These premises, when completed, are designed to supplement rather than to supersede

the older buildings on Mount Scopus, but for the present at least they will have to stand as the main seat of the University. The site will provide for a large botanical garden as well as for two large faculty buildings: for the University library: for an administrative building, an art school and museum, swimming pools and gymnasia. A long-felt need will be met by the erection of students' hostels; for shortage of accommodation and high rents have made the lot of the student in Jerusalem a difficult one of late. Moreover the present congested conditions of University life will be further eased by the re-location of the Hebrew University Hadassah Medical School, with its Schools of Dentistry and Pharmacy, its University hospital, its medical library, its School of Nursing, and its administrative offices, in Ein Karem, about six miles west of Jerusalem. The cost of all these developments, which will not be far short of £10 millions, will be met partly by the Government, but mainly by the special efforts of the Jewish people both in Israel and abroad. The time when the University could maintain itself wholly on voluntary contributions has long gone; grants are now received both from the Government and from the Jewish Agency. This 'official' recognition and help are well deserved; for the State calls freely upon the Hebrew University for the services of men who combine their University duties with research and administrative work undertaken on behalf of the nation.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem is the only university in the formal sense of the word which exists in Israel to-day; but there are a number of other institutions for higher study which also play an important part in the intellectual life of the country. Traditionalist tendencies in higher Jewish education require special satisfaction in an atmosphere slightly different from that of the ordinary modern university; and to meet this need the Mizrahi organizations in Canada and the United States sponsored a new college in 1955, which bears the name of the late Mizrahi leader, Rabbi Bar-Ilan. This is now functioning at Bnei Brak, near Tel-Aviv, where youths who seek a college education of the prevailingly religious tone sanctioned by ancient Jewish tradition can find what they desire. In addition to a faculty of Jewish studies, there are faculties of the natural sciences, the social sciences, and philology. Besides the Bar-Ilan College, the citizens of Tel-Aviv–Jaffa, who count

themselves one in every four of the entire population of Israel, enjoy local educational facilities in the shape of separate institutes for natural sciences, Jewish culture, accountancy a school of law and economics, and a new institute of forensic medicine jointly sponsored by the Government and the Hebrew University's Hadassah Medical School. Thus without going outside Tel-Aviv, it is already possible to take courses in natural sciences, physics, mathematics, the humanities, the Bible and the Talmud, philology, philosophy, psychology, pedagogy, law, economics, political science, accountancy and forensic medicine. Certain of these courses are intended mainly for secondary school teachers desiring higher training; but others are intended for the general student and for the specialist. This complex of institutions, which already caters for nearly two thousand students, is a university in embryo. There is an understandable local demand that Tel-Aviv–Jaffa should, like Jerusalem, possess its own 'real' university with recognized degree courses. Whether there will in future be room for another first-rate university of international repute in Israel remains to be seen; the answer must depend largely on whether the present high proportion of young people relative to the population as a whole can be regarded as a quasi-permanent or as a purely transitory phenomenon. This is turn is dependent upon the type and volume of immigration during the years immediately ahead. To-day there is certainly considerable pressure upon existing facilities for higher education, in spite of all efforts to expand them; and it is a good deal more economical for students to find these facilities near their homes than to incur the expense of living accommodation in a distant university centre. But if the present student-population should show signs of falling, either relatively or absolutely, it might well be wiser to limit the scope of the educational institutions of Tel-Aviv–Jaffa to the provision of either specialized, or of pre-university courses, so that the Hebrew University of Jerusalem should retain the position as the university *par excellence* of a nation whose total student population cannot, in the nature of things, suffice to nourish adequately more than a certain number of first-rate faculties of higher studies.

Science, both pure and applied, has long been highly esteemed among the Jewish people, who have contributed signi-

ficantly to its progress in many countries of the Diaspora. In Israel, the provision for its study is, as might have been expected, correspondingly liberal. The foundations for this were already laid during the Mandatory period, which saw the opening of the Haifa Institute of Technology—now generally known as the Technion—for the training of engineers in 1925. Between that date and 1949, nearly a thousand Jewish engineering graduates of various categories were turned out from the Engineering School and the Technical High School, which together make up the Technion; and a gradual extension of the number of faculties had taken place. In 1953 occurred a notable landmark in the Technion's progress; it was transferred from its old congested quarters in Hadar Hacarmel to a magnificent 300-acre site given by the Government on Mount Carmel itself. Four of the new buildings, the faculty of aeronautics, the wind tunnel, and two students' hostels have been completed, and work on six others is going on rapidly. The majority of the students—1,800 out of some 2,500—still take engineering, whether civil, mechanical, chemical, aerodynamic or agricultural; and in the autumn of 1956 a new Department of Mineral Engineering was created. There is also provision for the study of architecture, electro-technics, general science, industrial management, the industrial use of radio-active materials, and oil technology. Before long, a separate department of metallurgy is to be organized. In all the faculties and departments, emphasis is laid not only on a sound general knowledge of the subjects of study, but also upon the particular problems which the students, when they have qualified, will be called upon to face when they undertake development work in the conditions prevalent in Israel. Year by year, numbers of special research projects are commissioned by the Government, and financed by such bodies as the Ford Foundation, the Fohs Foundation, and the Israel Scientific Research Council—a body attached to the Prime Minister's Office which organizes and co-ordinates scientific research throughout the country, and advises the Government on all development plans related to science and technology. Two special pieces of aerodynamic research have been commissioned by the United States Air Force. There are more than three hundred members of the teaching and research staff, drawn from a considerable number of countries: and there

is an Extension Teaching Service which provides, among other things, for the needs of men and women who can only attend classes in the evening, after their day's work is done.

In addition to these three centres of higher learning—Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv–Jaffa, and Haifa, Israel also possesses a fourth, at Rehovoth. The earliest of the group of noteworthy institutions located in this charming and well-wooded township is the Central Institution for Agricultural Research, which was set up in 1921. It has a remarkable record of success in isolating and solving the characteristic problems presented by the policy of extending cultivation in the Negev: by the need for improved methods of soil conservation in the north: and by the necessity of carrying out extensive drainage schemes for the swamps in the Huleh and Jezreel areas. The Agricultural College of the Hebrew University is also situated here. But the pride of Rehovoth—and of Israel—is the Weizmann Institute of Science, founded in 1949 to commemorate the seventieth birthday of the great scientist who had dedicated a long life to promoting both scientific research and the cause of Zionism before he became Israel's first President. The Weizmann Institute embraces a number of buildings; the Daniel Sieff Research Institute (founded in 1934) which now incorporates the Institute for Physics and Physical Chemistry: the Wolf Laboratory: the Huber Library: and the new Institute for Bio-chemistry, Bio-physics and Technology. When the President died in 1952, the Government decided to dedicate to his memory a wide area round the house where he had lived, and from which he had inspired the creative activities which had built Rehovoth into a great and world-renowned centre of research. There is a fine entrance gate, an avenue, and a plaza for group activities, to add to the amenities enjoyed by the research workers, the students, and the visiting scientists who come from many countries to follow the fundamental investigations into the exact sciences for which Rehovoth is famous. There are departments for applied mathematics, for electronics, for optics, for nuclear physics, for isotope research, for polymer research, for biophysics, for organic chemistry, for petroleum chemistry, for experimental biology, for bacteriology and for plant genetics. A large electronic computer has been constructed and assembled to assist in the solution of complicated problems. The

research faculties which Rehovoth can provide for post-graduate students are strikingly complete; and work of first-rate importance and originality is being carried to successful conclusions in many branches of science. The Institute's isotype separation plant is the only source of highly-enriched oxygen isotypes in the world; there is a growing demand for them from other countries. It is no small advantage to Israel that she can harness scientific brains and scientific methods to the task of finding the best answers to many of the problems connected with her in-industrial progress and the exploitation of her natural resources. But scarcely less important to her is the principle, for which the Institute has always stood, that the pursuit of 'pure' science through fundamental research lies at the root of all advancement in scientific knowledge.

Although education justly ranks high among the priorities in Israel to-day, it is only one among several means through which the ideal of the Welfare State is being pursued. Its influence is greatest on the younger sections of the community; its importance is more limited for adults, and especially for adult immigrants who have arrived too late to experience fully its benefits. To them, provision for health, for social welfare, and for cultural life, figure considerably more prominently than education among their immediate requirements.

The great Ingathering of the Exiles which followed the establishment of Israel as an independent State raised the problem of the nation's health in a new and acute form. Throughout the Mandatory period, the Jewish community in Palestine maintained its own efficient arrangements for health, as for other indispensable services. Two great institutions were responsible, under the co-ordinating supervision of the Jewish Agency, for the health of the Jewish population—the Hadassah Medical Organization, sponsored by the Women's Zionist Organization of America; and Kupat Holim, the public health organization of Histadruth. Hadassah operated a network of hospitals and clinics up and down the country, providing both curative and preventive services in cities, towns and villages; while Kupat Holim organized the majority of the Jewish working population into a comprehensive health insurance scheme, financed by voluntary contributions, and backed by some well-equipped hospitals and a large number of clinics. Considerable care was

devoted to the prevention either of overlapping or of rivalry; with the result that the Jewish community in Palestine enjoyed a standard of health, an expectation of life, and a nadir of infant mortality which were entirely foreign to West Asia and could compare favourably with the general levels then prevailing in northern Europe and North America.

Excellent as this system had proved itself, it would inevitably have required some adjustment to the new conditions in which the Government of Israel became entitled to supreme directional authority over the Jewish community in Palestine. In any event, a system which had flourished on a voluntary basis among a population enjoying comparatively high economic standards and an advanced level of intellectual development soon proved quite inadequate to cope with the enormous flood of new immigrants who poured into the country. Many of them were completely destitute, chronically diseased, broken by hardship, and—in the case of those coming from the Middle East, Asia and North Africa, who made up half the total—entirely unfamiliar with even the minimum requirements of hygiene. The high proportions, which have been remarked on in an earlier chapter, of the very old and the very young, would by themselves have overstrained the medical arrangements which had worked so well up to the time of the disappearance of the Mandatory Government. Amongst the consequences of the advanced standards of health prevailing among the Jewish community during this period was the fact that there were only a few dozen hospital beds available for chronic cases all over the country. Yet more than 50,000 of the immigrants were over sixty years of age, with a substantial proportion of chronic cases which needed immediate hospitalization. Twenty per cent of the total arrivals were children under nine years of age—and there were only 225 beds for infants and children available. Moreover an appreciable number of the immigrants were permanently handicapped and needed wholly separate arrangements—to meet which a separate organization, somewhat outside the ordinary run of medical institutions, had to be set up. The excellent work done by Malben, the organization for the care of handicapped immigrants sponsored by the American Joint Distribution Committee, has been noticed on an earlier page: but it may be convenient to mention here that since its

foundation in 1949, Malben has cared for more than 100,000 people. It provides at present for the needs of some 700 of the chronic cases in custodial care centres, of which it has five. It looks after about 400 mental patients in special institutions; and cares for more than 3,300 aged people in twelve old-age homes.

The invaluable work of Malben has relieved other organizations of the necessity of dealing with one difficult and highly specialized factor in the general problem of public health in Israel to-day; but the strain which mass immigration imposed upon the health services which had worked so satisfactorily up to 1947 is clearly shown by the statistics of infant mortality. In that year, 1947, the infant mortality for each thousand of Jewish live births was only 29. Next year, it rose to 37: by 1949 it had attained to what fortunately looks like an all-time record height of 52. Next near saw a decline to 47: by 1953, it had fallen below the 1948 level, and it will soon be back to the satisfactory figure attained in 1947—or even below it. This result testifies clearly to the drive and to the devotion which have been characteristic of Israel's effort to master the health problems caused by the virtual trebling of her population through immigration in the short period of eight years.

The vesting of overall control over the health of the country in an official Ministry of Health, empowered to invoke in case of need the executive authority of the Government of which it forms a part, has greatly assisted both in directing the available resources to the utmost general advantage and in protecting the country from the dangers which the former, purely voluntary system of health organizations might have experienced difficulty in obviating. One among many instances of this latter function may be cited as an illustration. Four years ago, it was decided to authorize the immigration of two thousand persons from those members of the ancient Jewish community of Cochin who desired to leave India for Israel. But investigation (which would have been difficult except upon a Government-to-Government basis, such as Hadassah or Kupat Holim by themselves could scarcely have arranged for) showed that some 20 per cent of the Cochin population suffered from filariasis. To allow this disease to appear in Israel, where the culex mosquito, which is its carrier, is of common occurrence, would have been to incur serious risk to the health of the country. But the Minis-

try of Health was able to insist upon a special treatment being laid down for immigrants from Cochin. This precaution has been so successful that not a single case of local filariasis infection in Israel has been detected in the course of four years.

The creation of a Government health service, which co-ordinates and supplements, without displacing, the admirable arrangements made by Hadassah and Kupat Holim, has not been altogether easy. The voluntary services provided by both had developed, as we have noticed, to a high level of efficiency before the Government of Israel came into existence; and all that the Government had to build its own services upon was a handful of officials left over from the Mandatory administration, who, in any event, had been concerned almost exclusively with the health of an Arab population which no longer constituted a majority in the country. Yet in less than a decade, the Ministry of Health has expanded into an organization which employs more than 4,000 persons who staff nineteen hospitals, fourteen health centres—one for each sub-district in the country—and a number of mobile medical units. This organization has shown itself flexible in structure. Two years ago, a policy of decentralization was put into force to enable the district offices of the Ministry to exercise Ministry functions within their own area, with the object both of meeting local requirements more effectively, and of providing for the closer association of representatives of the local authorities and local populations with the administration of their hospitals and with the promotion of public health. To carry out this plan, five district and fourteen sub-district offices were set up.

The Ministry of Health is officially responsible for hospital maintenance: mother and child care: sanitation: epidemiological, nursing, and pharmaceutical services: arrangements for the prevention and treatment of malaria and tuberculosis: mental hygiene: and public health laboratories. But although there is an inevitable tendency for its functions to increase in response to the development of public policy—for example, the 'Ship to Village' immigration plan has necessitated a considerable expansion in the responsibilities, and hence in the importance, of the local health offices within whose jurisdiction the new immigrants find themselves—it continues to rely upon the work of the Hadassah Medical Organization and of Kupat Holim to

supplement its own efforts. Both organizations have expanded their activities to meet the new calls upon them. Hadassah, besides sponsoring the new Medical School of the Hebrew University since its foundation in 1949, maintains 3 hospitals, 27 clinics, and 34 mother-and-child welfare stations. It now tends to specialize in the three fields of preventive medicine, mother-and-child care, and health education. Kupat Holim not only provides medical aid for all members of Histadruth, but also, by arrangement, affords a similar service to members of certain other organizations—together totalling over a million people. To carry out this great task, it maintains thirteen hospitals—including some of the finest and best equipped anywhere in the world—twelve convalescent homes and nearly nine hundred clinics, staffed by more than six thousand doctors, dentists, pharmacists and nurses. The work among the immigrants is remarkably successful. By arrangement with the Jewish Agency, new immigrants are insured free of charge with Kupat Holim for their first three months in the country, and are allowed a substantial reduction—in some cases total remistion—of ordinary fees for the next full year. The health services of Kupat Holim extend to remote areas, and play an important part in the fight against malaria and other diseases to which immigrants may be liable. They have been largely responsible for a rapid decline in the infant mortality rate among this section of the population.

The expansion of the health services in Israel since 1949 can be judged by the increase in hospital beds from 4,626 in that year to about 12,300 to-day. In spite of the trebling of the population since the State came into existence, the ratio of hospital beds for every thousand of the population has risen from 5·33 to nearly 7. Out of a total of 102 hospitals, 20 are maintained by the Ministry of Health; these between them provide some 40 per cent of the beds available throughout the country. Israel is remarkably well supplied with medical personnel; there is one doctor for every 440 persons (as compared with 960 in Britain and 1,200 in France): while each dental practitioner in Israel has a mere 1,300 possible patients, as compared with 4,000 in Britain and 4,200 in France. First Aid is largely in the hands of the Red Shield Society (the Israel equivalent of the Red Cross) which with a membership of more

than twenty thousand, maintains branches, blood banks and ambulances in many parts of the country. An institution which has already proved its value in securing for the Government expert advice upon general and particular problems of public health is the Advisory Medical Council set up three years ago. This consists of some forty of the most outstanding medical men in Israel; it meets every month to discuss the recommendations of fourteen expert committees which keep under constant review matters connected with mother-and-child care: industrial hygiene: nutrition: medical legislation: forensic medicine: epidemiology: pharmacology: and similar indispensable attributes of a modern public health system.

No observer can escape the conclusion that the present health services, both Governmental and institutional, represent one of the most remarkable achievements of the State of Israel. In spite of all the difficulties which had to be faced, the health of the whole population, so far from being lowered by the influx of new immigrants from relatively backward countries, has actually improved; while the health standards of the immigrants themselves have been completely transformed for the better. No major epidemic occurred even in the earliest and most difficult days of mass immigration. Tuberculosis cases are now completely hospitalized. The expansion of the accommodation in hospital beds has been more than matched by the increased provision for mental cases. Side by side with the reduction of the infant mortality rate, which has been already noticed, the maternal mortality rate has been lowered to the level of 0·8 per cent of live births. The life expectation has risen from 65·2 years in 1949 to 67·3 years for males, and from 67·9 years to 70·1 years for females—figures which compare well with any that the most progressive countries in the New, as well as in the Old, World can show. Along with this, the incidence of such common diseases in the Middle East as typhus, typhoid and diphtheria has been drastically reduced.

The progress achieved during the last few years in education and public health may before long be matched by advances resulting from the improved provision for social welfare which has been made over the same period: but the science of social welfare is a relatively new one everywhere, and Israel, like other countries, is learning from experience as she goes. By its very

nature, social welfare work attracts a great variety of voluntary effort; and where, as in Israel, voluntary organizations have been first in the field, it is not easy to prevent overlapping of function and duplication of work. During the period of the Mandate, quite a large number of these voluntary organizations were working in Palestine. They all fell under four main headings: women's organizations, which specialized in child and youth welfare and care of mothers: youth movements, promoting the political and social fitness of their members to play their part in building up Israel: immigrant organizations, some working among immigrants of every kind, others concerned mainly with particular groups: and religious and philanthropic organizations, some with a universalist outlook, others looking after special-interest groups. Not only was there considerable overlapping among the organizations in each of these four groups, but also, since all of them were concerned to play their full part in helping immigrants of one kind or another, there was much duplication of effort between the groups themselves. In addition to these, but commanding the semi-official status and the larger resources which put them in a wholly different category, were the Welfare Department of the National Council of Palestine Jews, established in 1932: the various welfare activities of the Jewish Agency: and the social services provided for its members by Histadruth.

The emergence of the State of Israel, and the problems which faced it so early in its career, led to an intensification, greatly needed, of the work of all these organizations. Without them, it is difficult to see how the task of receiving, accommodating, and caring for the immigrants could have been undertaken with any hope of success. At the same time it became plain that the Government itself must enter the field of social service; partly to supplement the work of the older voluntary organizations, and partly to insure that their activities fell into line with the broad requirements of its own policy. Accordingly, a Ministry of Social Welfare was created very soon after the establishment of the State.

It will be clear from the circumstances set out above that considerable sectors of the total field of welfare work were already 'occupied' either by voluntary or by semi-official organizations. Some of these latter, like the Jewish Agency and

the various municipal authorities acquired, of course, official status forthwith. In these 'occupied' sectors the new Ministry had to satisfy itself that the ground was adequately covered and to make good any 'patchiness' which scrutiny might reveal. At the same time, there were other sections of welfare work, such as the provision of adult and youth probation services, adoption cases, and any national insurance schemes which might be instituted, which only the State itself could administer. Accordingly, the Ministry wisely adopted the policy of working in the closest possible liaison with the voluntary and semi-official organizations without attempting to supersede or displace them, while endeavouring tactfully to co-ordinate, and in some instances to supervise, the working and conduct of the institutions which they had set up. It is worth noting, in this context, that in one particular field—the social welfare of infirm immigrants—the Ministry has been content to leave the whole responsibility in the capable hands of the Malben organization.

The general trend of development throughout the field of social service has, during recent years, been in the direction of co-ordination of effort under the guidance of the Ministry. A representative Social Welfare Council, whose members can speak for the numerous interested organizations, acts as an advisory body. The Ministry is gradually taking a larger share in welfare work, often along lines suggested by the numerous specialist sub-committees which do the spade-work for the Social Welfare Council; and is so far content to operate mainly by encouraging, guiding and financing—in part or in entirety—the local welfare offices now functioning throughout the country. In the larger cities and municipalities, the Ministry's contribution to the welfare offices is proportionately smaller, for these well-organized and long-established authorities have their own social welfare machinery. It may be noted that in Tel-Aviv–Jaffa, Haifa and Jerusalem, in all of which a highly-organized complex of social services for the benefit of the Jewish population has existed for a long time, the municipal authorities remain virtually autonomous.

In the case of the rural towns and villages, whose resources are smaller, the Ministry's contribution to the welfare offices is greater; in the case of newly settled immigrant centres, the Ministry often meets the entire cost. The Government's policy

is to encourage local responsibility for welfare work; and to persuade local authorities to take up more and more of the burden involved, without diminution of their autonomy. But its contribution to the growing cost of welfare services tends to increase both its influence and its authority relatively to the purely voluntary organizations. The process is likely to be accelerated by the effects of the National Insurance Law.

This measure, passed through the Knesset in 1953, is the first State-administered scheme of the kind to be introduced in Israel; and it represents the preliminary stage of a comprehensive plan for national social insurance worked out some years ago by an inter-ministerial commission, on which the Ministries of Labour, Health and Defence—the latter intimately concerned with the social rehabilitation work carried on among disabled soldiers—were represented. The National Insurance Law covers provision for old age and survivors' insurance, including funeral benefits, for the whole population: maternity insurance and infant benefits similar in scope: and insurance against industrial accidents and occupational diseases. Later stages of the main social insurance plan envisage health and disability insurance for the entire population: and, in the last resort, the provision of family allowances and extended hospital facilities.

Already about half a million of the gainfully-employed population are registered with the National Insurance Institute, under the general control of the Ministry of Labour. The percentage of contributions to wages or income varies from an average of 1·4 per cent in the case of workers to 3·3 per cent in the case of the self-employed. Employers pay an average of 1·9 per cent. The old-age pension scheme will come into effect in April 1957. The pensionable age for men is 65 and for women 60; but there are two provisions about the old-age pension scheme which are worthy of remark. The pensionable age may be lowered by three years for men and women who are engaged in heavy manual labour; and the basic rates (which range from about £4 a month for a single person to about £9 a month for a pensioner with several dependants) are supplemented by additional grants varying with the cost of living. Insurance against industrial accidents and occupational diseases includes disability pensions, the cost of medical and vocational rehabili-

tation, and financial compensation. Permanent disablement brings a pension calculated at three-quarters of normal pay; and accidental loss of life brings adequate assistance to the bereaved family. Maternity insurance brings benefits for a period of twelve weeks; and a grant to cover hospitalization of the mother and the outfitting of the child. Up to the middle of 1956, some 135,000 cases have been dealt with under the National Insurance Law. More than three-quarters were concerned with maternity benefits; but there were also 50,000 industrial accidents involved—clear proof that the Law is already meeting a need.

The principal kinds of social work, undertaken by the State, by semi-official, and by voluntary agencies, are of the sort with which all advanced nations are now familiar: namely, advice: financial assistance: medical aid: placing children in kindergartens, orphanages, homes, and other institutions: rehabilitation of the handicapped and aged, both inside and outside special institutions: enforcing school attendance: administering a system of youth and adult probation services: welfare of prisoners: child care: and the supervision of the machinery required for all these various activities. But Israel differs slightly from certain other countries in the overriding importance which she attaches to the welfare of the family, which, according to Jewish tradition, she regards as the essential foundation of society. More and more does her approach to social welfare tend to be governed by this angle; and it is possible that this has been reflected in the growing tendency among newcomers to favour types of settlement which centre on the individual household, in contrast with the highly organized system of communalism, with its subordination of family life to the life of the community, for which the *Kibbutzim*, in their pure form, stand. It is among the immigrants, of course, that social welfare work finds its greatest scope; and family case-work is the kind aimed at. This ideal is making a good deal of progress in certain of the older settlements of the separate-household type, where it has been found very rewarding to encourage whole families, and not merely their individual members, to take group advantage, for example, of the preventive as well as of the curative facilities offered by the various health services. But in the newer settlements, it is possible to approach the family case-work system

only by degrees; for initially the case loads prove too heavy to be sustained by harassed social workers, whose time is fully taken both by meeting a mass of vitally urgent individual needs, and also by organizing from the ground upwards such essential institutions as kindergartens, crèches, youth clubs and study centres where none had existed before. Fortunately such workers can as a rule enlist help from suitable voluntary organizations in starting these institutions; and their efforts to introduce new immigrants to the Israel way of life are helped by the part-time instructresses whom the women's organizations sponsor jointly with the Ministry of Social Welfare.

There is a serious shortage of trained social welfare workers in Israel, although their total numbers—some 500 in all—would appear at first sight adequate for so small a country. Family social work, which, as we have seen, holds pride of place in official esteem, occupies most of them; the specialized services, like the probation services, together account for only about 15 per cent of the total. It has been remarked in Israel that the probation services, both for youths and for adults, need to be extended before they can influence a satisfactory proportion of the delinquents. At the moment, they operate mainly in the larger centres of population, where, admittedly, the need for them is greatest. But over the rest of the country, they are too thinly spread; and their work is handicapped (as in the case of their opposite numbers in Britain) by a shortage of the special institutions for the care and reclamation of the malajusted. The case-work approach, indispensable for probation officers, must certainly bear heavily upon the cadre, which consists only of thirty-three specialists for youths and seven specialists for adults.

Social workers in Israel can receive their training either in the Social Welfare Institute in Jerusalem, operated jointly by the Ministry of Social Welfare and by the Hebrew University; or in the Social Welfare School maintained by the municipality of Tel-Aviv. Both institutions have a full two-year's course; both arrange for shorter intensive courses when necessary. But for full professional certificates a high standard is demanded. This is a wise precaution, because of the complexity of the services to be administered, and the variety of agencies which operate, throughout the country. In view of the number

and scope of the social service benefits which the citizens of Israel enjoy, there is now increasing need for the kind of co-ordination which only all-embracing legislation can supply. The legislative foundation for this exists in the detailed provisions for the protection of workers' interests in such matters as hours of work: overtime: paid vacations: compensation for dismissal: regulation of work by minors: confinement leave for women workers, and the like. Other laws prescribe the treatment of juvenile offenders: compensation for war invalids: and the raising of entertainment taxes for the benefit of the social services. The present system, though piecemeal in character because of its different origins, has deserved well of the country; but the enactment of the first instalment of the comprehensive scheme of social insurance, which the National Insurance Law represents, shows pretty clearly that the Government looks forward in the future to a fully integrated complex of social services which will economize money and avoid reduplication of effort. In this complex, the Ministry of Social Welfare seems destined to play an increasingly important part.

The background against which all these social services function is largely shaped by the Ministry of Labour, which is responsible for the proper use of manpower (not an unlimited commodity in Israel) to insure that there is not unemployment in one quarter while there is shortage of available labour in another. It finds employment for new settlers outside the towns: it settles priorities among public works projects which need manpower—for example, as between the construction of new approach roads and the erection of new buildings. It checks any tendency among newly-arrived immigrants to drift to the cities by providing them with work near at hand. It registers manpower by vocation and arranges incentives to attract professional men, such as doctors, to newly-established or border settlements. It establishes new domestic industries to employ immigrant women gainfully: it arranges vocational training to give the immigrant new skills: it supervises the work, particularly on the social and economic side, of Israel's thousands of co-operative societies, which play so large a part in social organization.

This supervisory function is of great importance because the co-operative societies, numbering well over two thousand,

together take in about one-quarter of the entire economy of Israel. Their prominence is due to two factors. Historically, private investment showed itself shy to underwrite the kind of work which early immigrants considered vital—reclamation of land, apparently uncultivatable, by their own direct labour, and the like—preferring to concentrate upon the development of the few natural assets, for example, the potash deposits and the orange groves, which Palestine possessed. Thus as the Jewish community in Palestine grew, funds for expansion came to be derived almost entirely from Zionist sources, which favoured self-help along co-operative lines. The second factor was mainly ethical: the idealism which has been the mainspring of creative effort in Israel has tended to look askance at private enterprise and hired labour, preferring the communal type of organization exemplified by the *Kibbutz* in one or other of its forms. In the course of years, the co-operative system, originally fostered by these two factors, has firmly established itself as a brilliant success. There are now credit and consumer societies, producer societies, housing societies, marketing societies, agricultural co-operative settlements, transport societies. These cover one-third of the entire population to the number of half a million members. Three-fourths of the total agricultural produce is marketed co-operatively: urban and inter-urban bus and taxi services are co-operatively run.

Close integration and careful management have led to the accumulation of substantial capital assets in the hands of such giant organizations as Hevrat Ovdim, the central body of the labour co-operatives of Histadruth: Nir Shittufi, the central institution for co-operative agriculture: Hamashbir Hamerkazi, the central wholesale society, and the like. These assets are used to finance large and important industrial enterprises to turn out consumer and capital goods. All told, the financial resources engaged in the co-operative movement in Israel cannot be less than £50 millions to-day. It is not surprising that a movement of this order of magnitude should occupy a prominent place in the Ministry of Labour's calculations. As another part of its duties, the Ministry maintains labour exchanges, both for juveniles and for adults, to deal with unemployment and to encourage the mobility of labour: it arranges labour agreements between employers and employed, and acts as arbitrator in

such disputes as may arise. It maintains an inspectorate to prevent breaches of the regulations governing conditions of employment: it protects juvenile labour: it prepares detailed surveys of such matters as methods of encouraging the dispersal of the population, in accordance with the policy of the Government. All these functions can be parallelled more or less closely in the work of the Ministries of Labour of other western countries—more especially in times of emergency such as Israel is now experiencing on her land frontiers; but the Israel Ministry of Labour is perhaps unique in its responsibility for the organization and direction of the public works programme of the country. It promotes great projects like the Popular Housing Scheme, which ranks among the first services which Israel can offer to the newly-arrived immigrant, and, indeed, provides the necessary foundation for everything else which follows later. It is responsible for the physical execution of the schemes of the town planners and the water engineers, which are changing the face of the country. In a word, the Ministry of Labour provides the essential framework for the assimilation of the immigrants: for the economic development of the country: and for the conditions which enable the people of Israel to progress, stage by stage, to a fuller and more satisfying life.

This end cannot be achieved by work alone, although work, as every Israeli knows, is an indispensable, without which nothing can be gained which is worth having. But nations, like individuals, cannot work all the time—even if, as in Israel, some people, particularly those with heavy responsibilities, seem to be perilously near that situation. Nevertheless, to judge of the life which Israel offers to her citizens only by watching Israelis toiling tirelessly at the lathe, on the tractor, in Government offices, or in their splendid scientific laboratories, would be to miss an essential ingredient of the national aim, which is to provide for every aspect of what the Greeks termed 'the good life'. It is in keeping with the Jewish tradition that the pursuit of intellectual and artistic interests is recognized as a necessary part of the citizen's activities: that these have to be provided for and encouraged, no less urgently than his purely physical needs. Israel is to-day the melting-pot of a variety of cultural elements, some native-born, knowing nothing but the conditions of the land in which they live: others coming from

every quarter and country of the habitable globe, and bringing with them rich additions to their imperishable Jewish heritage of art and learning. These elements find a common link in the revived Hebrew language, which has now been shaped into the living tongue of a new State, fully adequate for the needs of the modern world. The result has been a remarkable upsurge of creative work in letters, in the living theatre, in folk dancing, in music, and the graphic arts.

It has been remarked, with justice, that the re-establishment of Hebrew as a living language is largely the work of the children, who have given it the colloquial forms of expression and the flexibility characteristic of a true mother-tongue. Certainly the use of Hebrew as a medium of instruction for conveying to the young both the abstract ideas and the advanced techniques current in the world to-day, has produced a language which is well fitted to express the aspirations of national renaissance in prose as well as in poetry, partly because purity of expression and correctness of form are laid down by the Academy of the Hebrew Language—a body established by law. As might be expected, much of this creative work finds inspiration from the three related topics of the Jewish national revival resulting from the Zionist movement: the events of the return of the exiles to the Promised Land: and the experiences of the War of Liberation. Israelis are great readers, and to meet their need every village, every settlement, no matter how small, no matter how remote, has its library reading-room, which is constantly in use. Israel publishing houses put on the market an average of about one thousand new books every year in Hebrew, about a quarter of these being fiction, drama and poetry. There is a substantial proportion, sometimes as much as two-thirds, of original work; but also a good many translations of the best books current in other languages, which can be added year by year to the wide selection of the world's finest literature, past and present, already available in Hebrew. In the larger towns there are excellent bookshops in considerable numbers, where books and periodicals in many languages are eagerly bought. The patriotic concentration upon Hebrew does not carry with it any distaste for books written in other tongues: English, French and German works are to be found in every public library, and in every private book collection, in Israel. The official reading-rooms

and libraries maintained by the Information Services attached to the foreign embassies are always crowded by persons seeking the latest topical literature as well as new technical publications. In this context, it may be noticed, there is a particular demand for British books. English literature, both classical and contemporary, is high in popular favour; but owing to the shortage of foreign exchange, books published in England are very expensive in Israel. Regret has been frequently expressed to the writer by Israel friends that British books are so dear and so difficult to obtain. Why, it is asked, cannot the British Government follow the example of the United States and Soviet Governments by using the 'counterpart fund' system, so that British books become as easy to buy and as cheap as American and Russian books in Israel? Under this system, Israel booksellers pay for American and Russian books in Israel currency, the sale proceeds being used by the Governments concerned for the purposes of their own local expenditure in Israel, while the foreign suppliers are compensated by their own Governments in the countries of origin.

There is a growing two-way traffic in literature between Israel and other countries, because much of the creative work which appears in the Hebrew language is promptly made available in English to ensure sales in the overseas market—much bigger than anything which Israel, even with her enthusiasm for reading, can furnish. Exchanges of this kind are still more simplified in the case of two other art forms which flourish greatly in Israel to-day—the drama and music. Israelis are passionately fond of both, insisting upon standards which command well-deserved admiration from the rest of the world.

Four professional theatrical companies are sustained by the keenness of the Israel public; three deal with drama and the fourth with operetta and musical comedy. The oldest, and most famous, is Habimah, which was founded in Russia in 1918; although Ohel, a co-operative company closely linked with Histadruth, actually dates from 1925, which is three years before Habimah transferred to Israel. Both of these companies divide their attention between original Hebrew plays and translations, as does the third company,* the Chamber Theatre, founded in 1945. The fourth company, Do-Re-Mi, confines its

* This company scored a remarkable success in Paris in 1956.

activities to light comedy—which is by no means the least appreciated. All four have their headquarters at Tel-Aviv, but they frequently tour to give performances throughout the country. The three dramatic companies stage about forty plays between them every year, and, so far, English classical plays and English plays of recent date, in Hebrew translations, figure more frequently in the billings than original Hebrew plays, although the proportion, never negligible, of these latter to the total performances seems to be growing. Altogether, there are something like two thousand theatrical performances every year, given for the most part in halls or amphitheatres, to well over a million spectators. These figures do not include the work of a great variety of semi-professional and amateur theatrical groups, which flourish in rural as well as in urban centres (the communal settlements alone have more than ninety such groups); or of Telem, an organization of Histadruth, which stages dramatic performances in new immigrant settlements. An interesting newcomer is the Arab theatrical company called Canaan, which caters specifically for the Arab community in Israel. The Israel theatre has already been seen abroad; two years ago, Habimah took part in the Festival of Dramatic Art in Paris, and was obliged by public demand to stage the longest run among all the foreign companies. The experience was extremely encouraging, because many difficulties have had to be overcome by the Hebrew drama, such as uniformity of pronunciation among actors hailing from many different countries: inadequate theatrical premises: and the lack of an Israel dramatic academy to train up young talent. A dramatic school did at one time exist; in its hey-day it had sixty pupils. But it has had to close down for lack of funds. Even so, so much progress has been made that the names of prominent actors are now household words throughout Israel; and much attention is devoted to theatrical criticism in the daily and periodical press.

But of all the arts which flourish in Israel, it is music which has contributed most strikingly to the cultural progress, as well as to the international reputation, of the country. There is a wealth of musical talent; there is widespread enthusiasm for good music. Musical instruction is given from the elementary schools upwards. The Israel Philharmonic Orchestra, with more than 17,000 subscribers, is the most famous orchestra in

the country; and the success of its European tour in 1955 testifies to the excellence of its performances. In Israel it gives more than a hundred concerts, together with special performances, every season. All are overcrowded, and tickets are almost impossible to obtain. Only second in repute to the I.P.O. are the Haifa Orchestra and the Kol Israel Orchestra, which serves the Israel Broadcasting Station in Jerusalem. But in addition to these, the Defence Forces maintain their own orchestra; there are two orchestras for chamber music: many smaller towns and even settlements have their own orchestras: and amateur orchestral, instrumental, and choral societies are too numerous to count. There are more than a hundred choirs throughout the country; and international meetings are staged to which Jewish choral societies from many lands are invited. There is a large local production of musical gramophone records.

The varied ethnic composition of the people of Israel is reflected in the types of music which are current; and the trends now to be observed would certainly repay expert examination of the kind which the present writer is ill-qualified to undertake. But it is clear that the main problem, which is doubtless susceptible of a number of different solutions, is to fit the finest western musical tradition into an environment still largely shaped by the heritage of Jewish sacred melody and by the rhythms of the Hebrew language. It is this problem which is being faced by the younger generation of composers; their elders for the most part belong to certain well-defined schools; the eastern European, with its folk music: the eastern Mediterranean, with its pastoral and semi-Oriental themes: the central European, with its western expression even of characteristically Jewish subjects. All three schools have extremely distinguished exponents, and their services to the musical life of Israel are outstanding; but there is a flexibility and an empiricism among the younger composers in their search for the solutions of their problem which may eventually produce a bridge between eastern and western music that will contribute to international understanding. One thing is obvious; there are few peoples today who are better versed in musical appreciation, and who attach greater importance to music as a vehicle for the expression of the gamut of human emotions, than the Israelis.

The press, the radio, and the cinema are as powerful in Israel

as in any western country, and their freedom from all restrictions except those imposed by the ordinary laws to which every citizen is subject give them great influence in shaping public opinion. There are 18 daily and 2 evening papers in Israel—14 in Hebrew and the others in German, English, Arabic, Hungarian and French. Including about 50 Government publications, there are more than 300 periodicals, among them 70 weeklies and over 100 fortnightlies and monthlies. Of this total, two-thirds are in Hebrew; the others are divided between no fewer than 10 different languages, ranging from Polish to Persian. They cover a very wide field—technical, literary, artistic and political—and appeal to a large variety of interests. No one can accuse the Israel press of failing to provide for the needs of the public which it serves; indeed, this is perhaps sometimes done at the cost of economy. The circulations of many of the dailies are limited to particular interests, and are thus small by western standards. This makes against efficiency. But the larger papers, some of which circulate all over the country, can stand comparison with dailies anywhere in respect of independence, enlightenment, and zeal for the public interest; as well as in factual accuracy, range of information, and technical expertize. These are eagerly read by all classes of the population, and result in a very wide diffusion of knowledge and opinion about foreign affairs as well as about domestic events. Hard as the Israel farmer, engineer or factory hand works, he always seems to find time to read his newspaper; and it is almost startling to find, even in the remotest village and settlement, so many people who are eager to discuss the events of the preceding twenty-four hours. Some share of the credit for this advanced level of interest in public affairs undoubtedly goes to Kol Israel, whose bulletins of news and information come regularly into almost every home, every public gathering-place, and every community centre. The broadcasting services, in other languages as well as in Hebrew—which, of course, occupies the predominant share of the time—cover eighteen hours out of the twenty-four; and their influence both in spreading authentic information and in assisting in the formulation of public opinion, extends throughout the length and breadth of the country.

At present the cinema in Israel has mainly entertainment

value; there are 150 cinema houses in Israel which are antended by some twenty-three million people every year. A visit to the cinema in the nearest rural centre is a favourite relaxation for hard-worked farmers; while in the large cities, the habit of cinema-going is firmly established—as the large queues testify. Of the films shown, numbering about three hundred every year, two-thirds are American; with Italy, France and Britain competing for a very poor second place. But the importance of producing Israel films, both for entertainment and instruction, is now realized; and although there will be no prospect of seriously competing with imported films for some time, full-length films, news-reels, and shorts are being made every year.

The plastic arts are comparative newcomers in Israel; for some unexplained reason, the Jewish people seem to have been little attracted to them in the past. But, beginning from a patriotic interest in the religious and folk art preserved in such institutions as the Bezalel Museum (founded 1906) in Jerusalem, the teaching of painting, etching and sculpture began to develop in the time of the Mandate. The teachers were mainly western in their methods of treatment, although in their subject-matter they sought inspiration from Jewish sources and from the Palestinian background. Their work received a great impulse towards originality from some of the distinguished etchers and painters who came from Germany because of Hitler's persecution. These men of talent and experience were fascinated by the problems which the characteristic colour and clear atmosphere of the Holy Land presented; they experimented tirelessly and evolved new techniques of treatment. From Jerusalem, and later from Tel-Aviv, artistic impulses spread widely; and the characteristic life of the *Kibbutzim* proved its capacity to give birth to some fine painters and sculptors. The result of all this was that painting and black-and-white drawing had reached, when the State of Israel emerged, a standard which fitted them to draw further inspiration from the national creative impulse which sought expression in so many different spheres. Accordingly, popular interest in the plastic arts greatly increased, as they were found capable of depicting in their own characteristic way the emotions and ideals of which Israelis had become so deeply conscious. Art exhibitions have multiplied; and although Israel is so small a country, regional art has

begun to emerge from the artists' colonies which sprang up among the widely different natural surroundings to be found in such great variety. Israel has to-day painters, etchers and sculptors whose work shows force and originality in the use of shapes and colours; and is being increasingly exhibited outside as well as inside the country. The plastic arts, in short, are making their full contribution to the cultural life of Israel and to the manifold impulses towards national unity. But there is no tendency to overlook the value and importance of the different forms of folk-craftsmanship which new immigrants bring with them. Partly for economic reasons and partly because of a real appreciation of their merits, active encouragement is being given to the silver work of the Yemen, to the ceramics and embroidery of Persia, to the needlework of eastern Europe, and to the rugs and carpets of Bokhara and Bagdad. All these, and many other such products are now being marketed co-operatively with the assistance of the Government and of voluntary bodies like the Women's International Zionist Organization; together they make up a valuable ingredient in the pattern of the cultural life of Israel, which is being woven out of so many separate threads into a convincing expression of a new nation's artistic gifts.

IX

Public Affairs

Although there are some aspects of the conduct of public affairs in Israel which look unfamiliar to an Englishman because they derive from characteristically European or American, as distinguished from British, practice, it is probably fair to say that he can grasp the real fundamentals more easily than a visitor from almost any other country. For public affairs are governed, in Israel as in Britain, by two principles which, in the absolute and unchallengeable validity accorded to them, are characteristic of the practice of these two nations alone among all the peoples of the world: the supremacy of law and the sovereignty of Parliament. In both countries, the law of the land controls the operation of the governmental machine, the actions of the Ministers, the findings of the Courts. In both countries, the judiciary is completely independent of the executive. The qualifications, manner of appointment, terms of office, emoluments and the like are laid down by Parliament; judicial office can terminate only by death, retirement or dismissal according to law. In certain respects, indeed, Israel goes even further than Britain in safeguarding the independence of the judiciary, because she has created a machinery to set the higher judicial appointments beyond the scope of the ordinary patronage which an executive might not unreasonably expect to exercise—albeit with the highest sense of responsibility. According to the Judges Act of 1953, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the District Court Judges must be appointed by the Head of the State (not by the Minister of Justice or even by the Prime Minister) on the recommendation of an Appointments Committee consisting of the President of the Supreme Court: two Justices elected by the full Bench for a three-year term: two members of the Knesset chosen by secret ballot: two Cabinet Ministers: and two practising lawyers elected by the Council of

the Bar Association. Nor, when once a judge has been appointed, can he be interfered with by the Executive. The President of the Supreme Court has to approve the permanent transfer of a judge from one court to another; it is he who appoints, from among the members of the Supreme Court, the Disciplinary Tribunal which examines and pronounces finally upon any complaint that may be made against a judge for his conduct in office. In fact, judges in Israel are at least as secure and as independent as they are in Britain.

Equally familiar to the British observer is the kind of Parliamentary supremacy which is the foundation of public life in Israel, but is rarely to be found in similar operation elsewhere. That Israel would adopt democratic institutions when she became a State was inevitable. In Mandatory times, the Jewish community in Palestine had its own elected representative body of which the Vaad Leumi acted as the executive. The Jewish Agency, the executive of the World Zionist Organization, was elected by the Zionist Congress; the complicated economic machinery of Histadruth was controlled by an elected executive. But it remained uncertain for some time what precise type of constitutional machinery would be adopted. Would Israel follow the example of most other countries, and limit the powers of Parliament by the provision of a fixed constitution, which lays down certain fundamental rights, whether of the individual citizen, of certain other organs of Government, or of the community at large, in respect of which Parliament can ordinarily exercise no authority? Would she adopt the American principle of giving the executive, the judicial and the legislative organs of government their inviolably separate spheres; or would she favour the system of 'responsible government' in which the executive depends for its authority on the support of a majority in the legislature? Would she confer upon the Head of the State the type of authority exercised by the President of the United States, or would she limit his functions to those formal symbolical and largely ceremonial duties undertaken by the British Crown?

In the early days of Israel's independent existence, none of these questions were conclusively answered once and for all; indeed each of the possible courses found a certain amount of favour. A draft constitution of the written type was

actually prepared, which defined the rights of the citizen and the responsibilities which the new State owed to him. In this document, the death penalty was abolished: preventive detention by executive order was forbidden: freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of worship, together with the inviolability of dwelling-houses and the privacy of private correspondence, were guaranteed subject to certain provisions which the State, for its own protection, might impose under the safeguard of continuous Parliamentary vigilance. The draft also defined the shape of the single-chamber legislature: provided for the recruitment and discipline of the armed forces: authorized the conclusion of treaties with foreign States (subject to Parliamentary control) and foreshadowed the creation of the Supreme Court and other judicial machinery. (It is worth noting that in Israel, as in Britain, the armed forces have become subject to the overriding control of the legislature. They are directed by the Civil Government, in the person of a civilian Minister of Defence, who must answer to Parliament. The supremacy of the civil over the military arm is a key-principle of the conduct of public affairs—a situation which contrasts strongly with the kind of intervention of the defence forces in political life which has become all too common among Israel's neighbours.)

Before any final decisions were taken about the form of constitution, a provisional Council of State was set up, thirteen members of which were invested with the powers of a provisional Government. This provisional Government fought the War of Liberation, conducted the affairs of the country until the armistices were concluded, and prepared for the first Parliamentary elections in February 1949.

For a number of reasons, some of which will be examined on a later page, the experience gained by the operation of the provisional Government and the provisional Council of State definitely influenced the decision between the various possible types of constitutional machinery which it was open to Israel to adopt. Although lip-service was paid to the idea of a written constitution by specifically designating the elections for the new Parliament as elections for a 'Constituent Assembly': and by terming certain constitutional enactments 'transitional' to mark their temporary character pending the adoption of a

final constitution, the assembly proceeded at once to call itself the Knesset (parliament) and to function as the organ whose majority support alone keeps the executive in office. Moreover, no law which has been passed by the first or the subsequent Knessets possesses the intrinsic character of inviolability, or the capacity of being altered only by some specially-designed procedure, which invariably distinguishes a 'fundamental law' under a written constitution from a law of the ordinary kind. In theory, the way is still open to Israel to adopt a written constitution if she should at any time desire one; indeed there is a resolution, still unrescinded, of June 1950, which entrusts the task of drawing up a written constitution to a committee. But the resolution has not been implemented; and in practice she has found that a sovereign Knesset, subject, like the British Parliament, to the strict rules of procedure which it has imposed upon itself, is a convenient and flexible instrument for giving effect to the will of the people, itself acknowledged to be supreme. Most of the proposals originally set out in the draft constitution have, however, become the law of the land through the specific enactments which the Knesset has adopted.

The Knesset follows the British model in legislative supremacy, and in the power to remove the executive from office by an adverse vote. It provides the personnel of the Government: it fixes the National Budget: it imposes taxation: it appoints the State Comptroller. In short, it operates in every sphere in which the British Parliament functions; and, like the British Parliament, it acknowledges no superior among the other organs of Government. Much of its procedure, too, resembles British practice. Legislative initiative is open to private members, as well as to the Government. A Bill passes three separate readings, and becomes law after receiving a majority vote, being signed by the President, being endorsed by the Prime Minister and being published in the official gazette. The Knesset has a Speaker, who is Chairman, and a Vice-Chairman. The Speaker's ruling on a procedural point is binding, although there is a Rules Committee to which subsequent appeal is permitted. Members enjoy immunity from search, imprisonment, criminal proceedings and military service. They are paid, but may receive payment from no other source. There is also, however, clear evidence of European rather than British practice in

certain particulars. Members sit in a semi-circle facing the Speaker. In the arc of the semi-circle is the table for Cabinet members. Those who address the House leave their seat, and mount a rostrum. Much use is made of Standing Committees to lighten the work of the full House. Of these there are nine of particular importance, dealing respectively with general purposes: finance: economics: security: foreign affairs: education and culture: home affairs: law: public services: labour. To these committees the Knesset is accustomed to refer draft bills, draft regulations, and other matters concerning which it desires a report; although it retains full freedom to appoint any *ad hoc* committees of inquiry which it may consider necessary. But perhaps the outstanding difference between the Knesset and the British Parliament lies in the fact that it is part of the Knesset's responsibilities to elect the President of Israel.

As has been pointed out on an earlier page, there was considerable uncertainty, immediately after Israel's emergence as a State, about the position and powers which the Head of that State ought to enjoy. That there would be a President no one doubted; so much was inherent in the Republican forms to which Israel had tacitly, but none the less finally committed herself in the Proclamation of Independence of 14th May 1948. But should he function as the head of the executive, as well as the Head of State, on the United States model? Or should he be strictly limited in his powers, like the sovereign of Great Britain? Should he be chosen by the people as a whole in an *ad hoc* election, on the American plan, or should the choice lie with the people's representatives in the legislature? It was not easy to divorce these questions from the personalities involved. Dr. Weizmann's weight of years and honours: his record of services in the cause of Zionism: and the part he had played in the great events which marked the stages of the road to the emergence of Israel—all these singled him out for the post of President, first of the provisional Council of State, and later of the Republic itself. Dr. Weizmann was believed to favour the American system under which the President is also the Chief Executive of the country. On the other hand, there was a strong body of opinion, endorsed by Mr. Ben Gurion (who was himself chosen initially as Premier of the Council of Government: and later, as Israel's first Prime Minister), in favour of the system

of joint Cabinet responsibility to the legislature, not to the President. What eventually led the country to decide along the lines favoured by Mr. Ben Gurion is obscure; but the difficulty of finding the breathing-space, in those critical early months, to frame an elaborate written constitution—an essential element in the system of checks and balances between the executive and the legislative spheres which the American plan requires—may well have been one factor in the almost imperceptible, but none the less conclusive, growth of public opinion against it. Further it seemed doubtful from the first whether Israel could expect the evolution of a two party system for a long time to come: and there were no precedents to guide constitution-makers who asked how the American system would function if the sectional and group opinions to be represented in the Government proved as numerous as those which were growing up in Israel. On the other hand, it had become clear, by the time that the first elections had been arranged, that a Council of State, broadly representative of a great many sections of opinion, was proving itself a very satisfactory link between public opinion and the new provisional Government; while at a time of grave crisis the Government, in effect a coalition of various parties and interests, held together by Mr. Ben Gurion's forceful personality and long administrative experience, was precisely the type of administration which Israel needed.

Accordingly, when the first election returned Mapai as the largest party with forty-six seats in the 'constitutional assembly' and nearly 36 per cent of the total poll, Mr. Ben Gurion was the obvious person to be asked to form a Government. Since not even Mr. Ben Gurion and Mapai could by themselves ensure that there would be a majority in the assembly to support the enactment of the legislation which the new Government would inevitably require to discharge its national responsibilities, some form of coalition between Mapai and other parties was essential. The components of the coalition had to be selected, not only for some broad community of view which would enable them to co-operate with one another, but also with regard to the number of seats which each component could command in the Assembly. Thus without any formal decision being registered against the adoption of the American system of government, Israel's first elected Parliament, which met in a reconditioned

cinema on the sea-front in Tel-Aviv, found itself possessed of the power not merely to accept or reject any particular legislative proposals which the executive might submit to it, but also to accept or reject an executive composed of any particular combination of parties. It is not surprising that the Assembly assumed almost at once both the historic title of Knesset and the functions of a Parliament.

Accordingly it fell to Dr. Weizmann, as President, not to nominate the members of an executive which he himself would head, but to call upon Mr. Ben Gurion to form a Government which would be collectively responsible to the Knesset; and from that time forward, the constitutional position of the President of Israel was placed beyond doubt. He stands above political parties, although he is elected by the Knesset. He is the Head of the State, appointing diplomatic representatives, receiving foreign envoys, promulgating legislation. But in all his activities, external and internal, he acts on the advice of the Prime Minister, who must answer for that advice to the Knesset in case of need. Like the British Crown, the President of Israel possesses the prerogative of mercy; but in Israel as in Britain, he is guided in exercising it by ministerial advice—for which, again, a Minister must answer to the Knesset. It is the Knesset which is the true sovereign body of Israel; both Dr. Weizmann himself, and, after his death, his successor, Mr. Ben Zvi, cheerfully accepted Knesset supremacy as delimiting their duties.

The sessions of the Knesset are open to the public unless a special decision to the contrary is taken by the whole House. The atmosphere of deliberation is intimate, homely, and businesslike. There is a preference for straightforward exposition rather than for oratorical fervour; and the self-discipline of the members is impressive. From time to time, a wave of deep emotion may be discerned; but it is invariably controlled and guided by the prevailing temper of responsibility. One striking characteristic of the procedure is a notable absence of lengthy speeches: contributions to the debate are terse, clear, and short. This eminently desirable end is secured by an ingenious, stream-lined, procedure which makes the guillotine unnecessary. The time to be allotted to any given measure or to any particular debate is first fixed by the House as a whole, and then

allocated among the various parties in proportion to the strength of each. The parties then proceed to allocate the time at their disposal among those of their members who are chosen to speak: so that each member, on rising, knows that his speech has to be made within the period already fixed. Thus filibustering becomes impossible; and obstruction for obstruction's sake is virtually ruled out.

This procedure, which from the writer's observation works admirably, when backed up, as it is, by the consensus of the whole House, and by the excellent preparatory work of the Speaker's permanent staff, has to some extent been imposed upon the Knesset by the system of proportional representation under which it is elected. This system had established itself firmly among the Jews in Palestine before Israel was established; it had governed the elections for the Jewish Agency and for the representative assembly of the community which chose the Vaad Leumi and controlled Jewish affairs. Accordingly its introduction into the new State was almost automatic. The basis is adult suffrage; every citizen who has reached 18 years on a fixed date preceding election day is entitled to vote, regardless of sex, race or creed; and within the following two months he or she receives formal notification of enrolment on the list of voters. Candidates for election must have reached the age of 21 years and must not hold judicial office—these are the only two restrictions. But civil servants and members of the armed forces who wish to stand for election must show evidence that they will receive leave of absence from their duties during the period between nomination day and election day; and, that, if they are elected, this leave will cover their period of Knesset membership. This provision, from which only members of the State teaching professions are exempt, is intended to ensure that the civil and defence services remain non-political in character—a feature of the British constitutional practice which, as we have already noticed, Israel highly approves and is determined to preserve in complete integrity.

For electoral purposes the country is regarded as a single constituency, and the 120 seats in the Knesset are treated as a block. Any party or group may put up its own list of candidates by nomination day; and on voting day, the voter casts his ballot for the list as a whole, and not for an individual. In each

list, the candidates appear serially, in the precedence fixed by the party or group. The total votes cast for each list determine what proportionate share the party sponsoring that list can claim of the 120 seats in the Knesset; and when that proportion has been fixed, the individual candidates on the list are declared returned in their order of precedence; for example, if a party is entitled to five seats as its share of the total membership of the Knesset, the first five candidates on its list will be declared successful.

In spite of its apparent complexity, the system is simple to work in practice, requiring only impartial and efficient administration. This is secured by the existence of a Central Election Board (presided over by a Justice of the Supreme Court), which is responsible for appointing Regional Election Boards which, in turn, set up Polling Station Boards to ensure that the law governing elections is duly observed. On the boards of all three grades, the parties represented in the outgoing Knesset are represented in proportion to their strength, so that the effective supervision of the elections is in the hand of the various contesting groups. There are more than two thousand polling stations throughout the country; and regulations strictly forbid canvassing, demonstrations, meetings, and loudspeakers in their immediate vicinity so long as they are open. Election day is always a public holiday in Israeli; but transport services continue to function for the convenience of voters.

This system of lists provides an accurate representation in the Knesset of the relative strength of the individual groupings of opinion in the country; and has the further advantages of dispensing with by-elections. The death or resignation of a member of the Knesset during the four years of the legislature's normal statutory life (which is, of course, always liable to be shortened by a vote of no-confidence or by the Ministry's decision to resign and to appeal to the country) is automatically followed by the succession to his vacant seat of the candidate next in order of precedence on the list from which he was elected. At the same time, the Israel system has the disadvantage of so fractionalizing the representation in the legislature that no party has yet succeeded in gaining an absolute majority. Coalition Governments have become the rule. Further, almost all the coalitions so far constituted have been built up of a

number of groups, on the continued allegiance of which the Ministry depends for its working majority in the Knesset. Some of these groups have always been religious rather than political; and if conflict arises between their conscience and their loyalty to the Ministry, conscience wins the day. The facts that these groups are mainly small, and that some at least would stand little chance of direct representation in the Knesset under any other system than that which now prevails, have led to some heart searching. Does the present plan give these fractional groups a weightage in public affairs, or even an opportunity to press purely sectional demands, which their relative unimportance cannot justify? Moreover, is their power, in times of crisis, of bringing down a Ministry whose majority party, at least, commands the support of more of the electors than any of its rivals, consistent with the necessity for political stability which Israel's circumstances undoubtedly impose? It is for these reasons that various plans of electoral reform have been discussed from time to time. The object of these is to raise, from the present figure of a little over one per cent, the proportions of votes which an individual group must win out of the total votes cast before it is entitled to be alloted direct representation in the Knesset. Such proposals are as a rule supported by the major, and opposed by the minor, parties; and no single group has so far made them a plank in the political platform from which it appeals to the electorate. Something like a vested interest, indeed, has grown up in favour of the present plan, which at least enables a group, which may have been unlucky in a particular election, to maintain itself as an active factor in political life until it can make a more successful appeal to the electorate. But political observers seem to think that had the Mapai—General Zionist coalition which held power in the second Knesset been returned in the same strength by the 1955 elections, electoral reform might by this time have become one of the dominating issues of domestic politics. In the event, both Mapai and the General Zionists lost ground—the latter seriously—and plans for electoral reform seen to have been laid aside while Israel concentrates her energies upon the heavy tasks which face her.

The fractionalization of representation in the Knesset between some fourteen groups has given the political life of Israel

a remarkable complexity; and it is essential to form some idea of what these groups stand for. Central among them, partly because of the continual appeal of its creed of 'moderate Labour' to the Israel electors, and partly because of its intermediate position between the extremes of Communism on one side and Chauvinism on the other, is Mapai. To it belong the political personalities who are best known even outside Israel—Mr. Ben Gurion and Mr. Sharett—who between them have given Israel her Prime Ministers since she became a State. Mapai has been returned in all three elections as the most numerous political party: it had forty-six seats in the first Knesset: forty-five in the second: in the third, however, its share has fallen to forty. This gradual reduction has been variously explained as a natural reaction against its long period of power: or as a result of a change in the nature of the electorate, due to immigration, which makes Mapai's balanced policies less attractive to impatient newcomers who are conscious of their individual difficulties. Many Israelis hope that this setback will not be of long duration, because the policy which Mapai advocates—a socialist régime based on the development of the co-operative sector, co-ordinated with constructive private enterprise by State planning: on the Ingathering of the Exiles and spiritual and political freedom—seems to lie at the heart of the best interests of Israel; and so far, has been applied with conspicuous moderation and ability. Moreover the leadership of Mapai in international affairs has been judicious and moderate as well as firm; cultivating as it has good relations with all the Powers who recognize Israel, without weakening the close ties of common interest and common approach which link her to the western democracies.

When viewed over the period since the emergence of the State, Mapai's most serious rival for the suffrage of the people of Israel has been Mapam, the United Workers' Party, a left-wing Socialist party which aims at working-class solidarity and State controls at home, and at close relations between Israel and the Soviet Union abroad. In the first Knesset it won nineteen seats: in the second, fifteen. But it has been hampered by internal disensions; and by the weakening of its main foreign policy plank, because of ominous manifestations of Soviet hostility to Israel, to Zionism, and to Jewish aspirations. It has

recently hived off Ahdut Ha' Avoda-Poalei Zion, another class-conscious group, with a detailed programme of State Socialism and class-solidarity: of friendship with all peace-loving peoples: and of neutralism in foreign affairs: but with a nationalist appeal based on claims to the peaceful settlement of the entire territory of Mandatory Palestine. Mapam and its offshoot, which is quite separate, have considerable support among the pioneering community in general and among the *Kibbutzim* in particular: together they hold nineteen seats in the third Knesset: but the differences between them make consistent co-operation difficult.

The third major party is the General Zionists, who regard State control with suspicion: pin their faith on private enterprise in business, combined with Governmental health and other social services: and stand for close ties with the western democracies and for the attraction of foreign capital-investment to Israel. In many respects, their political creed is Liberalism, with emphasis upon individual initiative and opposition to Socialism as such. In the first Knesset they did badly, with only seven seats: in the second Knesset they had twenty-one, and joined Mapai in a working coalition which laid more stress upon practical measures, like intensive economic development, than upon discussions about the proper relative proportions of the public and private sectors in the national economy. This party is probably strongest among the section of the community which built up prosperity for itself in the time of the Mandate; it seems to exercise less attraction over later immigrants—now the majority of the population—who must rely on State assistance for some time before they can find their feet, and do not as a rule command the resources which profitable private enterprise demands. Possibly it was for this reason that the General Zionists won only thirteen seats in the 1955 elections; although their policy of close relations with the western Powers, and their reliance upon western capital to aid development work, may also have failed to commend them to sections of the electorate who are impatient about western policies of Arab rearmament; and who have begun to think—as more and more of the younger Israel-born now appear to do—that in the last resort, Israel's best, and perhaps only, friend is her own strength. It was the growth of this feeling

throughout 1955 and 1956 which explained the final decision of the Israel Government in October 1956 to take the initiative against the main enemy—Egypt.

In the 1955 elections, the General Zionists were displaced from the position of second among the parties, which they had held in the second Knesset, by Heruth. This group is a survival from the underground warfare which was waged against the British during the latter half of the Mandatory period; and it regards itself as the political heir of the once-formidable secret organization known as Irgun Zvai Leumi. Soon after Israel became a State, Irgun Zvai Leumi gave a good deal of trouble to the Government, and it was disbanded as a para-military organization, leaving Heruth to succeed it. In the first Knesset, its appeal to the fighting spirit of the Jewish people won for it fourteen seats; but its uncompromisingly individualistic Chauvinist views, coupled with its militant expressions of them, debarred it from any immediate prospect of power. The shock given to world opinion by the murder of Count Bernardotte by terrorists revealed the danger to Israel's interests of open advocacy of violence. A reaction set in, and in the second Knesset, Heruth won only eight seats. In the 1955 elections, helped no doubt by the appeal of its forthright doctrine to enthusiastic youths, and to immigrants who suddenly realized the dangers of Israel's beleaguered situation, it won fifteen seats—to the surprise of many people. But it refuses to co-operate with the three main parties; while they, for their part, heartily dislike many of its tenets as being incompatible with much of that for which Israel essentially stands; so that it is unpromising material for inclusion in a coalition Government of any complexion which now seems probable; and it is scarcely regarded as a factor in constructive political progress. In a national crisis, however, its patriotism can be taken for granted; and it supported the Government firmly in the action taken against Egypt in the autumn of 1956.

Besides these parties, which are predominantly political in their outlook, there are two main groups—with slightly differing orientations—whose bond of membership is overwhelmingly religious; and whose principles are based on greater or lesser degrees of orthodoxy. One of these groups has lately become the 'National Religious Front' by the merging of its two com-

ponents, Hapoel Hamizrahi and Mizrahi, into a common programme. This calls for the recognition of Jewish jurisprudence and the Torah as guides for the planned development of the State on the lines of equal treatment for the private and the co-operative economic sectors. Both components contrive to work reasonably well with the kind of coalition Government, influenced mainly by Mapai, which Israel has so far enjoyed. Corresponding to the 'National Religious Front' on one side is Agudath Israel, with its Workers' Party (Poalei), on the other. This group demand the full observance of the Torah in the administration of the State: and the vesting of jurisdiction in rabbinical authorities; it opposes the formal equality of men and women. The Right element demands the opening up of the country to private investment, and favours the transfer of Sick Funds from the hands of Socialist organizations like Histadruth into the hands of the orthodox religious State for which it is working. In the first Knesset, the left and right religious blocks combined to secure a joint representation of sixteen seats; but in the second Knesset they split apart. The left block secured ten seats; the right block five, thus leaving the total representation of all the religious groups together virtually unaltered. In the 1955 elections, the left wing block increased its representation to eleven seats, joined the Mapai-Mapam-Ahdut Ha' Avoda coalition which Mr. Ben Gurion formed in November, and secured two Cabinet portfolios—Posts, and the combined portfolio of Religious Affairs and Social Welfare. The right wing group went into opposition.

There are also a number of smaller groups. The Communists are energetic, though limited in numbers. In the first Knesset they had four seats; in the second Knesset five. By joining together their Jewish and Arab branches into a combined force, they secured six seats in the 1955 elections. Their hostility to Zionism, and to everything for which Zionism stands, sets them apart from all other parties; but they have so far polled about 3 per cent or 4 per cent of the votes without much increase or decrease. Their support comes partly from the faithful who practise Communist doctrine among Jewish intellectuals and urban workers, partly from some Arabs who are hostile to the Zionist State of which they are now full citizens. A group which is influentual in a degree out of all proportion to its size is the Pro-

gressive Party, which has never won more than five seats in any of the three Knessets. But it is immensely respected because of the personality of its leaders, and of their services to Israel; and although it is a non-Socialist party, which cuts across class distinctions by its middle and working class membership, its progressive liberalism is so far from being a mere label that it always can count on at least one seat in the Ministry. Indeed, one of the arguments most frequently employed against the kind of electoral reform which would reduce the number of political parties is the danger that to raise the proportion of total votes necessary to secure representation in the Knesset might involve the disappearance of the Progressive Party from the political arena.

These groups are Jewish for the most part, although all of them make a point of including generous treatment of the Arab community in Israel among the items of their electoral programmes. But there are also three separate Arab groups, between them supplying five Arab members to the Knesset, who represent specifically Arab interests. The Arab Democrats, with two seats, stand for Israel's co-operation with the United Nations in improving conditions in the Asian and African worlds; Progress and Work, also with two seats, ask for the resettlement of Arab refugees and for the increased development of Arab towns and villages; Agriculture and Development, with one seat, claim the closer organization of Arab labour in co-operation with Histadruth. These three parties actively represent Arab interests in the Knesset. They speak Arabic, and their comments carry great weight, for none of the Jewish parties, or indeed the Government itself, would readily do anything to hinder the growth of a close community of interest between the Jewish majority and the minorities—of whom the Arabs are the most important—which are to be found in Israel. Israelis are proud of the fact that the Arabs, like other minorities, are now fully enfranchised citizens, who exercise their vote without property qualifications both in local and central councils.

The Knesset, as we have seen, is the supreme legislative authority of Israel; no law which it passes can be 'unlawful'. But, like the House of Commons, it exercises a certain amount of its authority by delegation—that is, by conferring upon the

Government, upon individual Ministers, upon officials of various kinds, and upon municipal councils, the power to make detailed regulations within the limits which it has laid down. But it does not do this in regard to each and every law; it regards some laws—for example the laws governing elections—as being too important for 'discretionary' application, and in such cases it lays down every detail itself. At the other end of the scale, there are matters which the Knesset is content to entrust almost wholly to subsidiary legislation by the authority which it has selected for the purpose. Examples of these are the Law for the improvement of agricultural production (1952) and the Law of control of export of plants and their products; in these instances the Knesset gives the Minister concerned a free hand to make the regulations which he thinks necessary to implement the policy which the Knesset has prescribed. But in several such matters the Knesset retains supervisory control over the regulations which are made; providing, either that they may be rescinded by its own resolution within a specified time after their publication in the Official Gazette; or—more drastically—that they will cease to have effect unless confirmed by a resolution passed within a specified period.

Again, like the House of Commons, the Knesset is jealous of its authority in matters of finance. Very detailed laws lay down both the legal basis and the legislative enactments which control State spending in all its branches. Little latitude is allowed for transferring expenditure from one head to another. No taxes or other obligatory payments to the Government are legal without the Knesset's sanction. In short, all the financial operations of the State, including the sanctioning of loans both external and internal, are conducted according to laws passed by the Knesset.

A review of the legislation passed by the Knesset since it came into existence shows that it has as a rule used with restraint and common sense the great authority vested in it by the people of Israel. While it has been concerned to enforce the control over the executive which the constitutional conventions of the country prescribe, it has been careful to avoid any trespassing upon the strictly executive functions. Notably, in 1955 it resisted the attempt of certain of its members to do by legislation what the executive had refused to do by administrative

action—to change the name of a settlement: to embody a transit-camp in an adjoining municipal area. Although it is careful to specify, in all laws of the kind which are not self-executing, the authority which shall be responsible for their implementation, it permits a certain flexibility to the Government in the designation of this authority. Its ultimate control is assured by the constitutional provision that every law must be signed by the Head of the Government and by the Minister or Ministers charged with the implementation of the law, so that the responsibility for implementation is not left in doubt. In general, implementation of the law is left to the supreme executive authority; but there is an exception in the case of the State Comptroller, whose function it is to exercise control over the State's financial affairs, economic enterprises, and property. This officer, who is appointed by the President for a term of five years at the recommendation of the Knesset House Committee, is independent of the Government and responsible to the Knesset alone. It is his duty to examine expenditure: to determine whether it falls inside the legal appropriation: whether the revenue has been legally received: whether income and expenditure are properly documented: whether the Ministries are conducting properly their services to the public: what faults exist in the administrative field: what suggestions should be adopted for improvement. He also deals with the problems arising from the status, rights, obligations, training and posting of civil servants. In a word he is the watch-dog of the State, bound in duty to bring to the notice of the Knesset irregularities, shortcomings, and suggestions for improvement.

It is interesting to find that although the Knesset is regarded as the indispensible lynch-pin of public life in Israel, it is criticized just as freely as people in Britain criticize the House of Commons. Moreover, in both countries, there is plenty of criticism of the kind which is not based merely upon party feeling, but which is directed to the need for improving the working of the institution itself. The mere fact that the Knesset, like the British Parliament, possesses such formidable power, inevitably leads to the demand that this power should be exercised more widely, with greater imagination, and with longer foresight, than is the case to-day. It has been complained that the Knesset tends to deal with things in a piecemeal

fashion instead of comprehensively: for example, why does the State Education Law fall so far short of prescribing a uniform structure of education that it confines itself to primary education alone? When will secondary education and the institutions of research and of higher education be allotted their due place by legislation in the whole educational structure? Why is the Government Development Authority (set up in 1950) limited in its functions to the care of certain State property? Should not the Knesset provide comprehensive legislation to regulate the ordered development of all natural resources, and not only petroleum? Ought not a comprehensive water law to have been taken in hand much earlier? and why has almost nothing, except the Co-operative Houses Law of 1953, been done to revise, and bring in line with modern requirements, the wholly antiquated land laws? It is no doubt a healthy symptom of the interest which the citizens of Israel take in the Knesset that these questions should be asked; yet it is but fair to remember that the Knesset has been in existence for only eight years; and that during much of its life it has been so largely concerned with matters affecting the very existence of Israel that there are inevitable gaps in the work which it has been able to carry to a conclusion.

The executive Government of Israel, as has already been noted, works on the principle of collective responsibility to the Knesset. Each member of the Cabinet, from the Prime Minister downwards, shares this collective responsibility; and unless he is prepared to support his colleagues in presenting to the Knesset the policies which have been collectively approved, he cannot retain his portfolio. Such a system, especially when it has to work in the political conditions prevalent in Israel, where party representation is so sectionalized that only a coalition Cabinet can command a working majority in the Knesset, imposes a heavy strain on the Prime Minister. While he has a relatively free hand to nominate, in accordance with his estimate of their usefulness, those of his Cabinet colleagues who belong to his own party, he is not equally free to select from the members of other parties who must be represented in his Government the persons whom he may really prefer. For this reason, as well as from the necessity of allotting to each party both particular portfolios, and a particular proportion of

Cabinet representation, the process of forming a Government in Israel resolves itself into the transaction of a series of complicated bargains. Compromise, involving some 'second bests', is thus inevitable. Nor is it sufficient for the Prime Minister to form his Cabinet; he must hold it together; he must maintain among all its members, in spite of the diversity of parties which they represent, the good working relations and the broad agreement on essentials which are alike indispensable to the efficient functioning of the Government.

Israel has been fortunate in her Prime Ministers, of whom there have been but two—Mr. Ben Gurion and Mr. Sharett, both from Mapai. Both have proved themselves equal to the delicate task of forming a Government which is at once representative and effective. Mr. Ben Gurion, after long experience in the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency, has become successively Prime Minister in the Provisional Government, and Prime Minister in the Governments approved by the first, the second and the third Knessets. Two years ago, saying that he did not want the Prime Ministership to become a one-man monopoly, he resigned in favour of his colleague Mr. Sharett, and retired to the life of a pioneer-farmer in the Negev settlement of Sde Boker. Mr. Sharett has always specialized in foreign affairs; but he showed himself not less competent than Mr. Ben Gurion in the fields which fell to him when he became Prime Minister. But the two men, whose personalities, though very different, supplement one another admirably, have always been looked upon by Israelis as a kind of team; and it was not long before Mr. Ben Gurion was persuaded to emerge from retirement and to take his place once more at the head of affairs while Mr. Sharett reverted to the Foreign Ministry. There is a strong feeling in the country that Mr. Ben Gurion is exactly the kind of leader whom Israel needs when she is in difficulties; and his re-emergence from the wings into the centre of the political stage coincided with an alarming increase in the war-potential of certain Arab countries which were loudly proclaiming their hostility to Israel. Israelis compare Mr. Ben Gurion to Sir Winston Churchill in his sturdy forthrightness; in his capacity to rise above popular clamour when it is directed to ends which he believes to be wrong: and in his occasional indulgence in 'calculated indiscretions' which

reveal, as by a lightning-flash, the profundity of the emotions which stir his people when they conceive that Israel's interests, and indeed her existence, are imperilled by the manœuvrings for position in the Middle East which mark the present stage of the 'cold war' between the democratic and the Communist power-blocs. To the cautious and correct Mr. Sharett, Mr. Ben Gurion is often something of an *enfant terrible*; and more than once in their long association there have been moments when Mr. Sharett feels that he just cannot bear things any longer. Such a moment came in 1956, when Mr. Sharett decided to resign from the Cabinet and to serve his country in other ways. There was no difference between the two men over the essentials of Israel's foreign policy: the disagreement occurred over timing and emphasis. Mr. Sharett was succeeded by Mrs. Golda Meir (formerly Myerson), the ablest and most experienced woman in public life in Israel to-day, who has been a member of every Cabinet since the beginning. She has been at pains to make clear that there will be no change whatever in foreign policy, even though her term of office has already witnessed the upheaval which overtook the Middle East in the autumn of 1956.

Although Mr. Ben Gurion's pronouncements on public affairs not infrequently provide headlines for the newspapers outside as well as inside his country, his blunt outspokenness and apparent impetuosity are in fact only outward attributes of an essentially judicial and well-balanced mind, deeply grounded in the great philosophical literature of the world, and experienced in evaluating each of the many factors which together determine Israel's foreign and domestic interests. While his great natural qualities and exceptional experience of men and things mark him out for leadership, it is part of his strength that he is accepted as the representative of the ordinary man, and, more especially, of the Israel-born. This position enables him to put a brake upon popular emotion in time of crisis, so that he can guide it into constructive channels instead of allowing it to endanger the country's interests; while at the same time he contrives to identify himself and his Government clearly with the causes which public opinion has most at heart. The esteem and affection in which he is held are enshrined in the numerous stories, many, no doubt, apochryphal, which

are told of him throughout Israel. They illustrate his wit as well as his wisdom: his intense vitality: his shrewd perception: his simple way of life: his hatred of sham and pretensions, his profound understanding of his country's problems. It is characteristic of Mr. Ben Gurion's special position in Israel that although he is not a *sabra*—he came to Palestine from Russia half-a-century ago—the Israel-born always count him as one of themselves.

Mr. Sharett, like his former Chief, is Russian-born; he came to Palestine a year or two before Mr. Ben Gurion. A graduate both of the old University of Istambul and of the London School of Economics, he became virtually the ambassador-at-large of the Jewish Agency in the time of the Mandatory Government. His extensive travels: his brilliant gifts—he speaks eight languages: and his formal academic training might well have combined to set him slightly apart from the general comprehension of the ordinary Israeli; but he has never failed to maintain what Kipling calls the 'common touch' through his long membership of Mapai and his consistent identification with the interests of the whole Jewish community, in fair and foul weather alike. He has shown himself possessed of the valuable knack of recruiting brilliant *aides*: both at home and abroad, Israel's diplomats seem to display an outstanding ability which has secured for them among the cadres of the United Nations, as well as among the *corps diplomatiques* of many individual countries, a measure of influence and esteem of which nations far larger than Israel might well be proud.

Both Mr. Ben Gurion and Mr. Sharett would be the first to admit that the task of forming, and then keeping in being, a coalition Government commanding a majority in a legislature so sectionalized as that of Israel would have been impossible unless they had been able to draw from the ranks of each party in the coalition men of considerable ability. In addition to the Mapai stalwarts of proved capacity who have held office in so many Ministries—Mr. Levi Eshkol, Mrs. Golda Meir, Mr. Naftali, to mention only a few of them—there are men to be found in almost every party who rank, by any standards, as of Cabinet 'timber'. Israel's successive Cabinets, indeed, have been enviably free from the kind of men, only too familiar to the political life of many democratic countries, who

owe their prominence either to family connections, or to a reputation for *bonhomie*, rather than to the positive contributions which they can make to the general good. Israel, partly because even the man in the street and on the farm is politically-minded, and partly because from her very inception as a State she has been subjected to the strain and strifes of virtual siege, does not tolerate passengers in her Government.

In few countries, indeed, do the Ministers and the permanent officials work so hard, and for such long hours, as in Israel. In many Asian countries, climatic conditions dictate the beginning of the office day at six a.m. and even earlier; but there is a long midday break, and few officials work late into the night. In the western world, a later beginning and a later ending are the usual practice. In the Israel Government, however, work begins at the early hours suited to tropical climates (which Israel does not boast) and ends, if anything, well after the hours at which the Departments of Whitehall and Washington are deserted. Such a system, when combined with the heavy strain imposed by rather makeshift accommodation (although this is being improved) and by the constant pressure of business, takes a heavy toll of energies. It is true that the offices of the Government are closed for the Sabbath break; but every officer seems to take work home with him, and telephones are kept very busy. In the early days of the State, there were deaths from sheer over-work; and even now, when the Administration has got into its stride, physical breakdown is by no means unknown. Although annual holidays are prescribed by regulation, all too often they seem to be seized upon as occasions for overtaking accumulated arrears of work, rather than for rest and relaxation. Fortunately, there are some signs that the killing pressure of work is easing a little, as the supply of competent and experienced senior officials, who can lighten the burden of their Ministerial Chiefs, becomes more and more assured; but until a short time ago Mr. Ben Gurion's assertion that he was the only person in the Government to realize the value of relaxation, and to insist upon practising it for at least one hour or two every week, was frankly admitted to be true.

Until comparatively recently, the strain imposed upon members of the Government, as upon their senior departmental officials, was materially increased by the division of the struc-

ture of administration between Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem. From the point of view of Israel, there is only one possible capital for the country, the ancient city of David, which has occupied a unique position in Jewish estimation since it was captured from the Jebusites some three thousand years ago. But the position has been greatly complicated by a number of practical difficulties. According to the United Nations plan for partitioning Palestine, Jerusalem was to form part of an international *enclave*, to include Bethlehem and a number of other sacred spots, under the trusteeship of the United Nations itself. Jewish opinion intensely disliked this suggestion, but the Jewish Agency, the World Zionist Organization, and indeed all but a handful of extremists, declared themselves ready to accept it, along with the rest of the plan, for the sake of peace. The Arabs, as has been recorded on an earlier page, refused; and when war broke out, the Jews in Jerusalem were fiercely attacked, their locations in the Old City were stormed, and the New City, which then became their main refuge, was besieged and subjected to heavy shell-fire. They held out stoutly; and before the Israel–Jordan armistice was arranged, they were already in touch with the rest of Israel through the 'road of valour' and the 'Jerusalem corridor'. After fighting to maintain the position against Arab attack, the Israelis finally resisted the later efforts of the United Nations to convert Jerusalem into an international trusteeship. Their resistance was endorsed, from his own point of view, by the late King Abdullah of Jordan, to whom the line of demarcation had allocated the Old City and most of the Holy Places, captured by his troops in the course of the fighting. Yet the resolution of the United Nations to internationalize Jerusalem still remains unrescinded; and many of the countries who are represented diplomatically in Israel consider themselves bound by its terms. Nor was this the only difficulty in the way of making the New City the capital of Israel. Many of the fine new buildings—offices, shops, dwelling-houses—which had grown up during the Mandatory period had been badly damaged in the course of the fighting; and all public services, transport, water, electricity, sewage, telephones and so forth—were either disrupted, or inadequate, or both. The upshot was that enormous efforts became necessary to repair war damage, to construct new accommodation, and to

extend public services, before New Jerusalem could provide even the most elementary necessities—leaving aside any amenities—for the Israel Government. And hanging over everything was the initial acceptance by Israel of the United Nations resolution for the internationalization of the Holy City —both Old and New—as part of the whole plan to which Israel originally owed her own international juridical existence. Her subsequent efforts to meet the wishes of the United Nations by agreeing to a trusteeship over the Holy Places themselves under the control of a United Nations custodian have so far failed; partly because of the strong feelings in some Christian circles that the United Nations proposal is the only right one; and partly because of the resistance of Jordan, within whose area the great majority of the Holy Places are at present located.

The strength of Jewish feeling over the Jerusalem issue dictated the piecemeal removal of the machinery of Government from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem as facilities could be made available. First, the Supreme Court was set up in Jerusalem in September 1948. This was followed next year by the Ministry for Religious Affairs; some departments of the Treasury; the Post Office; the Department of Statistics; and the Ministry of Supplies. The arrival of these branches of the Government caused some administrative difficulties, because the bulk of the Government was still located in Tel-Aviv. But in the estimation of almost all Israelis, the move was well worthwhile, both as evidence of the Government's determination to make Jerusalem the capital, and as an important step towards the renaissance of the city, which had emerged from the War of Liberation, battered, financially ruined, and a mere shell of its former self. Thanks to a vigorous loan policy and a comprehensive town-planning scheme, combined with the encouragement of new industries and the expansion and improvement of the public services, the New City began to take on the outward appearance of a worthy seat for the Government of Israel. In the course of 1950, most of the remaining Ministries, with the exception of the Foreign Office, were moved; and the Knesset held its sessions in the modest but perfectly adequate surroundings which it still occupies. To begin with, there was great congestion: shortage of living accommodation: shortage of offices:

shortage of telephones: and shortage of most of the other facilities upon which the day-to-day-work of a Government depends. But before long, things improved. By the time that a series of new Government buildings on a temporary basis were ready for the Foreign Ministry, New Jerusalem was fully embarked upon the process of expansion which has fitted her to become the political, as well as the spiritual, focus of the life of Israel. Some difficulties of protocol still remain; most of the foreign diplomatic representatives still stay at Tel-Aviv, refusing (in theory at least) to admit that the Government to which they are accredited has moved to another capital. With the exception of the headquarters of the Defence Forces, which for strategical reasons is located in Tel-Aviv, the central Ministries and the bulk of their staffs are now concentrated in Jerusalem, to the great advantage of the general working of the civil administration, which is no longer divided. Housing for all the officials, for the visitors who come on State business, for the delegates to the numerous Zionist and other conferences and conventions, still presents many problems; but there is plenty of room for the expansion of Jerusalem, particularly on the westward side. New buildings are going up everywhere according to a master-plan: a University city is under construction: transport is being improved: and there is an impressive atmosphere of energy and initiative which augurs well for the future. Already the people of Israel have cause to be proud of their ancient, but reborn, capital, which after suffering the loss of a third of its Jewish population during the troubles connected with the War of Liberation, has now more than 150,000 inhabitants.

The allocation of the business of administration among the various Departments of Government in Israel presents few distinctive features, beyond those which have been mentioned in preceding pages in the course of our survey of some of the major tasks which the nation is undertaking. It is perhaps worth noting, however, that in Israel the Prime Minister has a separate office which combines the function of the Cabinet Secretariat in Britain with those of inter-ministerial co-ordination and of control of the Civil Service (which is taken outside ordinary departmental supervision and is operated by a Civil Service Commission responsible to the Prime Minister himself). Included in the Prime Minister's office, also, are the Research

Council of Israel, which advises Government on matters of scientific research, including the development of natural resources of agriculture and industry, and public health: the Central Bureau of Statistics: and the Government Information and Civic Education Office, which is concerned with the entire machinery of public relations—press, broadcasting, documentary films, lecture tours and the like—by which the Government diffuses information about its activities, problems, and achievements to the people of Israel. But there is one ministry which is in some respects unique, at least in the sense in which it exists in Israel, and that is the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

The fact that Israel is a Jewish State finds expression in a number of laws; for example the Days of Rest Ordinance, which gives legal recognition to the festivals of the Jewish calendar: the Ordinance which guarantees *Kosher* food for soldiers: the clause in the law prohibiting night-baking which provides for the supply of unleavened bread for the feast of the Passover: the law requiring women who have been exempted from military service on grounds of religious conviction to do certain civilian service for the State. At the same time, freedom of conscience: the equality of all citizens without distinction of religion: and the protection of all Holy Places are laid down in the Proclamation of Independence. Thus the Government of Israel has a triple responsibility: to provide religious facilities for the citizens of Jewish faith: to ensure that Israelis of other faiths are free to worship in their own way: and to safeguard the Holy Places of all religions. The machinery responsible for discharging these responsibilities is provided by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Out of the total population of 1,827,000, there are 1,625,000 Jews. Of the non-Jewish community of 202,000, the great majority—139,000—are Muslim Arabs. Second in size are the 44,000 Christians, divided between Greek Catholic (17,700): Greek Orthodox (14,500): Latin (5,300): Maronite (2,500). Other communities are the Armenian Gregorian Church: the Coptic Church: the Abyssinian Church: and the various Protestant Churches (Anglican, Church of Scotland, Lutheran, Baptist and others). In addition there are 19,000 Druzes, whose forefathers split off from Islam in the eleventh century to commence a worship of their own, which centres on their

reverence for the prophet Shoo'av, whose tomb is near the Galilean village of Hittin; there are Bahais; there are about one hundred representatives of the ancient sect of Samaritans, mostly living in Holon.

All these communities possess their own internal organizations in Israel, sometimes elaborate. The Greek Catholic Church has its own Archbishop: the Greek Orthodox Church has the Archimandrite: the Latin Church is headed by a representative of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem: the Coptic Church is headed by a representative of its own Archbishop of Jerusalem. All told, there are about a thousand Christian clergy in Israel, including 150 monks and 550 nuns, divided between some thirty religious orders. Christian worship is conducted in 160 Churches and Chapels. For Muslims, there are more than one hundred mosques where congregational worship is conducted; the State helps with the upkeep of the structure and pays about 130 of the higher Muslim dignitaries, such as the Kadis of the Muslim Religious Courts.

To provide for the needs of all these communities as well as for the religious life of the Jews, the Ministry of Religious Affairs is divided into several branches. The largest branch, the Department for Religious Affairs in the State, has itself several divisions: one for the regulation of *Kosher* food and the making of devotional articles: one for the organization of special services of memorial or of celebration: one for the religious needs of new immigrant settlements, which have to be provided with Rabbis, ritual slaughterers, and religious instructors, together with help in the construction of synagogues: one for religious contacts with the Diaspora, including the holding of seminars for Rabbis and leaders of Jewish communities abroad: one for the supervision of the institutions for religious learning (of which there are more than 120 in Israel with 6,000 students) and for providing special religious instruction for schoolboys and college students: one for the care, restoration, and embellishment of Jewish Holy Places: one for the 169 religious councils which maintain services and provide for religious needs, as well as looking after slaughter-houses, cemeteries, mortuaries and burial clubs: and one for the Rabbinate and the Rabbinical Courts. In Israel the supreme religious authority is vested in the Chief Rabbinate, consisting of the Chief Rabbis of the

Ashkenazi and Sephardi communities and the Supreme Rabbinical Council: it is authorized to pronounce upon the interpretation of Jewish Law, and to supervise the Rabbinical Courts. There are seven Rabbinical Courts—one for each region—presided over by religious judges from whose decisions an appeal may go to a special Court presided over by the two Chief Rabbis. These courts are important, not only for the part which they play in maintaining Jewish orthodoxy—they hear about 11,000 cases every year—but because the Knesset decided in 1953 to entrust them with the exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce among the Jews of Israel. This decision has caused some controversy. There are those who consider that certain of the theories and practices of the orthodox section, which have been evolved in circumstances of persecution and of ghetto-segregation, are unsuited to the freer life which the emergence of the Jewish State has made possible.

A separate division of the Ministry of Religious Affairs deals with the religious needs of the Muslim and the Druze communities. The Knesset has given legislative sanction to the Sheria Courts of Appeal, which entertain appeals from the Sheria Courts of First Instance, which sit in Acre, Nazareth, Jaffa and the Central Area. These Courts function actively, hearing between one thousand and two thousand cases every year. As has already been noticed, the State pays salaries to Muslim religious functionaries, helps to keep Mosques in repair, and assists in the establishment of health and social welfare institutions by supplementing the resources available for Muslim religious endowments. New Mosques are built where they are needed. Such projects, as well as the grant of relief to the aged and the indigent, and the provision of clothing for poor pupils in schools, are the province of the Advisory Councils for Muslim Religious Affairs which co-operates with the Ministry in Acre, Haifa and Jaffa. The Ministry now publishes a quarterly magazine in Arabic, with Hebrew and English summaries, giving news of the activities of the Muslim community in Israel, noting the judgements of the Sheria Courts, and printing articles on religious subjects. The much smaller Druze community, living mainly in Galilee and Mount Carmel, has its machinery for supervising the marriage and divorce of its members. Understanding between the Druzes and

their Jewish neighbours is always close and cordial. The Druzes are well satisfied with their position; and the Jews do not forget that many Druzes fought side by side with them during the War of Liberation.

Another division of the Ministry deals with the Christian communities, and publishes in English, French and Spanish an excellent litt e periodical—*Christian News from Israel*—which describes the life and activities of the Christian Churches, surveys archaeological discoveries of religious importance, and records ecclesiastical appointments and the arrival of foreign clergy and laity. Relations between the Ministry and the leaders of the various Churches are cordial and co-operative: the Ministry arranges for the entry-permits of clergymen with clerical duties to perform and for passages of Christians from the New to the Old City. It keeps in repair the road to Christian shrines, and preserves Christian Churches and cemeteries in places where local Christian communities are unable to arrange adequate supervision. There is also a mass of business connected with claims for restoration of Church property abandoned during the fighting: with exchanges of land in areas under military administration: with compensation for war damage: and with the evacuation of premises occupied by the authorities in time of necessity. The general confidence among the Christian Churches in the fair treatment meted out to them by the Government of Israel is shown by the building of new churches and hospices and by the repair of those which have been damaged in disturbances before the restoration of order in 1948. A striking example of this is the new Church of the Annunciation in Nazareth which the Franciscan Order is now erecting.

In a country so small as Israel, much of the driving-power is necessarily imparted to the administration from the Capital, where the Government has its permanent headquarters. But it is interesting to notice that since Israel emerged as a State, there has been a great move towards decentralization through the strengthening of the institutions of local self-government. During the Mandatory period, local government made some small headway; the large towns had their municipalities and there were rural councils in some places. But the franchise was based mainly upon property qualifications; and in the then Arab-

majority communities, the elected representatives were drawn as a rule from the leading landowning and professional families alone. This system has been considerably altered and largely extended. The franchise has been liberalized to confer the vote upon all persons, aged 18 and upwards, who have resided for six months in a given area; any one who is 21 years of age and over can stand for election to municipal or rural councils. Israel now has twenty municipalities, eighty-six local councils —which exist in the larger Arab as well as in the larger Jewish villages—and forty-eight regional councils. Like the Knesset, the municipalities and the councils are elected for a four year term; their proceedings, and the electoral contests which settle their personnel, arouse great local interest and provide an excellent education in practical democracy for immigrants who have come from countries where such institutions are unknown. The larger municipalities enjoy considerable resources and a good deal of authority; in the initiative which they display, and in the magnitude of the improvement schemes which they put into operation, they can stand comparison with many of the corresponding bodies in the United States. The elected Mayors of such cities as Jerusalem and Haifa are not only important civic figures: they wield a personal authority which enables an able man to leave his mark for all time on the amenities and services from which his fellow-citizens will benefit. Both the municipalities and the councils play an important part in organizing all branches of the social services within their jurisdictions, receiving grants-in-aid from the Government and discharging on its behalf a number of functions.

There has been a tendency of late to decentralize the powers relating to municipalities and rural councils, originally vested in the Ministry of the Interior, to the District Offices, where relations with these elected bodies can become more intimate. This has enabled the Government's approval of the ordinary and the development Budgets of the municipalities to be obtained more quickly; and has helped to encourage sound local finance and to diminish deficits. It has, moreover, made easier the process of developing the powers of the regional councils, which have jurisdiction over individual settlements. New regional councils have been set up in the Negev, and as the settlements expand, the amenities and services controlled by

the councils will increase. A parallel process is the setting up in immigrant villages, still without municipal status, of some sub-offices of neighbouring municipalities, thus affiliating the settlement to the local authority. Co-ordination of this kind is the more desirable because certain forms of settlement, like the *Kibbutzim*, while extremely democratic in their domestic management, sometimes tend to concentrate on their own range of interests, with insufficient attention to the possibilities that affiliation to neighbouring local authorities might open up to them. On the whole, the main impression which the structure of local government institutions in Israel makes upon the observer is that of sturdy independence, combined with a recognition that each unit of government, urban, rural and regional, has its own part to play in the life of the country as a whole. Central and local institutions appear to combine well in providing Israel with the administrative framework which her people need.

X

The Arabs in Israel

During most of the Mandatory period, the man or woman whom the visitor most frequently encountered, whether in the Palestinian city or in the Palestinian countryside, was almost inevitably an Arab. Except in Tel-Aviv, in certain parts of Jerusalem, and in specifically Jewish areas of settlement, a Jew was rarely to be seen. This was, indeed, to be expected; for centuries Palestine had been an Arab country in spite of the continued Jewish connection with it. The Jewish population, it is true, grew steadily as the Balfour Declaration became effective; but the Arab population increased much faster, partly by superior fecundity and partly by extensive immigration from neighbouring Arab countries which could not offer economic conditions comparable to those obtaining in Palestine under the Mandate. The ratio between the two races was drastically modified in the early thirties as a result of the great waves of Jewish refugees set in motion by Hitler's persecution; but even so, right up to the end of the Mandatory régime, there were never fewer than three Arabs to every Jew. To-day, in Israel, there are nine Jews for each Arab. The Arabs are not evenly distributed over the country. One meets them in the large cities, particularly in Tel-Aviv–Jaffa and Haifa, where they are to be found in the docks, on public works, in factories and offices. Many are smartly turned out, westernized in dress, and, apparently, in outlook. They are not easily to be distinguished from the rest of the population except by their remarkably handsome, clear-cut features, and sometimes by their practice of wearing their national head-dress on formal occasions—although for the most part they follow the fashion, prevalent among the younger Israelis, of wearing no hat at all except for field-work. In the towns, they number all told about 51,000. Outside, as in

Galilee, there are many Arab villages, whose inhabitants are easily to be recognized by their traditional head-dress. Even here, however, with the exception of the sheikhs and headmen, mostly belonging to the older generation, there is a tendency to adopt the western shirt and trousers along with that head-dress. It is in Galilee that the bulk—120,000—of the Arab population, is concentrated, although there are also Arab villages in the Judaean hills and in the coastal plain of Samaria. Not by any means all the Arabs are Muslims, although the bulk of them hold that faith. There are some 40,000 Christians out of a total of 198,000. It may be noticed that about half the Christian Arabs formerly inhabiting the area which is now Israel remained where they were; while about 80 per cent of the Muslim Arabs went away. In addition to the 'settled' Arabs who are farmers and townsmen, there are some 20,500 nomad Arabs, Bedouin, to be found mostly in the Negev.

The principal impression left upon the foreign visitor to the Arab rural areas is that there has been a marked material advance since Mandatory times. The children look more robust: more of them seem to be in school: there are fewer in the fields. They are neatly dressed, and a high proportion of them wear shoes. Each village can show some new buildings completed, more seem to be in course of construction. Villages look cleaner and the main streets at least are being paved. More significant still, branches of such banks as the Bank Leumi le Israel are opening in Arab villages. A good many tractors and drills are to be seen at work. Inquiry shows that these are often the property of the individual proprietor—there are fifty privately owned tractors in Galilee alone—although others are rented from the co-operative machinery depot or the Ministry of Agriculture. Crops look heavy; it is not surprising to learn that the yield of wheat per *dunum* (one-fourth of an acre) is twice what it was only a few years ago; and that the average price of a *dunum* of Arab-owned land has continuously risen. Moreover there has been a change in the kind of crops grown. Tobacco used to be insignificant; it is now found on 10 per cent of the area under cultivation; and 7,000 families derive their livelihood from growing it. Vegetable production has similarly increased; the summer crops of such things as tomatoes and cucumbers are highly profitable. Experiments are going on with

cotton, sugar, beans and peanuts. All these things mean that an assured market has been found for everything that Arab farmers can grow. This is partly due, no doubt, to the high demand for agricultural products, and to the Government-inspired drive for national self-sufficiency in food, which has resulted from the Arab blockade and from mass-immigration; but on the face of things, the Arab community has found itself in a position to take full advantage of these favourable circumstances. The visible improvement in Arab standards of living does not depend only upon the valuable cash crops which are now grown in Galilee and the Central District; both the cattle and the poultry look finer and healthier, and it is not surprising to hear that the Ministry of Agriculture has improved the local breed of cattle by the introduction of Dutch cows, and that large numbers of chicks of good laying- and table-strains have been distributed to the villages. There seems to be money available for small luxuries: many village houses now have wireless sets: the bus services connecting the Arab areas with the nearby towns and cities are well patronized: and there seems to be a good deal of travelling for recreation as well as for business. Arab families are often to be seen in their own cars; and these people are not wealthy landlords, but peasant proprietors. A high proportion —perhaps as much as 80 per cent—of Arab farmers work their own land; and the energies of the rural community are now definitely directed towards intensive, as contrasted with traditional, methods of cultivation.

This healthy economic situation is the more surprising because the Arab inhabitants of the area which is now Israel suffered a profound material and psychological upheaval in the disturbances out of which the State was born. Apart altogether from those who departed to the neighbouring Arab countries—and these included most of the prominent and wealthy persons to whom the Arabs had been accustomed to look for leadership in opinion and for assistance in time of need—about one Arab in every six among those who remained had become a 'displaced person', unable to return to his village either because it was now in 'hostile' territory, or because it had been taken over by the Government; whether for security reasons, for development schemes, or for the accommodation of newly-arrived Jewish immigrants. Thus in addition to the vaster task of resettling

immigrant Jews there was another task, smaller in proportion but equally acute, of resettling displaced Arabs. The Government did not shirk its responsibility towards them; and all of them have now been absorbed into the economic life of the country. Legislation has been passed to provide compensation, either in land or in cash, for the property which passed out of their possession. If the land proves, on investigation, to be no longer required for essential purposes of development, settlement, or security, it is returned to its original owner. If it is still needed for these purposes, the owner may claim compensation, in land if he so desires; and if he is dissatisfied, he may appeal to a judicial tribunal. The claims are being steadily gone through; and as each is determined, another Arab family is permanently settled, very often with enough working capital to undertake highly profitable intensive cultivation of its new land.

The position of the Arab communities in the towns was equally difficult, because business was disrupted, trade with the neighbouring Arab countries had ceased, offices had shut down and employment had come to a standstill. But help to tide over immediate difficulties came both from UNRWA and the new Israel Government; and in the general demand for manpower for reconstruction, the prospects of re-employment brightened. Arabs, particularly craftsmen and trained office workers, found jobs as readily as Jews; for the Government's policy of admitting Arabs to citizenship on exactly equal terms with Jews is conscientiously applied. During the Mandatory period, trade unionism had not flourished among the Arabs, although some honest efforts had been made to introduce it. Under the Israel Government, however, the movement has spread rapidly. The Arab community in the towns has benefited equally with the Jews from the labour legislation which the Knesset has adopted from 1949 onwards. This covers maximum hours of work, weekly rest-day, annual holidays with pay, and national insurance. There is still some tendency for the wages of Arabs to lag behind those of Jews owing to difference in skills; but in all Government offices and public institutions, in Histadruth industrial enterprises, and in Jewish settlements which employ Arab labour, it is the rate for the job, irrespective of race, which is paid. Outside these occupations, particularly where there is competition for unskilled employment, conditions are still un-

satisfactory; but the Labour Federation has been successful in securing wage increases for Arab port workers, quarry workers, orange packers, and agricultural labourers. The Government itself has made great efforts to develop the Arab fishing industry by loans for the repair and purchase of boats and equipment. Arabs who make their living from the sea now find far better opportunities of a good livelihood than they have ever known before, thanks to the facilities provided for their avocation in Jaffa, Haifa and Acre. The aim of the State is to ensure that its Arab citizens share to the full all opportunities for economic betterment as they become increasingly available. In times of unemployment, the nine labour exchanges which have been set up in Arab centres arrange to distribute jobs connected with emergency programmes of road-making and other public works; and the location of these works in rural areas has helped to arrest the traditional drift of Arab labour from the country to the towns during the off-season.

Arabs are eligible to join Histadruth; the Federation has proved particularly attractive to skilled workers. It has a special department to look after the interests of Arab members, which co-ordinates all the Federation's activities that affect them, and also encourages trade unionism and co-operative enterprises. Progress in the latter direction is notable. Thanks to the joint efforts of Histadruth and the Ministry of Labour, there are now thirty-two agricultural marketing co-operatives and twenty-five co-operative wholesale associations in Arab villages, while in the cities there are artisan groups, and loan and savings associations. The work has not been easy: suspicion as well as apathy has had to be overcome. But there is an increasing tendency among Arabs who have become convinced of the advantages of the co-operative system to convert their fellows to their new way of thinking, and also to associate Jewish experience with the management of Arab co-operative enterprises. Histadruth itself has proved a powerful agency in knitting both the urban and rural Arab communities into the economic structure of Israel through its insistence upon equal treatment for Arab labour, and through its extension to its Arab members of the many well-organized and effective social services which it provides.

At present, the proportion of skilled to unskilled workers in

the Arab community is about one to five; but efforts are being made to increase this ratio substantially. Vocational training centres have been set up in various Arab localities, where carpentry, mechanics, and the repair of agricultural machinery are taught. The centre opened in Nazareth in 1955 is among the latest of these; the sixty-five trainees of the first course included semi-skilled workers, school graduates, and ordinary villagers. Those who attend the courses are given loans by the Ministry of Labour to enable them to support themselves or their families while they are studying for periods which may last from three months to one year, according to the subject taken. Evening courses and refresher courses are also arranged; among them being one to enable Arab clerks to qualify for the Israel Civil Service. Vocational courses for Arab women are organized by the Working Women's Council; Arab women and girls can learn domestic science, sewing, book-keeping and Hebrew. These courses are gaining in popularity among Christian Arabs; but in the cities and towns, progress is also being made among the younger generation of Muslim girls, some of whom are seeking careers in business like their Jewish compatriots. As might be expected, it is among the young people that the work of Histadruth and of the Ministry of Social Welfare is making the most rapid headway in the promotion of vocational training, sport, recreation groups, and cultural activity. Scouting has been successfully encouraged. Branches of the Israel Scout Federation are now attached to many Arab public schools: Arab Scouts are included in the delegations sent to the World Scouts Jamboree: and the movement is developing successfully by the formation of new troops every year in Arab and Druze villages. There are six main groups of Scouts in the Federation: Jewish Scouts: Arab School Scouts Association (Muslim): Catholic Scouts (Greek Catholic): Arab Scouts of Israel (Greek Orthodox): Druze Scouts: Terra Sancta Roman Catholic Scouts Association. Everywhere in Israel, Scouting is providing a valuable meeting-ground for Arab and Jewish youth.

Among the most important factors in the change which is coming over the position of Arabs in the territory which is now Israel is the development of local government. In the form in which it can be seen working to-day, it is a relatively new thing. Under the Mandatory administration, it was the Central

Government which provided such services as free primary education, anti-malaria and veterinary facilities, and the like. Contributions to public works and local development projects were, it is true, forthcoming on a voluntary basis; but except in municipal areas, where Arabs paid rates with the other inhabitants, there was nothing like any general assessment for local taxation. Taxation of Arabs outside the urban areas was central; the property taxes were low, and there was no income-tax. The Arab community as a whole had no experience of a system in which a local community provides its own services, and pays for them by rates which it imposes on itself. The introduction of this system has not been easy; first because the Arabs in the villages had become accustomed to look to the central Government for anything which they needed: and secondly because almost every individual village is divided by hereditary antagonisms and even feuds which hinder co-operation between the men to whom the bulk of the inhabitants ordinarily look for leadership. It has taken much propaganda work, and a great deal of patience, to convince the rural Arabs that they will be better off under a system which gives them control over their own local affairs—even if they have to pay something for what they will be getting. There has been no attempt to rush things through over-quickly; even to-day the income from rates in the Arab rural areas is low; and contributions to development projects and public works tend to be spasmodic. But there has been perceptible progress; something like half the total Arab community in Israel lives now under self-governing institutions. Of this half, numbering 100,000, some 50,000 live in the two all-Arab towns of Nazareth and Shifar'am and the urban centres of Tel-Aviv–Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, Acre, Ramleh and Lod (where they share these institutions with the Jews); but there are fourteen local councils which are purely Arab, and these look after the affairs of about 35,000 people. The number of these councils steadily increases. There are still many Arabs who live in smaller villages where no local councils have been set up; and here the Government itself supplies health and welfare services and defrays the salaries of the teachers, with what local help it can find, until Arab local government becomes practicable.

While Arab local government is gaining financial experience,

and learning the habit of taxing itself, the major share of the expenditure involved will continue to come from grants-in-aid. The Arab towns and the Arab local councils receive these grants on the basis both of population and of specific need: for example, the Ministry of Education pays the salaries of elementary school teachers, and helps with the equipment of secondary schools: the Ministry of Labour gives grants for public works: the Ministry of Social Welfare helps with the social services: and the Ministry of Health contributes to the cost of hospitals, dispensaries, and clinics. But the impulse to self-help is gaining ground; and in a typical year the total expenditure on public works in the Arab sector of Israel (excluding the special Nazareth development budget) is now divided about half and half between local funds and direct Government assistance. Additional evidence of the prosperity of the Arab community is provided by the budgets of some of these local councils, which handle funds yearly in the region of £20,000; and embark, with Government help, on new water projects, new school buildings, and new roads. For the first time in their age-long history, tap-water is now to be found in certain villages on a house-to-house basis. Nazareth is in a special position, with a population of 21,000 and a budget of £50,000. It is now the proud possessor of a new water system, which not only brings water to the town wells (rebuilt and protected from contamination) but also supplies every house in the city. It is controlled and maintained by the Nazareth municipality. A sewerage plan which will provide proper sanitary facilities is now being put in hand with help from the Government: home industries in handicrafts and the making of religious souvenirs, which sell readily in this ancient centre of Christian pilgrimage, are receiving encouragement: hotels and rest-houses have been improved: unemployment is falling rapidly.

Parallel with the development of local government has come the extension of the social services. In the time of the Mandate, the Jewish community was self-sufficient in such services, with the result that the Mandatory Government directed its own services mainly to the Arabs. When Israel became a State, the former services which had been operating among the Arabs were merged in the new comprehensive structure which was extended to benefit all citizens in common. Thus hospital facili-

ties, clinics, and the like, are available to everyone without distinction: while Arab members of unions affiliated to Histadruth are entitled to the extensive medical and health facilities provided by Kupat Holim. But such services are not readily accessible to Arabs who live in remote villages; and the Ministry of Health encourages local councils to set up village clinics by giving maintenance grants. In villages which do not come under local councils, or which have no clinics, the Ministry makes available a visiting nursing service and mobile medical units. For the Arab sector there is also a special network of mother-and-child centres, where pre-natal care and infant welfare work are undertaken. Thanks, no doubt, at least in part, to these institutions, infant mortality among the Arab community has fallen steadily to about sixty per mille of live births. This is regarded as still far too high (the figure for the Jewish population is just round thirty); but even so, it is less than one-third of the only figure given for a middle eastern country in the statistics collected by the United Nations. Equally important to the health of the Arab community will be the scheme of preventive medicine which is now being planned. The Ministry of Health is at present establishing rural health centres to provide preventive as well as curative services, with maternity wards, infant welfare departments and lecture halls for instruction in hygiene. The first of these centres was started in 1955: and during the next five years, eight more centres will be set up. The Ministry will meet half the running costs; the village councils will provide the balance. Growing co-operation between the Ministry and the Muslim religious authorities is proved by the decision of the Arab community to pay for the construction of the first two health centres out of Muslim religious endowments.

A certain degree of separation of treatment is still necessary to meet the health needs of the Arab community; and it is perhaps typical of this fact that there is a new hospital for Arab tuberculosis cases in Nazareth, which was opened with the aid of American counterpart funds. But the line of future development seems indicated by the further fact that the Nazareth hospital is intended only for adults; tuberculous Arab children go to the Eytanim hospital near Jerusalem, which is the children's tuberculosis hospital for the whole of Israel, and receive

treatment alongside their Jewish playmates. Moreover, Arab doctors and nurses are freely recruited by the Ministry: Arab students of physiotherapy and of medicine enter the national training institutions: and courses of practical health training for Arab men and women, both Muslim and Christian, are now available. The prevailing standards of public health are applied as carefully to Arab as to Jewish villages: both share in the widespread and elaborate anti-malaria operations, which include the spraying of houses and the decontamination of drainage systems, wells, pools, streams and swamps. In Arab as well as in Jewish villages the water supply is inspected, and the cleanness of food shops and factories is enforced. A corollary of this equality of treatment is found in the newly established social welfare institutions. There are now twenty-eight local welfare offices to take care of social cases among Arabs; and they are staffed by Arab men and women trained in the School for Social Work which, as we noticed on an earlier page, has been set up in Jerusalem jointly by the Ministry of Social Welfare and the Hebrew University. At first, the cost of this welfare work was defrayed entirely by the Ministry; but lately the Arab towns and villages which have their own local government have made themselves responsible for a third of the expenditure on social welfare work in their areas. Among the more important branches of this work is the care of the destitute, the aged, and the orphans, all of whom are entitled to regular assistance. Vocational training is arranged for old people who can still work: an old people's home, which will meet the needs of the whole Arab Muslim community, has been set up in Jaffa: a Muslim orphanage, similarly comprehensive in its function, is being built in Acre. The new scheme of National Insurance will be of considerable benefit to the Arabs, especially as the Government makes payment to the National Insurance Institute on behalf of old people who are too poor to pay for themselves. Arab Social Welfare workers deal also with juvenile delinquency among Arabs: there is a special staff of Arab parole officers to look after young delinquents who are put on probation by the courts. Club-houses, summer camps, special schools, and all the expedients which international experience suggests for the benefit of 'difficult' or maladjusted young people are now available for Arabs, as well as for Jews, in Israel. This is gradu-

ally exerting a considerable influence over the Arab attitude towards the sick, the aged, the indigent, the 'troublesome'; which is now distinguished by a growing sense of communal responsibility for their well-being, as Arab social workers, often aided by local teachers and religious functionaries, awaken to new life the ancient precepts of wisely directing charity and benevolence so deeply imbedded in the conscience of Islam.

Chief among the agencies which are transforming the life of the Arabs in Israel is education; and in no sphere of activity has progress been more rapid. Under Mandatory administration, Arab education was in much the same position as other social services; the Government mainly financed it and managed it, while the Jews mainly financed and managed their own system. All Arab education in the towns was 'run' from the centre; while in the villages, the great bulk of the schools were staffed and managed by the Government, with little more than the passive co-operation of the local people. In Mandatory Palestine there were in 1946 only 454 Arab public schools for 783 Arab villages and 17 urban communities. Only 25 per cent of Muslim children attended school at all, as compared with 90 per cent of Jewish and 90 per cent of Christian children. In Arab village schools, there were usually five grades, with one, or at most two, teachers. Girls rarely went beyond the first two or three grades.

The picture is now quite different. In Israel there are 110 Arab urban and rural communities all told; but they are served by 112 State primary schools, 78 kindergartens and 6 secondary schools, which muster between them about 26,000 pupils. In addition to the 112 State schools, there are 53 schools maintained by religious organizations. Protestant and Catholic mission schools number 33; there are 5 Terra Sancta schools; there are 15 parochial schools divided among Greek Catholic, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Armenian and Greek Orthodox. Like the State schools, these private schools operate on a functional basis, and are open to Muslim as well as to Christian children. As they muster some 7,000 pupils, the total of Arab schoolchildren is 33,000—17 per cent of the Arab population of Israel, which corresponds closely with the ratio for Jewish pupils, who represent 17 per cent of the Jewish population of Israel. Some further figures will underline the change. In the Mandatory

period, there was one school pupil for every 15 Arabs; there is now one for every 6. In 1948, the percentage of Arab children of school age who were attending school was 48 per cent: to-day it is 71 per cent among the settled population, and 67 per cent if the Bedouin are included. More than 30 villages which had no schools have now received them. To-day no village is without one. Moreover, as will be seen, the school age for Arab children has been lengthened. Formerly, it was 6 to 12 years. Now, in line with the rest of the child population, Arab children come under instruction from the age of 5 to the age of 14.

This transformation has not been achieved merely by blind conformity with the new regulations. It is the result mainly of the active co-operation of the Arab community in working the Education Act of 1949. This Act provided for free, compulsory, primary education for all children from 5 to 14, and set up local educational authorities to implement its provisions. The ensuing decentralization, and the scope thus offered for local initiative, both inherent in this plan, appealed strongly to the Arab community, to whom they were entirely novel. The new Arab local councils took full advantage of them, especially as the Ministry of Education paid teachers' salaries, and also bore other expenses in areas where local councils had not been set up. For the first time, the Arabs had a chance of taking a hand in building up the kind of educational system which they wanted for their children; and the enthusiasm among village elders, teachers, parents and pupils has been remarkable—indeed it has begun to break down some of the divisions with which clan and family rivalries have long afflicted Arab village life. Often the welfare of the village school, its progress and its success, seem to be the one thing on which a council split by traditional feuds can heartily agree: for everyone has begun to realize that the future of the Arab community, and their prospects of achieving in practice the position of equality with Jews which the law prescribes, depend very largely upon the education given to the younger generation. It is significant in this connection that it was the pressure of Arab opinion that induced the Government of Israel to introduce Hebrew as a subject of study in Arab elementary schools, in order that Arab boys should not be handicapped by ignorance of the language

in which much of the public business and private communications is conducted in Israel. In Arab schools, of course, the language of instruction is Arabic.

The larger share now allotted to local initiative in school management has led to the forging of closer links between what Arab children learn in school and the needs and opportunities of their ordinary life. Traditional teaching-methods in Arab elementary schools formerly concentrated on instruction in purely classical Arabic, with little attention to the speech of everyday existence. This was both uneconomical and unnecessary; the first because the time thus spent could be used more profitably in teaching the children the language ordinarily employed in conversation, in current literature, and in newspapers: the second because classical Arabic was already provided for separately in the hours set aside for studying and memorizing the Koran. The system has now changed; the Arabic which is taught in schools is that which will be immediately useful to the children in their life outside school hours: and new lesson-books are being produced which are interesting as well as instructive. Formerly, it was five or six years before a child, taught largely by rote, could read intelligently or take any interest in what he read; now this period is being appreciably shortened. Much useful pre-school training, which greatly helps children to make good use of their time in school, is provided in kindergartens, which played little part in Arab education until the Israel Government introduced its new plans. The kindergarten system does not cover the Arab sector of education completely; but it is being steadily extended.

No doubt it is also playing its part in one very remarkable development in the Arab educational system which deserves to be noticed particularly—the growing tendency towards mixed classes of boys and girls. This is a revolutionary conception in the Muslim world, and its origin and progress in Israel deserve closer examination than the present writer can devote to them. It seems in the first instance to spring from the impracticability of providing separate schools, or even separate class-rooms, for boys and girls in the initial stage when classes are very small; but it has been favoured by the teacher-training system under which men and women teachers are given professional training together. Co-education in the kindergarten stage certainly

eases the way, where kindergartens exist, to co-education at higher levels; but the main motive-force seems to be the determination of the ordinary Arab peasant to ensure that his children are adequately educated. If circumstances dictate co-education as the only system under which this education can in practice be obtained, he is ready to countenance it for the sake of the larger end of his own children's interests. Moreover, although the legal compulsion of the Education Act seems to be applied tactfully, it remains as a powerful sanction in the background. But the system is by no means universally acceptable. Until recently at least, the Druzes would not have it. It is still unknown in Bedouin areas. There are some Arab villages in Israel where it cannot be introduced because the very idea is disliked. Even so, it seems bound to spread, because the number of Arab girls whose parents demand education for them is rising; and if they can only be educated alongside boys because of the shortage of school accommodation, traditional inhibitions have to yield to modern necessity. The chances are that long before the present overcrowding of schools—a feature of Arab as well as of Jewish education in Israel to-day—can be completely remedied, the advantages of educating boys and girls together will be accepted as a commonplace by all except a very small section of the Arab community—especially as Arab women have now got the vote.

It will be obvious from what has been written about the condition of the Arab educational system which Israel inherited from Mandatory times that there has been a great deal of leeway to make up. One of the main difficulties in meeting the present desire of the Arab community for improved educational facilities has been the shortage of trained teachers. In 1955, only 18 per cent of the 735 teachers in Government Arab schools were certified; and nearly half had, in fact, not taken their own education beyond the tenth grade. According to religious classification, the teaching-body in Arab schools was mixed: 347 Christians; 295 Muslims; 55 Jews; 40 Druzes; and classification by sexes showed 222 women to 513 men. To improve professional qualifications, the Government has instituted training courses which can be taken by teachers already in service; a system of study leave, combined with special grants, make such courses practicable even for teachers who have dependants.

Intensive courses lasting as long as eight months or a year have been successfully arranged on these lines; and shorter refresher courses have also been held. Until now, the training of Arab teachers has taken place in Jewish training centres; there is as yet no permanent training college for Arab teachers, although the Government has announced its intention of setting up such an institute before very long. No doubt this will be a good thing, because Arab education presents problems of its own which are unknown to the Jewish community—with the possible exception of some immigrant sections of it. The old separation of the sexes is already breaking down in some measure, as we have noticed; and Arab Muslim women teachers are working side by side with men as well as women teachers of their own and other religious denominations. But in spite of the inroads lately made upon traditional ways, there is a conservatism of outlook among the Arab community as a whole which is lacking among the Jews; and for this the teachers, particularly the new entrants to the profession, need to be specially prepared if they are to exercise their full influence in the villages where the schools to which they will be attached are located.

Although the foundations of primary education among the Arabs in Israel now seem to be securely laid, the position in regard to secondary education is far less happy. It has been noted that there is no regulation by the State of education beyond the elementary stage. This applies to the Jewish as well as to the Arab community; and the omission is deplored by educationalists of many varying views. But Jewish education, having been highly organized on its own chosen lines for several decades before Israel emerged as a nation, is far less dependent than Arab education upon State regulation, and even upon State assistance; and no great harm has so far been suffered from leaving the establishment of secondary schools to municipal or private enterprise. The Arab community is in a different category; and it seems likely that before long there will have to be an increase in the numbers of Arab secondary schools, of which there are only six, located in Nazareth, Rama, Kafr Yasif, Taiyiba, Tira, and Baqa al Gharbiya. But perhaps more important than immediate expansion is the necessity of persuading the Arabs in general, and the Muslim Arabs in particular, of the desirability of their children proceeding beyond the

elementary stage. At present, there are only 795 Arab pupils in the six secondary schools which have been mentioned; although a few more are to be found in Jewish secondary schools side by side with Jewish pupils. But there are very few Arab girl students, and the policy of trying to attract them by offering Government scholarships has not so far been very successful. About one in every eight Arab boys attending secondary schools holds a Government scholarship, although school fees are very moderate—ranging from £20 to £30 per annum.

Among Arabs the desire for special vocational training and higher studies is less marked than among Jews. At present there are some sixty Arabs in general vocational schools and seventeen in agricultural schools. There are about a dozen in the Haifa Technion, almost all of them studying engineering, whether civil, mechanical, electrical, chemical, or agricultural. This is a healthy sign. Traditionally, Arabs who go on to higher study, in Israel as in other Middle Eastern countries, tend to specialize in the humanities. In this, of course, they do not differ from the well-marked pattern which Jewish education has also followed until recent times. But whereas the circumstances of Israel's emergence into nationhood have imposed upon the Jewish inhabitants a definite compulsion towards technical education, the applied sciences, and other 'highly practical' branches of knowledge, there has been no such urge to operate among her Arab community, whose intellectual leaders are still more attracted to letters than to science. For example, out of the 53 Arab and Druze students enrolled in the Hebrew University last year, 31 are taking courses in the humanities: 10 are studying law: while only 6 are enrolled in the Faculty of Medicine (including 1 student of pharmacy and 1 student of dentistry): only 4 are studying natural science: only 2 are taking agriculture. It seems clear that unless there is increased emphasis on technical studies in Arab secondary and higher education, Arab intellectuals will not find it easy in future to obtain suitable employment in a country where so much importance is attached to vocational and scientific training of one kind or another. If the Arab community in Israel should follow the unfortunate example of many other Arab communities in the Middle East by producing more lawyers, journalists, and men of letters than can find a decent living for themselves, the results might be

tragic. For the moment, all that can be done by the Government is to offer inducements to Arab students to encourage them to turn their attention to technical and vocational training; but the real remedy would seem to lie in so shaping the system of secondary education as to permit adequate attention to be paid to subjects which emphasize the importance of this kind of training—and this the Government has not so far been empowered to do. But it is clear from official reports and policy statements that there is no disposition to underestimate the risk of future middle-class unemployment among the Arab community; and that remedial measures are under constant review.

So far, it is the position of the 'settled' Arab community in Israel which has been reviewed. The Bedouin, of whom there are some 20,000 in the Negev and elsewhere, fall into a separate category. For centuries they have followed a migratory life, moving from place to place in search of water and pastures for their flocks; raising a few poor crops here and there where rainfall, and the natural fertility of the soil, allow them. In the time of the Mandate, they were to be seen very much as they could have been seen in the preceding centuries: picturesque and patriarchal tent-dwellers: as dignified, aloof, and arrogant, as their own magnificent riding-camels: clinging tenaciously to their traditional customs, and availing themselves but rarely—and usually too late—of such medical assistance as the Mandatory Government provided for them. To-day they are still picturesque enough, but a change is beginning to come over them. They may continue to live in tents; but many of their encampments are permanently located in the neighbourhood of Beersheba. The water which has been piped to the Negev is available to them also; they need no longer wander far in search of it. The shallow ploughing which yielded poor crops has been replaced by the deep ploughing which tractors make possible. Sprinkler pipes are encouraging them to grow vegetables, for which there is a large demand in Beersheba and other markets. Their flocks and herds have multiplied, and now total 70,000. Some of their sheikhs have become rich; but prosperity is not confined to them. It is widely diffused among the mass of the tribesmen. Bedouin are losing their distrust of western medicine; Bedouin women are beginning to come into the Hadassah hospital in Beersheba. The health service clinics, in the establishment of

which Dr. Norman Bentwich took so great a part, are now flourishing; and steady progress has been made in reducing the incidence of such ailments as eye-diseases and pellagra, to which their diet and their rudimentary ideas of sanitation make Bedouin particularly subject. In addition to the five clinics which are available, the Bedouin have the services of a number of mobile X-ray and other medical units.

Along with increasing adaptation to modern conditions has come a new respect for education. There are now five elementary schools for Bedouin children; and some promising boys have already advanced to secondary education. It will take a long time to bring the Bedouin to the level of the settled Arab community; but the process has made a good beginning on the purely economic, as well as upon the social, sides. The Bedouin are beginning to be conscious of new wants; they now make many purchases in the markets of Beersheba. They are beginning to work harder, now that the rewards of work are more readily forthcoming. At the same time, their increasing contact with civilization raises a host of new problems; and the intensive settlement of the Negev by Jewish pioneers, as it gathers force, must inevitably trench further and further upon the freedom of those Bedouin who love the 'wilderness' and shun modern ways of living. The foreign observer gathers the impression that the Military Government, which in present circumstances controls both the Negev and the Bedouin within it, has shown much tact in handling Bedouin susceptibilities; and that, apart altogether from the sheikhs (who seem on the friendliest terms with the authorities and like nothing better than to show lavish hospitality to any visitor under their aegis) the ordinary tribesmen are well satisfied with the treatment that they receive from the Israel officers with whom they come into contact.

It seems important to stress this point because it serves to illustrate the general policy of Israel towards the whole Arab community, 'settled' and migratory, within Israel territory. The Jewish majority seems determined to accord to all minorities within the country the kind of treatment which it would have liked (and which it so rarely received) in all the epochs and in all the lands in which it experienced the trials of existence under the rule of a majority differing from itself. Both

in the press and in the Knesset, any grievances which the Arab community puts forward, whether serious or trivial, are promptly taken up and widely ventilated. There is constant pressure upon the Government from public opinion, irrespective of party alignments, to secure for the Arabs and for other minority communities something more than a fair share of the benefits which all citizens are entitled to enjoy. In a word, the Jewish conscience is by no means content to see that the Arab community enjoys to the full the equal rights which the constitution accords: there is a continual, and active demand for what can only be called specially-favoured treatment for the Arabs. Even in such everyday matters as currency and postage stamps, Arabic figures alongside Hebrew. Arabs may use their own language in the courts, in Parliament, in all official documents as well as in correspondence with the Government. There is an edition of the official Gazette in Arabic for their benefit.

That the Arab community in Israel is taking full advantage of these new opportunities is shown not only by the rapid extension of the local government activities already described, but also by its increasingly keen participation in elections for the Knesset. In 1949, out of the total number—33,250—of Arabs and Druzes entitled to vote, nearly 80 per cent availed themselves of the opportunity. Most of the votes, but not all, were cast for Arab candidates, of whom three were returned to the first Knesset under the system of proportional representation. By 1951, the register of Arab and Druze voters had increased to 69,000; 86 per cent voted, and eight Arabs took their seats. In 1955, there were 77,000 Arab and Druze voters; and 92 per cent cast their votes—a higher proportion than that for the country as a whole. In the present Knesset, there are seven Arab members, some of whom belong to Mapai and others to Mapam. When the Knesset sends a formal deputation—for example, to the President—it is customary always to include an Arab member.

In economic condition, in civic rights, and in social services, the Arabs in Israel seem better off than their fellows in other Middle Eastern countries. But because many of them live in areas like Galilee and the Central District, near to a vulnerable frontier, they are subjected to a certain measure of military control. This control does not amount to military government

in the ordinary sense of the term; indeed the civic rights which they enjoy would make this impossible. The same system of civil administration functions in the Arab sector as in the rest of Israel. But the military authorities also have a say; and they are authorized to designate 'closed' areas and to restrict movement from one area to another. These powers seem, from the present writer's inquiries, to be used sparingly; for example, most of Galilee is an 'open' area, inside which there is complete freedom of movement. There is a much smaller 'restricted' area, nearer to the frontier, where permits are required for ingress; although Arabs who live there can move about the 'free' area with little difficulty. Along the frontier itself, there is a very small 'closed' area; entry to it is controlled strictly for Arabs, unless they live there. But those who do, can move about in it and into the other areas.

The precise impact of these controls upon the Arab community seems to vary with the degree of tension which prevails along the frontier where they operate. When things are quiet, there is no disposition on the part of the authorities to use the controls rigidly. When things are difficult, the controls are stricter; but even then, permits are freely given to Arabs whose work requires them to move about the country. But when there is reason to suspect that Arabs from across the frontier are lying up in Arab villages on the Israel side, the authorities act swiftly, and it may be that the sympathies of the villagers are rather with the men who have sought refuge with them than with the police who are conducting a search. The obligations of hospitality traditional in the Arab code of conduct forbid any discrimination between those who seek it; but from the Israel point of view, there is a great deal of difference between the 'economic infiltrators' who slip across to harvest crops on fields once their own: to visit relatives without waiting for the formality of a passport: or simply to seek the work which they cannot find on their own side, and the trained saboteurs who come over to murder: to spread terror: and to threaten internal security. The former class of infiltrator is generally harmless; and is so treated. But the saboteurs are dangerous. And throughout the first nine months of 1956 their depredations, seemingly highly organized and under central direction by the Egyptian authorities, increased alarmingly. They were accustomed to enter

Israel over one frontier, finish their task, and leave by another frontier, seeking refuge by day in an Arab village until nightfall covered their movements. It seems probable that most of the Arab community, who are essentially law-abiding, disliked these trouble-makers; but the obligations of hospitality are strong: the ties of blood and religion are close: and thus their presence often remained unreported. When this happened, the generally good understanding between the Arab community and the authorities suffered.

Are the Arab community becoming integrated into the fabric of Israel, and how far can the Government rely on their loyalty in an emergency such as happened in the autumn of 1956? It is doubtful whether these questions can yet be answered with any finality. Although some Arabs, and a good many Druzes, sided with Israel while the War of Liberation was going on, it must be assumed that the feeling of many Arabs in Israel is a good deal influenced by the hostile attitude of their kinsfolk outside; but contact between the two is not easy, owing to the blockade. Under the Family Reunion Scheme, Arab households in Israel have been joined by their relations from Arab countries under carefully controlled conditions; but this is the only way in which 'authorized' contact takes place. There were quite a considerable number of Arabs who returned to Israel clandestinely after the fighting was over; many of these now enjoy civic rights and appear to have settled down. But it is difficult to determine what effect the undoubted prosperity which the Arab community enjoys under Israel rule exercises upon its attitude towards the Government, which must still to a large extent be shaped by the traditional Asian suspicion of authority in any guise at all.

There has scarcely been time to build up among the middle-aged and older men, with their lively memories of the years 1947, 1948, and 1949, the attachment to democratic institutions, and the kind of civic loyalty, which may eventually outweigh the ties of religion, of family, and of race which now seem likely to bind them more closely to the Arab world than to Israel. If, as a result of any settlement arranged by the United Nations following the action against Egypt in 1956 that world begins to show more tolerance towards Israel's existence, the attitude of the older Arabs who live within her borders may

change. Meanwhile, among the younger generation, the position is much more hopeful. Few have any deep personal experience of the tragic events which accompanied Israel's birth as a nation; most of them tend to derive their impressions of the State in which they live from what life in it has to offer them. Their relations with their Jewish contemporaries are good; the young of both races work together, play together, and find pleasure in the same physical and cultural activities. A real feeling of common citizenship, based on equal opportunities, on democratic institutions, and on shared social services, seems to be growing up between Jew and Arab. If this could happen during a period when there has been so much hostility to Israel from the Arabs outside her borders, it may be that a reasonable settlement, under United Nations aegis, of the disputes between Israel and her neighbours will in years to come render the outlook of her Arab citizens as little open to doubt as the outlook of the majority community.

XI

The Arabs Outside

Earlier chapters have made it clear that the tense and uneasy relations between Israel and her neighbours have profoundly influenced almost every aspect of her economy. The same influences have shaped no less radically the outlook of her people, which, concentrated intensely upon the central problem of national survival, judges world affairs according to their estimated bearing upon it. It is essential to understand this outlook, if a key is to be found to many of the puzzles which confront the foreign observer of conditions in Israel; for example, the prevalent preoccupation with world affairs: the national sensitivity to every rise and fall of the international barometer: the occasional moods of something like desperation which sweep over Israel, such as that which grew up in the earlier months of 1956 and precipitated the action against Egypt in the Sinai peninsular which convulsed the chancelleries of the great Powers in October. The psychological factors which underly Israel's outlook must now be briefly examined.

It is quite natural that foreign affairs should figure among the major preoccupations of the Government of Israel. Israel has her roots in Zionism, itself an international movement. She owes her existence to a decision of the United Nations, the main regulating authority in the international field. Upon her relations with friendly countries, and upon the help which she receives from them, her very existence depends. Her Government must be alert to every change in the international climate which may seem likely to affect her interests. All this is understandable; but there is one factor which sets Israel in a class by herself among the nations, and that is the remarkable degree in which the mass of her people share their Government's preoccupation with foreign affairs. Everywhere in Israel, foreign

affairs are a main topic of conversation. They provide the opening gambit when strangers are introduced, as does the weather in England. Particularly is this true in social gatherings. Israelis are gregarious people, taking a great delight in each other's company; cafés and restaurants play as much part in their lives as in the life of the average Frenchman. Israelis love to take their meals in the open air when the weather allows; and whether they choose a restaurant in the countryside or a café on the city pavement, it is in such places that they can be best observed in their hours of relaxation. It is there that they discuss, tirelessly and with unflagging interest, all the topics of the day. Before long, someone will certainly mention the latest news from some European or Asian capital. At once, every other topic is brushed aside, neighbouring tables join in the discussion, men and women bring their coffee cups or tumblers of orange juice from the bar, and the news is thrashed out in every detail. For all Israelis know that events over which they have no control in the world outside may at any moment profoundly affect the welfare, and even the lives, of every man, woman and child.

The permanent focus, as it were, of Israel's anxious scrutiny of the international horizon is, of course, the hostility of the Arab States around her. This hostility is taken for granted because of the circumstances of Israel's birth as a nation; but there is a venomous quality about it which never fails to evoke shocked surprise in Israel. Israelis can understand that Arabs should hanker after a war of revenge; they can understand that Arabs should seek to reduce Israel's territorial limits—although they will resist such a process to the limit of their resources. What puzzles and shocks them is that Arabs should continue, long after hostilities have ceased, to proclaim their intention of exterminating Israel root and branch, of driving her inhabitants into the sea, and of blotting out her name from the roster of nations. Israelis are shrewd enough to realize that a shared hostility towards their country is almost the only bond which preserves some semblance of unity in an Arab world which is deeply divided by personal, dynastic and national rivalries; they appreciate that violence of expression in the press and on the platform probably outruns the practical possibilities of the kind of action which any Arab government, no matter how auto-

cratic, would seriously think of undertaking. But they are also keenly alive to the power of slogans, when constantly repeated, to condition the thinking not only of the masses, but also of those who lead them; and they know that the idea of a 'second round', of a war of revenge, has acquired a dynamic of its own in many Arab countries. Their experience prevents them from sharing the view, often expressed in western capitals, that threats against Israel are merely talk intended for local consumption. They firmly believe that the western Powers have consistently underrated both the scope and potentialities of the unsleeping Arab hatred of Israel.

No doubt it is for these reasons that the foreign observer who talks with Israelis in the cities, in the rural centres, and in the villages encounters everywhere what may strike him as unexpectedly strong criticism of the policies which have been followed by Washington, London and Paris since the last war in the hope of keeping the Arab world in friendly relations with the West, and thus preserving the Middle East from the threat of Communism. Israelis have long regarded the whole idea of supplying western arms to the Arab States in order to win their friendship and to strengthen their resistance to a future attack from Russia as wholly chimerical. They were confirmed in this view by the growing antipathy of the Arab world to western influence: by Britain's failure to win Egypt's friendship even by the cession of the Suez Canal bases: and by the reluctance of the western Powers (with the exception of France), to make available to Israel the arms which in her estimation are essential to balance the tanks and planes already supplied to the Arab States not only by the West, but also by the Iron Curtain countries since President Nasser of Egypt began his dangerous flirtation with the lures held out to him by Moscow. Israelis have long seen in western policy a grave threat to peace in the Middle East region; for in their estimation, if peace is preserved, it will be preserved not so much by such 'paper pledges' as the guarantee of the armistice frontiers against forcible alteration which Britain, the United States and France gave under the three-Power declaration of 1950, as by such healthy doubts as may still exist in the Arab world—in spite of all its acquisition of up-to-date armaments—about the issue of any general war against Israel.

The difference between Israel and western views of the

fundamental requisites for preventing a recurrence of hostilities in the Middle East explains the marked disposition, during 1955 and much of 1956, of several sections of Israel opinion to turn their eyes inwards, as it were; to shrug their shoulders at what the western Powers may or may not do; and to proclaim that Israel must stand on her own legs instead of relying on other people. This attitude, observable among the younger men, and particularly among the young *sabras*, might well seem perverse in the light of Israel's obvious dependence upon her western friends for much of the very bread that she eats, leave alone the money and the materials which she needs for the tasks of national development. Yet in the Israel mind, this apparent contradiction has not been considered fatal. Everyone knows of —and is grateful for—the help which the country is receiving from the Jewish communities of the Diaspora, and from governments and well-wishers abroad, in its effort to build up the strength which is making internal progress possible and will, it is hoped, eventually make aggression from outside unlikely. But the major effort is, and must remain, the responsibility of the Israelis themselves; and it is this effort which must make good to Israel whatever harm she may suffer from the miscalculations—as they seem to her—which the western Powers have made in their dealings with the Arab States.

The hostility of the Arab world, and the prospect that this hostility could without warning find expression in attack, exercises a profound influence upon the public and private life of the people of Israel. Psychologically, its effects are plain. Israelis are not so much nervous—they have faith in themselves, in the justice of their cause, and in the loyalty of their many good friends—as 'nervy', quick to be elated by news which seems to promise well; equally quick to fall into temporary despondency because of some momentarily unfavourable development. Conscious as they are of the difficulty of the tasks which confront them at home, such as the construction of a progressive, well-ordered society out of so many different racial elements, they often seem to find the constant threat of attack from their neighbours abroad almost intolerably burdensome, at least in the moments of depression which occasionally recur. Nevertheless the sense of impending danger which hangs over the nation does stimulate many Israelis to sustained and heroic

effort of a kind which must be seen to be believed. There is a feeling of urgency about every task that is undertaken; people are keyed up, not only for the work in hand, but for anything else which may fall to be tackled. Stimulus of this kind, when sustained too long, can be exhausting; the observer sometimes feels that many Israelis, especially those bearing responsibilities which affect their fellow-citizens, are living on their nerves. It takes robust minds, as well as robust bodies, to stand up to the cares of public office in Israel to-day.

Side by side with this sense of urgency, which seems on the whole to stimulate rather more people than it overstrains, comes the feeling of unity in the face of outside pressure. This shows itself most plainly when a crisis arises; when Israel finds herself condemned by world opinion; when danger seems imminent. At such a time all political parties, regardless of outlook and approach, draw together; the whole nation seems to react as one. This power of sinking differences and of pooling energies is one of the secrets of the underlying confidence in Israel's future which is the bed-rock conviction of most of her citizens. Nor is it the only consequence of the feeling of beleaguerment which prevails. The plain need of standing together imposes a sense of common interest on all the many cultural and racial strains which immigration has brought to Israel, and thus eases the task of those responsible for the assimilation of Jews from Oriental countries into a pattern of life which is essentially based upon a western outlook. Inside the ring-fence which Arab hostility has thrown round Israel, the forces of Zionist idealism, of faith in Jewish destiny, and of devotion to Israel, have operated with remarkable intensity to inspire a sense of common interest, of common obligation, of common citizenship.

The operation of these forces serves to convince immigrant elements that hard, disciplined work, the pioneering spirit, the sacrifice of the present to the future, are not mere fads of the Government under which they have come to live, but are the conditions of individual, as well as of national, survival. As such, they are accepted by sections of opinion that might easily resent them to the point of rejection if they were only precepts laid down for newcomers by those long resident in the country. It might have been very difficult, but for the unifying effects of the constant external pressure, to impose the standards which

Israel has laid down for herself upon that portion of the population—now as much as fifty in every hundred—whose mother-tongue is Arabic, and whose inclination it might well be, when once the danger of immediate persecution has been removed by the security which Israel provides, to relax into the easy-going existence which prevails in so many Asian and African countries. While more and more immigrants come from these countries (and within the last two years, one-third of all the Jews in Morocco have come to Israel, and the others are seeking to follow them) the problem of raising them to the living standards on which Israel insists grows ever more exacting, as those who uphold these standards are increasingly outnumbered by those whose background is purely Oriental. Had Israel been accepted by the Arab world: had the natural flow of trade with the surrounding countries been restored: then assuredly the difficulty of assimilating the Oriental immigrants would have been greater. It is Arab hostility which underlines Zionist idealism among them. Even now, the disciplined hardship of the pioneering life proves too much for some of them, and within the last two years, a little less than 10 per cent of them have drifted to the towns. The number of those who look back after setting their hand to the plough is small indeed, when account is taken of their urban background and their unfamiliarity with manual occupations of any kind. But if the pressure on Israel from the Arab world were relaxed, and the pioneering life came to be looked upon as something which is desirable rather than necessary, how many newcomers would find the call of the towns, the attraction of the familiar, easy-going life of the Levant, too strong to be resisted?

In addition to these psychological consequences, the Arab blockade of Israel, and the attitude from which it springs, have other effects, scarcely less important, upon the pattern of national life. The heavy cost of the defence services absorbs funds badly needed for development and for raising living standards; aggravating the difficulty of balancing the Budget, making insistent demands upon the meagre resources of foreign exchange to the detriment of vital civil imports, and slowing down progress towards the Welfare State. The needs of national defence cast a long shadow. They demand two and a half years' service from boys, two years' service for girls. They dictate the location,

and sometimes the composition, of settlements along the frontiers. They mould the system of transport according to the requirements of instant mobilization. The burden, it is true, is cheerfully borne, and brings with it compensations. But a burden it is. So with the economic blockade; it cuts Israel off from neighbouring sources of supply of food-grains, meat and vegetables. Some of these she must import by sea, again at the expense of her foreign exchange; others she must grow on land which might often be devoted more advantageously to valuable cash crops. The chain of consequences does not end here. The necessity of shaping national life according to the requirements of instant defence and of ceaseless activity in economic development has tended to enlarge the control of the State over the life of the individual citizen. While there are powerful political groups who favour this tendency on grounds of Socialist theory, there are other groups, scarcely less powerful, who see in it a threat to private enterprise and a discouragement of that individual initiative which has always figured so prominently in Jewish achievements. The condition of siege to which Israel is exposed has sharpened the division between those who favour State control *per se* as an instrument of progress in the social and economic spheres; and those who hold to the individualist ideal, either on grounds of religious orthodoxy, or because they oppose any restriction, beyond the ordinary obligations of civilized society, on the freedom of the citizen to manage his own affairs. Yet it is worthy of note that the very conditions which have provoked this division serve to prevent it from developing to a dangerous degree, because, in the face of common peril, there is a reluctance to push doctrinal differences to a point which would make difficult a reasonable co-operation in the national interest among the men who hold them.

The curious mixture of debit and credit items for which Arab hostility is responsible in its effects upon Israel is worthy of more detailed study than can be devoted to it here. The unifying influence which this hostility is exerting upon Israel's multiracial population and the consequent easing of certain of the problems presented by the process of building out of that population a new nation, have already been noticed. In an earlier chapter, the social benefits derived by the younger generation from military service, economically burdensome as it is from

certain points of view, were indicated; and note was taken of the healthy development of the sense of civic responsibility among young men and women of varying origins and backgrounds which has followed the bold use of the Defence Forces as a great university for the education of the masses. It is further to be remembered that the economic blockade, though its effects have been serious upon Israel's efforts to establish a balanced economy, has directly stimulated the growth of the merchant marine and the air services: the extension of the cultivated area: the rapid execution of large projects of irrigation and land reclamation. In spite of the condition of imbalance which the blockade has forced upon certain aspects of Israel's economy by obliging her to adopt a system of priorities, particularly in imports, which is related more to her immediate deficiencies than to the long-term requirements of her development programme, it is permissible to doubt whether her remarkable advance along so many fronts of progress could—or at least would—have been achieved without the strong stimulus applied to every section of her population by such manifestations of Arab hostility.

What are the sources of this hostility? And why does it continue to burn so fiercely, now that nearly a decade has passed since Israel attained independent statehood?

The Arab point of view is clear-cut and simple. As they see it, Israel occupies territory which, for more than a thousand years, has formed part of the Arab world which still surrounds it. Until Israel was established, this territory shared the predominantly Arab way of life and the predominantly Arab culture which make that world what it is; but this way of life, and this culture, along with the people who held to them, have been displaced by an alien culture and by an alien people, both of them brought to Palestine, and there maintained, as the Arab world judges, because of the exigencies of western power-politics. The whole transaction has been rendered all the more offensive to the Arab world because it has only been accomplished by setting aside one of the fundamental principles of modern political practice, namely, the right of the majority of the inhabitants of a country to determine that country's future.

No Arab is prepared to admit that the tiny patch of territory now called Israel is an insignificant fraction of the area still

under Arab control: that for three thousand years this tract has been associated with the distinctive contribution which Jews have made to Arab, as well as to world, civilization: that this contribution lends great moral force to the desire of some Jews to live there in a little State of their own, in fulfilment of the ancient prophecies about the Ingathering of the Exiles: and that it was for this reason that their claim was accepted as valid by the conscience of a great part of the human race, as expressed in the General Assembly of the United Nations. To such considerations Arabs attach no weight. When they are reminded that the Arab States tried to override the United Nations' decision by force of arms, they retort that this decision was never accepted by the Arabs, and that Israel has forfeited all right to base her case upon United Nations authority; first by extending her territory beyond the limits fixed by the United Nations, next by failing to comply with the United Nations' decision that Jerusalem should become an *enclave* under international administration, and finally by declining to honour the United Nations' resolution that Arab refugees from Palestine should be allowed to return to their homes in Israel territory.

This latter resolution, passed by the United Nations Assembly in December 1948, has acquired great sanctity in Arab estimation, and is often put forward as the minimum requirement for any Arab recognition of Israel's existence. Nor is it hard to see why this should be so. It is impossible to satisfy. Apart from the difficulty of finding homes in Israel for a refugee population which has now attained the formidable number of 900,000 by natural increase, the return of Arabs on so large a scale would lead to a conflict between two different ways of life, and to internal stresses, which would together endanger Israel's existence. Moreover it has been remarked, not only by Israelis but by neutral observers also, that the Arab States, with the exception of Jordan, seem mainly anxious to use the existence of the refugees as a political weapon against Israel, but show small concern for their welfare, make little effort to resettle them, and prefer to let them remain miserable so that they will continue to hate Israel bitterly as the sole cause of their exile and of all their subsequent misfortunes.

The truth is that this allocation of blame is misplaced. A study

of the proclamations issued on the Arab and on the Israel sides between December 1947 and August 1948 proves that it was the Jewish authorities who continually urged the Arabs not to leave their homes, and the Arab authorities who exhorted them to go away. In December 1947, there were about 630,000 Arabs living in the territory which is now Israel; and of these some 30,000 left their homes to get out of the way of the fighting which broke out when there were extensive attacks upon the Jews in the months of December 1947 and January 1948. Many of these Arabs were well-to-do; and in leaving their homes (for a short time, as they thought) they were displaying the same kind of prudence which they had shown when trouble broke out between Arab rebels and the Mandatory Government on several occasions between 1936 and 1939. But there were also some ordinary Arab villagers from places like the Sharon, where the disturbances were particularly bad. In this first wave of emigrants, there were some who sold up their property and took at least a share of the proceeds with them; but there were others who left behind most of what they owned because they expected to return as soon as the troubles were over. But when the Arab Liberation Army moved into the north of Palestine in February 1948, and fighting intensified, the exodus increased because Arab leaders, both inside and outside Palestine, redoubled their exhortations to the Arab population to leave the country and to return as soon as the Jews had been exterminated. By the beginning of April, it appears, another 130,000 Arabs had left, in spite of all the efforts of the Jews to assure them that no harm would come to them. According to neutral observers, the Jewish Agency, the Jewish municipalities, and the Jewish Defence Force continually appealed to the Arab population to remain quietly in their homes. The only instance that can be traced of a Jewish attack upon Arab civilians was the massacre of the Arab inhabitants of Deir Yassin, near Jerusalem, by Jewish terrorists, in defiance of the orders of their own authorities, as a reprisal for the outrages inflicted by Arabs on Jewish civilians, photographs of whose mutilated bodies were on sale in the Arab quarter of Jerusalem. The Deir Yassin massacre was widely utilized on the Arab side to persuade still more Arabs to leave Palestine until such time as it would be safe for them to come back and enjoy the property of

the Jews, who were all to be killed. By May 1948, according to the Syrian delegate to the United Nations, the number of Arabs so leaving amounted to a quarter of a million; and when the regular forces of the Arab States attacked the newly proclaimed State of Israel, the Arabs of Palestine, having been warned in stern terms by the Arab authorities in Egypt, Syria and Jordan to get out of the way of the Arab armies, left in even larger numbers. Some of them went because they were told to go; others because their homes were destroyed in the fighting; yet others because they were reluctant to live under Jewish rule when it became clear that the Arab armies had met defeat.

Looking back on that terrible period, it is plain that the Arabs who fled from Palestine, largely because of the exhortations of their co-religionists outside the country, would have done better if they had stayed. Arabs remained perfectly safely in Jaffa, Acre, Ramleh, and in many parts of Galilee, particularly Nazareth and its neighbourhood. But the natural disposition of those who fled to blame Israel for the sufferings which in fact she did her best to avert has saddled Israel in Arab estimation with the responsibility for the entire refugee problem.

The Arab Governments as a whole have done little for the refugees. Their plight has been the concern of the United Nations and of a number of Christian philanthropic bodies. So long as the work of these agencies is directed mainly to keeping the refugees alive, the Arab Governments do not object; but efforts to rehabilitate them through resettlement, such as would encourage their absorption into their new surroundings, encounter frequent obstruction on political grounds, except in the case of Jordan. In consequence, the refugee camps are centres of bitterness. Inquiries by United Nations observers from refugees in the Gaza strip, in Jordan, and in the Levant States seem to show that most of the refugees who were questioned claim their right to return to Israel, both on grounds of natural justice, and on the strength of the United Nations resolution; but that very few are willing to live under the Israel Government, to which they remain bitterly hostile. They blame it for all their troubles, and regard its continued existence as the main obstacle to their return to their homes. There is some evidence, however, that hope of this return is beginning to fade; and that the desire to find a new life elsewhere is growing. This is wel-

comed by United Nations experts, who agree that the only humane course is to resettle the refugees with the help of United Nations funds, in countries like Iraq, Syria and Jordan, where the density of population is low and the prospects open to development-projects of various kinds are promising. Between them, United Nations funds and refugee manpower could do much to realize the economic potentialities of many underdeveloped areas in the Arab world. But, as has been made clear, few Arab Governments are willing to countenance action which might be taken to imply their acceptance of the position that the bulk of the Arab refugees cannot return to Israel. The Government of Jordan is an exception. While maintaining that the refugees have a right to return to Israel if they wish, it allows new villages to be built, and is also building some itself; further, it gives every facility for development projects which will assist in their rehabilitation.

It is clear that in the refugee camps the feeling against Israel rises very high; and in none of them does it rise higher than in the Gaza strip. This territory, about twenty-five miles long by five broad, was occupied by Egyptian forces when they invaded Palestine in 1948, and Egypt retained it under the armistice agreement until Israel occupied it as a result of the expulsion of Egyptian forces on 1st November 1956. In it there were located some 200,000 refugees, who looked across the frontier at the Jewish settlements, often only a few hundred yards away. Throughout 1955 and 1956, the Israelis asserted that the Gaza strip was consistently used as a springboard from which trained saboteurs—the *fedayin*—were launched under President Nasser's orders against their villages, their pipelines, their new and old agricultural installations; and that life was made almost intolerable for Jewish settlers by perpetual raiding. It is a matter of record that across the frontier of the Gaza strip the years 1955 and 1956 saw some of the most serious violations of the armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt. These violations, accompanied by loss of life and damage to property, greatly exacerbated feeling on both sides; on the Israel side, because the murder of civilians, and the destruction of the crops and installations which represent so much hard work and self-sacrifice, reached proportions which became intolerable; on the Arab side because Israel's occupation, in plain view, of land which

formerly belonged to Arabs, was a constant exasperation to the refugees; and because Israel's rare, but highly organized and drastic, reprisal operations caused heavy loss of life. The Egyptian Government, consistently with its obstinate contention that it has never been at peace with Israel, made no serious efforts to stop raiding by refugees into Israel territory, and used paramilitary formations, formerly trained to embarrass British troops in the Canal Zone before the evacuation of the British bases, to harass Israel. Egyptian propaganda always took advantage of the fact that Arab raids on Israel, though collectively formidable, have been individually small and (with conspicuous exceptions) undramatic; while the reprisals of Israel, though rare, have been conducted on a scale and with a thoroughness which always make them headline news all over the world, and excite reprobation among humanitarians in many countries. More than once, the critical situation in the Gaza area has seemed to threaten a renewal of open hostilities between Israel and her Arab neighbours. In the spring of 1956, matters became so serious that the Security Council despatched Mr. Hammarskjold, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to relieve the dangerous tension. He investigated the grievances of both sides, and arranged for observation posts, to be manned by an expanded cadre of United Nations observers, at points where conflict seemed most probable. But he found himself obliged to confine his efforts to securing greater respect for the original armistice agreements. He was not authorized to explore the possibilities of progress towards a more permanent understanding between Israel and her neighbours; and he failed entirely to deal with the *fedayin* raids which infuriated Israel.

Although during 1955 and early 1956 the Gaza strip became a focus of serious friction between Israel and Egypt, there have been times when the friction between Israel and Jordan has given cause for almost equal perturbation. This is mainly due to two factors. The first is the nature of the armistice line between the two countries, which has petrified into permanency the position which the forces of each side happened to occupy at a certain moment during a period of heavy and fluctuating fighting. The result is that some sixty-three villages in Jordan territory are cut off, some completely and others in part, from the land, wells, gardens and groves from which their livelihood

was derived. Yet the inhabitants of these villages are not technically refugees, since they are still in their homes. Few are eligible for United Nations assistance; and in spite of the help which the Jordan Government gives them through the Frontier Villages Loans Committee, the condition of many of them is distressing. Further, in many of these villages, 'true' refugees have been billeted, either on relations, or in vacant houses which the Government has assigned to them for lack of other accommodation. Their presence adds to the prevailing bitterness, so that incursions and shooting across the frontier are frequent. The second factor is the narrow neck of land which this frontier compresses against the sea between the northern and the southern blocks of Israel territory. Through this neck run all Israel's land communications, and she is very sensitive to any threat to their integrity. Along the Qibya-Qalqiliya–Tulkarm line, roads and railways run only a few hundred yards away from the frontier, presenting a tempting target for attack, with good prospect of loot. Arab villagers in the foothills, who see lands in the plains which formerly belonged to them now being cultivated by Israelis, find the temptation to raid the groves and granaries of the new owners too strong to be resisted. Their attacks, especially when directed against transport and communications, spur Israelis to drastic reprisals which in turn increase the bitterness on both sides.

Part of the trouble along the Egyptian and Jordan borders springs from the presence of refugees filled with hatred against Israel. On the Syrian and Lebanese borders, where refugees are not allowed near the armistice line, 'incidents' are less frequent. But when they do occur, they are serious because the respective governments are directly involved. For some time, for example, the Syrian Government obstructed Israel's efforts to drain the Huleh marshes, although the demilitarized zone in which these efforts were made was intended by the Security Council to exclude troops only, not civil agencies of the kind involved in reclamation work. There was some sharp fighting, with loss of life on both sides, before Syrian objections were overruled by the Security Council. Even to-day, the Israel plan for taking off water from the Jordan for irrigation and hydro-electric development is held up by Syria's threat to regard any such operation

as a violation of the armistice agreement and an occasion for the renewal of hostilities.

The attitude of Syria towards Israel has never varied from one of unbending enmity, which is manifested even in international assemblies by a studied neglect of ordinary diplomatic courtesies. The attitudes of Jordan and Egypt have, however, varied from time to time; more perhaps from changes in the balance of political forces in the Middle East than from any modification of their dislike of their neighbour. In Jordan, British influence has occasionally succeeded in persuading the Government to co-operate with Israel (though always on the administrative, and not on the diplomatic, level) and in controlling border raids. King Abdullah, while he lived, steadily felt his way towards a situation which implied the recognition of Israel's existence. The belief that he was on the point of reaching some kind of live-and-let-live understanding with Israel no doubt precipitated his assassination; and after his death, the growing strength of the anti-Israel party, composed largely of men from those Palestinian districts west of the Jordan which King Abdullah had incorporated into his kingdom, steadily undermined both British influence and the possibility of some accommodation on a working basis with Israel, as the course of events in 1955 and 1956 all too clearly indicated. Political opinion in Jordan, as the Parliamentary elections of 1956 and subsequent resolutions in the new Legislature have shown, has turned against the west, has attacked the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, and has drawn closer to Egypt and her Russian connexions.

Soon after President Nasser became head of the Egyptian Revolutionary Government, there was a faint hope that Israel-Egyptian relations might take a turn for the better. He seemed prepared to maintain friendly relations with the western Powers and to build up Egyptian prosperity on the basis of social and economic reform. His Government even went so far as to appoint a committee to inquire whether the position in the Gaza strip could not be eased by transferring some of the refugees elsewhere. But this hope soon passed away as President Nasser, disappointed by his failure to win control over the newly liberated Sudan, and affronted by the conclusion of the Bagdad pact, began to give an anti-western, and particularly an anti-British, turn to his foreign policy, which was reflected in a

stiffer attitude towards Israel because of her connexion with the western Powers. Ambitious of extending his influence throughout the Arab world, he seemed to turn more and more to Russia. He gave utterance to a spate of new threats of a 'second round'; and the arrival of Iron Curtain arms in Cairo, along with Communist technicians, was acclaimed by many sections of Egyptian public opinion as the first step in the process of avenging the defeats suffered by Egyptian forces in the War of Liberation. Israelis firmly believed that these threats needed to be taken seriously; and that the stepping-up of operations of the *fedayin* saboteurs in the Negev and elsewhere which shortly followed were all part of a softening process intended to prepare the ground for a resumption of hostilities.

Many foreign observers considered this view over-pessimistic, and believed that President Nasser's main aim was to strengthen his own position in the Arab world by displaying Egypt once again as the relentless champion of anti-Israel activities. But when President Nasser showed his contempt for western susceptibilities as well as for Egypt's international commitments by 'nationalizing' the Suez Canal: proceeded to establish a Syrian–Jordan–Egyptian military command under the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief: and again proclaimed his intention of destroying Israel, Israelis felt confirmed in their own interpretation. Believing as they did that the impotence of the Security Council to stem the high-rising tide of Arab activities against Israel had been demonstrated only too clearly; and that Britain and France (like the United States, which was in the throes of the election which returned President Eisenhower for a second term) were too preoccupied with the Suez Canal crisis, with the Russian build-up of strength in Egypt, and with the risk of another world war, to pay much attention to Israel's pressing problems, Israelis decided that the only hope of national salvation lay in their own courage and determination. They were not content to stand passive until the preparations of their enemies for their destruction were completed; or to pin their faith upon the capacity of the western Powers—now deeply divided by the differing views of Britain and France on one side and the United States on the other about the policy which should be pursued in the Middle East—to restrain Arab hostility.

In a rapid campaign lasting only five days, Israelis broke the

military power of Egypt in the Sinai peninsular, capturing, and turning against the Egyptians, immense quantities of Iron Curtain armaments originally supplied and prepared for Israel's destruction. The objective of the campaign was not to conquer Egyptian territory, but to wipe out the bases and destroy the organization of the Egyptian *fedayin*. There can be little doubt that in taking this action, Israel was technically guilty of aggression; but in the view of every Israeli, nothing less than national survival was at stake; and the dramatic dissipation of the illusion of Egyptian armed strength has been hailed throughout the nation as the removal of an overpowering menace. The brief Sinai campaign, and the damage inflicted upon the Egyptian air force by the Anglo-French operations which followed Egypt's rejection of the Anglo-French ultimatum of October 30th, calling on both sides to withdraw from either side of the Canal—an ultimatum which Israel accepted —appears to have altered the Middle Eastern balance of power, for the time at least, in favour of Israel.

The open threats addressed by Russia to Britain and France, the emergency action of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, and the despatch of a United Nations Emergency Force to Egypt, have all pointed to the necessity of introducing effective safeguards into the local situation. Much now depends upon the determination with which the United Nations are prepared to seek and to implement a definitive settlement. The prospects of such a settlement from the Israel side, at any rate, are by no means unfavourable.

Israel's attitude towards the grievances which the Arab States allege against her has been shaped by her wish for peace and good understanding with her neighbours. Her treatment of her own Arab citizens has lacked neither in justice nor generosity. Moreover she has recognized the sad plight of the Arab refugees and has shown herself ready to do her fair share in relieving it. She subscribed handsomely, in proportion to her resources, to the United Nations Relief Fund when it was started, and she has continued to give an annual subsidy. For more than six years she has successfully made an arrangement for releasing to their Arab owners the accounts which remain blocked in banks in her territory; but the Arab States in which these refugees now live refuse to permit any transactions which

might imply recognition of Israel's existence; and utterly decline to release the blocked accounts of their former Jewish subjects who have sought refuge in Israel. Further the Israel Government has recognized its obligation to pay reasonable compensation to the Arab owners of land and property now occupied by Israelis; but it argues that Arab Governments ought similarly to recognize their obligations to compensate Jews now in Israel for the property which they left behind when they fled, or were ejected, from their homes. This the Arab Governments have declined to consider. So the matter has rested; but Israel has more than once declared her readiness to raise a loan, on the security of her revenues, to discharge her own obligations under any such reciprocal arrangements as may seem feasible. Finally, the Israel Government has always been willing to consider such adjustments of the frontiers as would help to relieve the hard situation of Arab villages who are cut off from their means of livelihood.

So far, all the efforts which Israel has made to reach a settlement with her neighbours have been frustrated by the refusal of the Arab countries to recognize her existence, to meet her representatives round a conference table, and to honour the spirit of the armistice agreements, which looked forward to the conclusion of a definitive peace. Perhaps the saddest feature of the situation up to the end of 1956 was the fact, that with all the progress which she has made towards overcoming her domestic difficulties, and in building up a Welfare State which can stand as an example to the entire Middle East, she could make no advance at all in adjusting her relations with her neighbours. It is not easy to see what more she could have done; her desire for a peaceful settlement has been blocked at every turn by Arab hostility. Any move which she has made to improve relations has remained unilateral. There has been no response to her action in releasing the blocked balances for the benefit of the refugees; no hint, however indefinite, from any Arab State for reciprocal action for the benefit of her own subjects. The need of the refugees is dire, and cannot wait; her own people, greatly as some of them have suffered, are at least happy and secure under her sheltering care. On the same humanitarian grounds, there was a case for hastening the payment of compensation to those refugees whose property has

been taken over. The burden upon her finances would have been severe; but the gain to her moral stature in the eyes of the world would have been inestimable.

There are no questions in dispute between Israel and her Arab neighbours which are not susceptible of a reasonable solution more or less along the lines which she has herself already announced her willingness to explore. But these questions have not so far been open to consideration on their merits; they have been bedevilled by the balance of power-politics in the Middle East. The Arab States have resented, as an affront to their national pride, any suggestions from the western Powers that they should moderate their present unreasoning hostility to Israel. These Powers have been handicapped in their efforts to mediate by their desire to gain the goodwill of the Arab States, both to offset Soviet designs to penetrate the Middle East, and to secure the assured flow of the oil supplies from Arab fields upon which western civilization largely depends for its economic existence. It has now become obvious that this goodwill is lacking; even the oil royalties which the Arab States have derived from western enterprises have been used to foster both anti-western feeling and hatred of Israel. A new and sustained United Nations initiative in the Middle East, accompanied by an effort to ensure effective co-operation in that area between Britain, France and the United States have plainly become essential.

Whatever may be the future judgement of history upon the independently conceived operations carried out against Egypt by the forces of Israel on the one side and of Britain and France on the other, this at least is clear at the time of writing. The United Nations have been given a supreme opportunity to lay the foundations of a comprehensive and equitable settlement between Israel and her neighbours. That Israel is ready to play her full part in such a settlement has been made clear in the course of this brief study of her people, of her activities, and of her ideals.

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
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
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

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