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
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
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St. Paul's use of the terms  
flesh and spirit











ST. PAUL'S  
USE OF THE TERMS  
FLESH AND SPIRIT

*THE BAIRD LECTURE FOR 1883*

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## PREFATORY NOTE.

This volume contains, in a revised form, six Lectures given by me last winter upon the foundation of the late Mr. Baird of Auchmedden and Cambusdoon, along with various additions, which were not delivered but are necessary to complete the design of the course.

My aim has been not to treat the subject from a doctrinal or a speculative point of view, or yet from that of popular exposition, but to conduct a purely exegetical inquiry bearing on recent discussions.

In pursuing it I have made large use of the labours of earlier inquirers ; and, as my task has been mainly that of sifting and selection, the result is necessarily a mosaic, in which it would hardly be possible to single out and assign to each contributor his own. But I have drawn so freely and fully on the recent monograph of Dr. Wendt of Göttingen, that I owe it alike to him and to myself to explain the circumstances under which I have done so. I had already read the chief works accessible to me on the points concerned, had reached my general conclusions regarding them, and had formed my plan of treatment,

before the work of Dr. Wendt came into my hands. But, when it reached me, I found his discussion of the subject in various respects so fresh, suggestive, and thorough, as to necessitate frequent reference to his views, and to make me desirous of placing before my hearers and readers the main results of a book not much known in this country, and from its special character little likely to be translated. I have therefore deemed it but just towards Dr. Wendt, that I should present them—and, where necessary, the process by which they are reached or vindicated—for the most part in his own words.

I have thought it fair also to the writers whose views I have ventured to combat, to subjoin in the Appendix—even at the risk of some repetition—a fuller statement of their positions couched mainly in their own language.

My thanks are especially due to my colleagues, Dr. Stewart, and Dr. Robertson, for valuable suggestions as the volume was passing through the press.

GLASGOW COLLEGE,  
*22nd October, 1883.*



## CONTENTS.

	PAGE
I.	
EARLIER VIEWS—BAUR—HOLSTEN - - -	1
II.	
SCHMIDT—LÜDEMANN—PFLEIDERER, - - -	29
III.	
CRITICISM OF METHODS, - - - - -	63
IV.	
PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION, - - -	94
V.	
OLD TESTAMENT USAGE, - - - - -	108 ✓
VI.	
THE DIVINE PNEUMA, - - - - -	130
VII.	
THE HUMAN PNEUMA, - - - - -	169 ✓
VIII.	
COLLATERAL QUESTIONS, - - - - -	198
IX.	
THE FLESH, - - - - -	244 ✓
X.	
EXAMINATION OF OTHER INTERPRETATIONS, - - -	272 ✓

## XI.

	PAGE
RELATION BETWEEN THE FLESH AND SIN—CON- CLUSION, - - - - -	309

## APPENDIX.

A.—VIEWS OF HOLSTEN, SCHMIDT, AND LÜDE- MANN, - - - - -	345
B.—DR. WENDT ON THE OLD TESTAMENT USAGE, - - - - -	404
C.—CONSPECTUS OF THE FACTS OF PAULINE USAGE, - - - - -	425
D.—DR. WENDT ON THE ARGUMENT IN 1 COR- INTHIANS XV. 35 AND 44, - - -	432
E.—ON THE MEANING OF EPHESIANS IV. 23,	441
F.—DR. EZRA P. GOULD ON THE NEW TESTA- MENT USE OF 'SARX,' - - - - -	445
G.—SPECIAL LITERATURE, - - - - -	449
INDEX, - - - - -	453

# ST. PAUL'S USE OF THE TERMS FLESH AND SPIRIT.

## I.

### EARLIER VIEWS—BAUR—HOLSTEN.

No reader of the letters of St. Paul can fail to mark, as a striking feature, the frequent recurrence of certain antithetic parallels on which the Apostle delights to dwell. We are constantly meeting one or another of those great polar contrasts on which his thoughts turn—each of them in his hands so fraught with meaning that all his teaching might seem gathered up into it or disposed around it. Law and gospel—sin and grace—death and life—faith and works—Adam and Christ—the old man and the new—such are some of his most important and far-reaching antinomies. But none comes before us more frequently, or tinges more deeply the whole current of his thought, than the contrast which we are now to consider—that of “flesh” and

“spirit.” It holds a central place; and from whatever point of view we regard it—in its bearing on the constitution of human nature, on the doctrine of sin, or on the genesis and growth of the new life in Christ—its importance can hardly be overestimated. It appeals to a variety of interests. While the theologian hopes to find here some light shed on the mystery of sin, and the philosopher to discover fresh materials for his speculation on the origin of evil, and the moralist to obtain at least fit counsel for the conduct of life amidst prevailing temptation, the psychologist desires to learn how St. Paul conceived of the nature and workings of the human mind, and the student of language, as it reflects the changing hues of thought, delights to analyse the use of that plastic instrument in the hands of a master who turns its resources to new account. Above all stands the deeper interest of the study of a religious experience, that sheds an unequalled light on man’s state of sin and on the power which generates and sustains his new life of consecration to God.

But, in proportion to the range of the subject and to the manifold and momentous issues involved in it, is the diversity of opinion to which it has given rise. Each of the terms entering into the contrast has been the theme of prolonged discussion and not seldom of vehement controversy; and further questions have emerged as to the relations subsisting

between them and the influence exercised by the one upon the other. It is admitted on all hands that, if the Apostle has not coined new words, he has stamped on those adopted by him an impress of his own; and that, in his employment of them, they carry a significance to which there is nothing at all akin in the usage of classical Greek, and nothing altogether corresponding even in Hebrew or Hellenistic use. His language is not merely peculiar; it is in a sense unique; and the key to its right interpretation is to be found in the comparison of his own utterances throwing light on each other rather than in anything that may be adduced by way of apparent analogy from without.

The difficulty, moreover, is increased by certain circumstances which so complicate the problem as to have led not a few to despair of its satisfactory solution. Not only does the Apostle often make use of the same word in different senses, or shades of meaning; but he has also a habit of rapidly interchanging cognate ideas, and the result at the first glance is a certain aspect of confusion or of apparent conflict. The term "spirit" (*πνεῦμα*) is used to denote at one time the divine Spirit given to man or dwelling in man, at another time man's own spirit receptive of, and bearing witness to, the divine. In Rom. viii. the Apostle within the compass of a few verses passes from "the Spirit of God" to "the

Spirit of Christ," then to "Christ" himself, then to "the Spirit of Him that raised up" Jesus, and thereafter to "the spirit of adoption." At one time we find him speaking of his "living or abiding in the flesh" as a present and continuing state (Phil. i. 22, 24); at another of the "being in the flesh" as for himself and his readers a state belonging to the past, which could be affirmed of them no longer (Rom. vii. 5, "when we were in the flesh;" viii. 9, "but ye are not in the flesh"). At Gal. v. 24, "they that are Christ's have crucified the flesh," while at 2 Cor. vii. 1 they are exhorted to "cleanse themselves from all defilement" of it. In various passages it might seem as if, without practically affecting the sense to be conveyed, the "body" (*σῶμα*) might take the place of the "flesh" (*σάρξ*), but every one feels that the adjective "bodily" or "corporeal" (*σωματικός*) could not by any means take the place of the significant epithet "fleshly" or "carnal" (*σαρκικός*). Sometimes "spirit" (*πνεῦμα*) seems interchangeable with the correlative "soul" (*ψυχή*) or "mind" (*νοῦς*): but so far is *πνευματικός* from being identified with or convertible into *ψυχικός*, that the one is expressly placed in direct contrast to the other (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15; xv. 44, 45). There is the "body of flesh" (Col. ii. 11); but there is also the "mind of flesh" (Col. ii. 18); while, in the Revised version at least, the "mind of the spirit" (Rom. viii. 6) has as its alliterative



correlate the "spirit of the mind" (Eph. iv. 23). And, while "flesh" and "spirit" are in many instances definitely contrasted, and are even directly affirmed to be "contrary the one to the other" (Gal. v. 17), we find that the Apostle at times expresses his own personality in terms of either—under circumstances, in fact, where the one would seem to cover or include the other, as in 2 Cor. ii. 12, "I had no relief for my spirit," and 2 Cor. vii. 5, "our flesh had no relief."

It is no matter of surprise—however much of regret—that amidst these and the like complications many should have been inclined to forego the quest after a definite and consistent solution of the problem, content to rest in the belief that the Apostle used such terms as came to his hand in popular language with a certain popular laxity and vagueness, and that it might be sufficient for them to seize his distinctions in a rough and general way. In the scholasticism of the Middle Ages and in the revised scholasticism of the seventeenth century—when there was no lack of subtlety, but little perception of the true principles of exegesis—the language of St. Paul was fitted into the framework, if not translated into the technical terms, of the prevailing philosophy and theology. During the eighteenth century it was well-nigh emptied of all special significance in the hands of a vapid and unsympa-

thetic Rationalism. Some expositors in more recent times have not scrupled to impute to the Apostle's indistinctness or confusion of thought their own inability to see clearly, have gently upbraided him with falling short of the precision of later theological formulæ, or have pitied his comparative ignorance of modern psychological distinctions.<sup>1</sup> If he had but expressed himself in terms of the objective and the subjective, the immanent and the transcendent, the sensible and the supersensible, the Ego and the non-Ego, how much clearer would have been his meaning, and how much trouble would have been saved to his expositors! With others, and especially with certain writers on Biblical psychology, there has been a tendency to the opposite extreme of building on the Apostolic foundation elaborate systematisings and speculative constructions out of all proportion to the scanty data on which they rest. If the ideas of St. Paul have been to some extent more clearly apprehended in the light of distinctions with which

<sup>1</sup> Fritzsche remarks: "*Tametsi Paulus omnium peccatorum incitamenta e corpore repetiisset, hæc tamen opinio, ut multa in antiquis scriptoribus, æquo animo ferenda esset. Nam ut veteribus scriptoribus nihil placuerit, nisi quod nobis verum esse videatur, ne postulandum quidem est*" (ad Rom. vi. 6). "The language of the New Testament," says Dr. Jowett, "does not conform to any received views of psychology" (Epistles of St. Paul, ii. p. 216); "neither did the age in which St. Paul lived admit of any great accuracy in speaking of the human soul" (i. p. 104).

modern philosophy has made expositors familiar, there can be little doubt that confusion has arisen from the attempt to apply the categories of modern thought, as *a priori* postulates, to this inquiry, and to fit the Apostle's teaching into them, or to find it already there—at the risk, if not of associating with it ideas foreign to his modes of thought, at any rate of assigning to his words a misleading connotation which may unduly extend or restrict their import.

We have been led to choose this antithesis of Flesh and Spirit as the subject of these lectures not only because of the importance and interest of the questions at stake, but also because—although particular points have received more or less adequate discussion—it has not, so far as I know, been dealt with of late years in any monograph specially devoted to it in this country, while it has been recently subjected to formal and elaborate treatment by various German theologians in connection with the theory of a supposed influence of Greek philosophical ideas in moulding the Apostle's thought. These discussions have not attracted in this country the notice which they merit, partly perhaps because of the *ex facie* improbability of the position which they strive to uphold, partly because of their being for the most part accessible only in the original German, partly because of what seems at first sight the repellent character of their contents—made up of

minute exegetical details and dry psychological or metaphysical disquisitions in varying proportions. But they have contributed in no small degree to the elucidation of the questions at issue, and they serve as signal illustrations at once of the excellencies and the defects of the methods followed by German scholars. It is not less instructive to compare their processes than to mark their results. They show wonderful fertility of resource, depth and thoroughness of research, skill in combination; but they display also much of the license of conjecture, arbitrariness of procedure, and eager quest of novelty that characterise our German neighbours—whose ingenuity can rear an imposing structure of theory on very slender data, and find fresh support for its discoveries in quarters where the ordinary reader would see nothing at all to suggest them.

As the field on which we enter is a wide one, it is desirable that we should indicate at the outset the scope and limits of our inquiry. It will not be possible to avoid incidental reference to the great issues that are bound up with it—to the bearing of its results on doctrine or life—or to leave wholly out of account its relations to psychology and philosophical speculation; but we do not propose to deal with the subject primarily or mainly from the standpoint either of the dogmatic theologian or of the psychological inquirer. Our task belongs essentially

to the domain of exegesis, or of Biblical Theology in the strict sense. Our object is to ascertain, by applying the recognised principles of grammatico-historical interpretation, the import of the terms "flesh" and "spirit" in the writings of St. Paul, and to examine in the light of these principles the exegetical results reached, and the conclusions based on them, by the writers of whom we have spoken. We do not intend to discuss the place and characteristics of the flesh or the nature and offices of the Spirit, in St. Paul's teaching, as questions of theology proper; but rather to seek at least an approximate answer to the necessarily prior question, What does he mean when he uses the terms "flesh" and "spirit" either by themselves, or in relation to each other? And we may reasonably ask to be judged in the light of this express limitation—with respect to what we announce it as our design to attempt, and not with respect to what we may leave unattempted.

It may help to a clearer apprehension of the points on which our inquiry is to bear, if we prefix to it a brief indication of the views held regarding the subject by the chief earlier masters of exegesis, and a summary of the main conclusions arrived at by its more recent expositors. Although we shall encounter, as we proceed, various differences as to the interpretation of *πνεῦμα*, the main question has related to the Pauline use of *σάρξ*.

The first great line of interpretation is that which, under various modifications of statement, regards *σάρξ* as denoting human nature as a whole in its condition under sin and apart from Christ. Clement of Alexandria gives it as his opinion, with respect to Gal. v. 19, that the "flesh" meant sinners and the "spirit" the righteous.<sup>1</sup> Augustine<sup>2</sup> adduces various passages in proof of his general proposition that it is the custom of the sacred books to use the word "flesh" so as to comprehend under it all kinds of human sins both of body and of spirit, and the "living according to the flesh" is equivalent in meaning to the "living according to one's self," "according to man," not according to God, because the part is put for the whole in such a way that not the "flesh" only, but also the other part of human nature, the "soul," is employed for the whole man and his nature as such. Thomas Aquinas<sup>3</sup> agrees with Augustine: "All kinds of sins are carnal (Gal. v.). The flesh is taken for man, who, when living according to himself, is said to live according to the flesh, as Augustine remarks in his Fourteenth book," but on his own part he adds: "And the reason of this is that every defect of human reason has somehow its beginning out of carnal sense." Luther<sup>4</sup> after his

<sup>1</sup> Strom. iv. 8, 61.

<sup>2</sup> De Civ. Dei, xiv. 2-4. X

<sup>3</sup> Summa, Prim. Sec. ii. quæst. lxxii. art. ii.

<sup>4</sup> Preface to the Epistle to the Romans.

pithy fashion says : “ You must not understand flesh and spirit here as if flesh were concerned only with unchaste desires, and spirit only with the interior of the heart ; but flesh with Paul, as with Christ at John iii. 6, means everything that is born of flesh, the whole man, with body and soul, with reason and all thought (in the Latin form : *totam rationem cum summis et optimis suis viribus*), because everything in him inclines after the flesh.” Zwingli (on Rom. vii. 18) says : “ Flesh is here put for the soul and body of which man is composed, that is, for the whole man.” Calvin, as might be expected from his character as an exegete, is more precise in his definition : “ Under the term flesh the Apostle always comprehends all endowments of human nature, whatever is in man, except the sanctification of the Spirit. . . . Either term, namely, as well flesh as spirit, is competently applied to the mind ; but the one, so far as it is regenerated ; the other, so far as it still retains its natural state.”<sup>1</sup> He is peremptory in denouncing the less comprehensive interpretation : “ It is evident that the word flesh is not restricted only to the lower desires, which have their seat in what is called sensuousness, according to the fiction of the sophists (the Schoolmen), but is predicated of all human nature.”<sup>2</sup> “ It is frigid and foolish to restrict the corruption, which has emanated from the

<sup>1</sup> On Rom. vii. 18.

<sup>2</sup> On 1 Cor. iii. 3.

very citadel of the mind and the inmost heart, only to what are called the motions of sense."<sup>1</sup>

Among the more recent theologians who, in their definition of the Pauline *σάρξ*, follow the example of Luther and Calvin, it may be enough to mention the view of Neander:<sup>2</sup> "The notions *σάρξ*, *κόσμος*, *πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου* correspond to one another, and so *σάρξ* denotes human nature generally in its state of estrangement from the divine life"; that of Tholuck:<sup>3</sup> "What is human with the accessory notion of weakness and sinfulness—human weakness"; that of Julius Muller:<sup>4</sup> *σάρξ* denotes a tendency—that tendency which turns towards the things of the world in desire and lust, and is thereby carried away from God," or, as it is otherwise put by him:<sup>5</sup> "Man's habit of life and conduct in this present world"; that of Lutz:<sup>6</sup> "The disinclination of the will towards the divine"; that of Philippi: "What is left of man after deduction of the *πνεῦμα*," or more recently,<sup>7</sup> "human nature in its present constitution, as corrupt"; and that of Delitzsch:<sup>8</sup> "It is the whole sinful and mortal nature of man that is

<sup>1</sup> Inst. Rel. Christ. ii. 1. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Pflanzung und Leit. d. chr. Kirche, 1841, p. 575.

<sup>3</sup> Studien u. Krit. 1855, iii. p. 488.

<sup>4</sup> Doctrine of Sin, i. p. 326, Eng. translation.

<sup>5</sup> P. 337.

<sup>6</sup> Biblische Dogm., p. 121.

<sup>7</sup> Kirchl. Glaubenslehre, iii. (1867), p. 207.

<sup>8</sup> Bibl. Psychol., p. 373.



called *σάρξ*," or again:<sup>1</sup> "The whole natural man is termed *σάρξ*, because it has fallen entirely into the power of the bad influences (*Potenzen*) of its nature-basis, which the first sin has let loose."

By the side of this there has subsisted, and at times predominated, another line of interpretation, which regards the *σάρξ* as having in general a more limited sense, as denoting the sensuous or animal nature of man with its instincts and ~~inclinations~~. Chrysostom (on Gal. v. 16) says: "What Paul here calls the flesh is not the bodily nature, but the wicked will (*προαίρεσις*), the earthly mind, slothful and careless (*λογισμὸν γεώδη ῥήθυμον καὶ ἡμελημένον*). And this is not an impeachment of the body, but a charge against the slothful soul. For the flesh is an instrument, and one does not feel aversion or hatred toward an instrument, but toward him who makes a bad use of it." Theodoret:<sup>2</sup> "He calls the bent of the mind to the worse things flesh." Cyril:<sup>3</sup> "Paul grounds his view in strictness on the nature of the body, and now looks closely into the power of the physical infirmities that are implanted in it. For the appetites that carry us away towards every sort of passion and the crimes of a life that is fond of pleasure have the flesh as their source." Le Clerc gives more definite expression and support to this

<sup>1</sup> *Bibl. Psychol.*, p. 374.

<sup>2</sup> In *Ep. ad Gal. v. 17*.

<sup>3</sup> On *Rom. vii. 18*, in *Cramer's Catenae Graec. Patrum*.

view when he says (on Rom. vi. 6): “The *body of sin*, or *subject to sin*, is here so called *reduplicative*, to use a scholastic term, in as far as it is such. What the Apostle has in view is not the substance itself of the body, but the quality of it, in respect of which it is the origin, fuel (*fomes*) and instrument of sin. . . . The things of sense, indeed, lead our mind to sin only by striking at the body, whereby the mind itself comes to be affected. And if we should say that almost all sins arise from the unlawful love of the things of sense, we should say nothing but what would readily be granted by all.” And again (on Rom. vii. 18): “By the word ‘flesh’ we must here understand not only the body, but also the bad habits which the mind has contracted from it.” Several modern definitions reproduce this view of Le Clerc. Usteri, *e.g.*, holds that “ἡ σάρξ is the enticement (*Reiz*) of sensuousness”;<sup>1</sup> and Rückert (on Rom. vii. 18) that it is “that portion of the whole being termed Ego, which is bodily or sensuous, the lower nature exercising sensuous desire.”<sup>2</sup>

The two lines of interpretation, of which we have spoken, partially meet in the view of Dr. Albert

<sup>1</sup> Paulinischer Lehrbegriff, 5th ed., p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> M. Reuss, on the other hand, remarks: “What we call sensuality answers but very imperfectly to the idea of the flesh,” which he defines as “the aggregate of all that is in opposition to the being and will of God,” *Histoire de la Théol. Chrétienne*, ii. p. 27.

Ritschl, who in earlier years was a zealous disciple of the Tübingen school, but on further reflection took up an attitude of opposition to it in the second edition of his suggestive work on the "Rise of the Ancient Catholic Church," published in 1857. In his compact and vigorous outline of the doctrinal system of Paul he states that the term "flesh" occurs in various phases of meaning, for the explanation of which we must have recourse to Old Testament usage. In the Old Testament "flesh" denotes not only man's body as contrasted with his spirit, but in many cases the *whole* man as contrasted with God—a mode of conception springing naturally from the fact that the body is the obvious mark of the distinction of man from God, and carrying with it special reference to man's weakness and frailty, but not definitely in any passage of the Old Testament to his sinfulness. St. Paul follows both forms of this Old Testament use. He employs *σάρξ* sometimes to denote the body in no other sense than that of *σῶμα*, sometimes to denote the whole man under the aspect of human weakness confronting divine power, but without any necessary association with the term of a reference to sin and guilt going beyond the limits of sure Old Testament precedent. In a number of other passages, however, the *σάρξ* is presented by Paul as the seat (*Träger*) and source of sin. Often it may seem as if Paul looked on man's sensuousness as the seat of sin.

But—Ritschl observes—where *σάρξ* is associated with the thought of sin, the contrast to it is never the *human* spirit, but always the *divine*. Now, if the *σάρξ* is not placed in opposition to the human spirit, it cannot be taken as sensuousness; if, on the other hand, it is put in opposition to the divine spirit, it must denote the whole man—a view, which is confirmed by the conception of the sinful *σάρξ* being interchanged with that of the *παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος*, and by the ascription to the *σάρξ* of mental functions—not merely *ἐπιθυμία*, but *φρόνημα*, *θέλημα*, *νοῦς*.

The question arises—How does St. Paul come to use the term sometimes with, sometimes without, the connotation of sinfulness? Ritschl conceives that, when the word, in itself neutral, takes on this accessory meaning, it gets it from direct indications of such a reference in the context; as in the Epistle to the Romans, where for the first six chapters the meaning does not go beyond the line of Old Testament use, but in the seventh chapter special adjuncts mark the specific sense there attaching to it. The circumstance that the expression only relates to sinfulness when accompanied by direct indications of this sort prevents our employing it in support of the conjecture that St. Paul would *account for* the fact of sin by man's fleshly nature. It does not occur to the Apostle either to explain sin by means of sensuousness, or to explain human weakness by means of sin; he merely

assumes the sinfulness and weakness of man as equivalent in quite positive and well-defined cases.

But it is still incumbent on us to explain in what sense Paul could designate *the body and the members as seat of sin and of desire*, if he did not incline towards the sensuous theory. The key to these passages (Rom. vi. 6, 12 ; vii. 5, 23, 24 ; viii. 13 ; Col. ii. 11 ; iii. 5) lies in the correct demarcation of the standpoint from which Paul makes the statements in question. A review of the chief features of the well-known passage Rom. vii. 14-25—which Ritschl conceives to describe not the experiences of the regenerate and redeemed man, nor yet those of the sinner generally, but those of the sinner who under the law has reached a definite stage of moral development—leads him to the conclusion that, so far as concerns those who are not yet redeemed, *σάρξ* signifies the whole man ; but that, in the case of the redeemed, the flesh which resists the Holy Spirit appears restricted to the body and its members. This does not imply that sensuousness as such is, for the believer at least, the only source of sin, but that sin in the believer—who, properly speaking, lives in the Holy Spirit—finds in the element of the body simply points on which it may seize.<sup>1</sup>

We find in the view of Ritschl, which we have thus summarized, a fair statement of the facts on

<sup>1</sup> Entstehung der alkath. Kirche, pp. 69 ff.

which the two chief lines of interpretation rest—facts which he is content duly to acknowledge and to coordinate without merging the one in the other, or seeking to explain the transition from the one sense to the other by reference to any common ground or underlying principle of unity. This attempt has been made, on the other hand, more or less explicitly and elaborately by the supporters of a third line of interpretation which has recently come into prominence. They find the key to the Apostle's use of *σάρξ* in its primary meaning as the substance or material of the earthly body, and in the association with it of the idea—derived consciously or unconsciously from Hellenic philosophy—that matter is the principle of evil, or is essentially evil. Here we can but briefly indicate the leading positions taken up by the successive exponents of this theory; but, as several of the works in which they are set forth are not accessible to the English reader, we shall present, in an Appendix, a fuller abstract couched for the most part in their own language, by which the reader may be enabled to trace the general tenor and sequence of arguments that from the nature of the case run much into detail.

Dr. Ferdinand Christian Baur, the illustrious founder and chief of what is commonly called the Tübingen School, has embodied his views on this subject—apart from earlier essays and minor inci-

dental references—in two different works ; first, in his treatise on the “ Life and Teaching of the Apostle Paul ” originally published in 1845 and issued in a second edition (but without change, so far as the section dealing with the Apostle’s doctrine is concerned), after his death by Dr. Zeller, and secondly in the “ Lectures on New Testament Theology ” delivered by him between 1852 and 1860, and posthumously published by his son. The latter book contains the most recent, and at the same time the fullest, expression of his opinion.

As to the earlier work we may note that, while he says<sup>1</sup> that “ man is not spirit merely, but, as regards at least the one side of his nature, flesh,” and that “ the σαρξ is in one word the seat and the organ of sin (ἁμαρτία) ” he goes on to declare<sup>2</sup> that, “ in order to understand rightly the resistance which the law encounters in the flesh of man, we must not take the idea of the flesh in too narrow a sense,” and to add : “ Man is not merely flesh according to the one side of his being ; but, viewed in respect of his natural constitution (*Beschaffenheit*), he is flesh according to his whole being (*Wesen*). The spirit, which is the contrast to the flesh, is in fact imparted to man only through the grace bestowed in Christ ; how could man therefore be by nature anything else than flesh ? Hence the flesh is not merely the body

<sup>1</sup> ii. p. 151.

<sup>2</sup> ii. p. 152.

with its corporeal impulses (*Triebe*): it is the sensuous principle ruling the whole man as to soul and body, out of which springs sin, as it expresses itself in the most diversified ways in human life and does not consist simply in the satisfying of bodily desires. Man in himself, as he is by nature, is merely a *σαρκικός* or *ψυχικός*; he becomes *πνευματικός* only when through faith in the grace of God in Christ he has received the Spirit as the principle of his Christian consciousness and life."

In the later "Lectures," after referring to Tholuck's admission that he had more than once changed his mind about the meaning of the term *σάρξ*, and pointing to the various shades of import ascribed to it, he asks, "What is the view underlying all this variety of usage? If we say that *σάρξ* is essentially human weakness, we must know which is the proper subject of the weakness—the spirit or the body in man. If it is the spirit, we need an explanation why it is that the Apostle designates the spiritual principle by an expression relating to the body; if it is the body, we are at a loss to know how there comes to be predicated of it so much, that can only be attributed to a spiritual subject." His answer is: The *σάρξ* is the material body, which forms, so far as man is *σάρξ*, his proper substantial being (*Wesen*). But the Apostle speaks of it as a subject having a mind (*geistiges*); which



may naturally be explained by the fact—constituting the special characteristic of the idea of the *σάρξ*—that the body is not a dead mass, but a being having life and a soul. It is not surprising that the Apostle should share the view of the ancients, who conceived of matter not as something dead and lifeless, but as a congeries (*Inbegriff*) of powers in living operation moving in a definite direction. Around this root-idea of the *σάρξ* as material body may be directly gathered the various marks by which the human is distinguished from, and put in contrast with, the divine. What man is as a weak, mortal, finite being has its ground in his being *σάρξ*—that is, a sensuous material corporeal being with the impulses and powers that dwell in the material body. *Σάρξ* and *ἄνθρωπος* are in various instances quite identical ideas, as when *κατὰ σάρκα* is used as equivalent to *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον*.

The mental life and soul ascribed to man as *σάρξ* are so embraced in the same unity of substance with the *σάρξ* that *ψυχικός* and *σαρκικός* are synonymous; comp. 1 Cor. ii. 11 and iii. 1. While the *ψυχή*, the more closely it is associated with the *σάρξ*, shares the more its impulses and motions of will, out of the *ψυχή* itself—out of its mental element—there emerges the *νοῦς*, which, as a purely intellectual faculty, distinguishes itself from the *ψυχή*, and detaches itself, in a higher degree than is possible for

the latter, from the material nature-basis of the *σάρξ*. The *νοῦς* is the principle of thinking and knowing, of clear intelligent thinking, of immanent self-consciousness. It is itself the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* of Rom. vii. 22, which, in the conflict there described, knows itself no longer one with the *σάρξ*, but, in spite of its attempts to become emancipated from what it now recognises as a material principle opposed to its own better Ego, cannot release itself from the dominant power, and remains accordingly in the last resort a mere accident to the substance of the *σάρξ*.

In the *νοῦς* the Pauline anthropology reaches its highest point. The radical (*prinzipiell*) contrast to the material *σάρξ* does not lie in the sphere of the human, but only in the divine *πνεῦμα*, which stands in a relation of absolute transcendence to the *νοῦς*. It is by this divine *πνεῦμα* that man is enabled to resist the power of the *σάρξ* and overcome all that issues from it. The Apostle places the psychic and pneumatic in so decided opposition to one another (at 1 Cor. xv. 45) as to show clearly how little we can ascribe to human nature any pneumatic principle immanent in itself. Though he speaks of a human *πνεῦμα*, the fact has no ulterior significance for his proper idea of *πνεῦμα*. That he ascribed to man a *πνεῦμα* belonging to his nature, is clear from 1 Cor. ii. 11, where he speaks expressly of *πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*. It is the principle of knowledge and

self-consciousness, the same which he elsewhere terms *νοῦς*, but here designates as *πνεῦμα* in order to draw a parallel between the *πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ* and the *πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*. But he ascribes withal to the latter none of the effects, of which he regards the divine *πνεῦμα* as alone the source. "How many unnecessary discussions," Dr. Baur well remarks, "people might have spared themselves as to Rom. vii. 14 ff., if they had but more closely attended to the distinction between *νοῦς* and *πνεῦμα*!"

In the year 1855 Dr. Carl Holsten, now a professor at Heidelberg, published a dissertation on the "Significance of the word *σάρξ* in the doctrinal system of Paul," which he re-issued, with the addition of a few notes, in a collection of papers entitled "Zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus—Altes und Neues" in 1868. This essay has been recognised on all hands as the work of a fresh, acute and original thinker, bearing an unmistakable impress of power, and conducting its criticism with incisive energy, but often with a contemptuous tone bordering on intolerance. He states it as his aim to reduce, with greater precision than hitherto, the manifold relations in which the word is used to the radical signification underlying them, and to demonstrate more definitely the decisive place held by the idea in the Apostle's religious

thought. He derives his materials only from the four great Epistles admitted by all as genuine.

The following are the leading propositions, which he has sought to establish. While *σῶμα* denotes the body as an organism under the category of *form*, *σάρξ* has as its constant and definite characteristic the idea of *substance*. It is the earthly-material substance of the *σῶμα*, distinguished from other forms of matter by the element of life. The cause of this life is the *ψυχή*, and, as it has its expression through the senses, man as *σάρξ* is sensuous-living matter, that is, flesh. The *σάρξ* is thus the distinctive mark of man as contradistinguished from God, who is the subject of the *πνεῦμα*. But *πνεῦμα* also belongs to the category of substance, invisible, incorruptible—transcending earth and the earthly—immaterial, at least relatively speaking, as the *negative* of cosmic matter. It has specially associated with it the conception of power, and is regarded as the principle of absolute truth and of holiness. Man, in respect of his nature-basis *σάρξ*, is the direct antithesis to God as *πνεῦμα*; nor has he anything akin to the nature of God in the *ψυχή*, which, though it may be pneumatic in the most general sense, is, in virtue of its relation to matter as the vital power thereof, purely opposed to the *πνεῦμα*. There is nothing akin to the divine nature even in what is called the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* or *νοῦς*, which—it is inferred

from a review of the chief passages—is merely the subjective consciousness, the *form* in which the subjective mind gets to know what is given to it as contents. But what is to be said of the passages that are commonly taken to affirm the existence of a further element, of a *human-creaturally* πνεῦμα, in man? After an ingenious explanation of these, Holsten comes to the conclusion that there is no such human πνεῦμα recognised by St. Paul. The only elements of human nature in itself are the σάρξ, the ψυχή, and the νοῦς; everything higher is the *divine* πνεῦμα.

As there is thus nothing in man akin to the divine nature, the Pauline contrast of πνεῦμα and σάρξ is not anthropological, but metaphysical; and, in the religious domain, the notion of the σάρξ is that of the finite overagainst the infinite. Now, the finite in concrete definiteness for Paul is the sensuous. Man in himself as σάρξ is a purely sensuous being; for the consciousness gets its contents only through sense-perception from the world of sensuous appearance, and the will its contents only from the sensuous impulse to sensuous pleasure. Overagainst the absolute life of the πνεῦμα the σάρξ is the principle of perishableness; overagainst the πνεῦμα as the principle of absolute truth, the σάρξ is the principle of error, and its wisdom folly. But the contrast reveals itself above all in the domain of the will. The ἐπιθυμία, sensuous impulse, is the power

—the law—immanent in the flesh, the necessary manifestation of the fleshly substance and, in St. Paul's view, the most especial (*eigenste*) self of man. All evil has its principle in the *σάρξ*, and all sins are derived from it; man, in presence of the divine will, is of necessity the sinful—the non-righteous. The *σάρξ* is essentially *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας*; and man of himself is already, as such, in his substantial nature *ἁμαρτία*, that is, sin in the objective sense, which is to be distinguished from *παράβασις*, subjective sin, the consciousness of guilt, that only arises through the revelation of God's holy will in the *νόμος*. In order to a righteousness based on works of the pneumatic law the will would need to be impelled by a pneumatic power. But power is the expression or outcome of substance, and to the sensuous man the pneumatic substance is wanting. So righteousness can come only from God out of his free grace, which redeems man from the curse and power of sin, and confers on him such a substantial pneumatic power.

Dr. Holsten comes accordingly to the conclusion that in St. Paul's view man of himself stands purely *in contradistinction to God*, and that this is only one of the forms of a dualism pervading St. Paul's doctrinal system. The ground of this dualism is the contrast in which the Apostle conceives the infinite and the finite. For '*finitum non est capax infiniti*' is the basis

of the Pauline system. Metaphysically this dualism would present itself as that of spirit and matter. But from this Gnostic dualism St. Paul has continued free, much as there is that approximately suggests it. Predominantly moved by the one interest of what had a direct bearing on religion, he has kept that dualism of spirit and matter within the limits of the religious sphere, and has merely in the contrast of God and man expressed it as the dualism of spirit and sensuousness without transferring it to the purely metaphysical domain. In his thinking the Jewish idea of God exercised too powerful an influence to admit of such an independent self-subsistence (*Selbstständigkeit*) of matter as was required for the Gnostic dualism.

We need not at present follow Holsten into the application of his views farther than to say, that he conceives St. Paul to have set aside the ritual elements of the law as purely external and non-pneumatic; that he holds the Epistle to the Romans as viewing the religious development of humanity from a double standpoint, that of objective necessity based on the idea and will of God (in the first section, ch. i.-v. 11), and that of free subjectivity turning on the nature of man (in ch. vi.-xii.)—the two forms of view running side by side and separate from each other, and the Apostle uttering the contradictory positions equally as truth; that at Rom. i. 3 he discovers a compliance

on the Apostle's part with the standpoint of the Jewish Christians at Rome not at all in keeping with his teaching elsewhere, where we find that he starts with a heavenly person sent by God and becoming man, whereas here he starts with a human person who by an act of God's will becomes His Son in power; that on the basis of Rom. viii. 3 and 2 Cor. v. 21 he represents the incarnation—the assumption of the *σάρξ*—on the part of Christ to have taken place in such a way that He, who in a *σῶμα πνευματικόν* was the *μὴ γνοῦς ἁμαρτίαν*, in a *σῶμα σαρκός* became withal *ἁμαρτία*, so as to condemn sin in the flesh. He applies here the distinction already mentioned between *ἁμαρτία* and *παράβασις*. Christ assumes the *σάρξ* and, in immediate connection with it, the objective principle of *ἁμαρτία* opposed to the nature and will of God; but the objective does not become either subjective consciousness, or subjective deed, in this *pneumatic* personality; *Χριστός* remains without (subjective) sin of his own. The cross of Christ was objectively the death of sin in the *σάρξ*; in theory at least for the believer the *σάρξ* is put to death, for what took place in the case of Christ took place objectively in the case of all; and all that believers have to do is subjectively to realize for themselves this objective effect in the power of the Spirit.



## II.

## SCHMIDT—LÜDEMANN—PFLEIDERER.

IN 1870 Dr. Richard Schmidt published an important treatise on "the Pauline Christology as connected with the Apostle's doctrine of salvation." The first chapter of this work deals with "the contrast of flesh and spirit as the presupposition on which that doctrine rests," inasmuch as the *walking according to flesh or spirit* implies a prior state of *being in the flesh or in the spirit*. While agreeing in the main with Holsten as to the general definition of the ideas, Schmidt deems it not superfluous to discuss the subject afresh with special reference to the critical examination of other views, which Holsten had not attempted, but which is called for by the very variety of divergent interpretations. He is, as it seems to us, much more successful in ingenious criticism of the results reached by others than in any new contributions of his own.

Dr. Schmidt sets out by calling attention to the heterogeneous character of the senses assigned to *σάρξ* by those who enlarge or change its original

import, and urges that we may not without arbitrariness discard the idea of an unity underlying that use, but may, on the contrary, with reason demand that each signification assumed shall make good its connection with the original contents of the conception always to be presumed as somehow present, whatever element may from the context preponderate. He examines the explanations given by Julius Müller, Hofmann, Weiss, and others in the light of their relation to this point of view, and comes to the conclusion that they are either vague in themselves or that they deviate from that primary sense to an extent not warranted by anything to be found either in the Old Testament or in the writings of the New other than those of St. Paul. He then reviews the chief passages adduced from St. Paul himself in support of the enlargement of the meaning, and maintains that in some of these there is no necessity for enlarging the conception beyond its original limits; while in others it is of the utmost importance to distinguish clearly between what is on each occasion involved in the contextual thought and what is implied in the idea of the flesh itself. Even where the proper idea may seem indefinitely enlarged (as in the apparent equivalence of *σάρξ* to *κόσμος*), we must bear in mind that *σάρξ* denotes not so much the body as the material substance of this body; that this substance is, in keeping with the Old Testament

view, essentially identical with that of the earthly world generally, sharing its character of materiality; that flesh is the medium of all man's relations with this world; and that it may therefore denote as well the *sphere* within which the purely natural being and action of man are carried on, as *that which determines the peculiar character* of such being and action, without abandoning the category of substance originally underlying it. He contends that this original meaning is to be retained, even where the term appears in distinctly ethical relations; quotes what he conceives to be positive indications to that effect; and concludes that  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  with St. Paul is neither the whole undivided human nature, nor is it one side thereof in distinction from another; it never means anything else than the material substance of the animal, inclusively of the human, body.

Dr. Schmidt holds that the idea of  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  is not simply synonymous with "that which is human," nor can the divine as such form the direct contrast to it. Even where the Spirit of God stands definitely over against the flesh, the emphasis rests, he says, not so much on the genitive of more precise definition as on the chief idea which is thereby more precisely defined. In other words the cardinal point is the contrast of flesh and spirit, not immediately that of God and man (as the latter is empirically viewed). The distinction thus made, which Schmidt considers

it of decisive moment to bear in mind, leads us to discriminate between the general idea of "spirit" and the reality presented in  $\piνεῦμα \Thetaεου$ , even if we should suppose St. Paul not to know any other spiritual reality at all. In various cases where  $\piνεῦμα$  stands in an antithetic relation, we could not supply the more precise definition "divine" without altering in some measure the sharpness of the contrast; and in all such instances the expressions are to be left entirely general. In this light we might dispose of the question so much debated, Whether in these cases we have to think of the divine or the human  $\piνεῦμα$ , as having no longer an object; it concerns an idea which "is meant to be left (*belassen sein will*) quite general." But we may not escape the question, Whether the divine Spirit is the sole reality? or whether there is also a  $\piνεῦμα$  as a constituent part of man's nature? The number of passages which seem to favour the latter view is far from inconsiderable, and the mode in which they are explained by those who do not accept it is pronounced "not very happy." The view of Holsten, that the passages apply to the Spirit of God as having become subjective, is examined with the result that his positions are pronounced "mere groundless assertion," "inadmissible," "impossible," "a denial of what is exegetically natural at the bidding of theory," while the thought which Holsten gains by his mode

of apprehending Rom. viii. 16 is declared "beyond doubt too modern an abstraction to commend itself much as Pauline." And the suggestion by Weiss that the reference is to a spiritual life of higher origin produced by the divine Spirit, while not open to the same objections, is declared to be the less natural by reason of its very position intermediate between the ordinary conception and that of Holsten, and by reason of its seeming to require the assumption "of a twofold communicated  $\piνεύμα$  in the redeemed." Schmidt holds it as exegetically scarce open to doubt that it is not unusual for St. Paul to speak of the spirit as a constituent part of man's nature, and falls back upon the position that the idea of spirit is opposed, "as we have convinced ourselves," in quite a general sense to that of flesh. While the latter finds its essential character in the element of "the material," the former on the other hand denotes primarily the "non-material" conceived of at the same time under a positive aspect as moving power (*bewegende Kraft*) just as with the idea of material substance is associated that of quiescence (*ruhenden Sein*). He grants that this contrast is essentially a metaphysical one, but maintains that this does not exclude its being in a definite sense anthropological, since it evidently underlies the Biblical view of man. By way of explaining why the contrast is not put more specifically with reference to the human spirit he

says that it is not difficult to discover the reason. Experience showed the *σάρξ* to be the dominant principle in man, imparting a fleshly character even to the inner life; and so the radical contrast to it could not but be sought outside of man. It is not as if the human *πνεῦμα* ceased to come under the general conception, as opposed to the *σάρξ*; but having no longer the significance of an independent principle, it became degraded to a mere organ, which continued to have, doubtless, in a purely formal aspect a determining power, and yet was essentially determined in its own operation by the flesh. If we should therefore refer the formula *κατὰ πνεῦμα περιπατεῖν* to the human spirit as it is found conditioned in experience, the conduct thereby designated would not really differ from a "walking according to the flesh," seeing that the *de facto* determining principle would be not so much the spirit itself as the flesh. For even where the *νοῦς* of man relatively withdraws from and opposes itself to the power of the flesh, its utter impotence shows how far it is from being an opposite operative life-principle. And he says, by way of summing up, without affirming that the thoughts are formally or consciously so carried out by the Apostle: "The general contrast which dominates the Apostle's view may certainly, from quite an abstract standpoint of moral contemplation, be defined as one between the material body and the immaterial life-spirit of man

—in so far, namely, as the two are apprehended abstractly, that is, apart from any relation to one another already existing in reality. On the other hand, looked at in actual experience, it shapes itself into a contrast between the flesh, which conditions the collective character of empiric humanity, and the divine Spirit, transcending this humanity as such. Or, in other words, in the former view we should be dealing with a general formula for the moral conduct, in the latter with the empiric reality—and the two find their unity in the general idea of the spirit in contrast to the flesh.”

† Schmidt cannot agree with Holsten in holding this contrast to coincide with that between man and God, or in accounting the *σάρξ*, as sensuousness, necessarily evil. This thought is open to well-founded objection in view of the Old Testament Theism, which the Apostle has never renounced; and in fact, as Rom. v. 12 ff. shows, St. Paul seeks to explain the origin of sin in quite a different way. For the statement that “through one man sin has entered into the world” cannot without violence be resolved into the thought that in Adam’s transgression there had only come into actual reality, or into manifestation, the sinful principle immanent in man from the beginning; in that case we must either attribute to the *εἰσεῖσθαι* a meaning foreign to it in reality, or narrow the quite general notion of

ἁμαρτία without demonstrable warrant to the more special sense of παράβασις. For only of the latter could a historical entrance into the κόσμος be really affirmed; while the ἁμαρτία, conceived as principle, would have been originally existent in the κόσμος, and would simply have become manifest through the first transgression. Certainly, he says, the later theory of original sin is nowhere expressly developed by St. Paul; but this may serve merely to prove that the Apostle's thinking was directed not so much to the explanation of the origin of sin as to a psychological knowledge of its nature. Schmidt asks us to distinguish between the materiality of human nature viewed in itself and its empirical significance as an operative life-principle, the source and ground of all sinful conduct in the individual. St. Paul does not say—as Holsten affirms—that the σὰρξ itself is enmity against God, but that the φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός is so; and he distinguishes from that εἶναι ἐν σαρκί (Rom. viii. 8 f.), which coincides with the εἶναι κατὰ σάρκα (verse 5), another, which subsists along with the being governed by the principle of the Spirit (2 Cor. x. 3; Gal. ii. 20). This warrants the distinction between the flesh as operative principle and the flesh in itself, even as regards its quality of life (*Lebendigkeit*); and we shall no longer be able to say that it is essential to the latter to be a σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας. "It may be granted," he concludes,



“ that such a view as is here presented must from its nature always incline in some measure towards a completed dualism between spirit and sensuousness ; nevertheless we must adhere to the definite distinction of the two all the more, that the abstract consequences of a theory not seldom leave its author’s own thought far behind.”

The subject received fresh, and yet more minute and elaborate investigation at the hands of Dr. Hermann Lüdemann of Kiel, who published in 1872 an exhaustive treatise, entitled “ The Anthropology of the Apostle Paul and its place in his doctrinal system, exhibited on the basis of the four chief Epistles.” In the Preface he asks that his work may be viewed in its connection as a whole, and deprecates a partial reading or a hasty judgment of its contents. What he calls the “ Heuristic ” course of his inquiry—in which he, as it were, feels his way towards a solution through all sorts of exegetical and philosophical difficulties, questionings, and polemics—renders his book somewhat tortuous and cumbrous ; and it is no easy matter to draw forth his results from the controversial network in which he has enwrapped them, and to present them in such a way as to do justice to his views. Reserving a fuller abstract for the Appendix, I content myself with stating his chief positions under the headings which he has himself chosen.

Under the first head of "Physical Anthropology," Dr. Lüdemann starts from the division of human nature into an ἔξω ἄνθρωπος and an ἔσωθεν ἄνθρωπος found at 2 Cor. iv. 16 and Rom. vii. 22. To the former belong the σάρξ as the material substance of the earthly body, and the ψυχή as the life animating it. St. Paul uses σῶμα not as identical with σάρξ, but as denoting the form by the assumption of which the σάρξ constitutes the body, and as conveying the idea of unity in multiplicity—an organism. To the inner man belongs νοῦς, which denotes self-consciousness and the mental activities that we call "understanding" (*Verstand*) — a purely formal activity of the thinking mind operating on any given contents. Under this category comes also the καρδία, the seat of subjective feeling and susceptibility, which appears with St. Paul under various aspects akin to the variety of its use in the Old Testament. By many the νοῦς is assigned to the καρδία as its organ and classed under it; but it would rather seem as if the more indefinite Old Testament expression no longer sufficed for St. Paul, and the conception of the νοῦς grew up alongside of it and gained independent significance.

It has been pointed out by Fritzsche and Meyer that these expressions, "the outer and the inner man," were current in the Platonic schools; and it seems scarcely possible to avoid the admission that St. Paul

has appropriated language which he found in contemporary use. But this does not decide the question whether he employs it in the spirit of its authors. We have to consider the relations of the inner and outer man to each other; and this leads to an inquiry into the contrast of the *σάρξ* and the *πνεῦμα*. That contrast undeniably emerges at Gal. vi. 8, and still more clearly at 1 Cor. xv. 40-53 in the various attributes assigned to them. In Rom. viii. 9, 10 the *πνεῦμα* is more precisely defined as *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ* or *Χριστοῦ*. To its nature belong power and might. And there is assigned to it also an outward nature—a *δόξα*, or finer luminous matter pertaining to it, of which the *σώματα ἐπουράνια* consist. “The *πνεῦμα* is consequently expressive of a higher materiality—a circumstance by no means without importance for the understanding of St. Paul amidst his age.”

When we ask, What this contrast means? those, who on the basis of the Old Testament use of *πάντα σάρξ* and *πάντα ψυχή* for “mankind” identify the flesh with human nature, answer that it is essentially the contrast between man and God, while from Holsten we get the answer that it is the contrast of material and spiritual substance. The former represents the Jewish-religious point of view; the latter that of Hellenistic dualism. In examining Holsten’s position, Lüdemann enters into the ques-

tion, What constitutes dualism from a logical point of view; and after giving illustrations of its Hellenic forms from Plato and Philo, shows that there was nothing corresponding to it in the Jewish religious consciousness, which, with its conception of the supreme power and sovereignty of God, could not oppose to Him any coordinate principle or contrary opposite.<sup>1</sup> The Hebrew contrast of infinite and finite and the Hellenistic contrast of spirit and matter do not, and cannot, coincide. Holsten's view of the *σάρξ* is pronounced to be neither Jewish nor Hellenistic—not Jewish, for the Old Testament *basar* may never be taken so literally as to denote man as a *purely material unity*; not Hellenistic, for the Hellenistic category of *σάρξ* does not profess at all to denote the whole of human nature, but confines itself merely to the body, man's material element.

But, while Lüdemann cannot accept Holsten's view, he suggests that in the case of a Judaism brought but slightly into contact with Hellenism we may conceive of a third solution, under which Hellenistic dualism may have so penetrated into a consciousness at first purely Jewish, as within the framework of its Jewish conceptions to shape out a really *contrary* contrast, and so to give a dualistic

<sup>1</sup> The argument on this point will be found well summarised by Dr. Laidlaw in the Appendix to his valuable Cunningham Lecture on the Bible Doctrine of Man. Edin., 1879.

form to the religious contrast of the finite and infinite, along with which there would necessarily emerge also a dualistic element in the anthropology. This is what he conceives to have been the case with St. Paul. After adducing—as indications of an approach to the Hellenistic mode of conception—the privative character of the predicates at 1 Cór. xv. 34 ff., the carrying out of the contrast there through all its elements, the stress laid on the *differences of matter*, the passage Gal. v. 13-17, where  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  is represented as an independent principle actively opposed to  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ , and various instances of a restricted use not covering the whole man; and after showing that St. Paul's view is not to be identified either with the Platonising Hellenism of Philo, or with the standpoint of the Palestinian Jews, he comes to the conclusion that St. Paul does not, as Holsten holds, simply share the view of his time, but occupies a peculiar position ranging him on the side of Hellenism rather than on that of Judaism. While Paul keeps on Jewish ground in his use of  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ , he employs  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  sometimes in the wider Jewish sense as equivalent to "man," sometimes in the narrower Greek sense of the matter of man's body.

He next takes up the question, What is the subject-proper of the inner man?  $\text{No}\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$  and  $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$  are organs and functions rather than *parts* of the mind. According to St. Paul's way of conceiving

the matter, we must ask after a real subject of the inner man, which acts in and through these. And after discarding the  $\Psi\chi\acute{\eta}$ —which has been suggested for this purpose—as inadequate from its indissoluble connection with the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$ , he finds the substance of the  $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\omega \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$  in that  $\tau\acute{o} \pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha \tau\omicron\upsilon \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\upsilon$  which the Apostle brings forward clearly enough at 1 Cor. ii. 11. He takes exception to the view of Krumm, who makes the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  a faculty similar to Schleiermacher's "feeling" or "immediate self-consciousness," and to the view of Delitzsch, who coordinates it with  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  and  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$  into a psychological triad, and thereafter acutely criticises the suggestions of Holsten as to the relation of the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  to the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$ , and as to the alleged equivalence of the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha \tau\omicron\upsilon \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\upsilon$  in 1 Cor. ii. 11 to the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha \tau\omicron\upsilon \kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\upsilon$  of verse 12. He infers from 1 Cor. v. 5 :  $\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha \tau\acute{o} \pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha \sigma\omega\theta\eta\acute{\eta}$ , that it is not to be identified with the Divine  $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$ , for  $\acute{\alpha}\phi\theta\alpha\rho\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$  does not belong to it in virtue of its nature—if it needs to be saved, it *may* also *perish* ; nor yet is it to be associated as respects its nature with  $\phi\theta\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}$ —for it *may* be saved. Out of twenty-two passages that may be adduced as bearing on this question, eleven are, in his judgment, to be decidedly referred to the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ , and eleven to the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha \tau\omicron\upsilon \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\upsilon$ , which is the proper subject of human nature. To the question whether this  $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  belongs to the side of

the *σάρξ* or of the *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ*, he replies, in respect of its nature, to neither. It must *itself* be a substance capable of being variously affected and differently determined. Only on this supposition are we able to vindicate for man in St. Paul's system of thought a spiritual (*geistiges*) character, and yet withal (1) to leave the *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ*, an absolute spiritual substance, in its transcendence; (2) to take the *σάρξ*, in contradistinction from it, quite according to its literal sense as bodily matter; and (3) really to uphold the categories of *σῶμα, νοῦς, καρδία*, as forms for different contents not essentially bound to the *σάρξ*. Such an idea is directly required by the system, and if not given to us in it, would need to be hypothetically imported. It goes to constitute—with its human *πνεῦμα*, needing and capable of redemption, in a *σῶμα σαρκός*—an anthropology which is out and out dichotomous, and thereby no longer Jewish, but not yet dualistic, and so not Hellenic.

Dr. Lüdemann then passes to the ethical domain, where the conceptions *πνεῦμα* and *σάρξ* take upon them the marks of good and evil, the latter being closely associated with *ἁμαρτία*, which dwells in the flesh with a necessity of natural law, "the law of sin in the members" (Rom. vii. 21, 23, 25). The views of Ernesti, Müller, and Weiss (whom he recognises as a more formidable opponent) are subjected to review; and it is held that the *ἄνθρωπος σαρκικός*—the

saturation of human nature with the quality of the *σάρξ*—is the *actual* result of the operation of the spontaneous sin-principle, but not, as Holsten would have it, an *essential constituent* of the idea. The “inner man” is a domain simply *occupied* by sin, and to be taken from it again. Man determined by the “flesh” is *σαρκικός, ψυχικός*; and the notion “man” may be interchanged simply with “flesh,” although at times it may be open to doubt whether the predominant idea may be the Old Testament one of “passive weakness,” or the Hellenistic one of “sinful energy.” The idea of *ἁμαρτία* is to be understood not subjectively of a tendency of the human will, but objectively of a quality of man’s earthly nature. It does not signify either “sin” in our sense of the word, or “sinfulness” as the potential ground of sin, but corresponds most nearly to our idea of “evil.” The maintenance of the pure objectivity of *ἁμαρτία* is held to be the key to Rom. vii., and also to Rom. v. 12. The *νόμος* is, as it were, a wedge driven into the joints of human nature and breaking up the unity of the *ἄνθρωπος σαρκικός*. Man comes to know sin, so soon as it has through the *ἐντολή* come to consciousness, and by reaction against the commandment presented itself as *παράβασις*. The *νόμος* as *πνευματικός* possessed the power, and had the task, of awakening the *νοῦς*, estranging it from the *σάρξ* and filling it with



hatred of its bondage. But it could go no farther ; it was weak through the flesh ; and deliverance could only come by means of the divine πνεῦμα, which the human πνεῦμα was, in virtue of its neutral formal nature on the one hand, and of its belonging to the genus πνεῦμα on the other, capable of receiving.

How does this divine πνεῦμα enter into the development of man's history? By the vision at Damascus Paul was led to speculate on the person, death, resurrection, and existence in glory of Christ. In His mission a heavenly factor came into human history,—the pneumatic principle concentrated in a person, who had already as such pre-existed in heaven, with God, from the beginning of the ages. He is the immediate image of God (2 Cor. iv. 4), for, like God, he too is πνεῦμα (Rom. viii. 9, 10). This ἄνθρωπος ἐπουράνιος, being in virtue of his essential equality with God the υἱὸς Θεοῦ (Gal. ii. 20 *al.*), organ of the creation for God (1 Cor. viii. 6), who had taken part in the gracious guidance of Israel (1 Cor. x. 1), came from heaven to become "man" and introduce the new epoch of the πνευματικόν. He had a σῶμα σαρκός with its accompaniment the ψυχή, but instead of the πνεῦμα ἀνθρώπου extant in other men, the πνεῦμα Θεοῦ formed the proper subject of His personality. With the flesh of Christ was associated ἁμαρτία as an objective quality of the flesh-substance ; but it encountered in the πνεῦμα Θεοῦ

a principle which was a match for it, and during His earthly life, as it were, paralysed it. 'Ομοίωμα (Rom. viii. 3) means a "copy" or "imitation" (*Nachbildung*). The blow which was to light on the σάρξ, and, by fatally striking it at one point of the complex unity to paralyse it in all, would have fallen *beside* the mark, if Christ had not had a real and true σάρξ ἁμαρτίας. The great object of His death was to cancel the ἁμαρτία in and with the σάρξ, and so to liberate the νοῦς. The continued existence of the πνεῦμα enclosed in the σάρξ so cancelled, and its victory over the latter, were made manifest by the *Resurrection*, which is fundamentally important as the necessary correlate to Christ's death. The objective result of Christ's death takes effect in the individual human subject by baptism, in which the union of the baptized with Christ is so close as hardly to fall short of a real identification. What has taken place in Christ is *eo ipso* accomplished in the baptized. The old man partakes in the crucifixion, and the σῶμα ἁμαρτίας is done away. By baptism we become one with Christ as the πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν, which accordingly enters into believers and supplies them with the ἄγεσθαι—the impulse needed for the new life. The indwelling πνεῦμα is now the element "in which" all takes place; man is πνευματικός and therewith δίκαιος, ἅγιος; and the more precise result is specified at Rom. viii. 10, where τὸ σῶμα

*νεκρόν* is taken to indicate the putting to death of the *σάρξ*, for *σῶμα* stands here as including the latter; and *τὸ πνεῦμα ζωή* indicates the putting of life into the *πνεῦμα ἀνθρώπου*, which is conceived to be here meant, partly because of the hypothetical character of the predicate *ζωή*, partly because of the correlative *σῶμα*.

The effect of the immanence of the divine in the human *πνεῦμα* is a gradual elevation of the powers of the latter, which, although held by faith as already accomplished, is but slowly realised. The position of the *σάρξ* as continuing to subsist in the *πνευματικός* can only be regarded in the light of an "interim arrangement" pending the approach of the Parousia. The *σῶμα* becomes capable of emancipation from the *σάρξ*, the matter of which it still in this life shares, and of serving as an instrument for the divine Spirit (1 Cor. vi. 13-19); and its *ἀπολύτρωσις* is completed when the earthly body has been taken away and the spiritual body bestowed. Paul knows no resurrection of the flesh or of the unredeemed; nor does he use the verb *ἀναστῆναι*. While the *σῶμα* of the redeemed is at the resurrection emptied of its *σάρξ*-substance and filled with the *πνεῦμα*-substance, the *σάρξ* is *φθορά* and abides in death. "The dualism is cancelled not by conciliation of its parts, but by violent destruction of the principle that succumbs."

In the third part, which treats of the place of anthropology in the doctrine of salvation, Dr. Lüdemann sets himself to discuss specially the problem presented in the first eight chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, where he finds that the first four chapters rest on an anthropological basis, and embody ideas altogether different from those which we encounter in the sequel from ch. v. 2 (where the transition from the one to the other is held to begin) to the end of ch. viii. He compares and contrasts the two courses of thought which are here brought into juxtaposition, the religious or subjective-ideal, and the ethical or objectively-real one. Going back upon the earlier Epistles, he finds the idea of the  $\sigma\rho\xi$  turned to ethical and pneumatic account in the Epistle to the Galatians, and doctrinally elaborated on its physical side in the Epistles to the Corinthians; while in the Epistle to the Romans the physical and ethical elements are put together, but in such a way that, if we give full effect to the leading principle of either line of thought, we shall find it incompatible with the maintenance of the other. It is maintained, therefore, that the earlier section of the Epistle which works out the notion of ideal or imputed righteousness, represents a view which is no longer St. Paul's own. He places himself intentionally at the standpoint of the Jewish consciousness, which he desired to win over; and the

argument of the first four chapters is merely intended as preliminary to the exhibition of his own view, which is really introduced at v. 2; "through whom," namely Jesus Christ, "also we have had our access by faith into this grace, wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God." The *καί*, which introduces something new, the perfect *ἔσχήκαμεν*, and the presents *ἔστίκαμεν* and *καυχώμεθα* show that Paul closes the juridical course of thought with v. 1, and makes the transition at verse 2 to the real. Faith and the juridical righteousness acquired by it simply *procure access* to *the* grace, whereby we become partakers of the real new creation, whose end is the glory of God. The Apostle's own definitive view of salvation is to be found in chapters vi.-viii., to which ch. v. gradually leads over. The elements of Christ's vicarious satisfaction and justification by faith, which are often regarded as the very Palladium of Paulinism, are but the Propylaea through which the Christian coming from Judaism must have his "access" to the real saving blessings of the gospel; and in the four chief Epistles what we have is not any self-consistent doctrine, but the stages of a process of thought going forward in the Apostle's mind amidst his incessant conflicts with Judaism.

In 1873 Dr. Otto Pfliegerer, now a distinguished professor of Theology at Berlin, published his treatise

entitled "Paulinism," which has been translated into English by Mr. Edward Peters. This monograph forms beyond doubt the most thorough exposition of the Pauline doctrine dealt with by itself. It is marked by great clearness and vigour of grasp, but it is unhappily vitiated—from the standpoint of a purely Biblical Theology—by its pervading tendency to recast the Apostle's thoughts in the mould of a modern philosophical terminology sufficiently alien from them.

Dr. Pfleiderer, in his discussion of "the flesh," starts from Rom. vii. 18: "I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth nothing good," as proving (1) that the flesh is not sin itself, and (2) that the flesh is not *the whole man*. The flesh is that side of man, which stands in contrast to the "inner man," and which with the members forms the seat of sin. The relation between *σάρξ* and *σῶμα*, which are interchanged promiscuously as materially identical, is this: The *σάρξ* is the *matter of the (earthly) body*, but the body is *the organised form*, in which *this matter exists as a concrete earthly individual*. So far as the body has flesh for its substance, it may share the predicates of the flesh, and may be designated as the body of sin and death; so far as it is the organ of an Ego destined to be governed by spirit, it may be the temple of the Holy Spirit. The sense of the "flesh" as (animated) matter is most obvious in many passages, where Paul expresses incidents,

states, relations of the bodily life by the adjective "fleshly" or by the substantive with a preposition. Further, the animated matter of the body is but part of the general matter which forms the substance of the earthly world, and has the character of what is sensuously visible, and thereby weak, perishable, and null (2 Cor. iv. 18: τὰ βλεπόμενα πρόσκαιρα). Thus the conception of σάρξ becomes enlarged so as to embrace all that is "worldly" in contrast to what is supersensible, eternal, divine (τὰ σαρκικά, Rom. xv. 27; οἱ κατὰ σάρκα κύριοι, σοφία σαρκική, and the like). In such cases as these there is nothing beyond the usual Hebrew conception, as implying non-spiritual, but not necessarily anti-spiritual, weak, but not positively bad, material substance. So St. Paul uses flesh of "man" generally. But it was withal already of itself natural (*es lag nun doch schon an sich nahe*) to raise the impurity and corruptibleness of the flesh (1 Cor. xv. 50) into sinfulness proper, as the two ideas coincide in expressing something displeasing to God, repugnant to His holy nature. In reality the Old Testament has already taken this further step in various passages that refer the sinfulness of man to his fleshly origin and fleshly nature (Ps. li. 7; ciii. 10, comp. 14 ff; Is. xlvi. 8, and especially numerous passages in Job); and it suggested itself the more readily to St. Paul, as with him the Messianic πνεῦμα had become converted from a

principle of transcendent physical life into a principle of morally good life. Its opposite, the *σάρξ*, must also have a moral spontaneity, which can of course only be evil. Thus from being mere non-spiritual substance it became an anti-spiritual causality, from its mere passive mortality it became an active striving (*trachten*) after death or working death (*τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός*, Rom. viii. 5). And, when this change has taken place, its peculiar activity can only consist in an *ἐπιθυμῆν κατὰ πνεύματος*, the result of which cannot but be of a sinful nature. Thus (*so wird*) the *contrast of physically different substances*, as presented in 1 Cor. xv., becomes the *dualism of morally conflicting principles* (Gal. v. 17). In reference to the more spiritual sins embraced in Gal. v. 19-21, it is laid down as a cardinal point for the understanding of the Pauline anthropology, that, when the matter, which the flesh from the outset and always is, becomes converted from a mere non-spiritual substance into a principle antagonistic to spirit, its activity no longer remains restricted to the sphere of the sensuous body, but seizes on the whole man, so that he becomes a *σαρκικός ἄνθρωπος*—not merely having the *σάρξ* as his physical basis, but having the *ἐπιθυμῆν* peculiar to the *σάρξ* as the law of his life. The *σαρκικός* accordingly is in his whole personal life antagonistic to spirit and God; and he is so by nature just because he is *σάρκινος*;



in his being physically flesh lies the inevitable ground of his moral fleshliness (*σαρκικὸν εἶναι*). The relation of the two ideas is clear from Rom. vii. 14; 1 Cor. iii. 1-3.

Pfleiderer defines the *ἐπιθυμεῖν* as at bottom nothing else than the *nature-will directed to the finite natural self-life* (*Eigenleben*), manifesting itself partly as sensuous, partly as selfish, with only this difference, that St. Paul makes the subject of this nature-will to be the animated matter of the body, while modern psychology makes it the individual (psychic) spirit inhabiting the body—a distinction pronounced not to be of essential moment for the practical side of the case. He objects to the view of Ernesti, Schmidt, and Biedermann—who make the idea that of the passiveness of spirit overagainst matter, or the tendency to be determined by what is material—as incompatible with such phrases as *κατὰ σάρκα εἶναι*, which would in that case be a pleonasm, *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός*, and the like; and he objects also to the view which resolves it into human nature determined by sense or the world, as incompatible with Paul's distinction between the Ego and the flesh, with the interchange of *ἐν τῇ σάρκι*, verse 18, and *ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν*, verse 23, as well as with the reference to the *σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου* and to the *πράξεις τοῦ σώματος* at viii. 13.

The undeniable consequence of this view—and the chief reason why it meets with so much opposi-

tion—is that it makes sin inevitable and mankind naturally sinful. We escape this result certainly, if we hold that the ground of sin is not matter in itself, but merely the self-surrender of the Ego to it, or empiric human nature in so far as in its case spirit allows itself to be determined by matter. But this is not at all St. Paul's opinion; it is the very opposite of his. For the cardinal point of the whole of Rom. vii. is just this, that all personal sinning is preceded by an impersonal sin-principle lying in human nature and, as ultimate ground, infallibly producing all sinful manifestations. According to verse 7 ff. sin is already in man, before the law comes to him and brings it to consciousness; at the bottom of conscious sinning lies an unconscious *ἀμαρτία* as purely objective power, which being dead, that is, latently and potentially existent, is awakened (*ἀνέζησεν*) on occasion of the law, that is, comes to consciousness; whereupon the Ego may ideally distinguish itself from the sin dwelling in it and from the flesh as its principle and seat, and may then also really turn with its personal will to the law, but only in inward reactions, which have not the power of practically vanquishing sin in the members. This view, he asserts, has the merit not only of simplicity but of adhering to the radical signification of the word. The context must decide the meaning in such cases; in various passages the moral seems to blend

almost indistinguishably with the physical sense, as in the "fleshly wisdom" of the Corinthian Epistles.

In the notion of the *σάρξ* thus defined sin appears—as at Rom. v. 12—an original, objective, necessary element presupposed *a priori* to the will of the individual. The difference between that passage and the *σάρξ*-doctrine is, that in the former the origin of this general principle is found historically in the first sin of Adam, and in the latter psychologically in the nature of man or matter of his body. It has often been attempted to make the sinful quality (*Beschaffenheit*) of the flesh appear a consequence of Adam's sin, whereby human nature became altered. But with St. Paul there is no trace of such a doctrine. If the *σάρξ* is by its nature and from the beginning the principle of sin, we are here certainly brought face to face with an antinomy, the deeper resolution of which does not pertain to exegesis.

But, while St. Paul regards man as by virtue of his flesh-nature essentially sinful, it is not his opinion that man is merely sinful, with no better power belonging to his nature. Holsten's view, which makes the *σάρξ* the whole man and the latter as "in his substantial nature *ἀμαρτία*," is an exaggeration of a Manichæo-Flacian character, decidedly un-Pauline. Rom. vii. distinguishes from the *σάρξ* an essentially other part of man, the *ἔσω*

ἄνθρωπος or νοῦς—an idea most akin to our “reason” (*Vernunft*) theoretical and practical. It is not substance, like πνεῦμα, but faculty, formal capacity of the Ego to exert itself in thinking and willing. Formally it may take up opposite contents. But according to St. Paul it is no mere empty mental form, indifferent towards that contents; on the contrary it has the νόμος Θεοῦ dwelling in it, and has it not simply as an object of consciousness, but as its own immanent impulse towards the good (νόμος τοῦ νοός μου, vii. 23), which contends with the sin-impulse in the members, and that so successfully that the Ego at last internally turns with assent and sympathy towards the law of God. This not inoperative element akin to God in the νοῦς is what becomes manifest even in the heathen as the consciousness of God (the νοεῖν, discerning God in creation, Rom. i. 20) and as the law of conscience (Rom. ii. 14 f.); and constitutes in man an element of preparation for his Christian redemption. St. Paul in his estimate of man’s religious and moral nature is thus equally remote from a Pelagian overvaluing and from an Augustinian undervaluing of it.

The question, whether the natural man has a πνεῦμα, is regarded as concerning only the Apostle’s general Jewish-vulgar, and not his distinctively Christian, anthropology. It is to be answered roundly in the affirmative, on the ground of various passages

quite unambiguous (such as 1 Cor. ii. 11 ; v. 4 ; vi. 20 ; vii. 34 ; Rom. viii. 16). These passages also give us significant hints as to its nature. It is specifically distinguished from the divine *πνεῦμα*, as it needs comfort and rest (2 Cor. ii. 12 ; vii. 13) ; it may be defiled and require purification (2 Cor. vii. 1) ; it is assumed that it needs to be sanctified and preserved (1 Thess. v. 23) ; and the possibility of its not being saved is plainly implied (in 1 Cor. v. 5). It is thus marked off from the specifically Christian *πνεῦμα*, which cannot be exposed to those affections, and from the anti-pneumatic *σάρξ*, which must fall a prey to *φθώρα*. The natural *πνεῦμα* thus holds between those two opposite principles a place of indifference in the middle ; as the neutral substratum of the personal life, having as little in common with the supernatural *πνεῦμα* given in baptism, as the general *life-spirit*, animating all creatures and man according to the Old Testament view, has with the supernatural *spirit of revelation* coming at times on the prophets. And just as that life-spirit is essentially identical with the *soul*, in the New Testament usage—to which St. Paul in this forms no exception—the (natural) *πνεῦμα* is substantially nothing else than the *ψύχη* (comp. their juxtaposition at Luke i. 46f. where the parallel makes clear their identity). The higher side of man in affinity with God is not his *πνεῦμα*, but his *νοῦς*. If the question be asked

how it is possible to assume in man such a faculty akin to God as the *νοῦς*, if its substratum, the subject of the personal life, is only such an indifferent *πνεῦμα* as has been described, Dr. Pfeiderer answers that a solution of this question may not at all be expected from St. Paul, with whom, obviously, such purely anthropological questions lay quite out of his way (*ganz fern lagen*), and who accordingly in this case simply followed throughout the popular unreflecting (*unreflektirten*) mode of conception of those around him; and adds that exegesis has to content itself with indicating this difficulty, which has an existence only from our point of view.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pfeiderer, *Paulinismus*, pp. 47-68. He adds, in a note, that of the two alternatives required by our logical consistency of thought—either that, because of the indifferent human *πνεῦμα*, we should deny to man any higher God-related element, or that, because of the God-related element present in the *νοῦς*, we should ascribe to the *πνεῦμα* therein manifesting itself a character at least potentially Christian—the former, defended by Holsten, is decidedly opposed to the Pauline doctrine of the *νοῦς*, and presents a Flacian exaggeration of his doctrine of sin; and the latter, which he himself had formerly supported (in a paper published in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift*, 1871, 2nd part), is, in its mode of starting from the basis of the *νοῦς* to make the natural *πνεῦμα* a potential form of the divine-Christian, not accordant with the immediate form of the Pauline teaching, and a reflection of modern rather than of ancient thought. He accordingly pronounces that earlier disquisition a dogmatic attempt to solve with categories of modern thought a difficulty, which exegesis has simply to indicate as such and to leave alone.

With respect to the divine *πνεῦμα* Pfleiderer<sup>1</sup> represents St. Paul as having set out from the traditional conception of the Messianic *πνεῦμα* received by the Christian in baptism. Under this the Christian Church understood substantially nothing else than the Old Testament prophetic spirit of revelation, which Joel had predicted as to be generally diffused in the last time, and which was conceived as supra-sensuous substance of the higher divine world, that had come upon men (by outpouring), and produced in them supernatural gifts and effects of a miraculous kind. St. Paul set out from this; but it was not the only or the essential element in the Christian *πνεῦμα*, which was for him the constantly operative principle of the whole Christian life. That the Pauline *πνεῦμα* was conceived in itself as a transcendent-physical essence, is regarded as proved by the antitheses at 1 Cor. xv. 42-50. It can only be termed relatively immaterial, in so far as it has not earthy and sensuous, but heavenly and supra-sensuous matter; hence its close affinity with the air, and with light, whose brightness (*δόξα*) is to be regarded as its standing form of manifestation. This supra-sensuous substance belongs originally to God and, moreover, to his Son Christ, as constituting their divine nature; but it does not form a separate (*besondere*) personality by the side of the

<sup>1</sup> Paulinismus, pp. 179-214.

two.<sup>1</sup> No doubt the Spirit often appears as an acting subject with consciousness and will; He distributes gifts as He will (1 Cor. xii. 11), searches the depths of the Godhead (Cor. ii. 10), is our intercessor before God (Rom. viii. 26), and bears witness to our spirit (Rom. viii. 16). But though it may be conceded that this personification is more than a verbal one, that it has a place in the very conception of the Apostle, this is still far removed from the definite thought of a Person distinct from God and Christ.<sup>2</sup> As a concrete hypostasis, the divine *πνεῦμα* subsists (excepting in God himself) only in the exalted Christ, for *ὁ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμα ἐστίν* (2 Cor. iii. 17).

In all these definitions, so far as they concern the nature of the *πνεῦμα* in itself, there is nothing peculiar to St. Paul. But the transition to his distinctive doctrine of the *πνεῦμα* is found in his fundamental view of faith and baptism as a real union with the crucified and risen Christ, as it is set forth in Rom. vi. If faith, completing itself in baptism, is a self-surrender of man to the dead and risen Christ so as to belong to Him and to have close fellowship of life with Him, and if this risen Christ is substantially heavenly *πνεῦμα*, it is a simple

<sup>1</sup> Not, as in the English translation: "a separate personality in each of them."

<sup>2</sup> Not, as in the English translation: "a separate personality of God and of Christ."



inference that the Christian thus obtains a share in the heavenly *πνεῦμα* through faith and baptism; and as this *πνεῦμα* in Christ is the person-forming principle of life, so must it necessarily also become in the Christian — who *κολλώμενος τῷ Κυρίῳ ἐν πνεύμᾳ ἐστίν* (1 Cor. vi. 17)—the not less constantly immanent principle of the new personal life, of the *καινὸς ἄνθρωπος*. Accordingly we have to explain the peculiarly Pauline doctrine of the *πνεῦμα* from the *confluence of two sources*—on the one hand, the *traditional doctrine* that in *baptism* there is obtained the (wonder-working) Messianic *πνεῦμα*; and on the other hand, the *originally Pauline doctrine of faith* as the heart's act of trustful-loving union with Christ; from the former came the dogmatic form, from the latter the religious-moral contents. How much more readily the second mode of view suggested itself to the Apostle, and was for him more essential than the first, may be inferred from the fact that he places the reception of the Spirit thrice in direct connection with faith (Gal. iii. 2, 5, 14), but brings it into relation with baptism only by a single, and that an indirect, hint (1 Cor. xii. 13 : *ἐν ἐνὶ πνεύματι ἡμεῖς εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν*). On the basis of this state of matters we are doubtless entitled to assume that Paul on his part accepted the traditional doctrine of the reception of the Spirit in baptism, but we must beware of assigning to this

point so central a significance for the Pauline soteriology, as is usually done, when baptism as the communication of the Spirit is placed alongside of justification by faith quite as a second saving principle. Had this been the Apostle's meaning, he must have expressed it, and must have made the reception of the Spirit as dependent on baptism as he makes justification and adoption dependent on faith.

As to the question of the relation of the Christian *πνεῦμα* to the natural *πνεῦμα* of man, Dr. Pfeiderer first notices the passages which seem to point to their co-existence and operation alongside of, or in, each other, and those on the other hand which do not suggest, or do not admit, such a distinction; and comes to the conclusion that, according to the mind of the Apostle, the divine *πνεῦμα* and the naturally human *πνεῦμα* unite in the Christian to form the unity of a *new subject*, of a *καινὸς* or *πνευματικὸς ἄνθρωπος*. Yet this union is not one absolutely complete from the beginning, but one always in course of formation merely (*nur werdende*) and consequently still in part non-existent; whence the two substances are still in another respect twofold, and are related to one another as the active and giving to the passive and receiving.

## III.

## CRITICISM OF METHODS.

THE works to which we have called attention are marked by no small skill in the combining and interpreting of the facts; and the reader who peruses any one of them will be apt at first sight to carry away the impression of an argument as successful as it is ingenious and elaborate. But a more careful examination of their methods, and a comparison of their several results, will do much to dispel the illusion.

There are two points as to which they seem agreed, namely, in the quest of a fundamental meaning to which the Apostle's varied use of  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  may be referred, and in the disposition to trace in that use a certain influence of Hellenistic philosophy. But, though they start from common ground, they reach very diverse and even opposite conclusions.

While they are not quite at one even as to the basis of the idea, they differ widely in their views as to the relation of the Jewish and Hellenic elements that are conceived to have moulded the Apostle's

thought. Baur points to an apparently indirect influence of ancient Greek philosophic ideas (p. 144). Holsten finds directly and throughout the speculative categories of Hellenism. Schmidt regards the Hellenic modes of thought as materially modified in their direction and application by the Apostle's Old Testament training. Lüdemann discovers the two lines of thought running side by side, the Apostle expressing himself sometimes in terms of the one, sometimes in terms of the other, without any attempt to combine or to reconcile them. Pfeleiderer contrives a bridge of his own to facilitate the Apostle's passing from the one to the other.

Not less divergent are their anthropological conclusions. With Baur the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is almost merged in the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$ , but is "at all events non-material, and so far pneumatic in the widest sense of the term"; the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  is its spiritual element. With Holsten not only the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ , but also the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  and  $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$  belong to the side of the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$ . With Lüdemann the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$  and  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  go to form the outer, the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  and  $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$  to constitute the inner, man. As to the human  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$  Baur holds that although spoken of, it has no real significance. Holsten cannot recognise it as an element of man at all. Lüdemann holds it to be the indifferent subject of personal life, the substance of the inner man. Pfeleiderer affirms it to be in substance

equivalent to  $\psi\chi\eta$ , the higher principle being in his view the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ . Schmidt resolves it into the general notion of "spirit," and leaves it without more precise definition.

It need not surprise us, if under such circumstances each writer, who advances his own solution of the problem with considerable confidence and, in some cases, strength of self-assertion, should not be at all disposed to acquiesce in the validity of the conclusions arrived at by the others. And it may be well, before we proceed, just to note a few of the judgments thus passed by one on another, and to observe how each paves the way for his own structure by more or less demolishing those of his predecessors. Dr. Baur<sup>1</sup> had affirmed—and not unreasonably, as we shall see by and by—that in place of his own simple concrete view (viz. that  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  is just the body) Holsten "has put abstract definitions, which, however correct, take already for granted the fundamental assumptions on which they rest." Holsten retaliates by asserting that Baur's "definition of the idea is erroneous," that he has "confounded  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  and  $\tau\omicron\delta\ \sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \sigma\alpha\rho\acute{\kappa}\omicron\varsigma$ ," and that, while accepting individual points from Holsten's investigation, he has ignored, set aside, or rejected what Holsten himself considers his "decisive re-

<sup>1</sup>Theologisches Literaturblatt, 1857, No. 42, as quoted by Holsten at p. 369.

sults" as to the categories of matter, substance, and the finite. Schmidt, besides effectually showing the utterly forced and unnatural character of the exegesis applied by Holsten to the passages where a human *πνεῦμα* seems referred to, declares himself at variance with Holsten's leading conclusions as to the contrast of flesh and spirit being convertible into that of finite and infinite, as to the identification of *σάρξ* with evil, and as to the introduction of the doctrine of objective *ἀμαρτία* at Rom. v. 12. Lüdemann refuses in numerous instances to accept Holsten's interpretations, and has conclusively proved that no such dualism as Holsten posits is chargeable against St. Paul, and that Holsten's own "Jewish-Hellenistic" view is neither Jewish nor Hellenistic. Pfeiderer repudiates Holsten's cardinal doctrine of the *σάρξ* embracing the whole man as a "decidedly un-Pauline, Manichæo-Flacian exaggeration."

As regards Schmidt, Lüdemann pronounces his main view—which reduces the Apostle's doctrine of redemption to annihilation of the *σάρξ*—as "artificial, scholastic, and utterly void of inner consistency";<sup>1</sup> and Pfeiderer says of his position as to Rom. viii. 3 that, "ignoring (under pretext of being scientific!) the Pauline mysticism of faith, it cuts through the religious roots of the Pauline soteriology, and ulti-

<sup>1</sup> *Anthropologie des Apostel Paulus*, p. 123, note.

mately retains a mere dry scholastic theorem, leaving it inexplicable how such a thought should ever have made an impression on religious humanity.”<sup>1</sup> And—*mutato nomine de te fabula narratur*—Lüdemann himself is destined to experience similar treatment at the hands of Pfeleiderer, who says of his singular attempt to make out the standpoint of Rom. i.—iv. as incompatible with that of Rom. vi.—viii.: “This opinion of Lüdemann I can only hold to be a fantastic blunder (*einen wunderlichen Fehlgriff*),” and in opposition to it lays down thus clearly the true state of the case: “The view given in the second portion (of the Epistle, vi.—viii.) is simply introduced *in addition to*, and *not instead of*, the first; and it is far from being brought in, as if here and now the earlier doctrine of the righteousness of faith were to be annulled, and a bran-new doctrine of moral righteousness were to be substituted for it. On the contrary, the real *πνεῦμα*-righteousness and the ideal righteousness of faith stand in the position of a new religious relation to God and a new moral life, neither of which can take the place of the other, but which are necessarily required as reciprocally complementary, and that, moreover, in such a way that the religious idea always remains the foundation and—for the Apostle, as for the religious point of view at all times—the main thing.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Paulinismus, p. 113, note.

<sup>2</sup> Paulinismus, p. 210, note.

It is obvious that theories, which issue in results so incongruous and conflicting, cannot together or equally present to us the thought of St. Paul. And, when we consider their bearing on the character and teaching of the Apostle, we can hardly regard them as carrying antecedent probability or as otherwise than on the face of them open to grave suspicion. Is it at all feasible, for example, to suppose that one, whose whole later life turned on the fact of redemption and was spent in the effort to persuade men to receive it, should have based his teaching on positions that, logically applied, *preclude its possibility?* on the positions, that *ἀμαρτία* is of itself essential to the *σάρξ*, and that *finitum non est capax infiniti*—which would seem to postulate in the strictest sense a new creation? If man is nothing but *σάρξ*, and Christ came to do away with the *σάρξ*, what is left to be redeemed or to lay hold of redemption? This is the natural question that arises for one who consistently follows out Holsten's theory. In point of fact, Holsten is not thus consistent; sometimes man is identified by him with the "flesh"; sometimes he is spoken of as a subject distinguishable from it. Lüdemann well asks, "But what is *man*, in Holsten's view, apart from the flesh?" Holsten has, at least, no right to insist that St. Paul shall be involved in the inconsistencies of his expositor.



Can anyone, again, think it likely that St. Paul knew so little what he meant to say as frequently to use *πνεῦμα* in a more general sense, to which no definite idea can be attached, or to leave it in many cases uncertain whether he was speaking from an abstract ideal point of view of the contrast between the material body and the immaterial life-spirit of man, or from an empirico-real point of view of the contrast between the flesh that conditions the character of existing humanity, and the divine Spirit transcending it? Can we suppose the Apostle to have taken refuge in the indefiniteness which Schmidt would impute to him? Turning to the choice that Lüdemann gives us, is it conceivable that the mind of the Apostle should have oscillated, as it is alleged to have done, between the wider Jewish and the narrower Hellenic use of *σάρξ*? that it should have passed under the domination now of the one, now of the other? and that the alternating currents should have succeeded each other so rapidly as to be repeatedly reflected—to the perplexity of the expositor—in the course of a single letter? Has Dr. Lüdemann persuaded any one else than himself of the possibility—to say nothing of the probability—of the explanation which he gives of the structure of the Epistle to the Romans? Lastly, coming to Pfeiderer, apart from all else, can we deem it at all likely that the Apostle

should have given an historical explanation of the origin of sin in Rom. v. and a psychological explanation of its origin in chapter vii., which constitute a formal contradiction, without being aware of, or concerning himself about, the “unreconciled antinomy”? One is tempted, in presence of such a suggestion, to apply the pointed remark of Holsten, in reference to a similar “unresolved antinomy” to which Baur has recourse: “To assume really an antinomy at the very centre of religious thought (*der Weltanschauung*) in the case of a mind like St. Paul’s is simply a proof of our being ourselves in error.”<sup>1</sup>

Above all, the supposition, which more or less underlies all these theoretical constructions of the Apostle’s doctrine—that it contains elements or reflects influences of Greek philosophy—is, in view of what we otherwise know of him, I shall not say, utterly incredible—for there can be no doubt of his having had some measure of Greek culture, and “he who became all things to all men that he might gain some,” might possibly find in it elements which he could, consistently with his “being under the law to Christ,” turn to account for his ends—but is at any rate in the last degree improbable. Can it be thought a likely thing that one, who was constantly placing his aims and his methods in direct contrast to those of the world’s wisdom,

<sup>1</sup> *Zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus*, p. 442.

should array himself in its clothing, borrow its ideas, or imitate its language? If he did not pour contempt on all its pride, he denounced it as folly, when put into the balance with that higher wisdom which he was commissioned to impart.

We do not lay stress merely on the emphatic assertion of the Apostle that he determined "to know nothing save Jesus Christ and Him crucified," or his disclaimer of glorying save in the cross of Christ, though it is difficult to conceive language of stronger or more unqualified negation. Nor do we think it necessary to adduce the vehement denunciations of misleading and unhealthful teaching in the Pastoral Epistles, or the special warnings directed against philosophy associated with vain deceit in the Epistle to the Colossians—however forcibly they are expressed, and however powerfully they may seem to tell in favour of our argument—partly because they may be taken to point to some special and abnormal condition of the period or church referred to, and partly because I am aware that most of those with whom we are dealing would not grant the validity of an appeal to works, in their judgment, of doubtful genuineness.

Let us take the First Epistle to the Corinthians, where it is admitted on all hands that the recurring expressions, "wisdom of words" (i. 17), "wisdom of the world" (i. 21), "wise after the flesh" (i. 26), "man's wisdom" (ii. 13), "wisdom of this world"

(iii. 19), " reasonings of the wise " (iii. 20), which are of the most general character and unrestricted in reference, can only point to the philosophy, dialectic, and rhetoric of the current Greek schools. Can it be thought that the Apostle, who declared that " God chose the foolish things of the world, to put to shame them that are wise," that he himself " came not with excellency of speech or wisdom," that the wisdom spoken by him among the full-grown was " a wisdom not of this world, nor of the rulers of this world"; that he who issued the solemn warning: " Let no man deceive himself; if any man thinketh that he is wise among you in this world, let him become a fool that he may become wise: for the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God," would betake himself to the world's wisdom which he had thus pronounced incompatible with the simplicity of the gospel? His words seem to indicate not a mere abstinence for local or temporary reasons from a course otherwise or elsewhere admissible, but a fundamental antagonism resting on the belief that the " faith " of the church should not stand in the " wisdom of men but in the power of God," and that by a resort to those expedients of fleshly wisdom the " cross of Christ would be made void."

In the face of such explicit statements as to the principles that guided him as a wise master

builder, who felt himself entitled to bid others take heed how they built on the one foundation and pointed them to the fiery trial awaiting each man's work, how can we suppose him to have nevertheless drawn his thoughts from, and moulded his language on, Hellenic philosophy? Are we to assume that, while he was assuring his readers that he had "renounced the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness nor handling the word of God deceitfully," he was consciously sitting as a partial disciple at the feet of the very men whose reasonings he had just pronounced to be, in the language of Scripture, vain? Or are we to conceive of the matter, as if he had become a philosopher, so to speak, in spite of himself, and had cast his ideas into a philosophic mould without knowing it or meaning it? The former alternative is incredible on ethical grounds; the latter can hardly be deemed possible in the case of the clear and penetrating intellect that asks: "Who among men knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of the man, which is in him?" We prefer to accept St. Paul's own assurance that he had not received the spirit of the world, and that he did not speak in words taught to him by man's wisdom.

But, if we are thus compelled by a due regard to St. Paul's own language to hold such an influence of Greek philosophy, as is assumed, to be either ex-

cluded or reduced to an indirect and unconscious minimum, we may fairly demur to the relevancy, at least in the first instance, of the categories and methods of philosophy as guides to the apprehension of his meaning.

And this brings us to the first objection which we are disposed to take to the method of the works before us. With considerable difference of degree certainly, but all of them to some extent, they import into their exegesis the canons, processes, and nomenclature of philosophy. It is no part of our present purpose to inquire what are the relations that ought to subsist between philosophy and theology; nor shall we presume to take exception to an application of philosophical categories and methods to the *results* of exegesis, if those who so apply them are persuaded that they can thereby understand the results better, or explain them more clearly. Let exegesis fulfil its function and complete its task; and let the product then be handed over to whom it may concern. What we here take exception to is not the separate and independent handling of theological topics by appropriate philosophical methods, but the intermingling of the philosophical and exegetical processes, to the confusion and detriment of both. It is difficult in such a case to determine how much belongs to the one factor, and how much to the other; how far the

theory is the outcome of pure and unbiassed interpretation ; how far the exegesis on the other hand may have been moulded and warped by the exigencies of the preconceived theory. The risk of this confusion is especially great when, as in several of the works before us, the writer attempts to engraft on his exposition of the facts an explanation of their genesis. If we come with our ready-made categories of system, we shall be but too apt to find what we expect, and to make the facts fit into them, or to pronounce it so much the worse for the facts.

Of the latter we meet a very striking illustration furnished by Holsten. His theory requires him throughout to interpret *πνεῦμα* of the divine Spirit, and, on finding it impossible to attach that sense to it in 2 Cor. vii. 1 without assuming the divine Spirit to be capable of defilement, he has no scruple in suggesting that the passage should be set aside as a spurious addition to the text, although there is not the slightest vestige of other ground for impeaching its genuineness. As St. Paul himself does not make use of the terms "matter," or "substance," or "the finite,"—although, had he wished to do so, he could easily have found the needful words—it may well be conceived that the terms which he does employ do not lend themselves very readily to the scientific fetters imposed on them ; and the con-

sequence is that the categories, to which they are referred with an affectation of great precision, exhibit under the exigencies of practical manipulation a wonderful elasticity. We are told ever so often that the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  is nothing but the body, the material body; but soon we find the admission extorted by the necessities of exegesis that the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  is equivalent to, if not synonymous with, "man." Nothing can exceed the iteration with which we are assured that the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  is throughout the matter or substance of the earthly body; but we have not proceeded far before we find it filled with life, instinct with emotion, putting forth energies of desire and thought and will, exhibiting, in fact, all the activities that are more especially associated with the idea of "spirit"—the suggestion of which, however, is dismissed with the assurance that it is at bottom mere bodily matter and nothing more!

Pfleiderer holds that in many instances  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  denotes simply non-pneumatic (*geistlose*) substance, but he meets with other cases where it is needful to take it as "anti-pneumatic" (*geistwidrige*) substance; and he apparently reckons the transition from the one sense to the other so easy that it needs—as it certainly receives—no explanation. He vouchsafes nothing more than the assertion: "It was withal already in itself natural" (*es lag doch schon an sich nahe*); on such occasions with our German friends



*schon* plays a large part for so modest a particle); and, after repeating the assertion two or three times that it may produce its effect *non vi sed saepe cadendo*, he tells us to our no small astonishment: "Thus we know in fact already how (*so wissen wir ja schon, wie*—*schon* reinforced this time by *ja*) the non-pneumatic passive becomes immediately at the same time the anti-pneumatic active matter."<sup>1</sup> Dr. Pfeleiderer, who is fond of throwing bridges over psychological chasms, and seems even at times to make the chasm for the pleasure of bridging it over, might have helped us to conceive how the passive becomes thus immediately active, and the non-pneumatic thus at the same time anti-pneumatic. I confess that to my mind a slight infusion of a pneumatic element in the form of a perverse human will would make the transition more readily intelligible. So much for the category of *σάρξ*, which must be rigidly defined as "matter of the body," but may elastically include, and exercise, all the functions of mind!

Let us now glance for a moment at the correlative term *σῶμα*, which is assigned to the category of "form," and stands, as such, contrasted with *σάρξ*, "substance." Holsten insists that *σῶμα* has, through-

<sup>1</sup> "So wissen wir ja schon wie dem Paulus die geistlos passive Materie unmittelbar zugleich die geistwidrig aktive ist."—Paulinismus, p. 62.

out, its qualitative characteristic in the conception of "form"; and he has an elaborate note,<sup>1</sup> in which he ingeniously attaches to this conception of "form" the further qualifications of "organic," "living," "material," "outward," "apparent," "dead," according as they seem to be requisite from the context of the several passages. But he comes to the case of Col. ii. 17: "which are the shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ," where, if *σῶμα* means anything, it means the very substance, the real and essential, in contrast to the idea of mere form, of shadow without substance. He admits that there is here what he calls "an interesting transition" to the idea of substance; but, in order to keep by his definition, he betakes himself to a novel category of "substantial form," whatever that may mean. When the category of "form" will obviously not suffice, he tells us that the idea of *σῶμα* on such occasions "shares the definite quality (*Bestimmtheit*) of its substance"; but what is this but borrowing at pleasure from the one category as much as he happens to wish to import into the other? and what in that case is the use of insisting on the distinction? The passage Rom. viii. 13, as to "mortifying the deeds of the body:" τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦτε, is plainly, as it stands, out of keeping with Holsten's definition; but he gets over the difficulty by in-

<sup>1</sup> Zum. Evang. d. Paulus u. d. Petrus, pp. 376, 377.

serting, on each occasion when he adduces the passage, the words “ τῆς σαρκός ” in brackets after σώματος, as if St. Paul had inadvertently omitted them, or as if there were a necessity, in the light of the context, that we should insert them—which is simply an avoidance of the question raised by the presence of σώματος where we should expect σαρκός.

Let us turn next to the other side of the contrast. We naturally expect that, if the “ flesh ” is “ matter,” the πνεῦμα opposed to it will be defined as “ non-matter,” as something immaterial. And so it is after a fashion. We learn from Holsten<sup>1</sup> that “ the πνεῦμα is an ἀόρατον ” (Rom. i. 20, where, however, nothing is said of the πνεῦμα, but the Apostle has himself specified the ἀόρατα as God’s “ eternal power and θεϊότης ”); and “ on this immateriality rests the freedom from all that is material, primarily the ἀφθαρτον and αἰδιον.” But it is conceived that this immateriality is “ not freedom from all substantiality,” because of the passages that present the communication of the Spirit as an efflux of something *substantial*, combined with a real effect. “ In this way a certain materiality slips again into the conception, and the immateriality of the πνεῦμα becomes at bottom merely the negative of ‘ cosmic ’ earthly matter.” “ The πνεῦμα,” says

<sup>1</sup> Zum. Evang. d. Paulus u. d. Petrus, p. 378.

Lüdemann, "is at the same time expressive of a higher materiality";<sup>1</sup> and Pfeiderer says, "It can only be called relatively immaterial, as it is not earthly sensuous, but heavenly supra-sensuous matter (*Stofflichkeit*)."<sup>2</sup> The *πνεῦμα* as well as the *σάρξ* is referred to the category of substance; and when we come to speak of matter, the *πνεῦμα* is in a sense material also—only higher, finer, transcendent, celestial. In this way the philosophic expositor finds himself at liberty to interpret *πνεῦμα* either in the sense of the "relatively immaterial" or of the "relatively material" as it may best suit him. One cannot help suspecting that the same standard is not always applied to the Apostle's language; sometimes it is weighed in the scales of modern psychological distinctions; sometimes it is tried by the standard of the Greek ideas of the time; sometimes the Apostle is credited with the nicest and most delicate discrimination in the use of terms; at others he is held to have contented himself with the "Jewish-vulgar" anthropology.

In keeping with the tendency to lay down stringent categories, which are subsequently widened or relaxed as the case may require, all the writers except Lüdemann deem it necessary to start from and constantly return to the assumption, in the case

<sup>1</sup> Anthropologie d. Ap. Paulus, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Paulinismus, p. 200.

of *σάροξ* at least, of a fundamental signification underlying its use, although they do not clearly explain what they mean by this. Baur postulates a “fundamental notion” (*Grundbegriff*); Holsten a “cardinal signification” (*prinzipielle Bedeutung*—that from which, assumed as a principle, the others may be derived); Schmidt an “original contents” (*ursprünglicher Inhalt*); Pfeleiderer a “fundamental signification” (*Grundbedeutung*). One would be glad to know what is the precise idea attached to these words. They can hardly be employed in the purely etymological or lexical sense. A lexicographer, such as Grimm or Littré, recording the history of a word, traces it back to its root and earliest mode of use, and evolves thence the succession of the several meanings or shades of meaning gradually associated with it. But in this case we are concerned not with the historical genesis of the word, or the record of its earlier applications, which might possibly throw little more light on existing usage than an inquiry into the origin of the terms “idiocy” or “lunacy” would shed on a modern medical treatise dealing with these subjects. Such researches have at most a very subordinate place and value as compared with the investigation of that actual usage—*usus, quem penes arbitrium est et jus et norma loquendi*; and they only contribute indirectly to the solution of the problem in so far as they help us to trace the

growth of that usage. The meaning of a word as used by St. Paul can only be got from his own writings. We take it therefore that, when the "fundamental signification" is spoken of, it is the fundamental signification that is conceived to govern Pauline usage. But this leads us to ask how, in that case, it is arrived at. Is it drawn from the standpoint of the expositor, and does it reflect his peculiar theory? If so, it may be little better than an arbitrary assumption—a mere begging of the question. Does it profess to be taken from St. Paul and to give his own key to his meaning? In that case it would seem to be most naturally reached at the close of the inquiry, rather than laid down at the beginning; or, if assumed at the outset, it should be merely treated as a working hypothesis to be verified in the sequel. I do not find any indication of its being thus reached or so treated; but there are signs not a few that the fundamental view is quite as much imported as educed—with the result of controlling the exegesis or hampering its free play, preventing the acceptance of its natural results, or straining it in support of conclusions brought from another domain.

And this leads me to present some specimens of the methods and processes by which exegesis is made to yield the desired results. Holsten and Lüdemann especially insist that *ἀμαρτία* as used

by St. Paul denotes what they call *objective ἁμαρτία*—that is, not sin regarded collectively or generically as a principle at work in man, but sin regarded as a necessity inherent in man's constitution as such—in other words not what we call "sin," but what we call "evil." And they adduce especially two passages as warranting this position. At Rom. v. 12 St. Paul says: "δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε." Baur remarks that the παρακοή and παράβασις of Adam can only be understood of the sin-principle, which was from the beginning immanent in the flesh, emerging into actuality in Adam.<sup>1</sup> Holsten renders or paraphrases the passage: "through one man (objective) sin (manifesting itself in his παράβασις) entered (as a real thing) into the world (of the visible);"<sup>2</sup> and Lüdemann comes to a substantially similar conclusion.<sup>3</sup> But, as is sufficiently obvious, the words inserted by way of explicating the meaning contain the very thought on which Holsten's position entirely depends; and there is in the passage itself not the slightest hint of them. St. Paul says: "sin entered into the world"; Holsten makes him say: "objective

<sup>1</sup> Vorlesungen über Neutest. Theol., p. 191.

<sup>2</sup> Zum Evang. d. Petrus u. d. Paulus, p. 413.

<sup>3</sup> Anthropologie d. Ap. Paulus, p. 88: "Beim Stammvater war seine ἁμαρτία keine straffällige Einzelthat, παράβασις, sondern, wie bei den Nachkommen, eine objective Beschaffenheit seiner Natur."

sin entered into the world of the visible, that is, came into manifestation as a reality." But this is not all. According to the doctrine thus ascribed to St. Paul the *ἁμαρτία* conceived as objective sin was already in existence from the very first as a reality in the *κόσμος*—was already, before the emergence of Adam's transgression, immanent in man's sensuous nature. It could not therefore be said *εἰσέρχεται εἰς τὸν κόσμον* without imposing on that phrase a meaning entirely foreign to it. When we say that a thing enters into the world, we must certainly be held to mean that something *comes in* which was *not there before*; and not merely that something, which had already been long in the world, had at length become manifest in it. Besides, according to the very definition of the difference between *ἁμαρτία* and *παράβασις* given by those writers, we should have expected the latter term rather than the former to have been used with *εἰσῆλθε*, for it was the *transgression* that *came in*, the *ἁμαρτία* was there *ab initio*. Then it is difficult to account for the preposition *διά* under Holsten's exegesis; it is not said merely: *in* Adam or *with* Adam sin became manifested or actual; but expressly *through* him, by means of his instrumentality or agency, which would seem to point at sin's having become present or operative in him in the first instance not as an outcome of necessity, but as the result of his per-



sonal action. We can scarcely conceive the laws of language subjected to a more violent strain; and we can hardly be surprised that Schmidt should here decline to follow his leaders,<sup>1</sup> and that Pfeiderer should declare Lüdemann's interpretation of the passage, which is an elaborate expansion of Holsten's, to betray itself mistaken by its very want of clearness. Pfeiderer condemns the attempt to bring in the doctrine of the *σάρξ* as the natural principle of sin at a passage which simply deals with its historic origin, as tending only to confusion; acknowledges that Ernesti is here in the right; and admits that the immediate sense of the passage and of the context is opposed to the conception of an objective sin-principle preceding the first sin of Adam, "for the words 'sin entered into the world' undeniably imply the coming in of a new thing, which consequently was not there at all previously."<sup>2</sup>

The other passage on which this doctrine is engrafted is Rom. vii. 9: *χωρὶς γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία νεκρά* . . . *ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς ἐντολῆς, ἡ ἁμαρτία ἀνέζησεν*—which is explained to mean that *objective* sin previously to the action of the law is latent, potential, but at the presence of the commandment comes to consciousness as what it is, becomes subjectively realised as transgression. But this interpretation imports its essential elements into the passage only

<sup>1</sup> Paulinische Christologie, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Paulinismus, p. 45.

by disregarding the proper import of νεκρά and the force of the preposition in ἀνέζησεν; and Hilgenfeld deserves at least the credit of superior consistency when he holds that sin which is described as *dead* and is said to *revive* must have had a previous life, and accordingly interprets it of sin in a pre-existent state. This view of his can hardly be entertained, for there is no trace of anything analogous to it in the Apostle's writings elsewhere; but whatever may be the precise meaning of the figure—which it is not our object now to discuss—this much is clear, that by no ordinary canons of exegesis can νεκρά mean “potential,” which is a modern philosophical phrase, constructed as a sort of *tertium quid* between possibility and necessity.

Lüdemann finds an exegetic support for his peculiar theory—that the first portion of the Epistle to the Romans as to justification by faith represents a Jewish standpoint, which the Apostle no longer accepts as his own—in Rom. v. 2, where St. Paul, after having said in verse 1: “Therefore having been justified by faith, we have peace (or, let us have peace) with God through our Lord Jesus Christ,” is supposed to make the transition to the opposite view of ethical righteousness, which is really his own, in the words: δι’ οὗ καὶ τὴν προσαγωγὴν ἐσχήκαμεν τῇ πίστει εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην ἐν ᾗ ἐστήκαμεν, καὶ κενχώμεθα ἐπ’ ἐλπίδι τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ.

After laying by means of spaced type a stress on the words "have *had* access *by means of the faith into this grace*," which there is nothing in the original to warrant, he says: "It is evident that the faith and the juridical justification acquired by it only first procures access to *the* grace [*nur erst den Zutritt verschafft zu DER Gnade*] whereby we become partakers of the real new creation." And he adds: "Only thus is explained the *καὶ*, which indicates a new thing, only thus the perfect *ἔσχήκαμεν*, and the presents *ἔστίκαμεν* and *καυχώμεθα*."<sup>1</sup> The suggestion is, that the faith in juridical justification as set forth up to this point, but not recurring afterwards in the three following chapters, is simply the means of bringing men from a Jewish standpoint to the real benefits of grace and new life to be got through union with Christ, and that, having served its purpose, it may now be discarded as having no further value. Upon this we remark, 1st, that the hinge of the whole argument turns upon the presence of the words *τῆ πίστει*, on which Dr. Lüdemann has imposed so peculiar a sense; but it is very doubtful whether they form a genuine part of the text. They do not occur in BDEFG, are omitted by Griesbach and Lachmann, and are bracketed by Westcott and Hort; and they have all the appearance of a gloss. But, 2nd, assuming them to be genuine, they

<sup>1</sup> Anthropologie d. Ap. Paulus, pp. 208, 209.

cannot without forcing bear the emphasis laid on them. There is no statement that faith *procures* the access, and still less is there warrant for the “*only first procures*” which Lüdemann inserts. The stress lies on the *access* and on *Christ* as procuring it. 3rd. His position requires that we take the *χάρις ταύτην* as referring not, as one should naturally expect, to the grace experienced in justification, which had been specially referred to at iii. 25, was resumed in part by the *δικαιώθεντες* in v. 1, and is now pointed to in the *ταύτην ἐν ᾗ ἐστήκαμεν* with a certain triumphant sense of present possession, but to a *χάρις*, the real nature of which was only to be developed in the sequel. 4th, He attaches the clause *καὶ καυχώμεθα* to *ἐστήκαμεν* which is a mere adjunct to *χάρις ταύτην*, whereas the great majority of expositors place it with far more probability in connection either with the *ἐσχήκαμεν* or, better still, with the principal sentence *εἰρήνην ἔχομεν* in verse 1. 5th, The *καὶ* is said to indicate something new, which is true in a sense, but not in such a sense as to constitute a basis for Lüdemann’s inference from it. It might denote something added to what goes before, or might even be construed as carrying a certain climactic force; but it is most probably to be taken, as it is taken by Meyer, of the “also” of the *corresponding relation*, bringing out more definitely and prominently the

significance of the mediation of Christ as the ground of our having our peace through Him. In any case it must introduce something in the same line or direction with what precedes; and not aught opposed to, contrasting with, or superseding it, as on Lüdemann's theory we would expect. If Lüdemann's view is correct, the Apostle must have so effectually disguised his meaning that it has utterly escaped the notice of all that have sought to reach it for eighteen hundred years.

Akin to Lüdemann's discovery here is his curious suggestion as to the Apostle's use of the phrase *μὴ γένοιτο*. He regards this expression as used by the Apostle, in what he terms truly Socratic irony, to effect under cover of the same word a change of the ideas denoted by it, or to pass from the one to the other, whereby the Apostle, after making an apparent concession, is enabled to neutralise it or turn it against an opponent.<sup>1</sup> This solution, under which the Apostle escapes from the consequences of an argument by deprecating the result but withal shifting his ground, is more creditable to the ingenuity of the expositor than to the ingenuousness of the Apostle; and, although the phrase may not have the deprecatory strength which is conveyed by its unfortunate rendering in the Authorised Version, we see no reason to doubt that the Apostle is speak-

<sup>1</sup> *Anthropologie d. Ap. Paulus*, pp. 158, 167, 169 *al.*

ing in earnest, and that, had he been made aware of the ironical equivocation which was to be imputed to him, he would have repelled it with a *μὴ γένοιτο*. Holsten, who does not hesitate to charge St. Paul with "dialectic sophistry," is in this case more just, when he describes it as the object of the formula to repel with a certain emotion an inference drawn from a true and real presupposition—an inference which *is logically possible, but in reality untrue and violating the religious consciousness*.<sup>1</sup>

An instance of a different character may be subjoined, where Dr. Lüdemann builds an important negative inference on an alleged parallelism of expression. He argues that St. Paul, who at 2 Cor. xi. 3 brings Eve, but not Adam, into contact with the serpent, must have declined to accept the intervention of the devil in the fall of man, because Rom. v. 12 is evidently written under reminiscence of, and with reference to, the Book of Wisdom ii. 24. The words of the latter are: *φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, while at Rom. v. 12 the words run: *δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος*. Here, we are told that the "sound of the words is in part so similar that the variation (*Abweichung*) can only be intentional";<sup>2</sup> and it is suggested that St.

<sup>1</sup> Zum Evang. d. Petrus u. d. Paulus, p. 433, note.

<sup>2</sup> Anthropologie des Ap. Paulus, p. 93.

Paul made the change to ignore the reference to the devil. But the resemblance extends only to the common use of the phrase "entered into the world," which might have been employed by any two writers desirous of giving expression to the same idea, without the slightest influence of the one on the other. Most people would deem the case one of accidental and unconscious coincidence almost unavoidable under the circumstances. The suggestion as to the variation being intentional is simply gratuitous, for in the parallelism between the death that had come through Adam and the life that had come through Christ there was no occasion to introduce mention of the tempter, and the omission cannot reasonably be construed into an indication of St. Paul's opinion on the subject.

Before leaving this question of exegetical methods, we may simply call attention to the disposition which appears more or less in all of the expositors we have named, to rest important conclusions on their own interpretation of texts confessedly among the most difficult, and of the most controverted character, to be found in Scripture—such as that in 2 Cor. iii. 17 : *ὁ δὲ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν*, or that in Rom. viii. 10 : *τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν δι' ἁμαρτίαν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζῶν διὰ δικαιοσύνην*, or, as a source of light for the ordinary use of *πνεῦμα* in the first instance, the eschatological statements of St. Paul

in 1 Cor. xv.—with the result, as it seems to me, of substituting problematic and theoretical constructions for the surer conclusions which may be drawn from passages that are admittedly more clear, and that have more immediate relation to the Christian life on earth.

Very different in character, methods, and results is the most recent contribution to the literature of the subject—a monograph published by Dr. Wendt of Göttingen in the year 1878, entitled, “The Ideas of Flesh and Spirit in Biblical usage investigated.”<sup>1</sup> In this treatise, which had been preceded by a partial discussion of the question, as regards the Old Testament, in an academic dissertation,<sup>2</sup> he enters upon a careful and unbiassed study of the Biblical facts, and reaches conclusions similar in general character to those of Ritschl and of Weiss, but based on a fuller and closer examination of the Old Testament, the extra-Pauline, and the Pauline usage. It is a work of much exegetical skill, acute criticism, and sobriety of judgment, temperate in tone, and, so far as it is polemic, a model of courteous controversy. We shall have frequent occasion to refer to its researches and their results in the sequel.

<sup>1</sup> Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im biblischen Sprachgebrauch untersucht von Lic. Dr. H. H. Wendt, 8vo, Gotha, 1878.

<sup>2</sup> Entitled: “Notiones carnis et spiritus, quomodo in Vetere Testamento adhibeantur, exponantur,” printed, but not published, at Göttingen in 1877.



As a matter of course the subject falls to be handled, though necessarily after a less full and minute fashion, in the various works dealing with Biblical Theology in general, with the teaching of the Apostles, or with the doctrinal teaching of St. Paul in particular. The most important of the general treatises are the classic works of Édouard Reuss of Strassburg<sup>1</sup> and of Dr. Bernhard Weiss of Berlin.<sup>2</sup> A minor but far from inconsiderable value belongs to the book of M. Sabatier on "The Apostle Paul,"<sup>3</sup> and to various smaller monographs that have been at different times devoted to sections of the subject.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Histoire de la Théologie Chrétienne au siècle apostolique*, troisième édition, 1864. It seems strange that nearly twenty years should have elapsed without a new edition of this masterpiece of the venerable author, who unites in his own person the most characteristic qualities of the two nations to which, in virtue of his border abode in Strassburg and of his bilingual literary activity, he may be said to belong—the accuracy and depth of German research, the order and clearness of French exposition.

<sup>2</sup> *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, 3rd edition, Berlin, 1880, by far the best book on the subject. A translation, in two volumes, by the Rev. David Eaton, and the Rev. James E. Duguid, has recently been issued in the Foreign Theological Library of Messrs. Clark, Edinburgh.

<sup>3</sup> *L'Apôtre Paul*. 12° Paris, 1879.

<sup>4</sup> See Appendix for a brief notice of the literature bearing on the points in question.

## IV.

## PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION.

IN endeavouring to ascertain the meaning of St. Paul, it may be well to state explicitly at the outset the two assumptions—or presuppositions, as the Germans would call them—on the basis of which such an inquiry must proceed. We take for granted, 1st, That St. Paul *had* a meaning which he wished to *convey*; and, 2nd, That he had in each instance only *one* meaning. It might seem unnecessary to express thus formally the circumstances under which exegesis is called for and is possible, if experience did not show that they are apt to be practically overlooked or disregarded. It cannot be too constantly borne in mind that St. Paul wrote for, and intended his meaning to be understood by, the readers whom he primarily addressed; and that he would necessarily use, as the vehicle of his thoughts, language which was already familiar to them, or, if not so, was at least such as they might reasonably be expected to put a like meaning into with himself. The character of his writing must

have been, to a great extent, determined by the position and circumstances of the readers; must have been in accordance with their need, and adapted to their capacity of receiving it.

What, then, was the standing of those original readers? Not that certainly of modern German philosophers or exegetes of the nineteenth century, nor that even of the Asiatic, Greek, or Roman "wise men" of the first century—for the Apostle has himself told us that not many of the wise or the powerful or the high-born of the world were among the partakers of the Christian calling—but that of men for the most part probably of humble rank and limited culture, who had been either themselves Jews by birth and training, or Hellenic proselytes who had frequented the synagogue and become familiar with Jewish ideas, or converts to Christianity who, in the very act of coming to Christ, had learned that "salvation is of the Jews," and had been brought into close contact with Jewish thought. It is to these—to readers of Jewish race or at least deeply imbued with interests and sympathies akin to those of the Jews—that the Apostle addresses himself; and as what he has written must be read by us in the light of its destination for, and of its adaptation to, those original recipients, we are naturally led to expect that under the exigencies of the case his thoughts and his language will bear a Hebrew rather than a

Hellenic complexion, and will be such, moreover, as to be, in broad outline at least, readily intelligible by a reader of average Jewish culture. It is *à priori* improbable that they should be pervaded either by a recondite philosophy or by a dreamy mysticism.

And this leads us to our second assumption as a basis for a clear and sure exegesis—that the Apostle must be taken to have on any single occasion of using a word only *one* meaning, and not *two* or more meanings. Whatever may be said of special cases where a double sense has been recognised, as in those of allegory, or of parable, or of prophecy having a double reference—and in each of these cases the literal and the figurative, the primary and the secondary, the proximate and the more remote, can hardly perhaps be in strictness termed double—it will readily be granted that the ordinary use of language rests on the footing of each word being conceived to represent a single definite idea, and not more. But expositors, who have been unable to determine to their own satisfaction which of two possible meanings is to be assigned to a word in a given place, have not seldom allowed themselves to attribute their own indecision to the Apostle's mind, and have expressed themselves as though he might have meant either the one or the other, or both at once. And Dr. Jowett, in his thoughtful

and suggestive, but often vague and hazy commentary<sup>1</sup>—a singular mixture of refining and refusing to refine—has not only exhibited various instances of hesitation in his choice, but has expressed theoretical doubts as to the Apostle's having only one meaning. Often we find him setting down two possible constructions side by side without indicating a preference for either; and not unfrequently we find him suggesting that they may be blended, or that the one may pass over into or be lost in the other. Bishop Ellicott seems at times inclined to a similar view—as when he says, in language strangely combining definiteness and doubt, on Phil. i. 27: “In most cases in the New Testament it may be said that in every mention of the human *πνεῦμα* some reference to the eternal Spirit may always be recognised”—and even Bishop Lightfoot on one occasion at least gives his countenance to the same idea, when at Phil. i. 19 he asks, “Must the genitive be considered subjective or objective? Is the Spirit the giver or the gift? Ought we not to say, in answer to this question, that the language of the original suggests no limitation, that *it will bear both meanings equally well*, and that therefore any such restriction is arbitrary. The Spirit is both the giver and the gift.”

<sup>1</sup>The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans, with critical notes, 8vo, Lond., 1855.

Dr. Jowett has devoted an Essay<sup>1</sup> to the discussion of the question, "Is it possible for the same word to have two meanings in the same passage?" In the very title of this characteristic Essay, which is a good specimen of the play on words of which it professes to treat, the author has unconsciously illustrated the double meaning of which he speaks by using the word "passage" in an ambiguous sense. For, when we turn to the Essay itself, we find the word applied sometimes to a single clause in which a word *occurs*, sometimes to a paragraph or section in which it more or less frequently *recurs*. There is an obvious difference between the two cases which Dr. Jowett has run together, namely, whether a word may have two meanings simultaneously imposed on it when it stands singly, and whether it may have different shades of meaning associated with it on successive occasions of its use; between the examples adduced by him, on the one hand, of *ἄγων* in 1 Thess. ii. 2 which, he contends, may mean at once inward conflict and outward persecution, or of *παράκλησις* in the following verse, which, he conceives, may denote at once consolation and exhortation, and those of the different occasions on which *νόμος* recurs in Rom. vii., or *πνεῦμα* in Rom. viii.

Not a few of the topics, interesting enough in themselves, that are introduced into this celebrated

<sup>1</sup> Vol. I. p. 125-135.

Essay, seem to me quite irrelevant to the subject as proposed, and tending by their very irrelevancy to confuse the issue. For example, the discussion of the variation in the meaning of words from age to age, of the growth of language, of the transition from fluctuation to fixity of usage; the inquiry how far the hearers may have been able to put at once all the Apostle's meaning into his words; the question how far one language lends itself to the exact reproduction of the words of another; the question, above all, whether Dr. Jowett is entitled to look for the fulfilment of his own expectations at the hands of St. Paul, or to impute his own unconsciousness of distinctions to the Apostle's inability to make them clear, or to say that the Apostle "blends in one the acts of the Spirit and the acts of man" when he does his best to distinguish them, or to hope that people will be content with the "general" or "the substantial" meaning of a whole passage, when they can get nothing definite as to its details—all these points seem to me utterly beside the simple question with which from the title of his Essay we should have expected him to deal, namely, whether a writer such as St. Paul can, consistently with the known laws of thought and language, be conceived to have used a word in two senses at one and the same time without consciously knowing, or specially willing, the predominance of one of them.

Dr. Jowett illustrates his meaning by the case of *ἀγών*. "If a statesman were to say, in writing to a friend, of some political measure which was the crisis of his fate, that 'it was a great struggle,' he might mean a great struggle to himself and to his own feelings, or a great struggle of parties or opinions; it might have been also a struggle in which violence had been resorted to. It is possible that all these three associations were passing through his mind at the time that he wrote down the word. Some light might be thrown by the context of the sentence, or by other parts of the letter, on the true sense. But language is not always used with the degree of exactness necessary in such cases to enable us to determine the meaning or associations of meaning which the writer had in his mind. Probably a critical analysis of the words would only lead to the conviction that the person who used them was not distinctly conscious of their import to himself." In this passage there is an apparent confusion of the process in the interpreter's mind with the process in the writer's mind; and it is suggested that, because we have not precise means of determining what the writer exactly meant, we may reasonably infer that he did not himself know his meaning exactly. But we are not entitled thus summarily to make our inability to discern which of three meanings an author wished to express a



ground for asserting either that he meant in some confused fashion each or all of the three, or that he was not himself conscious of what he really purposed to say. Because in a given case Dr. Jowett does not understand St. Paul, does it necessarily follow that St. Paul cannot have exactly understood himself? In point of fact Dr. Jowett's illustration imputes the attitude of the expositor, hesitating amidst possibilities, to the writer who has in reality no such difficulty or hesitancy. It is not possible that all the three associations were passing through his mind at the time he wrote down the word. If the writer in the case supposed was in earnest and not merely constructing an ingenious play on a word to puzzle his friend, he cannot have had the three thoughts simultaneously present to him; one alone must have been present, or at any rate dominant; and assuredly he meant that and nothing else, whatever his friend might take him to mean. For the latter there might be doubt as to what he may have meant; for himself there could be none as to what he *did* mean, and for himself it could not be for a moment uncertain whether the struggle of which he spoke was *inward*, *outward*, or accompanied by a resort to *violence*. Exegesis can only address itself to its task with any hope or confidence of a successful result on the assumption that the author whom it seeks to interpret has not thus

played fast and loose with language, but has attached to it in each instance a definite meaning, not manifold, but one.

And how are we to get at that meaning? Simply by applying the recognised principles and methods of exegesis. One of its first canons is that an author is his own best interpreter; and, in the case of a thinker so original and unique as St. Paul, our light must be sought mainly from himself. If he does not define formally his terms, we must seek to supply the want by examining them in the light of the context, by comparing their use in parallel or analogous passages, by invoking the aid of predicates or of contrasts to elucidate their import. On the basis of these materials we must start a provisional hypothesis, which may be applied as a means of grouping, correlating, and explaining them, and which may gather increasing probability in proportion to the success with which it connects and holds them together.

We must presume that the passages which are less clear are to be interpreted in the light of those that are more definite, explicit, and salient; and we must not permit the value or validity of the results obtained from the latter to be neutralised by the element of uncertainty clinging to the former. If the problem is complicated to some extent by the variety of apparent uses to be taken

into account, its solution is aided on the other hand by the facilities of comparison afforded by the numerous writings of the Apostle, issued at different dates and under different circumstances, but shown by their common characteristics, as well as vouched by tradition, to have come alike from him.

In this inquiry all the Epistles that bear the name of St. Paul may legitimately, as it appears to us, be used ; for the doubts that have been expressed by German critics, more especially of the Tübingen school, as to the genuineness of several or even most of them, are, generally speaking, of so subjective and arbitrary a character as to carry little weight in opposition to the solid grounds on which the Church has accepted them.<sup>1</sup> Indeed it has been pointed out that the same process of begging the question, under which the Tübingen school have first constituted a Pauline doctrine by excluding the disputed Epistles, and then applied it as a test to warrant the elimination of the latter as containing un-Pauline elements, would, if simply reversed, necessitate the exclusion of the Epistles now admitted on all hands to be genuine. The assumption that an author, having once formulated a doctrine, must continue in

<sup>1</sup> A specimen of these arguments as applied to the Epistles to the Thessalonians, and a searching exposure of their irrelevancy and worthlessness, may be seen in Dr. Jowett's disquisitions on the genuineness of the Epistles.

season and out of season to insist on it, and must be held bound to reproduce it in every case under penalty of having his identity denied; or, that, having once expressed himself in one set of terms, he could not under altered circumstances resort to another, will never, it may confidently be asserted, commend itself to any calm and dispassionate judgment. But while we do not find any sufficient reason for setting aside any of the Pauline Epistles from bearing on this inquiry, the question is really, so far as this matter is concerned, of minor moment, for the most important materials in relation to it are actually embraced within the range of the Four Epistles acknowledged as genuine by all; and it is in them that we are enabled to recognise the most distinctive characters of Pauline usage.

But this question of the Apostle's personal *usus loquendi* leads me to recall the fact that, while he has impressed on the terms used by him a stamp of his own, he did not create those terms, but found them already existing and turned them to account, building on foundations previously laid and on an usage inherited or acquired. None of the expressions employed by him are absolutely new. Whence, then, did he derive them? and in what form did they lie ready to his hand? What, in other words, was the usage that he found current and made the basis of his own peculiar structure? To these ques-

tions we can be little at a loss to return at least a general answer. We have already spoken of the character of the readers chiefly addressed as necessarily conditioning to some extent the nature and form of the Epistles sent to them; we have now to bear in mind above all that the writer was—not less certainly than his readers—of Jewish birth, training, and sympathies. We have no means of knowing what may have been the extent or depth of his Hellenic culture, or what influence was exercised by early or later contact with Greek life over his modes of thought or habits of expression. But his Hebraic culture is beyond all doubt, and has left its deep and abiding impress on all that bears his name.

He who could speak of himself in his letters as “an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Benjamin,” as “circumcised the eighth day, an Hebrew of the Hebrews, as touching the law a Pharisee;” who could say: “I advanced in the Jews’ religion beyond many of mine own age among my countrymen, being more exceedingly zealous for the traditions of my fathers;” who could before the Sanhedrim describe himself as “a Jew brought up in Jerusalem at the feet of Gamaliel, instructed according to the strict manner of the law of our fathers,” and who could subsequently, in presence of Agrippa, declare of himself: “My manner of life

from my youth up, which was from the beginning among mine own nation at Jerusalem, know all the Jews ; having knowledge of me from the first, if they be willing to testify, how that after the strictest sect of our religion I lived a Pharisee ;” he whose zeal on behalf of his nation continued such as to lead him with solemn adjuration to declare : “ I could wish that I myself were anathema from Christ for my brethren’s sake, my kinsmen according to the flesh ”—must—whatever else he may have had—have been imbued with the highest and best of Jewish culture, and must have been accustomed above all to think in the forms, and to clothe his thoughts in the language, of the race to which he was proud to belong. And as all Jewish learning started from, and ever stood in close relation to, the Scriptures of the Old Testament that were entrusted as a sacred deposit to the nation ; as all Jewish study centred in “ the law, the prophets, and the Psalms ;” St. Paul must have been especially familiar with the Biblical *usus loquendi* as well as with the current speech of his countrymen. It is on the Old Testament and Septuagint usage that we may fall back with absolute certainty as the primary basis on which he began to build.

It is difficult on the other hand to say how far he may have had access to, or been influenced by, any of the writings that are now in the New Testament

associated with his own, such as the records of the teaching of Christ that have now come to us in Synoptic form, or the Epistle of James, or the First Epistle of Peter, which Weiss seems to be right in referring to a comparatively early date. On the whole, looking to the Apostle's own testimony as to his independence, so far as the gospel went, on man or on human teaching, it seems better to abstain from assuming any such influence of Christian literature, and to confine our inquiry to the usage which St. Paul certainly found existing, and must certainly have known, in the Old Testament and Septuagint.

## V.

## OLD TESTAMENT USAGE.

IT is admitted on all hands that St. Paul bases his employment of the terms "flesh" and "spirit" not on the usage of Greek writers, which presents nothing similar to it, but on that of the Old Testament, with which he was most familiar, and with which his most cherished and hallowed associations were bound up. The words came to St. Paul through the Septuagint as Greek renderings of the Hebrew terms *basar* and *ruach*; and it is by falling back on that earlier use, which he had inherited as a Jew, that we gain the starting-point of his Christian thought—the factors made ready to his hand, which he could take up and turn to further and fresh account. The subject of this Old Testament *usus loquendi* has been more or less fully discussed, as regards the terms separately, in various monographs. One of the most recent and interesting of these is a dissertation composed by M. Sabatier in honour of the illustrious veteran Édouard Reuss of Strassburg on occasion of his jubilee in 1879, and



entitled "Mémoire sur la notion hébraïque de l'esprit ;" but, as regards both sides of the inquiry, the subject has received the fullest and most careful investigation at the hands of Dr. Wendt, of whose work we have previously spoken, and whose general results have commended themselves to the judgment of competent scholars.<sup>1</sup> This discussion, which necessarily runs much into detail, is so important in itself and has so essential a bearing on the question before us, that we shall present an abstract of its more important arguments in the Appendix. Here we shall endeavour to give a summary view of the leading conclusions which he seems to us to have satisfactorily established.

As regards the word *basar*, Wendt distinguishes three different ways in which the term is employed : the first, that in which it bears its original and strict meaning, denoting the *flesh proper*, that is, the muscular or fleshy constituent parts of the body as contra-distinguished from other elements of it such as skin, bones, blood ; the second, that in which it denotes the *whole human body* ; and the third, that in which it is applied to signify *earthly creatures generally*, with the connotation of *the absolute weakness of their nature in contrast to the power of*

<sup>1</sup> See Diestel, *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*, 1878, p. 496 ; Guthe, *Theologische Litteraturzeitung*, 1877, No. 18 ; Weiss, *Theologische Litteraturzeitung*, 1878, No. 9.

*God.* In the first and literal sense of the word it is used both of the flesh of the living body, and of that which is dead, especially, in the latter case, of what is employed for food or in sacrificial meals, but partly also of what is regarded as unclean. The second sense is not so much a change of meaning, as an *extension of use*, whereby the part is put for the whole. Wendt finds a link of transition to this second and extended use in the special employment of the term to express relations of *kindred* conceived as based on community of bodily substance—*consanguinity*—most fully in the form "bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh," more briefly in that of "thy bone and thy flesh," or simply in that of "our flesh." The synecdoche, by which the flesh is put for the whole body, does not rest on *basar* having the sense of animate matter generally (of which no instance can be pointed out), but on the simple circumstance that the flesh forms the most apparent and conspicuous characteristic of the body, or, as it is pithily put in the Latin form of his dissertation, "*caro corpori dat nomen, quia corpori conciliat formam, speciem, colorem*" (p. 7). When the body is spoken of as *basar*, it is mainly in passages where it comes to view as regards its *surface* or organised outward form, and not as regards its material substance. In this sense it is often placed in contradistinction to the *nepshesh* or *lebh* (soul or heart), the inner elements of man

that do not come under the cognisance of the senses, or belong to his outward *aspect*.

The third and still more extended use of the term meets us specially in the oft recurring phrase *kol-basar* ("all flesh"), which obviously in most cases denotes something more than either the flesh on the body or the whole body named after the flesh. When it is said, for example, that "all flesh" has corrupted its way on the earth (Gen. vi. 12), or that "all flesh" is to know God as the Saviour (Is. xlix. 26), or that "all flesh" is to come to worship before God (Is. lxvi. 23), it plainly applies to *living beings generally* and includes their mental nature, just as the correlative phrase *kol-nephesh* is employed under circumstances where it must similarly be held to include or cover the bodily nature. In this case, as before, the part is put for the whole; and living beings are spoken of under that *aspect* which most strikes the eye. When we ask why the flesh is chosen as the most fitting *part* for such a synecdochic use, we find, on comparing all the passages where this usage occurs, that throughout a clear *contrast with God* is expressed or implied; and we can scarcely doubt that the usage has its main motive in the purpose of indicating such a *contradistinction*—a purpose, which would be most readily attained by designating the living beings in terms of that wherein the contrast was *most directly* apparent.

Wendt finds a key to the nature of this contrast between God and living beings on earth in Is. xxxi. 3: "Egypt is man and not God, and their horses are *basar* and not *ruach*, flesh and not spirit," where the parallelism of structure shows that the idea of *basar* stands in the same relation to that of man as the idea of *ruach* to that of God. But, as will appear in the sequel, the *ruach* of God denotes throughout the Old Testament the power or powerful working of God; and so here and elsewhere, where the contrast appears, the *basar* denotes the relative or rather the absolute powerlessness of man. It is on the side of the bodily nature—where the flesh so easily falls a prey to corruption—that the perishableness and nothingness of man come most clearly to light, and make him stand forth in most absolute contrast to God. The word thus signifies *living beings* with the accessory notion of *the absolute weakness and transitoriness of their nature overagainst the power and living operation of God*. It is, in a word, the sense which we often express by the word "creature." Wendt has given numerous illustrations of its employment, where the object is to express the dependence of the creature on God, the reverence of the creature in presence of the Divine sovereignty, the folly of trusting in the creature; and especially of its frequent occurrence where the Divine judgments are spoken of.

In answer to the question, Whether, in addition to this undoubted accessory sense of natural *weakness*, the term does not include an element of moral blame, *of sinfulness*, Wendt examines several of the passages adduced in support of this view—such as Gen. vi. 3, where he controverts the view of Dillmann, as it seems to us, with some success, but the uncertainty as to the punctuation of the text and the obscurity of the whole passage, which wears an isolated aspect, preclude much stress being laid on it; Psalm lxxviii. 38, 39, where he rightly opposes the view of Tholuck; and various statements in the book of Job that assert man's inability to justify himself before God, as to which his explanation is more ingenious than sufficient—and he comes to the conclusion that in the Old Testament the idea of "flesh" has no accessory sense of moral blame. ✓

But, while we think that he has sufficiently made good his main positive results, we conceive that in coming to this negative conclusion he has not taken adequate account of the facts even as regards the passages in the book of Job, and that he has failed to attach due weight to the early assertion of the corruption of all flesh at Gen. vi. 12, 13. When we call to mind the reference at Job xxv. 3 to the pervading and searching character of the divine light on the one hand, and the prominence given on the other to man's want of purity (where it might

seem enough, from Wendt's point of view, to have urged man's want of power), and when we find the distinct recognition of the moral impurity of the race as conditioned by descent from non-pure parents (*e.g.* xiv. 4: "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?" and xv. 14: "What is man that he should be clean? and he which is born of a woman that he should be righteous?") the suggestion of Wendt that the general impurity of man here spoken of has nothing in common with what we call sinfulness, but is simply an indication of the absolute gulf between the human nature and the divine, looks very like a begging of the question, and falls short, at any rate, of an adequate explanation.

Still more difficult is it to reconcile his position as to the absence of all reference to sin with the existence, at so early a stage in the record of human history, of the great generalisation from experience presented at Gen. vi. 12, 13: "And God looked upon the earth, and, behold, it was corrupt; for all flesh had corrupted its way upon the earth. And God said unto Noah: The end of all flesh is come before me [that is, determined on by me], for the earth is filled with violence through them, and, behold, I will destroy them with the earth." It is true that this corruption is not referred to the flesh itself in virtue of any necessity inherent in its

nature, for such a reference would be at variance with the explicit statement of Gen. i. 31 that God at the close of his creative work "saw everything that he had made, and behold it was very good"; in point of fact the passage we have quoted charges the corruption of "the way" on the personal action of those concerned; but none the less does it present the reality of that corruption as a fact of experience holding true of "all flesh," and giving special point, as is remarked by Cremer,<sup>1</sup> to the contrast between the Spirit of God and the flesh spoken of a verse or two before (Gen. vi. 3). Can we doubt that under such circumstances the expression thus passing into general currency would carry along with it some connotation of the sin which was throughout its *actual* accompaniment? That it had this connotation seems evident from the very fact which Wendt himself had already pointed out, that the phrase "all flesh" occurs with especial frequency in connection with the mention of the Divine judgments—judgments proceeding essentially on moral grounds—the consciousness of which leads the people to say unto Moses: "For what is all flesh that it might hear the voice of the living God speaking out of the midst of the fire and live?"

<sup>1</sup> In Herzog's Real-Encyclopädie für Protestantische Theologie, 2nd edition, article "Fleisch"; and in the Bibl.-Theol. Wörterbuch der Neutest. Gräcität, 3rd edition, 1883, p. 690.

(Deut. v. 23), and prompts the prophet in presence of the vision in the temple to exclaim: "Woe is me for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips. For mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Hosts" (Isaiah vi. 5).

Passing now to the conception of *ruach*, the applications of which are far more varied and complicated, Wendt considers that we may find their common source in the original sense of "wind," while others have preferred to take the primary sense as "breath." The chief characteristics of wind are motion and invisibility. Under the former point of view, as moved and moving, it is mainly conceived of as destructive; under the latter, as invisible, it may be regarded either as *unsearchable* in its origin, or as *immaterial* in its nature. Notwithstanding the close relationship of these ideas, they give occasion to two very divergent chains of thought. The wind, not being an object of experience as regards its origin, is in numerous passages referred directly to God, who creates it, sends it forth, directs it, makes it His messenger. Lacking in virtue of its invisible character the usual marks by which reality is tested, it becomes the symbol and expression for what is empty, null, unreal; and in this sense it may mean precisely the opposite of what is meant by it when looked at on the side of its divine origin.



With the signification of wind is immediately associated that of breath, presenting itself as wind in man, just as conversely the wind is apprehended as the breath of God ; and a further step makes the breath of man appear directly as the breath of God—the *ruach* belonging to man, in so far as it stirs or works in man ; and belonging to God, in so far as He has sent it or breathed it forth.

From these combinations between the wind, the breath of God and the human breath, result manifold and even opposite references for the *ruach*. As the stormy wind brings destruction, so the breath in impetuous movement furnishes the expression of *anger*; and the blast of the divine wrath in this sense is conceived as destructive of life. On the other hand, where the element of stormy motion is in abeyance, the process of breathing is felt to be the proper mark of all that lives, and the *ruach* obtains the opposite significance of the creating and preserving *life-breath*, which is altogether of divine origin.

The communication of the divine life-spirit to the creature forms the ground of all possibility and power of creaturely existence. God forms it in, or gives it to, men ; and as at first it came from Him, to Him at death it returns. To it are referred the various states and manifestations of vital power. Under impressions of surprise or terror it seems as though it would depart ; under opposite influences

it revives; the failure of the breath is the proper designation for the decay of the vital power.

Wendt next inquires what is the relation of this *ruach* to the *nephesh*. There is undoubtedly great likeness between them. The soul, too, is treated as seat and centre of the powers of life; all things that further or hinder the life are placed in relation to it; and the like predicates are used of it as of the *ruach*, when the restoration or dying-away of the life is spoken of. But there are also indications of no inconsiderable difference. First, the *nephesh* is the seat of *individuality*, of personality, of self-consciousness, while the *ruach* is a *common* mark of living beings, of like character and working in all. Secondly, they stand in a different relation to God. The *ruach* is viewed as an immediate outbreathing of God; it is but part of the general divine *ruach* which creates and preserves life everywhere, and it does not lose its character as such, even when at work in an individual earthly nature. The soul, on the other hand, is never regarded as an efflux of the divine. The soul depends on God, because it is given by God; but the life-spirit depends on God, because it is itself divine. Thirdly, they are dissimilar as respects their fate after death. The spirit returns to God who gave it, but we nowhere in the Old Testament read of the souls of the dead coming to God. The *nephesh* is by death absolutely severed from God.

When on the basis of these distinctions we ask what is the relation between them, it is plain that they are not simply co-ordinate elements placed side by side, different in contents and mode of operation. The two terms represent one and the same quantity, but estimate it *from different points of view*. The nature of living beings may be estimated in two ways, either by comparison with God, or by comparison with inanimate nature: in the former, from the religious point of view, which distinguishes what in the creatures is earthly and what is divine; in the latter, from the physical or anthropological point of view, which distinguishes what in them is of material bodily nature and what is of an immaterial spiritual nature. The powers of spiritual or mental life are called *ruach*, in so far as they connect the creatures with God and place them in dependence on Him; they are called *nephesh*, in so far as they separate the creatures as animate individuals from one another and from the lifeless impersonal world of sense. Wendt finds a clear confirmation of this distinction furnished by Job xii. 10: "in whose hand is the soul of every living thing and the spirit of all flesh of man." The parallelism of the halves of this verse shows that the conceptions "soul" and "spirit" are related to one another just as the phrases "every living thing" and "all flesh of man." Now, as the two latter expressions denote quite the

same thing in point of contents, but denote it from different points of view—in the one case that of living beings in contrast to inanimate nature, in the other that of the creatures in contrast to God—it is clear that we must assume for the conception of “soul” and “spirit” a diversity not of the contents, but simply of the point of view, or, as it is put in the Latin form, a “*discrimen non rei designatae, sed rationis designandi.*”

A similar inquiry is instituted as to the relations of the *ruach* to the *lebh*. We find the word *ruach* very often joined with some designation of quality, when, generally speaking, a definite mental state is to be characterised; but for most of these designations we find parallels formed with *lebh*, while we elsewhere meet with the two expressions side by side, each accompanied by such an indication of quality; and in two cases they stand together with the same attribution—a clear proof that, while they are kindred, they are not exactly synonymous. An examination of the uses of the term *lebh*, as the seat of the conscious mental activities of living beings, leads Wendt to conclude that it is not so well rendered by the word “heart,” which makes us think of the seat of the feelings, and for which we are inclined to assume a favourable connotation, as by the German word *Sinn* (mind), which defines the different kinds of mental activity and indirectly of

outward action as regards *contents*; while *ruach* has its import best indicated by the older German use of *Muth*—still recognisable in its compounds, such as *Schweremuth*, *Freimuth*, *hochmüthig*, *demüthig*—and denotes the *energy* which, partly as *disposition*, partly as *character*, stamps on all the individual expressions of the life of feeling, as of the activity of thinking and willing, their definite *form*. The two sides, the natural disposition and the moral character, are for the Hebrew consciousness not yet separated; it is only our later reflection that separates them. There prevails no distinction in the strict sense between the designations formed with *ruach* and those formed with *lebh* so far as the thing itself is concerned, because the *contents* of the mental action given in the “mind” is always conditioned throughout by the peculiar *form* of the ruling natural or moral disposition. As between *ruach* and *nephesh*, so between *ruach* and *lebh* there subsists a distinction not so much of the *object designated*, as of the *point of view* of the designation.

A new and last signification of the *ruach* presents to some extent a blending of the most essential marks of the two that have already been mentioned. Here we encounter in the foreground the mark of *divine origin*, but in special connection with the *unusual* and *extraordinary* manifestations of the divine operation on man. This *ruach* is usually

designated simply as the *prophetic*, but not quite with strict justice; the prophetic *ruach* which expresses itself in prophetic speech or act is in reality only one species, though perhaps the most important, of a far more comprehensive class of phenomena. In all spheres of human action, achievements which in a conspicuous and significant way transcend the measure of ordinary human ability, are referred to the divine *ruach*. So it is with the proofs of Samson's strength, with the feats of the successful chief, especially in war, with the skill of the artificer or of the poet, with special powers of judgment and understanding, and particularly, in the religious domain, with the characteristic gifts of the prophets. This extraordinary divine *ruach* Wendt proposes to distinguish from the other senses of the term by designating it as the *transcendental*.

After enumerating various predicates of this *ruach*, he derives from them two leading marks as characterising it. First, it is constantly conceived of as a higher *power*, which comes on man as its organ, not dependent on his will and ability, nay even in some cases impelling him against his will (Num. xxiv. 5). But it nowhere appears as a *substance* of a supernatural heavenly kind; for that the expressions borrowed from material things, such as *shaphakh* and *labhash*—to *shed* or to *put on*—are merely figurative, is obvious from the very diversity of the

material conceptions with which they are linked. And he adds that an illustration of the almost accidental way in which such expressions may originate may be clearly recognised in the prophecy of Joel, where the prophet has (at ii. 23) promised for the fields devastated by the locusts the fertilising rain, and, when to this natural gift of God there is added in the hoped-for time of blessing the gift of the Spirit, its communication is likewise presented under the figure of the pouring out of a rain (iii. 2; comp. Is. xlv. 3: "I will pour water upon him that is thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground; I will pour my Spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine offspring"). Secondly, it is to be noted that this transcendental spirit-power is always conceived of as a moving power revealing itself outwardly, and not as a quiescent possession of the individual or as a mere capacity, which he might have but need not put forth. Even the prophet has the *ruach* only when he is prophetically active; his noiseless piety or his inner religious speculation is nowhere termed *ruach*.

If we ask how we are to conceive of the nature and quality of this transcendental *ruach*, we shall proceed most surely by following as far as possible the analogy of the other forms of its use already dealt with. Wendt holds that here too we may think first of a natural *life-power*, only not of that which

is normal and common to all creatures, but of a special *heightening* (*besondere Steigerung*) of the same, from which springs in each case the capacity for extraordinary achievement; but, on the whole, it may be said that the *ruach* in this sense belongs to the great ideal figures of early times—as in the Book of Judges—or is held forth in prospect for the last time (Is. xliv. 3; xi. 2: “spirit of might”). Elsewhere this element of heightened *natural* power falls into the background before that of the higher *religious* and *moral* working of God, which is communicated partly to the prophets of the present, partly to the king and people of the latter times. It is analogous to the *ruach* previously mentioned, which, as disposition and character, gives its ruling *form* to all man’s mental activity. The transcendental *ruach* also is such a *mental movement* (*Gemüths-bewegung*); which, however, is accounted not as a product of natural influences, but as a higher God-sent power that determines the form of all man’s thinking and willing (“*animi motio et affectio, quæ divinitus data omnibus mentis voluntatisque actis divinam suam conciliat formam*”). Especially, Wendt conceives, is this sense to be retained in the case of the prophetic *ruach*. It is far from being a *contents* communicated to the prophets, whether of any sort of spirit-substance, or of any kind of ready-made knowledge, but is a *form* of thinking and looking



at things (*eine Denk- und Anschauungsform*); namely, the religiously elevated tone of mind (*Stimmung*), which apprehends and judges of the given relations according to the supreme principle of the religious covenant-relation between Jehovah and his people.

The communication of this transcendental *ruach* is promised by the prophets to the collective Israel of the hoped-for last time. Joel presents it as the prophetic *ruach*, in which all members of the nation attain the highest stage of religious knowledge (iii. 1): Zechariah as "a spirit of grace and supplication," that is, as the "prayerful disposition" which turns in believing and penitent trust to the previously despised and forsaken God of salvation (xii. 10); Ezekiel speaks of the "new spirit," which as renewed life-principle has as its effect the walking after the commandments and ordinances of God (xi. 10f.; xviii. 31; xxxvi. 26f.); Isaiah and the Deutero-Isaiah conceive it specially as "spirit of judgment," that is, as the attitude of purified moral life, which is in keeping with the unique relation of the people to God (iv. 4; xxxii. 15f.; xlii. 1). And the individual pious man may, as Psalm li. shows, express his longing after a deletion of his consciousness of guilt and after a strengthening of his life and walk before God in the prayer for renewal and preservation of this divine *ruach*, namely, the steadfast, candid, and humble character

(verse 12, *ruach nakhon*; verse 14, *ruach nedhibhah*; verse 19, *ruach nishberah*), which, together with the pure and unselfish mind (verse 12, *lebh tahor*; verse 19, *lebh nishbar*), is the mark of true piety and morality.

Lastly, at two passages there occurs the expression "spirit of the holiness of God" (Ps. li. 13; Is. lxiii. 10f.) where the more precise definition of the *ruach* in the attribute of holiness is placed by means of the suffix directly in relation to God. But the difficulty apparently herein involved is removed when we recollect, as Diestel has well pointed out, that the holiness of God is throughout not a simple idea of quality, but an idea of relation, which denotes the *belonging* in covenant to God. In this case the attribute indicates not the nature and peculiarity which the *ruach* itself has, but the relation brought about and established by it. The "spirit of God's holiness" is that spirit, which is the expression of belonging in covenant to God, and the departure of which is linked with the destruction that results from the withdrawal and alienation of God.

Exception may, perhaps, be taken to some of these views of Wendt, such as his assumption of "wind" as the original meaning of *ruach*, rather than "breath"; his conception of the mode in which the several senses are correlated to the different

elements involved in that primary meaning; his apparent exclusion of special gifts of knowledge from the sphere of the prophetic *ruach*, which is hardly consistent with his own statement that the *ruach* communicates “*auctas sapientis, ethici, religiosi ingenii virtutes;*” and individual details of his exegesis may be open to question. But it seems to us that he has fully made good his main position that *ruach* conveys especially the notion of efficacious power, whether it is applied to the life-spirit constituting and upholding the life of man in general, or to the dispositions and character that mould his thoughts and his action, or to the higher and more extraordinary Divine influence that empowers and impels men to the special work given to them to do.

When we turn to the Septuagint, which was the medium through which the Greek-speaking Jews received the Old Testament, we find that the word *ruach* is almost invariably rendered by *πνεῦμα*; while *basar* is differently rendered according to the different modifications of its use. In its original import of flesh pertaining to the body it is translated by *αἱ σάρκες* when the reference is to the parts of the body as still living, and by *τὰ κρέα* or *κρέατα* as regards the parts of animals slain. When the word denotes by synecdoche the whole body, the word is rendered sometimes by *τὸ σῶμα*, sometimes

by the singular ἡ σάρξ; but it is not easy to discover on what principle the choice proceeds. Wendt remarks that "as the word σῶμα, according to general Greek usage, denotes the organism, it is found in the Septuagint only at passages where the body comes mainly into view as respects form, especially as to its surface (Lev. vi. 3 (10); xv. 13, 16, 19; xxii. 6; Num. viii. 7; 1 Kings xxi. 27; Job vii. 5); but there is no reason at all for extending the rule to the effect that σῶμα stands *everywhere*, where the body as organised is meant, and σάρξ *only*, where the body was to be designated as material substance." And he adds: "The comparison of the two passages, 1 Kings xx. (xxi.) 27, and 2 Kings vi. 30, where the same expression *saq'-al-besaro* is rendered in the former case by σάκκος ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, in the latter by σάκκος ἐπὶ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ, shows plainly that σάρξ is employed quite synonymously with σῶμα. And a specially clear proof of this usage is furnished by the passage Wisd. Sol. vii. 2: ἐν κοιλίᾳ μητρὸς ἐγλύφην σάρξ, 'in my mother's womb I was formed into a body,' where σάρξ therefore denotes the body precisely as organised." It is to be borne in mind, moreover, that the translators have not always been careful as to the accuracy of their renderings, *e.g.*, at Gen. xxxvi. 6, where our version has, "And Esau took all the persons of his house," the Hebrew has *naphshoth*, "souls," but the

Septuagint has *σώματα*, "bodies." It is especially important to observe that, wherever *basar* is used in the signification of "creature," it is always rendered by the singular *σάρξ*, and the phrase *kol-basar* by *πᾶσα σάρξ*, the only exception noted by Wendt being Job v. 4, where the expression *βροτός* is used as a more free rendering.

We may add, before leaving Wendt at this point, that his investigation embraces an interesting review of the various passages in the New Testament writers other than St. Paul, where the terms *σάρξ* or *πνεῦμα* are used, and shows with skill and success how closely they follow the lines, and scarcely pass beyond the limits, of Old Testament precedent.

## VI.

## THE DIVINE PNEUMA.

LET us now turn to St. Paul, and first let us note the facts, or rather classes of facts, of which we have to take account. The facts themselves, scattered, though in unequal measure, throughout the letters of the Apostle, are most conveniently collected and marshalled for reference in the admirable Concordance of Bruder, or, for the English reader, by a necessarily more circuitous process in the Englishman's Concordance, or in the valuable work of Dr. Young. They are to be found gathered into groups and classified with the utmost care and precision in the Lexicons of Grimm and Cremer, each excellent in its kind, and both indispensable to the student of the Greek New Testament. With these helps I have drawn up a conspectus of the different shades of meaning or of use as regards the terms with which we are here concerned, which will be found in the Appendix, and to which we must refer the reader for details that could not be well introduced here.

Suffice it now to say that lexicographers recog-

nise the following uses of  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  in St. Paul's Epistles:—A: the flesh proper—the soft substance covering the bones—at any rate at 1 Cor. xv. 39, where the flesh of man is distinguished from that of beasts, fishes, and birds. B: by synecdoche of the part for the whole, the body designated from its main component element, or from that which lends to it its appearance. C: the medium of family or national *relationship* among men. D: human nature designated from its visible manifestation, or according to community of physical conditions and aspect, as in the case of the phrase—imitated from *kol-basar*— $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha \sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  for “all men.” E: the wider sense of an ethico-religious conception, in which it most frequently appears, and which forms the special peculiarity of Pauline usage now under investigation.

$\Pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  appears in a still greater variety of uses:—A: as the breath of the nostrils (2 Thess. ii. 8), but not with St. Paul as the life-spirit, the principle of life, in what is termed the physiological sense. B: as the mind or spirit of man, when contradistinguished from  $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$  or accompanied by a personal pronoun in the genitive. C: as the spiritual nature of Christ. D: as a divine power or influence belonging to God and communicated by Him in Christ—variously termed the Spirit of God or of Christ, or the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit—which is by far the most frequent use. E: as a power or influence,

the more precise character, manifestations or results of which are expressed by accompanying genitives of quality, such as *πνεῦμα πραότητος*, *πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας*, or are, in the absence of any such adjunct, left to be gathered from express or implied contrast, as is the case with the special antithesis now before us. F: the plural *πνεύματα* employed of the *χαρίσματα* or spiritual gifts. G: Powers or influences alien from, or adverse to, the *πνεῦμα* are expressed by the same term with some qualifying adjunct, such as *πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου*, *πνεῦμα δουλείας*.

Considerable light is thrown on the import of *σάρξ* by the use of the double adjectives formed from it, *σάρκινος* "fleshy, made of flesh," and *σαρκικός* "fleshly, belonging to, or determined by, the *σάρξ*;" and on that of *πνεῦμα* by the corresponding adjective *πνευματικός* "belonging to, or determined by the *πνεῦμα*." We shall note also in the Appendix the chief uses of *σῶμα*, *ψυχή*, *νοῦς*, and *καρδία*, as we shall have occasion to refer to their points of contact or contrast with the expressions more especially under our consideration.

We have already stated that in examining into the usage of a term by a particular writer it does not seem to us necessary to follow the process by which we trace the successive modifications undergone by it in the historical evolution of the language. We may get at the result by a shorter and not less



certain path. With the facts before us we may pass at once *in medias res*, and take our starting-point from what appears on the face of them to be the most prominent, definite, and frequently recurring of those facts, and apply it, at least provisionally, as a key to the grouping and explanation of the rest.

Now it is beyond all doubt that the first and most marked feature in the Pauline Epistles is the place assigned to *πνεῦμα*—the presence and action of the *πνεῦμα* in the Christian life. Let us endeavour, first, to ascertain what is the Apostle's most common and salient—and presumably therefore most characteristic—use of this expression. Now there can be as little doubt that the sense in which it oftenest recurs is that of the distinctive power or influence emanating from God and communicated to such as are Christ's, in virtue of which they become *πνευματικοί*—recipients and organs of the *πνεῦμα* (Gal. vi. 1; 1 Cor. ii. 13; iii. 1). At Rom. viii. 9, St. Paul says to his Christian readers in Rome: “Ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if so be that (*εἴπερ*) the Spirit of God dwelleth in you.” The state described as *ἐν πνεύματι* is contingent on, and is evidently constituted by, the indwelling of the *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ*; while the words that immediately follow imply that the possession of the *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* is a necessary and indispensable mark of such as are Christ's: “If any man have not the

Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." At 1 Thess. iv. 8, God is spoken of as "having given unto us (or "giving to you") his Holy Spirit," and at Gal. iv. 6 it is said: "God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts." It is admitted on all hands that the designations "Spirit of God," "Spirit of Christ," and "Holy Spirit," though primarily expressing different aspects or relations of the *πνεῦμα*, are practically interchangeable and in operation identical.

The expression *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ* (or more explicitly *τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ* in 1 Cor. ii. 12) occurs at least fourteen times; *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*, or *Κυρίου*, five times; *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* seventeen times; and, in addition to these, there are at least thirty other passages where the presence of the definite article with *πνεῦμα* or, in its absence, the tenor of the context clearly indicates that the expression likewise refers to the *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ* or *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*.

Considerable discussion, no doubt, has arisen as to the effect of the presence or absence of the article with *πνεῦμα*. Bishop Middleton maintains that, while the use of the article *κατ' ἐξοχήν* points to the unique dignity and personality of the Spirit—a question with which we are not now concerned—the anarthrous *πνεῦμα* must be held to relate to His influence or operation; and he lays down the rule that "in the acceptation of the 'Holy Spirit' *πνεῦμα* or *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* is never anarthrous, except indeed

in cases where other terms confessedly the most definite lose the article,"<sup>1</sup> that is to say, according to his view, after a preposition or an anarthrous noun. And Harless, following in the wake of an earlier view of Winer, takes up the ground that τὸ πνεῦμα denotes "naturam divinam ipsam," πνεῦμα "divinum spiritum quem possideas, aut divinae aurae particulam, quam intus habeas."<sup>2</sup> But Winer has, in the later editions of his Grammar, referred to various instances of πνεῦμα as falling under the category of the omission of the article before words, "which denote objects of which there is but one in existence, and which therefore are nearly equivalent to proper names."<sup>3</sup> In this view Fritzsche, Meyer, and Ellicott concur, and it seems the more probable; but for our present inquiry it is of little moment whether certain passages adduced refer to the objective Personal Spirit or to the manifestations of His power in man. It is enough that they are acknowledged on all hands to point to a new element which is distinctive of the Christian—which does not spring from himself, or belong to him in himself, but comes to him from God and abides in him as a divine gift and power. It is regarded throughout

<sup>1</sup> Doctrine of the Greek Article in the New Testament. 1841, p. 125 f.

<sup>2</sup> In his Commentary on Ephes. ii. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Grammar of New Testament Greek, translated by Dr. Moulton, p. 148.

by St. Paul as, even when indwelling in man and constituting the spring and sustaining force of the new life in him, a power conferred, communicated—not self-evolved or self-sustained.

To see that this is so, we have but to recall some of the Apostle's statements regarding it. 1st. That it is conceived of as objectively and essentially belonging to God, is obvious from the very modes of its designation which we have just enumerated, *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ* or *τοῦ Θεοῦ*, *τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον τοῦ Θεοῦ*, and—in the case of the shorter and most frequent name—at once by the epithet *ἅγιον*, which places it in a category by itself, and by the definite article, which posits it as objective and treats it as well known. 2nd. It is represented as issuing from God (1 Cor. ii. 12); as sent forth by Him (Gal. iv. 6); given (1 Thess. iv. 8; 2 Cor. i. 22, v. 5; Rom. v. 5); furnished (Gal. iii. 5); and correlatively men are said to receive it (1 Cor. ii. 12; Gal. iii. 2; Rom. viii. 15); to have it (1 Cor. vii. 40; Rom. viii. 9); to be filled with it (Eph. v. 18); to be led or impelled by it (Rom. viii. 14; Gal. v. 18); to live and walk in it, or by it (Gal. v. 16, 25); to grieve it (Eph. iv. 30). 3rd. It is represented as dwelling in men (Rom. viii. 9, 11; 1 Cor. iii. 16; vi. 19; 2 Tim. i. 14); as making intercession for them (Rom. viii. 26, 27); and as bearing conjoint witness with their spirits (Rom. viii. 16).

We do not now inquire how far these passages warrant, as they certainly seem to warrant, the inferences which the Church has drawn from them and from others of a like kind as to the nature and personality of the Holy Spirit; we adduce them simply as indicating, as clearly as language can indicate, the recognition of a divine element or factor in the Christian life—of a power acting *on* or *in* man, which God gives and man simply receives. And we are content to cite M. Reuss as a witness to the import of the facts, without accepting his attempt to explain what he calls the “duplication of the spiritual nature of man” in the last passage to which we have referred (Rom. viii. 16, 26) when he remarks: “It will hardly present any difficulty, when we consider it as the consequence of the principle that all the movements of the soul which tend to its salvation come to it directly from God, and that the *spirit* is nothing else than the organ of this communication, or rather the communication itself personified. It is in order, therefore, to affirm the divine origin of all the salutary aspirations of the Christian that these are ascribed to an agent, distinguished at once from the active faculties of human nature and from the person of God.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *La Bible: Épîtres Pauliniennes*, ii. p. 82. It is a duplication, “by means of which certain psychical facts, which result

If any one on the other hand desires to see what exegetical caprice may attempt in dealing with the plainest words of Scripture, let him take a specimen from an elaborate commentary lately issued on the Epistle to the Romans by Professor Oltramare<sup>1</sup> of Geneva. On Rom. v. 5: διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου τοῦ δοθέντος ἡμῖν he remarks that “πνεῦμα ἁγιον must be looked at here as something subjective, since it is said that ‘it has been given’ to the Christian; it has become his possession, it is in him.” On viii. 14: ὅσοι πνεύματι Θεοῦ ἄγονται he observes: “ἄγεσθαι—to be guided, moved, directed by, is said (*se dit*) of the inner sentiments, which are the determinants and motives of our conduct. If Paul had said simply πνεύματι ἄγονται, πνεῦμα would have denoted the mind (*esprit*) of the Christian as opposed to σάρξ or to σῶμα; and not only might Paul have expressed himself thus, but moreover this expression would fit in (*cadrait*) very well with the preceding proposition. . . . Paul has preferred to say ‘the Spirit of God’ because this manner of speaking gives more clearness to his affirmation. Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ, ‘the Spirit of God,’ which nevertheless from man’s natural dispositions, are ascribed to a distinct and foreign personality”! But, if M. Reuss is correct in his assumption as to the facts resulting from man’s natural dispositions, why should the Apostle have had recourse to a duplication, which appears to imply the very opposite?

<sup>1</sup> Commentaire sur l’Épître aux Romains, Genève, 1881-2.

belongs to God and animates Him, is looked at here in a subjective manner as possessed by the Christian." While on the following verse: "for ye received not the spirit of bondage . . . but ye received the spirit of adoption," he says that "some" (*les uns*—being the great majority of commentators!) "take the genitives as genitives of the effect—the spirit which gives, procures, slavery or adoption. But in that case it would need ὅτι 'because,' rather than γάρ; and moreover (*et puis*) Paul must (*devrait*) have remained at the objective point of view and have said: 'because the Spirit which has been given to you,' or 'which God has given to you' is a spirit, . . . rather than have passed to the subjective point of view of possession by saying: 'because the spirit *which you have received*,' . . . for in this point of view the gift takes precedence of the possession, this it is which makes sons of God"! "Paul speaks here from a subjective point of view (ἐλάβετε), and πνεῦμα is subjective." Now—to say nothing of the peculiar and misleading use of the term *subjective* as applied to statements which in their very terms imply an objective correlate, or of the gratuitous suggestions as to what it might have well or better beseeemed the Apostle to say, or of the singular sense assigned to the "Spirit of God" as the inner sentiments that animate man, or of the inconsistency between the view taken at v. 5 and

that held at viii. 15; the expression "which has been given" being treated as subjective where it actually stands, and postulated as objective where it does not stand, in the text—it is obvious that St. Paul's assertion that his readers had received the Spirit must be held to imply, 1st, the existence of such a spirit apart from, and prior to, its reception, and, 2nd, a giving, which was the counterpart of the receiving; and that the Apostle's language would not only be emptied of any real meaning, but would be calculated to confuse and mislead the reader, if all that he wished to say was that his Christian readers were in possession of, and were being guided by, their own inner sentiments! It is not at all probable that the Apostle would have felt himself moved to write his letter, if he had had nothing better worth saying than such a truism as this.

When we come to ask more specially the nature and action of this πνεῦμα, we cannot but be struck by its close and frequent association with the idea of *power*. Thus we find it at Rom. i. 4: "with power, according to the Spirit of holiness"; xv. 13: "through the power of the Holy Spirit"; xv. 19: "by the power of the Spirit of God"; 1 Cor. ii. 4: "in demonstration of the Spirit and of power"; Gal. iii. 5: "he that ministereth (ἐπιχορηγῶν) to you the Spirit, and worketh miracles (δυνάμεις) among you"; Eph. iii. 16: "to be strengthened with might (δυνάμει)



by his Spirit in the inner man"; 1 Thess. i. 5 : "our gospel came to you . . . . in power and in the Holy Spirit"; 2 Tim. i. 7 : "For God hath not given to us the spirit of fear, but of power." And not only are the words thus closely associated; they are, it would seem, even interchanged. At 1 Cor. vi. 14 : "God will also raise up us by his own power," and 2 Cor. xiii. 4 : "we shall live with him by the power of God toward you," the resurrection and quickening of life are represented as accomplished by the power of God alone; while at Rom. viii. 11 we find the same results attributed to "the Spirit"; and there can be little doubt that at 1 Cor. v. 4, as Wendt has pointed out, the expression, "with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ," is employed to designate the Spirit of God simply because of the word *πνεῦμα* being already twice used immediately before (in verses 3 and 4) of the human spirit.

It is to be noted, further, that the word chosen by St. Paul to designate the special operation of the Spirit—*ἐνεργεῖν*—denotes distinctly active power, power at work, as Cremer has well put it: not mere ability to accomplish anything, but efficacious action, power in active exercise. "Inward working" is the great function, if we may so speak, of the Spirit, 1 Cor. xii. 11 : "but all these worketh (*ἐνεργεῖ*) the one and the same Spirit." Compare the statement immediately before at verse 6 with reference to

God's operative agency in spiritual gifts: "And there are diversities of workings (*διαίρέσεις ἐνεργημάτων*), but the same God, who worketh all things in all"; and the more general proposition at Phil. ii. 14: "For it is God that worketh in you both to will and to work" (*ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ θέλει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν*). We find repeated reference to the same pneumatic energy in the kindred expressions, Eph. iii. 20: *κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἐνεργομένην ἐν ἡμῖν* (comp. with verse 6, noted above); Col. i. 29: *κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐνεργομένην ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐν δυνάμει*; 2 Thess. i. 11: *πληρώση . . . ἔργον πιστέως ἐν δυνάμει* (mightily). In this connection Wendt calls special attention to the passages where the "spirit" is opposed to the "letter" (Rom. ii. 29; vii. 6; 2 Cor. iii. 6); for in these the *πνεῦμα* comes into view simply as effective power in contradistinction to the of itself ineffective letter.

Along with the idea of power we find that of *life* brought into frequent and close relation to the *πνεῦμα*; at Rom. viii. 2: "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus"; viii. 6: "the mind of the Spirit is life and peace"; viii. 11: "the Spirit is life"; 13: "he that raised up Jesus . . . shall quicken (*ζωοποιήσει*) your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you"; 1 Cor. xv. 45: "the last Adam became a life-giving Spirit"; 2 Cor. iii. 6:

“the Spirit giveth life”; Gal. v. 25: “If we live in the Spirit”; Gal. vi. 8: “He that soweth to the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting.”

A further characteristic of this *πνεῦμα* is, that it is the common possession of the Church and the members of the Church. It is not a gift partially or occasionally distributed, but an essential element and mark of the Christian life. It is not, from St. Paul’s point of view, chiefly an ecstatic-apocalyptic illapse, but the main-spring and motive power of all Christian action. At Rom. viii. 9 he says absolutely: “If any man hath not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his;” at 1 Cor. iii. 16 he asks his readers: “Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?” At vi. 11, contrasting their present Christian position with their former state of vice, he says: “And such were some of you; but ye were washed, were sanctified, were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God”; and still more explicitly does he bring all into common relation to the Spirit, when at xiii. 13 he affirms: “In one Spirit were we all baptised into one body, whether Jews or Greeks, whether bond or free; and were all made to drink of one Spirit.” So too in writing to the Ephesians he describes all his Christian readers as “sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise” (i. 13; iv. 30). And not only are all

represented as partaking of the Spirit, but it is repeatedly stated that it is one and the same Spirit that manifests itself under divers forms. The sameness, the unity of the Spirit is the point specially emphasized in the section of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, where the Apostle discusses the *χαρίσματα* (xii. 4-13). He enforces his entreaty that the Ephesians should "give diligence to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace" by the distinct affirmation: "There is one body and one Spirit" (w, 3, 4) (~~xii~~<sup>xii</sup>, 3, 14); and the same thought of necessity underlies "the fellowship of the Spirit," which the Apostle presupposes at Phil. ii. 1, and "the communion of the Holy Spirit," which he desires may be "with all," at 2 Cor. xiii. 13.

But while the identity of the Spirit operative in all is thus strongly affirmed, not less is the diversity of the forms and modes of operation explicitly recognised. This diversity appears under two main aspects—that of a difference of gifts bearing on the edification of the Church in the different members on whom they are bestowed; and that of a difference of functions, bearing on the formation and growth of the Christian life in the individual. In the organic unity of the Church the various members have not the same office; and St. Paul, in the great section which he has devoted to the treatment of this subject with special relation to the state of things

in the Corinthian Church, clearly proclaims the principle that the variety of the gifts and the diversity of their distribution have reference to the needs of the Church, and that their use is to be governed by a regard to the ends to which they are thus subservient (xii. 7 : " To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit to profit withal "). But while he enumerates in 1 Cor. xii. 4-12 the several kinds of gifts that thus cooperate for the service of the Church, he points out in the fourteenth chapter that even the most important among them—the speaking with tongues—is of little value unless associated with other gifts of a more practical kind.

In the case of the individual believer, on the other hand, the agency of the Spirit is presented as the means of carrying out the divine purpose and realising the aim of the Christian calling. It is the Spirit that enables him to confess the divine mission of Christ (1 Cor. xii. 3 : " No one can say, Jesus is Lord, but in the Holy Spirit "); to call upon God as Father (Gal. iv. 6 : " God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father "; Rom. viii. 15); to have the consciousness of sonship (Rom. viii. 16 : " The Spirit beareth witness with our spirits that we are children of God "); to know the love of God shed abroad in our hearts (Rom. v. 5), the peace and joy thence resulting (Rom. xiv. 17 ; 1 Thess. i. 6), and the hope that putteth

not to shame (Rom. v. 5 ; Rom. xv. 13 : " Now the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope in the power of the Holy Spirit " ; Gal. v. 5 : " For we through the Spirit of faith wait for the hope of righteousness " ). The Spirit is the new motive principle of Christian action, whereby believers are led (Rom. viii. 14 ; Gal. v. 18) ; so that, renewed in the spirit of their mind (Eph. iv. 23), and become new creatures in Christ Jesus (2 Cor. v. 17), they are enabled to serve in newness of the Spirit (Rom. vii. 6), and their life is described as a walking after, or according to, the Spirit (Rom. viii. 4, 5 ; Gal. v. 16-25). Sanctification is especially associated with the Spirit (2 Thess. ii. 13 : " God chose you from the beginning unto salvation in sanctification of the Spirit " ; Rom. xv. 16 : " that the offering of the Gentiles might be made acceptable, being sanctified by the Holy Spirit " ) ; and the fruit of the Spirit is declared to be " love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance " (Gal. v. 22).

Such are the chief characteristics of the Spirit's influence and operation as set forth by St. Paul. Who can fail to see in them a close and striking affinity to the leading features of Old Testament usage ? It is obvious at a glance that St. Paul proceeds on the great lines which the Old Testament

had laid down. The two most conspicuous marks of the *ruach*—supernatural power and God-given life—are reproduced in the Pauline *πνεῦμα*, but in such a form as might naturally be expected under the altered circumstances, with adaptation, in other words, to the more comprehensive range and fuller contents of the Christian conception. When we speak of St. Paul having followed in the line of Old Testament precedent, we do not, of course, mean that he has simply taken up and echoed its language with all the limitations or peculiarities of its original use. This would hardly have been possible for any one writing after an interval of several centuries, and least of all for a man of such fertility of resource and force of character as St. Paul—to say nothing of what he has himself told us as to the source whence he received his gospel. What the Apostle actually exhibits is such a use of the language already consecrated in the Old Testament to the expression of kindred ideas as unmistakably indicates its community of origin and affinity of import, and at the same time bespeaks the difference as well as the resemblance of the standpoint from which it is applied.

The *πνεῦμα* of St. Paul is the *ruach* of the Old Testament, conceived as manifesting itself after a manner analogous to, but transcending, its earlier forms. It bears the same characteristic marks of

divine origin, of supernatural power, of motive energy in active exercise—standing in intimate relation to the fuller religious life and distinctive character and action of its recipients. But, while in the Old Testament it is partial, occasional, intermittent, here it is general, constant, pervading. While in the Old Testament, as well as in the New, its forms of manifestation are diverse, they are expressly referred under the New to one and the same Spirit. While in the Old Testament they contemplate mainly the official equipment of men for special work given to them to perform, they include under the New the inward energy of moral action in the individual no less than the gifts requisite for the edification of the Church; they embrace the whole domain of the religious life in the believer and in the community to which he belongs. The *πνεῦμα* of the Apostle is not the life-breath of man as originally constituted a creature of God; but it is the life-spirit of the *καινὴ κτίσις*, in which all things have become new.

But we are disposed to go farther and to say that not only did the Apostle find in the Old Testament the language which he could thus appropriate and employ in an ampler usage and fuller meaning; but he found there also his warrant and encouragement to give to it this wider scope, to put into it this new and richer significance. For the prophets had,



under the influence of their *ruach*, not merely announced the larger effusion of the Spirit as a special characteristic of the Messianic period, but had also not obscurely foreshadowed some of the marks that it was to bear. Whatever of outward extension or of inward transformation the idea has undergone in St. Paul's hands was to some extent anticipated, and had its way prepared, in various utterances that could not but be familiar to him. A glance at some of these may suffice at once to make good our statement, and at the same time to show how little there is either need of, or foundation for, Pfeiderer's attempt to explain the transition in St. Paul's mind from the *πνεῦμα* viewed as an "ecstatic-apocalyptic principle" to the *πνεῦμα* viewed as the "immanent religious-moral life-principle of renewed humanity." We have already stated that Pfeiderer has recourse to this suggestion in order to account for the specially ethical character of the work of the Spirit as conceived by St. Paul; but that, while he repeatedly puts it forward, he has not given either sufficient grounds for assuming such a transmutation to have taken place, or an adequate rationale of the logical or psychological process by which it has been brought about.

The true nature of St. Paul's doctrine as to the Spirit is to be got from an induction of his teaching as a whole, and not from mere occasional allusions to one

aspect of it, or even from an isolated section of a single Epistle handling that aspect, which are gratuitously assumed to represent its earlier form. Pfleiderer takes for granted that there was a traditional doctrine whence St. Paul might have got his original conception of the Messianic *πνεῦμα* received in baptism as being simply a source of miraculous gifts; but neither he nor any one else—such as Weiss, who throughout lays undue stress on the *πνεῦμα* in the primitive Church as the medium of official endowment—has adduced adequate warrant for so narrow a conception of the Spirit's office. No doubt the passage in the prophecy of Joel which is quoted by St. Peter as finding its fulfilment in the special manifestations of the day of Pentecost, contemplates the effusion of the Spirit as accompanied by numerous and varied expressions of an ecstatic and apocalyptic type; but even in its case we may hardly assume that the specified phenomena of vision and prophecy were meant to be either the universal or the exclusive forms of the Spirit's action. They were marks of the presence and operation of the Spirit, by which it might be conspicuously signalled; but they were not necessarily the essential or the sole marks of that presence. The universality of the promise at the beginning: "I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh," and of the assurance at the end that "whosoever shall

call on the name of the Lord shall be saved," can hardly be conceived as having its import exhausted by such visible and audible tokens of ecstatic power—to say nothing of the argument that, from the very nature of the case, the bestowal of such powers on all would seem to deprive them of distinctive value or special significance.

Besides, it appears plain from the accounts in the Book of Acts that these gifts were not regarded as pertaining to all the members of the Church as such. For, if so, why are they singled out for specification and brought into prominence as distinctive characteristics of their possessors? If all had the spiritual gift of wisdom, why should the choice of the Seven have been based on the recognition of that gift? If all might prophecy, why was there a special category of *προφῆται*? The prayer of the assembled Church (Acts iv. 30) asks for freedom of utterance in the preaching of the word, and for an accompaniment of that preaching with miraculous gifts of healing. If these gifts had been the common possession of the Church, why should they have been made the object of special prayer? The next verse, which records the answer to that prayer, tells us that all were filled with the Holy Spirit and spake the word with boldness; but it does not say anything of all being furnished with the power of authenticating their word by signs and wonders.

But, whatever may be said of the import of the passage in Joel, it has, as Wendt has urged, simply the value of a single characteristic trait in the far more richly detailed picture which is drawn of the Spirit of God in the future. He calls attention to the fact that it is really in the older historical books, especially in the book of Judges, that the divine Spirit is chiefly conceived of in this ecstatic form; that in the prophetic books there appear but slight traces of such a conception at passages quite isolated; and that here the prophetic effects of the Spirit in the narrower sense of the term, which are by no means always of an ecstatic-apocalyptic character, fall very much into the shade as compared with other purely ethico-religious effects, which are specially ascribed to the Messianic King and to the Church of the expected last time. "As the picture of the Messianic King assumes different shapes in different prophets, and as special traits are woven into it by each according to the different circumstances under which he writes, so is the thought of a future Messianic communication of the Spirit differently presented by the leading prophets, as different operations of that Spirit are contemplated. For St. Paul Old Testament prophecy could only come into account as a *closed whole*;" and the impression made on him must have been the effect of the whole rather than of any single passage.

Wendt is disposed to lay some stress on the "spirit of judgment" more than once mentioned in Isaiah (iv. 4; xxviii. 26) as such an ethical conception; but, however this may be, there can be little doubt as to the ethical character of the connection in the well-known passage as to the Servant of Jehovah, the Mediator and organ of Israel's restoration, Is. xlii. 1: "Behold my servant whom I uphold, mine elect in whom my soul delighteth; I have put my Spirit upon him; he shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles," where most expositors are disposed to take the word *mishpat*, rendered "judgment," as equivalent to "religion as God's ordinance." Delitzsch paraphrases the clauses thus: "I have endowed him with my Spirit, in virtue of which he will bring forth far beyond the circle in which he finds himself placed, even unto the Gentiles, the absolute divine law (*Recht*). So the true religion is here designated, taken on its practical side as rule and standard for life in all its relations—religion as an ordinance of life, *νόμος*." M. Reuss, who translates: "I put my Spirit in him in order that he may impart to the peoples what is just," remarks: "the expression 'what is just' would be translated in modern language by '*that which is true and good*,' the unity and sovereignty of God and His holy will." "He shall bring forth," it is added, "judgment (religion) according to truth; he shall not fail nor be

discouraged till he have set judgment (religion) in the earth, and the isles shall wait for his law (teaching).” In this prophetic announcement, the application of which to Christ is expressly vouched to us by the Evangelist Matthew (xii. 18-20), the special end for which the Servant of Jehovah receives the Spirit is to promote the diffusion throughout the world, outside of Israel, of the true religion as a rule of life. The same ideas of righteousness and peace are associated with the Spirit at Is. xxxii. 15-17: “Until the Spirit be poured upon us from on high. . . . Then judgment shall dwell in the wilderness, and righteousness [or justice] remain in the fruitful field. And the work of righteousness shall be peace; and the effect of righteousness quietness and assurance for ever.” And—to say nothing of the form of the promise in Zech. xii. 10: “And I will pour upon the house of David, and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the Spirit of grace [or of prayer] and of supplication,” as pointing to that action of the Spirit in prayer to which St. Paul more than once makes reference (Rom. viii. 15, 26; Gal. iv. 6)—what can more definitely or explicitly describe the very character and functions of Paul’s *ethical πνεῦμα* renewing and consecrating the life than the two memorable passages of Ezekiel, xi. 19, 20: “And I will give them one heart, and I will put a new spirit within you; and I will take the stony heart

out of their flesh, and will give them an heart of flesh ; that they may walk in my statutes, and keep mine ordinances and do them, and they shall be my people, and I will be their God," and xxxvi. 26, 27 : " A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you ; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes ; and ye shall keep my judgments and do them." All these passages relate, quite as much as that of Joel, to the communication of the Spirit that was to take place in the Messianic time ; and why should they not equally have tended to mould the conception of the Spirit which St. Paul could not but regard as their fulfilment ? The Apostle had no need or occasion to remodel the idea of Spirit which he traditionally inherited, or to alter its contents while he gave to it a wider application ; and Pfeleiderer's hypothetical process of accounting for the transition from the one phase of the Spirit's efficacy to the other must be pronounced ingenious, but at the same time quite unnecessary.

We have thus found from an induction of the leading facts presented in the Apostle's letters that the chief sense in which the term *πνεῦμα* is used by him is that of the divine power or influence given to man or dwelling in him, whereby he is enabled to

live unto God or specially qualified for God's service; and we have seen that for this use the Old Testament furnished both precedent and warrant. This divine life-principle may be conceived of in some cases objectively as an influence operating *on* man, and in others subjectively as an energy operating *in* man, while in yet other passages it seems clearly to point to a Personal Source whence the power emanates and by which it is directed; but in all instances it denotes an element or factor not belonging to man as such, but originating apart from him, coming to him, and maintained in him as a divine gift. Now this predominant use, in keeping with that which St. Paul inherited in the Old Testament, may be most naturally assumed to have been uppermost in his thoughts, and to have imparted its prevailing colour to his language, even where it is not so explicitly and directly marked. The presumption is that other passages, where *πνεῦμα* occurs apart from more precise indication of its character as divine, will reflect the influence of the same ruling idea and bear the impress of the same Old Testament mould; and the burden of showing that the Apostle has in these cases deviated from the prevailing usage must rest on those who assume such a deviation.

Now, we can have little hesitation in holding that this presumption ought to govern the interpretation



of the passages that fall under class E, where *πνεῦμα* is accompanied by genitives of quality, defining more precisely the character, manifestations, or results of the power or influence so designated, such as Rom. viii. 2 : *νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ*, Rom. viii. 15 : *ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας*, 2 Cor. iv. 13 : *ἔχοντες τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα τῆς πίστεως*, 1 Cor. iv. 21 and Gal. vi. 1 : *πνεύματι πραότητος*, Eph. i. 17 : *πνεῦμα σοφίας καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως*, 2 Tim. i. 7 : *πνεῦμα δυνάμεως καὶ ἀγάπης καὶ σωφροτισμοῦ*. It may be that in most of these passages the *πνεῦμα* is conceived as a possession of the Christian ; but it is a possession that presupposes a reception and that rests on a bestowal ; and its real character as a gift is not thereby affected.

No doubt, if we had simply encountered such an expression as *πνεῦμα πραότητος* apart from the others that have genitival adjuncts, we might have probably regarded it as equivalent to *πνεῦμα πραῦ καὶ ἡσύχιον*—a “meek disposition or temper” as an attribute of man. But, when we find the Apostle speaking of “the law of the Spirit of life in Christ,” and of “the Spirit of wisdom and revelation,” we cannot hesitate to recognise that we have to do with something other than a mere periphrasis for a faculty or a disposition of man ; and we cannot share the surprise expressed by M. Oltramare when, in reference to the former phrase, he declares his astonish-

ment that all commentators ancient and modern, “except Koellner and Glöckler,” should have without any proof and *a priori* given it “the sense of the Holy Spirit instead of referring it to man.” No proof is needed of a use in entire keeping with the Apostle’s ruling thought; but, if we needed any, we should find it in the fact that here too the Apostle follows the analogy of the Old Testament, where we often encounter the like expressions, such as “the spirit of wisdom” (Ex. xxviii. 3; xxxi. 3 of Bezaleel: “And I have filled him with the Spirit of God in wisdom and in understanding;” xxxv. 31; Is. xi. 2: “And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord,”) and find them brought, as in the two passages we have quoted, into direct relation to the Spirit of God.

There are not a few cases in which *πνεῦμα* is used without a genitive of origin, or property, or specific character on the one hand, and without any possessive or adjective pronoun attached to it on the other, where its import is left to be gathered in the light of its more definite employment elsewhere. At Gal. v. 25: *εἰ ζῶμεν πνεύματι, πνεύματι καὶ στοιχῶμεν*, 2 Cor. xii. 18: *οὐ τῶ αὐτῆ πνεύματι περιπατήσαμεν*; 1 Cor. xii. 13: *ἐν ἐνὶ πνεύματι*, and other similar cases, there is a strong, nay, an

overwhelming probability that the Apostle employs the word in the same sense, as he had already stamped upon it sufficiently to place it beyond risk of being misapprehended, and beyond need of further definition. Accordingly Grimm has expressed the judgment of a calm and dispassionate exegesis, when he says, with reference to both sets of passages of which we have been speaking: “quibus omnibus locis etsi de spiritu *generatim* dicatur, tamen e contextis facile patet, intelligi spiritum a divino spiritu genitum aut ab ipso divino spiritu nihil diversum.”<sup>1</sup>

We have thus shown the source and import of the expression *πνεῦμα*, so far as the principal use of it by the Apostle is concerned. Before passing on to consider its further application, it may be well to advert to two questions that have a collateral bearing on that which we have been discussing. And the first of these relates to the import of the passages which we have placed under group G, where powers or influences alien from, or adverse to, the divine *πνεῦμα* are designated by the same term with some qualifying adjunct, after a fashion which might seem to favour the view that *πνεῦμα* is a neutral generic term, dependent for its more precise definition—its good or evil connotation—on the context. There are seven or eight such passages:—1 Cor. ii. 12: *ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου ἐλάβομεν*, 2

<sup>1</sup> Lexicon Græco-Lat. in Nov. Test. s. v. *πνεῦμα*, p. 359.

Cor. xi. 4: ἡ πνεῦμα ἕτερον λαμβάνετε; Rom. viii. 15: οὐ γὰρ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα δουλείας, 1 Tim. iv. 1: προσέχοντες πνεύμασι πλάνοις, 2 Tim. i. 7: οὐ γὰρ ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ Θεὸς πνεῦμα δειλίας, Eph. ii. 2: τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ νῦν ἐνεργοῦντος ἐν τοῖς υἱοῖς τῆς ἀπειθείας, Eph. vi. 12: πρὸς τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις, Rom. xi. 8: πνεῦμα κατανύξεως, where we meet, at least hypothetically, the idea of influences opposed to that of God. But it is to be observed with regard to the first four of these instances that the statements are couched in the *negative* form. The Apostle tells his readers that they had *not* received a πνεῦμα of the nature indicated; and it is obvious that the conceptions negatived are simply formed after the analogy of the positive counterpart with which they are placed in contrast. The Apostle makes no affirmation as to the *real* existence of that which Christians have *not* received.

It is otherwise with the remaining passages, where he speaks of powers now at work in the children of disobedience, and of the "spiritual powers of wickedness in heavenly places," in such a way that he must be taken to affirm their existence. But, as Wendt points out, this conception of supernatural spirits of evil at work in the world stands likewise in immediate relation to the Old Testament usage. We find various instances of a *ruach* of this sort conceived even as issuing from, or dependent on,

God, in so far as He permits its operation and thereby makes men subservient to his ends (Judges, ix. 23; 1 Sam. xvi. 14-16, 23; xviii. 10; 1 Kings xxii. 21 ff.; Is. xix. 14; and xxix. 10—the passage quoted at Rom. xi. 8); and we may very well hold that “both in the Old Testament, and with St. Paul, the conception of such a spirit opposed to the divine Spirit is only formed in analogy to, and dependence on, the latter idea,” just as throughout the Old Testament all evil is subordinate to the divine sovereignty and works out the divine purposes.

The other question has reference to the value of the grounds assigned by Holsten and Pfeiderer for their position that the Pauline use of *πνεῦμα* implies a conception of *material substance*, of a non-earthly, finer, luminous or lustrous substance, which is given forth by God to men, and which, when so communicated, produces in them pneumatic effects. No such conception seems to attach to the Old Testament *ruach*, which is essentially a principle of power and life. Is there any reason for assuming its presence in the case of St Paul?

The following are the passages adduced in support of their view:—1 Cor. xv. 40 ff.; ii. 12; Gal. iv. 6; Rom. v. 5; 2 Cor. iii. 18; iv. 6. Wendt appears to us to have effectually disposed of the arguments based on them. As regards the section of the First Corinthian Epistle dealing with the question of the

future or resurrection body, he has shown<sup>1</sup> that, according to the connection, *σῶμα πνευματικόν* denotes not a body which consists of pneumatic substance, but a body which contains and is animated by a divine *πνεῦμα*. At 1 Cor. ii. 12, and Gal. iv. 6, the *πνεῦμα* is said to be “received” and “sent forth” respectively; but there is nothing to indicate that what was communicated or received was anything *material*; and, as Wendt remarks, if the Apostle desired to speak of non-material power, there were no words at his disposal except those which, under other circumstances, might be used of the communication of that which is material. At Rom. v. 5: “the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which is given to us,” it may be allowed that the expression *ἐκκέχυται*—although used strictly of the love of God, while the Spirit is said to be given—is really applicable to the idea of *πνεῦμα*; but the conception comes from the Old Testament, as in the case of the prophecy of Joel (iii. 1 f.) and of that of Isaiah liv. 3: “I will pour water upon him that is thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground; I will pour my spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine offspring.” At the former passage Wendt is of opinion, as we saw, that the metaphor was suggested to the prophet by the previous mention of rain (ii. 23); and at the latter, if “spirit” is held to be a

<sup>1</sup> See a summary of his discussion in the Appendix.

substance, "blessing" in the parallel clause must also be deemed a substance, for it too is *poured* forth. And, in answer to the objection that the Spirit must be conceived of substantially in order to be apprehended under the figure of substantial water, Wendt adduces the repeated use of the same verb to denote the effusion of the Divine *anger* (Is. xlii. 25 ; Jer. x. 25 ; Ezek. xxii. 22 ; Hos. v. 10 ; Ps. lxix. 24) where there will hardly be any disposition to maintain that the wrath of God is conceived of as a definite supernatural substance.

As regards the other two texts brought forward, namely, 2 Cor. iii. 18, and iv. 6, the second : " God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ," does not make any mention of the Spirit ; and it is relevant only in so far as it seems to continue or resume the reference to the *δόξα* presented in the former : " But we all with unveiled face reflecting as a mirror (or beholding as in a mirror) the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory." Here the *δόξα* is conceived as the radiance of light which forms the substance of the *πνεῦμα*. But Wendt has shown that this passage can only be rightly understood in the light of the connection to which it belongs ; and he gives the following exposition of its import. •

“ The Apostle finds himself compelled, by the personal attacks made upon him, to explain on what he founds his authority as Apostle (iii. 1). He first remarks that the Church in Corinth had little need of other proof of this authority, seeing that its own existence was the best evidence thereof (iii. 2, 3). But thereupon he chooses a yet higher point of view ; and bases all his authority not on his *person*, but on his divine *calling* (4, 5). He points to the incomparable dignity of the *contents* of his calling (verse 6), in order thence to deduce, in the sequel of his exposition (iii. 7—iv. 6) the greatness of the authority, which belongs to this calling as such. The dignity of the *contents* of his New Testament calling is established by a comparison of the New Testament with the Old. The one consists in the *γράμμα*, having no power dwelling in it of itself, and so leading to death ; the other consists in the *πνεῦμα*, which is in itself power, and leads to life. And now he proves the greater *authority* of the New Testament calling by an inference *a minori ad majus* ; if the calling in the case of the Old Testament, which had reference to a mere death-bringing *γράμμα*, possessed a high authority, how much higher must be the authority of the calling in the case of the New, which had reference to a power of God ! The authority of the Old is symbolised in the brightness, the *δόξα*, which shone from the face of Moses (Exod. xxxiv. 29 ff.) ; and



this suggests [*im Anschlusse daran*] the describing the authority of the New Testament calling also as a δόξα—a brightness, which shines forth from the organs of the New Testament revelation.

The whole detailed illustration that follows down to iv. 6 is controlled in its figurative mode of expression by the retrospective reference to that Old Testament account. The Apostle sees a mark of the lower value of the δόξα of the Old Testament in the fact that this δόξα needed a veil, which had merely the object of concealing from the eyes of the Israelites the null and finite character of the Old Testament, based on its nature as γράμμα (verses 13-15). But the δόξα of the New Testament—that is, figure apart, the authority and value which that revelation of God has as such—needed no such veil, because there were no limits of the δόξα to be here concealed; for Christ, the bearer of the New Testament revelation, is—in contrast to the γράμμα—the life-creating πνεῦμα, the constantly operative power of God (verse 17). If then the lustre of the δόξα of Christ is free from all veil, it can throw its light unhindered on all who look at it, and be reflected by these in equal clearness. From the δόξα of Christ—which is the expression of his πνεῦμα, of his divine power—there arises consequently a δόξα of the Apostles of Christ; both present (*gewähren*) the same *appearance* (τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα), for both are bearers of the same pneumatic

power (verse 18), and, as Christ himself puts forth his δόξα unveiled, so may the Apostles put forth the like δόξα—that is, the divine authority of their calling—unveiled in presence of the churches (iv. 1-6).

If we take iii. 18 rightly as a link in this chain of thought, there can be no doubt that there is no sufficient reason here for assuming a materiality of the πνεῦμα. It comes into view only as *efficacious power of God* overagainst the dead letter; and the δόξα is simply the figurative expression—originating in a clearly recognisable occasion—for the *apparent value* of this divine power. Of a substantiality in any respect there is no mention; in particular, the transformation which is mentioned, is indicated by express addition as a transformation, *not of matter*, but of *aspect* (*des Ausschens*). Even if we should assume that the δόξα of the face of Moses were originally conceived of as a luminous matter, from which issues a radiant effect, in the transference to Christ and the Apostles the δόξα is to be held a figure, not for an analogous *matter* which exists in these, but for the analogous *effect* which issues from them. But we need not even at all concede that the δόξα signifies in general luminous matter; for this hypothesis would only rest on a reasoning in a circle, of which Lüdemann has made himself guilty, when he says (p. 21 f.) that “frequently δόξα seems to denote a finer

luminous matter, which belongs to the *πνεῦμα*," and when he simply from this *semblance* draws the conclusion that "*consequently πνεῦμα* is at the same time expressive of a higher materiality." The *semblance* that *δόξα* is a luminous substance, arises simply from the fact that there is an inclination *a priori* to ascribe to the *πνεῦμα*, whose *δόξα* is in question, a substantial nature ; for other reasons cannot give rise to such a *semblance*, seeing that the conception of *δόξα* nowhere else betrays a material sense. We cannot therefore, at anyrate, well deduce from this *semblance* of materiality of the *δόξα* the materiality in its turn of the *πνεῦμα*.

Whether we may or may not assent to this ingenious interpretation of Wendt, it is obvious that we cannot lay stress on an alleged import of an ambiguous and apparently metaphorical expression as warranting a view for which nothing more substantial can be adduced.

## VII.

## THE HUMAN PNEUMA.

WE have still to consider another set of passages, in which *πνεῦμα* appears to be used of the mind or spirit of man, of the inward self-conscious power which feels, thinks, and wills. There is, first, the passage 1 Cor. ii. 11, where the knowledge which the Spirit of God has of the deep things of God is illustrated by the analogous knowledge which man's spirit has of what pertains to man: "for who among men knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of the man which is in him." Then at Rom. viii. 16 the spirit of man seems expressly contradistinguished from the Spirit of God, which is represented as bearing witness with, or to, our spirit. In ten other passages *πνεῦμα* is accompanied by a personal pronoun in the genitive, or an adjectival personal pronoun: "my spirit, thy spirit, your spirit," whereby it is marked as a possession or property of man, which he may fairly speak of as his own (Rom. i. 9; 1 Cor. v. 4; xvi. 18; 2 Cor. vii. 13; ~~xi.~~ xi. 13; 1 Thess. v. 23). In four of these the

personal spirit is placed in the relation of the object or recipient of the divine grace in Christ (Gal. vi. 15: "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ be with your spirit;" Phil. iv. 23; Philem. 23; 2 Tim. iv. 22). At 1 Thess. v. 23 the *πνεῦμα* is not only accompanied by the personal pronoun *ὑμῶν*, but is correlated with the *ψυχὴ* and *σῶμα* of man; "may your spirit, and soul, and body be preserved entire, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." Lastly, in four or five passages *πνεῦμα* is placed in contrast with *σῶμα* (or with *σάρξ*) under circumstances which most naturally suggest the other side of human nature proper—something which equally with man's body may be said to belong to him (1 Cor. v. 3; vii. 34; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Col. ii. 5; Rom. viii. 10).

How are these passages to be explained? Holsten, in keeping with his view as to the Pauline conception of *πνεῦμα* as a divine element that only becomes immanent in man with and through Christ, maintains—notwithstanding the adjuncts that appear to point to something belonging to man in virtue of his nature—that in all these instances the *πνεῦμα* spoken of is not a "human-creaturely spirit," or an organ in man corresponding to, and receptive of, the divine Spirit, but the divine *πνεῦμα* itself regarded as immanent in man and, as it were, subjectively appropriated. This view has the merit of con-

sistency ; but it rests on a forced exegesis, which has failed to commend itself to any of the writers who have succeeded him. That at 1 Cor. ii. 11 the *πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* is to be identified with the *πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου* of the 12th verse, notwithstanding the circumstance that the Apostle says of the latter that he had *not* received it ; or that at Rom. viii. 16 the *πνεῦμα ἡμῶν* is to be identified with the *πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας*, the transcendent divine Spirit of ver. 15, so that the witness is borne by the divine Spirit objective along with, or to, the same divine Spirit subjective : or that at Gal. vi. 18 and elsewhere the spirit for which the Apostle wishes the presence of Christ's grace is the divine Spirit already indwelling in the believer—are suggestions not only at variance with the most obvious and natural construction of the words, but of a far-fetched and artificial character, under which the Apostle's meaning is reduced to a minimum, if not to a mere play on words.

Nor does it seem to us that the view of Weiss—though not liable to so strong objections as that of Holsten—meets adequately the circumstances of all the cases. He conceives that “ *πνεῦμα* in the specific sense has no place in the Pauline psychology,” although he grants that at some places (such as 1 Cor. v. 5 ; Col. ii. 5) St. Paul follows a popular *usus loquendi*, according to which *πνεῦμα* would

be substantially synonymous with  $\psi\chi\acute{\iota}$ ; but he holds that  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  is only ascribed to regenerate Christians, and that, where  $\tau\acute{o}$   $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$   $\eta\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$  is used, what is meant is the new spiritual life wrought in us by the Spirit. He maintains that at several of the passages to which Schmidt and Wendt appeal as proofs of the ordinary anthropological sense of  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  (such as 1 Cor. xvi. 18: "they refreshed my spirit and yours," 2 Cor. vii. 13: "his spirit (that of Titus) hath been refreshed by you all," 2 Cor. ii. 13: "I had no relief for my spirit") the reference is to *religious* relations—not by any means to states and moods of the natural mental life, but to such as pertain to the persons in question simply and solely in the sphere of their *Christian life as such*, and that the same explanation applies to Gal. vi. 18, to Rom. i. 9: "whom I serve in spirit," and several other passages.

But while it may be granted that this view is exegetically allowable—in so far as it is to a certain extent in keeping with what is the general and dominant usage of the term by the Apostle, and in so far as it strives to preserve a certain unity of conception throughout—it encounters, as it seems to us, two considerable difficulties arising out of that very prevailing usage to which it seeks to conform. 1st. Elsewhere  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  denotes the divine energy operating on, or acting in, man—a causal principle

or agency, whereas in the cases with which we are now concerned it must denote the effect or result thereby produced. It is not a question merely of the term signifying now the giver, now the gift; but of its signifying now that gift as the principle and motive power of the new life, and now the life itself thence resulting as its fruit. It is improbable that the Apostle should thus use the word in both these senses. And 2nd. the very constant association of the term elsewhere with what is distinctively divine, its attribution to God and to Christ, its predicates of power and life, the recognition of it as objective and as, even when immanent, a divine gift—which we are ever meeting elsewhere—render it unlikely that the Apostle should have designated it thus directly and unqualifiedly as a personal possession. It seems to us better, accordingly, to regard the Apostle as speaking of something that he may with more warrant call his own; and we are confirmed in this view, when we find that, even after applying Weiss's explanation of the new spiritual life to the cases in which the personal pronoun is used, there remain various instances of an indubitable reference to a human *πνεῦμα*, such as 2 Cor. ii. 11 and 1 Thess. v. 23. Seeing that beyond all question Paul thus had the conception of a *πνεῦμα* belonging to man as such, it is most natural to take this as the conception present to his mind, wherever



he speaks of "my spirit" or "your spirit," or employs it as a counterpart to "body" (except, possibly, at Rom. viii. 10, of which more hereafter).

But what is this human  $\piνεῦμα$ ? Proceeding chiefly on the basis of the passage in the earliest of the Pauline epistles, 1 Thess. v. 23, where  $\piνεῦμα$ ,  $\psiυχή$ , and  $σῶμα$  are brought together as if constituent elements of human nature, various expositors and Biblical psychologists have worked out in different forms the theory of a trichotomous division of man as having the sanction of St. Paul's name; and elaborate treatises have been written, partly in vindication of its title to rest on Biblical ground, partly in application of its alleged results to the elucidation of Christian doctrine, *e.g.*, the well-known work of Dr. Heard on the Tripartite Nature of Man. Apart from this book, which is of the nature of a special pleading, the view of a trichotomy has been more or less supported by Usteri, Neander, Lünemann (on 1 Thess. v. 23), Auberlen, Beck, and Delitzsch.

The two latter may be regarded as the chief expositors of what is called Biblical psychology; but, interesting and valuable as are their treatises, neither of them has succeeded in placing the subject on a proper exegetico-historical basis. It is with some difficulty that the Biblical facts lend themselves to be handled in the sense of modern psychological distinctions foreign to Jewish modes of thought;

and the result too often is that they lose under the process their Biblical impress, without acquiring any valid title to pass current in their philosophical guise. The meaning of Scripture, which is tolerably clear to the ordinary reader who takes its language in the sense of popular usage, becomes darkened rather than elucidated by the attempt to impose on it the distinctions—in themselves often obscure, precarious, or even baseless—of modern speculation. The book of Dr. Beck,<sup>1</sup> which was some years ago translated into English probably as well and as far as its uncouth form and unmanageable phraseology would allow, contains, like everything that has come from him, much that is fresh and suggestive; but its value is greatly impaired by the utter absence of a historical method of treatment. Scripture is dealt with as a whole with little regard to the difference or succession of its parts; as if, to use Dr. Laidlaw's words, "the whole had been written contemporaneously, and as if every text bore with equal directness on the nature of the soul." The fuller and more elaborate treatise of Dr. Delitzsch,<sup>2</sup> translated into English with care and success, though not

<sup>1</sup> *Unriss der Biblischen Seelenlehre: ein Versuch.* 3rd edition, Stuttgart, 1871. Translated under the title "Outlines of Biblical Psychology," Edin. 1877.

<sup>2</sup> *System der Biblischen Psychologie,* 2nd edition, Leipzig, 1861. Translated by Rev. Robert E. Wallis, Ph.D. in Messrs. Clark's Foreign Theological Library, Edin. 1869.

always with adequate precision, by Dr. Wallis, takes more account of the processes of exegesis, and of the distinctions of age and authorship in Scripture ; but instead of starting from an exegetical inquiry and resting its more general conclusions on a careful induction of the Biblical statements bearing on anthropology, it sets out from the *a priori* basis of what are called "the eternal presuppositions," which include not merely the ideal—but also real—preexistence of man, and the Trinity as the divine archetype, but also the divine  $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ , wherein God, threefold in persons, reveals Himself as sevenfold in powers and manifestations. The result is an ingenious mosaic of Biblical facts, psychological explanations, and theosophic speculation, as to which it is no easy matter in the long run to distinguish how much really belongs to the Scriptural foundation, and how much to the superstructure raised on it by the varied erudition and versatile fancy of the illustrious writer.<sup>1</sup>

So far as the question now before us is concerned, the human  $\piνεϋμα$  is, by those who differentiate it from  $\psiυχη$ , variously conceived, according as the difference is held to be a difference of nature, or of faculties and functions. The more extreme view

<sup>1</sup> A brief discussion of the trichotomous theories will be found in Dr. Laidlaw's Cunningham Lectures on the Bible Doctrine of Man, p. 60 ff., and a fuller account in his Appendix, notes F. and G., p. 306-329.

assumes that man consists of  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ , the material element, which forms the physical basis of his being ; the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ , which is the principle of animal life ; and the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$ , as the higher principle of the intellectual nature, of reason. Others have preferred to speak of the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  and  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  as different sides or functions of the one Ego or inner man ; the former being generally held to include the feelings and appetites, the latter to embrace the higher powers that are more specially distinctive of man. Thus Lüne-mann says (on 1 Thess. v. 23): " $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  denotes the higher and purely spiritual side of the inner life, what is elsewhere called by Paul  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  (reason) ;  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is the lower side, which comes in contact with the region of the senses." Beck gives the following oracular utterance : "The spirit forms for the individual life the *principle* and the *power* in which it subsists ; the soul forms the *seat* of the same, its *vehicle* and *conductor* (*Träger und Leiter*) ; the body, the *vessel*, and *organ*, so that each is peculiar in its kind, but only in connection with the others (Matth. x. 28 ; 1 Thess. v. 23)."<sup>1</sup> Delitzsch, after saying that "spirit and soul are of one nature (*Wesen*), but different substances," proceeds : "But if the form of expression be preferred that the soul is a *tertium quid* not substantially but potentially self-subsistent between spirit and body, belonging as regards its nature

<sup>1</sup> Umriss der Bibl. Seelenlehre, p. 35.

to the side of the spirit, we are not opposed to putting it so. The matter of more moment is that the soul, whether it be named substance or potency, is not the spirit itself, but another thing conditioned by it, although standing very much closer to it than the body." <sup>1</sup> And he adds, at intervals, the following

<sup>1</sup> System der Bibl. Psychologie, p. 96. In a note he refers to the view of Dr. von Zezschwitz, who, at p. 37 of his suggestive lecture entitled "Profangrätigkeit und Biblischer Sprachgeist," with entire correctness according to Dr. Delitzsch, defines the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  in man as "the supreme spirit-power (*Geistesmacht*), holding together, governing, penetrating all powers (*Kräfte*) of the soul and of the body in virtue of its own connection with God." This looks like a mixing up of the human and divine aspects of the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$ ; and it is but fair to Dr. von Zezschwitz to add that he has just before described the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  as "the psychological organ for the intercourse (*Wechselverkehr*) of man with God," and that his definition quoted above is expressly qualified by the clause "where it subsists in fulness of life and in its just position." He states, moreover, clearly enough the difficulties that beset the attempt to exhibit a Biblical psychology: namely, the need, so far as concerns  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$ , of separating in our conception elements that Scripture presents as *de facto* blended, the working of the divine Spirit and the subsistence of the human spirit; and the fact that it has to deal, not with the presentation of a fixed spiritual state always alike, but with a state of flux and development that changes with the changed relations of the two factors. But it does not seem to us that with all his ingenuity he has successfully surmounted those difficulties. His practical conclusion is thus announced (at p. 50): "Any one who does not force on Scripture a dogmatic system must acknowledge that it speaks dichotomously of the parts viewed in themselves, trichotomously of the living reality, but everywhere in such

illustrations of his meaning: "The human soul is related to the human spirit as the divine Doxa is related to the triune divine nature. That is a comparison which is certainly not carried out exactly so in Scripture, but for which it affords all the needful premisses."<sup>1</sup> "The spirit is *spiritus spiratus*, and animates the body as *spiritus spirans*. The spirit is (let it be well marked!) the inner of the soul, the soul the outer of the spirit; for there is no inner without an outer, and no outer without an inner."<sup>2</sup> It is scarcely necessary to quote other definitions, such as that which takes the *πνεῦμα* as immediate self-consciousness—as it were, the "feeling" of Schleiermacher—which knows only "intuitionis ratione" (Krumm), or that of a "more exalted life-potency," referred to by Holsten. Distinctions of this nature do not in reality throw much light on the subject. All such refining is simply misapplied ingenuity without adequate Scriptural basis; a manner as to preserve the *unity* in the original plan of human nature [*mit Wahrung des principiell auf Einheit angelegten Menschenwesens*]."

<sup>1</sup> Bibl. Psychol., p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> Bibl. Psychol., p. 98. He illustrates this relation between centre and circumference by a reference to Philo's comparison of the νοῦς in the ψυχή to the pupil in the eye; and to a passage in the Constitutiones Apostolicæ, which describes the νοῦς as the charioteer of the soul (vii. 34. 3: νοῦς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡνίοχος ταῖς ἀισθήσεσιν ἐπιστήσας).

the grounds on which the distinctions are sought to be established are too slight and narrow to sustain so weighty an inference.

The main argument, as we have already indicated, that is adduced in favour of a trichotomous scheme is based on 1 Thess. v. 23. Now we do not think it necessary to dwell on the fact that this passage, which is supposed to give the key to St. Paul's anthropology, occurs in the earliest of his Epistles—in which there is no mention withal of that term which plays so important a part in the later Epistles, the *σάρξ*—or on the circumstance that the combination nowhere recurs. Nor shall we argue with Weiss that we can hardly infer the Apostle's position as respects the constituent elements of human nature regarded in itself from a passage which speaks of *Christians*, who are distinguished from other men by the possession of the Spirit of God. Nor yet do we attach much weight to the ingenious suggestion of Wendt, although it carries a certain plausibility. He calls attention to a peculiarity in the use of *πνεῦμα* by St. Paul, which he would designate as liturgical, where in the benediction at the close of certain Epistles (Gal. vi. 18 ; Philemon 25 ; 2 Tim. iv. 22), *τὸ πνεῦμα ὑμῶν* is put for the simpler *ὑμεῖς*—the spirit by synecdoche for man as a whole—and which, as only occurring in the solemn style of these concluding formulæ of blessing, he conceives may have

been adopted by St. Paul from a liturgic mode of expression then current. He throws out the conjecture that, as the Apostle was approaching the close of his letter with the benediction already, as it were, in view, the expression *ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα* occurred to him as a fuller designation instead of *ὑμεῖς*, and that then to this as the leading thought there was added the partitive specification; *καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα*. In a linguistic point of view he finds this mode of apprehending the passage confirmed by the circumstance that both the preceding *ὀλόκληρον* and the subsequent predicate *τηρηθεῖν* strictly refer only to *τὸ πνεῦμα* (although, it is true, this would not exclude another explanation). And in point of fact the mode of expression, which at first seems surprising, is accounted for by our recalling the special interest with which St. Paul brings into prominence the truth that the *σῶμα* is not excluded from sanctification (1 Cor. vii. 34; 2 Cor. vii. 1). Sanctification is the very essence of his wish here; he desires that God may sanctify the Thessalonians in all that constitutes their nature (*ἀγιάσαι ὑμᾶς ὀλοτελεῖς*) and may preserve them irreproachable (*ἀμέμπτως*)—*i. e.* furnished with all virtues. If on this occasion he used the solemn formula *ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα*, it was not immaterial for him specially to bring out that this expression was to be rightly understood in the synecdochic sense,



because the *whole* man, *including* his  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ , was to be sanctified. For that reason he appended the appositional words: "as well the soul as the body."<sup>1</sup>

This is an apt and adequate exegesis; but it is also conjectural; and we deem it better to take the simple explanation of Pfeiderer, that just as in the Gospel of St. Luke, at i. 46, 47 (in the Magnificat, which has been preserved for us, we may add, by one who was closely associated with St. Paul and has given to us, according to tradition, the Pauline gospel): "My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour," the two conceptions are placed side by side under conditions of Hebrew parallelism that make them in substance synonymous, "so St. Paul, when he would strongly emphasise the completeness of human nature, may place side by side the different expressions of popular terminology, without wishing withal to teach a philosophical trichotomy, of which no trace is found elsewhere, or could well be found on Hebrew soil."<sup>2</sup> St. Paul, says Dr. Jowett (*in loc.*), "is not writing a treatise on the soul, but pouring forth from the fulness of his heart a prayer for his converts. The words may be compared to similar expressions among ourselves; *e.g.*, 'with my heart and soul.'" "It is," says M.

<sup>1</sup> Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im Bibl. Sprachgebrauch untersucht*, p. 123 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Paulinismus*, p. 67, note.

Reuss, "to exhaust the idea of this totality, and not to give theoretical teaching as to human nature, that St. Paul names three elements, spirit, soul, and body, in place of limiting himself to two, as he does elsewhere (Rom. viii. 10 ff.; 1. Cor. vii. 34; 2. Cor. vii. 1)." But he seems to us not quite consistently to add: "Distinguished from the spirit, the soul, in St. Paul's language, comprehends the inferior faculties, the instinctive affections, the animal vitality."<sup>1</sup>

In support of this statement M. Reuss refers to 1 Cor. xv. 44 ff.; Phil. i. 27; 1 Cor. xi. 14. We find Bishop Lightfoot (on Phil. i. 28) saying: "The spirit, the principle of the higher life, is distinguished from the soul, the seat of the affections, passions, &c.," and referring for this distinction of *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* to the notes on 1 Thess. v. 23. These notes have unfortunately not yet been given to the world, and will now, it is to be feared, be too long withheld from the expectation of scholars by the pressure of other work. The terms "higher" and "lower" life are not very clear; and probably no two writers would exactly agree in defining them. But let us examine St. Paul's usage of the word *ψυχή* in the light of the Old Testament precedent on which he built.

It may be remarked that the word has undergone a certain disparagement or derogation in consequence

<sup>1</sup> La Bible, Épîtres Pauliniennes, i. p. 61.

of its being habitually associated by Baur, Lüdemann, and others with their conception of  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$ . The  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$ , they tell us, is *animated* matter; the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is essentially bound up with it, cannot emancipate itself from it, must partake its character, and the like. But, as Wendt well points out, from the fact that the conception  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  is never employed except where there is a  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  as animating principle, the converse propositions by no means follow, that with the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  there is everywhere associated  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$ , and that the meaning of  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ , where it is associated with  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$ , is exhausted by its being animating principle for that  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$ ; and he calls attention to the fact that in the other New Testament writers the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is so far from being in idea bound up with the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$ , that, on the contrary, it is regarded as the proper object for the future  $\sigma\omega\tau\eta\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$ , which lies as far remote as possible from the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$ .

But the question now before us relates to Pauline usage, and is to be determined in the light of the several passages where the expression occurs. We find, first, the Old Testament precedent followed in the employment on two occasions of  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha$   $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  (Rom. ii. 9; xiii. 1) to denote "all individuals" from the point of view of their individual life, whereby they are marked off from inanimate nature. In this case, as in the parallel one of  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha$   $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$ , the part is put for the whole, and, though the

designation is taken from a part, the phrase really means the *whole* man. Rom. xi. 3 is expressly a quotation from the Old Testament (καὶ ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν μου); and at several other passages (Rom. xvi. 4: ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς μου, 2 Cor. i. 23: ἐπικαλοῦμαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχὴν, 2 Cor. xii. 15: ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν, Phil. ii. 30: παραβουλευσάμενος τῇ ψυχῇ, 1 Thess. ii. 8: ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχάς) we meet with precisely the same Old Testament use, according to which, as Wendt puts it, the soul forms especially the seat of the personal Ego, and is therefore emphatically employed instead of the simple personal pronoun, when the object is to name oneself or another not merely *simpliciter*, but with the special indication of value as individual personality. It will hardly be maintained that in the one, for example, of these passages where the Apostle says: "I will most gladly spend and be spent (out) for your souls," it was in respect of any partial or lower elements of his readers' personality, or of any value other than that of the life or of the man as a whole, that he expressed this willingness to spend himself. Nor can it reasonably be contended that there is any suggestion of limitation, or any note of inferiority, when the Apostle at the parallel passages, Eph. vi. 6, and Col. iii. 23, exhorts slaves to discharge their duties to their earthly masters not as a matter of eye-

service, but ἐκ ψυχῆς,<sup>1</sup> the distinctive import of which Wendt finds in the idea thereby suggested that they are to take a *personal* interest in it, as accounting it a religious duty in the service of Christ. There are several passages in the Epistle to the Philippians, where the word occurs as an element in compounds (ii. 2: σύμψυχοι, ii. 20: οὐδένα γὰρ ἔχω ἰσόψυχον), and even in the simple form (i. 27: μιᾷ ψυχῇ συναθροῦντες) to denote entire accord of feeling and sentiment, and where it signifies in one case the comfort to be derived by the Apostle from the receipt of good news (ii. 19: ἵνα καὶ γὰρ εὐψυχῶ). What warrant is there for taking the language here as restricted to the lower functions of a mere animal life-principle? Were the joint striving for the faith of the Gospel, of which the Apostle hoped to hear, or the harmony of sentiment which he asked for in order to the fulfilment of his joy, or the gratification which he hoped to get from the mission of Titus, or the sympathy of the latter with the Apostle's feelings and aims, matters belonging merely to a certain "lower" sphere of the mental life of those

<sup>1</sup> Here the Revisers of the Authorised Version have strangely thought it right to retain the rendering "heartily," "from the heart," and have thereby concealed from the English reader the fact that the Apostle emphasises his injunction by expressing it under different aspects in terms both of "heart" and "soul," and, indeed, in Eph. vi. 7, of a third form νοῦς, when he adds μετ' εὐνοίας.

concerned, in which the "higher" side of their nature might not, or need not, partake?

There remain only two other passages which bear on the question, and form in fact the mainstay of the position that *ψυχή* carries of necessity this lower meaning. They are 1 Cor. ii. 14, and xv. 44 ff., where, in each case, the adjective *ψυχικός* stands contrasted with *πνευματικός*, and certainly denotes a state or stage of man far inferior to the pneumatic, but from which it has been somewhat hastily inferred that, because *πνεῦμα* stands often in contrast with *σάρξ* and here appears similarly set overagainst *ψυχή*, *ψυχικός* must be practically treated as synonymous with *σαρκικός*. Wendt has conclusively, as it seems to us, shown the real nature of the distinction; and we give an abstract of his exposition, from which it will be apparent that the passages do not warrant the inferences drawn from them.

We need hardly say at the outset that the question is not as to the distinction between a human *πνεῦμα* and the *ψυχή*, but as to the contrast between a man determined or governed by the divine *πνεῦμα*, and one from whom that *πνεῦμα* is absent. It is generally admitted that in *πνευματικός* the divine *πνεῦμα* is, in keeping with Paul's prevailing usage, referred to; but it is argued that, because *σάρξ* is often opposed to *πνεῦμα*, the *ψυχή* here opposed to it must be closely associated with the *σάρξ*. At 1

Cor. ii. 14 we read: "Now the natural [*ψυχικός*] man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; and he cannot know them because they are spiritually judged [or rather, judged of]. But he that is spiritual [*πνευματικός*] judgeth of all things, but he himself is judged of by no one."<sup>1</sup> "The theme of the discussion in the previous section from i. 17 onward is the distinction of the Christian gospel from human or cosmic *σοφία*—that is, from human scientific speculation. Paul shows in i. 17 ff. that so far from Christianity having the value of a merely scientific knowledge, it appears from the standpoint of Jewish or Hellenic science absolute folly. Christianity belongs, as to its nature and value, to quite another domain; it is in the first line a *δύναμις Θεοῦ* (verse 18; comp. Rom. i. 16), a divine *saving power* for redemption; and the *σοφία*, which is coupled with this power of God (verse 24) is a *σοφία Θεοῦ*, a *religious* view of the world, which has nothing to do with the scientific knowledge of it. Of this general thought the Apostle, in the second chapter, gives a special application to the mode in which he himself preaches the

<sup>1</sup> This passage is greatly marred by its rendering in the Authorised Version where the same word is, in one case, rendered "discerned," and in another, "judged"; and is not so carefully amended as it might have been in the Revised, where the marginal "examine," or, perhaps, the idiomatic "judge of," is preferable to the ambiguous "judge."

gospel. He has brought forward the gospel among the Corinthians in the *first line as God's power*, without applying withal the means of human science (ii. 1-5); in the *second line* doubtless—namely, in presence of the *τελείοι*, the more mature Christians—the preaching of the gospel becomes with him too a *σοφία* (verse 6), yet even then not an earthly *σοφία*, but a *religious* speculation, whose object is the divine *plan of salvation* (verses 7-9). Such a religious view of the world is distinguished in principle from any earthly wisdom by the fact that it proceeds entirely from a revelation of the Spirit of God, because only this Spirit is able to see through the depths of the divine saving plan (verses 10-13). Thus as the *contents* of Christian *σοφία* are not of an earthly but of a divine kind, so its origin is to be found not in human cognition but in revelation of the divine Spirit.

Now, to these thoughts the words of verse 14 are immediately annexed. The whole connection treats, as we have seen, only of human cognition, in contradistinction to what is religious, divine; there is no mention either of the physical or of the moral weakness of man in relation to the Spirit of God, but only of the distance intervening between human cognition and divine wisdom. Accordingly the connection indicates that in the case of the words before us, in which there is described



negatively and positively the *organ* for the apprehension of divine wisdom, we have to think of an *organ of cognition*, and to take the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  of the  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma\ \psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\iota}\kappa\omicron\varsigma$  as the *organ of human cognition*, which, as such, is not in a position to comprehend the religious view of the world, and the place of which therefore the Spirit of God itself must take as the organ of understanding. The object of the Apostle in these words is, as is confirmed by the beginning of ch. iii., to give an explanation of the thought already expressed in ii. 6, that the communicating of the religious speculation of Christianity in preaching the gospel stands only in the *second line*, and is only destined for the more mature Christians; for it presumes that the recipients have already experienced the gospel as divine  $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ , that they have already become  $\pi\upsilon\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\iota$ . This way of apprehending Christianity as speculation is the only one possible, because here only is the religious organ for apprehending it in existence; the converse way is not possible, whereby men might apprehend the gospel merely as new philosophy without having previously experienced the saving power which forms the proper essence of Christianity. On this thought alone the Apostle laid stress, and therefore he characterises the man who is not yet capable of understanding divine  $\sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\iota}\alpha$  as  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\iota}\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ , *i.e.*, as one who possesses in his  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  simply the

organ of purely human cognition, but has not yet the organ of religious cognition in the *πνεῦμα*.

It is only when we take the *ψυχή* in this way as the seat of the human cognitive faculty, and that in the highest sense, according to which it is the organ for all science and philosophy, that our passage obtains its proper force and significance. But how colourless would be the thought, if the *ψυχή* of the *ἄνθρωπος ψυχικός* really signified merely the animating principle of his bodily matter, in which case the existence of a human *πνεῦμα* as a higher cognitive faculty would remain a reserved point! The Apostle would then have expressed his thought after a very imperfect fashion; for the question would still remain whether man of himself did not possess in this higher *pneuma*-faculty an appropriate organ for the reception of divine wisdom. Everything depended precisely on the answer to this question being in the negative. It may seem strange that the Apostle should immediately afterwards, in applying this thought specially to the Corinthians, use the expression *σαρκικός* and no longer *ψυχικός* as a contrast to *πνευματικός*; but this will find its explanation when we come to consider his use of *σάρξ*.

The *ψυχικός* then is one in whom there dwells an earthly *ψυχή* as mental power; the *πνευματικός* one in whom dwells the divine Spirit. Wendt applies

this distinction to the explanation of the other leading passage (1 Cor. xv. 44 ff.). His view as to the exegesis of the passage as a whole, will be subjoined in the Appendix. Instead of making the discussion in this case turn on the idea of substance and on the substantial diversity between earthly and heavenly bodies, so that *σῶμα πνευματικόν* would mean a body composed of celestial luminous matter and *σῶμα ψυχικόν* a body composed of earthly psychico-sarkic matter, Wendt holds that the latter expression denotes simply a body which encloses an earthly *ψυχή*, and the former a body, in which the divine *πνεῦμα* fills the place of the earthly *ψυχή*. The adjectives denote the power—in the one case creaturely, in the other divinely spiritual—that animates the bodily organism; and the *ψυχή* is here a brief designation for the whole compass of the *non-corporeal* side of the earthly man.

But if there is thus no foundation for the distinction between *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα* as that between a lower and a higher element, faculty, or function in man, wherein lies the difference between them? Wendt holds that, in analogy with the distinction which he recognises between *σῶμα* and *σάρξ*, the former denoting body in general, the latter the earthly body in particular (when it is used by synecdoche for the body), “with St. Paul *πνεῦμα* is the *general term for the conception of spirit*, and may

be used as well of the earthly as of the non-earthly spirit; while  $\psi\chi\acute{\iota}$  is the designation for a *special kind of spirit*, namely, *for the earthly-creaturely spirit*. As  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  without further addition may be simply said of the earthly body, when from the connection it is clear that this and no other kind of body is in question, so is the term  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$  used without more precise designation as expression for the human spirit, when the anthropological contrast of  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  or the connection otherwise already suggests the specialising of the general idea. As, again, the word  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$  is emphatically employed instead of the more general  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ , when the object is definitely to distinguish the earthly body as such from a supra-terrestrial body, so we saw at the two passages, 1 Cor. ii. 14, and xv. 44 ff.; the term  $\psi\chi\acute{\iota}$  emphatically employed to place the creaturely-earthly spirit in sharp contrast to the divine Spirit. In this respect, therefore, but only in this, are  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$  and  $\psi\acute{\upsilon}\chi\eta$  homogeneous; they are akin to each other not as respects the *notion* conveyed by them, but as respects their *value*, inasmuch as they both stand at the same stage of *creatureliness* in contradistinction to God."

But, while this view of Wendt may be regarded as correct so far as it goes, it does not account for the selection of the term  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$ , nor does it explain the point of view from which that term comes to be *predominantly* employed. For the explanation of that

choice we must fall back on the Old Testament, where we meet with the distinction between *nephesh* and *ruach* very marked, as resting on a difference not of contents but of the point of view from which the same contents are regarded. *Nephesh* is used of the soul looked at as an individual possession distinguishing the holder from other men and from inanimate nature; *ruach* is used where it is conceived as proceeding directly from God and returning to him. The former indicates the life-principle simply as subsistent; the latter marks its relation to God, or, as Wendt expresses it, its *religious value*. Why may we not suppose St. Paul to have made choice of, or to have preferred, the word  $\piνεῦμα$  for the simple human spirit precisely on account of this connotation—because of his regarding it, and valuing it, as thus primarily related to God?

We cannot quite agree with the peculiar position that Wendt takes up as regards this specialty of Pauline usage. He conceives that the  $\piνεῦμα$ , as used by St. Paul of the human spirit, no longer in any way betrays the Old Testament religious mode of looking at it; that it has simply the value of a second part of human nature, which may be co-ordinated with the body; and he goes so far as to say: "People are for the most part inclined to see in this anthropological application of the  $\piνεῦμα$  an essential link connecting the Pauline usage with the 'popular'

Old Testament use, while they believe that they discern a peculiar new conception of Paul in the mode in which the divine  $\piνεῦμα$  is brought forward. I would rather, on the other hand, call attention to the fact that it is just this simple use of  $\piνεῦμα$  in anthropological contrast to the body, that belongs to Paul alone, and does not find analogues either in the Old Testament *usus loquendi* or in that of the other New Testament writers."

In thus putting the case, Wendt seems to me to assume—and to assume without necessity or warrant—the very point that St. Paul has here abandoned the Old Testament line of use, that in so employing  $\piνεῦμα$  he has eliminated from it the religious element, and has treated it as a purely anthropological conception precisely equivalent to  $\psiυχή$ . Granting that it designates a part of human nature overagainst another part, the body—and it is to be observed that, while it may be co-ordinated with it, it is also from the very nature of the case differentiated and contrasted—does it follow that the designation must have all its distinctive significance discharged from it, and may carry no connotation of an import at all distinguishing it from  $\psiυχή$ ? In that case it must be held that St. Paul's employment of the expression in this sense is not only left without adequate explanation, but is, in view of all the circumstances as set forth by Wendt, almost inexplicable. If its connotation is in

nothing different from that of  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\iota}$ , why has the Apostle employed it? Why has he gone, if we may so speak, out of his way to take up a term which he had already, after Old Testament example, turned to account for other purposes, and which in its new application could hardly fail to run a risk of—as it has in point of fact given rise to—no small misunderstanding and confusion? Why has he placed a human  $\piνε\upsilon\mu\alpha$  alongside of the divine, when he could easily have avoided doing so, and when he had a familiar word at hand which would have precisely expressed what he meant without incurring a suspicion of being intended to convey anything more?

And not only may we reasonably ask Dr. Wendt to explain why St. Paul should in this case have betaken himself to such a term; but we may also ask from the other side why a writer, who in other respects follows, as we have seen, so closely Old Testament precedent, should be held in this instance to have gratuitously departed from it or set it aside? Why should he have thrown off its distinctive character? Why should he have taken the word without adopting the idea associated with it? In a word, we are reduced to a choice of the alternatives: either, that he did not get the term in this use from the Old Testament at all, which nobody will maintain, seeing that its presence there is beyond all doubt, and its absence in a psychological sense from profane

Greek writers is equally indubitable ; or that he did get it from the Old Testament, in which case the presumption is that his use of it would be analogous, and the burden of showing that it no longer carries any estimate of religious value must rest on those who assert the negative. It is certain that in this case as well as in others the term came to him from the Old Testament ; and the only ground on which we can conceive him to have preferred it to  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  is just that it carried with it something of that aspect of *relation to God* which it had been wont to convey. We may not have the means of precisely determining what was the special idea present to the Apostle's mind on each occasion when he so chose it as thus expressive—whether that of origin from God, or of affinity with Him, or of destination for him, or of return to Him ; but that the term designates the soul on its God-related side, and connotes it as so related, can hardly be questioned by any one who bears in mind whence the designation came and with what sanctions the Apostle received it.

There is no need, in order to bring out this meaning, either that we should identify the human  $\piνεῦμα$  with the physiological life-breath, or that we should mix it up with the action of the divine  $\piνεῦμα$ , as Bishop Ellicott appears to do in his strangely-expressed note on Phil. i. 2, already quoted ;<sup>1</sup> or that

<sup>1</sup> See page 97, where the passage is quoted from the first



we should engraft on it dubious theories as to the relation in which it stands to the pneumatic influence superinduced on it in the Christian. It is enough to recognise the fact that, when St. Paul has occasion to speak of the inner side of man's nature as the correlate of body, as the sphere of the religious life, or as the recipient of grace, he prefers to designate it by a name that indicated something of its religious value, that told how it had come forth from God, and thereby suggested it as the sphere of a divine renewal, the vehicle of a higher life, the abiding temple of the Holy Spirit. Here, too, as in other matters, the Apostle faithfully keeps by the lines that Jewish usage had laid down ; and we find the use extended, enlarged, generalised, but not substantially altered or transformed.

edition of his Commentary (1857). In the third edition it runs, "in the mention of the human  $\piνεϋμα$ ," instead of "in every mention."

## VIII.

## COLLATERAL QUESTIONS.

BEFORE leaving the subject of the human *πνεῦμα* and its correlation with *ψυχή*, it may be well to glance at the Apostle's use of two other terms of frequent occurrence that partake of a psychological character, as denoting, in whole or in part, the inner man—*καρδία* and *νοῦς*. A brief examination of the facts regarding them will at once enable us to complete our view of the several aspects in which St. Paul conceived the mind and its action, and show how far he moulded his language on, and how far he advanced beyond, Old Testament precedent.

The word *καρδία* is employed by him fifty-two times, in one or two instances as part of a quotation, but in most cases as his spontaneous choice; and it is, in point of fact, of more frequent occurrence than either *ψυχή* or *πνεῦμα* (in the psychological sense). Its position in the cycle of the Apostle's thoughts is, relatively speaking, clear and definite. It is never used, like *ψυχή*, of the subject to whom the individual life belongs, in such a

sense as to be interchanged with the personal pronoun; nor is it employed, like *πνεῦμα*, to denote the principle of that life as divinely given. It signifies throughout the *central seat and organ* of the personal life of man regarded in and by himself. Hence it is almost constantly accompanied by the genitive of the possessive pronouns *μου, σου, αὐτοῦ, ἡμῶν, ὑμῶν* (*ἐμῆς* in Rom. x. 1 : *εὐδοκία τῆς ἐμῆς καρδίας*).

The term is adopted and applied after the analogy of the Hebrew *lebh*, the meaning of which is, as we have seen, more comprehensive than in our modern use of "heart." The latter word indeed serves perfectly to bring out the hidden, inner, central nature of the seat of life; but, as we use it, it denotes predominantly, if not exclusively, the emotional side of that life. It is for us the seat and organ of feeling rather than of intelligence or of counsel. When we speak of thoughts, ideas, or purposes in reference to a local centre, we refer them to the head or to the brain rather than to the heart. If we use the latter term, therefore, as we cannot but continue to do, as the rendering of *lebh* or *καρδία*, we must carefully dissociate it from the restricted import of its ordinary use, and treat it as like the Homeric *κραδίη, κῆρ*, or *φρένες*, the inner organ to which all the functions of the mind are referred—the seat of all mental action, feeling,

thinking, willing.<sup>1</sup> There are a few passages, no doubt, where it points mainly to the seat of the feelings and emotions, such as 2 Cor. ii. 4: "anguish of heart"; Rom. ix. 2: "pain in my heart"; Rom. x. 1: "my heart's desire" [literally good pleasure, *εὐδοκία*]; 2 Cor. vi. 11: "our heart is enlarged"; Phil. i. 7: "I have you in my heart" [or "ye have me in your heart"]; but even in these cases the special does not exclude the more general sense that would be best expressed by our word "mind," if it had carried along with it anything of a local reference.

In the great majority of passages, it is absolutely necessary to give to the term the wider meaning, which is obviously implied in the cardinal counsel of Prov. iv. 23: "Keep thy heart with all diligence [literally: above all that is kept—*prae omni re custodienda*], for out of it are the issues [or sources] of life." It is not merely the receptacle of impressions and the seat of emotion, but the labora-

<sup>1</sup> This comprehensive sense of the term is well illustrated by Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 9: "Aliis cor ipsum animus videtur, ex quo *excordes, recordes, concordisque* dicuntur, et Nasica ille prudens, bis consul, *Corculum* ["*corculum a corde dicebant antiqui sollertem et acutum,*" Festus] et

*Egregie cordatus homo, Catus Aelius Sextus*"—

a verse of Ennius, which Cicero is fond of quoting. And the same thought is pithily expressed by Lactantius (*De Opif. Dei*, 10): "Cor domicilium sapientiae."

tory of thought and the fountainhead of purpose. Sometimes it appears as pre-eminently the organ of intelligence, as at Rom. i. 21 : “ their foolish (*ἀσύνετος*) heart was darkened ” ; 2 Cor. iii. 15 : “ a veil lieth upon their heart ” ; 2 Cor. iv. 6 : “ God . . . shined in our hearts ” ; Eph. i. 18 : “ having the eyes of your heart enlightened ” [*τῆς καρδίας* instead of *διανοίας*] ; sometimes as the seat of moral choice and volition, 1 Cor. vii. 37 : *ἔδραϊος ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ . . . κεκρίκεν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ* ; 2 Cor. ix. 7 : “ according as he hath purposed in his heart ” ; Rom. ii. 5 : “ impenitent heart.” Actions spring out of, and take their character from, the *καρδία*, as in Rom. vi. 17 : “ ye obeyed from the heart ” ; 1 Tim. i. 5 : “ love out of a pure heart ” ; 2 Tim. ii. 22 ; Eph. vi. 5 and Col. iii. 24 : “ in singleness of heart.” It is in the heart that the work of the law is written (Rom. ii. 15) ; and it is on hearts of flesh and not on tablets of stone that the Corinthian Church is inscribed as an epistle of Christ (2 Cor. iii. 2, and 3, where the best text runs, *οὐκ ἐν πλαξίν λιθίναις, ἀλλ’ ἐν πλαξίν καρδαίαις σαρκίνοις*, “ not in tablets of stone, but in tablets *that are* hearts of flesh ” ; but Drs. Westcott and Hort suggest that as “ the apposition is harsh and strange, it is not unlikely that the repetition of *πλαξίν* was a clerical error suggested by the line above ”).

The *καρδία* in this sense is accordingly set forth

with special frequency as the recipient of the divine πνεῦμα, as at Gal. iv. 6 : “ God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts ” ; Rom. v. 5 : “ the love of God hath been shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Spirit which was given unto us ” ; 2 Cor. i. 22 : “ God who . . . gave us the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts. ” It is the sphere of the Spirit’s various operations and influences, so as to be thereby comforted (2 Thess. ii. 17, Eph. vi. 22, Col. ii. 22), established (1 Thess. iii. 13, 2 Thess. ii. 17), directed (κατευθύναι, 2 Thess. iii. 5), guarded (Phil. iv. 7). It is the seat of faith (Rom. x. 9 : “ if thou shalt believe in thine heart ”), and the inward organ of spiritual praise (Eph. v. 19 : “ singing and making melody [ψάλλοντες] with your heart to the Lord ” ; so too at Col. iii. 17). At Eph. iii. 16, 17 the Apostle presents it as the special object of his prayer for the Church that God would grant “ that ye may be strengthened with power through his Spirit in [εἰς = with reference to] the inward man, that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith. ” Here the καρδιά is clearly indicated by the parallelism of the clauses as equivalent to the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος. “ Its characteristic mark is,” as Wendt observes, “ its being *hidden*, secret (Rom. ii. 28, 29, where the περιτομή καρδίας ἐν πνεύματι is contrasted with ἡ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἐν σαρκὶ περιτομή, 1 Cor. xiv. 25 : ‘ the secrets of his

heart are made manifest').<sup>1</sup> The knowledge of the *καρδία* is a special attribute of God (Rom. viii. 27 ; comp. 1 Thess. ii. 4); and the manifestation of its secret counsels forms a main feature of the future judgment (1 Cor. iv. 5 : 'the Lord will both bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and make manifest the counsels of the hearts'). In contrast to the *καρδία*, therefore, we find not the body generally, but sometimes the *face* (*πρόσωπον*, 1 Thess. ii. 17 : 'in presence [face], not in heart'; 2 Cor. v. 12 : 'that ye may have wherewith to answer them that glory in appearance [*ἐν προσώπῳ* = external aspect] and not in heart'); sometimes the *mouth* (Rom. x. 8 ff. : 'If thou shalt confess with thy mouth . . . and shalt believe in thy heart'), because these are the organs for the expression of what is within." Here too it is evident that the Apostle proceeds on the lines of traditional usage, and employs the term "heart" in all the compass of its Old Testament significance as embracing the whole region of man's inner life, and especially the domain of conscious thought and purpose.

But, while St. Paul stands thus far, in his use of *σᾶρξ*, *πνεῦμα*, and *καρδία*, on Old Testament ground,

<sup>1</sup> So, he adds, the Hebrew speaks poetically of "the heart" of the sea, to designate the deepest recesses (Ex. xv. 8 ; Ps. xlv. 3 : "though the mountains be carried into the midst [lit. heart] of the sea").

it is not so with the remaining term which plays a part, though a less prominent one, in his psychological vocabulary—the *νοῦς*. Here he has recourse to a word not unknown indeed to the Septuagint, but for a definite use of which it afforded but little precedent; and he turns it to peculiar and fruitful account, as yielding for him a special significance which those other terms were, in virtue of their very generality and comprehensiveness, less fitted to convey. They designate, as we have seen, the inner life regarded on different sides or aspects, but they deal with it as a whole rather than single out any faculty or function. The *καρδία* doubtless embraced in a general way the functions of reflective intelligence, and moral judgment; but, when the Apostle desired to bring these into particular relief, he chose a word more restricted in its original compass and in its popular use, and stamped upon it an impress of his own. The *καρδία* is the more general, the *νοῦς* the more special term.

“We have no reason,” as Wendt well puts the case, “to separate in analysis the two conceptions, so that the *καρδία* might not as such exercise also the functions which are elsewhere ascribed to the *νοῦς*; we may rather see in the *νοῦς* simply the specialising of an individual faculty of the *καρδία*—a faculty which might even be placed as an independent factor alongside of it. Such a



specialising naturally arises in the *usus loquendi*, when psychological observation has gradually become finer, and when the more general expressions of popular speech no longer correspond to the author's need for a more precise embodiment of his thoughts. Then a special conception detaches itself from the more general one, without its being necessary for the latter to be curtailed in its general significance. There was such a need in the case of St. Paul, and this explains the fact that, while the use of the word *νοῦς* itself is not in the New Testament absolutely confined to him (for it occurs at Luke xxiv. 45, Rev. xiii. 18, and xvii. 9), its frequent and pregnant employment is distinctively characteristic of him. The Apostle had learned from the psychological experience and self-observation which he so strikingly describes in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, that there exists in the human mind an organ, the significance of which consists in the fact that it can make itself independent of the general mental bias of man, but the weakness of which lies in the fact that on account of this very independence it cannot exercise any effective influence over that bias. This faculty is the *νοῦς*, namely, the power of discursive judgment."

The word occurs in the Septuagint some six times as the rendering of *lebh* or *lebhabh*, "heart," and once as a rendering of *ruach* in the passage

Is. xl. 13, which is quoted or alluded to by St. Paul at Rom. xi. 34 and 1 Cor. ii. 16 : *τίς γὰρ ἔγνω νοῦν Κυρίου*. Here it is applied, after human analogy, to the divine understanding or the thoughts and counsels thence issuing ; and it is doubtless in accordance with this general, rather than in his own more specific, sense that St. Paul employs it in the words which he personally subjoins to the passage of Isaiah he had quoted (1 Cor. ii. 16) : *ἡμεῖς δὲ νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν*. The key to its distinctive Pauline use is found in the express contrast in which the Apostle presents it at 1 Cor. xiv. There, in discussing the subject of spiritual gifts as exhibited in the meetings of the Church, he indicates repeatedly his preference for the *προφητεύειν* over the *γλώσσαις* or *γλώσση λαλεῖν* ; and he assigns as a reason for the preference that, while the latter is intelligible only to the speaker, and cannot without being interpreted conduce to the common edification, the former is intelligible to other members of the Church and may edify, comfort, or console them. At verse 19 the Apostle declares that, notwithstanding his grateful consciousness of excelling all in the measure of his glossolalic powers, he would “ rather speak five words with his understanding (*τῷ νοῦ μοι*), that he might instruct others, than ten thousand words in a tongue.” And what he means by *λαλεῖν τῷ νοῦ* is made clearer by the contrast which he had just

drawn at verse 14 between τὸ πνεῦμα μου and ὁ νοῦς μου: "Wherefore let him that speaketh in a tongue pray that he may interpret. For if I pray in a tongue, τὸ πνεῦμα μου προσεύχεται, ὁ δὲ νοῦς μου ἄκαρπός ἐστι. What is it then? I will pray with the spirit, and I will pray with the understanding also; I will sing with the spirit, and I will sing with the understanding also."

To find the distinctive sense here pertaining to νοῦς, it does not seem very material to determine the question what is the precise import of the πνεῦμα; whether it is to be taken—with various expositors following Chrysostom's interpretation ("the spiritual gift given to me and moving the tongue,")—of the Spirit of God as having laid hold of the man and moving him to utterance, or of the human spirit which becomes the recipient of the divine influence. In accordance with what we have already said as to the use of πνεῦμα with the genitive of the personal pronoun, the latter would appear the more probable. In that case there is distinguished from the spirit in man that is filled and moved by the Spirit of God in the *glossolalia*, and that yields itself immediately to the divine impulse, a power or faculty called νοῦς, the active participation of which the Apostle desires and commends. This is commonly and rightly held to denote the faculty of reflective intelligence, which apprehends, works upon, and re-

produces in its own forms the contents given to it, and is thereby enabled to make others similarly constituted partakers of its acquisitions. Lüdemann and Pfeleiderer restrict its meaning unduly to the formal sense of "consciousness," or "self-consciousness." The former says (p. 63): "Whatever may be our view of the nature and mode of working of the *πνεῦμα* here mentioned, this much appears certain, that the *λαλῶν γλώσση* has not a clear consciousness of what he says. In his case, as the Apostle says, the *νοῦς* is *ἄκαρπος*; by which St. Paul merely indicates that the *λαλῶν γλώσση* does not give his words as the expression of a conviction gained in the way of self-acting consciousness." But what Dr. Lüdemann is sure of has hardly seemed to others equally certain. There is nothing to intimate such an absence of consciousness on the part of the speaker, which, on the contrary, seems hardly consistent with the Apostle's distinct assertion in verse 4: "He that speaketh in a tongue edifieth himself," for "edification,"—building up in the Christian life—cannot well, in keeping with the tenor of the Apostle's teaching elsewhere, be conceived as in progress apart from consciousness.

Wendt, moreover, has well pointed out that "the two conceptions 'to speak without consciousness,' and 'to speak intelligibly for others,' do not form an exact antithesis. One may speak with the fullest

consciousness on his own part, and yet not be intelligible to others on account of a defective *mode of expression*; and, on the other hand, something that is spoken unconsciously may quite well be intelligible to others." And in substantial agreement with the view of Meyer, who renders: "my understanding furnishes nothing, contributes nothing to edify the Church," and interprets the *voûs* of the discursive reflecting faculty, he adds: "The peculiarity of the *glossolalia*, which caused it to lack value for the common worship of the Church, is rather to be conceived as consisting in its being the expression of a merely *intuitive* conception, of an internal perception *in feeling* (*einer gefühlsmässigen Anschauung*), and not proceeding in the forms of discursive thought. The speaker himself must have been well aware of what took place, as it formed the object of his feeling and his internal perception; but it could not be understood by others so long as that intuition was not interpreted by the speaker, or others, in the forms of discursive thought (verses 26 ff.). The *προφητεύειν*, on the other hand, is the expression of a conception already apprehended in itself by means of the discursive faculty of judgment, and for that reason needed no special interpretation for others. And this view that the discussion turns not on the distinction between unconscious and conscious speaking, but on the distinction between what is presented

in non-analysed intuition and what is apprehended successively in individual concepts and judgments, is confirmed by the example of the pipe and harp (verse 7 ff.), in which St. Paul brings out that it depends on the *διαστολή*—that is, on the separation of the individual sounds, in contradistinction to their blending and crossing—whether a clear melody shall be heard.”

The special character of *νοῦς* as the faculty of judgment appears at 1 Cor. i. 10 in its association with *γνωμὴ* as the opinion resulting from its exercise: *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοῖ καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ*, and at 2 Thess. ii. 2: “that ye be not quickly shaken from your mind (*νοός*),” where the construction seems to be pregnant and the *νοῦς* to denote the mental attitude of sober considerate judgment. So too at Rom. xiv. 5, immediately after the statement that “one man judgeth (*κρίνει*) one day above another, another judgeth every day *alike*,” it is added with reference to the mind exercising this judgment: “let each man be fully assured in his own mind” (*ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ νοῖ*).

As might naturally be expected, its field of exercise with St. Paul is especially ethical; its functions bear pre-eminently on the moral side of life, on the judgment of action. In the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, to which we shall presently recur, the Apostle affirms at once its theoretical position, and its practical incapacity to effect the change from

the servitude of sin to the service of the law of God. And at Rom. xii. 2 he sets forth a renewal of the *νοῦς* as the means of that transformation on the part of his readers which he urges, and the necessary preliminary to a correct judgment of right action: "and be not fashioned according to this age, but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind (*τῆ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοῦς ὑμῶν*), that ye may prove (*δοκιμάζειν*, i.e., in the exercise of moral judgment ascertain) what is the good and acceptable and perfect will of God." "The peculiar activity of the *νοῦς* in this reference," Wendt remarks, "is the *δοκιμάζειν*, that is, the exercise of judgment as to duty, as to how, in the special position of one's calling the individual conduct is to be brought into its due place under (*zu subsumiren ist*) the general rule of the moral law in relation to the kingdom of God. The *νοῦς*, which does not correctly exercise this judgment, so that action takes an unbecoming course, is a *νοῦς ἀδόκιμος* (Rom. i. 28), comp. 2 Tim. iii. 8 : *κατεφθαρμένοι τὸν νοῦν, ἀδόκιμοι περὶ τὴν πίστιν*, and Tit. i. 15, where the *νοῦς* is associated with the conscience, and it is said of the unbelieving that "both their mind and their conscience are defiled."

At Eph. iv. 17, the Gentiles are described as walking in the vanity of their mind (*ματαιότητι τοῦ νοῦς αὐτῶν*), the import of which is explained by the addition "being darkened in their understanding"

(τῆ διανοίᾳ, where the preposition serves to bring out the element of reflection—of subjection to *thorough handling* in thought); and on the other hand it is set forth as part of the “having learned Christ” that the readers “be renewed in the spirit of their mind”—an expression without any precise parallel, which it would seem most in keeping with the analogy of St. Paul’s teaching elsewhere to understand not directly of the divine agent of the renewal—for the Spirit is not elsewhere spoken of as belonging to man as subject—nor yet of a special inner sphere of the human mind that is the seat of the renewal—for there is no warrant elsewhere for the distinction thus sought to be established—but simply as a dative of reference, defining more precisely the nature and character of the renewal as furnishing a new motive power: “as regards the spirit—the principle of new power and life—by which the νοῦς is thenceforth possessed and governed.”<sup>1</sup> The point, the essence, of the change lies in the new divinely-given influence under which the νοῦς thinks and acts, and which empowers it to effective action.

This relation of the πνεῦμα as efficient power in the Christian, standing in contrast to the νοῦς as the faculty of moral judgment theoretically active but practically impotent in the natural man under the

<sup>1</sup> See note as to the interpretation of this difficult passage in the Appendix.



discipline of positive law, is most strikingly exhibited in the two remarkable chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, where the Apostle first presents us—in the seventh chapter—with the typical picture of his own experience as illustrating the state of men under the light of the law but not yet enfranchised by grace, and then passes on—in the eighth chapter—to describe the contrasted experience of those who are redeemed in Christ and are led by His Spirit. The question, long and keenly debated, whether in vii. 14-25 the Apostle is to be held as speaking from the standpoint of the regenerate or of the unregenerate man, may now be regarded as determined by the almost unanimous judgment of modern expositors, based on adequate exegetical grounds. Hardly any recent exegete of mark, except Philippi and Delitzsch, lends countenance to the view—to which Augustine was eventually led to resort in opposition to Pelagianism, and which was supported by the chief Reformers following in his wake, and by many subsequent theologians—that St. Paul is depicting the experiences of the believer under grace in conflict with sin. The great body of modern expositors who have had occasion to deal with the question—including Neander, Julius Müller, Nitzsch, Tholuck, Hahn, van Hengel, Ewald, Schmid, Gess, Ernesti, Messner, Baur, Mangold, Lechler, Meyer, Kahnis, Weiss, Godet—have held—although with minor

shades of difference as respects the personal or typical, real or ideal, character of the picture—that it relates to the earlier not yet regenerate state.

It is not necessary for our present purpose that we should enter into the detailed exposition of the passage, or even into the grounds on which the question of its reference has been so generally decided of late in a sense different from the view of the Reformers.<sup>1</sup> It is enough that we take note of the striking contrast in the use of terms presented by the seventh and eighth chapters. In the former, from the point at which St. Paul enters on the

<sup>1</sup>These will be found well put in brief compass by Immer, *Neutest. Theologie*, p. 278 f., and stated with care by Meyer (in his *Commentary*, Eng. translation, vol. II. p. 1-5, 16 ff.; Meyer-Weiss, *Komm.*, p. 335 ff.), and by Godet (*Commentaire*, tome II, pp. 92-95, 115-118, and 142-146), who states that he cannot put his own conclusion into better shape than in the words of M. Bonnet (*Comment.* p. 85): "The Apostle does not speak here either of the *natural man* in his state of ignorance and of voluntary sin, or of the *child of God*, born anew, emancipated by grace, and animated by the Spirit of Christ, but of the man, whose conscience, awakened by the law, has entered with sincerity, with fear and trembling, but still *with his own proper powers*, upon the desperate struggle of opposition to sin (*contre le mal*)," simply adding that "in our present (*actuelles*) circumstances the law which thus awakens the conscience and calls it to the struggle with sin, is the law under the form of the Gospel and of the example of Jesus Christ, taken apart from (*isolément de*) justification in Him and sanctification by Him." Dr. Laidlaw (*Bible Doctrine of Man*, p. 201 ff.) has an interesting discussion of the subject, as to which he holds that "that there are almost equal difficulties

new question raised at verse 7, there is no mention of, or reference whatever to, the *πνεῦμα* which is distinctive of the Christian, and which as such forms the theme whereon he delights to dwell from the very outset of the eighth chapter, proclaiming in the second verse the great characteristic privilege of his state "in Christ Jesus": "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus made me free"—in joyful contradistinction to the previous cry of despair, at vii. 24, "Who shall deliver me?"—"from the law of sin and death." While in the Christian subject, as depicted in chapter viii., the *πνεῦμα*

in affirming the experience described to be that either of a wholly unregenerate or of a fully regenerate man," and recognises "such mixed elements in both delineations [chapters vii. and viii.] that no application of them to distinct stages in conversion and spiritual life is quite satisfactory." His own solution is that the Apostle is presenting two ideal conceptions of the relations to law and grace respectively of a man in Christ aiming at the attainment of holiness. In the first, given in chapter vii., he looks simply at himself and the law." But, with every allowance for the "ideal" conception, and for Dr. Laidlaw's distinction that the Apostle is not merely "describing an experience, but is conducting an argument," his suggestion of a man *in Christ* looking simply at himself and the law seems liable to the remark made by Godet on Dr. Hodge's idea that the Apostle is speaking of a believer under the point of view of his relation to the law apart from his faith (*abstraction faite de sa foi*): "*Mais un croyant, abstraction faite de sa foi . . . cela ressemble bien à un non-croyant.*" How can a man in Christ lay aside his faith? or why should he be supposed to do so?

stands forth in triumphant antithesis to the *σάρξ*, in the special discussion of chapter vii. St. Paul employs only terms pertaining to the natural faculties of the human mind, and especially places in the foreground the *νοῦς*. It is impossible to doubt that the distinction is made designedly; and that those who choose to overlook it, or to explain it away, thereby deprive themselves of the main key to the understanding of the Apostle's utterances. Well might Dr. Baur comment on the amount of unnecessary discussion which people might here have spared themselves, if they had but attended to the distinction between *νοῦς* and *πνεῦμα*!

The *νοῦς* throughout this chapter is the faculty of moral judgment, which perceives and approves what is good, but has not the power of practically controlling the life in conformity to its theoretical requirements; and the use of the term here is quite in keeping with its employment by the Apostle elsewhere. Wendt well disposes of an objection to this view based on the ascription in Rom. vii. 15 ff. of a "willing" (*θέλειν*) to the *νοῦς*. "It would seem indeed," he says, "from this passage as if the work of the *νοῦς* went beyond this mere judging; for there can be no doubt that the *θέλειν*, which at this passage is set overagainst the *κατεργάζεσθαι* or *πράσσειν*, is an action of the *νοῦς* mentioned in verse 23 ff., which in the state standing in need of

redemption has already before Christian regeneration turned itself away from sin. But here I am disposed to agree with the view of Holsten (p. 383) that the θέλειν in the νοῦς signifies merely the intention, the direction of the mind towards willing (*nur die Absicht, den auf das Wollen gerichteten Sinn*), that the νοῦς denotes the practical conduct only in so far as 'every willing is preceded by a knowing, by the conception of willing.' The verb θέλειν in all Pauline passages signifies not the willing of *resolve*, but the willing of *wish* (Rom. i. 13; ix. 16, 18; xi. 25; 1 Cor. iv. 19; x. 1; xii. 1; 2 Cor. i. 8; v. 4; xii. 20; Col. ii. 18; 1 Thess. iv. 13; 1 Tim. ii. 4). A question could only arise as to the few passages, where with the θέλειν, just as in Rom. vii., there is contrasted a κατεργάζεσθαι, ἐνεργεῖν, or ποιεῖν (1 Cor. vii. 36; 2 Cor. viii. 10 f.; Gal. v. 17; Phil. ii. 13). But in these cases we have to seek for the willing of *resolve* throughout on the side of the ἐνεργεῖν or κατεργάζεσθαι, while θέλειν merely signifies the "thinking it good" (*für gut Halten*), to which the resolve, and thereupon the action, may correspond or run counter. In interpreting these passages we allow ourselves to be too easily influenced by the familiar translation of Luther 'Wollen und Vollbringen' [willing and accomplishing]; but the words κατεργάζεσθαι and ἐνεργεῖν signify not properly to 'accomplish,' but

rather to 'operate' (*bewirken*), or 'be operating', (*κατεργάζεσθαι*: Rom. i. 27; ii. 9; iv. 15; v. 3; vii. 8, 13; xv. 15; 1 Cor. v. 3; 2 Cor. iv. 17; v. 5; vii. 10 f.; ix. 11; xii. 12;—*ἐνεργεῖν*: Rom. vii. 5; 1 Cor. xii. 6, 11; 2 Cor. i. 6; iv. 12; Gal. ii. 8; iii. 5; v. 6). That in our section of Rom. vii. *θέλειν* has merely the sense of the intellectual thinking it good (*des erkenntnissmässigen für gut Haltens*), is confirmed on the one hand by the expressions *σύμφημι* and *συνήδομαι* (verses 16 and 22), which are interchanged with *θέλειν*, as it is, on the other, required by the whole context. The state of the man in need of redemption, before regeneration takes place, is distinguished morally from the state of the regenerate, not in such a manner, that in both alike there is present the willing of the good, and only in the latter is there wanting the execution of what is willed; but rather conversely in such a manner, that in the former the positive direction of the will towards the good is, in spite even of better knowing and wishing, not attained, while in the latter the transforming of the whole direction of the will is accomplished, but withal the *execution* of the good may possibly be still very defective. For in this case sin is in principle overcome and done away by the Spirit of God, although in individual cases the new direction cannot always effectually assert itself, because the former still makes its influence felt;

but for such an overcoming *in principle* of sin, the *voûs* with its *θέλειν*, that is, with all its good purposes and wishes, is not of itself able." The same conclusion practically is reached by Godet (on verse 15): "This will which puts itself on the side of the law is only a desire, a velleity, a simple *I should wish*, which miscarries in practice"; and again (on verse 18): "the verb designates a simple desire, an intention, rather than a fixed and deliberate decision (*décision arrêtée et réfléchie*)," as well as by Weiss, who says on verse 15:<sup>1</sup> "In the regenerate the Spirit works the *θελεῖν* and the *ἐνεργεῖν* (Phil. ii. 13), as Meyer justly brings into prominence in opposition to Philippi, but here the discussion turns, if not on the mere *velleitas* of the Schoolmen (Tholuck), at any rate on a willing that remains constantly inoperative, that continues accordingly mere theory and never determines practice."

At Rom. viii. 10 we meet with a remarkable passage, which is admitted to be one of the most difficult of interpretation in connection with the Pauline use of *πνεῦμα*, and as to which we cannot but think that the exegetical instinct of Chrysostom, Calvin, and Grotius reached a more probable conclusion than that which has commended itself to the majority of more recent expositors. There is a

<sup>1</sup> In the sixth edition (1881), revised by him, of "Meyer's Commentary," *ad loc.*

general agreement among expositors that in the earlier portion of chapter viii., from verse 2 onwards, the *πνεῦμα* spoken of is the divine Spirit, the source or the principle of the new life in the Christian (although M. Oltramare forms an exception, who thinks that he elucidates St. Paul's meaning by practically identifying *νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ*, *νόμος τοῦ νοός* and *νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος*, and expresses his surprise that so few should agree with him in regarding *πνεῦμα* as the superior spiritual part of man raised above the senses), while in the verses succeeding the tenth (13, 14, 15, 16) the import of *πνεῦμα* is usually accounted the same. But in verse 10 the contrast to *σῶμα* tends at first sight to suggest the taking of *πνεῦμα* in the corresponding sense of "the human spirit": "εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν δι' ἁμαρτίαν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζῶν διὰ δικαιοσύνην. Meyer, for instance, says: "το πνεῦμα, namely in contrast to the *σῶμα*, is necessarily not the *transcendent* (Holsten) or the Holy Spirit (Chrysostom and others); nor yet, as Hofmann turns the conception, the spirit which we now have *when Christ is in us* and *His righteousness is ours*; but simply our *human spirit*, i.e., the substratum of the personal self-consciousness. That the spirit of those who are here spoken of is filled with the Holy Spirit, is in itself a correct inference from the presupposition *εἰ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν*, but is not implied in the *word τὸ πνεῦμα*, as



if this meant (Theodoret and De Wette) the human spirit pervaded by the divine Spirit, the pneumatic essence of the regenerate man." And Godet takes it of "the spiritual element in the believer, the characteristic organ in man for the perception and appropriation of the divine, by which the Spirit of God can penetrate into the soul and by it rule the body." But it cannot mean the human spirit *per se*, or "the natural spirit of man," as Schmidt would take it, because, as Weiss remarks, the passage speaks only of those in whom Christ is. And the latter scholar has preferred<sup>1</sup> to understand *πνεῦμα* as "the new spirit-life produced in us by the divine *πνεῦμα* (or the Christ in us) and pervaded by it, consequently the pneumatic essence (*Wesenheit*) of the regenerate."

This exegesis of Weiss is clearly more in keeping with the context and with the general tenor of the Apostle's teaching; but it is to be observed (1) that, while it professes to rest on the parallelism with *σῶμα*, it really departs from it, for, while *τὸ σῶμα* represents literally the one side of human nature proper, *τὸ πνεῦμα* is not the other side of that nature taken in and by itself, but a new element superinduced on it; (2) that, as thus put, it seems almost a pleonasm to say: "the new spirit-life

<sup>1</sup> In his *Biblische Theologie d. N. T.*, p. 397, note, and in his new edition of Meyer's *Commentary in loc.*

is life"; and (3) that, as we formerly remarked in regard to this special sense of  $\piνεῦμα$  for which Weiss contends, it seems an unnecessary and confusing course to assume that  $\piνεῦμα$  may mean not merely the power or cause of the new life wrought in man, but also the effect or result—the new life itself.

It appears to us, therefore, still better to adhere with Hofmann to the sense suggested by all the other uses of  $\piνεῦμα$  in the preceding and following context—from which it is *à priori* improbable that St. Paul should thus suddenly perplex his readers by deviating—and to understand him as saying that in the Christian the divine Spirit—the Spirit of God and of Christ mentioned in viii. 9, and the indwelling Spirit spoken of immediately after—is the source and vehicle of life.

In fact the very deviation from strict parallelism of structure (which would have required overagainst the  $νεκρόν$  of the one clause the simple adjective  $ζῶν$ , or, as in the reading of one or two MSS., the verb  $ζῆ$ ) and the change to the wider, higher, more absolute predicate  $ζωή$ , seem clearly to indicate that something more than such a mere parallelism was intended, and to make the reader at once fall back on the  $\piνεῦμα$ , of which he had already learned so much. Nor can we attach any such importance as Weiss is disposed to concede to the argument against Hofmann's view, based by

Schmidt on the words *διὰ δικαιοσύνην*: "The Spirit of God is always in itself life, so that in its case the question wherefore or whereby it is so cannot at all arise, and the words *διὰ δικαιοσύνην* would form an addition as superfluous (*müssigen*) as singular (*seltsamen*)."<sup>1</sup> What is superfluous is rather this exception taken to the words; for the Apostle is specifying not a reason why the Spirit is "life" in itself, but a reason why, or a ground in connection with which, the Spirit is life for the persons addressed, if they are Christ's, or conversely if Christ is in them. He had previously discussed the close connection of death with sin, and of life with *δικαιοσύνη*, especially in chapter v.; and he had but a few verses before, at the beginning of the chapter, brought significantly side by side the exemption of believers from condemnation and their deliverance by the law of the Spirit of life from the law of sin and death. And, if he was not of opinion with Lüdemann that his earlier chapters as to the righteousness bestowed for Christ's sake and received by faith were merely *ad captandum* arguments not reflecting his own view, what was more natural than that he should in this way associate the quickening power of the gift of the Spirit with that other gift of righteousness which he had already gratefully commemorated.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Paulinische Christologie*, p. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Calvin *in loc.* says: "Porro ante admoniti sunt lectores, ne

The circumstance that in this passage St. Paul uses the expression "if Christ be in you" when he had just before spoken of the "Spirit of God," and then of the "Spirit of Christ," has been held to indicate that he treated these ideas as quite interchangeable; and this conclusion is assumed to be confirmed by the apparently still more explicit statement at 2 Cor. iii. 17: ὁ δὲ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν. Holsten tells us that "τὸ πνεῦμα is in St. Paul's conception first the substantial essence (*Wesen*) of the Divine subject and of the transcendent Χριστός, the κύριος τοῦ πνεύματος, and then is sent by God and from God into the hearts of believers" (p. 384). And Pfeiderer states that at Rom. viii. 16, 26, "the indwelling Spirit of God or Christ is not different from the indwelling Christ himself (verse 9, comp. 10)"—although there is nothing said in either of these passages to identify the Spirit with Christ, and the use of them for that purpose proceeds simply on the assumption that the identification is already proved by verses 9 and 10—and he adds, a little further on: "As a concrete hypostasis, the divine

per vocabulum Spiritus animam nostram intelligant, sed regenerationis Spiritum; quem Vitam appellat Paulus, non modo quia vivit ac viget in nobis, sed quia vivificat nos suo vigore, donec extincta mortali carne perfecte demum renovet." It is not necessary that, along with Calvin's view of πνεῦμα we should take his fanciful interpretation of σῶμα as *crassior massa*.

*πνεῦμα* subsists (except in God himself) only in the exalted Christ, for *ὁ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν* (2 Cor. iii. 17).”

Now we might reasonably maintain that, even assuming our inability to give any satisfactory explanation of the passages thus adduced, such an author as St. Paul was hardly likely to use language after so loose and indefinite a fashion as to employ different terms for one and the same idea; that he must be conceived to have chosen on each occasion the words fittest for the expression of his thought: and that his more concise and obscure utterances must be interpreted in the light of those that are more numerous, full, and explicit, rather than the converse. Even if one or two passages should seem to indicate the identity in some sense of the *πνεῦμα* with Christ, this cannot legitimately neutralise the effect of the great mass of expressions, which clearly imply a distinction. But in point of fact there is no sufficient reason for resting so important a conclusion on the passages in question.

At Rom. viii., 9-11, it is obvious that the Apostle designedly varies his form of expression. He speaks of “the Spirit of God” dwelling in his readers, then of the “having the Spirit of Christ” as a necessary mark of belonging to him, then of the spiritual effect of “Christ” being in them, and lastly

of the result, as regards the eventual quickening of the mortal body, of the indwelling of "the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead." Are we to suppose that the Apostle varied his expressions without any reason, or simply in order to pursue a play on words? If not, then we must seek a reason for the transition, and it is not difficult to find it. He frequently uses other language that betokens a close union of believers with Christ—a presence of Christ and of His life in them—in respect of which they are, as it were, a part of Christ (as in Gal. ii. 20: "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me;" Col. i. 27) and elsewhere he indicates that this presence of Christ is in and through the Spirit. The Spirit is His, is sent forth by Him, is the principle and organ of His presence, and the effect of the Spirit's action is to make Christ live in us. Wherever there is the presence of the Spirit of Christ, there, according to the Apostle's teaching, Christ himself may be said to be. But in this case St. Paul substitutes the "Christ is in you" for "Christ's Spirit is in you," because he desired specially to mark—"to bring more forcibly into relief," as Godet puts it (*ressortir plus energiquement la solidarité*)—the closeness of the tie connecting His *person* and *ours*, and so to prepare the way for verse 11, where the resurrection of Christ is presented as the pledge of ours.

As to the other passage, 2 Cor. iii. 17, we may

remark, first, that hardly any verse of the New Testament has been subjected to a greater variety of interpretations, and yet it is chosen with as much confidence as a foundation for important inferences as though its meaning were entirely clear and admitted on all hands. Baur, for instance, Holsten, and Pfeiderer find here a simple affirmation that Christ is an *immaterial substance formed of light!* Some have explained the passage by suggesting that πνεῦμα is to be taken in quite a different sense from what it usually bears, while others have sought to change the meaning of κύριος; and there have been many attempts to weaken or explain away its apparent tenor on the ordinary interpretation. Secondly, assuming it to apply to the actual personal Christ as κύριος, and to mean, as Meyer explains it: "*the Lord, to whom the heart is converted, is not different from the (Holy) Spirit, who is received, namely, in conversion, and is the divine life-power that makes free,*" we might be content to accept also Meyer's view of its significance: "That this was meant, not of *hypostatical identity*, but according to the dynamical *economic* point of view that the fellowship of Christ, into which we enter through conversion, is the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, was obvious of itself to the believing consciousness of the readers, and is also put beyond doubt by the following τὸ πνεῦμα κυρίου." But, thirdly, it seems to us that the explana-

tion of the passage is to be sought from the more *immediate* context, and that the key to it is given in the language of Calvin *in loc.*: "Praesens sententia nihil ad Christi essentiam, sed officium duntaxat exprimit. Cohæret enim cum superioribus, ubi habuimus Legis doctrinam esse literalem, nec mortuam solum, sed etiam materiam mortis. E converso nunc Christum vocat ejus spiritum, quo significat, tunc demum vivam et vivificam fore, si a Christo inspiretur. Accedat anima ad corpus, et fit vivus homo." St. Paul had, at the 6th verse, described himself as a "minister of the new covenant, not of the letter but of the spirit; for the letter killeth, but the spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα) giveth life." He had contrasted the ministration of death in the law with the ministration of righteousness; and after referring to the veil on the heart of the Israelites when the law was read, had said that on turning to the Lord the veil should be taken away. He adds: "Now the Lord is the spirit"—the spirit previously mentioned (such is the force of the article)—the spirit that vivifies the law and makes it minister to freedom. This contextual explanation has commended itself with minor differences of detail to Erasmus, Olshausen, Neander, Ewald and Klöpffer.

We cannot see much force in the exception taken to this interpretation by Meyer on the score of the Apostle's subsequently and naturally reverting to the



usual expression *πνεῦμα κυρίου*; while it derives support rather than the reverse from the peculiar expression at the close of verse 18: *καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος*, whether we take it as meaning "even as from the Lord the Spirit," or, as seems more probable, "the Lord of the Spirit." But it would unquestionably obtain greatly increased probability, if we felt ourselves at liberty to accept the ingenious and, as I venture to think, singularly felicitous conjectural emendation of Dr. Hort, by which he at once disposes of the *πνεῦμα κυρίου* here that forms Meyer's difficulty, gets rid of the perplexity of construing the *κυρίου πνεύματος* in verse 18, and accounts for the origin of the remarkable predicate *τὸ κύριον* attached to the Spirit in the Creed of Constantinople.<sup>1</sup>

We have thus seen that St. Paul employs the term *πνεῦμα* on various occasions to denote the human mind alongside of what we have recognised

<sup>1</sup>The following is Dr. Hort's most interesting note on 2 Cor. iii. 17: "οὗ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα Κυρίου, ἐλευθερία.] These words contain no obvious difficulty; yet it may be suspected that *Κυρίου* is a primitive error for *κύριον* (Υ for Ν). First, the former clause of the verse does not in sense lead naturally up to this clause, whether the emphasis be laid on *πνεῦμα* or on *Κυρίου* (or *κυρίου*). Secondly, in *ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος* at the end of verse 18 neither principal word can naturally be taken as a substantive dependent on the other, nor both as substantives in apposition. The simplest construction is to take *κυρίου* as an adjective ('a Spirit exercising lordship,' or, by a paraphrase, 'a Spirit which is Lord'); and apparently

as his predominant use of the term to signify the new spiritual power given to men in Christ. What, it may be asked, is the relation between the two? To this question as it stands exegesis does not furnish any direct reply; but it must not be supposed on that account to have no voice or function as regards the attempts of speculation to provide an answer. Its function is simply to present fairly and fully the Scriptural data, to ask that they shall all be taken into account, and to urge that, in any case, a clear line shall be drawn between the facts as Scripturally vouched for, and the speculative efforts to systematise or harmonise them.

When we find Usteri, *e.g.*, "readily conceding that St. Paul has not conceived to himself the notions of *νοῦς*, *πίστις*, and *πνεῦμα* in the logical definiteness" which they gain in Usteri's hands, but holding it "indisputable that the germ of the latter lies in the

the Scriptural source of the remarkable adjectival phrase *τὸ κύριον* in the (so-called) Constantinopolitan creed (*το πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον τὸ κυρίον τὸ ζωοποιόν*) can be only verse 18 construed in this manner, the third in the triad of epithets being likewise virtually found in this chapter (verse 6) as well as elsewhere. This adjectival use of *κυρίον* in the genitive would, however, be so liable to be misunderstood, or even overlooked altogether, that St. Paul could hardly use it without some further indication of his meaning. If he wrote *οὐδὲ τὸ πνεῦμα κύριον, ἐλευθερία*, not only do the two clauses of verse 17 fall into natural sequence, but a clue is given which conducts at once to the true sense of *ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος*."

Pauline conception, which it is our task to place on a deeper basis and to justify in logic;" when we learn that the distinction thus germinally present to St. Paul takes "νοῦς as the principle of abstract understanding thinking on a being objectively confronting it; πίστις as the principle of immediate knowing, of experience, of feeling, where the objective being has become a subjective; πνεῦμα, the cancelling of the distinction between understanding and faith, and the gathering of them up (*Zusammenfassung*) into a higher concrete unity. . . . The third and highest stage, embracing under it the two others, is the consciousness of the spirit, which knows itself existing out of, or rather in, God;" or again, when we are told, as to the trilogy in 1 Thess. v. 23, that, while "σῶμα is the animal body with all its functions, and ψυχή—the soul—is the animal life-principle of the body, including the functions of thinking, feeling, willing, which constitute the individual human life (νοῦς, καρδία)"—a view of ψυχή, by the way, not coinciding in its terms with any of those we have formerly touched on!—"the πνεῦμα is the spirit issuing from God and uniting man with the being (*Wesen*) of God, a self-conscious power (*Kraft*), in which the intellectual and the moral principle are identical as in a higher, the essential nature (*Wesenheit*) of God, which individualises itself in the Christian, but is in all alike;"

we may be of opinion that we have here the germ of a philosophy rightly reading the mystery of the relation between the divine and the human, or a mere play of dialectics deftly ringing the changes on words and ready to make or cancel distinctions at pleasure, but a candid exegesis tells us that St. Paul is not to be charged with either the merit or demerit of such speculations ingeniously read into his words.

Again, when we find M. Reuss, after, as is usual with him, a very clear and fair statement of the two different ways in which the Spirit of God is presented by St. Paul as related to the spirit of man in the “mystic communication”—as existing and acting in us *by the side of* the human spirit, or as having *taken the place* of our spirit, identifying itself with it, or, as it were, absorbing it—proceeding to say that the formulæ expressing the latter view “are more in keeping with the system as a whole (*conformes à l'ensemble du système*), more adequate to its generative thought than those which are associated with the other point of view,” we must point out that, whatever may be the value of the judgment thus expressed, it does not rest on the ground of exegesis, which establishes both sets of facts, and requires that, on the principle of an author being supposed to know his own mind and to be consistent with himself, room must be found for both within

the system as a whole, and the one be explained in terms of the other.

Dr. Pfleiderer goes still farther. Speaking of the two sorts of expressions used by St. Paul, he describes the second as "admitting no distinction between the divine and the human," and subsequently as "not suggesting, relatively not admitting" such a distinction; and, after quoting some instances, especially such expressions as *πνεῦμα τῆς πίστεως* (2 Cor. iv. 9), *πνεῦμα πραότητος* (1 Cor. iv. 21), *ἀγάπη τοῦ πνεύματος* (Rom. xv. 30), in which he conceives it much more natural (*es liegt viel näher*) to take the *πνεῦμα* simply as the *subject* of these virtues than (according to the usual view) to separate it from the Christian subject as the *cause* of the virtues in question, he adds, "In all these and similar passages the distinction between objective *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* and subjective Christian spirit is not so much exegetical precision (*Pünktlichkeit*) as rather scholastic abstraction, which certainly misses the meaning of the Apostle (*den Sinn des Apostels gewiss verfehlt*). This meaning we shall have to see rather in the view that the divine *πνεῦμα* and the natural-human become united (*sich einigen*) in the Christian into the unity of a *new subject*, of a *καὶνὸς* or *πνευματικὸς ἄνθρωπος* (thus substantially; comp. 1 Cor. vi. 17), but so, that this union is not one absolutely complete (*fertige*) from the outset, but one

always in the mere course of being carried out, consequently still always one that subsists only partially; hence the two substances are still always in another aspect of two kinds (*zweiertei*), and are related to one another as the active and giving to the passive and receiving."

Now it is to be observed, first, that Dr. Pfeiderer deals with several distinctions which are not precisely equivalent. He had set himself to discuss the relation "between the new Christian *πνεῦμα* and the natural *πνεῦμα* of man," or, as he otherwise expresses it, "between the divine and human *πνεῦμα*"; but at the outset of this passage he introduces a third distinction which is not coincident with either of these, viz., that "between objective *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* and subjective *Christian* spirit." Even assuming the latter kind of distinction to be alien to St. Paul's mode of conception, we still leave the question to be answered—What is the relation between the divine and the human elements, both of which are unquestionably recognised—or between the natural and the specifically Christian *πνεῦμα* in man? Further, it may be remarked that, while the distinction between the objective and subjective may be scholastic as regards the terms in which we find it convenient to express it, it has only arisen out of the facts given to exegesis by St. Paul, and is simply the result of its dealing *precisely* with

these facts in accordance with its laws—a treatment, which, so far from being reproached as “punctiliousness,” is but legitimately due to any author who is presumed to have had a meaning to express, and to have known how to express it. St. Paul unquestionably speaks of the *πνεῦμα* now as a power acting *on* man, now as an energy acting *in* him; and to ignore that distinction, or to refuse to apply it, as undoubtedly given in some passages, to the interpretation of others where it may not be so explicitly set forth, on the pretext of its being a scholastic abstraction, is just to deny to exegesis the means of effectually doing its work. But, thirdly, we have to observe that Dr Pfeleiderer's mode of getting out of the difficulty, and of discovering the meaning of St. Paul without resorting to scholastic subtleties, is a mere cutting and not an untying of the knot. He tells us that the divine *πνεῦμα* and the natural human *πνεῦμα* join themselves in the Christian to form the unity of a *new subject*, of a *καινός* or *πνευματικός ἄνθρωπος*; but it is obvious that, even granting this to be a correct account of the matter, it does not at all explain how this unity is brought about. There are admittedly *two* factors at the outset: how do they come to be blended into the *unity* of the new subject? Dr. Pfeleiderer, who is skilful in resolving unity into difference and difference into unity, should hardly have been content with simply affirming the

*substantial* synthesis. Fourthly, he has no sooner propounded this "unity of a new subject" than he is dissatisfied with it. It is not complete, but only in course of growth; it exists, and yet it is partially non-existent; the two *substances* that form a junction insist on being differentiated; and the explanation, thus admitted by its author to be inadequate, savours more of dialectic subtlety than of exegetical candour. Lastly, we may be allowed to point out that a slight ambiguity underlies Dr. Pfeiderer's use of the expression a *new subject*. Does it mean, as one would naturally take it to mean, that a new Ego has taken the place of the former, and that the Ego, which is able to call itself *καινός*, has no consciousness of identity with that which is characterised as *παλαιός*? This, of course, cannot be; for there is a continuous chain of consciousness identifying the Christian Ego that is new with that which existed anterior to the renewal; and it is only in virtue of this conscious identity that he is able to distinguish the new state from the old. There is therefore not a *new subject* in this, the strict and legitimate, sense of the term; and, whatever strong expressions St. Paul may use to denote the entireness of the change, he cannot have meant to obliterate the continuous sense of personal identity as between the new and the old. But, if so, the natural human consciousness at any rate is carried



forward into the Christian subject; and the question still remains where Dr. Pfeiderer found it: "How is the divine element, superinduced on the human, related to the latter?"

To that question St. Paul does not give any direct answer; but the principles of rational exegesis require that, in any attempt to deal with the question, we should take all his statements into account, that we should correlate the results of our interpretation, and that, instead of assuming him to have indulged in meaningless duplication, or unreconciled antinomies, or mere vague mysticism, we should accept his utterances according to the limitations which they necessarily impose on each other. It is beyond doubt that St. Paul ascribes the new life of the believer in its inception and in its growth to the divine *πνεῦμα* acting on and in man as a motive power; but it is also true that he addresses to believers appeals and exhortations which presuppose a subject distinguishable from, and receptive of, that *πνεῦμα*, summoned to a walk accordant with it, and privileged to bear witness along with it. St. Paul recognises both a divine and a human factor; and in any attempt to systematise his teaching, both must have a place without the one excluding or yet absorbing the other.

It is no part of our present aim to pursue this inquiry from a theological or from a speculative point of

view, although, if we did so, it might not be difficult to show that the Hebrew conception of power and life is more fruitful of light and help in pursuing it than the imported Greek concept of substance. And we shall only, before leaving it, quote the words of Immer, as giving, in brief compass, a fair account of that remarkable correlation, on which so much of the Apostle's teaching turns:—"The principle of the new life is the  $\piνεῦμα$ , which is at decisive passages distinguished from the human  $\piνεῦμα$  (1 Cor. ii. 11 ; Rom. viii. 16), and is conceived as an objective and supernatural principle. The relation between the two is partly one of homogeneity, since otherwise they would not both be designated by the same expression, and since both—in distinction from the  $νοῦς$  as the reflective understanding (1 Cor. xiv. 14, 15, 19 ; Rom. viii. 2, comp. vii. 23, 25)—denote the immediateness [*Unmittelbarkeit, i.e., the absence of mediate agency*] of spirit-life ; partly one of difference, since according to St. Paul the divine and the human  $\piνεῦμα$  are related as upper and lower [*Oben und Unten* = literally, *above and below*]. Yet it is a relation of correspondence ; otherwise the human  $\piνεῦμα$  could not  $\sigmaυμμαρτυρεῖν$  that we are God's children."

The distinction thus recognised by exegesis between the divine and the human  $\piνεῦμα$  has naturally led translators to facilitate its apprehension by

employing an initial capital to mark the former, wherever they conceive it to be clearly referred to, and more especially where the Spirit appears to be regarded as the objective Personal Source of the new life. Whether the introduction of such a note of distinction falls within a translator's province, may be a question open to debate on hermeneutical grounds ; but, if it is legitimate in any case, it must be so in that of a distinction which has been on all hands—for Dr. Holsten's extreme view on the one hand, and that of M. Oltramare on the other, do not count for much in presence of such a consensus of expositors—admitted, and the importance of which is obvious on the face of it. That very importance, however, makes it essential that, if it is acted on, it should be regulated by some definite principle—whether the line be drawn as between the divine and the human, or as between the objective Personal power and its subjective manifestation in the Christian—and should be uniformly applied.

In this respect the Révisers of the Authorised Version do not seem to me to have had, or to have been successful in always applying, a definite rule. It is difficult to see, for instance, why at Gal. v. 17 we find : “ the flesh lusteth against the Spirit and the Spirit against the flesh,” while at Rom. viii. 6 we find : “ the mind of the flesh is death, but the mind of the spirit is life and peace.” If the ἐπι-

*θυμία* appears to require personification in the one case, the *φρόνημα* might fairly claim it in the other. And, if it should be maintained that the rendering of Gal. v. 17 by "Spirit" is required by the immediately preceding "Walk by the Spirit" of verse 16, that of Rom. viii. 2, "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus" might fairly be taken to govern the import of the *πνεῦμα* in the immediate sequel: "walk after the spirit" (verse 4). Indeed, as regards the whole section—Rom. viii. 1-17—I venture to think that the exegetical consistency of the Authorised Version in this particular stands out in advantageous contrast to the alternation of the Revisers.

Still more is it to be regretted that, while thus failing to give full effect to a distinction which exegesis warrants, and the bringing out of which obviously facilitates the apprehension of the Apostle's meaning, the Revisers should on the other hand have continued to maintain a distinction of rendering, for which exegesis certainly furnishes no warrant, and which cannot but be for the English reader perplexing, if not misleading. The primary requisite of accurate translation—uniformity of rendering—has been signally disregarded in the case of *πνεῦμα*, where not only has the antiquated term "ghost"—which no longer carries for the English reader the significance that still fully per-

tains to its German form "Geist"—been retained by the side of "spirit" to suggest to the reader a difference which does not exist in the original ; but, even in the case of the Third Person of the Trinity, the identity apparent in the Greek has been obscured by the use now of "Holy Ghost," and anon of "Holy Spirit." The rectifying of such an anomaly as this would seem one of the first and most obvious of the duties to which the Revisers were called ; and if, as is clear, they could not have substituted the word "Ghost" for "Spirit" in the case of such expressions as "walking by or after the Spirit" (Gal. v. 16 ; Rom. viii. 4), "fellowship of the Spirit" (Phil. ii. 1), "grieve not the Holy Spirit of God" (Eph. iv. 30), to say nothing of the cases where the reference is to the "spirit" of man, they had no alternative but to adopt the converse course, and to employ throughout the rendering—to which there could be no rational objection either on exegetical or other grounds—"the Holy Spirit." It seems strange that they should not have made this change of their own motion ; but more strange that they should have declined to comply with it when suggested by their American associates, who had the candour and the courage to say : "For 'Holy Ghost' adopt uniformly the rendering 'Holy Spirit.'" <sup>1</sup> That a great oppor-

<sup>1</sup> It is difficult to see on what principle the Revisers abstained from accepting most of the suggestions of the Ameri-

tunity of redressing an imperfection and of reproducing for the English reader the *πνεῦμα* of the original was thus missed, can only be accounted for by supposing that the reverence for a liturgical formula and its hallowed associations outweighed

can Company, especially those applying to "classes of passages." I ventured to comment on some of these cases in a letter to the Editor of the *Academy*, July 9, 1881. Few who have an opportunity of looking into the American Revised Version will fail to see in it a great improvement as compared with its English prototype; and nothing can better indicate the mistaken course pursued in the latter, than the form in which the Americans in their Appendix record "the readings and renderings preferred by the English Revisers." I subjoin one or two instances:—

"For 'try,' or 'make trial of' ('trial'), where enticement to what is wrong is not meant, substitute 'tempt' ('temptation')."

For 'demon' ('demons') representing the Greek words *δαίμων*, *δαίμόνιον*, substitute 'devil' ('devils').

For 'know' in Acts iii. 17; vii. 40; Rom. xi. 2; Phil. i. 22, substitute 'wist.'

In many passages, too numerous to specify, substitute 'which' for 'who' or 'that' when used of persons."

And, as to the question with which we are here concerned, the following is their note:—

"For 'Holy Spirit' (which occurs more than 90 times) adopt the rendering 'Holy Ghost,' except in Matt. xii. 32; Mark iii. 29; xii. 36; Luke ii. 25, 26; iv. 1; x. 21; xi. 13; xii. 10, 12; John i. 33; xiv. 26; Acts ii. 4; vi. 5; 1 Cor. xii. 3; Eph. i. 13; iv. 30; 1 Thes. iv. 8; Jude 20.

In Luke xi. 13; Eph. i. 13; iv. 30; 1 Thess. iv. 8, 'Holy Spirit' is the rendering of the Authorised Version, as it is in the Old Testament (Ps. li. 11; Is. lxiii. 10, 11)."

what was due to the truth and unity of the Scriptures whence that formula came, and to which it traced its sacred significance. It is scarcely matter for surprise that a Revision, which amidst its undoubted excellence in many respects fails to deal with this and other matters of real importance, while it introduces numerous minor changes of dubious value, should not be accepted by scholars as adequate or final.

## IX.

## THE FLESH.

LET us turn to the other branch of our inquiry, the significance of *σάρξ*. Applying here the same method as before, and seizing upon what on the face of the Apostle's writings is the most salient and characteristic use of the expression, we cannot but perceive that, as his thought on the one side centres in the divine *πνεῦμα*, it centres on the other in that which forms the contrast to it—the sense of *σάρξ* in which it is contradistinguished from, or placed in opposition to, what is pneumatic. And just as in that case the investigation of the Old Testament use threw light on that of St. Paul which it helped largely to mould, so we may here recall the results of our inquiry as regards the use of *basar*, and see how far the Old Testament conceptions are reproduced in the categories of Pauline thought.

Let us begin with the simplest use—that of the flesh proper, the soft muscular covering of the bones. We saw that the Septuagint rendered *basar* in this sense by *τὰ κρέα*, where the reference was to the parts of animals slain, and by *αἱ σάρκες*, where the



reference was to the flesh clothing the living body. In accordance with this usage St. Paul designates the flesh of animals offered in sacrifice κρέα (Rom. xiv. 21 ; 1 Cor. viii. 13) ; while he makes use of the adjective σάρκινος to denote that which is composed of flesh, *fleshy*, as in 2 Cor. iii. 3, where the fleshy tablets of the heart are opposed to stony tablets in verbal accordance with two passages of Ezekiel xi. 19 and xxxvi. 26 : καὶ ἐκπάσσω [ἀφελῶ] τὴν καρδίαν τὴν λιθίνην ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτῶν [ὑμῶν] καὶ δώσω αὐτοῖς [ὑμῖν] καρδίαν σαρκίνην. Here, Wendt points out, the flesh of which the heart is to consist is to be taken in the strictest sense, and not in the more general sense of animated matter ; and the connotation here associated with the term is not only not a bad one, but, on the contrary, expressly a good one. Whether 1 Cor. xv. 39 : "There is one flesh of men, another of beasts, another of birds, and another of fishes" (according to the order in the best critical text), is to be taken of the flesh proper, or of the body as such, will fall to be discussed along with the interpretation of that important passage.

Not less distinctly is the precedent of the Old Testament followed in the use of σάρξ to denote kindred or family relationship, at Rom. xi. 14 : "If by any means I may provoke to jealousy *them that are my flesh*, and may save some of them" (παραζηλώσω μου τὴν σάρκα), where σάρξ is obviously

equivalent to the fuller ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφῶν μου, τῶν συγγενῶν μου κατὰ σάρκα in ix. 3 (comp. Gen. xxxvii. 27). At Eph. v. 30 the words appended to the statement "We are members of his body" ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὀστέων αὐτοῦ, which convey the same sense of affinity, are of doubtful genuineness. In the case of several other passages, such as 1 Cor. x. 18 : βλέπετε τὸν Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα, Gal. iv. 23 : κατὰ σάρκα γεγέννηται, Eph. ii. 11 : τὰ ἔθνη ἐν σαρκί and others, the same principle of explanation may be applied ; but some of them at least may be interpreted in the wider sense of the term which we shall encounter in the sequel.<sup>1</sup>

The next chief use of *basar* is that in which the flesh, as forming the most prominent characteristic of the body, and lending to it its outward appearance, is put for the whole body, in keeping with a well known and oft-recurring synecdoche ; and here we find that in the Septuagint sometimes the word σάρξ and sometimes the word σῶμα is used to render it, without its being always possible to tell on what ground the one is chosen rather than the other. This usage reappears in St. Paul ; and it seems doubtful whether the two terms are not employed by him, in some instances at least, as practically synonymous

<sup>1</sup> In connection with this special use of σάρξ Dr. Ezra Gould has propounded an ingenious explanation, of which some account will be found in the Appendix.

and interchangeable. At 1 Cor. vi. 16, 17, the proposition ὅτι ὁ κολλώμενος τῇ πόρῃ ἐν σῶμά ἐστιν is proved by appeal to the Scriptural passage: ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν; and at Eph. v. 28-31 the positions of the Apostle seem to rest on the interchangeableness of the conceptions σῶμα and σάρξ. At 2 Cor. iv. 10 we find the expression ἵνα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡμῶν φανερωθῇ exchanged at the close of the following verse for ἵνα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ φανερωθῇ ἐν τῇ θνητῇ σαρκὶ ἡμῶν. At 1 Cor. v. 3, the Apostle presenting the contrast between bodily absence and spiritual presence uses ἀπὼν τῷ σώματι, while at Col. ii. 5 he says: εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ ἄπειμι. In such cases as these it is difficult to draw any clear line of distinction.

But, as we have formerly seen, the greatest importance is attached by Holsten and his successors to the establishment of the position for which they contend, and some of their chief conclusions are dependent entirely on its validity. They maintain that σῶμα, as used by St. Paul, represents the conception of *form*, and σάρξ the conception of *substance*; σῶμα is the form of the bodily organism, σάρξ is the matter of the earthly body. We formerly gave a couple of illustrations of the shifts to which Holsten has recourse in the effort to apply throughout these categories of form and substance—in the case of the contrast of σῶμα with σκιά in

Col. ii. 17, where he imports substance into the form, and of Rom. viii. 13 : *πράξεις τοῦ σώματος*, where he arbitrarily appends *τῆς σαρκός* to make the expression square with his view. M. Reuss has not, apparently, been much impressed by the value of the distinction so drawn, for at 1 Cor. xv. 39 he renders *οὐ πάντα σάρξ ἢ αὐτὴ σάρξ* by "tout organisme n'est pas le même organisme," adding: "Literally the *flesh*; but it is evident that the Apostle does not wish to speak of muscles alone."

It might be sufficient to adduce—as a proof that, whatever the distinction may be, it is not at any rate strictly that between form and substance—the language of the Apostle at 1 Cor. ix. 27, where, comparing himself to an athlete, he says: "so fight [or box] I, as not beating the air," as aiming my blows at empty space, *ἀλλ' ὑπωπιάζω μου τὸ σῶμα, καὶ δουλαγωγῶ*, "but I buffet or bruise my body, and bring it into bondage." Here it is evident that the contrast to beating the air requires something more substantial to be buffeted and enslaved than mere form; and, assuming Holsten's account of the apostolic usage to be correct, we should rather expect the material *σάρξ*, with its bad connotation as the seat of sin, to be the object of the buffeting. "The idea of *σῶμα*" says Heinrici, a recent commentator on this Epistle, "would be cancelled, if it were to be conceived as pure form;" and Holsten

in his most recent book thus comments on the passage: "At ix. 27,  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  denotes quite correctly the body as the outward (material and substantial) manifestation-form of the inner Ego—the outer man which is combated and kept in discipline by the inner man. . . . Of course the idea of  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  would be cancelled, if it were to be conceived as pure form. For this 'pure form' is only an empty abstraction of the understanding. The living conception of  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  is that of a substantial form. Nevertheless, even in the physical domain,  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  always remains for the consciousness of Paul the *form* of the substance, the *body* of the flesh;  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  the *substance* of the form, the *flesh* of the body."<sup>1</sup> Here again we encounter the new category of "substantial form," which is just a means of associating the conception of substance with  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  whenever it is convenient so to interpret it, or, in other words, a virtual abandonment of the distinction as originally laid down.

And thus we might leave the question, having shown that the words are used at times interchangeably without obvious difference of meaning, and that, whatever be the difference, it is not uniformly that between matter and form as alleged by Holsten; but we are enabled to go farther and not only to maintain with considerable assurance that the dis-

<sup>1</sup> Holsten, *Das Evangelium des Paulus dargestellt*, I., p. 427, note.

inction is not such as has been asserted, but to indicate positively what it really is. For the question has been subjected to elaborate investigation at the hands of Dr. Wendt, and his results are both interesting in themselves and important in their consequences. His discussion, of which we shall present an abstract in the Appendix, necessarily runs much into detail; here we must content ourselves with indicating his chief conclusions.

After pointing out that the sense assumed for *σῶμα* as used by St. Paul has no analogies in other Hellenic usage, seeing that everywhere else *σῶμα* denotes the organism, in which the conception of form is an essential constituent element, but nowhere constitutes the whole contents; and that in the non-Pauline books of the New Testament the word is throughout employed in its usual sense as organised body with constant inclusion of the bodily substance, he proceeds to examine the argument based on the passage in 1 Cor. xv. 35ff., which he recognises with Holsten, Lüdemann, and Pfeiderer, as of decisive importance for this inquiry. He subjects to an acute criticism the theory of Holsten, and of the other two writers whom we have mentioned, that Paul's argument here 'turns upon the conception of substance, and shows that not only are some of the main links purely imported, but also that in that case Paul would not at all have touched the real difficulties of

his opponents. He then proposes to apply to the explanation of the passage the signification of *σάρξ*, for which we find warrant in the Old Testament, Septuagint, and other New Testament writers, whereby it is employed synecdochically to denote the whole body, and that not merely in so far as it is material, but in so far also as it is organised; and he reaches in this way a clear sense, whereby the desiderated correspondence between the starting-point of the opponents and the goal at which the Apostle arrives is fully secured. He points out that *σάρξ* in this synecdochic use is not quite equivalent to *σῶμα*. Just because it is put as part for the whole, it can only denote a whole of which it is *really part*, that is, it can only signify the organism of an earthly living being consisting of flesh and bones, but cannot denote either an earthly organism that is not living, or a living organism that is non-earthly. The conception of *σῶμα* is not bound to any such limits; it denotes the organism of the plant; it denotes likewise bodies celestial. He comes accordingly to the result that at 1 Cor. xv. 35 ff. the two conceptions *σῶμα* and *σάρξ* are related to each other, not as a conception of form to a conception of substance, but as a general to a special; *σῶμα* denotes the material organism apart from any definite matter (but not, as he points out in opposition to Lüdemann, form apart from any *sort* of matter); *σάρξ* denotes a quite

definite material organism, namely, the earthly-animal one; the two words are synonymous, when σῶμα from the context is used of an earthly-animal body."

He finds the same use of σάρξ at various passages of the minor Epistles. At Col. ii. 1, Paul speaks of such as have not seen his πρόσωπον ἐν σαρκί—his *bodily* face; and at ii. 5 contrasts his bodily absence—ἀπεῖναι ἐν σαρκί—with his spiritual presence, to which an illustrative parallel occurs in the contrast between the παρουσία τοῦ σώματος pronounced *weak*, and the ἐπιστολαί declared to be weighty and strong at 2 Cor. x. 10. At Phil. i. 22 ff. Wendt states that the Apostle uses ζῆν ἐν σαρκί, ἐπιμένειν ἐν τῇ σαρκί, when speaking specially of the *earthly* body, from which he might wish to be set free on his own account, but does not wish it for the sake of the Church; and remarks that the word σῶμα might here have been misunderstood, seeing that the Apostle contemplates the being clothed upon with a new organism, and so does not wish to be altogether free from σῶμα (2 Cor. v. 1 ff.). But Wendt apparently overlooks the fact that in the sequel of that passage (verse 8) the Apostle uses the expression σῶμα of that which was his present place of sojourn, but which he preferred to leave—ἐνδημοῦντες ἐν τῷ σώματι—ἐκδημηῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος—so that there does not seem any practical difference between the



ἐπιμένειν ἐν σαρκί of the one passage and the ἐνδημεῖν ἐν τῷ σώματι of the other.

Wendt points out, on the other hand, that σῶμα can only be employed where the reference is to an organism in the metaphorical sense, as in the many passages where the Church is termed the "body" of Christ, and Christians are described as its members (Rom. xii. 4 ff.; 1 Cor. x. 16 f.; xii. 12-27; Eph. i. 23; ii. 16; iv. 4, 12, 16; v. 25, 30; Col. i. 18, 24; ii. 19; iii. 15). It is also used with special frequency, alternately with μέλη, when the body is to be brought into prominence as the organ of human feeling and willing. In this case there was no occasion for employing σάρξ, because the object was to designate the body not definitely as earthly, but generally as organic. Thus sin rules and works in the σῶμα (Rom. vi. 12; vii. 5); and the μέλη are instruments or slaves of unrighteousness (Rom. vi. 13-19). The thought of the body as organ of the will is clearly expressed at 2 Cor. v. 10: "That each one may receive [literally: carry off with him] the things attained through [or *by means of*, where the Revisers have unaccountably retained *in*] the body according to what he hath [done." The passage 2 Cor. iv. 10 ff. has a special interest in so far as the σῶμα not only is interchanged with σάρξ, but has the double significance of a receptive as well as an active organ. "The body is a receptive

organ for the sufferings which befall the Apostle and bring about his resemblance to the death of Christ ; but it is also an active organ for the power of divine life which exhibits itself in his official activity and proves his resemblance to the life of Christ ; in the former case therefore the Apostle is *himself the object* of the effect which completes itself by means of the body, in the latter the Apostle is the *subject*, and the members of the Church are the *object*, of the divine effect accomplished through the body as organ." A similar double reference, with a like application, occurs at Phil. i. 20 : " As always, so now also Christ shall be magnified in my body, whether by life or by death " ; and a kindred one at Col. i. 24 ; " I fill up that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ in my flesh for his body's sake, which is the Church," where the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  is employed definitely to distinguish the Apostle's earthly body from the metaphorically used heavenly body of Christ.

When next we inquire what qualities are predicated of the earthly body thus designated, we find that the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  is characterised as mortal (2 Cor. iv. 11) and as subject to disease and weakness (Gal. iv. 13 ; 2 Cor. xii. 7), as locally limited (Col. ii. 1, 5), and as an object not of hatred, but of being nourished and cherished by man (Eph. v. 29) ; but alongside of the physical weakness thus clearly brought out

there is no mention of ethical weakness. The case is somewhat different as respects the  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ : it, too, is described as mortal (Rom. viii. 11), weak (2 Cor. x. 10), capable of life (1 Cor. xiii. 3; 2 Cor. iv. 10); but, in addition, at many significant passages it is brought into immediate relation, on the one hand, to the sin which is found in man and never utterly leaves even the Christian, on the other hand, to the sanctification which forms the aim of his moral-religious life. The connection of  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  (or  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\eta$ ) with sin appears at the following passages: Rom. i. 24; vi. 6; vii. 5, 23 f.; viii. 13; Col. iii. 5; its connection with sanctification at the following: Rom. xii. 1; 1 Cor. vi. 19 f.; vii. 14; comp. 1 Thess. iv. 4; v. 23; while there are yet a few other passages at which the relation to sin is just as possible as the relation to sanctification (Rom. vi. 12 f., 19; 1 Cor. vi. 13, 15; 2 Cor. v. 10). The  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  has thus a close connection with moral activity in general, whether good or bad of its kind.

Here lies the chief motive leading the supporters of a Hellenistic explanation of the Pauline idea of the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\zeta$  to lay so much stress on distinguishing the  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ , as a mere conception of form, most rigorously from the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\zeta$ . If  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\zeta$ , forsooth, signify the material substance of the earthly animal organism, and this substance is in itself the objective ground of all sin, it is clear that a sanctifying of this bodily sub-

stance is utterly out of the question ; and so, when St. Paul requires of believers the complete sanctifying of the *σῶμα*, and the presentation of it as a well-pleasing sacrifice to God, it follows that this *σῶμα* cannot comprehend in it the *σάρξ*, but must, on the contrary, denote the—in itself morally indifferent—bodily *form*. He quotes the words of Lüdemann (p. 57): "Far more frequently is the *σῶμα* mentioned by St. Paul, without any respect whatever to the flesh of which it consists, simply as the teleologically determined *form* of the organism which as instrument is associated with the spirit of man in whatever region of the universe it may find itself. The Apostle often exhorts to the right use of this organism and its employment only in the service of God. It is this *σῶμα* of which it is said at 1 Cor. vi. 13 that 'it is for the Lord, and the Lord for the body,' because this organism must *always* remain associated with the spirit, seeing that man will continue to wear it even after the resurrection. In this case, however, all consideration of the substances, which form its basis in this life or the other, must necessarily be laid aside, for these are not identical but opposite."

Upon this Wendt observes, in the first place, that, while in thought nothing is easier than to abstract the form from the substance of the body, there appears to be very much greater, and indeed utterly insuperable, difficulty in the way of executing the

same abstraction in the case of moral action. "I am not well able to see," he says, "how a man is to set about making his mere bodily form, apart from the matter of the body, the object of ethico-religious sanctification; and his bodily form, indeed, in the quite general signification in which it falls to be retained even with a complete change of bodily substance. No amount of theoretical reflection on the possibility of effecting the separation in ideal thought really contributes anything at all to the solution of this ethico-practical problem. And we may not impute it to St. Paul that in an often-repeated chief point of his exhortation—placed in the Epistle to the Romans at the very head of his moral injunctions—he has expressed a thought logically indisputable, but practically quite worthless and empty."

Turning to the view expressed by Pfeiderer (p. 49): "So far as the body is the organ of an Ego which has the destination to be ruled not by the flesh but by the spirit and, as Christian Ego, is also determined by the Spirit (of God), in so far the body may and ought to be instrument and temple of the Holy Spirit," Wendt observes upon it: "To this it is to be replied that the body, which forms the organ for the Ego, is always just the substantial body, never a mere body-form without substance; and if it is a fact that the Ego of man as Christian is ruled by the Spirit, it yet by no means thence follows that the

substantial body as organ of the Ego can become instrument of the Spirit, when this very substance is by its nature sinful and opposed to the Spirit. On the contrary, there would only remain admissible the inference that, although the Ego may be already sanctified during the earthly life, the organs withal of this Ego must during the earthly life remain constantly unholy, and only become adequate organs of the Ego in another world, where they obtain a new substance no longer antagonistic to the Spirit. At the utmost, Paul could only institute as a practical demand this *one* thing, that men should render the body in its sinful nature as far as possible *inoperative*, that they should not allow the sin objectively grounded in them to become subjective, but this negative exhortation he could never convert into a positive demand for the sanctifying of the body; because, for the body, including the matter thereof, the demand would be *illogical*; and for the *form* of the body, apart from the bodily matter, it would have been utterly *unpractical*."

Moreover, the assumption that *σῶμα* is only to be apprehended as a conception of form has been framed mainly for the purpose of facilitating the exclusion of bodily matter as in itself sinful from the required sanctification of the *σῶμα*, and has been framed under the supposition that the conception of *σάρξ*, denoting the substance of the body,

could in no case be exchanged with that of *σῶμα*. But this supposition is not confirmed by an examination of the facts, and the whole assumption thereby becomes aimless. It is not unimportant to note that at 2 Cor. iv. 10-12, where the conceptions *σῶμα* and *σάρξ* are interchanged, the thought that the life-power of Christ revealing itself in the mortal body of the Apostle may exercise its effect on the members of the Church, can only have the meaning that the body of the Apostle—his *σάρξ*—is an organ well adapted for the power of the Spirit of Christ approving itself in the apostolic calling. How could this thought be expressed in this form, if the flesh in itself sinful really stood in the most abrupt contrast to the divine *πνεῦμα*?

But far more decisive is the other passage, 2 Cor. vii. 1: "Having therefore these promises, let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement (*μολυσμοῦ*) of flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God." As the genitives *σαρκός* and *πνεύματος* can only be genitives of the object, we see that *σάρξ* is viewed not as the seat and objective ground, but as the object, of sinful defilement, and the resulting tenor of the exhortation is that this pollution is in the Christian to be discontinued and the *σάρξ* is to become, just as is elsewhere required of the *σῶμα*, an object of sanctification. The passage would be quite incomprehensible, if *σάρξ* in

reality denoted with Paul merely bodily matter in itself sinful. Holsten accordingly rejects the passage as not genuine, and Lüdemann thinks this very probable. But for its non-genuineness no other reason can be adduced than that the words do not suit the hypothesis of the *σάρξ* as sinful bodily matter—a ground which in reality brings suspicion not so much on the passage to be explained, as on the hypothesis which proves insufficient to explain it.

But, if the *σῶμα*, that is to be made the object of sanctification, always denotes the whole body including the bodily matter, and this matter may accordingly not be conceived as in itself sinful, what is to be made of the passages in which *σῶμα* is brought into closest relation to *ἁμαρτία*? After setting aside the assumption of Holsten and others that in all these passages the *σῶμα* is to be taken as *σῶμα τῆς σαρκός*, that is, to be explained as body including bodily substance, which latter conditions its sinfulness; and after taking exception to the at first sight plausible view of Ritschl that the passages, where sin is referred to the body and the members, relate to regenerate men, in whom sin has no longer a central place, Wendt abides by his previous suggestion that the *σῶμα*, wherever it is brought by St. Paul into relation to human action—that is, either to sin or to sanctification—comes into view merely as the *outward organ* for the execution of the good or



bad resolve of the will. In some passages this instrumental significance of *σῶμα* is expressly brought out (Rom. vi. 13, 19: 2 Cor. v. 10); in other passages the expression gets a more local turn, so that the body and the members appear as the *place* or *seat* at which the tendency of the will comes to be displayed (Rom. vii. 5, 23; 1 Cor. vi. 20), without change in the thought proper. A number of other passages are certainly, as they stand, of so indefinite and general a tenor that other explanations might be possible (Rom. vi. 6; viii. 10, 13; 1 Cor. vi. 13; Col. iii. 5); but to these passages we have to apply the tried principle of hermeneutics, that the more obscure expressions of an author are to be interpreted by the help of those that are more clear.

If, then, in the sixth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans at different passages the thought is clearly expressed that the body as a ministering organ is ruled by sin (verse 12), that its members render service to sin or to righteousness as implements (verse 13) or as slaves (verse 19), nothing is certainly more natural than in the sixth verse also to understand the words *τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας* in such a way, that the genitive *ἁμαρτίας* is in the strictest sense *genitivus possessoris*, that is, that sin is conceived as the master, to whom the body as slave belongs and is obedient to execute its will. As the slave must perform his definite functions,

not because he *in himself can* perform no others, but because on account of his *actually* subsistent relationship of service he *may* perform no others, while of himself he might belong as well to another master and render other services; so the earthly *σῶμα* belongs not *of itself* to the *ἁμαρτία*, but may just as well belong *τῷ κυρίῳ* (1 Cor. vi. 13), and doubtless it is *de facto* enslaved to sin, so long as a redemption from this state has not set in by virtue of the Divine Spirit (Rom. vii. 24)." And, by way of accounting for the prominence thus given to *σῶμα*, and for the fact that St. Paul summons us not directly to annihilate the sinful tendency of will, but indirectly to render inoperative the organs of that tendency, he points out the cardinal position of *ἁγιασμός* as embracing and gathering up into a compact unity all the individual virtues, not leaving untouched or throwing into the shade any single side of human nature, but embracing all, and extending its effect as to the spirit, so also to the body. See 1 Cor. vii. 34: "that she may be holy (*ἁγία*) both in body and in spirit," and 1 Cor. vi. 20: "Glorify God therefore in your body." The words which are here added in the Received text: "and in your spirit, which are God's," are set aside by the later critical editors as without adequate attestation, and have probably owed their insertion to a marginal gloss or glosses.

We found, in the case of the Old Testament, that the word *basar* had, in addition to its proper and primary sense, and to its extended application to the whole body, a *third* and still wider range of use, under which it denoted living creatures on earth, and man in particular, with the accessory idea of their weakness and perishableness as standing in contrast to God. Is there any trace of an analogous usage in the case of St. Paul?

Now we meet on several occasions the very phrase which so often recurs in the Old Testament, *πάσα σάρξ*. At two passages Paul adopts, or rather adapts, words which were taken from the Old Testament, Psalm cxlii. (cxliii.) 2 : *ὅτι οὐ δικαιοθήσεται ἐνώπιόν σου πᾶς ζῶν*, inserting instead of this latter the equivalent *πάσα σάρξ* (Rom. iii. 20; Gal. ii. 16). At a third passage (1 Cor. i. 29) he employs it on his own part: *ὅπως μὴ καυχῆσθαι πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ*. That in all these cases the phrase means not merely all men as such, but all men as *standing in contrast to God*, is evident from the express addition *ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ*. Akin to this is the use of the similar but fuller expression—not so occurring in the Old Testament but found in later Jewish literature—*σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα* in Gal. i. 16 : “I conferred not with flesh and blood,” where it carries a like connotation : “I did not consult or derive any official authority from those who shared the common

character of weak and dependent humanity"; at 1 Cor. xv. 50: "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God," that is, men as creatures in their own power merely, without having received the power of a divine life in the Spirit; and at Eph. vi. 12: "our wrestling is not against flesh and blood," that is, against weak men with whom conflict might be waged on no unequal terms, as compared with those powers that are termed *πνευματικά*, wielding more than earthly resources, and so only to be overcome by the divine help.

This third usage, frequent and familiar in the Old Testament, and as such well known to the Apostle, supplies a fitting key to the interpretation of the numerous passages where St. Paul employs *σάρξ* in a sense obviously wider than that of the mere body or bodily matter. It will, we think, be found that, wherever the Apostle speaks of "flesh" in this more comprehensive use, he means either "man as a creature in his natural state apart from Christ," or "the creaturely side or aspect of man in Christ." Weiss objects to the terms "creature" and "creaturely" as not quite applicable, inasmuch as they would include the angels or higher spiritual beings that are not *σάρξ*, and his objection is, to some extent, well founded; but the expressions "man merely as such," or "the mere natural man," are somewhat restrictive of the comprehensiveness of the conception, which embraces living

beings on earth, and there is no convenient adjective corresponding to them. On the whole, perhaps, the word "creature" is that which is best fitted to indicate the essential element of *contrast to the Creator*, as the "creaturely nature" is contradistinguished from the new pneumatic life.

Exception has, however, been taken, especially by Richard Schmidt, to the idea of the Apostle's having here followed the Old Testament on the ground that the expression "flesh" in the Old Testament denotes "the concrete man," whereas with St. Paul it denotes the abstract notion of "human nature" or of "what is human" in a general sense, which is, he contends, practically an abandonment of the original meaning, because the general conception of substance or matter, which the word involves, is exchanged for the entirely heterogeneous notion of "nature" or "kind." To this Wendt replies by granting that "the transition without any intermediate link from the conception of substance to that of human nature, would be impossible; but we are not here called on to assume such an immediate transition. For the transition is made by starting, not from the original signification of the word as denoting the muscular constituents of the body, but from the synecdochic signification, according to which, the part being put for the whole, "flesh" denotes the whole man or, more correctly

speaking, the creature. And such a transition is not even difficult, to say nothing of impossible. Such exchanges of concrete and abstract meaning are frequent in all languages, especially in Hebrew."<sup>1</sup>

"The word *σάρξ* denotes in Hebraising usage the concrete man, but not in so far as he is simply such, but in so far as he belongs to the more general class of creaturely beings, whose nature is at an infinite distance from the divine nature. In this there is already implied a clear abstraction, which, however, only comes fully into prominence when the concrete human individual can no longer be placed *as regards all that he consists of* under that more general class of creaturely beings, because in addition to the creaturely nature which had formerly constituted all that belonged to him he has now received another—a divine—side of his nature. So soon as this latter state has set in, the word *σάρξ* *must*, just in order to retain its original meaning unchanged, cease to denote the concrete man, and *can* only henceforth signify in an abstract way his creaturely nature. It is not the contents of the conception *σάρξ* that is changed or narrowed, but the contents of the *concrete man* that is extended; and for this reason the conception of *σάρξ*, which has remained unchanged, can now no

<sup>1</sup> "Nägelsbach gives a number of examples in his *Hebräische Grammatik*, 2nd edition, 1862, § 59; comp. Gesenius, *Hebräische Grammatik*, 21st edition, 1872, § 83, note."

longer be applied *simpliciter* to that *concrete*. The *σάρξ* now denotes the concrete individual, not *because* he is *only* creature, but *in so far* as he is *merely* creature.”

Let us note some of the more prominent features of this Pauline use of *σάρξ*. And, first, let us mark the fact of its correlation with *ἄνθρωπος*. At 1 Cor. iii. 3, the Apostle asks: *οὐχὶ σαρκικοί ἐστε, καὶ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε*; and at the 4th verse, where the Received text has *οὐχὶ σαρκικοί ἐστε*, the reading approved by the chief critical editors presents as the parallel expression *οὐκ ἄνθρωποί ἐστε*. At Rom. vi. 19: *ἀνθρώπινον λέγω διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν*, it is likewise evident that *σάρξ* is used in a sense interchangeable with *ἄνθρωπος*, if not coincident with it. At any rate the readers might be characterised in terms of either. At 2 Cor. v. 17, the Apostle announces, *εἴ τις ἐν Χριστῷ, καινὴ κτίσις· τὰ ἀρχαῖα παρῆλθεν*, after having just before declared that now he no longer knew any one *κατὰ σάρκα*. The *σάρξ* is therefore something apart from, and anterior to, this *καινὴ κτίσις*—an earlier and older *κτίσις*.

At Rom. vi. 6 St. Paul speaks of *ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος* as having been crucified, while at Eph. iv. 22 ff. he puts forward, as the distinctive mark of his teaching and of his converts' learning, *ἀποθέσθαι ὑμᾶς*

. . . τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον . . . καὶ ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον, just as at Col. iii. 9, as having “put off the old man with his deeds (σὺν ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτοῦ) and having put on the new (τὸν νέον).” But at Gal. v. 24 the object of crucifixion on the part of those that are Christ’s is represented as being the σάρξ: “They that are Christ’s have crucified the flesh.” The σάρξ would seem therefore to be interchangeable with “the old man.” In keeping with these indications that it denotes “man such as he exists in experience,” “pre-Christian, non-renewed man,” we find that it has ascribed to it powers, activities, functions, that are more fitly predicated of man as a whole than either of the material substance of his body or of the body as such. The σάρξ has not only παθήματα and ἐπιθυμίαι (Gal. v. 24), but also θελήματα (Eph. ii. 3: ποιοῦντες τὰ θελήματα τῆς σαρκός), a φρόνημα (Rom. viii. 6, 7), a νοῦς (Col. ii. 18, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦς τῆς σαρκός), as well as a σῶμα (Col. ii. 11; ἐν τῇ ἀπεκδύσει τοῦ σώματος τῆς σαρκός, according to the best critical text, omitting τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν).

But, while such passages mark its correlation with, or equivalence to, ἄνθρωπος, we get a further and more exact measure of its import, when we look at it under the foil of contrast to πνεῦμα. Not only do we meet with such sharp antithetic utterances as Gal. iii. 3: “Having begun in the Spirit, are ye



now perfected in the flesh ?” ; Gal. vi. 8 ; “ He that soweth unto his own flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption ; but he that soweth unto the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap eternal life ;” but in two passages more especially the Apostle carries out a lengthened juxtaposition and contrast of the states or effects produced under the ascendancy of the *σάρξ* or *πνεῦμα* respectively.

At Gal. v. 16 ff. we find the words : “ Walk by the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh ; for these are contrary the one to the other ; that ye may not do the things that ye would. But, if ye are led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law.” And then follows the well-known contrast carried out in detail between the works of the flesh and the fruit of the Spirit (Gal. v. 19-25). And at Rom. viii. 4, he describes Christians as those “ who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit,” and proceeds to draw out and illustrate the contrast. We quote the passage from the Revised Version, but without accepting the distinction, as compared with the Authorised Version, which the Revisers have sought to mark between “ spirit ” and “ Spirit ”. “ For they that are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh ; but they that are after the Spirit the things of the Spirit. For the mind of the flesh is death ; but the

mind of the Spirit is life and peace; because the mind of the flesh is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can it be; and they that are in the flesh cannot please God. But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you. But if any man hath not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. And if Christ is in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you, he that raised up Christ Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies through his Spirit that dwelleth in you. So then, brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh; for, if ye live after the flesh, ye must die; but, if by the Spirit ye mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live."

From this passage we learn that the presence of the *πνεῦμα* is the distinctive mark of the Christian, and that those who have this *πνεῦμα* are no longer in the flesh; while the previous passage still more explicitly describes the *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* as antagonistic in man. We are warranted therefore in concluding that, as the *πνεῦμα* constitutes the new differential characteristic of the Christian, the *σάρξ* must be human nature without the *πνεῦμα*—the creaturely state of man prior to, or in contrast

with, his reception of the divine element whereby he is constituted a new creature. It is not confined to the bodily, external, or animal nature of man, but embraces his whole being as it exists and acts apart from the influence of the *πνεῦμα*.

Practically, when applied to the unregenerate, it denotes, as Ritschl has rightly recognised, the *whole* man; while, in reference to those who have become regenerate in Christ, it must be restricted not to the body as Ritschl holds, but to the *side* or *aspect* of man which is *creaturely* as contrasted with that which is pneumatic. Just as we found that, in the case of *πνεῦμα*, the predominant element in St. Paul's thought was the divine power issuing from God and operative in the believer, so we find in the case of *σάρξ* the predominant thought of man standing by himself or left to himself overagainst God—in other words, the natural man conceived as not having yet received grace, or as not yet wholly under its influence.

As this meaning clearly appears wherever the contrast is explicitly set forth, it may reasonably be assumed to be applicable in other cases where the term occurs without any indication from the context of its bearing a more restricted import.

## X.

## EXAMINATION OF OTHER INTERPRETATIONS.

WE have now passed under review the leading facts of Pauline usage, and have arrived at the conclusion that, while *πνεῦμα* has its paramount place in the teaching of St. Paul as the divine power which originates and sustains the new life distinctive of the Christian, *σάρξ* in its most characteristic use denotes the creaturely nature of man, or the creaturely side of his nature, in contrast to the new life which he so receives. This conclusion, when applied as a working hypothesis, will, we venture to think, be found adequate to embrace and to connect the facts, and will thereby vindicate its title to be accepted as solving the exegetical problem before us. It has not been imported from without, but has been suggested by the examination and comparison of the Apostle's own statements; and, while its ultimate justification must lie in the success with which it fits, binds together, and explains his utterances, it cannot but carry an *à priori* feasibility on the face

of it, inasmuch as it is in strict keeping with the Apostle's historical position and with the influences by which he was moulded. His language in this case rests throughout on the precedent of Old Testament usage, and finds at once the warrant for its being employed and the key to the course of its development in the Scriptures of his own nation. We find no occasion to go beyond the resources of that rich treasury, and the common stock of current speech as wielded by a masterhand with new spiritual power, in order to put adequate meaning into the Apostle's words; and we cannot, under such circumstances, see the need, or the advantage, of calling in the aid of psychological theories or metaphysical speculations to elucidate utterances that proceed directly from, and address themselves mainly to, a religious interest.

But the value of the conclusion to which we have come—a conclusion coincident in substance, though not in form of expression, with the line of interpretation followed by Augustine and by the leaders of the Reformation—and the special significance of the more precise expression here given to it will be the more apparent, if we now, in the light of our exegetical inquiry, briefly examine the warrant or adequacy of the other leading interpretations on which we touched at the outset.

I. Let us take, first, that which, as the more

recent, has especially engaged our attention, and induced us, indeed, to enter on this inquiry—the explanation which regards *σάρξ* as the earthly substance or bodily material side of man, and which discovers in the Apostle's use of it an element akin to certain positions of Hellenic philosophy regarding matter as essentially evil. Of this view Holsten is, beyond doubt, the ablest and most thorough representative; and we cannot but admire the skill with which he supports it, and the clear-cut precision of his exegesis in applying it. No one has more subtlety of insight or lucid force in expressing his thoughts, as no one withal has less tolerance for what he deems a lack of these gifts. But in this case he has not succeeded in convincing even those most disposed to sympathy with his views. Baur and Schmidt, Lüdemann and Pfeiderer, decline to follow whither he would lead them, and dissent from his more stringent conclusions. We have already indicated some of the grounds on which such a borrowing of ideas from Greek philosophy as Holsten assumes is, from the general point of view of St. Paul's relations and statements, intrinsically improbable in the highest degree; and we have shown that, in the judgment of the theologians whose names we have associated with his, he has failed in point of fact to make good his main positions. There is no warrant in St. Paul's utterances for converting his contrast of the *σάρξ*

and *πνεῦμα* into the metaphysical contrast of finite and infinite, or for identifying the *σάρξ* with matter necessarily evil. Lüdemann has shown that St. Paul is not chargeable with dualism in Holsten's sense; and Pfeleiderer has affirmed that Holsten's view as to the *σάρξ* is "decidedly un-Pauline."

It is not surprising that a theory should have found few supporters, which takes its one postulate from a strictly monotheistic Judaism subordinating all things to God, and its other from a system positing an eternal matter inherently antagonistic to the divine will—a theory which assumes the Apostle to have held these contrary opposites side by side, and which, by its denial of a human *πνεῦμα*, its resolution of the whole man into *σάρξ*, and its making Christ's work to consist in the destruction of this *σάρξ*, leaves no logical place for redemption. It not only makes the Apostle half Jew and half Greek, notwithstanding what he may have himself said to the contrary, but it places these halves on a footing of irreconcilable antagonism, and constitutes the Christian, not by superinducing a new element of power which is capable of transforming the old, but by a process of destruction and of substitution which amounts to the formation of *another* rather than to a renewal of the *same* man.

It is obvious, however, that the very frankness with which Holsten throughout acknowledges the Jewish

type of St. Paul's thought as regards the transcendent character of the *πνεῦμα* may be claimed by us as an emphatic witness to the truth of the position that we have sought to establish, so far as the pneumatic side is concerned. He has effectively shown, even while carrying his principle to the unwarranted extent of denying any other use, that the distinctive sense of *πνεῦμα* with St. Paul is that of a new divine factor supervening on a prior non-pneumatic state of man. But, while he thus freely owns the correctness of the exegetical instinct which has guided the Church in the apprehension of the Apostle's teaching as to the *πνεῦμα*, he thereby furnishes a very strong presumption, to say the least, against the relevancy or the feasibility of his resort to another and an alien source for the explanation of its correlate—the *σᾶρξ*. If the Apostle takes his stand, as is admitted, on purely Jewish ground as regards one side of his antithesis, how can it be reasonably supposed that he should not occupy the same ground as regards the other side, the meaning of which could, under the circumstances, be only conceived by him, and could only be understood by his readers, as sustaining a definite correlation to what was thus recognised as fixed? If Holsten rightly sought and found the import of *πνεῦμα* on Jewish soil, why should he go elsewhere in quest of the import to be attached to what is here opposed to it?



If the "spirit" is Jewish, surely the "flesh" must, in the necessity of the case, be Jewish also! It could hardly have occurred to anyone, other than a German philosopher in search of novelty, to propound or to defend a theory that thus links St. Paul simultaneously to two different and incongruous spheres of thought; and it is no matter of wonder that even the ingenuity of Dr. Holsten has striven in vain to give unity or consistency to his association of the elements thus unequally yoked. Such a semblance of success as he presents he has achieved simply by reading into the use of the terms by St. Paul extensions or restrictions of their import which there is nothing in his language to warrant, and which the ordinary canons of exegesis supply no means of justifying.

But, while the objections which we venture to take apply most strongly to the positions of Holsten, they are applicable, in greater or less measure, to all the explanations which turn on the dominant conception of the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  as the material bodily substance of man.

1. If this definition is to be taken in the ordinary literal import of the words that are chosen to express it, it is seen, upon even a cursory glance at the Pauline use of the term, to be manifestly inadequate to cover the range of the conception. Dr. Grimm, in his admirable Lexicon, must be regarded as a thoroughly competent and impartial exponent of the facts; and

we find him defining *σάρξ*, at such a passage as Rom. viii. 3, as "*humana natura, incluso etiam animo*," and remarking in regard to its explicit or tacit opposition to *πνεῦμα (τοῦ Θεοῦ)* that it denotes "*natura mere humana*," so as to comprehend "*quidquid est in animo molle, humile, demissum, ad profana et prava tendens*." We have formerly referred to various cases in which the *σάρξ* is associated with attributes and functions of mind, that can only be predicated of it on the assumption that it embraces far more than the mere body or bodily matter; so that, if we are to explain them in terms of Holsten's definition, we can only do so by understanding that definition in a non-natural sense, and giving to the conception of bodily substance a range inclusive of these mental activities. But such a course does violence to the laws of language, and substitutes confusion for clearness of thought. What can be more confusing than to insist on retaining throughout the primary or fundamental signification of "material bodily substance," and at the same time to make that category so elastic as to embrace whatever function of mind one chooses to bring under it? To say that St. Paul never departs from the radical sense of "matter of the body," and to assert withal that what he means by "bodily matter" is a good deal less or a great deal more than most people who are not materialists understand by it, is simply to

play fast and loose with language. Surely it were much more reasonable to derive our definition of the word from observing St. Paul's own use of it, and to render its import by some such expression as "creature" answering to its real contents, than to force all that variety of contents into the concept of "bodily substance." In point of fact, much of the forced exegesis to which Holsten and his (partial) followers have recourse springs from their preferring to *deduce* the Apostle's meaning from an assumed "fundamental signification" (*Grundbedeutung*), rather than to gather it from a sober *induction* of the facts. We have seen that the Hebrew usage, to which St. Paul attaches himself, stands directly related *not* to the *primary* and literal, but to a *synecdochic* and transferred sense, that it is, as it were, *twice removed* from that primary one, and that it turns much less on the idea of *substance* than on that of *form, appearance, or aspect*, as Grimm well puts it, "*homo, qualis in conspectum cadit, qualem oculis se spectandum præbet.*"

2. As regards the suggestion that St. Paul has conformed to, or borrowed from, the Greek conception of matter viewed as evil, we remark that there is no trace in St. Paul either of the terms or of the ideas associated with that conception in Greek or Jewish-Greek philosophy. St. Paul neither adopts its language nor expresses its sentiments. In that philosophy the well-known *vox signata* for "matter"

was ὕλη,<sup>1</sup> and the cognate adjective ὑλικός supplied a definite designation for what consisted of, or belonged to, matter; and it might fairly be presumed that, if St. Paul was conversant with that philosophy and more or less imbued with its conceptions, he would naturally have recourse to its language, or, if not, would at times almost unconsciously reproduce it. But he makes no use whatever of the word,<sup>2</sup> and

<sup>1</sup>The currency of the word as a philosophical term subsequent to the time of Plato, who did not use the word itself in this sense but spoke of the thing, is well indicated by the passage in Plutarch, *De Defectu Oraculorum*, 10, where it is affirmed that Plato delivered philosophers from many difficulties by finding out for them this subject-basis for the qualities of things: εὖ λέγουσι καὶ οἱ λέγοντες ὅτι Πλάτων τὸ ταῖς γεννωμέναις ποιότησιν ὑποκείμενον στοιχείον ἐξευρών, ὃ νῦν ὕλην καὶ φύσιν καλοῦσιν, πολλῶν ἀπήλλαξε καὶ μεγάλων ἀποριῶν τοὺς φιλοσόφους. It might have been added that, if by this means he extricated them from some perplexities, he involved them in others.

<sup>2</sup>It is not used at all in the New Testament, except in the Epistle of James iii. 6: ἰδοὺ ἡλίκον [according to the best text] πῦρ ἡλίκην ὕλην ἀνάπτει, where it is to be taken as denoting "wood" rather than "matter" generally, as in the Revised Version: "Behold how much wood is kindled by how small a fire!" It occurs thrice in the LXX., on two occasions (Job xxxviii. 40; Is. x. 17) in a similar literal sense, on the third (Job. xix. 29: τότε γνώσονται ποῦ ἔστιν αὐτῶν ἡ ὕλη), under circumstances where it is very difficult to tell what is the true text of the original or the meaning of the Septuagint translation. On the other hand, the more general idea of "matter" seems to underlie the peculiar use of the adjective ὑλώδης in Job. xxix. 5, where the words: ὅτε ἤμην ὑλώδης λίαν, literally, "when I was very full of matter,

—we may therefore infer—had no occasion to express the thought, of which it had become the recognised vehicle. He does, on the other hand, employ the word *χοϊκός*, which has no special currency as a term of philosophy, and which he evidently borrowed from the *χοῦς* of the LXX. at Gen. ii. 7.

But not only have we to call attention to the absence of the word Hyle; we have to note also the yet more significant absence of any indication that matter was regarded as evil or as in itself polluting. There is nothing in the Apostle's writings analogous to the *πεφυρμένη ὕλη* of Philo, which God in creation "might not Himself come into contact with, but employed incorporeal powers, whose true name is ideas, to put into fitting shape"; nor is there anything akin to the idea of the body as a burden bearing heavily on the soul, such as we find in the Book of Wisdom erroneously named from Solomon, which bears various marks<sup>1</sup> of the influence of that

*materiosus*," are given as the rendering of the Hebrew, which simply means: "when the Almighty was yet with me." And the philosophical idea appears in the Book of Wisdom, xi. 18: *κτίσασα τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης*. See Grimm's interesting note on the passage in his *Exegetisches Handbuch zu den Apokryphen*.

<sup>1</sup> As to the tone and tendency of this Book there can be little doubt. See Grimm's Commentary on it, and Zeller (*Philosophie der Griechen*, iii. 2, p. 230 ff., 2nd edition), who

Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy that subsequently found its chief representative in Philo, and which distinctly reflects the dualistic spirit of that philosophy at ix. 13: "The corruptible body oppresses the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weighs down the meditative mind" (*φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχὴν, καὶ βρῖθει τὸ γεῶδες σκεῦος νοῦν πολυφρόντιδα*). The very circumstance that this striking utterance occurs in a book admitted on all hands to have been composed long before St. Paul's time (variously placed between 150 and 50 B.C.), and supposed by Lüdemann and others on the score of several assonances of expression to have been

has at the same time pointed out some of the extravagances into which the search for early traces of this Jewish-Greek philosophy has led Gfrörer and Dähne. The latter for instance, he tells us, is disposed to regard the expression *παρὰ πτώματος ἰδίου* in x. 1, as denoting the descent of the soul from a higher pre-existent state into the body, whereas the first clause of the verse as to *πρωτόπλαστον πατέρα κόσμου* clearly betokens that the reference is to the account in Genesis of the fall, and the predicate *ἰδίον* denotes that the fall was self-incurred (*selbstverschuldete*) in contrast to the divine agency. Zeller has, we may add, effectually disposed of the slight and inadequate grounds on which Gfrörer and Dähne, the latter more especially, have held the Septuagint translators to exhibit traces of having been influenced in their work by their philosophical leanings; and he comes to the conclusion that, "putting all things together, we have no reason to assume in the case of the authors of the Septuagint version more than a superficial and isolated contact with Greek ideas" (*Philos. d. Griechen*, iii. 2, p. 215 ff.)

well-known to the Apostle,<sup>1</sup> serves to bring into fuller relief the entirely independent standpoint of the latter, who, so far from depreciating the body, contemplates it throughout as the fitting organ of the soul's activity, claims it for the Lord (1 Cor. vi. 14), declares it the temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. vi. 19, 20), calls for its presentation as a living sacrifice (Rom. xii. 1), and indicates the due function of its *μέλη* as that of instruments of righteousness unto God (Rom. vi. 13, 19).

It is, however, most natural that the teaching of St. Paul should be compared with that of the nearly contemporary Philo, whose writings present the fullest elaboration of the Jewish Alexandrian philosophy; and no small efforts have accordingly been made to adduce evidence of points of agreement. To any one, indeed, who takes the trouble to compare the masterly outline of the Philonian system given by Dr. Zeller, with a similar outline of the doctrinal system of St. Paul, as presented by M. Reuss, or by Dr. Pfeiderer, it must soon be obvious that such an

<sup>1</sup> We have already referred to the slight correspondence of expression (*εἰσήλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον*) on which Lüdemann bases his suggestion of St. Paul's having imitated the Book of Wisdom in Rom. v. 12, but at the same time ignored the reference to the agency of the devil (*φθόνῳ διαβόλου*) there found. If anything was needed to show the absurdity of this line of argument, it would be found in the converse use made of the reference to the devil by Grätz to prove that the passage was a Christian addition. See Zeller, *l.c.*, p. 231, note 2.

enterprise is far from a hopeful one. Beyond the fact that they start from the common basis of Judaism, they have little in common; and the collation will not proceed far, before the collator will feel the significance of the *caveat* which Dr. Carl Siegfried more than once appends to his notice of traits of resemblance between the writings of Philo and those of St. Paul: "Our purpose here is to investigate the similarities, and not the differences."<sup>1</sup> The differences are manifold and far reaching; the resemblances are merely such as may be readily accounted for by the dealing with kindred topics under the influence of a common background of Old Testament tradition and faith. It appears to us, indeed, that in judgments of this nature traces of resemblance between two writers are often set down to unconscious imitation, or to borrowing from a common source, while they may really be due to the quite independent action of two minds exercising the like faculties on kindred subjects. The wonder is that parallels under such circumstances should be met with so seldom rather than that they should occur at all; and the question remains how far those that are verbal are also real.

As regards a general comparison—with which

<sup>1</sup> In his elaborate work: "Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments," p. 306, 308.



we are not here concerned—it may suffice to refer to the interesting essay of Dr. Jowett on “St. Paul and Philo” subjoined to his exposition of the Epistle to the Galatians, and to quote the words in which Siegfried has fairly, as it seems to us, summed up the main points of agreement and difference between the doctrine of Philo and the Christian teaching. “Common to both is the effort to bring about a higher union of Jew and Gentile. Both have the important idea of an intermediate being (*Mittelwesen*), connecting God and the world, God and man. Both have the like view of the utter sinfulness of the human race, and of the ethical problem set before it, how to become pure from sin. But by the side of these features of resemblance there subsist deep and far-reaching distinctions. Philo’s idea of God is more Gentile-philosophic than Biblical, while that of the New Testament exhibits the traits of the living God of Israel. The Logos-doctrine of Philo leans towards the Pantheistic conception, while that of the New Testament abides throughout on the soil of Theism. In respect to ethics, the view which places evil exclusively in the bodily nature is altogether alien to the New Testament.”<sup>1</sup>

It is with this last question that we have now to do ; and in support of the opinion thus distinctly

<sup>1</sup> Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria*, p. 304.

expressed by the most recent and distinguished student of Philo—as to the utter absence from the New Testament of that exclusive reference of sin to the bodily or sensuous nature, which is characteristic of Philo's teaching—it might be enough to contrast the place and functions assigned to the *σῶμα* by St. Paul, in such passages as those we have just referred to, with the statements of Philo, that “the earthly part enveloping each of us is the cause of the sorest evils of the *νοῦς*,”<sup>1</sup> that the mind, “so long as it is contained in the city of the body and the mortal life is contracted and kept down, and confined as it were in a prison, openly owns itself unable to inhale a freer air,”<sup>2</sup> that the body is “a corpse which the soul drags along with it from birth to death,”<sup>3</sup> that it is “an urn, or a tomb, or whatever name it may be called by, in which one is buried,”<sup>4</sup> and that “so long as one lives in it, fellowship with God is not possible.”<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Quod deter. pot. insid. p. 210. The references are to the pages of Mangey's edition. It seems strange that the zeal expended of late years on Philonian studies should not have addressed itself in any case to a new edition of the text.

<sup>2</sup> De ebrietate, p. 372. See also Leg. alleg., p. 95, and de migr. Abrah., p. 437, where the body is called τὸ παμμίαρον δεσμωτήριον.

<sup>3</sup> De agricult., p. 304, ἄχθος τοσοῦτον νεκροφοροῦσα. See also De gigantibus, p. 264.

<sup>4</sup> De migr. Abrah. 438 f., Leg. alleg. p. 65.

<sup>5</sup> Leg. alleg. p. 95.

But, as Lüdemann has sought to support his peculiar half-and-half theory—as to St. Paul's having engrafted a Greek dualistic conception of the *σάρξ* on the stock of his original Judaism—by the assertion that the use of *σάρξ* in Rom. vii. has its exact parallel in Philo, and has thus brought forward a definite allegation of resemblance, it may be well to note the mode in which he reaches his conclusion. His position is, that *σάρξ* is used in Rom. vii. in the sense of the Hellenistic dualism of the intellectual and the sensuous elements in man, and that the double function there assigned to the *σάρξ* by St. Paul—that of repressing and blunting the powers of the *νοῦς*, and that of stifling and corrupting its moral consciousness—has its counterpart in the language of Philo. It is not at all necessary for us to discuss how far Lüdemann's interpretation of Rom. vii. is itself correct; were we to do so, we might fairly take exception to some of the ideas, such as that of objective *ἀμαρτία*, which he imputes to the Apostle; it is sufficient for our present purpose to point out that, even granting Lüdemann's own statements, the differences between St. Paul and Philo are, on his own showing, far more marked than the resemblances.

He tells us that “one cannot conceal from himself that the course of thought, though tending in the same direction, is by no means coincident”

(p. 104), that "St. Paul is not acquainted with the idea of the human mind" on which Philo proceeds, and that "accordingly the ethical process does not pursue quite the same course as / with Philo" (p. 104), that "up to a certain degree an analogy doubtless cannot be mistaken," but "a distinction nevertheless separates the Apostle from the theosoph" (p. 105). He holds that, while according to the Platonic Hellenism of Philo it was not absolutely impossible for man to attain true wisdom and accomplish the good in spite of the *σάρξ*, if only he should be willing to control and repress it, and to give free play to his original affinity with God,<sup>1</sup> the extremity of despair in which the Apostle finds himself in presence of the *σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου* at Rom. vii. 24 is due to his combining with the Jewish view of the absolute weakness and inferiority of the finite mind the Hellenistic conception of the *σάρξ* as a principle of spontaneous enmity to God. Without pausing to inquire whether this is an altogether correct account of the matter, we find him further putting the distinction in this way: "that the Platonist constructs *a priori* by means of his philosophic anthropology what the Apostle gets done only in the history of redemption"—in other words, that, while "Philo makes man from the outset

<sup>1</sup> De mundi opificio, p. 35 : ἡ δὲ συγγένεια τίς ; πᾶς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ὑκείωται θείῳ λόγῳ.

have a share in the *πνεῦμα θεῖον*, Paul reserves the idea of the *πνεῦμα θεῖον* entirely for the Christology, thereby making it clear how thoroughly his thoughts mould themselves on the central idea of redemption." This is certainly a very considerable and a very real difference; and it would seem to presuppose, as its necessary correlate, a difference in the conception of the state of human nature, according as it may deliver itself or may stand in need of a divine deliverance.

Lüdemann, from his own point of view, goes on to notice other distinctions. Philo asserts expressly freedom of choice, which Paul in substance at Rom. vii. excludes. Philo draws a distinction between sinning knowingly and sinning in ignorance, and holds the responsibility of the *νοῦς* only for the former, while in a passage, which presents a superficial resemblance to Rom. vii.,<sup>1</sup> he describes man, in the state when *without knowing it* he is wholly abandoned to the corporeo-sinful, as *pure*; and only when the divine word has come to the soul does man become deserving of condemnation. With St. Paul, on the other hand, the sense of guilt awakened by the law extends backward over the time of purely objective alienation from God. For the Hellenist sin acquires the religious character of guilt only by the conscious and free self-surrender of the *νοῦς* to

<sup>1</sup> In his treatise *Quod Deus sit immutabilis*, p. 292 f.

the evil quality of what is corporeal. The Jew, on the other hand—and Paul shares this Jewish view—is acquainted with a guilt in a religious sense attaching to him (*eine ihn religiös verhaftende Schuld*), which arises without participation of his knowing or willing.

But, if in all these respects, according to Lüdemann's own account, there is marked difference, wherein consists the affinity? It consists simply, so far as we can see, in the fact that Philo *occasionally* makes use of the word *σάρξ* to denote the element that is fundamentally opposed to the *νοῦς* and the *διάνοια*. But Lüdemann frankly confesses that Philo has no special predilection for the word. On the contrary, he for the most part calls the element in question *σῶμα*, or *τὰ πάθη, ἡδοναί, ἐπιθυμίαι* and *ἡδοναὶ τοῦ σώματος*; and, so far as I can judge from the context of the few passages to which Lüdemann refers, the word *σάρξ* is not used in any sense practically different from that in which elsewhere *σῶμα* occurs; in one passage expressly quoted by him the one is translated without ceremony into the other.<sup>1</sup> In point of fact, as Lüdemann admits, it is comparatively seldom that Philo makes use of *σάρξ* of his own initiative; he employs it, because it has been suggested to him by the Old Testament

<sup>1</sup> In the fanciful interpretation of Lev. xviii. 6 given in the tract *De gigant.*, p. 267.

text on which he hangs the thread of his discourse, and so strongly is he possessed by the ruling conception of a material evil principle that he reads it into many passages of Scripture in which the ordinary reader would suspect nothing of the kind. In the few instances where he has himself apparently chosen the word, it may perhaps be employed after a manner similar to that which governs its occasional use by Greek philosophers, to which Zeller has drawn attention,<sup>1</sup> as conveying the gross material nature of the "body" somewhat more strongly than the latter term in itself implies. But there is nothing here really akin to St. Paul's use, in which

<sup>1</sup> In a paper in the *Theologische Jahrbücher* for 1852, XI., p. 293 f., entitled "Illustration of some theological subjects from the doctrine and *usus loquendi* of the later Greek philosophers." Even if we grant Zeller to have made good his statement that the word *σάρξ* occasionally in Greek philosophers bears this sense of body with a gross, contemptuous connotation, it would by no means follow that St. Paul's use of it could be more probably or effectively elucidated from this source than from the Old Testament. See, moreover, the remarks which Cremer has inserted in the new edition of his *Biblisches Wörterbuch der N.T. Gräcität* (1883), p. 697, on the mode in which Plutarch has, after the precedent of Epicurus, occasionally used the word *σάρξ*—where, after stating the marked differences underlying the superficial semblance of affinity, he ends by saying: "We must abide by the observation of Wytttenbach ad Plut. Mor., p. 126 C.: "Epicurea consuetudo loquendi manavit ex colluvione vulgi; ecclesiasticus *σαρκός* usus latissime ille patens ex Hebraeo fonte fluxit."

Lüdemann and the other writers of whom we have spoken insist upon our noting the distinction maintained between *σῶμα* and *σάρξ*. The truth is that, while Philo seldom uses *σάρξ* and, when he does so, employs it interchangeably with *σῶμα* and attaches to it similar predicates, St. Paul reverses the state of the case, using *σάρξ* most frequently and using it, according at least to Dr. Lüdemann's account of his practice, after a manner sufficiently distinct from his employment of *σῶμα*.

And we have only to glance at the turn given to the matter in the two chief passages quoted by Lüdemann to see at once how different is the philosophic atmosphere in which Philo lives and moves from the practical religious interest that animates St. Paul. In the discussion *de Gigantibus* based on Gen. vi. 1 ff. the expression "*διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς σαρκάς*" gives occasion to Philo to write thus: "But the greatest cause of ignorance (*ἀνεπιστημοσύνης*) is the flesh, and relationship (*οἰκειώσις*) with the flesh." "Nothing is so much a hindrance to the increase of wisdom as the nature (*φύσις*) of the flesh. For it underlies all things that are built on it, as it were, as a first and greatest foundation of ignorance and incapacity (*καθάπερ τις θεμέλιος ἀγνοίας καὶ ἀμαθίας πρῶτος καὶ μέγιστος*). The souls that are without flesh and without body (*ψυχὰὶ ἄσαρκοι καὶ ἀσώματοι*), passing the whole day in



the theatre of the universe (*τοῦ παντός*), enjoy, without any one causing hindrance, divine sights and sounds (*θεαμάτων καὶ ἀκουσμάτων θείων*), for which they are filled with an insatiable desire. But as many souls as bear the heavy burden of the flesh (*τὸν σαρκῶν φόρτον ἀχθοφοροῦσι*), weighed down and straitened, are unable to look up to the celestial circuits (*περιόδους*), but, dragged down forcibly by the neck like quadrupeds, are rooted to the ground." And in the treatise on the Unchangeableness of God (p. 293 f.) the passage in Gen. vi. 12 as to all flesh having corrupted its way on the earth is made to mean: "All flesh has corrupted the perfect way of the eternal and incorruptible, that leadeth unto God. Know that this is wisdom; for by this path, straight and smooth, the mind being conducted arrives at its destined goals (*ἄχρη τῶν τερμάτων*), and the goals are the knowledge and understanding of God. This path every one who is a friend of the flesh (*ὁ σαρκῶν ἐταῖρος*) hates and endeavours to corrupt (*φθείρειν*), for no one thing is so antagonistic to another as knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) to pleasure of the flesh."

In these passages, which we have just quoted a little more fully than Dr. Lüdemann has done, the main stress is laid, as might be expected, on the value of knowledge as opposed to the pleasures of sense; and their whole tone and tenor stand contrasted with,

rather than akin to, those of the Seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, where the misery depicted by the Apostle springs not so much from want of knowledge or even to some extent of wish, as from *want of power*, of effective controlling will, of such energy capable of initiating and regulating action as that of which chapter Eighth proclaims the triumphant possession. There does not seem any other relation between Philo and St. Paul except that the dreamy speculation of the Alexandrian theosoph serves as an admirable *foil* to the vivid sense of reality and of assurance, with which the Apostle grasps the problem of the grave conflict before men and announces the at length revealed mystery of its successful solution, whereby—apart from all vain philosophy, apart from all human wisdom—he is enabled to say: “I can do all things in Him that strengtheneth me,” and at the same time to add: “I count all things to be loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord.”

II. Having thus shown the inadequacy of the explanation of *σάρξ* that turns on the mere bodily or material side of human nature, and that assumes any reflection of an influence of Greek philosophy in such a use of the term, let us now turn to the other earlier and more current interpretation, wherein *σάρξ* was deemed equivalent not to the mere “body,” but to the sensuous nature of man—the lower or sensuous

as opposed to the higher or intellectual side of man's being. The terms that are employed to convey this explanation are not always alike, nor is it always clear what precisely is meant to be denoted by them: but, whatever may be the shades of meaning, they find a common meeting-point in this respect that they regard the *σάρξ* as one side or aspect of man's constitution in contrast to another side or aspect of the same. And, although the use of such an expression as sensuousness (the German *Sinnlichkeit*<sup>1</sup>) in room of the *σαρκικόν εἶναι* of St. Paul may lead to a confusing interchange of the Biblical language with that of philosophy, it may serve conveniently to denote the special feature of the theories with which we are now concerned—man's dependence on his psychico-corporeal organisation, whereby he is placed in relation to, and brought into close connection with, the outward sensible world, receives its impressions, and undergoes its influences.

<sup>1</sup> Lüdemann calls attention to the ambiguity which attaches to this expression in the German language, as it may signify "on the one hand the bodily, earthly-material existence, on the other a direction of the will and dispositions to sense and its wants," and he points out that Julius Müller and Ernesti have not always used the word with the same meaning. But, whatever may be the worth of his special polemic as directed against them on this ground, it does not seem of much moment as respects the general question of the reference of *σάρξ* to sensuous nature. At the same time we have sought to avoid ambiguity by employing "sensuousness" instead of "sensuality."

The inadequacy of this explanation—which really differs from the previous one more in form than in substance—has been pointed out by Neander, Tholuck, Julius Müller, Delitzsch and others on the strength of various arguments, the weight of which cannot be questioned. It may be enough to mention some of these grounds. 1. In Gal. v. 19-21 the Apostle states that “the works of the flesh (*ἔργα τῆς σαρκός*) are manifest, which are these, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousies, wrath, factions, divisions, heresies [or parties], drunkenness, revellings, and such like.” Now, whatever may have been the principle guiding his choice as to the several elements or modes of sin that enter into this enumeration—and various schemes of classifying them have been suggested by Meyer, Bishop Lightfoot and others—it is obvious that all that variety of “works” cannot be without straining reduced to the one category of sensuous origin and manifestation. The vices no doubt that are named first have, as well as those with which the list closes, a specially sensuous character; but it is otherwise with the “enmities, strife, jealousies, factions, divisions, heresies” that intervene, and which have a much more direct relation to the mental than to the bodily or physical life of those concerned. In like manner, when at Rom. xiii. 14 St. Paul calls on

his readers to "put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and not to make provision for the flesh (*τῆς σαρκὸς πρόνοιαν*) to fulfil the lusts thereof," he had just before (verse 13) made mention not merely of different forms of sensual indulgence, but of "strife and jealousy."<sup>1</sup> 2. In the second and third chapters of the First Epistle to the Corinthians the Apostle describes his readers as *σαρικοί*, in so far as they were disposed to range themselves into parties taking the names of different leaders; but there is nothing to suggest that this tendency to *αἰρέσεις*, and the disputes and discords to which it led (1 Cor. iii. 3-4), had their origin in, or reference to, the life of sense rather than of intellect. 3. In the same Epistle the special pursuit of the Greek schools of philosophy is characterised as *σοφία κατὰ σάρκα* (*σοφία σαρκική*, 2 Cor. i. 12), but there is no reason to suppose that their philosophy concerned itself

<sup>1</sup> The suggestion of Lüdemann (pp. 72, 73) as to the mode in which we are to conceive the "sarkic principle at work, and the wide sphere of operation which we have to assign to it" really amounts to a superseding of the distinction on which the theory is based. He says, "The impulses of the *σάρξ* make their way throughout the *νοῦς* and *καρδιά*, and it is obvious (*es versteht sich*) that the co-operation of the *σάρξ* with the one or other of those factors may have the most diversified sins as its result." But St. Paul says nothing here of such co-operating factors; he mentions the works as works of the *σάρξ*; and that term defined as "the sensuous" must have the *νοῦς* at least contrasted with it—if not opposed to it, as it is in fact by St. Paul in Rom. vii.

merely with the sensuous side or sensuous wants of human nature, or, in fact, that it did not address itself mainly to matters pertaining to the inner or supra-sensible life. 4. In Col ii. 18 the Apostle characterises the type of person against whom he bids his readers be on their guard as *εἰκῆ φυσιοῦμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦς τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ*; while it is evident from the references to *ταπεινοφροσύνη*, *ἐθελοθρησκεία* and *ἀφειδία σώματος* in the context, that the peculiarity by which this *νοῦς τῆς σαρκὸς* was puffed up was a rigid asceticism, practising—it may be, in spiritual pride—a thorough self-denial as regards the life of sense. In this case the *σάρξ* manifests its *νοῦς* in an abstinence from those very forms of bodily indulgence which are elsewhere prominent among its characteristics; and it is plain that the explanation which resolves it into the latter can no longer apply.

¶ III. Setting aside then, on these and like grounds, the view which limits *σάρξ* to the physical or lower side of man and makes it equivalent to “sensuousness,” we cannot say that the attempts at definition on the part of those who have seen the insufficiency of the materialistic or the sensuous explanation are altogether satisfactory. Some of them read into the word itself a meaning which is largely derived from the predicates or statements that are found in association with it, while others unduly restrict its

import by limitations for which Scripture furnishes no warrant. Neander, for instance, has rightly recognised the affinity of the conceptions *σάρξ* and *κόσμος*, but, when he goes on to say that “*σάρξ* denotes human nature generally in the state of its estrangement from the divine life, the tendency towards the world as dissociated from the tendency towards God,” he does not sufficiently distinguish the thing itself from what is affirmed of it—the “nature” of man as creaturely from its empirical condition of estrangement, that in which the tendency is manifested from the tendency itself. Moreover, when he proceeds with some truth to assign reasons for the predominant reference of sin to the bodily element—“partly in so far as in the present state of human nature the power of the sinful principle displays itself specially in the antagonism of sensuous impulses to the law recognised by the mind, partly in so far as Christianity first diffused itself among the classes in whom it had most to contend with the power of rude sensuousness (*der sinnlichen Rohheit*), partly in so far as the body serves as organ for the sinful tendency governing the soul, and the power of sinful custom with the independence attained by it continues longer at work in the body after the soul has become partaker of a higher life”—he uses language liable to grave misapprehension in adding: “in all these relations it happens that St.

Paul frequently puts the body subservient to sinful habit for the whole nature (*das ganze Wesen*) of sin." Does it not appear as though Neander had here overlooked, partly, the distinction between *σάρξ* and *σῶμα*, and, partly, the distinction between the nature liable to sin and the sin or, as Principal Tulloch calls it, "all the evil activity" affecting it.

Tholuck, again, in his disquisition on this subject contributed to the *Studien und Kritiken* in 1855, has well pointed out the necessity of reverting to the Old Testament basis of the Apostle's language, and of recognising the accessory conception of weakness; but, when he selects as his summary definition of it "human weakness," he does not sufficiently distinguish the subject of the weakness from the quality associated with it. Under such a definition expressions like *ἀσθενεία τῆς σαρκός, ἡσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός*, would be reduced very much to tautology. And, when he goes on to speak of the "reason for weak sinful humanity being termed *basar*, *σάρξ*, as lying in the very fact that it is invested (*umkleidet*) with the impotent organism that incites to sin," to refer the incitement of sin to "the material nature-organism," and to tell us that "according to the doctrine of the Apostle the soliciting impulses to evil fall on the side of the body,"<sup>1</sup> he reintroduces the confusion, of which he had seemed at the outset

<sup>1</sup> *Studien u. Krit.*, 1855, iii. p. 497.



to get rid, between the use of the term "flesh" by synecdoche for "the body," and the wider and more specially characteristic use of it for "the creature."

Julius Müller, in his treatise on the Christian Doctrine of Sin, has likewise acknowledged the importance of the Old Testament as the main factor in moulding the Apostle's language; and has found the term *σάρξ* employed by St. Paul to denote the outward side of human existence, discernible by the senses; whence by a natural progress it gains the signification of "man's earthly existence in general—of human nature itself in its present earthly stage of development, and the individual beings belonging to it, especially when conceived of as a whole." But he conceives that the New Testament goes beyond the Old Testament stage in using the word to denote "a general tendency, which turns with desire towards the things of the world, and is thereby turned away from God." He holds that the term specially implies love of the world, devotion to the goods of the *κόσμος*, while the principle of selfishness falls into the background in the Pauline conception. As regards this latter distinction, it would seem enough to point to the enumeration of "the works of the flesh" already referred to (in Gal. v. 19 f.) as showing its untenableness, for what but the principle of selfishness or self-love underlies the "enmities, strife, jealousies, wrath," explicitly included in that

category? On the other hand, his definition of *σάρξ* as “a tendency towards the things of the world,” as well as the wider definition given by Schmid:<sup>1</sup> “the *σάρξ* is sinful inclination generally,” and the more precise one given by Ernesti:<sup>2</sup> the *σάρξ* is “that direction of the will, in virtue of which man allows his mind to be determined by the sensuousness of the body”—are obviously liable to the objection taken to them by Lüdemann and Pfeiderer, that they impute to the Apostle an unmeaning pleonasm in such expressions as *κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν*. Pfeiderer points to the absurdity that would be implied in rendering Rom. vii. 18 in terms of such a definition: “In me, that is, in my sinful inclination in general, or in my love of the world, dwelleth no good thing”; and Lüdemann—while maintaining that he can with perfect propriety from his own point of view as to the import of *σάρξ*, speak of *κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν* or of *εἶναι ἐν σαρκί* as “a tendency of life”—justly affirms that “to take the word *σάρξ* itself in this sense is to impute to the Apostle at least a singular pleonasm. For as the *σάρξ* on account of *κατά* is here just that according to which man directs himself, to which he accommodates himself, the *σάρξ* cannot withal be this same direction, this accommodation itself; and,

<sup>1</sup> Neutest. Theol., II., 268.

<sup>2</sup> Ursprung der Sünde, II., p. 52 ff.

further as the εἶναι ἐν τινί, even if taken in a mere local sense, already in itself denotes a position, *conditio*, or state, it follows that Ernesti's explanation of such expressions (comp. p. 83: 'the being in spirituality, the being in carnality,') would strictly and literally have to run thus: εἶναι ἐν σαρκί, 'to be in the state of a state,' and κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν, "to be walking according to (κατά) the life-according-to-the-flesh (σάρκα)," or 'to take the direction of a direction.'" "If flesh," asks Dr. Laidlaw,<sup>1</sup> "be a designation for sinfully-conditioned human nature, whence comes it that the term is appropriate?" This question aptly applies to several of the other definitions that we formerly quoted (at p. 12), such as that of Lutz: "the disinclination of the will towards the divine," that of Philippi, in its later form: "human nature in its present constitution as corrupt," and that of Delitzsch: "the whole sinful and mortal nature of man." In each of these cases σάρξ gets the specific elements of its definition from certain predicates more or less closely associated with the term where it occurs; but the choice of the term itself is left unexplained.

Nor is the mystery quite cleared up, when we pass to the further remark of Delitzsch: "The whole natural man is termed σάρξ, because it has fallen entirely into the power of the bad influences of its

<sup>1</sup> Bible Doctrine of Man, p. 32 f.

nature-basis (*Naturgrundes*) which the first sin has let loose" (p. 373). He had previously said by way of explaining the nature of the first sin: "The world, crowned with the creation of man, was very good. But it was brought out of chaos into this state, and even this very good state of man rested on the chaotic basis that was made the substratum of his life. The powers (*Potenzen*) of this basis, for themselves alone powers of wrath and death, were through the spirit of life made serviceable to life, and this life was in the personal man for the whole earthly world linked to the living God, and was to maintain and progressively strengthen itself in communion with Him. When man fell from his life subsisting in God's love (*seinem in Gottes Liebe wesenden Leben entfiel*), therewithal the nature-basis of his life became the abyss (*zum Abgrund*) of death" (p. 125 f.). Here one is tempted to ask, What is meant by this "nature-basis"? What is its relation to the "chaotic state" out of which it was brought? Why were the "powers" of this nature-basis for themselves powers of wrath and death? One does not see in what respect this "right ultimate answer" to the question propounded by Hengstenberg, namely, how it comes that nature is called *σάρξ*, differs, except in increased obscurity, from what Delitzsch elsewhere calls "a materiality opposed to God" (*eine widergöttliche Materialität*), or from

Hengstenberg's own phrase of "the material nature," or from Tholuck's "material nature-organism." In such utterances as these there is no slight approximation to the language which we have found to be employed by the upholders of the materialistic or sensuous explanations; and Delitzsch seems not so far removed from Holsten, when he thus defines the conception of  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  in the *ethical* sense: " $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  in this sense is the tangible material flesh, inclusive of the psychico-mental inner life (*seelisch-geistigen Innerlichkeit*) homogeneous and standing in reciprocal relation with it from the beginning of human existence, and inclusive even of the Ego which allows itself to be determined by this inborn fleshly nature, and, in yielding to the sinful dispositions (*Anlagen*), hindrances and incitements of this nature, increases its inborn corruption." Surely the large extent of the field here covered by the two-fold "inclusive of" might have suggested a definition more in keeping with the ethical character of the conception than that which thus puts into the foreground, and even emphasises by "tangible" (*tastbare*), the "material flesh." And thus from the point of view of comprehensive fitness to embrace what is admittedly contained in the conception, not less than from that of linguistic precedent, we may urge the superiority of an explanation which does not confine itself to one side or part of human nature

but includes the whole creaturely condition, as it subsists in experience, in contradistinction to what comes to it anew, or afresh, from God.

This comprehensive sense of the term is more or less fully recognised by writers of different schools in their exposition of individual passages; as, for instance, by Holsten on 1 Cor. i. 26: “σάρξ denotes the whole domain of the human, in so far as it is conceived in distinction from, and in contrast to, the divine”; and by Reuss on 2 Cor. vii. 5: “flesh comprehends all that belongs to the natural existence,” and on Rom. vii. 5: “that natural life which precedes in all men the moment of regeneration”;<sup>1</sup> as well as by Godet on Rom. ix. 5: “the term *flesh* comprehends human nature in its totality,” on Rom. iv. 1: “the *flesh* indicates here human activity in its isolation from the divine Spirit (*souffle divin*),” and on Rom. vii. 5: “the entire natural man.” He adds, however, the qualification, “in so far as governed by the love of enjoyment or fear of pain, that is, by the tendency to the satisfaction of self,” and subjoins the remark: “La complaisance naturelle de moi en lui-même, voilà l'idée du mot *chair*” in the moral sense.

<sup>1</sup>The freedom, at times, with which M. Reuss allows himself to translate the language of Scripture into that of the present is well illustrated by his rendering of 1 Cor. vii. 28: θλίψιν τῆ σαρκὶ ἐξουσιῶν as *éprouveront des difficultés domestiques!*

The advance towards a more exact conception of the import of the term is especially well illustrated by the difference of its definition by Meyer and Weiss respectively in leading passages of the Epistle to the Romans. Meyer, *e.g.*, says on Rom. iv. 1: "the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  on its ethical side is the material-psychic human nature as the life-sphere of moral weakness and of sin's power in man," on Rom. vi. 19: "the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$ , material human nature psychically determined," and on Rom. vii. 5: "the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$ , the materially human element in us in its psychically determined antagonism to the divine Spirit and will." In these, and in numerous other instances—for Meyer has, of course, striven after consistency in his interpretation—we find a constantly recurring use of the word "material," which shows that Meyer was still largely influenced by the original physical sense of the word, as indeed he distinctly indicates at Rom. xiii. 14 where he describes "the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$ —that which composes the material substance of man—as the source and seat of sensuous and sinful desires." Weiss, on the other hand, in his revision of Meyer's work<sup>1</sup> has

<sup>1</sup> I readily grant the value of much in this revision; but further use of it has only strengthened the conviction which I ventured to express pretty strongly in the Preface to the English translation of Meyer's Commentary on Mark and Luke as to the unfairness of the plan adopted in this *Neubearbeitung* of Meyer's work. While the book continues to be named from Meyer, it no longer presents his work as he left it.

been careful to eliminate this reference to the material element, for he recognises that "all reflection on the original physical sense of the word is abandoned."<sup>1</sup> Thus at Rom. iv. 1 the *σάρξ* is "the naturally human in itself," at Rom. vi. 19 and vii. 7: "the natural human existence (*Wesen*) as our life-element in contrast to the new element of spiritual-divine life," or, as he otherwise expresses it, "in its specific distinction from God."<sup>2</sup> This definition, which is even more briefly expressed in the form familiar to the older divines of "the natural man," has, as we have already said, the advantage of specific reference to man; but it requires, in order to explicate its import, the addition of words conveying the contrast to God or the divine—a contrast which is already implied in what we have for that very reason deemed the preferable definition of "creature" or "creaturely nature."

His judgments are set aside and superseded by others in the text itself; and the reader who buys the remodelled work gets only so much of Meyer's as the editor has deemed it fitting to retain. It would have been more consistent with the honour due to Meyer and would have more fairly met the demands alike of historical truth and of scientific progress, had Dr. Weiss and his fellow-editors kept their own additions or alterations—whether for better or for worse—distinct from the work of "the master," which it was their duty to reproduce in its integrity, if it was still to carry the passport of his name.

<sup>1</sup> *Bibl. Theol. d. N. T.*, p. 246 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Bibl. Theol. d. N. T.* l.c.



## XI.

RELATION BETWEEN THE FLESH AND  
SIN.—CONCLUSION.

WE have thus endeavoured to ascertain, and to vindicate in opposition to other views, the distinctive sense of *σάρξ* in Pauline usage, and have thereby completed the task which we proposed to ourselves in these Lectures. We disclaimed at the outset the intention of pursuing the subject in its theological bearings; but we stated that it was hardly possible to avoid incidental reference to the great issues bound up with it. So close, in particular, is the connection between the Apostle's conception of "the flesh" and his doctrine of "sin" that we cannot but briefly touch on it, simply in order to indicate the conclusions which our investigation directly or collaterally suggests as regards that momentous and much discussed question, and more especially with reference to certain views urged in the works that we have been discussing. These conclusions are chiefly negative, but not the less important in the light of the stress that has been

laid on the positive propositions to which they are opposed.

1. There is no just ground for the allegation that the Apostle identifies *σάρξ* with *ἁμαρτία*. The very expression *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας*, which brings the two terms into so close a relation, precludes their equivalence, for, if the term *σάρξ* had of itself necessarily implied the conception of sin, there would have been no need of, or meaning in, the explicit addition of *ἁμαρτίας*. The Apostle, who has at Rom. vii. 17, 18, 20 spoken so strongly of the power of indwelling sin, has at the same time distinguished it not only from the Ego, but also from the *σάρξ* in which it dwells. So far from the conceptions of sin and the flesh being identical, they are most explicitly separated in the exhortation of 2 Cor. vii. 1: "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of flesh (*μολυσμοῦ σαρκός*) and spirit." The flesh is not in itself defiling, although it has undergone defilement; and while it needs, it also admits of, cleansing. The Apostle's own statement, as regards his Christian life, at Gal. ii. 20: "The life that I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God," sufficiently shows that he does not regard the flesh as essentially and always associated with *ἁμαρτία*.

2. The Apostle does not identify *σάρξ* with the material body or outward bodily substance of man. We have seen that the attempts to apply this view of

the facts of Pauline usage utterly fail to explain them otherwise than by postulating an extension of the conception of matter coined for the occasion, which makes it embrace the whole man and thereby cease to be mere corporeal matter. The *σάρξ* with which the Apostle deals is the *σάρξ* of the living man, animated by the *ψυχή* as its principle of life—a fact which would, to the ordinary mind, seem enough to preclude the idea of mere materiality. And not only so, but it is distinctly used as co-ordinate, or practically synonymous, with *ἄνθρωπος*. Of course, where it stands expressly contrasted with other elements pertaining to man, such as the human *πνεῦμα* or the *νοῦς*, this contrast necessarily limits its comprehensiveness; but where it stands without any such restriction, or in contrast to the divine, it must be held to follow the precedent of the Old Testament *basar*, on which it was undoubtedly moulded, and of which Lüdemann himself affirms that “the *basar* is everywhere not a material unity, but embraces in an emphatic manner the nature of man mental and corporeal (*das geist-leibliche Menschenwesen*) with its internal distinctions.”<sup>1</sup>

3. The Apostle does not identify matter, or the material side of man, with evil. He makes no reference to matter as such (*ὕλη*) at all, nor does he present anything at all resembling either the

<sup>1</sup> *Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus*, p. 28.

language or the conceptions of that philosophic dualism which meets us with so persistent and tedious an iteration in Philo. We may certainly apply to the forced attempts of some recent writers to discover traces of Philonian thought in St. Paul the remark of Lüdemann in regard to Philo finding his own ideas in the Old Testament: "Alexandrian Hellenism has imported its own dualism into the Old Testament when interpreting it (*hineingedcutet*), but the Old Testament itself withal has not said a word on the subject."<sup>2</sup> St. Paul preserves throughout the standpoint of Jewish monotheism. He recognises all created things as called into existence by God, as subsisting for Him, and as subservient to His purposes (Rom. xi. 36: "From Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things"; 1 Cor. viii. 6; Eph. iv. 6; Col. i. 16 f.); and he has explicitly declared that "every created thing (*πάν κτίσμα*) of God is good, and not to be rejected" (1 Tim. iv. 4). And, while it is evident that the view which regards matter as necessarily evil is inconsistent with the Apostle's recognition of the sovereign supremacy of God, it is also clear that it is logically incompatible with the recognition of any *real service* of God while the material organism remains. But the Apostle has no hesitation in exhorting his readers (Rom. xii. 1) "to present their bodies a living sacri-

<sup>2</sup> Anthropologie des Ap. Paulus, p. 27.

fiice, holy, well-pleasing unto God," and in designating this as their "reasonable service" (*τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν*).

4. St. Paul does not associate sin exclusively or predominantly with the body or with the sensuous nature of man, although he sees in these its instruments or manifestations. He summons his readers in the passage quoted above (2 Cor. vii. 1) "to cleanse themselves from all defilement of flesh and spirit," as though the spirit as well as the flesh might undergo defilement and stand in need of cleansing; and at 1 Cor. vii. 34 it is set forth as the aim of her who cares for the things of the Lord, that "she may be holy in body and spirit": while at Rom. xii. 2 he posits as the essential foundation of the Christian life a transformation "by renewal of the mind," and at Eph. iv. 23 defines more precisely the sphere of that renewal as "the spirit (the motive governing power) of the mind." The *ἐπιθυμίαι* have their seat in the heart (Rom. i. 24).

The frequent and prominent mention of the body is due, not to its being regarded as the *source* of sin, but to its being the *seat* or scene of sin's *manifestation*, the organ in and through which it shows itself. The counsels of the heart, the resolves of the will in which sin has its origin, are for the present hidden (1 Cor. iv. 5: "The Lord will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will

make manifest the counsels of the heart"); but they find expression, and execution, in the *σῶμα* and its *μέλη*. This function of the *σῶμα* as the instrument of man's action is very apparent in such a passage as 2 Cor. v. 10: ἵνα κομίσηται ἕκαστος τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, πρὸς ἃ ἔπραξεν, εἴτε ἀγαθόν, εἴτε κακόν. It is in this way that sins come to be termed *πράξεις τοῦ σώματος*, as accomplished by its agency; and the body itself may even be spoken of as *σῶμα ἁμαρτίας*—the body that is subject to the rule of sin (Rom. vi. 6). Thus, too, we may account for the recurring mention of the *μέλη* as the organs by means of which what is in man becomes outwardly visible, and what is inwardly resolved on becomes carried into effect (Rom. vi. 12, 13: μηδὲ παριστάνετε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν ὄπλα ἀδικίας κ.τ.λ., vi. 19: παρестήσατε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν δούλα κ.τ.λ.). The function of the *σῶμα* or *μέλη* is indicated as that of practical activity by the presence of such words as *πράσσειν*, *κατεργαζέσθαι*, *ἐνεργεῖν* (e.g., Rom. vii. 5: τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου ἐνηργεῖτο ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν); and, as is well remarked by Wendt, the statement in Rom. vii. 23 that the law of sin rules in the *μέλη* and wars against the law of the *νοῦς*, has its special significance in the contrast between the merely *theoretical* ineffective attitude of the *νοῦς* and the *practical* controlling influence of sin which knows how to carry its wishes into *execution*.

“ It is,” says Weiss, “ such expressions as these that have given a handle to the erroneous view that Paul conceives of sin as dwelling in the body and its members, while it is in these that the dominion of sin only comes to manifestation, because the *νοῦς*, in which lies the only reaction against this dominion of sin, belongs entirely to the inner hidden life of man, and on account of its powerlessness never determines the outer life of man in any visible way. Sin can make the *νοῦς* powerless, and thereby restrict it to the domain of the hidden inner life, while it positively controls the *σάρξ* and incites it to an action antagonistic to God, which becomes visible through the members of the body.”<sup>1</sup>

5. While St. Paul undoubtedly represents the *σάρξ* as the seat of sin, thereby associating sin with man's creaturely nature or the creaturely side of that nature, and while he presents vividly its power in and over man, depicting especially its relation to the law as the occasion of developing it in Rom. vii., he has not there, or elsewhere, given any explanation of the psychological origin of sin. As Wendt remarks, his design was to set forth not the origin of sin *from* the *σάρξ*, but the power of sin *in* the *σάρξ*. He has nowhere pronounced the *σάρξ* in itself sinful ; he has nowhere declared it even to be, as such, the *source* of sin, though we sometimes find

<sup>1</sup> Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. d. N. T.*, p. 252 ; comp. Wendt, p. 209f.

this proposition imputed to him ; and still less has he propounded any theory, such as his philosophic expositors would ascribe to him, as to the principle or ground-form of sin consisting either in bodily matter, or in that aggregate of feelings and impulses associated with the bodily organism which constitutes the sensuous side of man. We have shown that  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$  is not resolvable into mere sensuousness any more than into mere matter : and that much of the Apostle's language is incompatible with any such restriction as is imposed on it by those who attribute to him an exclusive reference of sin to the sensuous nature, either as a philosophical principle or, as in the case of Schmidt, on the lower ground of an induction from experience of its practical operation in life.

The very fact that the Apostle more than once lays it down as the characteristic principle of the new life of the Christian, that he no longer lives to or for himself (Rom. xiv. 7 : " for none of us liveth to himself " ; 2 Cor. v. 15) rather warrants the inference that the root and principle of sin is to be found in man's thus *living to himself*—in the selfishness that converts his creaturely position into a self-asserting independence, and makes himself the sole object of his thought and care—a view which derives some confirmation from the circumstance that in 2 Thess. ii. 4 sin reaches its culmination in the arrogance of the " man of sin who opposeth



and exalteth himself against all that is called God, or that is worshipped; so that he sitteth in the temple of God, setting himself forth as God."

6. But, while the Apostle has not explained the psychological origin of sin, he has indicated pretty distinctly its *historical* origin in Rom. v. 12 ff.; and we are not warranted by any canons of exegesis in *explaining* that passage *away* after the manner of Dr. Pfeiderer—who finds in it a suggestion of the speculative idea that “properly (*eigentlich*) not the individual first man, but man as such (*der Mensch an sich*) is the subject of the fall,” and recognises “the historical beginning as the mere form for the generality of a principle that has no beginning (*einer anfangslosen Prinzips*)”—even if we should “thereby ensure the essential material agreement of Rom. v. 12 f. with the mode of view of Rom. vii.” When St. Paul uses words that clearly affirm a *historical* beginning, we are bound to take him at his word, and have no right to impute to him anything else. It can only be regarded as an illustration of what Dr. Pfeiderer calls “the artifice of the idea (*List der Idee*),”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Paulinismus, p. 91 : “There is no other means of reconciling the faith still formally subsisting in the absolute truth of the letter with the material progress of the ideal conviction, than just that “artifice of the idea,” by means of which the religious spirit conceals from itself its new developments, until the fruit gaining strength is able to dispense with and throw off the protecting husk of the old.”

when, after frankly admitting the verdict of exegesis, and asking that its results should be recognised independently of each other, he conceives that he can settle the matter by first asserting a formal contradiction and then resolving it by an alleged "speculative idea" lurking beneath St. Paul's words, of which St. Paul was himself unconscious.

But exegesis not only declines to accept Dr. Pfeiderer's resolution of the difficulty which his assumed formal contradiction creates; it demurs to the suggestion that such a writer as St. Paul could have allowed himself to fall, within the compass more especially of one and the same Epistle, into any such contradiction, and it may reasonably maintain that such a result is a strong presumption of the error of the process by which it has been reached. There is not, in reality, any incompatibility between St. Paul's account in Rom. v. 12 of the *origin* of sin in the race, and his description in Rom. vii. of its *development* in the individual. The alleged variance arises only, when the passages are interpreted in the light of imported philosophical conceptions, such as that of objective *ἀμαρτία*, of which the Apostle probably knew nothing—certainly has said nothing.

7. St. Paul's doctrine of sin has its basis not in speculation, but in experience. He deals with the facts as they are given to him in man's life and

history.<sup>1</sup> The *σάρξ* is not necessarily in itself sinful, for the creature, as originally constituted by God, and adapted to the conditions of earthly existence, could not but be recognised by St. Paul, in accordance with the Biblical teaching, as "very good." But the *σάρξ*, as it has actually existed from the time of the introduction of sin in Adam's transgression, is recognised by the Apostle as tainted with sin, in accordance with the generalised experience represented in Gen. vi. 12, "All flesh hath corrupted its way upon the earth"; and the term, which in itself denoted the distinction of man from God, carries accordingly, in the Apostle's use, the connotation not merely of contrasted weakness, but of self-willed antagonism (Rom. viii. 7: "the mind of the flesh is enmity against God"). It is this broad basis of universal expe-

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Gifford, in his clear and concise excursus on "the Flesh," subjoined to the Introduction of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans ("Speaker's" Commentary), pp. 48-52, has called attention to the form of the expression in Rom. vii. 18: 'I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing.' "It is important to observe that St. Paul's judgment is the result of practical experience (*οἶδα*), not of any speculative analysis of the ideas of 'flesh' and 'sin.' He found as a fact sin dwelling in his flesh; we may add that he regarded this as a fact of universal experience (iii. 9-20); but we have no reason to suppose that he regarded sin as inseparable from the very essence of 'the flesh'; we are still far from the conclusion that in the Apostle's mind 'the flesh is by its nature and from the beginning the principle of sin' (Pfleiderer, p. 62)."

rience that forms the explanation of the Pauline use of *σάρξ* in so close relation to sin, and of the strong expressions used to characterise it. The creature as subsisting in distinction from God has become practically equivalent to the creature opposing itself to God; and *σάρξ*, which marks creatureship, connotes also its invariable empirical accompaniment of *ἁμαρτία*.

Wendt has an interesting discussion<sup>1</sup> of the leading passages in which the Apostle seems to indicate a judgment as to the value or non-value of the *σάρξ*, classifying them according as they bear on the intellectual, moral, or religious value thereof, and according to the character—analytic or synthetic—of the judgment so expressed; and conceives himself to have established the distinction that, while the *σάρξ*, on account of its creaturely weakness, is incapable of knowing what is divine and of fulfilling the law, it only errs and sins (hypothetically), *when* it would know the divine and fulfil the divine will *with its own powers*. But, ingenious as his distinctions are, and ably as they are worked out, they are liable to the criticism of Weiss that such refinements are alien to the Apostle's habits of thought and alter the true point of view. And it seems sufficient to take up the ground occupied by the latter, when, in opposition to an objection of Schmidt that the ab-

<sup>1</sup> Occupying the latter portion of his book, p. 167-216.

sence of the article in such expressions as *κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν, ἐν σαρκὶ εἶναι*, must be held to point to human nature generally rather than to human nature as receiving its qualitative definition from experience, he remarks that "St. Paul does not philosophise over *σάρξ* and *ἁμαρτία* in the abstract (*an sich*), but discusses the fact as it stands (*den Thatbestand*) of the dominion of sin within empiric humanity. Now within this sphere of fact there is only a *σάρξ* ruled and perverted by sin. St. Paul may therefore very well speak of the nature of the *σάρξ* generally, and yet be throughout thinking only of the *σάρξ* as it is constituted in empiric humanity."<sup>1</sup>

8. To this category of *ἁμαρτία* as universally in experience predicable of the *σάρξ* there is one exception. Christ Jesus appeared *ἐν σαρκί*, and yet was sinless. The sinlessness of Christ, which indeed forms the necessary presupposition of all His work in condemning sin and redeeming men from it, is expressly affirmed by the Apostle in 2 Cor. v. 21: *τὸν μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν, ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν*, where the form of the negation *μὴ* undoubtedly points to a subjective judgment, but the judgment can only be exegetically that of the subject of the sentence, namely, God.<sup>2</sup> But, notwithstanding

<sup>1</sup> *Bibl. Theol. d. N. T.*, p. 247, note.

<sup>2</sup> The peculiar interpretation put upon this passage by Holsten, in which he has hardly been followed by any one

this explicit statement, Holsten, Lüdemann, and Pfeiderer have strangely enough found evidence of Christ's having had a *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας* in a passage which has been generally taken by interpreters as implying, if not affirming, the very opposite, namely, Rom. viii. 3: "God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh." Here it is asserted that the words *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας* denote not a similarity to the flesh characterised as having *ἁμαρτία*, but such an exact copy or reproduction of it that the *σάρξ* which the Saviour had may be itself described as *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας*.

This opinion which is maintained by its champions with great confidence not only in opposition to the great bulk of interpreters, but even in opposition to the adverse voice of such illustrious chiefs of their own school as Baur and Zeller and Hilgenfeld, rests except Hausrath—viz., that it refers to the pre-existent Christ, who, as *πνευματικός*, knew no *ἁμαρτία*, but was made *ἁμαρτία* by God, when at his incarnation he assumed with the *σάρξ* the objective sin-principle thereto belonging—has been conclusively refuted by Schmidt (*Paulinische Christologie*, p. 98 ff.) and by Pfeiderer, who pronounces it "erroneous, 1st, because the whole context speaks not of the incarnation, but only of the *death* of Christ; and, 2nd, because of the analogy with *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, under which, according to Pauline usage and to the connection (comp. especially verse 19: *μὴ λογιζόμενος . . . αὐτῶν*), there can only be understood imputed ideal righteousness, and therefore the *ἁμαρτία* of Christ can only be a merely imputed ideal one."

on two assumptions—1st, That *ὁμοίωμα* signifies, as Holsten puts it, “not a similarity which posits, but a likeness which cancels, distinction (*nie auf eine Ähnlichkeit geht, welche den unterschied setzt, sondern auf eine gleichheit, welche den unterschied aufhebt*)”; and, 2nd, That *σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας* must be taken together as one inseparable conception: sin-flesh, flesh inherently sinful. For neither assumption is there sufficient ground.

As regards the first position, our confidence in it is considerably shaken at the outset by the fact that hardly any two of the expositors who have examined the meaning of *ὁμοίωμα* are agreed in defining it, or in applying their definition. With Baur, Zeller, and Hilgenfeld, *ὁμοίωμα* means “that which is made similar (*Aehnlichgemachtes*)”—a sense most naturally suggested by the relation to *ὅμοιος*, and by the form of the verbal noun ending in *-μα*; but, while Zeller holds that the similarity ascribed to Christ consisted in His possession of a real human *σὰρξ*, which merely lacked *ἁμαρτία*, Hilgenfeld conceived it to consist in His having a *semblance* of *σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας* (in a Docetic sense). With others, the stress is laid on the notion of likeness (*Gleichheit*); but, while Holsten brings into prominence the element of form (*Gestalt*), and assigns to Christ a visible “sin-flesh-shape” altogether agreeing with that of men, Overbeck drops the very idea of *form* which

Holsten had treated as essential, and emphasises the abstract idea of *congruence*, so that the *ὁμοίωμα* of a thing is constantly that which is “essentially (*im Wesentlichen*) nothing else” than the thing itself, and Christ’s flesh was in his view essentially nothing else than human sin-flesh. Pfeiderer again prefers to fall back on Holsten’s element of form, and makes *ὁμοίωμα* “the sensible form, the visible *appearance*, so that Christ appeared in a form which was that of sin-flesh and consisted of sin-flesh, as in the case of other men.” And lastly, Lüdemann declares himself not satisfied with any of these views, especially finds fault with Pfeiderer for returning to Holsten’s view as regards the prominence of form, pronounces the latter to be utterly irrelevant in this case where the likeness spoken of has reference not to form but to *matter*, and propounds a solution of his own, which is to this effect: “Substantives ending in *-μα* denote the result of an action, and preserve throughout the mark of *origination by action*. ‘*Ὅμοίωμα* accordingly signifies ‘copy’ or ‘reproduction’ in the sense of that which is copied or reproduced after an original (*Nachbildung* in the passive sense *eines nachgebildeten*).” He claims for this definition the merit of bringing out the ‘tendency to similarity, to repetition of the original,’ and at the same time leaving open the question wherein the similarity consists. “What the Apostle here says is that God sent His Son in a



copy [*Nachbildung*] of the sin-flesh. If it is asked why he does not say merely ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμαρτίας, the answer is simple. In the sin-flesh of mankind, which through community of descent (*Geschlechts-gemeinschaft*) is a self-subsistent whole forming an unity (*einheitliches Ganze*) and as such belongs to the aggregate (*dem Complexe*) of the χοῖκοί alone, the pneumatic celestial man could not come to have (*bekommen*) any share at all without some further process (*ohne weiteres*). If he was to appear withal in a body of such matter, this matter had to become in a special way newly formed—as it were, mingled anew—for Him in particular after the subsisting original of sinful flesh. If this matter was really to be the same as that of mankind—and this was, as will soon be evident, unavoidably necessary—he had of necessity to be (*so musste er . . . sein*) a ὁμοίωμα, a copy, a repetition of the same.”<sup>1</sup>

It is not at all necessary to enter on any detailed examination of the arguments—largely one-sided—by which these opinions are respectively supported, because the incongruous results arrived at serve to a

<sup>1</sup>Anthropologie des Apostel Paulus, pp. 116-121. Lüdemann has given in a note (p. 116 f.) an abstract of the leading views, from which we have partly derived the statement given above. The question was fully discussed by Overbeck, Zeller, Hilgenfeld, and Pfeiderer, from their several points of view, in articles contributed to the Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie in 1869, 1870, and 1871.

great extent to neutralise or refute each other. A considerable amount of research and a far greater amount of ingenuity and refining have been expended on the discussion of St. Paul's use of *ὁμοίωμα* in the other passages where it occurs, and of its use in classical Greek and in the LXX. (as *e.g.* at Ps. cvi. 20: *καὶ ἠλλάξαντο τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν ἐν ὁμοιώματι μόσχου ἔσθοντος χόρτον*, where, if we should apply the principles contended for by some of the writers we have named, we should have to maintain that the *ὁμοίωμα* reproduced the living calf and the eating of grass); but rarely have such efforts been made with so entire and so obvious a missing of the mark.

Let it be granted that in most cases *ὁμοίωμα* approaches more to our conception of "likeness" than to that of mere "similarity"—although, as it seems to us, Wendt and Cremer have too readily conceded the validity of the position contended for in this respect, and it is, in point of fact, absurd to attempt the laying down of a rigid rule as regards a conception so varying, if we may so speak, in the *percentage* of its strict application according to the objects of which it is predicated—the plainest principles of exegesis, coincident with the dictates of common sense, require us to assume in each instance that the term is chosen because of its

special fitness to convey the meaning, or shade of meaning, that the writer would express. We are bound to suppose in the case before us that, when St. Paul used the peculiar phrase ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας, he had a reason, and a sufficient reason, for using it and each part of it. If he had wished merely to say—what some expositors practically assert to be all that he meant—that Christ was sent “in the flesh,” or “in sin-flesh,” he would most naturally have expressed that meaning by ἐν σαρκί or ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμαρτίας. But he has used the more complex expression, and has used it presumably to convey an idea different from what is conveyed by either of the simpler forms.

Now, to determine what is the real sense of ὁμοίωμα, we must bear in mind not only—what is so strongly insisted on—that it denotes something more than mere resemblance (not to say, semblance), but also—what is too often forgotten—that it denotes something falling short of, or different from, identity. It is this latter side or aspect of the word that Holsten and his supporters practically ignore. To affirm “likeness” is at once to assert ‘similarity’ and to deny ‘sameness’. The proposition laid down and so strenuously maintained by Holsten—that the conception of “likeness” in ὁμοίωμα cancels distinction—is, I venture to say, sheer absurdity, and would, if true, utterly destroy the *raison d’être* of the

word, which must, in the very nature of the case, imply a distinction, such at least as to preclude its being interchanged with terms more strictly expressive of parity, equality, or identity.

When Pfleiderer treats it as "beyond doubt that, if the expression *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκός* merely occurred, no one would hesitate to translate it simply: in flesh-shape = in a shape, form of appearance, which was that of all human flesh and itself consisted of flesh," we should certainly hesitate to accept his statement as a fair or full account of our procedure in such a case. We should not at once assume that *ὁμοίωμα σαρκός* meant a shape which consisted of flesh any more than we should assume that *ὁμοίωμα μόσχου* means a shape that consisted of and was calf; for, if "in flesh-shape" meant merely "in a shape of flesh, which was flesh," we should certainly wonder why the writer had not at once used "in flesh." We should on the contrary naturally credit the writer with purpose and with judgment in the use of his words, and we should set ourselves to ask why he had chosen the phrase "in a shape made like to flesh," or, in other words, to inquire not merely wherein lay the *resemblance*, but also wherein lay the *difference*—logically inseparable from the form of the expression—between the *σάρξ* and its *ὁμοίωμα*.

Moreover, if we were disposed to look very

minutely into Lüdemann's application of his definition—which seems to us in itself to come closest to the original import of the word—we might venture to ask, whether a copy formed after an original can, without risk of misunderstanding, be termed a *repetition* of it? whether, on his own showing, the matter which had to be newly made or newly mingled did not by that very new making differentiate itself from what previously existed?—and whether, if it was inevitably necessary (though the necessity exists only for Dr. Lüdemann's theory) that the matter should be really the same as that of *sinful* flesh, the Apostle might not have been expected to use some word other than the one which—whatever it may mean—certainly does not quite denote *sameness*? We cannot—if we have regard to the ordinary principles of exegesis—but proceed on the assumption that the Apostle chose his expression because it best expressed his thought; and we cannot do justice to the import of the word *ὁμοίωμα* by looking merely at one, even if it be the main, aspect of it, and ignoring its element of differentiation—its implication of a difference that precludes identity.

When we keep these points in view, the only natural and reasonable explanation is seen to be that which has commended itself to the great majority of exegetes, namely, that Christ appeared in a body which was like that of other men in so far as it consisted

of flesh, and was unlike in so far as the flesh was not "flesh of sin." To this Lüdemann objects that it is an arbitrary course and tantamount to a *petitio principii*, thus to place the element of likeness on the side of the *σάρξ*, and the element of unlikeness on the side of the *ἁμαρτία*. We reply that, apart from all reference to the analogy of the Pauline doctrine elsewhere, and apart from the explicit assertion in 2 Cor. v. 21, the immediate context in the verse before us practically necessitates this reading of the Apostle's meaning, for it explicitly states that Christ *had* the *σάρξ* as the element or sphere wherein the condemnation of sin took place, and it implies that He *had not* personally the *ἁμαρτία*, seeing that He was sent to achieve, and did achieve, what was impossible otherwise for man in consequence of the weakness of the flesh which was the seat of *ἁμαρτία*—namely, its condemnation. How could one, who Himself had *ἁμαρτία*, condemn it?

And this brings us to the other assumed ground for the interpretation given by Holsten and Pfleiderer—namely, that *σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας* must be taken as one conception, and *ἁμαρτία* must be held inseparable from the *σάρξ*. We have already pointed out that the very fact of the addition of *ἁμαρτίας* precludes the conception of sin being essentially part and parcel of the flesh. It may be predicated of it; empirically it may be constantly associated with it;

but it is not *necessarily involved* in it; and the very circumstance that St. Paul has in this same verse so markedly dissociated the two is itself a cogent argument against the alleged necessary connection between them.

But Holsten, who contends that this passage really attributes to Christ a 'sin-flesh'—that is, a bodily substance which had in it the objective principle of sin, although in his case it did not pass into *παράβασις*, into subjective consciousness of actual sin, in consequence of its energy being kept in check by the divine *πνεῦμα* of the pre-existent Christ—has adduced *four* grounds for his position. One of these we have already disposed of—namely, the peculiar exegesis by which he makes St. Paul assert *ἁμαρτία* as an attribute of Christ in the passage where he himself describes Christ as *μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν*, 2 Cor. v. 21—a position so obviously untenable, that Pfleiderer has expressly disclaimed it.<sup>1</sup> Another—namely, that St. Paul's whole anthropology knows no flesh that is not a 'sin-flesh'—is a mere *petitio principii*, the question being precisely whether the case of Christ here mentioned is not a distinct evidence to the contrary.

A third ground is put by him in the form of a question: How could God have condemned to death

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 321, note.

the *ἀμαρτία ἐν τῇ σαρκί* on the cross of Christ, if the *σάρξ* of Christ had not been a *σὰρξ ἀμαρτίας*? But—to say nothing of the fact that the words *ἐν τῇ σαρκί*, if thus bound up with *ἀμαρτία*, would seem a somewhat meaningless repetition of the thought already, according to Holsten's view, covered by *σαρκὸς ἀμαρτίας*—it has been well pointed out by Wendt that we must on purely grammatical grounds set aside Holsten's construction. "If St. Paul had wished," says Wendt, "to express at the close of the verse the thought that God has condemned sin which had its seat in the flesh, he must have distinctly written: *κατέκρινεν τὴν ἀμαρτίαν τὴν ἐν τῇ σαρκί* (comp., e.g., Gal. iv. 14, *τὸν πειρασμὸν τὸν ἐν τῇ σαρκί*). Here, where he has not so written, we are grammatically required to connect the more precise definition *ἐν τῇ σαρκί*, not with the substantive *ἀμαρτίαν*, but with the verb *κατέκρινεν*, so that it designates the sphere or arena where the condemnation was accomplished (comp., e.g., Rom. v. 21, *ἐβασίλευσεν ἡ ἀμαρτία ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*)."

The last ground on which Holsten holds that Christ had 'sin-flesh,' and the one on which, in common with Pfeleiderer, he lays the greatest stress, is that the current interpretation, which takes the *σάρξ* of Christ to have been without *ἀμαρτία*, goes in the face of the whole course of thought (*der ganzen Ausführung*) from chapter vi. to chapter viii. 3 (Holsten



has "*bis* 7. 3," but he evidently means viii. 3), which has laboured to prove that, because man is in bondage to *ἀμαρτία* only through his flesh, the cross of Christ, as the death of this very *σὰρξ ἀμαρτίας* of man, has delivered him from the bondage of sin.<sup>1</sup> Pfeiderer thus expresses the same idea: "We must remember that, according to the whole context of the passage, and generally of the section Rom. vi.-viii. the existence of *ἀμαρτία* in the *σὰρξ* of Christ is so much a logical postulate that with the denial of it the whole argument of the section would be destroyed, and the peculiar doctrine of St. Paul as to the cancelling of the power of sin in the flesh by Christ's death would be deprived of its basis."<sup>2</sup>

These are strong words, and all the more so that the "peculiar doctrine" here ascribed to St. Paul has only been discovered to be his of late years, and that the great majority of expositors have not at all experienced the need of any such key as is now pronounced indispensable to the value or validity of the Apostle's argument. It might be sufficient to say in reply, 1st, that St. Paul has nowhere assumed or proved that man is in bondage to *ἀμαρτία* only through the *σὰρξ*, in the sense in which these terms are understood by the discoverers—or inventors—of

<sup>1</sup> Holsten, *Zum Evang. des Paulus und des Petrus*, p. 436 f.

<sup>2</sup> Pfeiderer, *Paulinismus*, p. 154.

this key to his meaning ; and, 2nd, that the doctrine of objective *ἀμαρτία* in their sense of it, so far from being indispensable to the grasping of his argument, is not even compatible with his language at the two points on which it has been specially sought to engraft it.<sup>1</sup>

But Wendt has so pointedly called in question the bearing and significance of this boasted theory, even from the point of view of its supporters, that we cannot but quote his words. "Would it not really be a thoroughly clear and luminous thought of the Apostle, if he were thus to discern in the simple objective process (*Vorgange*) of the destruction of the *σάρξ* of Christ along with the objective *ἀμαρτία* therein contained the cardinal act (*den principiellen Akt*), whereby the longed-for deliverance from the sin-dominion of the *σάρξ* should be brought about ? That process would certainly be simple enough—only it appears to me to be *quite too* simple really to meet the object aimed at in accordance with St. Paul's apprehension of it. In other words, we cannot well see—and it is nowhere clearly expressed even by the theologians who would discern this meaning in St. Paul's words—how it is held to be possible for that objective process in the death of Christ to bring about the very object, with which the Apostle in his discussion

<sup>1</sup> See above pp. 83-86.

was solely concerned. Granting in the first instance that the question really related to the conquest and destruction of objective sin, the Apostle would have needed to specify—because it could not otherwise be at all discerned—*how* [literally, *in how far*] the death of Christ could have a cardinal value for this destruction. The putting to death of the *σάρξ* of Christ is withal not an unique process, in which an extraordinary and hitherto unheard-of blow against the *σάρξ* and sin in the *σάρξ* would have been struck, but it is merely an individual instance of a process quite general and regular in its occurrence. With the same warrant any other case of the destruction of a *σάρξ* in death might be pointed to, and a judgment of condemnation over objective sin in the *σάρξ* be discerned in it; with much greater warrant would the general fact of the death of the *σάρξ* be urged as a cardinal judgment of God over sin in the *σάρξ*. Indeed, if the question were as to the higher or lower value which the individual case of death has as evidence of the cardinal destruction of objective sin, we should be inclined *a priori* to ascribe to the death of Christ in this respect even a specially low, if not the lowest, value. For, if in Christ's case the objective sin was and remained as harmless and ineffectual as it can at all be conceived to be, seeing that it never became subjective and actual transgression, we should conjecture its destruction to

be—alike as regards difficulty and relative value—inferior to the destruction of objective sin in the *σάρξ* of other men, in whom it had attained to vigorous manifestation and exercise.

If we view the matter apart from reality, there are only two possibilities conceivable, in which the putting to death the *σάρξ* of Christ and the *ἁμαρτία* in this *σάρξ* would have had a cardinal value. The first possibility would be in the event that no destruction of the *σάρξ* had taken place before Christ, and that the death of Christ had been the cardinal commencement of this destruction, which would thenceforth repeat itself in every case of death as a renewed conquest of objective sin in the *σάρξ*. The second possibility would be in the event that the destruction of the *ἁμαρτία* and the *σάρξ* of Christ had really been an ultimate valid destruction of the *σάρξ* or at least of sin in the *σάρξ*, and that not only in reference to the *σάρξ* of Christ, but in reference to the *σάρξ* generally, so that subsequently to this cardinal destruction there would have been no more objective sin. Only these two possibilities are conceivable, and neither of the two has, according to the Apostle's clearly expressed view, really occurred.

But the difficulties hitherto encountered are considerably increased, when we consider that in the whole connection of the Pauline discussion, in which

our passage is embraced, there is in fact no question at all about the cancelling of that alleged objective sin. Assuming even that St. Paul knew such an objective sin—a question to be considered apart—the discussion in the connection before us at any rate concerns *not* the point that this sin shall be broken in itself or in its objective subsistence, *but rather* the point that it shall be destroyed in its control of the subjective will, in its actual energy. The *felt need* of redemption (*Erlösungsbedürfniss*) which the Apostle describes in chapter vii., has reference merely to deliverance from this power of *subjective* sin, and the *achieved result* of redemption (*Erlösungserfolg*) which the Apostle describes in chapter viii. likewise concerns merely deliverance from this *subjective* power of sin *notwithstanding* the continued subsistence of the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$ , in which the objective sin would be inclosed. The destruction of objective sin in the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  of Christ would therefore neither have met that need, nor have been able to explain the result achieved. If it was well nigh impossible to see how the destruction of objective sin in the death of Christ could have the significance of a cardinal defeat of objective sin generally, it is even far less clear how that destruction can have the value of a cardinal victory over subjective sin. The process accomplished in the death of Christ always remains completely apart from the process to be accomplished in

the individual man; a rational reason why the former should have an influence on the latter, can hardly be conceived. At most there prevails an outward analogy in form between the two processes: but it would prevail just as exactly, if instead of the putting to death of the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  of Christ there were named the putting to death of any other  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  whatever.

Pfleiderer has become aware of the great incongruity (*Incongruenz*) which we should have thus to assume in the connection of Pauline thought. He expresses himself at the close of his discussion of our passage as follows (p. 118): 'On the likeness of the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$  condemned in Christ's body to ours rests the very conception that that death has been immediately in itself the destruction of the sin-principle for men collectively—no doubt a difficult conception withal, inasmuch at any rate as the destruction of the flesh in the case of Christ has quite a different sense than it has in the case of Christians; in the former it is the flesh as the natural substance of the body, in the latter it is the flesh as the moral principle of sin—consequently the same subject, doubtless, on both sides, but according to two wholly different points of view.' Pfleiderer finds the solution of this difficulty in the Apostle's 'immediate mysticism of faith' (*unmittelbaren Glaubensmystik*). But if it is allowable to speak of a mysticism of St. Paul, we are certainly far more warranted in speaking of his

dialectic; and we must be very careful lest under cover of that word of many meanings ‘mysticism,’ we impute to the Apostle lines of thought which would run directly counter to all the acuteness—elsewhere so well attested—of his dialectic.

It would thus appear that this lately found key to the Apostle’s argument ends, by the confession of Dr. Pfeiderer himself, in placing that argument on a footing of undoubted obscurity and of very dubious relevancy or cogency, in which Dr. Baur can only see one of his ‘unsolved antinomies,’<sup>1</sup> and which Dr. Pfeiderer can resolve into nothing better than mysticism leaving all argument far behind it! The key is declared to be indispensable to the right apprehension of the Apostle’s meaning—“to deny this assumption,” says Dr. Pfeiderer, “is to cut the sinew (*Nerv*) of the argument”—but the meaning that results from its application is declared practically to be no meaning at all!—a *reductio ad absurdum*, which is of itself sufficient to dispose, not certainly of the validity of the Apostle’s argument, but of the value of the alleged key to it.

If it should be asked why St. Paul has added the word *ἀμαρτίας* to *σαρκός*, and has not contented himself with the simple *ἐν σαρκί*, or *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκός*, we may fairly reply, with Weiss, that “the express bringing out of that condition of the em-

<sup>1</sup> Vorlesungen über Neutest. Theologie, p. 191.

piric *σάρξ* could not be dispensed with in a connection, where the point under discussion was the reference of the mission of Jesus to the sin that ruled there, in so far as it could only be conquered in the sphere of its previous sway," Or we may quote the fuller expression of the same idea in the words of Wendt: "The *σάρξ* is designated *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας*, in order to indicate, not *wherein*, but *wherefore* Christ became quite like the *σάρξ*. The fact that Christ was fully creature has, for St. Paul and his discussion, an interest, only in so far as the creature — according to his previous discussion of the subject—is regularly sinful and needs a redemption from the condemnation associated with sin. What is indicated by the simple genitive *ἁμαρτίας* is yet more definitely brought out by the express addition *καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτίας*. We may reproduce the thought of St. Paul approximately by paraphrasing his words thus: 'God sent His Son so, that he in his nature fully answered to the conception of the creature, which, as experience shows, is for the most part sinful and on account of this very sin formed the object of Christ's manifestation as creature. And the bearing of Christ's creaturely manifestation on this sin is specified by the Apostle in the last words of the verse, where he says that God through the mission of His Son had pronounced a judgment

<sup>1</sup> *Bibl. Theol. d. N. T.*, p. 293, note.



of condemnation within the creature itself over sin. This thought becomes intelligible only on the presupposition that Christ as *σάρξ*, as creature, was quite free from sin. If, forsooth, Christ was fully *σάρξ* and, *notwithstanding*, the sinless Son of God, He was Himself precisely as *σάρξ* a judgment pronounced by God over sin, to the effect that sin does *not* belong to the conception of the *σάρξ*, that the creature does not, as such, stand in moral dualism overagainst God, but rather that, as in Christ, so also in the community associated with Him *notwithstanding of all creatureliness* a fulfilment of the divine will has become possible (verse 4)."

The inquiry which we have now brought to a close has, we trust, served to show that, while the treatises by recent German scholars of which we spoke in the outset are unquestionably marked by great acuteness and subtlety, they present a somewhat motley combination of exegesis, criticism, and speculation, dubious in methods and incongruous in results; that the leading idea common to them of St. Paul's having partially drawn his thoughts or language from Greek philosophy—apart from its threefold improbability, in view of the readers to whom he addressed himself, in the light of his own pre-eminently Jewish nationality and culture, and in the face of his special

disclaimers of dependence on, or alliance with, the wisdom of the world—has no foundation in the facts of the case; and that, on the contrary, the Apostle's language rests throughout on the precedent of Old Testament usage and finds therein at once the warrant for its employment, and the key to the variety of its shades of meaning.

We have seen that there is no adequate exegetical ground for the distinctive positions which these writers have laid down as to *σάρξ* carrying everywhere a fundamental reference to the matter of the earthly body or implying a necessary element of sin, and as to *πνεῦμα* involving the conception of substance, any more than for the special distinctions drawn by them between *σάρξ* and *σῶμα*, or—more or less in common with certain Biblical psychologists—between *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή*. We have traced, on the other hand, as regards *πνεῦμα*, its origin from, and affinity to, the Hebrew *ruach*, its paramount place in the Pauline system as the divine power initiating and sustaining the Christian life, and its connotation of a religious aspect and interest even when applied as a designation for the mind of man; while we have found the leading senses of the Old Testament *basar* reproduced in the case of *σάρξ*, and the significance of the latter term—in its most characteristic Pauline use of contrast to *πνεῦμα*—to lie not in the conception of material substance, nor in that of man's

lower sensuous nature, but in the contradistinction of the creaturely nature of man—or creaturely side of his nature—to the new life wrought by the power of the divine Spirit in Christ.

And, if we have been in any measure successful in establishing these conclusions, it would seem that in this field at least theology may well dispense with such gratuitous hypotheses and fanciful refinements as those which we have passed in review; that it may with advantage fall back on the principle that “sacred Scripture is its own best interpreter”; and that it may find in the general results of a process conducted in accordance with the methods and canons of a sound exegesis a fresh confirmation of the well known judgment of Winer, that “the controversies among interpreters have usually led back to the admission that the old Protestant views of the meaning of Scripture are correct.”



## APPENDIX.

### A.—VIEWS OF HOLSTEN, SCHMIDT, AND LÜDEMANN.

We have given in the first and second Lectures (pp. 18-62) an outline of the main positions taken up in the discussion of the subject by Baur, Holsten, Schmidt, Lüdemann, and Pfeiderer. Here we present a fuller abstract of the views of Holsten, Schmidt, and Lüdemann, who have dealt at length with the questions concerned in works not yet accessible to the English reader. It is less necessary to adopt a like course with those of Dr. Baur who preceded them, because he has not worked out the investigation so fully; or with those of Dr. Pfeiderer whose work is the most recent, because it has been already translated. Our purpose here is simply to state the views of the writers; and we shall do so, as far as possible, in their own language. For brevity's sake we shall represent *σάρξ*, *πνεῦμα*, *ψυχή*, *νοῦς*, and *καρδία* by their respective *initial* letters, and *ἁμαρτία* by *ἁμ*.

#### I. DR. CARL HOLSTEN.

Dr. Holsten's dissertation, entitled *Die bedeutung des wortes σάρξ im lehrbegriffe des Paulus*, was published in 1855, and reissued with some additions in 1868 in a

volume bearing the title *Zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus*. Our abstract is taken from the latter.

At the outset he tells us that his aim in the inquiry is to disclose the basis of Paul's theological speculation; that he conceives this basis to be found in an investigation of the import of  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$ ; and that he has set himself the special task of tracing the manifold variety of its use back to its fundamental (*prinzipielle*) signification. He draws his materials only from the four Epistles that are *Homologoumena*, not as pronouncing any judgment adverse to the genuineness of the *Antilegomena*, but as basing a contribution to a critical question only on grounds accepted by criticism.

The first section is entitled " $\sigma$ . and the nature of man." The Pauline view of human nature is based on that of the Old Testament, and distinguished only by the precision and consistency with which it is maintained. According to Gen. ii. 7, man is  $\chi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\delta \tau\eta\varsigma \gamma\eta\varsigma$ , into which God breathed the life-breath whereby man became  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta \zeta\omega\sigma\alpha$ . The first man as such (*der Mensch an sich*), the type of pre-Christian man (Rom. v. 19), is  $\epsilon\kappa \tau\eta\varsigma \gamma\eta\varsigma \chi\omicron\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$  (1 Cor. xv. 47). Earthy and earthly matter is the ground-element of his nature—one of the forms in which the matter of this *visible* world appears (Gal. vi. 14). Such a material is the  $\sigma$ ., as is shown by 1 Cor. xv. 35—a passage which, rightly understood, supplies a further decisive element for the conception. There the sinew of the argument is the difference of substance between earthly and heavenly bodies. The deniers of the resurrection had doubted its possibility on account of the earthly material substance of the  $\sigma$ . Paul answers that, as on earth there are differences in the material substance of animal organisms, so is there difference as to substance between heavenly and earthly

bodies. Under the idea of  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$  they are posited as identical; in respect of substance they are distinct. The substance of the  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\alpha\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\iota}\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$  is the earthly material substance of the  $\sigma$ ; while that of the  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\alpha\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\upsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\iota\alpha$  is conceived as a heavenly light-substance (verses 41, 47, 2 Cor. v. 2), with corresponding diversity of appearance— $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ .

The result is that  $\sigma$ . is the earthly material living substance of the animal organism, distinguished from earthly matter generally only by the element of life. The cause of this life is the indwelling of  $\psi$ ., which, in Paul's view, has as close relation to the  $\sigma$ . as in the Old Testament the *nephesh* has to the *basar*, without the two being coincident. All the passages where  $\psi$ . occurs with Paul do not carry us beyond the conception of vital power, of life. And as the life of the  $\sigma$ . has its expression through the senses, man as  $\sigma$ . is sensuous-living matter, that is, *flesh*. But  $\sigma$ . has always its qualitative characteristic in the conception of *substance*. By this it is specifically distinguished from the conception of  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ , which is that of *form*, and especially the form under which the living substance shaped into an articulate organism subsists—that is, *body*.

We have thus gained the cardinal signification of the word, but to get at its significance for Pauline theology, we must ask: What in Paul's view was the bearing of this definition of man's nature, as being sensuous-living matter, on the religious relation of man to God? And as in this relation the question at stake is the difference and unity of man and God, we must ask, first, Has man in Paul's view, as an element immanent in his nature and contributing to define it, aught like or akin to the nature of God, the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\iota}\mu\alpha$ ? The answer to this question requires us to look into Paul's conception of  $\pi$ . We must make

it out from sparing hints. The proper natural basis of the idea, "breath, wind," has disappeared. But we are reminded of it by the conception of invisibility (*ἀόρατον*, Rom. i. 20) as a contrast to visible sensuously-palpable matter. On this immateriality rests the freedom from all that is natural—primarily, the *ἄφθαρτον* and *ἀίδιον*. But that this immateriality is not freedom from all substantiality is evident from the very circumstance, that Paul can only have conceived to himself the communication of the Spirit of God to believers as a radiation of *something substantial* combined with real effect (1 Cor. ii. 12, Rom. v. 5, 2 Cor. iv. 6, Gal. iv. 6). In this way a certain materiality slips again into the conception, and the immateriality of the *π.* becomes at bottom merely the *negative* of "cosmic" earthly matter. He next passes in review the conceptions associated with the nature-basis of *π.* as self-movement. The *π.* *ἐνεργεῖ*, is *δύναμις*, and works *δύναμις*. It stands related above all to the will, and the standing word for its effect is *ἄγεσθαι*. It is a fiery power radiating warmth, a vital flame newly kindled at the centre of the inner life, the *καρδία*—which is in Paul's view its standing recipient. It is the principle of absolute truth (1 Cor. ii. 6), light in contrast to darkness, shining in the hidden interior. It is the principle of holiness, pre-eminently a *ἅγιον*; and by holiness is originally meant the negative of the natural—a freedom from all that springs out of the sensuous nature (*natürlichkeit*) of man. In all these elements the *π.* is thought of as *substantial*, but also as *transcending* earth and the earthly.

. Returning to the question, Whether man, according to Paul, stands in any sort of unity of *nature* (*Wesen*) with God, whose substantial nature is *π.*, Holsten holds, from the view of *σ.* already given, that man, being in respect of



his nature-basis  $\sigma$ ., stands purely in contradistinction to God. Nor has man in the  $\psi$ . anything identical with the nature of God. The  $\psi$ . is at all events, doubtless, non-material, and, in so far, must be pneumatic in the most general sense of the term. It is a life-principle too, and as such analogous to the  $\pi$ .. But, so far as the  $\psi$ . stands in absolute relation to the natural, as the life-power of what is material, it is in turn purely opposed to the  $\pi$ .. But Paul distinguishes a higher element in man's nature, an  $\epsilon\sigma\omega$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$  designated in Rom. vii. 9 by  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ . Have we in this an element essentially akin to the divine  $\pi$ ? After a review of the chief passages (1 Cor. xiv. 14 ff., Rom. vii., Rom. xii. 2) it is concluded that  $\nu$ . is merely the subjective *consciousness*, the *form*, in which the subjective mind comes to know what is given to it as contents, and which may have opposite contents. It is not an element identical with, or analogous to, the nature of God.

But is not the  $\pi$ .. itself for Paul an element in the conception of man?

Although the clear statement at 1 Cor. xv. 44 that the first man Adam was only a  $\psi$ .  $\zeta\acute{\omega}\sigma\alpha$ , the whole Pauline view of the world—which is simply an explication of the saying:  $\omicron\upsilon\prime$   $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\nu$   $\tau\acute{\omicron}$   $\pi\nu\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu$   $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha$   $\tau\acute{\omicron}$   $\psi\nu\chi\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu$ ,  $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha$   $\tau\acute{\omicron}$   $\pi\nu\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu$ —and the absolute sway of sin from Adam to Christ might seem to indicate that the  $\pi$ .. had been until Christ purely transcendent, and had only become immanent in humanity through Christ, expositors have, on the basis of various passages in the admitted Epistles, thought themselves entitled to assume also a “human-creaturally”  $\pi$ ., although no one has yet specified what sort of conception Paul has associated with it, or what sort of significance it has for the nature of man. To determine the question we must go through all the pas-

sages that bear on it, and accordingly, after mentioning those where the reference to the transcendent  $\pi.$  is clear, Holsten proceeds to examine the others on which the opposite view is usually rested. He thinks that at 1 Cor. v. 3, 4, but slight reflection suffices to discern the divine  $\pi.$  conferred on the Apostle as the source of his apostolic dignity and power. Whence else could he have had the power, or wished to take the right, of *παραδοῦναι τῷ Σατανᾷ*? The passage shows the arbitrariness of the canon that the addition *ἐμὸν* or *ἡμῶν* or the like makes the  $\pi.$  human. At Rom. i. 9 *ἐν τῷ πνεύματι μου* denotes the same apostolic  $\pi.$ , the spirit specially conferred on him and enabling him to render pneumatic service. Had Paul meant the sincerity of his service in contrast to hypocritical semblance, he would have said *ἐκ καρδίας*. In accordance with this passage we must explain 2 Cor. ii. 13; xii. 18; vii. 13; 1 Cor. xvi. 18; Rom. xii. 11; xv. 30, of the divine  $\pi.$  at work in the preachers of the gospel (and believers). At Gal. vi. 18 the express prominence of the  $\pi.$  is only to be explained by its being understood of the divine  $\pi.$  become immanent in the Galatians, which was in danger of being quenched in the carnal nature. So with 1 Cor. vii. 34 and 2 Cor. vii. 1—a passage, however, very difficult to be explained in keeping with Pauline conceptions, according to which the  $\sigma.$  is the principle and source of pollution and so cannot be the object of it, which could only be the *σῶμα*. The whole passage vi. 14-vii. 1 is probably not genuine.

In all these passages  $\pi.$  is used only of believers, in whom the transcendent has become immanent. As contrast thereto stands in 2 Cor. xi. 4 a  $\pi.$  *ἕτερον*, where the *λαμβάνειν* itself shows the conception of transcendence.

Passing to the cases of  $\pi.$  being defined by a genitive of quality, he holds that passages like Rom xi. 8, viii. 15

show that the modern view of a subjective "disposition" of the human mind is quite alien to them.  $\pi$ . here denotes, quite in keeping with its idea, an *objective*—as it were, hypostatically presented—pneumatic power, which, as the expressions  $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\epsilon\tau\epsilon$  and  $\acute{\epsilon}\delta\omega\kappa\epsilon\nu$  show, is conceived as in itself transcendent, and is therefore set forth as bestowed by God on man at a definite time and as being felt at work in the  $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$  (Rom. viii. 15, comp. Rom. viii. 26 f.) to impel man to a definite action. Thus are to be explained Rom. i. 4; viii. 15; xi. 8; 1 Cor. iv. 21; Gal. vi. 1; 2 Cor. iv. 13. But Rom. viii. 16 and 1 Cor. ii. 11 are said to be decisive in support of a human  $\pi$ . Now at the former passage interpreters vary, and Baur is evidently right in taking the  $\pi$ .  $\eta\mu\omega\nu$  as the  $\pi$ .  $\nu\iota\theta\theta\epsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ ,  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \phi\grave{\iota}\ \kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}\zeta\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu\ \text{'}\text{Αββ}\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\omicron}\ \text{πατ}\acute{\eta}\rho$ , which again, according to Gal. iv. 6, is the transcendent divine Spirit, the same objective  $\pi$ ., which in Rom. viii. 26  $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\epsilon\rho\epsilon\nu\tau\upsilon\gamma\chi\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\ \sigma\tau\epsilon\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\mu\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$ , whose effect God discerns in our hearts in which it has become immanent. At the latter passage, after a view of the connection, it is admitted that there is mention of a pneumatic element in man as the principle of his self-consciousness. But so far is this  $\pi$ . from being one akin in nature to the  $\pi$ . of God, that it is only by communication of the divine  $\pi$ . that man is enabled to apprehend the pneumatic, and to discern that even with *this*  $\pi$ ., and notwithstanding of it, he remains an  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma\ \psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ , who certainly has a  $\pi$ ., but only the  $\pi$ .  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\upsilon$ . For it is evident that for Paul what he calls  $\tau\omicron\ \pi$ .  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\upsilon$  here coincides with the  $\pi$ .  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\upsilon$ , and this coincides with the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ , the spirit of sensuousness which in the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  comes to consciousness—that is, the contrast to the  $\pi$ . This  $\psi$ . is, like the  $\nu$ ., doubtless a pneumatic element, because everything non-material is  $\pi$ . in the most general sense of the word; it doubtless falls under

the conception of  $\pi.$  as abstract generic conception for the non-material; but it has nothing in common with the concrete  $\pi.$ , the  $\tau\acute{o}$   $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\mu\alpha$ , the sole *reality* of the abstract generic conception. So at Rom. ii. 29 the  $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\tau\omicron\mu\acute{\eta}$   $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$  is  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$   $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\mu\alpha\tau\iota$ , but this does not mean the sphere of the subjective spirit, which is correctly designated by  $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$  in opposition to  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$   $\tau\hat{\omega}$   $\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\hat{\omega}$   $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$   $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\acute{\iota}$ . It is a circumcision of the inner subject, which has its existence in the objective sphere of the non-natural, non-sensuous, non-external, because it transcends the letter of Scripture, that is, the external carnal understanding of the word, according to which  $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\tau\omicron\mu\acute{\eta}$  certainly refers to the externally visible material element of the subject, the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$ .

An accurate analysis of all the passages thus shows that there does not, according to Paul's conception, exist in man an organ corresponding to the divine  $\pi.$ , a human  $\pi.$  receptive of the divine. That organ is the  $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$ ; the principle of self-consciousness is the  $\nu\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ ; anything higher is the divine  $\pi.$  The essential elements of man as such are for Paul only  $\sigma.$ ,  $\psi.$ ,  $\nu.$ , which have the appearance (*Erscheinung*) of an individual Ego in the  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ , the organic form for the substance of the  $\sigma.$  This result is substantially in keeping with the distinction, not always adhered to, in the Old Testament between *ruach* and *nephesh*.

With this result we are now in a position to determine the significance of the  $\sigma.$  for Paul's religious anthropology. As there is no essential element in man like to the essence of God—to the  $\pi.$ —and the contrast between  $\pi.$  and  $\sigma.$  is thus not an anthropological but a metaphysical one, and as the  $\nu.$ , as a mere theoretic form indifferent to its contents, is no essential peculiarity characteristic of man overagainst God, we may see (*so*

*begreift es sich*) how in the religious relation of God and man the nature of the latter may for Paul coincide with the  $\sigma$ . animated by the  $\psi$ .; how the religious relation generally may be presented as that of the  $\pi$ ., the non-material mental substance, to the  $\sigma$ ., the material sensuous substance; and, if that relation in abstract generality is that of the finite to the infinite, we may see that for Paul the *conception of  $\sigma$ . is the expression for the conception of the finite.* In this conception of the finite the  $\sigma$ . has its most proper (*eigentlichste*) significance; hence may be explained its comprehensive use and the variety of its applications.

Hence, first, *ἄνθρωπος* as *finite subject* in religion is identical and interchangeable with  $\sigma$ . (comp. 1 Cor. iii. 4 with iii. 1, 3); *ἀνθρώπινος* and *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον* are parallel with *σαρκικός* and *κατὰ σάρκα* (Rom. vi. 19; 1 Cor. iii. 21 comp. with 1 Cor. i. 26; 2 Cor. xi. 18; and 2 Cor. i. 12 comp. with 1 Cor. ii. 13). Mankind in this sense of finiteness is called *πάσα  $\sigma$ .* (Rom. iii. 20; 1 Cor. i. 29; Gal. ii. 16) and man  *$\sigma$ . καὶ αἷμα* (Gal. i. 16 comp. with 1 Cor. xv. 50). Now God as  $\pi$ . and man as  $\sigma$ ., infinite and finite, stand in absolute contrast. Physically the  $\sigma$ . is identical with *φθορά* (1 Cor. xv. 50, 42). As *φθαρτός* man is also *θνητός*. The  $\sigma$ . is the principle of perishableness. In the intellectual sphere the  $\sigma$ . is the principle of error. The *σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα* are *μωροί*. The  $\pi$ . alone is the principle of the knowledge of absolute truth (1 Cor. ii. 10, 14). The *νοῦς τῆς σαρκός* (Col. ii. 18; Paul in the four Epistles has the thing, but not the expression) clings to the material, the sensuously perceptible. But the contrast reveals itself above all in the practical domain—the will. The  $\sigma$ . is, in virtue of its indwelling  $\psi$ ., material substance having sensuous life, which expresses itself in *ἐπιθυμία*, sensuous impulse,

desire. This is the *δύναμις* immanent in the flesh, the necessary manifestation of the sarkic substance. Its manifestations are *παθήματα* (Rom. vii. 5; Gal. v. 24), because man in them has not the freedom of self-determination, but is given up powerlessly to a nature-power and nature-necessity. The *ἐπιθυμία* is a *νόμος* in the *σ.*; the *σ.* obeys not the law of God, *οὔδε γὰρ δύναται*. The *ἐπιθυμία* is in Paul's view the most especial (*eigenste*) *self* of man, in which is displayed the most complete contrast between man and God, *σ.* and *π.* The contrast of *substances* becomes a contrast of their effects, when, as in Gal. v., the *ἔργα τῆς σαρκός* are set overagainst the fruit of the Spirit. The *σ.*, as the sensuousness of man's living material substance, is at the same time evil. All evil has its principle only in it. All sins, which we apprehend as sins of "the finite spirit"—the spiritual sins of idolatry, heresy, variance, envy—are derived by Paul from the *σ.* (Gal. v. 19–21). This follows consistently from the dualism of substances, and from the fact that they in Paul's view are a power completely dominating the subject, which is at bottom merely meeting-point and form for the workings of the finite and infinite substance (comp. Gal. v. 17). The *σ.* thus stands in absolute contrast to the *π.*, the nature of God; but, if it is the true nature of man, it follows that, in Paul's view, *man as such (an sich) stands simply in contradistinction to God.* This is only one of the forms of the dualism pervading St. Paul's doctrinal system. [Here comes in the passage as to the grounds and limits of this dualism, quoted in the text at p. 26 f.]

He then proceeds to follow out *σ.*, thus defined, in its relation to the *νόμος*, as to which he holds that the forms of the ritual law are treated by Paul as purely external, relative to the *σ.*, and not properly belonging to

the νόμος as πνευματικός;<sup>1</sup> and thereafter in reference to the conception of sin, which is essentially bound up with it. Man as such is evil. The σ. is essentially a σ. ἁμαρτίας, and man of himself is, as such σ., in respect of his substantial nature ἁμαρτία, which, however, is not to be taken as equivalent to our conception of sin as accompanied by consciousness and sense of guilt. These are subjective elements; ἁμ. denotes merely *sin in the objective sense*, all that, in purely objective relation to the idea of God, reveals itself in the ἐπιθυμία as *unholiness of the sensuous-material substance*. Subjective sin, sin in the proper sense of the word, only arises through the revelation of the holy will of God in the ἐντολὴ ἁγία or the νόμος πνευματικός; under which ἁμ. becomes παράβασις, conscious transgression. The σ. is the nature-ground, the ἁμ. the objective presupposition, of all subjective sin. Sin is a necessity without freedom; man is a slave determined to sin; but he has the consciousness of the sinful deed as *his own*; and it is this dualism, the consciousness of his *own* act with the feeling of being absolutely determined to it by the substance of the body, that brings man to that exclamation of despair, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from this body of death?"<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps, Holsten says, Paul reckoned the ritual law among the πατρικαὶ παραδόσεις. At any rate, in his polemic he ignored it and dealt only with the moral law.

<sup>1</sup> Holsten regards the controversy as to whether Rom. vii. 14 ff. refers to the state of the regenerate or the unregenerate as altogether superfluous (*durchaus müssiger*) so far as Paul is concerned. The connection shows it to be "a representation of the religious history of the Hebrew subjective spirit, carried back from the apparent reality to its idea (*begriff*), and expressed by the individuality, which must be in plain language (*ohne phrase*) called the Hebrew Ego attaining to clearness respecting itself."

But how is this doctrine of sin and death as a necessary consequence of the finiteness of man's nature to be reconciled with Rom. v. 12 ff., where they seem presented as the consequence of the one sin of the one first man, Adam? Without entering into the particulars of Holsten's discussion, which in this field, as in those of Christology, the new life of believers, and the resurrection, passes beyond our limits, suffice it to say that Holsten regards Rom. v. 12-21 as forming a transition from the first great section of the Epistle, i. 18—v. 11, to the second section, ch. vi.-xii. The first section deals with the objective righteousness brought through Christ, presupposing the non-righteousness of man, and conferred as a gift of grace apart from the law; and the second seeks to obviate objections to the new doctrine from a Jewish or Jewish-Christian point of view, based on its apparent incompatibility with the legal requirement of *subjective* righteousness. The passage v. 12-21 delineates in a few broad traits the new form in which the history of the religious development of humanity reveals itself to the Christian consciousness, setting forth the world as determined (*bestimmte*) by Adam and by Christ respectively, and the law with its intermediate position and relative-absolute aim of leading the old over into the new. And he comes to the conclusion that Paul views the development of the world-order from a double standpoint—from that of objective necessity, the idea and will of God, and from that of free subjectivity, the nature of man. The two modes of view are not logically reconciled, but run separately side by side, and fall dualistically apart; and Paul utters the contradictory elements equally as truth. We too must therefore in the sense of Paul think the contradiction and the two together, the objective and the subjective form of world-development. Although



men were objectively made sinners and given up to death through an act of God by means of Adam's transgression, yet at the same time their subjective nature—their  $\sigma$ .—makes them sinners and drives them into death.

## II. DR. RICHARD SCHMIDT.

In a treatise on "the Pauline Christology," published in 1870, Dr. Schmidt devotes his first chapter to "the contrast of Flesh and Spirit." While agreeing in the main with Holsten, he deems it not superfluous to subject to critical examination the different views entertained on the question.

The usual course is to start from the fact that the flesh appears with Paul as the seat, if not the source, of sin, and from the conviction—otherwise acquired—that the Apostle may not be regarded as supporting the so-called theory of sensuousness; and to assign to the conception of  $\sigma$ . a contents transcending or altogether leaving the sphere of sensuousness, so as to facilitate the reference to it of phenomena essentially mental (*geistiger*). Before investigating the warrant for such an extension or transformation of the original conception, we have first to assure ourselves of what is the proper meaning of the extension. The answers to this question are not so distinct as could be wished, when almost in one breath  $\sigma$ . is defined as the seat of sinful inclination, or sinful human nature, and then as this sinful inclination itself, or the tendency of the will as opposed to God, or human sinfulness in general (as by Neander, Schmid, Messner). As if these were not quite disparate conceptions, or as if we were at liberty to impose on a word, whose primary sense is—rightly or wrongly—dropped, any signification we please, to be applied in each case according to the

fancy of the expositor. Even assuming the technical use of the word in Paul to prove an extension beyond its original import, we may not without arbitrariness discard the idea of an unity underlying that use; and we may reasonably claim that each signification so assumed shall make good not only its general *motive*, but also its association with the original contents of the conception.

The latter demand, if admitted as valid, is fatal to the view which takes  $\sigma$ . as denoting sin itself according to the ground-form which conditions its individual manifestations: for Schmidt at least cannot see what connection of ideas is held to subsist between the material substance of the body, which  $\sigma$ . originally denotes, and a tendency of the mental life. This objection remains in force, even when the sensuous element is so far retained as to define that tendency specially as "fleshliness," that is, as conditioned by a preponderance of the material side (as by Ernesti); for that which has its peculiarity determined by the flesh is not on that account itself flesh. Nor does it mend the matter to fill up that sensible gap by a series of stages of development (Julius Müller), so long as there inevitably remains at the decisive spot a chasm through an utter abandoning of the connection previously in somefashion retained. But apart from such general considerations the view in question cannot be maintained in the face of the definite distinction which Paul makes (Rom. vii. 17f., 25) between the  $\sigma$ . and the sin dwelling in it, as indeed on such an assumption the combination  $\sigma$ .  $\acute{\alpha}\mu$ . (Rom. viii. 3) would be absolutely meaningless. The attempt of Julius Müller to get quit of this difficulty by retaining for such passages the morally indifferent anthropological import of  $\sigma$ . is not consistent with the close connection between the seventh and eighth chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, which precludes our

assuming such a difference of sense as that explanation demands.

It might seem as if the objections urged against the identification of  $\sigma$ . with sin did not apply to the other more usual view, under which  $\sigma$ . is held to denote *human nature*, so far as it is a source of sinful conduct for the Ego. But here, too, we must ask: What is precisely meant? Does the  $\sigma$ . denote directly *sinful* human nature, so that the element of corruption adhering to it forms an immediate constituent of the conception? Or is it meant that the word is in itself merely an expression for human nature in general, but that the latter empirically exists only in such a shape as to produce a sinfulness of the personal conduct conditioned by it? Against the former nearly the same exegetical objections may be urged as were adduced before; the statements of the Apostle that in his flesh dwells nothing good, or that he with his flesh serves the law of sin, would contain a truth, but a truth so indubitable as hardly to be distinguished from a platitude; and a combination like  $\sigma$ . ἀμ. would be a hardly conceivable pleonasm. Besides, we ask how could a  $\sigma$ . in that case be ascribed to Christ, and yet His sinlessness retained? Hardly any other course would be left than to take the word in such cases in a morally neutral sense; and then we may ask with what warrant there has been introduced into the conception an element which may thus be laid aside at pleasure? This leads accordingly to the modification, under which the element of sinfulness belongs, not to the conception in itself, but only to its empiric reality (Weiss). But in that case how should the formulae περιπατεῖν κατὰ σάρκα, ἐν σαρκὶ εἶναι involve, as unquestionably in Pauline usage they do, a moral censure? They would of themselves mean "a walk according to human nature," but not according

to human nature so and so determined—the general character of the formulæ not leading us to seek in them such a more precise definition. Hofmann strikes out a middle course not liable to the previous objections. He takes  $\sigma$ . as denoting not human nature in itself, or as sinful, but as in its present state conditioned by the sin of the first man. This is explained to mean that man is, after Old Testament usage, called “flesh,” as a being dependent and perishable; it designates him on the side of dependence, not of sinfulness. “But,” says Hofmann, “liable to such perishableness, he is also liable to sin. A will placed in such conditions cannot be righteous, life in so impure a body cannot be pure.” But, apart from the question how far Hofmann is warranted in speaking of the body *a priori* as “impure,” we are naturally led to ask how, assuming that Jesus has taken the present human nature, it stands with His sinlessness, if the two—perishableness and sinfulness—are to be so closely connected? And, even if we hold the personal conduct of Jesus not to have been conditioned by this His nature, as is the case empirically with us, we may still ask on what Hofmann’s definition is based? and what entitles us at all to find in  $\sigma$ . an expression for collective human nature, whether in itself or with any sort of *de facto* qualification?

This question seems all the more called for, the less that the current application of the conception is of itself natural. Long ecclesiastico-ascetic usage of the word “flesh” associated with the world and the devil, makes it difficult for us to recall the original meaning that lies under its technical application; but, if we consider the matter apart from this traditional habit, we cannot but think it a far from obvious, and indeed a pretty strange, usage to designate human nature as a whole simply as

flesh. It has no doubt been claimed already for the Old Testament, and asserted as a general Biblical usage, inasmuch as there the whole man is designated absolutely as flesh, even in connections which are far from bearing exclusively or preponderantly on the sensuous side of his being. . . . With the restriction that the latter statement applies at bottom only to the *kol-basar*, which has become in the strictest sense technical, the fact must be undoubtedly recognized as correct; but we must deny that any inference may be drawn thence for the correctness of the view in question. In all such cases *basar* denotes the concrete "man," not the abstract "human nature" or the "human" generally; and it seems to betoken an inadequate attention to the distinction, when the transition from the one to the other is accounted quite easy and obvious (Luthardt). For the concrete man is actually flesh in the strictest sense, although animated by a personal life-spirit; in view of others he exists only as such, belonging as such to the phenomenal world. It would not even be correct to find here an extension of the original conception, seeing that the sole difference from its application elsewhere amounts to this, that in the one case the Ego is distinguished from its material body as something belonging to it, while in the other this body itself as animated by personal life is elevated into the subject. Again, it is not an extension but an abandonment of the original sense, when "flesh" is held to denote human nature, inasmuch as the general conception of substance or material, which the word involves, is exchanged for the quite heterogeneous one of "nature" or "kind." Granting ever so duly that this nature is that of a corporeal, material being, the material body and the nature characteristically conditioned by it are none the less different things; and it is not easy to

explain how the substance of the former could become an expression for the latter. Where, besides, *basar* is predicated of man absolutely, it is in no other sense than that in which the formula "all flesh" relates at times also to the animal world (*e.g.* Gen. vi. 19; vii. 16), or in which it is said of the horses of the Egyptians that they are flesh and not spirit (Is. xxxi. 3); whence we may see how little the analogy of the Old Testament use can be appealed to for the sense ascribed to  $\sigma$ . of "the human with the accessory idea of weakness and sinfulness" (Tholuck). Nor in the New Testament writings other than those of Paul is there any necessity for going beyond the bounds of Old Testament usage and enlarging the proper idea of  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\grave{\xi}$  into that of empiric human nature,—not even at Matt. xxvi. 41, where the temptation, into which the disciples are in danger of falling, threatens them from an outward need which affects the sensuous man, and the flesh may be conceived accordingly as subject to it, in so far as it is animated and accessible to sensuous impressions.

After all this it would require very cogent grounds to make us in Paul's case recognize a signification of  $\sigma$ ., for which no sure warrant can be found elsewhere. But not only are the arguments adduced for it not so cogent, but indications telling against it are got rid of by its supporters after a very unsatisfactory fashion. Schmidt reviews the chief passages, maintaining that at Rom. i. 3; ix. 5; Gal. ii. 23, 29; 1 Cor. x. 8, where *κατὰ σάρκα* is used as regards Christ, Israel, and the people of Israel respectively, there is no necessity for enlarging the conception beyond its original limits; that at other passages, where the flesh is represented as the peculiar sphere and characteristic determining element of non-Christian being and conduct (such as 1 Cor. iii. 3, where

κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖν is obviously equivalent to κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν elsewhere, 1 Cor. i. 26 f. where σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα are identical with σοφοὶ τοῦ κόσμου, and Philem. 16: καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ καὶ ἐν κυρίῳ), it is of the utmost importance to distinguish between what is on each occasion involved in the thought, and what is implied in the conception of the flesh itself (as in the latter passage, where, so far as the general sense goes, we might render ἐν σαρκί; "in the human-natural relation in which he stands to thee as a slave," but σ. itself does not denote a relation any more than κυρίως does); and that, even where the proper notion may seem indefinitely enlarged (as in the apparent equivalence of σ. to κόσμος), we must bear in mind that σ. denotes not so much the body as the material substance of this body, that this substance is in keeping with the Old Testament view (Gen. ii. 7; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 4, 7), essentially identical with that of the earthly world generally, sharing its common character of materiality; that, as flesh, man is a member of the phenomenal world; that flesh is the medium of all his relations with this world; and that it may therefore denote as well the sphere within which the purely natural being and action of man is carried on, as that which determines the peculiarity of such being or action, without renouncing the category of substance or matter originally underlying it.

The original meaning of the word is to be retained, even where it emerges in definite ethical relations. Great stress is laid by Wieseler and Ritschl on the fact that when Paul opposes the π. to the σ., he is to be understood as speaking not of the human, but of the divine π.; and so σ. cannot denote the bodily nature of man only, but must denote his being as a whole (*das gesammte Wesen*). But, even granting the correctness of

the premiss, the stringency of the inference drawn from it may be questioned. When Paul opposes the non-Christian and Christian conduct as a *περιπατεῖν κατὰ σάρκα* and *περιπατεῖν κατὰ π.*, he wishes to describe them according to the principle or determining power which empirically characterises each; if this is for the Christian's walk the indwelling Spirit of God, why should the Apostle not oppose to this the flesh in the proper sense, in so far as it may be otherwise shown that he *de facto* discerned in it the power determining the non-Christian life? We see easily that this argument must at bottom assume what awaits proof as proved already. So we may admit that the formulae *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖν* and *κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν* ultimately amount in substance to the same thing, without allowing the inference of a coincidence in conception. Lastly, if appeal is made to Gal. v. 19 ff., as including not merely sensuous sins, but also such as hatred and envy among works of the flesh, it is not necessarily involved in the consistency of a view which finds the empiric ground of sin generally in the material body, that all individual sins should admit of being with equal directness traced back to it. At any rate, two questions require to be kept quite distinct—the one whether such a view, objectively regarded, is really adequate for an explanation of sin in its various shapes; and the other, whether it is actually to be found in the Apostle's writings. The negation of the former is no reason for denying the latter, at least so long as we do not come to the inquiry with the absolute presupposition that there cannot be found in the Apostle's cycle of thought anything at variance with the view we ourselves deem correct—a presupposition, which purely historical research cannot make without depriving itself beforehand of its freedom, and which strict orthodoxy (*Schrift-*



*gläubigkeit*) cannot make without practically renouncing its own principle of unconditional submission to the Apostolic utterances.

The less may we evade the weight of the positive indications, which bring the proper signification of  $\sigma$ ., elsewhere demonstrable, definitely enough into prominence also in its ethical relations. When Paul places the law of sin in the members (Rom. vii. 23), when he speaks of a destruction of the body of sin (Rom. vi. 6), or of a mortifying the mischievous (*ränkevoll*) activity of the body (Rom. viii. 13) he lays a stress on the bodily nature, which must be at least surprising for those who defend the view hitherto considered. . . . Evidently the conceptions "flesh" on the one hand and "body" or "members" on the other are treated as essentially equivalent: to the  $\sigma$ . in which sin dwells (Rom. vii. 18) correspond the  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\eta$ , in which the law of sin has its seat (verse 23), just as at Rom. viii. 13, to the  $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}$   $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\alpha$   $\zeta\eta\upsilon$  is opposed the  $\theta\alpha\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon$   $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$   $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$   $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$   $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ . Both are to be explained from  $\sigma$ . being the substance of this material body itself, consisting of members.

After some remarks controverting the view of Ritschl, who had questioned the practical equivalence of the two conceptions in dealing with Rom. vii., Schmidt finds himself now in a position to judge what warrant there is for speaking of  $\sigma$ . as used in several significations, as is done by Ernesti, who distinguishes a physiologico-anthropological, a historico-anthropological, and an ethico-anthropological standpoint. Such a view is only got by either raising collateral conceptions associated for us with the idea into immediate constituents of it, or by attributing what is implied in the general thought of a passage simply to one notion contained in it. Paul's peculiarity is not to be sought in his having remodelled the notion in ques-

tion, but only in the equally comprehensive and precise significance which, with contents unchanged, it holds in his doctrinal system.  $\Sigma$ . with him is neither the whole undivided human nature, nor is it one side thereof in distinction from another; it never means anything else than the material substance of the animal, including the human, body.

Having thus fixed the signification of the one member of the antithesis, we may acquire a more precise insight into the peculiar nature of that antithesis. As the conception of  $\sigma$ . is not simply tantamount to that of the human, the divine as such cannot form the immediate contrast to it. Even where the Spirit of God stands definitely overagainst the flesh, the emphasis will rest not so much on the genitive of more precise definition, as rather on the chief idea which is thereby more precisely defined. In other words, the question turns on the contrast of flesh and spirit, not immediately on that of God and man (the latter conceived of as he exists naturally in experience). The distinction thus made, which it is of decisive importance to keep in view, leads us on at once to distinguish between the general conception of spirit and the reality existing in  $\pi$ . Θεοῦ, even in the event of Paul's being supposed not to know another reality of spirit. This may be tested by the fact that we cannot by any means, wherever the idea of  $\pi$ . appears in an antithetic relation, mentally supply at once the more precise definition of the divine, without altering somehow the sharpness of the contrast. Especially instructive in this respect are the passages in which not  $\sigma$ . but *γράμμα* forms the contrast (Rom. vii. 6; Rom. ii. 29; 2 Cor. iii. 6); but the same holds true of cases where  $\sigma$ . forms the antithesis, such as Gal. iv. 29; Rom. viii. 9, and throughout this earlier part of the eighth chapter.

where there are not expressly more precise definitions added ; as well as at Gal. v. 16 ff. In all these cases the expressions are to be left entirely in their generality.

In this light the question much discussed and diversely answered—Whether in the passages adduced we have to think of the divine or the human  $\pi$ .—has become for us one without an object, as it concerns a conception which “desires to be left entirely general.” But we may not escape the other question, Whether in the Apostle’s opinion the divine Spirit is the sole reality of this conception, in such a sense that the  $\pi$ . stands overagainst man as such in absolute transcendence ? or whether it is in any way a constituent part of his nature ? The former is energetically maintained by Holsten, according to whom man in himself, as conceived by Paul, is held to have absolutely no element in himself really opposed to the  $\sigma$ .; and Weiss maintains that, though occasionally the Apostle follows a popular use of language, this may not be looked on as at all a criterion for his anthropology, which excludes the specific conception of  $\pi$ . But the number of passages, where to all appearance there is mention of a spirit of man, is far from inconsiderable (Rom. i. 9 ; 2 Cor. ii. 13, vii. 13 ; 1 Cor. xvi. 18 ; Gal. vi. 18 ; Phil. iv. 23 ; 2 Tim. iv. 22 ; Philem. 23 ; 1 Cor. v. 3 ff. ; ii. 11 ; vii. 34 ; 2 Cor. vii. 1 ; Col. ii. 5) ; and the defenders of the view in question find themselves compelled to deviate from the current explanation of them in a way not very happy. In almost all these passages Holsten would have us understand the  $\pi$ . of the divine spirit become subjective, and Weiss of a spiritual life of higher origin produced by that spirit. Holsten thinks himself able to show that the addition of the personal pronoun does not make the  $\pi$ . human at 1 Cor. v. 4 and Rom. i. 9. He tells us that at the former passage it needs “but

slight reflection" to recognise in the  $\pi$ . the divine Spirit, "the source of apostolic dignity and of apostolic power"; but it likewise needs but little reflection to see that Paul could not possibly regard something common to him with all Christians as such a source of his specific apostolic standing. Besides, the "power" of the Lord Jesus appears alongside of the  $\pi$ . of the Apostle as something different from it, which would have hardly been the case, had Paul understood under the latter the Spirit of Christ himself. Lastly, at verse 3 the contrast:  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omega\acute{\nu}$   $\tau\hat{\omega}$   $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\iota$ ,  $\pi\alpha\rho\omega\acute{\nu}$   $\delta\grave{\epsilon}$   $\tau\hat{\omega}$   $\pi\nu\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota$  can hardly be taken as other than anthropological, and, as it is plain that the mention of  $\pi$ . in verse 4 looks back to these words, the  $\pi$ . must be the same in the two cases. That the passage yields no natural sense in the ordinary view, is a mere groundless assertion. As to Rom. i. 9 the objections urged by Holsten against Philippi's view are certainly well-founded; but he has not observed that the addition  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$   $\tau\hat{\omega}$   $\pi\nu\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota$   $\mu\omicron\upsilon$  admits of a more satisfactory explanation than is given by him. The Apostle calls God to witness that he serves him in the cause of the gospel not merely by the outward activity of preaching, but also inwardly (the words  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$   $\tau\hat{\omega}$   $\pi\nu\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota$   $\mu\omicron\upsilon$  affirm this) in so far as all his thoughts are applied to advance it in the churches (so Hofmann). At other passages too, where the personal pronoun occurs, Holsten's view is inadmissible. At 1 Cor. v. 5 to take the  $\pi$ . to be saved of the communicated Spirit of God yields no effective meaning—unless we should for  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$   $\tau\eta$   $\acute{\eta}\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$  read  $\acute{\epsilon}\iota\varsigma$   $\tau\eta\nu$   $\acute{\eta}\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\nu$  in the sense that the Spirit should remain preserved for the sinner till the day of judgment. As here, so at 2 Cor. vii. 1 the spirit is contrasted with the  $\sigma$ ., at 1 Cor. vii. 34 with the  $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ ; and at these passages the impossibility of Holsten's explanation becomes apparent. For in the

case of the Holy Spirit of God even become subjective there can be no talk of a defilement, or yet of a sanctifying; and, even if with Holsten we question the genuineness of the former passage, there remains the latter, in which the parallelism with *σώματι* precludes us from thinking of aught else than a sanctifying of the spirit (not through the Spirit). No less clearly is the distinction of the human *π.* from the divine apparent at Rom. viii. 16, where Holsten's identification of the *π. ἡμῶν* with the previously mentioned *π. νιοθεσίας* is hardly anything else than a renunciation—forced upon him by his theory—of the natural exegesis, which points clearly enough to the referring the words *αὐτο τὸ π.* to the immediately preceding *π. νιοθεσίας*. Besides, the thought which Holsten gets from the passage has too much of a modern abstract character to commend itself as Pauline.

The view of Weiss is not so much affected by these objections, but is, regarded purely in itself, the less natural, as it occupies an intermediate position between the ordinary view and that of Holsten. According to it the *π.* in the passages in question is a higher spiritual life wrought in believers, which is distinguished from the divine Spirit even as having become immanent in man, so that we should have to assume in the redeemed a two-fold communicated *π.* But Paul knows only of a received Spirit; and the higher life possessed by the Christian is only a life led in the power of this Spirit; besides, it would be difficult to form a really clear conception of what is meant, if, on the one hand, the objective power, as communicated to us (N. B.!), of the divine Spirit is by no means to be entirely merged into that subjective spiritual life produced by it, and, on the other hand, *alongside* of this latter, the natural spirit-life is regarded as continuing to subsist. Paul certainly

distinguishes the divine  $\pi$ ., even as having already become immanent, always in some way from the  $\pi$ . which he designates as that of man; but for that very reason under the latter can only be understood the human inner life generally, which, as but relatively penetrated by the Spirit of God, continues also relatively distinct from it. If, on the other hand, this latter side is expressly marked off, that which remains behind is no longer to be distinguished from the divine become immanent; else we should—seeing that in fact the Spirit as communicated has thereby at the same time become a subjective spirit—be obliged to assume a *threefold* sphere in which the life of believers is accomplished. Weiss remarks quite correctly that in Rom. viii. 16 the Spirit which gives the certainty of childship is distinguished from our spirit, “in which the childlike confidence is wrought;” but, if this latter is apprehended as a “higher spirit-life” first wrought in us, it cannot be thought of from the outset as devoid of that childlike confidence; and there will therefore be no proper meaning in saying that this is for the first time called forth “in it.” Still clearer is the passage Rom. viii. 10, where (in Schmidt’s conviction) under the  $\pi\nu$ . is to be understood the human as distinguished from the divine. For evidently the intention is to express what takes place in man when Christ, that is, more specially Christ’s Spirit, dwells in him; and likewise the contrast to  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ , which at any rate denotes only one side of human nature, naturally requires that overagainst it something should be affirmed of another side of that nature. It is obvious accordingly that we cannot think of a something simply wrought by the divine Spirit itself.

It cannot well be questioned that Paul was quite accustomed to speak of spirit as a constituent element of

man's nature. But it has been alleged that this anthropological *usus loquendi* does not stand in any inner relation to the specific conception of the  $\pi.$ , which dominates the Apostle's whole religious thought; and it has been urged that the element of Spirit in the specific sense is one absolutely transcending natural humanity, on the ground of 1 Cor. xv. 45 ff., and of the fact that in Rom. vii. 22 ff. it is not the  $\pi.$  but the  $\nu.$  that is opposed to the flesh. As to the former passage, Holsten ought not to have left unnoticed the specialty of the utterance, which lies in the *concrete* sense in which the conceptions of  $\pi.$  and  $\psi.$  are here used. The passage doubtless directly asserts that the first man as distinguished from the second *was* not spirit, *i.e.*, a nature of spirit; but this by no means excludes spirit as something pertaining to him. According to the Biblical account man becomes a living soul just by the combination of a life-breath issuing from God with the material body formed of earth—a view, which may be recognised in Paul's familiar juxtaposition of  $\sigma.$  or  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  and  $\pi.$ ; but for this very reason man in the unity of his earthly being cannot well be designated as  $\pi.$ , although it may be said that he possesses a  $\pi.$  Further, as regards the distinction between  $\pi.$  and  $\psi.$ , it is in the main correctly put (by Hofmann) to the effect that the former denotes the moving life-power, the latter the individual life in its state as conditioned. Now such a conditioned character is given for the individual human life by the very fact of its being linked to a material body; and from this is explained the close relation, in which with Paul the  $\psi.$  stands to the  $\sigma.$ , so that in this respect  $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$  may be used as synonymous with  $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$  (1 Cor. ii. 14). But that between the conceptions of a  $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$  and a  $\psi.$   $\xi\hat{\omega}\sigma\alpha$  on the one hand, and a  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$  and a  $\pi.$   $\xi\omega\pi\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu$  on the other, there subsists an essential dis-

inction, need hardly be mentioned after what has been said. In the Apostle's view Christ has become a  $\pi.$  ζωοποιούν only through the resurrection ; hence this predicate does not belong to the earthly Jesus, who may rather fall under the conception of a  $\psi.$  ζῶσα. As little can believers, though possessing the Spirit in the specific sense, be called  $\piνεύματα$  ; and so the passage adduced is far from fitted to prove the absolute transcendence of the  $\piνεῦμα$ . Verse 46 itself would not really yield this, even if the whole connection did not make it probable that we should there supply  $\sigmaῶμα$  from verse 44.

As to Rom. vii. the prominence given to  $\nu\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$  at the close is certainly not accidental, but is accounted for by the course of thought. For its meaning 1 Cor. xiv. 14 is rightly compared, where  $\nu.$  denotes the intelligent reflecting consciousness. Certainly it cannot be limited in Rom. vii. to the intellectual (*das theoretische*), for there is ascribed to it a  $\sigma\nu\nu\eta\delta\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  and even a  $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$  ; but as little may we in the case of the latter think of a practical willing complete in itself, else it would remain inconceivable why the action should thus fail to be accordant with this willing. The whole thought of the section requires rather the conception of an inward movement (*Regung*), which, immediately conjoined with that  $\sigma\nu\nu\eta\delta\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ, must be thought of as practical impulse, but does not completely carry itself out into real energetic willing ; that joy in the law itself can only denote in substance such a complaisance (*Wohlgefallen*) as accompanies the inwardly wrought knowledge of the excellence of the law's contents. Though the question here therefore is not that of a merely intellectual knowledge, the starting point of the whole conception lies on the side of consciousness ; in no



case at least can the  $\nu$ . be an expression for the whole inner life. Doubtless the mode of expression seems as if the Ego were set simply overagainst the  $\sigma$ . as the impersonal side; but this representation is evidently one to be understood *cum grano salis*, seeing that the Ego, in fact, participates in the acting just as well as in the  $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$ . And for that very reason it is not correct simply to identify the conception of  $\nu$ . with that, previously used, of the  $\epsilon\acute{\sigma}\omega$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ ; the former expression is rather to be apprehended as the more exact, or as in some way limiting the latter: for there is no occasion, so far as Schmidt can see, to take the latter in another sense than it has at 2 Cor. iv. 16, where it denotes the life within in contrast to the outside. A comparison, moreover, of the passage just adduced with 1 Cor. v. 5 readily shows that the contrast of the inner and outer man coincides substantially (*sich sachlich deckt*) with that between  $\pi$ . and  $\sigma$ . (or  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ ), and accordingly it will also be clear that, even on the assumption of a  $\pi$ . ascribed to man and falling under the conception of spirit when viewed in its unity, the choice of the designation in this case by  $\nu$ . is sufficiently accounted for (*motivirte*) by the thought of Rom. vii. 14 ff.

There is the less reason for our placing the Apostle's anthropological terminology out of relation to his specific conception of the  $\pi$ ., that the conception of spirit is, as we've convinced ourselves, contrasted in a quite general sense with that of the flesh. If the latter finds its essential quality (*Bestimmtheit*) in the element of the material, the spirit on the other hand denotes primarily the non-material, conceived of at the same time in a positive aspect as moving power, just as with the notion of material substance is associated that of being at rest. So far it may be said that the contrast of flesh and spirit is

essentially a metaphysical one ; but this does not exclude its becoming in a definite relation an anthropological one, since the same contrast, as it has just been generally characterised, evidently underlies the Biblical view of man. Holsten himself very correctly remarks that the dualism of spirit and matter in this strictly metaphysical form is not met with in Paul, inasmuch as with him in place of the latter comes the narrower conception of the flesh ; but, when he defines the contrast accordingly resulting simply as that between God and man, his view rests on presuppositions which Schmidt cannot regard as really proved. Holsten himself must admit that so far as  $\pi$ . denotes the non-material, the human  $\psi$ . falls under this as abstract generic notion, and that in this respect Paul certainly knows a "human-creaturely"  $\pi$ . No doubt he immediately adds that this latter has absolutely "nothing in common with the concrete  $\pi$ ., the  $\tau\delta$   $\pi$ ., this sole *reality* of the abstract generic conception"; but what at bottom is meant by this ? If, on the one hand, the immaterial element of human being falls under the general conception of spirit, and on the other hand the human  $\pi$ . is, as cannot rationally be denied, not less a concrete than the divine, how should it not then be likewise viewed as "a reality of the abstract generic conception" ? or conversely, if the divine Spirit is the sole reality of the same, with what right is another thing likewise real subsumed under the same general conception ? It is surely not very probable that Paul should have on the one side restricted the sphere of the material to the bodily nature of man, but on the other side should have quite excluded the immaterial element of his being from the conception of spirit ; on the contrary, it is of itself very natural to seek the proximate basis for his peculiar view in the reality which that contrast, generally con-

ceived, has within human nature itself. By this Schmidt does not mean, indeed, that anywhere, where Paul contrasts flesh and spirit in the moral sphere, he would have the latter understood as the human : but there is everywhere meant either the general conception of spirit, or the concrete reality which it has in the *divine*  $\pi$ .

The grounds on which Schmidt conceives that the Apostle, looking to *reality*, could take little account of the human  $\pi$ ., and the general conclusion to which he comes, are sufficiently indicated in the text (pp. 34-37).

### III. DR. HERMANN LÜDEMANN.

The elaborate treatise, extending to 217 pages, published in 1872 by Dr. Lüdemann on the "Anthropology of the Apostle Paul and its place in his doctrinal system," discusses, first, the physical anthropology. He sets out from the division of human nature into an  $\epsilon\xi\omega$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$  and an  $\epsilon\sigma\omega\theta\epsilon\nu$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ , in 2 Cor. iv. 16, following it without asking, in the first instance, its warrant. The *outer* man embraces, 1st, the conceptions of  $\sigma$ . and  $\psi$ ., the former being the material substratum of the earthly body, the latter the life animating it.  $\Sigma$ . occurs in the purely material sense in 1 Cor. xv. 39, 50, and 2 Cor. iii. 3. But it is not to be conceived as *materia bruta*, but as living, animated matter, which it is not necessary to explain, as Baur does, from the analogy of the ancient idea of matter. The  $\sigma$ . without a  $\psi$ . is no  $\sigma$ ., and the  $\psi$ . is only conceivable within a  $\sigma$ . This  $\sigma$ . is susceptible of pain and pleasure (1. Cor. v. 5 ; 1 Cor. vii. 8). The close connection between  $\sigma$ . and  $\psi$ . is confirmed by their promiscuous use (identical sense of  $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$  and  $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ ). The use of the expression  $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}$   $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\alpha$  in

matters of descent rests on this primary sense (Rom. i. 3, etc.).

But with this restriction to bodily matter another use of  $\sigma$ . or  $\psi$ . conflicts, when they denote the *whole man*, particularly in the phrases  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha$   $\sigma$ . and  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha$   $\psi$ ., Hebraic turns of expression certainly used in the sense of "every one," but always from the connection employed of human nature in a state of subordination and humiliation. So, too, the formula  $\sigma$ . καὶ ἀίμα (Gal. i. 16) with the accessory sense of frailty. The sister-conception  $\psi$ . likewise denotes individual existence (1 Cor. xv. 45; Rom. xi. 3; 2 Cor. i. 23). To this Old Testament extension of meaning the Pauline usage attaches itself, according to which  $\sigma$ . denotes anything belonging to the natural mode of man's existence, but never without a certain purposed degrading connotation [*Beigeschmack*], e.g., Gal. iii. 3, Gal. vi. 12. This seems to carry us beyond the category of the  $\xi\xi\omega$  ἄνθρωπος; and we must ask whether we can still follow it. But the remembrance of passages where it is decidedly confined to the body, as well as the consideration that it is used in classical Greek (though mostly in the plural αἱ σάρκες), and that the conception  $\sigma$ . in later Greek is used with strict limitation to the body (as shown by Zeller), appear to require us to keep by this category, and to set aside for a time the Old Testament extension of the conception. And in this we are confirmed when we glance at another conception, that of  $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ , which is used by Paul not as identical with  $\sigma$ ., but as denoting the form by assuming which the  $\sigma$ ., as substance, is in a position to constitute the human body.

That  $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$  resolves itself into bodily form is plain from its being applied entirely irrespective of any particular matter (1 Cor. xv. 35-50), where the pith of the proof for a resurrection-body lies in the fact set forth of diverse

bodily substances, and ultimately in the assertion of a celestial body-substance. *Σῶμα*, thus used for bodies of quite opposite matter, has nothing to do with materiality. It is a form, into which any matter may enter, though, as verse 40 shows, the character of the matter is of essential influence on the shaping of the form. At 1 Cor. xii. 12 Paul defines the *σῶμα* as unity in multiplicity—in short, under the conception of *organism*; and hence it is applied to social organisms, especially the Church. The teleological idea here is that of being the organ of action generally—so at 2 Cor. v. 10. The use of *σῶμα* in sexual matters is noted (Rom. iv. 19; 1 Cor. vi. 13-20), and also, as form conditions appearance, its use to express “aspect” (2 Cor. x. 10; 1 Cor. v. 3).

The combination *σῶμα τῆς σαρκός* is not (doubtless accidentally) carried out in the larger Epistles (it occurs at Col. ii. 11). But we find *σῶμα ψυχικόν*, which means the same, for it can only be so called as *σῶμα σαρκικόν*, and presupposes this formula. *Σῶμα* may be often employed instead of *σ.*, but *σ.* can never come in place of *σῶμα*, for *σ.* cannot express, or even include, the conception of form. . . .

When at 2 Cor. iv. 16 it is said of the “outer man” *διαφθειρέται*, and this perishableness procures for man elsewhere the name *φθαρτὸς ἄνθρωπος* (Rom. i. 23), so that the *σάρξ* as *φθορά* characterises it, it might appear as if we must revert to the view that *σ.* is an expression for human nature generally, or, as Holsten puts it, for the conception of the finite. But when we recall the fact that the *διαφθειρέται* is expressly affirmed only of the *ἔξω ἄνθρωπος*, it is clear that the element of finiteness and perishableness is in the first instance limited to the body, and, whatever may be the case with the Old Testament, in Paul's case where the *σάρξ* is pronounced perish-

able as matter (1 Cor. xv. 42, 50, 53, 54; Gal. vi. 8), the teaching seems strongly akin to the Greek or Hellenistic conception of the principle of matter, to which perishableness or non-being ( $\mu\lambda\grave{\iota}$  ὄν) was ascribed. What, if the Hellenistic negativity of matter here appears? But it is alleged that all this separation of an ἔξω ἄνθρωπος has with Paul no strict anthropological value. For at 2 Cor. iv. 16 he is speaking of the redeemed man, in whom an ἔσω and ἔξω ἄνθρωπος may be distinguished; but in the natural man it has no place. We reply that there is mention of the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος also at Rom. vii. 22; and there the discussion concerns not the redeemed, but the natural man, who is simply longing for redemption. What is the "inner man" there?

The expression at Rom. vii. 22 is interchanged with νοῦς, which must accordingly be a chief constituent of it. N. denotes self-consciousness (1 Cor. xiv. 14), and thence all the mental activities in which it is presupposed, and which we comprehend under the term "understanding" (*Verstand*); the result of which is γιγνώσκειν and εἰδέναι, and its outcome the νόημα. It is in this respect a purely formal activity of the thinking mind, dealing with any contents at pleasure. It is primarily the faculty which distinguishes good and evil (Rom. xiv. 5, xii. 2). In Rom. vii. there is clearly ascribed to it the θέλειν itself; but for the practical attitude of will resting on judgment and appreciation and influencing life Paul uses φρονεῖν, φρόνημα, φρόνησις.

The conception καρδιά, which recurs in the New Testament with the many-sided variety of aspects which it bears in the Old, and which Paul frequently makes use of, is to be arranged under the category of the inner man; and, one might say, constitutes with Paul the inner man directly as a whole. But, when from this it is

inferred (by Beck, Delitzsch and Weiss) that the  $\nu$ . is to be assigned to the  $\kappa$ . as organ and classed under it, the prominence given to it by Paul would seem to preclude its being thus simply merged in the latter. The conception of  $\kappa$ . carries with it a reference to subjective feeling, to the concrete inner life of the Ego, and, when a cognitive faculty is associated with it, it is pre-eminently a receptive one, coincident with susceptibility. It is the seat of feeling also and of will. When  $\kappa$ . was too indefinite for the Apostle's purposes, he had recourse to  $\nu$ .

With the terms  $\nu$ . and  $\kappa$ . we have exhausted the materials that may be applied for a view of the  $\epsilon\sigma\omega$   $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$  without prejudging certain controversies. On these we have now to enter, and to discuss first how far that division of the inner and outer man in the Apostle's view is justified. Fritzsche and Meyer have long since pointed out that the formulæ used by Paul for designating these two parts of human nature were naturalised at that time in a more or less similar form by the usage of the Platonic school. It seems hardly possible to avoid granting that Paul here appropriates the language of his historical environment. But in so speaking we do not yet decide whether he employs it in the spirit of its philosophic authors. In reality it is denied that he does so. And in fact when we recall those expressions which we meet with in Paul of the  $\sigma$ . or  $\psi$ . comprehending the whole man, and add to them the  $\kappa$ . which stands in so close relation to the  $\sigma$ . (2 Cor. iii. 3) that it cannot be substantially different from it, the separation of an  $\epsilon\sigma\omega$   $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$  in any such cardinal sense as that of Philo's statement as to the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ :  $\delta\varsigma$ ,  $\kappa\rho\upsilon\iota\omega\varsigma$   $\epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ ,  $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$   $\epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$   $\epsilon\nu$   $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omega$ ,<sup>1</sup> seems not practicable. Here we encounter the view of Holsten, who

<sup>1</sup> Philo, de Congressu, p. 533.

finds man's unity summed up in the notion  $\sigma$ . and its pure antithesis in the  $\pi$ .; and we are led to investigate the latter conception. This contrast is undeniably presented at Gal. vi. 8, and still more clearly at 1 Cor. xv. 40-53, in the various attributes assigned to  $\pi$ . and  $\sigma$ . respectively as the two poles of being. The  $\pi$ . is not merely called  $\zeta\omega\sigma\pi\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu$  and identified with  $\zeta\omega\eta$  (Rom. viii. 2) but it is more precisely defined as  $\pi$ .  $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$  or  $X\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon$ . It belongs to the nature of God, and what is affirmed of God is affirmed of it, and conversely. Power and might are ascribed to it. And there belongs to it an outward nature, as is to be seen from the—it must be admitted—somewhat fluctuating use of the conception  $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ . On several occasions  $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$  seems to denote a finer luminous matter (*Lichtmaterie*), which belongs to the  $\pi$ ., and of which the  $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$   $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\upsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\iota\alpha$  consist. . . . The  $\pi$ . is consequently at the same time expressive of a higher materiality.

The question, What is meant by this contrast of  $\sigma$ . and  $\pi$ . is answered by those who identify the  $\sigma$ . with human nature to the effect, that it is essentially the contrast between man and God; while from Holsten we get the answer, that it is the contrast of the non-material spiritual substance with the material sensuous substance, or in other words of the infinite and the finite. The former represents the *Jewish-religious* point of view; the latter that of *Hellenistic dualism*. In examining Holsten's position, we must first inquire: Can the speculative categories of Hellenism serve to express the religious categories of the Jewish consciousness thus offhand, so as to yield unity of thought? And, to answer this, we must attempt definitely to answer two further questions, What is dualism? and how is the *Jewish-religious* consciousness related to it? To the former it is replied that a dualis-



tic contrast can only be formed by two notions, which are at the same time co-ordinate, disjunct, contrarily opposed ; and illustrations of this dualism and of the difficulties attending the attempt to carry it out consistently are adduced from Plato and Philo. To the second it is replied that there is nothing corresponding to this dualism in the Jewish-religious consciousness. The absolutely transcendent place of power, which the Creator of the universe occupies for the Hebrew, precludes the latter from lighting on the idea of opposing to God any co-ordinate principle or contrary opposite. He feels himself indeed penetrated by the deepest sense of the inferiority of all that is finite in presence of the Exalted One, who has His throne in heaven ; but there is here no dualism. There is merely a contradictory contrast of the finite and the infinite, in which all "position" and activity fall to the latter, while the notion of the former never gets beyond the merely privative predicates of the frail, the weak, of complete or partial non-being. While in Hellenism man consists of a material element and a spiritual akin to the divine, which are dualistically separated, and are only brought to agree at the expense of one of them, in the Old Testament man is a unity of spirit and body, ranking with the finite under the designation *basar*, sometimes in intercourse with the divine infinite and receiving the divine revelation (Ps. xvi. 9, lxiii. 2, lxv. 3 ; Is. xi. 5, lxvi. 23, 24 ; Joel iii. 1), sometimes—with emphatic extension of this designation, so as to embrace his whole being—in a relation of humblest subordination to the Deity (Jer. xvii. 5 ; Deut. v. 23 ; Ps. lxxviii. 39 ; Is. xi. 6, xvi. 16). It is clear therefore that those two general contrasts—the Hebrew of infinite and finite and the Hellenistic of spirit and matter—do not, and cannot, coincide. Holsten's view of the  $\sigma$ . is

neither Jewish nor Hellenistic—not Jewish, for the Old Testament *basar* may never be taken so literally as to denote man as a *purely material* unity ; not Hellenistic, for the Hellenistic category of  $\sigma$ . does not profess at all to denote the whole of human nature, and to merge it as a whole in dualistic contrast to the pneumatic-divine, but confines itself only to the body—man's material element.

But, while we cannot accept Holsten's definitions, the discussion has perhaps paved the way to our understanding the Apostle's position. There may be conceived, alongside of a Judaism but slightly brought into contact with Hellenism, a third relation of the two spheres of consciousness as possible, under which Hellenistic dualism may have so penetrated into a consciousness originally purely Jewish, that within the framework of Jewish conceptions there is evolved a really *contrary* contrast, and the religious contrast of the finite and infinite undergoes dualistic remodelling and consolidation (*sich dualistisch umbildet und verfestigt*), with which at the same time there must emerge a dualistic element in the anthropology. In that case the Hellenistic categories would never be met with quite pure, but partly *alongside* of a purely Jewish way of looking at things, partly *mixed* with the Jewish categories, perhaps even becoming advanced in opposition to them and thereupon in their consequences more and more abandoning (*aufhebend und durchbrechend*) that basis of Jewish consciousness that at first appeared so pure. Is not just such a form of consciousness apparent in the Paulinism of the four Epistles ?

In the sense, laid down at the outset, of  $\sigma$ . as man and finiteness we have already recognised an element of the Old Testament religious view. Paul at times actually ex-

presses the sense of the inferiority of all that is human by the contrast of  $\sigma$ . and  $\pi$ . (Gal. i. 11, 16; Gal. ii. 17—Rom. iii. 20; 1 Cor. i. 29 expressly, quite in the Old Testament manner, by  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\omega}\pi\iota\omicron\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ ). Reverting to the proper signification of  $\sigma$ ., we find it set overagainst  $\pi$ . at Rom. i. 3, 4; ii. 28, 29; also at Rom. ix. 27; 1 Cor. ix. 11; 2 Cor. x. 4. Gal. iv. 23, 29. We find the contrast advancing to the sense of what is human generally after the analogy of 1 Cor. ii. 5 ( $\sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\nu\ \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ , comp. verse 13); possibly also 2 Cor. i. 12 ( $\sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\ \text{---}\ \chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ ), although here another point of view may emerge. We may likewise see this contrast in 2 Cor. iii. 6 ( $\gamma\rho\acute{\alpha}\mu\mu\alpha\ \text{---}\ \pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ ); and  $\sigma$ . stands in a more comprehensive signification as a whole aggregate of relations of man's outward life (the Mosaic law) overagainst  $\pi$ . at Gal. iii. 3. Doubtless to some extent the Old Testament contrast underlies the passage 1 Cor. xv. 34 ff. But a characteristic element of this passage lies in the predicates almost throughout purely privative—expressing passive weakness—that are assigned to the finite overagainst the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu$ , and appear to denote the nature of the  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma\ \chi\omicron\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ —of the  $\psi$ .  $\zeta\acute{\omega}\sigma\alpha$  as respects its unity as a whole. For that very reason a dualism in the proper sense cannot be formed from these predicates, for the  $\sigma$ . as  $\phi\theta\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}$ ,  $\acute{\alpha}\tau\iota\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$ ,  $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\iota\alpha$ , does not attain to life or reality as confronting the transcendent glory and absolute reality of the  $\pi$ . But the intentional accumulation of opposite attributes, and the strict carrying out of the contrast through all its elements points, in connection with the expressed doctrino-metaphysical and physical character of this section, decidedly to the conclusion that that Old Testament religious contrast is here on the eve of becoming consolidated into a really doctrinal dualism. The impression of such

a metamorphosis is strengthened, when we observe that the pith of the argument lies in the proof of differences of *matter*, and that, while at verse 45, on the basis of a Biblical citation, the whole nature of man is adduced as proof, at verse 50 the expression  $\sigma.$  και  $\alphaἷμα$ , used at Gal. i. 16 of man generally, sinks quite to the sphere of the mere material side of his being. And the attention here given to  $\sigma.$  as mere matter in contrast to  $\pi.$  leads us to repeat the question, Whether the purely physical use of the word, claimed for it at the outset, is not much more fitted to place the Pauline conception of  $\sigma.$  in analogy with the Hellenistico-speculative dualistic category of matter, than the other, embracing emphatically after Old Testament usage the whole man, with which Holsten makes the attempt. It will lend support to such an attempt, if we find passages where the  $\sigma.$  emerges as an independent *dualistic* principle, as in Rom. viii. 6, where the  $\phi\rho\acute{o}\nu\eta\mu\alpha$ , the goal of an *active effort* of the  $\sigma.$ , is  $\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ ; and Gal. v. 13, 17 (the passage where, be it observed, this conception of the  $\sigma.$  *first appears in Paul and in Christian literature*) where  $\sigma.$  and  $\pi.$  are designated as principles, which  $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\eta}\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha\iota$ . . . . In point of fact, there are not a few instances where the conception of  $\sigma.$  is restricted and does not cover the whole man, such as those where man distinguishes himself *as such* from his  $\sigma.$ , reckons it not so much his Ego as his possession, speaks of it as his (Rom. vi. 19; vii. 18; xiii. 14; 2 Cor. vii. 5; Gal. iv. 14; vi. 13), where the  $\sigma.$  appears as the *matter* merely of the  $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ , and this  $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$   $\tau\eta\varsigma$   $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$  is so far from constituting man's proper nature, that it appears as the "outer man" whose  $\delta\iota\alpha\phi\theta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  does not hinder the renewal of the "inner man," and as a mere *tabernacle* to be left, a dress to be put off, or where the cry is for deliverance from the  $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$   $\tau\omicron\upsilon$   $\theta\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\nu$  (Rom. vii. 24). Such a

separation of the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος from the ἔξω ἄνθρωπος. must consequently be possible; and human nature cannot be simply coincident with the σ. as sensuous-material substance.

After criticising acutely the idea of Holsten that Paul, when entering, as in the passages quoted, on dichotomous distinctions, simply shares the view of his time as to a purely external relation of the spirit to the body, and after showing that Paul's view is not to be identified either with the Platonic Hellenism of Philo, who presents purely the dualism of spirit and matter, or with the position of the Palestinian Jews, who, so far from sharing Paul's view of the fleshly body as a *non-constituent* element in human nature, treat it as so essential that man is not to be conceived of without it, Lüdemann comes to the conclusion that Paul does not simply share the view of his time, but occupies a peculiar position ranging him on the side of Hellenism rather than of Judaism. While Paul keeps on Jewish ground as to his use of π., he employs σ. sometimes in the wider Jewish conception as equivalent to "man," sometimes in the narrower Greek sense of the earthly matter of his body. The σῶμα σαρκός is separable from man himself, and the category of the ἔξω ἄνθρωπος is thus restored.

But if that is so, how does it stand with the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος as to its more precise definition? and in what way is the subject proper of man to be sought in it? This question is not cleared up by the previous discussion of ν. and κ., which are not so much *parts* as organs and functions of the spirit; we have to inquire, according to Paul's way of thinking, after a real *subject* of the inner man, which acts in and through these. Ψ., which has been suggested for this purpose, cannot be taken, for while it occasionally has—particularly in the phrase πᾶσα

ψ.—the sense of the personality of man corresponding to the wider sense of σ., it elsewhere restricts itself, like the latter, to the material-animate side of human nature; and its indissoluble connection with σ. is a sufficient reason for giving to it, as regards its idea, an essentially external position towards human nature proper—a view confirmed by the synonymous use of ψυχικός and σαρκικός. The substance of the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος is to be found in that τὸ π. ἀνθρώπου which the Apostle brings clearly enough forward at 1 Cor. ii. 11, and which, in his view, forms the contrast to σῶμα in 1 Cor. v. 3; 2 Cor. vii. 34. Lüdemann cannot accept the view of Krumm and Delitzsch, which assigns to the π. the ν. as organ of cognition, and the κ. as organ of feeling. He cannot see how one and the same conception can be taken now as the mind itself, now as one of the mental faculties. To Holsten's declaration that "Paul distinguishes yet a higher element in human nature, an 'inner man' opposed to the 'outer,'" he replies that it is not easy to see how a "higher element" can belong to man who, by Holsten's account, is essentially only σ.; or how the ν., if it is only an organ of the σ.-substance, can take up an attitude of contrast to it, as Holsten holds it to do; or how it can even be in a position to establish the fact of its impotence overagainst the σ., if it *essentially* and indissolubly belongs to it. The very possibility of a renewal of the ν., to which Holsten points as a main ground for the distinction of ν. from π. Θεοῦ, would rather make good the essential diversity of the ν. from the σ. The very concession of distinctions such as Holsten makes breaks up with the sharpness of a wedge that unity of the σ. he had formerly laid down. He cannot accede to Holsten's interpretation of the π. τοῦ ἀνθρώπου in 1 Cor. ii. 11 as equivalent to the π. τοῦ κόσμου in verse 12, which Paul expressly *denies having re-*

ceived, or of the latter as coincident with the  $\psi$ ., which Holsten elsewhere treats as a purely physical conception, but here treats as something non-material, pneumatic! He infers from 1 Cor. v. 5: *ἵνα τὸ π. σωθῆ*, that it is not to be identified with the divine  $\pi$ ., for *ἀφθαρσία* does not belong to it in virtue of its nature—if it still needs to be saved, it may also perish—nor is it to be associated as respects its nature with *φθορά*, for it may be saved.

If it be asked, Whether this  $\pi$ . belongs to the side of  $\sigma$ . or of  $\pi$ . Θεοῦ, he answers: in respect of nature to neither of them. This  $\pi$ . of man—which has its outward manifestation in the *σῶμα* as the *form* for opposite contents of substance, and its cognitive (*gegenständliches*) consciousness in the  $\nu$ . as the *form* for opposite contents of knowledge, and lastly its reflective (*zuständliches*) consciousness in the  $\kappa$ . as the *form* for opposite contents of experience—this  $\pi$ . must *itself* be a substance so purely capable of being determined and variously affected that we cannot wonder, when, under the influence of a stronger substance, it, as it were, disappears from our view. Yet it is a necessary element for connecting the conceptions of the anthropology. Only under the supposition of this  $\pi$ . ἀνθρώπου is it possible to vindicate for man, in Paul, a spiritual (*geistigen*) character, and yet withal, 1, to leave the  $\pi$ . Θεοῦ, as absolute spiritual substance, in its transcendence; 2, to take the  $\sigma$ . in contradistinction to it quite according to its literal sense as matter of the body; 3, really to uphold the categories *σῶμα*,  $\nu$ .,  $\kappa$ ., as forms for different contents, not essentially bound to the  $\sigma$ . It appears therefore that this conception, which brings unity and fixity into the whole system, is directly required by it, and would need to be hypothetically supplied to the Apostle, if he had not himself presented it with such clearness as is desirable.

Looking back, we see in the anthropology the result of Hellenistic influence operating on an originally Jewish consciousness, and manifested in the evolving of two conceptions, that of the  $\nu.$ , and that of the  $\sigma.$  as bodily matter. The abiding basis of the Jewish view manifests itself, (1) in that, although fleshliness is recognised as not constitutive for human nature, yet corporeality ( $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ ) is still retained as constitutive, as necessary for the existence of the  $\pi.$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\nu$ , (2) in that we do not reach the Platonic-Hellenistic conception of the human mind as a  $\pi.$   $\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$  so as to get an absolute dualism within human nature, but the dualistic contrast to the  $\sigma.$ -matter is only found in the  $\pi.$   $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ . This anthropology, with its  $\pi.$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\nu$  *standing in need as well as capable of redemption* in the  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$   $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ , is *out and out* dichotomous, and thereby no longer Jewish; but not dualistic, and thereby not yet Hellenistic. It is the first *Christian* anthropology.

The second part is entitled the Ethical Anthropology. Here the conceptions of  $\sigma.$  and  $\pi.$  take upon them the marks of *good* and *evil*, and we encounter a conflict between the two principles—which is presented, so far as the individual is concerned, in the utterance Gal. v. 17: “The flesh lusteth against the Spirit” and, so far as history is concerned, in the two phases or periods, 1 Cor. xv. 46:  $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\nu$   $\tau\acute{o}$   $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ ,  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha$   $\tau\acute{o}$   $\pi\nu\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ . The first section treats of “the  $\sigma.$  as principle of sin, and its relation to the conceptions  $\psi.$  and  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ .” Here we must hold strictly by the physical conception in connection with the mark of  $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$  that is now associated with it (Rom. vii. 18: “sin dwells in my flesh”; vii. 14:  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma$ , consisting in *substance* of flesh—from which seemingly mere physical basis sin is derived, for the  $\pi\epsilon\pi\rho\alpha\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$   $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\acute{o}$   $\tau\eta\nu$   $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$  is placed as quite synonymous by its side). Sin dwells in the flesh with a necessity of



natural law (*νόμος*, vii. 21, 23, 25). The views of Julius Müller, Ernesti, and Weiss, are reviewed and criticised at considerable length. If *σ.* by itself denoted a tendency of life (*Lebensrichtung*), *κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν* would mean "to take the direction of a direction," and Rom. vii. 14 would be a tautology. Such expressions as: "we are debtors to the flesh to live according to the flesh" (Rom. viii. 12), "the flesh lusteth," has *ἐπιθυμίας* and *θελήματα* (vi. 12, 13, 14; Gal. v. 16, 17), *εἰς ἀφόρμην τῆ σαρκί* (Gal. v. 13), clearly present the *σ.* as an independent operative principle, not as a mere "tendency of life." The objection, that some of the *ἔργα τῆς σαρκός* in Gal. v. 17 f. have absolutely nothing to do with the flesh as "sensuousness," is met by pointing out the ambiguity of the latter expression, which sometimes is used to denote the bodily, earthly-material existence, sometimes to signify a direction of the will and the affections to the sensuous and its needs. We do not need to refer all sins as such to sensuous desire; for the impulses of the *σ.* make their way throughout the *ν.* and *κ.*; and the classification of the works of the flesh given by Meyer admits of the whole being traced either to the purely bodily desire of the *σ.*, or to the *ν. τῆς σαρκός* (sins of spiritual aberration—idolatry, witchcraft), or to the *κ.* enslaved by the *σ.* (*ἔχθραι . . . φόνοι*). Man thus determined by the *σ.* is filled throughout, saturated, by its quality. He is *σαρκικός, ψυχικός*; and the conception "man" may be interchanged simply with *σ.*, although it may at times be matter of doubt whether it is the characteristic of the Old Testament *σ. passive weakness*, that is predominant, or that of the Hellenistico-dualistic, *sinful energy*. The two modes of view run into one another, especially in the Epistles to the Corinthians. Holsten holds the connection of the *σ.* with *ἀμ.* to be essential

and incapable of being done away, so that Weiss could use no simpler argument against him than the question, If *ἀμ.* is essential to the *σ.* as the whole human nature in itself, where remains for Paul the possibility of a redemption of man from sin? Lüdemann holds the *ἄνθρωπος σαρκικός*, or the saturation of human nature with the quality of the *σ.*, as the *de facto* result of the operation of that spontaneous sin-principle; but it is not in his judgment *essential*, or *constitutive* for the idea of man according to Paul. The *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* is a domain only occupied by sin, only conquered, and to be taken from it again. Rom. vii. shows how the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* comes to be awakened by the *νόμος πνευματικός*. The *νοῦς*—the self-consciousness—appears in that classic passage so at variance with the *ἀμ.* in the *σ.* that *ἀμ.* cannot *essentially* have its seat in the *ν.*—which wills it not, yea, rather hates it—but only in the *σ.* Now, as man has not given to himself the *σ.*, but has got it as an appointed condition of his existence, it follows that sin is given to him without his own action. The conception of *ἀμ.* is therefore to be understood not subjectively of a direction of the human will, but *objectively* of a *quality* (*Beschaffenheit*) of man's earthly nature. . . . The *νόμος* is, as it were, the wedge driven into the joints of human nature, and breaking up the apparent unity of the *ἄνθρωπος σαρκικός*. The exposition of this subject fits into the frame-work of Rom. vii. 7—viii. 30. The pure objectivity of the *ἀμ.* in human nature is required by the conception of *νόμος*, and is apparent from the expressions that indicate how sin is subjectivised in man by the law—a thought which is formulated concisely in Rom. iii. 20: *διὰ γὰρ νόμον ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας*. The key-note of the section is Rom. vii. 9: *ἡ ἀμ. ν ε κ ρ ἄ . . . ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς ἐντολῆς ἡ ἀμ. ἀ ν ἐ ξ η σ ε ν*. Man comes to know sin, so soon as it has

through the ἐντολή come to consciousness and by its reaction against the commandment presented itself as παράβασις. Paul does not expressly reflect on the free decision of will, which for us constitutes sin, wherein we regard the element of evil design as essential. Objectively looked at, he indeed very decidedly denies it in Rom. vii.; but he does not propose to himself the question as a problem proper. ἄμ. does not mean either sin in our sense, or "sinfulness" as only the potential ground of sin; it embraces completely the element of actuality, and corresponds most nearly to our notion of "evil." The maintenance of the pure objectivity of ἄμ. gives the key to Rom. vii. . . . The entire equality of nature of the first and of all other men is clearly enough intimated by 1 Cor. xv. 45 ff. where the first man is described as mere ψ. ζῶσα and as χοϊκός, and then it is said (verse 48): οἶος ὁ χοϊκός, τοιοῦτοι οἱ χοϊκοί, which is to be regarded as an axiom of the Pauline theology. Need we supplement Rom. vii. from Rom. v. 12 ff.? "We believe that we do not go beyond the cycle of Pauline thought, when we conceive of the matter thus: Upon the creation of man, when the χου̅ς was combined with the πνοή ζωῆς, the σ. with the ψ. came at once into existence. Along with it immediately emerged the fact, that ἡ ἄμ. εἰσῆλθε εἰς τὸν κόσμον. But this is not the only mode of the εἰσῆλθε. For this objective ἄμ.—(νεκρά)—'ἀνέζησεν' already in the first man. Already here there was introduced a positive command which is, (1) ἐπίγνωσις τῆς ἄμ., (2) δύναμις τῆς ἄμ. Therefore, ἡ ἄμ. κατειργάσατο τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, and—because οὐ̅ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, οὐδὲ παράβασις—there arose, just because a law was there, already in Adam the παράβασις, as the Apostle sharply brings out at v. 14. We have here exactly the same state of things as at vii. 7-13."

The objectivity of the  $\acute{\alpha}\mu$ . is even in Adam the causal ground of his  $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ . Paul recognises as an axiom the *natural* (not merely positive-legal) connection of death with sin, which underlies the threat of the law and the feeling thereby produced in the subject of guilt and fear of punishment. . . . The doctrine of a *status integritatis* is then discussed, and it is held improbable that Paul could have adopted such a view of the fall as we find in the Wisdom of Solomon and Philo, linked as it is in their case with anthropological premisses which are foreign to him. That Paul did not accept the intervention of the devil, is inferred from a comparison of Rom. v. 12 with Wisd. ii. 24, where "the verbal accord is in part so striking (*der Wortlaut so ähnlich*) that the variation can only be intentional." Paul's anthropological speculation has purposely taken a way of its own. The first man was like the rest; in him too was posited from the first the  $\sigma$ . with the  $\acute{\alpha}\mu$ . Returning to Rom. vii. it is held that in the state of things presented in verses 14-24 the  $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\beta\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$  continue still, just as they broke out at verse 9, and were full-blown in verse 13. But the inward conditions of the  $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$  are no longer the same as in 7-13. The process here described passes through two stages, in the former of which the  $\nu\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$  has the better knowledge, while in the second it has this as well as also the better will. We may describe as the two poles of this development the  $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon}\kappa \text{ }\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\text{νω}\nu$  and  $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon}\kappa \text{ }\eta\delta\epsilon\iota\nu$  of verse 7 on the one hand, and the  $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon} \text{ }\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omega$  of verse 16 on the other. The process may be called the gradual (*successive*) emancipation of the  $\nu$ . from the  $\sigma$ . It is characteristic of this that the Apostle at vii. 14 does not use  $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ , but  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma$ . The former is here a standpoint already transcended. It was done away with the ceasing of the  $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon}\kappa \text{ }\eta\delta\epsilon\iota\nu$ . The  $\nu$ . is already awakened and discerns the

ground of its death-suffering more clearly in the sarkic quality which by nature attaches to its body. But this emancipation as only affecting the *knowing* and *willing* of the ἔσω ἄνθρ. remains here in the first instance a purely inner fact; it does not extend to action; it cannot yet attain to the καλόν. The νόμος as πνευματικός possessed the power, and had the task, of thus awakening the ν., estranging it from the σ. and filling it with hatred towards its bondage. But although the better willing of the ν. was already an effect of the pneumatic-divine factor that had appeared in the law, man could not accomplish more by its aid. For the law was only a preliminary manifestation of the Spirit of God, not yet the divine π. itself; it could not introduce the period of the πνευματικόν, but could only pave its way. The σ. was the hindrance weakening the law; the σ. must be *removed*. The law could go no further; it was weak through the σ. But the Apostle, before proceeding to ch. viii. which deals with this topic, and the relief of which he partially anticipates in vii. 24, recapitulates calmly the result of ch. vii. in the 25th verse.

The anthropological result of ch. vii. is that the ἔσω ἄνθρ. remains such an entity (*Wesenheit*) as was formerly indicated, in itself quite void of contents, but fitted to receive any determining influence. Lüdemann does not share the views of those who from different standpoints see in Rom. vii. a proof of the originally good character of the ν. (Baur, Beck, Usteri). The distinctions *within* man, which vanished for us in the ἄνθρ. σαρκικός, are now brought out in all their sharpness of relief by the intervention of the law and the thereby accomplished severance of the ἔσω ἄνθρ. from the σ. For the dualistic formula by which Paul here expresses the struggles of the moral consciousness he was indebted to Hellenism. We find,

especially in Philo; the  $\sigma$ . used just as Paul brings it in at Rom. vii. No doubt Philo is not fond of using the word  $\sigma$ .—making use rather of  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ , or  $\tau\alpha\ \pi\alpha\theta\eta$ ,  $\eta\delta\omicron\nu\alpha\iota$ ,  $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\upsilon\mu\iota\alpha\iota$ . It is comparatively seldom that he employs it of his own motion; he uses it mostly when he gets it given to his hand by the Old Testament text. But, so far as it appears, it has the same twofold function as with Paul, of oppressing and blunting the  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  in its powers, and of stifling and corrupting the moral consciousness. The points of analogy and difference between Paul and Philo in this respect are reviewed. . . . In ch. viii. the  $\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma\ \pi\upsilon\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$  gives place to the  $\pi$ . itself, which Paul designates as  $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\iota\omicron\nu$ , and which liberates man from the dominion of the  $\sigma$ . The human  $\pi$ . by virtue of its neutral formal nature on the one hand, and of its belongings to the genus  $\pi$ . on the other, is capable of receiving the divine  $\pi$ . We have already seen a pneumatic element, the  $\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma$ , enter into the human mind. So man cannot well be left under the  $\sigma$ .; he must be saved from death and sin. And this could not be done more effectually than by the  $\pi$ .  $\zeta\omega\omicron\pi\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu$  itself. We have first to ask in what way and form the  $\pi$ . enters into the development of human history.

In the vision at Damascus God had shone into the Apostle's heart to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. The person, death, resurrection, and existence in glory of Jesus were the problems that presented themselves to the speculation of the Apostle. The following is a summary of the results of this speculation. That in the mission of Jesus, culminating in his death and resurrection, a heavenly factor had come into human history, was plain. Of what nature? First of all, a pneumatic factor, as the law had been, but a more powerfully effective embodiment of the

pneumatic principle, yea, this very principle concentrated in a pneumatic person. As such, the Christ who appeared on earth as Jesus had already pre-existed in heaven, with God, from the beginning of the ages. Hence he is the immediate image of God (2 Cor. iv. 4), for, like God, he is  $\pi$ . (Rom. viii. 9, 10). God created him as such, when He after His own image created that man (Gen. i. 26) who, according to 1 Cor. xv. 45, ἐγένετο εἰς  $\pi$ . ζῶσσοιοῦν. Paul there names him after his emergence in history—in which not the pneumatic but the psychic is first,—the ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ. But in himself he must have preceded his counterpart, the πρότος Ἀδάμ, who became only  $\psi$ . ζῶσα, for the principle of verse 46 cannot possibly—even apart from history—hold absolutely, and τὸ ψυχικόν be posited as first being generally. He was opposed in his whole nature to the earthly Adam. . . . This ἀνθρ. ἐπουράνιος as εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ created εἰς  $\pi$ . ζῶσσοιοῦν is in virtue of this, his essential equality with God, the υἱὸς Θεοῦ (Gal. ii. 20, *al.*), organ of the creation for God in the beginning (1 Cor. viii. 6), and taking part in the gracious guidance of Israel (1 Cor. x. 1). This heavenly person was ὁ Χριστός, an expression which Paul uses throughout as a proper name. All this, therefore, Christ was already before he came down from heaven to become man and inaugurate the new period of the πνευματικόν.

When he had become “man,” he had a σῶμα σαρκός in which, instead of the  $\pi$ . ἀνθρώπου in other men, there dwelt the  $\pi$ . Θεοῦ, and this formed the substance of its inner nature, the proper subject of His personality. In that  $\sigma$ . of course the  $\psi$ ., the sensuous life, was included. . . . But had Jesus Christ with the  $\sigma$ . also  $\acute{\alpha}\mu$ .? So far as Rom. viii. 3 is concerned, the question turns on the import of ὁμοίωμα. Is it “similarity” admitting a

percentage of dissimilarity? or is it "likeness"? The result of a careful investigation of the formation and Pauline use of the word gives as its meaning "copy" (*Nachbildung*); and this meaning is to be retained here: "God sent His Son in a copy of sin-flesh." If we ask why he does not say merely ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμ., the answer is simple. In the sin-flesh of humanity, the common characteristic of the χοϊκοί, the pneumatic celestial man could not at once have a share. If he was to appear in a body of such matter, the matter had to be, as it were, formed anew for him in accordance with the extant original of sinful flesh. If this matter was really to be the same as that of mankind—and this was inevitably necessary—it had to be a *δμοίωμα*, a copy or repetition of it. . . . If it is asked how we have to conceive the existence of ἁμ. in Christ according to Paul, we reply that ἁμ. is an objective quality of the flesh-substance. This latter, because living, is not merely habitually, but actually sinful, where it does not find within its sphere of operation an opposing principle to counterbalance it. In man's case it dominates the π. ἀνθρώπου, at first without its knowledge, after the intervention of the law with its knowledge, as producing παράβασις. But in Christ, instead of the π. ἀνθρ., there was the π. Θεου, in which the σ. from the outset encountered a principle, which was a match for it and must during Christ's earthly life have, as it were, paralysed it and kept it in a fettered state. In Him παράβασις could not occur, because their real ground, the ἁμ., lacked operative power. In this case it simply remained in part objective, and in part mere habitual quality of the σ. But as such it could not be wanting, if Christ was to be really incarnate.

The object for which Christ assumed the σ. ἁμ. was (Rom. viii. 3) that God might thereby "condemn sin



in the flesh," that he might in the bodily death of Christ annihilate the  $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$  in and with the  $\sigma.$ , and thereby liberate the  $\nu.$  That the reference here is to the death of Christ, is obvious from other passages connecting this destruction and liberation with the passion of Jesus (Rom. vi. 10 ; vii. 4 ; 1 Cor. v. 7, *al.*), and from the  $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$   $\acute{\alpha}\muαρ\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$  = "sin-offering," subjoined. The passage could not be understood, if Christ's flesh were not the same as that in which sin is condemned, The blow which is now to light on the  $\sigma.$  would fall *beside* it, if Christ had not had a real and true  $\sigma. \acute{\alpha}\mu.$  If Christ, by special arrangement ( $\acute{\omicron}\muο\acute{\iota}\omega\mu\alpha$ ), shares in the human  $\sigma.$ , and thereby the complex unity of that  $\sigma.$  is fatally struck at one point, its paralysis in all its parts can only be a question of time. This effect of the bodily death of Christ presupposes his pre-existence as  $\pi. \zeta\omega\omicron\piο\iota\omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}$  ; and the continued existence of the  $\pi.$  enclosed in that annihilated  $\sigma.$ , and its victory over the latter, are made apparent by the *resurrection*, which is fundamentally important as the necessary correlate to Christ's death.

The next question is, How does what is objectively accomplished in Christ's death and resurrection obtain effect for the individual human subject enslaved by the  $\sigma.$ ? Every one will have the answer on his tongue: by  $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$  ; but the Apostle puts baptism *foremost* (Rom. vi. 3. ff.). So intimate is the union of the baptized with Christ that it appears to fall almost nothing short of a real identification. The connection is such that what has taken place in Christ's case (*in Christo*) is *eo ipso* *l* accomplished also in the case of the baptized. The old man, the  $\sigma.$ , shares in the crucifixion, and the  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$   $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$  of the baptized is thereby removed, cancelled. So real and certain a thing for the Apostle is this putting to death of the  $\sigma.$ , that it, and it only, is to him the

guarantee for the possibility and reality of a moral renewal. Many expositors here interpret Paul as speaking "figuratively." Certainly he cannot be here speaking of bodily death, but he speaks of a death which for him *has not in the least a less reality*, namely of the death of the  $\sigma$ . as the sinful principle in man.

As an immediate postulate of the dying with Christ, the Apostle designates the rising with Him (Rom. vi. 5). But while we see a real ground for the dying, we as yet lack it in an equal measure for the rising. Looking to Rom. vii. 25, a positive change is not *eo ipso* involved in the negative abeyance of the  $\sigma$ . With the abeyance of the  $\sigma$ . there remains only the  $\nu$ ., and, considering its want of independence, it is very doubtful whether from itself there would issue a vigorous action in place of the previous weak *συνήδεσθαι*. In fact, a new *ἀγεσθαι* is needed to impel the human subject into the new path. By baptism we become one with Christ, *i.e.*, with the  $\pi$ . *ζωοποιουῦν* itself. This  $\pi$ . has accordingly entered into believers, and effects in them the rising, just as in Christ himself it rose from the dead. At Rom. viii. 2 this new power is presented as the *law* (that is, the compelling necessity) of the "*spirit of life*," delivering from the compulsory service of sin, and enabling man to fulfil the *δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου*. At Rom. viii. 4-8 the two principles and their working are contrasted; and still more clearly as regards their ethical sides, *ἀμ.* and *δικαιοσύνη*, at Rom. vi. 18-23.

How quite objectively the  $\pi$ . is present in man, without losing its self-subsistent nature, may be seen from such passages as Rom. viii. 9, 1 Cor. iii. 16, where the Spirit is presented as *dwelling in believers*—*ὄντως* 1 Cor. xiv. 25—and other passages where the Spirit is spoken of as *given and received*. As this  $\pi$ . is also the  $\pi$ . *Χριστοῦ*, and

indeed the Χριστός himself, the expressions as to “putting on Christ” (Gal. iii. 27) and “Christ in man” (2 Cor. xiii. 3) refer to this; and in connection therewith the religious relation to the risen One as “Lord” and the most frequent designation of Him as Χριστός find their explanation. The π. is now the element “in which” all takes place. Man is πνευματικός, and therewith δίκαιος, ἅγιος; and the more precise result of its presence is specified at Rom. viii. 10: “the body is dead on account of sin, but the spirit is life on account of righteousness,” where the first effect is the putting to death of the σ., for σῶμα stands here as including the latter; and the second is the putting of life into the π., which must be taken of the π. ἀνθρώπου, partly because of the *hypothetical* ascription to it of the predicate ζῶη—which would not be intelligible were the divine π. the subject—partly because of the correlative σῶμα.

The abstract-dogmatic description of the pneumatic redeemed man briefly runs thus: τὸ σῶμα (ἁμαρτίας) νεκρόν, τὸ πνεῦμα ζῶη. But how stands the matter in real life? How is the σῶμα as νεκρόν to be reconciled with the σῶματα θνητά (so *not yet* dead) of verse 11, and with the fact that after all in verse 13 the mortifying the works of the body is apparently left to the subject himself? Before we can answer these questions, we must determine more exactly the sense of the “π. ζῶη.” If π. in verse 10 is the human spirit, may it be so likewise in verse 13, or is it the divine Spirit that is there referred to? Lüdemann decides in favour of the latter; but it is necessary to avoid arbitrariness, and the following criteria are suggested for determining whether in the passages discussed by Holsten the reference is to the divine or to the human π.:—(1) Where something is conferred on, or wished for, the π., which the divine

already from its nature has, or where something befalls the  $\pi.$ , for which the divine has naturally no place, this  $\pi.$  is always the human. This rules such passages as 1 Cor. vii. 34; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Gal. vi. 18; Rom. xii. 11. (2) When  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$  and  $\pi.$  are in juxtaposition, and  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$  is simply to be understood of the human body as it appears, the  $\pi.$  is the human. So at 1 Cor. v. 3, 4, and also 1 Cor. vii. 34, as above. (3) If again  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$  stands pregnantly—that is, of the  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$  or  $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ — $\pi.$ , unless something intervene to hinder it, is the divine. So at Rom. viii. 13. Rom. viii. 10 is an exception on account of the hypothetical attribution of the  $\zeta\omega\acute{\eta}$ . Contrasted with  $\sigma.$ ,  $\pi.$  is always the divine, except at 1 Cor. v. 5; 2 Cor. vii. 1. At other passages discussed by Holsten, we see with him the divine  $\pi.$ , with the exception of Rom. viii. 16, where Holsten thinks the  $\pi. \acute{\eta}\mu\omega\acute{\nu}$  is just the  $\pi. \nu\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$  of verse 15; but how can witness be first borne to this  $\pi.$ , that we are sons? And by whom? By itself? If verse 16 is clearly only epexegetis of verse 15, so that  $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\epsilon\tau\epsilon$  is explained by  $\sigma\upsilon\mu\mu\alpha\rho\tau\upsilon\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ , and the  $\pi. \nu\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$  by  $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\tau\omicron \nu\acute{o} \pi\iota.$ , it only remains for  $\pi. \acute{\eta}\mu\omega\acute{\nu}$  to be epexegetis of  $\acute{\eta}\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ . This passage gives us a glimpse into the life of the  $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ , showing that an intercourse subsists between his self-consciousness and a divine element in him, of which, as a Christian, he is aware; and it receives confirmation from Rom. viii. 26, and illustration from 1 Cor. xiv. in the distinction between the  $\lambda\alpha\lambda\acute{\omega}\nu \gamma\lambda\acute{\omega}\sigma\sigma\alpha\iota\varsigma$ , in whom the divine  $\pi.$  is alone active while the  $\nu.$  is quiescent ( $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\alpha\rho\pi\omicron\varsigma$ ), and the  $\pi\rho\omicron\phi\eta\eta\tau\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\omega\acute{\nu}$ , who also acts under the influence of the  $\pi.$ , but maintains his state of reflective consciousness.

The effect of the immanence of the  $\pi. \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$  in the human  $\pi.$  appears as gradual heightening of the powers of

the latter in different ways—of the powers of thought, in an ἀνακαίνωσις τοῦ νοῦς εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν τι τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ (Rom. xii. 2), the effects of which are expressed by γνώσις, λόγος, σοφία (the remarkable phrase “being known of God” is only another expression for that immanence, 1 Cor. viii. 2, *al.*), and of the affections of the κ. which is the special seat of its operation, shedding abroad the love of God, and generating the various fruits of religious experience, peace, joy, hope, the rich harvest of the κάρπος τοῦ πνεύματος. . . . But all this points to the gradual completion of a process; and what is to be said of the σῶμα νεκρόν, in view of the fact that the σῶμα σαρκός remains after baptism as before, that the σ. does not even appear to cease subsisting? It is true that the Apostle frequently gives *exhortations* which point to a continuance of the σ., and prescribe the Christian's attitude to it. But let us consider what is implied in such exhortation. The state of Rom. vii. 23-25 can no longer exist in the man to whom such exhortation is addressed. It presupposes that radical changes have taken place, that the ν. has become free and strong, that the σ. has had its power broken and received its death-blow. But the nature of the case implies that what faith in abstract-dogmatic form boldly anticipating posits and sees as a *fait accompli* is but slowly realised (comp. the expressions in Rom. vi. 11 ff. and Rom. viii. 13). . . . Here we have a glimpse of the distinction between the Hellenistico-Pagan and the Pauline-Christian mode of thought, for the former of which the conflict is continually being renewed without prospect of definitive decision, while for the latter the result of the struggle is definitely secured by the conquest of the σ. through Christ—by the characteristic idea of redemption from the σ. which separates Paul from the dualism of the time.

The  $\sigma$ . is in the course of dying off; and Paul exhorts that this process be not interrupted by any revival of its *ἐπιθυμίας*. This idea is at the root also of Paul's freedom from any *ascetic* way of regarding the *sensuous* nature.

But the objection may recur, whether it is not merely the  $\acute{\alpha}\mu$ . that is hit, while the  $\sigma$ . without it continues to subsist? Various expressions seem to favour this view, as at Rom. vi. 2: *ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμ.*; at verses 7, 10, 11, 12, 13 ff. it is always merely the  $\acute{\alpha}\mu$ . that the death concerns; the *σῶμα* remains everywhere intact; at 2 Cor. vii. 1 we are warned against defilement of the  $\sigma$ ., and at 2 Cor. iv. 10, 11 it even partakes of the life of Jesus. But all this is mere seeming; there is here also pure solidarity of the  $\acute{\alpha}\mu$ . with the  $\sigma$ . . . . The position of the  $\sigma$ . at all in the *πνευματικός* can only have been conceded by Paul in the sense of an *interim* arrangement, *pending* the approach of the Parousia. . . . Here comes in the distinction of  $\sigma$ . and *σῶμα*, the latter capable of emancipation from the former, though for this life still sharing its matter; having as an organism a part in the *ἀγιότης* (1 Cor. vii. 34), and serving generally as an instrument for the  $\pi$ . Θεοῦ in man (1 Cor. vi. 13-19; Rom. vi. 13, 19, *al.*).

After a review of several passages bearing on this distinction—such as 2 Cor. vii. 1; 2 Cor. iv. 10 ff.; 2 Cor. i. 4 ff.; Rom. viii. 19-21, 26, 27—comes the concluding section as to the resurrection, whereby the *ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ σώματος* is completed, when the earthy body has been taken away, and the *σῶμα πνευματικόν* is bestowed. Paul, in keeping with his conception of the  $\sigma$ ., knows no resurrection of the flesh. He never uses the verb which might point to an independent rising of the body, *ἀναστῆναι*. The  $\sigma$ . is *φθορά*, and abides in death. Nor does he know any resurrection of the unredeemed. The

identity of the *σῶμα* as such before and after the resurrection enables us to explain the apparently so confused Pauline usage, in virtue of which he at Rom. viii. 10 calls the *σῶμα* "νεκρόν," then at verse 11 contemplates the *ζωοποιεῖσθαι* of the *σῶμα θνητόν*, and at verse 23 again longs after the *ἀπολύτρωσις* of the *σῶμα*. This *ἀπολύτρωσις* is the *ζωοποίησις*, and the latter is the taking away of the *σάρξ*-substance from the *σῶμα*-form, and the filling of the same with the *πνεῦμα*-substance. . . . The dualism is cancelled not by conciliation of its parts in virtue of a dialectic bridging over of the gulf, but by the violent destruction of the one principle that succumbs, the *σ.* ; and in this respect the Apostle separates himself sharply from the Jewish consciousness, for which the *σ.* is, and remains, quite *unobjectionable*.

The *third* part, entitled "the Position of the anthropology within the doctrine of salvation," is mainly devoted to a discussion of what Dr. Lüdemann calls "the problem in the first eight chapters of the Epistle to the Romans," in which we deem it the less necessary to follow him, partly because it carries us beyond the limits of the subject with which we are here specially concerned, and partly because the views therein set forth have not commended themselves—so far as I know—to any one else than their author (See pp. 48, 49, 67 and 86-89).

## B.—DR. WENDT ON THE OLD TESTAMENT USAGE.

The following is a translation, occasionally somewhat abridged, of the portion of Dr. Wendt's work in which he treats of the use of *basar* and *ruach*.

### I. THE CONCEPTION OF BASAR.

The word *basar* in its original and most frequent signification denotes the *flesh* as the muscular constituent portion of an earthly animal organism in distinction from skin, bones, blood (*e.g.* Num. xix. 5; Job x. 11; xix. 20; Ezek. xxxvii. 6-8). It is so used of the fleshy portions of the living body as well as of that which is already dead; the latter especially in the many passages where it appears either as means of nourishment in general (alongside of bread or wine: Exod. xvi. 3, 8, 12; Is. xxii. 13, *al.*), or as the chief material for the sacrificial meals (Lev. vii. 15; Hos. viii. 13, *al.*). This sacrificial flesh is as such called holy (Ex. xxix. 33 f.; Hagg. ii. 12), in sharp contrast to which stands flesh from whatever cause unclean and withheld from use (Lev. xi. 8 ff. *al.*); evidently therefore the flesh in this literal sense is of itself *indifferent* as to cleanness or uncleanness. The fleshy parts lend to the body its fulness and beauty (Gen. xli. 2 ff.; Dan. i. 15).

The transition to a *second* and extended use of the word is found in its employment to express *relation of kindred* conceived as based on community of bodily substance, most fully in the phrase "bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh" (Gen. ii. 23, *al.*), more briefly "thy bone and thy flesh" (2 Sam. v. 1, *al.*), also simply in that of "our



flesh" (Gen. xxxvii. 27 ; Is. lviii. 7). In this latter case the flesh alone represents the substance of the body generally ; the fuller formula is *she'er besaro* (Lev. xviii. 6 ; xxv. 49), where *basar* as body is distinguished from *she'er* as flesh in the narrower sense. Sometimes the other chief element of the body—the bones ('*etsem*)— is also used to denote the whole body (Lam. iv. 7 ; Ps. cxxxix. 15)

This use of *flesh* for *body* is not to be spoken of as a real change of *meaning*, but as merely an extension of *use*, resting on the synecdoche of the part put for the whole. The word itself is not to be conceived as carrying the general signification of animate *matter* of which the body consists, so that the signification of simple flesh would be merely a special application of the general sense. For, 1st, no Old Testament passage can be pointed out, where *basar* really means merely animate matter in general ; and, 2nd, it is to be noted that we meet the designation of the body by *basar* mainly at places where the *surface* of the body is dealt with—where the body comes precisely into view not as regards its material substance, but as regards its organised outward form (comp. Lev. vi. 3 ; xv. 13, 16 ; xix. 28 ; xxi. 5 ; xxii. 6 ; Num. viii. 7 ; 1 Kings xxi. 27 ; 2 Kings vi. 30 ; Job iv. 15 ; Is. xvii. 4). This latter circumstance puts us on the more correct track, and leads to the conclusion that the designation of the body as flesh owes its origin not to the consideration of its materiality, but to that of its outward appearance. Because it acquires its *aspect*, shape, and colour mainly from the fleshy parts, it is named from what is most important for appearance ; and, as this aspect of flesh applies only to the *human* body not covered by skin, feathers, or the like, it is perhaps by no mere accident that not a single passage occurs where *basar* denotes the body of an animal, while the

word is used with comparative frequency of that of man.

In this enlarged signification we find the flesh frequently placed in contradistinction to the *nephesh* or the *lebh*, those natural constituents of earthly living beings, which form the seat of the higher vital and mental functions, not coming under the cognisance of the senses and not subject to the laws of outward nature (Ps. lxxiii. 2; Job xiii. 14; Ezek. xxxvi. 26; Ps. xvi. 9 ff. *al.*). . . .

We encounter a *third* application in the oft recurring phrase *kol-basar*, as well as in a small number of other passages (Gen. vi. 3; Is. xxxi. 3; Jer. xvii. 5; Ps. lviii. 5; lxxviii. 39; Job x. 4; Dan. ii. 11; 2 Chron. xxxii. 8). Here we perceive at once that it is no longer used either of the flesh on the body, or of the whole body taking its name from the flesh. When it is affirmed of "all flesh" as subject, that it has corrupted its way upon earth (Gen. vi. 12), or that on the ground of the divine revelations of judgment it comes to know that Jehovah is the Saviour and Redeemer of Israel (Is. xlix. 26; comp. xl. 5; Ezek. xxi. 4, 5), or that it comes up to worship Jehovah (Is. lxvi. 23; comp. Ps. lxv. 2; cxlv. 21), it is evident that it is meant to designate not merely the outward bodily side, but *living beings generally*, inclusive of their inner mental nature. And the *way* in which this designation comes to be thus used seems quite similar to that in the second use of "flesh" for the whole "body" — a synecdoche by which the part is put for the whole, and man is spoken of according to what constitutes his outward aspect. And just as we saw formerly "bone" employed also for the body as a whole, so here we find the other phrase drawn from the inner man, *kol-nephesh*, similarly applied to denote not merely all souls of living beings, but the living beings generally, inclusively of their

bodily nature. Each of these phrases rests on a synecdoche; only the parts chosen to designate the whole are different.

Now when we come to ask what are the *grounds* for the selection of "flesh" in the passages in question as the most fitting *part* for such synecdochic use, the answer is to be obtained by a comparison of the passages adduced, in which we encounter a peculiarity common to them and most significant. Wherever living beings are expressed in terms of this synecdoche, they stand in a clear *contrast to God*. In the majority of the passages the designation is met with, where *God is Himself the speaker*, so that in these that contrast is already expressed, if it is not further emphasised; at all other passages the *contradistinction to God* is sharply and expressly brought into prominence (comp. Num. xvi. 22; xxvii. 16; Deut. v. 23; Ps. lxv. 3; cxxxvi. 25; cxlv. 21; Job xii. 10; xxxiv. 15 *al.*). Under such circumstances we can hardly doubt that we have to seek the main motive for this usage in that intentional *contradistinction to God*. Living beings were to be designated not *simply* as such, but *so*, that this contrast to God should find clear expression; and that purpose would be most readily accomplished by describing them in terms of the part in which that contrast was *most directly apparent*.

If we further ask of *what nature* was the contrast thus brought out between God and living beings on earth, we get a sure basis for a decision in the passage, Is. xxxi. 3: "Egypt is man and not God, and their horses are *basar* and not *ruach*." The parallelism shows that the notion of *basar* stands in the same relation to that of man as the notion of *ruach* to that of God. But the *ruach* of God denotes—as may be here assumed by anticipation—throughout the Old Testament not the Spirit as a separate Divine

Person, or as the celestial substance of the Divine Being, but the supernatural *operation of power*, by virtue of which God makes Himself known in the world of nature and of spirit. This is confirmed by all the other passages in which the divine *ruach* is opposed to the "flesh" (Gen. vi. 3; Numb. xvi. 22; xxvii. 16; Job, xii. 10; xxxiv. 14 f.; Joel iii. 1). Here, therefore, when living beings on earth are named flesh overagainst God, so far as He works by His Spirit, we easily see that they are so termed not as regards the distinction of their *substance*, but as regards their *power and mode of working*. That *basar* itself conveys the notion of substance, and not of power, is certainly beyond doubt; but this term is here applied to them by way of synecdoche, to characterise them not merely as possessed of this substance *as such*, but as possessed of the peculiar *power* of this substance. This result is not at all invalidated by the fact that they are so named to bring out their *want* of power, their utter impotence; for, whether the existence of power is to be asserted or denied, in any case the stress rests on the notion of power as determining the choice of the word. And it is easy to explain why it should be so chosen; for it is in the corporeal nature falling under the cognizance of the senses, and especially in the flesh-portions which so readily fall a prey to corruption, that the perishableness and nothingness of man come most clearly to light, whereby he stands in absolute contrast to God. The word thus denotes living beings *with the connotation of the absolute weakness and perishableness of their nature in distinction from the power and living operation of God*—a sense which we shall perhaps best express by the word "creature" ("*Geschöpf*" oder *Kreatur*).

This sense is vouched for by all the passages at which this use of *basar* occurs. The formula *kol-basar* is opposed

to the spirit of God, on which the creature depends for existence, and the withdrawal of which involves its destruction (Job xii. 10 ; xxxiv. 14 f. ; Is. xl. 6 f.) ; for this reason Jehovah is called "God of all flesh" (Numb. xxvii. 16 ; Jer. xxxii. 27) or more fully "God of the spirits of all flesh" (Numb. xvi. 22). Hence the folly of making the creature one's arm (Jer. xvii. 23), while they who trust in God may not fear, because flesh cannot harm them (Ps. lvi. 5 ; 2 Chron. xxxii. 8). We meet with the expression *basar* at passages which treat of the reverence of the creatures confronting God's power and majesty (Ps. lxxv. 3 ; cxxxvi. 25 ; cxlv. 21 ; Zech. ii. 17 ; Deut. v. 23). The "all flesh" recurs with especial frequency where the destroying judgments of God are spoken of (Gen. vi-ix. ; Is. xl. 5 f. ; xlix. 26 ; lxvi. 16 ; Jer. xii. 12 ; xxv. 31 ; xlv. 5 ; Ezek. xxi. 4 *al.*), less frequently when the converse—the salvation of the last time—is referred to (Joel iii. 1 ; Zech. ii. 17). At most passages the expression doubtless embraces under it *men and animals* (*e.g.*, Gen. vi. 17 ff. ; Lev. xvii. 14 ; Num. xviii. 15 ; Ps. cxxxvi. 25 ; Is. xl. 6), but elsewhere the connection shows that *only men* are meant (*e.g.* Gen. vi. 12 f. ; Is. lxvi. 23 ; Ps. lvi. 5 [comp. verse 12 "man"] ; lxv. 3 ; Job xii. 10 ; Joel iii. 1)—a diversity springing from the fact that the phrase is used not merely as a collective notion to denote the *whole mass* of earthly creatures, but primarily to denote the *peculiar character* (*Beschaffenheit*) common to them in contrast to God.

The question next arises whether, in addition to the connotation of *natural weakness*, it does not sometimes include an element of *moral blame*, a suggestion of *sinfulness*. This question has often been answered in the affirmative with an appeal to Gen. vi. 5 and to Ps. lxxviii. 39. In the former passage—which belongs to an apparently iso-

lated fragment probably first inserted here by the *redacteur* of the Pentateuch, and not specially connected with the history of the deluge that follows—the point with which we are now concerned is the inserted clause, which contains at any rate the specification of a ground for the divine judgment, rendered in the A. V.: “for that he also is flesh,” which admits of being interpreted differently according to a slight change in the pointing of the first word. The view recently defended by Dillmann, who points it *beshaggām*, deriving it from *shagag*, and makes it mean: “on account of their transgression or aberration he is flesh, that is, still merely flesh,” is liable to the objections, that there is no mention of sin in the context, which speaks rather of an increase of the natural vigour of life, that might, it is suggested, be compensated by a restriction of its duration; that the words “still merely” [*nur noch*] are imported without warrant, and the sense assigned to flesh is drawn from the New Testament rather than from the Old; and that the *enallage numeri* in the suffix of the *beshaggām* is very harsh, if not impossible, while Dillmann’s reference of it to the “sons of God” lessens the linguistic harshness only to increase the difficulty of the contents, for the main matter, “the thereby developed tendency to the sensuous,” would, as Dillmann admits, have to be supplied. The other interpretation, which takes it as = *ba’asher gām*, and renders: “for that he too is flesh,” has the support of all the old translations. The objections to it may be reduced to two, that the *ṣ* = *asher*, is foreign to the *usus loquendi* of the Pentateuch, and that the *gam* is altogether superfluous. The former must be granted; but the passage stands isolated, and the occurrence of the *ṣ* in the book of Judges and even in Deborah’s song (v. 7; comp. vi. 17; vii. 12; viii. 26) attests the possibility of the form even for the older

language. The other again has little relevancy, for the order of the words suggests a reference of the *gam* to *hu* and not to *basar*; and the passage seems to give the appropriate sense, that, notwithstanding any impression to the contrary that might be produced by the emergence of a Titanic race, *man too* belongs to the general category of the creature, and has his life not as his own and incapable of being lost, but as given by God and subject to withdrawal at such term as He appoints.

In Psalm lxxviii. 39, the whole clearness and beauty of the passage would be lost, if we should assume in the phrase: "and he remembered that they are flesh" the transition completed from the conception of weakness into that of sin, as Tholuck does. Immediately before it is said that God "covers" iniquity; and how could it be added that God remembers the Israelites, so far as they are flesh, that is, so far as in their nature lies the seat and origin of sin? and what is to be made in that case of the apposition to *basar*: "breath that passeth away and returneth not"? Obviously the words contain not a reason explaining on God's part the sin of the Israelites from their being flesh, but rather a motive for His covering of their sin, for His forgiveness, based on their weak and transient nature. The same motive appears at Psalm xxxix. 14; ciii. 13 f.; Amos vii. 2<sup>k</sup>, 5<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, various passages in the book of Job seem to assert man's inability to justify himself before God, and connect that inability with his being dust (such as iv. 17 ff.; xv. 14 ff.; xxv. 1 ff.) . . . To understand the argument in these cases, we must look at the question not from our Western notions of right, but from the Oriental point of view, according to which the question of right was primarily a question of *might*. "As in the gate, that is, in the judicial assembly, that man is not

put to shame in the process with his enemies, who appears at the spot with the due number of stalwart sons in his train (Psalm cxxvii. 5), so conversely, when contending with God, man is from the outset and absolutely in the wrong, because, confronted with God, he is absolute *weakness*." . . . The references to the frailty and affinity to dust of man, so far from being intended to explain human *sinfulness*, are merely adduced to make good man's utter *destitution of right* (*Rechtlosigkeit*) *in presence of God, notwithstanding even of possibly existent sinlessness*. Nor can the references to Levitical uncleanness occasioned by contact with certain forms of disease, or with a dead body, be regarded as vouchers for natural frailty and mortality being viewed at the same time as moral defect. For this Levitical impurity has nothing to do with sinfulness in the proper ethical sense. . . . Nor is there any trace of an allusion to this sort of impurity in the conception of *basar*, as it denotes in the Old Testament creaturely beings.

## II. THE CONCEPTION OF RUACH.

The remarkably varied applications of this conception in the Old Testament find the explanation which binds them into unity in the original signification of "wind." Its chief marks to be here taken account of are those of movement and of invisibility.

First, the wind presents itself as a moved and moving nature-force, seizing moveable objects, sweeping them before it, and spreading destruction. With the Orientals it was regarded primarily as a *destructive* agency; very seldom is it wished for, as when it brings rain (2 Kings iii. 17; Prov. xxv. 14); otherwise it appears everywhere dreaded, partly for its destructive power intensi-



fied in southern climates (Job i. 19 ; Psalm xlvi. 8 ; cvii. 25 ff.) ; partly for its withering effects (Isaiah xl. 7 ; Ezek. xvii. 10 ; Hosea xiii. 15, *al.*). It is very often symbol of annihilation (Isaiah xvii. 13 ; Jeremiah xiii. 24 ; Psalm i. 4, *al.*).

As regards its other significant peculiarity of *invisibility*, it may be judged of from two points of view—either as *unsearchable* in its origin, or as *immaterial* in its nature. Closely as these come into contact, they give occasion to two very divergent chains of thought. So far as the wind in its enigmatical origin lies beyond the sphere of experience (Eccl. xi. 5), it is referred directly to God ; it is God who creates the wind (Amos iv. 13), brings it out of his treasure-chambers (Jer. x. 13 ; Psalm cxxxv. 7) ; determines the weight for it (Job xxviii. 25) ; sends, turns, or directs it (Gen. viii. 1 ; Ex. x. 13, 19 ; xiv. 21 ; xv. 10 ; Num. xi. 31, *al.*). The winds are his messengers, executing His word (Psalm civ. 4 ; cxlviii. 8) ; He is himself described as travelling on the wings of the wind (Psalm xviii. 11) ; and it plays a remarkable part in the passing of God before Elijah (1 Kings xix. 11), in the night-vision of Eliphaz (Job iv. 15, “a wind,” not “a spirit”), and in the vision of Ezekiel (i. 4).

On the other hand the Hebrew has a vivid consciousness of the fact that the wind lacks sensuous visibleness and the other marks by which the *reality* of a thing is wont to be tested. “To grasp the wind” is a proverbial expression for an impossibility (Prov. xxvii. 16 ; xxx. 4), and so *ruach* becomes emblem and expression for what is empty, null, unreal, so that the sceptic illustrates his sermon of the vanity of all human existence and action by comparison with the “pursuit of wind” (Eccl. i. 14, 17 ; ii. 11, 17, 26, *al.*). Under this point of view, it may mean the very opposite of what it means

when regarded as of divine origin; and *ruach*, in this sense of windy nothingness, may form a contrast to almost all the other significations of the word. [Of this several interesting illustrations are given.]

With the sense of wind is immediately associated that of *breath*, as bearing essentially in its invisible motion the form under which the wind manifests itself. As the seat of the breath are named the nostrils (Job xxvii. 3; Lam. iv. 20, *al.*), or the mouth (Ps. cxxxv. 17, *al.*), or the lips (Is. xi. 4), or the interior of man generally (Zech. xii. 1; Heb. ii. 19, *al.*). And as the breath presents itself as a wind in man, the wind may conversely be apprehended as the breath of God, which issues (anthropomorphically) from his nostrils (Ex. xv. 8; 2 Sam. xxii. 16, *al.*). A further step makes the breath of man appear directly as the breath of God, so that in Ps. civ. 29, 30, *rucham* "their (men's) breath," and *rucheka* "thy (God's) breath" may be interchanged. The *ruach* belongs to man, so far as it stirs and works in him; to God, in so far as he has sent or breathed it forth. . . .

From these combinations between the wind, the breath of God and the human breath arise manifold, and in their turn opposite, relations for the *ruach*. As the wind is chiefly a destroying and dreaded nature-force, so the breath, resembling in its snorting movement that of stormy wind, gets the sense of *anger* (Judg. viii. 3; Ezek. iii. 14; Job xv. 13; Prov. xvi. 32). God's *ruach* in this sense of blast of anger is always destructive of life (Job iv. 9; Is. iv. 4; Zech. vi. 8, *al.*). Where the point of view of impetuous movement falls into abeyance, the process of breathing is felt to be the proper mark of all that lives, and so the *ruach* becomes transformed into the opposite sense of the creating and preserving *life-breath*, which is altogether of divine origin. This life-breath of

God it was, which moved over chaos (Gen. i. 2) and created the host of heaven (Ps. xxxiii. 6). . . . We have seen in discussing *basar* how it is the communication of the divine life-spirit to the creature, that forms the ground on the one hand of all possibility and power of creaturely existence, and on the other of its entire dependence on God; it remains that we now notice the further passages where there is not the word *basar* as opposed to *ruach*. God forms or gives the life-spirit to man and to all that walk on earth (Zech. xii. 1; Is. xlii. 5); by this life-breath the creatures are made, and by it what is already dead may be recalled to existence (Job xxxiii. 4; Ps. civ. 30; Ezek. xxxvii.), while on the withdrawal of the breath by God the creature falls unto death and earth (Ps. civ. 29; cxlvi. 4). The basis of the conception here clearly is, that the life-breath of the creature, as it was in its origin a communication of God's own breath, returns at death to the fulness of the divine breath—which is described as a being-gathered-in-again by God (Job xxxiv. 14; Ps. civ. 29). The same thought occurs in the celebrated passage Eccl. xii. 7: "The dust returns to the earth in keeping with its nature, and the life-breath returns to God, who has given it." . . .

To the divine *ruach* in man are referred all the several states under which his life-power subsists and shows itself. When impressions of terror or surprise overwhelm man, it is said, the life-breath no longer subsists (Josh. ii. 11 [A. V. "courage"]; v. 1; 1 Kings x. 5); under opposite refreshing or reinvigorating influences, it is said, that the life-breath revives or comes back (Hab. i. 11; Gen. xlv. 27; Judg. xv. 19; 1 Sam. xxx. 12); the failing, extinguishing, or emptying of the breath is the proper designation for the ceasing of the vital power (Is. lvii. 16; Ps. lxxvii. 4; cxliii. 4; Ezek. xxi. 12; Is.

xix. 3, *al.*). The same sense of the word appears in the phrase *hé'ir-eth-ruach*—"to stir the life-spirit," *i.e.* to instigate any one (Hagg. i. 14; 1 Chron. v. 26; 2 Chron. xxi. 16; xxxvi. 32; Ezra i. 1, 5).

In what relation does this *ruach* stand to the *nephehsh*, the soul? Are the two notions equivalent, or are they so different as to denote two co-ordinate parts of the nature of living beings? There is unmistakeably great likeness between them. The soul is treated also as seat and centre of the vital powers; all things that promote or hinder the life are placed in relation to it (Ps. vi. 4; xvii. 13; xxii. 21, 30; xxvi. 9; xxxiii. 19, *al.*), and the like predicates are used of it as of the *ruach*, when the renewal or dying out of the life is spoken of (comp. Ps. cvii. 5; Jon. ii. 8 with Ps. lxxvii. 4 [*hith'atteph*]; 1 Kings xvii. 22 with 1 Samuel xxx. 12 [*shubh*]; Gen. xxxv. 18 with Ps. cxlvi. 4 [*yatza*]). But there are other marks pointing to a not inconsiderable difference.

First it is to be noted that the *nephehsh* is primarily the seat of individuality, personality, or self-consciousness. Hence it is often, especially in poetic diction, merely a fuller designation for the Ego. While other things are, or might be, more or less common to man, each man's soul belongs to him as his own most special property, which cannot be exchanged or, in the event of loss, reacquired. Hence it is the dearest possession that man has, and the poets may well interchange it with "my darling" (Ps. xxii. 21; xxxv. 17), or "my glory" (Ps. xvi. 9; xxx. 13 (12); lvii. 9 (8); cviii. 2 (1)). For the same reason, all natural and mental impulses, in which the individual self asserts itself, are apprehended as immediate functions of the soul. To it is ascribed *e.g.* the activity of longing [*ivrah*] (Deut. xii. 15, 20; 2 Sam. iii. 21; 1 Kings xi. 37; Is. xxvi. 8 *f. al.*); "to lift up the

soul" is equivalent to "to desire" (Jer. xxii. 27; Hos. iv. 8; Ps. xxiv. 4; xxv. 1); hence in the sense of censure *nephesh* probably signifies also selfish greed (Ps. xxvii. 12; xxxv. 25; xli. 3). This signification of individuality so characteristic of the *nephesh* is entirely wanting to the *ruach*. The life-spirit is in all creatures of like character and effect; it forms a preponderantly *common* mark of living beings, while the *nephesh* is individual.

But this first difference is but the consequence of another and deeper one. The *ruach* stands in quite a different relation to God than the *nephesh*. It is viewed as an immediate outbreathing of God; it is but a part of the general divine *ruach*, which creates and preserves life everywhere, and does not lose its character as such, even when at work in an individual earthly creature. Quite different is it with the *nephesh* in presence of God. No doubt at several places there is mention of a *nephesh* of God, where in manifest anthropomorphism certain emotions are ascribed to God (Ps. xi. 5; Prov. vi. 10; Is. xlii. 1; Jer. vi. 8, *al.*); but the soul of the creatures is never regarded, like the *ruach*, as an efflux or portion of that divine *nephesh*. The soul depends on God, because it is given by God (Gen. ii. 7; Jer. xxxviii. 16); but the life-spirit depends on God, because it is itself divine.

A third difference turns on the dissimilarity of their fate after death. The spirit of the finite creatures returns to God. But we nowhere read in the Old Testament of the souls of the dead coming to God. The *nephesh* is by death absolutely severed from God. When the conception of a continued existence of the departed in Sheol, remote altogether from the divine presence, is expressed, it is the *nephesh* that is the subject of that shadowy sad existence (Ps. xvi. 10; xxx. 4; xlix. 15; lxxxvi. 13); nay, even the corpse, which stands in sharpest contrast to God

and the living spirit, may be designated as *nephesh*, probably because it bears, and so long as it bears, the lineaments of the individual personality (Lev. xxi. 11 ; xxii. 4 ; Num. v. 2 ; vi. 6 ; Hagg. ii. 13).

How are we on the basis of these distinctions to conceive the mutual relation of *ruach* and *nephesh* ? First, it is plain that they do not stand side by side simply co-ordinate, so that we can derive from them the usual trichotomous scheme. For, as the differences exhibited between them essentially concern their origin and issue, which do not admit of being established by experience, they are to be taken as diversities, not of *contents* and of *mode of operation*, so much as of *value*. Further, we must distinctly reject the view, which would regard the spirit as the collective expression (*Inbegriff*) of the higher powers that form the ground of the divine image in man, and thereby at the same time of his distinction from the animals consisting only of body and soul. The Old Testament does not enter upon a demarcation of human and animal psychology ; and least of all is the *ruach* common to all creatures fitted to furnish the principle for such a demarcation.

Much more deserving of attention is the view (of Oehler) that, according to the Old Testament, the whole man only consists dichotomously of *basar* and *nephesh*, while the *divine ruach* is the power, which by its very union with matter produces animate beings, and then as divine power continues to subsist in those two anthropological constituents as its organs and objects of its operation. Nevertheless, even this interpretation seems to me not admissible. If any Old Testament author applied the two conceptions side by side in such a way as to show clearly that he referred them to an unity of psychological system, or if we should be led to suppose that such an

unity of system must have lain ready to the hand of all the authors who use the two terms, then that combination might perhaps commend itself. But in reality there is no ground for such assumptions. We may shape the answer to our question more correctly to this effect : the two conceptions denote the same quantity (*Grösse*), but with a different estimate of value, *because from different points of view*. The nature of living beings may be judged in a twofold way, either by comparison with God, or by comparison with inanimate nature ; in the former there prevails the *religious* point of view, which distinguishes what in the creatures is earthly and what divine ; in the latter there prevails the physical (or anthropological) point of view, which distinguishes what in them is of material bodily nature and what is of an immaterial mental nature. The mental life-powers are called *ruach*, so far as they connect the creatures with God and place them in dependence upon Him ; they are called *nephesh*, so far as they separate the creatures as animate individuals from one another and from the lifeless impersonal world of sense. A clear confirmation of this distinction is yielded by the words of Job xii. 10 : “in whose hand is the soul of every living thing and the spirit of all flesh of man.” The parallelism of the two portions of the verse shows that the notions *nephesh* and *ruach* are related to one another just as the phrases “every living thing” (*kol-chay*) and “all flesh” (*kol-basar*). Now, as the two latter expressions denote as regards contents quite the same thing, but under the different points of view, that in the one case the living beings are placed in contrast to inanimate nature, and in the other the creatures in contrast to God, it is clear that we must assume for our notions of *nephesh* and *ruach* a diversity not of the contents, but of the point of view.

Let us turn now to the comparison of *ruach* with *lebh*,

which at once suggests itself when we look at a new, often used signification of our term. The passages are quite isolated, at which *ruach* without addition appears to denote the thinking activity of the mind, e.g., Ezek. xi. 5 (xx. 32), in the combination *ma'aloth ruche'ykhem*, "that which cometh up in your mind," while elsewhere is regularly found the phrase, 'alah 'al lebh (Jer. iii. 16 ; vii. 31 ; xix. 5, *al.*) or Psalm lxxvii. 7, where a diligent search is affirmed of the spirit. But with great frequency we find the word *ruach* combined with some designation of quality, where, generally speaking, a definite mental state is to be characterised. This qualitative notion is attached to the *ruach* either attributively (e.g., *ruach nēdhibhah*, Psalm li. 14), or constructively (e.g., *morath ruach*, Gen. xxvi. 35), or lastly predicatively (e.g., *tiktzar ruach*, Job xxi. 4). The origin of this new signification may easily be discerned. When the *ruach* is spoken of as "shortened," what was originally thought of was the short rapid drawing of the breath, and only thence was it transferred to the impatient disposition therein expressing itself; in the opposite conception 'erekh appayim (Prov. xiv. 29 ; xvi. 32) the original sense is more clearly apparent. Similar is the case with the *ruach kehah* (Isaiah lxi. 3), where the breath dying out is primarily the sensuous expression of the depressed mental state. In the use of other such expressions as *shebher ruach* (Isaiah lxxv. 14), *shēphal-ruach* (Prov. xvi. 19 ; Is. lvii. 15) that original signification has already quite disappeared.

For most of these designations there may be shown parallel phrases formed with *lebh*, e.g., "hard of spirit" (1 Sam. i. 15) and "hard of heart" (Ezek. iii. 7), "erring in spirit" (Is. xxix. 24) and "erring in heart" (Ps. xc. 10); "grieved in spirit" (Is. liv. 6) and



“grieved in heart” (Prov. xv. 13); “breaking of spirit” (Is. lxxv. 14) and “broken in heart” (Ps. xxxiv. 19); “a firm spirit” (Ps. li. 12) and “a firm heart” (Ps. lvii. 8; cviii. 2). *Ruach* and *lebh* are also found side by side, each with such a designation of quality: as “broken in heart and contrite in spirit” (Psalm xxxiv. 19); “a clean heart and a firm spirit” (Psalm li. 12; and so at Ex. xxxv. 21; Deut. ii. 30; Is. lvii. 15; Ezek. xi. 19; Prov. xvii. 22); lastly, at the two passages, Ezek. xviii. 31 and li. 19, the two words stand side by side, joined with the same attributes—a clear proof that *ruach* and *lebh* have in all these cases a signification nearly akin but yet not synonymous. To determine the distinction, let us first examine shortly the signification of *lebh*.

The *lebh* is in general seat of all mental conscious activities of living beings, especially of the thoughts, plans, and resolutions (Gen. vi. 5; Ps. xxxiii. 11; Prov. vi. 18, *al.*); so the *lebh* stands specially in contrast to the words of the mouth or the deed of the hands, in which the inward plans and thoughts express themselves (the former, *e.g.* at Isaiah xxix. 13; Ps. xix. 15; xl. 11; xli. 7; lv. 22; the latter at Ps. xxiv. 4; xxxiii. 15). But desires and wishes (Ps. xx. 5; xxi. 3; xxxvi. 4), and especially feelings of all sorts—of joy (Ps. iv. 8; xiii. 6; xvi. 9, *al.*); of confidence (Ps. xxviii. 7); or of fear and apprehension (Ps. xiii. 3; xxv. 17)—have their root in the *lebh*. To this very comprehensive sense of the Hebrew word, the German “Sinn” [mind] would probably best correspond, as we in the term “Herz” think mostly of the seat of the feelings, and besides are inclined to assume a favourable connotation (comp. “hearty, heartless”) which is entirely wanting in the new conception. From

the *lebh* proceed good thoughts and plans just as the bad (e.g., Jer. iii. 17 ; Gen. vi. 5), "to walk or speak according to his heart" is used to describe the opposite of a conduct willed by God (Num. xvi. 28 ; Is. lvii. 17 ; Jer. xxiii. 16). It is the *lebh* that according to its character gives to man the direction in which his thoughts, resolves, and actions move (Psalm xxxvii. 31 ; xlv. 19 ; Jer. iii. 17 ; vii. 24 ; xvii. 5) ; and this especially when it is combined with definite adjectives, intimating that the mind of man, *i.e.*, the contents of his activity of thought and will, is of this or that nature, follows this or that direction. So e.g., *yěshar-lebh*, he who with "upright mind" grasps the right thoughts, purposes, &c., that correspond to God's will ; *nishbar-lebh*, he who, breaking his "wilfulness," subordinates himself to the designs of God ; *'anav-lebh*, he who renouncing high and selfish thoughts readily suits his mind to the relations given by God.

*Ruach*, in an analogous use, has a somewhat different significance : it denotes not the mind, which determines the different kinds of mental exertion and indirectly of external action *in point of contents* ; but it is the *energy* (*Gemüthskraft*) which, partly as *disposition*, partly as *character*, stamps on all individual expressions of the life of feeling, as of the activity of thought and will, their definite *form*. The two sides, the natural disposition and the moral character, are for the Hebrew consciousness not yet separated ; it is only our later reflection that separates them. The Hebrew conception is, I believe, most completely covered by our [German] word "Muth" in the older signification, which still cleaves to it, when used as simple, only in particular phrases (e.g., "*mir ist so oder so zu Muth, getrosten, traurigen Muthes sein*"), but in substantive and adjective compounds answers quite

closely to those compound Hebrew expressions, likewise without distinction of natural disposition and ethical character (e.g., *ruach kashah* = Schwermuth; *ruach nē-dhibhah* = Freimuth; *gobhah-ruach* = hochmüthig; *shēphal ruach* = demüthig). The result, moreover, is that strictly speaking there prevails no substantial difference between the designations formed with *ruach* and those with *lebh*, just because the *contents* of the mental activity given in the "mind" is conditioned throughout by the peculiar *form* of the ruling natural or moral tone. As between *ruach* and *nephesh*, so between *ruach* and *lebh* there subsists a distinction not so much of the object, as of the point of view, of the designation.

A new and last signification of *ruach* presents in some degree a blending of the most essential marks resulting from the two already considered. In the foreground comes here first the *mark* of *divine origin*, which had been no longer apparent in the last discussed use of *ruach*. Formerly we perceived it both in the signification of "wind" and in that of "life-spirit"; in both of which cases there were denoted by *ruach* supernatural operations of God, but yet such as we might regard as comparatively usual and regular. But now it becomes a designation for all the *unusual* and *extraordinary* phenomena, in which an influence of God operating on man shows itself. It is usual, but not strictly quite warrantable, to describe this *ruach* simply as the prophetic. The prophetic *ruach*, which expresses itself in prophetic speech or deed, is in reality only a single, though perhaps the most important, species of a far more comprehensive class of phenomena. In all spheres of human working, physical or mental, achievements, which in prominence of gifts and in significance transcend the measure of ordinary human ability, are referred to the communication of such a divine *ruach*.

So the extraordinary specimens of strength of a Samson are manifestations of the *ruach* which seizes him (Judg. xiii. 26; xiv. 6, 19; xv. 14); so with the successful gifts of the ruler, especially in war (Judg. iii. 10; vi. 34; 1 Sam. xvi. 13; Is. xi. 2); so even a single wonderful act, like the dry passage of Elisha through the Jordan, may show the presence of the *ruach* (2 Kings ii. 14 f.). Mentally, all distinguished theoretical or practical ability is proof of a *ruach chokhmah ubhinah* communicated by God; so with artists and poets (Ex. xxviii. 3; xxxi. 3; xxxv. 31; 2 Sam. xxiii. 2), or in men of special powers of judgment and understanding (Gen. xli. 38 f.; Deut. xxxiv. 9; Is. xi. 2; Prov. i. 23; Job xx. 3, *al.*). But especially are gifts in the religious sphere, which can least of all be understood from merely natural presuppositions, a manifestation of such a God-sent *ruach*, whose organ is the *nabhi* and whose effect is the *nibba* or *hithnabbē* (Num. xi. 25 ff.; 1 Sam. x. 6, 10; Is. lxi. 1; Ezek. xi. 5; Joel iii. 1 f.; Mic. iii. 8; 1 Chron. xii. 18; 2 Chron. xv. 1, *al.*). Accordingly the revelation of God in the *Torah*, as well as all further witness of God among the people on the basis of the *Torah*, has taken place in the divine *ruach* through the medium (*bēyadh*) of the prophets (Zech. vii. 12; Neh. ix. 20, 30).

The predicates used of this extraordinary divine *ruach*, which we may briefly hereafter designate as the *transcendental*, are: *labhash*, "to put on" (Judg. vi. 34; 1 Chron. xii. 18, *al.*), *tsalach-al*, "to fall upon" (Judg. xiv. 6, 19; xv. 14; 1 Sam. x. 6, 10, *al.*), *nuach*, not "to rest," but "to settle itself" (Num. xi. 25 f.: 2 Kings ii. 15; Is. xi. 2), *millē* (Ex. xxxi. 3; xxxv. 31; Mic. iii. 8), *hayah-al* (Num. xxiv. 2; Judg. iii. 10; 1 Sam. xix. 9, 20 ff., *al.*). When God is named as communicating sub-

ject, there is used *nathan* (Is. xlii. 1 ; Ezek. xxxvi. 27 ; xxxvii. 14) or *sîm* (Num. xi. 17 ; Is. lxiii. 11) or *shaphakh* (Joel iii. 1 f. ; Zech. xii. 10 ; Ezek. xxxix. 29). Two main marks of our *ruach* may be recognised from these predicates.

[The substance of what follows is sufficiently indicated in the text, pp. 122-126.]

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### C.—CONSPECTUS OF THE FACTS OF PAULINE USAGE.

The facts, readily accessible for reference through the excellent Concordance of Bruder or the smaller volume of Schmoller, are brought together and classified in the several lexicons of New Testament Greek, especially in those of Grimm and Cremer. But it may be convenient for the reader to have them presented here at one view with a reference to the chief passages falling under each group or illustrating each variety of meaning. My object here is simply to tabulate, not to discuss, them. For a fuller statement I may specially refer to the new (third) edition of Dr. Cremer's *Biblisch-Theologisches Wörterbuch der Neutestamentlichen Gräcität*, which has just been completed, and has come into my hands as these Lectures were being passed through the press. The article on  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$  in particular, to which I should have been glad to have had earlier access, has been so greatly enlarged—in no small degree under the influence of Dr. Wendt's investigations—that from the four pages devoted to

it in the second edition it has grown to eleven in the third.

The following are the chief uses recognised by lexicographers in the Epistles of St. Paul as to

### 1. Σάρξ.

A. Flesh proper, *caro*, substance covering the bones, 1 Cor. xv.<sup>3</sup>9 (the only Pauline passage where *σ.* is used of the other creatures); associated with *ὀστέα* at Eph. v. 30; but the words there are of doubtful genuineness. *Κρέας* used of dead flesh: Rom. xiv. 21; 1 Cor. viii. 13.

B. The body itself, designated (by synecdoche of *part* for the whole) from the flesh as its main substance and as *characterising* it: 1 Cor. vi. 16; vii. 28; 2 Cor. iv. 11; vii. 5; x. 3; xii. 7; Gal. ii. 20; iv. 13; iv. 14; Eph. v. 29; Phil. i. 22; i. 24; Col. ii. 1; as also Rom. ii. 28; Eph. ii. 11; Gal. vi. 13; Col. ii. 13; Phil. iii. 3, 4. But, as in several, if not most, of these passages it may be doubtful whether the Apostle's choice of the term does not rest on the *value* associated with it under his more general point of view, Cremer rightly urges that it ought to be translated "flesh," and not to be rendered as "body."

C. The *medium*, in and through which the natural *relationship* of men manifests itself as regards descent, family and national affinity—the obvious *bond* of community between them [based on Gen. ii. 23, 24, quoted at 1 Cor. vi. 16 and Eph. v. 31: *εἰς σάρκα μίαν*]; Gal. iv. 23, 29; 1 Cor. x. 18; Rom. i. 3; ix. 3, 8; xi. 14; Eph. ii. 11; Philem. 16.

D. Human nature designated from the common visible form in which it appears: Col. i. 22; 1 Tim. iii. 16. Akin to this is the use of *σ.* in the phrase *πᾶσα*

σάρξ, reproducing the Hebrew *kol-basar* : 1 Cor. i. 29 ; Gal. ii. 16 ; Rom. iii. 20. The same idea is more fully expressed by the association of the blood as vehicle of life with the σάρξ in the phrase (Matt. xvi. 17) σάρξ καὶ αἷμα ; 1 Cor. xv. 50 ; Gal. i. 16 ; Eph. vi. 12.

E. The natural state, or natural side of man, as contrasted with his Christian state or pneumatic side—an ethico-religious conception in which appears interchangeable with ἄνθρωπος or with παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος, in specific contrast to πνεῦμα, and in close association with sin : 1 Cor. iii. 3, 4 ; Rom. vi. 6, 19 ; viii. 4-13 ; 2 Cor. x. 3 ; i. 17 ; Gal. iii. 3 ; v. 13 ; v. 16-26 ; vi. 8 ; Rom. vii. 17, 18, 25 ; viii. 3 ; Col. ii. 18, 23, 29.

The Apostle uses two adjectives derived from σάρξ—σαρκικός and σάρκινος, although in consequence of their similarity in form and affinity of meaning there is some variety of reading in the MSS. and some doubt as to the reading to be preferred.

Σάρκινος—composed of flesh, *fleshy*, is undoubtedly taken in the strict literal sense ; and it probably deserves the preference at Rom. vii. 14 and 1 Cor. iii. 1.

Σαρκικός—belonging to the flesh, *fleshly*, is employed (a) in reference to the σ. put for the body in Rom. xv. 27 and 1 Cor. ix. 11, and (b) in reference to the σ. as human nature *per se* in contrast to God, at 2 Cor. x. 4.

## 2. Σῶμα.

Σῶμα is the general term for “body,” as an organism composed of parts or μέλη, and serving as organ for the ψυχή or πνεῦμα with which it is associated. It is used (a) in the proper sense, at the *locus classicus*, 1 Cor. xii. 12-26, where the word occurs sixteen times ; 1 Cor.

xv. 35 ff.; Rom. vi. 12; viii. 13; xii. 4; 1 Cor. v. 3; vi. 18; vii. 34; 2 Cor. v. 6, 8, 10; ix. 27; x. 10; Phil. iii. 21; Col. i. 22; ii. 11, *al.*; (*b*) in a figurative sense, of the Church as the body of Christ: 1 Cor. xii. 27; Rom. xii. 5; Eph. i. 23; Col. i. 18 *et al.* (especially frequent in the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians).

### 3. Πνεῦμα.

A. The breath, *anhelitus*, *spiraculum*: 2 Thess. ii. 8. [Hence naturally transferred, in classical Greek and in other Biblical books, to denote the vital principle—*anima qua vivitur*; but this *physiological* sense is not found in St. Paul.]

B. In the *psychological* sense of the spirit or mind of man, the inward self-conscious principle which feels, thinks, and wills: 1 Cor. ii. 11; v. 3; vii. 34; Col. ii. 5; accompanied by a personal pronoun in the genitive: Rom. i. 9; viii. 16; 1 Cor. v. 4; xvi. 18; 2 Cor. ii. 13; vii. 13; Gal. vi. 18; Phil. iv. 23; 1 Thess. v. 23; Philem. 25; 2 Tim. iv. 22.

C. Of the spiritual nature of Christ: 1 Cor. xv. 45; 1 Tim. iii. 16 [Rom. i. 4?].

D. (Most frequently in the special sense of) A divine power or influence belonging to God, and communicated in Christ to men, in virtue of which they become *πνευματικοί*: 1 Thess. iv. 8; Gal. iv. 6; Rom. viii. 9. It is designated as:—

(a) *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ*: 1 Cor. ii. 10, 11, 12, 14; iii. 16; vi. 11; vii. 40; xii. 3; 2 Cor. iii. 3; Rom. viii. 9, 11 (*bis*), 14; Eph. iii. 16.

(b) *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*: 1 Cor. iii. 17, 18; Gal. iv. 6; Rom. viii. 9; Phil. i. 19.

(c) *πνεῦμα ἁγίου*: 1 Thess. i. 5, 6; iv. 8; 1 Cor. vi. 19;



xii. 3 ; 2 Cor. vi. 6 ; xiii. 13 ; Rom. v. 5 ; ix. 1 ; xiv. 17 ; xv. 13, 16, 19 ; Eph. i. 13 ; iv. 30 ; 2 Tim. i. 14 ; Tit. iii. 5.

(d) πνεῦμα with, or without, the article, but with its definite reference to the πν. Θεοῦ or πν. ἄγιον clearly indicated by the context: 1 Thess. ii. 13 ; 1 Cor. ii. 4, 10, 13 ; xii. 4, 7, 8, 9 (*bis*), 11 ; xii. 13 ; 2 Cor. i. 22 ; iii. 8 ; v. 5 ; Gal. iii. 2, 5, 14 ; v. 16, 18 ; Rom. viii. 16, 23, 26, 27 ; xv. 30 ; Eph. iv. 3 ; vi. 17 ; Phil. ii. 1 ; 1 Tim. iv. 1.

E. A power or influence, the character, manifestations or results of which are more precisely defined by qualifying genitives : 1 Cor. iv. 21 and Gal. vi. 1 π. πραότητος ; 2 Cor. iv. 13 π. πίστεως ; Rom. viii. 2 π. ζωῆς ; 15 π. υιοθεσίας ; Eph. i. 17 π. σοφίας καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως ; 2 Tim. i. 7 π. δυνάμεως καὶ ἀγάπης καὶ σωφρονισμοῦ ; or, in the absence of any such adjunct, are to be gathered from express or implied contrast : *e.g.* Gal. v. 5, 25 ; Eph. v. 18. In several cases π. is contrasted with γράμμα : Rom. ii. 29 ; vii. 6 ; 2 Cor. iii. 6 ; and in numerous others with σὰρξ ; especially at Gal. v. 16-24 and Rom. viii. 1-13.

F. The plural πνεύματα, used of the χαρίσματα or spiritual gifts : 1 Cor. xiv. 12, or of the persons who are or profess to be under spiritual influence : 1 Cor. xii. 10.

G. Powers or influences alien from, or adverse to the divine π. are designated by the same term with some qualifying adjunct ; 2 Cor. xi. 4 π. ἕτερον ; 1 Cor. ii. 12 π. κόσμου ; Rom. viii. 15 π. δουλείας ; xi. 8 π. κατανύξεως ; Eph. ii. 2 ; 2 Tim. i. 7.

Πνευματικός, belonging to, or characterised by, πνεῦμα, *i.e.* the divine π., is applied (a) to things : 1 Cor. ii. 13 ; ix. 11 ; x. 3, 4 ; xii. 1 ; xiv. 1 ; xv. 44, 46 ; Rom. i. 11 ; vii. 14 ; xv. 27 ; Eph. i. 3 ; v. 19 ; Col. i. 9 ; iii. 16 ; (b) to persons : Gal. vi. 1 ; 1 Cor. ii. 13 ; iii. 1 ; xiv. 37. Πνευματικῶς occurs at 1 Cor. ii. 14. [The expression τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας, Eph. vi. 12, seems related to the

use of πνεῦμα elsewhere in Scripture, but not with St. Paul, to denote spiritual existences or powers higher than man, but inferior to God—whether angels or demons.]

#### 4. Ψυχή.

A. The individual life, the seat of the personal Ego : 1 Thess. ii. 8 ; 2 Cor. i. 23 ; xii. 15 ; Rom. xi. 2 ; xvi. 4 ; Phil. ii. 30.

B. The subject of the life, the person in whom it dwells, named *a parte potiori* : 1 Cor. xv. 45 ; Rom. ii. 9 ; xiii. 1.

C. The mind as the sentient principle, the seat of sensation and desire, the soul : Phil. i. 27 ; Eph. vi. 6 ; Col. iii. 23. Associated with πνεῦμα and σῶμα at 1 Thess. v. 23.

The adjective ψυχικός (in contrast to πνευματικός) : 1 Cor. ii. 14 ; xv. 44. *σύμψυχος "of one accord" Phil. II, 2.*

#### 5. Καρδία

Is throughout the *inner central seat and organ* of the personal life in man, regarded in and by himself, and so almost constantly accompanied by the genitive of the possessive pronouns μου, σου, αὐτοῦ, ἡμῶν, ὑμῶν, αὐτῶν. It represents the Old Testament *lebh* and is more comprehensive in meaning than our "heart" : 1 Cor. ii. 9 ; iv. 5 ; xiv. 25 ; Rom. i. 24 ; ii. 29 ; viii. 27 ; 1 Thess. ii. 4 ; contrasted with στόμα : Rom. x. 10 ; 2 Cor. vi. 11 ; with πρόσωπον : 1 Thess. ii. 17 ; 2 Cor. v. 11 ; appearing as the seat of intelligence : 2 Cor. iii. 15 ; iv. 6 ; Rom. i. 21 ; Eph. i. 18 ; iv. 18 ; as the receptacle of impressions : Rom. ii. 15 ; 2 Cor. iii. 2 ; as the seat of moral choice and decision : 1 Cor. vii. 37 ; 2 Cor. ix. 7 ; Rom. ii. 5 ; as the

seat of feeling and emotion: 2 Cor. ii. 4 ; vii. 3 ; Rom. ix. 2 ; Phil. i. 7 ; as the source of actions which take thence their character : Rom. vi. 17 ; Eph. vi. 5 ; Col. iii. 22 ; 1 Tim. i. 5 ; 2 Tim. ii. 22 ; as recipient of the divine πνεῦμα : Gal. iv. 6 ; 2 Cor. i. 22 ; Rom. v. 5 ; Eph. iii. 16 ; as the object of the various operations of the divine influence : 1 Thess. iii. 13 ; 2 Thess. ii. 17 ; iii. 5 ; Eph. vi. 22 ; Col. ii. 22 ; Phil. iv. 7 ; as the seat of faith : Rom. x. 9 ; and as the inward organ of spiritual praise : Eph. v. 19 ; Col. iii. 16. Καρδία = ἔσω ἄνθρωπος : Eph. iii. 16.

## 6. Νοῦς.

A. The mind as consciously exercising its reflective faculty and pronouncing moral judgment : 1 Cor. xiv. 14, 15, 19 ; Rom. i. 28 ; vii. 23, 25 ; xii. 2 ; xiv. 5 ; 1 Cor. i. 10 ; Eph. iv. 17 ; Phil. iv. 7 ; 2 Thess. ii. 2 ; 1 Tim. vi. 5 ; 2 Tim. iii. 8 ; Tit. i. 15.

B. As applied to God or Christ, it denotes, after human analogy, the divine counsels or purposes that are the result of the divine thought : Rom. xi. 34 ; 1 Cor. ii. 16 (*bis*).

At Eph. iv. 23 occurs the peculiar expression τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοός, and at Col. ii. 18 τοῦ νοός τῆς σάρκος. [See Appendix E.].

D.—DR. WENDT ON THE ARGUMENT OF 1 COR.  
XV. 35 F. AND 44 F.

(P. 191 and 250.)

According to the view of Holsten and the inquirers associated with him, the whole discussion of the Apostle in this passage turns on the conception of substance. The opponents, whom Paul combats, had drawn their argument against the possibility of a resurrection of the dead from the sarkic substance of the present human body. Their first premiss had been that the risen must at any rate have an organism, a  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ , for which an organised *substance* is requisite; their second premiss was that the *sarkic* substance, of which men are composed, could confessedly not rise; thence they had concluded that no risen  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ , and consequently no rising of the dead at all, is conceivable. This conclusion has, of course, only a meaning, if with the second premiss there be tacitly implied either the one presupposition, that there cannot be a substance of another kind than the earthly-sarkic, or else the other presupposition, that identity between the dead and the risen must take place through the  $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$  of the latter containing the substance of the former. As Paul concedes the correctness of the two chief premisses of his opponents, but nevertheless does not acknowledge the conclusion thence drawn, it follows that he must turn against the two tacit presuppositions which condition their mistaken conclusion. The latter of these presuppositions Paul refutes in verses 36-38; it is not at all necessary, he says, that a resurrection should take place only on the basis of there being an identity between the substance of the risen and that of the dead;

on the contrary, the analogy of the plant-world shows that the naked seed-germ obtains quite a new substantial organism ; and so God may communicate to the resurrection-germ of the dead man an organism, whose substance has nothing to do with the substance of the dead sarkic organism. But the former presupposition must also be invalidated, namely, that no other substance than an earthly sarkic one is possible ; and this is alleged to be done by the Apostle in verses 39-41 through the following argument : As on earth the material substance in different animal organisms is different (verse 39), so are heavenly and earthly bodies substantially differentiated from one another, inasmuch as the heavenly bodies consist of a heavenly light-substance (verse 40), and in their turn on the ground of the very diversity of this light-substance present a different appearance or  $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$  (verse 41). I must confess that this second part of the argument neither satisfies me thoroughly as to its contents, nor appears to be even outwardly expressed with clearness in the verbal tenor of the verses mentioned. At the best, Paul would only have repeated the assertion, the accuracy of which was the very thing denied by his opponents. In the first place, it is not at all easy to see what he would attain by the adduced analogy of the diversified substance of animal organisms on earth. Possibly, his opponents might take exception to the fact itself, seeing that it is at any rate not easily perceivable, and it is not added by Paul himself, *wherein* such substantial differences consist. And then, even conceding the correctness of this fact, it might be objected that it was not relevant to the question in dispute, for the point under discussion was not whether there are different substances *within* the circle of the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$ , but whether there are different substances *outside* of the  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$  ; with the utmost substantial diversity

of sarkic organisms one from another, they still retained the decisive substantial unity expressly owned by Paul, that they belonged, all of them, to the *σάρξ*, and the question now was merely whether, alongside of this *σάρξ*, there could exist another substance for organisms. The proposition in verse 40, therefore, which was to be inferred from verse 39, and which it could not but concern the Apostle above all to prove—that, namely, there are heavenly organic substances beside the earthly—remained in fact for the opponents just as improbable after as before. And if we now look at the very words of the text, it is obvious that it cannot have been at all the design of Paul to put forward the substantial diversity of sarkic organisms as a proof or analogy for the possibility of non-sarkic organisms. Had the Apostle wished to express the thought which Holsten (p. 375) thus formulates: “as already, here on earth, the material substance of animal organisms is diverse, so are heavenly and earthly bodies distinguished as regards their substance,” he would doubtless have begun the first clause of verse 40 with a sharply pointed *οὕτως*. This, however, he has not done; but on the contrary, his declaration that there are bodies of heavenly substance is by a simple *καί* attached to the preceding clause as an introductory presupposition for the chief thought following thereafter (verse 40 b.-41), which is here, just as in verse 39, brought into prominence by a prefixed *ἀλλά*. And what is expressed in this chief thought? Is it that the heavenly bodies are different as respects *substance* as well from earthly bodies as from one another? By no means; but we are told that the heavenly bodies are distinguished from earthly bodies and from each other as regards *δόξα*—*aspect*. For, when Lüdemann (p. 8) renders *δόξα* simply by “light-matter,” he attributes to the word a sense

which would doubtless be very suitable for the connection of his views, but which the word *withal* has not. Holsten translates more cautiously: *appearance* of light-substance; on which we have merely to remark that the more precise definition "of light-substance" added by Holsten, which necessarily was of decisive importance for the connection of the Pauline thought, is *not* added by Paul. The word *δόξα* simply signifies *appearance* alone or, as the case may be, "brilliant appearance"; but that this appearance issues from a *light-substance*, is a synthetic judgment which is not at all contained in the notion of *δόξα* itself. We should therefore reach the result, that Paul would not have touched at all the proper difficulty of his opponents; he first adduces an analogy of such substantial diversity as can prove very little for the substantial diversity of quite another kind that is sought for; then he annexes the chief point doubted of in some measure as a conceded presupposition, in order at length to speak of a diversity of appearance, which was not at all in question. The starting-point of the opponents was, according to Holsten's statement, the sarkic substance of the present body; the goal which the discussion of Paul reaches is not, however, as Holsten says, the heavenly light-substance of the resurrection-body, but the *aspect* of the resurrection-body, *assuming* it to exist in heavenly light-substance. That starting-point and this goal do not, therefore, duly correspond with one another.

In view of these perplexities we shall the rather be induced to attempt an explanation of our section on the footing of assigning to the word *σάρξ* a signification which has its analogies in the *usus loquendi* of the Old Testament, of the LXX., and of the other New Testament writers; *i.e.*, we shall no longer apprehend *σάρξ* as

“earthly animated matter,” but instead of this *notional* extension of the original sense of the word shall assume the mere extension of *use*, according to which the word “flesh” is synecdochically employed to denote the whole body, and that not only so far as it is material, but also so far as it is organised. The meaning of our passage becomes thereupon not immaterially altered; the investigation turns no longer on the question what *substance*, but on the question what *form*, what *aspect*, the risen will have. The question of the opponents: ποίῳ σώματι ἔρχονται; signifies not “Of what material will these bodies consist?” but rather “What organisation will they have?” The subject of doubt is not the possibility of the existence of a heavenly material (*Stoffes*), but the possibility that this material, which at any rate is quite of another sort than earthly matter, should not be fitted to become in a similar way somatic organ for a risen πνεῦμα as here on earth the body is organ of the ψυχή. This doubt arises in the minds of the opponents from the circumstance that they cannot form a clear conception to themselves how such a body of another kind would *look*; on account of this impossibility of clearly conceiving the thing, they deny the possibility of the thing itself. Psychologically such doubt is quite intelligible; the man who does not think philosophically acquiesces in the declaration of a thing which he realises in his mind’s eye (*welche ihm anschaulich ist*), and asks no further as to the possibility of its origin and subsistence; whereas mere notional discussions can only with difficulty convince him of the possibility of a thing, so long as it cannot be in any way brought before his mind’s eye (*zur Anschauung*). Against such narrow-mindedness (ἀφρων verse 36), which on account of its own subjective incapacity to conceive a thing thinks that it may be allowed to deny



the objective existence of the thing itself, the Apostle turns with his elucidation. He proves first, by the adduced analogy of plants, that the necessity of thinking of the resurrection-body as organised in quite a different way from the earthly body, and that in a way such as we cannot infer from the shape of the earthly body, contains nothing at all improbable; for the plant-germ in like manner receives an entirely new organism, the nature and shape of which cannot at all be inferred from the seed-grain deposited in the earth. And then the Apostle points to the singularly great variety of organisation in the case of all the bodies which fall within our experience, in order to show that there cannot fairly be any difficulty in assuming a new and different organisation in the case of bodies that do *not* fall within the vision of our experience (*unsere anschauliche Erfahrung*). Thus above all verse 39 now gains a clear meaning;  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\acute{\iota}\varsigma$  here denotes simply the body of an earthly living being, inclusive of the bodily form; only in respect of this form are earthly bodies different one from another; and to draw attention to this diversity of organisation was immediately in the interest of the Apostle's proof. But as between the earthly bodies cognate to each other distinctions of organisation take place, so such distinctions likewise occur between the earthly and heavenly bodies foreign to each other; and the heavenly bodies themselves in turn are different one from another as to their form. We do not therefore need either to suggest for the word  $\delta\acute{\omicron}\xi\alpha$  in verse 40 f. a heterogeneous sense, or to supply the chief conception to it; on the contrary the argument of the Apostle turns precisely on the notion of appearance, of aspect, and on nothing more. The correspondence desiderated above between the starting-point of the opponents and the goal at which Paul arrives

seems to me to be in the fullest compass secured by this explanation.

On 1 Cor. xv. 44 ff. Wendt refers to the explanation which we have just given, and proceeds:—

Paul had been engaged in discussion with his opponents as to the new form and organisation of the body, in which the risen must be conceived, and had proved to them that this newness was no argument against its possibility. Now the Apostle takes a further step and shows that the complete diversity of appearance between earthly and heavenly bodies is grounded on the complete diversity of the whole (*gesammten*) nature in the state before and in the state after the resurrection. He first concisely puts forward three points, in respect of which earthly beings are distinguished from the risen, namely in respect of their duration (*φθορά—αφθαρσία*), in respect of their value (*ἀτιμία—δόξα*), and in respect of their power (*ἀσθένεια—δύναμις*). To this he adds as a fourth point of distinction, that the former have a *σῶμα ψυχικόν*, the latter a *σῶμα πνευματικόν*. What is meant by this distinction? Those theologians who think that the whole explanation of Paul in this section turns on the notion of substance and on the substantial diversity between earthly and heavenly bodies, explain in keeping therewith the adjectives *πνευματικόν* and *ψυχικόν* as designating on the one hand the heavenly light-matter, and on the other the earthly, psychico-sarkic matter of the *σώματα*. But against this mode of apprehending the distinction we may urge the following considerations. The analogy of 1 Cor. ii. 14 shows us that the adjective *ψυχικός* is used of a being in which there dwells as mental (*geistige*) power an earthly *ψυχή*, while the adjective *πνευματικός*, when put in contrast to it, is used of

a being in which dwells the divine Spirit. According to this, at our passage the *σῶμα ψυχικόν* signifies a body which encloses an earthly *ψυχή*, and the *σῶμα πνευματικόν* a body in which a divine *πνεῦμα* fills the place of the earthly *ψυχή*.<sup>1</sup> The thoughts of Paul move here not in the categories of form and substance, but in the categories of substantial form and mental (*geistigen*) contents;<sup>2</sup> the conception *σῶμα* denotes the bodily organism, the substantial diversity of which in heavenly and earthly bodies is not at all thought of (*gar nicht reflektirt wird*) in our words; and the conceptions *ψυχικός* and *πνευματικός* denote the mind-power (*Geisteskraft*), either creaturely or divine, which animates the bodily organism. Although the *ψυχή* does not come into view here, as in ii. 14, directly as human organ of cognition, it is clear withal that we may not except this faculty in any case from the *ψυχή*; it is here a brief designation for the whole compass of the *non-corporeal* side of the earthly man. For the fact that man's earthly mode of existence is really thus definitely characterised by the *ψυχή* in distinction from the heavenly mode of existence in the resurrection-

<sup>1</sup> There does not seem to me much force in the objection of Weiss (Bibl. Theol. d. N. T. p. 242) to Wendt's view of *σῶμα ψυχικόν*—viz. that, when the *σῶμα σπείρεται*, i.e. is laid in the grave, the soul has already “departed from the body,”—because the Apostle is speaking of what *had been* the characteristic mark of the body now laid in the grave, as contrasted with what *was to be* its character when raised. If the words are to be thus strictly construed, it is clear that the body as “sown” could no longer be called *ψυχικόν* in any sense, when the *ψυχή* had left it.

<sup>2</sup> I render the passage literally, though I do not like the expression “substantial form.” Moreover, while the German language labours under occasional disadvantage from the use of *Geist* to denote both “spirit” and “mind,” the English has no word reproducing exactly the force in such a case as this of the German ‘*geistig*.’

state, the Apostle now appeals to the expression in the beginning of Genesis (ii. 7): "the first man Adam became a living ψυχή." To him it appears to be not without significance that at this important passage precisely the expression "soul" is used and not "spirit"; he sees therein a veiled antithetic reference to the second Adam, whose divine nature is characterised by the fact that he is life-making πνεῦμα. And only now, after the distinction set up between a psychic and pneumatic mode of existence has been applied (*ausgeführt ist*), the Apostle comes at the close to point also to the diversity of substantial constitution (*Beschaffenheit*) of the bodies here and hereafter, attaching it to the comparison between the first and the second Adam (verse 47 f.); the former is of earth, the latter is of heaven, so are those associated (*Genossen*) with Adam earthy (χοϊκοί) and those associated with Christ heavenly (ἐπουράνιοι). But on this very occasion it comes once more very clearly to light that the whole discussion of Paul has for its subject not the diversity of substance, but the diversity of form and shape in the case of earthly and risen beings. For here at the close, when for the first time he brings expressly into prominence the diversity of substance, it serves him withal merely as a further proof, that the *appearance* of the risen is other than the *appearance* of those living on earth: "and, as we have borne the *image* of the earthly (man), so shall we also bear the *image* of the heavenly" (verse 49). Thus, very far from wishing to establish the diversity of substances through the diversity of forms of appearance, the Apostle rather pursues the converse course, and reaches the goal to which his argument, starting from the doubting question of his opponents, had from the outset tended.

## E.—ON THE MEANING OF EPH. IV. 23.

(Note to page 212.)

The peculiar expression here used ἀνανεοῦσθαι τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοῦς ὑμῶν, which places πνεῦμα in an unique relation to νοῦς, has occasioned some difficulty to expositors. Several explanations have been suggested. Augustine took the genitive by way of apposition: “the spirit which is called mind,” but this may be at once set aside as inadequate and improbable. Many have been disposed to construe the genitive as possessive, and to regard πνεῦμα as the dative of the instrument: “by the Spirit which the νοῦς is endued with”—the divine Spirit dwelling in it as the source of renewal. Bishop Ellicott adopts this view as consonant with the predominant usage of Scripture as regards πνεῦμα, and complains of the strong language in which Dr. Eadie has described it as “an evident error” and a “blunder.” But, while it is true that πνεῦμα would naturally receive this interpretation if standing by itself alongside of ἀνανεοῦσθαι, it cannot well be taken to mean directly the divine agent, when it is associated with the genitive τοῦ νοῦς ὑμῶν which marks it as belonging to the readers. Meyer rightly holds, in opposition to this view, that “the Holy Spirit bestowed on man is never in the New Testament designated in such a way that man appears as the subject of the Spirit (never τὸ πνεῦμα ὑμῶν).” A second reason, however, urged by him against it—namely, “that it was the object of the Apostle to put forward the moral self-activity of the Christian life”—seems the less cogent, as he has just before maintained that ἀνανεοῦσθαι is to be con-

strued as *passive*, not as *middle*. Meyer, with De Wette and Eadie, prefers a third explanation which takes the genitive as partitive, and the dative as that of reference: "in respect of, as regards, the spirit by which your *voûs* is governed," and he quotes with approval the pithy gloss of Bengel: "*spiritu mentis*, 1 Cor. xiv. 14, *Spiritus est intimum mentis*." The *πνεῦμα* is, in Meyer's view, "the human spirit, different from the divine"; and he describes it as "the *higher life-principle* in man, the *moral power akin to God* in him," "the substratum of the inward man." And Delitzsch, who finds in this passage, taken along with his interpretation of 1 Cor. xiv. 14, a main support for his theory of the *πνεῦμα* of man as "the innermost sanctuary of the heart," complains that "the important psychological conception" which underlies it has not received any satisfactory or at least thorough explanation (*Bibl. Psychol.*, p. 185 f.). He quotes in an Appendix (p. 394 f.) an interesting extract from a work entitled "Scriptural Thoughts as to the powers of the human soul,"—published in 1760 by Professor Heinrich Wilhelm Clemmens—as the only attempt within his knowledge to determine exactly (*festzustellen*) the conception of *πνεῦμα τοῦ νοῦς*—an extract, which has at least the merit of being relatively more clear than the exposition of Dr. Delitzsch who has disinterred it, and which seems to me to suggest, on the part of Clemmens, a different and simpler interpretation of the unique expression than that which Dr. Delitzsch has read into it.

The passage runs as follows:—"The powers of grace that work in the soul and regenerate the man constitute [*machen aus*, not 'determine,' as Dr. Wallis renders it] the spirit of man, which thereupon penetrates the whole soul, and, inasmuch as it dwells in the innermost recess of it, is termed the spirit of the mind, *πνεῦμα τοῦ νοῦς*."

As such a spirit, it is then in turn (*wieder*) specially subject in a pleasantly passive manner to the Holy Spirit and his gracious operations, which are always continued and advanced in the hearts of believers, and it is related to these operations of the Holy Spirit as human feeling viewed in itself is related to the general assistance of grace or to the first grace common to all men [not, as Dr. Wallis oddly renders: 'that grace which is common to the first man and to all men']. *Spiritus est facultas animae*, Bengel says in this sense, *quum ea Spiritus divini operationem suaviter patitur; et voûs est facultas animae foras progredientis et cum proximo agentis*, 1 Cor. xiv. 14.

With the reason, so far as it rules alone, the word *πνεῦμα*, which points to a foreign power, is not once associated [not, as with Dr. Wallis: 'which points to a foreign power, not for one time only']—a manifest proof that man has in reason a ground determining his actions, which is peculiar to him doubtless, but is quite corrupted by sin. When, on the other hand, the reason is used in good understanding and by those who are under grace, it happens that now and then such an adjunct as *πνεῦμα* is attached to it, inasmuch as believers, precisely because they are under grace, allow their reason and all their thoughts to be animated by the workings of grace, and come to have (*bekommen*) a spirit in themselves, which may thereupon receive and retain in the inmost depth of the soul the impressions of the Holy Spirit, that only now (*erst*) rightly carries forward and completes the state of grace. So at least speaks Holy Scripture; for otherwise we could not understand why at 1 Cor. xiv. 14 *πνεῦμα* and *voûs*, spirit and understanding, are distinguished, and why, according to Eph. iv. 23, the believer is daily to let himself be renewed in the spirit of the understanding, *πνεῦμα τοῦ νοῦς*.

When the reason works under grace, it becomes ever more skilled in comprehending with all saints what is the breadth and the length and the height and the depth of the knowledge of God, which is in Christ Jesus. At the beginning it attaches itself (*hält sich*) to the first all-present grace which is near to all men; and, if it shows fidelity here, it will become from time to time sur-

rounded with new grace and so pervaded, that a spirit of the powers of understanding (*ein Geist der Verstandskräfte*) animates its working and makes it acceptable to God; and that these powers are, to the praise of the wisdom and glory of the great God and Saviour Jesus Christ, daily renewed, awakened, set in motion, and by the help of the good Spirit that completes the work of grace and his constant influence

Even in the innermost depth of men's souls  
Are wedded with the most child-like sighs.

Thus then in this inmost depth of the soul (*Seelengrund*) the *πνεῦμα τοῦ νοός*, the spirit of the mind and of all the powers of the soul comes to have (*bekommt*) its dwelling."

Now this passage, although not throughout equally precise and discriminating in its language, does not seem to convey the idea of the *πνεῦμα* as something belonging to man as such, as a part of human nature—"a spirit within the mind," forming its background or substratum—which becomes the seat and sphere of the renewal, and of which psychology may claim to take cognisance as within its domain. It is not, in Clemmens's view, the human, but the divine, basis for the operations of special grace. It is not a thing which man has, but which he comes to have (*bekommt*). It is itself not natural faculty or potential aptitude, but a result and product of *first grace*, whereby the mind is prepared for, and made receptive of, the more definite operations in which the Spirit carries forward and completes His work. Nothing could be more plain than the opening statement that the powers of grace at work in the soul and regenerating the man constitute the spirit, which thereupon pervades the soul; and the whole passage savours more of grace than of psychology. But for that very reason—because it deals with the matter under the religious aspect—it suggests a better key to the interpretation of the words, than



that duplication of the mental machinery maintained by Delitzsch and others, which, as M. Reuss remarks, we are "tempted to regard as a pleonasm." The *πνεῦμα* is not an inner aspect of the mind itself, nor, as M. Reuss would have it, 'the direction or tendency which the mind takes' in the renewal, but is the influence by which it is guided and governed—the new motive power which comes into it, directs it, rules and effectively controls its action. And the *νοῦς*, having the divinely given *πνεῦμα* as its animating and impelling principle, stands thus diametrically opposed to the *νοῦς τῆς σαρκός*—the mind as directed and controlled by the *σάρξ*—at Col. ii. 18: *φυσιοῦμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦς τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ*, where, looking to St. Paul's use of *νοῦς* to denote the intellect as exercising moral judgment, it is hardly necessary to have recourse to Bishop Lightfoot's ingenious suggestion that the Apostle is here taking up some watchword of the false teachers, who doubtless boasted that they were directed *ὑπὸ τοῦ νοός*, and are answered by the Apostle, "Yes; but it is *ὁ νοῦς τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν*."

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F.—DR. EZRA P. GOULD ON THE NEW TESTAMENT USE OF 'SARX.'

(Note to p. 246.)

In an article contributed to the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1875, vol. xxxii., p. 36 ff., Dr. Gould states that his object is "to present a view of this use, that the writer has

not seen elsewhere, and which, if warrantable, removes grave difficulties in the matter of New Testament psychology." His theory is that the use of the term as applied to humanity and to sinful humanity rests on "a recognition of the *σάρξ* as the basis of human descent and propagation"—a meaning which most directly appears in the passages expressive of relationship classed by us under C.

The New Testament passages are classified by him as, 1, Those in which *σάρξ* is used quite literally, at least with no greater departure from the original meaning than is involved in the confusion (?) of *σάρξ* and the wider *σῶμα*; 2, those in which, as the medium of descent, it is the basis of relationship; 3, those, in which *σάρξ καὶ αἷμα* is used as equivalent for man, never the individual, but the *genus homo*, always contrasted with something greater, and so denoting weakness; 4, those where *μία σάρξ* denotes the union in marriage; 5, passages in which it is used for the human race or humanity, where it is observed that "*σάρξ* evidently in the Hebrew mind stands in constant contrast with *πνεῦμα*, and man, as habited in flesh, although endowed with spirit, is described by that which distinguishes him from the world of purely spiritual beings"; and 6, its most important use to denote man's sinful nature, meaning by that the entire man before conversion, or the sinful part, 'the old man,' after conversion.

He objects to the common explanation, which supposes the fleshly or sensual nature of man to be the seat or starting-point of sin, as involving an unwarranted and superficial psychology. . . He thinks that a wide induction of facts would show that in children the sensual passions were the very last to be sinfully excited, and that the first outbreaks of sin were in the region of

spiritual things, especially selfishness and anger. Then, as far as we can understand the probably allegorical account of the fall of man, it was not through his bodily appetites that the tempter reached him. . . . The appeal was rather to his spiritual nature, to which was offered the tempting bait of knowledge. If we attempt to find a class of sins which generally lead to the rest, or a principle universally inherent in sin, he thinks that "we shall fail equally in supporting the charge against the flesh that it is pre-eminently the sinful part of man. It is true that these fleshly sins sometimes furnish the occasion for others through which they reach their ends or revenge the thwarting of them. But such a relation as this is not fundamental enough to warrant the prominence given to *σάρξ*. . . . The mere occasion has no essential connection with the result. . . . If any pre-eminence among sins is to be named it belongs to such sins of the spirit rather than of the sensual nature, as selfishness, malice, revenge, and the like." And he concludes as follows:—

"What then is the reason of this use of *σάρξ* to denote man's sinful nature? I think that we may find the key to an explanation of it in the preceding discussion of its other uses. We have seen that it is used to denote humanity, both in the concrete and the abstract, partly at least because through it the race is propagated. Humanity, which on the natural side owes its continuance to the *σάρξ*, is itself called *σάρξ*. Natural and sarkical are therefore convertible terms in reference to man. On the other side the spirit, *πνεῦμα*, is that through which man is connected with the divine and supernatural, and especially in the new birth. It is there that the divine Spirit works implanting the germs of a new life, and so spiritual and divine or supernatural are also convertible

terms in regard to man. To this let it be added that the natural man connected with the race through the *σάρξ* is sinful, while the new man, connected with God through the *πνεῦμα*, is holy; and does it seem strange that *σάρξ* should itself be used to denote the sinful natural man, and *πνεῦμα* the holy renewed man? It is simply resolved into this: the former is that through which man in his natural state is descended from a sinful race, and inherits a sinful nature, and it is used to denote that nature; while the latter is that, through which and in which God implants a new divine life of holiness, and it is used to denote that life."

This theory seems based on very slender exegetical grounds. The number of passages in which the element of descent comes directly into prominence is but small, and it is only by a *petitio principii* that the conception of sin is specially associated with that descent, while it is not easy to see in what sense Dr. Gould would make his suggested analogy of *πνεῦμα* to bear. The designation of mankind as *σάρξ* is much more naturally explained by synecdoche of the (visible and conspicuous) part for the whole; and the association of sin with the humanity so designated is with more probability referred to an induction of experience than to a special theory of hereditary transmission. Whatever grounds there may be elsewhere for imputing such a theory to St. Paul, Dr. Gould has by no means adduced sufficient warrant for engrafting it on *σάρξ*.

## G.—SPECIAL LITERATURE.

The following is a list of the monographs, or special discussions, that I have had opportunity of consulting, exclusive of the works already mentioned in the text or notes, and of books of a more general character that have occasion to deal more or less fully with the questions concerned.

- Ackermann (Dr. Carl): Beitrag zur theologischer Würdigung und Abwägung der Begriffe *πνεῦμα*, *νοῦς* und Geist. [Studien und Kritiken, 1839. iv. 873 ff.]
- Auberlen (Dr. Carl August) : article "Geist des Menschen im Biblischen Sinne" in the *first* edition of Herzog's Encyklopädie, iv., 728 ff.
- Cremer (Dr. Hermann) : articles "Fleisch im Biblischen Sinne;" and "Geist des Menschen im Biblischen Sinne," in the *second* edition of Herzog's Encykl.
- Eklund (P.) : *Σάραξ* vocabulum quid apud Paulum Apostolum significet. [Acta Univ. Lundensis, 1871.] 4° Lund, 1871-72.
- Griethuysen (Theodorus Joannes van): Disputatio exegetico-theologica de notionibus vocabulorum *σῶμα* et *σάραξ* in Novi Testamenti interpretatione distinguendis. 8° Amstel. 1846.
- Hausrath (Dr. Adolph) : "Die dualistischen Voraussetzungen der Paulinischen Theologie." [Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte, ii. 463 ff.]
- Kahnis (Karl Friedrich August) : Die Lehre vom heiligen Geiste. Erster Theil. 8° Halle, 1847.
- Kleinert (Dr. Paul) : Zur alttestamentlichen Lehre vom Geiste Gottes. [Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie, xii. (1867), 1 ff.]
- Kluge (Dr.) : Der *Νοῦς*. [Jahrbücher f. D. Theol. xvi. (1871), 319 ff.]

- Kupff (Émile): Sur la signification du mot *σάρξ* dans le Nouveau Testament; thèse. . . 8° Strasb. 1853.
- Menegoz (Eugène): Le Péché et la redemption d'après Saint Paul. 8° Paris, 1882.
- Nees von Esenbeck: Zur pastoralen Seelensorge; Exegetische Andeutungen zur Biblischen Psychologie. [Stud. u. Krit. 1865, iii. 490 ff.]
- Roos (Dr. Magnus Friedrich): Fundamenta psychologiæ ex Sacra Scriptura . . . collectae. 12° Tubing. 1769.
- Sabatier (Auguste): articles "Chair" and "Esprit," in Lichtenberger's Encycl. des Sciences Religieuses.
- Schoeberlein (Dr. Ludwig): Ueber das Wesen der geistlichen Natur und Leiblichkeit. [Jahrbücher f. D. Theol. vi. (1861) 1 ff.]
- Smeaton (Dr. George): The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit; Cunningham Lecture. 8° Edin. 1882.<sup>1</sup>
- Stirm (C. H.): Anthropologisch-exegetisch Untersuchungen: ein Beitrag zur neutestamentlichen Anthropologie. [Zeitschrift für Theologie, 1834, iii. 1 ff.]
- Tholuck (Dr. Friedrich August Gottreu): Erneute Untersuchung über *σάρξ* als Quelle der Sünde. [Stud. u. Krit. 1855, iii. 477 ff.]

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I have received, through the kindness of the Editor, a volume and several numbers of the "Chrysanthemum, a Monthly Magazine for Japan and the Far East," containing a series of papers by the Rev. H. Waddell, B.A., "On the Rendering into Japanese of some Theological and Psychological Terms." The chief object of the writer is to call in question the principle on which *πνεῦμα* has been rendered in "the standard Japanese version" by a variety of terms according to the variety of its use, and to maintain that the aim of the translators should be

<sup>1</sup>The limitations which I have imposed on myself (see Lecture I.) preclude me from touching otherwise than incidentally on this doctrine of the Personal Source of the *Πνεῦμα*, to the exposition and defence of which Dr. Smeaton has devoted his valuable work.

to find a single word which shall correspond as nearly as possible in its physical and physiological senses to the Hebrew *ruach* and the Greek *πνεῦμα*. The discussion is interesting, and Mr. Waddell supports his views in an ingenious and elaborate argument; but he has barely as yet (so far as I have seen his papers—up to No. 14) reached the stage of deepest interest, and, I should apprehend, difficulty—namely, the transition to the psychological, and, above all, to the distinctively Christian, use of the term.

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In a note subjoined to my General Preface to the translation of Meyer's Commentary (Rom. I. p. xiii. f.) I gave some illustrations of the mode in which German theological works are too often rendered into English. I add a few specimens, out of many that I have met with in the course of reading on the subject of the present volume: eine Werthbestimmung, "an intentional accuracy"; zur Erscheinung bringt, "brings about"; die Erscheinung der menschlichen Natur bestimmt, "affects the nature of the man"; wird bestimmt, "is described" or "is spoken of"; gleichbedeutend, "of kindred significance"; wie hier verbunden (viz., *σῶμα* and *ψυχὴ* at Matt. x. 28), "are identified"; fast häufiger, "much oftener"; ohne dass jedoch, "though of course there is"; eine besondere Abhandlung, "a remarkable treatise"; innerlich, "entirely"; neben, "united to"; innwerden, "inner being;" nach biblischen Anschauung, "according to a Biblical inspection"; pneumatische Anlage, "a spiritual beginning"; gliedlich, "material"; Verwechslung, "mistake"; Geist, "soul"; das Gesetzgemässe, "the proportion of the law"; persönlich angelegte, "personally interested"; dass mir das Böse vorliegt, "that evil is foremost to me"; Zwecksatz, "the point in view"; s. v. a. ich

bedeute, "means as an equivalent I"; Urhah des Kosmos, "origin of the Kosmos"; solidarische Einheit, "a substantial unity"; es ist also ohne Widerrede gegen die Schrift, "it is thus no contradiction against Scripture"; Nebenordnung, "regular ordination"; die Hauptsache worauf es ankommt, "the principle in which it results." I subjoin a *literal* rendering of three sentences, and place overagainst it the form in which they appear in the English translations, where the meaning is either obscured or reversed.

To designate a being which is without bodily vesture for its inward nature, so that, if we may so speak, it is merely the living [thing] that presents itself, it is natural to use just the word which denotes this inward nature (perhaps in some association with the fundamental signification "breath").

Thence sprang the *dogmatic form*, the fixed idea; but the deep *religious and moral contents*, which soon widened into a speculative stream, emanated here too from Paul's inmost emotional nature and most thoroughly personal experience.

The law, when it heightens sin, serves as a foil [*als Folie*] to the power of grace.

"The word thus comes to denote an essence without, or, not requiring any corporeal garb, or especially any corporeal medium for its inner reality, so that it is only as we simply utter the word which denotes this that the living essence is, so to speak, present ( $\pi\nu$ . being here perhaps akin to its derivation breath.)"

"Hence it was that the dogmatic form, the fixed idea, and also the deep religious and moral content were derived, which soon widened into a river of speculation; here also was the source of the innermost affections and most personal life of Paul."

"The law, as enhancing sin, treats the power of grace as folly."



# I N D E X.

- '*Ἀμαρτία*: viewed as objective sin by Holsten, 26, 28, 354; Lüdemann, 44, 390; Pfeiderer, 54; without support from passages adduced, 83-86, 318; meaning of *σάρξ ἄμ.* discussed, 330-341. See **SIX**.  
 American revised version, 241.  
 Anthropological conclusions, divergent, 64.  
 Augustine: definition of 'flesh,' 10.
- Basar*: different uses of the term, 109-115.
- Baur (Dr. Ferdinand Christian): earlier view, 19; later, 20-23; judging Holsten, 65.
- Beck (Dr. Johann Tobias): Biblical Psychology, 174; trichotomy, 176.
- Body. See *Σῶμα*.
- Calvin: definition of 'flesh,' 11 f.; on Rom. viii. 10, 223 f.; on 2 Cor. iii. 17, 228.
- Charismata of primitive church, 151.
- Chrysostom: definition of 'flesh,' 13.
- Clemmens (Heinrich Wilhelm), on *πνεῦμα τοῦ νοῦς*, 442 f.
- Corinthians, first Epistle to the: ii. 14, 187-190; ix. 27, 248; xiv. 14, 206-210; xv. 35 ff., 191, 251, 432-440.
- Corinthians, second Epistle to the, iii. 1-iv. 6, 164-167; iii. 17, 227-230; v. 21, 321 f.; vii. 1, 259 f.
- Cremer (Dr. Hermann): his *Lexicon*, 130; quoted, 115, 141; on Plutarch's use of *σάρξ*, 291; on *ὁμοίωμα*, 326.
- Delitzsch (Dr. Franz): on Is. xlii. 1, 153; his *Biblical Psychology*, 175; on trichotomy, 176-8; definition of *σάρξ* examined, 303 f.; view of Eph. iv. 23 examined, 441-445.
- Δόξα*: view of Lüdemann, 39, 380; of Pfeiderer, 59; of Holsten, 347; import at 2 Cor. iii. 18, 163-167.
- Dualism: as defined by Holsten, 26; by Lüdemann, 39 f.; Pfeiderer, 52; in *Book of Wisdom*, 282; not in O. T. or in St. Paul, 312.
- Ellicott, Bishop: on human *πνεῦμα*, 97, 194; on *πνεῦμα τοῦ νοῦς*, 441.
- Ephesians, Epistle to the, iv. 23, 211, 441-445.
- Exegesis, specimens of, 82-91, 138 f.; principles of, 94-112.
- Flesh and Spirit as used by St. Paul: interest of inquiry, 1 f.; difficulties, 3-7; scope and

- limits, 7-9; recent German theories stated, 18-62; divergent and incongruous, 64-67; *ex facie* improbable, 68-73; criticised as to methods and results, 74-92; discussions of meaning of terms, 130-308; general conclusions, 341-343.
- Flesh. See Σάρξ.
- Gifford (Dr.): on Rom. vii. 18, 319.
- Godet (Dr. Frédéric): on Rom. vii. 14 ff., 214; on *θέλειν* in Rom. vii., 219; on Rom. viii. 10, 221; definition of σάρξ, 306.
- Gould (Dr. Ezra): explanation of the use of σάρξ, 246 and 445; set aside, 448.
- Grimm (Dr. C. L. W.): Lexicon, 130; quoted 159, 278, 279.
- Hilgenfeld (Dr. Adolf): on Rom. vii. 9, 86; on *ὁμοίωμα*, 323.
- Hofmann (Dr. J. C. von): on Rom. viii. 10, 222; reviewed by Schmidt, 360, 367.
- Holsten (Dr. Carl): leading positions stated, 23-28, 346 ff.; criticised by Baur, 65; Schmidt, 66, 367 f., 374; Lüdemann, 66, 381 f., 385, 400; want of consistency, 68; elasticity of categories, 75, 77, 79; interpretation of Rom. v., 12 ff. examined, 83 f.; *πνεῦμα* as material substance, 161 f.; explanation of passages as to human πν., 169 f.; distinction between σάρξ and σῶμα examined, 247 ff.; rejection of 2 Cor. vii. 1, 75, 260; theory as to σάρξ examined, 274 ff.; on 2 Cor. v. 21, 321 f.; on *ὁμοίωμα*, 323; attribution of 'sin-flesh' to Christ, 331 f.; grounds for it examined, 332 ff.
- Hort (Dr. F. J. A.): conjecture as to 2 Cor. iii. 17, 229 f.
- Hyle*: currency as philosophic term, 280; use of *ὕλη* in N. T. and LXX., 280; not employed by St. Paul, 279 f.
- Immer (Dr. A.): on correlation of divine and human *πνεῦμα*, 238.
- Interpretation, principles of, 94-112.
- Jowett (Dr. Benjamin): on St. Paul's psychology, 6; on double meaning of words, 97-102; on 1 Thess. v. 23, 181.
- Καρδία*: use of the term, 198 f., 430; comprehensive import, 198 ff.; seat of intelligence and volition, 200 f.; characteristics and contrasts, 202 f.; relation to νοῦς, 204.
- Laidlaw (Dr. John): his Bible Doctrine of Man, 40, 174, 175; view as to Rom. vii., 214 f.; on definitions of σάρξ, 303.
- Lebh*: distinction from *ruach*, 120 f., 420-422.
- Le Clerc (Jean): definition of 'flesh,' 14.
- Lightfoot, Bishop; quoted, 97, 182, 296, 445.
- Literature, special, 449 f.
- Lüdemann (Dr. Hermann): his views stated, 37-49, 375-403; criticising Holsten and Schmidt, 66; criticised by Pfeleiderer, 67, 85; on Rom. v. 2, 86 f.; on *μὴ γένοιτο*, 89 f.; alleged parallel, 90 f.; on 1 Cor. xiv. 14, 208; on the σῶμα as 'form,' 256 f.; alleged parallel between St. Paul and Philo examined, 287-293; on ambiguity of "Sinnlichkeit," 295; on sphere of operation of the σάρξ, 297; on σάρξ as 'tendency of life,' 302; on Alexandrian Hellenism im-

- ported into O. T., 312; on *ὁμοίωμα*, 324 f.; his view examined, 326 f.
- Lünemann (Dr. Gottlieb): on distinction of *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή*, 176.
- Luther: view of 'flesh,' 11.
- Matter: elasticity of the category, 76; not mentioned as such, or as evil, 280 f.; not identified with evil, 311.
- Meyer (Dr. H. A. W.): 98, 135, 296, 389; on 1 Cor. xiv. 14, 209; on 2 Cor. iii. 17, 227; his definition of *σάρξ*, 307; recent revision of his "Commentary," 307 f.
- Middleton, Bishop: on use of the article with *πνεῦμα*, 134.
- Müller (Dr. Julius): definition of *σάρξ*, 12, examined, 301; criticised by Schmidt, 358; and by Lüdemann, 388.
- Neander (Dr. August): definition of *σάρξ*, 12, examined, 299.
- Nepesh* in distinction from *ruach*, 118 f., 416-419.
- Noûs*: use of the term, 431; as defined by Baur, 21; Lüdemann, 38, 378; Pfeiderer, 56; relation to *καρδιά*, 204 f.; sense in 1 Cor. xiv. 14, 206 f.; faculty of judgment, 209 f.; field specially ethical, 211 f.; *πνεῦμα τοῦ νοῦς*, 211 f., 441-445; use of *νοῦς* in Rom. vii., 213-219.
- Oltremare (Dr. Hugues): exegetical caprices of, 138-140, 220.
- Ὁμοίωμα* (Rom. viii. 3): conflicting views of its meaning, 323; Lüdemann's view, 324 f., 396; asserting similarity but denying sameness, 327; assumptions of Pfeiderer and Lüdemann criticised, 328-330.
- Overbeck (Dr. Fr.): view of *ὁμοίωμα*, 323.
- Paul, St.: relation to philosophy, 70; declarations and disclaimers, 71-73; original readers, 94 f.; Jewish culture, 105 f.; teaching compared with that of Philo, 283-294; doctrine of sin, 309-340.
- Pfeiderer (Dr. Otto): views stated, 50-62; repudiation of Holsten's view as to *σάρξ*, 66; and of Lüdemann's view as to Rom. i.-viii. 67; presumption against his theory of "unreconciled antinomy," 70; elasticity of categories, 76 f., 80; rejects Holsten's exegesis of Rom. v. 12, 85; explanation of Pauline doctrine of *πνεῦμα*, 150; conception of *πν.* as material substance, 161 f.; on 1 Thess. v. 23, 181; on relation between divine and human *πνεῦμα*, 233; solution examined, 234 ff.; view as to *σῶμα* examined, 257 f.; explaining away of Rom. v. 12, 317; 'artifice of the idea,' 317; on Holsten's view of 2 Cor. v. 21, 322; view of *ὁμοίωμα*, 324, examined, 328; alleged key to St. Paul's argument at Rom. viii. 3 examined, 333-339.
- Philo: teaching compared with St. Paul's, 283-294; main points of agreement and difference, 285; on the body, 286; alleged parallel use of *σάρξ*, 287 ff.; a foil to St. Paul, 294.
- Philosophy: St. Paul's alleged relation to Greek, 70-75; categories of, imported into exegesis, 74-80.
- Πνεῦμα*: uses of the word, 131 f., 428; meaning of, at Rom. viii. 10, 219 ff.; at 2 Cor. iii. 17, 227 ff.; *πνεῦμα τοῦ νοῦς*, 211 f., 441-445.

- Πνεῦμα**, the Divine: 133 ff.; effect of the article, 134 f.; characteristics, 136 ff.; identity in all, 143; diversity of operation, 144 f.; relation to O. T. *ruach*, 146 ff.; apocalyptic conception too narrow, 150; "gifts" of primitive church, 151; ethico-religious character, 152; promises in Is. and Ezek., 153 ff.; with genitival adjuncts, 157 f.; adverse influences similarly designated, 159; passages adduced as implying substance, 161 ff.; relation to human πν., 230 ff.
- the Human: 168 ff.; passages implying, 168; suggested explanations, 169 f.; difficulties, 171 f.; distinctions suggested, 175 ff.; relation to ψυχή, 182 ff.; Wendt's view of the distinction, 191 ff.; objections to his peculiar position, 193 ff.; term chosen to express religious value, 194-197; relation between human and divine πν., 230 ff.; correlation as presented by Immer, 238; mode of marking the distinction, 239.
- Psyche**: use of term, 430; place and function, 182 f.; seat of Ego, and value as such, 184 f.; meaning of ψυχικός, 187 f.; relation to πνεῦμα, 191 f.
- Psychology**, Biblical: tendency to systematise, 6; trichotomy, 173 f.; Beck and Delitzsch, 174; psychological origin of sin not explained by St. Paul, 315.
- Reuss** (Dr. Édouard): definitions of 'flesh,' 14, 306; *Histoire de la Theol. Chrét.*, 93; on the sense of πν. and duplication of man's spiritual nature, 137 f.; on Is. xlii. 1, 153; on 1 Thess. v. 23, 152; on relation between divine and human πνεῦμα, 232; on 1 Cor. xv. 39, 248; freedom of his rendering of σάρξ, 306.
- Revised version of N. T., 185, 269; twofold rendering of πνεῦμα, 239-241; American revision preferable, 242.
- Ritschl** (Dr. Albert): his view stated, 15-17, 260; modified, 271; criticised by Schmidt, 368 f.
- Romans**, Epistle to the, v. 2, 87 f.; v. 5, 162; v. 12 ff., 83 f., 317; vii. 9, 85; vii. 14-25, 213-219; viii. 3, 323-332; viii. 10, 219-223; viii. 15, 138.
- Ruach**: uses of the term, 116-127; relation to *nephesh*, 116-120; relation to *lebh*, 120 f.; transcendental, 122; qualities of, as promised to Israel, 123 f.; "spirit of the holiness of God," 126; precedent and warrant for N. T. conception, 152 ff.
- Σάρξ**: chief lines of interpretation, 10-18; recent German theories, 18 f.; O. T. use of *basar*, 109-116; does it imply sinfulness? 113-116; uses by St. Paul, 224 f., 426; distinction between σάρξ and σῶμα, 246 ff.; Wendt's view, 250-262, 432 ff.; πᾶσα σ., 263; σ. καὶ αἷμα, 263; used for 'creature' or 'creaturely side,' 264 f.; prominent features of this use, 267; interchanged with 'man,' 267; with 'the old man,' 268; contrast to πνεῦμα, 269 f.; result arrived at, 271; other interpretations and definitions examined, 272 f.; theory of bodily substance examined, 274-294; theory of 'sensuousness,' 294-298; definitions of Neander, Tholuck, Julius Müller, Delitzsch reviewed, 299-303; views of Meyer and Weiss, 307; definition pre-

- ferred, 308; relation to sin, 309-340; *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας*, 330-339; view of Dr. Gould, 445.
- Schmidt (Dr. Richard): his view stated, 29-36, 357-374; judgment on Holsten's positions, 66, 367f., 369, 371; criticised by Lüdemann and Pfeiderer, 66f.; presumption against his view, 69; on Rom. viii. 10, 223; objection to taking *σάρξ* as an abstract notion examined, 265 f.; referred to, 316, 322.
- Sensuousness: definitions resting on, 13 f.; theory of, examined, 294 f.; ambiguity of 'Sinnlichkeit,' 295; sin not associated exclusively with, 313 f.
- Septuagint: usage of, 127 f.; but slightly influenced by philosophical leanings, 282.
- Siegfried (Dr. Carl): comparison of St. Paul and Philo, 284 f.
- Sin: relation of the *σάρξ* to, 309-340; not associated exclusively with the body, 313; psychological origin not explained, 315; referable to selfishness rather than to sensuousness, 316 f.; historical origin, 317 f.; Rom. v. 12 and Rom. vii. not incompatible, 318; doctrine of, based not on speculation but on experience, 319; empiric dominion of, 321; exception of Christ, 321 ff.; Holsten's theory examined by Wendt, 334 ff. See *ἁμαρτία*.
- Sinlessness of Christ, 321 f.; discussion of Rom. viii. 3, 322 ff.; grounds for attributing *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας* to Christ examined, 331 f.
- Σῶμα: usage of the term, 427; distinguished from *σάρξ* by Holsten, 24, 247, 347; Lüdemann, 38, 256, 376 f.; Pfeiderer, 50, 257; Wendt, 250, 432 f.; positions examined, 247-262; ethical connections of, 255; at 2 Cor. vii. 1, 259; outward executive organ, 260 f.; prominence given to it, 262; relation to sin not as source, but as seat or organ, 313 f.
- Spirit. See Πνεῦμα.
- Substance: alleged conception of, as to *ruach*, 122 f.; as to *πνεῦμα*, 161 f.
- Thessalonians, first Epistle to the, v. 23, 179 f.
- Tholuck (Dr. F. A. G.): definition of *σάρξ*, 12, examined, 300.
- Translations from the German, 451.
- Trichotomy, 175 f.
- Tübingen School: doubts of, 103 f.; divergent conclusions, 64 f., 322 ff.
- Usteri (Dr. Leonhard), definition of *σάρξ*, 14; speculation of, as to relation between divine and human *πνεῦμα*, 230 f.
- Weiss (Dr. Bernhard): his Biblical Theology of N. T., 93; criticised by Schmidt, 33, 369; Lüdemann, 43, 389; on *πνεῦμα* as source of "gifts," 150; view as to human *πνεῦμα* examined, 170-172; on 1 Thess. v. 23, 179; on *θέλειν* in Rom. vii., 219; on Rom. viii. 10, 221; his revision of Meyer, 307; definition of *σάρξ*, 307; on the reference of sin to the body, 315; on *σάρξ* without the article, 321; on Rom. viii. 3, 339.
- Wendt (Dr. H. H.): his monograph, 92; on the O. T. usage, 109 ff., 404 ff.; exception taken to his position as to passages implying sinfulness, 113 f.

- and to certain positions as to *ruach*, 126 f.; on ethico-religious character of the *πνεῦμα*, 152; on O. T. conception of spirits of evil, 160; on alleged conception of substance, 161 ff.; on 2 Cor. iii. 18, 164-167; on 1 Thess. v. 23, 181 f.; on relation of *σάρξ* and *ψυχή*, 183; on *ψυχή* as seat of the Ego, 184 f.; on *ψυχικός* in 1 Cor. ii. 14, 187 f.; on distinction between *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή*, 191 f.; objections to his position as to St. Paul's peculiar use of *πνεῦμα*, 193 f.; on *καρδιά*, 202; and *νοῦς*, 204, 208, 210; on *θέλειν* in Rom. vii. 15 ff., 216 f.; on 2 Cor. iii. 3, 245; view of distinction between *σάρξ* and *σῶμα*, 250-262, 432 f.; on relation of the *σῶμα* to sin, 260 f.; answer to Schmidt's objection regarding abstract use of *σάρξ*, 265 f.; on Rom. vii. 23, 314; classification of St. Paul's judgments as to the *σάρξ*, 320; exception to his view of *ὁμοίωμα*, 326; on Rom. viii. 3, 332; examination of theory of Holsten and Pfeid-erer as to Christ's cancelling of *σάρξ ἀμαρτίας*, 334-339; reason for choice of this expression, 340 f.
- Westcott and Hort (Drs.): conjecture as to 2 Cor. iii. 2 f., 201.
- Winer (Dr. G. B.): on use of anarthrous *πνεῦμα*, 135.
- Wisdom, Book of: alleged reminiscence of, 90; its dualism, 281 f.
- Zeller (Dr. Eduard): on alleged early traces of Jewish-Greek philosophy, 282; on use of *σάρξ* by Greek philosophers, 291; on meaning of *ὁμοίωμα*, 323.
- Zeschwitz (Dr. von): on trichotomy, 177 f.





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