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Studies in Hindu Thought.



With a foreword

BY

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Inscribed to

DR. BRAJENDRA NATH SEAL M. A., Ph. D.

VICE-CHANCELLOR, MYSORE UNIVERSITY,

AS A HUMBLE TOKEN OF GRATITUDE

FOR THE INSPIRATION DERIVED

WHILE STUDYING HINDU

PHILOSOPHY

UNDER

HIM.



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Foreword.

The two essays which Mr. Ganguli has here brought together were originally written by him when he was a Post-graduate student of the University, and now appear with some slight modifications. They attempt to compare the Hindu views of perception and the self with analogous doctrines in the West. The comparative method which the author adopts enables him to bring out what is unique in the Hindu views as well as accentuate what it shares with the thought of the West. The author is aware that it is not possible to give systematic treatment of the topics within the limits set to himself. Though I do not feel able to agree with the writer on all the points—perfect agreement in philosophical discussions is hardly to be expected—I have great pleasure in saying that the attempt is a praiseworthy one, and shows vast learning and critical powers of a high order.

Calcutta University } S. Radha Krishnan
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Studies in Hindu thought.

Perception

*Analysed Psychologically, Epistemologically
and Ontologically after the
Sankar Vedānta.*

Perception, as a source of knowledge, plays a very important role in almost all the systems of philosophy. This fact led the empiricists to maintain that perception is the only source of knowledge. All the systems of Indian philosophy in the midst of the divergence of their views agree that perception is an instrument of knowledge. Kant had sufficient insight to perceive that analytical thought could not produce the content of knowledge. Logic and Epistemology, however, occupy a peculiar position in the Vedantic system. The central truth of the Vedānta, the pure self or Brahman, is revealed and not ascertained by any 'human evidence' like that of perception and inference. Still perception and inference have a place in the Vedānta, for though they cannot yield the sacred truth, they yet point to it.

Perception is Brahman itself, the immediate identity of the knower and the known (प्रतत्तत्त्वं प्रमात्राच्चैतन्यमेव). All determinate knowledge means self-abnegation as it leads to the stratification or modalisation of the pure consciousness into three particular forms: determinate self-consciousness (प्रमात्राच्चैतन्य), modes of consciousness (प्रमाणचैतन्य), empirical object (विषयचैतन्य).

The mind goes out by the sense-gates of the body and takes the form of the object in the act of perception. It is objected that this going out of the mind implies a materialistic conception. This objection, however, is not tenable as Sankar recognises no distinction between the self and the material objects. Ultimately Sankar maintains that the body is phenomenal, the space is phenomenal and this going out of the mind is illusory. In ancient Greece and India it was held that the common sensory went out to meet the object. Knowledge thus shows the spontaneous activity of the self. But subsequently there was a transference from the object-centric to the ego-centric view. According to modern psychology the objects come from without and evoke the reaction of the Sense-organs. The objects

stimulate the peripheral nerves, the stimulation is carried to the brain and then the image of the object is produced. As the mind in perception goes out and takes the form of the object, there is unity of space-position between the modalised consciousness and the empirical object. This unity of space-position distinguishes perception from inference. In inference the mind does not go out to meet the object but only thinks of it. 'This distinction is practically the same as that drawn in modern psychology, only viewed from the point of view of the self's spontaneity, that in perception the given element and its interpretation are welded together in a unity, while in inference they are kept distinct.'

In the act of perception there is also the unity of time (*एककालीनत्व*), otherwise the remembrance of past happiness would be a case of perception. Unity of time-position thus distinguishes perception from memory for the object of memory precedes the act of memory.

The Naiyayika raises the objection that if unity of time and space were the only conditions of perception, the knowledge we get by means of words of the merit and demerit present in us would be a case of perception. In order

to avoid this difficulty, the Vedantic replies that another condition is necessary namely 'the object should be capable of being cognised by the sense' (योग्यत्व). It is nature (स्वभाव) that shows us which object is thus capable of being cognised and which is not. This 'yogyatva' or 'the object being capable of being cognised' distinguishes perception from *Sabda* which deals with supersensuous objects.

A perceptive act, according to the Sankar Vedanta, involves three conditions namely unity of time, unity of space and 'yogyatva'. Perception means the identity of the modalised consciousness which has taken the form of an empirical object and of the empirical-object-consciousness which is capable of being cognised by the senses. (तथाच तत्तदिन्द्रिययोग्य वत्तमानविषया-
बच्छिन्न चैतन्याभिन्नत्वं तत्तदाकार इत्यवच्छिन्नज्ञानस्य
तत्तदंशे प्रत्यक्षत्वं ।)

The Sankar Vedanta analysis of the process of perception from the psychological standpoint is characterised by a deep introspective analysis in as much as it has pointed out the three conditions of perception. It lays great stress on the spontaneous activity of the self in perception. Unlike Hume and Locke, who make

the self passive in the act of perception, Kant and the Sankarite emphasise the activity of the self in perception.

The greatest defect of the Sankar Vedanta theory of perception is that it does not take any notice of the psychological facts. Again in perception, the group of sensations, says Titchener, is supplemented by images. The Vedanta psychology of perception takes no account of these images which together with the sensations constitute the percept. The Sankarite sides with the psychology of the Association School in maintaining that sensations come as discrete psychical facts. James points out the error of this psychological atomism and holds that the primitive consciousness is not a duality but one confused mass of presentations in which the subject, the object, space, time and the categories are all rolled up together. All knowledge grows by dissociation among the elements of this consciousness. It is out of such a matrix that clear consciousness is evolved. The Sankar Vedanta has noticed the spontaneous activity of the self in perception but it has not adequately taken account of the pragmatic factors—the will in cognition and

the interest which exert a great influence on perception. The Sankarite thinks that the mind takes the form of the object and in this it betrays the fact that it has not been able to shake off completely the tendency to look upon an object and the knowledge of it as two different entities. Bergson maintains that it is vain to attribute to the cerebral substance the property of engendering representations. Its function is selective; and those parts of the environment which it selects by its action, are the content of perception. A perception is not something added to reality nor is it something of the mind projected on the object, nor something of the object projected towards the mind. Perception is a selection from reality. It is selection, says Wildon Carr, which gives to the perception its distinctness and individuality. The perception does not represent but is the reality.

The Sankarites are not representationists who, like the Sautrantikas, believe in the existence of an external material world which may be inferred as the cause and ground of our sensations, but do not allow an immediate perception or presentation of it. These representationists are what Hamilton calls Hypothetical

Dualists—those who assume a duality of existence—mental and material. He also calls them Cosmothetic Idealists *i. e.* Idealists who only assume but do not immediately perceive the cosmos or external material world. In opposition to these representationists like Locke, the Sankarites side with the Baibhasikas and maintain a presentationists' theory of perception and think that the external world is an object of direct, immediate perception. They correspond to such thinkers as Descartes, Reid, Hamilton, Martineau etc.

Perceptions according to the Sankarite may first be divided into सविकल्पक and निर्विकल्पक *i. e.* conceptual knowledge and relationless intuition. That which enters into the relation of particulars is conceptual knowledge. A specific mode constituted by relations gives सविकल्पक ज्ञान (वैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञान) as in 'I see the jar.' On the otherhand that which does not enter into relation of concepts is Relationless Intuition eg. 'He is that Devadatta.' निर्विकल्पक is the original data and सविकल्पक is derivative. निर्विकल्पक is non-relational knowledge. The विशेषण are there but they do not enter into any relation. It is however not below the threshold

of consciousness. In निर्बिकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष there arise in Brahman individual presentations of the nature of hallucination. And in सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष these are schematised and ordered by means of the relating activity of individuated consciousness. According to Kant, however, perception is indeterminate in the form of a manifold of sense and it becomes determinate when ordered by means of the categories. Hence determinate perception is more subjective. According to Nyaya, निर्बिकल्पक ज्ञान is below the threshold of consciousness, there being no conscious relation there. Savikalpak Jñāna (सविकल्पक ज्ञान) alone is present and from this by a logical process we go back to the stage of relationless intuition, which is not capable of being cognised by the senses but is a matter of inference. Nirbikalpak Jñāna (निर्बिकल्पक ज्ञान) is an explanatory hypothesis leading to Savikalpak Jñāna (सविकल्पक ज्ञान). Hegel agrees with the Naiyayikas in recognising the categories as not something foreign, but as something already there in an implicit form. The Naiyayikas hold that the passage from the implicit to the explicit is due to the relating activity of the mind. According to Hegel however, it is the result of the inner dialectic. According to

the Buddhists Nirbikalpak Jnan (निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान) is the condition in which objectless psychoses emerge out of the void or absolute indefinite by a process of negation within negation. In Sabikalpak Jnan (सविकल्पक ज्ञान) there is a further definition of these psychoses by means of Vikalpa (विकल्प) or the schematism of the thinking process. We see, therefore, that Sankar, Kant and the Buddhists agree in recognising the Nirbikalpak (निर्विकल्पक) state as a pure manifold. The Bikalpas (विकल्प) are an extraneous addition and hence the schematised manifold gives only illusory presentations.

Perception can be further classified into intuitive knowledge of the limited self and intuitive knowledge of the supreme self (जीवसाक्षी, ईश्वरसाक्षी).

Perception may also be either produced by the senses or not (इन्द्रियजन्यं इन्द्रियाजन्यं च). This classification corresponds to Locke's perceptions due to internal and external senses. Knowledge produced by the internal sense or mind is called इन्द्रियजन्य by the Sankarite, for he does not recognise mind as a sense. This division to some extent resembles Kulpe's classification of sensations into peripherally excited and centrally excited.

The perception of distance, according to the Vedantist, is a matter of presentation and not of inference (चक्षुः श्रोत्रे च स्वत एव वियषदेशं गत्वा स्व स्व विषयं गृहीतः) The two senses, ears and eyes, are प्राप्यकारी. They go out and meet the object. This going forth means localisation and projection in space. The Vedantins' theory of the perception of distance is rather crude. Justice is not done by it to all the factors entering into the perception of distance. Experimental psychology agrees with the Sankarite in holding that the perception of distance is generally of visual origin. But it adds that the appreciation of distance is due to the fusion of retinal impressions, the muscular movements of the accommodating muscles of the eyes as well as the convergence of the eyes.

The Sankar Vedantin's Psychology of Illusions and hallucinations is a valuable contribution. Illusion is not a case of unconscious judgment nor an inference nor a memory-image. Illusion, according to the Sankarite, is a case of presentation. (a) Something presented as an objective back ground इदम् (eg. nacre) (b) comes in contact with दूषितलोचन the fault may be due either to the diseased condition of

the eyes or to faint light, and (c) produces इदमाकारा, चाकचिक्याकारा अन्तःकरणवृत्ति. (d) This चाकचिक्याकारावृत्ति by the law of association gives rise through रजतसंस्कार (e) to the उद्बोधन or awakening of रजतगोचरज्ञानाभास *i. e.* प्रातिभासिक रजतोत्पादन by the transformation of nescience. (f) Then the identification of साक्षिचैतन्य अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्न चैतन्य and रजतावच्छिन्न चैतन्य gives rise to the perception of illusion.

The Naiyayikas object that there is no necessity to posit the production of an apparent silver to prove भ्रान्तिज्ञान. We can account for it by holding that a silver perceived elsewhere may be the object of this present false apprehension. Ramanuja, supporting the Naiyayikas, holds that illusion is due to erroneous judgment. To this the Sankarites reply that in order to be an object of apprehension, though illusory, it must be immediately present and hence a piece of silver perceived elsewhere at a different time cannot be the object of the present perception. The Naiyayika in order to defend his position holds that though in an illusion there is no direct-sense-contact with the object, yet there is some mediated contact called प्रत्यासत्ति *i. e.* non-sensuous contact. The Sankarite replies that

in that case inference cannot be established as a separate प्रमाण since fire which is a matter of inference can be held to be an object of perception through mediated and indirect contact of अनुव्यवसाय.

It is again objected that on the Sankrite principle it is impossible to distinguish between real silver and an illusory silver. The Vedantin replies that it is true that both are cases of superimposition on the self. But there is an element of subjectivity entering in प्रातिभासिक रजत which marks it off from a piece of real silver. My illusion of silver is cognised by me alone while the real silver may be cognised by all. In this sense प्रातिभासिक रजत is केवल साक्षिवेद्य and like pleasure and pain, incapable of being cognised by others (सुखादिवदनन्यवेद्य).

Like pleasure and pain, the illusory silver is superimposed on the self. And we say that we are happy or miserable. But why do not we say that we are silver? The Sankarite replies that 'I' and 'silver' cannot be felt together. For when we feel happy, we think that we are feeling happiness. But when we perceive the silver we never feel that we are

silver but it is silver (यस्य यदाकारानुभवोऽहित संस्कार-
सहकृताविद्याकार्यत्वं तस्य तदाकारानुभवविषयत्वं इत्येवानु-
गतं नियामकम्)

Why should not the witnessing self immediately perceive the प्रातिभासिक रजत without the help of the वृत्ति? The reply is that as it is a case of perception and as वृत्ति is an essential condition of perception, the psychosis is necessary.

In the case of an illusion, we have two वृत्ति's (i) इदम्वृत्ति and (ii) प्रातिभासिक रजताकारवृत्ति. The first वृत्ति is correct as it is a correct presentation, the second also is a true memory image. Ontologically, hold the Pravakaras, there is no error but error is pragmatic. The Sankarite replies that it is true that there are two वृत्तिस or mental modes but both are unified by one and the same चैतन्य which is connected with what is true as well as what is false. Consciousness interpenetrates and integrates both what is true and what is false and hence there arises error.

All psychologists, ancient or modern, admit that in an illusion there are two factors—presentation and representation. Sankar lays all the emphasis on the presentative elements and

hence arises the defect in his psychology of illusion—the assumption of indescribability (अनिर्वचनीयत्व). Such an assumption, Ramanuja maintains, does not dispose of the fact that in an illusory experience something is apprehended as something else and as the assumption of erroneous judgment (अन्यथा ख्याति) consisting in the ascription of the nature of one thing to another is in itself sufficient to explain illusion, the further assumption of an absolutely unverifiable and indescribable principle is not necessary. As the erroneous judgment has to be assumed in some form, the theory that illusion does not consist in erroneous judgment but in the experience of something indescribable is untenable. Sully and other psychologists support Ramanuja. The greatest defect of both Ramanuja and Sankara is that they do not take notice of psychological facts in their psychology of illusion. Wundt thinks that the main psychical conditions of abnormal states consist (i) in the abnormal character of the psychical elements (ii) in abnormalities in the way in which psychical compounds are constituted and (iii) in abnormalities in the way in which psychical compounds are combined and he also co-relates these psychical conditions with physiological conditions.

When elements, says Wundt, are united partly from direct external stimulation and partly from reproduction, the sense impression may be essentially modified through the intensity of the reproduced elements. The result is then an illusion of fancy. The illusions are in their psychological character nothing but assimilations. They may be defined as assimilations in which the reproduced elements predominate. Ribot in his 'Diseases of memory' gives emphasis to the physiological facts in explaining illusions.

The psychology of illusion leads us, as a side-issue, to the discussion of the nature of dreams. Like illusory silver, the objects of the dream-world are not merely remembered past experiences but creations of the present moment. The dream-impressions carry with them the stamp of perception and are further instances of प्रातिभासिक reality. The Sankarite opposes the प्राभाकर theory that dream-images contain no presentative element. In dreams we have certain recollections falling in a series. In अपरोक्ष ज्ञान the विषय is अव्यवहित but in dreams the विषय is व्यवहित. Again the senses in dreams have ceased their functioning, and we know that mind is not

independent of बहिरिन्द्रिय in matters relating to external objects. The orderly procession of chariots etc. in a dream may be explained by स्मृतिव्यवहार i.e. the activities in dream may be explained by memory, imagination and their combination. Disjointed images follow one another in a dream and there is absence of judgment or विशिष्टज्ञान ।

In the Vedantic theory of dream it is maintained that owing to निद्रादोष there is a modification of nescience. But here we have no positive condition of dreams in the Vedanta. Some Indian medical writers and certain Sankhya philosophers hold that we have a स्वप्नवहनाड़ी through which the currents come and go in sleep. There may not be peripheral stimulation in the case of इन्द्रियग्राह्य in dreams. Kulpe maintains that the older theories looked upon dreams as the result of a spontaneous ideational activity and attempted to wring some deep meaning from them by all means of symbolical explanations. Experimental researches, however, have traced the origin of dreams to the intensive action of external or internal stimuli upon definite sensory centres. All ideas which are not directly related

to the particular excitations remain inhibited. Wundt holds that in sleep the mind is almost wholly cut off from the rest of the world and the controlling power of apperception is wholly suspended. Yet dreaming is not wholly unaffected by extra-mental things, it seems often to be excited, and its direction and character determined by the condition and working of the bodily organs e.g., any slight obstruction or disorder of the liver inevitably produces disagreeable dreams.

The Sankarite theory of perception comprises a good deal of epistemological matter. The Sankarite begins with a definition of correct knowledge (प्रमा). If we exclude memory-knowledge, then the two characteristics of knowledge are novelty and its being uncontradicted by experience. (अनधिगतावाधितार्थं विषयज्ञानत्वं प्रमात्वं) If we include memory-knowledge, then only the latter mark will suffice. Kulpe also maintains that only peripherally excited sensations have this property of novelty. This definition of true knowledge also extends to persisting cognition (धाराबाह्यबुद्धि) of the same object e.g., the pot. The perception of time is involved in the persisting cognition of the same object. And as each

moment differs from another moment, the persisting cognition of the pot is therefore different at each moment. Moreover, when we are perceiving the pot, the knowledge remains the same, unless it is contradicted by an opposite knowledge. 'The theory of the persistence of the presentation fits in with the peculiar realism of Vedanta which demands an intuition-continuum for every grade of abstract thought.' (Studies in Vedantism)

The problem of truth and error is one of the central problems of philosophy. Various theories have been advanced as to the test of truth. We have seen that according to the Sankarite a presentation is true when the विषय is अनधिगत वा अबाधित—This अनधिगतार्थविषय as a mark of presentation, really seeks to secure the original, primary character of that knowledge. It means also that there must be an element of novelty in an advance of knowledge. All प्रमा must contain something new in addition to its being primary and original. This is the extension of the same problem from inference to presentation, and the question is tackled not logically but psychologically. Hindu logic comprehends the value and validity of

perception as well as of judgment and inference. Uncriticised perception is defective. The logical apparatus of criticism must, therefore, be applied to perception as well. This characteristic distinguishes the Hindu Logic from the western Logic which is busy with the test of the truth of inference only. The certainty of memory-knowledge lies in its being uncontradicted. स्मृति has as much validity as presentation. If we exclude स्मृति, we have to exclude the entire past from the field of certitude, thereby leaving the greater part of life groundless. Hence स्मृति is also a source of certitude. स्मृति is to the past what प्रत्यक्ष is to the present. This is also the view of Bertrand Russel and many other Neo-realists.

Sankar's test of truth is not merely subjective but objective as well-अनधिगताथेविषयत्व may be subjective but अवाधितत्व is objective. The correspondence theory of truth states that a true thought is one which claims to correspond with a reality. But so does a false, and hence the theory leaves us where we were, puzzled to distinguish between truth and error. In order to avoid the difficulty which wrecked the correspondence theory, that of making the truth of an assertion reside in an inexperienceable

relation to an unattainable reality, the coherency theory of truth maintains that an idea is true, if it is consistent with the rest of our thoughts. But it is hardly a test of objective truth (Murray). The Pragmatists, the Naiyayikas and the Buddhists hold that knowledge to be valid which promotes an activity ending in fruition. 'Truth is the harmony of experience which is implied when the volitional reaction that is promoted by a cognition and that completes the circuit of consciousness meets with fruition' (Dr. Seal's *THE POSITIVE SCIENCES OF THE ANCIENT HINDUS*.) The Pragmatist's handling of this question of truth is confusing and dangerous in so far as it consists of loose generalisations condemning the practical or satisfying character of truth. Through emphasis on the practical aspect of truth, it has seemed to make truth after all subjective. The moralists, on the other hand, make truth a harmony between thought and things. The Sankarite definition of truth is an advance upon all these views as it makes justice to both the subjective and the objective elements of truth.

Next comes the question of value and validity of knowledge. There is only one

absolute प्रमा and that is Brahman. The rest is merely relative knowledge. This empirical world possesses only phenomenal reality and is not contradicted till the knowledge of Brahman is attained.

The philosophy of विनाश constitutes an important part of the Epistemological aspect of the Vedantic theory of perception. विनाश is of two kinds, namely बाध which means destruction along with उपादान (कार्यविनाशेवहि द्विविधः—कश्चिदुपादानेन सह, कश्चित्तु दिद्यमान एवोपादाने, बाधो बाधः द्वितीयन्तु, निवृत्तिः १), the other निवृत्ति which means cancellation of the effect, though the material cause remains. The Cosmic illusion vanishes when we attain the knowledge of Brahman (बाध). Illusions and dreams again are cancelled (विनाश) when there is the cessation of the fault (दोषनिवृत्ति), as when the eye disease is cured or we get up from sleep, or when there arises a contradictory knowledge.

We now come to the ontological aspect of the Vedantic theory of perception. Consciousness is eternal. Then how is modalised consciousness produced by the contact of the senses ? This is because consciousness as modalised or rendered determinate is not eternal (वृत्तिविशिष्टं चैतन्यं आदिमत्)

It is objected that the mind (निरवयव अन्तःकरण) which is without any part cannot take the form of the object and thus become modalised. The reply is that the mind has parts as it is created.

The Naiyayikas maintain that mind is the internal sense. Pleasure and pain are the qualities of the soul. It is by the internal sense that the soul feels pleasure and pain. The Vedantin replies that he does not include mind under the category of senses, as there is no proof to that effect. The proof rather lies on the other side for we find in the Sruti 'इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः'

In opposition to the Naiyayikas, the Vedantists of the Sankarite School reject the class-concept and the relation of inherence (जाति समवाय) The Naiyayika definition of जाति thus runs नित्यत्वे सति अनेकसमवेतत्वं: When we perceive a घट we perceive घटत्व in घट. The घटत्व has no parts. It is neither an attribute nor an action. At the same time it is of the nature of a percept and is eternal (नित्यत्व) and remains identically the same everywhere, (अनेकसमवेतत्व). The Naiyayika first proves that घटत्व is नित्य, then proves that the नित्य घटत्व is एक and finally proves that नित्यैकघटत्व is अनेकसमवेत.

The Sankarite raises doubt concerning the नित्यत्व, एकत्व and अनेकसमवेतत्व of जाति and then about the concept of जाति. In the first place, as there is no impression of जाति, there cannot be any idea of जाति. In the second place, the Sankarite rejects all things eternal except Brahman and therefore समवाय as an eternal relation does not exist. Hence class or जाति must be a mere figment of the imagination.

The distinction between जीव and जीवसाक्षी; ईश्वर and ईश्वरसाक्षी is fine. Common ubiquitous eternal consciousness is undergoing certain limitations in individual centres in us all. It is believed in the Vedanta that a certain conditioning stuff namely अन्तःकरण is necessary. Through this अन्तःकरण the eternal consciousness is individuated and becomes subject to भोग or enjoyment. But along with this experience, cognitive, emotional and conative, there is the साक्षी, the witnessing self. This साक्षी is the individual centre, and the whole experience of the individual passes before the साक्षी as an appearance. The साक्षी is also in the अन्तःकरण, which is necessary as a condition here, but does not enter as an organic and constituent element in the साक्षी. Accord-

ing to Green, the eternal consciousness in every act, be it perceptive, be it desire, is present. It is an all-inclusive system of relations but there is something which contradistinguishes itself from the relations. It conditions the relation but is different from the relation. This is the साक्षी of Sankar Vedanta. ईश्वर as a personal centre has the same relation to the world as the जीव to his organism. ईश्वरसाक्षी is the consciousness to which this cosmic panorama unfolds itself. ईश्वरसाक्षी is one and eternal since the limiting condition or उपाधि of *Maya* is one and eternal. When माया is विशेषण (कार्यान्वयी व्यावर्तक) of ईश्वर we get परमेश्वर and when it is only an उपाधि (कार्यान्वयी व्यावर्तकी वत मानस्य) of ईश्वर we get ईश्वरसाक्षी ।

The Hindus have been a determinedly moral race. This code of moral necessity or कर्म is imposed even upon God. The Sankarite description of creation is not like the Absolutist's eternally realised order somehow come to be adumbrated in the phenomenal aspect. According to the Sankarite, there is a pragmatic reference in this Cosmic or creative fiat, or it is guided by the कर्म of the जीव's.

As to the problem of monism and pluralism

the Sankarite's reply is that in fact there is one reality namely Brahman, but in the phenomenal plane each individual centre constitutes a reality by itself. (अयञ्च जीवसाक्षी प्रत्यक्षं नाना, एकत्वे तु चैत्रावगते मैत्रस्याप्यनुसन्धानं प्रसङ्गः).

So also James admits that there is one presentation continuum or experience, which breaks up into subject and object. At each individual centre, however, there is a peculiar feeling of warmth and intimacy which makes my experiences *mine* and not *yours*.

What is the nature of the percept? Of this problem various solutions have been offered. The agnostics hold that we are confined within the magic circle of ideas, and can never know what the percepts are. Kant held that no predicate can be given to the *ding-an-sich*. The dualists like Descartes are of opinion that the perceptual world is a material world comprising mass and motion. The Neo-Realists hold that the world of experience is immanent as well as independent of the mind. The cardinal principle of the Neo-Realist is the independence of the immanent. James maintains that the experience continuum is neither subjective nor objective. Idealism strongly supports the

view that the percept is of the nature of idea. The Sankarite maintains that the percept has no reality independent of the subject (प्रमादसत्तातिरिक्तसत्ताकत्वाभावः) But the Vedantist does not agree with Berkeley that '*esse is percipi*'. All that the Vedantist means is that the percept is neither a mode nor an evolute of the subject, but that its सत्ता, or substratum which maintains it, is not different from the सत्ता of the subject. From the point of view of modalisation of consciousness, the principle recognised is that when there is unity of time and space, there is identity. This principle of arrangement is the basal principle of the Metaphysics of Schopenhauer that different things cannot be arranged in the same points of time and space. The Vedanta is by no means subjective idealism. In fact it is a form of Absolute Idealism but not of the Hegelian type. It differs from the subjective Idealism of Berkeley and Fichte as well as from Bijnanbadi Bauddhas. The world is not my idea. But everyone of us is working under the same cosmic illusion which after covering the true nature of Brahman produces this world of name and form. So there is some sort of objectivity in this phenomenal world. Again, there is some similarity between the Sankarites


and the Bijnanbadi Bauddhas, but there is no identity. For while the latter resolves everything into momentary psychoses, the former believes in one permanent underlying consciousness of which the subject and object are modalisation.

The Vedanta like Bradley admits that there are degrees or grades of reality. Leaving aside the transcendental (परमार्थिक) truth of the existence of Brahman, we have in empirical experience various grades of reality constituted by the principle of cosmic illusion. According to the gradation of उपाधि becoming more and more fine (सूक्ष्म), अविद्या in the course of her परिणाम gives rise to the various grades of reality: namely, व्यवहारिकसत्ता like घट, पट corresponding to the phenomenal reality of Kant, and प्रातिभासिक सत्ता which again is of two kinds namely illusions and hallucinations and dream-images. The प्रातिभासिकसत्ता is contradicted in the course of this mundane experience, while व्यवहारिक सत्ता is contradicted only when the knowledge of Brahman is attained. Again व्यवहारिक सत्ता possesses some sort of objectivity. The घट is perceived by all. But there is an element of subjectivity in प्रातिभासिक सत्ता. My

dreams and illusions are mine and not yours. The cause of व्यवहारिक सत्ता is the one cosmic illusion while the cause of प्रातिभासिक सत्ता is some defect over and above the cosmic illusion. In case of optical illusion, the defect pertains either to the diseased condition of the eyes or to faint light. In the case of dreams the defect pertains to sleep. There are other organic and physical conditions of sleep which we find in ancient Indian medical books but of which the Vedanta takes no account. The distinction between illusion and dream-images lies in this that while dream images are आश्रित in शुद्ध चैतन्य the आश्रय of illusion is इदमावच्छिन्न चैतन्य ।

On analysing the Sankarite theory of perception, psychologically, epistemologically and ontologically, we see that there are three conditions of perception viz. unity of time and place and योचत्व. Perceptions may be classified into सविकल्पक and निर्विकल्पक, जीवसाक्षी and ईश्वरसाक्षी and इन्द्रियजन्य and इन्द्रियजन्य. We have also referred to the Sankarite psychology of illusions and dreams. Under the epistemological aspect we have discussed the definition of true knowledge, the value and validity of knowledge and the philosophy of

विनाश । Under the ontological aspect we have discussed the relation of consciousness to modalised consciousness, and similar minor questions. We have referred to the Sankarite refutation of जाति and समवाय and have shown the distinction between जोव and जोवसाचो and ईश्वर and ईश्वरसाचो. We have also discussed the problem of monism v. pluralism, and of the nature of the percept. The grades of reality according to the Sankar Vedanta have been referred to. And finally, it has been shown that the Sankar-Vednata is by no means Subjective Idealism but a form of Absolute Idealism, though not of the Hegelian type.



The Self as Transcendental Subject.

We may strike the note of universal skepticism but the existence of our own self cannot be doubted. Descartes made the experiment. He began to doubt everything. But however far he carried his doubt, one fact remained irrefragable, nay even became more certain the more he doubted—namely the existence of the ego that doubts—*Cogito ergo sum*. Everyone is conscious of the existence of his own self, and never thinks 'I am not', सर्वोहि आत्मास्त्विं प्रतीति न नाहमस्मीति शङ्कर भाष्यं. We are thus most certain of the existence of the self. But what is the nature of this self? Is the self to be considered as a transcendental substance?

The Charvakas deny that the self is a transcendental substance. They identify the conscious psychical reality with the bodily vehicle. The human organism is the substrate of consciousness. देहमात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टमात्मा इति प्राकृता जना लोकायतिकाश्च प्रतिपन्ना इति शारौरिकभाष्ये. The materialists of Europe in like manner maintain that the brain secretes thought as the stomach secretes bile. Consciousness is an epiphenomenon, a bye-product of the brain. A second school of the Charvakas holds that

the organism as such will not do. Mere vital organs cannot serve our purpose. We want sundry psychoses इन्द्रिय चेतनानि आत्मा इत्यपरे. The followers of *Hiranyagarbha* maintain that the self is the vital breath, the biological life. Even if the senses are destroyed, so long as the principle of vitality endures, the individual lives. Therefore according to these philosophers apart from the body, there is no transcendental self.

These materialistic theories which identify the conscious psychical reality with the bodily vehicle are utterly untenable. Consciousness (चैतन्य) and matter (जड़) are the two opposite poles of reality. The self and the organism cannot be identical, for "otherwise we might as well say that iron is at bottom wood" (Marvin). The views of the European materialists and the Lokayatikas cannot be seriously maintained. Madhavacharya in his 'Bibarana Promeya Sangraha' raises three objections against the theory of the second type of the Charvakas, who hold that the body is the substrate of the senses which constitute the self. Firstly, this view would give rise to various selves as there are various senses. The self is thus reduced

to a series of detached selves. Man is a colony of animals. Each self is supposed to be independently conscious. Secondly, this view cannot therefore explain the recognition of personal identity. Thirdly, if the different senses constitute the self, there would be simultaneous enjoyment of sight, sound, taste etc. But we have succession in the sensation-order. Hence the theory that the senses constitute the self is untenable.

The *Bijnanabadi* maintains that the self is not identical with the body. There is nothing other than the series of impermanent psychoses *विज्ञानधारा* and this cognition constitutes the self *क्षणिकविज्ञानआत्मा*. The psychoses are discrete but they are held together by means of the continuity of the stream of consciousness. This *अनेकविज्ञान* is a heterogeneous medley of the sensations, each of which is momentary. Thus there is a perpetual flux of momentary sensations. And the continuity accounts for the sense of personal identity. Hume also holds that there is no continuing mind or soul. The stream of consciousness implies simply the combination of many psychological elements into one total whole.

Cognition is momentary according to the *Bijnanabadi*. So however you bring the idea of

continuity, you cannot account for remembrance, recognition and the sense of personal identity. A series of cognitions cannot think of itself as a series. The Associationist School of Hume and Hartley made this mistake. Unless there exists one continuous principle, equally connected with the past, the present and the future, or an abiding self which cognises everything, we are unable to explain remembrance, recognition and personal identity.

The *Madhyamikas* deny the existence of everything, including the self. They hold that if विज्ञान or the series of appearances be taken away, then what remains is zero and that is the self. If you mention anything other than the zero, it must be realised or experienced (उपलब्ध). But what is realised or experienced is cognition, and cognition is a mere appearance. So everything must be denied. And the Upanishads declare “असदेवासौत्”. Thus both the inner and the outer series are imagined in the background of Zero (शून्य).

This nihilistic doctrine that everything is empty is contradicted by all means of right knowledge and therefore requires no refutation.

शून्यावादिपक्षस्तु सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषिद्ध इति तन्निराकरणायानादरः क्रियते इति शारीरिक भाष्ये. Moreover, as Descartes pointed out, the existence of the self can not be doubted. And, as BijnanVikshu maintains, the non-existence of the self cannot be proved अस्ति आत्मा नास्तित्वसाधनाभावात् । Hence it follows that the existence of the self is self-evident.

The Sankar-Vedantist agrees with the मनवादी against the प्राणवादी, with the विज्ञानवादी against the मनवादी, with the साध्यात्मिक against the विज्ञानवादी rising ultimately up to चित्प्रताय. This shows a dialectical ascent. Psychological reaction is superior to the merely biological. In the आल्यविज्ञान of the विज्ञानवादी all psychoses fall into an orderly stream. But all this is appearance. Yet it is no zero—not a complete obliteration. For even if we say that all this is illusion (जगन्भ्रान्ति-कल्पित') there must be some substrate of this hallucination. Hence phenomenality presupposes noumenality (शून्यस्यापि स्वसाक्षित्वात्). Appearance is experienced (उपलब्ध). Hence there must be a subject (साक्षी). This transcendental subject is the self.

According to Sankar the self is not a transcendental substance with attributes. It is

चैतन्यस्वरूप identical with intelligence. It is pure eternal consciousness, one without a second. Intelligence is not its attribute but the very stuff of which it is made. Being (सत्) and thought (चित्) become absolutely identical in Sankar's Brahman. The very nature of the transcendental Ego is one eternal स्वप्रकाशत्व सम्बित् self-luminous consciousness. This consciousness is natural and not adventitious, essential and not accidental. This does not depend upon any aggregate of factors. The self-consciousness is not caused and is independent. The self is luminous and is सन्वेद्य (known) by being and संबिद (cognition) नित्योपलब्धि स्वरूप आत्मा ।

The self is associated with a certain power called *Maya* or cosmic illusion. It is due to this power that the appearance of the material world with the individual being is projected, and the individual self appears to be enveloped in conditions or *upadhis*. This is the phenomenal aspect of the self. When the knowledge of Brahman rends the veil of illusion, the true self एकमेवाद्वितीयं संबिदानन्द shines forth in all its glory.

The *Naiyayika* raises some objections against the Vedantic hypothesis of the nature

of the self. According to the *Naiyayika* the position of the Vedantist that self-consciousness is unconditioned (अकारणिक संवित्) is not tenable. Moreover, the self is not only the knower, but an agent (कर्त्ता) and an enjoyer (भोक्ता).

Knowledge is phenomenal. It stays a few moments and then subsides. But the self, according to the *Naiyayika* and the *Vaisesika*, is a substance (द्रव्य). Intelligence is a separable attribute and arises to *Purusha* when the self is joined to a body, supplied with sense organs, and acted on by objects through those sense-organs. This knowledge again disappears in the state of disjointment from the body. Hence the soul substance is not essentially conscious. It is unconscious (जड़), though capable of being endowed with consciousness. The various organs and the organism are to be taken as instruments (कारण), and they necessarily imply the agent (प्रयोजक). As the charioteer is inferred from the movements of the chariot, so the purposive bodily movements, selective and rejective (हिताहित प्राप्ति परिहार इति वैशेषिकभाष्ये) imply a purposive, controlling guide. The *Naiyayika* maintains that घटोऽयं simply indicates the घट. When

it is enriched by the empirical consciousness घटमहं जानामि it is only ज्ञानविशिष्ट घट. Hence there is no reference to अहं—Either it is the घट or the knowledge of the घट. There is knowledge but no self-knowledge. Thus according to the Naiyayika, the subject in knowing objects becomes conscious of itself. But the subject cannot become the object—the spiritual entity can never be an object of direct knowledge (प्रतीति).

The Sankar Vedantist replies that the self is self-luminous (स्वप्रकाश) without any reference to the objects. It is a self-manifested spiritual entity. This accounts for self-consciousness and also shows that self-consciousness is unconditioned. Moreover, when the cosmic illusion disappears, there only remains सच्चिदानन्दमय ब्रह्म. There is nothing to do and nothing to enjoy. So in the transcendental plane, the self is only knower ज्ञाता, though in the phenomenal plane it may be spoken of as an agent and an enjoyer. The Sankar Vedantists and the Ramanujists maintain that the Nyaya Vaishesika theory of the self is utterly untenable, as it reduces the self into an essentially non-intelligent object comparable to a stone, with intelligence as an adventitious quality of it.

Ramanuja is one of the strong opponents of Sankar. He maintains that the self is an essentially intelligent substance with intelligence as its necessary attribute. The relation of self to consciousness is one of substance and attribute (धर्मो and धर्म्य). The self is not identical with knowledge (चित्सवरूप) but has consciousness as its attribute (चिद्वर्म्य). Smell is a quality of the earth and is also distinct from it. So knowledge which is expressed in relations such as 'I know' and is a quality of the knowing subject is distinct from the knowing subject. (यथा पृथिव्या गन्धस्य गुणत्वे नोपलभ्यमानस्य ततो व्यतिरेकः तथा जानामीति ज्ञातृगुणत्वेन ततीयमानस्य ज्ञानस्य आत्मनः व्यतिरेकः सिद्धः इति श्रीभाष्ये) Scriptural texts also affirm this relation "जानात्वेवायंपुरुष". The Scripture sometimes even states distinctly that knowledge is something distinct from the knowing subject *viz.* in the passage 'For there is not known any intermission of the knowing of the knower.' 'नहि विज्ञातुर्ब्रिज्ज्ञाते ब्रिजपरिलोपो विद्यते' बृहदारण्यक । Sometimes it is urged that the scripture in certain passages speaks of the self as being mere knowledge (not a knower). This can be explained thus. The self in these passages is designated as knowledge, for knowledge constitutes the essential quality of the self.

When the self is spoken of as having knowledge for its essential nature, it is to be understood that knowledge constitutes its essential quality. Therefore self is not identical with consciousness, but it has consciousness as its essential attribute (चित्त्वत्तः आत्मा नतु चित्स्वभावः)

Sankar in his Hastamalak ably refutes Ramanuja's theory of the self. Ramanuja maintains that consciousness and self stand in the relation of attribute and substance. But this relation, Sankar points out, is logically inconsistent. The relation between intelligence and self may be either one of identity or of difference or of identity in difference. If intelligence be different in nature from the self, no relation of substance and attribute is possible between them (आत्मघटादिवत् धर्मधर्मित्वानुपपत्तेः) In the case of difference, the relation between self and intelligence may be either external combination (संयोग) or internal relations (समवाय). External combination indicates the contact of two corporeal things. But self and intelligence are not corporeal. Hence there can be no relation of external combination between self and intelligence. Can the two be combined by an internal relation

(समवाय) ? If there be relation of Samabaya between self and intelligence, the relation must somehow be related to the self, this second relation also must somehow be related to the self and in this way we are landed in the fallacy of *regressus adinfinitum* (अनवस्था दोष). Hence in the case of the difference of nature of the self and intelligence, there can be no relation of substance and attribute between them. In the case of identity of nature, the relation of substance and attribute becomes all the more impossible, for an object is not an attribute of itself; whiteness is not an attribute of whiteness. Now, let us consider the case of identity in difference. It would be contradictory to hold that one thing is both identical with and different from another. It is maintained that intelligence has two aspects, in one aspect it is of a similar nature to the self and in its character as intelligence it differs from the self. In its aspect of similarity intelligence is identical with the self. But in its aspect of difference, as we have shown above, intelligence cannot be an attribute of self. Hence the relation between the self and intelligence cannot be that of substance and attribute; the relation can only be one of identity. (तस्मात् आत्मा चित्सवरूप एव इति

हस्तामलकं) Hence the self is identical with intelligence. It is not a transcendental substance but a transcendental subject.

The controversy between Ramanuja and Sankar rages round the nature of the self—whether it is a transcendental substance or a transcendental subject. In the West also philosophers are divided in their opinion regarding this. The Rationalist Psychology maintained that the mental principle considered as a substance is separate from the body, having personal identity and individuality. This spiritualistic theory of the self, which is within easy reach of popular thought and was advocated by the Scholastics, holds that within each of us there is an immaterial spiritual substance called the soul. This soul or the psychical substance underlies all psychical phenomena and thinks, feels, wills and persists through all changes of psychical activity. This doctrine was enunciated in a telling way by Maher in his famous sentence that psychology without soul is like the play of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. This theory can be traced back to Aristotle and Plato and it received its complete elaboration in the hands of the Scholastics.

Thomas Aquinas & others. Descartes gave this theory currency by a statement that the self is a thinking substance. Hobbes Locke and Berkeley defended it. Leibnitz also supported this theory and held that souls are monads or spiritual atoms. Christian Wolff strongly supported the theory of soul-substance in his Rational Psychology. He declares that, the principle of individuality within us must be substantial, for there can be no psychic activity without a concrete agent. Thought is simple immaterial and spontaneous or free i. e. not determined *ab extra*. For these objective reasons the principle of psychic life or the soul must be immaterial simple as well as substantial in which the various psychic functions inhere. The consequences of the simplicity and the substantiality of the soul are its incorruptibility and immortality.

Kant coming after Wolff brought out his logical inconsistencies and thereby subverted the traditional Rational Psychology. He shows that underlying Rational Psychology there was the fallacy of *Petito Principii*. The conclusion, *cogito ergo sum*, from "I think," to "I exist" from the ego as the logical subject to the ego as

the metaphysical entity is fallacious. The result of Kant's Critique of Rational Psychology is that no Rational Psychology is possible. Fechner Wundt and Paulsen reject the theory of soul substance. The essence of soul consists in psychic life. If we subtract the psychical process, no substance is left behind. The soul substance is a survival of a worn out Metaphysics. Wundt shows that it is impossible to apply the concept of substantiality to the soul. If a support is to be found for soul life, it must be sought not in an isolated rigid block of reality which is posited absolutely but in the comprehensive whole, from which, on which and in which it is. The soul is brought in as a principle of explanation of the psychic life, but about the soul nothing is known. The concept of the soul, therefore, has its origin in that sort of philosophy whose great maxim according to Dr. Hodgson is: Whatever you are totally ignorant of, assert to be the explanation of everything else. The soul theory is a complete superfluity—the substantial soul is a metaphysical blank explaining nothing and guaranteeing nothing. Hence the bankruptcy of the soul theory needs no further proof and discussion.

Popular thought is inclined to the con-

ception that presentation is the real characteristic of the self. The intellectualistic philosophers also have adopted this view. Herbart carried out his intellectualistic theory systematically and showed that all states of consciousness can be derived from ideas and their relations. Sankar, like Herbart, makes thought the essence of the self. The self, according to him, is identical with thought. We apply the concepts of volition and feeling to the self, under the spell of cosmic illusion.

Modern Psychology, which is more partial to biological views than its predecessor, is gradually approximating Schopenhauer's Voluntaristic metaphysics. Four reasons can be put forward in support of the Voluntaristic psychology. Firstly, the evolution from lower animals to men is an evolution from will to thought. Secondly, the evolution from childhood to manhood is also an evolution from will to thought. Thirdly, it is will and not the understanding which gives to life its purpose. And fourthly, interest which is an aspect of will, manifests itself as the predominant element in the world of ideas and movements. Hence will is the essence of psychical life. Kant gives primacy

to his practical reason. Bergson says that intellect is an appendage to action. The fundamental teaching in James seems to be his theory of the primacy of will, and the consequent subordinate position of intellect as merely the instrument of the will. This is the central idea of his theory of pragmatism. Hoffding regards will as the original form of consciousness. The intellectual and emotional elements are merely links in the chain that lead to action. The development of the individual proceeds from will to will. Hence Sankar's intellectualistic position is untenable.

Kant, Ward and others, however, hold intellect to be the primordial factor, the other two depending more or less upon it. A careful survey of the facts of consciousness justifies the view that cognitive energy is the *stve qua non* of mental life. Feeling always pre-supposes and involves discrimination. Will also implies intelligence, voluntary action involves choice and choice presupposes discrimination. Even the life-preserving movements of monera, the lowest forms of animal existence, involve rudiments of intellection. This is confirmed by Schneider in his book "On the development of


the expression of will in the animal kingdom." Thus intellect seems to be the fundamental faculty and the intellectualistic position of Sankar is maintained.

The unity of the self has been looked at, in Indian thought, from different standpoints (i) As knower (ज्ञाता). This lays stress on the cognitive side. This is Sankar's View. (2) As agent (कर्त्ता). This lays stress on the active side. This is the Nyaya view. (3) As enjoyer (भोक्ता). This lays stress on the feeling aspect or passive aspect. This is the view of the Sankhya. In Europe, on the otherhand, the unity of the self has been looked only from the epistemological point of view. Sankar applies only the category of ब्राह्मत्व to the self. This position, however, is difficult to maintain, according to his opponents. He has no logical ground to maintain, says his opponent, that the self is a knower and neither an agent nor an enjoyer. But in reply it may be said that Sankar's metaphysics is intellectualistic. It is only under the phenomenal aspect that the concepts of agency and enjoying are applicable to the self.

The unity of the self is constituted neither by the bodily vehicle, nor by the senses nor

by a series of cognitions, neither is it a nothing. The self is not a transcendental substance, as is maintained by Ramanuja, Ballav and others. The self, as Sankar maintains, is a transcendental subject. Thought and being are identical in the self. The self is one ultimate reality without खजातीयभेद, विजातीयभेद and स्वगतभेद i.e. the self is one without a second. 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं सच्चिदानन्द' But under the spell of cosmic illusion, the self manifests itself in a peculiar way and becomes subject to a set of upadhis (attribute)—manas—Indriyas etc and this appears to individualise itself. This is the phenomenal aspect (सगुण aspect) of Sankara's self which is a really transcendental subject. Sankar's self is thought itself. But Spinoza's Absolute is a substance with attributes. Sankar's self may also be distinguished from the Original of Plotinus. The 'Original' of Plotinus transcends all thought and being while in Sankar's self thought (चित्) and being (सत्) become absolutely identical. Again Fichte's Absolute ego is at first unconscious and becomes conscious only in so far as it finitises itself, and opposes itself as non-ego to itself as ego. Sankar's self is self conscious from eternity. Consciousness is rather the very stuff out of which it is made. Sankar's self may also be

distinguished from Hegel's Absolute spirit which realises and completes itself in and through this world which is, therefore, a stage in the evolution of the spirit from the state of abstractness to that of concreteness. Sankar's self, however, is complete from eternity and does not need the world for its self realisation. Sankar emphatically maintains, in opposition to all other Opposite Schools of philosophy, that the self is not a transcendental substance but a transcendental subject (नित्योपलब्धिरूप).



Opinions.

I have been greatly struck with his habit of thinking out a position for himself, his intimate appreciation of varied types of philosophical thought and culture, Eastern as well as Western, his wide reading as well as his critical acumen and insight × × . It is really a creditable production.

Brajendra Nath Seal M. A., Ph. D.
Formerly George V Professor of
Philosophy, Calcutta University,
at present Vice-Chancellor
Mysore University.

I have done myself the pleasure of reading your book. It shows considerable labour, research and learning in the treatment of abstruse topics of Hindu philosophy.

Promoda Ch. Banerji Kt.
Offg. Chief Justice
Allahabad High Court.

I have just finished reading your book 'Studies in Hindu Thought' and am very glad to find you have developed so well your powers of expression and presenta-

II,

tion of Hindu concepts and modes of thought in terms of western philosophy. I take it that this brochure is only the first instalment of further works on Hindu Philosophy of which you have made yourself a fully equipped exponent. I only wish you fuller opportunities and scope for your specialised philosophical talents.

Radhakumud Mukherji

M. A., P. R. S., Ph. D.

Senior Professor of Indian History,
Lucknow University.

I have read with great delight the very able thesis "Studies in Hindu Thought" written by Mr. Charuchandra Ganguli. It is based on a wide and well-digested knowledge of Hindu and Western philosophical thought and it presents concisely and clearly the views of different Hindu and Western philosophical thinkers and adds fitting comments and criticisms to them.

Syamacharan Ganguli

Formerly Principal Uttarpara
College.

III.

Your essays furnish a good illustration of the truth that students of Western philosophy are better able to appreciate Indian philosophy as such, than mere oriental scholars. You have put together Hindu ideas on two of the most important problems in philosophy within the short compass of two small essays. Your exposition makes interesting reading.

V. K. Joag

Senior Professor of Philosophy
Fergusson College,
Poona.

The work is full of promise and the treatment of the difficult, abstruse problems is splendid. Herein he will be able to do something really very valuable.

Khagendranath Mitra M. A.

Member Legislative
Assembly, Professor of Philosophy,
Presidency College, Calcutta.

"Studies in Hindu Thought" seeks to investigate two deeply absorbing topics of Philosophy, perception and the nature of self. It presents the treatment of these problems mainly from the standpoints of the Nyaya and Vedanta systems and the parallel treatment in modern

IV.

and recent European Philosophy. The points of parallelism are clearly grasped and concisely explained. The comparison displays considerable critical insight. Each section concludes with a lucid statement of the position reached by the author.

I warmly welcome this little book, as it covers portion of a field which has not yet received the amount of attention which its importance demands. It will give genuine pleasure to all earnest students of Philosophy.

The author Mr. Charu Chandra Ganguli M. A. B. L. is a brilliant student of the Presidency College, a distinguished graduate of the Calcutta University and son of the veteran educationist and well-known scholar Professor Gopal Chandra Ganguli of Ravenshaw College, Cuttack.

Adityanath Mukherjee
M. A, P. R. S., Ph. D, I. E. S.
Professor of Philosophy,
Presidency College,
Calcutta.

V.

I am very glad to find that your comparison of the several systems and the exposition of their views are both clear and instructive.

Sd. A. C. Mitra M. A.
Asst. Prof. of Philosophy, Calcutta
University,

You have taken up an original line of interpretation
× × I feel so very proud of this performance of
yours.

Benimadhab Das M. A.
Formerly Prof. of Philosophy,
Revenshaw College,
Cuttack.



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