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Borden Parker Bowne

Studies in Philosophy and Theology

By Former Students of
Borden Parker Bowne

Edited by
E. C. WILM
Professor of Philosophy, Boston University



THE ABINGDON PRESS
NEW YORK CINCINNATI

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Printed in the United States of America

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I

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

THE papers comprised in this volume are by a number of Professor Bowne's former students in Boston University, and were intended for publication in 1920, at the tenth anniversary of Bowne's death, as a slight token of respect for a teacher whom they honor and revere. It is a matter of regret to me that a number of circumstances delayed the appearance of the volume a little beyond the time originally planned; nevertheless, the purpose of the book will still be served, since, although another year has passed, the sentiment toward Bowne of those who knew him remains the same.

It is probably needless to say that it is not my intention (and I imagine I speak also for those who have cooperated with me in this enterprise) to seek, through the publication of this volume, to add to the reputation of Bowne, or to expound or defend the type of philosophy for which he stood. Bowne's place in the history of philosophy is pretty definitely known, and cannot be enhanced by any eulogies which might be pronounced. From what one gleans of his own half-humorous, self-deprecating comments, such eulogies would have impressed him but little. He seems to have imbibed somewhere the healthy sentiment

which every young beginner in philosophy would do well to lay to heart, that "philosophy is an elegant thing, if anyone modestly meddles with it; but if he is conversant with it more than is becoming, it corrupts the man."

Nor would a mere defense of his system have pleased him better. "The men who have helped philosophy forward," he wrote shortly before his death, "have seldom been men learned in the bibliography of the science, but men who have grappled with the problems themselves." It was Kant's aim, we learn from a passage in the *Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysic*, not to teach philosophy, but how to philosophize—*nicht Philosophie, sondern philosophieren*. The true teacher is not bent upon obtaining agreement with his own opinions. He is most pleased when he detects in his pupils the ability to grapple successfully with the questions of philosophy, and a disposition to reenter the fields in which he has labored, with what partial success no one knows better than he. To seek merely to preserve his teachings intact, and to hand them down to the future unchanged, is to do philosophy and philosopher small service. Intellectual progress results from the strife of systems, from the contact and ferment of contrasting views, not from the transmission, in unchanged form, of any set of opinions, no matter how able or well considered. "You cannot institute," said Emerson, "without peril of charlatanism."

Bowne's relation to previous thinkers in the history of modern philosophy is not a matter of doubt to anyone conversant with the course of nineteenth-century speculation. He belongs to that large school of thinkers broadly classed together under the head of post-Kantian idealism. Leibnitz, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, Herbart, Green, Lotze—these names suggest the philosophic tradition to whose influence he owes the main direction of his own thought. Although, as said, he set small store by the merely historical study of philosophy, and made scanty reference to other philosophers in his own writings, he has himself clearly indicated his historical affiliations in a passage in the preface to the *Metaphysics*, which he dedicated "in grateful recollection to the memory of my friend and former teacher, Hermann Lotze."

"Among the idols mentioned by Bacon," he writes, "the idols of the cave, or den, are those which are most likely to influence students. The loneliness of the study and its distance from practical effort enable such idols to practice their malign seductions with eminent success. . . . Whether in the views herewith presented I have grasped any truth; or whether, by long brooding in solitude, I have fallen a prey to some idol of the philosophic den, must be left to the reader to decide. I am encouraged, however, to hope that I have not gone wholly astray by the fact that there is nothing unheard of in the results reached. Leibnitz furnishes the starting-point, Herbart supplies the

method, and the conclusions reached are essentially those of Lotze. I have reached them, for the most part, by strictly independent reflection; but, as far as their character is concerned, there would be no great misrepresentation in calling them Lotzian." The re-examination and criticism of the fundamental philosophical categories and concepts, somewhat after the manner of Herbart, with an idealistic and theistic outcome, this describes roughly the character and trend of Bowne's life effort.

I have previously given a brief résumé of the principal ideas of Bowne's philosophical system, in a memorial article published shortly after Bowne's death,¹ and I shall therefore not attempt to go over the same matters here, except to indicate the most general metaphysical position, upon which everything else depended.

Reality, according to the school to which Bowne belonged, is not definable in the terms and categories of mechanical physics, but in terms of consciousness. Moreover, consciousness is not a mere collection of passive and passing states, mere momentary and shifting ideas, as Hume had taught; consciousness, when adequately understood, can only be a conscious self, the permanent and independent subject of experience and of life. The universe is immaterial, conscious and personal in its constitution: this is the sweeping formula of personal idealism.

With an initial doctrine of such character and scope,

¹ *American Journal of Theology*, vol. xiv, No. 3, July, 1910.

numerous special problems of philosophy and religion are solved in advance. Mechanistic naturalism, which recognizes nothing in the world but mass, motion, and unbending law, is seen to be nothing more than an abstraction, useful for intellectual or practical purposes, but having no metaphysical reality. The abstract world of mechanics is a world from which all efficiency has been emptied out; the real world in which we live is a world of living personalities, the theater of purposive agency and will, of ideals and moral imperatives and responsibilities.

Under such an interpretation of the world, the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, as two mutually exclusive realms, is seen to be a spurious one. It is not as if nature did the bulk of the world's work, while God is reserved for interruptions, exceptions, and "things science cannot explain." If this should be the case, the scope of God's activity would be constantly restricted as the range of knowledge widens with the progress of science, and these unexplained facts are one by one brought into relation with a general system of law and order. No, the natural roots in the supernatural, and the supernatural, in turn, manifests itself in the facts and laws of our everyday experience.

Bowne's central position is stated with characteristic clearness and vigor in a letter written under date of May 22, 1908, to Professor G. M. Duncan, which Professor Duncan has kindly loaned for use in this

connection. I take the liberty of quoting from Professor Duncan's own account of his meeting with Bowne on the occasion of the latter's visit to New Haven for the purpose of giving an address before the Yale Philosophical Club, as it gives an excellent impression of Bowne, the man, whose simplicity and personal charm impressed all who met him. "After spending a delightful afternoon with me, and at dinner at my house meeting the other members of the staff of the Yale Department of Philosophy, Dr. Bowne gave a most illuminating and inspiring address before the Yale Philosophical Club on the outlook in philosophy. He then spent the night as my guest and the following forenoon we took a walk together to the top of East Rock. We had much delightful conversation and I was deeply impressed by his simple, open, and engaging personality."

After his return home, Bowne wrote Professor Duncan a letter, from which the following is an extract: "I meant to mention to you a work which you may not have seen and which I think will prove to be interesting. It is by Bergson and has the title *L'Evolution Créatrice*. I have not come upon it myself as yet, but I have seen notices of it, especially one by Father Tyrrell, the Modernist who has recently been banned by the Roman Church. It seems that Bergson in this book sets forth very strongly the complete failure of the mechanical doctrine of evolution and on essentially the same grounds which are fa-

miliar to us, namely, that logical equivalence of cause and effect in the impersonal scheme reduces every such scheme to mere tautology and endless regress. How much he makes out of the creative idea or how he conceives it, I do not know. Of course nothing can be done with it except on the plane of personality, but in any case it is progress to have the mechanical idea shown in its logical emptiness."

It is superfluous to say nowadays that Bowne's way is but one of numerous ways of envisaging the universe, and I believe Bowne was himself very willing to recognize this. Still, a man cannot with equal conviction champion diverse philosophical standpoints, unless, indeed, he is a mere student of philosophical systems, instead of being a philosopher himself, that is, a student of the nature of things. And it is to Bowne's credit that he taught with straightforward sincerity, and without too much regard to the attitudes of other men, whether friends or foes, the view of the world which seemed to him on the whole the most adequate and expressive.

It is perhaps worth while to say in conclusion that a certain acrid quality, especially in Bowne's earlier writings, and an air of dogmatic assurance, were perhaps largely due to the controversial atmosphere of the time in which he wrote, and were perhaps even a sort of "compensation activity," or "defense mechanism," as the modern psychoanalyst might say; that is, really indicative of a sensitiveness and diffidence of

character and disposition, which, however, conveyed to the outsider, and the mere reader of his works, a suggestion of intellectual arrogance and of a cynical attitude toward those who differed with him. One gathers from Professor Duncan's letter, and I have corroborated this impression from conversation with several persons who were personally acquainted with Bowne, especially with Professor George Herbert Palmer, who knew him well and esteemed him highly, that this is an almost wholly erroneous opinion, and that one of Bowne's most attractive qualities was a quiet modesty and self-effacement, and an entire absence of that least amiable of human qualities, vanity and self-importance.¹ He was a man of unobtrusive

¹ As this goes to press, the mail brings a letter from Professor Palmer which is of such interest that I have asked him to permit me to make it available to my readers.

11 Quincy Street, Cambridge.

DEAR PROFESSOR WILM:

I did say what you quote, and I have no objection to your printing it. Only I think that much of a contrary character should also be said. Bowne was ever a respecter of persons. When dealing with an individual he was most considerate, sweet even, keeping himself in the background, ready to listen. But he was also a man of profound and ardent convictions who believed he had a message of great importance (as I am sure he had) and when through writing he dealt with the indiscriminated public he drove that message home with pungent insistence and a superb scorn of all who were disposed to other views. Philosophy was serious business with him, not to be taken lightly. This tendency of truculence toward unbelieving sinners was much more marked in his early writing. As time went on he attached more importance to differing points of view, where there was seriousness, and never, even in his most denunciatory writing, is there self-assertion. Nobody could talk with him and fail to see how inherently modest, almost self-distrustful he was. It was only when truth called on him to be its vindicator against the triflers, the unthinking, or the irreverent, that he put on his fighting robes. A man to love! Even those who differed from him I think pretty generally recognized him to be a truly great man, one from whom petty self-seeking was singularly absent.

I am glad you are preparing this book, though he perhaps would

manner, a true friend and delightful companion, fine-grained and courteous to all he met, a man "of singularly pure and lovable character and a practical Christian experience of the most convincing kind."

In the college classroom too he stood, I believe, the acid test of the true teacher, since the effect upon his students was to elicit and enlarge, not to oppress and extinguish, the intellectual impulse of those who came under his influence. The youth entering his classroom or study not only found inspiration in the wide and accurate scholarship and the critical acumen evinced before him, but he found encouragement in his own efforts at reflection, such as only a hospitable attitude toward him could make possible. It is one of the signs of greatness not to misuse the possession of power from motives of egotism and self-aggrandizement. "The imbecility of men," says Emerson, "is always inviting the impudence of power. It is the delight of vulgar talent to dazzle and to blind the beholder. But true genius seeks to defend us from itself. True genius will not impoverish, but will liberate, and add new senses. If a wise man should appear in our village, he would create, in those who conversed with him, a new consciousness of wealth, by opening their eyes to unobserved advantages; he would estab-

have discouraged it. A pity you did not know him. He was too big to be easily explainable. But the strong students you have gathered together will do much. Each will illuminate some side of him, and the resulting figure should stand out as a helpful stimulus to all teachers of Philosophy.

Faithfully yours,

G. H. PALMER.

March 5, 1922.

lish a sense of immovable equality, calm us with assurances that we could not be cheated; as every one would discern the checks and guaranties of condition. The rich would see their mistakes and poverty, the poor their escapes and their resources."

I believe that Bowne deserved in no small measure this superb encomium, so we leave him, where he wished to be left, with his own life and philosophy to do their work, without further praise or criticism here. If any inquire, "What were his ideas and the arguments for them?" the answer is, "Yonder are his works; few men have been better able to speak for themselves than he."

E. C. WILM.

II

THE EMPIRICAL FACTOR IN BOWNE'S THINKING

GEORGE A. COE

IF I were to give a general estimate of my loved and revered teacher, Dr. Bowne, I should have to repeat much that I printed in the *Methodist Review* in July, 1910. Instead of repeating, let me endeavor to answer a single question: What seems to me now, after the lapse of more than a third of a century since I sat in his lecture room, to be the most certainly true and important contribution that he made to the mental habits and the mental furniture of us his students?

One's answer to such a question will reflect, of course, one's response, during the intervening years, to our rapidly changing world and to recent types of thought. Bowne's views were formed at a period so different from 1922 that, startling as the statement may be, it is literally true that he did not and could not conceive of most of the critical problems that are characteristic of to-day. Of course it is possible to generalize issues, and to say, with truth, that in one form or another the old questions persistently recur in human experience; yet there is change as well as permanence in the issues. In a growing world we start from different data; we are moved by different interests; our tools are different, and our tests also change. If, then, Bowne's definition of problems, his methods, and his solutions are somewhat out of joint

with our own reflection, this is but an instance of the universal dynamics of thought in a changing social world. A generation hence the critical thought of to-day will have become equally remote from the students who will then be finding their own way in their own world.

Thus it is that our *systems* "have their day . . . and cease to be." This is true of the greater as well as of the lesser luminaries in the philosophical firmament. Yet all through the history of philosophy, factors of permanent value, "broken lights" of the inclusive truth, are embedded in the successive systems. The part of Bowne's thinking that seems to live on in the greatest vigor in our minds to-day is the empirical rather than the dialectic or speculative factor. And the particular empirical content that looms most significantly in the retrospect is the observable facts of religious and moral life to which he insistently called attention. He turned multitudes of minds away from religious, theological, and metaphysical conventionalities toward certain of the living, dynamic realities of experience. In spite of his strong liking for dialectic; in spite of the tendency of many to estimate him in terms of a system, I believe that we are nearer the truth, and nearer his own conception of himself, if we remember him most for the eagerness and the pointedness with which he reverted to primary data.

Who among his students and readers can have failed to be impressed by his almost constant warnings against "merely verbal thinking," the "fallacy of the universal," "logomachies" or "logic-chopping," and "taking the order of thought for the order of

reality"? He who never tired of dialectical contest nevertheless made "the field of life and action" his supreme court of appeal as against "the arid wastes of formal logic."

In the words last quoted there is reflected a second persistent tendency, namely, the ethical valuation of all experience. If, now, we contemplate these two habits together—the empirical and the valuational—we shall be able to see that he was working upon, or at least toward, certain of the problems that have taken acute forms among us since his own thinking reached its maturity. If he did not enter the field of the psychology of religion in any technical manner, he was unquestionably moving toward it. If his psychology was restricted to structural concepts, and was one-sidedly a psychology of knowledge in the logical sense, nevertheless his emphasis upon "life and action" implied a correlative functional point of view. If he never fully appreciated what one may call the historical inevitableness of pragmatism, yet he himself helped prepare the way for it! Finally, if he did not apprehend the depth of the social factor in mind, morals, and religion, nevertheless his metaphysics of immanence and his own faith in a loving and lovable God—these two taken together—make for hospitality to a thoroughgoing recognition of the social in its primordialness and its ultimateness.

This may not be evident to one who approaches Bowne's mind through his metaphysics. But then metaphysics was to him not the main thing, but, rather, a sort of police force with which to defend the life and the liberties that he prized. Turn to his *Principles of Ethics* and you will see that he does not intend

to deduce the moral life from a theory, but theory from moral life. Note that he consciously endeavors to unite "the intuitive and the experience school of ethics." His affinity with utilitarianism is unmistakably close, and he comes as near to an evolutionary view as to assert that duty is not completely determinate because what is good has to be found out in part by this historical process.

Or turn to his writings that deal with the Christian life. What gems of practical wisdom they are! And they are gems, not because they are deductions from his metaphysics, not because they are compacted systems, but because they are so simply and directly objective. "We must fall back on good sense, that general sense of reality and soundness without which the moral life becomes a series of snares and loses itself in silliness and fanaticism. We must point out that the essence of religion lies in the filial spirit, in the desire to serve and please God; and then we must point out that our all-inclusive religious duty is to offer up the daily life pervaded and sanctified by the filial spirit, as our spiritual service and worship of God" (*The Christian Life*, New York, 1899, p. 106).

He was probably quite aware of the fundamentally empirical quality of his own primary procedures. His dialectic was consciously secondary and defensive—one might say disinfecting. It did not profess to discover or demonstrate the real, but only to remove obstacles from the real and from the perception of it as real. We are to find and know reality by action and interaction, by giving play to our sense of need, by contemplating historical developments and judging values; by revising thought and conduct and trying again.

That he did not *develop* this view of experience, but left it for the most part in the background of his reasonings, is to be accounted for, no doubt, by the thought-situations that confronted him through most of his career. On the one hand, he beheld the rule of dogmatic and muddy notions of evolution and of natural law, with an almost faddish agnosticism as prime minister. On the other hand, the ecclesiastical forces were mostly under bondage to traditionalism reenforced by another muddy metaphysics. His calling was to help clear up the confusion. This he did in part by his metaphysical "reworking of concepts," but also in important part by direct appeal to experience.

III

NEO-REALISTIC THEORIES OF VALUE

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

PHILOSOPHERS do not agree. It may be doubted whether they desire to. The greatest philosophers have ever been, like Royce, "rebels," not merely against tradition and authority, but also against each other. Meanwhile the innocent bystander, be he ordinary citizen (the target of every philosopher's shafts), college student, or man of science, is inclined to regard philosophy in general as fanciful speculation, and turn skeptically to practical facts. But this skeptical mood is even more obviously unsatisfactory than the competing dogmatisms of philosophy. No human being can utterly destroy his wonder and curiosity in the presence of the mysteries of life; and everyone must seek and find for himself some answer to the questions as to the meaning and value of his personality and of the world in which he and his fellows live. That men do not agree in their answers is not a reproach to philosophy; it is but a reflection of the infinite inexhaustibility of life. "After all," as Professor Bowne one day remarked, "it is not so desperate a confession to make that the divine and supreme Intelligence is to some extent beyond us—beyond *us*." Philosophy should not be blamed if the most interesting and the most important things are the most perplexing.

Every honest attempt at philosophical construction is therefore to be welcomed. Such an attempt may

contribute real insights; or, if there is no vision, will at least serve as an example of what happens in the end to those that start wrong. Most actual systems are a blend of insights and wrong starts. It would be most surprising if the New Realism, perhaps the most talked about of contemporary systems of thought, did not consist of such a blending.

The New Realism, in its American form, came before the public as an organized movement, a party or creed, in 1910, when a group of philosophers printed in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods* what they called "The Program and First Platform of Six Realists." These philosophers were Professors Holt, Marvin, Montague, Perry, Pitkin, and Spaulding.¹ In 1912 the same group of six published a volume containing an introduction to which all six subscribed, and an independent essay by each member of the group. It cannot be denied that the movement has shown unusual vitality. In addition to many articles contributed to the periodicals, the New Realists have written several books of importance.² Other philosophers have indicated a greater or

¹ *The New Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy.* By E. B. Holt and Others. Published by The Macmillan Company, New York, 1912. Reprinted by permission. See references in text below; footnotes 5, 9, 10, 12, etc.

² R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies.* Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1912; rev. ed., 1916. (Hereafter referred to as *P. P. T.*)

R. B. Perry, *Present Conflict of Ideals.* Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1918. (Hereafter referred to as *P. C. I.*)

W. T. Marvin, *A First Book in Metaphysics.* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1912.

W. T. Marvin, *The History of European Philosophy.* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1917.

E. B. Holt, *The Concept of Consciousness.* G. Allen & Co., London, 1914.

E. G. Spaulding, *The New Rationalism.* Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1918. (Hereafter referred to as *N. Ra.*)

less degree of agreement with the views of the six, notably McGilvary, Woodbridge, and Fullerton. If we look abroad, we find a similar and older school in England, headed by Bertrand Russell, the great mathematician. This school, holding numerous tenets in common with American Realism, along with several characteristic differences, and exerting a strong influence on it, will be left out of account in the present study. It will be our purpose to examine and criticize the most important utterances of the American realists regarding one of the most fundamental philosophical problems, if not the most fundamental, the problem of value. These utterances are found chiefly in the writings of Professors Perry and Spaulding, and we shall therefore confine ourselves chiefly to a study of these two men.

What is the problem of value? That, we may reply, is the problem. But at least we may assert that there is such a problem, unless the only interest of the human mind is that in having no interest, so that it regards all knowledge as equally important and all ends of conduct as equally good. There is an extreme of the intellectualistic temper that appears not merely to abstract from, but even to deny the validity of, value distinctions in knowledge. If one feels moved to count the grains of sand at Nantasket Beach, or measure with a footrule the inches from Hongkong to Rio Janeiro, well and good. But human nature turns, and philosophy herself rebels against that type of trivial objectivity, inane disinterestedness. Prior, then, to the performing of any task, theoretical or practical, is the insistent but baffling question, Is this task worth undertaking—is it of value?

The question is baffling for two reasons. First, because it is often impossible to know whether a thing is worth doing until it has been done, not once merely, but many times; secondly, it is baffling because it is so difficult to define what we mean when we say that a task is worth undertaking. What makes a task worthy, a goal valuable? What is worth, or value? To no more important problem can a philosopher address himself.

The various possible solutions to the problem may be classified from numerous points of view, according to the interest of the classifier. A classification from the point of view of the relation of value to consciousness seems most promising for present purposes. Such classification will be in a sense arbitrary in that it does not attempt to group actually existing, or even historical, theories of value. It is, rather, a logical division of the subject with a view to showing the possible relations of theory of value to the principle of personality.³

Any theory, then, must regard value as either extra-mental in its nature, or as some activity or attribute of consciousness. For short, we may speak of the "extra-mental" and the "consciousness" theories. By the extra-mental theory is meant one that regards value as an entity that exists or subsists independently of any consciousness of it. Plato's theory of ideas, as generally interpreted, would be an illustration of this sort of theory. By a consciousness theory would be meant any theory that makes value dependent on consciousness. But here we find that

³ For an illuminating classification of the former type, see Professor Perry's article, "The Definition of Value," *Jour. Phil.*, 11 (1914), pp. 141-162.

notions as to what consciousness is, and what sort of relation to or dependence on it constitutes value are widely diverse. Let us therefore subdivide the consciousness theories into subjective and objective—a distinction ignored by the Neo-Realists. A subjective theory makes the value depend entirely on and consist of our individual, human consciousness of it. Justice, on such a theory, has value because, and in so far as, I value it. If I ceased to prize it, I could rightly say that it had no value. My neighbor, who still honors it, can with equal justification say that it has value. Value, on a simon-pure subjectivist theory, is as local and purely personal as toothache. An objective consciousness theory asserts that, while value must be thought of as dependent on consciousness for its quality as value, yet our valuations point to an objectively real world of values, which our subjective valuations are seeking to know, but which itself can only be thought of as a realm of consciousness. A pair of sub-subdivisions, and we have done with "logic-chopping." Each type of consciousness theory may assume either an impersonal or a personal form, the term "personal" being used as Professor Bowne used it, to characterize the unitary self. An impersonal, subjective, consciousness finds value to consist in consciousness, truly, but regards the self as a complex product of impersonal elements, and denies that personality is ultimate. Here would belong any empiricist theory of Hume's type. A personal, subjective, consciousness theory views value as consisting in consciousness, regarded as belonging to a unitary personality. Here might be classified theories that regard value as an a priori law of the activity of the mind.

The impersonal, objective, consciousness theory would be illustrated by some forms of absolute idealism; whereas the personal, objective, consciousness theory is theistic personalism. It is obvious that the terms "objective" and "impersonal" also apply to all extra-mental theories.

Expressing these results in tabular form, we have the following:

THEORIES OF VALUE

- I. Extra-mental (impersonal and objective).
- II. Consciousness.
 - a. Subjective.
 - 1. Impersonal.
 - 2. Personal.
 - b. Objective.
 - 1. Impersonal.
 - 2. Personal.

It is, as we have indicated, the purpose of the present essay to formulate and criticize the theories of value held by Professors Perry and Spaulding. We are concerned with Neo-Realism in general only in so far as it is essential to an understanding of the theory of value held by these two men. It seems desirable to this end to sketch a brief outline of realistic beliefs as a background for the special investigation. The system is peculiarly subtle, abstract, elusive, and revolutionary. Any exposition from without the camp is chargeable with bias or dullness of apprehension, or both. Braving this charge, one may venture the assertion that the doctrine of epistemological monism is the fundamental tenet of the school. Those uninitiated into New Realism have generally held, following

Locke and Descartes, that we have ideas, not identical with objects, but somehow "representing," or "knowing," or "describing," or "referring to" the objects; and that ideas present to consciousness are all that we immediately possess. The idea of a house and the house itself are two numerically distinct facts in the universe; my idea is not the house itself or any part of it. This common view is called epistemological dualism, or dualistic realism—the theory that there are two entities essential to every case of knowledge, the idea of the object and the object itself. The idea is ours, present and possessed; the object is merely "meant" or "referred to" by the idea. New Realism regards this dualism as a heresy, foisted on an innocent public by seventeenth-century philosophy. The "true" epistemological monism is a return to "naïve realism," the theory that "objects are not represented in consciousness by ideas; they are themselves directly presented." What we call consciousness consists of relations among entities which are themselves not conscious,—the "relational theory of consciousness." Ultimately reality is made up of "neutral entities," neither mental nor physical, but capable of being so related as to form either mental or physical complexes. A complex of such entities (which we call an object) in certain relations to another complex (which we call a human organism) is knowledge. Objects are what they are entirely independent of whether anyone "knows" them or not; the self is not only not constitutive of knowledge, but it—or all there is left of it for New Realism—is epistemologically irrelevant and otiose, a mere "predicament." These results are attained by the employment of the method of analysis,

whereby, according to the principles of mathematical logic, the universe is reduced to terms and relations, of various types. Since there is no one common term or relation to which all are reduced, the theory is rather strongly inclined to pluralism. Further, since the ultimate terms are conceived as independent of their relations, and capable of entering unchanged into many different relations, it adopts the external theory of relations.

Such are the bare outlines of the New Realism. At first sight, a theory so arid and abstract, so frankly contrary to the results of the history of philosophy, avowed by Professor Perry to be a philosophy of disillusionment, would hardly seem promising. How, then, can its rise and popularity be accounted for? Several items enter into the answer to this question. Its mathematical method and genius ally it with the natural sciences, which are to-day so vigorous and influential. Its advocates are characterized by an earnest desire to promote cooperation and discussion in philosophy, and to define philosophical problems with scientific accuracy; and they have dignified their position by seriously relating it to all the major problems of philosophy and life. Professors Perry and Spaulding even teach that this scientific philosophy is theistic,⁴ offering a new and positive solution to the problems of philosophy of religion. This avowal of theism, a distinctly unfashionable belief among contemporary philosophers, is a bold and surprising element in Neo-Realism.

Let us now examine Professor Perry's theory of value. He has made it very easy for us to classify

⁴ *P. C. I.*, p. 379; *N. Ra.*, p. 520.

him under one of our rubrics. Since he holds that "value is dependent on consciousness,"⁵ specifically on interest (for the unitary self of personalism is to him, discoverer of the "ego-centric predicament," anathema) his seems obviously to be what we have called an impersonal, subjective, consciousness theory of value. Herewith a veto is interposed on an immediate investigation of Professor Perry's theory of value; for if value be dependent on consciousness, it becomes of prime importance to know what is meant by consciousness.

If philosophy and psychology up to recent times have agreed on anything, it has been with reference to certain facts about consciousness, such as, that it is immediately felt, is indefinable, and is unique, that is, is entirely different in kind from all of its "objects," especially its "material" objects. Within this field of agreement there have been sharp differences. The associationalists have regarded the stream of consciousness as a series of essentially passive awarenesses, which combine and separate much as blocks may be built up into toy mansions by a small boy, save that in this case the boy himself was explained in terms of the blocks, and the blocks had an annoying way of disappearing. The opposing camp we may call personalists. Neglecting many shades of variation in opinion, we may say that personalism has held that consciousness was essentially active self-consciousness; and that the self, as unitary agent, was the basal fact of experience, making association possible, somehow transcending space and time, and rendering moral obligation intelligible. In lowest terms, according to the

⁵ *The New Realism*, p. 140.

one view, consciousness is fundamentally passive awareness of sense qualities; according to the other, it is a knowing, willing, feeling agent.

Both of these traditional views are the object of neo-realistic attack. Professor Perry asserts that "the nature of mental action is discoverable neither by an analysis of mental contents nor by self-intuition:"⁶ for him, then, consciousness is neither awareness nor agency.

To do business without a self is by no means unheard-of in philosophy and psychology. But Professor Perry goes much further. Conspicuous English realists, like G. E. Moore and B. Russell, find it in their hearts to recognize consciousness, by admitting that awareness is "a distinct and unique relation."⁶ But it puzzles Professor Perry (as it had puzzled James) to understand just what this awareness is, since on Moore's confession it is "of such a nature that its object, when we are aware of it, is precisely what it would be, if one were not aware." If one, so to speak, turns out the gas of awareness, it leaves everything just as it was, on its good behavior. So that, *if such* awareness is all there is to consciousness, it is not surprising that Professor Perry is willing to allow "Mr. Moore's distinction to lapse."⁷ The objects are there all the time. The awareness makes no difference. Hence awareness has no function or meaning. Such seems to be his thought.

It would be grossly unfair to infer from this that the terms "consciousness" and "personality" in Professor Perry's opinion refer to nothing whatsoever. But he

⁶ *P. P. T.*, p. 283.

⁷ *P. P. T.*, pp. 321-322.

does mean to teach that traditional conceptions of consciousness are based on a radically false foundation, namely, faith in the method of introspection. It has for centuries been assumed that I, and I alone, am directly conscious of my own experiences. I may give another person a piece of bread or a piece of land; but to give him a piece of my mind has seemed to be only metaphorically possible. No one, so it has been thought, can experience my neuralgia, or my love, or my ideas, or even my sense perceptions. Others may, indeed, on occasion diagnose my neuralgia, respond to my love, understand my ideas, or perceive the same sense object; but in so doing they refer to the objects which my experience also refers to without actually possessing my experience itself. Yes, even my most social experiences are inalienably mine. "The monads have no windows."

This traditional view has been based, as we said, on the verdict of introspection, that I am aware of my own consciousness; and on the belief that I am not aware of anyone else's consciousness, nor is anyone else of mine, in the same sense as I am of my own. Introspection is inferred to be the only method of knowing consciousness immediately: any knowledge of consciousness other than by introspection is mediate and inferred, not immediately given. The New Realism, according to Professor Perry, seems to admit the datum, that we do actually introspect, and to accept qualifiedly the belief that no one else can be conscious of my consciousness as I am; but to reject entirely the inference that introspection is the only or even the best method of knowing consciousness directly. The supposed "unique accessibility of mind to itself" fun-

damental to the consciousness view is manifestly even more vital to personalism. Here realism has an issue, which Perry formulates with boldness.

He admits "that in certain respects and under certain circumstances, a mind can only with great difficulty be known by another mind."⁸ But if mind be regarded as belonging to "that same open field of experience wherein all other objects lie," and if ideas be objects in this sense, then there is indeed no reason why two people should not have literally the same idea, precisely as two may share the same friend, or the same home. That is to say, Professor Perry's argument at bottom means that if you will grant that ideas possess the properties, or certain of the properties, of physical objects, it follows that the inaccessibility of my ideas to you has no absolute basis. It is true that any given physical object, such as the variegated colors of the kaleidoscope, may perhaps be accessible to observation only from a specific point of view (in this case, the proper end of the kaleidoscope). So too conversation in San Francisco is inaccessible to me in Boston, unless I am listening at the telephone. The interior of the earth or of the sun would be even more inaccessible. In a similar manner, processes occurring within one's own body cannot normally be observed by others. But all physical facts are inherently observable by more than one person; and if ideas are of the nature of the physical, they too can be seen, felt, shared. This, in rough paraphrase, seems to be Professor Perry's argument.

Let us look around for a moment in the world of

⁸ Art., "The Hiddenness of Mind," *Jour. Phil.*, 6 (1909), p. 30, etc. Compare *P. P. T.*, p. 287, and the context.

realistic mind. We have been told to abandon the introspective method, and even the very term "awareness." Mind appears to become a physical object, or a complex of physical objects in certain relations. This situation tempts one to raise questions as to the unity and identity of personality, the possibility of error (regarding which, in particular, the whole realistic school has had a very hard time), the meaning of moral obligation, and other matters. But instead of raising difficulties, it would be better for us to continue observations.

However this view may be related to the history of philosophy, it is clear that it is thoroughly consistent with contemporary behaviorism in psychology. Of the alliance between realism and behaviorism, Professor Perry is aware. American realists, he tells us, are in accord with behaviorism (an assertion that is hardly consistent with Professor Montague's position!), the theory that means by mind "only the peculiar way in which a living organism endowed with a central nervous system behaves."⁹ Taken literally, this means that mind is certain peculiarly organized motions of "matter" in space, and is nothing else. The old distinction of subject and object is reinterpreted. The subject is the activity of the organism, the object or content is the parts of the environment "selected" by that organic activity.¹⁰

Behaviorism has something in its favor, else it would not be so widely held. It gives to psychology a subject matter open to general observation. It removes

⁹ *P. C. I.*, p. 378. For Professor Montague's criticisms, see *The New Realism*, pp. 270-272.

¹⁰ *The New Realism*, pp. 475f.; *P. P. T.*, pp. 299, 300, 323, etc.; *P. C. I.*, p. 377.

certain puzzles inherent in traditional dualism. It employs the categories of biological science, which is now in the ascendancy. Objections to behaviorism need not be urged at this point. But it is important to emphasize the sharp line of distinction that must be drawn between extreme behaviorists and believers in consciousness. The failure to be conscious of the distinction is productive of much confusion in recent discussions. Behaviorism has rendered discussion peculiarly difficult; for whatever a behaviorist says must be taken in a Pickwickian sense. He uses the language of consciousness, but refers to the objects of biology. If his theory is correct, he is, of course, justified. But, justified or not, if he means by desire, for instance, a certain tendency or group of tendencies of a physical object, my body, to move in a particular way, he cannot intelligibly use the term in conversation with one who regards it as meaning conative consciousness. The two persons would simply talk past each other. It must gloomily be confessed that most contemporary philosophical discussion consists of a series of mutual misunderstandings; it is all but unprecedented to find a philosopher admitting that his critic has understood him. And lo!—perhaps we are even now misunderstanding Professor Perry and behaviorism.

If, despite the danger of that misunderstanding, we were to characterize Professor Perry's account of consciousness in the light of the data before us, it would be difficult to avoid regarding his behaviorism as an instance of philosophical naturalism. "Mental action is a property of the physical organism." Mental contents are certain selected aspects of physical nature,

related according to a peculiar pattern, it is true; but they are "fragments of nature" that "find their way into my mind."¹¹ More naturalistic still is the allusion to "minds and other bodily things"; and the assertion that the independence of consciousness "of another onlooking self is only a special case of the independence of physical events on the observation of them."¹² When mind is thus treated as a bodily thing or a physical event, the logic of behaviorism is carried out into materialistic naturalism.

We are purposely emphasizing one current in Professor Perry's thinking, without doing full justice to all that he said. It is our present aim to show that the naturalistic current is a very powerful one in his view of consciousness. This becomes increasingly clear if we observe his criticism of "the relational theory of consciousness," which means, as Woodbridge put it, that "consciousness is only a form of the connection of objects."¹³ Professor Perry feels a certain inadequacy in this theory. But it seems to me that his objection is not to the naturalism of Woodbridge's theory, but rather to its lack of definiteness. For he complains merely that the relational theory fails to show what kind of connection among objects characterizes consciousness. He does not overlook the idealistic answer that reference to a self or self-intuition is the only key to the difficulty (whereby also the naturalistic interpretation of the objects is denied); but Hume and Bradley satisfy him that the experience of self-activity can be analyzed into ele-

¹¹ *P. P. T.*, pp. 298, 277.

¹² *P. P. T.*, p. 301; *The New Realism*, p. 147.

¹³ *P. P. T.*, p. 278. For the following argument, compare pp. 278-280.

ments, and hence is not ultimate. Professor Perry is also dissatisfied with the answer made famous by James, to the effect that self or "spiritual activity" is "the feeling of some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head"; for he justly fails to see how a process within the head could function as a unity of consciousness that should weld together processes within the head and movements of bodies outside the head.¹⁴ Consciousness of those processes and of those movements is contents that need still to be unified. This insight is one which personalism has found conclusive in favor of the self.

But Professor Perry's own solution remains true to behaviorism. Question: what is the unity of consciousness, the secret of mental action? Answer: it is not a conscious self that acts, nor is it the feeling of "intra-cephalic movements"; but it is "bodily action itself,"¹⁵ to which the question of whether it is "felt" or not is quite accidental and indifferent. "Feeling" still remains, as the last echo of a dying self, but it doesn't explain anything, is utterly unimportant and irrelevant to our understanding of mental unity. The mental unity in listening (to use Professor Perry's illustration) is not a unity of consciousness, but a unity of bodily action, of "operation of a nervous system." To this theory our author gives the name of "the immanence of consciousness." His explanation of that term strikes one as perhaps too metaphorical to be exact. It is, he tells us, the theory that "mind and the surrounding world interpenetrate and overlap as the university interpenetrates and overlaps the

¹⁴ *P. P. T.*, p. 284.

¹⁵ *P. P. T.*, p. 285.

other systems and groupings from which its components are drawn."¹⁶ How else than physically, we may inquire, does this occur? How can one, in short, with the best will in the world, avoid regarding this view as materialistic naturalism?

But, as above stated, we have hitherto been presenting only one side of Professor Perry's theory of consciousness. If we turn to another side of his thought, we are struck with his sincere refusal to be classified as a naturalist. His first book¹⁷ may be described as an avowed polemic against naturalism, a polemic which reappears in *Present Philosophical Tendencies* and *Present Conflict of Ideals*. It is apparently grounded in the fact that Professor Perry cherishes the moral and religious values of life, whereas naturalism is indifferent to value, is "equivalent to the denial of optimistic religion. . . . Life is impotent, and the aspirations and hopes to which it gives rise are vain."¹⁸ In rejecting naturalism he would by no means affirm all that "optimistic religion" has affirmed. But he is concerned to have his realism appear as "theistic and melioristic."

It would almost seem that Professor Perry's reason demands naturalism, his heart religion and value. But this would not do him justice. Not only in his direct criticisms of naturalism, but also in numerous significant admissions with reference to his own (naturalistic) theory of consciousness does it appear that there are purely intellectual difficulties in naturalism. He declines to accept the naturalistic account as the

¹⁶ *P. C. I.*, pp. 376-377.

¹⁷ *The Approach to Philosophy*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1905. Compare p. ix.

¹⁸ *P. P. T.*, p. 85.

whole truth; processes do, it is true, obey mechanical laws, he tells us, but these identical processes also obey laws of value, of "interest," as he calls it. "Things take place because of the good they promote."¹⁹ Whether this is logically a rejection of naturalism will depend on whether he supplies a nonnaturalistic definition of value. Meanwhile let us call attention to certain respects in which he criticizes or modifies naturalism.

Despite his behaviorism, he holds that the contents of consciousness are not confined to the physical environment. Not only remote²⁰ regions of space and time, but also abstractions and principles are included in these contents. The extent to which this goes beyond naturalism is debatable. Any theory must, of course, admit the obvious fact of knowledge of the remote in space and time. The more important question would then be, What abstractions and principles are real? Professor Perry's answer seems to be, Only the abstractions of mathematics and logic, that is, "Only the mathematical and logical part of Platonic realism."²¹ This he regards as sufficient to contradict materialistic metaphysics. But since he admits that it is equally contradictory to idealism, and since the real principles which he recognizes are precisely those of significance to naturalism, its fundamental categories, this point cannot be regarded as carrying him very far from naturalism.

The doctrine of "neutral entities" is a more thoroughgoing attempt to avoid naturalism in all its

¹⁹ *P. P. T.*, p. 342.

²⁰ *P. P. T.*, p. 304.

²¹ *P. C. I.*, p. 371, 373.

forms (materialistic, agnostic, positivistic). This doctrine may be summarized as follows: If I analyze "consciousness" into elements (such as the quality "blue," or hardness, or number), I find that I ascribe these same elements to physical nature, and to other minds. The elements of which the universe is made up are themselves neither distinctively "physical" nor distinctively "mental";²² they are "neutral." This theory does, it is true, avoid naturalism; it is dogmatic, not agnostic; metaphysical, not positivistic (although not without affinity with positivism, especially in the denial of "substance"); and neutral, not materialistic. It attains this result by a double abstraction; for it abstracts not merely from reference to a subject, but also from reference to an object. It asserts "the indifference of the terms of experience not only to their subjective relations, but to their physical relations as well."²³ In themselves, the neutral entities have no "home," are not "anywhere." Each entity apparently exists as it is, eternally unchangeable, with a nature independent of and unaffected by the relations into which it may enter. This perhaps avoids some of the difficulties of naturalism; but whatever we may say of the logic by which this new mind-stuff (which is neither mind nor stuff, but capable of becoming both) is arrived at, we must say of the entities themselves that they defy conception in their unrelated, individual isolation. Even Professor Perry admits that the *minimum cognoscibile* may be a complex,²⁴ that we cannot know any entity by

²² *P. P. T.*, p. 277.

²³ *P. P. T.*, p. 316. Compare *The New Realism*, pp. 128, 129.

²⁴ *The New Realism*, p. 127.

itself, but only in relations. The ultimate neutral terms cannot then be conceived as they "really" are—homeless, unrelated, unchangeable. Is this not ground for suspecting that we must regard them as abstractions rather than as reality? To attribute ontological reality to every abstraction arrived at by logical analysis is not merely a return to scholasticism, as it has been called; it is worse than scholasticism.

It must be granted, however, that Professor Perry's theory of neutral entities affords foundation for a very interesting interpretation of his theory of mind, with reference to the differences between "mind" and "matter," as they are commonly called. These two words point to different groupings of "neutral entities." In these different groupings or relations is found room for many of the traditional differences between the two realms; nay, to the "mind"-complex are attributed so many powers that it begins to look almost like personality. "Where my mind is the object to be known," we are told, "I can embarrass the observer, because I can control the object. I can even make and unmake my mind. . . . I may accelerate [my thoughts] or double on my tracks to throw you off the scent."²⁵ Such self-control and self-activity would seem as difficult of attainment by neutral entities as by physical objects; they would seem to be the ultimates of self-experience.

In any event, the same Professor Perry who a few pages back appeared as an exponent of naturalism, is now very eager to avoid that appearance. He seeks explicitly to prove that consciousness is not merely

²⁵ *P. P. T.*, p. 291. For further discussion of this criticism, see Professor Lovejoy's review, *Jour. Phil.*, 9 (1912), pp. 680, 681.

mechanical. He does this in a series of essays, the most important of which is entitled "Docility and Purpose."²⁶ The problem is how, on behavioristic principles, to account for purpose, as it is expressed in such phrases as "in order to," "for the sake of." It is noteworthy with what tenacity Professor Perry holds to the category of purpose, which is *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the category of personality. Much of the language used by behaviorists to express that category is, he concedes, inadequate. Purpose, for instance, is not mere adaptation (as complementary adjustment), which "may be construed as complex cases of automatism or mechanism"; not, then, the mere fact of adaptation, but, rather, the fact that "the organism acquires or learns" adjustments presupposes purpose; for "the response is selected owing to its complementary character."²⁷ On this foundation Professor Perry seeks to build up an account of purpose, yet without any appeal to consciousness. He would not impute "causal efficiency to mental states"; he does not find it necessary "to believe that any mysterious psychic force is at work"; indeed, "to explain this process by a reference to what is commonly regarded as consciousness would be to commit the fallacy of *obscurum per obscurius*."²⁸ And here is the nub of the matter; Professor Perry is after all unwilling to go outside the categories of the physical sciences for his account of consciousness, and yet does not wish to admit that this logically shuts him up to naturalism. Instead of conscious purpose, he speaks of "the selective or

²⁶ *Psychological Review*, 25 (1918), pp. 1-20; Princeton, N. J., Psychological Review Co. Compare *P. C. I.*, p. 377.

²⁷ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 1, 2.

²⁸ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 8, 9, 16.

higher propensity," or (following Thorndike) of "the learner's Set or Attitude or Adjustment or Determination," or of conation, or of something which drives the animal and ceases when the end state is reached, or of "the dominance of the general motor set over the subordinate reflexes which are assimilated to it." Purpose is present when "an organism not only does something, but it *learns how to do something*; the 'how' being selected and consolidated under the control of the 'something to be done.' "

Let us make explicit what such a view of purpose means. A physiological organism (quite free from any obscure and mysterious conscious purposes, in the familiar sense) is controlled by something to be done that does not yet exist, or even by a generalized object that never could exist physically, and then both selects and consolidates the means of attaining this something by which it is to be controlled. In our author's own words, action is "determined by its relation of prospective congruence with a controlling propensity."²⁹ One is tempted to inquire, Which language is more obscure: that which speaks of a conscious self as having ideas, forming plans of actions, making choices, or that which employs the terms just cited from Professor Perry and speaks of objects that do not exist in the physical environment as nevertheless stimulating my organism, which is a physical object? It is not to be wondered at that Professor Pitkin, speaking in another connection, says, "I am aware that, in asserting planes, angles, numbers, ratios, and some other mathematical geometrical characters to be stimuli of the peripheral sensory

²⁹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 12.

organs, in precisely the same sense that ether waves are, I am exposing myself to ridicule.”³⁰ Professor Perry’s view may be true, but it is not because it is more lucid than personalism; and personalism may be untrue, but not because it involves metaphysical assumptions of a theistic nature if the facts of purpose in organic life are to be explained.

Significant, however, is not merely the difficulty of Professor Perry’s view, but also the fact that he is driven to it by his dissatisfaction with contemporary expressions of behaviorism. Watson, for example, he criticizes as overlooking the fact that the learning animal is driven by something that ceases when the end state is reached. Holt he regards as neglecting the dominance of general motor set over the subordinate reflexes assimilated to it, and as narrowly limiting the responses to facts of the environment. In short, Professor Perry desires to do full justice to the complexity, the genuinely teleological character, and the nonphysical or ideal elements of purpose—precisely those elements in which personalism is chiefly interested. In a moment of exceptional frankness, he confesses that so simple a purposive activity as looking for a pin “evidently requires an epistemological construction beyond the scope of a strictly physiological behaviorism.”³¹ We have found above that modern realism and behaviorism had concluded an alliance; they cried “Peace! peace!” but there is no peace. And one may be pardoned a good deal of curiosity as to this new behaviorism that is not strictly physiological. It may turn out to be better to admit that, since

³⁰ *The New Realism*, p. 425.

³¹ *Loc cit.*, p. 7.

a purely naturalistic behaviorism cannot explain purpose, a mixed or seminaturalistic variety would probably not function much better, but would turn out to be a mere hybrid makeshift. May it not be that the bottom has dropped out of behaviorism *überhaupt*? Does it not seem more promising to return again to consciousness—yes, to personality itself?

On this foundation of a modified behaviorism Professor Perry would build his theory of value. In its ultimate terms, that theory is very simple. "Value is dependent on consciousness," "is a function of desire."³² What, then, is desire? In human life "desire" is synonymous with "interest"; and an "interest" is "a unit of life," "an organization which consistently acts for its own preservation."³³ "Life" and "organization" are fairly colorless terms, but seem to designate biological life, biological organization. If this seeming be fair to Professor Perry's intent, the fundamental unit of value is a thoroughly naturalistic concept, correlated with the corresponding view of consciousness. That this interpretation is correct seems all but certain from Professor Perry's statement that "I use the term 'interest' primarily in its biological rather than its psychological sense. Certain natural processes act consistently in such wise as to isolate, protect, and renew themselves."³⁴ He tells us, in the same breath, it is true, that "a physiological account of the action of mind must be supplemented by a moral account," and he is concerned to distinguish the element of interest from "the merely physical and

³² *The New Realism*, pp. 140, 141.

³³ *The Moral Economy*, p. 11. Compare *P. C. I.*, pp. 368, 369.

³⁴ *P. P. T.*, pp. 304, 301, 302.

mechanical element." But if interest itself be a biological unit, it is hard to see how an account in terms of interest is other than a physiological account.

The basic thesis of this theory of value seems to be that "the fulfillment of a simple isolated interest is good;" "to like or dislike an object is to create that object's value."³⁵ To be of value, then, means to be desired.

While the fulfillment of a single vagrant desire, whatever it may be, is on this theory good or valuable, it is not yet morally good. "Only the fulfillment of an organization of interests is morally good." In a vivid phrase, "morality is the massing of interests against a reluctant cosmos."³⁶ Now, this would appear to mean that there is nothing present in the moral or other higher values that is not given in interest as a biological unit, except quantity. That all differences in value are capable of quantitative measurement—"the more the better"—is one of the main theses of the article on "The Definition of Value" already referred to. Such are the foundations on which Professor Perry's theory of value is based. With the superstructure we do not need to concern ourselves, for our interest is in the fundamental principles involved. We may postpone further criticism of these principles at present, while we give our attention to Professor Spaulding's theory of value.

Professor Spaulding's most significant utterances on our problems are found in his recent work, *The New Rationalism*.³⁷ We shall confine attention to this book

³⁵ *The Moral Economy*, p. 15. Art., "The Definition of Value," *Jour. Phil.*, 11 (1914), pp. 157, 153. Compare also the art., "Religious Values," *Am. Jour. Theol.*, 19 (1915), pp. 1-16.

³⁶ *The Moral Economy*, pp. 15, 14.

³⁷ Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1918.

in discussing his theory of value. As in the case of Professor Perry (although for different reasons), we shall look first at the theory of consciousness, then at the theory of value.

Professors Perry and Spaulding alike regard the problem of consciousness as fundamental in philosophy.³⁸ We have seen that the former based his view on a criticism of the relational theory of consciousness, which we have already discussed. The relational theory is explicitly accepted by Professor Spaulding,³⁹ who ascribes it to Woodbridge, Pitkin, and Holt, but makes no mention of Perry's emended form of the theory. Silence in this case would seem to give the reverse of consent.

Professor Spaulding is aware of the historical (personalistic) objections urged against any theory that, like the relational, explains personality in terms of the impersonal, or neutral. They are (as he states them) first, that "consciousness seems too tangible, solid, and substance-like . . . to be a mere relation," and, secondly, that it involves "too much of a continuity and unity of personality."⁴⁰ It is not altogether clear just how Professor Spaulding would dispose of these two considerations. But one of the main theses of his book is that substance is a category modeled by Aristotle on the concept of a physical thing, and that hence there is no room for it in a New Realism that does not recognize "things" as ultimate. It does not seem to occur to him that personality may perhaps fulfill that category in a unique sense, nor

³⁸ *P. P. T.*, p. 227; *N. Ra.*, p. 91.

³⁹ *N. Ra.*, p. 89, n. 3.

⁴⁰ *N. Ra.*, p. 90.

that the ultimate subsistent entities of his own universe are in some sense an illustration of that category. Indeed, his tone seems to imply that there is no substance; but that if there were, we should have to admit that personality was an instance of it. At all costs, the view that consciousness is a substance (or "container") must be given up; not through any defect in consciousness, but because of the rejection of the category of substance.⁴¹ He is thus in the suburbs of the personalistic insight that true substance is to be found not in "things" but only in active, causal, purposive personality.

With reference to the other matter, the unity of personality, Professor Spaulding would doubtless point to his belief that "knowing" cannot be "an absolutely simple term, since such a term, illustrated by a point and an instant, cannot appear and disappear,"⁴² as states of consciousness notoriously do. That is, he rejects one abstraction out of personal life, the physical thing, as his model of "substance," and substitutes for it a much higher abstraction, namely, the points and instants of mathematical analysis. We may agree that personality is not a substance like a physical thing, nor a unity like a mathematical point. But that products of personal thinking, like mathematics, can yield a deeper insight into unity than is afforded by the experience of self, through which alone mathematics is possible, is not established by Neo-Realism. The purposes of the analyzing mind are ultimately the only standard by which the results of analysis may be tested.

⁴¹ *N. Ra.*, pp. 470, 492.

⁴² *N. Ra.*, pp. 88, 89.

Personality rejected, there remains the view that consciousness is "a relational complex" that arises "when the . . . entity that is to become known gets into certain specific relations with . . . an organism having a nervous system. . . ." This is a mild behaviorism, which holds that in the case of certain behavior, the knowing situation arises; that is, something psychical, not merely physiological, occurs. The general tenor of Professor Spaulding's book is to the effect that consciousness exists.⁴³ The mildness (softness, as James might put it) of his behaviorism is further evidenced by his criticism of that theory itself as subject to the error of (at least tacitly) assuming that the study of "the 'conditions,' 'elements,' organizing relations (and the like) of any specific kind or instance of consciousness, sensory or other, does away with, nullifies, or makes a non-fact of the whole that results from the organized elements, that is, the sensation, memory-image, abstract idea, and the like."⁴⁴ This seems to mean that consciousness must be recognized as something uniquely different from its "conditions" or "elements," possessing qualities that cannot be stated in terms of these "conditions" or "elements." Just this criticism appears to be valid as against Professor Perry's theory, even in its modified form. On the whole, Professor Spaulding's theory is distinctly more inclined to accord an independent status to personality than is Professor Perry's. The latter rejected awareness. Professor Spaulding defines the knowing process in terms of

⁴³ Professor Pratt refers to *N. Ra.*, pp. 253, 356, 373, 447, 484-485, 490 as teaching this. See his whole article, "Professor Spaulding's Nonexistent Illusions," *Jour. Phil.*, 15 (1918), pp. 688-695.

⁴⁴ *N. Ra.*, p. 478.

awareness.⁴⁵ He also emphasizes "the nontemporal and nonspatial character of consciousness as such."⁴⁶

That Professor Spaulding is himself not satisfied with his account of consciousness is evidenced by numerous contradictions in his thought on the subject, contradictions that do honor to his love of truth and willingness to face the problems. Professor Pratt has called attention to those centering around the theory of error. Here we shall mention only Professor Spaulding's vacillating attitude to his relational theory of consciousness. His final view is that consciousness is a dimension, "a linear series," but a "new" dimension, "and, therefore, more than a mere class."⁴⁷ Just as a series of points results in a new dimension, length, so "a serial organization of ether-waves, waves of air, physico-chemical processes . . ." results in "one whole . . . , the sensation."⁴⁸ This would seem to be a clear enough explanation of the personal in terms of the impersonal, with the aid of a figure of speech from mathematics; but since he follows this with the criticism of behaviorism in favor of consciousness, and by the explicit rejection of the (once accepted) relational theory of consciousness, it would appear that he is more interested in the uniqueness, novelty, independence of consciousness, after all, than in its analysis. His argument that, since there can be a relation between consciousness and its "elements" (and other "things"), consciousness itself cannot be merely a relation, not only concedes much to

⁴⁵ *N. Ra.*, p. 492.

⁴⁶ *N. Ra.*, p. 492.

⁴⁷ *N. Ra.*, p. 471.

⁴⁸ *N. Ra.*, p. 477.

personalism, but also cuts deep into the external theory of relations.⁴⁹

For the purpose of understanding the realistic theory of value, Professor Spaulding's account of consciousness is significant chiefly as a domestic criticism of Professor Perry's behaviorism. For, unlike the latter, Professor Spaulding does not adhere to a fundamental consciousness value-theory, but clearly accepts an extra-mental view. He classifies theories of value as (1) the (extreme subjectivistic) view "that all values are wholly dependent upon a consciousness," and (2) the view that "there are some values which can be demonstrated to be independent of all consciousness." On this latter view, says Professor Spaulding, the Deity may be "that which is value in the universe," "a Being supra-personal and perhaps supra-conscious."⁵⁰ This second is his own view.

Professor Spaulding arrives at his "extra-mental" theory of value somewhat as follows: He starts tentatively with a definition of value as "anything that is desired and accepted as an end to be attained."⁵¹ In the discussion of the "value-centric predicament" he still uses the term "value" in the subjectivistic sense of "desires, preferences, yearnings."⁵² But these expressions give no clue to his own theory, which he describes as a "Neo-Realism of ideals." These ideals are "discovered by reason," are a "command," and are realized through our freedom "to go counter to

⁴⁹ *N. Ra.*, p. 482. Spaulding is here on the verge of the truth that all terms and relations are relative to the purposes of some mind. But this would lead us back to personality as unitary substance, and the forbidden "ego-centric predicament."

⁵⁰ *N. Ra.*, p. 69.

⁵¹ *N. Ra.*, p. 66.

⁵² *N. Ra.*, p. 206.

the desires and impulses that are causally and instinctively rooted in human nature.”⁵³ They are independent of the physiological organism. Values, ideals, do not exist in space and time; they are, or at least moral values are, “serially organized,” are “efficient,” “account for the appearance of consciousness,” have “agency,” are “objective.”⁵⁴ Professor Spaulding, in short, avows himself a Platonist, a conclusion manifestly consistent with an important side of Neo-Realism. Most members of the school are Platonic realists with reference to the universals of mathematics and logic;⁵⁵ Professor Spaulding extends this Platonism to the realm of values, its native element.

For any Platonism, old or new, there are at least two very difficult problems: first, the problem as to the relation between “ideas” and the phenomena of experience; and, secondly, the problem as to the precise nature of the objective existence (or “subsistence”) of these ideas. Professor Spaulding’s solution of the first problem, summarized above, is in terms of what Dr. Bowne would call a theory of metaphysical causality, although Professor Spaulding has condemned causation-philosophy as well as substance-philosophy, and although he struggles to avoid using the term “cause” of the relations between ideals and the phenomena of consciousness. In any event, these ideals produce results in life that merely mechanical explanation cannot account for. Yes, even the very world process itself, physical though it be, is somehow dominated by value, for it has direction and is crea-

⁵³ *N. Ra.*, pp. vi, 395, 507, 501.

⁵⁴ *N. Ra.*, pp. 479-480, 515-516, 497-498.

⁵⁵ *P. C. I.*, p. 371.

tive.⁵⁶ Thus the entire realm of nature is in some sense ruled by the agency of value.

To the second problem, as to the objective nature of value, Professor Spaulding adumbrates various answers. First, he tacitly assumes that the presence of value in life must be due to a unitary cause. "There is an efficient agent or power to produce all values." Secondly, he further assumes that only value can produce value, and concludes that the unitary cause is therefore itself a value.⁵⁷ There is, then, one supreme, objective value in this Platonic Neo-Realism, a self-existent sovereign in the hierarchy of values; yet not "existent" in realistic sense of being correlated with space and time, but "subsistent," and transcending those limits. Professor Spaulding is aware of being in the neighborhood of theism, and he speaks of "God." But, strangely, having just argued for an efficient power or agent that produces all values, he proceeds to identify God, not with that power, but with the "totality of values, both existent and subsistent."⁵⁸

This definition of God does not clear things up sufficiently. Just what is this God, this realm of values? The "ideals" seem strangely like abstractions endowed with life, like hypostasized concepts. How can an hypostasized concept have efficiency? Does God possess the agency of a personal will and purpose? Professor Spaulding's only answer, very casually given, is: "Accordingly, if God is personality, he is also more than personality, even as the moral situation among

⁵⁶ *N. Ra.*, pp. 512-514.

⁵⁷ *N. Ra.*, p. 514.

⁵⁸ *N. Ra.*, p. 517.

men is more than personality. He is love and affection and goodness, respect and reverence, as these exist among men and in men, but he is these also as they subsist by themselves, and act efficiently upon men. In brief, God is Value, the active, 'living' principle of the conservation of values and of their efficiency."⁵⁹ The only comment on such a position must be one of regret that a thinker usually so conscientious should here speak so vaguely and loosely. The problem itself is at once the most important and the most difficult of all the problems that confront the human mind. All the greater, then, the obligation to define our terms as precisely as possible. Professor Spaulding neither defines what he means by personality in this connection, nor indicates whether God is a personality for himself in any sense, in addition to his existence in and for human personalities. At any rate, Professor Spaulding uses the third personal pronoun masculine of his God, and thus personifies him. But he bases his claim to be theistic and not pantheistic not on the personality of God, but on the reality of evil in the world.⁶⁰ Professor Spaulding not only hovers on the verge of personalism; he comes near to giving us a God and a Satan too. It is significant that his extra-mental, utterly objective, value-theory leads him to thoughts of God and personality; and yet compels him to remain in a view that seems to a personalist as "romantic," "mystical," and "ineffable," as personalism could well appear to its critics.

Professor Perry taught us to regard value as always dependent on consciousness, and yet ventures to hope

⁵⁹ *N. Ra.*, p. 517.

⁶⁰ *N. Ra.*, p. 520.

for the objective triumph of value in the world (meliorism). Professor Spaulding asserts that some (and the most important) values are objective and extra-mental, and yet in formulating objectivity uses terms that suggest a supreme personality, just, affectionate, loyal, as the highest value, and source of all value in the universe. Is not a personalist warranted in feeling that his view represents the synthesis of these two positions? For him, as for Perry, value is always dependent on consciousness; yet not utterly dependent on human consciousness, for subjective value implies objective value, as Spaulding holds; but the objectivity of value is identical with the personality to which religion gives the name of God. The following series of considerations will show some of the grounds for confidence in the personalistic synthesis as opposed to the realistic theories that we have been considering.

1. Professor Perry's unit of value, "interest," is distinctly impersonal. As a mere tendency to act for its own self-preservation, it is an entity in the life of the organism, considered by itself, apart from any ideal or obligation or recognition of a unitary personality, with its laws and its claims.

2. Where morality is (as for Professor Perry), a massing of impersonal interests "against a reluctant cosmos," interest being interpreted behavioristically, morality becomes logically identical with physiological efficiency. There is no doubt that Professor Perry would repudiate this conclusion, but his attitude would appear to be dictated rather by his fine moral sense than by the logic of his theory of value.

3. A fundamental difficulty with Professor Perry's

view is that "interest" in actual life is (contrary to his theory) not made up by a massing of interest-units. Interests massed give rise to new interests that stand in no quantitative relation to their "constituent" interests. He asserts that "in two of a given unit of goodness there is more of goodness than in one."⁶¹ It would be difficult to mention a unit of which this would be unconditionally true; two dinners, or wives, or religions, or inches on the end of one's nose, or millions of dollars, are not necessarily better, in any respect, than one of each of these units. "Units" of interest are always relative to the total personal situation; and that situation, animated by some ideal, does not aim to amass a certain quantity of units, but, rather, to transform and organize all units under the guidance of some supreme or unifying ideal. There is an interest, let us say, in color. There is also an artistic ideal. When an artist combines his colors so as to produce a painting, the number of interests-in-color satisfied is irrelevant, and entirely subordinate to the question as to whether the combination of colors embodies the ideal meaning that the artist was seeking to express. If it be urged that interest in such an ideal meaning is also an interest, it must be said that such an interest is incapable of merely quantitative comparison with others.

4. Interest-in-relation-to-object is not (as Professor Perry holds) the unit of intrinsic value; it should be regarded, rather, as an assertion of value, but an assertion (or judgment, vs. Perry, again) that may well be in error. Fulfilled interest is indeed value for the purpose of mere adaptation; the object is valuable

⁶¹ *The Moral Economy*, p. 56.

in so far as it is adapted to fulfilling the interest. But just such fulfilled interest is often enough judged to be an element of disvalue, that is, fulfillment of interest has neither intrinsic nor extrinsic value when the object that fulfills the interest is judged to be in conflict with what one regards as a "higher" ideal: "higher," not because it fulfills a larger number of interests, but because it fulfills what are judged to be more imperative ones, such as the laws of reason, æsthetic preference (which Professor Perry recognizes), obedience to conscience, or love. Mill is not the only one to believe that "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied." A few unfulfilled interests may come nearer to fulfilling an ideal than multitudes of fulfilled interests.

5. Value, that is to say, is always relative to an ideal of what humanity ought to be, or at least to an ideal of one's own personality, either implicit or explicit. Self-realization (as moral ideal) ought to mean not mere complexity of functioning, multiplicity of satisfied interests, but also, and more fundamentally, the achievement of a particular type of human life, and the discipline of impulse in the interests of that type. The Stoic ideal of the sage, the Pauline conception of life "in Christ," the Kantian doctrine of the dignity of the moral person, T. H. Green's teaching that "our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of personal worth,"⁶² Dürr's *Persönlichkeitsideal*, and Bowne's "ideal of humanity"⁶³ are all attempts to express this same concept.

The use of this principle in a theory of moral value

⁶² *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 210.

⁶³ *Principles of Ethics*, pp. 97, 111, 116ff., 133.

has been criticized. It has been said that the ideal of humanity (which in T. H. Green's theory means that human selves are the temporal manifestation of an eternal self) "throws no ray of light upon the specific problems of morality."⁶⁴ While this is perhaps true of our ideas of the "Eternal Self," it is hardly true of our concrete ideal of what our own personality should become. Professor Perry believes that Green's view reduces to the maxim, "Fulfillment of interest as such is good, therefore the more the better."⁶⁵ But it is very doubtful whether such a reduction can be proven. Interest in interests is different from obedience to a self-imposed ideal of personality. The fact that it is easier to count interests than to make or estimate ideals of personality does not prove that the easier theory is the truer. That ideal admittedly appeals to the creative imagination for the ultimate test of all values; but an imagination instructed by the growing totality of life. It admittedly is not made up of rigorously calculable units. A philosophy based on this conception of value cannot be either mathematical or scientific, as Neo-Realists count science, for it regards value as a whole that cannot be understood by analysis. This theory, like Professor Perry's, emphasizes the dependence of value upon consciousness; unlike his, it affords a positive basis for the gradation of our interests themselves, a system of values.

The Neo-Realist would doubtless object to the complex and mysterious character of this ideal. But if it be found that every valuation of every type—cognitive, or æsthetic, or moral—presupposes that the true

⁶⁴W. G. Everett, *Moral Values*, p. 2.

⁶⁵*Jour. Phil.*, 11 (1914), p. 157.

value in each instance is not what now satisfies me, or what I now desire, but what conforms to the nature of an ideally wise, appreciative, and good person, and that I do actually judge my own value-assertions with reference to my ideal of this person, it is difficult to see why the complexity or even the mystical character of the ideal is an objection to it. Perhaps ideal value *is* complex and mystical.

6. Value is objective, as well as dependent on consciousness. Professor Perry's subjective consciousness theory found it to be objective, in the sense that our desires are independent of our knowledge of them. Professor Spaulding's extra-mental theory found it to be objective as the Platonic ideas are, namely, independent of all consciousness. Both realists agree in the conviction that values not merely ought-to-be, but in some sense actually are. We may add that so fundamental a fact as the experience of value may well be regarded as revealing something about the structure of reality. But just what does it reveal? Professor Perry replies that there are desires; Professor Spaulding that there are impersonal and immaterial efficiencies dominating the universe; personalism, as well as Green's idealism, that the ideal of humanity suggests a perfect person who ought to be. And lo! we are face to face again with the ontological argument once more in the history of thought, but in a much more modest form. For the personalist does not regard the demands of our nature for perfection as a theoretical proof. He admits the impossibility of a "rigor and vigor" demonstration of an objective order of value in a supreme personality. He only contends that the actual existence of this ideal personality is needed if

his system of value-judgments is to have the objectivity that it demands. It may be doubted whether other objective truths regarding concrete matters may be any more conclusively proved than this one.

7. The personalistic theory is not open to Professor Perry's criticism of absolutism. "Absolute optimism," the theory that reality is "the very incarnation of value," reduces, in Professor Perry's judgment, to coherence which "looks suspiciously as though it were dictated by the facts of nature."⁶⁶ Not so, in personalism. In its universe there is room for good persons and bad ones, for real value, and equally real disvalue. Instead of absolute optimism, personalism, with Neo-Realism, offers a meliorism; instead of "the monism of values" by which "all values are conceived as of that one type which is represented by the universe as a whole,"⁶⁷ there is a pluralism of values, represented by many attitudes toward the ideal of the Perfect Person. Absolutism may perhaps "tend to tolerance of evil"; personalism emphasizes personal responsibility both for and adhering to an ideal of humanity.

8. Personalism affords a more rational basis for freedom than does Neo-Realism. That the latter recognizes freedom in any sense is surprising. But Professor Perry emphasizes what he calls "positive freedom," the fact that "I can and do within limits act as I will." He points out that this means that "in a measure life is independent of mechanism" and "in a certain sense the control of life by moral laws takes precedence of

⁶⁶ *P. C. I.*, pp. 232, 241. He has in mind especially Pringle-Pattison and Creighton.

⁶⁷ *P. C. I.*, p. 246.

its control by mechanical laws.”⁶⁸ This is doubtless consistent with the realistic theory of external relations, as well as with the demands of real experience. But Professor Spaulding’s plea for freedom is much more adequate to the facts as a personalist sees them. “The very possibility,” he writes, “of freeing oneself from one universe of discourse, conditioned by one set of assumptions, and of then putting oneself into another ‘universe’ leads to the specific hypothesis that any specific reasoning process is certainly not causally related to all other ‘things’ and perhaps not even to other conscious processes or even to other specific knowing processes.”⁶⁹ His dimensional theory of consciousness doubtless entitles him to a more personalistic conception than behaviorism would grant to Professor Perry. But if freedom be a fundamental fact of human consciousness (and both our Neo-Realists are agreed that it is), if without freedom men could not obey the commands of value to do as they ought to do,⁷⁰ it would seem that the realistic attempt to escape from personality had broken down, so far as theory of value is concerned. For whatever is thus capable of free self-determination, on which all other “universes of discourse” are admittedly dependent, is personality in the personalistic sense, and may well be regarded as an “entity” even though it be “complex”—though the realistic highway of analysis as the one road to truth be thereby blocked. Personalism makes the basic fact of freedom frankly fundamental to its whole view of consciousness; Neo-Realism in the presence of

⁶⁸ *P. P. T.*, p. 343.

⁶⁹ *N. Ra.*, p. 391.

⁷⁰ *N. Ra.*, pp. 395, 451.

values feels driven to smuggle it in, but neither in behavior, nor in a new dimension does it have an adequate "home" for freedom. Perhaps it needs no home; it may float neutrally about nowhere like the other "subsistents," but such a view would make greater demands on imagination and faith than does the view that the conscious self is real and is free.

9. Personalism gives a more reasonable account of religious values than does Neo-Realism. Professor Perry,⁷¹ with his repudiation of every moral and spiritual ontology, with his universe of neutrals, nevertheless makes "the hazard of faith" to a belief in a "forward movement of life," and in "man's hope of possessing the world in the end." "The narrow and abstract predictions of astronomy" might lead us to look with B. Russell for the ultimate ruin of all man's achievement; but this is "provincial and unimaginative"; we may as well hope, and greet "the residual cosmos" "as a promise of salvation." Life is after all too much for Professor Perry's rigid scientific method and anti-romanticism. But the faith at which he arrives is very mild in comparison with the real religious consciousness of mankind. If it is permissible to hope, why not hope on a larger scale, and think one's hopes through? Professor Perry's philosophy of religion, if such it should be called, differs from that of personalism, in that he refuses to become conscious of its implications, its fundamental bearing on all of life and science, its relations to ontology. That is to say, such realism desires a moral world-view in a watertight compartment of utterly ineffable mystery; for there is no reason, in a neutral universe, either for the

⁷¹ *P. P. T.*, pp. 344-347.

fact of past progress or for the hope of future. There is mystery enough, personalism would grant. But the hypothesis of moral and rational personality as the key to ontology makes many facts intelligible that realism leaves obscure. Personalism does not lay claim to the apodictic certainty of realistic "dogmatism"; but it may reasonably offer itself as a more intelligible interpretation of religious faith than Professor Perry has presented.

Professor Spaulding's idea of God, already discussed, comes dangerously near to being a moral and spiritual ontology, so repugnant to other realists. But it has already been shown how vague Professor Spaulding's conception of God is in comparison with the view of God as personality; and how inadequate is his conception of value as impersonal, objective efficiency, in comparison with the interpretation of it as personal experience fulfilling our ideal of personality, and deriving its efficiency from no mysterious property of its own, but from our free response to it and from the divine will in which it has its origin and eternal being.

The present examination of Neo-Realism as a theory of value has shown us that Professors Perry and Spaulding each would evade the principle of personality as the home of value. The former seeks refuge in the depths, the latter in the heights. Which, being interpreted, means that Professor Perry's explanation, although a consciousness theory, is subpersonal, reducing personality to behavior, and value to interest as a biological unit. Professor Spaulding, on the supra-personal heights, makes more numerous and more

notable concessions to personalism than does his fellow-platformist. But as the new movement in philosophy fails to come to a satisfactory definition of its attitude to value and religion, and even fails to attain agreement within itself, personalists have little reason to believe that a more comprehensive or intelligible explanation of the facts than their own has yet been found, or is very likely to be found.

IV

A TRULY CATHOLIC SPIRIT

(Illustrated in John Wesley)

D. A. HAYES

IN a democratic reorganization of Christendom it will be recognized that a very extensive unity in belief is neither necessary nor possible nor desirable. On the contrary, the widest divergence of opinion on many important themes will be recognized as consistent with thoroughgoing unity in the Spirit. A reunited and truly catholic church must rest upon the basis of absolute freedom of thought and "liberty of prophesying." The dogma of papal infallibility must be set aside and no assumption of infallibility on the part of any Protestant individuals or bodies must be permitted to take its place. The unquestioned right of private judgment must be acknowledged by all and the toleration of any theological opinions consistent with a holy and useful life must be practiced by all. A universal church can neither be established nor maintained on any other foundation than that of loving liberty of thought and speech and action on the part of all its members. We must be willing to "think and let think," or we must be contented with a disunited Christendom forever.

The Christian Church is to be a universal church, and a universal church will contain, and must contain, an almost infinite variety of racial, national, ecclesiastical, and creedal types. Its motto ought to be,

and necessarily must be, that old motto of Meiderlin, *In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas*. John Wesley saw this clearly enough in his day. He said: "It is certain, so long as we know but in part, that all men will not see all things alike. It is an unavoidable consequence of the present weakness and shortness of the human understanding, that several men will be of several minds in religion as well as in common life. So it has been from the beginning of the world, and so it will be till the restitution of all things."¹

One sometimes hears it stated that the early Christians were all of one mind, but the Pauline epistles and the book of Acts do not bear out the assertion. We find the records of disagreements there. Paul and Barnabas had a sharp contention at one time, and at another time Paul withstood Peter to the very face. The first Christians differed in opinion as to the practical methods of procedure in the distribution of alms and as to the conditions upon which the Gentiles should be admitted to the new fellowship and maintained in good standing there. These differences sprang up in the Pentecostal church, and among those who were devoted Christians, and among the very chief of them, the apostles themselves. Having called our attention to that fact John Wesley added: "Nor does it appear that the difference which then began was ever entirely removed. We do not find that even those pillars in the temple of God, so long as they remained upon earth, were ever brought to think alike, to be of one mind, particularly with regard to the ceremonial law. It is therefore no way surprising

¹ Wesley, *Works*, vol. i, p. 348.

that infinite varieties of opinion should now be found in the Christian Church.”²

Just as there are infinite varieties in religious experience, so there will be infinite varieties in religious opinion as long as the world stands. Until all eyes are of the same color they will see things in different light. Until all ears are of the same size and shape they will hear the same thing differently. Until all brains are of exactly the same convolutions and proportions men will come to different conclusions upon the basis of the same data. The conclusion of the wise man will differ from the conclusion of the fool, and the most of men will approximate one or other of these conclusions in infinitely various degrees.

It was an old maxim, “Whatever is received, is received after the manner or nature of the recipient.” Just as surely as the recipients are tall and short and fat and lean and white and black and red and yellow and brown, just so surely they differ in their manner and nature and just so surely they will differ in some and in many if not all of their opinions. We are told that no two blades of grass are alike and that no two leaves on an oak tree are exactly alike, and we know that this infinite variety of nature has its parallel in the world of men and in the realm of mind. In that case how can anyone expect all men to think alike or all Christians to think alike? It is utterly impossible, and it always will be impossible. Unity of spirit must be maintained in despite of varieties of judgment; that is the only possibility of continuous fellowship in a universal church. Therefore we must bear and forbear in all nonessentials of thought and speech and action.

² Wesley, *Works*, vol. i, p. 341.

Wesley said, "I have no more right to object to a man for holding a different opinion from me, than I have to differ with a man because he wears a wig and I wear my own hair."³ Many people are not as wise as John Wesley at this point. They object to any man who does not wear his hair just as they themselves do. They object to hair that is too long or hair that is too short or hair which is parted in the middle. Wesley knew that just as surely as the outsides of men's heads are not all alike and there are black-headed and white-headed and red-headed and bald-headed men, men with a surplus of hair and men with a minimum supply and men with wigs, so surely the insides of men's heads are not all alike. God made them of almost infinite variety. Nothing could be clearer than the absolute impossibility of bringing all men to think alike on all points and nothing could be clearer than that God never intended that they should, in this stage of their existence at least. Let us recognize this fact and rejoice in it, for it means a fuller and richer revelation of God and of God's truth through the church.

God has revealed himself to men through the Bible; but the Bible is a collection of books representing a great variety of literature. There is fundamental truth in the Bible, expressed in almost infinite diversity of forms. God has revealed himself to men through nature; but there is no sameness nor staleness in this revelation. The infinite variety of nature is suggestive of the infinite resources of the Creator of all. There is a fundamental type of American life. Yet the Western type is easily distinguishable from the Eastern type, and there always has been a wide

³ Lelievre, *John Wesley*, p. 430.

difference between the North and the South. All life is varied in its manifestation, and that is as true of the religious life as of any other. Unity in variety is evidently the purpose of God in the formation of the church, and while he will reveal himself through the church that revelation will be as varied as are his revelations through nature and in the Bible. We ought to be glad that this is so. We ought to see that the church will be all the better for this reason.

Catholicity is impossible without variety, and, as Bishop Gore has said, "Christianity is really a catholic religion, and only in proportion as its catholicity becomes a reality is its true power and richness exhibited. Each new race which is introduced into the church not only itself receives the blessings of our religion, but reacts upon it to bring out new and unsuspected aspects and beauties of its truth and influences. . . . How impoverished was the exhibition of Christianity which the Jewish Christians were capable of giving by themselves! How much of the treasures of wisdom and power which lie hid in Christ awaited the Greek intellect, and the Roman spirit of government, and the Teutonic individuality, and the temper and character of the Kelt and the Slav, before they could leap into light! And can we doubt that now again not only would Indians, and Japanese, and Africans, and Chinamen be the better for Christianity, but that Christianity also would be unspeakably the richer for their adhesion—for the gifts which the subtlety of India, and the grace of Japan, and the silent patience of China are capable of bringing into the city of God?"⁴

⁴ Gore, *The Epistle to the Ephesians*, pp. 138, 139.

We need to realize two things: that Christians are to be the evangelists of the nations and that when the nations are evangelized the universal Church of Christ will be neither the church of any one of our present nationalities nor the church of any one of our present multiplicity of divisions. It will be a church of international brotherhood with racial and creedal differences tolerated in Christian love. No one will say to his brother, "Know the Lord," for all will know him, from the least to the greatest; and no one will say to his brother, "You must think as I think," for each will be willing to grant unto others the same liberty of thought which he claims for himself. It is the only basis upon which Christendom can be united.

All must come to the position of John Wesley when he said: "Does the love of God constrain thee to serve him without fear—to rejoice unto him with reverence? . . . Is thy heart right toward thy neighbor? Dost thou love, as thyself, all mankind without exception? . . . Give me thy hand. I do not mean, Be of my opinion. You need not: I do not expect or desire it. Neither do I mean, I will be of your opinion. I can not. It does not depend on my choice. I can no more think than I can see or hear as I will. Keep you your opinion: I mine: and that as steadily as ever. You need not ever endeavor to come over to me, or bring me over to you. I do not desire you to dispute these points, or to hear or speak one word concerning them. Let all opinions alone on one side and the other: only, give me thine hand."⁵ The "opinions" which John Wesley had in mind when he wrote those words were theological opinions, doctrines, dogmas of

⁵ Wesley, *Works*, vol. i, p. 351.

great importance and great dispute in his day, "such as the nature and use of the moral law, the eternal decrees of God, the sufficiency and efficacy of his grace, and the perseverance of his children."⁶

The controversies over evolution and higher criticism and the literal or symbolical interpretations of the creed in our own day have been no more vital to us than these issues were in John Wesley's day, and in connection with the controversy over the higher criticism Professor Bowne was in complete accord with the spirit of Wesley when he said: "If any one cannot believe in God the Father and in his Son without believing in the whale of Jonah or the ass that spoke, or the talking serpent and other saving truths of that kind, I should say, By all means believe in them. If these are the only things that hold you to the deeper truths of religion, hold on to them with all your might; only you must not insist that others also must believe in them. So far the church may go in condescension to ignorance, but no farther. The church should always be a church for the ignorant, but it should never be an ignorant church."⁷ That is to say, the wise and the simple must dwell together in the Christian Church in brotherly love, although they never will be able to dwell together with like opinions in matters of knowledge and faith. It is this principle of individual liberty of opinion in corporate harmony of spirit which alone can insure a lasting or a universal church.

It was upon this basis that the Methodist Church, the church of John Wesley, was founded; and we

⁶ Wesley, *Works*, vol. i, p. 341.

⁷ Bowne, *Studies in Christianity*, p. 397.

submit that this is the only basis upon which a universal church ever can be established. In the first Methodist Conference ever held, in London in 1744, the question was raised, "How far does each preacher agree to submit to the unanimous judgment of the rest?" and the answer was made and recorded, "In speculative things each can only submit as far as his judgment shall be convinced; in every practical point, as far as we can, without wounding our several consciences."⁸ In the fourth Conference, held in 1747, the same question was raised and the same answer was made, and then it was asked, "Can a Christian submit any further than this to any man or number of men upon earth?" and the answer was recorded, "It is undeniably plain he cannot, either to Pope, council, bishop, or convocation. This is that grand principle of every man's right to private judgment. . . . Every man must think for himself, since every man must give an account for himself to God."⁹

Notice how that question was worded. It was not, How far does each preacher agree to submit to the majority opinion of his brethren? That is the way in which we settle most of the practical questions with which we deal to-day, by a majority vote to which all submit. That was not the question raised in that first Methodist Conference. The question was, "How far does each preacher agree to submit to the unanimous judgment of the rest?" One lone preacher on one side and the whole Conference unanimous on the other side! What did that mean? It meant that every Methodist preacher was expected to have an

⁸ Stevens, *History of Methodism*, vol. i, p. 212.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 319.

individually convinced judgment and to maintain an individually unwounded conscience, even if he had to stand alone against the unanimous judgment and conscience of the brethren. That was the only position the early Methodists agreed to respect. In the fourth Conference they extended the principle to all Christians. They ranked the right of private judgment and of the individual conscience far above the necessity or the desirability of absolute unanimity of either opinion or action. It is the only position capable of maintenance in a church with a universal destination.

Luther made the right of private judgment in all holy things a fundamental principle of the Protestant Reformation. He never could believe that any Pope or any man was infallible. He never could be persuaded that any church council was infallible. The twenty-ninth of his theses declared, "It is open to us to set aside the Councils, freely to question their actions and judge their decrees and to profess with all confidence whatever appears to be the truth whether it has been approved or reproved of any Council."¹⁰ John Wesley had no higher opinion of church councils than Martin Luther had. He said of them, "How has one Council been perpetually cursing another, and delivering all over to Satan, whether predecessors or contemporaries, who did not implicitly receive their determinations, though generally trifling, sometimes false, and frequently unintelligible or self-contradictory!"¹¹

Infallibility is not to be reached by any summing

¹⁰ Grisar, *Luther*, vol. vi, p. 300.

¹¹ Wesley, *Journal*, Standard Edition, iv, p. 97.

up of fallible judgments. Final authority in matters of truth is not to be attained by any rounding up of a majority vote in any ecclesiastical body made up of men some of whom are grossly ignorant, and many of whom are greatly prejudiced, and all of whom are confessedly fallible. That is the trouble with all the General Councils and Assemblies of Divines who have essayed to formulate and finally fix the Christian faith. They have not been adequate to the task. If we could have an adequately representative body, made up of perfectly holy men, free from all jealousies and antipathies and individual idiosyncrasies and prejudices, absolutely devoted to the truth, and the truth alone, and master of all the knowledge available to that age, such a body might formulate a creed which would be adequate for their own time; but that creed would be antiquated as soon as any new truth had been discovered which would necessitate a readjustment of thought along the whole line.

Such a body of men never was assembled in all the history of the world, and it never will be to the end of time. All the creed-making councils and assemblies of the church have fallen far below this ideal. Some of them have been so bad that they have fitted the description given by Gregory of Nazianzen to the assemblies of bishops in his day. He said: "I never have known one to terminate well. They strive only for power. They behave like angry lions to the small and like fawning spaniels to the great. It would seem as though a herald had convoked to the Council all the gluttons, villains, liars and false swearers of the empire. I will never more sit in these assemblies of cranes and geese."

One trembles to think that the formulation of the faith has been intrusted to such hands, and one rejoices to believe that the truth has come out of them in as good condition as it has. Other councils have been better than these, but in some of them we read of decisions reached by fraud and bribery and in the best of them we read of different parties and fierce and prolonged debates and final compromises to obtain majority votes, and we sympathize fully with Oliver Wendell Holmes when he says,

“Not from the conclave where the holy men
Glare on each other, as with angry eyes
They battle for God’s glory and their own,
Till, sick of wordy strife, a show of hands
Fixes the faith of ages yet unborn—
Ah, not from these the listening soul can hear
The Father’s voice that speaks itself divine!”¹²

The Thirty-nine Articles are right, therefore, in declaring of the General Councils that “forasmuch as they be an assembly of men, whereof all be not governed with the Spirit and Word of God, they may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining unto God,” and Luther was right in asserting over against all their authority the liberty of his individual conscience: “Very well, let them decree and say what they will, still say I, Thou canst not rest thy confidence thereon, nor satisfy thy conscience; thou must thyself decide; thy neck is at stake, thy life is at stake, therefore must God say to thee in thy heart, This is God’s Word, else it is still undecided.”¹³

¹² O. W. Holmes, *Complete Poetical Works*, Cambridge Edition, p. 183.

¹³ Quoted in Dods, *The Bible: Its Origin and Nature*, pp. 38, 39.

Truth is not determined by a majority vote. The majority was against Jesus, but he had the truth nevertheless. The majority decided that Arius was right and Athanasius was wrong; but Athanasius stood alone against the world until the truth had proved itself mighty enough to prevail. The majority decided that the Copernican astronomy was wrong and that Galileo must recant his heresy that the sun was the center of our system and that the earth moved around it, and Galileo recanted, but tradition affirms that he said at the end of his recantation, "It still moves"; and so it does, in spite of the majority vote. Questions of fact are not to be settled by those who are ignorant of the facts, even though they may have a majority vote. Majorities may be in the right, and if they are the individual can go with them in all good conscience; but if the majority seem to him to be in the wrong then it is his right and it is his duty to protest in the name of his own reason and of his own conscience and to allow no authority to coerce him in these things.

The judicious Hooker in his *Ecclesiastical Polity* has stated the truth in this matter: "Now, it is not required, nor can be exacted at our hands, that we should yield unto anything our assent, than such as doth answer the evidence which is to be had of that we assent unto. . . . For men to be tied and led by authority as it were, with a kind of captivity of judgment, and though there be reason to the contrary not to listen unto it, but to follow like beasts the first in the herd, they know not nor care not whither—this were brutish. Again, that authority of men should prevail with men either against or above reason is no

part of our belief. 'Companies of learned men,' be they never so great and reverend, are to yield unto reason; the weight whereof is no whit prejudiced by the simplicity of his person which doth allege it, but being found to be sound and good, the bare opinion of men to the contrary must of necessity stoop and give place."¹⁴

It is the perpetual vindication of the privilege and principle of the humble and sincere conscientious objector in all affairs of church and state. That man who in the assumption of his personal infallibility and in the consciousness of the possession of the majority power attempts to excommunicate or persecute or crush the conscientious objector is as un-Protestant as he is un-Christian, and his position will make a truly catholic church forever impossible. John Wesley set forth the only pronunciamiento for such a church when he said: "Every one must follow the dictates of his own conscience, in simplicity and godly sincerity. He must be fully persuaded in his own mind, and then act according to the best light he has. Nor has any creature power to constrain another to walk by his own rule. God has given no right to any of the children of men, thus to lord it over the conscience of his brethren; but every man must judge for himself, as every man must give an account of himself unto God."¹⁵

Wesley phrased the fundamental principle of a genuinely catholic spirit when he said: "Think yourself and let think. Use no constraint in matters of

¹⁴ Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, book II, chap. vii, paragraphs 5, 6. *Works*, vol. i, pp. 323-325.

¹⁵ Wesley, *Works*, vol. i, p. 349.

religion.”¹⁶ John Wesley said: “Every wise man will allow others the same liberty of thinking, which he desires they should allow him; and will no more insist on their embracing his opinions than he would have them to insist on his embracing theirs. He bears with those who differ from him, and only asks him with whom he desires to unite in love that single question, Is thy heart right, as my heart is with thy heart?”¹⁷

It was in this spirit that Wesley praised the saintly Roman Catholic Fénelon, and held him as a model minister and Christian man. It was in this spirit that he published and scattered abroad among his people the biographies of Roman Catholic saints, like the Spaniard Gregory and Madam Guyon. It was in this spirit that he wrote the life of a saintly Unitarian lady and circulated the tract among his people for their spiritual good. It was in this spirit that he published *The Life of Thomas Firmin*, a Unitarian, and said in the Preface to it: “I had long settled it in my mind that the entertaining wrong notions concerning the Trinity was inconsistent with real piety. But I cannot argue against matter of fact. I dare not deny that Mr. Firmin was a pious man, although his notions of the Trinity were quite erroneous.”¹⁸

It was in this spirit that Wesley wrote in his *Journal*, “I read to-day a part of the Meditations of Marcus Antonius. What a strange emperor! And what a strange heathen! Giving thanks to God for all the good things he enjoyed. . . . I make no doubt but this is one of those many who shall come from the

¹⁶ Wesley, *Works*, vol. i, p. 336.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 348.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Mason edition, 1831, vol. xiv, p. 307.

east and the west and sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, while the children of the kingdom, nominal Christians, are shut out.”¹⁹ Wesley read Homer and found a vein of piety running through his whole work.²⁰ He believed that the Montanists, “in the second and third centuries, were real scriptural Christians.”²¹ In his Christian Library he published a manual of *Devotions for Every Day of the Week and the Great Festivals*, and took it from a work by John Austin, a Roman Catholic writer of the preceding century.

He wandered through the ruins of a Carthusian monastery and then reflected, ‘Who knows but some of the poor, superstitious monks who once served God here according to the light they had, may meet us, by-and-by, in that house of God not made with hands, eternal in the heavens?’²² He read the *Journal* of William Edmundson, a Quaker preacher, and then wrote in his own *Journal*, ‘If the original equaled the picture (which I see no reason to doubt), what an amiable man was this! His opinions I leave; but what a spirit was here! What faith, love, gentleness, long-suffering! Could mistake send such a man as this to hell? Not so. I am so far from believing this that I scruple not to say, ‘Let my soul be with the soul of William Edmundson!’²³ He had no doubt that godly men were saved, even if they belonged to the Unitarian Church or the Roman Catholic Church, or even if they were Quakers, or even if they were heathen.

¹⁹ Wesley, *Journal*, Standard Edition, iii, p. 215.

²⁰ Wesley, *Ibid.*, p. 366.

²¹ Wesley, *Ibid.*, p. 490.

²² Wesley, *Ibid.*, p. 209.

²³ Wesley, *Ibid.*, v, p. 137.

He would have sympathized with Alexander Balmain Bruce, of whom they tell the characteristic story that he was present at a student discussion of the question of the fate of the heathen and the issue was raised as to whether a noble soul like Socrates could be denied salvation. One said, "Omnipotence can do anything." Another objected, "Omnipotence surely can do nothing unjust." Yet another suggested, "Omnipotence could not condemn a man of lofty character." To this it was answered, "He might do so, if he did not approve of his goodness." Then Bruce came forward with his fist clenched and closed the debate with this characteristic utterance, "I say, Daniel, God couldn't damn Socrates."²⁴ Of course not. Neither could nor would John Wesley. He said, "The thing which I was greatly afraid of, all this time, and which I resolved to use every possible means of preventing, was a narrowness of spirit, . . . that miserable bigotry which makes many so unready to believe that there is any work of God but among themselves."²⁵ He believed that

God sends his teachers unto every age,
To every clime, and every race of men,
With revelations fitted to their growth
And shape of mind, nor gives the realm of Truth
Into the selfish rule of one sole race:
Therefore each form of worship that hath swayed
The life of man, and given it to grasp
The master-key of knowledge—reverence—
Infolds some germs of goodness and of right.²⁶

²⁴ Henderson, *The Religious Controversies of Scotland*, p. 251.

²⁵ *Methodist Review*, vol. lxxxi, p. 514.

²⁶ Lowell, *Complete Poetical Works*, Cambridge edition. Rhoecus, p. 46.

We can understand how it could be said of John Wesley, "No reformer the world has ever seen so united faithfulness to the essential doctrines of revelation with charity toward men of every church and creed,"²⁷ and we can agree with the conclusion of Professor Winchester, who affirms of Wesley, "The arch-heretics of history, Montanus of the second century, Pelagius of the fifth century, Servetus of the sixteenth century—he declared that, in his opinion, they were all holy men, who, at the last, with all the good men of the heathen world, Socrates, and Plato, and Trajan, and Marcus Aurelius, would come from the east and the west to sit down in the kingdom of heaven. Religious history from the dawn of Christianity to the present day may be searched in vain to find another leader of equal prominence and equal positiveness of personal opinion who showed such genuine liberality as the great founder of Methodism."²⁸

Dean Stanley used to claim that John Wesley was the founder of the Broad Church. The church which he actually founded was put upon a basis broad enough for the universal Church of Christ. Just three years before his death he said of it: "One circumstance is quite peculiar to the people called Methodists; that is, the terms upon which any person may be admitted into their society. They do not impose, in order to their admission, any opinions whatever. Let them hold particular or general redemption, absolute or conditional decree; let them be Churchmen or Dissenters, Presbyterians or Independents, it is no

²⁷ Meredith, *The Real John Wesley*, p. 160.

²⁸ Winchester, *The Life of John Wesley*, p. 212.

obstacle. Let them choose one mode of baptism or another, it is no bar to their admission. The Presbyterian may be a Presbyterian still; the Independent or Anabaptist use his own mode of worship. So may the Quaker; and none will contend with him about it. They think and let think. One condition and one only is required—a real desire to save their soul. . . . Is there any other society in Great Britain or Ireland that is so remote from bigotry? that is so truly of a catholic spirit? so ready to admit all serious persons without distinction? Where is there such another society in Europe? in the habitable world? I know none. Let any man show it to me that can.”²⁹

Those words were written in an intolerant age and the greatness of John Wesley at this point is the more apparent in the light of that fact; for he declared that a Christian church ought to be a church of absolute tolerance in all nonessentials in religious worship and theological opinion. Wesley wrote in his *Journal*, December 3, 1776, “O that all men would sit as loose to opinions as I do; that they would think and let think”;³⁰ and that motto might be made the Magna Charta of individual liberty in the universal church. Christians think—that ought to be true of them first of all. They ought not to adopt their opinions without thinking and simply because their fathers have held them. They ought not to come to any final conclusions in their faith without serious and studious and adequate research. Then it ought to be equally true of them that they allow others to think for themselves and come to their own conclusions; and, if

²⁹ Wesley, *Works*, vol. vii, p. 321.

³⁰ Wesley, *Journal*, vi, p. 134.

their conclusions differ with those they themselves have reached, abate no whit of their fellowship with them on that ground. That is the high plane upon which any universal church must be founded.

When John Wesley wrote his treatise on *The Character of a Methodist* he began with these words, "The distinguishing marks of a Methodist are not his opinions of any sort. . . . Whosoever, therefore, imagines a Methodist is a man of such or such an opinion is grossly ignorant of the whole affair. . . . As to all opinions which do not strike at the root of Christianity, we think and let think. So that, whatsoever they are, whether right or wrong, they are no distinguishing marks of a Methodist."³¹ Up in Glasgow John Wesley wrote in his *Journal* in 1788: "There is no other religious society under heaven which requires nothing of men, in order to their admission into it, but a desire to save their souls. Look all around you. You cannot be admitted into the church or society of the Presbyterians, Anabaptists, Quakers, or any others, unless you hold the same opinions with them, and adhere to the same mode of worship. The Methodists alone do not insist on your holding this or that opinion; but they think and let think! Neither do they impose any particular mode of worship; but you may continue to worship in your former manner, be it what it may. Now, I do not know any other religious society, either ancient or modern, wherein such liberty of conscience is now allowed, or has been allowed, since the age of the apostles. Here is our glorying; and a glorying peculiar to us. What society shares it with us?"³²

³¹ Wesley, *Works*, vol. v, pp. 240-241.

³² Wesley, *Journal*, vii, p. 389.

A year later and less than two years before his death, down at Redruth in Cornwall, Wesley wrote in his *Journal*, "I still aver I never read or heard of, either in ancient or modern history, any other church which builds on so broad a foundation as the Methodists do; which requires of its members no conformity either in opinions or modes of worship, but barely this one thing: to fear God and work righteousness."³³

His advice to his people always was, "Use every ordinance which you believe is of God; but beware of narrowness of spirit toward those who use them not. Conform yourself to those modes of worship which you approve; yet love as brethren those who cannot conform. Lay so much stress upon opinions, that all your own, if it be possible, may agree with truth and reason; but have a care of anger, dislike, or contempt toward those whose opinions differ from yours. . . . Condemn no man for not thinking as you think: let every one enjoy the full and free liberty of thinking for himself: let every man use his own judgment, since every man must give an account of himself to God. Abhor every approach, in any kind or degree, to the spirit of persecution. If you cannot reason or persuade a man into the truth, never attempt to force him into it."³⁴

That is not the spirit of the Vatican decree of 1870, which asserted the papal infallibility and closed with these words, "If anyone shall oppose this our decision, which God forbid, let him be accursed," that is, let him be damned, let him be anathema (*anathema sit*). It is not the spirit of the Athanasian creed, which

³³ Wesley, *Journal*, viii, p. 5.

³⁴ Wesley, *Works*, vol. v, p. 253.

begins by saying, "Whoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic faith; which faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly," and which ends by saying, "This is the Catholic faith; which except a man believe faithfully he cannot be saved."

What did John Wesley say about the Athanasian creed? He said, "I am far from saying he who does not assent to the creed commonly ascribed to Athanasius shall without doubt perish everlastingly."³⁵ So is every sensible and tolerant Christian man; for assent to any creed never will save a man and failure to assent to any creed never will damn a man, if he be a lover of the truth and has honest scruples concerning any statement in it. Augustine did not believe that, and he invoked the civil power to crush out all schism and heresy. Roman Catholicism did not believe that, and it made the Spanish Inquisition a chief defense of the church. John Calvin did not believe that, and he hoped that Servetus might never be allowed to leave Geneva alive. Servetus had written him, "Though I believe the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, yet I scruple using the words 'Trinity' and 'Persons,' because I do not find those terms in the Bible."

What did John Wesley say about that? He said: "I dare not insist upon any one's using the words 'Trinity' or 'Person.' I use them myself without any scruple concerning them, because I know of none better; but if any man has any scruple concerning them, who shall constrain him to use them? I can-

³⁵ Wesley, *Works*, vol. ii, p. 21.

not: much less would I burn a man alive, and that with moist green wood, for saying he had such scruple."³⁶ The Puritan Fathers drove Roger Williams into the wilderness, where for fourteen weeks he knew not "what bread or bed did mean." The Presbyterians tried Albert Barnes for heresy because he held to the governmental theory of the atonement. The Methodists expelled Dr. Thomas from their connection because he could not believe in the eternal torments of literal hell-fire, and a Methodist minister cited Professor Bowne to a heresy trial upon points nonessential to salvation. But a Methodist Conference, in the true spirit of Wesley, promptly acquitted him.

What did John Wesley say about all of this? He said: "Beware you are not a fiery, persecuting enthusiast. Do not imagine that God has called you (just contrary to the spirit of him you call your Master) to destroy men's lives, and not to save them. Never dream of forcing men into the ways of God. Think yourself and let think. Use no constraint in matters of religion. Even those who are farthest out of the way never compel to come in by any other means than reason, truth, and love."³⁷ It is this tolerance in religious belief which is of the very essence of Christianity and a necessary prerequisite for a universal church. Intolerance is un-Christian as well as unwise and unjust and unkind; but it is not uncommon, even among those who profess to be very pious people.

Religion was intended to bind man to God and to bind men together; but some men make their very

³⁶ Wesley, *Works*, vol. ii, p. 21.

³⁷ Wesley, *Works*, vol. i, p. 336.

religiousness a reason for their persecution of their equally religious brothers. The Master gave his disciples two sacraments as the symbols of their union with each other and with him; and these sacraments of love and life have been made causes of separation and subjects of most bitter controversy and mutual anathema. The church has been divided on the question of transubstantiation and the method of baptism. The very things intended to bring the Christians into closest communion with each other have served to make the most lasting divisions among them.

Jeremy Taylor said, rightly enough: "It is not the differing opinions that is the cause of the present ruptures, but want of charity. . . . There is no cure for us but piety and charity. . . . All these mischiefs proceed not from this, that all men are not of one mind, for that is neither necessary nor possible, but that every opinion is made an article of faith, every article is a ground for a quarrel, every quarrel makes a faction, every faction is zealous, and all zeal pretends for God, and whatever is for God cannot be too much. We by this time are come to that pass, we think we love not God except we hate our brother; and we have not the virtue of religion unless we persecute all religions but our own: for lukewarmness is so odious to God and man, that we, proceeding furiously upon these mistakes, by supposing we preserve the body, we destroy the soul of religion; or by being zealous for faith, or which is all one, for that which we mistake for faith, we are cold in charity, and so lose the reward for both."³⁸

³⁸ Jeremy Taylor, "The Liberty of Prophesying," *Works*, vol. v, p. 368.

There is the natural history of the genesis of many an ardent persecutor of heretics in the Christian Church. A beginning zeal for religion and then religion identified with orthodoxy, and then orthodoxy made to cover not only the essentials of the faith but also everything else which the self-styled orthodox may believe, including all questions of higher criticism and historical fact; and, finally, with the assumption of personal infallibility in the whole field, the arrogation of ecclesiastical authority to maintain it in its integrity and purity, heresy trials, church divisions, charity cold, religion dead. The professional heresy-hunter seldom or never maintains any spiritual leadership in the church.

It was against him and his whole tribe that Professor Bowne used to inveigh with his characteristic irony in these words: "Having themselves little knowledge and no intellectual interest, they desire to stand in the old paths, that is, the old formulas, or, still more accurately, the old phrases. All that is needed for this is a competent and active ignorance and a belligerent conceit. With this furnishing, they read out to their own satisfaction all modern science, modern history, modern sociology, modern political economy, and modern thought in general; and know not meanwhile that they are poor and miserable and blind and naked, and know nothing as they ought to know it. This has been so largely the character of self-styled orthodoxy that one might almost have ground for a suit for slander or libel at being called orthodox."³⁹

All irony aside, Professor Bowne would have been

³⁹ Bowne, *Studies in Christianity*, p. 376.

among the first to acknowledge that there were orthodox people who were intelligent and tolerant and religious. He believed, however, that their orthodoxy was to be measured not by their tenacity of adherence to old formulas or old phrases but by their absolute loyalty to the truth as God had given them to see it. That loyalty would keep them in touch with the best in the past and at the same time it would keep them in line with all progress toward a better future. It would be perfectly consistent with an absolute tolerance toward those who had not yet arrived at its own stage of enlightenment, and with a cherished hope of added revelation in the days to come.

Our creeds never will be perfect or complete, since they must be formulated by finite minds. No man and no body of men ever will be superior to all misunderstanding and mistake. It is not necessary that we have all of the truth in order to be saved. It is necessary that we love the truth and seek after it with all the heart and mind and soul and strength. The amount of truth a man possesses may have been determined for him by his opportunities or his environment. The love of the truth will save him, even if he attains to but an infinitesimal portion of the truth itself; for the love of the truth determines his character, and his creed does not. Therefore Professor Bowne was altogether right when he declared: "Let us say, then, with all conviction, that simple intellectual assent to a dogma can never be a ground for acceptance with God, and that simple rejection of a dogma can never be a ground of rejection by God. The guilt or innocence of a soul can never be a matter

of heterodoxy or orthodoxy, but only of the person's attitude toward his ideals of righteousness."⁴⁰

This utterance is in exact accord with the statements made by John Wesley: "Whatsoever the generality of people may think, it is certain that opinion is not religion: no, not right opinion; assent to one, or to ten thousand truths. There is a wide difference between them: even right opinion is as distant from religion as the east is from the west. Persons may be quite right in their opinions, and yet have no religion at all; and on the other hand, persons may be truly religious, who hold many wrong opinions."⁴¹ He illustrates with Romanists and Calvinists who seemed to him to be in error in their doctrine but at the same time were "real inward Christians," and then he concludes, "We cannot but infer, that there are ten thousand mistakes, which may consist with real religion; with regard to which every candid, considerate man will think and let think."⁴²

That is the foundation upon which a universal church can be built, the charitable belief that vast multitudes will be saved who differ with us in their faith because they are just as religious as we are, or even more religious than we are, even though they are not half as orthodox. Religion depends upon nothing but the attitude of the heart toward God and man. It is as the Master said, "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father who is in heaven."⁴³ All who honestly and

⁴⁰ Bowne, *The Essence of Religion*, p. 167.

⁴¹ Wesley, *Works*, vol. ii, p. 20.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴³ Matt. 7. 21.

consistently desire to do the will of the Father ought to be recognized as members of the kingdom, no matter what their name or creed. They must be permitted to think for themselves and they must not be condemned for their conclusions, however erroneous we may believe those conclusions to be. It is as Paul said, "Who art thou that judgest the servant of another? to his own lord he standeth or falleth. Yea, he shall be made to stand; for the Lord hath power to make him stand. One man esteemeth one day above another: another esteemeth every day alike. Let each man be fully assured in his own mind."⁴⁴ Let every man think for himself and let think, and maintain the unity of the spirit in the face of any minor or major differences of dogma.

It was upon this principle that John Wesley insisted through all his life. It is upon this basis that practical cooperation among all Christians becomes possible. It is upon this basis alone that unbroken fraternal union may be maintained among all the Christian churches as long as their separate existence may last. It is along this line alone that anyone can hope for organic union in the end. A truly catholic spirit like that so well illustrated in John Wesley must be cherished in the world-wide church before we can realize that ideal set forth by James Martineau, an ideal to which all sincere disciples of the Christ will look forward with great longing until it is attained, the ideal of the final union of Christendom in a "unity more deep-seated and affectionate than that of mere opinion; a unity of allegiance to one Father, and toil for one Brotherhood, and reverence for one law of

⁴⁴ Rom. 14. 4, 5.

Duty, and aspiration for one home in Heaven; the universal church of good and faithful souls, adorning God's providence with varieties of thought, and strengthening it by consentaneousness of love."⁴⁵

⁴⁵ *Life and Letters of James Martineau*, vol. i, p. 107.

V

RELIGIOUS APRIORISM

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

THE term "a priori" has had a long history and has been used in a variety of senses.¹ Down to the time of Kant it was used mainly to denote that type of reasoning which proceeds from cause to effect, standing thus opposed to the a-posteriori method, which argues from effect to cause. Of these two methods the former manifestly yields the higher degree of certainty so long as the field of formal logic is strictly adhered to. If a thing or idea is so simple in its structure that its contents can be completely analyzed and its logical consequences clearly and unmistakably deduced, as is the case in mathematics, it is evident that we have in the conclusions thus reached a greater degree of certainty than any that could be logically attained by the a-posteriori method, where the connection between effect and cause cannot be clearly or fully perceived. In the latter case there is always necessarily more or less of a margin of uncertainty. But "a priori" and "a posteriori" were not in the pre-Kantian period always used in a strictly logical sense. There was a tendency to identify "a priori" with knowledge founded on general or abstract conceptions and "a posteriori" with knowledge based directly on experience, and at the same time there

¹ See article on "A Priori," by Paul Kalweit in *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

was a tendency to approach the problem of certainty from the psychological rather than the logical point of view. Now, psychologically it is evident that the concrete data of experience come first, and carry with them a greater degree of certainty than do general conceptions. The result was that with some thinkers, such as Gassendi, the *a priori* ceased to be an index of certainty and became subordinate to *a-posteriori* knowledge.

The ambiguity that thus arose in the use of the term "*a priori*" prepared the way for the ascription of a new meaning to it. The new meaning grew out of the increasingly sharp antithesis which the thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries established between reason and experience. The fundamental problem which engaged these thinkers was the question as to which of the two, experience or reason, was the source and norm of knowledge. Both no doubt were involved in the knowing process, but one or the other, it was thought, must be primary and normative. In this way there arose a sharp distinction between *pure* reason and *pure* experience, and the term "*a priori*" naturally became identified with knowledge derived from the former. This usage appears in Leibnitz, and forms the starting-point of Kant's work. "*A priori*" in this sense denotes knowledge that is independent of experience. It does not mean simply reasoning from cause to effect, nor does it mean a knowledge based on general conceptions. It means such knowledge as grows out of the very structure of reason itself; it denotes those principles that are immanent in the mind, in the rational nature as such, principles that are consequently necessary and

universal and in this sense the condition and norm of knowledge.

It is Kant especially to whom we owe this meaning of the term "a priori." Indeed, the term itself figures far more prominently in his thought than in that of any philosopher before his time. The problem indicated by it formed the very center of his system. His entire philosophy might be said to revolve around the various questions relative to synthetic judgments *a priori*, that is, judgments that do not consist simply in the analysis of concepts and that at the same time pass beyond the range of experience. Are there such judgments, how are they possible, and what are they? It was these questions above all others that Kant set himself to answer; and the answers he gave to them constitute the substance of his philosophy.

It was Kant's aim to mediate between empiricism and apriorism or rationalism. And this he did in the sense that he acknowledged elements of truth in both. But at heart his system was a new form of apriorism. Its very genius consisted in the thoroughness and originality with which he made good the claim that there are synthetic judgments *a priori*. These judgments he found both in the theoretical and the practical reason. In the theoretical reason the a-priori elements are the pure forms of perception, space and time, and the various categories. What distinguishes these elements in our thought life is the fact that they have the marks of universality and strict necessity. It is this that gives to them their a-priori character. They are not innate ideas, nor are they psychological capacities like that of color-sensation. They are purely formal principles, immanent in the mind, prin-

ciples that are involved in experience as a whole and that are essential to experience. In the practical reason, on the other hand, the a-priori element, according to Kant, manifests itself in the categorical imperative. This imperative involves the unconditional obligation to do the right; and the right Kant interprets in terms of the unselfish will and of the sacredness of personality. That the latter ideas have no foundation in mere experience is evident. They are ideal creations of the practical reason, and hence are to be regarded as *a priori*.

To Kant's use of the term "a priori" in the latter connection objection has in recent times been raised. It has been urged that there is hardly any resemblance between his theoretical and his practical a priori. The same tests, those of universality and necessity, it is said, are not applied in the two cases; and in the practical realm there is no such fusion or cooperation of the a priori and the empirical as in the theoretical. The will, for instance, must be determined by the a priori alone. But while there are manifest differences between the two kinds of a priori, there are also significant points of similarity. Both are principles immanent in the mind, not derived from experience, and both are purely formal in character; that is, the practical a priori is constitutive of moral action in the same way that the theoretical a-priori conditions experience in general. There is thus an apparently adequate justification for applying the same term to both. The question here at issue, it may be added, might also be raised with reference to Kant's use of the word "reason." Was he justified in speaking of a "practical" as well as a "speculative" reason? Is it

true, as he says, that "practical and speculative reason are based on the same faculty, so far as both are pure reason"?² If so, it is evident that there must also be a practical as well as a theoretical or speculative a priori. For reason implies a-priori principles. Without them there would be no reason. "A priori" and "rational" are with Kant synonymous terms. "Rational knowledge," he says, "and knowledge a priori are one and the same."³

From this it follows that religion also, in so far as it is based on reason, must have its a priori. The a-priori element in religion, however, did not, according to Kant, have the same specific character as the moral a priori. It was rather derived from it. The beliefs in God and immortality are, to be sure, distinctively religious beliefs, and they are synthetic judgments a priori; necessarily so, since they are not given in experience. But their validity does not rest in themselves, as is the case with the categorical imperative. They are, rather, inferences drawn from the moral nature, postulates of the practical reason. Without God and without immortality the moral will would face an impossible task. This is evident from the fact that the *summum bonum*, which by its very nature the moral will is called upon to realize, contains two essential elements, personal holiness and the harmony of happiness with morality, and that neither of these can be attained by mortal man. Holiness implies "a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence."⁴

² Kant's *Theory of Ethics*, p. 261. Translation by Abbott.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 317.

Its realization is an endless task, and so requires as its condition an endless life. On the other hand, an endless life would not affect the harmony of happiness with morality. For that an omnipotent Being is needed, and so the moral nature postulates the existence of God. In this indirect way Kant sought to show that religion has its roots in pure reason, and consequently has an a-priori basis.

Such in its main outlines was Kant's conception of the a priori, a conception that with some variations has since been adhered to by the various Kantian schools. It is out of these schools that the current doctrine of a "religious a priori" has arisen, and it is only in the light of the Kantian tradition that it can be understood. Kant himself did not use the term "religious a priori," but the idea, as we have just seen, is manifestly involved in his system. With the way, however, in which he developed the idea there has been much dissatisfaction. Fault in particular has been found with his subordination of the religious to the moral a priori. He did not allow religion to come fully to itself, to express itself in its own unique and distinctive character. He left it secondary and derivative. Hence the effort has of late been made to give to the religious a priori a more independent character and to define it more precisely.

This effort has in Germany attained almost the proportions of a theological movement. It is closely associated with the so-called history-of-religion school, and has a twofold motive, a motive analogous to that which underlay the Kantian philosophy. What Kant primarily aimed to do was to save reason and the

cultural interests of mankind from the disintegrating influence of the sensationalistic and empiricistic philosophy. At the same time he wanted to enable reason itself to come to its own as over against the cramping influence of the dogmatisms of the past. To attain this double object he created the critical philosophy with its theoretical and practical a priori. He showed that there are principles immanent in the mind, which no psychology can dissolve away, and which are essential in order to make not only psychology but even experience itself possible. On the other hand, these principles do not enable us to go beyond experience, and hence there is no theoretical basis for the traditional metaphysical dogmas. The latter are at the most permissible only in so far as they serve the purposes of the practical reason. Reason with its aprioristic principles thus stands in its own right as over against empiricism on the one hand and dogmatism on the other.

What Kant in this way did for reason as a whole, especially for the sciences and morality, the modern advocate of religious apriorism seeks to do for religion. Religion is to-day confronted with a double danger. On the one hand, there are the various psychological and sociological attempts to explain religion as an illusion. Religion, we are told, is simply a revival or survival of an earlier "prelogical" type of thought characteristic of primitive men, and hence is destined to disappear before the light of science. Or it is, as Karl Marx declares, simply the outcome of unjust social conditions. "Religion," he says, "is the striving of the people for an imaginary happiness; it springs from a state of society *that requires an illusion*,

but disappears when the recognition of true happiness and the possibility of its realization penetrates the masses.”⁵ Or one may with Emile Durkheim regard religion as a necessary and permanent phase of human society, while at the same time denying objective reality to the ideal objects of its faith. Or one may with various theorists of the past treat religion as the baseless product of fear, of dreams and trances, or of the personifying tendency of the human mind. In any case religion in its creedal form is an illusion, and has no basis in reason.

On the other hand, as over against this powerful positivistic tendency in modern thought we have the various traditional theologies, which fix upon some point or period of the past and erect it into an absolute standard of faith. In so doing they often tie religion up to the obsolete ideas and customs of the past, and so stand in the way of the development of true religion. Furthermore, in virtually all cases they make the truth of religion dependent upon the historicity of some ancient tradition. This exposes religious faith to the destructive fire of historical criticism, and leaves the intelligent believer in more or less of perplexity and uncertainty.

To meet this double peril, one coming from theological dogmatism and the other from naturalistic positivism, it is urged by the religious apriorist that what is needed is a theology, which will make it clear that religion is something wrought into the very texture of human reason, that it is not a merely primitive or transitory or illusory phase of the social life of man, but that it is woven into the very warp and woof of

⁵ Quoted in *Woman and Socialism* by August Bebel, pp. 437-438.

the human mind as a unique and constituent factor thereof, so that it stands in its own right and is relatively independent of the support either of science or history. And such a theology, it is claimed, is contained or involved in the doctrine of a religious a priori. This doctrine thus carries with it a twofold polemic. One is directed against the relativism of psychologism and historicism, and the other against the authoritarianism of biblicism in all its forms, even the attenuated form represented by the Ritschlian school. That the latter line of attack has not been without its effect is conceded by the Ritschlians themselves. Professor E. W. Mayer, for instance, writing in 1912,⁶ represents the theological youth of Germany as carried away with the new program. He sees them going forth in long processions with poles and torches in search of the religious a priori, and as he watches them he feels like a father who beholds his sons forsaking the fruitful daily task and starting out on a vain quest after some magical stone of wisdom.

The acknowledged leader of the new movement is Professor Ernst Troeltsch, perhaps the most influential theologian of the day. It is he who has given currency to the term "religious a priori," and made it the watchword of the movement. The term, however, in spite of what has been said above, is by no means clear in its meaning and implications. H. Süsskind, writing as a representative of the movement, declares that "the most interesting thing in connection with the whole discussion relative to the religious a priori is that up to the present [1914] it has been virtually

⁶ *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, pp. 59f. Article entitled "Ueber den gegenwärtigen Stand der Religionsphilosophie und deren Bedeutung für die Theologie."

totally devoid of results. The reason for it is that no one knows what the religious a priori really is or is meant to be."⁷ This uncertainty and indefiniteness as to the meaning of the term has naturally given rise to different interpretations of it. Within the history-of-religion school we may distinguish two, that by Troeltsch and that represented by Rudolph Otto and Wilhelm Bousset. After considering these we will take up a third view advocated by Paul Kalweit, which stands in closer relation to the traditional theology.

With Troeltsch the idea of a religious a priori is of central importance. Frequent references to it are to be found in his essays, and in three of them it is expounded at some length. Of these the first was delivered as a lecture at the International Congress of Arts and Sciences held in Saint Louis in 1904, and bears the title of "Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft." The second appeared in 1909 in "Religion und Geisteskultur," and is entitled "Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori." And the third was published in "Logos" in 1913 under the title of "Logos und Mythos in Theologie und Religionsphilosophie."⁸ What Troeltsch says in these essays and elsewhere concerning the religious a priori is not as definite nor does it get us as far as one might like, but the main lines of his thought are fairly clear.

He begins with the conviction that the first task of the philosophy of religion at present is to establish the fact that religion is no accidental or contingent ele-

⁷ *Theologische Rundschau* (1914), p. 54. Article with title "Zur Theologie Troeltschs."

⁸ The last two essays are reprinted in the second volume of Troeltsch's *Gesammelte Schriften*, pp. 754-768 and pp. 805-836.

ment in human life, no mere product of psychological and sociological forces, but that it is rooted in human nature, and not only in human nature, but in reason itself. Holding this conviction he naturally turns for support to the Kantian doctrine of a rational a priori. Within human reason there are principles, both theoretical and practical, that are independent of experience, that carry their validity within themselves, that are unique and ultimate. Among these religion along with science, morality and art has its place. It is a necessary and constituent element of reason. That this is so, says Troeltsch, "may be proved from the immanent feeling of necessity and obligation that belongs to religion, and from its organic position in the economy of consciousness, which first receives its unification and its relation to an objective world-reason through religion."⁹ That is, the a-priori character of religion is guaranteed by its inevitableness, by the feeling of obligation immanent in it, and by its structural relation to a rational world-view. In other words, both religious experience and philosophy attest the existence of a religious a priori, a distinctively religious principle inherent in reason itself.

But while there is a certain apologetic advantage in thus emphasizing the rational character of religion, there are also perils in it. The rationalism of the eighteenth century made that clear once for all. To these perils Troeltsch is quite alive, and seeks to guard himself against them. First, he insists that his is a purely "formal" rationalism: The "speculative" and "regressive" rationalisms of the past he rejects. They offered themselves, their logically deduced ideas

⁹ *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, pp. 43f.

of God and immortality, as substitutes for the historical religions; but as such they were wholly inadequate. They lacked vital power and before long died of anemia. A purely rationalistic religion is in truth no religion. At the best it is a parasitic growth, wholly dependent on the historic faiths which it seeks to displace. The only "rationalism" that is consistent with really vital religion is a "formal" rationalism, a rationalism that does not detach the religious a priori from experience and history but finds it realized only in and through them.

How, from this point of view, to distinguish the aprioristic element in religion from the purely empirical is no easy matter. Even in the theoretical field it is difficult enough to separate the autonomous and the valid from the given and the factual. But the difficulty is still greater in the cultural values of life. And yet the distinction must be made. The logical must be distinguished from the psychological, the normative from the factual. Otherwise truth itself would vanish. The difficulty of the task—and it is, says Troeltsch, "the fundamental difficulty of all thought in general"—must not, therefore, bar us from undertaking it. No simple and final solution of the problem, however, is possible. All that we can do in the practical field is to acquaint ourselves with the various cultural developments of human history, compare them, reflect on them, live ourselves into them, and then wait for the response of our own spirit as to what is normative and valid, not in the absolute sense of the term but in the sense of approximating and pointing forward to an ideal goal. In all this there will necessarily be more or less of the volitional; but voli-

tion is not arbitrary, it is guided by truth, a truth which it does not make but finds, a truth rooted in reason—a truth, however, which is actualized only in practice, in life itself. To determine the a priori in religion is thus a complex and a more or less elusive undertaking. But it is on this account, according to Troeltsch, none the less important that the existence of such an a priori should be recognized. And the very fact that the religious a priori, as he conceives it, is purely formal, immanent in experience and with no content apart from it, saves, he thinks, his conception of religion from the charge of being a barren rationalism.

In meeting, however, the latter charge Troeltsch does not content himself with affirming the purely formal character of the religious a priori. He is equally insistent on the view that the religious a priori is unique, distinct from the intellectual, the moral, and the æsthetic. It is not an intellectual principle nor an appendix to morality, but something peculiar, realized only in experience itself. It is not, therefore, a “rational” a priori in the same sense as is the theoretical a priori, or, if so, the word “rational” is in both cases used in a sense different from the ordinary. There is, consequently, a question whether the word “rational” should be applied to the religious a priori. On this point Troeltsch himself seems to have undergone a change of view. In the first essay in which he advocated the idea of a religious a priori he laid stress on its “rational” character. He speaks of the “rational a priori of religion” and of the “rational kernel of religion,” and declares that “being religious belongs to the a priori of reason.”¹⁰ In the second essay, that

¹⁰ *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie*, pp. 36, 48, 44.

entitled "Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori," he retains this usage, and confesses that he has no such aversion to the word "rational" as many theologians have; but at the same time he brings out the fact that he uses the word in a special sense. It means for him simply "autonomous validity"; that is, religion, science, morality, and art each has within itself the law of its own being and needs no validation from without. It is this that constitutes the rationality of each. But in the essay called "Logos und Mythos in Theologie und Religionsphilosophie" Troeltsch seems to fear that his previous use of the word "rational" may have been misunderstood, and so emphasizes the "anti-intellectualistic" and even irrational character of religion. There is, he says, no "rational standard" by which religion may be judged. The only standard applicable is a purely religious one, one that rests upon a personal act and grows out of life itself, one that is, therefore, nontheoretical, nonscientific, yea anti-intellectualistic. So emphatic, indeed, does Troeltsch make this idea that one might almost as well speak of his "irrationalism" as of his "rationalism."

The difference, however, between the later and the earlier exposition of his views is, after all, one of phraseology more than of substance. In the last named essay he still speaks of a "unity of reason" that embraces both the theoretical and the atheoretical validity recognized in morality, art, and religion. He thus continues to hold to a species of "rationalism"; he looks upon religion as rooted in reason. But the reason he here has in mind is a broader and deeper reason than the theoretical or scientific. It is a reason that in the religious realm has its own law, a law

that may be said to be "irrational" in the sense that it is nontheoretical. To speak of an "irrational reason" seems, to be sure, to be a manifest contradiction, but the contradiction disappears when one takes into account the ambiguity of both terms. Reason has its practical as well as its speculative side, and in the former regard it may, though somewhat ineptly, be spoken of as "irrational." It is, however, reason in both cases.

In thus stressing the broader and deeper conception of reason Troeltsch seeks to weaken, if not to overcome, the epistemological dualism of the Ritschlians. They sharply oppose religion to science, and so to a certain extent isolate religion. What Troeltsch as over against this seeks to do is to bring religion back into the circle of reason and to link it up more closely with the other rational interests of men, science included. He consequently traces these various interests back to a common "kernel of reason." This kernel of reason is structural in human personality, and hence is more than a merely formal reason. In this respect Troeltsch goes beyond Kant, introducing a metaphysical element into his conception of reason. But more significant than this is the fact that reason as thus understood is represented as having both its *a priori* and its *a prioris*. When Troeltsch is interested in emphasizing the unity of man's rational nature, he speaks of "the *a priori* of reason," but when he wishes to bring out the distinctive character of the great practical interests of life he declares that each of these has its own *a priori*. The religious *a priori*, for instance, has its own "completely anti-intellectualistic peculiarity."¹¹ We are thus left in uncertainty as to

¹¹ *Gesammelte Schriften*, ii, p. 820.

whether reason is one or many, or if it is both, how the two are related to each other.

The tendency in Troeltsch's thought is toward the recognition of several different *a priori*s, but he still insists that there is a common element in them all, and this common element he finds in the autonomous validity that characterizes each. They are all "validities of reason." But if these validities are independent of each other, in what does their unity consist? Does the general term "reason" furnish anything more than a verbal unity? That Troeltsch means to affirm an actual bond of union between the different *a priori*s is, of course, evident. But would it not be better to find this bond of union in personality itself rather than in reason? The word "reason" suggests too easily the "intellectual," and the ambiguity of the term leads almost inevitably to more or less of misunderstanding. Furthermore, in Troeltsch's case the desire to satisfy both the intellectual and nonintellectual elements in reason leaves his thought in a state of unstable equilibrium. The apologetic interest leads him to affirm the rationality of religion, but, on the other hand, the fear of "rationalizing" religion leads him to insist on its anti-intellectualistic nature, the result being that neither aim is fully attained.

The frequency and emphasis with which Troeltsch asserts the nontheoretical character of the religious *a priori* has been accepted by his followers as sufficient evidence that there is in his *aprioristic* conception of religion no danger of a new Hegelianism. But it is by no means certain that this confidence is fully warranted. H. Süskind, for instance, accepts all that Troeltsch says about the anti-intellectualistic and

anti-rationalistic character of religion, but in his effort to define more precisely the religious a priori falls himself unwittingly into a species of intellectualism. The religious a priori means, he says, that it can be demonstrated "that it is necessary to think the thought of God, and that therefore a necessary idea of reason lies at the basis of religion; and this proof," he adds, "it must, of course, be possible to carry through with cogent reasons, if the thought of the religious a priori is to have a meaning."¹² Thus defined the religious a priori has manifestly a theoretical character. The "cogent reasons" referred to are reasons addressed to the intellect. The "proof" is a logical proof. Yet Süskind thinks he saves the practical nature of religion by saying that cogent reasoning does not compel the obedience of the will. "The concept of the religious a priori means not that everyone *must* become religious, also not 'merely that everyone *can* become such, but that he *ought* to become such."¹³ The final decision rests with the will. The will "lays hold of the truth apprehended by thought."¹⁴ But this very statement implies that the rational factor in religion is the primary one. The decision of the will, the "ultimate axiomatic act," as Troeltsch terms it, has no part in the knowing process. The truth itself is already there, apprehended by thought and established by cogent reasons. All that the will does is to ratify what logic has made indubitably clear.

The will, to be sure, may act without convincing proof, but convincing proof will necessarily to some

¹² *Theologische Rundschau* for 1914, p. 57.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

extent influence the will. In any case it is the rational that logically comes first. It is there, according to Süskind, in the logical necessity of the idea of God, that the religious a priori is to be found. And if so, no matter what may be said about the uniqueness of religious experience, the conception given us of religion is essentially rationalistic. That theory does not carry with it practice by no means saves a theory from the charge of being rationalistic. "A rational a priori of religion," as Traub says, "would necessarily rationalize religion itself."¹⁵ Troeltsch himself escapes this conclusion by leaving the religious a priori vague and undefined. But the tendency is implicit in his system, and no amount of stress upon the "anti-intellectualistic peculiarity" of religion and upon the purely formal character of its a priori can altogether eliminate it. The very word "apriori" has a rationalistic suggestion.

The tendency toward rationalism or intellectualism is, however, considerably more pronounced in the conception of the religious a priori which we find with Otto and Bousset. Otto speaks of the "religious a priori" as a "not very felicitous expression" and as one "encompassed with misunderstandings,"¹⁶ but both he and Bousset still use it, and the idea figures prominently in their theology or philosophy of religion.¹⁷ These men also profess to be Kantians, but

¹⁵ *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1914, p. 196. In article, "Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori."

¹⁶ *Kantisch-Fries'sche Religionsphilosophie*, p. 3.

¹⁷ Bousset says: "Das aber wird, wie es von Tröeltsch bereits richtig erkannt, das grundproblem unser heutigen Systematik bleiben: die Frage nach dem religiösen Apriori und seiner Aufweisung im Gesamt-wesen der Vernunft" (*Theologische Rundschau*, 1909, p. 471). Says Otto: "Wir suchen ja heute wieder von allen Seiten nach dem religiösen Apriori" (p. 3).

the Kantianism which they adopt is that system as modified by Jacob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843). In harmony with this modified form of the system they surrender the two conceptions on which, as we have seen, Troeltsch mainly relies in order to meet the charge of intellectualistic rationalism. For them, as for Fries, the religious *a priori* is neither wholly unique nor purely formal.

According to Bousset, the characteristic of the Friesian philosophy of religion, and its chief service to theology, is to be found in "the assignment of the religious ideas to the pure reason and the abolition of the Kantian dualism between the theoretical and the practical reason."¹⁸ There is, therefore, from this point of view, but one reason and that the theoretical. The religious ideas are a "necessary constituent of the one homogeneous reason." There is no distinctive religious *a priori*. It is the same theoretical reason that lies at the basis both of religion and of science.¹⁹ The only way, consequently, to establish the truth of religion is to show that its central ideas—its ideas of God, freedom, and immortality—are implications of pure reason.

In seeking to furnish this proof the neo-Friesians begin by rejecting the Kantian doctrine of the subjec-

¹⁸ *Theologische Rundschau*, 1909, pp. 422, 472. Review of Otto's "Kantisch-Fries'sche Religionsphilosophie und ihre Anwendung auf die Theologie."

¹⁹ In his recent book, entitled *Das Heilige*, Otto distinguishes between the rational and irrational elements in religion. The idea of holiness involves both, and in each sense "the holy," he says, is "a pure *a priori* category." The "irrational" is a fundamental, constituent and permanent element in religion. There is thus an "irrational" as well as a "rational" religious *a priori*. This is an approach to Troeltsch's position. What is said of Otto in the following pages applies to his earlier rather than his later views.

tivity or ideality of the categories. Thought, they say, starts with full confidence in itself, faith in the objective reality of that which it apprehends. This is a fundamental fact of consciousness, one that needs no demonstration and is capable of none. The basal assumption of the Kantian epistemology is, therefore, mistaken. We have an immediate metaphysical knowledge, and *that* in the idealistic rather than the realistic sense.

So far as our knowledge of nature is concerned, the Kantian theory is accepted as essentially correct. The only important criticism is directed against the assumed external source or cause of sensations. Sensations, it is argued, are as subjective as the categories and also as the speculative ideas, the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality. These ideas Kant had found no basis for in the pure reason. They were not constitutive elements in experience and hence could not be deduced. Whatever basis they had must, therefore, be derived from the practical reason. But this Fries and his followers deny. They hold that the speculative or transcendent ideas have the same basis as perceptions and the categories of thought. All three forms of representation are equally immanent in consciousness. No proof that they grasp an objective reality is possible in the case of any of them. They all derive whatever validity they possess from reason's undemonstrable faith in itself.

There is, then, nothing in the fact that the speculative or religious ideas have no direct relation to experience that need cast any doubt on their truth. Rather do they represent a higher type of being and a greater degree of certainty than do the things of sense. The

space-and-time world is a world of incompleteness, of multiplicity and manifoldness, and for that very reason fails to meet the deepest test of reality. What reason in its inmost nature requires of reality is unity and necessity. But unity and necessity can be realized only in the realm of spirit, of consciousness, of the Absolute. It is, consequently, only there, in the supersensible world of the soul, of freedom and of God, that ultimate reality is to be found. The world of sense experience represents a lower form of existence, and is to be viewed simply as the manifestation of a higher order of being. This is a conclusion forced upon us by reason's fundamental demand for a "necessary synthetic unity in the nature of things," and it is also a conclusion that involves the essential ideas of religion. These ideas, therefore, belong to the *a priori* of reason, and as such they constitute the true religious *a priori*. They form the rational essence and norm of religion, and their validity is guaranteed by "the immediate metaphysical knowledge" possessed by the human mind.

Such in brief is the Friesian or neo-Friesian conception and deduction of the religious *a priori*. This conception manifestly implies that the *a priori* of religion is not purely formal, as with Troeltsch. It consists of a body of abstract doctrines; and this, according to Bousset, gives to it a distinct advantage. Troeltsch with his formal *a priori* is forced to find its definite content in history; and from this point of view the universally valid aprioristic element in religion can only gradually be disentangled out of the multiplicity of individual phenomena. And even then we have nothing final, for man's religious history is in

constant process of development. Change is continually taking place. In history, consequently, we can find no absolute norms. Norms so discovered can at the best be only relatively valid, and as such they leave our fundamental problem unsolved. "For," says Bousset, "what we here need is an absolute a priori and in harmony therewith fixed norms of judgment for the individual religious phenomenon."²⁰ Hence, it is claimed, the religious a priori of the neo-Friesians with its positive content and its necessary and absolute "ideas" meets the needs of the situation better than a merely formal a priori.

Whether this claim is justified need not here be discussed. Nor is it necessary to point out how unsubstantial is the Friesian epistemology and how inconclusive is the Friesian deduction of the speculative or religious ideas. What concerns us here is the bearing of the neo-Friesian conception of the religious a priori upon the nature of religion. Does this conception "rationalize" religion and so destroy its distinctive character? Both Bousset and Otto are confident that it does not. For one thing, they lay stress on the prominence given by Fries to the emotional element in religion. The speculative ideas in his system are not offered as the basis of a new religion of reason. They are "wholly abstract ideas which by themselves alone can never become vital, which, however, unconsciously or consciously—and usually unconsciously—lie at the basis of all vital religion as aprioristic elements."²¹ In this sense they may be said to be "formal"; that is, they are cold and lifeless. Feel-

²⁰ *Theologische Rundschau*, 1909, p. 432.

²¹ Bousset in *Theologische Rundschau*, 1909, p. 439.

ing and action are essential to genuine and vital religion. But however much this point may be emphasized, it still remains true that from the Friesian standpoint the validity or truth of religion is not to be found in the vital religious experience itself but in the speculative ideas that underlie it and that have their root in the theoretical reason. Religion as such, then, does not stand in its own right as something unique and distinct. It derives its support from speculative ideas that lie outside of or underneath it. What Fries offers us as the rational basis and norm of religion is an abstract metaphysical system—a system that is not itself religion. Real religion he makes subordinate and derivative.

This is the case no matter whether his “religious ideas” be regarded as logically deduced or simply as constituent elements within human reason. Bousset thinks it important that a distinction should be made between “a logical proof,” a *Beweis*, “of religion” and a “setting forth or exhibition,” an *Aufweis*, “of the necessary and fundamental religious ideas and the determination of their place in the total structure of reason.”²² The latter, he asserts, is the aim of the Friesian system and not the former; and this he seems to think is an effective response to the charge of rationalism. But however interesting the distinction between *Beweis* and *Aufweis* may be, the fact is that in philosophy an *Aufweis* is of value only in so far as it is a *Beweis*. To exhibit certain religious ideas as constituent elements of reason has significance only in so far as such exhibition carries with it a proof of their validity. And this is manifestly the aim of the Fries-

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 478ff.

ian philosophy. Its conception of religion is, therefore, fundamentally and in principle rationalistic. In spite of all that it says about the emotional and practical nature of religion, what it actually does is to bring out not the truth *of* religion but the truth *in* religion, which is a very different thing. The truth *in* religion belongs not to religion as such but to the theoretical reason.

Thus far in our consideration of the doctrine of a religious a priori as held by Troeltsch, on the one hand, and by Otto and Bousset on the other, we have dealt chiefly with its bearing on the general nature of religion; and we have seen that there is a tendency in the doctrine toward rationalism or intellectualism. In the case of Troeltsch this tendency is held in check by the author's insistence on the purely formal and wholly unique character of the religious a priori, but in the case of Otto and Bousset these restraints are lacking and the result is that we have, in spite of all protestations to the contrary, a fundamentally rationalistic conception of religion. A further point to be noted in connection with the religious apriorism of these scholars is its bearing on the relation of religion to history. Naturally, the rationalistic tendency just spoken of will manifest itself here. There will be a depreciation of the importance of the historical. The a priori of reason rather than any fact or facts of history will be made the basis of religion. But there will also be a difference in the degree of this depreciation of the historical as between Troeltsch on the one hand and the neo-Friesians on the other. The latter will be more negative in their attitude toward

history than the former. And such, as a matter of fact, we find to be the case.

Both Troeltsch²³ and Bousset²⁴ accept Kant's dictum that "the historical serves only for illustration, not for demonstration"; to which also may be added Lessing's famous saying that "the accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason." In history we can never find the absolute. Miracle is excluded by modern science. There is, therefore, no point or person or period of the past to which absolute authority can be ascribed. The authoritarianism of biblicism in even its mildest form is to be rejected. The ultimate basis of religion must be found in the rational, not the factual. But in spite of agreement on this point Troeltsch in his philosophy of religion accords a considerably larger place to history than does Bousset. The latter sees in history nothing more than symbols of religious truth. That is all Jesus is.²⁵ Whether he actually existed or not is a matter of comparative indifference. In either case he is a symbol, and in neither case is he more than a symbol. Furthermore, in the case of a symbol the important thing is not the symbol but the thing symbolized. Psychologically, it is true, the symbol may be of considerable value, may even be essential to a vital religion; but logically or epistemologically it has no real significance. The one source of religious truth is reason, and reason stands in its own right. History has nothing whatever to do with the validity of religion. It matters not, therefore, what conclusions

²³ *Das Historische in Kant's Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 131, 134.

²⁴ *Theologische Rundschau*, 1909, p. 432.

²⁵ See *Die Bedeutung der Person Jesu für den Glauben* (1910), by Bousset.

critics may arrive at with reference to biblical history. The most negative conclusion would not affect religious faith. For in reason faith has a storm-free port, undisturbed by the winds of criticism.

With not a little of this Troeltsch would probably agree in the abstract. But actually, he would insist, the case is different. History may perhaps furnish us with only symbols of religious truth. But a symbol, in order to be an effective symbol, must be more than a symbol. There must be an historical reality corresponding to it. It is not then, Troeltsch says, a matter of indifference whether Jesus ever lived or not. A negative conclusion on this point would put an end to the Christian Church. Organized Christianity could not exist without the belief in the historicity of Jesus. It is the historical Jesus, the Jesus alike of faith and of history, that is the center of Christian worship and the uniting bond in every Christian communion. Without him the religious forces of our Western civilization would disintegrate. His is the only name given among men whereby a vital religious life can be maintained in our American-European world. What might happen if our Western civilization were overthrown no one can tell. The religious forces of mankind would no doubt again reassert themselves, and might then rally under some new name. But for us this is impossible. Jesus is the very life blood of our Western religion. His "heartbeat goes throughout the whole of Christendom just as the vibrating of a ship's engine is felt in every corner of the great vessel."²⁶ In our European civilization there is no substitute for him. For us it is "either Christ or no one."

²⁶ Troeltsch, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ii, p. 847.

Vital religion, therefore, according to Troeltsch, is necessarily bound up with history. The necessity, however, does not lie in any absolute predicates of Jesus. It is not an a priori of reason. It is due to a socio-psychological law. Religion as a social force requires a unifying bond, a center around which worship and fellowship may develop, and this center can with us be found only in Jesus. History makes this indubitably clear. The Christology, consequently, which Troeltsch had discarded in the realm of the a priori he thus in large measure restores in the realm of the a posteriori. But the question arises at this point as to whether on Troeltsch's own principles it is necessary to make such a sharp distinction as he at times does between the rational and the socio-psychological. If the religious a priori is purely formal, it can manifest itself only in the empirical; and if it is unique and non-theoretical, there would seem to be no reason why it should not reveal itself in a socio-psychological law. Indeed, Troeltsch himself says that "it is one of the clearest results of all religious history and religious psychology that the essential thing in every religion is not dogma or idea, but worship and fellowship, living communion with God, and that too a communion of the entire social group."²⁷ In accordance with this it would seem evident that we must look for the religious a priori in the life of spiritual communion and the law that governs its development. For an a priori that did not express the essence of religion would not itself be "religious." The socio-psychological law, therefore, which conditions the life of worship and fellowship, and which,

²⁷ *Die Bedeutung der geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben*, p. 25.

according to Troeltsch, makes necessary the veneration of Jesus and his leadership in our Western world, need not be regarded as a mere empirical fact. It may be looked upon as an expression of the religious reason. What alone seems to prevent this in Troeltsch's case is the possibility that our American-European civilization may be overthrown. But on this point he seems unnecessarily dubious. With the world unified as it now is it is hardly probable that our present civilization will ever be engulfed as those of the past have been.²³ In any case what we have here to reckon with is simply an abstract possibility. So far as we know, our civilization is so deeply rooted in reason as to give promise of permanence; and its permanence, as Troeltsch admits, guarantees the permanence of historic Christianity.

In spite, however, of all that Troeltsch says about the practical necessity of the historical in religion, one cannot escape the feeling that he has not altogether extricated himself from the influence of eighteenth-century rationalism. Take, for instance, his indorsement of the Kantian dictum that history "serves only for illustration, not for demonstration." It is here assumed that demonstration is essential to rational belief, and that demonstration and illustration form a complete disjunction. But both these assumptions are false. Demonstration, at least in the strict sense of the term, is not only not necessary to rational belief; it is not even possible in the practical realm. Belief roots in life, and life justifies itself. It is this that Troeltsch himself has in mind when he speaks of

²³ See article by Johannes Wendland on "Philosophie und Christentum bei Ernst Troeltsch im Zusammenhange mit der Philosophie und Theologie des letzten Jahrhunderts," in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* (1914), p. 164.

"autonomous validity." The only difference in his case is that he identifies autonomous validity with reason or regards it as an expression of reason. But reason thus understood is manifestly not independent of history. As over against history it is an effect as well as a cause. For history, at least from the religious point of view, is not passive. It does not simply illustrate truth discovered elsewhere; it reveals it; and this revelation is a necessary factor in evoking the religious "life" or "reason," whichever we may call it. To represent demonstration and illustration as forming a complete disjunction is thus a mistake, the result of a rationalistic bias. There is a third alternative. History, we agree, does not serve for demonstration, but it does not serve only for illustration; it serves also for revelation, as a medium through which religious truth is discovered and apprehended.²⁹

But if this view of history be adopted and the tendency toward rationalism thus avoided, the question arises as to whether we are still justified in speaking of a religious a priori. Many think not; but we have at least one noteworthy exposition of religious apriorism representing this standpoint. The author is Paul Kalweit, to whom reference has already been made.³⁰ Kalweit turns back to Schleiermacher for his definition of the religious a priori, and finds it in the feeling of absolute dependence. This feeling is not simply a psychological or empirical state, analogous

²⁹ For an elaboration of this idea, see Georg Wobbermin, *Geschichte und Historie in der Religionswissenschaft*, especially pp. 16-20 and 47-72.

³⁰ "Das Religiöse Apriori," in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1908, pp. 139-156.

to other feelings. If it were, there would be nothing of the "absolute" about it. That it is a feeling of absolute dependence characterizes it as something altogether unique. Indeed, it would be better, as Kalweit says, to give up the word "feeling" and put in its place the more general term "consciousness." The consciousness of dependence is something that grows inevitably out of the conditions of our life. It is, to begin with, fragmentary, lawless. We are aware of being dependent at this point and at that. But the sense of dependence itself we cannot escape. The more we attempt to do so, the more we find ourselves involved in its coils. The only release from the difficulty lies in rising above the empirical and recognizing an absolute dependence. As we do this we enter into the realm of religion. Indeed, it is this consciousness of absolute dependence that constitutes the essence of religion. To have this consciousness is to be religious. And the characteristic of this consciousness is that it both embraces and transcends all the concrete feelings of dependence, giving meaning and unity to life as a whole. It is, therefore, a superempirical consciousness, a consciousness which empirical reality could not generate; and as such it may properly be regarded as the true religious *a priori*.

As against this view of the religious *a priori* it may be objected that the term "*a priori*" implies the idea of human activity and of immanence in human consciousness. And these ideas, it is urged, contradict the nature of religion. For religion means recognition of the transcendent and submission to it. The expression "*religious a priori*" is, therefore, a case where the noun devours the adjective and the adjective the

noun. But, as a matter of fact, the antithesis between the two terms is not necessarily so sharp as all this. In the notion of an *a priori* there is involved the idea of something super-individual and so transcendent. On the other hand, the feeling of absolute dependence does not necessarily mean passive submission. It may mean and does mean active self-surrender—in other words, faith. Faith is thus an essential constituent of the religious *a priori*. It is faith that makes possible religious experience. It is not religious experience that gives rise to faith but the reverse. Faith is the *a priori*, the formal principle, that alone makes religious experience possible. If we wish to distinguish between the consciousness of absolute dependence and faith, we may say, as does Kalweit, that the former constitutes the religious *a priori* in its most general content, while the latter expresses its purely formal side.

Such a conception of the religious *a priori* manifestly contains nothing that conflicts with the idea of revelation as a source of religious truth, and hence nothing that implies the rationalistic attitude toward history. Still it does, as over against a one-sided historicism, emphasize the fact that religion is primarily a present relation to God and not some sort of relation to the past. A knowledge of the events of Christ's life does not necessarily have any religious value. These events become religiously significant only in so far as they are interpreted by faith and express the feeling of absolute dependence. All the facts of Scripture, however, do not serve this purpose. A distinction must, therefore, be made between the transient and the permanent in biblical history, and it is the reli-

gious a priori that enables us to make this distinction. Apriorism thus affirms that there is in man a native religious endowment that is measurably independent of science, of morality, and of art. Each of these great human interests has an independence of its own and validates itself. Religious certainty, consequently, has as good a basis as scientific certainty. But however true all this may be, it still remains a question whether "apriorism" is the proper term to apply to such a conception of religion. And this is a point which only taste and usage can finally decide.

In concluding this essay it will be well to sum up the main considerations that have been urged for and against the idea of a religious a priori. Against the idea there are three main arguments. First, the term "a priori" belongs primarily to logic, and can never wholly divest itself of its logical or intellectual implications. The result is that the use of the term tends almost inevitably to "rationalize" religion and so to destroy its unique and distinctive character. Secondly, "a priori" points to a human capacity rather than a human need, and this too runs counter to the essential genius of religion. For in religion it is not capacity but need that is the important thing. That human nature or human reason necessarily generates the idea of God is an interesting and significant philosophical truth, but what religion requires is not simply a self-generated idea of God but God himself. That is, revelation is essential to religion, and this idea is not conveyed by the term "a priori." The latter rather suggests human self-sufficiency.

In the third place, the idea of a religious a priori does not sufficiently differentiate religion from the other cultural interests. One may, as does Troeltsch, emphasize the unique and non-theoretical character of the religious a priori, but in doing so he coordinates religion with the other a prioris, those of science, morality, and art, and this very coordination implies a conception of religion that fails to do justice to its distinctive nature. For, as Windelband has pointed out, religion does not have its own independent field of cultural or rational values alongside of science, morality, and art. It is, rather, something superior to them and manifesting itself in them. The ideals of the true, the good, and the beautiful are also the ideals of religion. What religion does is simply to unite these ideals in a supreme ideal, an infinite Being, to whom we stand in personal relationship. And it is this personal relationship to the divine that constitutes the unique element in religion. It is this fact that leads Dunkmann³⁰ to distinguish between *Geistesgeschichte* and *Kulturgeschichte*, and to argue that the religious a priori is to be found in the former, in that society of spirits human and divine, which is the creative source of human spirits, who in turn are the creators of that cultural history, to which science, morality, and art belong. But if the religious a priori is to be assigned to so distinct a field, it would seem best to discard the term altogether, and to think of religion as the source and ground of the other a prioris rather than as itself an a priori coordinate with the others.

As over against these considerations, however, it is

³⁰ *Das religiöse Apriori und die Geschichte* (1910).

argued that we need a term to express the fact that religion, in spite of all its uniqueness, is not an isolated phenomenon, but stands in a structural relation to life or reason as a whole. We need also a term to bring out the idea that religion is not something secondary and derivative, but something fundamental and irreducible, as much so as the intellectual, moral, and æsthetic interests of men. We further need a term that will carry with it the implication that religion rests upon as sure a basis as does either science or ethics. And these needs, it is claimed, are all met by the term "religious a priori." It is the relativism of empiricism that is to-day, as it was in Kant's time, the chief philosophical enemy of religion. The only logical position, therefore, for the religious believer at present to take is that of apriorism.

But with this limited meaning of the term the religio-historical school would hardly be content. Troeltsch and the neo-Friesians, as we have already pointed out, see in it not only an antithesis to relativistic empiricism but also an antithesis to authoritarian supernaturalism. And in the latter as well as the former sense there is a certain fitness in the term. It designates that which is autonomous. But when we seek to define it more precisely and to make it the organizing principle of a theological system, as some do, we find ourselves confronted either with a disconcerting vagueness or with differences of opinion as to its precise meaning that seem to preclude its fruitful use. Still in spite of this the term has a stimulating suggestiveness, and in view of its manifest adaptability to express certain fundamental and significant religious ideas may very well serve a use-

ful purpose as the watchword of a new theological endeavor.³¹

³¹ In addition to the articles and books already referred to, see George Wobbermin, *Die Religionspsychologische Methode in Religionswissenschaft und Theologie*, pp. 353-358; Ernst Troeltsch, "Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissenschaft" in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, Teil I, Abt. IV, pp. 461-489; Karl Bornhausen, "Das religiöse Apriori bei Ernst Troeltsch und Rudolf Otto" in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 1910, pp. 193-206; and "Wider der Neofriesianismus in der Theologie" in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1910, pp. 341-405; Paul Spiess, "Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori," in *Religion und Geisteskultur*, 1909, pp. 207-215; D. C. Macintosh, "Troeltsch's Theory of Religious Knowledge" in the *American Journal of Theology*, 1919, pp. 274-289.

VI

BOWNE AND THE SOCIAL QUESTIONS

FRANCIS J. McCONNELL

STUDENTS of the Bowne philosophy often ask what the attitude of Dr. Bowne would probably be toward the great social and international questions of to-day if he were now among us. It is, of course, impossible to hazard more than a guess in an attempted answer to this question, but there are certain principles of the Bowne philosophy which have a direct bearing on the problems which confront us to-day; and some recollections of chance interviews which I may be pardoned for mentioning are at least suggestive.

At the very start it may be well to remind ourselves that in his ordinary conversation on social themes Dr. Bowne was a man of varying moods. I remember calling upon him once on a Sunday evening at his home just after he had finished reading Miss Tarbell's *History of the Standard Oil Company*. He was blazing with rage against the practices which had been laid bare through the investigations of the skillful journalist. A few weeks later I saw him again when he was in an equally strenuous temper over the Standard Oil Corporation. This time, however, his attitude was one of defense of the organization against the attacks of a group of ministers who were protesting against the use of tainted money for religious purposes. We may see in a moment that there was not as much contradiction between the two moods as one might

imagine; but on the surface the attitude at the one time was directly opposite to the attitude at the other. So, in relation to the social crises through which men were passing in his day, the attitudes of Dr. Bowne were many times in contradiction to one another until the underlying reason in each case was discovered.

Let us remind ourselves also that Dr. Bowne did not give himself to a close study of social questions until rather late in his professional career. He came upon the scene when the Huxley and Tyndall and Spencer type of agnosticism was on the ascendent in the United States. From the period when he first began to write on philosophical themes in about 1871 until 1882, when his *Metaphysics* was published, the evolutionary philosophy of the materialistic variety was making long strides in the United States. The polemic articles which Dr. Bowne wrote in those days were directed against Huxley, Tyndall, Spencer, Romanes, and even against John Fiske, for John Fiske was then writing in Spencerian fashion on what he called cosmic theism. Dr. Bowne also found leisure for an occasional thrust at skepticism of the Strauss type. It was not until the late eighties or early nineties that Dr. Bowne made opportunity to devote himself largely to ethical questions, including, of course, social questions. He himself felt that his chief duty was in the realm of strict metaphysics and that the application of his principles to social philosophy would have to be the task of those who were to follow him. So that we must remember, in thinking of Bowne's relation to the social sciences, that he himself did not consider that his own obligations lay primarily in this field. Moreover, a goodly share of

the strength he had left after completing his metaphysical system he felt inclined to devote toward clearing up some of the difficulties of everyday religious experience.

Keeping all this in mind, however, we may not be far astray when we say that Dr. Bowne wrote no greater book than his *Principles of Ethics*. The outstanding feature in his ethics was his proposal for reconciliation of the intuitionist and utilitarian schools. While Bowne was still a student in college he wrote a classroom thesis to show that the two schools, correctly understood, were not really opposed. Even as a youth he insisted that the intuitionist was right in maintaining that certain moral data were part of the native furnishing of the mind; but he maintained, on the other hand, that while the intuitionist was right in emphasizing an innate categorical moral imperative, the utilitarianist was right also in teaching that the only way this imperative could take actual concrete content was in experience itself. At the center of the moral life Dr. Bowne maintained that there must always be the absolute will to do right, but conscience alone cannot tell what is right in a particular set of circumstances. This must be determined by observation and reflection, and sometimes by guess. Even if the inner will and disposition may be looked upon as absolute, the concrete duty must always be conceived as relative. At the center of the Bowne system, then, must be placed the will to do right. Next in order, but practically equal in importance, must be the need of intense intellectual effort to determine the consequences which ought to be sought for in carrying out the will to do right; and, finally, Dr. Bowne contended

that there must be a growing human ideal which will condition all thought of moral duty. Through these three points his ethical system was drawn, and, of course, he built upon all these points in his reflection upon the problems of society.

It is the merest commonplace that one who made so much of personality as did Dr. Bowne could not do otherwise than put personality at the center of his ethical philosophy. Just as Dr. Bowne conceived of the thinking person as furnishing the clue to the universe, so he conceived of the moral will as the only element which would make personal life worth while. He would at times, indeed, defend the utilitarian position in such terms as to lead one to believe that he was losing sight of the inner will to do right altogether; but he never left a discussion without coming back to his fundamental proposition that moral persons are the only ends in themselves, and that in all their relationships to one another moral persons owe one another good will.

Inasmuch as Dr. Bowne was a teacher rather than a preacher, it was but natural that in his classroom work he should lay stress upon the importance of the second point in his system, namely, the need of using every faculty at our command—especially every intellectual faculty—for determining what is right under given circumstances. He would insist at the outset that every man of us owes every other man good will; but suppose the man whom we owe good will is in an imperfect moral condition, or suppose he is in any condition which raises perplexity. In such case Dr. Bowne would protest vehemently against any attempt to solve the problem by any other method than the

most careful and earnest thought. It is from this angle that such contradictions as those in his moods about the Standard Oil Company must be understood. His first feeling was one of rage against the system which had left out of the account the harmful social consequences involved in building up such a monopoly. His second mood was explained by his resentment at the attempt to deal with a tangled and difficult economic situation by coining a phrase like "tainted money." In this field of the study of social causes and effects Dr. Bowne had a thorough horror of those whom he called "sentimentalists"—a horror so intense as to lead him to question the sincerity of most sentimentalists.

In the days when the United States was wrestling with the problem of how best to deal with the Philippines—in the years 1899 and 1900, to be exact—Bowne found himself much out of patience with the "aberrant moralizers," as he called them, who kept shouting that America must do right toward the Filipinos without giving any sort of hint as to what the right would call for. He used to declare that the performances of these moralizers were about as commendable as if they should shout at a doctor ministering to a sick patient, "Cure the patient," without themselves possessing any information as to the cause of the patient's illness, or without any suggestion as to what a cure would be. Remarks of this sort threw a certain type of impatient radical into a frenzy. After some such deliverance by Bowne a heated member of a Philosophical Club to which Dr. Bowne belonged remarked that the Doctor might well have been employed as prosecuting attorney before the

Sanhedrin which condemned Jesus. This criticism, by the way, seemed to amuse Dr. Bowne himself very much. He was never tired of quoting it. The Bowne students, however, never misunderstood; they knew that Dr. Bowne had a passion for social righteousness which never waned, and that he felt that the passion for righteousness in all men should manifest itself in the hardest kind of hard thinking. He felt that conscience should be a driving force urging men on to the most thoroughgoing intellectual mastery of the enigmas of social life. For earnest thinking—not noisy oratory—of the most revolutionary kind Bowne had sympathy. I remember looking through a New York book store with him upon one occasion to find the best books on socialism by socialists to recommend to students. Of course it would have been impossible for Bowne, with his nature and training, ever to have been a socialist. He was an individualist through and through, but he was always willing to give heed to such social radicalism as might show itself intellectually respectable. He once stood in Copley Square gazing at the Boston Public Library and finally turned away with the remark, "That library comes out of the kind of socialism I believe in." Moreover, he never wearied of poking fun at the professed intellectual superiority of many social conservatives. In the famous free silver campaign in 1896, a prominent Boston political economist was supposed by Beacon Hill Republicans to have completely demolished the free silver cause with what he called his "hammer argument." "Here are two coins," said this economist, "one silver, and the other gold. Hammer the governmental inscription off the silver and it loses half its

value. Hammer the governmental inscription off the gold and it still has nearly its full value." This particular argument gave Bowne no end of mirth because of the obvious failure of the economist to see that if the demand for gold as currency should cease in large part, as the demand for silver had ceased, it too would lose much of its value. Another class of arguments that Bowne delighted to ridicule were those advanced in behalf of withholding political suffrage from women. Most of these Bowne characterized as among "the drollest whimses" that had ever entered the human mind. The objection that women should not be allowed to vote because they were evidently intended to be the "mothers of the race" he declared could only be matched by the objection that men should not be allowed to vote because they were evidently intended to be the fathers of the race.

Against the pretensions too of any governmental autocracies of whatever sort Bowne was very fierce. Political and ecclesiastical machines he detested. The ecclesiastical mechanism of his own church in his day must have been in very woeful plight if it deserved the criticism that Bowne poured forth. It must be admitted that his own encounters with official ecclesiastics had been very unfortunate, especially during the days when Professor Mitchell, of Boston University, was under fire for his biblical views. I have heard him say more than once that the best thing that could be done for the Methodist Church would be to abolish the episcopacy and the district superintendency outright.

If any fault is to be found with Dr. Bowne's method of social theorizing, it would probably have to take

the form of showing that some of his own logical devices occasionally played tricks on him. Every student who has ever worked under Dr. Bowne is aware of the Bowne emphasis on the fallacy of the universal—the fallacy, that is to say, of considering class terms as if they represent actual realities, whereas, of course, the only realities are the concrete individual existences themselves. In many a field Bowne wrought splendid service by showing the bogs in which we land ourselves by taking class terms as if they were anything more than mere tools to help our thinking; but in discussing social institutions Bowne would occasionally lay himself open to a charge of failure to admit the degree of reality which attaches to institutions as such. In dealing with the major social groups, like the state and church, or the minor institutions, like the school and the theater, for example, he would lay such stress on the fact that individual human beings are the only realities concerned that he would now and again understress the other fact that when individuals meet together in group contacts, their conduct is different from that which marks them as unrelated individuals. To be sure, it would arouse to contempt the Bowne who founded an argument on the fact that even chemical elements act differently when together than when separate to hear anyone speak as if he were not aware of so obvious a consideration; but it is true that he did not always make clear his own understanding of the part played in human life by social groups functioning as groups rather than as mere assemblies of individuals.

Again, it can probably be urged with justice that Bowne had not read widely or closely in the field of

social theory. He was apt to flip social theories out of his fingers because of their logical weakness without stopping to consider their historical importance. For example, he dismissed the theory of the divine right of kings with the curt remark that the only truth in it was the general supremacy of society over individuals—a supremacy which grasping kings identified with their own sway. The historic fact that the divine right of kings was, in its day, a potent weapon against ecclesiastical official pretension he would have lightly dismissed. Bowne once remarked that books had done him very little good. He was hugely pleased when a book reviewer in the New York Tribune referred to him as a man who had thought more than he had read.

The third element in the Bowne social philosophy, namely, the shaping of a conditioning human ideal, also called forth much of his best utterance. "What the law of good will asks for," he used to say, "will depend altogether on what we take ourselves to be. The law of good will in a group of convivial roisterers would call for nothing higher than a fresh round of drinks." It was at this point that the Bowne doctrine of an inherent dignity in man and of a morally responsible God came in to reenforce the conclusions of his ethical thinking. He placed Christianity at the head of the forces working for an enlarging human ideal, and therefore among the most powerful dynamic agencies for the development of the true ethical spirit. All the larger theistic conceptions Bowne employed to make more forceful his notion of what he called the essential dignity of humanity. Readers of the *Ethics* will recall the sentence which declares that social con-

tacts take on new force when we reflect upon the passage, "Inasmuch as ye did it to one of the least of these, ye did it unto me."

A moment ago I spoke of his emphasis on the necessity of the careful calculation of consequences in a sound moral life. In estimating consequences Bowne made quite as much of inner consequences as of outer, and by inner consequences he meant the effect of courses of conduct on what he called "essential humanity" in ourselves and others. For every form of patent panacea for the redemption of society, Dr. Bowne had unsparing scorn, but he welcomed every movement in every quarter which laid increasing stress on what he always called the essential human values.

About the year 1906 Dr. Bowne remarked to his closer friends that his interest in abstract philosophical questions as such was beginning to fade out as compared to his interest in the larger social and international themes. His journey around the world, made at about this time, did much to deepen his interest in the greater human needs. Dr. Bowne was nearly, if not quite, sixty years of age when he made his journey through the Orient—a journey which did not indeed change fundamentally the character of his thinking, but which made an impress upon it truly indelible. It will be remembered that in discussing the larger international questions in his *Principles of Ethics* Dr. Bowne occasionally spoke with a harsh accent. He said once of the non-Christian nations that they must either be transformed or perish—and there was a suggestion of unpleasant grittiness in his tone. After Dr. Bowne, however, had served for a considerable

period as trustee for the American College for Girls in Constantinople, and after he had himself visited the Orient, his thinking on international questions took on a new charity and sympathy. It will be remembered that one of Dr. Bowne's favorite utterances was that in dealing with men we are dealing neither with animals nor with angels, but with beings passing upward from a predominantly animal stage to a stage which may be predominantly spiritual. He used to declare also that this was the true ground for charity in our dealings with men and that only a cheap cynicism could unqualifiedly condemn men in this half-way stage. The journey out into the non-Christian world chastened the Bowne spirit and deepened his feeling of charity for the so-called heathen peoples. This was very remarkable when we consider the peculiar sensitiveness of his own nervous organization to anything crude or even unæsthetic. He once stood on the banks of the Ganges watching the Hindus in the midst of one of their chief religious festivals. The disgusting sights and odors sickened him so dreadfully that he asked to be taken home; and he left the scene with an ashen face, exclaiming that he could understand very well how it might repent God that he had ever made man and how God might justly exterminate the race which he had made. The mental nausea passed, however, and following it came abiding pity which was probably the largest factor in the Bowne consciousness in the last months of his life. He felt that the huge outlying races of the world had vast contributions to make to the moral and spiritual content of the human ideal. Almost the last thing I heard him say was that if he were to live his life over, and were to

teach philosophy and ethics again, he would sooner work in China than anywhere else on earth.

Dr. Bowne saw the so-called backward races of the earth in all their unpleasant and even revolting characteristics. He described the impression of sheer inanity and futility made upon him by hearing hundreds of Mohammedan youths at school droning away together in a monotonous sing-song in their study of the Koran. He was distressed by the apparent superficiality of many of the Indian students. Lecturing once to a group of Hindus, he became nettled as one after another would arise and leave in the midst of his most profound discussions; and finally called out to some of those going out of the room that "pint pots are soon filled." He saw much everywhere to set his soul on edge, and yet he came back to America in the main hopeful of the final outcome of the non-Christian peoples.

Especially did he rebel against any treatment of the so-called heathen peoples as other than human beings. He used to say that it was immoral and abominable for a so-called civilized nation to deal with the backward nations with a purpose of exploitation, or to act on any policy which left the betterment of the backward nations out of the account. The world interested him as a vast human problem. He would not think of men just in masses, but he saw them as hosts of individuals, each with the possibilities of distinction as a responsible human soul. He hoped for great things even from peoples whose careers since Dr. Bowne's death have dashed to earth the dreams of their best friends. For example, Bowne in the nineties was extremely bitter toward the Turks.

He used to say that if he had an earthquake harnessed into good working condition, he could think of no better use for it than to rock around in Turkey and shake it into ruins. At the time of the Young Turk Revolution, however, his feelings underwent a change. He was in constant correspondence with friends in Turkey who filled his mind with fine hopes for the days just ahead. The story goes that Dr. Bowne became so convinced of the bright prospects of the new movement in Turkey that he prevailed upon an American philanthropic board to give outright \$125,000 for education in Turkey. He used to quote with delight the reports that would come to him of the way in which the Mohammedan priests had adjusted themselves to the altered situation and were declaiming upon the worth of education. "Certainly our people should know geography," said one Mohammedan leader to a friend of Bowne's; "how can they tell rightly how to place their prayer mats unless they do?" And Bowne remarked slyly after the utterance of the priest had been reported to him, "It is a perfect illustration of the smugness with which religion can adjust itself to a revolutionary change." Dr. Bowne was spared the distress of seeing his hopes for the Young Turk movement brought to naught.

There are two incidents which recur to me as illustrating Dr. Bowne's feeling about men everywhere. Both occurred in India. The Bowne party once went into the Himalaya region accompanied by a servant from the hot plains. The servant was but thinly clad and suffered much from the cold in the high altitudes. Upon inquiry Dr. Bowne learned that the keeper of the inn, or hotel, who was to lodge the party was ex-

pecting the Indian servant to crawl under a sort of porch and shiver the night through as best he might. The dismay of the innkeeper can be imagined when he found that the entire party would move from their lodgings unless the servant had quarters inside as comfortable as the quarters of any one of the party.

The other incident was even more significant. Staying one night with a missionary, Dr. Bowne heard a peculiar sound about nightfall—a sort of mixture of scuffle and moan. He went to the rear of the house to learn the cause and found the missionary beating a servant—an old man. That missionary then and there heard a disquisition on the brotherhood of man and the rights of human beings as such probably much more pointed than the students ever heard in the classroom. Then Bowne gathered up his bags and marched off to a hotel. Now, with Dr. Bowne these two incidents meant just this: that he would not compromise under any circumstances as to the ideal of the worth of a human life as such. That really was the heart of his ethical system.

The net result in largest and finest human terms—this was the Bowne test for all social institutions whatsoever. He would judge social systems and nations and empires by their effect on the human beings who had to live under them.

It may be well to add that Dr. Bowne saw in the social, and especially in the international realm, the sphere for moral expansion and development of most significance for mankind in the decades just before the world at the time of his death. He always urged that moral advance must take the line of bringing more and more persons within the range of our good

will, and more and more of our activities under the sway of enlightened conscience. He used to say that there is a deal of wild land as yet untouched in the social and international ethical sphere and that human moralization cannot be complete until these large outer relationships are completely conquered under the guidance of ethical principle. It may seem like a trifle, but he would inveigh in his classrooms against the sharp-tongued talkers who, under the cloak of patriotism, would carry their sarcasm and scorn into treatment of international themes. Glancing at a cartoon once which represented a foreign nation under a grotesque and stupid personification, Bowne remarked, "All that sort of thing is profoundly immoral and will one day raise a spirit which we cannot easily lay."

If we put Bowne's social ethics into his own terms, we may say that social progress can only come by the efforts of those who have warm hearts and cool heads. Very likely those who know Bowne only through his books think of him as altogether of the cool-headed type. Those of us, however, who were privileged to stand closer to him knew the warmth of a heart which beat passionately for mankind. Borden P. Bowne would not be beguiled into believing in any sort of fool's fire or any sort of wild fire. He did believe, however, that the problem of the moralization of the world is so desperate that it can never be solved except as an earnest purpose shows itself in the most careful and intense scrutiny of facts in the search for the principles which will make the life of men worth living. The aim of all ethical striving, both individual and social, said Bowne, should be to lift men up to the highest reaches of normal human life. All ethical theories must be tested

out in life. It is all very well, said he, to avow that we are to let justice be done though the heavens fall; but we must remember that if an act brings down the heavens it is not likely to be an act of justice. He protested against our being told that virtue is its own reward unless the concrete contents of the virtue and of the reward were specified. He believed that the testing place of human character is in the play and interplay of relationships in ordinary human contacts. If out of this interplay there comes increasing and enlarging richness of life, Bowne maintained that the ethics governing such contacts is justified. He would not hear of any appeal whatsoever to any other standard for social morality than the actual effects upon actual human beings. When a fastidious New York editor sniffed contemptuously through two columns and a half against a sincere moral deliverance of a host of good ordinary citizens, Bowne declared of the editor that "Pharisaism had so dementalized him that he had become an ass of the first magnitude." For Bowne believed in the people, and demanded that all social causes must stand or fall by the degree to which they meet the needs of the people. He once said that the vast amount of drudgery performed to keep the world going was an immense item to be set down to humanity's credit—and he declared that all moral and social precepts and philosophies must minister to the ordinary mortals who day by day bear the load of the world's drudgery. He believed that social solutions must be wrought out—rather than talked out. After long ethical discussion of social themes he would return to the words of Voltaire's *Candide*: "Meanwhile, let us cultivate the garden."

VII

A PERSONALISTIC VIEW OF ART

HERBERT C. SANBORN

WHEN one attempts to identify and assemble the data designed to serve as the starting point for developing some general conception of beauty one discovers at once a disconcerting situation that explains, while it does not ultimately justify, the desperate claim of the skeptic. No accounting for tastes, *de gustibus non est disputandum*—the perennial plaint that has received a recent formulation in the positive assertion of Robert Eisler: "Whatever pleases or at any time has pleased anybody is beautiful"—would seem to be the appropriate reaction to the apparent confusion of palates and palettes. In spite of such downright relativism, however, it seems significant, otherwise than to sophist and skeptic, that hardly anything is more general than disputes on matters æsthetic and no field perhaps where in practice skepticism is actually less prevalent.

The notion that everybody is an equally good or, rather, equally bad authority in matters of taste, that the conflicting verdicts of naïve appreciation and those of the connoisseur stand on the same plane, is surely not borne out by any survey of practice; moreover, the state of æsthetic purity and innocence assumed as the possibility of strictly naïve appreciation is practically nowhere existent. The bald fact that things have pleased or displeased given individuals is cer-

tainly no guarantee of æsthetic worth, since it is obvious that things please and the contrary for various reasons. Furthermore, just as every layman is to some extent a psychologist, so everybody concerned is somewhat sophisticated æsthetically. Everybody worth considering as a source of the alleged not-to-be-disputed facts knows for one thing of the existence of standards of criticism and is under the influence of this knowledge; one important cause preventing the novice from rendering a tolerably chaste judgment resides in the fact that he knows or believes, without having the power to discriminate between them, that both good and bad works of art exist. As compared with the connoisseur who is able to attain a state of comparative æsthetic abstraction, such a person is embarrassed by this as well as by the humiliating consciousness that defects of taste in some way argue even greater inferiority than lack of knowledge. Neither in the determination nor in the evaluation of the facts is reliance placed in practice on off-hand judgment; nor is it usually felt that the emphasized disagreements of experts and epochs are actually irreconcilable when due account has been taken of individual and racial evolution and of uneliminated personal and epochal equations, which probably receive too much consideration from pragmatist and skeptic.

In the attempt to exclude irrelevant factors, that is, to indicate somewhat precisely just what facts ought indisputably to be included under the general head, we become more than ever keenly aware that "æsthetics" is a kind of blanket term, sometimes for different classes of phenomena, sometimes for different methods of treatment. If we use the word thus broadly,

as may be done, to include facts throughout the whole field of sense experience, we are soon forced to indicate by means of qualifications like "æsthetically effective" (to which the experience of animals is perhaps limited) and "æsthetically beautiful" differences of importance or value inside this larger field. Finally, we must make in the narrower field of the beautiful distinctions of excellence which but corroborate the belief that the most important element in the manifest "complexity of æsthetic experience" is the implicit or explicit reference to a norm.

In æsthetics so-called facts are, after all, significant or *known* facts, appearing always relative to principles, and being patently, perhaps even more than elsewhere, the results of selection and interpretation behind which stand not merely deep-rooted prejudices and idola of various kinds but also more or less consciously defined systems of metaphysics. The issues are ultimately philosophical ones; the trail of the serpent is over it all. Except in the denial of this inevitable circle there is, indeed, no truly naïve approach to any special field of investigation; and this and other general considerations suggest caution—here and elsewhere—in putting unlimited confidence in the efficacy of the experimental method in the narrower sense of the term, notwithstanding striking averages obtained by it and data of heuristic value that have been unearthed.

In typical instances of experimentation in æsthetics, lines of various forms and directions, rectangular and other figures of different sizes and proportions, colors of different hues, shades, tints, and saturation are exhibited to subjects, among them children and savages,

in the effort to determine æsthetic preference, emotional and motor reactions, etc.; and in this way the majority vote is secured. In order, however, for such results to possess more than doubtful value it hardly needs to be said that the jury impaneled must not be naïve but, on the contrary, sophisticated æsthetically and sufficiently schooled in introspection to be capable of determining whether normally free judgment has actually taken place, and in such event to be able to indicate to some extent what subjective factors—individual, racial, and epochal influences—may have entered into the reaction. These may, indeed, be quite other than æsthetic.

Similar considerations would apply *a fortiori* to attempts that have been made to gather naïvely from an examination of literature the conceptions of beauty prevalent in past epochs of history. In such cases we may, to be sure, discover what has been called beautiful, ugly, or indifferent; that is, we may gain obviously an identity of terminology; but knowledge is not thereby advanced, unless by some reference to what is otherwise known concerning the spirit of the race and the periods in question, and through analogy on the basis of our own reactions, we are enabled to guess whether the appeal was chiefly physiological, intellectual, ethical, religious, or, indeed, æsthetic.

Subjects suffering from tone-deafness or from achromasia would be plainly as handicapped in their judgment of music and painting as a cretin in reasoning. A gourmand, or even a gourmet, might find estimates of still life prejudiced by the arousal of nonæsthetic elements. Differences of age, artificial and abnormal habits of life, accidental associations, racial tenden-

cies, fashions, social and religious experience, and, in general, strong emotions and moods of various kinds may modify or destroy intended æsthetic effects. Sorrow in particular seems either to prevent or to exaggerate enjoyment of given works of art, while the blindness of love to positive ugliness is proverbial. Bad or indifferent paintings of John Knox preaching to the Covenanters were once sure of general approval in England; the Niederwalddenkmal, erected in commemoration of 1871, fails to receive proper objective consideration on either side of the Rhine; the presentation of his birthplace in a mere daub may delight the exile, while the mediocre portrait of a wife by a son now dead may call forth eccentric appreciation in the case of husband and father. Through association with persons of distinction and beauty the most bizarre and ugly fads in clothing, etc., may come to be considered beautiful, so as even to warp the collective judgment of subsequent epochs. Thus, for example, a mere fashion of wearing wigs in the sixteenth century seems to have been largely responsible for the eccentricities of the rococo, the baroko, and for Hogarth's emphatic and one-sided preference for the famous serpentine line.¹ Similarly the bold color effects of cathedral glass in the fifteenth century brought about a rather crude use of color in contemporary painting.

As a most typical illustration of the way in which nonæsthetical factors may intervene to disturb seriously æsthetic appreciation we may note, furthermore, how frequently the spirit of a narrow moralism prevents works of genuine value from producing their

¹ Compare Victor Rydberg, *Det Sköna och dess Lagar* (Göteborg, 1901), pp. 28ff.

legitimate effects. The conflicting estimates of Byron, Coleridge, Poe, and many others, Ruskin's homilies on painting and painters, and the effect of the Puritanical atmosphere on art in general are too well known to need much emphasis. Whole epochs, too, like that of the Middle Ages, may hold the æsthetic consciousness as a mere *ancilla ecclesiæ* in bondage from which only a long period of time may partly liberate it; while, under the influence of positivism and naturalism, æsthetic truth may come to be regarded as nature seen through a personality instead of personality seen through the medium of the natural. Moreover, the complex works of art are truly "caviare for the masses"; the full appreciation of such works, if it comes at all, far from being naïve, is largely, except perhaps for the especially talented, the outcome of careful education in discrimination.

Just as in the field of theory there are easy conceptions and those whose elements are united with difficulty, as well as many of both kinds whose wider implications are by no means self-evident, so also in the field of art. Rhythm in music, for example, is regularly apprehended and appreciated, so that dance music and marches (good or bad) are popular with the masses for whom the harmony of such pieces or of Beethoven symphonies and Bach fugues is as non-existent as the philosophy of Kant. In poetry and painting, too, the uninitiated will seek mere mechanical rhythm or a didactic content, taken in abstraction from the form. These are, however, all of them abnormal and complex phenomena that find their parallels in other fields than that of art, and, while they arouse distrust for merely impressionistic criticism,

they should cause one to despair of æsthetics no more than mistakes in addition and subtraction, fallacious reasoning, or aberrations in conduct lead one to skepticism of mathematical, logical, or ethical science.

Because of the unitary nature of culture in the concrete, action and reaction necessarily take place between the other fields of human experience and art of which the latter must take due account while maintaining abstractly its own freedom. Works of art as such belong to a world of their own in a sense independent of practical everyday life, as is, in fact, indicated symbolically by isolating devices like the pedestal of the statue, the frame of a picture, the inclosure of the stage, the "*es war einmal*" of the narrating grandmother, etc. Inasmuch, nevertheless, as works of art enter indirectly as potent factors into the practical world itself, they are doubtless subject to political sanctions, as Plato means in banishing the poets from the Republic. The artist cannot expect, even conceding that there may be pure works of art and that some of them may not be for children, that layman or critic shall be forced to put off the moral consciousness in order, as an abstract æsthete, to enter the realm of art without embarrassment. In order, however, to render a tolerably unbiased verdict it is important for the critic in many instances to be able to approximate the state of æsthetic abstraction of the creative artist as a limit or ideal, while it may be necessary for him at times to leave this vantage point for that of vivid moral consciousness in order to establish whether fundamental ethical principles or merely some long-established but false conventionalism has been violated by the artist.

In view of the complexity and the development of æsthetic experience the study of the facts may be pursued in several ways. We may direct our attention to the physiological concomitants of the psychic processes involved; we may attempt an introspective study of the æsthetic consciousness itself; we may trace the genesis and evolution of this consciousness in the individual and in the race by an examination of its products in the field of art history; and we may, on the basis of such studies, attempt the development of a theory of beauty. As is the case with other fields of investigation, these methods, though logically distinguishable, are in actual practice more or less intermingled. The sciences mentioned are, in fact, merely points of view for observing one and the same reality.

In pure physiological æsthetics efforts have been made to explain beauty and ugliness as adjustment or maladjustment of the object to given bodily conditions, more specifically to the peculiar modes of nervous, organic, and glandular activity. Sometimes it has been alleged that the physiological description exhausts the æsthetic fact, which has forthwith been identified outright with what would otherwise be called its physiological concomitant. On such extreme theories the consciousness of beauty would be reduced to minute or incipient organic movements and secretions of certain glands. The work of art might then be thought of as the permanent possibility of certain organic conditions not yet definitely specified but probably closely connected with manifestations of sex and functioning biologically in sexual selection. Such one-sided interpretation rests, of course, on meta-

physical views that are far from being established and also seem to be hardly in good repute.

The psychology of beauty starts with the reality of the æsthetic experience as a psychic fact, attempting to isolate it in introspection from other factors of experience in order to determine by analysis its nature and the conditions and laws of its occurrence. Its general field of investigation is the receptive and productive artistic activity among civilized adults, but it also takes account, in comparative and genetic studies, of the origin and development of æsthetic consciousness in the individual and in the race. In such studies it employs experimental methods of the old and of the new psychology, depending, of course, upon psychological theorizing to supplement the facts of direct observation.

Beauty is for this point of view primarily a feeling, the quality or predicate of a valuing subject. It is not a quality of the object like red or green, sweet or sour; but means that acts of æsthetic appreciation, which take place only in consciousness, are grounded in the nature of an object to which they are referred secondarily as predicates of æsthetic judgments. As reactions they are likewise founded in the nature of the subject, so that the complete study of their conditions involves directly or indirectly the study of the æsthetic nature of the subject. Variations in either set of conditions result, of course, in variations or modifications of appreciation.

As a result of a preliminary analysis of consciousness the distinction is established between those feelings that arise in the presence of objects which satisfy us because of their manifest utility and the thrills of

emotion that animate us in reaction to objects that evoke no such conscious reference but which delight us solely because of their existence. This attitude of disinterestedness or æsthetic detachment, the absence or negation of theoretical and practical desires, has been uniformly stressed as a chief characteristic of the æsthetic consciousness, since Aristotle first called attention to it. A knife or other tool, but only after its purpose is known, may please because of utilitarian considerations; whereas the immediate delight in the ornamentation of the handle not only implies no such extrinsic reference of value, but might conceivably exist when the decoration should serve to diminish considerably the utility of the implement, or even in the case of some archaic instrument whose utility should not be apparent. We distinguish also between shelter as the utilitarian aspect of a building and its architectonic value, noting that in the dwelling house beauty is regularly sacrificed to utility and comfort. Some—not all—useful things are also beautiful; and not all beautiful things—for example, a ruin or a destructive conflagration—are useful. Indeed, beauty and utility often vary in the inverse ratio. Similarly it is not difficult to discern that the *agreeable* odor of a rose and the *agreeable* warmth of a room are experiences different in kind from those due to the rich color, the arrangement and shape of the petals in the one, and to the harmonization and general disposition of objects in the other; although, indeed, in the case of many complex objects such distinctions are practically more difficult than in these simple examples. The utilitarian in the field of æsthetics attempts to explain all such disinterested feelings as developments from

narrow individualistic interests by means of assimilation and complication, much as in the field of ethics he strives to exhibit altruistic feelings as an evolution from self-seeking, thus far, however, in both fields without marked success.

A further distinction may be drawn between elementary feelings and form-feelings, or between those feelings aroused in the presence of simple tones, colors, movements, and lines, and those which occur in the presence of complex rhythmic and harmonious combinations of such elements. So far as these elementary feelings are concerned it seems impossible to find in consciousness directly the ground for their peculiarity, while explanation of them as due merely to past individual or racial associations, complications and the like, would seem to abandon the æsthetic point of view. These feelings may, however, be interpreted fairly in the light of our knowledge of the feelings due to æsthetic form.

Form-feelings arise in connection with regular, symmetrical, and proportionable arrangements of the elements which call forth the elementary æsthetic feelings. The artist's problem, like that of the logician, consists in the harmonization of discord and contradiction, in the unification of a manifold. It is this universal and fundamental aspect of art to which Madame de Staël in her declaration that architecture is "frozen music" and Walter Pater in the statement that "all art aspires toward the condition of music" both refer. In other words, when the object manifests, so spontaneously and obviously that attention is facilitated, the typical form of consciousness, then we experience the peculiar kind of affective consciousness that is called æsthetic and

ascribe beauty to the object in the form of an æsthetic judgment. This law of harmony or unity in variety, which is one of ancient discovery, has been regularly emphasized by those who have described the conditions of æsthetic experience.

Harmony implies, however, not that the elements appear simply associated or conjoined as the result of the merely temporal continuities of past experience but that they are connected conatively and evaluated, that is, belong together organically. Only an organism, or that which must be apprehended organically, is able to arouse a thrill of beauty. The special conditions for harmony are realized when differentiation of a common principle is revealed in the elements of an object; for example, the rhythm or rime common to the parts of a poem; the poetical idea unfolded in the successive stanzas (sometimes emphasized in the refrain, as in Poe's "Raven"); the architectural principle illustrated and typified in the parts of a structure; gradations of light and color and characteristic mood revealed in the manifold color-tones of a landscape; or consistency, that is, harmony of volition, manifested in the successive acts of a character in the drama or in real life. Richard III and, in real life, Napoleon (for both of whom our approval is not moral but æsthetic) are illustrations for this last group.

It is possible to distinguish clearly two phases of this law. In the one case we have the simpler differentiation of a common principle, which might be called monotonous or democratic differentiation, where the common bearers of the principle stand about on a par with one another. The regular alternation of the

pillars, metopes, and triglyphs in the Greek temple, the spondaic and pyrrhic foot, and the regular succession of similar feet in a line of verse are examples. We may have, however, in the æsthetic object a point of orientation or emphasis which appears as the special representative of the common principle to which the other elements are plainly subordinated. According as the subordination is more or less absolute, we may speak of a monarchical subordination that is tyrannical and of one that is free. Illustrations of the former are towers, pyramids, and structures like the Egyptian temple that dominate us with a consciousness of sublimity and mystery, together with all caricature; whereas instances of the latter are the Gothic cathedral, in which the spire (often counterbalanced by one or more turrets) typifies the architectural principle involved; cases of "majoring," such as the legitimate exaggeration of the head, jaws, and paws of a lion, or the neck and shoulders of a bull; groups in painting with dominant and subdominant figures; poems and dramas with carefully graduated climax; and characters like Balzac's Catherine de' Medici, whose every act is brought into unity through the control of a ruling purpose.

Attempts to discover empirically and abstractly the exact relationship that should prevail between the unifying and the unified or subordinated principle in a work of art, or the search for the most pleasing proportion, have given some very interesting results without leading to anything absolutely conclusive. Moreover, like the memory experiments with nonsense syllables, the conditions of such abstract experimentation vitiate to a degree the actual concrete problems

involved. The relation in question is doubtless a variable dependent on factors of each concrete case to a greater degree than in other fields of experiment, and is, in general, some mean between a differentiation that means æsthetic anarchy, as in the perfect square, and a domination seen in extremely elongated rectangles and in ultra-impressionism, that means tyranny.

From the knowledge that such well-established principles as these underlie the æsthetic feelings due to the form of the elements found in combinations, it is not unreasonable to infer that the elementary æsthetic feelings aroused by the purity and richness of colors and tones result similarly from peculiarities of form (different rhythms of vibration, simplicity and complexity of sound and ether waves, and the like) in the objects to which they are provisionally referred. The æsthetic satisfaction would then be explained by their concinnity with fundamental psychic conditions, subject to modification by manifold environmental factors that would to some extent account for epochal, racial, and individual idiosyncrasies.

The object that inspires æsthetic feeling is content as well as form, and this content too is an expression of the nature of the contemplating subject. Æsthetic delight, in general, is the enjoyment of our own free activity *in* the æsthetic object, which itself exists, in the sense that everybody creates or recreates his own work of art, only in the consciousness of subjects: it is an objectification of self. In the case of the ugly in art or nature the elements are likewise drawn from our own psychic life, but the independent exaltation or exaggeration of subordinate aspects in this kind of

experience—insubordination—serves merely to depress or disgust by diminishing our sense of free activity.

In the life of the child and of primitive man we find a thoroughgoing tendency to personify or animate the total environment, traces of which persist in the sober daily life of the civilized adult to a greater extent than is commonly noticed. We speak of the ocean *dashing* against the shore, of the drawn bow *tending* to unbend; while the scientist, who is supposed to talk prose and not poetry, tells us of *unities*, *energies*, *forces*, *activities*, and also of *functional* relations in objective things, though reflection shows that these words have significance, so far as experience goes, only as the names for reactions in consciousness in the presence of certain sounds, colors, etc. We find, moreover, in consciousness experiences that possess a unique intimacy, although they are referred to the past. In the contemplation of these we relive them in the active experience of personal identity as inalienable “moments” of self. In a similar manner, for the consciousness of artist and critic, moods and other psychic states are embodied in works of art. The work of art does not merely suggest life; it is itself *alive*, *spirantia mollius aera*, when attention is held, not merely by the details of one of its Protean manifestations but by the fundamental meaning.

In the contemplation of even simple geometrical lines we introject this feeling of our own self-activity into the object of consciousness. The regular curving line or the line with periodical changes of direction or thickness satisfies æsthetically, inasmuch as it permits and induces psychic activity that is unified, continuous, and regular. In contrast with the checked and

interrupted activity called forth by the annoying attempt to attend to broken lines or to those that change their direction lawlessly, such regular, facilitated, "natural" activity satisfies, since in it, without *explicit* effort, we live through a bit of the consistent, unified life we strive constantly, but with comparative lack of success, to realize in other fields; it corresponds too with the nonvolitional rhythm of the emotional life. Too great regularity, however, here and in the field of art in general (even in design) is monotonous, artificial, enslaving, "faultily faultless, icily regular, splendidly null," and thus out of accord with the free self. "There is no excellent beauty," as Bacon said, "that hath not some strangeness in the proportion." Art does not exist for law, but, rather, law for the sake of art.

Abstract figures seem beautiful in themselves, when not composed of lawless, broken lines, and when the activity in them is not too mathematically regular, as it is, for example, in the *perfect* square and the *perfect* circle (both of them rejected throughout art history). Lines in combination must submit freely, not absolutely, to the limitation of the general plan or artistic purpose. The plans or ideas of Athena or Aphrodite, for examples, are, respectively, a female goddess-figure presented by means of severe dignified lines and one presented by means of sinuous lines for the purpose of communicating quite different emotional attitudes. Mathematically straight lines are, however, excluded in either case, and no Aphrodite-line may enter the Athena-plan without violation by the artist of his freely accepted limitation. Other specific limitations or laws would be present, according to difference in

posture, etc.; but Athena stooping down or Athena in motion would still reveal the general law of her nature; and the beauty of the sculpturesque idea would in any case be independent of the mythological or literary theme accidentally involved.

Our apprehension of colors, but particularly of musical tones, is pervaded with a peculiar intimacy that invests them with psychic qualities hardly less certainly than is the case with the intonations of the human voice. In my own personal experience a pure color in isolation is not so satisfying as a rich color, just as for practically everybody the tones of the tuning-fork are not so beautiful as the rich tones of the violin; whereas contrast combinations of pure colors, such that one of the contrasting members somewhat dominates, seem beautiful. The reason seems to be that the simplicity or lack of variety in absolute color does not task the self sufficiently to evoke the consciousness of free activity; it is in short too easy. The pure color appears somewhat insipid or lacking in character and does not evince its freedom until in combination with other colors it is limited or has opposition to overcome, as in the case of the fundamental or dominant tone of the rich color. Purple is one of the most beautiful colors, if, indeed, not the most beautiful one because of this fact.

The beauty of light seems similar. Not the clear, bright sunlight of high noon, but the uncertain, mysterious twilights of dawn and evening appeal to us most æsthetically. Pure white in pigment is not so pleasing as a warm or a cool white; the latter have character, that is, freedom. A piece of clear glass has no freedom and individuality as compared with a

diamond, which is alive and active; *it* sparkles forth its freedom to us and is beautiful when the color in it is subordinated to its light. Yellow and gold are preferred colors, I believe, for the same reason. Pure black (not the rich, luminous, golden black, which Tintoretto called the most beautiful color) exhibits, on the other hand, no freedom; it is dead and appropriately the symbol of mourning, terror, and evil. Gray in most of its shades is inactive, a balance of impulses, and hence properly described by artists as a neutral. The general effect of gray is delicacy, refinement, and modesty. We can trace this general quality of beauty, I believe, throughout the fine arts.

Music was called by Hegel the most subjective of the arts, and Schopenhauer regarded it as the most intimate and profound revelation of absolute reality. In point of genesis perhaps the most primitive of them all and in its later development surely the most perfect, the spirit of music may from one point of view be regarded as the universal matrix from which the other arts emerge as objectifications. Unity in variety is realized in music in the harmonious system of any chord; in the domination of the notes of a melody by the tonic; in the mysterious identity of a triad in its various positions and inversions; in modulations; together with the monarchical subordination of the dominant and subdominant to the tonic in the moving equilibrium of the piece (continually attained, continually lost), which regularly ends with the psychic organization of all the elements in the unity of the tonic. The counterpart of this organization of the real work of art in the consciousness of the artist, previous to externalization, is given us in an oft-quoted description of such

an experience by Mozart¹—one of the few fragments of the psychology of genius that we possess. Music manifests to us depths of experience not yet rationalized and in this form art is perhaps closest akin to religion. In its organic growth and struggling lawful development from point to point a musical work seems the very image of personality.

In the contemplation of architecture, as Lipps (developing the thought of Lotze and Friedrich Theodor Vischer) well says, we find ourselves active *in* the sturdy columns as they thrust upward to meet the load of the superstructure, which must be heavy enough to call forth the reaction of the pillar; otherwise the effect is that of extravagant use of energy, as in the massive buttresses of degenerate Gothic. If, on the other hand, the columns of a structure are so slender as to seem inadequate to the task imposed on them by the plan of the whole to which they are subordinated, we have an acute sense of æsthetic dissatisfaction, a consciousness of failure to realize function or purpose, maladjustment, a lack of adequate freedom. This instinctive personification or “inner imitation” of the pillar becomes at times so vivid in the consciousness of the artist that the supporting columns are externalized, somewhat extravagantly, as animate forms, for example, in the animal piers of the rock temples of India, the statue columns of the Egyptian and the caryatids of the Greek temples, or in supporting figures in such monuments as the Fontaine Bartholdi at Reims. Similarly we strive upward in the “soaring Gothic” with an exalted sense of comparatively unchecked effort in the vertical; while the

¹ Compare Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 456f.

Greek temple, with its balance of opposing forces, reveals the *freedom of poise and repose*. The massive, unpierced walls of the Egyptian temple awaken in us the sense of some dominating mysterious presence, the sense of divinity omnipresent in Egyptian culture, while the Byzantine dome or a column like that of Trajan seems the very image of imposing grandeur. In contrast with dwelling houses (which "being built to live in and not to look upon" fail to arouse genuine æsthetic feeling because lacking in freedom and universality and because of their emphasis on utility and comfort) such public structures reveal or adumbrate to us profound and significant aspects of personality, quite foreign to the plane of ordinary everyday experience.

The natural material of artistic building is stone and the architectural problem consists in the construction of a shelter, while the artist realizes his freedom in conformity with the laws of gravity and of the given material and the selected site. It is this last condition or limitation of the architect which accounts for certain characteristic differences in Greek and Gothic structures. The shelter itself, the utilitarian phase of his task, might be provided for by means of a flat roof and by solid walls with almost no openings; but such a building would be in æsthetic effect a prison, lacking freedom and beauty, though it might possess mystery and awe. Beauty is manifested *inter alia* through the construction of numerous apertures by cutting from the solid walls all the material that may be removed with safety, that is, without weakening the structure unduly. Freedom is, furthermore, revealed in architecture by nicety in the determination

of the distance that may be spanned in safety by a flat roof, as in the Greek temple and in the Roman basilica. While, however, in these cases the width of the building is limited chiefly by the direct working of the law of gravity, the development of the round arch in the Romanesque style presents the possibility of transcending this limitation.

The more powerful thrust of the heavier Romanesque vault, however, demands greater thickness in the supporting walls, and this in turn precludes the possibility of a sufficient number of openings for complete æsthetic satisfaction. Attempts to circumvent this difficulty by means of the pointed arch and the device of the flying buttress were never more than partially successful, while the disappearance of the problem of the Gothic with the advent of architecture in metal and artificial materials, brings special difficulties from the opposite direction. With natural stone there was never a possibility of getting too many openings without weakening to a dangerous degree the whole structure; the stone brought with it the law in its own limitations. With the greater concentration of strength in small compass in the metal buildings together with the use of girders, architecture becomes unrestrained and lawless. When sufficient material has been used to secure the proper stability and strength needed for the structure, there is the ever-present danger of leaving too many openings or of filling up the empty spaces arbitrarily and licentiously; since guidance and limitation by the law of the material itself is lacking. Furthermore, such structures, though in fact actually stable and strong, do not give the appearance of being so, and this is

from the point of view of æsthetics a fatal defect. These are the chief causes of ugliness in buildings constructed from artificial materials.

Sculpture and painting are allied in the beginning with architecture as ornamental adjuncts to the latter. Even in Greece, where sculpture and painting come to their development probably earlier than architecture proper, we find them united, with the marble statuary adorning the temples and also the temples themselves stained or painted. Only by a gradual differentiation and mutual limitation do sculpture and painting become later free and independent arts. Pure sculpture renounces color and the portrayal of actual space, limiting itself rather strictly to representation of form. Simultaneously there is an advance beyond architecture in that the artist has now freed himself and his art from certain embarrassing utilitarian problems. Instead of the presentation symbolically and merely suggestively of aspects and fragments of personal experience there is in sculpture a development toward completer organization and a certain unification of such elements in the objective representative of the person. All material not necessary for the expression of the sculpturesque idea is chiseled carefully away, so that form and content stand in a characteristic relationship of balance and poise. Freedom is shown by the artist in the selection of typical or representative poses that shall manifest not merely some particular action but the general capacity and possibility of the body for a wide range of action, as in the Discobolus. In sculpture, moreover, as Hildebrand has made clear, depth or the third dimension is given to us in *idea*, without the necessity of actual

visual accommodation as in the perception of real depth in natural objects; that is, through a closer unification of the dimensions in the work of art attention is facilitated and we experience a corresponding increase in freedom.

In classic sculpture, where the sculpturesque problem consisted chiefly in the presentation of the body, statues are nude or more lightly draped than in real life, even with the naturally artistic Greek clothing, which manifests easily the freedom of bodily movements. Inartistic modern clothing, however, with its mathematically exact lines succeeds in masking or in boxing up the body to such an extent that the sculptor is able to reveal freedom (with the greatest difficulty) only by such disposition of the folds of coat and trousers as shall show graceful free lines; by the draping of national heroes with flags, etc.; and by the portrayal of character in poses and particularly in the lines of the face. To a certain extent the inner personal life may be revealed in sculpture through the structure of the eye and its socket, the brow, and in the modeling and conformation of the muscles, as, for example, in the meditative sculpture of Praxiteles and in the emotional works of Scopas and the later Hellenistic school. The monotonous stone and bronze can, however, in general suggest merely the broader aspects of personality; whereas the medium of color, with its highly differentiated variations of light and shade, is able to express, particularly in the eye (which in sculpture is comparatively lifeless), much finer differentiation of psychic life, feeling, moods, and action. Painting thus marks from one point of view an advance over sculpture as a direct result of its material.

Midway between sculpture and painting might be placed the so-called graphic arts of etching, drawing in black and white, and recently, in the hands of Maskell, Demachy, Coate, Craig-Annan, Puyo, and others, artistic photography. Renouncing color proper, or *chrome*, these take for their material various intensities of colorless light, by means of which they are able to present space with considerable differentiation of feeling. Their problem, like that of sculpture, is chiefly one of form; and it seems rather significant in this connection that certain great colorists, notably Rembrandt and Whistler, have sought and found under the limitations of etching expression of form, voluntarily renounced by them in the field of painting.

Modern photography, as Sizeranne points out, has become an art rivaling at its best good work in the other graphic arts. In such work personality is everywhere in evidence in the selection of scenes, groups, poses, costumes, and, above all, in the developing and toning, which in ordinary photography is purely mechanical. To-day the artist-photographer is able to intervene in the developing, printing, enlarging, and combining processes to such an extent that he may secure modulations and gradations of light and shade, creating at will high lights and low lights, softening lines, blurring and effacing unimportant details and accentuating others in accordance with a given plan or artistic idea, until, from one and the same objective scene, several artistic pictures may be obtained, differing widely from one another and representing, in spite of the fact that the process of production is still rather more mechanical than in the

other allied arts, not mechanism chiefly and not eccentric individuality, but personality.

Motion pictures up to date have been limited chiefly to a slavish, mechanical imitation of the stage-play and, in general, to a quite trivial content suited to the taste of the industrial masses. Muensterberg has shown, however, that a new form of art is probably developing here with special possibilities of its own. The material proper is the same as that of the graphic arts, and when fully conscious of its peculiar possibilities and limitations the motion picture should be able to bring its special interpretation of reality in its own silent material, aided perhaps by music or lyric verse, and dispensing, like true painting, with the prosaic and oftentimes tactless labels to the scenes. At present most of the plays presented consist merely of stories in telegraphic form thrown on the screen and illustrated by pictures. Lyric productions, like that by Annette Kellerman in "A Daughter of the Gods," represent perhaps, in spite of many quite obvious defects, the most successful efforts in this general field. In such works as these a greater unity might be secured by appropriate *lyrical* transitions between the scenes shown, together with emphasis on the musical aspects of the verse and accompanied perhaps by suitable interpretative music. In this latest sphere of art there are doubtless unrealized possibilities of an epic and dramatic nature; but in any case its development into true art depends on its being rescued and freed (by dignified screen artists like Pauline Frederick and by some playwright of real capacity) from the vulgarity and maudlin sentimentality that now infest the films.

Painting rises into freedom in differentiation from painted sculpture, carving, and tattooing, revealing even in its developed form, like sculpture and the other arts, the common origin and interdependence of all art. Painting is sculptural in the case of Mantegna and Verrochio; epic in the works of Giotto; lyric in Duccio, Dolci, Reni, Corot, or van der Weyden; and dramatic in Titian. In any case painting is not at all concerned with the imitation of nature, which is seen clearly here to be an impossibility. Even in portraiture, where at first thought an accurate imitation would seem requisite, freedom demands an interpretative presentation of character. "*L'art n'est pas une étude de la réalité positive; c'est une recherche de la vérité idéale,*" the saying of George Sand, is well illustrated here.

All painting, even that of landscape, serves as a revelation of personality. Sometimes it is the subjects which are the bearers of the idea, when the artist in a typical Shakesperian manner effaces or loses himself in his theme, as did Velasquez and Holbein; sometimes it is the artist himself, as in the case of Van Dyck, who reveals to us in himself a typical character or a characteristic point of view. Even in a landscape there is regularly some detail, now a person, now an object of human creation, or some isolated and emphasized natural object that arouses specific human interest or intensifies the consciousness of personal values; while, by virtue of its coloring, toning, direction of line, and composition, the whole landscape may be imbued with a specific mood or an emphatic presentation of what Lanier calls "the vast sweet visage of space" that brings a sense of some-

thing transcendent and ineffable peculiar to this field of art. It has been maintained that the chief, if not, indeed, the only purpose of landscape painting, is to give this intense experience of space, the objects of the composition being accessory or merely subsidiary to the production of this exalted consciousness, which Berenson describes as "the feeling of being identified with the universe—which is the very essence of the religious emotion." It is interesting to note in this connection that the love of landscape painting develops *pari passu* with the establishment of large industrial centers, whose inhabitants, cut off as they are from any considerable experience of space and vista, seek and find compensation for this want in the works of the landscape artist.

The completest definition of æsthetic experience is poetry, where we find in a sense the epitome of the other arts. The material of poetry is no longer tones simply, the bearers of vague, general meaning as in music, but words as the vehicle of ideas. The artistic value of language, contrary to the opinion that finds "all words equally poetical," consists in certain felicitous combinations of vowels and consonants, fusions or complications of various kinds of imagery, chromatic accent, cadence, assonance, alliteration, rime, collocations of words, etc., which vary, of course, from language to language and serve to render poetry untranslatable even into prose of the same language. The function of rime, contrary to the opinion of those who regard rime as an impediment, is to free the verse from the tyranny of mechanical rhythm, and marks, as Lipps pointed out years ago, a difference comparable with the transition from a state of society

where the individual counts for little and the law is everything to a condition where law in the abstract becomes subordinated to the needs and purposes of the individual. Rime, when used with strictly mechanical rhythm, stands in antithesis to the latter, producing then a humorous effect, as for example in the lines of Walt Mason. Rime when properly used unifies the verses and strophes in various significant ways, and by concentrating the attention on the end of the verse, as a goal for the movement in it, permits more freedom of substitution in the individual feet of the verse than is possible in the verse of antiquity. Trochees may thus take the place of iambics or even of anapests, and vice versa, for the sake of logical accent or movement, so that the verse gains in flexibility and freedom of expression. Rime has also an analytic and synthetic function. As it synthesizes the verses into strophes by concentrating the attention upon similar sounds, it analyzes the thought units into elements which gain a relative independence. In this way the stanza as a whole becomes at one and the same time more complex and more unified. Such verse, freed as it is from the comparative monotony and rigidity of stricter rhythm, is more expressive of personality; while for special themes like that of "Thanatopsis," where the inflexibility and uniformity of law needs to be emphasized, we have rhythm alone, that is, blank verse. Free verse, so called, seems to be an attempt to get rid of all law; in other words, it is licentious in the æsthetic sense of the word.

In epic poetry the persons stand out for us in an objective plastic manner, like the figures of sculpture and painting; in the lyric we find again the spirit of

music; while in the drama these two forms of poetry are united. In the epic the artistic idea is a series of heroic deeds presented not immediately as in the drama, but in poetic narration as a train of historical events; it is history in germ or history with particular emphasis on artistic expression. The deeds portrayed and interpreted are gathered, of course, from widely different sources and are then exaggerated, harmonized with one another, and fused imaginatively by various authors into heroic or superhuman unities and demigods. It is interesting to note in this connection that the two Greek epics give us in Odysseus, the man of wisdom, and in Achilles, the man of action, ideal objectifications of intellect and will. The lyric is like music subjective; and in this form of poetry we are introduced through imaginative description to the emotional sources in which overt acts in some way take their origin. The lyric in its purity reveals, not specific deeds, but their general possibility in the private aspects of personal life. A given lyrical background of love and hate, joy and sorrow, etc., offers the material for specification and definition in numberless dramas. In the drama, finally, we find the clearest manifestation of personality in the immediate presentation of a struggle of wills, rooted in the clash of conflicting interests.

In comedy the struggle is either merely apparent or transparently specious—a mere play; the issues are never important enough to preclude their reconciliation; and the characters lack grandeur or are humanly all too human. The typical comic figure is, in fact, a kind of sham, claiming freedom and perfection until unmasked by the irony of events. By the reaction of

the environment upon which he acts he is revealed as more or less ridiculously weak, limited, and mechanical; by pillorying him the artist announces his own superiority to the fools these mortals be, and we laugh with him in æsthetic consciousness of a freedom superior to that of the comic figure, without raising the question as to whether in the affairs of life we behave much differently.

In genuine tragedy, however, vitally important ideals which cannot be compromised, and uncompromising characters as the incarnations of such ideals, are involved; there is in tragedy not a mere play or simple opposition of conflicting forces, but a genuine antagonism to the death. The tragic character is one for whom the internal law of his nature is supreme; he comes (neither rightly nor wrongly, for the question of poetic justice is a doubly false issue imported from the field of morals) like Romeo, Othello, or Richard III into inevitable and irreconcilable conflict with the will of his environment. His action upon this in the initial stages of the tragedy is followed in the later parts by its reaction which destroys him. The tragic character must die (like Turgeneff's sparrow), not indeed to satisfy poetic justice, but to satisfy causality and in order that we, through the sense of his loss, may come to have a proper appreciation of his real value æsthetically. His willingness to die for his life-purpose attests, as nothing else can, his genuineness; we know then certainly that he has not been shamming.

This is without doubt what Edgar Allan Poe had in mind, when he maintained that the most artistic object is a beautiful woman lying cold in death; for at

such a time, because we value our possessions most when we have lost them, her æsthetic value would indeed become enhanced. The excellence of the hero's personality in the tragedy is impressed upon us through the fact that, though pitted against something stronger than the force of any isolated individual will, he is yet able to struggle with it to the very end. The characteristic tragic feeling is a mixed emotion, consisting of joy in the contemplation of an ideally free personality, limited and tempered by sorrow at his loss and by awe for the superindividual power that compasses his destruction. To say, as has been done, that the struggle of the tragic hero must end in failure is surely to measure success and failure by external, apparent consequences rather than by inner purposes.

Poetry, music, and dancing were closely associated in the primitive song and dance and the intimate relationship still persists. Poetry and music in some form seem to be as original and fundamental as any of the arts; and their appeal to-day is perhaps more general than that of other forms. For the majority architecture, sculpture, and painting are far from being, even in a quite legitimate sense, "frozen music"; and, except in the case of highly specialized talent, the full appreciation of these arts probably presupposes a certain development of taste through experience with poetry and music. The fundamental significance of musical sense seems also to be suggested by the results of recent research, according to which persons specifically designated as "musical" are regularly found to be highly gifted in other respects.

Moreover, it appears that art experience in general, in spite of those who believe that "nature is more

beautiful than art," first teaches us to see the beauty of nature; it is very doubtful whether beauty in the world of natural objects is really discernible except from the platform of liberalizing art experience. It was not the savage or the rustic, neither the man in the street nor the man in the laboratory, who discovered (amid much ugliness of color, form, etc.) the beauty of forest and field and stream, but poets and the great landscape painters. Only the artist-genius and the lover of art may detect, through the chaotic presentations of the natural world, the harmoniously ordered reality, the freedom at the heart of the world, as did Plato and Wordsworth; and thus it is indeed true that "poetry is the elder sister of philosophy," without which the latter and even science itself cannot exist. Art, philosophy, science, and morality are never mere adjustments or simple adaptations in reaction to a given environment, but transformations and interpretations that regularly transcend the environment.

It is perhaps the keen awareness of spontaneity in his own consciousness that has called forth so often from the artist-genius the emphatic but mistaken protest that art has nothing whatever to do with rules or laws. On the one hand it seems to be clear enough that while all art is expression, not all expression is art; but on the other it is probably above debate that the perfectly *correct* is often far enough removed from the artistic. True art, great art, is, however, never capricious and licentious (in the æsthetic sense), though regularly violating worn-out conventions that claim absolute validity. Its æsthetic truth is, indeed, its freedom, but freedom implies above all things

poise and balance (not rest), being here and always autonomous—voluntary self-control under law, living-law, the fact of *noblesse oblige*.

Art works are beautiful only in so far as the artist succeeds in expressing himself under the limitation of general art laws, the specific conditions of a given art medium and a *selected* artistic idea. The artist must, for example, affirm the universal law of symmetry, but his subjection to this must not be absolute and mathematically exact. A too great regard for symmetry and abstract proportion and “repose” is artificial and fails to satisfy a mature taste. There is even an art of the “poker-face” variety that arouses disgust through its studied lack of expression.

In a *thing* of the natural world, such as a crystal, a tree, a rose, or a lily, the most absolute realization of symmetry and proportion seems satisfying aesthetically, because it seems to manifest the exceptionally free and lawful development of the given object, struggling toward organization against an apparently opposing environment. When it succumbs, as in the gnarled and twisted tree that has been thwarted in its development, we get a painful experience of the ugly in nature. When it triumphs, we triumph with it. We seem then to pierce the veil of phenomena and to find ourselves in contact with reality to a degree seldom realized in the contemplation of natural objects; because of lack of perspective and insight, imperfection regularly overwhelms and oppresses us in the world of things.

Our delight in such organic things, however, hardly seems to equal the thrill aroused by the unification and organization of impulses and instincts in the

animal form; and the reality of this form, which *is* in very truth the animal, is probably revealed less clearly in the perfect "repose" of sleep or death than in poised attitudes and graceful movements. Trained animals, and persons like Dumas' Sapho, attract us æsthetically, until we know the secret of their mechanical activities, because we find here the illusion of character and personality. A natural songster may express its exuberant and joyous freedom "in profuse strains of unpremeditated art" and we are delighted as in the artless life of the child; but the adult human singer must show *seemly* poise and control of his instrument, if he is to arouse an experience of beauty. It seems that æsthetic satisfaction depends upon our finding reality, whether at rest or in motion, in stable equilibrium with itself, such that it emphasizes itself as law amid the apparently chaotic and formless, and as autonomy is in the presence of automatism or manifest anarchy.

The realm of beauty (of tones, of color and line, of word and phrase, marble and porcelain and bronze) subjects the one who enters that domain to laws that are felt not as external determination but as internal æsthetic obligation. Harmonies and contrasts in art are beautiful when they are not absolute but free. The octave is the most perfect, but not the most beautiful chord; and, even in the elementary experiences that underlie the higher combinations, the pure tone of the tuning-fork and the pure colors are of less value æsthetically than the rich tones of the violin and the deep, rich colors. Merely technical scientific terms fetter the imagination, which is stimulated to freedom through the old, natural words rich

in overtones. Free-hand lines, soft or brilliant strokes of the burin, and ornamentation executed with the ax of the Norman mason are all of them beautiful; while ruled lines, photo-engraving, and machine-made ornaments, no matter how perfect their execution, are unfree and ugly. This fundamental and essential quality of beauty is touched on without being explicitly stated in an approving criticism of Whistler's etching by Hans Singer when he says: *Dass es in der Kunst so etwas wie eine gerade Linie ueberhaupt nicht gibt, haben auch zahllose andere gefunden, und haben darnach gesucht, dieser "Luege der Natur" zu steuern, die Starrheit der Form zu mildern. Keiner fand eine so glueckliche Loesung wie Whistler. Bei scharfer Beobachtung mit der Lupe sieht man oft, wie er die Form geschmeidiger macht, nicht etwa, indem er die Linie zittriger fuehrt, sondern indem er sie in ein System von zwei ganz nebeneinander parallel laufenden Einzellinien aufloest, die sich synkopieren.*

Freedom is, moreover, manifested in the selection of the artistic idea capable of being incorporated in the given art medium—the underlying theme, in fact, of the "Laokoon." "The sensuous medium of each art," says Walter Pater, "brings with it a special quality of beauty, untranslatable into the forms of any other, an order of impressions distinct in kind. Good painting and sculpture attempt to present nothing that cannot be manifested in color and stone without the use of a label or title. Music as such is always "song without words." The opera presents and develops its action differently from the drama in verse; and this in turn quite differently from the prose drama. Freedom is also shown in a subtle manner in the treatment of the

details of the chosen artistic theme. The lines of Raphael, for example, in the Sistine Madonna, though more restrained than those of Murillo and Coreggio in similar works, are nevertheless freer and more beautiful, while the pictorial idea as a whole possesses a dignity and divinity not found in the human, somewhat theatrical madonnas of the last two. If the purpose of Raphael had been, furthermore, to express primarily beauty of the body, as in the case of a dancer or athlete, the clothing might have been omitted altogether or so disposed, as in Sargent's charming "Carmencita," as to reveal and emphasize posture and the general possibilities of free movements. Ribera's club-footed boy is a sublime masterpiece, a ringing challenge to the ugly in nature, but it would have been ugly and pathetic, as in real life, if the artist had attempted to show the boy dancing or performing some movement requiring dexterity of limb. "The Nike of Samothrace" lives and has its very being in the free movement of its drapery, but the "Discobolus" draped in any way would be intolerable. The "Laokoon" with wide open-mouth, as Lessing says, would indeed have had a distorted face, but since the style is the man, it would also have revealed to us a certain lack of freedom in the artist and the race he might represent, of which they would indeed be quite unaware. In the severe lines of Pallas, as in the more graceful lines of Aphrodite, we find freedom in different guises, and though both statues in their special organization of parts are lawful, free, beautiful, the head of one transferred to the body of the other would reveal lawlessness, license, ugliness. We should have the lawlessness that is seen, though in a minor degree,

in the tolerable incongruity of head and body in the Discobolus.

The inorganic intermingling of architectural styles, the unrestrained skyscraper, the squat or square building of our crowded streets, Gothic structures on hilltops and Parthenon-like buildings in the level plain are ugly and the other fields of art teem with similar aberrations. Arbitrary Klingerism, geometrical and exaggerated sprawling poses in sculpture or painting; glaring and flashy or timid color effects (as distinguished from skillful touches of color in *subdued* color schemes and the free use of color by the great colorists); too great or too little contrast in light and shade (as compared with their masterly reconciliation in Rembrandt and Correggio); uncertain modeling, hard lines, and extremes of impressionism; flesh like marble or chalk and brutal imitations of flesh tints; emaciated bodies (Cranach) and voluptuous portrayal of bodily forms (Rubens and Correggio); mechanically precise music, unrestrained rag-time and the abandon of jazz; sing-song cloying variations that cling too closely or those that depart too widely from the musical theme; mechanically faithful as well as eccentric interpretation in playing or singing; jingle instead of real functioning rime; *vers d'esclave* and more recently *vers licencieux* (as distinguished from the *vers libre* that great poets have regularly written); ornament for ornament's sake; anachronisms and other inconsistencies in the development of a novel's plot; ranting actors and ranting playwrights; snakelike movements and contortions or awkwardness in gesture and gait; too few or too many details: the extremes of the grotesque and of naturalism in any field of art—these

are all of them in their effects unlovely because unfree and serve merely to reemphasize the old truth, "*In der Beschränkung zeigt sich der Meister.*"

In the study of Raphael from his earliest imitations of Perugino and the Umbrian School up to the masterpiece just mentioned we may trace a continuous development in the expression of freedom (also observable in other great artists and schools); and a comparison of the successive periods of art history discloses a similar evolution. The life-quality of a people or an epoch is clearly seen in its art. Whether we view it in the architecture of Egypt or Assyria, Oriental art is comparatively mechanical, mathematically perfect, conventional, and unprogressive; its chief characteristic is the irresponsible, awe-inspiring force of a culture that suggests, as Hegel said, "a Memnon waiting for the dawn of the Greek spirit." Greek and Roman art in general marks decided advances in the expression of organic perfection, Roman art being, however, for the most part imitative, ostentatious, and unfree. In sculpture the progress is seen historically from Egyptian works dominated mechanically by what Lange called the "law of frontality" to freedom of body, head, and face in Greek art and to the sublime expressiveness of Michelangelo; from the slavish particularity of Oriental portrait statues to the freedom of types like the "Nike of Samothrace"; from groups in which the composition is slavishly symmetrical to the free grouping in the pediments and friezes of the Greek temples. In music the historical development is seen from simple melody through polyphony to *explicit* harmony; from the simple harmony of the octave through the fifth to the musical mastery of the

third; from the musical suite and the merely mechanical sonata to its free treatment in Beethoven, etc. With respect to form there is a general progress in art from rather slavish symmetry to free proportion.

From the psychological or psycho-physical point of view we might come to see that beauty is always due to an harmonious adjustment of inner relations to outer relations. We might analyze and describe both sets of conditions, explaining the present experience by a continual reference to past experience and finding the ultimate *causes* for the phenomena of art in certain prehistoric Unga and other geniuses, who have molded the æsthetic consciousness of "their tribes that were blind"; we might account for their choice of art medium, their subjects, and even certain details in their methods of treatment through a reference to physiological, social, and environmental factors of various kinds; we might discover art originating apparently in more or less awkward and realistic imitations of nature, conceivably useful in the beginning but subsequently *modified* and *idealized* into uselessness; and we might accomplish this important determination of facts in infinite regress without understanding the general characteristic of beauty already indicated, without discovering the *ground* or possibility of the beautiful object as such, and without inquiring whether the æsthetic experience ends in itself or has perhaps some further significance. For the mere hedonist the æsthetic experience is sufficiently accounted for by empirical description and a reference to the universal desire for pleasure alleged to be the chief or the sole aim of human beings. For Kant, however, æsthetic experience has a fundamental

significance first emphasized by him in the *Critique of the Judgment*. In this work, which serves as the maturest thought of the author to reinterpret the earlier critiques, he points out that æsthetic sense forms a kind of bridge or hyphen between theoretical and practical reason.

The possibility of knowledge for Kant lies in the categories when applied (not temporally but logically) to the material furnished by the senses. Theoretical reason is limited to objects of possible experience and never reaches the ground of empirical objects, the transcendental thing by itself; because this is not given under the general conditions of space and time and cannot be reached causally; that is, the thing by itself has neither spatial nor causal predicates. For theoretical reason, freedom, like God and immortality, is a mere idea, incapable either of demonstration or of refutation. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, however, Kant makes it clear that freedom is real and that it constitutes the possibility of all conduct that is distinctively human. The fact of moral obligation reveals freedom as its necessary implication. Natural laws, far from invalidating freedom, are indeed subordinate to it, but this subordination is not for Kant a function of theoretical reason.

Now, while scientific knowledge is a computation (as Hobbes put it, an addition and subtraction), there are nevertheless among the objects of the phenomenal world some which are not susceptible of such treatment, namely, the living organisms. Wholes which are merely aggregates may be handled by a method of analysis and synthesis; but wholes, like organisms, in which the parts are functions that get their meaning

from the idea of the whole in which they are implied, transcend the limits of theoretical reason or scientific thinking. These objects are not mere aggregates that *change*; they *grow* and develop. Whatever develops must develop into something. Viewed as progressive stages in evolution, instead of as objects of knowledge, the phenomena in question are bearers of purpose, manifesting the general character of self-determination. Since, now, the existence of such objects is undeniable, while they are for science miracles that cannot be understood theoretically and mechanically, they can be thought of only as ideas and purposes. They belong not to the world of science, but to the intelligible world, and must be interpreted from the point of view of philosophy. In this necessity the subordination of nature to freedom is revealed.

Kant suggests, furthermore, as Schopenhauer emphasizes later, that the thing by itself, the transcendental object, is in some sense identical with the transcendental subject of knowledge; so that the objects of the natural world that demand a teleological interpretation must be considered, from the point of view of the reflecting judgment, as concrete manifestations of the will to live which develops them and their parts as functions necessary to its purposes. Life, then, so far as revealed in the so-called objective world would abut on freedom and will; life is for science and mechanical causality a limit-notion. Such interpretation has, moreover, an a priori foundation in aesthetic experience.

For Kant the beautiful is that which arouses a disinterested, universal, and necessary feeling of complacency or delight by virtue of its accord with the

conditions of selfhood. *Æsthetic* satisfaction is a purely subjective condition of free contemplation, concerned only with the subjective aspect of the object; but the fact that in this state we are conscious secondarily that the object is beautiful is grounded in some peculiarity of the object that can be understood from the point of view of science as little as the life manifested in the organisms. Only in *æsthetic* experience do we obtain the key for interpretation of any kind, because here, and here only, do we find an adequate realization of freedom and the intrinsic adaptation of elements to a common end, an awareness of unity of purpose and organic perfection that enables us to transcend and synthesize the *disiecta membra* of the objective world. Because of *æsthetic* sense we are able to interpret the natural organisms and, indeed, the whole external world teleologically. The ground of *æsthetic* experience itself and the whole world of art (as well as that of thought and conduct) is, then, for Kant as for his disciple Schiller, free purposive personality.

Only in the art world do we find "things molded to the heart's desire." In the contemplation of the work of art we live in it, identifying ourselves with it instinctively and sympathetically, and experiencing then a completer realization of self, a more exalted sense of personality than is possible on the plane of everyday life with its continual compromises. The masterpiece, so far as we possess it, is a subjective construction whose elements are drawn from our innermost life, but purified then and raised to an unwonted degree of intensity that gives at times a mysterious sense of potentiality and reserve force not easily accounted for

by the object contemplated. "*En art il ne faut pas tout dire.*" In this sense indeed "suggestiveness is the height of art," involving at the least a kind of hero-worship.

The characteristic delight (as distinguished from mere pleasure attached to ordinary activities) of the æsthetic experience is due to the instinctively realized accord, the thrill of agreement, between our free selves and the spirit manifested in the beautiful object. We are in such experience truly at one with the other and are so satisfied with the consciousness of its existence and discovery that we concern ourselves for the time being with it alone. The æsthetic absorption proceeds from the fact that for persons nothing is so supremely fascinating and valuable as that which reveals free personality, no exaltation so great as that which flows from the sense of spontaneous, triumphantly successful activity, perfect economy of psychic force, as contrasted with the cabined, cribbed, confined striving of ordinary practical life. While other experiences in their incompleteness involve a reference to the past and to the future, the æsthetic experience transcends such reference to time and is complete in itself. Feeling is not here an end in itself—it never is—but a sign or symptom of the completest functioning we know. The beautiful object proceeds from freedom and functions to develop freedom, a freedom that is no longer a goal or a problem, but a realized condition. The experience is disinterested, not merely in the sense that it can be shared by others, as Bain says, but in so far as in it we are freed from the burden of strenuous practical and theoretical interests. We do not desire to own the work of art for individual

use and enjoyment, but are content to possess it in contemplation. We are, in fact, interested and eager to put it in some public place to be shared by others, as one hastens to repeat a good joke without a thought of its utility to us or to others. We do not in the moment of æsthetic appreciation attend to its physical constitution or to its technique, nor do we desire to analyze it in scientific abstraction. The experience is immediate and necessary in the sense that the object (for example the triad c, e, g as contrasted with c, d, e) delights us immediately and necessarily; but the necessity, like that which leads to a true conclusion in reasoning, is felt, not as hindrance and restraint, but merely as limitation. While at one with the spirit of the object we find ourselves in this activity more truly at one with ourselves than elsewhere. We *yield* to the influence of the beautiful object, but *willingly and gracefully* in activity that is neither toward it nor away from it but in it.

Variety is the spice of art, since it provides occasion for free activity in the contemplating subject. Objectively it reveals to us personality that is freely creative instead of passively mechanical, habitual, and slavish. Chaotic variety, however, taxes the freedom of attention beyond its capacity, revealing objectively caprice and lawlessness. Ugliness means subjectively the failure to *cosmetize* such a chaos, objectively it means the awareness of such a spirit. Both beauty and ugliness are expressions of life, so that, depending on the grade of culture in the artist and the race of which he is the representative, we have on the one hand expressions of freedom; while on the other we have the consciousness of a comparatively unfree

spirit, expressing and even revelling in disorder, discord, and mere passion (which is always ugly, as Poe points out in the *Poetic Principle*, and the cause of our bondage, as Spinoza insists). Even in the representation of objects naturally ugly the great artist will show us beauty, freeing by his creative act that which in itself is chaotic, unfree, and cramped in expression.

In so-called naturalistic art we find a slavish attempt to reproduce faithfully the world of phenomena. The function of the artist is conceived here (in the spirit of positivistic natural science of the latter half of the nineteenth century) not as a "*recherche de la vérité idéale*," but as an "*étude de la réalité positive*." From this point of view art is not properly selective and interpretative but merely imitative; and appreciation sinks to the level of an estimate of technical skill. The standard of excellence would then be that given us in the alleged contest of Zeuxis and Apelles in which the former deceives the birds with his picture of fruit and the latter tricks the former to such an extent that he takes the painted curtain for a real one concealing a competing picture. This is not only a modern view of art but that of Plato and probably even of Aristotle, and it is, in fact, on account of his theory, which, indeed, contradicts the practice of the Greek artists, that Plato excludes the artist from the plan of his Republic. From the point of view of personalism the productions of naturalism must necessarily receive scant consideration.

In realism art rises into freedom in the presentation of significant, typical, and universal aspects of experience. The attitude of the artist is selective and reveals to a considerable extent free personality. Orien-

tal art, for example, gives us particularistic portraits of kings victorious in battle, while Greek art shows us the "Nike of Samothrace," which typifies Victory in general and is freed in its treatment from the imitative impulse of mere portraiture. The realist starts, like Browning in the "Ring and the Book," with a theme selected from the factual world and interprets and modifies it creatively with the purpose of securing greater unity and coherence in the resulting work of art.

An idealistic treatment involves a greater subordination of a given subject matter to an artistic ideal and though the limits (between this form of art and realism on the one hand, and between idealism and the grotesque on the other) are often difficult to determine, they are in general fairly well defined. The Greeks and Shakespeare are, for example, realistic in their method. "There is," as has been well said, "no Shakesperian point of view. We are left in the presence of a world of types, no one of which is preferred or indorsed by the artist, that is, he does not use them as vehicles to indicate his appreciation of life. The attitude of Goethe is similar, while Schiller, Tennyson, Byron, Wordsworth, Dante, and others interpret life from the vantage ground of a clearly marked world-view. In the extremes of the grotesque and fantastic we find reality considerably distorted in absolute subjection to some controlling ideal, as in the excesses of romanticism.

Beauty is in the first instance an actual, affective state of consciousness, an act of synthesis, a feeling of worth or delight *in* the completest realization of freedom we can know; it is not a predicate of the beautiful

object except through a sort of transference in the process of æsthetic judgment. In so far as it exists *for me* both form and content of the beautiful object are my own product. Its beauty is not, however, subjective in the sense that it is accidental, a mere "special to me." Just as nobody when uttering a judgment in mathematics or physics is persuaded that the judgment is true for him alone, though well aware that many men are and probably always will remain ignorant of these sciences, so one finds an inexpugnable element in æsthetic judgment to consist in an objective reference. If persons really believed in the particularity and incommunicability of this sort of experience, how, pray, could we account for the infinite pains taken by artist and critic to impart to us their treasures? Even failures, like that of Michelangelo with the Brutus head, emphasize, at least in the intention, this objective reference of the judgment which constitutes its universality.

It is equally clear that, while beauty is objectively grounded, it is in nowise an analytic predicate of any physical thing; and none of the predicates of the phenomenal world may be applied to it without producing nonsense. It is in the physical world as little as "happiness" in the happy brook, "utility" in the useful tool, or "interest" in the object possessing interest. It can be seen with the physical eye no more than force in the perceived effects of force, or a good intention in the overt act. Beauty is not red or green, heavy or light, long or short; it is not to the right, in the center or in the periphery of the beautiful painting, nor is it the function of any or all the notes of a musical composition. The arrangement of elements in the

so-called beautiful object may well be the immediate causal correlate of bodily movements, glandular changes, etc., concomitant with kinæsthetic sensations in the contemplating subject; but even though we should be able to reduce the æsthetic experience to such sensations we should not thereby (unless sensations are movements) have located beauty in the physical realm. We look truly here not upon the things that are seen but upon the things that are unseeable, "the light that never was on sea or land." Beauty is not *there* at all, but *here* and *beyond*, *this* and *that*, not *now* and *then*, but eternal. Unity in variety, symmetry and proportion may suffice for a merely formal solution of æsthetic problems, but if we seek for beauty in the concrete we can find it only in the manifestations of free, purposive personality.

In a search for the possibility of the great creations of art we are thrown back ultimately to a study of those inspired personalities who sit closer to reality than the masses of men in their day. Impelled and reinforced, like the mystic, the reformer, and the martyr, by a strong sense of freedom (the *quod nequeo monstrare et sentio tantum* of which Coleridge spoke), they regularly burst the bonds of political, moral, æsthetic, and intellectual conventions, false to the spirit of the past, and channel new paths for themselves and for humanity. While in one sense the product of their epoch—the highest crest of an evolutionary wave—they seem in another profounder sense more than this, consciously or unconsciously "participating," as Shelley thought, "in the eternal, the infinite, and the One." They, for the world movement as a whole, are like the few isolated acts of free choice in the midst of mechani-

cal habits in the individual, and they mold both their own and subsequent periods by virtue of their sublime spontaneity. This is the significance of the mysterious creative impulse, or *Spieltrieb*, by means of which the genius, as Plautus said, "seeks and finds what previously existed nowhere." It is what both Raphael and Beethoven suggest when they say that they found in their own souls something they could discover in no work of nature. Lanier means the same thing in his poem entitled "Individuality." Back of their categorical creations the experience of average mortals does not go.

The psychology of genius, like the psychology of instinct and feeling, reminds one of the saying of Emerson that in skating over thin ice our safety lies in our speed. Genius itself in its fragmentary and cryptic utterances has been perhaps too prone to overemphasize the "*poeta nascitur non fit*," as, for example, when Whistler in the famous Ruskin trial went so far as to assert that there are neither artistic peoples nor artistic periods, though admitting that some periods and peoples offer less resistance to the efforts of the artist than do others. On the other hand, paralleling Hegel's retort to Talleyrand that no man is a hero to his valet because the valet is not a hero, it is clear that we are lacking in proper first-hand information, because few geniuses have attempted to communicate their artistic experience to the world except through their works of art. What we know is obscure and fragmentary, consisting for the most part in the recognition of a mysterious fact, together with the enumeration of certain general characteristics. Genius appears under most unexpected conditions, and there is no rule for its production. Corresponding

to the special fields to which the genius devotes himself there are important and significant differences of endowment, but along with these go by general agreement certain qualities common to the class, such as the possession of a prodigious memory, great emotional capacity, extraordinary power of selective attention and will, combined often with eccentricity of various kinds and a sense of personal dignity and worth amounting at times almost to conceit. According to all accounts, the genius is not merely a representative man, but in some sense one who speaks or assumes to speak in the name of all reality.

Primarily the work of art is a free construction in consciousness, an objectification or imaginative interpretation of an exuberant, enthusiastic state of the self in the case of such supermen, in some sense an "inner imitation" in the presence of some natural object at the start, but nevertheless *free*, constructive, *refining* contemplation. Secondly, art is a technical convention for fixing and recording such states, or for communicating them to others, through an appeal to their imagination. The individual for whom such a work of art is to exist must recreate the same for himself, guided and controlled in his experience by the interpreting spirit of the art-leader, who produces the externalization under the guidance of what he commonly calls his inspiration. Just as a reasoner must reconstruct for himself from merely conventional signs the thought of the person he would understand, so the art lover must reproduce in free imaginative construction the real work of art in the spirit of the artist, of which the externalization is never more than an imperfect and unsatisfactory representative.

The inartistic layman for the most part sees even living things as mere aggregates, so that if asked to draw or to picture to himself a familiar animal like a horse, he finds (when at best he can imagine some of the parts) that he cannot join them properly. He has not observed how the parts connect or organize themselves. The artist, on the other hand, masters and synthesizes the manifold of his experience, reconciling contradictions and seeing things organically; he finds, as Coleridge saw, "the freedom and movement of life in the confining form." Great artists never take machines but only organisms or that which must be interpreted organically for their subjects; and great art creations, just because they are never mechanical in their origin, can never be understood mechanically (as Taine and others have thought) nor reproduced mechanically by rule of thumb. Every attempt to do so, whether by meistersinger and noisy huckster-poets, or by imitating pupils and virtuosi who have not caught the secret spirit of the master, or by the copyist with his slavish, hesitating line and faltering color, merely emphasizes by violent contrast the essential nature of all true art; true art is never thus artificial.

Great art, the grand style, whether in lines, postures, colors, tones, words, actions, or composition, manifests always one and the same spirit. Whether the genius show us "what swimmeth below when the tide comes in," "the light, level, and aerial illusions of Italian sunsets," "the glint of light on a haystack," or that which rests on the face of a madonna, he will in any case present us not merely "objectified emotion" unqualified, but typical manifestations of freedom. If he shows us joy or passion, it will never be

unrestrained and licentious, but (as in the maternal love of the Sistine Madonna) idealized, rationalized, shot through with law; and when he leads us to the very depths of human sorrow, there, too, we shall find, as in the Greek stele, Michelangelo's "Pieta," or in much misunderstood "Hamlet," noble self-control, autonomy, "a temperance that may give it smoothness." Beauty is objectively, freedom of a line, of a posture, a color, light and shade, a tone, a movement, etc.; or freedom manifested in their combinations under general and specific freely accepted law-giving limitations; freedom and purification of the sensibility, just as truth is free-thinking under the limitations of logical laws, and good conduct is action under the limitation of freely accepted moral laws.

At times defective technique or faulty materials may prevent an individual or an epoch from adequate manifestation of experience, leaving us the impression of profundity mingled with *gaucherie*. On the other hand, accomplished technique for technique's sake, paint for paint's sake (particularly in periods of decadence lacking in freedom and confusing the uniformity of law with necessity) may revel in the obtrusive presentation of itself or serve to reveal an all too human or even subhuman content. Blasé nerves in such unhealthy periods revel in emotion for emotion's sake and demand the spicy, sensational, and burlesque in art, as the depraved appetite of the pampered sybarite the taste of putrid meats. Moreover, the corrupted taste may come to seem the norm, just as through constant association the piano out of tune may come to be preferred by an originally normal ear. The great masters, however, free and refine themselves (and

through them their race and the epochs) in fashioning the work of art (in either sense), making known through an ever-differentiating, ever-developing series of particular externalizations the creative spirit revealed in their innermost life, and thus bearing witness, consciously or unconsciously, to the universal spirit of absolute reality. The world of art, taken as a whole, is one gigantic example of infinite variety manifesting progressively, throughout the ages, the unifying, organizing spirit of freedom. In this sense beauty, like the other two aspects of reality, would be for us a goal until the end of time, an unfinished sentence, although as in the "Flower in the Crannied Wall," and in the realization of the good in each good deed, the universal would be really immanent and living in each particular.

The arrangement of the elements in the externalization of the artist results in phenomenal forms expressing a real content; it reveals not merely the artist himself and his epoch with various tendencies and idiosyncrasies, but ultimately, at least in the case of real genius, something more fundamental and universal. Nobody has been more persuaded of this than certain great artists who have felt themselves inspired; and they tell us, at times with great assurance, that their works interpret merely suggestively and inadequately a vast background of inner experience but vaguely adumbrated by the artist himself; and these, in any case, must be our authorities of last resort. *Æsthetic* experience has been for them a sort of ecstasy, like that described by Plato in the *Phædrus*, coming only at rare moments and irregularly. For them, if their report be trustworthy, it has been some-

thing akin to religion and their works have been a kind of language for communicating something as much deeper than thought as thought itself is deeper than speech.

The transcendent masterpieces of art may be, as Grant Allen says, "the last link of a chain whose first link began with the insect's selection of bright-hued blossoms"; but they are also in all epochs, whatever their subjects may happen to be, like transparencies in the general veil of mystery that surrounds the race, through which we gain in especially thrilling moments glimpses that seem to reassure us, immediately and prior to all reasoning, of our essential kinship with absolute reality. We experience then, in the accord between our free selves and the free spirit of the universe in this or that concrete manifestation, the consciousness that, even as here, in spite of the contradictions and paradoxes of life, all's right with the world as a whole. Abutting on real freedom, not on caprice or blind mechanism, it may be trusted practically. We realize this instinctively, but when we reflect upon it we may well think with Dante of an influence that "inwills" us, *che'n suo voler ne invoglia*. We may understand too in the same spirit Goethe's declaration: *Wer die Kunst hat, der hat Religion, wer die Kunst nicht hat, der habe Religion*; as well as the assertion of still another inspired artist that "art is God's grandchild;" for art that is worthy of the name is rooted in sublime personality, and personality has its solid basis in freedom.

When a person speaks to us the words are nothing substantial, nothing abiding; they pass swiftly while the meaning remains. As the externalization of con-

cepts they serve to mark out and to fix for our attention and retention important aspects described in the changing world of nature. They themselves, whether spoken or written, are indeed only special arrangements and modifications of that realm, the latest conventionalized skeletons of what were once poems and (in writing derived from hieroglyphics) paintings; they represent, in varying degrees of abstraction, stages on the way from æsthetics to logic, summations or condensations of experience, living concentrations of psychic force by which we act upon the immediate present. By means of these as tools we grasp in the eternal *becoming*, truth that *is*, truth that it required ages of human effort to discern and which without these instruments would pass unnoticed by us. In the practical field, too, we find in a relatively stable form other instruments, "the lengthened shadows" of innumerable known and unknown reformers who have molded the conscience of the race. In a similar manner the artist manipulates and organizes into typical forms the elements of the world of experience, fixing for himself and for us in the *becoming*, aspects of beauty, shorthand records to remind himself and the rest of us of something caught by his glance in the apparently chaotic, incoherent flux.

The *externalization*, that is, the communication of this real work of art in stone and bronze, or even in *monumenta aere perennius*, persists only somewhat longer than the spoken word: it, too, like the artist's body, his brain, his detachable tools, and the rest of the constant flux, is transitory. We feel, however, that Leonardo, for example, abides not merely and chiefly in the works of his contemporaries, but that he must

persist as an immortal "moment" in universal history, even though the bare fragment of him we now identify with certainty should pass beyond the recognition of mankind, as has indeed happened with Apollodorus, Apelles, Zeuxis, and their unknown civilized and savage predecessors. The æsthetic truth discovered by them, the true principles, by means of which new syntheses of past and present beauty are here and now possible, would still remain functioning in spite of temporary aberrations and lapses of art-memory, as the inalienable possession of men.

Art, as the organization and modification of elements in space and time, would be like the rest of nature, "not existence but speech," while art as a spiritual possession would not be in that realm any more than thought exists in libraries. It would not be merely the "holding of a mirror up to nature," as one great realist said, but would consist, rather, in finding nature itself always a mirror of the supernatural. The substratum of communication would be, then, for us ultimately the free World-Ground; and to that extent we should agree with Malebranche that in some sense all things, art works along with the rest, are seen by us in the World-Ground. Art, as the most immediate and human revelation of beauty, leads eventually to the height from which in perspective the natural world appears, notwithstanding all apparent discord, imperfection, and failure, as a cosmos and in some sense a work of supreme art, a theurgy and a theophany. We can well agree with Walter Pater that "the ideal end of Greek sculpture, as of all other art, is to deal, indeed, with the deepest elements of man's nature and destiny."

Of course the meaning is not that all this is consciously present or is *explicitly* involved in the production or in the contemplation of a given work of art. The reactions there are surely unpremeditated. We and the artist abandon reflection largely in appreciation. Nevertheless the judgment, it is beautiful, contains implicitly the subjective and objective reference indicated, just as the familiar impersonal judgment: it snows: implies with subjective and objective reference the true but unfamiliar: I snow: of Emerson; he himself in the "Conduct of Life" calls beauty "in its largest and profoundest sense one expression for the universe."

Positivistic and agnostic writers have intimated that the period is perhaps not far off when art, like religion, may be cast aside like a worn-out garment, and even Ruskin says somewhere that he can imagine a period of the future when art shall have been outgrown because its content will have been realized in other ways by men. However that may be for the enlightened, the hedonist, and the industrial, it seems in general rather plain that art in some form should continue to function in human life at least until the time comes when "the great world-struggle of developing thought," as George Eliot puts it, shall no longer be "continually foreshadowed in the struggle of the affections seeking a justification for love and hope"; that is, until experience shall have been completely rationalized. "Sometimes," says Bowne, "the subject matter eludes all articulate thought and expression. This is particularly the case with the emotional life. In setting forth this deeper life of feeling and aspiration we fall back on music, art, worship, and various symbolic activities

which alone serve to give voice to the dumb souls of men."

The ubiquity of æsthetic judgment in popular distinctions like the good and the beautiful theory or proof, the good life and the beautiful life, a beautiful tool, a beautiful case of cancer, a beautiful stroke in tennis, a beautiful play in other athletic games, etc., is explained by the fundamentality of æsthetic sense as the possibility of ideals in thought and conduct. Back of the "will to know" and the "will to realize ideals," back of all "rhythmic anticipation" of stimuli, all attempts at cleanliness, comprehension, "workmanship," and the like, the first manifestations of living-law, in which it appears that beauty possesses us rather than that we possess beauty, is the *enthusiastic* instinct to organize, the ordering normative principle, which is Heaven's and our first law and upon which all values depend. A person unfurnished a priori with æsthetic sense, even supposing he could think and act at all, would hardly stumble on the notion of an ideal world to be realized in thought or an ideal self to be realized in conduct; for theoretical and practical experience, taken in abstractness, would leave us impotently fumbling with the isolated details of life, with no real unities and totalities, no syntheses and harmonies of coexistence and sequence, no freedom of thought and action, no mastery of experience. There would be no impulse toward truth for truth's sake, no *art* of thinking; the very conception of education and progress would seem to be impossible.

It is through this fundamental tendency that we are stimulated to the will to "see things steadily and whole," and normally, that is, except in the case of

the mere æsthete, the experience of art results in a return to the difficult field of theoretical and practical life in a renewed effort to live artistically. Thus we are enabled to transcend the empirical *bellum omnium contra omnes* and come to the consciousness of a principle of solidarity in the social order to which we are related organically. This would seem in a sense to indicate the importance of æsthetic development, particularly under the ægis of democracy, to which the modern world seems irrevocably committed. Art does not need democracy or sectarianism, but democracy and sectarianism, whatever their own opinions in the matter may be, certainly need art.

It has long been a familiar commonplace that democracy rests in some vague way on education and culture; but the danger to civilization from trained, irresponsible democracy "doing as it likes," was regarded rather lightly until the imminent menace of universal radicalism without ideals, with wants but without desires and real purposes, startled men into the insight that democracy militant and triumphant must in some way be made safe for the world, unless, indeed, the sequel shall "bring the old Dark Ages back without the faith, without the hope." The danger is all the greater because of the blunders and flagrant injustice with which democracy in our own country under the influence of materialistic, sensationalistic philosophy, utilitarian ethics, and naturalistic notions of art may perhaps be justly charged.

Pragmatic "bluffing and getting by," "frenzied finance," "illegal combinations in restraint of trade," political corruption, "graft," inhuman conditions of child labor, lynchings, "shootings," etc., have un-

doubtedly been viewed with considerably more tolerance in modern democracies than in modern monarchies, whatever may be the reasons and whatever may be said theoretically of the two forms of government. The citizen, in such democracies as we have had, has not failed to look out for number one in a sense not intended perhaps by the proverb. He has too often thought of himself and his fellow men in terms of mechanism, as individuals instead of as *persons*, because his own life has lacked organic unity and consistent purpose. The individual with us has usually not been very keenly aware of any organic, purposive relationship uniting himself and others; he has not regarded society *sympathetically* as "himself writ large"; that is, as the means for realizing the highest personal good as distinguished from mere personal advantage or "enlightened self-interest." He fails, I believe, rather generally to attempt some personal embodiment of the Platonic ideal of *Dikaio-sune*, because he is for the most part far too busy staking out superficial claims to liberty and equality to bother himself overmuch about real freedom and fraternity. The spirit of cooperation and good fellowship often seen in and between European classes is almost unknown with us; so that it almost seems as though the leveling process and the *auri sacra fames* had resulted not merely in "insulating the individual," as Emerson said, but in *isolating* him.

All this is perhaps due to a fundamental lack of taste and tact that might be corrected by a certain emphasis on æsthetic and cultural education generally, conspicuous in our American life by its absence. Under a form of government dependent for its control

and direction largely on the culture and initiative of the individual it would seem that the development of taste should be of supreme significance; since it should bring to the members of the social body a profounder consciousness of personal worth, the solid foundation on which any adequate realization of true freedom must surely rest. It would lead men, in general, perhaps really to believe the statement of David Friedrich Strauss: "*Das Menschen groesstes Kunstwerk ist der Mensch.*" It might lead to living harmony and a genuine chivalry in the social group.

The present outlook for Western civilization hardly seems so rosy as to warrant the unreserved optimism displayed by many. Civilization is not yet safe; no safer than it ever has been. "*Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben, der taeglich sie erobern muss.*" "*Was Du ererbt von Deinen Vaetern hast, erwirb es um es zu besitzen.*" The story of Faust and the story of the talents is one which every period of civilization as every individual must take to heart in order to fulfill its "contract with those who are dead and those who are to be born." It is not inconceivable that after a brief respite Western life should decline rapidly from the temporary exaltation of the present moment to a plane of crassest materialism and naturalism. It may, on the contrary, rise, sooner than can now be guessed, to another Renaissance—to a reincarnation of the incomparable spirit of Hellas that always finds men young and always keeps them so.

Whichever of these visions shall become the reality may depend perhaps in a most vital way, not on the mechanical efficiency of "vocational training," not even on "mental discipline," but, rather, on the proper

functioning of art and culture for everybody possible in the democratic programs of the immediate future. Once in the days of the humanities it was universally believed that only the liberal arts were occupations worthy of *freemen*; but it is at any rate true and needs to be emphasized that only liberal education of some kind, "giving," as Plato intended, "to the body and to the soul all the beauty and all the perfection of which they are capable," will develop *free men*. In spite of unproved and one-sided assertions concerning the transference or nontransference of education there is one phase of the problem for which the discussions are somewhat irrelevant, since it concerns something not intended to be transferred but, on the contrary, to remain an inalienable, living possession. Inasmuch as the "completer living" for which education is alleged to be a preparation is more than eating and drinking and being merry with set purpose, Ovid's ancient statement, "*Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros*," still holds its full measure of truth.

When Eris at the marriage of Peleus threw in at the window the famous golden apple we are told that it bore the inscription, 'Η καλὴ λαβέτω. Accordingly, the prize was awarded not to jealous, squabbling Hera, mother of Ares, not even to versatile, intellectual Glaucopis Ergane, but to Aphrodite, goddess of love, beauty, and the "smiling, peaceful sea." Both the inscription and the judgment seem appropriate. The source of all values is indeed evil, contradiction, discord; but only beauty may truly possess and assimilate their fruits.

VIII

SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL PREMISES

BENJAMIN W. VAN RIPER

IT may be doubted that, in its original formulation, the law of Identity and Contradiction was supposed to carry with it any great insight either logical or metaphysical. Certainly the statement that A is A and is under no imaginable circumstances to be regarded as non-A, has little dramatic quality. Yet, in the whole course of history, few generalizations have given rise to anything like such prolonged and acrimonious controversy. In the eyes of the chance observer it seems like a labored deliverance of an obvious triviality; to the Platonist or Hegelian it is not unlikely to appear as very much the evidence of things not seen. And whatever one's final opinion of it now, it must be conceded that for many centuries the law itself—even Aristotle's formulation of it—has remained as a cardinal point of reference for the whole field of abstract reflection.

There are doubtless many reasons for this long and extraordinary career. Two are not far to seek. In the first place, it seems to be the innermost citadel of conceptual thought. The integral unity of the concept, the inherent necessity for stability in the foci of thinking, the fundamental exclusion by an idea of all contradictory relationships—these read like the constitution and by-laws of all mental life. Granted that in daily life the principle is abstract and unheard-of;

it would certainly seem to be at least an elementary consideration for any understanding of thought itself. For this it would be valuable even if it never proved of any direct use in the actual concrete calculations of every day.

But the dialectician does not leave the law in any such obscure philosophical retreat. Not a law of syllogizing merely, it generally becomes for him a dominating fact in the processes of objective knowledge. With this simple change of context it may assume a most startling importance. If it be written, not merely that an idea shall remain consistent with itself within the narrow confines of the mind, but that consistency is the most inescapable requirement in the acquisition of knowledge—that two *rational* contradictory statements cannot both be *true*—one appears to stand in the very presence of Absolute legislation itself. By what transcendent right, one is inclined to ask, does a dry and abstract rule of thinking assume to say what may or may not *be* in the infinite world outside of and beyond the thinking mind? How may it presume to set limits to the antecedent alternatives of creation, eliminating even from the realm of the possible everything that fails to pass the censorship of its criterion of logical coherence? Philosophers were not slow to see the sweep and pretension of such acclaim, and so, long before Kant announced the synthetic activity of the mind in the process of knowledge and constructed his celebrated table of categories, the authority of the understanding to lay down at least one “condition of all possible experience” had already been more than once acknowledged—the condition of noncontradiction.

To the taunt that so vague a generalization is either tautologous or fanciful, the traditional dialectician has a quick reply. This law, in spite of its seeming aridity, may easily be seen to be the constant though tacit reference of our most concrete thinking and the one thing of which the average man is absolutely certain. He may not know which of two witnesses is telling the truth, but he does know that, if their statements are logically contradictory, one at least *must* be false. The scientist likewise accepts it. He, indeed, may be open-minded where the average man is not. Black swans, birds with vertebrated tails, gill-slits in human throats, mountaintops made of sea shells, canals on Mars, degradation of chemical elements, space bent through a fourth dimension, even telepathy—there is apparently no limit to his mental hospitality. He knows the danger of declaring *anything* impossible *ante rem*. But he too becomes instantly dogmatic in face of logical contradiction. Tell him of a breakdown of the law of gravitation and the scientist is glad to receive and inspect the evidence; tell him that a circle and a square have been discovered that are of exactly the same area and he laughs you out of court. That can be shown to involve a *logical* contradiction, and not the most cogent evidence of the senses may prevail against it. Once dispense with this criterion and admit that two logically contradictory judgments *can* both be true, and experience becomes an indiscriminate chaos; assert it, and knowledge begins to shape itself into manageable order. So it would appear that this highly rarefied and desiccated abumbration of formal logic is, after all, a very practical and indispensable rule of procedure. It thus turns out that

the statement "A is A," when rendered with all its variations, is an interesting and even portentous assertion.

While, from the assumption that two contradictory statements cannot both be true, it is possible, as we saw above, to launch at once upon the dialectic of idealism, the more common route is through the concept of the knowability of things. All conceptual dealing with the world assumes, so the argument runs, that knowledge is possible, and from the fact that knowledge is possible one may finally reach the conclusion that the outer world is in some sense a thought product, or is "cast in the molds of thought." Whatever be the force of this deduction, better known as the epistemological argument, it is mentioned in this connection only to remark that it is essentially the same as the objective reading of the principle of non-contradiction. If it be assumed that the detection of inherent contradiction is what is meant by inconceivability, then from the statement that the inconceivable is not true one may infer the obverted converse that the true is conceivable—which is to say that the world is amenable to thought, or that knowledge is possible. This has become the major premise of more than one philosophy. The object of what immediately follows is to inquire more in detail (1) to just what degree the principle of identity and contradiction is an a priori principle of thought and what further may be involved in it; and (2) as to what, either in this connection or in isolation, is to be understood by, or inferred from, the postulate of the possibility of knowledge.

One thing may be acknowledged in advance. *If* we had things on one side and thought on the other whose function it was to penetrate and know the things; and *if* thought apprehended or comprehended those things only in terms of ideas which were essentially the product and creatures of the thinking subject; and *if* in relation to each other these ideas were possessed of certain intrinsic qualities known as mutual compatibility or consistency, and contradiction, in virtue of which the mind could categorically permit or deny certain combinations of predicates from any real subject qua real, then, certainly, thought processes might at once be taken as a prototype for the philosophical understanding of the world. To be specific: The judgment "S is P" professes to describe a certain reality, "A," which may or may not be named by the grammatical subject, "S." The judgment "S is P" is either true or false of "A," and it is evident that the ground of this relationship must be either "A" itself or something that may, without loss or gain or modification, be substituted for "A." And so, if there are purely mental qualities of ideas—such as consistency and contradiction—that can of themselves to any degree mark the judgment as true or false, then those qualities must be epistemological equivalents (in the sense that the one may legitimately and validly be substituted for the other) of some assignable properties of the reality in question, "A." In so far, that is to say, as the ideas "S" and "P" have about them inherently logical marks that determine to any extent the truth or falsity of the judgment "S is P," then to just that extent is "A" built on a framework of logical laws. This would be the epistemological argument in

an irrefragible form, since it would require as an alternative either the condemnation of knowledge as a whole (or at least of that part of it which is logical in character), or the acknowledgment of a Reality in which mental principles are structural.

This conclusion, however, hangs from the combination of "if's" mentioned above. It is impossible here to discuss all of those conditions. It is the third that must for the present monopolize our attention. Does the law of identity and noncontradiction refer to an inherently logical disposition of ideas, or does it only report an objective and empirical necessity in dealing conceptually with things themselves? This paper is dominated by the opinion that the latter is the case.

Doubtless it is a vicious and, in the long run, impossible theoretical project to draw a clear and distinct line between subject and object, between the mind and the things it knows. Yet certainly for practical purposes it can be done, and all traditional discussion of logical laws apart from things presupposes it. Doubtless reasoning is never rigidly formal. Yet, in so far as its processes can be described in abstraction from their cognitive content itself, the question may fairly be raised whether any given principles find their locus primarily in the noetic processes as such or in the objective field of intellection.

It probably would be admitted that traditionally the laws of identity and noncontradiction (and their correlate of excluded middle) have been regarded and relied upon as primarily mental principles. The theory of the concept as Socrates sketched it and as Plato elaborated it was the basis of Aristotle's theory of judgment and inference. To see how direct and nat-

ural this sequence was one has only to try to imagine what the first formulations of logic might have been had the original doctrine of the concept been along the lines, say, of James' account! It hardly seems probable that in that case there would have developed a logic in which the syllogism was basal and in which the laws of identity and noncontradiction could express the fundamental presuppositions of ratiocination. But the original theory of reasoning did grow out of a view of concepts as fixed metaphysical and intellectual entities the operation of which would require, as logical axioms, just those laws of thought as Aristotle stated them.

It has always been difficult, however, to confine these laws to the field of thought, or to make them axiomatic. As an illustration of this ambiguity, interest naturally attaches to Mr. Bradley's account, especially in view of his well-known theory of Reality and Appearance.

The law of identity he has stated in two more or less distinct ways; we shall consider first the more striking view of the matter. As applied to propositions he makes it to mean "Once true always true."¹ This, indeed, will, as he says, "seem a false statement." If it is not a false statement, it is because the field of truth has been enormously restricted in comparison with ordinary usage. He himself points out that a merely singular judgment, such as "I have a toothache," could not possibly be true on this theory. One may grant that we are occasionally confronted with a vivid and overwhelming conviction of the validity of such a proposition; but as a *logical* proposition it fails

¹ *Principles of Logic*, p. 133.

by default. It is a fragment of a "this," torn from a context in separation from which it can be neither true nor real, and, while inadequate to the present, it does not even make any pretensions of transcending the present to give expression to a general truth. Such a statement is therefore, in Mr. Bradley's view, caught between the upper and the nether millstones and has practically no value at all as truth.

Ordinary universals, though always hypothetical, do aim to assert of reality a quality by virtue of which, when A is given, B always follows. While this is highly abstract, it still meets much more successfully the demands of the law of identity as Mr. Bradley understands it, and so is more nearly true. "The real axiom of identity is this: What is true in one context is true in another. Or, if any truth is stated so that a change in events will make it false, then it is not a genuine truth at all."² Obviously, nothing but a highly abstract universal could begin to approach this ideal of identity. Incidentally, Mr. Bradley mentions no examples of this genuine sort of truth. The vicissitude of daily life, taken along with the all-inclusive drift of cosmic evolution, renders such an illustration extremely difficult of discovery and hazardous of formulation.

When this view of identity is taken in conjunction with the above-mentioned view of singular judgments on the one hand, and that of the identity of indiscernibles (which he accepts) on the other, the result is startling. Singular judgments, as we saw, are all stamped as ultimately false because of their mutilation in being isolated from their context or conditions

² Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, p. 133.

which, however much they are abstracted from, *are* always organically relevant to the judgment in question. But the law of identity, in the form of "What is true in one context is true in another," deliberately ignores, and even denies, the inevitable influence and relevancy of the context, which to do was acknowledged to be the unpardonable and blasting sin of all singular judgments. In other words, the ideal of truth is absolute identity through difference; but since no element of meaning or reality ever *is* absolutely independent of its context, the ideal of absolute truth is a logically unrealizable one. This is not pointed out as a startling refutation of Mr. Bradley's theory; rather it is a consequence of his theory which he himself draws in the "Appearance and Reality," where all thought, because of this very discrepancy, is set down as appearance. The present purpose has been to make it clear that, if the above a priori formulation of the law of identity be adopted, the result is a theory of truth that condemns, not merely all existing judgments, but all possible ones, to the graduated limbo of varying degrees of falsehood.

And this is the outcome even if the law as stated be accepted at its face value. But it is by no means apparent that it should be so accepted as a law of thought. A law of thought might be expected to reveal some distinguishing mode of the mind's activity; the formula in question sets up an ideal of validity to be sought for in the finished product of the thought process. So, even apart from the intrinsic unattainability of this ideal, it is doubtful that, if it did exhaust the law of identity, it could be regarded as an elemental law of *thought* at all. If anything like

a law, it is a law of truth—of a type of relation between the thinking subject and the object thought about. And if, in the above form, it were offered as a law of thought, it would possess the doubtful virtue of defining the thought activity in terms of one of its own derivatives, namely, truth. But perhaps these are minor matters. The essential point in all this is that in this formulation of the principle of identity we have, not a fundamental necessity nor an elemental *modus operandi* of the thought process as such; and whatever it be, other than that, need not concern us here.

In his chapter on "The Two Conditions of Inference" Mr. Bradley gives us a slightly different view of the law that does at the start locate it quite specifically in the thought process. If, from "M is P" and "S is M," we are validly to conclude that "S is P," "M" must be identical, not merely similar, in the two premises. "The axiom may be monstrous or again it may be true, but at least one thing is beyond all doubt, that it is the indispensable basis of reasoning. It may be false metaphysically, but there is no single inference you possibly can make but assumes its validity at every step."³ But with this too there must be coupled the familiar proviso that "an identity that is not a synthesis of differences is plainly inert and utterly useless."⁴ Which is to say that, in the world of thought, as in the proper realm of any other appearance, we are aware of converging lines that point into a realm of perfection where the appearance itself would cease entirely to exist.

³ *Principles of Logic*, p. 264.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

But that is not the chief difficulty here. The main question still is the degree to which this presupposition of all inference is a law of thought. Is it necessary, in other words, that "M" be identical as "M"—as the middle term in the syllogism—or is the primary necessity merely that it shall *refer to* an identical entity in the world? It is certainly true that if we knew on good authority that, while the concept "M" had remained identical, the entity designated by it had undergone material change, the most regular and formally faultless inference would be immediately repudiated. If, on the other hand, the concept "M" changed in the mind of the reasoner, in any other respect than that which had led to the judgments "M is P" and "S is M," and if at the same time it were discovered that the objects referred to were unaltered—at least in the essential relation of "M" to "S" and "P"—the validity of the inference would be unharmed. That, in order to reason certain ways about objects, certain assumptions must be made about them, is surely no more concerned with the reasoning than with the objects reasoned about. If you are going to conclude, from "M is P" and "S is M," that "S is P," you must assume that the terms involved remain essentially identical. If you are going to reason from a nest of eggs to a flock of birds, you must assume that the entities involved are living things. Nobody would regard the latter as a law of thought; it is an empirical generalization from objective facts; but just on that account it imposes incapable restrictions and responsibilities on the thought that deals with them. Down to this point no reason has been shown why the other law should not be

understood in a similar way and regarded as having a similar—though broader—empirical origin and significance.

Thought we understand to be a way of dealing with reality, and for its operation a certain dependableness seems to be necessary in the reality dealt with. If the world were merely an enormously exaggerated kaleidoscope, thought would doubtless fail of fruitful results. It requires a moderate degree of identity, just as a pair of ice tongs requires a relative persistence of rigidity and weight in the ice. If ice were in the habit of turning without warning into electric charges or volcanic explosions, ice tongs would certainly lose their prehensile utility. But too much identity would be just as fatal. If the cake of ice did not change at all, not only would there never have been the present use for ice tongs, but their mechanical utility would have been in principle impossible. The bite of the tongs depends upon two things: the relative persistence of the ice as ice, and a sufficient capacity for change to let the tongs sink in. In the same way, while thinking requires a field of reference of a fair degree of stability, it also might have *too much* identity! If it became apparent, for instance, that the objective world had been stricken into total rigidity by a kind of cosmic paralysis, or if all existing concepts were suddenly congealed into standardized thoughts that would never change again, certainly all the occasion and character of thought would be gone. Just as the process of carving marble consists partly in a continuous repair of tools, so the action of intelligence on its world consists always in a relative remaking of itself in addition to its objective achievements.

All such effective interaction would be destroyed if the law of identity were regarded as an *a priori* necessity and applied with legalistic severity to concepts and to the objects of their reference.

If, on the other hand, the law be interpreted in the relative and empirical way just outlined, its serviceability as a major premise for the epistemological argument would, of course, disappear, since the force of that argument depends upon that law's being of itself and in its first intention a fact of the mind. Only as a mental law in the latter sense could it be held to put upon the very content of knowledge the indelible stamp and superscription of the mind, and to require in consequence a mental structure of reality on pain of sacrificing the validity of knowledge were reality otherwise.

The law of noncontradiction is ordinarily stated in one of two ways: (a) Logically contradictory predicates may not validly be asserted of the same subject; or (b) two contradictory judgments cannot both be true. These, however, amount to the same thing, since two judgments could not contradict unless they both referred ultimately to the same entity or subject. We may not, then, ascribe logically inconsistent predicates to the same subject without subverting the whole knowing process. This, in other words, is a law of thought to which the objective world, in so far as it is to be accepted as knowable, must conform. And with this there begins a familiar dialectic.

Obviously, the crux of the whole matter is the discovery and ordering of the incompatible predicates. Simple cues from the structure of words will not help

us. Dr. E. E. Southard once noticed with surprise that to "ravel" a knitted object, and to "unravel" it, meant precisely the same thing. The housemaid "dusts" the furniture; to "undust" it would be an identical performance. "Valuable" and "invaluable" are not contradictories nor even opposites. If there be logical marks of consistency and inconsistency, they, at any rate, are not reflected in any dependable way in the form of words.

Unquestionably, there are many pairs of words that are divergent and opposite, not in mere form but in meaning. This fact is so conspicuous that Heraclitus could think of these dichotomies as fundamental to the very nature of being itself. Aristotle did much the same thing, at least in the field of ethics. But the trouble is these opposites do not stay put. Whether any two shall be regarded as really incompatible and as contradictory to each other is always an empirical matter and depends upon the thing of which they are asserted and the sense in which they are regarded as modifying or qualifying it. Can the same thing be both round and square? A plain area cannot be, but a cylinder can if it be looked at from two certain points of view. "Dead" and "alive" are mutually exclusive enough in human society, but as applied to a dry seed the case is not so clear. The argument generally ends with, "Of course, in a certain sense, one may say—" etc., and that is just the point. Professor James once remarked that there was a sense in which not even the arithmetical laws of addition and multiplication would hold—for drops of quicksilver, for instance, or for rabbits! Can a thing be both large and small? It is an ancient paradox that a tall Esquimo

may be a short man. Are not straight and curved lines absolute opposites? It is perfectly allowable in mathematics to regard a straight line as a curve—as a circle, for instance, of infinite radius.⁵ Can the same person be both happy and unhappy? In the same sense and for the same identical causes, perhaps not. But ask a mother who wears a golden star whether she was happy or unhappy on Victory Day. She will probably answer that she was both! Are “like” and “unlike” logically contradictory terms? It is a familiar paradox that no two entities could possibly be compared which were not in some degree both like and unlike. It would probably be impossible to mention any two so-called opposite terms about which some such qualifications would not have to be recognized.

The more such points are raised, the more evident it becomes that without specific objectification in something actual and without definition of the predicates with reference to both the substantive and the context in which the terms are applied, these questions cannot be answered. When taken in complete abstraction from empirical particulars attributes lose the purchase that is necessary to offset or displace each other. The two predicates do not, in these circumstances, come to quarrel, because they have nothing to quarrel *about* or fight *over*. The only opposites that are inherently—in and of themselves—contradictory are the completely formal pairs “A” and “non-A,” in which

⁵ It is interesting that between straight and curved there may also be qualitatively intermediate terms. Consider (a) a line straight with reference to the three axes of our space but curved with reference to a coordinate axis in the fourth dimension; or (b) a line straight with regard to all given axes of space, but drawn in a space which is itself curved, etc.

"non-A" designates no assignable content of reality in this world or the next, but stands only for a denial which, as a psychological act, is the opposite of affirmation. In other words, the only case in which two predicates may be seen in an a-priori and purely logical sense to be contradictory is where there are really no two predicates at all, but only *one* which submits to the mental alternative of assertion or denial. All other cases are either obviously empirical—or beg the question.

Perhaps it goes without saying too that logic, even the logic of contradiction, must adjust itself somehow to the facts of individual or differential psychology. So long as there was "The Human Mind" which an organism either did or did not possess, so long as reason was a homogeneous principle like the Logos, the law of contradiction could be a simple, ultimate, and equally homogeneous principle of the structure of the mind. But the case is different when it is conceded that probably no two minds are alike either in content or in structure, when no two authorities can agree as to what an absolutely normal mind would be, and when it is presumptuous for anyone to claim that such a sample exists in real life at all. When, for example, one says that an "A-XY" is a contradiction in terms, that must be taken to mean: "Granting that consciousness as such has no immediate insight into the compatibility of real predicates, I am still convinced that, since facts must strike your mind approximately as they do mine, you, if you had before you the evidence that I can present, would be unable to believe in the existence of an 'A' that was both 'X' and 'Y.'" And not only does this raise Mill's ques-

tion as to whether contradiction is a fact of content or attitude, but one is also bound to acknowledge that however much evidence may seem to warrant the regarding of these ideas as incompatible, it is always abstractly *possible* for a mass of new evidence to come to light that would quite harmonize them. Even then, one would be absolutely certain that another mind would draw the same conclusion only if it were antecedently known that the subjective dispositions and objective content of the other mind were identical with one's own. While, in other words, it might be possible to state a law of contradiction in abstraction from personal variations, it would be entirely impossible to apply it, to depend upon it with confidence, without taking them into account.

Mr. Bradley's treatment of the law of noncontradiction comes as a surprise after his highly abstract interpretation of the law of identity. Having stated the latter as an ideal of logical immutability which few judgments aspire to and none achieve (and which is therefore never, as such, exemplified in experience), the principle of noncontradiction is declared to be purely an empirical matter. "There is no logical principle which will tell us what qualities are really disparate."⁶ "In the nature of things (this is what it all comes to) there are certain elements which either cannot be conjoined at all, or cannot be conjoined in some special way; and the nature of things must be respected by logic."⁷ This statement of the thoroughly empirical and objective character of the relation of logical contradictoriness is especially valuable as com-

⁶ *Principles of Logic*, p. 136.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

ing from the present monarch of philosophical absolutism.

Once more, at the risk of irrelevance, we may notice the peculiar relation of this account to Mr. Bradley's other views. "If we wish to show that this axiom is merely the other side of the Law of Identity, we may state it thus, 'Truth is unchangeable, and, as disparate assertions alter one another, they cannot be true.'"⁸ But, as he has developed them, the two halves of this statement are not coordinate either in quality or in origin. The first is an ideal set up quite antecedent to and independent of the deliverances of experience; the noncontradiction half of it rests entirely upon the relationships found in experience. In other words, the law of identity involves no need of reading experience content-wise; the second is meaningless without such reading. Certainly, to say that two contradictory assertions cannot both be true does seem, if taken by itself, to be as *a priori* as the Bradleyan concept of identity. The disillusionment comes when it is discovered that, apart from the profound impossibility of the simultaneous assertion and denial of an identical predicate, the only conceivable way of determining whether two assertions *are* contradictory is to find out beforehand whether they can both be true! No such induction as that could be said to be logically antecedent to the law of identity as he stated it. Accepting, then, his statement of the principle of noncontradiction, it is sufficient to have pointed out that it is anything but the simple reverse of his lofty formulation of the principle of identity.

In view of Mr. Bradley's well-known Criterion of

⁸ *Principles of Logic*, p. 137.

Reality, it is not surprising that he distinguishes two kinds of logical disparity—the concrete disparity which does, and the dialectical disparity which does not, cancel the possibility of the thing to which the opposing predicates are attributed. If this distinction depended upon the mere assertion that one is taken from the realm of daily life and the other from the charmed field of metaphysics where ordinary laws break down (and no remark is better calculated to lead to disorderly conduct in a philosophical discussion)—if that alone were the distinction, the dialectical method would, indeed, be saved at the expense of its self-respect. But our attention is called to the fact that, while concretely there are opposites that never are conjoined and apparently cannot be (and to respect which is the principle of noncontradiction itself), the dialectical method in metaphysics builds upon disparities that not only may be, but always *are*, conjoined in the same reality.⁹ In the one case you may choose between A and B, but never may have both. In the other case you not only must acknowledge both A and B while recognizing their disparity, but you find upon reflection that the A taken alone resolves into A₁ and B₁, the A₁ into A₂ and B₂, and so on infinitely. For instance, when one tries to understand the objective reality of terms and relations, the terms themselves turn out to be made up of terms in relation, and the relations also to be nests of related terms. Such a case differs from ordinary logical opposition in that the disparate terms not only oppose but *also* imply each other.

Our concern here is not, of course, with the reality

⁹ *Principles of Logic*, pp. 137-142.

of the dialectical contradictions nor with the question as to whether they finally are reconciled with the law of noncontradiction. We are dealing with the concrete opposites which, under that second law, do exclude each other. And since the distinction just referred to does involve a fundamental difference in the two types of disparity, the empirical concreteness of the ordinary rule of noncontradiction may be taken as adequately protected in theory. And that is the sole apology for mentioning the subject. It would at least be plausible to claim that Mr. Bradley's construction of dialectical contradictories in the *Principles of Logic*, and his solution of their mystery by a kind of transcendental empiricism, unquestionably does take at least one of the props from the support of the Absolute. But that point would be clearly irrelevant.

One of the most interesting historical discussions of the question of contradiction was the controversy on this subject between Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill. The former had set it down that the most ultimate proof of the truth of a proposition was the inconceivability of its opposite. To which Mill replied that, since most of the fundamental scientific doctrines of modern times had at some time or other in the past seemed preposterous and inconceivable, it was fair to suppose that our present inconceivables might some day similarly be regarded as true. Among such inconceivables Spencer had explicitly mentioned the inconceivableness of the *invalidity* of the syllogism or (what comes to the same thing) of the simultaneous validity of contradictory statements. In insisting that inconceivableness does not prove a statement false,

Mill was taking the same position that he had taken as against Whewell and Sir William Hamilton; and this position roughly was as follows:

1. Axioms are generalizations from experience. It is because we have had every reason for believing the axiom that the denial of it seems inconceivable (that is, incredible) to us. But "I maintain," he says, "that uniformity of past experience is very far from being universally a criterion of truth. But, secondly, inconceivableness is still farther from being a test, even of that test."¹⁰

2. When he speaks of contradictories, he refers to the propositions regularly so regarded in formal logic. "An affirmative assertion and its negative are not two independent assertions, connected with each other only as mutually incompatible. The negative proposition asserts nothing but the falsity of the affirmative." That these cannot both be true he considers to be, "like other axioms, one of our first and most familiar generalizations from experience. The original foundation of it I take to be, that belief and disbelief are two different mental states, excluding one another."¹¹

These last two paragraphs, with the exception of the last sentence in each, are entirely in harmony with all the foregoing. Even logical laws turn out to be simply our "most familiar generalizations from experience." It then becomes of interest to find out what he regards as, in the last analysis, the present status—perhaps one should say locus—of these laws, and what their sanction.

We have seen throughout that contradiction may

¹⁰ Mill's *Logic*, Eight Edition, book ii, chapter vii, p. 2.

¹¹ Book ii, chapter vii, p. 5.

be regarded in two ways—as the objective existence of incompatible predicates, or the formal sort of contradiction as found in the assertion and denial of the same predicate. These two meanings Mill very carefully distinguishes. But it is easier to make a distinction than to accord it scrupulous observance. When, for instance, it is said that the principle of noncontradiction is simply a very familiar generalization from experience, one gets the impression that it is the relation of objective incompatibles that is in question. This is even more evidently the case in a remark in the *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*. The latter had insisted upon applying the three laws rigorously to his field of inscrutable noumena. To which Mill replies: "Now, in respect to phenomenal attributes, no one denies the three 'Fundamental Laws' to be universally true. Since, then, they are laws of all phenomena, and since existence has to us no meaning but one which has relation to phenomena, we are quite safe in looking upon them as laws of existence. This is sufficient for those who hold the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge" (p. 418). It is hard to see how contradiction here could possibly be other than the objective relationship known as incompatibility. For, surely, the mental impossibility of believing both an assertion and its denial is not a fact to be discovered among objective phenomena as such. Define contradiction as Mr. Bradley did, and it becomes at once a law standing for a type of relationship among phenomena. But define it as Mill does, in the Aristotelian way, and it could at best be a "generalization from experience" only in the psychological sense that assertion

and denial of the same thing defy simultaneous belief.

If, in other words, contradictoriness be taken as merely affirmation and denial of the same thing ("mathematician" and "moralist," he says, are different but not contradictory; "man" and "horse" as applied to the same object *are* contradictory, "the one affirming and the other denying the extra number of legs"), what does it mean to say that they are "universally true of all phenomena"? Are the assertions and denials phenomena?—or factors in phenomena? If they are merely *of* phenomena, then phenomena are objective to them, and the law can be true of phenomena only if we translate belief and disbelief into existence and nonexistence. But that existence and nonexistence are not simple alternatives is evident from a whole cloud of witnesses. Think of the doctrine of degrees of reality as one finds it in Bradley, Taylor, Bosanquet, etc.; or of phenomenal and noumenal reality, in Kant or the views of Mill himself; or of the Neo-Realist distinction of existence, subsistence, etc. Mill would certainly not risk that translation. Yet without it one must assume either that credibility and incredibility are themselves phenomena, or that the laws in question belong to the mind and so are antecedent to, and not generalizations from, experience.

If the law of noncontradiction is to be taken in its Aristotelian sense, as simply forbidding the simultaneous prediction of "A" and "non-A," that law can be made a generalization from experience only by adopting the position of what Mill calls "the extreme nominalists," that we have simply found it linguisti-

cally possible to express the *same* thought in two ways—by direct assertion, or by denial of its contradictory. But he does not care for that view of the matter. Having recognized the laws as simply generalizations from experience, he is still haunted by the feeling that in some way they lie deeper in the mind than mere inductions would. “Whether the three so-called Fundamental Laws are laws of our thought by the native structure of the mind, or merely because we perceive them to be universally true of observed phenomena, I will not positively decide; but they are laws of our thoughts now and invincibly so.”¹² And the word “invincibly” was put there in deadly earnest. In response to Sir Wm. Hamilton’s observation that they are not necessities of the thinking act but instructions for right thinking, Mill replies: “It would not have been claiming too much for these three laws to have regarded them as laws in the more peremptory sense. Our author could hardly have meant that we are able to disbelieve that a thing is itself, or to believe that a thing is, and at the same time that it is not.” When one sees a contradiction “it is totally impossible for him to believe it.”¹³

It is evident in all this that the contradiction he discusses is by no means simply the content of an empirical generalization regarding incompatibles. It is the Aristotelian sort of thing instead. And since the latter confessedly deals only with the formal character of propositions as assertions and denials, it is obvious that the law of noncontradiction must either be assumed as ultimate or grounded upon other more

¹² *Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton’s Philosophy*, p. 418.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 407.

fundamental laws of *the mind itself*. It was to provide such a sanction that Spencer offered his criterion of conceivability. It is inconceivable that two contradictories should both be true; therefore the acceptance of the law of noncontradiction is a categorical necessity of the mind.

That, of course, depends upon the meaning of conceivable and inconceivable. The Abelian functions, for instance, are wholly "inconceivable" to me, not because I can detect any logical hiati in their development, but simply as snow is inconceivable to a Congo savage. Such inconceivability is certainly not in question. Neither could it be the simple psychological impossibility of holding the opposed ideas before the mind. In other words, it is not, so far as the mind is concerned, a mere passive noncoexistability. However inconceivable it may be that one plus one equals three (neglecting Professor James' rabbits), it is not at all impossible to hold the whole offending assertion before the mind and understand perfectly what it means. We not only do conceive—conceptually formulate—what in practice we decline as "inconceivable," but we *must* conceive and understand it in order to make our repudiation of it intellectually respectable. A man who declared inconceivable a proposition he did not clearly understand would be pretty generally discredited. Spencer, certainly, would despise an opponent who declared his views inconceivable without first showing that he understood, that is, had correctly conceived them.

All of which confirms the suspicion that "inconceivable" in its literal psychological sense is not exactly what is meant. It is not sheer obstruction of cognitive

process—a stalling of the machine. One has to do, not with a totally baffling and incomprehensible mental deadlock, but with the impossibility of *believing* contradictory statements together. Mill makes it perfectly plain that it was this meaning he had in mind in his well-known statement that inconceivability is no proof of impossibility. And this psychological fact, of the incompatibility of belief and disbelief in the same thing, is the ultimate ground he assigns to the formal law of noncontradiction in the traditional sense. “The original foundation of it I take to be that belief and disbelief are two different mental states, excluding one another.”¹⁴

That belief and disbelief are opposite and quite incompatible in reference to the same thing is indisputable. But it is not so plain in what sense this is any reply to the “extreme nominalists.” Surely, the order of events is not that we contemplate “S is P” and “S is not P,” find that the mind balks at believing both, and because of this difficulty regard them as contradictory. Rather it is because we know them to be contradictory that we are unable to believe them both. And the formal contradictoriness is recognized because we know enough about language to know that the second proposition is simply the cancellation of the first, and that in meaning it is an extension to infinity of the relationship of real mutual incompatibility that we find in objective experience. In that certainly is the fundamental truth in Mill’s original insight that the law of noncontradiction, like any other axiom, is in the last analysis a generalization from experience and not an a priori determinant of it.

¹⁴ *Logic*—Eighth Edition, book ii, chapter vii, p. 5.

It remains in this connection to deal with one or two questions that might naturally present themselves. In the first place, if even the fundamental laws of formal logic are empirical formulæ, one might be led to ask: "Has the mind, then, no laws of its own? No matter what your definition of it, it is certainly *something* and so must have a character of its own." To this there is the patent answer that, indeed, the whole science of psychology is devoted to a statement of that character. All that has been denied in the foregoing is that the mind furnishes any of the ground of *validity* of judgments—except, of course, when the mind is itself the subject matter of those judgments. The validity of thought must finally be grounded in the character of the things thought about; and when the intended object of a judgment is some fact or relationship of the objective order it would be very droll indeed were some inherent bias of the mind itself to lay down conditions of what should be acknowledged true. What is denied is not that the mind has a nature of its own but that it has a logical authority of a-priori censorship. In a similar way the structure and "laws" of the physiological apparatus determine what a man's handwriting shall be like, but not the *truth* of what he writes.

Yet another point demands attention. The claim that the laws of identity and noncontradiction refer primarily to types of relationship in the content of knowledge must not be identified with the interpretation put upon those laws by some of the neo-realists, in particular by Mr. Holt. Logical facts, from his point of view, are all objective entities of some kind or other, and that leads him to regard logical opposi-

tion as identical with the strain and tug and resistance of objective things in interaction. "The objective world does contain contradictions."¹⁵ "All collisions between bodies, all interference between energies, all processes of warming and cooling, of electrically charging and discharging, of starting and stopping, of combining and separating, are processes of which one undoes the other."¹⁶

There is certainly physical opposition enough in the world, counteraction as well as contradiction, and the physical opposition must be allowed for in our thinking. The only question is whether there does not exist also, and as a distinct type, the kind of opposition that Mr. Bradley calls disparity. To be specific: When a shell leaves a high-angled gun, it is perfectly allowable for Mr. Holt to say, if he chooses, that the force of gravity "contradicts" the upward inertia of the moving shell. The trouble is, however, that what he gives us is not an illustration or more extended application of the old term, but a completely altered meaning of it. The two statements (*a*) that the momentum of the explosion urges the shell upward, and (*b*) that the force of gravity urges it downward, describe and specify an actual opposition; but the two statements as such are not opposed to each other as are the really contradictory assertions (*a*) that the shell is moving upward, and (*b*) that it is moving downward. The first two are opposed, but not in disparity; they can both be true simultaneously. The second two cannot both be true of the same object, in the same sense, at the same time. If the word "con-

¹⁵ *Concept of Consciousness*, p. 273.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

tradiction" is used to name the first type of opposition, then some other word would have to be found to tag the second; in some way or other language would have to provide for so evident a difference. Certainly, the simpler course would be to accept the present usage, which does take care of the distinction.

If it be replied that all that Mr. Holt means is that in the case of logical contradiction the two propositions oppose each other exactly as two forces oppose each other in the material cosmos—as Fouillée might have pictured the competing energy of mental entities in his theory of "idée-force"—it would still be impossible to agree with him. In the first place, the opposition of contradictory propositions simply is *not* in principle similar to the opposition of forces. The resultant of two forces is never a destruction of either; on the contrary, each force realizes its total effect even though it act in conjunction with others which will undo what it individually does. The competing force, far from canceling, does not even diminish its competitor in the slightest degree. That, when forces act in conjunction, each realizes in the resultant precisely the effect that it would produce if acting alone is, indeed, the fundamental theorem of the science of kinetics. Such is certainly not the case with two competing, mutually exclusive propositions between which the thinking subject is obliged to choose. The final judgment in such a case is anything but a cognitive *resultant* in which each of the opposed judgments retains its full validity and, though overshadowed, realizes its complete effect. And, in the second place, even if this analogy did hold, it would hardly be of service to Mr. Holt because of the epistemological

dualism it suggests. For him there is no mental realm and mental facts separate from and in any sense duplicating the objective realm of fact. And when, with him, you have identified the knowledge content and the thing known, the fact comes back that in the field of objective knowledge there are the two clearly distinct types of relationship, which relationships must be separately defined and should be separately named.

It seems, therefore, that one may hold fairly enough to the essentially empirical origin and reference of the law of noncontradiction without grave risk of being committed to any so mechanically realistic a position as that presented in *The Concept of Consciousness*.

To sum up, then: The law of noncontradiction means one of two things; either that predicates that are found to be incompatible in reality shall on no account be attributed in thought to an identical subject, or that one shall not in thought both assert and deny the same predicate of the same subject at the same time. In the first case it is explicitly empirical and can censor present judgment only as, in all processes of apperception, the weighted generalizations of the past condition present knowing. In the second case we are doubtless dealing with a kind of necessity, but not the one from which could possibly be inferred anything regarding the structure of objective reality.

The traditional law of the excluded middle is omitted from this account, not because it is supposed to be any less important or less interesting than the other two, but because it does not seem to have any direct part in the major premise of the idealistic argument from epistemology. It is the force of that argument

(not the truth of its conclusion) that it is the purpose of this discussion to review. If it has been possible to show that these laws are not a fundamental bias in the mental structure which, if knowledge is to be vindicated, the outer world must be assumed to duplicate, but primarily inductive and inferential genera that, because of their pervasive presence, have come to seem transcendent in character, then it is obviously impossible to argue from their necessity to a parallelism in structure between the mind and the world it knows. This is not to say that there might be valid thinking without respect of them. No doubt they dominate in the processes of knowledge acquisition. But they command and compel us by the only force that thinking knows—the coercion of fact.

It remains to notice a little further the question regarding the postulate of knowledge. A postulate may be taken to differ from an ordinary assumption in the pressure, practical or theoretical, that is back of it. It differs from axioms in the ordinary sense in that such sanction is not a corollary of any a-priori or immediate insight into its truth. Mr. Russell has pointed out that some of the axioms of mathematics are so very abstract as to lose the sense of immediate certitude ordinarily attaching to axioms. They are known to be true only because they are presuppositions of other simple propositions that are immediately seen to be true. But even these more ulterior axioms would be distinguishable from a postulate like the postulate of knowledge in that still the necessity of the axiom is, mediately or immediately, the unanswerableness of direct intellectual insight, while a

postulate may arise from a practical or ethical necessity. The postulate, in other words, is an assumption in the sense that it represents in some way an aggressive act of the mind. But that act is not at heart a free and arbitrary one; it is the outcome of some kind of pressure, either practical or theoretical. Whether such usage is universal or not, the word "postulate" will be used in that sense in what follows.

The "knowledge" that is both the starting point and the final problem of epistemology is quite unanimously distinguished from subjective imagination or the mere having of states. It is not simply a series of interesting events in the knower's head, but a real connecting link between the mind and the world with which it deals. This difference between cognitive states as mental events and the same states in their capacity as cognitive is said to make the difference in subject matter between the psychology of knowledge and the science of epistemology.

But suppose the outcome of the study of cognitive states should be the conclusion that knowledge is impossible? Suppose that, having set out as Kant did to inquire how knowledge is possible, one should find oneself obliged to "destroy knowledge" and be content with the unobstructed belief for which that catastrophe had made room?

Kant saw his way out of the difficulty he had set forth in the irresistibility of the moral postulate. Having found the starry heavens above him so much a creation of the mind itself, he could save himself from solipsism by an appeal to the moral law within. That was absolute, while the other was relative, and thus he was enabled to reach again to an outer world

from which he had seemed to be barred by the subjectivity of the categories. Duty and responsibility could bridge the chasm between the self and ultimate Reality and serve as a warrant and sanction of the faith for which his intellectual agnosticism had cleared the way. In other words, the categorical imperative made unnecessary any fundamental assumption of the possibility of knowledge as a starting point for metaphysics.

But the course of thought during the last century has set this alternative in many a strange light. In contrast with the familiar Hegelian epistemological absolutism only a few, like Professor Andrew Seth, have preferred to build their absolutism on the moral postulate (thus following Kant). "We must conclude that the end which we recognize as alone worthy of attainment is also the end of existence as such."¹⁷ As Hegel had identified thought and being, this identifies being with morality. But a very important departure was made by Professor Huxley in his humanistic representation of morality. Objective nature, he reminds us, knows no moral ends; it treats alike the just and the unjust, and seems content with the ruthless decision of tooth and claw. In man only does justice, fairness, mercy, altruism, or personal obligation count. Man's morality, in other words, is his own proud construction; it is at once an achievement of his history and a differentium of his species. Morality is not what binds us to nature, but, rather, it is what distinguishes us from it. Where Kant had insisted that the understanding makes nature, Huxley replies that the active self creates its moral world; as

¹⁷ *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 32.

Kant, to escape solipsism, had relied upon the objective validity of moral obligation, Huxley depended upon the objective validity of knowledge in order to set forth his doctrine of the mind's activity in the constitution of the moral law. This theory, which is such a complete reversal of that of Kant, has not only found easy acceptance in the rapidly widening anthropological view of life, but has found genuine spiritual interpretation. One has only to think, in this connection, of the hardy idealism of Professor Eucken or the austere beauty of Mr. Russell's *The Free Man's Worship*.

At any rate, the moral issue has turned out to be a precarious device for the ontological objectification of conscious life. It may be a pathway to Reality, but few now care to risk it as the *only* pathway. And that brings us back to the original epistemological problem: Is it necessary to make, as the basal philosophical premise, the assumption that knowledge is possible?

That question cannot be answered until one knows precisely what such an assumption calls for. Obviously, it is not to be a guarantee of all cognitive processes, else it would be contradicted by the first case of error. And, on the other hand, it can hardly be taken to authenticate any specific classes or groups of judgments or perceptions without becoming either a complete *petitio* (if it be taken to refer only to those judgments that are known on other grounds to be valid) or else a merely empirical conclusion in particular cases (in which, if it be a general epistemological postulate, it would again also have assumed itself). Since it carries within itself, as a postulate, no determining limitations of context or occasion, one seems

driven by it either to claim an utterly untenable infallibility of judgment, or else to be lost in an uncertain and indefinite application to specific cases.

To this it may be replied:

(1) That all that the postulate asserts is the *possibility*—not the actuality—of knowledge. Naturally enough, it may be said, an assumption of the actual validity of knowledge would label every real judgment as true; but to orient the mind comfortably in its world it is only necessary to assume that reality is such that knowledge is possible. That is a conceivable point of view. But the question of validity is not to be so easily sidetracked. Unless the knowledge that is possible is valid knowledge, it would be no better than the noncognitive states of imagination from which, as a matter of primary definition, it had been distinguished. It remains, then, the assumption that valid knowledge is possible. This, again, either applies to knowledge in general, or it is a statistical or specific deduction from particular cases known, without the prior aid of the postulate, to be valid instances.

Or (2) may it be understood to mean a kind of commensurability of the mind and reality, a relation of "rapport," that is implied alike by truth or by error? Are we to say, in other words, that Thought (A) and Thing (B) are already in epistemological relation with each other when A is *mistaken* about B? Some such position as this seems to be implied in the treatment of the assumption by Professor Royce and, in another way, by Professor Ladd. Certain it is that the relation even of error between Thought and Thing is different in some sense from no relation at all. But this does not prove error to be a real relation between the mind

and reality. Indeed, Professor Royce comes to the conclusion that error contributes to the epistemological enterprise only in so far as the fact of error can be shown to involve a basis of truth. A judgment is not true or false in general or in and of itself. It can be true or false only concerning some ideally designated object or other, and for it to be false in that necessarily teleological sense it must assume *in particular* the validity (not the epistemological possibility) of the reference by which its object is identified. And this, so far as any general prior assumption of the possibility of valid knowledge is concerned, is no better off than any other specific act of cognition; it implies the possibility of validity in general only in so far as it is known, on other grounds, to be valid itself.

Suppose, again, that the postulate be read in extension. Does the possibility of knowledge mean that *everything* is ultimately knowable? This has probably never been explicitly claimed, at least not without heavy emphasis upon the distinction of finite and infinite intelligence. And it is with the finite that we have to deal. It is quite logically possible to claim that everything is knowable even to a finite mind though, as finite, it could not know all things. All sugar is edible, though no one subject can eat it all. Might not everything, therefore, be knowable? Of course it might be. If such a premise were found implicit in our cognitive nature, there would be no a-priori objection to making the assumption. But, except perhaps in the case of a few like Parmenides or Hegel who dare to equate thought and being, the postulate, considered as an epistemological necessity, is not generally extended so far.

On the other hand, it is hard to see, if it be regarded as an epistemological necessity, how any limiting line is to be drawn. If the limitation were in the facts themselves, we could never know it any more than we could know a limit of space. Just as, in the latter case, we would be thinking back to a region (a space) in which there was no space, so in this case we would assume to know of strata in reality that could not be known. This would mean (1) that there were things so at parallax with our minds that our judgments could be neither correct nor mistaken concerning them, or else (2) merely that they were so constructed that our thought about them could not be valid concerning them. And either is obviously set aside by the familiar consideration that to know such a limit is already to transcend it.

But it is doubtful if, in any case, a limitation merely in the facts themselves would suffice. There is no possibility, in the last analysis, of relieving the postulate of the responsibility. If the dividing line between the knowable and the unknowable were primarily an objective one, the postulate would surely have to make some provision for the recognition of it; and if the limitation were inherent in the nature of the mind which establishes the postulate itself, surely the latter would be inadequate to its task if it did not embody such an organic circumscription of its own function. But in either case one is faced by the difficulty mentioned in the preceding paragraph—the difficulty of stating valid limits of the range of validity.

Apart, however, from the question of the content of the postulate, there remains the further question of the circumstance or occasion of its being made.

For a postulate means some kind of act that must have, in some sense, a locus and a context. Here also more than one alternative suggests itself.

(1) It obviously is not made consciously at the beginning either of our knowing life or of specific processes of knowledge in isolation.

(2) But is it subconsciously assumed? It would be possible to hold that some such event occurs subconsciously before cognition proceeds. The chief reason for not adopting this alternative is the apparent entire absence of any reason for adopting it.

Or (3) it might be assumed when knowledge became reflective or self-conscious. But history would seem to be against such a view. The problem of knowledge itself was reflectively raised long before anybody found such a postulate necessary. In fact, it can hardly be said to have been stated as a clear-cut alternative before Descartes. While it may turn out that the ultimate philosophy will regard such an explicit assumption as necessary for a valid theory of knowledge, it is at least true that thought was fruitfully reflective in its concept of knowledge long before the necessity of this prior assumption was declared.

From another angle one may remind us (4) that the postulate, while perhaps debatable in academic discussions, is nevertheless assumed by everybody as the rational justification of practical life. But here once more is the old ambiguity. If this is to say that the assumption *is* made in practice, it would seem to be palpably false in the vast majority of cases. The individual is rare who prefaces his participation in practical affairs with an acknowledgment of the possibility of knowledge! If it be claimed only that any

cognitive being *would* see the necessity of it *if* the question were raised, one has only to point to the differences of opinion on the part of those who *have* reflectively raised the issue.

Or (5) it may be said that, while such an assumption is not always made as a premise even of epistemological speculation, it *should* be, since it is logically implicit in the data of that science. As, in mathematics, everything can be proved except the ultimate axioms which have to be assumed as a starting point and just on that account cannot themselves be proved, so epistemology has to start *with* or *from* something assumed on trust. To which it may be replied that even in mathematics there is so much question as to the content of this axiomatic terminus a quo that any mathematician is under considerable obligation to justify his choice of axioms, even though it be granted that none of them can be demonstrated from prior mathematical premises. He must show that they are necessary for the coherence of his science as well as being antecedently unprovable. And, even granting for the sake of argument the parallel between these axioms and the epistemological postulate, it has been the purpose of the foregoing to show that the latter would not stand, in its own field, before a demand for justification which even a mathematical proposition, set up as a mathematical axiom, has to face.

After so unwarrantably long a discussion of the postulate of the possibility of knowledge, the positive opinion that underlay it need occupy little space. *If* the situation were just as Descartes pictured it—*if* the mind knew first itself, then its intermedia of knowledge, and finally, indirectly and by inference,

the world outside itself, a postulate of the possibility of knowledge would be an a-priori necessity, perhaps, as a step in the process. The logical continuity of the transition would be broken without it. But nothing would be harder to prove than that such is the case. That the knowledge of self is a relatively late attainment of thought and is, even now, a subject on which there is the greatest imaginable divergence of opinion, should be sufficient certainly to cast some doubt upon the Cartesian premises. Besides, the argument cuts both ways. If it is necessary to assume the possibility of knowing the world outside the mind, it is equally necessary to postulate the validity of the distinction between the mind and its world, the possibility of knowing the mind itself, and even perhaps to assume the possibility of making valid postulates! In a sense any function doubtless assumes its own possibility; walking assumes the possibility of walking, or a man's effort to write poetry assumes (however precariously) his ability to do so. But it is hard to think of such an assumption as either profound or valuable.

There is one other point to notice in this connection. The assumption of knowledge is not the same thing as assuming a bridge, a cognitive rapport, between the knowing mind and the balance of reality, the world outside the mind. Because, the knowing mind itself is an object of its own cognitive states. If the very continuity of Being between the mind and the rest of the universe consisted in a cognitive interaction only, not only would some familiar conclusions follow very easily but many other unfamiliar ones would also follow if the matter were pressed. Two considerations would seem, however, to discourage such a view. In

the first place, if the being of consciousness consisted fundamentally in its cognitive function, one would have to go to the length of accounting for other kinds of subjective states as the products of cognition (which would be difficult) or leave a complete existential disparity between cognitive and noncognitive elements of the same consciousness. In the second place, sensation as the elemental fact of cognition not only is not primarily an act on the part of the subject but has a being and even a character quite distinguishable from and in addition to its cognitive value. In the third place, some ideas may purport to be true about certain other ideas that belong or have belonged to the same consciousness; and when they become reflective in this sense the relationship between ideas and ideas is exactly the same, in so far as it is noetic (in virtue, that is, of its sheer abstract capacity of being true or false) as the relationship between ideas and objective things. A theory of the way in which the idea reaches or relates to its object is therefore anything but a theory of the basal concatenation of subject and object. It may assume it, or be a factor in it, or may even in the last analysis throw much collateral light upon it; but it is not identical with the fact of such concatenation.

Finally, let one consider what is essentially the same thing from another point of view. Suppose one grant the whole sequence: "I know myself directly. The outer world I know only in the form of thought. Assuming, then, that my knowledge is real and valid, the outer world must itself be cast in thought forms," etc. It is obvious that the conclusion follows just in so far as my effective commerce with the outer world *is* a matter of thought. But that may be no more

than a small fraction of the actual nexus. The whole body of affective processes and emotions, the overt functions of volition with all its deep-lying instinctive foundations, the dim and unknown recesses of the subconscious life, all this is left untouched by the metaphysical inference based upon the postulate of knowledge. The parallelism, if it holds even in the most elaborate way within the province of cognitive subject and object, still concerns but a fraction of consciousness. If, then, all the above-mentioned remainder be without parallel in objective existence, and if there be a similar proportion of reality to which cognition accordingly does not apply, it might well act as a millstone about the neck of the most validly inferred idealistic veneer of logical intelligibility. In no case, therefore, could the argument in question authenticate a complete idealistic conclusion. Even if all the traditional or Cartesian premises be granted, one could at best only say that the neotic function in the conscious self seems, on the basis of the enigmatical postulate of the possibility of valid knowledge, to imply a corresponding factor or element of logicality in objective reality. And this would still be compatible with a preponderating balance in a nonidealistic direction.

It is not the interest of the above discussion to support any such positive nonidealistic conclusion, but only to point out that while (1) the argument from the possibility of knowledge is itself ambiguous and of uncertain value, it still (2) does not, even if accepted as valid in its own field, assimilate to personality or consciousness any more of outer reality than logical cognition proportionately occupies in the living mass of consciousness itself.

IX

DEMOCRATIZING THEOLOGY

HERBERT ALDEN YOUTZ

It is the fashion to-day to decry every ministry to life that is not "practical." Our very philosophies follow the fashions and deal often in superficialities and utilities. Yet every earnest man has a deep spiritual experience which refutes these superficial estimates of life. Ideas, convictions, spiritual insights are the ultimate sources of life—men do not live by bread alone. The mistaken Gospel of Wages must be replaced by a Gospel of Manhood which shall sympathetically diagnose anew the heart-breaking symptoms of human need that find expression in the current social upheaval. Religion is the greatest and oldest social power in the world. Religious hunger cannot be satisfied by cheap substitutes for a Living God. Neither can it be quieted by scientific assurance that "religion is an emotion." All hunger is an emotion—but starvation is none the less a fact. Is there a Living God? Who is He? Where is He? How shall I find Him? These questions are insistent. These questions can be answered and religious hunger can be satisfied. Human life and human society can be fed, energized, from above—from within! The great social ill is spiritual anemia. The remedy is radical, and calls for an expert physician. The quack remedies applied to the symptoms must be replaced by attacking the spiritual sources of human ills. The practical

ministries which we are all so eager to offer must profoundly understand the spiritual nature of personality and its need. The genius of Jesus lay in this discovery. The power of Jesus' Gospel lies in speaking "with authority" to men's deepest consciousness. We shall escape the threatening materialism of to-day only by a deeper diagnosis and by heroic remedies. The discussion which follows undertakes such a diagnosis, and is addressed to thoughtful leaders of the Church everywhere. Especially does it long to bring a vision of the need of the world to young men and women, and a vision of the opportunity for ministry to need, that faces educated religious leadership. It aims to sound a note sometimes lacking in our discussions of "religious education."

Religion, like all of the spiritual possessions of the race, grows by vital processes. Theology, the rational interpretation of religion, is likewise subject to the laws of growth. A vital theology is never a manufactured thing. It germinates and grows and bears fruit in the soil and climate and under the thought-culture of a particular age or people. What will an age of dawning democracy contribute to the shaping of Christian theology? That is the problem of this discussion.

The leadership of men passes by slow processes from the primitive stage of the tyranny of the strong, through feudalism and constitutional monarchy, to the ideals of democracy and freedom. Democracy is that native, irresistible force planted in the heart of a race, by which with growing insight it throws off, one by one, the petty tyrannies of life, and achieves ideals of freedom and autonomy.

Democracy is not first of all an organized form of government; it is a spirit, an attitude toward life. Modern science has thrown off the tyranny of ecclesiastical control and achieved freedom, democracy. Modern industry is seething with revolt against tyrannical control, trying to achieve democratic freedom. The nations are in revolt against artificial tyrannies, trying to find the form of government where the people can exercise self-control, in the interests of their higher destiny. The democratic meaning of the momentous world happenings since 1914 is that the yeast of democracy has not waited for the slow processes of evolution, but has burst forth in earthquake and volcano. The task of spiritual leadership is to control this mighty force and educate this passion for freedom which so strongly marks all social movements of our day. And the history of religious interpretation reflects tardily, but surely, the awakening spirit of democracy, feeling its way cautiously, but passionately, out of the old despotisms and feudalisms of thought, into the larger freedom of the spirit. And what can contribute more to the processes of civilization than the spiritualizing, the democratizing, the freeing of our religious thinking, and thus putting it at the service of the New Age that is dawning? Christian theology was once rated as "queen of all the sciences." It has fallen from its pedestal into the dust. But theology will come back to its place of power when it shows itself trustworthy.

The democratizing of religion is one of the significant processes that is taking place just now at an unprecedented rate. This democratizing comes not with observation; but it is coming silently and inevit-

ably. The very conception of religion, our interpretation of spiritual processes, and even our way of conceiving the living God and his relationship to our world, is undergoing a radical transformation.

Sometimes a minister will yield to the temptation to re-preach sermons from his barrel, and has the curious, indignant experience of discovering that these sermons have become innocuous. He preaches the thing that he wrote about Christ ten years ago, and he has a sense of unreality and untruth. He preaches the thing that holy men taught him about God, and he knows that he is not dealing with the living God, but with a theological God. Our Christologies and our doctrines of God are being democratized. The church has inherited some magnificent systems of theology, cherished through the generations as "The Faith of our Fathers." And a good many of us are making the disconcerting discovery that these splendid ideas which once stirred the people have become denatured and powerless to affect the people. They do not ring true to our modern democratic ideals!

There is a superficial way in which a man may democratize his theology by going over it and substituting for the monarch God a democratized divine ruler; substituting a republic of God for a kingdom of God. This is necessarily an artificial thing to do, however suggestive. Theologies grow by vital processes, and it is only by understanding the principles of growth that a man can intelligently and effectively set himself to the task of reconstruction for a democratic age. The living theology of to-day must root in our age and grow in our thought climate and receive the most intelligent cultivation. This paper deals

with some of the tyrannies that beset theological thinkers, and some of the consequences of emancipating theology from these tyrannies. We cannot get at the root of the matter by discussing devices or patched-up doctrines, but only by discussing thought-movements, certain shaping principles of our thinking which find expression in our theologies.

That was a fine insight of Sabatier when he said, "To the thinking man a discord between methods is a graver matter than an opposition between doctrines." The matter of democratizing theology is not a matter of superficial or popular modernizing of old doctrines; it is a matter of re-thinking the truth about God and spiritual reality—a matter of right or wrong intellectual method. It is not a matter of popular juggling with evolution and socialistic doctrines, bringing forth a finite god while the crowd gapes—after the manner of H. G. Wells; but it goes back to the thought-currents themselves, and tries profoundly to understand and test conceptions and thought-movements, that it may determine their truth and their value for religion.

I will speak of three tyrannies that the democratic spirit in theology must overthrow: The Tyranny of Orthodoxy, The Tyranny of Mechanism, and the Tyranny of Externalism.

I

By the Tyranny of Orthodoxy, I mean not any particular orthodoxy, but the mental habit of thinking religion in terms of fixed standards, and not of living truth! The principle of operating with an orthodoxy in our religious thinking, as though that were a mark of spirituality, is the evil I want to arraign. It has

come to be one of the most despiritualizing things that haunt our theological world. The spirit of democracy in the heart of many preachers is trying to throw off the tyranny of orthodoxy, and be free to think things through with all the help that comes from the present as well as the past. For if the consciousness of a Living God is to come to the New Age, we must have a living theology.

Let me illustrate the present tyranny of orthodoxy by reference to church history. A half century ago the church was in a turmoil over the doctrine of creation. The orthodox doctrine held that the divine creation occupied six days. Geology taught that world-making occupied millenniums. The situation was tense in the warfare between science and theology. Harmonizations of science with orthodoxy multiplied. The most successful "harmonization" was that which held that though geology had won the case, still there were six periods of creation, "creative days"; and thus orthodoxy was saved! It brought relief to multitudes of pious people; and there are churchmen still who curse evolution and worship the six-day theory. Surely the logic of this sort of thing has had its day, though it has not yet ceased to be. The principle of measuring spiritual truth and religious interpretations by canons and infallible rules of faith still persists.

In every field of Christian doctrine the tyranny of an orthodoxy haunts us, with evil results. Our Christologies, our conceptions of salvation, our conceptions of God, of sin, of prayer, of the power of the Spirit of God in human life, are all hampered and hindered by a thought-method, a sacred thought-standard, an orthodoxy beyond which a man may not venture and

be regarded as safe! Now I have little respect for reckless adventure in thinking; but I believe that the spiritual regeneration that must come to the Church of Christ in the New Age will come not through men who play safe and repeat the slogans of the past, but to the men and women who in the spirit of holy adventure wrestle with the meanings of the Spirit of God in our modern world and modern social movements, and "go forward" in their thinking.

Every really great creative age has dealt with the perennial problems of religion anew, and found inspired conceptions of God, inspired conceptions of God's meanings in its own life. Like Jesus, it has fulfilled the old and passed into the new way of thinking. Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time that Luther and Calvin and Grotius and Wesley and Hodge and Park and Finney¹ are the orthodox guides of faith; but I say unto you that the Spirit of the living God, of the great holy Christ, can come in power to our generation only as we realize that our own thinking is God's way to the hearts of the people. That sense of responsibility, that sense of prophecy—that experimental method of finding God and his meanings—how sadly we preachers need it! Theology must follow Jesus' method of growth and living inspiration, not the scribal method of holy standards. Creativeness rather than conformity must be the law of our thinking.

We have looked backward to a God of the Past, to "sacred history," to sacred thought-guides. All ortho-

¹ This address was given from the Oberlin pulpit where the great evangelist, Finney, used to speak as pastor, and where his name is still revered.

doxies do that. We have said, "God's revelation is in the past." And as a consequence our own age has seemed secular, and our own thinking we have distrusted, and our own prophets we have stoned, and we have given the people a second-hand account of God out of the world that used to be, instead of a vision of God living in our own thought and life and work!

Can an "orthodoxy" guide an aroused preacher of righteousness to his place of power as a religious leader? Are we not stewards of the thought of the past? Do faithful stewards keep the shining coin of thought wrapped in a napkin or do they invest it?

The church has tacitly assumed in the past that true piety and spiritual insight is the possession of the conservatives, and that liberals are under suspicion because they are liberal. We have applauded the "defenders of the faith," and we have unsparingly condemned the enlargers of the faith. We have endured the liberal spirit, but we have not welcomed it. Surely the time has come to insist that illiberalism and conservatism are immoral and unspiritual in a world of progress; they are contrary to God's way of working. The vision of God must come to the people of the New Age through the liberal, forward-looking, forward-moving thinkers. In the name of the rising passion for spiritual reality and a spiritual message for the people, I urge upon the church the intellectual duty of a progressive interpretation of ethical religion. For the great days of religion lie ahead of us, not behind us! And the achieving of the theology of the future must be our inspiration; not the defense of the theologies of the past. For divine revelation is a living process, never discontinued. God's meanings are grow-

ing meanings; and growing men and women must seize these newer revelations for the blessing of the world.

II

By the Tyranny of Mechanism I mean the widespread tendency in our thinking to treat the experiences of consciousness as though a man were simply a resultant and not an actor. The ideals of natural science, mechanism, force, cause and effect, have overspread our thought of the personal world until in some cases they have flouted and defeated the convictions of freedom and responsible action and of creative idealism. The outcome of this type of thinking is materialism and naturalism. The trail of mechanical thinking lies over our religious explanations, leaving the conviction of determinism, materialism, atheism, in its wake.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the conviction of freedom is of the highest service to the welfare of the race. No dynamic inspiration so affects the spirit of a man as the belief that he is free and responsible. And the paralysis of that vital belief cripples a man's powers of recovery and attainment. The virtual fatalism of much so-called Christian philosophy strikes at the very beating heart of all spiritual conviction, emasculating and stultifying our creative efforts. A man lives and works best under the spell of the conviction, "I am not a machine nor a slave, but a free man!"

It would not be profitable to show in technical detail here the history of the rise of modern Naturalism, getting its clew from natural science method, and insisting that the law of things shall be the law of a

man. It is a subtle process creeping into our thinking, but it is very real and cannot be met by popular magazine philosophy. Naturalism is the thought-method which sees the spiritual merely as a continuation of the scheme of the natural. It is the insistence that the spiritual shall have no significance save the secondary significance shed from the natural. It says, truly, "That is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural"; and then it passes to the inference, "therefore the natural must be authoritative for the spiritual," the law of things must be valid for personality. We accept the scientific, evolutionary description; the natural comes first. We challenge that false philosophic inference; for the spiritual, the higher, creative, personal facts—now that they have arrived—are authoritative over the natural order and over a man's whole life. A man as a man has a right to his ideals of freedom, and has the capacity to achieve freedom, whatever his pedigree has been. The Indian philosopher gazes at a point in space until he loses his very sense of existence. And the modern naturalistic philosopher fixes his eyes on his animal pedigree, the animal instincts that preceded reason, until he is persuaded that instinct and animal impulse are the great reality; while creative reason and the ideals of freedom are illusions and mockery. Which is the dream and which is the reality? Is this fundamentally a world of mechanism, or is it fundamentally a world of personality and purpose? The answer to that question is fateful for religion.

The religious philosophy which conquers the world must resolve that uncertainty and re-evaluate Moral Personality as a creative power, re-evaluate the ideals

of conscience, re-estimate the greatness of consciousness as freedom and will. No interpretation of the meaning of the tragic world-war seems so adequate as that which sees it as the modern epic-contest between the ideals of moral personality and the ideals of force and materialism and mechanical power and world-mastery. The cause of the War was the arrogant challenge of Force. The victory was the victory of personality and its spiritual ideals, over Force. Thank God for the victory! The thing that was really demonstrated was that the spirit of man is mightier than mechanism! Even Field Marshal Foch, the organizer of military victory, says, "Battles are lost or won, not materially, but morally." Morale, the power of spiritual personality, was the big fact in the Great War. It is the big fact in the universe.

Now in almost all fields of our thinking, that very battle is being fought out. The ideals of mechanism and naturalism are militant in current thinking, striving to assert their supremacy. And nowhere more than in the fields of psychology and of education is the significant contest going on. To quote the language of a prominent educator and psychologist,² "We have been in some doubt in the past as to whether society is based on instincts or ideas. We have talked about our institutions as intelligent, but studied them as if they were mechanical. Our whole treatment of human life has been biological rather than psychological. I believe that the period of biologizing human life is over." The same writer protests that those "who bear the name of psychologists are arrayed on

² Professor Judd's Presidential Address before the American Psychological Association, December 30, 1909. Published in the *Psychological Review*, March, 1910, vol. xvii, p. 97.

the side of physiologists and biologists"; and he declares that "we are on the eve of a newer psychology" which shall deal fairly with living personality.

I have cited Professor Judd's article in the *Psychological Review* that you may not feel that my earnestness is that of theological interest, and that I have no rational justification. Mechanism and its ideals are seeking to get a strangle-hold upon our thinking in all fields. It is tyrannizing over the ideals of much popular literature and leavening the thought of the masses with materialism.³

The democratizing of theology calls for emancipation from this tyranny. For the ideals of religion, her conceptions, her message, her goal, her challenge, depend upon a conception of personality as living, creative power; a conception of conscious agency, and not of blind "cause and effect." One cannot breathe in the atmosphere of Jesus' teaching, with its utter confidence in a heavenly Father, and its confident assertion of human values, without feeling a greatness of spiritual import which refutes the travesty of a mechanical explanation. And we who labor at the task of theology in the democratic spirit want the intellectual right to think of a living God in living relations with men and women who are great enough to respond freely to his call—free to accept, free to reject his love. That is the only thing that makes love and work great! We want the right to teach workers that they are "workers together with God," not cogs in a machine. That gospel is needed more than all else. I do not think that any other gospel is

³ A remarkable and valuable analysis of the present thought situation is Professor Stuart P. Sherman's "On Contemporary Literature."

true enough and stirring enough to solve the great crying "labor question."

And with this re-evaluation of personality as free and creative, our Christologies will drop the unrealities of the older formulations, and present Christ as the Way and the Truth and the Life for our age, which more than any previous age pants for life and reality in its religion. Christ as supreme moral Personality is the world's supreme Saviour. Christianity can come to its own only as it transcends the realm of mechanical explanation and scientific method, and trusts the interpretations of the world as purpose and meaning and infinite worth. The living ideals of religion and ethics, as well as the ideals of science, must find satisfaction in our view of the cosmic life. Cause and effect are no more cosmic facts than conscience and creative will.

Surely some of the crucial experiences of the War, the agony of our intellectual questionings, must bring a renewed conviction of the emptiness of a mechanical universe, and of the truth of a universe which is life and warmth and sympathy and purpose and love! No little God can heal a broken-hearted world. It is a rational faith that demands, though it but dimly understands, a living God in control of life who is himself Sympathy and Self-Sacrifice and Present Help, sharing our suffering and our work of reconstruction. This world is a living world of a good God, not the dead, meaningless thing that mechanism affirms. The pitiless ideals of machinery and force are not our guides to the great redemptive truths; but the pitying, unconquered Christ and his Cross. The cosmic meaning of these things is that we have a Christlike, cross-

bearing God; and this is therefore a world where Christlikeness and cross-bearing always pay, in spite of appearances. The profound meaning of preaching a living Christ as a Saviour is just this: that the living, Christlike God is a Saviour! When the church utterly believes that, we shall witness a regeneration of religion as power. For no truth is mightier to bless life than belief in a living God.

III

I have spoken of Orthodoxy and of Mechanism as enemies of the spiritual interpretation of life. My third point is that Externalism must be overthrown in the democratizing process. The essentially spiritual is an inward movement, an inward act, an inward achievement. Great religion moves fundamentally from within, outward; not from without, inward.

It will be apparent that my three points are but three angles of approach to the same plea, namely, that personality is a form of power that works best when it can manage its problems in the insight of creative freedom; when the creative will is seen as an energy that lays hold of the cosmic sources of life, personal and social. The cosmic contacts are within the hearts of men, in the heights and depths of their moral experiences, not in the external mechanism of the outer, visible world. Prayer is a living moral act by which a man lays hold of the environing energy and knows God as Moral Help. The well of living water has its source within us!

To an age that is learning so well the lessons of the scientific control of life, this gospel of the spiritual control of life seems like an outgrown superstition, a

fairy-story of our childhood. For we must acknowledge and give unstinted praise to the mastery of life that has come through scientific invention. It has helped us to throw off the superstitions and the slaveries of the past. And the New Age that is opening promises to bring undreamt-of modes of scientific ministry and power for the blessing of our human world.

But there is a deadly peril to the soul in this unparalleled progress in scientific achievement, if it confuses and stampedes the Christian Church from its ancient, original conviction that the kingdom of God must come to the world *through the souls of men*, and not from without. The only salvation against the peril of the scientific control of life is that the church shall keep alive its original message, that is, the spiritual control of life. The finest achievements of human invention serve the ends of diabolism quite as effectively as the ends of ethical spiritualism. Science as such is neutral on that point. Scholarship can Germanize the world or it can Christianize it. Germany outranked the world in many lines of scientific control, and she deserves credit for it. But she lost the mastery that has to be achieved from within, and a world-catastrophe has resulted. What doth it profit a man or a nation if it gain scientific control of the whole world, and lose the spiritual control of its own soul? If the soul has not learned moral mastery, self-mastery, it will run amuck, a world-wrecking force!

Externalism is the form of thinking in many fields which does not acknowledge the inner source of control and value in personal life. When a labor leader recently wrote, "Altruism is unscientific," he was

speaking the language of externalism, denying the worth of self-sacrifice and love. When we put our trust in economic and political programs as the supreme way to manage men and women, that is externalism. When we frankly talk of wages and short hours as the chief labor problems, that is externalism. When we say anything which forgets that men and women are not things, but offspring of the Almighty, that is externalism. When we treat society as though redemption could come from without, without transforming the very souls of people, that is externalism. The inwardness of the spiritual control that redeems and saves society is the characteristic insight of Jesus, the characteristic note of great Christianity. When a preacher forgets this and tries simply to get Jesus behind his own social program, he has lost Jesus' distinctive message.

It may be put in this way. There is a great contest going on in the church to-day between Christianity conceived as a *method* of practical service, and Christianity conceived as a *message*, a spiritual philosophy of life. The ministers are aligning themselves on the issue. There are those who lead with a passion for better methods. Reorganized work and institutionalized work are the fruit of this leadership. It is a sign of awakening with a promise of a better future for the church. It speaks much of efficiency, the efficiency of improved methods.

Then there are the ministers who feel that men and women need new motives, new meanings, new incentives, comfort, sympathy, help, and companionship. They feel that nothing challenges and arouses and heals like an evangel of divine meaning and love

and inward transformation. Such leadership tries to keep the vision of a living God before the eyes of the people, a heavenly Father who wants to awaken a childlike spirit in men. It lays much stress upon preaching a gospel to arouse and sustain the spirits of men.

On the whole our churches are tending to become institutional or social centers rather than places for prayer and worship. Our ministers feel a strong call to become business managers or popular exponents of industrial unions rather than prophetic guides of the inner life. We put great stress upon the practical, the concrete, the visible, in our religious thinking. We are possessed or obsessed by the idea of administering to life from the outside and controlling it from the outside. The Young Men's Christian Association came home from a great ministry to the needs of our boys in uniform. Their practical service was inestimable. The effect has been to raise a somewhat confused issue as to whether the religion of the future will be a matter of purely practical service. We are told that numbers of pastors returned to resign their pastorates in order to become Y. M. C. A. workers. Certainly a good many Christian ministers returned from war service with a feeling of impatience for the slow-working processes of moral education and spiritual ministry; they feel called to large tasks of "organization" and "administration." They have felt the pulse of the big movement in the world's life and they have made a wrong diagnosis. They have lost something of Jesus' vision of the fundamental greatness of the leaven method of saving souls, and are impatient to save "society," not by the laws

of moral health, but by applying some "social" or "civic" or "economic" or "political" remedy. Surely there is peril to the soul of the world in this widespread ethical confusion!

All of the symptoms seem to point to a cleavage between the two ideals of Christian ministry. And I am not sure but the greatest problem before the church in the immediate future is the problem that lies behind these symptoms. What is practical Christianity?

Shall the church of the future be a regenerating church with a message, or shall it be an organizing church with its emphasis upon efficient methods? Is it a gospel that human life most needs, or is it better methods and organization and laws? Shall the future church work with a spiritual passion or a practical passion—when we see the problem in the right proportion, what kind of minister shall we need? It is true that the minister who is not alert to the best methods is lacking in efficiency, but it is equally true that excessive emphasis upon practical methods often conceals spiritual deadness. Here is the fatal weakness of much religious education and pedagogical psychology. The best methods we must have; but a message great enough to arouse and inspire and motivate and sustain men seems to me a prime condition of religious awakening. A Method or a Message—which is the greater need?

The most practical appeal in the world, after all, is the call to serve a great Cause; to live and die for a great Meaning; to march with unconscious heroism to the music that a conquering host makes advancing together toward the goal of victory. The world has

never heard a greater recruiting, fighting, conquering call to humanity than the challenge of the kingdom of God as a cause that puts heroism into every task and every cause. Shall the church to-day not learn the lesson of the Call of a Cause which has aroused Canada and America to heroism and sent our boys out to make the supreme sacrifice? Is a *method* the supreme need of the church—or a great dramatic cause to enlist our supreme loyalties?

The great menace that hangs over the world to-day, with its Peace Terms, its League of Nations, its Bolshevism, and its rising Socialism, is that we should come to feel that organization and laws and a reconstructed world contain the power of redemption! These things are all external; they are all elaborate methods and programs, with machinery to enforce their observance; they are in danger of concealing or denying the fact that spiritual salvation must first come through men as a transforming experience, and not to men as a New Social Order. We must socialize the souls of men before we can reconstruct society. We must make men brotherly, as well as organize brotherhoods. It is that inner dynamism, that free thing in men's hearts which must be morally educated to accept the new order in the spirit of willing cooperation, of glad self-sacrifice, of "unscientific" altruism, which alone will make economic and international programs and peace methods workable as redemptive agencies.

This will seem obvious or childish to some readers. It seems to me the fateful point in our social philosophies to-day. Programs, better laws, a new social order, we must have. Bless the men and women who

are working away at these problems! But all of this social reconstruction, as such, believes that when the perfect order is outlined, the remedy for human ills is at hand. It believes that human nature will respond automatically to its better environment. It says that "we can't save the souls of men when their stomachs are empty." And it seems to assume that an emaciated soul can be nourished by bread and beef. So much social enthusiasm has such a superficial estimate of a man—it forgets that we must save the souls of men if we would save men for society!

When a great factory is built and fully equipped with the most modern machinery, the problem of production is not solved. The matter of power and the matter of men must be solved before the machinery has any significance. Thus the externalism of all socialistic programs from single tax and abolition of property to the latest Bolshevism assumes that men can be manipulated like things; that cause and effect and environment and wages exhaust the ways in which men can be managed. And I am trying to say that the human spirit cannot be managed from the outside; it must be spiritually educated to manage itself from within; it must learn the greatness of following idealistic programs, not because it must, but because it will! It is the will and the affections that must be educated, not the intellect alone. Democracy must learn and teach the meaning of self-control to the point of unselfishness, the free subordination of its own to that of another, before externalism and socialism will work. In short, the task of regeneration must go hand in hand with the task of reorganization and administration.

The supreme peril before the church, and the supreme opportunity, lies right here. Shall we so democratize our thinking about religion, so throw off the tyrannies that beset us of rigid standards of thinking, of mechanism and externalism in our treatment of religion, that we can bring Jesus' living message to the people—namely, *the challenge to rise up and follow him, and go against the strong currents of life, and wrest a victory over the world in the form of Christly character, Christly service, and a new Christly order of society in which men shall follow Christ, not because he has the loaves and fishes, but because they love him and want to follow him?*



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