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STUDY OF ETHICS
A SYLLABUS

DEWEY

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Howard Scott Liddell
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THE STUDY OF ETHICS

A SYLLABUS

By JOHN DEWEY

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PREFATORY NOTE.

The edition of my *Outlines of Ethics* having been exhausted, I have prepared the following pages, primarily for the use and guidance of my own students. The demand for the former book seems, however, to justify the belief that, amid the prevalence of pathological and moralistic ethics, there is room for a theory which conceives of conduct as the normal and free living of life as it is. The present pages, it may be added, are in no sense a second edition of the previous book. On the contrary, they undertake a thorough psychological examination of the process of active experience, and a derivation from this analysis of the chief ethical types and crises—a task, so far as I know, not previously attempted.

ERRATA.—Page 91, for 'Chapter VI,' read 'Chapter VII.'

CONTENTS.

SYLLABUS—ETHICAL THEORY.

CHAPTER I.—NATURE OF ETHICAL THEORY.

Section I.—Subject-Matter of Ethics.

Subject-matter of ethical theory is judgment concerning the *value* of conduct. Three stages. (1) Practical encouragement and discouragement of certain acts. Reward and punishment primary forms of such judgments. Next stage, urging and restraint through speech. (See Plato, Protagoras, 325–26.) Third stage, reflective judgment as to reason for such acts.

Ethical theory is simply (1) a *systematic* judgment of value. The way is prepared for this through the fact that primitive judgments relate not to isolated acts, but to *habits* of action, and to the types of character which are disposed to induce those habits. Necessary spontaneous generalizations. Codes, customary and legislative.

Demand for more systematic generalization arises when, through an extension of the area of life, former habits begin to conflict with each other. Illustrated by Athenian life; by Roman; by modern since the Renascence. Ethical theory is thus (2) a *critical* judgment upon conduct. Not systematic in the sense that it simply catalogues previous judgments, but in the sense that it attempts to reconstruct them on the basis of a deeper principle. (See Sec. 2.)

It is a matter of indifference whether we say ethical theory attempts to systematize (in the above sense) *judgments* about the value of conduct, or attempts to systematize *conduct itself*. Every act (consciously performed) is a judgment of value: the act done is done because it is thought to be *worth while*, or valuable. Thus a man's real (as distinct from his nominal or

symbolic) theory of conduct can be told only from his acts. Conversely, every judgment about conduct is itself an act; it marks a practical and not simply a theoretical attitude. That is, it does not lie outside of the matter judged (conduct), but constitutes a part of its development; conduct is different after, and because of the judgment. Ill. in education, where the main point is not so much to get certain acts done, as to induce in the child certain ways of valuing acts, from which the performance of the specific deeds will naturally follow. That is, the best education aims to train *conscience*. Ethical theory is only a more conscious and more generalized phase of conduct. Analogy with place of theory in modern (*experimental*) science. A theory not a fixed or abstract truth, but a standpoint and method for some activity. It is in this (the activity as directed by theory) that the value of the theory comes out and is tested. (See Sec. 3.)

References: Definitions of ethics will be found in Murray, Introduction to Ethics, pp. 1–7; Porter, Elements of Moral Science, Introductory; Muirhead, Elements of Ethics, chs. 1 and 2; Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, Introduction; Bowne, Principles of Ethics, Introduction.

Section II.—Rise of Ethical Theory.

Origin of reflective morality was in Greece. Other ethical codes were either customary or else conceived to be absolute emanations from a divine will. The Greek was in the habit of discussing questions regarding ends and means of life. This strengthened by growth of democracy. Also by methods of education, which (in Athens) relied upon appeal to individual's own intelligence rather than upon conformity to fixed rule. (Davidson, Aristotle and Greek Education, pp. 11, 70, 86–87.) Development of commerce, and more general social intercourse among the Greeks, with growth of science and art, resulted in Sophist, who undertook to teach virtue and methods and aims of political influence; he also discussed the moral standard, some denying any moral criterion whatever, holding it possible

to prove arbitrarily an act either right or wrong; others holding the source of moral law to be the superior power of the ruler. Thus they raised the question whether moral distinctions exist in the nature of things, or simply by arbitrary enactment, or for convenience and expediency. While the Sophists themselves tended to answer the question in one of the two latter senses, the dramatists (Æschylus and Sophocles) had, amid the disintegration of the lower religious beliefs, attempted to maintain an eternal and intrinsic moral law and ideal. Socrates took the latter position, and attempted to uphold it by means of the weapons of the Sophists themselves, i. e., by inquiry and reflection. He attacked the ideas that morality is based upon the will of the stronger, that it rests upon custom, and that it is adequately expressed in the more or less haphazard and external conclusions of the poets and ordinary moral teachers of the times. (See Plato, Republic, Books 1–3.) He insisted that the only adequate and sure basis for morality is knowledge of the Good, i. e., true end of life, and ability to refer the value of particular acts and aims to this supreme end. He thus became the founder of conscious ethical theory.

See Sidgwick, History of Ethics, esp. ch. 2; Grant, Ethics of Aristotle, ch. 2; Paulsen, Ethik, bk. 1, ch. 1; Grote, History of Greece, chs. 57 and 58; Hegel, History of Philosophy (trans. by Haldane), vol. 1; Fairbanks, on Sophocle's Ethics, International Journal of Ethics, vol. 2, 77; and Butcher, Aspects of Greek Genius; Hellenica, essays by Myers and Abbott. Consult also histories of philosophy by Erdmann, Windelband, and Ueberweg, portions treating of Sophists and Socrates.

Section III.—Relation of Moral Theory to Practice.

As already said, ethical theory arises from practical needs, and is not simply a judgment about conduct, but a part of conduct, a practical fact. (See Aristotle, Ethics, Book I., chs. 2 and 3; ch. 6; Book X., ch. 9.) The inference sometimes

drawn from this is that ethics is not a science but an art. (For two strong statements of this view, see Mill, Logic, Book 6, ch. 12, and Martineau, Essays, vol. 2, pp. 6–9; strong statement of contrary view, see Bradley, Logic, pp. 247–249.) We have to ask, therefore, whether ethics is practical in value, because it is, or is not, a science. The former position will be taken.

1. Moral value not equivalent to preaching or *moralizing*. Truth has its own moral value, all the greater because not deflected to serve some immediate end of exhortation.

2. Current antithesis between science and art not tenable. Science does not *teach* us to know; it is the knowing; art does not *teach* us to do, it is the doing. Art of morality is practice of it, not rules laid down. Same of art of dyeing, of mensuration, etc. Rules give basis for mechanical routine, not for art. Art is based upon insight into truth, or relations involved.

3. Question whether word 'science' or word 'art' is to be applied to ethics is of very little account. But question is as to whether ethics is to be regarded as helpful to morals because of scientific insight into truth afforded, or because of its formulation of precepts for action. In the latter case, it "helps" the moral life, only by depriving it of its freedom. Ill. by physiology and hygiene. In former case, helps by freeing it: by making it more significant and effective—as knowledge of mechanics helps a bridge builder. Importance of distinction illustrated by moral value of teachings of Jesus: Did he lay down rules for life, or did he give insight into nature of life? That is, is "salvation" conformity to some scheme laid down, or is it the freeing of life reached through knowledge of its real nature and relations?

Summary. So far as agent needs rules, or fixed precepts, he does not perform his deeds from full personal preference, and hence is only imperfectly moral: so far as he understands and is personally interested in the acts demanded, he needs no rules. Hence the absurdity of defining ethical theory from the standpoint of rules. Casuistry. Difference between a

principle and a rule; former a *method* for action, latter a prescription for it; former experimental, latter fixed; former orders in sense of setting in order, latter in sense of commanding.

Practical value of moral theory is both destructive and constructive. Negative side always visible first. In ideal, destruction is only the reaction of the construction. So far as two are separated, reform becomes merely sentimental, or else mere fault finding.

On practical value of moral theory, see Muirhead, Elements, ch. 3; Lotze, Practical Philosophy, Introduction. Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 174–175. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 338–360; Hoeffding, Ethik, pp. 1–9; International Journal of Ethics, vol. I., No. 2, Art. by Dewey, on Moral Theory and Moral Practice; p. 335, by James on The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life (a very strong statement of the practical character of the moral judgment); vol. 4, p. 160, by Mackenzie, on Moral Science and Moral Life.

CHAPTER II.—THE FACTORS OF MORAL CONDUCT. THE AGENT AND HIS SPHERE OF ACTION.

SECTION IV.—CONDUCT AS REFERRED TO THE AGENT.

No act is a part of conduct except as it is a part of a system of plans (purposes) and interests. Theory arose (as already seen) when these plans and interests were reflected upon with a view to their unification. Thus (for all European peoples since Socrates) an act must express character if it is to have *moral* meaning; it must be considered as the outcome of some aim and interest on the part of a conscious agent. (Spencer, Data of Ethics, ch. I.)

The elements involved in such reference of an act to an agent are: 1. *Some knowledge of what he is about;* that is, some end in view in doing the act. 2. *Some interest in the act;* the act is chosen or preferred. The agent not only knows

what he is about as a reasoning automaton might, but the act appeals to him, has value for him.

3. The insight and the interest must be more than momentary—they must express some stability. *The act must proceed from a disposition, an established tendency, to act thus and so.*

This analysis was begun by Socrates and practically completed by Aristotle. See Xenophon, Memorabilia, III., ch. 9; Plato, Protagoras, esp. pp. 352–359; Apol. 25; and Aristotle, Ethics, Book II., ch. 4. See also Green, Prolegomena, pp. 268–72.

The contact of Greek thought with Semitic conceptions (particularly through Christianity) emphasized the necessary reference of conduct to the agent. It made holiness of will (character, dominating idea and interest) the ideal, rather than the performance of certain acts: (compare idea of justification by faith) and proclaimed the criterion of moral worth to be in the personal attitude, rather than in the particular act. (See, e. g., I. Corinthians, ch. 13.) In its extreme forms, this emphasis made the act almost indifferent; it was regarded as somehow "external," the ideal and attitude being all-sufficient *per se.*

The contact with the Germanic peoples, with their strong Romanticism, emphasized also the other factor in the analysis —namely the insistence upon the agent's own *interest* in his acts. It asserted the right of the individual to choose his own ends, and the worthlessness (the slavery) of all acts not performed because of this personal preference. In its extreme form, this spirit became the demand for unlimited personal enjoyment—not mere sensuous enjoyment, but the *right* of the individual to realize to the uttermost the emotional value of his own acts.

See Green, Works, Vol. III., p. 92; Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, Book II., ch. 9 (on the happiness of the shoe-black); Royce, Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 110–126. Seth (editor) Essays in Philosophic Criticism, Kilpatrick, on Pessimism and the religious Consciousness.

Section V.—Reference of Conduct to the Sphere of Action.

In analyzing conduct, it is just as important to consider the situation as the agent. While conduct proceeds from an agent, the agent himself act with reference to the conditions as they present themselves. Conditions (environment) constitute action in the following ways:

1. The agent is moulded through education, unconscious and conscious, into certain habits of thinking and feeling as well as acting. His act, therefore, partakes of the aims and disposition of his race and time. (See Grote, Plato, vol. I., p. 249, for a strong statement of this influence).

2. Our acts are controlled by the demands made upon us. These demands include not simply the express requirements of other persons, but the customary expectations of the family, social circle, trade or profession; the stimuli of surrounding objects, tools, books, &c.; the range and quality of opportunities afforded.

3. No idea, plan, wish whatever, can pass into action save through the forces of the environment. Unless, then, we mean to confine our definition of conduct entirely to inner states of consciousness, we must include the scene of action within the definition. But the situation does more than execute the plan; through its acceptance or rejection of it, partial or complete, it reacts into consciousness, and strengthens or modifies the plan. All existing ideals of all practical (i. e., non-sentimental) agents are the outcome of such a struggle for realization.

Historic.—At the outset of reflection, equal emphasis was put into the reference both to the agent and to the situation. Ethics, dealing with conduct in its individual reference, and politics, dealing with it in reference to the scene of action, were not separated. Plato, Republic, II. pp. 368–9, IV. pp. 427–445; Aristotle, Ethics, X., ch. 9; Politics, I., chs. 1 and 2; III., ch. 12. The term ethos meant the disposition or prevailing habit of the community (compare Lat. *mos*, *mores*), and it only grad-

ually shaded over into the idea of individual character. The exclusive reference of conduct to the individual came later, and was due, partly, to the influence of Christianity already referred to, and partly to the general disintegration of local customs and interests, consequent upon the growth of the Roman Empire. (See Renan, Hibbert Lectures, 1880.) The result was that the individual was thrown back into himself, the conditions of action seeming indifferent and even hostile to the realization of moral aims. Stoic, Epicurean, and Sceptic all agreed in setting up as their ideal the individual, self-sufficient to himself, independent of everything beyond himself—that is, everything beyond his own consciousness (Sedgwick, History of Ethics, pp. 70–73; Windelband, History of Philosophy, pp. 164–170). The identification of the highest ideal with a good capable of realization only through supernatural assistance, and, as to content, only in another world, led in the Middle Ages to considering the present conditions of action as indifferent or profane, the state as the realm of force, not moral aims; and there was a corresponding exclusion of objective factors from the theory of conduct. Since the Reformation, however, the tendency has been steadily the other way. It has culminated in the present generation through the development of the idea of evolution and of the historical method, on the scientific side; and through the growth of reforming and philanthropic interest on the practical side. The former have shown the immense part played by historic antecedents and by environment, physical and social, in shaping conduct. The latter has revealed that one of the chief obstacles to general and permanent moral reforms is unfavorable institutions and habits of living.

Herder, Philosophy of History Book IX., and Comte, Positive Philosophy Book VI., are important references in the historical development of the present point of view. For various ideas on the social nature of ethics, see Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, pp. 5–15, 81–96; Yale Review, vol. I., pp. 301 and 354, Hadley, Ethics as Political Science; Mind, vol. II.,

p. 453, Barratt, Ethics and Politics; vol. VIII., p. 222, Wallace, Ethics and Sociology; International Journal of Ethics, vol. III., p. 281, Mackenzie, Ethics and Economics; vol. IV., p. 133, Hibben, Ethics and Jurisprudence; Journal Speculative Philosophy, vol. XXII., p. 322, Patten, Economics and Morality. The necessity of including social conditions and relations in the idea of conduct is brought out, from different points of view, in Spencer, Data, ch. 8; Stephen, Science of Ethics, ch. 3; Green, Prolegomena, pp. 191–201; Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 148–156.

Sec. VI.—Twofold Formula for Conduct.

We may sum up the foregoing, on its practical side, by saying that in order to secure right conduct we find ourselves under the necessity of paying equal attention to the agent and to the conditions with reference to which he acts. No amount of external pressure or influence can secure right conduct of an agent, *except in so far as it ceases to be external;* except, that is, as it is taken up into the purpose and interests of the agent himself. But, on the other hand, there is no way to develop within the individual right plans, and to attach right values to ends, save as these plans reflect the *requirements of the situation* in which he finds himself.

A business situation gives an illustration. The agent, to be successful, must form his plans with reference to his conditions—state of raw material, transportation facilities, demand in market, and others competing to supply this demand. His purposes, so far as rightly formed, are *a synthesis or co-ordination of the prevailing conditions of his scene of action.* But this situation is not something hard and fixed, outside of the agent. What the situation is to him depends upon his own capacities—his resources, skill, etc. He himself is a part of the conditions to be taken into account. Inferior raw material will yield to an invention which enables him to get more out of it, remoteness from market to his ability to contrive new methods of transportation, &c. In other words, *the situation*

is nothing but the complete co-ordination of all his powers (abilities) and relations.

Thus it is with that larger success in conduct, termed morality. From the standpoint of the individual agent,

Conduct is the co-ordinating, or bringing to a unity of aim and interest, the different elements of a complex situation.

From the standpoint of the scene of action,

Conduct is co-ordinating, in an organized way, the concrete powers, the impulses and habits, of an individual agent.

(See Alexander, Moral Order, pp. 97–130.)

Sec. VII.—Moral Functions.

Conduct may be considered as the same *consciously* that a biological function is unconsciously. It is the nature of every function to include within itself both organ and environment. The act of respiration is a co-ordination of lungs as organ and air as environment. So digestion, locomotion, etc. We are apt at first to identify function with the organ alone, and conceive of environment as if it bore a more external relation to it. But the reference to environment is absolute and intrinsic. The organ is the point of initiation for the function, and is more permanent than any particular portion of the environment. It is thus of more *immediate* importance. But it is the environment, comprehended in the exercise of the function, that finally fixes the organ (as food builds up the organism), and thus, indirectly or *mediately*, the environment is of the most importance. (Compare the mutual dependence of "appreciation" and "retention." Psychology, p. 149.)

It is equally an error then to consider either organ or environment as fixed in itself. Function is not the exercise of a predetermined organ upon an external environment, nor is it the adjustment of an organ to a predetermined environment. The nature of the *function* determines both the organ and the environment. Two animals in whom the function of nutrition is differently performed have, in virtue of that fact, different environments as well as different organs. Spencer, (Biology,

Part I., ch. 4; Psychology, Part III.; Ethics, pp. 75–76) has defined life, mind, and conduct as adjustment of inner relations to outer; but the separation involved in calling one "inner" and the other "outer" marks the failure to recognize that function is not a parallelism between organ and environment, but includes and determines both.

Sec. VIII.—Ethical Postulate.

Interpreted in moral terms, the foregoing means that moral conduct cannot be adequately conceived as the property or performance of the agent alone. The agent corresponds to the organ biologically, and is thus, in itself, simply an instrument for exercising certain functions. Its structure, its aims, its interests, are controlled by the ends to be reached, and these ends include the *conditions* of action as well as the *instrument*. In other words, we cannot take the agent as final in defining conduct, because we demand a certain structure of the agent.

Conversely, we require that the conditions of action be modified so as to permit the exercise of functions, so as to become the means of the realization of ends. The exercise of function itself tends to this transformation of environment. (Illustrated by nutrition, by industry, by valor, etc.)

Defining conduct from the standpoint of the action, which includes both agent and his scene of action, we see that

The conduct required truly to express an agent is, at the same time, the conduct required to maintain the situation in which he is placed; while, conversely, the conduct that truly meets the situation is that which furthers the agent.

The word "truly" in this statement means with reference to the exercise of function.

This statement may be termed the *ethical postulate*. Its analogy with the scientific postulate—uniformity of nature, reign of law, etc. That is, we demand order in our experience. The only proof of its existence is in the results reached by making the demand. The postulate is verified by being acted upon. The proof is experimental.

The ethical postulate, in other words, expresses the fact that moral experience continually demands of every agent that he shape his plans and interests so that they meet the needs of the situation, while it also requires that, through the agent, the situation be so modified as to enable the agent to express himself freely.

See Dewey, Outlines of Ethical Theory, p. 131.

The discussion of conduct in relation to the agent constitutes *psychological* ethics: in relation to the conditions of action, *social* ethics. It must be borne in mind, however, that this distinction is one of point of view taken, not of material involved: the agent, that is, is a social fact as well as a psychical fact, and the conditions of action have a psychical as well as a social meaning.

It should also be borne in mind throughout the whole discussion that the aim is not to discover the ideal at which all conduct aims, nor the law which it should follow; the aim, once more, is not to find precepts or rules, but to analyze conduct. The question is concerning the nature of any ideal and the part which it plays in conduct; the conditions which must be met to entitle any fact to the name of law, etc.

PART II.—PSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS.

CHAPTER III.—A GENERAL ANALYSIS OF CONDUCT.

Section IX.—The Nature of Impulse.

All conduct is at first impulsive. It has no end *consciously* in view. The self is constantly performing certain acts more or less determined in results, but without distinct consciousness of their significance. The food impulse; following light with eyes; handling; reaching; locomotion; the talking impulse. All activity is impulsive so far as containing new elements—so far, that is, as it is not purely habitual. Impulse is not used as synonymous with instinct. The latter is a defined or limited impulse; the physical mechanism for the act is pretty definitely prearranged. In man, there are very few instincts pure and simple, but rather the loose beginnings and ends of very many instincts. Hence the range and variety of human, as compared with animal, actions. Hence also the impossibility of a systematic classification of fundamental impulses to action. (Such classifications were frequent in the older psychologies: see also Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, vol. II., pp. 120–256, esp. p. 246). While the acts which have proved themselves necessary in the previous life of the race have become so organized into the structure of the individual that they now assert themselves spontaneously as appetites and aversions, each of these is so modified by the experiences and circumstances of the agent that it is meaningless when separated. Such impulses as love of gain, love of fame, etc., are either pure abstractions, there being in the normal man no such thing as love of gain in general, (that is, unmodified by the make-up of his entire experience) or else they represent an

abstract classification of the various *ends* to which impulses may be directed.

Section X.—The Expression of Impulse and its Consequences.

The various impulses of the individual are not a loose bundle of tendencies existing side by side. Because they have been evolved in relation to the one more inclusive activity of maintaining life, they are interconnected. One impulse in its utterance tends to call up others, and this excitation or stimulation is not wholly dependent upon the circumstances of the moment, but follows (within widely variable limits) certain lines. Thus the movement of the eye in following light and of the hand in grasping an object tend to co ordinate, etc. The difference again between the lower animals and man is that in the former this co-ordination is predetermined quite specifically, while in man only the very general lines are laid down, thus leaving room for great variation and experimentation—implying possibility of new combinations, and thus the performance of new acts almost without limit. The acts, which to the animals are well defined ends, are, in the human structure, freed from their adjustment to predefined ends and made flexible instruments for a large number of different and much more complex ends. The *definite* co-ordination of acts is thus, with man, not a *datum* but a *problem*.

Each impulse in its expression tends to call up other impulses; and it brings *into consciousness* other experiences. A child puts forth, by natural impulse, his hand towards a bright color; his hand touches it and he gets new experiences —feelings of contact; these, in turn, are stimulus to a further act; he puts the thing in his mouth, and gets a taste, etc. In other words, *the expression of every impulse stimulates other experiences and these react into the original impulse and modify it This reaction of the induced experiences into the inducing impulse is the psychological basis of moral conduct.* In the animals, so far as we can judge, the stimulus and the response

seem to assume purely serial order, one impulse calling forth its appropriate act, this its proper sequence and so on. The latter acts or experiences do not return into the earlier; they are not referred or reflected back. The animal life is one of association, not of thought or reflection.

Section XI.—Will, or the Mediation of Impulse.

This back-reference of an experience to the impulse which induces it, we may term the *mediation* of impulse. If we suppose that the series of experiences used in the previous illustration give the experience of an orange, then the next time the same impulse of following light occurs it is modified by all the experiences in which it previously resulted. It is qualitatively different; the image or idea of the pleasant contacts and tastes is now a part of the impulse. A child follows a purely natural impulse in making more or less articulate sounds; these sounds, through the response which others make to them (a response as natural as the sequence of contacts upon the following of light with the eye) set up other experiences of the child, and these induced experiences mediate the original babbling impulses. He finds that, expressing one impulse, he gets attention when he falls down; by another, food when he is hungry, etc. It is not simply that these results *do* follow, but that the child becomes *conscious* that they follow; that is, the results are referred back to the original impulse and enter into its structure in consciousness. It is evident that these mediations, or conscious back-references, constitute the *meaning* of the impulse—they are its *significance*, its *import*. The impulse is *idealized*. The impulse mediated, that is given conscious value through the reference into it of the other experiences which will result from its expression, constitutes *volition* proper.

Section XII.—The Ethical Interpretation of this Process.

As the primary point to understand, in ethical psychology, is the return of induced experiences into the stimulating im-

pulse, so the fundamental fallacy to avoid is the *separation* of impulse and induced experiences. It is too common an error to think of the expression of the impulse as an independent act and of the induced experiences as simply certain external consequences which follow upon the act, but which have nothing intrinsically to do with it—which in themselves are indifferent to the act. (See Martineau, Types, vol. II., p. 24.) So we hear of the act *and* its consequences. In fact, the consequences, so far as they refer back, *are* the act as a moral or conscious (not simply physical) act. Differences of moral value (as we shall see later) depend simply upon the range and thoroughness of this mediation—the completeness with which the "consequences" of an act are returned into the structure of the natural impulse. We thus see again the mistake of the systems which attempt—like Martineau's—to build up ethical theory on the basis of separate natural impulses. Their moral value is in their interactions, not in themselves as independent. (Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, vol. I. of Works, pp. 49–55, brings out this truth very clearly; he uses, however, the term 'motive' to denote what I call natural impulse, while I shall use the term motive to designate the mediated impulse.)

The mediation of the impulse through the experiences it excites, may be comparatively organic or comparatively external. That is, some 'results' are almost entirely conditioned upon the relation of the impulse expressed to other organs of action—as satisfaction from food when hungry, burning hand from putting it in fire, etc., while others are due more to circumstances which accompany the act at the time, but which may be absent as a rule—as poison may be found in a food usually healthy. But this distinction is not rigid (that is, they are no 'results' absolutely internal and none absolutely external to the act) and does not afford a natural basis for separation of acts into those truly moral, and those morally indifferent. A large part of our moral discipline consists precisely in learning how to estimate probabilities—to distinguish

between relatively necessary and relatively accidental results and to mediate the impulse accordingly.

Psychologically, the mediation of impulse (a) *idealizes* the impulse, gives it its value, its significance or place in the whole system of action, and (b) *controls*, or directs it. The fundamental ethical categories result from this distinction. The worth of an impulse is, psychologically, the whole set of experiences which, presumably, (that is, upon the best judgment available) it will call into being. This, *ethically*, constitutes the *goodness* (or badness) of the impulse—the satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) which it carries. But the thought of the consequences which will follow, their conscious return back into the impulse, modify it—check it, increase it, alter it. The impulse to reach, otherwise immediately expressed, is arrested by the nascent consciousness of the pain of the burn, it is reinforced by the nascent consciousness of the satisfaction of food the impulse to see is profoundly modified by the response of other experiences when the child learns to read, etc. In this modification, through reaction of anticipated experiences, we have the basis of what, ethically, we term *obligation*—the necessity of modifying any particular expression of impulse by the whole system of which it is one part.

Thus we have, on one side, the moral categories of Satisfaction, Good (Summum bonum) Value, and, on the other, those of Duty, Law, Control, Standard, etc. Every concrete act, unites, of course, the two phases; in its complete character, as affording satisfaction and, at the same time, fulfilling its organic interactions, it is *right* and the agent which it expresses is *free*. Thus we have three main sets of ethical ideas; those centering, respectively, about (a) the *Value*, (b) the *Control*, (c) the *Freedom* of conduct.

CHAPTER IV.—THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

Section XIII.—The Subject of the Moral Judgment.

What is the subject, and what the predicate of the moral judgment? That is, to *what* do we attach the ideas of good,

bad, right, wrong, etc., and what is the *meaning* of these predicates when attached? We begin by asking what it is that has moral meaning; what conditions must be met in order that ethical notions may be applied to any experience? We may sum up what we have already learned as follows: only an act (and a conscious act) has moral significance; every conscious act, in its lowest terms, is a mediated impulse—"mediation" being the reference back to an impulse of the experiences which it is likely to occasion. In this process, as we have seen, the consequences of the impulse cease to be mere external results and come to form the *content* of the act.

We may recognize three degrees of completeness of this mediation. In the most complete reaction, the original or natural impulse is completely *transformed;* it no longer exists in its first condition; our impulse to locomotion, for example, is entirely made over when the reaction of other experiences into it is completed—when we learn to walk; the first babbling impulse is wholly transformed when we learn to talk, etc. This also means that the mediating experiences are completely *absorbed* into the initiating impulse; the two sides, the immediate and the mediate, no longer have any separate existence. This complete reaction we call *habit.* When the reaction is less organized into the impulse, and yet is closely connected with it, we have general lines or plans of action; the larger, more continuous and permanent expectations which form the framework, as it were, of our conduct—one's occupation, the daily round of acts which, without being fixed habits, yet form the limits within which one's other acts fall. And finally, we have the particular variable acts, where the experiences which express an impulse are so numerous and complex as to be uncertain. In this case, the "consequences" do not organically react of themselves, but we have to "think it over" and calculate as best we may the probable meaning of an act.

If acts all came under the first principle, we should be slaves of routine; if they all came under the last, our whole time would be taken up with minute and anxious reflection

and our deeds would have no effectiveness. As it is, habits are the tools which put at our immediate disposal the results of our former experiences, thus economizing force; our general plans hold us within certain limits and thus keep us from being at the mercy of caprice or the flux of circumstance; while the play of the relatively uncertain elements keeps our life from petrifying and forms an unceasing call to the exercise of the best forethought at command. "Probability is the guide of life." It is the tension between the habitual and the more variable factors that constitutes the significance of our conduct morally. Habits, second nature, give us consistency and force; the reflective element keeps us thoughtful. All of the tendencies to action, taken together, constitute "capacity"—the power of action, whether impulsive, or habitual, or reflective, which an agent has at disposal.

If the view so far presented be correct, we may assert that either *conduct* or *character* in the subject to which we attach moral predicates. The terms "character" and "conduct" do not refer to different subjects, but to slightly different aspects of the same subject. We say character when we are thinking of the mediated impulses as the source from which all particular acts issue. It does not refer to the bald unmediated impulses, nor does it refer to fixed unchangeable habits. It designates the *way* in which impulses (varying of course, in every person) are directed and controlled—that is, mediated. The impulses are still there, and just so far as, in their expression, they give rise to new experiences, character is modified. There is accordingly no force in the objection sometimes made, that to make character the subject to which the adjectives, good and bad, apply, does not allow freedom or the possibility of change. The reaction of the experiences, which the expression of character effects, is sufficient ground for change. Nor is there more force in the objection that to make character the subject of moral predication is to afford an excuse for acts which are bad on the ground of the "good" feeling or disposition from which they proceeded. Character

includes the style and nature of the *ends*, the *objects* by which the individual mediates his impulses, and thus affords sufficient basis for taking into account the objective results of acts. We cannot excuse, for example, an act of unregulated benevolence on the ground that it proceeds from a good heart or good feeling, when we judge on the basis of character, any more than when we judge on the basis of the results of the act. On the contrary we are only enabled the better to locate the defect; the person's character is such that he does not properly mediate his impulses; he is defective on the reflective side; or, again, the nature of the end which that character sets up—the following of the immediate impulse of the moment—is not such as to be an object of approval.

On the other hand, by conduct we do not mean a mere aggregate of particular acts. Conduct is the *expression* of the mediated impulses. Character, according to its definition (the way of mediating impulses), has no reality apart from the acts in which such impulses must sooner or later issue. It is because acts proceed from character that they are not a mere series of separate things, one after another, but form the organized whole: conduct. In a word, character is the unity, the spirit, the idea of conduct, while conduct is the reality, the realized or objective expression of character. The objection sometimes made to taking conduct as the subject of the moral judgment, that conduct is something outward and therefore indifferent, thus has no place. As character is a *way* of acting, conduct is the executed way.

We can now deal shortly with a pair of antitheses which are sometimes set up as the proper object of moral judgment, viz.: motive on one side, consequences on the other. Motive is only character in a given instance. Motive is never a bare natural impulse, but is impulse in the light of the consequences which may reasonably be supposed to result from acting upon it. A mere impulse to anger is not a motive, and in itself is neither good nor bad. It becomes good or bad according to the nature of the end to which it is attached. Conse-

quences, on the other hand, are no more a part of conduct than they are of character, save as they are foreseen; save, that is, as there is reason to believe that they will follow a given impulse. But, if there is such reason, the consequences become a part of the conditions which enter into the mediation of impulse—a part of character.

For theories denying the necessity of mediation by consequences see reference previously made to Martineau, and Kant, Theory of Ethics, (translated by Abbotts), p. 28, 44–46, 107–114, 123. For theories holding to consequences see Bentham, Principles of Morals, and Mill, Autobiography, pp. 49–50, and Utilitarianism, ch. II., (where, however, the doctrine refers not to the consequences alone, but to the exclusion of motive). For a criticism of Martineau, see Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Bk. III., ch. 12. For a discussion of the subject, Muirhead, Elements, pp. 55–62, Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, pp. 40–46, Alexander, Moral Order, pp. 36–46, Green, Prolegomena, Bk. IV., ch. 1.

Section XIV.—The Predicate of the Moral Judgment.

When shall we call the character, or conduct, good or bad? An impulse, it must be remembered, is a native or spontaneous way in which the self acts. The experiences which are referred back to the impulse are experiences which the self undergoes because of its own nature. The mediation of the impulse thus means a process of self-development. It is the process by which the self becomes aware of the meaning, in terms of its own experiences, of one of its own impulses. The impulse, by itself, or in isolation, is a partial or abstract expression of the self. The child who reaches for a light may want the light, but he does not want the burn which is none the less a part of himself, an organic portion of his experience, under the circumstances. So the child may want to talk, but he can hardly be said to want the introduction into new social relations, and into a world of science and literature, which the expression of that impulse brings about. And yet all this is involved in the original impulse. The expression of impulse

is thus a process of self-realization. The first meaning of an impulse of anger is simply blind reaction, but this reaction has consequences (relations to others, habits established, etc.), which are, from that time on, part of the impulse. This tendency to act without thought, to set up hostile relations to others, is now the meaning which the impulse has for the self. Or the blind reaction of anger is against some meanness; it serves to do away with that meanness and to brace the self. These relations differentiate the impulse and bring the self to consciousness in this direction. *The completest possible interaction of an impulse with all other experiences, or the completest possible relation of an impulse to the whole self constitutes the predicate, or moral value, of an act.* The predicate is, therefore, identical in kind with the subject.* That is, the subject, 'this act,' in the judgment 'this act is right,' is an act mediated by reference to the other experiences it occasions—its effect upon the self. The predicate 'is right' simply traces out such effects more completely, taking into account, so far as possible, the reaction into the future character of the self, and, in virtue of this reaction, judging the act.

The basis for discriminating between "right" and wrong in the judgment is found in the fact that some acts tend to narrow the self, to introduce friction into it, to weaken its power, and in various ways to *disintegrate* it, while other acts tend to expand, invigorate, harmonize, and in general organize the self. The angry act, for example, in the first case given, is bad, because it brings division, friction, weakness into the self; in the second case, "good," because it unifies the self and gives power.

The first effect of every mediation of an impulse is to check or arrest that impulse. Reflections means postponement; it is delayed action. Through this delay the impulse is brought into connection with other impulses, habits and experiences.

*This has important bearings upon the subject of the *criterion* as we shall see hereafter. Because the predicate and subject are identical in principle, both being the mediation of the impulse, the criterion always lies within, not without, the act. The criterion is nothing but the completest possible view of the act.

Now if a due balance is kept, the result is that the original impulse is harmonized with the self, and, when expressed, it realizes not only its own partial nature but that of the whole self; it becomes the organ through which the whole self finds outlet. The moral criterion for an act proceeding from anger or from benevolence is whether only a part of the self or the whole character moves outward in the act. The bad act is partial, the good organic. The good man "eats to live," that is, the satisfaction even of the appetite of hunger is functional to the whole self or life; if we say the man who "lives to eat" is bad, it is because he is sacrificing much of himself to one partial expression of himself.

We see again the impossibility of classifying the impulses into a hierarchy of higher and lower. When an act is right, there is no higher or lower as to the impulse from which it proceeds. The satisfaction of hunger in its place (that is, one which unifies the whole self) is as imperious in its rightness as the noblest act of heroism or the sublimest act of self-devotion.

The good man, in a word, is his whole self in each of his acts; the bad man is a partial (and hence a different) self in his conduct. He is not one person, for he has no unifying principle. (Compare the expressions "dissipated, gone to pieces, shaky, unstable, lacking in integrity, duplicity, devious, indirect, snaky," etc.)

This conception of the organic mediation of an impulse as equivalent to rightness may be expressed in other ways. Aristotle seems to have meant this by his principle of the "golden mean." (Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. II., chap. 6–9.) While he states it as an arithmetical mean, it is easy to translate what he says into the conception of an active balance in which due regard is had both to the immediate impulse and to the mediating consequences; e. g., courage as the mean between foolhardiness and cowardice, foolhardiness being undue preponderance of impulse, cowardice lack of proper assertion of impulse; moderation is the balance between extravagance (preponderance of immediate impulse) and miserliness (preponderance of reflection), and so on.

Alexander conveys the same idea by calling rightness a "moving equilibrium." (Moral Order and Progress, pp. 97–111.)

The same idea is also expressed in the conception of "self-realization," provided this is understood in the sense of expressing the concrete capacity of an individual agent, and not in the sense of filling in the blank scheme of some undefined, purely general self. (Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 178–207; Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, pp. 136–138, and Bradley, Ethical Studies, chap. 6, tend to use the idea in the latter sense. For further criticism see Philosophical Review, vol. II., p. 652, on Self-Realization as Moral Ideal.)

CHAPTER V.—MORAL APPROBATION, VALUE AND STANDARD.

Section XV.—Natural Good.

The satisfaction which any impulse affords in its expression may be termed its *natural* value. It is equivalent to what the economists term "value in use"—value which is directly enjoyed, but not measured. Such is the satisfaction which accompanies the fulfillment of the appetite of hunger or of thirst, in itself or apart from any consideration of its further bearings. But, as we have seen, the expression of an impulse is always referred back to it, and comes to constitute its meaning or the content of the act. Purely natural good is found therefore only in the original primitive satisfactions of early childhood: it is the state of animal innocence—the state of *knowing* neither good or evil, but simply enjoying suffering good or suffering evil as they come.

Section XVI.—Moral Good.

The mediation of the impulse evidently prevents the immediate satisfaction of the impulse, and thus replaces natural good by a good which is presented to consciousness. This satisfaction mediated in thought, that is, by reflection upon the nature of an impulse in its relation to the self (or the whole system of impulses) is moral satisfaction or *moral value*.

This process of reflection evidently sets up a standard or criterion for the value of the original impulse. It no longer has worth in itself but simply in its relation to the whole set of desirable experiences which it will occasion. And this means, of course, its tendency to further the other impulses in its interaction with them, or to express the self. It may be compared with the measured or defined value of the economists, the measurement here also being through interaction or relation (namely, exchange) creating a tension of various impulses against each other, which makes it necessary to estimate the relative importance of each.

The mediating process evidently has two sides; there are two standpoints from which it may be considered, and in terms of which it may be stated. As in the operation of exchange there is but one reality, one process, and yet that process will be differently described according as it is the buyer or seller who reports it, so in measurement of moral value, or the reference of an impulse to the whole experience of the self. The process of mediation or measurement is one, and yet our mode of stating it will be different according as we look at it from the standpoint of the inducing impulse or of the impulses and experiences induced. The process, as a whole, is one of adjustment, of balancing, of co-ordination. But if we identify ourselves in imagination with the impulse, we have first the checking of the impulse, and then, as dammed up, its gradual transformation and reinforcement—the condition of *desire* and its struggle for fulfillment. The impulse, being the thing which makes itself directly felt in consciousness, is taken to be reality: it is the present factor.

But as the other impulses stimulated (redintegrated) and their results begin to be present in consciousness, we may identify ourselves with them and tell the story from their side. As induced and derivative, not immediately present (present only as results of the original impulse), they are *ideas*; yet, as induced, their reflective character is not equivalent to unreality; they make themselves felt by *checking* the very impulse

which aroused them. In this aspect, they are the *law*, the controlling power of that impulse. They determine in what form, under what conditions of time, place and quality, if may be satisfied. Thus they determine or measure its value; they say to it: You are not what you are alone or in yourself, but your value is what it is in relation to us. In this aspect, the induced experiences (reason, for short) are the *standard* of measurement for the natural impulse.

But the experiences thus reflectively brought forward while they may transform the original impulse, they also reinforce it. They have their own impulsive quality, or urging for expression. Thus they constitute the *ideal*; what is desired; the *reflective* good. The gradual self-assertion of desire up to choice or preference, and the gradual formation of an ideal up to resolution or decision, are one and the same process of mediatiou of impulse described from the two standpoints, until they gradually merge in a complete unity—the overt act. The whole process is one of discovering and applying the criterion, a process of estimating value. In other words, it is a process of testing, of proving, until, in the act, there is approbation.

Section XVII.—Development of Volition from Side of Idea.

We begin with a consideration of the process by which the end becomes developed into an act. This end is at first intellectual—that is, it exists in thought only. It is a *proposed* end, not an actualized one. It is an aim, a plan, an intention, a purpose—all terms expressing its unrealized condition. In its own content it does not differ from any image which may come before the mind. Its relation to the impulse which calls it into being tends, however, to unite its destiny with that of the impulse, and thus confer upon it a practical value. Consider a person who has an artistic impulse—one towards painting. This impulse cannot find its immediate expression; it calls before the mind (by association or redintegration) images of all circumstances which are relevant to it—which seem to be

involved in its execution. According to the strength (the insistence and persistence) of the original impulse, the ideas thus aroused will be mere fleeting fancies, vague schemes to be carried out if circumstances favor, or a defined (determined) project. In abnormal cases, hypnotism, "compulsory ideas," etc., we find that every idea suggested to the mind tends to execute itself, or that some idea becomes so dominant that there is no co-ordination between it and others and hence no control. These abnormal cases reveal the normal principle, covered up by complexity of ordinary life—the connection of every idea with an impulse. In childhood we see precisely the same thing, save that here the idea is hardly distinguished in consciousness from the impulse. Attention reveals the same principle in its normal and matured form. Attention is an idea or set of ideas so completely bound up with an impulse that they demand realization. The sole difference from the abnormal "compulsory idea" is that in attention the induced ideas are *organically* connected with the impulse. That is to say, the distinguishing trait of attention is that it arouses the *whole* set of ideas which are relevant to the impulse, and *only* those, other ideas as they arise dying out because of their indifference to the realization of the impulse, while all relevant suggestions are maintained.

The full development of an ideal, an end, is, then, the same thing on the ethical side that we term reflective attention on the psychological side—just as the direct satisfaction of an impulse is equivalent to non-voluntary, or direct, attention. (See Dewey, Psychology, pp. 121–129, on natural and acquired value; James, Psy., vol. I., pp. 416–124, on passive and voluntary attention.) Interest is, by general confession, bound up with attention; we may, therefore, expect to find a similar close connection between ideal and interest in the process of volition.

In the discussion of this development, it is convenient to consider separately two phases which are always, as matters of fact, found together. One of these is the formation of the

intellectual content, the end (what is aimed at, the rational structure of the plan); the other, the connection of this intellectual content with the impulse—the *interest* or practical value which attaches to the aim as thought. Before considering them separately, it must again be remarked that while the *content* of the plan is purely intellectual or rational (abstract, or objective to the self), the fact that it is found worth while to develop the plan (that attention remains fixed) shows that this rational content is not, for a moment, freed from its practical or dynamic value—its connection with impulse as the immediately acting self.

Section XVIII.—Development of Intention or the Rational Content.

An intention is what an agent *means* to do. It is thus the primary differentia of a volitional from a purely impulse act, showing that the impulsive is mediated. It constitutes *reflection*, or the control of the impulse by *reason*. The thought, or what one intends, may be a mere image which passes listlessly through the mind—as in the state of building castles in the air; it may be a vague undefined thought of something or other in general — a sentiment, what is sometimes termed "meaning well" or having "good intentions," and yet not meaning the particular *end* which alone is right. When ethically justifiable, it signifies giving attention to all the bearings which could be foreseen by an agent who had a proper interest in knowing what he is about.

So far, we have unduly simplified the account by ignoring the conflict of aims or the difficulty of coming to a conclusion in many cases. The natural satisfaction, that is, the thought of the course which the original impulse would take if left to itself, and the rational, or mediated, satisfaction contend in the mind. This is, as we shall see, the basis of the moral struggle, the conflict of desire and duty. Or, the various suggested *ends* do not harmonize; it is necessary either to bar out some, or else to discover a still more comprehensive aim in which the claims of the conflicting intentions shall be adjusted.

Thus we are brought to *deliberation*, the more conscious weighing and balancing of values—consideration. We are apt to describe this process as if it were a coldly intellectual one. As matter of fact, it is a process of tentative action; we "try on" one or other of the ends, imagining ourselves actually doing them, going, indeed, in this make-believe action just as far as we can without actually doing them. In fact, we often find ourselves carried over the line here; the hold which a given impulse gets upon us while we are "trying it on" passes into overt act without our having consciously intended it. Particularly is this the case so far as our character is immature; there is a temporary relapse into a "compulsory idea."

Decision, *resolution*, the definitely formed plan, is the proper outcome of consideration. This expresses the conclusion of the process of conflict among ends, and the emergence of a purpose which, whether through suppression or comprehension of other ends, now expresses the self. It is the completed self under the given circumstances. The appearance of an ideal in the mind and the final selection, or determination, are simply the beginning and the end of one and the same process—there is no thrusting in of an outside power, of will or attention. The process we are describing *is* the process of will or attention. This brings us expressly to a statement of the connection of the intention or aim with the self urging on to action—impulse.

Section XIX.—Development of Motive.

The reaction of the intended content into impulse renders the former itself an impulse; the original impulse, now enlarged, goes on to express itself. This identification of the aim with impulse is motive, the rational spring to action.

As attention cannot be separated from interest, the formation of a plan cannot be separated from the reaction of that plan into the self. Every end that occurs to the mind awakens a certain amount of interest, or has a *certain value* attached to it. It is this reaction, the extent to which the thought tends

to stir the self, to call it out, that measures the motive power of the thought. Abstractly we may distinguish between the conception of the end, which is rational or reflective, and the motive power of this end; actually, we cannot. Whether or not the conceived end remains in consciousness, *even as a conception*, expresses its value to the self. This identity of the evolution of the ideal, on the intellectual side, with the evolution of a determining motive power, on the emotional, *both being forms of self-expression*, is the key to an understanding of the ethics of motive. The ideal, or end, is the abstract, objective expression, of the self; the acting, or real, self temporarily checked as to its overt expression (immediate activity) but deepened and widened in its consciousness of what it is doing—in its appreciation of value. The motive is this abstract self completely related, having its value felt, and thus no longer merely objective but subjective as well, and hence passing into act. (See Dewey, Psy., pp. 15–23, and p. 347).

If we take the reaction of the content into the other impulses of the self, and consider it apart from the reason or purpose of the act, we get the conflict of *emotions*—the stress and strain of feelings, the play of hope and fear, of doubt and expectation, of suspense and adjustment, of tension and growing ease, which is the subjective counterpart of the objective conflict and resolution of ideals already spoken of. (See Dewey, Psychology, XII. The "formal feelings" there described are the consciousness of the *process* of mediation of impulse, apart from its content). One of these emotions is so important that it is often identified with volition itself; it therefore demands special attention. It is the consciousness of *effort*. Effort is the same process, stated in terms of emotion, that we call consideration, or reflection, when stated in terms of rational content. It is the feeling of the *division* of activity —a necessary accompaniment of the period of suspense within which the original activity is arrested, while the induced impulses which arrest have not yet gained sufficient force to determine the act. It is a period when the impulses are striv-

ing towards co-ordination and yet, not having reached it, are in tension against each other—temporarily oppose each other. Such temporary opposition is evidently necessary in order to secure a balance which will utilize each set to the full, or secure the maximum of energy. It is obvious that if the opposition of one set to the other is imperfect, one or the other will get the preponderance too soon. The result will be an undue suppression of the other set, loss of efficiency and ultimate friction. This conflict of impulses *which oppose each other in order to reinforce each other* is reported in consciousness as the feeling of effort, whose distinguishing trait is precisely a peculiar combination of feelings of power and impotence, of activity and resistance to activity.

SECTION XX.—NATURE OF EFFORT OR TENSION.

According to this statement, effort is simply the consciousness of the critical moment in the development of will; it is not to be identified with the putting forth of will itself. And yet effort is often considered to be will asserting its own power *against* some resistance outside of itself. What is the origin of this fallacy? What are its ethical consequences?

According to the theory given in the text, neither one or the other of the contending forces is to be identified by itself with will; each represents a normal and a necessary phase of will—the mediate and the immediate, the original and the induced, to repeat once more. Moreover their temporary separation and the resistance which one phase of the activity offers to the other is itself a factor of great positive importance in the evolution of a truly rational practical conclusion, or act. Now, if will proper is not this whole process, but is some one distinct power, some force standing outside the other factors, if therefore these other factors are resistance not *in* will, but *to* it, both our psychological statement, and our ethical theory must be radically changed.

It is not difficult to detect the source of the error. We necessarily tend, during the struggle, to identify ourselves especially with that phase of the process which is prominent in

consciousness, and to regard the other phase (although equally an expression of ourselves) as indifferent or even as hostile to ourselves. The more interesting, the more important, is, for the time being, the self; it absorbs consciousness. Then we fail to notice that the final act, the complete expression of self, is by no means this side alone, but is colored throughout, and is given value, by the other phase of the self. Take a poor person tempted to steal; suppose he has habits, of honesty. Here the self is identified with the thoughts of decency, of self-respect, of reputation, which arise and assert themselves against the direct impulse to take the loaf of bread. The mediating self is *the* self, and the impulse is a mere intruder, something outside the will, outside the self, and yet somehow coming in to tempt it. Yet the very fact that this impulse is presented as an end, that it becomes the *thought* of stealing, shows that that end also, so far as entertained, is self. And if the final determination is not to take the bread, this conclusion the completed self, has by no means the significance which the same conclusion (the same outwardly) would have when not the outcome of such a struggle; the self has not simply returned to its normal state after having got rid of an intruder. The impulse to steal has become an integral part of the final act—not, of course, in its own isolated state, but in its mediated relationship.*

And if the statement as thus formulated seems strange, stated in another way, namely, that the meeting and overcoming of temptation develops character, it seems a mere commonplace.

In other instances, the thought of the original, natural impulse will seem the real self, and the induced experiences the invading force; as, for example, when a man starts to fulfill a natural office of friendliness and then is checked by the

* The bearing of this upon the question of the relation of good and evil, and the possibility of an absorption of evil into good character, or vice-versa (*corruptio optimi, pessima*), will come up later.

thought of the unpopularity of the object as likely to affect him if he does the act. In this case, the very fact that these reasons have weight with the man, that the thought of the obloquy holds his mind, shows that that end expresses himself —in its measure. And yet, the man feels that his "true" self demands the negation of this temptation, and so this end is thought of as external, and the final conclusion (which in reality involves the co-operation of both partial selves) is taken as simply the victory of one over the other. So it may be as to the thing physically done, but in meaning, in its moral (or character) value, it involves both. The same apparent dualism is found in any exhibition of *attention*. In one aspect, the self as attending, the group of impulses and habits, which are endeavoring to assert themselves, seems to be the self, and the content attended to, the object, seems to be outside the self. Yet the fact that the content arouses such interest as to maintain the tendency to assimilate the attending "subject" and the "object" attended to, shows that the integrity of the self, its complete assertion, is neither side separately but the co-ordination of the two phases. Of this co-ordination, the very struggle, or tension, is an integral phase necessary in bringing out the full bearing, or importance of both factors. Every one would admit that we do not get adequate consciousness of the *object* of attention until attention has worked itself out; it is just as true that the impulses and habits which press forward to the object have *their* significance and value brought to consciousness at the same time.

The fact that sometimes *the* self seems to be inducing experience and sometimes the induced, shows the absurdity of setting up a *fixed* will or self. When the attraction is *towards* the conceived end, that seems to be self; when that end repels, upon the whole, so that the movement is towards reduction of its value, the self is located in the primary experience. A man's true self in temperance is in the induced experiences; in courage in the inducing, etc.

SECTION XXI.—THEORIES OF ABSTRACT IDEALS.

The ethical consequences of identifying will with a power which puts forth effort against or towards something outside of will flow from the interruption thus abruptly introduced into the moral process.

The existence of the ideal is rendered inexplicable. It is reduced (A) to a supernatural visitor from a world above that of ordinary experience. The very word "ideal" suggests to a sophisticated mind something which is remote and unattainable—outside of the natural course of life. If not defined as introduced into the mind from without by a divine power, it is thought of after the analogy of this concept. (See Martineau, Types, vol. II, pp. 73–74; 97–99; 217–218; and Study of Religion, vol. II, pp. 26–40, for assertions of the transcendent character of the ideal.)

(B) Recent moralists have seen the objections which attach to putting the origin and formation of the ideal outside of the self. Yet instead of showing the point, in the normal process of volition (the appearance of the induced experiences which mediate the original tendency to action) at which the distinction arises, they split the self into two selves and attribute the impulses and appetites to one, the actual urgent self, and the ideal to another self, a "higher" or "rational" or "spiritual" self in general.

(1) Kant presents one type of this view. According to him, there is a sensuous, "phenomenal" self, constituted by appetites and impulses; this furnishes the actual material for our volition. Besides this, there is a rational "noumenal" self, which sets up the ideal or goal of effort. (Theory of Ethics, trans. by Abbott, pp. 105–124; 144–147.)

(2) Green recognizes the objection to splitting the self so completely, and falls back on the notion of the moral ideal as meaning the end of the self as a whole, while natural satisfaction means the satisfaction of a particular impulse. This *might* be interpreted in a sense analogous with the theory I have previously advanced, but as matter of fact, Green makes

the whole self not the complete definition of the natural impulse, under the conditions, but something quite distinct from any possible development of the particular impulse as such. See Green, Prolegomena, pp. 160–162, 178–188, 202–204; Works, vol. II., 136–148; 308–309; 329; 336–338. Compare with the following criticisms my article in Philosophical Review, vol. I., No. 6.

Objections to the absolute or separate ideal may be stated as follows:

(a) It makes a dualism, practically unbridgeable, between the moral and the scientific phases of our experience. If any account of the ideal can be given meeting the needs of the case, we should certainly hesitate before accepting a mode of statement introducing ideas which not only do not lie within the scope of scientific method as usually presented, but which emphasize their complete *transcendence* of scientific categories and results. All the above theories (any theories which set up an independent, fixed ideal) are necessarily metaphysical in a sense which separates metaphysics from science, instead of making it a more complete recognition of scientific methods and data.

That moral science introduces a set of ideas which are not brought explicitly to the front in the physical or even the biological sciences, there can be no doubt. But the account which I have given recognizes this distinction without changing it into a break. Physical science deals wholly with the rational, abstract or objective content. That is, it leaves out of account (i) the fact that every object, or law (relation of objects) *arises*, in actual experience from an inducing impulse, an action of self; (ii) the fact that sooner or later it *reacts back* into the impulse, and thus has its *final* meaning in the new significance which it gives to action. In other words, physical science deals simply with the *content* of mediation, leaving one side the whole *process* of mediation. In considering, for example, a flower, it takes account neither of the impulses of seeing, of reaching, touching, smelling, etc., which make the flower

into an object in consciousness nor yet the additional value, æsthetic and moral, as well as intellectual, which our activity (our character) will have as result of the study. It omits, in a word, both the *reason* for and the *nature* of the *value* which objects have in our experience—in relation to the self.

While biology is compelled to assume the *fact* of value as possessed by objects in relation to life (most generally their value in either maintaining or hindering the life of the genus in question), it does not consider this value as present to the *consciousness* of the agent. It will describe, for example, the interaction, both favorable and unfavorable, of a race of men and their environment, but it confines itself to results actually accomplished. It puts one side this value as realized in the conscious life of that race, as affording motive and assimilated into character.

Yet science, as science, does not deny the fact of further conscious value. It simply concentrates itself upon other aspects of reality—the *content* which gives value independent of why or how it gives it. Neglect is not denial of value; and recognition of value is not denial of science. Ethics completes the analysis of reality—experience—begun by physical and biological science. It does not introduce a new and opposed set of ideas. (Royce, Spirit of Modern Philosophy; ch. XII., distinguishes between the world of description and the world of appreciation, this distinction being identical in statement with the distinction just made; but he seems to conceive of the "physical" world as a fixed thing, as, indeed, a limitation, due to our "*finite* nature," instead of the intermediate stage in the development of an act:—the definition of the conditions of action).

The fixed, or absolute ideal, is not only inexplicable, but *is presupposed or ready-made.* Against such ideals, we may urge:

(b) No moral value attaches to their working-out, or formation. It may belong to the attitude taken towards them, to their choice or rejection, but nothing more. But, in our actual

experience, no such separation exists between forming and choosing an end of action. Our moral discipline consists even more in the responsibility put upon us to develop ideals, than in choosing between them when made. The making of plans, working them out into their bearings, etc., is at once a test of character and a factor in building it up. But this is an impossibility if the ideal is something *given towards* which will is to be directed—if it lies outside the normal process of volition. (Thus, Martineau is logical in holding that only intellectual or prudential value attaches to the consideration of consequences. Types, vol. II., pp. 255–256. With a fixed ideal, they must lie outside, be mere *means*, and moral meaning is found simply in the selection of one or other of the ends given ready-made. *Deliberation* has no intrinsic moral significance. So Green has to draw a decided line between the estimation of acts, and of character, the former being decided by a consideration of consequences, the latter by a consideration of the disposition from which the act proceeds. Moreover the consideration of character, or conscientiousness, he has logically to reduce to a subjective introspection on the part of the agent as to whether "he has been as good as he should have been," not an objective examination of whether his interest, or attention, is rightly distributed. Prolegomena, pp. 317–325. On p. 259, Green takes another view of the ideal).

(c) The process of choice, of selection between competing ideals, is rendered arbitrary and meaningless. Why should there be two competing ideals at all, one good, the other bad? And, supposing there are, on what grounds do we prefer one to the other? As to the first question, there appears to be no alternative between saying (with Kant) that there is a fixed dualism in our nature, sense, as inducing to evil, being on one side, reason, as good, on the other; with Green, that the particular impulse is always and fixedly opposed in its realization, to the demand of our entire nature (Prol. pp. 180–183; 206–207; 233–234); or (with Martineau) that there is an original fixed scale of higher and lower in our impulses. But experience

does not testify to a conflict between ends one labelled, from the start and unalterably, good and the other labelled bad. On the contrary, one *becomes* good, the other bad, *in the process of competition* and deliberation. Moreover our *theory accounts for the presence* of the two competitors and the relative conflict between them; it is the old story of the immediate and the mediating phases of action. It gives positive meaning to the opposition—the deepening of consciousness. (See Alexander, Moral Order, pp. 297–316, also Int. Journ. Eth., vol. II., p. 409, for an adequate recognition of the fact that the competing ends are *made* good and bad, by the very process of deliberation and choice; or, as I have previously put it, the process of action is itself one of estimating and constituting value, of proving and approving.)

As to the second question, on what grounds does the self choose between the two fixed ideals, there appears no answer save an appeal to arbitrary free-will, the power of choosing between alternatives without any reason for the choice. The problem of freedom will meet us hereafter; at this point, it is sufficient to note that the sole occasion for bringing in a freedom of the kind just referred to, is that the alternative ends to be chosen are taken as lying outside the development of will. On our theory, the emergence of the ends and the final choice are facts of exactly the same order, being only an earlier and a latter stage, in time, of the definition of an impulse in its relation to the self. It may also be noticed, at this point, that the theory opposed to freedom, namely, that of necessitation has its origin in exactly the same assumption that the origin and development of the ends lie outside the self; being conceived as foreign forces, it is natural to draw the inference that the strongest force determines the will—overlooking the fact that ends have motive power, great or small, only so far as they interest, hold attention—that is, express the direction in which the self is already moving.

There is still another difficulty as to choice. If one side comes thus labelled bad from the start, why should it ever be

chosen? Why should the bad recognized as such, offering itself as such, have superior value? The doctrine of original sin is the only logical answer, and Kant is perfectly logical in trying to introduce a philosophical statement of that doctrine. Theory, pp. 339–352. (Abbott's trans. "Religion within the Bounds simply of Reason.")

(d) No basis is afforded for development of moral ideals—for positive progress. The ideal is there once for all and it is only a question of greater or less distance from it. The logical conclusion (not that these writers have been logical enough to draw it) is the Pharisaical one—since there has been progress, how much better morally must we be than savages, or our primitive ancestors, or "the lower classes," or than any one else whose acts do not rank objectively as high as ours! On our theory, it is the ideal, as recognition of the objective meaning of action, which has progressed; so that there is only additional capacity, and thus additional demand, for mediation. One class of persons, as a class, is, then, morally no better than any other; one period no more virtuous than another. Responsibilities not virtues, increase. The increase, that is, of knowledge of the bearings of an impulse makes care in action morally more imperative, we are no nearer a goal of perfection, but action has more intellectual and æsthetic meaning.

(e) From this it follows also that progress in character is purely negative;—on the basis of a fixed ideal it consists simply in lessening the gap which separates us from the ideal. The moral life thus becomes a struggle towards something without and beyond, and, in so far, a hopeless and slavish struggle. The ideal never is realized, do what we may. (Kant has to fall back on purely supernatural means to meet this difficulty. Theory, pp. 218–231.) The ideal has no self-executing, no *moving* power. It is never *of itself a motive.* Upon our theory, the very fact that an ideal is present in consciousness, is, as far as it goes, its realization; it is the self moving that way; in so far as it modifies conduct, it is directive and effective. A *mere* ideal, or unrealized ideal, is a contra-

diction in terms. The ideal is a very present help in time of trouble.

(f) The fixed ideal gives no instruction or information as to the particular thing needing to be done. It does not translate itself into terms of a concrete, individual act—and every *act* is concrete and individual. In other words, it does not and cannot become a *working* principle for what has to be done. (See Green, again, Prol. pp. 317–325, for the necessity, on his basis, of a double standard.) Such ideals are pure luxuries; only the sentimentalist and the pure theorist can afford them. The working man, of busy life, must have an ideal by which he can go in action, one which defines specific acts. (Green attempts to meet the need by reference to the past institutions in which the ideal is embodied; cf. Prol. pp. 180; 207–208; 393–394. But, since such embodiments are, according to him, only apparent, not real, it is difficult to see how this gives the required instruction. Kant attempts to get to the specific act needed by reference to the universal, non-self-contradictory character of the ideal. Of this, more below.) Again, our theory meets this need, because the ideal is *nothing but* the definition or mediation of the immediately acting, or impulsive, self.

We conclude then, from our examination of abstract ideals, that true ideals are the *working hypotheses* of action; they are the best comprehension we can get of the value of our acts; their use is that they mark our consciousness of what we are doing, not that they set up remote goals. Ideals are like the stars; we steer by them, not towards them.

Section XXII.—The Hedonistic Theory of Value.

According to the theory advanced, value consists in the realization or expression of impulse, moral value being the conscious realization of impulse in its relation to the self or system of active experience. The "ideal" is the consciousness of the relationship. The function of the ideal is to give content or meaning to the impulse: it is the impulse stated in

objective terms. Abstract idealism was criticized on the ground that it made the ideal something at which impulse and activity in general is aimed, and in which therefore it is exhausted. There is another group of theories which also sets up an outside goal for activity, although differing as to the nature of this goal. This group is tho hedonistic (from the Greek, ἡδονή pleasure.) It proclaims that pleasure is the end towards which all action is directed—that pleasurable feeling (involving the absence of pain) is the Summum Bonum, the supreme good and thus the standard for measuring value.

Before passing on to its consideration, it may first be contrasted with abstract idealism. Comparatively, hedonism may be termed empirical idealism. It has an ideal—pleasure—but this ideal is a state, a passive experience, something which has already been enjoyed;* as against this, the ideal of perfection set up by the other school is attainable only in the remote future—at the end of an infinite time according to Kant and Green. The good of one school is reason, that of the other feeling.† The two schools have stood over against each other since the very beginning of ethical speculation. At first, it was the Cynic against the Cyrenaic; then the Stoic against the Epicurean; latterly, the Kantian against the Utilitarian. (See Sidgwick, History of Ethics, pp. 32–33 and 71–88.)

Such a continuous opposition is accounted for on the ground not that one is all truth, and the other all error; but on the ground that each school represents the abstraction of one phase of the process of volition. In truth, the process begins and ends in activity; the beginning being impulsive (original or habitual) activity, the end activity whose value has been measured. In this process, reason (the phase selected and set up independently by the abstract idealists) represents the

*See note to p. 147 of Murray's Introduction to Ethics; also Mill, Utilitarianism, pp. 348–349; Bain, Moral Science, p. 27.

† "Reason is and must be the slave of passion."—Hume. See Treatise on Human Nature, Book II., Part 3, Secs. 3 and 4.

transition from the immediate to the mediated activity—the consciousness of the relations of the impulse, the objectified impulse, while feeling (the phase abstracted by the empiricists) —represents the consciousness of value to the agent as an *individual*—the activity in its *subjective* existence. Reason is turning the action inside out, seeing it as part of a general order, independent of the individual's own immediate propensities. Hence the ideas of spectator, disinterested, universal, which associate themselves so easily with reason. Rational content is required to give the individual's feeling substance and *real* worth. Feeling is turning the action outside in; it is the realization of value terms of the agent's own peculiar character.*

Hedonism (as compared with rationalism) fails to see that the nature or content of this value (as distinct from the mere fact of some value) depends upon the mediation of reason; while abstract idealism fails to note that the reduction of self to reason or thought leaves the self in the air, with no *individualized* value. Each of them has to disparage the opposite principle, or reduce it to a mere means to its own end. The theory of experimental idealism (as we term the position here taken), because of its recognition of activity as the primary reality is enabled to give both thought and feeling their due. It does not attempt the impossible task of setting up for activity some end, whether a state of feeling or one of perfect reason, outside itself. It is content to note that activity, moving according to its own law and principle, becomes objectively conscious of its value in the ends which its projects (ideals) and subjectively conscious of its value in the emotions which accompany the realizing of these ends.

As compared with the facts, then, both ethical rationalism and empiricism take a derived and secondary phase for the whole truth. As compared with each other, rationalism is

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* Hence Lotze's hedonistic tendencies. See Practical Philosophy, pp. 15–20.

right in so far as it asserts that feelings (or pleasure and pain) are mere abstractions apart from the objects (or rational contents) which give them their quality, while empiricism is right in asserting that an end which is not *felt* (that is, appreciated as part of the agent's own being) has no moral validity or claims.

SECTION XXIII—FEELING AS END OR IDEAL.

We shall consider pleasure-pain, (1) as end or ideal of action, (2) as motive, and (3) as criterion or measure of value.

The contradiction in hedonism meets us at the outset. Pleasure and pain as feelings exist only as they are actually felt, and to the one who feels them. Because we have one word, we are apt to suppose that there is some one fact or entity corresponding. There are, indeed, pleasures and pains, but no such thing as pleasure in general. Hence we cannot aim at pleasure. It is a pure abstraction.

We may aim, however, it will be said, at some particular pleasure, the pleasure of eating an apple, of performing a charitable act, of deceiving an enemy, etc. Even here, however, there is ambiguity, and even self-contradiction in the theory as ordinarily stated. There is confusion of an *ideal of pleasure*—the conception of what constitutes pleasure—with *pleasure as an ideal.* Since pleasure exists only while it is felt, to say that it is aimed at must mean that there is a thought of it formed. Now this thought will either be an image so distinct that it is itself pleasurable, or it will be a conception of the objects or ends which afford pleasure or yield satisfaction. Take any of the instances above given and it will be seen that these two alternatives exhaust the possibilities. Neither of them is equivalent to pleasure as an ideal. In the former case, a pleasure is actually felt and no action is called forth aimed at it. In the latter case there is a presentation of the ends whose attainment is regarded as affording satisfaction, and (through redintegration) of a certain amount of accompanying pleasure. But neither actually experienced pleasure, nor a consideration of the objects which afford enjoyment is

pleasurable feeling as an aim of action. This latter is a psychological impossibility. But since the idea has prevailed, not only that pleasure is a possible end of action, but that it is the only end, it must be examined in more detail. The idea is usually presented in connection with a theory of desire. (For the notion that pleasure is the object of desire see: Mill, Utilitarianism, pp. 354–355; Bain, Emotions and Will, Part II., ch. 8; Senses and Intellect, pp. 338–344; Spencer, Data, pp. 26–44; Sully, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 574–589, Human Mind, vol. II., pp. 196–207; Thompson, System of Psychology, Part IX.; Lotze, Microcosmus, vol. I., pp. 678–706. Most of these cover other points in the hedonistic theory besides the relation of pleasure and desire. Stephen, Science of Ethics, pp. 42–57 and 246–263, is noteworthy for the clearness with which he shows the confusion in ordinary hedonism as to the end, while still himself holding that pleasure is *motive*.)

SECTION XXIV.—HAPPINESS AND DESIRE.

It is generally held by hedonists to be self-evident that we desire pleasure, and avoid pain. The doctrine is even tautology, according to them. Good, pleasure, the desirable, are synonymous terms; evil, pain, that to which we are averse, mean the same experience. Substituting 'happiness' for 'pleasure', 'misery' for 'pain', we agree unreservedly to this statement, and yet insist that it does not mean that pleasure is the object of desire, or aim of action. It is true that good (happiness) is the satisfaction, evil the thwarting of desire. This measures, or defines, happiness in terms of desire; desire is the primary fact, happiness its fulfilling, its completion. Hedonism sees the connection, but reverses its direction. It takes happiness as a fixed fact, and then tries to define desire in terms of happiness—as that which aims at it. It is true that happiness is found in the satisfaction of any desire, particularly in the degree of its dominance; happiness *is* this satisfaction of desire. But hedonism transforms this fact into the notion that somehow pleasure is there as an ideal, and its contemplation arouses desire. As Green says (Prolegomena,

p. 168), the hedonists make the "mistake of supposing that a desire can be excited by the anticipation of its own satisfaction."

This identity of happiness with satisfaction of desire is the reason for substituting 'happiness' for 'pleasure'. Pleasure and pain are often passive and accidental (pathological, Kant terms it. Theory, p. 106). A child goes on the street and hears pleasant music; he runs and has a painful fall; a man inherits money and finds himself in the possession of new resources; he invests money safely, as he supposes, and finds it swept away by a sudden panic. It is absurd to deny that satisfaction and dissatisfaction, in the way of pleasure and pain, result in all these instances; yet common speech agrees with sound theory in holding that any one or all of them may become parts of either happiness or misery, weal or woe, *according to the relation assumed towards them by the dominant desires (that is character) of the individual** (*see Alexander, Moral Order, pp.* 212–218).

SECTION XXV.—THE NATURE OF DESIRE.

The hedonist, then, gives the following account of desire: Admitting that the original, or impulsive, activity does not occur for the sake of pleasure, it is held that when pleasure or pain is experienced as a result of action, the image of memory of the feeling occurring afterwards arouses a desire for its renewal (if pleasure), or aversion, a movement to escape it (if pain).

Concerning this account a question arises. How does this image of memory happen to occur to the mind? No image or memory can come into the mind directly or of itself; there must be some suggestion, association or exciting stimulus. We may suppose (i) that the object which gave the satisfaction before is seen (as a child, having eaten sugar once, sees it

*I do not mean that the words 'pleasure' and 'happiness' are marked off to denote exclusively these two kinds of satisfaction, one comparatively extraneous to character, the other measured by it, but only to insist that there are these two types of satisfaction, and that common speech is quite aware of their difference.

again), and this redintegrates the pleasure image. Now (a) this, at most, is an accidental and, morally, unimportant way for desire to originate. A character whose desires were habitually aroused in this style would be immature; it would be the sport of caprice and circumstance, with no settled lines of action. This theory presupposes that the mind is, like Micawber, passively waiting for experiences to "turn up." In the child, or in any character so far as morally immature, the relatively accidental recognition of an object may arouse its own isolated line of action. But moral training consists not in perpetuating this mode of action, but in eliminating it. As a matter of fact, even a child is actually engaged from the outset and all the time in activity. He has his own impulses, or lines of discharge, representing the selected outcome of generations of activity. The child's immaturity chiefly consists not in the fact that it is passively dependent upon external excitations, but in the lack of continuity in the activities set up by the organs themselves. One way of action gives way to another without reference to a general or comprehensive plan. In other words, the impulse is not mediated or rationalized. (b) Even in the child, therefore, the object arouses the desire because *of the activity already going on.* The child's primary impulse is already there—that of eating. The presentation of the object and the representation of the satisfaction previously had in connection with it, simply deflects, or mediates, this activity.

This suggests the fundamental fallacy in the old case of the ass evenly balanced between two bundles of hay. It supposes that the desirable quality, the power of inciting activity, resides in the *object* entirely independent of the activity of the organism. As matter of fact, the animal (and so with man) is already doing something, looking, or moving, this way or that, and so the hypothesis of a purely indeterminate equilibrium is absurd—it assumes impossible conditions.

Pleasure, in other words, is *not suggested immediately by the* object, sugar, but by the activity of tasting, which constitutes the practical meaning of that object.

This brings us (ii) to the normal case. The pleasure is aroused because the activity already asserting itself, as a habit more or less organized, *hits in idea upon the object (that is, the conditions) which will afford it fulfillment.* The recognition of the congruity of the object to the activity arouses the pleasure. A hungry child, seeing or thinking of something to eat, experiences gratification in the thought; an engineer, trying to express his engineering capacity, thinks of a new machine and experiences pleasure, etc. Instead of the image of pleasure exciting the action, the activity already going on sets up a pleasure by calling into consciousness the conditions (the object) of its satisfaction. There is *no image* of a past pleasure once experienced or of a future pleasure to be attained; there is a *present* pleasurable experience. This brings out the fact that desire, instead of being the beginning of activity caused by a state of feeling, is a stage in its development arising when both the original and the induced activity are in consciousness but have not yet come to a complete agreement, or co-ordination. (It is the same condition as that already noticed as effort.) Desire is not excited or aroused by any end, whether pleasure or anything else. It is a phase in the growth of valued, or rationalized, action.

At this stage of development there is more than pleasure felt; there is also pain. Pleasure is felt so far as the object (the mediating or induced experience) is present *in idea*, thus promising future satisfaction. Pain is felt so far as it is present *only* in idea, not in act.

The actual perception of the sugar is still, in part, merely ideal, so far as the activity is concerned; the activity which is striving to assert itself is not seeing the sugar, but *tasting* it. So far as the sight promises success, by redintegrating further acts (reaching, etc.), it is pleasurable, the draft the organs of tasting make upon it being honored. But so far as the *full* activity is still non-existent, there is pain.

The very essence of desire is tension, *divided* activity. The self is divided against itself; activity is partial. So far as it

goes, it is *action*, and hence pleasurable; but as *partial*, it is painful. Desire is neither complete activity aiming at a state outside itself, nor a condition of sheer emptiness.* It is conflicting activity. The man who desires an education in so far as he can "objectify" his desire (that is, present to himself the conditions which will further his self-assertion in that direction), is *in so far* already acting in the desired direction, and there is satisfaction; but in so far as he is at present acting in ways which must be mediated, or transformed, there is conflict and dissatisfaction. The pleasure-pain condition of desire *reports*, in other words, the existing state of action; it does not initiate it.

In any account of desire, there are three elements to be dealt with—activity, object of desire (end thought of as satisfying), and feeling. According to hedonism, the object awakens feeling, and the feeling arouses active desire. I have tried to show above that the feeling *is* the activity subjectively appreciated; it is equally true, on our theory, that the object is no independent thing, but is the activity presented to intelligence —is the content of action, the statement of the conditions involved. The thought of food *is* the definition, in objective terms, of hunger; a complex set of commercial relations (a plan of business) is the objective definition of the impulse to assert one's self in nature; the conception of conditions of political power the objectifying of its special impulse, etc. 'Object' and pleasure-pain feeling are thus the correlative phases, objective and subjective, of activity.

The fundamental fallacy of both perfectionism and hedonism is thus the same. Both assume value as something presented to the self, and awakening and measuring activity. In truth, value is constituted by activity. (An interesting form of the assumption of a fixed system of goods or values (not hedonistic) towards which activity should be directed will be

*The double sense of words here is suggestive. Want means both *lack* and *demand;* it is dynamic, and still partial. Capacity means both power (actuality) and possibility (ideality).

found in the International Journal Ethics, vol. II., in an article by Mr. Davidson, entitled "The Ethics of an Eternal Being." All formulae like the one there given (p. 306) reverse the real state of the case. They assume the existence of valuable ends towards which interest, attention, affection are to be directed, forgetting that such ends *are simply the objective expression of interest and attention.*)

Arguments against the idea that pleasure is the object of desire will be found in James, Psychology, vol. II., pp. 549–559; Green, Prol., pp. 163–177; Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 226–235, and Mind, vol. XIII., p. 1; Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, pp. 34–47, Mind, vol. II., p. 27, and Contemporary Review, 1871, p. 671; Alexander, Moral Order, pp. 186–225; Dewey, Outlines, pp. 17–30; Muirhead, Elements, pp. 92–111; Murray, Introduction, pp. 160–173; Mackenzie, Manual, pp. 89–116. Most of these references deal with the question of motive as well as of end. The criticisms of hedonism advanced above are practically identical with many of those contained in the references. The positive doctrine of desire is, perhaps, more nearly allied to that of Spinoza, according to which desire is a form of fundamental self-assertion. It is not aroused by some 'end', but the 'end' or 'object' is the consciousness of the nature, or content, of self-assertion. See Spinoza, Ethics, Part III., props. 6–9 and def. 1 of the affects. In Part IV., props. 14–37, desire seems at times to be defined in terms of "Good", and good at other times in terms of desire—as the content of self-realization. The latter is the characteristic doctrine, in any case. See III., p. 9, schol., and p. 39, schol.

Section XXVI.—Pleasure and Motive.

As already stated, most hedonists confuse the idea of pleasure as object of desire with pleasure as motive. This confusion testifies to a right psychological instinct: that which is an aim of action must also move to action. There must be an identification of the real concrete ideal with the impelling spring to action. Unless the aim or ideal itself becomes a moving force,

it is barren and helpless. Unless the moving force becomes itself idealized, unless it is permeated with the object aimed at, it remains *mere* impulse, blind and irrational. According to hedonism, the ideal and motive may be confused with each other, but they cannot be identified. The thought of pleasure is either simply an abstract conception, coldly intellectual, of the means to getting pleasure, or it is a concrete image of pleasure—that is, itself a pleasure. In neither case is it a motive. In the former case, it is simply an abstract idea, without practical efficiency; in the latter case, the pleasure is already enjoyed or experienced, and there is no cause for action.*

We are in this dilemma in hedonism. If the motive is feeling, it can suggest no intention whatever, and thus cannot move to anything in particular. There is a certain state being experienced, and that ends the story. Or, if there is a definite aim or intention in view, that end will arouse feeling only in the degree in which it expresses activity—tendency towards or away. The feeling excited will not be the moving spring, but will indicate or register the extent to which the *self is moved*. There is no connecting link, on its theory, between aim and motive.

We may freely admit, with the hedonist, that bare thought does not induce, is not motive. But before we can infer from this that an ideal is not motive, we must be able to show that an ideal, or aim, is *mere* thought. On the contrary, it is the induced or mediating *activity*. The ideal, indeed, is a conception or thought; but as such, as intellectual, it simply gives definiteness and coherency to the content of the induced self. The concrete ideal is always activity asserting itself in another direction from the present, natural, activity.

Physiology has, indeed, afforded a complete disproof of any theory which makes a gap between the ideal (or intellect)

*Stephen, Science, p. 51, holds that pleasure means persistence in given state, pain change. So also Ward, Psychic Factors of Civilization, p. 54, who goes to the extreme of holding that all desire is pain, while still defining it as representation of pleasure as well as pain (p. 52).

and overt action. From the side of the expenditure of energy, the sole difference between thought and action is in the external, or gross, visibility of the discharge. Thinking involves molecular motion, and continued discharge to the muscles and glands. The question of the final passage of idea into act is simply the question of the concentration (unification) of this organic activity in some definite direction. Physiologically, the entire function of thought consists in transforming the vague, diffuse and non-valued (valuable, bu not defined or measured as to value) activity of infancy into definite, coordinated and intentional (measured) activity.

Upon our view, then, the ideal and motive are both names for self in certain phases of action. If a man kills another intentionally, his ideal, the thought of the removal of the other man, is not something beyond himself—there is no way for the thought, even as thought, to come into his mind, save as a projection of himself. That the thought dwells there and becomes an impelling force to action (a motive) is simply the realization, the definite recognition, of the extent to which the self is involved in that ideal, of the extent to which that ideal *is* the self. The act of reflection is a phase of the act of fulfillment.

We thus come to the question of intention and motive. The hedonist asserts that the motive is always a feeling of pleasure-pain, the intention is the consequences aimed at.*

We assert that both intention and motive are the self in action, and the sole difference is that motive is intention completely developed, the *concrete* or unified self.

A man wills to kill another. Roughly speaking, intention corresponds to what he wills, motive to why he wills it. His intention is the "foreseen consequences," his motive, that which makes him desire them. His intention is the death of another man; his motive varies according as he is seeking revenge, is a soldier in war, or is engaged in defending himself

*Mill, "The intention is what the agent wills to do, the motive is the feeling that makes him so will to do."

from an assault. So far all agree. Does the complete separation of intention and motive follow from this account?

Intention, as above illustrated, is an abstraction of intellectual analysis. No man ever intends *merely* to kill another. He intends to save his own life, to defend his country, to "get even" with another, to get money, or, maybe, to exhibit his own markmanship. The "killing another" is simply *part* of the intent, of the whole aim. It is necessary to discover intention in the narrower sense in order to determine *that* one acts in the moral sphere at all, but it is necessary to discover the whole concrete aim before we can find *what* a man really wills. Now the moment we have the whole aim, we have motive also. To defend self, to get revenge, is what *impels* a man to act. Or, if on the other hand, we say revenge, ambition, avarice, patriotism is the motive to murder, this sense of motive is a *mere* sentiment, an abstraction (and hence incapable of inducing action), or it means *an active attitude towards certain ideals*—and this is simply the concrete aim. Suppose Napoleon's motive was ambition. Many men are ambitious; why do they not do what he did? If ambition is a *mere* feeling, it will never induce action at all; it will not define or suggest any particular act to be performed. It will remain stuck in its own sentimental, self-absorbed dreaming. A working ambition must translate itself into thought, into the idea of objects, and must be interest in these definite ends or objects; it must be *a demand for the reality of certain ideas.* It thus *includes* intention, in the abstract sense of that word, and *is* intention in its full sense—that at which a man really, and not simply incidentally, aims.

An objection sometimes made will bring out the point. Suppose a man shoots at game, knowing that a man is near the line of fire; he kills the man. Now, it is urged, his motive clearly implies lack of regard for life, but it cannot be said that he intended to kill the man.

Or, from the other side, it may be said that Brutus intended to kill Cæsar, and yet the killing of Cæsar was not part of his

motive (Mackenzie, Manual, p. 40). As to the first, the agent did not intend, *by itself*, to kill the man; yet neither did he intend, merely by itself, to kill the deer. He intended, as a result, a form of satisfaction of which the *possible* death of a man, as well as of a deer, was a part—and this aim, as self-expression, was the impelling force. As to the second instance, Brutus did not intend simply to kill Cæsar; he intended a certain deliverance of his country, or a certain self-advancement, the death of Cæsar forming a constituent part of this aim; and in just this same sense the thought of the death of Cæsar (which is what I take Mackenzie to mean by the loose phrase "the killing of Cæsar") was a part of his motive; he took a positive interest in the thought of Cæsar out of the way, an interest which was sufficient to induce him to do the deed. His whole ideal, of which the removal of Cæsar was a part, was what moved him.

The identity of the complete intention and the motive may also be gathered from a consideration of the circumstances under which we give credit to a man for a good intention even when no act is obvious. We do so only when the agent can point to effort on his part, and to obstacles which prevented execution. If a man says he really intended to do a certain duty but forgot it, we may indeed recognize the intention so far as entertaining the thought is, psychologically, action, but at the same time must recognize that the possibility of forgetting shows that the matter was not really "on his mind." That is, we infer from the fact that it did not move him to the fact that it was only half-formed intention. We always, practically, judge intention from act, provided we have sufficient data to enable us to judge intelligibly concerning the *act*. Sound psychology justifies our condemnation of the man who has "good intentions" but no deeds to show; his action, in revealing himself, reveals his true intent and gives the lie to his profession.

The impossibility of really judging the conduct of others, as maintained by Kant (Theory, pp. 23–24) and by Green

(Prol., p. 318), is a fiction resulting from separation of motive and intention. There is, of course, always difficulty in deciding what the *act* is, but so far as we can tell this, we can tell the *intention*, and knowing the intention executed, can tell *in what kind of ends the man is sufficiently interested to be moved by them to act*—can estimate his character.

This brings us again to the question: Is feeling motive? Yes, and no. Decidedly no, in the sense in which the consistent hedonist must use the term feeling—a state of experienced pain —or pleasure. Yes, in the sense in which practical life uses the term: *An active interest in certain ends*, that interest expressing the controlling lines of activity.*

The distinctions of interest from *mere* feeling, or passive affections are:

(1) Interest is active, projective. We *take* interest. Interest is demand, insistence. Whenever we have an interest in any thought, we cherish it, cling to it, endeavor in all ways to realize or fulfill it.

(2) Interest implies an object—the end, or thought, which claims attention. We are interested in *something*, while *mere* feeling begins and ends in itself. In common speech an "interest" means the end which dominates activity.

(3) Interest (*inter-esse*) implies the relation which the interesting end bears to the controlling lines of action, to *character*. It expresses the *identification* of the object with the subject. Mere feeling does not involve this complete interaction with character. Because of this difference, mere feeling is of value only while felt, as actually experienced; an interest has value on its own account (as the outworking of character) whether the objective aim included within it is ever *externally* experienced or not. "It is better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all." It is better to aim at anything

* Common speech often uses feeling to denote impulse. Hoeffding, Psychology, seems to use feeling in a dynamic sense which brings it close to impulse, and yet pp. 235–236, he makes impulse a derivation from feeling.

which calls forth the powers of the self than to get the passive enjoyment of any object whatever; the true satisfaction of interest lies in the assertion of its activity and not in the mere results attained. That is, the assertion of self *is* the result, in comparison with which all other results are insignificant. This is that independence of the moral agent of all the contingencies of life, of which the Stoics made so much.

We conclude, then, by saying that the term 'motive' simply expresses the moving force or interest of a given end or aim, this interest indicating the extent to which the self finds its own character involved in the realization of that end. Confirmation, if any further is necessary, is found in the fact that all hedonists, since James Mill, have used their theory of motives to furnish the machinery by which certain ends are made active interests of the individual agent. The subject with which they have really dealt is not the psychology of motive as such, but rather this problem: Given certain ends which are requisite to the welfare of society, how can these ends be rendered motives to the individual? Their answer has been: We must so connect, through the instrumentalities of pleasure and pain, these ends with the individual's own welfare that they shall become identified with his conception of himself. In other words, their practical assumption is not that feeling as such is motive, but that feeling may be so *used* as to make certain aims, otherwise lying outside of the agent and hence indifferent, *interests* to him.

The following references will give the status of the discussion of intention and motive from the time of James Mill to the present. James Mill, Analysis of Human Mind, vol. II., chs. 22 and 25; Bentham, Principles, chs. 8 and 10, pp. 71, 92–95, 97–103; Austin, Jurisprudence, vol. I., chs. 18–20; Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 27, note (Eng. ed., not in Am., but quoted in next reference); Green, Prol., pp. 315–325; International Jour. Eth., vol. IV., pp. 89–94 and 229–238, and references there given.

Section XXVII.—Pleasure as Criterion.

We saw that pleasure as feeling could not be ideal, because every ideal is present as thought, not as feeling; we saw, however, that the ideal, or thought, might awaken present pleasure, and so the question arose whether this present pleasure might not be impelling motive. We were obliged to deny it, on the ground that mere feeling ends in itself, or has no dynamic power, and because concrede feeling, as actually experienced, (a) depends upon the activity already going on (instead of exciting it), and (b) is colored throughout by the character of the end or idea which defines the activity. We concluded, then, that the pleasure-pain condition is not motive; but registers the interest which a given individual takes at the given time in a given act.

This brings us to the question of pleasure as criterion or standard of the worth of action. Giving up the thought that it is either aim or motive, have we not arrived at the conception that it indicates, registers, reports the worth of action, and is thus its test? In the following sense, yes. The satisfaction (interest) which a given individual takes in an act measures the worth which that end, as a matter of fact, has to him at that particular moment. But this does *not* mean that pleasure or pain is the moral criterion. It means that if we know the kind of ends and acts in which a certain agent *takes* pleasure (instead of passively enjoying it), we know how to estimate his moral character. If he rejoices in temperance, he *is* temperate; if he grieves at it as an enforced thing, or as merely useful to some further end, he is still partial in that virtue, etc. Pleasure does not determine the worth of an act, but the kind of act which affords pleasure determines the worth of an agent. That is, *we measure the worth of a given experience of pain or pleasure by reference to a standard of character, by reference to the moving ideal which calls it forth.**

*See Plato, Laws, II., pp. 653–4, Aristotle, Ethics, Book II., ch. 3; Laws, II., pp. 659–61, and Aristotle, Ethics, Book X., ch. 5. I am not able to see that much advance has since been made as to the ethical psychology of pleasure and pain. The artistic sense of the Greek who understood that it was a mark alone of a true gentleman to know how to take (as to when, where and how much) his pleasures and pains, divined the truth.

But the hedonist himself contends that it is not the present felt pleasure which measures the value of the act, but the *results* of the act in the way of pleasures and pains—an act is good according as it effects a net balance of pleasure over pain, bad when painful results predominate over pleasures. It is this doctrine which we must discuss. We note that it makes a break between criterion and ideal and motive. Not the same pleasure, or pleasure in the same sense, is criterion that (on their theory) impels to action or that is the desirable end. (a) The motive must be present and individual, the results are distant and, according at least to one school of hedonists,* general, consisting in pleasure or pain to all men, or to all sentient creation. (b) According to the hedonist, no one would ever *aim* at anything but pleasure, but the *act* may result in pain as well as in pleasure, may bring other pleasures than those aimed at, or may bring none at all. If the criterion and the ideal were the same, every act whatsoever must be right—because an unadulterated pleasure.

I. Thus to dissever criterion from ideal is to reduce moral experience to a chaos. A person may aim at anything whatsoever, may have any end we please to suggest and the character of that end has nothing whatever to do with the morality of his act. The whole process of forming intentions, of defining ideals, of discussing aims, has absolutely no moral value. It is true that Mill (Util., p. 27, note, Eng. Ed.) says "the morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention," but this seems a complete reversal of hedonism. It proclaims that the test of an act is not the pleasures and pains which, as matter of fact, result from it, but whether, in doing the act, the agent *aims* at bringing pleasure or pain to himself and others (Mill being a 'universal' hedonist). By no conceivable stretch of language can this be interpreted as meaning that pleasure is the test of morality; it makes the *character* of

* Termed by Sidgwick, universalistic hedonism, as distinct from individualistic, but commonly called utilitarianism.

the agent, the sort of result he aims at, the kind of end that moves him, the criterion.

Only extended quotation can show how typical this reversal is of all modern utilitarianism, though it seems, in the main, to have escaped the critics. The only hedonistic view is that which measures an act, after it has been performed, by its results in pleasures and pains. Every utilitarian has substituted a criterion for the formation of right ideals. It says to an agent: Before you act, consider as thoroughly as possible the results of your actions, the pains and pleasures that are likely to result to all people and animals from them; then, if you decide upon the act which promises to bring a balance of pleasure, your act is right. See, for example, the "hedonistic calculus" as explained by Bentham, Principles (p. 16), noting such expressions in the memoriter verses as "*such* pleasures *seek*," "*such* pains *avoid*," which clearly indicate that he is setting up a standard for the kind of ideals at which men ought to aim. We do not here need to discuss this criterion of morality; whether correct or incorrect, it is not hedonistic. *It measures conduct not by pleasure and pain, but by the character of the agent as manifested in the end which he attempts to realize or bring into being.* It virtually says that the act performed by an agent in a spirit of benevolence (defined as that which aims at giving pleasure to sentient beings) is right. The utilitarian confuses results which do happen with *foreseen results moving to action.* Yet if he does not make this confusion, he has no alternative but to say that intention, aim, etc., have nothing to do with the morality of an act. As matter of fact, our criterion and ideal must have a common denominator: the worth of an act must be measured by the worth of its intention, or the experiences aimed at.

II. Similar confusion results from the divorce of criterion and motive. The test for the morality of the agent is made one thing, and the test for the act another, *and both conceptions contradict the view just stated.* The *motive*, being pleasure, is, according to the hedonist, always good. (Bentham,

Principles, p. 48.) "A motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain operating in a certain manner. Now pleasure is in itself a good . . . . It follows, therefore, immediately and incontestably, that there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one.* If motives are good or bad, it is only on account of their effects." Here the criterion is distinctly stated to reside in the *effects* of the act. Hence the separation of the morality of the act from that of an agent. The agent, as expressed in motive, may be 'good,' his act 'bad,' or the contrary. Two entirely different sets of considerations decide the respective cases. The rightness of the act is decided by its actual effects; of the agent by his predominating feelings.

It is quite true that other systems beside the hedonistic make such a separation, generally under the names of the 'formal' and 'material' rightness of an act. (For the historical origin of this distinction, see Sidgwick, History, p. 200; its meaning to those who accept it will be found well stated in Bowne, Principles of Ethics, pp. 39–40. The best assertion known to me of the doctrine of the text [the identity of agent and act] is found, of all places, in Brown, Philosophy of Mind, Vol. III., pp. 489 and 499–502.) According to this distinction, formal rightness pertains to the motive of the agent; it is his will to do the right. But with the best will in the world, the agent may still act contrary to the conditions of well-being, and do something whose consequences are evil (materially wrong). The distinction seems to avoid a real difficulty in our judgment of conduct. But this very avoidance is the chief objection to it. It restates the difficulty in generalized form instead of solving it. It introduces a fundamental dualism into moral experience by making it possible for a good man to

*It would seem as if "pain operating in a certain manner" ought logically to be bad. But if Bentham admitted this, being obliged to hold also that pain impels away from further evil, he would be in an obvious dilemma: the motive would be at once bad and good. The same contradiction, of course, is involved in holding, at one and the same time, that pleasure as motive is good, and yet that motive is good only by its effects.

be continually doing bad acts, and for a bad man to express himself constantly in good acts. No amount of criticism can say more than the mere statement of the doctrine says. It tends to reduce good character to mere sentimental well-wishing in general, eliminating the objective factor, the kind of ends aimed at, and to reduce good action to mere conduciveness to external results, eliminating the factor of self-reference, of spontaneous vital self-assertion.

As the outcome, we are left with no working criterion for acts. There is no way in which the individual can convince himself in advance of the right thing to be done. The pleasures and pains which may result from any act depend so much upon circumstances lying outside both the ken and the character of the agent, that it is impossible to forsee them, or to get any guidance from their consideration. If we already have a belief that certain lines of action are, upon the whole, right, we may act in the faith (never with the proof) that such lines of conduct will, upon the whole, result in more pleasure than pain; but if we are dependent upon calculation of the painful and pleasurable consequences, in each instance, we shall have an infinite task. On the reference of an act to the self, to the immediate and to the secondary impulses, there is a defining principle, something which set the minimum and maximum limits. But the pleasures and pains which may proceed from an act are so remote from the intrinsic nature of the act that there are no assignable values in the problem; it is indeterminate throughout. A wholly consistent hedonist would be in the position of one having the "mania of doubt"; the condition of an agent who cannot start to do anything without thinking that if he does the act, this, that or the other painful consequence may follow, and who, consequently, passes his life in self-absorbed, futile worry.* From the standpoint of *possible* consequences, the position is legitimate; however improbable, such possibilities cannot, with reference to external results, be

*See, for example, Amer. Journ. Psy., vol. I., pp. 222 and ff especially p. 238.

disproved. Only the force of inner impulse and the demand of the occasion, the power of self-assertion, carry the normal individual out of such endless reflections into act. The limit must be self-contained.

Criticisms upon the hedonistic standard will be found in the following references, some of which duplicate criticisms upon the subject of ideal and motive, but, so far as possible, confined to the subject of criterion: Bradley, Studies, Essay 3; Green, Proleg., pp. 233–255, 361–388 and 399–415; Martineau, Types, vol. II., pp. 308–334; Leckey, History of European Morals, pp. 1–75; Grote, Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy; Birks, Utilitarianism, chs. 1–4; Alexander, Moral Order, pp. 204–211; Murray, Introduction, pp. 167–205; Dewey, Outlines, pp. 31–51.

Section XXVIII.—The Standard of Happiness.

In spite of all said concerning the unworkable character of the hedonistic ideal, motive and criterion, there is little doubt that, in its modern or utilitarian form, it has been the chief theoretic instrument of practical reform. Such a paradox demands attention. Its explanation is found, I think, in the fact that while nominally the utilitarian has been insisting upon happiness as an ideal and standard, *really* he has been engaged (i) in working out an ideal and standard of happiness of a wide, free and, often lofty nature; (ii) has insisted that every individual, without respect of birth or accident of fortune, have the freest chance to realize this happiness for himself, and has, (iii) identified happiness with general welfare, or common good, demanding that all the machinery of law and education be employed to make reference to the general interest a controlling motive with the individual. In all these respects, utilitarianism has been in the forefront of modern political and industrial development. But none of these demands is, in itself, hedonistic; indeed, all are signs of a more organic view of the individual and of society than is logically possible to hedonism. It is the advance beyond hedonism which has con-

stituted the power of the doctrines, while their entanglement in the individualistic psychology of the 18th century (which gave them their hedonistic character), has, in so far, reduced their effectiveness. A brief sketch of the development of modern utilitarianism will at once complete our criticism by showing how hedonism has abandoned its own ground of happiness *as standard* and has set up *a standard for happiness*, and will enable the criticism to take a more appreciative attitude toward the practical spring and worth of the chief modern writers.

In Bentham (1748–1832), utilitarianism was made the instrument of legal reform in the interest of the whole people and a weapon of attack upon class interest. Great abuses had deflected law and its administration from equal regard to the community interest, and made of it a device by which a few profited at the expense of the many. The abuses were protected in the name of custom and precedent and these, in turn, were consecrated, it seemed to Bentham, by an ethical philosophy which held that right and wrong were inherent characteristics of things, without regard to the end to which they contribute, or their practical serviceableness. Now as against this view, Bentham testified that every idea and institution must be cross-questioned, and if not able to justify itself by showing its contribution to the happiness of the world, be condemned to pass out of existence. Bentham equally insisted that this justifying end of happiness was public or common, not individual or belonging to a class. Hence the two war-cries of utilitarianism, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," and in its computation, "everyone to count for one and for only one." Here we have the standard, which is in practical substance, the well-being of the community as a whole, with equal and impartial reference to the well-being of each member of the community. To a period when the democratic spirit was rising against the survivals, finally become useless, of an aristocratic civilization, such a theory proved a most useful standard and rallying point.

In such a standard, there is nothing of necessity hedonistic. Happiness is the common name for welfare, well-being, a generally satisfactory condition of life. It conveys, of itself, no suggestion concerning what constitutes happiness, and is far enough from identifying itself with the hedonistic notion of a series of states of agreeable sensation.

The other side of utilitarianism developed through the need political reformers have, at least practically, of framing a theory of motives. Bentham differed from earlier utilitarians largely in his appreciation of the necessity of inducing the individual to take sufficient interest in the general welfare to direct his conduct in accordance with its requirements. Pain and pleasure seemed to him just the instruments needed. Especially interested in criminal procedure and prison administration, pain, in the form of punishment, seemed to him to have great possibilities as a motive power when brought to bear, under the direction of a scientific psychological analysis, upon the individual. On the other hand, the growth of commercial life, as reflected in current political economy, had brought to consciousness the ties of interest which hold men together in modern society; it had revealed, in the language of the day, how far the self-interest of one coincides with the self-interest of others. Here, pleasure, as personal profit, seemed to be a powerful inducement to men to seek the common welfare.

As happiness, under the influence of the dominant individualistic psychology, was translated into agreeable sensation, so social interest, under the same influences, was interpreted as sheer personal pains and pleasures, abstracted from the objective conditions which, in their relation to the activity of the individual, really determine and measure them.

James Mill (1773–1836), who had a knowledge both of current psychology and current political economy denied to Bentham, completed the fusion of these various elements; and bound, seemingly irretrievably, the new standard and ideal of industrial democracy to the analyses of an individualistic psy-

chology. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), his son, while continuing the tradition, yet even more than Bentham changed the idea of happiness as a standard unto a standard of happiness, defining it still *nominally* as agreeable sensation, but in reality in terms of the objective conditions which determine it.

(A). Bentham and James Mill had dwelt only upon the *quantity* of pleasure, in the various forms of its intensity, duration, fruitfulness (as to further pleasures) and purity (or freedom from pain)*. John Stuart Mill insisted that the *quality* of pleasure must also be taken into account, and that a small amount of a higher quality might, or should, take precedence of a much larger bulk of a lower quality. Now differences of quality in pleasure as to higher and lower evidently imply a standard of measurement. What is it? Mill gives (or at least suggests) two answers: (i) The standard is the preference of those who have experienced both. Now of this it may be said that such preference only proves that it is preferable to that person or body of persons; but, even if they were unanimous in their judgment, this would not mean that one was higher for me unless I found it so. But a more serious objection is that this puts the standard of pleasure in the character of the person enjoying it, instead of making pleasure the standard of character, and thus contradicts hedonism. This aspect comes explicit when we find (ii) Mill saying that a "sense of dignity," presumably a sense of the kind of pleasure that is appropriate to a human being to enjoy, comes in to decide as to higher and lower. (Mill, Util., pp. 309–313.)

Now when we define a higher pleasure as that (a) which any person, or (b) a person of higher character, *prefers*, we have obviously referred pleasure to that in the person's character which makes it preferable — we have an objective standard.

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*Criticisms of the conception of greatest sum of pleasures, showing the implied presence of an objective standard, will be found in Green, Proleg., pp. 235–240; Alexander, Moral Order, pp. 207–210; Watson, Journal of Spec. Philos., vol. 10, p. 271.

(B). As to motive, the question again arises how an individual agent may be induced to prefer the general well being to his own private profit. The previous answer had been: through the influence of punishment, of reward, of education, etc., setting up *associations* in the mind of the agent between his own happiness and that of others. Mill saw clearly that an identification resting only upon association is artificial, and likely to dissolve through the force of intellectual analysis (which hap pened in his own case, leaving him with a feeling of isolation. Autobiog., p. 136), and that there must be some intrinsic connection. This is the social unity of mankind; the nature of the individual is so thoroughly social that he cannot conceive himself "otherwise than as a member of a body." He, therefore, comes to identify happiness with harmony with his fellows. (Mill, Util., 343–347.) Here the social value of the individual is made the criterion of the moral worth of happiness. *This thoroughly socialized ideal of happiness* is the most characteristic feature of Mill's ethics. It is noble, but it is not hedonism.

Spencer marks the final stage in the transformation of happiness as pleasurable sensation over into the accompaniment of certain objective conditions. As John Stuart Mill is signalized by recognition of the dependence of pleasure upon social law and unity, Spencer is signalized by recognition of the dependence of pleasure upon the laws not of society alone, but of the universe which conditions the life of society and of the individual. (See his criticisms of the older utilitarianism, Data, pp. 56–63, with which compare Stephen's Science of Ethics, 353–379.)

According to Spencer, we must "*deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness.*" And to derive perfect moral laws, we must postulate the case of a "completely adapted man in a completely evolved society," defining, therefore, man "in terms of the conditions which his nature fulfills." (See pp. 179, 275, 280 of Data.) Under present conditions, pleas-

ure is not an adequate test of morality; we make it so only by reference to the thought of the complete relation of individual to environment. At present, pleasure and rightness conflict in at least three respects. (1) We have to do things through sense of obligation only, with constraint, dislike and pain. (2) We have to compromise, and surrender present to future pleasure, while in a 'right' state we would enjoy both. (3) We have often to sacrifice our own pleasure to that of others. (See Dewey, Outlines, pp. 75–77 and references there given.)

Now we do not have to ask concerning the adequacy of Spencer's analysis here. In any case, it is all but the most explicit recognition that pleasure is not of itself a standard, but that certain activities and conditions, defined in objective terms, measure, or are a standard for, pleasure.

In a similar manner, Stephen practically sets aside happiness as a criterion, and substitutes for it conduciveness to the vitality and development of the social organism. The objective conditions have finally encroached more and more upon the "agreeable feeling," and have made it only a very thin shell upon a very solid core.

Hoeffding, Ethik, compare also Monist, vol. I., p. 529, on Principle of Welfare, represents the best contemporary effort to develop utilitarianism along the lines of John Stuart Mill, but distinguishing frankly between welfare as social criterion, the motive which actually impels the individual, and the pedagogical problem of so influencing his motives as to make him interested in the social end. Gizycki, Manual of Ethical Philosophy (trans. by Coit) occupies much the same position, but with less clear and thorough analysis. Compare, Mind, vol. XI., p. 324, article by Coit on Ultimate Moral Aim, and Int. Jour. Ethics, vol. I., p. 311, by Gizycki on Final Moral End. A good statement of the best side of utilitarianism is found in the last named Journal, vol. III., p. 90, by Hodder.

Section XXIX.—Standard, Ideal and Motive.

We conclude this phase of the subject by stating what seems to be the true relation of the three. At first, in the life of the child and of the race, the ideal or aim is comparatively

particular—it is to do this or that thing. As the ideal is formed before, and with reference, to a given act so the criterion is applied to a given act after it has been performed. The act is judged at first by its outcome; primitive people carry this to the point of making no distinction between intentional and accidental acts. Even inanimate things, axes, trees, as well as animals, are tried and condemned.* At this stage, intention or ideal is also undefined, acts resulting from custom or instilled habit rather than from tension of habit and intent. But with further development, there is recognized the need of a criterion not simply for acts after they are performed, but for the process of forming ends and purposes. As we have seen, the utilitarian, while nominally dealing with the former, really concerns himself with the latter. Now the act is judged beforehand as well as afterward; the agent asks not simply whether the act is *good*, i. e., satisfies impulse, but also whether it is *right*, i. e., whether the impulse itself meets the requirements of a certain standard. This change is at the same time obviously a change in the character of the ideal; the ideal is no longer this or that particular act, its generality being simply in the unconscious, underlying habit, but is the *relation* of this or that act to a more general aim. The aim becomes comprehensive, and the particular act simply one form which the permanent aim assumes.

The criterion thus comes to be only the generalized ideal, while the ideal is a specific definition of the more general standard. They are related as a foot-rule in the abstract, and this rule translated into the defined length of some portion of space. The original mediation of impulse is through the special consequences related to that special impulse. But as

*Curious survivals of the early point of view are still found in the procedure of admiralty law, relating to libelling of ships. O. W. Holmes, Jr., Common Law; the same book contains a careful analysis of the legal view of motive, showing that law, in its practice, identifies motive not with feeling, but with foreseen consequences as inducing to action, and that "malice" is inferred wherever the consequences aimed at or assumed are not of a kind a standard character would aim at.

consequences develop, it is seen that they are not one lot of experience isolated from the whole system. It is seen that the consequence chief in importance is that upon the agent's own habits of action, his capacities, tastes, attitude toward life, ways of forming ends, etc.; in short, *the* consequence is the mediation, not of this or that impulse, but of the entire actual self. The mediation of the particular impulse has meaning only in relation to the placing or function of that impulse in the system of activity. The generic standard and ultimate aim—expression of self—are thus one. (See Sec. XIII.) The act is the subject; but *what* the act is—the predicate—is known only by placing the act, in its obvious features, in its right position in the whole activity. If we look at this whole activity as that which the agent is urging towards in every 'act,' it is Ideal; if we look at it as really deciding the nature and value of the 'act,' it is Criterion.

The practical application of this conception of criterion may be briefly stated. (1). Such a criterion is workable. The individual always has his criterion with him, because it is himself. It is nothing more nor less than the thought of the consequences of the act with reference to his own efficiency as an agent in the scene in which he participates. The formulation here is abstract; it must be, because it is not a criterion for action at large, but a criterion for some agent, this or that or the other particular individual, with his own experiences and part to play. Just because it is so absolutely concrete for him, the criterion can be stated at large only in abstract terms. The criterion and its application both exist in terms of the individual's own moral life; it is always putting two and two together; doing the best possible with the material available. Its terms are the given impulse and its bearing in the agent's own life; it is simply a complete view, or judgment, of the intrinsic nature of the act. Only a criterion which does lie within the range of the self is workable; an outside criterion, just in the degree of its externality, will never translate into terms of the individual's own needs and powers; it will not

connect. The hedonistic criterion of consequences in the way of pleasure and pain has no intimate intrinsic connection with the individual's own habits and aims, and while the rationalistic criterion is the self in name, it is only in name. The self is a blank all-engulfing whole which does not define itself in terms of definite experience.

(2). Such a criterion is absolute, yet relative. It is permanent, yet flexible. It is absolute in the sense of containing all its conditions and terms within itself, it is self as a living actuality. It is relative, in that it is not an abstract rule excluding all difference of circumstance, but applies to the concrete relations of the case. It is permanent or identical, because self is one in its life and movement; but flexible and variable since the self is one in and through activity and not by its mere static subsistence.

(3). Such a criterion excludes all taint of casuistry and Pharisaism. In any standard save the efficiency, the expression, of the agent herself, the criterion is one thing, its application another. The standard is a rigid something, external to that to which it is applied. As a result, questions always arise as to rules of application, as to possible exceptions, as to variation according to circumstance. The fatal weakness of encouraging the agent to consider how far the rule may or may not apply to this special case comes in. With complete, or organic mediation as criterion, the case and the standard are really one; it is always a question of what the case really is, when looked at not partially, but in the light of the agent as a concrete, effective agent in his vital relationships. Moreover, fixed, external criterion encourages fixity of condemnation. A man is condemned because he does not come up to this abstract standard entirely independently of his own instinctive tendencies and his own situation. Only when the criterion is defined as we have above defined it, can we judge the agent on his own ground according to the meaning the act has for him. The external standard means always a false complacency, a fixed self-congratulation whenever we conform to the rule. A criterion which is nothing but

the act completely viewed imposes action by its very nature; it leaves no time nor opportunity for self-directed complacency. The joy is in the action, not in the thought of the self as good enough to do it. Such a criterion, finally, requires acute and objective examination of the conditions of action, as the external criterion demands continued subjective introspection to see how far along we have got. The latter makes the agent keep his eye on his subjective attitude *towards* action, instead of simply finding his attitude *in the act.*

So much for the connection between ideal and criterion, and the identity of each with the act organically viewed, or referred to self as self. How as to motive? That again names the organic act from a certain side—the side of the interest as the act because expressing the self. It names the extent to which the ideal and criterion are such in deed, and not in name: the extent, that is, to which they are one with action. An ideal which does not move is no part of the self and hence not an ideal or guide to action. A criterion which is not an application of character, an individualized, habitual view of considering conduct, is mere knowledge that other persons think well of an act; it is second handed information. A man's ways of judging acts—his standard—are just as much a part of himself as are the performance of the acts. The judging is one way of acting. The real criterion is the way of estimating action; the value which the self puts upon it, the interest it takes i. e., motive.

We have now finished our study of approbation, or the conscious value attached to action, on the sides both of the good (ideal) and its standard. We have seen that action is itself the process of measuring and defining goods, and that ideal and standard both come into existence as phases of action. We have seen that conscious action *is* the process of approbation involving the development of a general standard of reference and its translation into definite terms. In all this it is implied that the act measures the agent, and that the act

tests the standard as well as the standard the act. It is this implication to which we now pass.

CHAPTER VI.

Section XXX. Reflective Approbation, or Conscience.

The identity of agent and act has been our guiding principle. Because of this identity, we have insisted that impulse, ideal, motive and standard, all express various phases of character. But so far we have overtly considered this identity only on the side of the passing forth of the agent into act, showing that the act is the conclusion of the process of estimating value entered upon whenever any impulse is referred to its probable consequences. This also means, as just said, that the act in manifesting character, reveals it—makes *it* a subject of judgment. This reaction of a deed back into the estimation of character, the reflective weighing of character and motive in the light of the acts which express it, constitutes conscience. We measure the act by our controlling standard—*direct* approbation; we must equally measure our standard by the act as seen in its expression—*reflective* approbation and reprobation, with the involved ideas of merit and guilt.

The act from the standpoint of intention, that is the act in consciousness before performance, is an abstraction. The act as done, the deed with its import brought home, the act in consciousness completed, is concrete or individual. The abstraction, in intention, comes from the fact that character, the organized habits, the relatively permanent ideas, are taken for granted. The agent is *consciously* concerned only with the objective conditions under which the permanent, assumed ends take their particular shape. A man will measure land well only when he keeps his thought concentrated upon that one fact of measuring, abstracting both from his larger end (selling it, building a house, etc.), and from his largest end—self-expression. But this act done, its meaning in terms of his own life, as realized self, must to some degree, appear. Be-

fore, the act was defined, or measured, in terms of the objective conditions involved in its performance; now, it is measured, or appreciated, in terms of its significance for the self, one's own individuality. It is this fuller value, in its relation to the partial value, that constitutes *conscience*. It is the return of the ideal, the motive, the standard, back out of its abstraction into terms of character, of living self. We have first to notice the different sense which attaches to this return in the cases of the good and the bad act respectively.

The good man's ideal is the next thing to be done, the step which requires taking. But in so far as the agent is good, the act, no matter how specific, utters his whole self. The definite act and the generic end are one. It harmonizes his powers, reducing his impulses, both primary and induced, to unity. His whole self being in the act, the deed is solid and substantial, no matter how trivial the outer occasion. As Aristotle says (Ethics, Book I., ch. x., p. 12), the nobility of the good man shines through ignoble circumstance. The good man *always* builds better than he knows. Furthermore, the very aim of the good man is itself a unification in thought, as the deed is in act, of the realities of the situation. (See Sec. VI.) His intent lines up, focuses the demands of life. In doing the deed, then, the universe of Reality moves through him as its conscious organ. Hence the sense of the dignity and validity of the act—the essence of the religious consciousness. Hence the joy, the feeling of full life, and the peace, the feeling of harmonized force, which accompany the good act. The "moral sense," on the part of the good man, is this realization of himself in his deed, the consciousness of the deed in its organic significance.

The moral consciousness is thus one with the consciousness of the act. The joy is in the act itself, not in the goodness of the agent as distinct from the act; the peace is found in doing the deed; it is not an end to be reached by the deed as a means. The moral consciousness is not a distinct thing, apart from the act: *it is the act realized in its full meaning*. We

instinctively recognize that there is something unhealthy in over-conscious morality. There is a Pharisaic paradox, as well as a hedonistic one. As pleasure can be got only by aiming at something else, so the consciousness of moral worth, the sense of right doing, can be had only when it is not sought for. And there is a necessary reason for this: the consciousness of goodness is the consciousness of a completely unified self. If the agent is thinking of his own glory, or credit, or moral worth, or improvement, he is, by that fact, *divided;* there is the deed to be performed, *and* the reflex of it into himself. In so far as the latter is the real motive for action, the interest is not in the act as self (or in the acting self), but in the act as means to a state of enjoyment (in the mere getting a certain experience). Attention to the act is, of necessity, partial, for it does not absorb interest. Hence the moral emotion which is the internalizing of complete activity, or attention, is missed.

Mackenzie (Manual, p. 164) takes the ground that conscience refers only to wrong doing; that good action is unconscious of itself. That there is no *separate* consciousness of good action follows, indeed, from the above. But when Mackenzie says (p. 338, sec. ed.) that there is probably *no* pleasure of conscience proper, since (i) the moral ideal can hardly be attained, and (ii) "if any individual did attain it, he would attain it only by a devotion to objective ends, which would exclude the possibility of any feeling of self-satisfaction," he seems to me to make the moral life absolutely meaningless (i) The first assertion sets up our old friend, the 'abstract ideal' (Sec. XXI.), not a working ideal, and brings out a further objection to it. The continual non-attainment must mean continual dissatisfaction. Healthy interest in work for its own sake, the only genuine and self-persisting form of morality, is rendered impossible. Instead, we must have an anxious craving for a remote future and a restless irritation with the present. (Humility means not that what we have done is worthless, but that its *present* worth is the *use* we can make of it; humility is willingness to throw the past achievement into the stream of life, instead of clinging to it as a life preserver. And so aspiration is not a striving for a vaguely higher ideal, but the tense muscle, the full interest in the present deed. It is humility on its positive side, or utilized for the future.) (ii) The second assertion brings out the contradiction in the doctrine of self-realization when self is conceived as remote, or is presupposed as in any way existing outside the definite act. There is no alternative apparently save

choice of a self-satisfaction which is exclusive and, really, hedonistic, or a devotion to objective ends which does not mean self-satisfaction—in reality, asceticism or self-sacrifice. All this, because it is not seen that devotion to objective ends (*i. e.*, the mediation of impulse) *is* self-satisfaction. No theory which sets up a self at large can recognize that the only satisfaction which really satisfies is the interest, the value of the act itself. Only a doctrine which sees self to be specific, defined activity can admit the consciousness of satisfaction, or good, as a normal fact, and yet not set it up as a separate (and therefore hedonistic) aim. To it, there is no self save in the conscious act; no consciousness of satisfaction save the interest, the value, of the act itself.

This disposes of the "disguised selfishness" theory concerning virtue, the argument that the good man gets his satisfaction out of the good act as much as the bad man out of the evil act. Of course he does, and more. But it is a misunderstanding, already dealt with, to suppose this means that he does the act *for* his satisfaction; he does it *as* his satisfaction. What makes him a good man is precisely the fact that such acts *are* his interest, his satisfaction. In the good man, the act measures or exhibits the interest; the self is only in the moving act; in the bad man, the act is done for the sake of a self, an interest, outside the act; it is measured by a fixed self. (A good ethical statement here is Mackenzie, Manual, App. B, IV.; a good psychological statement, James, Psy., vol. I., ch. 10.)

Section XXXI.—Moral Condemnation.

The recognition that an act is evil (moral condemnation or consciousness of guilt) takes quite a different form, though based on the same principle. Were all our acts approved, we should have no moral consciousness *distinct* in any way from our consciousness of action; but reprobation means a distinct, a reflex, consciousness. We are morally glad *in*, not for, our deed; but we are sorry *for* it. The condemning judgment is one which stands, in a sense, outside of the act as well as within it. It holds the act out; looks back upon it and feels its unworthiness as measured by a standard self, up to which the act has not come. This consciousness of division, of act

and self, value *and* standard, is the very essence of the troubled conscience. Yet, in principle, the consciousness of evil is the same as consciousness of good; *i. e.*, it is the realization of an act in its full meaning, as brought out through doing the deed. But the *meaning* of the bad act *is* division; the agent has intended an unreality; his aim, his ideal, has been severed from the conditions of the situation, from the realities of the universe; he has set up a *merely* subjective end, and thus isolated himself. In so far as the performance of the act reveals the true nature of the act, there is recoil, rebound; the deed kicks. The agent feels his separation. The dissatisfaction of the act performed reveals the unrealty, the split of self.

Hence the peculiar dualism in all remorse. The agent at once feels the extremest repugnance at the very thought of the act, would repel it as far from himself as possible, and yet feels that that act was his very self—knows, indeed, that he feels this repulsion just because the act was himself. As *his*, the act holds him, fascinates him, perhaps to the point of morbidness; literature is filled with accounts of this binding, gnawing, insistent character of evil done. As not *truly* himself, because unreal and false in its very nature, the agent is repelled, he attempts to thrust out the memory, to drown remorse and deaden conscience; to have "the damned spot *out.*" The contradiction of these two sides of remorse marks the emergence in consciousness of the contradiction in the act itself. No one intends an act save as good; but the completed act stands forth as most thoroughly not good.

The moral condemnation, in other words, is directed essentially at the ideal and standard of the act. Not because the agent consciously aimed at evil does he have the guilty conscience, but because the good (ideal) aimed at was of such a kind as to show a character which takes for good that which in the light of enlarged character is seen as evil. Again, guilt is imputed not because the agent already had a standard of good and then fell short of it. On the contrary, the remorse

is, for the first time, the experience of shortcoming. The guilt is imputed because it reveals the previous standard of good. How unworthy my character must have been, how defective myself to have such a conception of value! The evil was radical, not simply in the act; it was in the way the self determined, or measured good, in the way it set up ends as approved. Prior to the act, the agent measures by his existing standard of good, and does the deed as good; afterward, the deed, in its full content, reveals his own character, and thus measures the standard.

It is implied that the very condemnation, the consciousness of evil, means the consciousness of a new standard of a higher good. If the agent is still on the same level as that in which he performed the act, no compunctions arise. The act is still good to him, and he is still good as exhibited in that act. Only because the bad act brings to light a new good in its own badness manifested. The reaction of the deed into character, in other words, brings that character to consciousness; it shows character its own powers and requirements, and thus enables it to pass judgment upon, *i. e.*, to appreciate, its own unworthiness. Moral condemnation, in fine, if really moral, if itself approvable, is of itself always *repentance* or the beginning of better things. Only because to some extent the self is moving more organically does it realize the disorganic character of its past efforts. Only the man becoming good recognizes evil as evil.

From this appears the duty of the agent with reference to his experiences of guilt, or unworthiness. It is *not* to experience them for themselves, but to get their reaction into character. One is to dwell on his mistakes and shortcomings just enough to get the meaning, the instruction, the mediation of impulse and habit, which is in them. The more the attention is turned upon the bad act *in itself*, the more that act becomes a fixed, external thing, a finality; the dwelling upon the fact that one *has* done a bad act is positively demoralizing save as one gets from it correction and stimulus for the future. It

simply widens the very division, hardens the very isolation, which is the badness, while the true function of *consciousness* of division is to enable one to heal the gap. In other words, one has the same duty regarding his experiences of guilt that he has regarding every other experience, viz., to use them, to make them functional in activity, instead of merely experiencing them.* It is a common fallacy to suppose that the mere experiencing of painful consequences from bad action has of itself any remedial power. As we noted (Sec. XXIV.), pleasures do not mean satisfaction; here we note that pains do not, of necessity, mean dissatisfaction. The "wicked" man may experience an indefinite mass of pain from his badness, and yet get none the better for it, if it is not reflected back into his character, is not used as a standpoint whence to measure his previous standard of good. And the professionally "good" man may get nothing out of his compunctions, his pangs of conscience. He may even, as a dilettanter, come to enjoy them, relishing them as indications of his sensitive moral nature. This happens when he isolates them, instead of using them as symptoms by which to locate, and correct, his unworthiness of character.

If the foregoing is correct, then ethical writers have tended immensely to exaggerate the distinction between regret and remorse, in holding that the former applies simply to consequences, having no moral meaning, while the latter refers to motive and is essentially moral. The true difference is simply one of perspective, of proportion; both relate to a *reaction of consequences into motive* as used to guide the latter. It is regret when duty demands that we do not dwell much upon the past bad act; when we can get the good of it without much reflection upon the unworthiness of a character which could

*The doctrine of 'salvation by grace,' as expressed in the writings of St. Paul, with the immense meaning attached to it-seems to have for its ethical content the first historical consciousness, on the part of humanity, that sin, when it becomes a *consciousness* of sin organically referred back to character, means, also a consciousness of a good which can take that evil up into itself and so conquer it, which, in fact, has already begun so to do.

assume such consequences. It is remorse (normal, not morbid) when in order to get the change of attitude for the future, it is necessary to realize, more radically, how unworthy was the self displayed in an act of such consequences. Regret and remorse stand on the same basis so far as the implication of character is concerned. One no more regrets the death of a friend, caused by himself without shadow of intent or carelessness, than he regrets the earthquake of Lisbon. He may, do infinitely more than regret it; he may be stunned and haunted by it; but 'regret' is as futile in one case as in the other.

It is impossible to give many references to distinctly ethical writers in agreement with the foregoing position. It is the view, in substance, of Emerson, expressed perhaps most definitely in his Essay on Compensation. The view regarding the essential defect of the Puritanic morality, viz., that it aimed at the moral consciousness by itself, has been very forcibly expressed in the various writings of James Hinton, and of William James, Sr.

Section XXXII.—Various Aspects of Conscience.

Conscience, as used in common speech, is a term as wide as the entire moral consciousness of man. It is absurd, accordingly, for theory to attempt to narrow the word to some technical or special meaning. But common speech indicates by the word, at different times, certain typical phases of the moral consciousness, and theory may follow with a description of these typical phases.

1. We hear of a tender, a hardened conscience, the pangs, pricks, compunctions, pains and joys of conscience. This evidently refers to conscience as an *emotional fact*; the interest of the act as brought home to the agent in terms of his own feelings.

2. We hear of the voice of conscience, conscience telling us to do this and that, of an enlightened conscience, of educating conscience, etc. Here we are thinking of the *intellectual* content of the moral consciousness; moral judgments as a system of truth, of ideals and standards.

3. We also hear of the commands of conscience, of its majesty, its inviolability, that aspect which Kant terms "cate-

gorical imperative." Here is clearly indicated the *authoritativeness* of any act recognized as moral.

SECTION XXXIII.—CONSCIENCE AS THE MORAL SENTIMENTS.

The intellectual aspect of conscience is most conveniently discussed in connection with the question of intuitionalism and empiricism; that of the authority of conscience in connection with obligation.

Concerning the emotional side of conscience, it is hardly necessary to do more than gather together the scattered threads of what has already been said. The purport of the theory, as already developed, is that the valuation of an act assumes an objective and a subjective form. The objective is the analysis of the act into its various conditions, its definition or limitation—the ideal, intention, etc. The subjective is the feeling excited in the individual, by either the contemplation of the act in thought or by its actual execution in deed. The thought, the intention, is not colorless; it represents a projection of the self, and the moral emotion is simply the realization by an individual of the value of the projected act for himself and as an individual. The thought of every act must have, therefore, its own peculiar, qualitative, emotional accompaniment. We are somehow *affected* toward every plan. Hope, fear, disgust, tedium, love, hate, etc., etc., so far as excited not directly by some object, but the *thought of an object as an end to be reached* (so far as mediated by ideas of acts) are thus all forms of moral consciousness, on the emotional side. Such feelings are evidently no adequate criterion of the act. On the contrary, they depend upon that which needs judgment—individual character —and vary with (See Sec. XXVII.)

The emotions which are usually picked out as peculiarly ethical, correspond to the generalized ideals already spoken of (Sec. XXIX.). When the feared or hoped for end is itself brought into relation with the self as a whole, with organized character, an emotional response appears which is 'moral' in a definite sense. A person who is susceptible to such reactions

is the one with tender or acute conscience; it is natural for him to feel the indwelling reference of character as a whole to any special act; if a child, we say his moral nature is easily appealed to.

To a considerable extent, this sensativeness to given acts as expressions of the whole character is a natural gift, a temperamental quality; one person always differs in kind and range of it from every other. This consideration shows how little we can rest in this emotional response as an ultimate fact, or regard, it as an adequate criterion for the distinction between right and wrong.* It is, psychologically, simply one phase of aesthetic susceptibility in general. Like all the other phases, its moral value lies not in itself but in the use to which it is put, the ends to which it is made subservient. A "sensitive" conscience may become an ingredient of a bad character, and a somewhat inert one a factor of a good character. The former happens when the sensitiveness leads the individual to taking the easiest way out of moral difficulties, as relieving a beggar simply to quiet the clamor of his own "conscience," or hiding scenes of sin and misery from himself because they pain him so greviously. The latter happens whenever the inertness is changed into the habit of looking every situation squarely in the face as it comes, and deciding it on its own merits, without regard to the merely personal feeling awakened by it. Over pietistic training has almost always tended to make the emotional response of conscience a criterion in itself, instead of recognizing that it is a part of conduct to which the same responsiblity for right use attaches, as to the passion of anger, or the desire for food.

So far as responsibility for the emotional side of conscience is concerned, the great need is to insure that emotion take the form of *interest*—that is, satisfaction in the working out of an idea into deed,—and not the form of *mere feeling*, even though it be called "moral feeling." In the main, this is secured just

*As some writers, naming it "moral sense," have considered it.

in so far as there is interest in the deed *on its own account*—just as the artist is interested in painting his picture, the chess-player in his game, the engineer in the execution of his drainage project, etc. It must be remembered that every deflection or defect of interest as to the deed itself, means lack of attention to it, and means diversion of thought in some other direction, and hence, of necessity, something slighted, scrimped or distorted in the act itself. Completeness of action and complete possession of consciousness (full interest) by the thought of the act are synonomous terms.

In this sense, the moral emotion, or interest, and the artistic interest, are identical.* Both, to be genuine, are interests in adequate, non-slighted execution of ideas; a phrase which, after all, means only undivided, organic, pure interest in the act itself. The artist whose chief interest is in his product, *qua* product,† and not as fulfillment of a process (who separates, that is, the thought of the completed house from the steps necessary on his part to complete it, who looks at the making of a statue as a *mere means* to the objective statue) is, by that very fact, so far short as an artist. He has not sufficient interest in his performance to give it the care and attention it demands. *A fortiori*, any interest which looks beyond the objective result to the reflex of that result into personal profit or credit is partial and must manifest itself in a partial—that is, inartistic-execution.

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*I say 'artistic,' not 'æsthetic.' Artistic interest is interest in the *execution* of an idea; in its assumption of that concrete fullness of detail which is realization. Aesthetic interest is interest rather in the contemplation of some idea *already* executed. It is the difference between art as a process to the *artist* and a *work* of art to the spectator. The latter *may* free activity in the beholder and so be artistic in turn; but it may stop in itself, in the mere self-absorbed feeling awakened. All the attacks, worth considering, of moralists upon art as meaning self-indulgence, effiminateness, corruption, etc., seem to me to rest on the confusion of artistic with æsthetic.

†"You look to the result, you want to see some profit of your endeavors: that is why you would never learn to paint, if you lived to be Methusalem." Stevenson, in The Wrecker.

It is necessary, however, not to be too rigid in our conception of the act; not to attempt to draw lines too narrowly as to just where the act itself begins or leaves off and external considerations come in. A man who should write a book for the mere sake of fame would not be, relatively, much of a writer; his aim would not direct him; yet the thought of fame may become fused with the thought of the book and add a deepened touch of interest to his work. A man who should carry on a profession simply for the sake of supporting his family would be partial in his morality, and would reveal his moral disintegration by carelessness at some critical juncture. But the *identification* of his family's welfare with the pursuit of his calling reinforces, by so much, his attention to his business, the fullness with which he gives his whole mind to his duties.

In the same way, appeals to personal profit or loss often do not have the selfish (in the bad sense) meaning, which, at first sight, attaches to them. A man's indignation at some cruelty to humanity is often first stirred by some bitter experience of his own. A cynic may contend that all his efforts are now put forth simply because of the personal injury he himself has suffered; as matter of fact, the appeal to his own interest may mean simply an enlargement of himself. The shock has acted as a stimulus to call his attention to matters previously ignored; it has revealed to him his own implication in that which had previously seemed external. So a man may first be awakened to the public's need of improvement of transit facilities, or sanitation, by coming himself to own property in the needy region; but it is, psychologically, poor taste to assume that of necessity such an one is moved simply by his own advantage. It may again be that his own personal interest serves as a connecting link in giving a stimulus to attention."

This principle gives a basis* for judging concerning the

*See, again, James, Psy., vol. I., pp. 317–329, especially pp. 325–327. Alexander, Moral Order, pp. 317–323 is helpful, though he seems to give too personal a definition to interest. The statement "when its worth a man's while to do wrong, the guilt lies as often with others as with himself," may be safely changed, I think, into the statement that whenever there is opposition between principle and interest, there is always a responsibility upon others to change the conditions which make the individual conceive of himself in the narrow way.

moral value of rewards and punishments; of appeals to do a deed because of the profit it will bring self, or because it will please parent or friend or God to have the act done. So far as these ends tend to become distinct ends, *substituted* for the act itself, the latter being reduced to a *means*, the tendency is thoroughly immoral. If these appeals are used as stimuli to bring *the self to consciousness of itself*, to *bring home to self* the real intrinsic nature of the deed needing to be done, in so far the effect is moral—provided always these instrumentalities are the most efficient ones, under the circumstances, in effecting this end.

Our general principle enables us to deal with the assertion that a pure conscience always is attached to the right "for the sake of the right." Correctly interpreted, this statement is true to the point of truism, but many who insist upon it appear to interpret it so as to make it false theoretically, and dangerously sentimental practically. In reality, to do a thing for the sake of its rightness means to do it for its *own* sake; the rightness is not an *end beyond* with reference to which the act is a means; it simply names that phase of the end or aim which confers upon it a claim to pass into act. Rightness names the quality of the deed in itself as the fully mediated activity, or expressed self. We may say that 'right' is primarily and fundamentally an *adverb;* we are to act *rightly*, in a certain way or fashion. It then becomes an adjective; the deed is 'right' when performed in this way. Finally, it is a noun. Rightness simply denominates this quality wherever found. To make it an end in itself is to set up a sheer abstraction for the moral ideal. The result is the same as when moral approbation, or a satisfied conscience, is made the end. (See p. 75.) The end lying beyond the act, attention to the latter is partial and diverted; the act is only partially, that is, *wrongly*, done.* The theory avenges itself.

* When Green says (Works, vol. II., pp. 335–336) "The highest moral goodness . . . . issues in acts done for the sake of their goodness . . . . But it is impossible that an act should be done for the sake of its goodness, unless it has been previously contemplated as good for some other reason than that which consists in its being done for the sake of its goodness," he seems to fall into this error. Of course, acts done earlier as good are done later with a deeper consciousness of what their goodness consists in, but this is quite a different matter. Upon the whole subject, see Bradley, Studies, Essay II.

Yet there can be no doubt that conflicts arise, times when interest in the act itself and interest in right as such do not immediately coincide. In times of great temptation, or at periods of change, when it is necessary to do some act so novel that as yet it does not present interest for its own sake, such conflicts occur. We feel that the right in general demands that the act be done, and yet the act, in itself, is decidedly a bore or even repulsive. Or we feel that an act which has all the argument of attractiveness on its side must be foregone simply for the sake of right. Moreover, it is precisely at such junctures that moral fibre is made. Only through such discipline is character other than wishy-washy. Only at such periods is morality freed from extraneous recommendations, and the self thrown back naked upon itself in its own innate vigor. Do not these facts contradict the theory laid down?

The apparent contradiction vanishes the moment we subject the meaning of 'Right' in general to analysis. The conflict then turns out to be not between interest or self, and moral law or principle, but between two selves, between an interest in the act narrowly viewed, and an interest in the act more fully realized. My interest as a momentary being, with capacities for enjoyment, may be in some self-indulgence; my interest in myself as a member of a family is in abstinence; my interest in myself as, abstractly, a person who can procure enjoyment out of possession is in getting the better of my customer in a bargain; my interest in my self as actively participating in the interchanges of life is in honor and good faith. In other words, the Right which demands loyalty to itself in spite of the inducements of immediate interest, is not some Rightness at large; is a view of the particular act as expressing the self wholly and not partially. And in general, whenever there is talk of a conflict between a lower and a higher self, a material and a spiritual self, and of the necessity of sacrificing one to the other, as identical with sacrificing self-interest to the demands of Law and Right, it will be found hat the lower self, the interest, is a partial, passive, possessing

self; the higher self, the Right, is not some abstraction, but is the self *performing some concrete function*, as father, neighbor or citizen.

We conclude, then, with the statement that the emotional side of conscience expresses the interest which every working ideal and act have for the self—have by their very nature psychologically.*

SECTION XXXIV. — NATURE OR CONSCIENCE AS MORAL KNOWLEDGE.†

The intuitional theory holds that conscience is a peculiar faculty which gives man, directly and immediately, knowledge of principles, or rules, of right. In attacking the opposed theory of empiricism, it is quite customary, however, for the intuitionalists to shift their ground, and substitute a doctrine of the *intrinsic nature* of rightness for a doctrine of *immediate knowledge* of it. There is no necessary connection between these two standpoints; rightness may be a quality which belongs to acts in themselves (and not because of any considerations or results extraneous to the acts) and yet it not be known, except through experience, in what this rightness consists. Any relation made known by physical science certainly belongs to mass and energy in their own intrinsic character (if true, at all), but it does not follow that we perceive these relations upon bare inspection of the facts. It takes experience,

*While not in all cases discussing the same questions, the standpoint of Alexander seems to be close to that of the previous pages. In addition to reference already given, see Moral Order, pp. 148–160; 181–193; 324–332. See Stephen, Science, pp. 311–339, and 396–417. On "moral sense," Mackenzie, Manual, pp. 49–52 and references there given. Also references in next section An interesting though (it appears to me) somewhat abstract view of moral emotions will be found in Laurie, Ethica, chs. 8, 23, 26 and 27. Schmidt, Das Gewissen, contains an interesting account of the historical development of ideas about conscience, from the early Greek and Hebrew period to the present. It includes much more than the emotional side. A further statement of the doctrines of 'higher' and 'lower' selves will be found in Dewey, Outlines, pp. 216–220. A discussion of a point barely alluded to in the foregoing will be found in Sharp, Aesthetic Element in Morality.

†This is to be interpreted as knowledge of right and wrong, not of obligation. To that, a further section is devoted.

often long and painful, to bring home to us these "intrinsic" qualities; there is every reason to believe the same is the case with the quality of rightness. It is no more a matter of direct perception, than is the law of gravitation. It will be found upon careful reading most modern intuitionalists that they are really concerned to uphold the real and necessary character of the moral distinctions in themselves, rather than any special theory regarding the way in which these distinctions are made known.

A good historical sketch of intuitionalism will be found in Sidgwick, History, pp. 167–200, 213–224. The same author gives a theoretical analysis in Methods, Book I. chs. 8 and 9, and Book III. The following will indicate the positions of some of the modern intuitionalists. Martineau, Types, Book I., Part II., Vol. II., especially pp. 17–64; Calderwood, Moral Philosophy; Maurice, Conscience; Rickaby, Moral Philosophy; Janet, Theory of Morals.

A good criticism of ordinary intuitionalism will be found in Porter, Elements of Moral science, ch. X; while in ch. VIII. will be found a theory of reflective intuitionalism.

In general the intuitional theory in its older form has been shattered by a series objections which may be summed up as follows: The intuitional theory, instead of saving the necessary and objective character of moral distinction, swamps them all in the merely subjective consciousness. An appeal to "intuition" as final means in reality an appeal to purely individual opinion, to the dogmatic deliverance, or the unproved sentiment of this or that man. If we go outside the "intuitions" of the individual, there is left only an appeal to a vague common-sense, which is often unenlightened, the product of mere custom and prejudice. In general, intuitionalism leads to the consecration of established opinion. It allows every existing creed and institution to resist challenge and reform by the assertion, "I represent an eternal and necessary intuition."*

* These are, in substance, the trenchant objections of Bentham, Principles, chs. I and II. The objection to intuitions as always inuring practically to the conservative party is as old as Locke, see Essay, Book I. It largely determined Stuart Mill's standpoint. See Autobiography, pp. 273–74.

The development of historical and comparative science and of the doctrine of evolution have dealt the theory hard blows. The former has revealed the great variety of ideas conscientiously maintained upon matters of right and wrong in different ages and in different peoples, and also largely accounted for this variety of ideas by showing their relativity to types of social life. The latter theory, as it gains in acceptance, leaves no room for belief in any faculty of moral knowledge separate from the whole process of experience, and cuts the ground out from under any store of information given directly and immediately.* The modern standpoint and method in psychology also make it almost impossible to attach any intellegent meaning to the thought of a special faculty of knowledge.

On strictly ethical ground, the value of such moral intuitions, if we had them, would be open to grave question. Intuitionalism would take the form of knowledge either (a) that this or that *particular* act is right, or (b) that certain *kinds* of action (honesty, chastity, etc.) are right. The former alternative would be useful if the essence of morality were a short cut to doing the exact things which are right. But if we abandon this materialistic ethics, and recognize that the heart of morality is development of character, a certain spirit and method in all conduct, such intuitions would much lessen the range of self-expression, and render hard and mechanical what little remains. It would shut out all that growth of character, all that opening up of consciousness and experience of values that comes in the search for and testing of right and wrong; it would leave the individual simply with the sheer, arbitrary decision to abide or not to abide by the right once for all revealed.

*The first objection is generally met by intuitionalists by holding that certain ultimate principals are alike, though their 'application' varies. This transfers the ground entirely from a question of mode of knowledge to a question of validity of content. In connection with the theory of evolution, Spencer's contention that it restores a modified intuitionalism (empirical for the race, intuitional, by inheritance of consolidated experience, for the individual) is to be noted. Data, pp. 123–124.

If intuition reveals general principles, then the responsibility of the individual is limited simply to their application. More than this, moral principles once for all made known go necessarily with an *external* ideal and standard. Casuistry—the consideration of an act from the standpoint of different rules, in order to see *under* which one it is to be brought—is a necessary outcome.

The term 'intuition' has a popular as well as a philosophic sense. Examination indicates that the popular sense is really much more philosophical than the one professedly so. In practical life, we mean by intuition the power to seize as a whole, in a single and almost instantaneous survey, a complete group of circumstances. It is the power to read off at a glance the meaning of a given situation. It is opposed *not* to experience, but to abstract logical reflection. It is the outcome, on the theoretic side, of habit on the practical side. A custom of dealing with a certain sort of facts and conditions often gives an almost incredible facility in coming to an immediate conclusion. When the quality is largely temperamental, we term it (or rather the response in action based upon it) 'tact'; developed through experience, it constitutes the 'expert.' The architect sizes up a plan at once, and is prepared to act. The landscape gardener takes in at a look the possibilities of a certain 'lie' of ground, and sketches its future development, etc.

In this practical sense, much of our moral knowledge is constantly assuming the form of intuitions. The demand for quick appreciation of conditions for action in general is much greater than it can be in any one special direction, like carpentry, or treatment of guests. Thus every individual comes to have ways of judging action which are practically instinctive.* It must also be remembered that the whole experience goes on in terms of the individual self. Both initiating impulse and mediating idea are acts of self. This reference to self always limits the field for reflection, and also makes this field a whole, a self-contained unity. That a man should get intimate prac-

*See Dewey, Psy., pp. 344–46.

tical acquaintance with self, should come to appreciate quickly his own deepest concerns, that he should form habits so fundamental that they at once take up a given set of facts into themselves and thus judge its value—all this is matter for no surprise.* Two qualifications are to be noted. First, such intuitions are not an ultimate criterion. They test individual character, because they are functions of it; that is, the kind of judgments immediately passed shows the kind of character engaged in making the judgment. No *moral* judgment is ever *merely* intellectual, because it reflects the aims and interests of the judge. These intuitions must, therefore, upon occasion submit themselves to wider judgment, must become conditions of a fuller character. Secondly, strength of moral character demands a continued tension between the reflective and intuitive sides, as between conscious aim and habit. (See pp. 18–19.) The intuitive side means quickness, certainty, and, above all, concreteness and solidity; the reflective side is the demand for continued mediation, for continued reaction of the whole into the part, for enlargement of scope. It means delay, but a delay which permits a wider field to be surveyed; uncertainty, but an uncertainty which makes the final making up of one's mind more reasonable.

The empirical theory of conscience is that the individual has no immediate knowledge of right and wrong, either as to particular acts or general principles, but that such knowledge is the outgrowth of continued experience. Logically, this is all the empirical theory is required to mean; and in this strict sense, empiricism seems to be true. The theory, however, has no special meaning, until there is a further analysis of what experience is. In general, the saying that "knowledge results from experience" is a meaningless one; the point of interest is always in the question *how* experience gives birth to knowledge.

*Emerson has stated the intuitive character of moral knowledge as a result of the individual's own activity more clearly than any moralist. See, for example, his Essay on Self-Reliance.

The force of this general statement is apparent when we note that historically the ethical empiricist has gone far beyond the harmless statement above made, and insisted that moral knowledge comes from a calculation of the consequences of the act, those consequences lying outside the content of the act itself. In other words, the empiricists have, as a rule, been hedonists, and have interpreted their empiricism as meaning that moral quality is *extrinsic* to the act, lying in the results of the act in the way of pleasure and pain, not intrinsic to the act itself.

Thus the *negative* side of both intuitionalism and empiricism has been their strength. The empiricist has kept up his side by denying that we have immediate knowledge of right; the intuitionalist has sustained his by denying that moral quality is found in considerations alien to the act's own structure. Both have failed in interpreting the positive significance of their own contentions. The failure of empiricism need hardly be re-argued here. The force of the objections already brought against pleasure as standard finally comes back to the idea that pleasure as a result, lies outside the act itself, outside the character of the person willing the act, and, therefore, is accidental, externally variable, incapable of being foreseen, tending to produce either undue laxity or undue anxiety—in general, unusable.

On the ground of the principles hitherto advanced, experience *is* precisely the mediation of impulse; the execution of impulse brings it to consciousness, shows the meaning for life as a whole of that impulse in particular. By reaching in a certain way (that is, in connection with other impulses of ear or eye) we find out what this impulse means, its value, in terms both of the content of the impulse, the object (ball, or hot iron or whatever) and in terms of the place which that object occupies in our own sentient experience—pleasure or pain. Experience is the revelation of the meaning of our impulse, of our acting selves. As such, there must be all the regard to consequences in forming aims, and using standards,

which the most extreme empiricist could urge. But these consequences are not extrinsic to the act—they are the act unfolded, defined. (See Sec. XII. A most suggestive illustration and formulation of this principle will be found in vol. I., No. 6 of Philosophical Review, article by James.)

CHAPTER VI.—OBLIGATION.

Section XXXV.—The Psychology of Obligation.

A typical phase of conscience is indicated by such phrases as 'I ought, am bound,' 'it is my duty,' to act thus and so. There is here a consciousness of a double relation. 'I ought to go to my business today' means there is an agent on one side, and a certain idea on the other; that the former owes something to the latter, while the latter imposes a certain necessity (a *bounden* somewhat) on the former (Duty, due, debt; ought, owe.) What is the meaning of this peculiar relation between agent and ideal? This problem becomes clearer when we compare it with the question of the good. In that also, there is a distinction between immediate agent and ideal; the one being in a condition of lack and effort, and the other expressing satisfaction, and a completed act. But both terms of the relation are in the same line of movement. The immediate self is striving to attain the good; the good is this striving satisfied. But in duty, the distinction between present self and ideal seems pushed to the point of dualism. The present self does not want, of itself, it would seem, to realize the ideal; the latter rather presents itself as a demand, an exaction, if not a coercion. It stands over against the agent and utters the "categorical imperative" (Kant), 'thou shalt,' 'thou oughtst,' instead of drawing the agent on by its own intrinsic attractiveness.

Were the relation one of sheer compulsion or coercion, however, the problem, in some respects, would be easier to deal with. We could, at least, class it with other exhibitions of brute force; the relation would be simply one case of a superior

energy overcoming a lesser. But, on the contrary, in spite of all the apparent opposition and resistance between agent and ideal, the consciousness of duty carries with it the sense of a fundamental underlying identity. The sense of obligation is not the sense of a stronger alien force bearing down; it is rather the sense that the obligatory act is somehow more truly and definitely one's self than the present self upon which the obligation is imposed. 'I ought to do this act,' implies that 'this act' is really "I"; in so far as the idea of the act is felt as merely alien to self, it is felt as irritating, as something to be got rid of, not as authoritatively binding.

We thus have before us, in a descriptive way, the main features of the consciousness of duty. It is a consciousness of the present self in relation to an idea of action, this relation involving (a) a certain opposition and conflict between the two, based on the reluctance of the immediate self to identify itself in action with the idea, and thus realize it, and (b) a consciousness that in reality the ideal is a more adequate expression of the self than is the present agent.

The psychology of this relation may be most easily approached by a return to the distinction of self as immediate and mediate. At a given time, there is always a certain body of positive impulse and habit urging forward for complete expression. But this very structure, in its expression, stimulates certain other tendencies and activities which are not, on their face, compatible with the prior activities which induced them. It is, for example, upon the basis of certain present activities that a person marries, or, again, engages in a certain profession. The activities corresponding to these latter engagements are stimulated by the former, and are, indeed, necessary to their normal psychological completion. Nevertheless, the person has now, as we say, "assumed the obligations" of a new condition or occupation. He cannot possibly continue his former habits unchanged; they must, moreover, not only be modified here and there, in pieces, but must be subordinated, readjusted to the new aims. Here we have the psy-

chical conditions for the feeling of obligation. The old habits tend to assert themselves; they maintain themselves by their own inertia and momentum. Moreover, it is highly important, from the moral standpoint (as well as necessary from the psychical) that they should do so. If the habits are entirely resolved, or disintegrated, there is no efficient instrumentality by which the new aims may realize themselves. The person relapses into a moral pulp. What is wanted is not the destruction of the old habits and desires, but their utilization in new directions. Now, just in the degree in which the habit is definite and efficient, it will resist an immediate and speedy assumption of a new direction. It is, upon the whole, safe to say that only in matters of slight importance, or of weak and unformed character, will the habit slip easily and naturally into new channels, and become, through its co-ordinations with other habits, a subordinate factor in a more comprehensive habit. It is of its very nature to continue its self-assertion.

And yet the newly aroused tendencies and ideas are organically connected with this habit. They are included within its self-assertion. The expression of the old habit carries *within itself* the making over of the old habit. The responsibilities of the new profession which demand a surrender of old acts and enjoyments, which acquire a redistribution of time, which impose changes in the direction of attention and interest—all this is not a visitor from an outside sphere, but arises from the former acts and impulses, the former interests and lines of attention. The new which requires the readjustment of the old is necessary to the integrity of the old. Hence the sense of finding *self* in the duty, the sense of unity, as well as of conflict and difference. The two sides in their tension give that consciousness of authority and subjection which is the marked phase of the sense of duty.

The sense of duty is thus a phenomenon of moral *progress*, appearing in so far as an intention or ideal demands the transformation of impulse and habit, by adapting them to instruments of its own realization. Without the new ideal, the habit

becomes monotonous and dead; sheer routine. Not being in tension with an aim, it falls entirely below consciousness, and thus loses all value and significance. It is the essence of habit to be *instrumental*, a means for accomplishing ends. If the end *has* been accomplished, the unmodified repetition of the habit is useless, and is paid for by disintegration; the habit sets up in business for itself, runs on its own account, and its action becomes at odds with the activity of the organism as a whole. The habit of eating, for example, has been initiated and developed with reference to the end of maintaining life; it is relative, as habit, to an organic function, and must, to be efficient be controlled constantly (held in check, be made to operate as to when, where and how much) by reference to the function.

Biologically and psychologically, it is a division of labor; yet, as such, it gets a certain independence and tends to isolation; to become the act of eating for the mere sake of eating.* This *tendency* is involved in its becoming a division of labor, with its own specific, defined structure and modes of operation. To do away with the *tendency* would be to destroy the specialization of structure, and relapse into a relatively unorganized life, one homogenous as to parts and organs.

The problem here arises, in other words, from the very nature of progress. Progress demands *definite* individualization, *specific* organization. It requires effective instruments, and no instrument is effective save as its structure is individualized with reference to the special service to be performed by it. As long as the movement to be accomplished is rough and bulky, one and the same physical lever will serve for a multitude of ends; let the ends to be reached become refined and valuable, the idea of leverage has to be differentiated into

* To recur to the ethics of hedonism, we thus get a criterion for the moral value of pleasures and pains. Any pleasure or pain is normal (moral) in so far as it accompanies the working of an organ which is stimulated into action by the demands of the organism as a whole; is pathological (immoral) in so far as the organ assumes to work *per se*, or on its own credit.

thousands of physical shapes, sizes and materials. Every instrument then, as instrument, must assert its own specific, differentiated character, or relapse into uselessness. But, on the other hand, it is the nature of progress to require that instruments be truly instrumental, that they *serve* for ideas, for ends. The instrument must be flexible, must be continually readjusted to meet new needs and requirements. This antithesis between differentiation, definition (stability) and coördination, interaction, (flexibility) gives, once more, the conditions involved in the consciousness of obligation.

The progressive action of any organism illustrates the same relationship. The eye represents in its structure definite habits of action; it represents a specialization of the whole organism for a certain purpose. It is effective and orderly just in the degree of its specialization. It must assert itself, assert *seeing*, and not attempt, upon occasion, to hear or to reach. There is, therefore, a continued tendency to isolation, a continued tendency *merely* to see. The healthy organism keeps this differentiated action in tension by rendering the habit of seeing adapted to the needs of other organs. The eye sees and only sees, but not for itself merely. It sees to help the hand reach, to help the legs walk, etc., etc. In short, there is a continued relative distinction and continued reconciliation, on basis of organic unity, of *structure* (organ) and *function*. The individual agent, as present self, is so much immediate impulse and habit, so much structure, a definite organ; while the ideal which demands a certain quality, a certain direction of the agent, stands for function, for organic service. In this process, 'organ' evidently stands for the self as distinguished, as partial, function for self as unified, as whole.

Here, as everywhere, both the conservative and the radical factors are required for progressive action, nay, for each other. An ideal, without existing habits and impulses which represent the past (impulses, the history of the race, habits, of the individual) has no machinery, no instrument of realization. It is in the air, impotent, sentimental, dreamy. The reform must

always be a re-form, a readjustment of the existing habits giving them new value. But the existing habits, save as they become subordinate factors in a larger value, lose their power. The past can be maintained only by being used, and that means readjusted. Left to itself, it decays, introducing friction. Power is lost, not conserved.

To sum up: The consciousness of obligation arises whenever there is felt the necessity of employing an existent habit or impulse to realize an end with which it is connected on the basis of present need, though not of past history. Its peculiar double relationship arises from the fact that it is the nature of habit and impulse *in themselves*, or abstractly, to demand immediate discharge on the basis of their own past; thus they tend to resist readjustment, and go their own way. But habits and impulses are, after all, developed with reference to the needs of the organism; the habit is not isolated, but connected, and the consciousness of this functional connection comes out in the recognition that the required thing is somehow bound up with our own being, and not imposed from without.

This connection of duty with critical periods, periods of a greater or less readjustment, of adaptation of old habits to new needs, determines the extent to which the *consciousness* of duty should, normally, enter into conduct. Practical common sense recognizes two extremes equally repugnant to it. On one side is the character which professes to bring every act, from small to great, in connection with duty; which professes to perform every act under the guidance of a stern sense of duty—which never lets itself go, never plays morally. Our repulsion to this standpoint as pedantic, narrow, as indicating an ungenerous disposition, making us suspect hypocrisy, is justified by the previous analysis. It is true that every act of the moral man should, objectively viewed, be a dutiful act; it should always be possible to say of it (that is, when it is reflected upon) that it was the act which, under the given conditions, ought to have been performed. But it by no means follows that because every moral act is dutiful (i. e., right) that it should be accom-

panied with a distinct sense of obligation. On the contrary, since the larger number of the acts of a decent man is covered by some general plan in pursuance with which they occur, the normal attitude in these cases is that of unconsciousness of duty. The act is taken care of by the general line of attention, by the comprehensive interest. It falls, in so far, within the habit of action; the tension between habit and plan or ideal is slight. The reflection or tension, between immediate act and mediating idea, necessary for value, is simply by reflection upon means, upon the best expedients or instrumentalities for realizing the end. Think of the moral futility of a mother caring for her child, a business man following his calling, by accompanying all acts with consciousness of duty! There is not sufficient reconstruction of ends to demand any such consciousness, and if it enters in, it is forced and unreal.

But there is another moral tendency which insists that duty must be swallowed up in inclination and love—that so far as one is moral, he performs all his acts with no consciousness of authority and subjection, no sense of bounden duty, but from the overflowing spontaneity of his own affection. Practical sense, without being able to give its reasons, is as suspicious of this view as of the other. Analysis reveals the reasons. The steady affection, the direct outflow of interest, will cover all actions which lie within the scope of any one end, less or greater. But when the acts appropriate to that end are exhausted, when the end has become realized, a readjustment of attention is required. A new end comes in, and demands a rearrangement, a reform, of older habits and interests. This means suspense, resistance, conflict, the sense of subjection and of authority in some form. Were there no critical periods, no times of readjustment, the absorption of duty in direct inclination would occur, but so long as they come—so long in other words, as progress through *relative* discontinuity or nodal points is the law of life—a character without sense of obligation is inadequate, slippery and wishy-washy. The practical is that there is no occasion to be con-

tinually stirring up the feeling of obligation, to be reminding one's self of it *ab extra*. Interest in work is the normal condition, and the open-minded man, with broad and flexible interest, will find that very interest, at critical periods of his work, force the problems of obligation upon him, without his hunting them up afield.

This connection of obligation with the periods of reconstruction in moral progress also accounts for the relativity, or better, the individuality,* of duty. Let theorists deal with the facts as they may, the facts remain that no two persons have or can have the same duties. It is only when we are dealing with abstractions that they appear the same. Truth-telling is a duty for all, but it is not the duty of all to tell the same truth, because they have not the same truth to tell. Any other conception is like the pedagogical theory which has mechanized our schools—that all the children are to recite the history, the geography, the arithmetic lesson in the same way. It is only the abstraction, the text-book, which is the same. The truth to each child is this abstract fact assimilated into his own interests and habits, and proceeding from them vitalized—free. The great underlying contradiction, the lie, in modern moral methods, is the assertion of individuality in name, and the denial of it in fact. Duty always expresses a relation between the impulses and habits, the existing structures of a concrete agent, and the ideal, intention, purpose which demands a new service of that structure. By the necessities of the case, it is only the general form of duty; the relationship between habit and demand, which is alike in different individuals, or in the same individual at different times. A

*The theories which have made so much of 'relativity' in ethics seem to me, without exception, to stop half way. The very idea of relativity implies that there is still somehow a single, absolute standard and duty for all, but that owing to circumstances or 'finitude' or some other unanalyzed category, we aren't up to it yet, and have to make a shift with our relative morality. Assume frankly once the standpoint of the *individuality* of conduct, and the whole relativity industry is outlawed, while all the facts brought out in its maintenance are amply preserved. The standard and process are absolute, but (and because) individual.

man of real self-control is no more conscious (save at critical junctures) of the duty of temperance than the thief is conscious of the duty of regard for property. In the former case, there is no impulse or habit to fall into tension with the demand for control, and hence no sense of duty—save again at the times when new circumstances flood in, arousing dormant impulses. In the latter case there is no ideal to create the tension. For consciousness of obligation to arise in the former case (save in conditions mentioned) indicates degeneration; in the latter case, it is the potency of reformation. Let this extreme instance serve to indicate the dependence of consciousness of duty upon individuality.

Other mooted questions with reference to obligation, the conflict of desire and duty, of interest and reason, of the 'ought' and the 'is,' will best be discussed in connection with the two types of one-sided theories of duty next to be considered. Each of these theories abstracts one phase of the relationship between immediate acting and mediate ideal, and by exaggerating it to cover the entire field, by denying or minimizing the other phase, presents a distorted view of moral experience. Here again we may consider the Stoic and Kantian ethics as the abstraction of the ideal side, and the hedonistic ethics as the abstraction of the direct side.

Section XXXVI.—The Kantian Theory of Obligation.

Kant's starting point is the unconditional character of morality. It admits of no exceptions; allows of no parleyings, of no if and buts. It says without compromise, "Thou oughtst." It does not follow, but precedes and commands inclination. It does not depend for its authority upon any desire or tendency towards itself; it rather requires of desire a certain quality and of tendency a certain direction. It proposes not a dependent, but an absolute end—it is a *categorical*, not a hypothetical imperative. Some commands read, "Do thus and so *if* you would reach a certain end"; but morality says, you *must* do this, you must have a certain kind of end in view.* Thus duty

* "There is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative is categorical. . . . This imperative may be called that of morality." Abbott's trans., p. 33; see whole passage, pp. 30–39; also pp. 112–144; 119–121; 125–127; 153.

imposes laws, while hypothetical aims, ends which presuppose a further end, can give rise only to either rules of skill—the most suitable ways of reaching that end—or to counsels of prudence—provisions for securing happiness.

Beside the universal, independent authoritative character of duty, its important feature is its relative opposition to immediate inclination. The notion of duty, says Kant (p. 13 of Abbott's trans.), implies certain subjective restrictions and hindrances. In other words, it is *imperative*, as well as categorical. The very fact that it takes the form of command, of law, of authority, implies a subject who may, if left to himself, resist.* As thus stated, the doctrine seems practically identical with that already laid down. This apparent identity is reinforced when we find that the source from which the 'categorical imperative' proceeds is not external to self or will, but is the self or will in its universal nature. Obligation is a relation holding between will in one aspect, that of universal rationality and validity, and will in another aspect, individual preference (*Willkühr*), not between will and any external end or power. Kant insists strenuously upon this point, terming true obligation '*autonomous*,' while false theories make it '*heteronomous*.' (See Abbott, pp. 50–54; 57–59; 72; 180–181.)

The identity disappears when we study in detail the meaning which Kant attaches to the conception of self as unconditional (authoritative) law-giver, and the relative opposition of this law-giving self to the subject-self. We shall find that Kant interprets these ideas negatively—by abstraction. By the universality of self he means something which *excludes* all specific material of experience; by the opposition of the duty-imposing self to the immediate agent something which *excludes* any natural underlying identity of the two.

*This aspect comes out most clearly in the case Kant takes to distinguish the *dutiful* from the *holy* will. (See p. 58; 121; pp. 174–178.) The latter will is so identified with the ideal that the ideal presents itself not as law or duty, but simply as good. This is a condition to be always striven for, but never attained by "finite" beings, like man.

The course of the argument runs as follows: Since the authority of moral law, or duty, is unconditional and absolute, it cannot rest upon anything given in experience. (See references given at end of Sec. XIII., p. 21.) Everything which rests upon experience is contingent and variable; experience at most can determine that a thing has been so and so in the past, not that it is so without qualification. Much less can it establish that a certain duty *ought* to be done, for the duty may refer to an ideal which has *never* been realized—which (Kant would sometimes seem to say) *can* never be realized, and which it is none the less our duty to strive to realize. Now if we remove all content of experience from the law thus imposed there remains nothing but the mere form of will, or practical reason, nothing but the bare idea of law universal.

The same kind of considerations determine the nature of the opposition between duty and the immediate agent. The immediate agent may be reduced to an impulsive, desiring being; all ends posited by man in this capacity are matters of experience and have, therefore, to be neglected in considering the end involved in doing one's duty, the end imposed by the rational will. Furthermore, those ends which the impulses and desires propose for themselves are not only to be *excluded* as empirical, but they must be suppressed (in forming the moral motive) as anti-moral. For all these natural inclinations reduce themselves to a desire for happiness, to self-love. And while this is not evil *per se*, yet *as suggesting itself to the will as its motive*, its controlling power, it is the great antagonist which duty has always to meet. So far as anything is done from inclination as motive, it is still non-moral; nay, immoral, as representing the victory of inclination over duty. It is not enough even that the right thing (the thing *conformable to duty*) be done; it must be done *out of respect for law as motive.* The consciousness of law, of authoritative obligation (while furnishing no concrete material) is thus necessary to give to all material, to every special act, its motivation, if the act is to be done morally. This conflict of inclination and

law, and the use of the idea of law as motive, occur not simply at critical reconstructive points, but with each and every act. The ideal moral character would be he whom the practical judgment of men unhesitatingly terms a moral pedant.* (For this account see Abbott's trans., pp. 9–20; 54–56; 105–116).

Kant's position evidently involves two questions, questions which are the analogue of what we have previously considered as 'ideal' or 'intention,' and as 'motive' respectively; the rational content of the moral will, and the propulsive, dynamic quality of this content. Or, putting the first problem in terms of Kant's own position, how can a consciousness of will in general, a consciousness of law universal, be transformed into consciousness of specific volition, of particular acts required; how can the 'form' get concrete filling? This is a question which must be met. However universal the law may be, all acts are specific, individual; there must be something in the law that gives instruction as to the special duty which the general law imposes in the given act. How do we get from the mere consciousness that duty *is* duty, to the consciousness that truth telling, that purity, etc., are duties? How do we get to the conscious that my duty, in the present situation, is *just* thus and so? The second question is: how can the consciousnecs of duty get sufficient hold upon the agent to interest him, to move him to act for its realization? This problem is particularly acute in the Kanthian ethics, because it is *through* the agent as instrument, in any case, that the law must be executed, and Kant has reduced the agent, *qua* agent, to a mere seeker for happiness as already given in experience.

*The extent to which Kant carries this may be well seen by this account of the good man in distress (Abbott, p. 112.) "He still lives only because it is his duty, not because he finds anything pleasant in life." For my own part it seems less an exaggeration to say that a man who consciously lives simply because it is his duty to live is a self-absorbed egotist or a moral pedant and valetudinarian. There can be no doubt that upon occasion of wreckage of hopes and habits, failure of concrete interest in life may arise. But surely, upon such occasiou, it is one's "duty" to bestir one's self to find something worth while in life—not merely to live from a sense of duty.

I. According to Kant, instruction as to concrete acts proceeds from the very *universality* of the law. Universality, even in its most formal interpretation, means self-identity, non-contradiction. Morality requires consciousness of a universal law, but a universal law, by its very nature, must be one which can maintain itself without contradiction. Hence the general consciousness of duty may be thus translated. 'Act only on that motive which can become a universal law' or act upon the same basis on which you would act, if you were an omnipotent Being, so that your principle of action were made a law of nature. (Abbott, pp. 38–42; 115; 55–56; 119; 133; 161-162).

The way in which the universal imperative 'Do thy duty,' thus becomes transformed into the particular imperatives 'do this, that and the other specific thing' may be illustrated as follows:

(*a*) Some one, wearied by what he conceives to be the entire misery of life proposes to commit suicide, but he asks himself whether this maxim based on the principle of self-love could become a universal law of nature; and "we see at once that a system of nature in which the very feeling, whose office is to compel men to the preservation of life, should lead men by a universal law to death, cannot be conceived without contradiction." That is to say, the principle of the motive which would lead a man to suicide cannot be generalized without becoming contradictory—it cannot be made a law universal

(*b*) An individual wishes to borrow money which he knows that he cannot repay. Can the maxim of this act be universalized? Evidently not: "a system of nature in which it should be a universal law to promise without performing, for the sake of private good, would contradict itself, for then no one would believe the promise—the promise itself would become impossible as well as the end it had in view."

(*c*) A man finds that he has certain powers, but is disinclined to develop them. Can he make the maxim of such conducta universal law? He cannot *will* that it should become

universal. "As a rational being, he must will that faculties be developed."

(*d*) A prosperous individual is disclined to relieve the misery of others. Can his maxim be generalized? "It is impossible to *will* that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires."

See Abbott's trans., pp. 9–46. Caird's Critical Philosophy of Kant, vol. II., pp. 171–181; 209–212.

Criticism. That a valid moral motive is capable of generalization may be admitted without question. But what is the nature of this generalization, and what is implied as to its relation to inclination—to desire? Is generalization possible only on the basis of reason standing over against desire. Nay is it possible at all on such a basis? Let it be admitted that truly moral action involves rationality or generalized validity, does this rationality proceed from a faculty outside the natural impulses and desires, is it attained only by abstraction from them? or (to state the alternative theory definitely) is not rationality, universality, found in the co-ordination, the reduction to a harmonious unity of the impulses and desires? Admitting that the moral life involves, as one of its features, a certain relative opposition of sensuous material and rational form, are form and content separate in origin and purpose? or is the "form" simply the movement of the "material" to its own organic unity? Or, again, admitting that it is often helpful to test a proposed line of conduct by reference to the capacity of its motive to be universal law, are we to understand universal law in the sense of uniformity, of bare likeness among different circumstances, or is the universal law found in the organization of the different conditions? To sum all these questions up in one: Are we to do an act *in* its universality, or *because of* its universality?

These points may be tested by Kant's own illustrations. In every case we find the question raised is not whether universality is the motive, but whether a *specific* motive can be generalized. In every case, also, we find the answer to the question turning not upon formal, but upon material identity. The question is treated as if it were one concerning the character of the content involved. There is nothing formally self-contradictory in the idea that every one should, from self-love, shorten life when its continuance promises a balance of harm. Contradiction enters only when there is postulated a *system of nature*, in which the impulse of self-love has a certain *definite quality*—tending toward "improvement of life." Grant this, and there is no difficulty in showing that the general system contradicts itself if the impulse is turned against itself. It is the character of the system of nature, or of the impulse, which affords the real criterion—material, not formal considerations. So in the other cases. A social system and the impulse to better one's self through the assistance of others would both contradict themselves when promises were made not to be kept. It is as a "rational being," that is, as a person with a certain definite constitution, that one wills that faculties be developed, and self-indulgence contradicts that organization of things which man conceives to be truly rational. And so again a social system in which men are interdependent would go to pieces if men never assisted one another. In every case, the contradiction is within a certain assumed structure or system. Presuppose such a system, and it is simply a matter of adequate *detailed* knowledge to discover whether a given line of action will tend to reinforce or to disintegrate it. The criterion is workable and often helpful, but it is in no way formal. Universal is interpreted as falling in line with the maintenance of the system as a whole. A self-integrity, material self-consistency is the real standard. In this sense, every good act must be legislative; it must execute principles which tend to the maintenance of the system of which it is a member.

Not only do Kant's examples all go against a formal rationality and point to a rationality which is none other than the

organization of content, but a formal universality would absolutely break down. If I kill a man in defence of my family or country, I cannot will that everybody should always kill; if I will to aid a man by charity, I cannot will that everybody at all times should try to relieve all the distress that comes before him. My moral imperative is to kill or to give, but I cannot will that it be *formally* universalized, that is, be made a uniform principle of action. I can only be willing that where *all relevant circumstances are the same* the same principle be followed. In other words, I could wish my motive to become general law only in so far as the particular material conditions have been—not excluded from, but—*taken into the motive.*

Reason, then, not mere sense, must constitute the law of the moral will; it alone can substantiate the ideal. But this 'practical reason' is not a faculty separate from desire; were it thus separate it could furnish no directions whatever to the desire. It could but demand its obliteration; not its functioning in a specific direction. The reason that consciousness of duty always involves specification into some definite requirement is precisely because we cannot separate the consciousness of self as a whole from the consciousness of a particular desire of the self. Take the former in its adequate differentiation and it becomes the latter, just as the consciousness of a particular desire conceived in its relations, not abstractly, is the consciousness of the whole moving self.

Duty as Motive. We turn now to the other aspect of the question. How is it, upon Kant's theory, that the consciousness of law universal becomes an *interest*—a conception which takes hold practically and moves to execution; how does it become a motor, become dynamic?

Kant's solution may be summarized as follows: The moral law must of itself be the spring to action; if it make use of some feeling already in existence to become the motive, then an act will be performed which has legality (i. e., outward conformity to duty) but not morality, because not springing from a purely moral motive. "The essential point is that the

agent be determined simply by the moral law, not only without the co-operation of sensible impulses, but even to the rejection of all such." (Abbott, p. 165.) Thus the moral law snubs the impulses, and in so far gives rise to the feeling of *humiliation;* the pretension of the agent to worth in himself (self-conceit) is struck down, and his effort to be happy (self-love) is deprived of all valid claim to control. Here then we have one feeling, humility, which tho' itself sensuous (or pathological) is yet originated by reason. Moreover, this negative feeling of humility gets the obstacles (self-conceit and self-love) to the moral law out of the way, and thus is the same as so much positive impetus added to the law. It is equivalent to a feeling of respect, reverence for law." "Humiliation on the sensuous side is an elevation of the moral esteem for the law itself on the rational side," (p. 171.) Reverence is thus not simply a motive *to* morality, "it is morality itself viewed subjectively as a motive; for our practical reason, by rejecting the rival claims of self-love, gives authority to the law which now alone has influence," (p. 168; see the whole of ch. 3, of the Analytic of Practical Reason.)

Criticism. Criticism turns here upon the relation assumed to exist between reason and sensibility as the system of impulses. It may be urged that Kant's position is in unstable equilibrium. If the relation between reason and sense is as external and mechanical as he makes it, the operations which he describes cannot occur; or, if these operations do take place, the relation must be conceived as so organic and intrinsic as to make necessary an entire reconstruction of the theory of desire.

In the first place, it is sheer assumption that the sensuous impulses may be adequately described under the heading of self-love, in any sense in which self-love is equivalent to seeking for pleasures. Kant retains the whole substructure of the hedonistic psychology of desire; sees the evils which result ethically from it, and then adds on the top story of reason as an offset. If the discussion already had (pp. 46–50) is of weight, the true course is to make over the theory of desire.

If, however, impulse and desire are as self-absorbed as Kant declares them to be, we must question the adequacy of the machinery by which Kant makes law a motor. If there is no *intrinsic* connection between desire and reason, how can the former, even when checked and held in by reason, give rise to the feeling of moral humiliation? This presupposes some moral capacity already *in* the desires; something capable of recognizing the authority and value of law—which is not only the thing to be explained, but also impossible if desire has the purely low and selfish character Kant attributes to it. At most, the desire would simply feel restraint, coercion, and would be correspondingly impatient and desirous of breaking away—the reverse of humility.* When Kant changes the negative feeling of humiliation into a positive one of reverence, it simply attributes even more frankly some kind of positive moral capacity to impulse. That the feeling is supposed to *originate* from reason, emphasizes rather than avoids the difficulty. If the moral law can transform itself into feeling; if reason can become an impulse, then feeling and impulse cannot be so depraved as Kant has already defined them to be. When Kant says (p. 170), the agent "can never get enough, when he has laid aside self-conceit, of contemplation of the majesty of law, and the soul believes *itself* elevated in proportion as it sees the moral law elevated above it and its frail nature" there is something intrinsically akin to law ascribed to the "frail nature" of the soul. It is simply a round-about way of saying that the "soul" is not so frail after all, if only it be given a chance.

Moreover the whole question is begged from the start. It is only in so far as the reason is already itself impulsive or moving that it can check and restrain the sense nature and thus occasion humility. To hold that "whatever diminishes the obstacles to an activity, furthers this activity itself," (p.

*It is worth notice that Plato, who has substantially the same dualism between reason and appetite, is obliged to bring in a third and mediating power, the *active* impulses, (spiritedness), to bridge the gulf.

171) is to admit that reason already possesses an active, self-realizing power, *i. e.*, is impulsive.

The further difficulty in the separation of sense and reason may be seen in the utter inability to answer, from Kant's standpoint, the question as to why, in a given case, the moral law does or does not become a motive. I do not mean simply that it can not give a detailed account—perhaps no theory can do that. But it cannot point to any method of approaching the question. Failure cannot be due to lack of authoritative presence of the moral reason—that is always there. It cannot be due to the mere presence or agency of the sensuous impulses —they are always present and always selfishly urgent. There is absolutely no connecting link by which to indicate any explanation of why the machinery of humiliation and reverence should get itself adequately into operation in some cases and fail in others. We are thrown back on bare chance. The ideas of approval, blame, responsibility are made meaningless. All this because the actual concrete unity of individual character is surrendered and the two abstractions of sense and reason substituted.

Thus far we have taken Kant purely on his own ground. It may be added that, historically, reverence seems to have no special priority or moral pre-eminence over motives like patriotism, manliness, desire for community esteem and recognition; that when it did appear it took, until the development of specialized technical reflection (like Kant's own), the form not of recognition of superiority of moral law as such over sensuous impulse, but the recognition that the community welfare is higher in its claims than the immediate pleasures and pains of the agent. (See for example, Plato, Laws, 647, 649, 671, on reverence as fear of pain attached to right objects.) If we turn from theoretical analysis to actual life, it is at once evident that to make reverence for duty the sole motive would lead to a Pharisaism which must deny morality to the vast masses of mankind, and permit it only to a few who have attained a certain stage of intellectual abstraction.

Upon the whole question, positively, it may be said: (1) The truth in Kant's main contention is adequately recognized in the statement that an action is to be done *as* duty, that is, for its own intrinsic meaning independent of any reflex advantage, but not *for* duty. The latter makes an abstraction of duty, reduces the act to a mere means, and thus introduces division and lessens interest (See pp. 85–87.) (2) The consciousness of the opposition between desire and duty, with the correlative feelings of humility and reverence, arises not *essentially*, by the nature of each, but *historically*—that is, when the appearance of a more comprehensive and organic end demands a readjustment of desires, demand that they attach themselves to the new end instead of following their past course.

Kant's account, therefore, strengthens our original analysis. The sense of the majesty and inviolability of duty is the consciousness of the moving, the functioning self as against a partial habit, which in its narrow self-assertion, tends to become isolated and static, instead of connected and instrumental. The moral feeling of humility is in its essence the continued attitude of not hanging on to attainment for its own sake—of recognizing that it has no worth save as changed into power. Reverence is the correlative continued openness of will and interest to new and larger demands (p. 75). They require not the absolute opposition of a higher and lower nature to explain them, but the relative opposition between differentiation and inter-connection of impulses and habits.

Convenient accounts and criticisms of Kant's Ethics will be found in Caird, Critical Philosophy of Kant, vol. II.; Muirhead, Elements, pp. 112–124; Mackenzie, Manual, pp. 55–70.

Section XXXVII.—Hedonistic Theory of Obligation.

The problem of duty for the hedonist assumes the converse aspect from that presented to the Kantian. For the latter, the main difficulty is in showing how the consciousness of law, proclaimed by reason, should come into working relations,

intellectual and motor, with desire, so great is the assumed opposition. For the hedonist, the difficulty lies in getting enough opposition to desire to subject the latter to authority*—or in getting that *kind* of opposition which should give rise to a feeling of duty rather than of coercion. Upon the basis of hedonism, it may be said that it is to an agent's profit or advantage or superior interest to take such and such a course, but how can it be said to be his duty? Pleasure is the good, and man's natural desire is for pleasure. How can there be any checking of desire, save as another desire, promising more pleasure, presents itself? Such a checking as this has none of the elements of the consciousness of duty.

The traditional hedonistic answer has been through the idea of *sanction*, some foreseen evil attached to the satisfaction of a desire which, in itself, would give pleasure.†

The essence of Bain's theory is the transfer within the mind of the agent of a relation, now existing between elements of his own conduct, which originally existed between the agent's conduct and the behavior of others. The ideas of authority (command) and obedience are correlative. The lesson of obedience is taught from the outset of life to every agent. "The child's susceptibility to pleasure and pain is made use of to bring about this obedience, and a mental association is rapidly formed between this obedience and apprehended pain, more or less magnified by fear." The knowledge that punishment may be continued until the act is discontinued "leaves on

* Bentham felt this difficulty that it wished to banish the very term 'duty' from ethical discussion.

† Besides the authors considered below, this conception has been developed by Paley, Moral Philosophy, in a theological form (virtue is "doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting happiness"); by Austin, Jurisprudence in jural form; by Bentham, in jural and social form, in his, Principle of Morals and Legislation, and by J. S. Mill, notes on h's father's Analysis of the Human Mind, vol. II., pp. 324–326 and Utilitarianism, ch. V. It should be remarked, however, that Mill's account only touches the question why we judge the conduct of others from the standpoint of duty; it does not answer the question why a man conceives something as obligatory upon himself.

the mind a certain dread and awful impression as connected with forbidden actions." This "dread of offending" is the germ of the consciousness of duty. It is reinforced, first, by the sentiment of love or respect for the person imposing the command—which brings in a new dread, "that of giving pain to a beloved object." Then a tertiary factor comes in: "When the young mind is able to take notice of the use and meaning of the prohibitions imposed upon it, and to approve of the end intended by them, a new motive is added on and begirds the action with a three-fold fear." This latter fear is more definitely stated as follows: "If the duty prescribed has been approved of by the mind as protective of the general interests of persons engaging our sympathies, the violation of this on our part affects us with all the pain that we feel from the inflicting an injury upon those interests." (See Bain, Emotions and Will, pp. 285–87.)

Now this sentiment of fear or reverence attached to superior power, "at first formed and cultivated by the relations of actual command and obedience, may come at last to stand upon an independent foundation." The third factor mentioned above seems, from Bain's further account, to be not so much a factor as a revolution. When the child appreciates the "reasons for the command, the character of conscience is intirely transformed" (E. and W. p. 288.) The form of authority and subjection remains, although the authority is no longer imposed from without. Conscience becomes an "ideal resemblance of public authority" (E. and W. p. 264; the references are all to the third ed., London, 1888); "it is an imitation within ourselves of the government without us" (p. 285.) When the thing which a person regards as obligatory is so far from being enforced by social pressure, that it contradicts received moral ideas, "even then the notion, sentiment or *form* of duty is derived from what society imposes, although the particular matter is quite different. Social obedience develops in the mind originally the feeling and habit of obligation, and this remains when the individual articles are changed. . . .

The person has so assimilated in his mind the laws of his own coining to the imperative requirements of society, that he reckons them as of equal force as duty'' p. 289 note. See also pp. 467–73 and his Moral Science, pp. 20–21 and 41–43).

Criticism. Now just as we did not question the principle of generalization, but simply the way in which Kant interprets it, so here the question is not as to the account given by Bain, but rather as to its real meaning, especially as to its consistency with hedonism. (1) Admitting that a consciousness of duty arises historically in connection with commands and fear of punishment, does it follow that the sense of duty is, even at the outset, equivalent to fear of pain? (2) And how can this whole content of fear drop out at the proper moment and leave the pure sense of duty—the man a moral law to himself?

(1) In so far as there is any moral consciousness at all, any sense of *authority*, we must say that from the start there is a sense of the reasonableness of the command, and not a mere dread of the pain to result from its infringement. The latter alone gives rise, even at a very early age, to a sense not of duty and authority, but of wrong and smarting injustice, or else to apparent acquiescence while the one commanding is at hand, and to great cleverness in evading whenever the pressure is removed. Any careful observation will reveal three cases: (a) that in which it is necessary to prevent, and at once, a given line of conduct—as a child's going into a fire. Here the motive of sheer fright may be appealed to, but not with any moral end, or with reference to developing a sense of duty or as punishment; but simply as the necessary way of preventing, under the circumstances, the occurrence of a given overt act. Every sensible parent appeals to this motive when necessary, but does not assume too easily that it is necessary; and tries to replace it by more rational means as soon as possible. (b) Second, there is the case already referred to of using the dread of *punishment per se* as motive. This, as suggested, is so far from calling into being the sense of duty, that it arouses irritation and anger, duplicity and slyness. (c) There is the

use of punishment to draw positive attention to a content otherwise ignored—punishment as a means of enforcing an idea not strong enough to make its own way in an immature mind. The first case is non-moral, the second immoral, the third alone moral. Here again careful observation will reveal that punishment, in the case say of a lie, is morally effective just in the degree in which fear of it does not operate as an isolated motive, but is the emphasis required to bring out the undesirable quality of the act itself. It is a means of revealing the hatefulness, the repulsiveness of the lie. Bain himself speaks of the "fear of offending," and this is quite other than the fear of punishment. (2) Only in so far as punishment is a means of calling attention to the intrinsic quality of the act, does it afford a transition to the third stage—the independent conscience, or one which recognizes the act as obligatory because of its own significance. The more we use punishment to effect simply a dread of itself the more surely we prevent the growth of the conscience which can recognize acts as valuable "in themselves." Logically and practically (so far as the theory is acted upon), there is not only no bridge from the first of Bain's stages to the last, but the two are exclusive. (For some practical phases of this discussion, see the Aug. '94 No. of the Pop. Sci. Mo., article on Chaos in Moral Training.)

The point of these criticisms is that Bain unconsciously begs the whole question. The authority somehow resides already in the idea (the act proposed) and the agent in recognizing the idea purely, must recognize its authoritative quality. The punishment simply serves to bring the idea adequately into consciousness (compare what is said pp. 84–5.) Punishment may provide the psychological conditions (put the mind into shape) for recognizing authority, but cannot possibly constitute it. Unless the positive value, capable of being seen, already reside in the idea, punishment causes either rebellion or servility or trickiness—or a mixture of all three. The question is still untouched: What is that which constitutes the value of the proposed idea so supreme that it is authoritative,

and gives some rational assurance that punishment, judiciously used, will assist the growth of conscience?* In lack of a better, our previous answer must still stand; because the act proposed stands for the active, the functioning and thus the *whole* self, while the agent to whom it appears obligatory, or authoritative, is the static, the instrumental (and thus if isolated, the partial) self.

Spencer's Theory of Obligation. Spencer, like Bain, holds that the sense of duty originates from social pressure. He emphasizes, perhaps, the element of fear less than that of restraint—the checking of the immediate impulse or desire. The chief inhibitory agencies in the history of the race have been the "visible ruler, the invisible ruler, and public opinion" —the policeman, the priest, and public opinion, as someone has alliteratively summed it up. These restraining agencies operate mainly through fear—the dread awakened of, respectively, "legal penalty, supernatural punishment and social reprobation." As in Bain's theory, the sense of restraint thus originated gradually works itself free from the incidents of its birth and growth, and asserts itself as an independent factor in consciousness. The favorite hedonistic analogy is the love of gold on the part of the miser—a love which can have arisen only in connection with the special benefits derived from the gold, but which finally sets itself free from these accompaniments, and attaches to the gold *per se*. The individual learns to connect the forseen evil effects resulting intrinsically from the satisfaction of a given presen impulse or desire with the feeling of compulsion, and this representative association suffices to restraint the urgency of the desire.

The "essential trait in the moral consciousness is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings." (Principles of Ethics—Data—p. 113.) In general,

*In strict logic, the term 'judiciously used' cannot be employed in Bain's theory. Everything falls back upon the mere punishment, apart from its relations and attachments; there is no duty as respects the use of punishment, because it is the source of duty, just as in Hobbes' political philosophy the sovereign, being the source of law, cannot be subject to it.

and upon the average, the feelings which control are related to those controlled as the compound to the simple, the remote to the proximate, the representative to the presentative (Data, pp. 103–109.)

The connecting link with the element of social coerciveness is thus found by Spencer: "Since the political, religious, and social restraining motives, are mainly formed of represented future results; it happens that the representatives, having much in common, and being often aroused at the same time, the fear joined with three sets of them becomes, by association, joined with the fourth. Thinking of the extrinsic effects of a forbidden act, excites a dread which continues present while the intrinsic effects are thought of; and being thus linked with these intrinsic effects causes a vague sense of moral compulsion." And from this Spencer draws the logical conclusion (logical because true morality refers *only* to the *intrinsic* effects of an act, p. 120) that the "sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralization increases." The duty comes to have interest of itself, becomes itself pleasurable if persisted in, and the aspect of coerciveness dies out, (pp. 127–128.)

Criticism. In so far as Spencer's theory resembles Bain's, the same criticism, of course, holds. External compulsion (which generates, by association, the feeling of self-compulsion) is positively anti-moral, because bringing into play the motive of sheer fear; if it have moral potentiality at all, even in furthering the transitional sense of obligation at a certain imperfect stage of moral development, it is because it does *not* operate as coercion, but as bringing to light, or reinforcing against opposition, the intrinsic authoritativeness of the acts proposed. Spencer's contention that with moralization the sense of duty tends to disappear is a recognition of the immoral character of the sense of coercion. But the contention, after all, only emphasizes the difficulty. Is it not the logical conclusion, from Spencer's premises, that we should *never* use or appeal to the sense of obligation; that, from the outset, we should strive

to prevent the growth of this feeling, instead of encouraging it through punishment, blame, etc.? Or, otherwise stated, if Spencer's *conclusion* is correct, we must condemn all the social agencies which develop in the child the sense of compulsion (whether external or self) and leave the child to the expression of his own impulses, till he learns, by intrinsic reflection, to control some of them.*

In the other factor of Spencer's theory, the doctrine of intrinsic control as connected with increasing complexity, remoteness and representativeness of ends, we have, I think, an approximation to the true doctrine. It is, indeed, impossible to see why these facts should of themselves confer any claims to control. Carlyle's 'do the thing that lies nearest' is just as valuable as Spencer's remote end. Indeed, Spencer himself calls attention to the fact that cases often arise where the simple and present desire has moral supremacy on its side. He gives, however, no explanation of why one or other has this claim, this supremacy. An analysis of his biological accounts, will reveal however, that the real criterion in each is the self in its wholeness. And if we translate complexity, remoteness, etc., into terms of standing for the self as a whole, the moving, functioning self, all the mystery vanishes. It is not *qua* remote, or *qua* proximate, that an end exercises authority, but as comprehending within itself the self as functional unity. On the other hand, the criterion of complexity, it seems to me, will *always* work, because the complex, by its very definition, represents the self as organic activity. In the conflict, say of hunger impulse with the impulse to give food to children to keep them alive, (the example given by Spencer, p. 110) the former may be

* The difficulty is only increased when we remember that, upon Spencer's theory, the postponement or checking of a desire involves pain and the sacrifice of pleasure, and thus, *absolutely* is bad, even if relatively right. Data, pp. 183–184; 260–261. The reader may be reminded that, upon the theory already stated, the sense of duty ever disappears with respect to certain ends as these become absorbed into a habit, but not absolutely. It reconnects itself with those other ends, which, for any reason, demand readjustment of habits.

more, not less, complex than the latter, and *is* more complex whenever its fulfillment is a condition of fulfilling the latter. In this case, to feed one's self is an act which, psychologically, includes within itself the feeding of others. The same may be said of the claims of health as respects the claims of meeting obligations to others; in so far as the former is supreme it is also more complex, carrying the other within itself—representative, in other words, of the whole self. We repeat, then, the original statement—the sense of duty, with its correlative phases of authority and subjection, is a sense of the supreme value of the functional self, and the relative, or instrumental value of the structural self. Authority is not to be identified with coercion, any more than with the action of self conceived as a blank metaphysical form.

CHAPTER VIII.—FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBLITY.

Section XXXVIII.—The Psychology of Freedom.

The violitional has been defined and developed as the mediation of activity, at first impulsive or direct. It has been shown that the ideal (intention), with the deliberative process, is the growth of the mediation; that this finds its completion in the standard or generalized ideal. But the end and law react by their very natures into the direct impulses, and present another phase of moral experience: desire and consciousness of good, so far as the end and standard reinforce the immediate tendencies of impulse and habit; effort and consciousness of duty, so far as this reaction checks and reconstructs.

It must be remembered that the process of reaction is not one which follows in time after that of projection of ends and recognition of law. The origin and growth of the mediate, the rational content, proceed contemporaneously with its use in reinforcing and in checking the impulse or habits. Whatever completes the development of the ideal, the concrete recognition of the end and principle of action, completes the

habit urging forward for expression. It is this completion with which we now have to deal.

The completely mediated activity is what we term a *deed*. The deed cannot be distinguished as act in contrast with mere getting ready to act. The whole process of working out ends, of selecting means, of estimating moral values, of recognizing duty, is, as we have seen, one of activity at every point; it is dynamic and propulsive throughout. The deed is simply this activity focused, brought to a head. The deed is the activity, concluded; it is the 'round up,' and in this conclusion at once (1) defined, marked out, and (2) unified.

(1) The overt act or deed is the *definition of self*. Up to this time all is tentative; it is the experimenting of self in this direction or that, seeking outlet, forming and revising possible ends, trying on this satisfaction and that. In the deed, this movement of the self culminates; the activity is no longer tentative, but definitive. Up to this time, the self has been exploring, trying to find self and to come to consciousness. The deed is the net result of the exploration, of the learning; it exhibits or shows what the self, at the time, is. The voyage of discovery is summed up in the map which shows the limit, external and internal, of the activity.

(2) This culmination of activity is complete *co-ordination* or unification. Starting from the immediate, impulsive activity, the whole intervening development may be regarded as one of increasing range of stimulation, bringing this and that further habit or impulse into play. This increasing range or scope of action is not merely quantitative, as just said, it finds a limit, an end. Now this limiting principle prevents the increasing waves of activity from being mere diffusive, expansive outgoing agitation without meaning. This principle, confining and determining the range and distribution of intervening activity, is, in biological terms, the function of the organism; in psychological terms, the unity of the self. The increase of activity, the continued suggestion of new ends and tentative adoption of new means, does not go on *ad indefinitum*, but with

reference to a *whole*—the self. The deed expresses the attainment of this whole.

In this connection we must recall the fact that a moral struggle means, psychologically, not the sacrifice or exclusion of one value by another, but its inclusion, comprehension (pp. 31–32); the process of control is not one of suppression of desire or habit, but one of directing, using it—making it a tributary factor. Physically, outwardly, the deed is a selection of one impulse or ideal, and a rejection of the other. A man takes either the right or left hand road; steals or remains true to his trust; is self-indulgent, or puts his passions to the service of others. But morally the meaning, the value, of this defined, or one-sided deed, has the competing of ends and habits absorbed into it; the process of completion determines the significance of the deed in and to the agent's own consciousness.*

We have various words to designate the completion, the finality of the process; some naming it from the side of the impulsive, others of its intellectual phase. Preference† brings out the definiteness, the individuality of the conclusion. So also does determination, with the added shade of wholeness in its idea of firmness and certainty; decision and resolution name it considered both as the outcome of a complex, tangled intel-

* This gives another point of view for criticizing Martineau's theory of preferential selection of one of two impulses in the scale of values. It fails to note how the *value* of the impulse chosen (that is, its moral character) includes the rejected impulses. It also shows why an agent who is continually conscious that he has done an act of self-sacrifice is still immoral; he has not succeeded in comprehending the 'sacrificed' end within the act performed. It is still there, asserting itself on its own isolated account. Paradoxical as the phrase may sound, the fact that it is felt *as* sacrifice shows that the sacrifice is not yet made. On any basis save that of the text, the moral life reduces itself, as Emerson says, to mere expiation for something else; it never asserts itself as of *positive* value. See Emerson's Essay on Self-Reliance, p. 54.

† Preference seems sometimes to be opposed to choice, as when one says, 'I should prefer that, but I choose to do this.' But this is only an abstract preference; it says, under other circumstances, with changed conditions, I should prefer otherwise. But with things as they are, the agent prefers what he chooses. Preference, however, undoubtedly has more reference to the natural, unmoralized (unmediated) aspect. We prefer *things;* we choose acts or lines of action.

lectual process and as indicating the single volitional attitude assumed for the future. All these these various implications are pretty well blended in the term 'choice,' and thus that is the most characteristic moral term.

The essence of this account of choice is obviously the conception of it as the normal outcome of the process of will, the conclusion of a process which in its primary stage is named impulse, and at a latter stage deliberation (intellectual) and effort (emotional). It is thus opposed to those conceptions which regard all that goes on before as non-voluntary, and regards choice alone as act of will. The latter makes will, self, personality, an entity existing outside of the operations of impulse, habit, desire, reflection, etc., and coming in *ab extra* to settle a process which in itself is endless, and to import an ethical element into a process otherwise mechanical. Upon the basis of psychological analysis, there is no more a dualism between non-volitional data on one side, and will, on the other, than there is in the process of intellectual judgment. We do not have, in the latter, two separate faculties, one, that of gathering data, weighing, rejecting and accepting evidence, the other, an outside power, reason, to draw the inference. The whole process is rational in form, and is determined by rational considerations as to its content; the drawing of the inference is the conclusion arrived at when the data assume coherency and completeness—that is, exhibit neither such mutual contradictions as to stimulate the mind to make them over, nor such gaps as to set the mind hunting up more facts.

Self-made problems incapable of solution, result from the indentification of volitional action with choice alone, difficulties which are not existent upon the other theory. Such questions as these arise only to be unanswerable: What induces the will to interfere? how does it know the proper time at which to do so? is it unerring in its selection of time, or may it operate too soon or too late? are the sources of error in the will or in the outside soliciting elements? upon what basis does the will select this side rather than that? etc., etc.,—all the intermin-

able discussions, in fact, which since the time of the scholastics have haunted the problem of freedom of will. No justification in the psychology of will can be found for the view which gives rise to these insoluble difficulties; whether the explanation of moral freedom and responsibility demands them will be considered later.

The foregoing account implies that choice and doing (the deed) are morally identical. This appears to run against the conviction of practical sense that we can choose to do a thing at a future time, make up our mind to act in a certain way, at a distant period—that choice is not doing but getting ready to do. Cannot a man choose to eat without beginning to eat, choose to go to Europe without at once starting? The consideration of this difficulty will serve to bring out more clearly the identity.

A more appropriate name than choice for conclusions of the sort indicated is decision. The question is not a merely verbal one, in some cases only the intellectual phase of the process is developed, and accordingly, the conclusion is still abstract, hypothetical. To say that I have decided to act in a certain way if attacked by a burglar, or to go to Europe, etc., means that intellectually I present a certain hypothetical case to myself and draw the appropriate conclusion. It is an anticipation or prior rehearsal which gets the various relevant conditions before one and thus shortens and facilitates the actual choice when that is necessary. We decide to do so and so, if something happens. We decide not to act, but how to act. The categorical, concrete implication of the whole self does not occur, hence no deed and no true choice.

In cases which are not intellectual preparations, choice is really a beginning to act on the spot. If I really choose to eat an apple, I at once bend all my energies to getting it; if I do not begin on the spot, choice is still hypothetical; I choose to when I get a good chance. If I really choose to go to Europe, while outwardly a spectator may not see the action commence, psychologically the deed at once begins. I *now*,

at once, act differently than I would otherwise, and this different way of acting is an actual part, under the circumstances of going to Europe.

The moral meaning of this identity of choice and act comes out in such an illustration as this: A person virtually says, 'I decide, I will to reform, but circumstances are such that I must do this one evil act; to-morrow I positively will do better.' Such a person is simply deceiving himself. He still wills the evil thing and that only; the supposition that he has chosen another line, and that this is an exception which doesn't count, is one of the best (and commonest) devices imaginable for keeping one's self from squarely facing things as they are. The person who wills merely to do something in the future is in an impossible state psychologically and a dangerous one morally. The identity of choice, deed and will is the culmination of psychology, as well as the supreme moral lesson.

Section XXXIX.—The Ethics of Freedom and Responsibility.

The ethical conception of freedom is the recognition of the meaning for conduct of the identity of self and act, of will and deed. There is no factor in the act foreign or alien to the agent's self; it is himself through and through. No action is moral (that is, falling in the moral sphere) save as voluntary, and every voluntary act, as the entire foregoing analysis indicates, is the self operating, and hence is free. Impulse is self, the developing ideal is self; the reaction of the ideal as measuring and controlling impulse is self. The entire voluntary process is one of self-expression, of coming to consciousness of self. This intimate and thorough going *selfness* of the deed constitutes freedom.

Ethical writers have distinguished 'formal' and 'substantial' freedom; and have claimed that only *right* acts are really free. This claim involves this truth: Every conscious act is free in the sense that it expresses the self; it is psychologically

free. But is the intention, the purpose, of self, one 'really possible'? Does it square with the conditions of things, with the laws of the universe? Is it possible for the self to be what it would be? No intention guarantees its own execution. Its execution depends upon the co-operation of reality; it must fit into the forces which really make up the course of events. Now if the self has a solid intention, one which reality itself reinforces, one whose execution is guaranteed by the conditions of the case, the agent is said to be really, as well as formally, free. But if his intention is *merely* subjective, if it involves objective impossibilities, the attempt at execution involves friction, loss, a negative, or destructive, reaction of deed into self. In such cases, the agent is really (ethically) in bondage. He is self contradictory. He cannot express the self he aims to express. It is not so much a paradox as it seems, to say that only the good can be *really* willed; that we only *seem* to will, only go through the motions or form of willing, the bad.

This same identity of self and deed is, of course, the basis of responsibility. We are responsible for our deeds because they are ourselves. Responsibility is a name for the fact that we are, and are something definite and concrete—specific individuals. I am myself, I am conscious of myself in my deeds (self-conscious), I am responsible, name not three facts, but one fact.

There is a formal and a substantial responsiblity. One is liable, accountable, *held* responsible *for* his acts, because they are himself. This is formal responsibility, and may coincide with moral irresponsiblity. Every bad man is (in the substantial sense) irresponsible; he cannot be counted upon in action, he is not certain, reliable, trustworthy. He does not respond to his duties, to his functions. His impulses and habits are not coördinated, and hence do not answer properly to the stimuli, to the demands made. The vicious man is not socially responsible, and one part of his nature does not respond to the whole. Irresponsibility is but another name for his lack of unity, of integrity; being divided within himself, he is

unstable, we can never be sure of him, he is not sure of himself. Yet this is consistent with formal responsibility. He is capable of forseeing consequences, and of having these foreseen consequenses influence or modify his conduct. The person who fails in one respect or other of these factors is insane, imbecile or morally immature and is not responsible.

One's conduct calls forth certain reactions from others—reactions as natural as those called forth when one comes in contact with a physical force. The individual lives as truly in a social as in a physical environment, and the reaction of the one to his deed is as much an intrinsic organic consequence of the deed as that of the other. If the individual has not properly mediated his habit or impulse, if he acts upon intention which is one sided, the reaction brings out that factor of the deed. In one case, it may be the burn from putting his hand in the fire, the other case the rebuke or punishment for violating or coming short of social functioning. This is no external consequence (see pp. 14–16); it is an organic factor of his deed, formerly hidden, but brought to light through the action. The deed executed brings the agent to a more definite consciousness of himself; the reactions of others in the way of praise or blame are simply phases of the return of the deed into the agent, arousing him to consciousness of certain features hitherto obscure. A person who is not capable of such experiences, of having the consequences of his action react back into himself, and become motives or modify character, is not (even formally) responsible; one who has this capacity is responsible. This capacity for mediation is not the cause, and responsibility the effect; this capacity for mediation *is* responsibility.

But if this *power* of being influenced by the foreseen consequences is a *habit* we have *substantial* responsiblity. This is an attainment, a conquest, not an original possession; it is a name for virtue or rightness of will. Such a man is responsible *in* his acts, not simply liable *for* them. He does not try to escape himself in his deeds; when they are bad, he does not

try to escape himself in his deeds; when they are bad, he does not 'lay it off' on circumstances, but stands up to the reckoning, and in the very identification of himself with the evil deed in its consequences gets beyond it. He meets the demands of the situation. He is sufficiently interested in his function adequately to translate it into its rational detail of specific aims, and to carry out these aims to overt conclusion in deeds. Just as to say that a man is truly free is to recognize his realization of moral good, so to say that one is truly responsible is to give him the highest commendation for actual faithfulness to duty.

Section XL.—Determinist and Indeterminist Theories.

We are, however, told that man cannot be responsible unless he is free in another sense; that a man cannot be responsible unless at the time when he acted he could equally well have acted otherwise than as he did act, and this without any change of character and motive. We are told that self-blame, remorse, etc., are inexplicable without this freedom of indifference; and that rebuke and punishment from others become meaningless and unjust without such freedom. All arguments to this effect seem to rest upon an ambiguity. Just so far as a man believes that he was *forced* to act as he did act, he excuses himself—and rightly; the act was not himself at all, it was the external compulsory force that really acted. The condition of responsibility, that the deed be the concrete will or unified self, is absent. The confusion comes in when absence of adequate self-motivation is substituted for absence of external compulsion. 'I might have done otherwise'—that consciousness *is* itself my miserable condition, my blame or remorse, and not simply a condition of it (pp. 77–8); but what it means is not that I might arbitrarily or with no different self have done otherwise, but that the sole reason for my acting as I did lies in myself, is attributable to no external cause. I might have done otherwise had I been a better self, had I been a worthy person—had I been one to whom this

right end adequately appealed, but I was not such an one; I was just such an one as would do this sort of deed, which I now see in all its badness; this *is* my blame.

The whole problem arises because the objector insists upon carrying the dualism between agent and deed which he himself makes over into the doctrine of his opponent. He continually says: 'Ah, then, according to your doctrine, the agent at the time he acted could not have done otherwise than as he did; this I call not freedom but necessity.' He has simply imported here his own separation of agent and act. Upon the basis of the theory against which the objection is brought, this sentence must be rendered as follows: 'The man was himself and did act precisely as he acted.'*

The entire sting of the proposition vanishes and it becomes a harmless truism. But the content of this truism gives the only basis of responsibility. Everything which lessens or loosens the concrete, specific organic connection of the agent with his act, in just so much relieves the agent from responsibility for his act. If the abstract, metaphysical will or self intervenes between the concrete self, the impulses, habits, ends, and the deed, then it and not this concrete individuality must assume the responsibility for the act; it is none of my doing. In the desire to magnify the self, the indeterminists deny the specific, real self, which is in and through action, and erect an abstract, outside self, reducing freedom to an irrationality, and responsibility to a myth.

Only a few of the indeterminists carry the argument beyond an expansion, generally rhetorical and hortatory, of the dependence of self-blame and just punishment upon ability to have acted otherwise. Martineau has attempted a more detailed statement (Study of Religion, Book III., ch. II., vol. II., esp. pp. 210–227.) An analysis of this shows that the real origin of the doctrine of indifference is not the need of justify-

*The 'determinism,' in other words is a logical determinateness, and not an external pre-determinism. See an article in the Monist, vol. III., p. 362, The Superstition of Necessity.

ing moral responsibility, but a defective psychological analysis of will, making of it an impossible abstraction.

Mr. Martineau gives the following case (pp. 213–215.) You suffer from calumny admitting disproof; to make the exculpation would cast a shadow on some one else, or embitter some precious friendship. The impulse to exculpate self is arrested by another impulse, equally natural. Now in the decision of this conflict Martineau claims that the following factors are involved:

(1) "The two incompatible springs of action; (2) Your own past, i. e., a certain formed system of habits and dispositions brought from your own previous use of life. The former head comprises the *motives* that are offered; the latter the *character* that has come to be. Do these settle the matter between them? * * * Or, is our account of what is there still incomplete, and must we admit that besides our formed habit or past self, there is also a *present self* that has a part to perform in reference to both? * * * In all cases of self-consciousness and self-action there is necessarily this duplication of the ego into the *objective*, that contains the felt and predicated phenomena at which we look, or may look, and the *subjective*, that apprehends and uses them. It is with the latter that the preferential power and personal causality reside." And further (p. 216):

"I submit that no one can sincerely deem himself incapable by nature of controlling his impulses and modifying his acquired character. That he is able to make them the objects of examination, comparison and estimate, places him in a judicial and authoritative attitude towards them, and would have no meaning if he were not to decide what influence they should have. The casting vote and verdict upon the offered motives is with him, and not with themselves; he is 'free' to say 'yes' or 'no' to any of their suggestions: they are the conditions of the act; he is its agent. * * * * You do not let yourself sway to and fro with varying fling of the motives upon your character, like a floating log on an advancing and retreating wave; but address yourself to an active handling of their pretensions. * * * * You yourself, as a personal centre of intelligence and causality are at the head of the transaction and determine how it shall go."

The passage has been quoted at length because it clearly reveals the process which leads to the fiction of a distinct, deciding self, a self separate from the material estimated, the impulses competing. That process is an unreal abstraction of

motive on one side, and of character on the other. These abstractions being erected into fixed things, some other power has to be brought in to make up for the omitted elements and to bridge the gulf:—Martineau's third factor, or self in which alone selecting power resides. If motive and if character were what Martineau assumes them to be, certainly something else would be required to get a moral action under way.

(1) Consider the matter from the side of 'motive,' and see what an impossible abstraction Mr. Martineau has made. Here is the impulse to clear one's repute; there the impulse not to hurt the friend's reputation or affection. And these set over *against* character, and supposed to be acting upon it or acted on by it! A very moderate amount of reflection will reveal that each impulse is what it is, in intensity,* in intellectual significance and in moral weight, *as a function of character.* The desire to clear my standing cannot even occur to me save as I have certain habits and dispositions. Its very existence is the expression of a certain tendency of character; *what* it is, whether a mere dislike to be thought ill of, a love of popularity for its own sake, a recognition of the commercial or professional value of good standing, or the need of having everything that concerns one squared and true—all this is constituted wholly by character; finally, the weight which it has with respect to other 'motives,' the relative value attached to it, the whole process of estimation, etc., is a process of *internal* development, of revelation of the extent to which character is bound up with, is *present in the motive.* The mere appearance of the 'impulse' is the immediate, hasty, possibly superficial moving of character in a given direction; the constitution of its intellectual significance and moral import is the mediated, persistent assertion of self, developing itself in this defined direction. And the completion of the motive *is* the volition, the deed.

* Martineau afterwards recognizes this much (p. 239), but without reconstructing his theory of motives at all. They still remain objective, phenomenal, etc., etc.

(2) Equally fictitious is the assumption of the character as fixed, given or presupposed. One would imagine from Mr. Martineau's account that habit means only mechanical routine, formation is equivalent to fossilization and organization to a static arrest of development. When one reflects that the difference in the *dynamic* efficiency of amœba and man is the difference in habits, in structure, in organization, one sees how much truth is likely to be arrived at from this assumption. Habit is no final, rigid attainment—were it only for the reason that every habit is a dependent function of the whole organism, is a member of a system of habits, and *must* co-ordinate, must stimulate and be stimulated by others—must, in a word, be flexible, continually readjusting itself. The development of volition is a continued exhibition, self-revelation of character, just as the formation of motive is one with passage of self into unified activity or deed. We know what we are and what we can be only through what we do. If character were this solid, inert lump that Martineau conceives it, undoubtedly it could not originate an act which is free and responsible. But in reality the whole process of initiating impulse, considering, deliberating, choosing is a movement of character aiming at adequate discovery and exhibition of self.

(3) The necessity of the third factor, the deciding self, is a necessity originated wholly through the failure to recognize the present moving self in 'motive' and 'character.' The defect comes out clearly when we find the problem stated as if it were an alternative between determination of the volition *by* character and motive, or *by* the Self, the free will. It is in reality simply a question of the resolution of a volition into its definite factors. There is no third thing, a volition, determined by motive; the volition *is* the completed motive; and just so it *is* the exhibited character, the fulfilled self. The introduction of self as a third factor (instead of the recognition that the whole process is one of self-movement) marks the break, due to defective psychological analysis, between character and deed. It is the flagrant symbol of the failure to

recognize that the deed *is* the concrete agent, the self in functional (that is, definitive and co-ordinated) activity.

The truth of the matter is that Martineau (and so with all the other indeterminists) simply accepts the adequacy of the necessitarian psychology of volition up to a certain point, accepts its dualistic separation of impulse and motive from self, and then, seeing the ethical insufficiency, help themselves out by bringing in the *Deus ex Machina*, a Free Will. This is the reason the contests between indeterminists and determinists (in the causational, not logical sense) are so futile and unending. *Both have the same premises*, the product of inadequate psychological analysis. The only way to 'rescue' freedom from the attack of the determinist is not to bring it in as a 'third factor,' but to reconstruct the theory of motive and character to bring out the functional presence of the self in them, and their consequent flexible, dynamic structure.

The criticism of the indeterminist holds equally, therefore, against the determinist, that is, the predeterminist. He makes the same abstraction of motive, erecting hunger, love of praise, modesty, etc., into little entities which pull and haul on a self outside of them. Or, going into a wider field, he talks of the determination of self *by* heredity and environment. He has the two things, set over against each other, and with only a mechanical connection between them, one of force, just as the indeterminist can get only an arbitrary relation. They both argue then as if it were a question between mechanical causation on one side, and arbitrary interference on the other, forgetting that *both* alternatives arise from the unexamined assumption of the dualism of self and ideal and motive. The whole controversy vanishes in thin air when we substitute for the determination of volition *by* circumstances or *by* Free Will, the determination of Self *in* volition, *in* deed—its passage into definite, unified activity.

The best statement of the determinist position will be found in Bain, Emotions and Will, ch. XI. For indeterminism, see, besides the above reference to Martineau, his Types, vol. II., pp. 34–8;

Lotze, Practical Philosophy and James, Unitarian Review, vol. XXII., p. 193: Dilemma of Determinism (James's refutation of *Pre*-determinism is convincing; but I see nothing in his positive argument for indeterminism which does not fall in with the determinateness of action argued for above); Calderwood, Handbook, Part II., chs. 3 and 4. Stephen's Science of Ethics, pp. 274–293, seems to be in unstable equilibrium between predeterminism and determinateness. Much the same may be said for Gizycki, Introduction, ch. VI. Green, Prolegomena, Book II., ch. I., would be in substantial agreement with the view above stated were it not for his abstract view of the Self, which compels him to separate self as ideal (future) from character, making the latter fixed, or past only, and thus bringing him to the determination of deed *by* character and circumstance. Alexander, Moral Order, pp. 336–341, does not seem to me wholly free from the idea of character as static, but brings out more clearly than any other writer that choice, preference *is* freedom, and that it is irrational to try to get back of choice as both indeterminist and predeterminist attempt to do. Dr. Ritchie, Ethical Implications of Determinism, Philos. Rev., vol. II., p. 529, turns the tables neatly against the indeterminist's usual assertion that he alone can 'rescue' responsibility. (Gizycki is strong here also; Hodgson's statement, quoted in Martineau, Study, II., p. 224, is also excellent). Bradley's Ethical Studies, I., is a thorough-going statement of the identity of freedom and responsibility, as they are valued by the popular consciousness, with concrete Selfhood. Muirhead, Elements, pp. 50–54; and Mackenzie, Manual, pp. 140–150, are in accord with the text, but hardly adequate upon the psychological side.

CHAPTER IX.—VIRTUE AND THE VIRTUES.

Section XLI.—The Two-Fold Statement of Virtue.

It is implied in what has already been said that virtue, the active good will, or unified self, may be stated from either of two standpoints; that of freedom or of responsibility. Virtue may be considered either as a case of substantial freedom, of solid, thoroughly unified action, or as a case of substantial responsibility, of flexible, properly adjusted, interaction—the adequate intellectual recognition of, and adequate emotional interest in, the demands of the situation. We have, here, the emphasis, first upon one side, then upon another, of the idea of coördination. Coördination implies the attained order, organization — freedom. But as coördination, it implies the

reciprocal adjustment of the various *sub*ordinate activities involved—responsibility.

It is because the unity of will is a functional, a dynamic unity, because deed is simply self in full activity, that freedom and responsibility are the correlative phases of virtue. Every organic function is maintained through the coöperation, the working together of a number of organs, and the higher the specialization of the function (the definiteness of the deed), the more comprehensive the number and scope of reinforcing organs.

Freedom, again, names virtue from the standpoint of good, of value; responsibility from the standpoint of duty. To be a free and responsible self at every point, and in every act, is at once the sole *law* and the sole *end* of conduct.*

This gives the solution of the apparent paradox of virtue. Some writers insist that virtue is not virtue until it is wholly free, or one's very nature, until it is spontaneous self-movement from sheer inclination; that every sign of struggle, of effort, of constraint, must be eliminated.† Others hold that it is the essence of virtue to express effort, resistance and conquest; it is, in Kant's expressive words, "the moral disposition warring," in Laurie's, "it is mediation through pain." (Ethica, p. 145.) Now a case can be made out for either of these positions; and this fact would seem to indicate some common ground. This is found, I think, in the fact that both contentions have in view in their conception of virtue the wholeness of the self in the deed, but approach it from different points of view. The first view thinks of the relation of the whole to the part, reinforcing, completing it; the self so present in the deed that there is no resistance, so that we, as Emerson says, "do by knowledge what the stones do by structure." It is the fullness of the mediation that is in mind. The second view thinks

*The principle, it may be observed, is formal *in statement*, just because it is so full of *detailed content in actuality*.

†See Aristotle, Ethics, Book II., ch. III., and still more expressly, Emerson, Spiritual Laws.

of the readjustment of the original, or isolated, tendency, of the part, involved in its membership in the whole. It thinks of the reconstruction, the readjustment involved in mediation. It is not because there has been no struggle that we identify virtue with full, easy nature, nor is it merely because of struggle that we identify virtue with conquest. It is, in both cases, because conquest means struggle *brought to an issue*. We know well enough that the man to whom virtue is natural has had his own fights, and we reverence him the more that he has subdued his own enemies, and not inflicted part of the burden upon us, nor distracted our own efforts by continually calling attention to his. We reverence him because he has turned even his struggle into power.

We may assume that the position of maximum ease and æsthetic freedom in the human body is not one of impotence or flabbiness, or even of being asleep; but the maximum exertion of all the muscles, the limit being found in the principle of balance. In looking at such a poise, one might praise it as indicating the power of doing maximum work, another as indicating that it is not work but play. So, after all, there is no inconsistency in the statement that it is not easy to be virtuous, and that yet we are not virtuous till it is easy.

Section XLII.—The Classification of Virtues.

Virtue being the wholeness of self, the full and definite manifestation of agent in act (the adequate mediation of impulse), the various virtues will naturally name various phases of this act. The main phases were first hit upon by Plato (Republic) and have since been named the 'cardinal virtues.' These are wisdom (practical judgment), temperance, (self-control), courage and justice. After the psychological analysis now completed, the derivation and significance of the virtues should be obvious. Wisdom, as a virtue, is evidently the habit of considering the bearings and relations of a given act; it is the habit of interpreting and appreciating it in terms of the self, of taking it concretely and seriously, instead of ab-

stractly; whether the abstraction be of brute irrationality, or of that sentimentality which sometimes constitutes an over-refined culture and sometimes a crude flippancy. It is, in short, the habit of defining impulse in terms of its objective content, a preparation for giving its due function, of attaching it to its proper use.

The over-subjective ethics of one-sided individualism, fostered by evangelical phases of Protestantism, need a reconstruction upon the basis of Hellenic thought as regards this virtue. The modern 'I have to follow my conviction' finds substantiality only in the ancient 'wisdom is the guarantee of all virtues.' There is and can be no duty of living up to conviction till we have some surety as to the rationality of conviction; no duty of 'obeying conscience' till we have taken pains to have an instructed conscience. Moral education requires a shifting of the centre of obligation, locating it less in the mere doing of what seems to be right and more as the habit of searching for what is really right. As mediæval Catholicism, in its consciousness of the superiority of spirit over matter, is accused of confusing dirt with piety, so modern Evangelicalism, in its emphasis upon moral emotion and attitude, is open to the charge of encouraging an ignorant sentimentalism at the expense of a truthfulness which is not simply formal truth-telling, but which insists upon knowing what the truth is.

The tendency to derogate from the ethical claims of knowledge on the ground that knowledge is merely intellectual, is entirely aside from the point. As long as an idea (an aim, purpose, reason) is essentially involved in voluntary conduct, so long responsibility will attach to the formation of the idea, and attention to this need will be a virtue. While the idea itself, in its content, is 'merely intellectual,' that factor determining *what* this content shall be, is not 'intellectual' at all; it is *character:* which may be stated, in emotional terms as the *interest* in the adequate recognition of what one is doing; in volitional terms, as the *habit* of attending to the bearing and value of acts. In short, it is that phase of virtue ordinarily

termed conscientiousness. The Socratic identification of wisdom and virtue is much nearer the truth than the modern view which, holding to knowing the good and still doing the evil, substitutes a conventional state of being informed, a second hand, representative or symbolic set of opinions, for vital intelligence.

So much for the mediate side. But we have also the relation of the mediate and immediate—the tension due to their interaction. Now because this is a process of mediation, not of suppression or substitution, each phase of the process must duly assert itself. If the process be looked at from the side of the necessity of self-assertion of impulse, we have courage. Courage, as a virtue, is the habit of adequate persistence on the part of impulse, in the face of external resistance or obstacles, such as, when transformed into self-experience, give rise to fear.

But mediation involves change of direction, and this involves the adequate assertion of the *mediating* activity. As the present felt pleasure is apt to be connected with the immediate impulse, representing as that does some assured satisfaction of the past, we seem here to have a struggle against pleasure, as, in the case of courage, one against pain. The virtue of adequate assertion of the mediating activity is self-control, temperance, in the Greek sense of whole-mindedness.

The man under self-control does not go off at a tangent, he does not act partially; he has himself in hand, at command, and hence acts as a whole. Unfortunately, the virtue has become associated mainly with the negative aspect of this virtue, with the immorality of false asceticism and false Puritanism. Self-denial has flourished upon the perversion. The rational injunction, deny yourself *this* or *that* satisfaction, has been changed into the impossible and immoral injunction, Deny *Yourself*—without qualification. That is, the need of checking the primary tendency of a desire, the need of transforming it by attaching it to a more functional end has been perverted into a need for suppressing, or, if that is impossible,

minimizing, desire itself. The continual assumption has been that appetite itself is evil. In reality the negative phase of temperance is but the partial development of the positive, arrested in its incompleteness. It is but a step, a means; as an end it is meaningless. The positive phase, clearly embodied in the term 'control,' is power; efficiency as an agent or instrument. To abstain, to mortify,—this, taken absolutely, is immoral; to attain mastery, to live, undergoing whatever sacrifice and refusal of particulars may be involved in the attainment of full power, is the law of self.*

There is need for a return to the Greek standpoint from which many traits now regarded as gifts of fortune, or as happy acquirements, as talents or mere accomplishments, were considered as virtues. The very term 'intellectual virtue' sounds strangely to our ears, so given up are we to the habit of considering knowledge as the choice possession of a few. Yet continuity of thought, power of concentration, clear-sightedness, sincerity, all these are but particular forms which the one virtue of conscientiousness assumes, and there can be no concrete conscientiousness save when these specific powers are developed according to the measure of the agent. So persistence, patience, honor, good humor are but the varied manifestations of courage, while readiness, alertness, flexibility, industry, balance, decorum are as much forms of self-control as are chastity, and moderation in eating and drinking. All the so-called minor morals, or manners, in fact, are but the detailed contents of the great or cardinal virtues, their translation into the daily detail without which conduct is a barren ideality, an iridescent dream. If it be said that concentration of attention, good humor, presence of mind, equable temperament are gifts of nature, the answer is 'Yes,' as *capaci-*

*So far as 'egoism' and 'altruism' is a psychological problem, this principle applies there also. To say that altruism is a *definition* of the ego, indicating its essential outgoing character, is one thing; to suppose that besides the self there is another end is to affirm a psychological impossibility. The sole value of the idea of altruism, in other words, is in forming a demand for a wide and flexible conception of self.

ties, 'No,' as habits. And precisely the same is to be said of truthfulness, modesty, honesty, charity, or any virtue which has a secured place in the catalogue of the Moral Pantheon. In every case there is a natural impulse in the given direction, which becomes virtue when transformed into a rational habit —that is, into an impulse attached to the realizing of a certain end or idea. Our failure to recognize these traits as true virtues does not mark, as we are apt to flatter ourselves, an advance over the Greeks in distinguishing between the gifts of nature and the attainments of will; it marks rather a falling off in the standards of responsibility, a more abstract idea of will.

The conception that Justice is a term applied to the process in its entirety, designating its organic character, the adequate and completed unification of impulse and reason, may be approached by reflection upon the mutual dependencies existing between wisdom, temperance and courage. Wisdom is impossible without courage; what makes our intentions, our ideals, imperfect is our unwillingness to face the thought of consequences of a given habit or desire; our tendency to shy when the first unpleasant thought comes to view. There is no courage in the world like the courage of holding ourselves fairly and squarely to the import of our own deeds. From this point of view, all vice is letting things drift, waiting to see what will turn up, hoping for a turn of luck, a miraculous intervention which shall come between our deed and its legitimate fruit. (See James H., pp. 563–564, for an excellent statement.) Wisdom is equally dependent upon temperance. To follow the lead of appetite, of passion, is the same thing as not to think. The checked impulse, the arrested habit, *is* reflection commenced. The self-denial of prejudice, of hasty assumption, of one-sided opinion, of cherished tradition is as real and as virtuous as the conquest of any lust of the flesh. The interdependence of courage and temperance stands out on the face of things when we give the latter its positive name, self-control. Self-control is ever passing into self-assertion;

the fruit of the spirit into second nature. On the other side, there is no rejection of the solicitations of pleasure, of the allurements of the Siren, that is not equally ability to bear the infliction of pain. All these mutual dependencies are inexplicable, if, making an entity of each virtue, we suppose them to be causal. They are inevitable if courage, temperance and wisdom denote simply phases of every moral act; and the name is given according to the phase which, in a given case, happens to be uppermost.

Justice, then, is the name for the deed in its entirety; it names as a whole what we name in aspects when we use the other virtues. It is not another virtue; it is the system of virtue, the organized doing: whose organic members are wisdom, the will to know; courage, the impulse to reach, control, the acquired power to do.

Justice is the habit of maintaining function, concrete individuality, in its supremacy and of giving every impulse, desire, habit its value according to its factorship in this function. Justice conveys so fully, in the very term, its meaning of regard for the whole, but for the whole maintained by the positive maintenance of its parts as organs, instead of by their suppression, that it is hardly possible to bring out the idea more closely with any number of words.

Aristotle (Ethics, Book V., ch. 1), points out a supposed ambiguity of meaning in the term justice; in one sense, it is equivalent to obedience to law, and equals complete virtue; in this sense the just man is the man who fulfills all requirements, the good man. In the other sense, it means fairness, equity; the just man being he who demands simply his share in an apportionment. The first sense is the whole of virtue; the second simply a part, according to Aristotle.

There can be no doubt of these two senses, and yet I think practical sense is wiser in fusing them than Aristotle in separating them. It seems, again, to be a case of considering the organization of self in action, the co-ordination of impulse and habit, from the standpoint first of the co ordination as such, of

the whole, and then of the process of co-ordering the constituent factors. The just man (in the first sense), is after all simply the man who is fair, impartial in meeting demands; he is the man who adequately distributes his attention, giving to each impulse and habit precisely its place, neither more nor less, in the whole function. Because the unity of a good act is a unity of function, that is of content, an organization (not simply a formal unity), it must have the aspect of the adjustment, the fitting in of one part to another. But co-ordination both as effective organization, and as mutual adjustment of parts according to the claims of each (equity), is goodness as a whole; the difference is simply one of emphasis. If justice as obedience to moral law is severed from justice as equity, as due attention to every aspect of one's nature, it becomes external, the law is no one knows what, and obedience is mere conformity. If justice, as due sharing in the distribution of a whole, is severed from justice as law-obeying, it loses all standard; there is no measure by which to tell what the due share of each is.

And this suggests Aristotle's other division of justice into corrective and distributive (Book V., chs. 3 and 4.) The former is sharing in the distribution of an evil (*i. e.*, punishment), and its rule is arithmetical; *i. e.*, make the individual suffer according to his deed—simple *re-quital*, redress. The latter is sharing in the distribution of honor, wealth, etc., positive goods; and its law is not arithmetical equality, but geometrical (that is, proportion, not simply equality of sums.) It is fair, (equal) that the better citizen should receive more, not the same honor as another; the workman of skill more, not the same return as another. It seems obvious that when we deal with this positive, distributive equity, we have nothing save justice as full virtue. Certainly the man who gives *value* to every impulse and habit according to its *service* in the constitution of his function is precisely the good man, the man of fully mediated impulse, of adequate concrete interests in life.

And this suggests that the current distinction between jus-

tice as penal, and justice as concrete recognition of positive merit by the share awarded an agent in the conferring of praise, honor or wealth, is far too rigid. Justice, in this distributive aspect, involves the whole question of merit and blame, and of rendering a man his due. If we ask what *is* his due, we are told his deserts; his merits according to his service. Then into this answer, not so much true as tautological, is unconsciously inserted an assumption of the most momentous character. The question, *what is* a man's due, his desert, his merit; that is, what estimate is to be set upon him; remains wholly unanswered; but unconsciously there is smuggled in the assumption that worth is static, that it is to be measured by what the man *has* done; that what the man *has* done is somehow complete in itself, and serves to indicate his merit, and, therefore, the way in which he should be treated. Service is taken as some *thing* rendered, not as function.

Re-tribution, re-quital is, indeed, just; it is the good, and the only good; but, after all, what is retribution? And the assumption that it is an arithmetical measuring out to the individual of pain similar to that which he has inflicted, the restoring of an algebraic equation, is monstrous as an assumption, even if it should turn out to be justified by examination. The whole subject of a *standard* of measurement is ignored, and yet that is the all determining question.

What is due the self is that it be treated *as* self; what is due a man is that he be regarded in his manhood. Nothing less than this is 'fair.' But a *given* deed taken as something which *has* been performed is not the self, it is an isolation, an arrest, an abstraction. The deed in its living concrete character is *activity;* it has the whole self implicit in it, and that self is an urgent, on-going power, not a finished performance, or a settled accomplishment. What is due the self is that it be made aware of itself in its deed, be brought to full consciousness of itself through the mediation of the deed. In other words, its due is that its deed in fact and not merely in name be the self manifested, and that there follow the re-action, the

reflection of the 'consequences' of the deed back into impulse and habit; that character be transformed and developed through this continual mediation.

Now this reaction may be of a kind to inhibit, and require modification of dominant habits. In that case there is pain, punishment. The return of the deed into the agent's consciousness is painful, negative, *i. e.*, destructive. It tends to disturb, to uproot existing tendencies or directions of action. But this, of course, is but the first phase in re-construction, in the re-adjustment; it is new habit beginning. That is, so far as the pain is normal, and not pathological, it is reform. Stated in the abused antithesis of current language, all punishment is retribution, but the only genuine retribution is reform. The conception that the desert of the self is anything other than to be self is as monstrous in its content as it is as an assumption. No man can concretely realize the definition of the self involved in any other idea, without indignation at the degradation, the meanness of character involved in the harboring of such an idea about manhood and life. The worst pessimism is not that which flaunts itself as such, but that which damns human nature at its very heart.

But the very fact that it is necessary to spend so much time upon justice as penal, shows how almost completely, under the influence of one-sided aspects of Christianity, ethical theory has come to be dominated by pathological, rather than by healthy, physiological considerations. The normal case, that to which punishment is incident, is the reaction of the whole into the part, of function into habit, stimulating, reinforcing, expanding—setting free. Justice is thus self-realization.

The contention that the 'Platonic' classification of cardinal virtues is incomplete, and needs to be supplemented by the distinctively Christian virtues of faith, humility, aspiration (reverence) and love is due simply to retaining narrow conceptions of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. Aspiration, hope, if other than sentimental longing, is self-assertion,

courage in its pure form; and the same may be said of the relation of temperance to humility, if the latter is other than artificial self-effacement. Faith, as virtue, is but the adequate consciousness of the practical character, the volitional stamp of all knowledge: the staking one's *self* upon the reality of the idea, affirming it absolutely as identical with self, instead of resting content with the easy acknowledgment of it as mere object.

When it was said that the ordinary conception of desert concealed a momentous assumption, it was meant that the whole dualism of justice and love is involved. If justice be conceived as mere return to an individual of the equivalent of what he *has* done; if his deeds, in other words, be separated from his vital, developing self, and, if therefore, the 'equivalent return' ignore the profound and persistent presence of self-hood in the deed, then it is true that justice is narrow in its sphere, harsh in form, requiring to be supplemented by another virtue of larger outlook and freer play—Grace. But if justice be the returning to a man of the equivalent of his deed, and if, in truth, the sole thing which equates the deed is self, then quite otherwise. Love is justice brought to self-consciousness; justice with a full, instead of partial, standard of value; justice with a dynamic, instead of static, scale of equivalency.

Psychologically, then, love as justice is not simply the supreme virtue; it is virtue. It is the fulfilling of the law—the law of self. Love is the complete identification of subject and object, of agent and function, and, therefore, is complete in every phase. It is complete interest in, full attention to the objects, the aims of life, and thus insures responsibility. It provides the channels which give the fullest outlet to self, which stirs up the powers and keeps them at their fullest tension, and thus guarantees, or *is*, freedom, adequate self-expression. It alone is wisdom, for anything but love fails to penetrate to the reality, the individuality of self, in every act, and thus comes short in its estimate of values. It alone is cour-

age, for, in its complete identification with its object, obstacles exist only as stimuli to renewed action. It alone is temperance, for it alone provides an object of devotion adequate to keep the agent in balance and power. It alone is justice, dealing with every object, aim and circumstance according to its rights as a constituent, a member, an organ of self—the sole ultimate and absolute.

In many respects the discussions of virtue by Plato and Aristotle are still unequaled. The Platonic dialogues are so permeated with the idea of virtue throughout that it is impossible to give specific adequate references. The Republic, 427–434, suggests the main principle. See Aristotle, Ethics, Books III., chs. 6–12; IV., V., VI. Modern ethics has been so occupied with the problem of duty in its metaphysical and practical aspects as to very defective in its treatment of virtue. For the most part, the question is ignored or else there is given an empirical cataloguing of virtues, with no attempt to discover any principle. Again, the writings which do use a principle of classification generally use that of individual and social virtues, failing to see that no matter how social a virtue may be in its content and object, it must, as a quality of character, or attitude and disposition of will, be capable of a thorough going psychological statement. Since a certain type of character, since the right activity of will, is confessedly the goal of all practical endeavor, the slighting of this goal in the theoretical treatments, as if it were a mere incident or corollary, is the more fatal. The following references will serve to indicate the various methods of treatment: Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Book III., chs. 2–5; 9–10; Book IV., ch. 3; Spencer, Principles of Ethics, Vol. II., especially, pp. 3–34 and 263–276 (Justice is public; Beneficence private, and either negative or positive); Stephen, Science, ch. V., courage, temperance, truthfulness—individual, efficiency of the agent; justice and benevolence,—social vitality. In spite of this (to me) false disjunction, Stephen's treatment is exceedingly real and faithful in detail; Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, pp. 242–253 (denies the value of psychological classification, holding they refer to social institutions—has the advantage of sticking to a single, instead of a cross, principle of classification.)

The question of 'natural ability' *vs.* 'virtue' is suggestively handled by Hume, Treatise, Part II., Book III., Sec. 4, and Inquiry, Appendix IV. See also Bonar, Intellectual Virtues.

The literature upon penal justice or punishment is almost endless. Emerson's Essay on Compensation has the advantage of being written from the normal instead of the pathological point of view, and is a good substitute for a large quantity of other discussions.