• LOLLFXTIVC

:.;. ■ ■ ■ ■ fO! IS

By
r Itei I ee Sickles

A DISSER :iL

or ti

■ THE
DEGREF Oi DOCTOR ! L.OSCI ft

I , II

TO KY WIFE 01 11

AND MY CHiLDREN

I ISA, LAURIE, AND MATTHEW

FOR THEIR PATIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to express his appreciation for the direction
and encouragement provided by the cormiitt.ee. He especially thanks
the committee members for their cooperation and time given unhesitat-
ingly towards the fulfillment of his goal. The writer is indebted to
Dr. K. Forbis Jordan, Chairman, Dr. Ralph B. Kimbrough, and Dr. Arthur
J. Lewis.

The writer wishes to express his deep appreciation and gratitude
for the cooperation, extra time, and assistance provided by Dr. K.
Forbis Jordan for suggestion:* regarding the organization and general
support throughout the study.

Finally, the writer wishes 'co recognize his indebtedness to his
wife, Jill, and his children, Lisa, Laurie, and Matthew, for the
patience, understanding, end inspiration they provided as this study
was our sued.

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS • iv

ABSTRACT . . -vi'ii

CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION,

Statement of the Problem {■

Delimitations and Limitations • 3

Justification for the Study . . ... i

Definition of Terms ■ ' 5

Procedures '

Organization of the Research Report. ....... 9

Review of Related Literature and Research 9

ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES IN COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EDUCATION. . . ......... 2?

What Should Be the Role of the School Board

in Collective Bargaining?

What Should Be the Role of the Superintendent

in Collective Bargaining? 3

What Should Re th? Role of the Principal in

Collective Bav coining? ■

What Should Be Included or. the Board's

Bargaining Teani? ■

How Should Bargaining Teams Prepare for

Negotiations and Wh?t Strategies Were Used

to Get Proposals to the Negotiating Table? ... 71
What Strategies Should Be Used in Presenting

Proposals for bargaining? 76

What Should Be tne Scope of Collective

Bargaining in Publ ic Education? 79

Should Collective Bargaining Involve

Curriculum and Instruction? 90

Should Compulsory Unionism Be Required in

educational Collective Bargaining?- ....... 97

i-iow Should In-oasses in Collective Bargaining

in Public Lducaticn Be Resolved? 100

Should the Strike Be Used as a Labor Weapon

in Public Education? ^!'j

?.6
33
41
57

Page

311 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS FROM )KL LITERATURE OH

ISSUES AND STRATEGIES . . \ 26

,'f -

What Strategy Should t.'ie School i';card Adopt

in Determii'iirifj Its" Role in Collective

Bargaining? ...'■. • 127

What Strategy Should the Superintendent Adopt

in Collective Bargaining? "j 28

What Strategy Should the Principal Adopt in

Collective Bargaining? . 129

Who Should Be Included on the Board's TaLle

Bargaining Team?. 130

What Strategy Should De Used to Get the

Necessary Proposals to the Bargaining

Table? 131

What. Strategy Should Be Used to Determine the

Scope of Collective Bargaining? 133

What Strategy Should Be Used for Curriculum

and Instruction in Collective bargaining?. .... 134
What Strategy Should Be Used for Dealing with

Compulsory Unionism in Educational Collective

Bargaining? 135

What Strategy Should Be Used by the School

System in Resolving an Impasse? . . ... . . . . .136

What Strategy Should Be Used by the School

Board in Deal ing with Strikes? ....)?/

IV RESULTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND TEACHER NEGOTIATOR

SURVEYS 139

Issue Number One 141

Issue Number Two , , ... 144

J'ssue Number Three . 149

Issue Number Four 15A

Issue Number Five HT»

Issue Number Six 163

Issue Number Seven 1 58

Issue Number Eight 173

I.ssue Number Nine 178

Issue Number Ten, 183

V SUMMARY, COHCLUSiONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 190

Sum-nary 190

Implications for the Theory and Practice of

Negotiations 191

Substantive Conclusions 198*

Procedural Conclusions 20b

Ipsplications for Further Research 205

F<:ge
APPENDICES

1 Preliminary Letted ano' Survey ............. 207

2 Survey Results to Determine Year:- of Baroaining

in. Floridci by County. .... ........... 209

3 Interview Guide ..... ..... 211

4 Letter to Selected Experienced Negotiators 215

5 Experienced Negotiators interviewed . 216

BIOGRAPHICAL. SKETCH 218

Vil

Abstract of Dissertation Presented i.c the Graduate Council

of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

A STUDY OF ISSUES IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT
■ STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THOSE ISSUES

B>'
Walter Lee Sickles

August, 1975

Chairman: K. Forbis Jordan

Major Department: Educational Administration

The purposes of this study were to 'identify .issues, in the.. col-
lective-bargaining process in public elementary and secondary educa-
tion, referred to in this study as public education, and alternative
strategies for dealing with those issues from the school board's
perspective. Collective bargaining literature written between 1965
and 1974 was- reviewed. To validate the major issues and alternative
-strategies, an interview guide was developed from the literature.

Experienced administrative negotiators and experienced teacher
negotiators from six Florida counties were interviewed. The six
counties represented large, medium, and small pupil populations; urban
and-, rural- settings.; and each had been involved in collective bargain-
ing for five years or more. The substantive findings and conclusions
were as follows:

1. The school board should approve- its bargaining team, estab-
lish guidelines and limits, and give the team authority to
act. Boards. should remain away from the table during the
bargaining process.

2. The superintendent should work as executive officer to the
board and provide: direction' to the board's team. He should
not represent both board and tether teams, act as chief
negotiator for the- board 4 or assays a neutral posture in
collective bargaining.

3. The principal should align himself, with In? beard's team and
sit with that team at the table as an advisor. He should
not assume a neutral role, join the teachers' group, or
organize his own unit.

4. The board's table team should include district personnel
without the superintendent, principals in an advisory capacity,
and an outside expert if expertise is unavailable in the dis-
trict. The team should not include board members, superin-
tendents, or attorneys.

5. The board's team should consult with principals to determine
what portions of the contract need modification. Proposals
are prepared from the principals' recommendations and ex-
changed with teachers during the first bargaining session.
The board team should not work exclusively from counter-
proposals.

6. The best strategy for determining. scope should be a broad
interpretation of "conditions of employment" with discussions
ef concerns throughout the year. The scope should not be
confined to salary and fringe benefits.

7. Curriculum and instruction should be d.?a!t with by a com-
mittee of administrators and teachers away from the bargaining

tabic*. However, procedures for establishing the joint com-
mittee are legitimate items for bargaining.

8. The best strategy for dealing with compulsory unionism is

- a "right to work" law. Keeping it out of the negotiations
■ law is not adequate protection for- boards.

9. Mediation and fact finding are the best strategies for boards,
Boards should avoid arbitration whenever possible.

10. The board should keep schools open by calling upon qualified
members of the community to take over classes until the dis-
pute is resolved. Teachers should be informed of their legal
obligations. Boards should not use the lockout against
striking groups.
In addition, the following procedural conclusions appear to be
justified by the study:

1. The body of literature on collective bargaining in education
was sufficient to provide ample material for the identifica-
tion of issues and alternative strategies for coping with
each issue.

2. Issues have remained relatively constant over time, but the
strategies for coping with the issues appear to be evolving.

3. When queried concerning the validity and relevance of the
issues and strategies, negotiators for administrators vm
teachers had & high level of agreement except in certain
isolated instances.

CHAPTu\ I
INTRODUCTION

According to Pierce, one- third of the geneva 1 labor force of
the nation has become- unionized- since -the passage of the Wagner
Act in 1925. ' Between 1964 and 1974, thirty-one states passed
public employee collective bargaining lav;s end large numbers of
teachers became involved in collective bargaining/ Lieberman
reported that 1.4 million teachers were involved in some form of
collective bargaining in 1973 and the numbers were likely to con-
tmue to rise throughout the 1 9/0s ."

By the mid- 1 970s, whether collective bargaining should or
should not have been encouraged in public education was no longer
an issue; public educators -hud to face realistically the problems
and issues which emerged wi thin the profession as a result, of the
rapid development cf collective bargaining. Pierce said that edu-
cation had a critical need for more information and more knowledge-
able individuals in the collective bargaining area if the problems
were to bo understood and the needs of society met.

•Wendell H. Pierce., "Education and Unionism." Comoact 6 (June
1972): ?..

2!"!£^'^.ti a tj_o ; L_Kes e a > ch j; i _y e s t 8 (May 1974): 10.

JMyron Lieberman, "Negotiations: Past, Present, and Future,"

A^^Lll^iT^ILr. 17 (i'^j/ 1973): 14.

fierce, "fduciition and Unionism," d. 2.

A major problem in education in the !970s v;as to determine; the
;strateo*es to use in tnt- collective bsrga inlng process. -Issues in
the pub-jic eciuca Li o*"; collective bargaining process have resulted In
the development of various strategies. -• -

Statement of the Problem

The problem of. this study was to identify issues in the collec-
tive bargaining process in public elementary and secondary education,
referred to 'in this study as public education, and alternative strat-
egies for dealing with those issues from the school board's perspective,
Answers were sought to the following questions:

1. What were the issues a:>d alternative strategies most fre-
quently cited in the literature. and research relative to
collective bargainee in j/ub"! ic education 'from 1365 through
1974?

2. From among the alternatives identified, which strategies
were most beneficial to the total educational program accord-
ing to tiie experienced administrative negotiators and
experienced teacher negotiators? Why were the selected
scrategves iv;ost beneficial to the total educational program?

3, From among the alternatives identified, which strategies
were the least beneficial to the total educational program
according to the experienced administrative negotiators and
experienced teacher negotiators? Why wore selected strat-
egies least beneficial to the total educational program?

4, Rem amoriii tne alternatives identified, what differences
and/or- similarities were there among those which were

3

considered to be most beneficial a-nd least beneficial to the
educational program as selected by experienced administrative
negotiators and experienced teacher negotiators in public
education?
5. What, were some of the most important observations which may
be made as a result of the interviews?

Delimitations and Limitations

The study included a review of the related literature and research
on collective bargaining from 1965 through 1974 to identify issues and
•alternative strategies. To determine the relative value of the various
strategies, interviews were conducted among selected districts in Florida
which have had five years or more of collective bargaining experience.
Those districts were determined -by a prior letter and brief survey to
county superintendents.

The study was ex-post-facto and contained the weaknesses inherent
in that design. Therefore, causal relationships were not determined
and conclusions were not generalized beyond the time for which the data
were appropriate.

Justification 'for the Study

This study added to the growing body of knowledge on the process
of collective bargaining in public education and it may help solve some
practical problems for practicing negotiators . The alternative strat-
egies may be particularly useful to practitioners.

Collective bargaining became a" major influence in education during
the period studied. Growing acceptance of collective bargaining was

4

'iiicivcked »y tne nu^-er of ;r!::<ces enacting such legislation. The
first law *as enacted by Wisconsin, in !^9, and by May 1974, thirly-

, 5 T'

ono stater, had collective bat gaining legislation Tor teachers. i:.e
legi slut ion varied in 'scope, but, in general, it was as broad as that
granted the private sector.

On Mav 30, 1974, the Governor of Florida approved e comprehensive
Public Employees Collective Bargaining Law. The law required each of
the sixty- seven Florida counties to bargain with public employees who
wished to bargain collectively. The ?^tifitjo]i.ResGcr£»i^£est of
June 1973 reported that eighteen counties out of fifty responding
Florida counties had written negotiation -procedures.' Since there
were sixty-seven counties in Florida, the possibility existed that
forty-nine counties had little or nc experience in collective bargain-
ing in 1574. Even if chose counties represented a small percentage of
the total instructional positions in Florida, the potential for dis-
harmony was evident. Therefore, there was a need for strategies which
experienced administrative negotiators and experienced teacher negotiators
found to be successful.

Another indication of the impact of collective bargaining in edu-
cation, and a sign that mure knowledge on the process was needed, was
the nrov/tli of signed agreements between boards cf education and teacher
groups over the United States. A January 1974 National Education
Association Research Report showed an increase in negotiated agreements

^ei]OtJj3ti_qii_R_es_eaj2cl2_ ,^ige_s_t 8: 10.
%>9otiation3es^r£h_0]5est 7 (June 1973): 16.

fro::' 389 In S 956-67 to -2,tJf,S iu ">9'2-l'U -€■;' a 500 percent, increase
during that period,'

Pierce suggested thai; touc^tirih not only needed more accurate
■information, but also needed tc, identify the issues at state and
institutional Icvals and tc become bettor informed on collective bar-
gaining. ^

Al terns ti ve strateg i es . Alternalive strategies were different
actions which may be token either prior to or during the collective
bargaining process- -to deal with identified issues.

Bargaining unit. A bargaining unit is a group of employees
recognized by the employer or designated by an agency as appropriate
for representation by an employee organization for purposes of coi-
lective bargaining.-

CoUcctJve_i2argoi_ning. Collective bargaining is the performance
of the mutual obligations of the public employer and the bargaining
agent of trie employee organization to meet- at reasonable times, to
negotiate in good faith, and to execute a written contract with respect
to agreements reached concerning the terms and conditions of employ-
ment, except that neither party shall be compelled to agree to a

^National Education A2§ocj3^on_^e^^h_^e2or_t (January 19/4):

°piercc, 'Tducation and Unionism," p. 2.

William C. Miller and David N. Newbury, T^^hji'J^etj^^itjorjs^
A_&Jide for Bargaining Teams (West Myack, New York: Parker Pud"! ish-
"ing" Coiiipan;/, Inc., 19/07, p. 234.

propose] or be required to make a concession unless otherwise provided
in this pert:. '"

E^peneticed^fiumirnj^trfitive negotiators. Fxperienced administra-
tive negotiators were individual:-; v;!io were responsible for negotiating
for school districts in the State of Florida .luring the 1973-74 school
year.

Experienced teacher negotiators. Experienced teacher negotiators
were individuals who were responsible for negotiating for a teacher
unit in the State of Florida during the 1973-74 school year.

Grievance. A grievance is an employee problem whose solution is
within the province of the employer or regulating agency. - -

Impasse.. An impasse is a persistent, disagreement between the
employee organization and the employer,, requiring the use of media--
tier, or appeal procedures for resolution.''

Issues. Issues are basic features wfvicli have emerged in the
public negotiations sector and at1.? considered important. 'to the process
by either administrators or teachers or both.

Mediation. Mediation is action by a third party to in-.-lp in the
settlement of disputes between employers and employees through fact-
finding, interpretation, suggestion, and advice. Recommendations of
mediators are almost always advisory and not binding, in practice,
mediation is synonomous with conciliation.

^Florida Statutes 44 7-100 PubHc Emu'lovees Relations Act.
Section 4-17.002 (Ki).

'• Mill or- and Newbury, Teacjier Negotijtiors -_ A_ Guide _f or Bar-
12Ibid.

-.; . !^*?CQ.gjT_i tion , Recognition is formal acknowledgemeiit by the employer
that a particular organization has the right to represent all of the
employees or 3 portion of their, in -collective bargaining.

lYoceiiiircs

The probleir. of the study was to identify issue? in the collective
bargaining process in public education and alternativp strategies for
dealing with those issues from a review of the related literature and
■research from lS:65"ti;rough 1974. Identified issues and alternative
strategies v/ereS«sed:as a basis for the development of an interview
instrument. Experienced administrative' and experienced teacher nego-
tiators were selected from six school systems in Florida that were
involved in collective bargaining for five years or more. Those
individuals were interviewed to provide data for the study.

Dcivjllopriient of .Literature_and_ Research to Determine Issues and
AltiH^tiYJl S^rateffies jA3'^C^JJ^iIv^-Ji?Iil^.i!lL^.^^LeAS.
in Publ ic Education

A review was completed on the related literature and research or.

collective baroVi.v. or;g in public education from 1965 through 1974. The

writer identified and listed issues from the related 1 iterature and

research on cot'.ec'.ive bargaining during this period. Strategies from

the related l-itora.l-ui'.'e and research for dealing with each of the issues

were also icient; i '.k-ci- and listed.

OeyejOi.-niient of_ an^In^srv •ew__Guide for_ _U_s^^ntlL Jx^IL'-JMll
Ad i ; ; i i Ti stV'aTi ye_fie ^tiators_j>mi .Jixperj enecd Teacher
Negotiators

An interview :;;ide was developed which enumerated selected

issues from the rciated i iter^ture and research in collective bargaining

8

in public education a-d alternative s v.r:i r.eg i es for defiling wish the
issuer... The alftTnst.ive stra terries were listed so that respondents
were able tc identify those vbey beTieved would be most benef icia';
end those they believed would be least beneficial to the educational
program. The- experienced administrative and teacher negotiators were
also asked why they thought certain strategies were nest benef Icia'!
and least beneficial .

Identification of rAp&j;tgnced_K;^jjce;;ieitL and Experienced

'" l£^.(r!|2.r...liGg^ikl§i.(iLi

The writer surveyed Florida county school systems to identify
school districts which had experience in collective bargaining. The
brief survey also determined the iinnics a.vd business addresses of the
individuals responsible for negotiating for Florida school boards and
the names and addresses of individuals negotiating for Florida teacher
organisations.

using the interview guide developed from a review of the related
literature and research for the study, data were obtained by interview
ing selected, experienced, administrative negotiators and selected,
■experienced, teacher negotiators from among those named in the brief
pre- survey. Appointments for the interviews were made with adminis-
trative and teacher negotiators. The interview guides were sent to
the negotiators in advance to facilitate the process.

To answer the questions posed in the statement of the problem,
the data were treated in a descriptive manner. However, frequencies

and totals of both experienced administrative negotiators and experi-
enced teacher; negotiators- were Calculate:!' for strategies that were
most beneficial and for strategies that were least beneficial for
each issue.

Organization of the Research -Report

The study was reported in five chapters. The first, chapter de-
tailed the problem and the procedures of the study and, additionally,
offered an overview of related literature and research illustrative
of collective bargaining in public education. Chapter II focused or,
issues and alternative strategies identified in the literature and
research on collective bargaining in public education. Chapter III
presented a discussion, of findings .from the literature on issues and
strategies. Chapter IV presented a discussion of findings from admin-
istrative and teacher negotiators interviewed. The data from Chapter
IV were reported individually and comparatively for administrative and
teacher negotiators. Chapter V summarized, drew conclusions, and
offered implications for further research.

Review of Related Literature and Research

Although collective .bargaining in private industry was widely
accepted1 by the general public in the United States from 1935 through
1974, attempts to encourage its adoption in the public sector met
resistance in the courts until 1951. In 1917, several teachers were
dismissed from their positions by the Chicago Bo^'d of Education
because they joined a union. The Boa.rd had adopted a policy, prior
to their joining the union., prohibiting such action by teachers. The

10

Supreme. Court of Illinois U one 'Id the Board's resolution, declaring that
-•union membership "is inimical' to proper discipline, prejudicial to
the efficiency of the teaching force, and detrimental to the welfare
of the public school system.11'-' In 1930, a similar case was ruled on
in Seattle with the same result.^

The union membership issue was not settled until 1951 when several
teachers in the Norwalk, Connecticut, schools were dismissed for striking,
The state court upheld the dismissal, but ruled that, in the absence of
enabling legislation, (1) public school teachers may organize; (2) a
school board is permitted, but is not legally obligated, to negotiate
with a teachers' organization; (3) a school board may agree to arbitrate
with teachers, but -only on those issues that do not erode the board's
legal prerogative to have the last word; (4) a school board may not
agree to a closed shop; and (5) public school teachers may not strike
to enforce tneir demands. Those five conclusions from the Norwalk
Case set precedent in states without enabling legislation and were used
between 1951 and 1974 as a basis for teacher collective actions.

For most practical purposes, I960 marked the beginning of the col-
lective negotiations movement in public education. The formal movement
was preceded by a period of informal discussions where teachers and

'■3'{ People ex rel . Fursman v . City of Chicago . 116 N . E . 158, 1 917 )
as cited in M. Che's ter No ite, Status and Scope of Collective Bar-
SJJJLiPAJA Public Fducatioji (Eugene, Oregon: ERIC Clearinghouse "on
Educational Administration, University of Oregon, 1970), pi 4.

14(Seattle High School Chapter No. 200 of the AFT v. Sharpies,
293, Pac. 994, 1 930) as "cited in No Tie , Status and Scope of Col 1 ect i ve
Bar ■gain j ng in Public Edu cat i e n , p. 4.

^!S!I^^.Jle^^rs^_Assoc2a_tj_OJ, v- Board of Education, 83A> 2d
432, 1951] as cited" Tr)""NoTt'e", "States "and Scope of CoT'lective Bargain-
inc in Public Education, -r», ^-5.

board members cr giinilivis-'criitorf; discussed- salaries, fringe benefits ,

and other natters, Such discussions were pursued by teachers as an

effort to convey their concerns to-ueducaricnal management.

Teacher leaders had beer: aware of the advances made in private

industry through the collective bargaining process, and unions had

recognized teachers as an exec"! 'lent source of revenue. Dr. William

6. Carr, Executive Secretary of the National Education Association,

discussed what he -identified as the threat of unionization at the

1962 National Education Association Convention in Denver, Colorado:

It now seems probable that a change may be taking
place in the attitude of leaders in organized
labor toward education. Some years ago, in 1957,
after some internal controversy, the AFI-CIO con-
demned the NFA and your state and local associa-
tions as "company unions." Within the past year,
the • AFL-CIO has been spending heavily to unionize
public school teachers. I believe the resources
assigned this year by union labor to achieve its-
objectives among the teachers cf New York City,
alone, amounted to about a half -mi 11 ion dollars.

Why has the AFL-CIO, after decades of cooperation
with the NF.A, suddenly moved in on the teaching
profession? Union membership has been dec! ining
since 1956; the average loss being about 140,000
members per year. Many union leaders believe .
that they must organize the white collar workers-
office employees in the main--in order to serve
the lab-jr' movement, properly. Perhaps, they regard
teaching as a relatively undefended gateway to
this wider objective. I think it is not really
the gateway., and 1 am sure it is not defenseless.

Organisational patterns in many school systems over the nation
have been modeled after industrial systems with typical line and staff
organisations. Authority whs placed largely in the hands cf adminis-
trators and boards and no corresponding power was built into the

^William G. Cam, The "iuvnina Joint ,_ Address snd_ tj^ceedijigs ,
One-Hundredth Annual MeeTlngV" Denver", July' Tg^Twasinnqton, O.C.:
NEA, 196?}, p. 22.

12

structure for- teachers. Abbott and Love 11 expressed the point as
follows: "There is not a formal , '-legitimatized structure through'
which teachers can make policy decisions and be held responsible for
those decisions. "

The. basic problem was that power and influence for teachers
was not built into the structure of the school system or embedded in
the legal structure until the recent state laws regarding teacher
negotiations were passed. These followed the industrial model. -

Saunders and Lovell expressed ideas for a different structure

for education:

It is our contention that the education profession
should initiate action immediately to change the
legal structure within which schools now operate
so as to permit the legitimatized involvement of
teachers. It is possible that objectives being
sought through structured, industrial type nego-
tiations may be achieved through a different model
of educational administration which would generate
efficiency in goal attainment, better policies,
higher levels of teacher satisfaction and less
confrontation, unrest and militancy J°

Administrators and teachers generally agreed that employee involve-
ment would lead to better education, but the methods and degree of
involvement rarely gained bilateral acceptance. Prior to collective
bargaining, the methods and degree of involvement were generally deter-
mined by administrators. However, major differences existed between
the traditional approach to school personnel administration and collec-
tive bargaining and perhaps the differences will help define methods

'?Max G. Abbott and John T. Lovell, eds., Changing Perspectives

in Educational Administration (Auburn, Alabama: Auburn~Uhi versity ,
'1965), p7"W.

^SRobert H. Saunders and John T. Lovell. "Negotiations: Inevitable

Consequences of Bureaucracy?" Educational Leadership 26 (October 1969):

and degree for administrators ^r\6 teachers... No] te. j eported .the fallow-
ing differences:

JJI?li^QflL.APIlroac^- The '•- ■>»""<■''" could not act
iini lateval i y without consul tat ', or. with employees,
allow only one vMy commin'iicafiur!., always have the .
lost word; lack good faith. ignore divergencies
between policy and oractice, find retain -a power1
relationship that is unilateral , paternalistic,
and authoritarian.

taljeotive_ Bargaining. The ocard is required to .
consult with, employees, communication is two way,
impasse procedures are provided, good faith oar-
gaining is mandated, constant dialogue requires
the board to discuss divergencies between policy
and practice, and the power relationship is bi-
lateral s cooperative and democratic. '9

The industrial collective bargaining mode1, was used, widely in
education, but many, realizing the wide differences between education
and private. industry, wondered if the model was appropriate. That
question remained unanswered in 1574.

Several of the differences have been identified by Ashby, McGinnis

and Persing as follows:

1. Industry is profit motivated. School systems
a^e not proprietary. Except as a long-range
investment of a high order, public schools are
not operated for profit.

?.. Industry is a matter of private enterprise
and initiative. Schools are mandated by law for
the general welfare of all concerned'- the indivi-
dual and the corporate state.

3. Industry exists in a highly competitive milieu.
School systems are not competitive, though certain
critics are arguing that more competition in edu-
cation would be desirable.

4. Industry is concerned with turning out tangible
goods and services. Schools, on the other hand,
are concerned with human growth and development , a
process infini tely more complex and individualized.

1 'Tlol to , Status _ a nd_ Scope of_ CuMect i ve JSargoi r:i no, j n PuM i c_ L'du-
cation, pp, 13- 14.

5, Industry, in a tr.^dit'iynjl sense, accounts only
to the stockholders. Schools are accountable tc
the community through a boarc of education, and
schools are being pressured into being more reGpcnsi-
it!e5 more responsive and .more- accountable for what
they do and the methods ivied.

6. Bargaining in industry is concerned' with a fair
distribution of profits; .bargaining here is mostly
concerned with wages, salaries, fringe benefits,
and working conditions. Industrial unions have
seldom attempted to take over management responsi-
bilities. In educational institutions there are,
cf course, concerns with salaries, fringe benefits,
and working conditions. But, public employee bar-
gaining in education tends tc go further by asking
that the employees be co-equals at the negotiating
table. The range of -considerations goes far beyond
those- normally bargained in industry- ^

General opinions among teachers and administrators were that the

industrial model of collective bargaining was hers to stay. A number

of factors led educators to accept the industrial model o? collective

bargaining.

F a e c o r s Co n t r ib u_t i ng__t o_ the Collective Bar- g a i n i to
Movement iii Education

bieberman arid Meskow suggested that there we're six major factors

which contributed to collective bargaining in education as follows:

(1 ) the need for effective teacher representation at the local level;

(2) changes in teacher attitudes; (3) organizational rivalry; (4)

"larger school districts; (5) the "snowball" effect; and (6) develop--

pi

meats outside of eduction.

^Lloyd W. Ashby, James E. NlcGinnis. and Thomas t. Persing.
Common oense__i_n Neeotiat/inq in J'ubljc JVJueo tion (Danville, Illinois:
"iTiteKfUU'l'rirTeTT'a'rid PubTfshers", "Inc. 7T9727, p. •?.

■-H'yron bieberman and Michael H. Moskow, Collective Negotiations
for Teachers (Chicago: Rand HcNal'iy and Company, 1%F), pp. 55-60.

15

Carlton and Goodwin -.1 so suggested :n;< factors which contributed
to teacher militancy. ; They v-'ere (1) t!'p .economic problem, (2) intense
organizational power struggle:, (3) nev.-ly developed political potency,
• (4) increased size and impersonality of the educational bureaucracy,
(5) tendency of teachers no longer to be tied to the communities they
serve, and (6) tendency of teachers to be brighter, younger, more self-
assured, and less likely to accept non-professional duties and arbitrary
decisions.

Nolte, in 1970, suggested that there were nine important factors
which contributed to collective bargaining in education. They were
(1) teacher militancy, (2) lower compensation in public service, (3)
increasing numbers of public employees, (4) size of. the educational
enterprise, (5) Presidential Order No. 10988, (6) statutory enactments,
(7) labor management experience, (8) bargaining as a constitutional
right, and (9) waning power of local boards.23

Myers condensed twenty-four studies on the factors that have affected
collective bargaining and teacher militancy into six internal and four
external factors.

The six internal factors were:

1 • Civil Disobedience. Successes gained by those using civil
disobedience were not ignored by teachers. Carlton and

--Patrick W. Carlton and Harold I.Goodwin, eds., The Collective
Dilemma: Negotiations in Education (Worthington, Ohio: Charles"
A. Jones Publishing Company, 1969)7 pp. 24-28.

^Nolte, Status and Scope of Collective Bargaining in Public
Education, pp. 5-9.

24

Donald A. Myers, Teacher Power - Professional ization and

Collective Bargaining .(LexingtonT'MassachusettV: "Lexington Books,
D.C. Heath and'Tbmpany, 1973), pp. 6-7.

16

Goodwin suggest en tk.,t the change of teacher leader attitudes
from conservatism and conformity to militant liberalism has
been influenced by the "value orientation;"" of the social pro-
test movement. " 1 lie non-violent civil rights activities of
trie early 1950s and the social protests of the 1960s rein-
forced the feeling that militant protest was acceptable for
teachers.

2. . Xl2.?_ /'-lii-Lr "* c^In_L.^Qil_^l9 vernenl". . Teachers were aware of the
labor movement". 's success in improving the wages and working
conditions in the private sector. Lieberman and Moskow sug-
gested that "blue collar workers have been decreasing as a
percentage of the total labor force, and white collar and
professional workers have been increasing.'"" With tradi-
tional sources of income declining, unions placed increasing
emphasis on white collar and professional workers.

3- Dissatisfaction with Schools. The schools were going through

a crisis as many educators and other citizens charged that

the public: schools were not making the proper contribution

to society, . This created a climate of dissatisfaction and

tended to. legitimize teacher militancy. Lutz and Azzarelli

identified .some of the dissatisfactions as follows:

The. e i':,. a feeling that the schools are not reach-
ing 'the -lower class child in American cities.
The:e.ds a sense of frustration that if such chil-
dren are nut reached early, they are condemned to
a useless march through the years of the school
sysf'em-v There is fear that the body of knowledge

or *■**■'

JCarlton and" 'Goodwin, The U>ilectiye_Dil_emma: Negotiations

in Education, p. 2.7... " ~ "" " " ~"""~ "

^'-'Lieberman and Moskow, Collective Neootiations for Teachers,
P. 87. "~ ~ "

■k -growing so large that the "cbool curriculum
dof-s not fully introduce the student .to this
world of ya"iOvf'i'.:Oi;s. There is '-■'• uneasiness
that science deserves -a greater place in school
than has ever. been gsanteee There is an addi-
tional fear that schools are failing, dismally,
to prepare. studies for the work world c<r
tommorrcv/.^/' "

4. ChaiiSincj- Characte-r_of_LiiG Topxhjix^P^f^sicr)^ According to
Myers, the decade of the sixties buried permanently the myth
that teachers were self-sacrificing missionaries content -to
work for whatever wages and under whatever conditions the
patrons in a local community thought appropriate for such
"service-minded folk."-8 He pointed out that they were be-
coming outspoken and, at times, rude groups of self- centered
professionals dedicated to imp roving their lot and, at the
same time, improving the education of children/- Perry and
Wildman said:

The percentages of males in the teaching force is
increasing;, teachers, of both sexes .are. better,
trained and prepared than ever before; and, turn-
over among teachers is decreasing moderately. The
great disparity in years of formal preparation
which used to exist between rank-and-file teachers
and administrators is no longer in evidence. Many
teachers are becoming increasingly professionalized
in terms of training' and career commitment and want
a larger voice in determining exactly how they will
be allowed to go about the job of teaching. -30

^frsii!: !■:. Lutz and Joseph d. Azzsrolli, StnjcjfQo_ *or _P pwe_r_1__n
Education (New York: The Center for Applied Research' in Education,
TiTcTT"T966J, p. 48.

^Vsvevs, Teacher Power_-_ Profer.sjojia 1 i ^ajdon^nd _J3^1 l^t u'e
"aj"Ord_!;i_ijy! , p. 1.

?-hirid. , p. 8.

30Char'!os R. terry and Wesley A. V'iidman, The_jjiipactj^_j<ejgo-
turtions in Public education :_ The livid once fi^_the Scjjooljs
'(Won Chi nqt(~!:rr Oh ; "■>"■' """ Clia rl'eT A '.' Jones TublTshi no Company . 1 970) ,
p. "i'i.

18

'->• iJI]ivl^(L.!.!:-_ke. j'.??^l!::'" j"!'^v'per.;;ation. Salaries and benefits for
workers in the public sector have, traditionally, been less
attractive than these In the private sector. According to
Nolv.e, because of pressures pi need i;j.'0:! the spoils system in
1383, Congress enacted the Pendleton Act providing for com-
petitive examinations under the newly established Civil
Service Commission. Security of employment became more
important to v/orkers than compensation. T.'se tenure laws
provided the seme kind of security for teachers. Nolte
pointed out that it was

Not until government workers realized that
they were subsidizing the; government through
inadequate pay &a6 that they 'lacked organisa-
tion '<i?A bargaining power, did they begin to
campaign for the^same rights as workers in the
private sector. ^

The allocation of scarce resources in the fern of tax dollars
was a problem in public education for years and will probably
remain a problem in the future.
6. Prof ess i ona ! s i n the Organi zati on , As teachers gained in
power and ability, they increasingly viewed themselves as
professionals and nut more pressure on administrators. That
increased' the tension between management and labor.
Tire four external factors which contributed to collective bargain-
ing and teacher militancy reported by Myers were^

~ 1 No 1 1 e , Status j i nd 5 , c o oe _ o f_Co lj_ec t_ive _Ba rg aining i n_P ub 1 i c
Cr/iicaj^iuc. p. 5.

32Ibid. , pp. G-5.

••'•''Myers, Teacher Power •- Professional ization and Collective
F^rqainjjK^ pp~""95-97~" "" " " " '"'" "

19

^- k^JlQ^L-i51-^ L/|0J2g But r.'iiici-a tic Sv:i.<;ms. The decrease in the
. number of school sy-^ems resulted in larger school districts.
Teachers felt that they lost their identities in the large
.bureaucracies. .Rising teacher militancy may have been associa-
ted with the increasing size of school districts over the
nation.

2. Societal Demands Toward More Democratic Institutions. Myers

reported that

The societal thrust toward more democratic insti-
tutions was evidenced by factors such as the
reduced number of autocratic heads of nations,
the lessening number of colonial possessions
throughout the world, and the ecumenical move-
ment. 34

Teachers were aware of the movement in every aspect of society

and became convinced that education would be better with more

democracy in the public schools.

3. Struggle Between the AFT and the NEA. The beginning of this
power struggle was 1965 when the AFT defeated the NEA for
representation rights for New York City teachers. Since that
time, the AFT has gained much support in the larger cities
around the country and the NEA has taken a more militant
approach in education. It became difficult to distinguish
between the two organizations and suggestions of -merger were
commonplace.

4. Countervailing Power. Countervailing power occurred when
one section of the economy gained a disproportionate amount
of power over another section. According to Goodwin and

"W - - - -

layers , Teacher Power - Professional ization and Collective

;gai_riing. p. 96.

20

Thompson, teachers h-'-'e rjsintc! c position of countervail ina

power in education as a response- to the power- held by boards

of education.3'- Conf diet v;i 1 1 continue until a balance has

been reached.

Several other factors contribut ing to the teacher movement toward

collective bargaining were identified:

1. l^r^singj^)ers _^^ No He reported ttiat

the number of public employees was approximately seven million

in 1956, reached twelve million in 1969, and was projected to

be fifteen million by 1975.3()

Educators comprise a substantial proportion of
all government workers. One of every 2 state
or local employees in public service is encaged
in education. The number of public school
employees in the 1970s is expected to exceed
2.4 million. Should these workers unite and
speak with one voice, the resulting organiza-
tion would be larger than the Teamsters Union,
the American Medical Association, or the United
Automobile Workers. It could well be the most „
influential organization in the United States.3''

2- Pres i dent i a 1 Order 1 0988 . In January 1952, President Kennedy

formalized relationships between the federal government and

its employees with Executive Order No. 10988. Even though

they could negotiate, they had little power without some form

of sanctions or the power- to strike. Though they were illegal,

strikes did occur. After several years of unsatisfactory

3^i;arolcj I. Goodwin and Gerald W. Thompson, "Teacher- Militancy and
Countervail ina Power," The_ColJectjve Oileinmaj _ Negotiations in Edu-
cot ion, Patrick 1-1. Carlton arid "iTaroTd"'!!"" Goodwin, ads. [Worthington,
O'irioT""' Charles A. Jones Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 272-80.

36NoH&, Status and _Scope qf_j:olle£tiye_Barja^
Education, p. 6.

37Ibid.

experience '.aider Six ecu five Order No. 10388,. president liixory. ■.' -■

invoked Executive Ordov No. 1 "; 9-1 1. ^'-^ If. become effective

**•■-: January 1. 1970, and provided for binding arbitration in

. . . impasse situations for federal employees..

-• ■ Leqj^l afive _Acts . Increasing numbers of state legislatures

have enacted laws Granting collective bargaining rights to

. public employees . The first law v<as enacted by Wisconsin in

1955, and by May 1374, thirty-one states had collective bar-.

gaining legislation for teachers. ^J According tc Nolte, the

lack of enabling legislation has not prevented collective

bargaining in education.

Arizona has no legislation concerning collective
bargaining in education, bet 68,9 percent of the
instructional personnel were engaged in collec-
tive bargaining. Colorado had 82.4 percent;
Illinois, 65. D percent; Kansas, 6?. b percent;
and Ohio, 63.1 percent of their instructional
personnel engaged in bargaining. None of these
states had collective bargaining rights for
teachers. A0

These factors suggest that collective bargaining in public educa-
tion is pa>~i". of a significant movement in labor relations in the public
sector.

The second chanter will identify major issues in collective bar-
gaining and the strategies used to deal v.'ith those issues from the
related literature 3^6 research.

3^'Ashby, HcGinnis, and l-ersing, Common Sense in Negotiations in

39Negot:iatinps Research Digest 8 (May 1974): 10.

''"No i tc , Status ;__ a nd___S cope o r_Col_l_ect|v'e_ Bargajni ng_ i nJM.'bl ic
Education, p. 8. " * "" '

CHAPTER

ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVE STRATFCIFS IN COULCT! VE

BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EDUCATION

Collective bargaining in public education has ^ner^ly followed
the industrial model through 1974 2nd the trend appeared to be toward
legislation end court decisions which sanctioned many of the procedures
and practices found in the industrial model . As a result, many of the
issues that have surfaced in public education have been raced in the

private sector.

The key issues in private sector bargaining have traditionally
been (1) the right to organize, (2) designation of a majority represent,
five, (3) union-shop or "union security" provisions, (M dues rh»ckcffs

(5^ bargaining and accenting an enforceable agreement, (6) grievance
■ 1

processing, terminating in binding arbitration, end (7) the strike.
In 1965, public school teachers and boards of education were in a
nositior, analagous to that of employees and employers in private .indus-
try prior to and immediately following the enactment of the United

n . , ..„ lv-^-m.^c It-/ -i'i i Q^ r ^ -n10 essential difference was
Stares raeor Kesat^ons Law i*1 i^-)J- "K- -—--"-

that no interstate commerce was involved in education: therefore.

1 Wesley A. Wild^n, "Legal Aspects of Teacher Collective Action, ,:
Theo>xJQ™Jtelti£ 3 (February 1965): b6-b7.

?-d. «•-,—.'• - poher+v "The- Imoact of Teacher Organization Upon
Sett inqlchoof Policiesy' CleanrK.Jio.se 40 (May 1966): 515.

23

school systems operated urvier fifty different sets of rules and
regulations. -......",

■In 1974, after approximately ten ye^rs- of public employee
collective-bargaining, the issues were being institutionalized
through the establishment of more formal relationships. By June
1974, thirty-one states had passed public employee collective bar-
gaining laws.-"5 According to Hough, "it can be safely said that,
with the enactment of state laws with respect to staff negotiations
in schools, an adversary relationship has been created and does, in
fact, exist."

Carlton wrote of a three-stage evolution in attitudes toward
negotiations within teacher organizations. (See Table 1.) The
first stage was identified by hesitancy and uncertainty on the part
of teachers since the process was foreign to them. The second stage
was hard-nosed militancy to overcome the board's initial reluctance
to deal with teacher groups on a power equivalence basis. Demands
were extreme during that period. Following the militant stage, where
teachers gained major economic concessionSj they moved into a steady
state.

At the beginning of negotiations, the administrator-board group
also went through identifiable stages which began with shock and

-^Negotiations Research Digest (May 1974): 7.

'^Charles R. Hough, "Negotiations and Accountability," National
Association of Secondary School Principals Bullet iji 55 ( December 1 971 ) :

^Patrick W. Carlton, "Educator Attitudes and Value Differences -
in Collective negotiations," The High School Journal 52 (October
1968): 16-17. ~~" ~~ "

TABLE "I

ATTITUDINAL EVOLUTION IN NEGOTIATIONS

24

Teacher
Attitudes

Negotiatory
Descriptors

Board-

Administration

Attitudes

Stage 1
(Nativity)

Stage 2
(AdoTesence)

Stage 3
(Maturity)

guilt:
hesitance

hard-nosed
demands

spirit of

accommodation;

mutuality of

educational

interests

emerging

confusion;

negotiatory

ineptness

hostility;

frustration;

"we-they"

syndrome;

distributive

bargaining

homeostasis;
balance of
power1;
integrative
bargaining

utter shock;
temporary
decisional
paralysis

intransigent
refusal or
grudging
acquiescence

recognition
of mutual
educational
interests;
spirit of
accommodation

Source: "Educator Attitudes and Value Differences in Collective Nego-
tiations" by P. V-'. Carlton, The High School Journal 52 (October
1968): 18.

dismay that teachers, who had Deer; (.rented so well, would consider
such tactics.3 The shock changed. to intransigence, indignation,
and hostility. The? we-lhey syridrot;!3 was evident at that point.
The we- they syndrome never disappeared completely, but became less
pronounced as the relationships matured.

During the first two stage:., issues were bargained which pro-
vided rnaxin^m conflict of 'interest. Salary and fringe benefits
were included in that group with ether issues involving the allocu-
tion of scarce .'resources. In stage three, issues were bargained
which had advantages to both teachers and boards. An example was
the improvement of teaching facilities. . ,

This study focuses on issues which have emerged ever the years
in collective bargaining. According to Carlton, administrators and
board members have generally attempted to resolve educational issues
through the application of rational analytic processes.' However,
collective bargaining often has been an exercise in political power
and the rational , analytic process may be inappropriate."

Nei nor pointed out that there were significant differences
among teachers, administrators, and school board members in their
perceptions of negotiations and negotiated items, Some problems

6Ibid.l pp, 17-18.

"''ibid., p. 19.

8lbid.

JRay l. r'einer. A Study oTths Scope_cf the iiegotiab'!_e and
No(>-Ncgotiable Items in $cjhooi_ Roa_rd_and School i'acul L^y Professional
l'ir.3.9i'--li_aJ:J5i:Lf'. (':-'• D- diss., Southern iTlineTs Urn vers i ty~ l~97l J.
tijsr^rJ-siTon Abstracts International ?.'•: (February 1972): 4298A.

have appeared repeatedly as issues in nducrrLional collective bargain--
•incj in the past ten year;;. They were ('!). the role of the school board
in collective bargaining, {?.) the role of the Superintendent in col-
lective bargainings (3) the role of tho principal in collective luvr--
gaining. (4) the compos ition of the board's barga ining team, (5)
strategies to get proper,-?. Is. to the table, (6) the scope of collective
bargaining,, (7) curriculum and ins truer" on and educational bargaining,
(.8) compulsory unionism in education, (9) impasse in strategies in
educational bargaining, and (10) strikes in education and collective
bargaining.

.^PiTi! in Col "I ect i ve Bargai ning?

School Board Issues.

The school board has been charged with certain leys'! responsi-
bilities. The board is to provide education for the children within
the school district's boundaries according to the legal limitations
imposed by the community and state. It is to provide buildings, staff,
supplies, and transportation. The board has a legal obligation to
protect the public's interest. Hough has suggested that its primary
obligations are twofold: (1) to provide the student with the best
facilities, staff, and materials that available money will bey; oo.d
{?.) to snend the taxpayers' money with the grestest possible efficiency
and wisdom and thereby, ideally, to provide the kind of education that

is for the best good of the individual student and the community.
' '-'Hoiioh , "Negotiations and Accountability," p. ?..

10

Traditional'! .V'v 3^i-"ioo'S boards have exercised sole authority in
makino decisions regarding c-d ucstion. However t. teachers nave had
the professional privilege of giving recommendations about salaries '■'
ui)6 v/orkif!'; conditions. Prior to collective bargaining, suggestions
could be cither accepted or rejected unilaterally by the board.

Through collective bargaining, boards have lost some of their
flexibility. When they ceased to be audiences for teacher recommenda-- .
tiens, requests, or concerns, and entered into collective bargaining
for mutually acceptable employment rules and conditions, boards lost
their rights to make unilateral aecisious on personal matters,
Doherty said, "That's what collective bargaining is all about. It is
the intrusion by employees into the unilateral decision-making. authority
of the employer."

The role of school board members in collective bargaining is of
great importance. The philosophy of the board, its basic posture,:
and the nature and extent of its involvement in the bargaining process
have spelled the difference between a successful bargaining experience
and a disaster.

Many boards have been reluctant to extend to teachers the privilege
of negotiating with them on matters of mutual educational concern. iJ
'Wei r.s tuck and Van Horn suggested that the consensus among school board

""Robert E. Doherty, "Letters to a School Board," P|^i_Delt?_
Kaji p_?> n 4 8 ( V e b r u a r y 196 7 ) : 2 7 ?. .

'"Myron Liebernian, "Avoid These Costly Bargaining Mistakes,"
School^ Management 13 (February 1969); 36.

''^Heivry R. weinstock and Paul L. Van Horn, :,Iinpact of Negotia-
tions Uooii Public Education, fi The Clearing House 43 (January 1969):

28

members was that collective bargaining wa:; unnecessary in light
of their awn vie/.' of good traditional working relationships with
teachers."''* The high degree of teacher militancy caused most
observers to doubt that outlook.

Since collective bargaining legislation was inevitable, accord-
ing to Oamieson, beards should have attempted to influence legis-
lators in developing laws and should have strongly opposed laws not
in the boards' interests. ' b In 1965, he suggested fighting for
legislation which was informal, which emphasized voluntary board
action, and which avoided out-of-district intervention. Such legis-
lation would have provided much flexibility among boards and little
standardization of collective bargaining practices.

Many boards of education felt oppressed by increased militant
demands from teacher groups. Jarnieson. while Vice President of the
Illinois Association of School Boards, suggested that boards have
been led to believe that contract negotiations were needed because
of universal dissatisfaction with problems in ecucation.,h Edu-
cation has: become the arena for issues such as federal aid, -civil
rights, desegregation, separation of church and state, and the war
on poverty. All of these -issues, along with archaic systems of
school financing, have brought increased pressures on school boards
in terms of the allocation oT scarce resources.

1-

Ibid., p. 359.

'"'Robert A. Jarnieson, "The- Board's Positive Approach,"
The American School Board Journal 155 (November 1967): 14.

16Ioid,

Many school board members interpreted the negotiations process
as illegal because it purportedly removed the pub! ic 's delegation of
authority "from the board. Aocorri,i:;g to Peterson, this position was
questioned by many authorities, for the courts had already denied that.

a party which must bargain col ■ectivoiy was forced to delegate away

18

either Us. -ultimate, authority or its responsibility.. ' Norte sa'ia,

"Hoards have oe jure authority to implement policy, teachers are grab-:
binq de facto power to influence and even veto district policy." '-'

The number of board members who negotiate directly with employee
organizations has declined substantially since the middle 1960s. In
1965-67. 33 percent of board negotiating teams were made up -exclusively
of board members; by 1971 -72, the number had dropped to 14.7 percent. :u
Boards realized that participation required excessive time, participa-
tion may result in the legal risk of losing the right to refuse to
ratify, and inexperienced negotiators on the management side frequently
were pitted against experienced full-time negotiators for teachers.
Board members have been challenged to find a balance between the desire
of teachers for more involvement in decision making and the demands
of constituents to provide educational leadership.

l7Weinsteck and Van born, "Impact of Negotiations Upon Public
Education," p. 359.

■ H-Orov Peterson, "Legal Status of Teacher Personnel ," Review

of Jdjicational Research 37" (June 1967) :■ 296-299 , as cited "Tn

Weufstock"and''"Van"'Ho"rn,' ''Impact of Neootiutions Upon Public Mucation,1

p. 3n0.

^M. Chester Nolte, "School Board Power arid Its Three Cynical
Categories," The America n JchooJ J3oard__ Journal 161 (October 1974):
24."

^°:-1yron hieberman, "I'iocoteat ions : Past, Present, and Future,"
School Management 17 (May 1973): 16.

30

Furr and V-ialsh conducted a study m 1968 to obtain information
on school board members ' reactions to collective negotiations. Re-
spondents were divided into two groups of those who had opposed a
collective bargaining law and those who had not opposed it. Several
generalizations were made as follows:

1. As a group, school board combers do not appear
as anti- employee., pro-management as might be
expected. In the-h- stand for and against nego-
tiations for teachers, they appeared about evenly
divided.

2. About two-thirds of the school board members
originally opposed to negotiations for teachers

do not believe that negotiations have harmed their
school program in the short-term and only a thin
majority of those originally opposed to negotia-
tions believe their school program has been harmed.

3. School board members seem to be more concerned
and less optimistic about the effects of negotia-
tions in the future than at the present.

4. School board members who participate directly
in negotiations are less positive in assessing
results than school board members who participate
indirectly.

5. School board members from large and small dis-
tricts tend to believe that negotiations have
restricted school programs, whereas school board .
members from medium- si zed districts tend to
believe that negotiations have not restricted
school programs. 21'

i-Yoescholdt found that boards of education in the Twn> Cities

metropolitan area (1) had not prepared for negotiations in the manner

suggested by the literature, (2) had generally not presented positive

proposals to teachers at the outset of actual bargaining, and (3)

wanted to retain the authority for decision making in the area of wage

21 Robert N. Furr ro;d Hubert M. Walsh, :' Board Members View PN,"
Michigan fducation dournal -16 (i'opniary 1969) : 18-19.

31

structure formulation, rather than to p-.vss this authority on to the

voting citizenry.

A two-year study conducted by Rehmus found that:

The majority of board members held a negative
opinion about long-term benefits of negotia-
tions and a high degree of anxiety for the
. . future of education. Small district boards
were more conservative and less hopeful for
negotiations, than urban districts. Ten per-
cent of board members from larger school
districts adopted a "wait and see" attitude
relative to negotiations. 23 .. -

School Board Strategies

The strategies concerning the role of the school board from 1965
through 1974 remained fairly consistent. The theme running through
.that period was for boards to remain away from the collective bargain-
ing table. Lieberman and Moskow held a somewhat different view in
1966, but had changed their thinking by 1969. 24 They suggested that
practice might differ in relation to the size of the district. In
large districts, personnel experienced in collective bargaining could
feasibly negotiate for the board, while in small rural districts, due
to the lack of experienced personnel , board members could reasonably
be expected to negotiate.

97

"Paul W. Proescholdt, The Preparation Process for Collective

Negot i ations by Boards of Education in the Twin Cities Metropolitan

Area ("Ed.D. diss. , University of Minnesota, 1969). Dissertation

Abstracts International 30 (April 1970): 4202A.

"Charles Rehmus, "The Economic Results of Teacher Bargaining -
Michigan's First Two Years," as cited in Kai Erickson, "Board Opinions
Vital to Us," Michigan Education Journal 46 (February 1969): 19.

-24Hyron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow, Collective Negotiations
for Teachers -_An Approach to School Administration (Chicago: Rand
McNally'and Company, 7966)7 pp".' 249-50".

The task of a board is not to. negotiate , but to ensure that
negotiations are conducted by competent -personnel . Such- personnel
may or may not be employed by the school system. If they are com-
petent, they will take steps to" provide adequate communication be-
tween the -board and its negotiating team. Such communication should
preclude erosion of. board authority, on the .one hand, and insufficient
delegation of authority to negotiate, on the other. Boards should
respect expertise in this area, but such experience should not make
basic policy decisions for the board. Rather, it should be used to
clarify important alternatives from which the. board must choose.25

Manning stated that board members should not be on the team
since it would place the superintendent in an almost untenable role - -■■
in terms of compromising his leadership role in matters of adminis-
trative authority and professional expertise.26

Gilrpy et al . stated that:

Nevertheless, the board should not become
involved in negotiations unless the board's
confidence in its administrators is shaken.
The board's chief role is to provide policy
guidelines to the administrator prior to
negotiations in order that the administra-
tor has a reference point to guide him
through the session. -7

or

'"Liebermari, "Avoid These Costly Bargaining Mistakes," p. 44.

Of,

" William R. Manning, -"Negotiations: The Process of Collec-
tive Bargaining," The American School Board Journal (August 1966),

p. 15. ■". , .

^'Thomas P. Gilroy, Anthony V. Sinicropi, Frederick D. Stone,
and Theodore R. Urich, Educators' Guide to Collective Negotiations
(Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969), p.-

This statement 'clearly implies that the b-ar'd negotiating tea;1: should
b(- composed of members of the d istrict's ad mini strati ve staff.

The m inoiG Association of Schoe'! boards; staled that ''boards
of education should refrain fro':n enrtriwj into direct negotiations.'1"0

Liebcrmsn suggested seven "golden rules1' of collective- bargaining
for boards. They vera:

1. J. f you don't know what you're doing, hire
someone who does.

2. Board members should stay out of the actual
negotiations.

3. Give your negotiating team authority.

4. Knew how much money you're talking about.

5. Don't agree to too much too soon --or too
late.

6. Doiv t require teacher ceru,ession3 as a
precondition to negotiations.

/. Don't get bogged down over procedures. uJ

^lL^.lh9^X4..P':LP'ne r<0) e_ °f "tjiG? Sujrerm terident
intellective Ba rgcdV; in: g?

^P^ntendannt_lssues_

A number of articles and studies between 1905 and 1974 suggested
that the superintendent was the rnon in the middle. At the beginning
of that time period, the superintendent's cole in collective bargain-
ing was often that of a neutral advisor t" both teachers and board.

'"'When toards :.yegotiate or_Baayeria (Springfield, Illinois:

Association of ■. iTTnois'SchooT Boa rdsY" 1967) , p. 7.

.'9,

J7-?,Z

ichor-man, "Avoid These Costly Bargaining Mi states ," pp.

Toward the end of the period, he had slrifou toworu 5 leaoorship
role for boards in collective bargaining

In about 75 percent of "Ml d I ii *:ricti". where
negotiations took place/the superintendent
was cither a member of tiie board negotiating
team or served it exclusively as an advisor.
In 1965-67, more than 40 percent of the super-
intendents served as advisors to both board
and teacher negotiators; by 1971-72, only 14
percent, served in this dual capacity. Some-
what surprisingly although the proportion
who served as a "neutral resource person"
drooped from 6.8 percent to 4.G percent,
the' number who were uonparticipanrs increased
from 1 percent to 5 percent."50

The roie of the superintendent in teacher negotiations was a
major issue in education in 1969. 31 Geisert, in 1966, stated that
"Thare is a great need to clarify the function of the superintendent
in collective bargaining."32 The superintendent's role was compli-
cated bv the variety and confusing expectations and pressures of
d'iff event educational groups.

The National education Association, The American
Federation oi Teachers, The National School
Beards Association, and *t.o American Association
of School Administrators were e>:an:ple« of groups
that suggested their role ■lef io.ition.~~

Conflicting definitions of the super r etendent 's role led to

considerable confusion with rer.pcct to this important aspect of

•'•°Lieberman, "Negotiations: Past, Present dv.^ Future,'1 p.

3"!i<o>,' ! . Swihart... "Teacher Negotiation d^.d the Role of the
Superintendent," 7he_ .Cie«2_r_1ii_9_Hquse 43 (Hay 1969): 534.

32Roald F. Campbell, "Is the^School Superintendent Obsolete?"
Phi De'ba Kappan 4'..; (October 1966): 57.

33Swihart, "Teacher Negotiation and the Roie of the Super-
intendent." n. h.'Pi.

professional neqotia.tions.^ '■ .Perhaps ,. the greatest problem that . .

developed war-: the change in the professional status of the supor-

intendent •°'-i C'isrk saw the cdernne, coming in 1958 when he said:

"Professional negotiations were straining the bond which binds

teachers and administrators together. "^ At that time, many of

the state ci -gsnic a rior.s to which superintendents belonged and the

AmorLeui Assocrrco.n of School Administrators were under the umbrella. ■

of state teacher associations and the National Education Association.

The Illinois Edre.'tion Association, in 1%7, stated:

The superintendent has a dual role to fulfill
as- educational leader of the staff and as chief
administrative officer of the hoard of educa-
tion. He shall possess an allegiance to the
learner which supersedes either of these loyal-
ties.37

Fvans poimrd act that many superintendents selected the role of
either impartial advisor or nonparticipant.^ In Connecticut, out
of ninety- three .csr^s in the 19es-h6 school year, the superintendent
served as the advisor to both parties in forty-five cases. In ■ twenty-
three cases, he sei'ved as neutral observer. In only four instances.

""'I. M. St h-v.\e;;. ';-.., Jack It Kleinmam;, and Martha Ware, Professional
Negotiation in .Prm ic_£ducj5tion (Nov/ York: The Kacinillan Coinpa v.y ,
T966;V"'p- 'i"o5.":;;T~

•M"

"^'Sernard ..:" . Donovan, "i'egot iaf ions : Ten Years Later," b'atjpnaj
A.sr.ociation of rcroimiary School Principals bulletin fib (December 1971):

^Maurice rd ■■■•Clark , "The Superintendent's Role in Professional
Negotiations," -l: lino <c:_ fdjc|n-;_cjj 57 (October 1%3): 70.

:'-/r .roiess ycca i NeuoMa piers Guidel uses ( 11 1 ino is Fducation Assoc
tier, 19-17). a- cred i;s Clark, "Tee Supr' inlendcnt ' s Role in Pro-
fessional Negorisd ions . " p. 70.

'"'''Seymour fares, "The Superintendent's Dilemma," The_A.meric.ri
School hoard don-ml 155 (November 1967): 11. "" " "

did he act as the board's iul-r^.or and Iris vole as negotiator for the
board was "iimi ted to but two district".-''

Teachers made, it clear that they did not view the superintendent
as their leader in matters cf staff personnel,^ The middle man role
served to reduce the effectiveness cf the superintendent, for teachers
who perceived the super! ntendenc as a transmitter of requests found
it more advcn'-ao-ons to bypass hi- completely and go directly to the

In a l^b-fi? survey by the Rational bducation Association, over
50 oercenu of tne responding superintendents cons'idei' ed themselves
advisors to the negotiators, 40.5 percent for both the school board
and the teachers, and 13.3 percent for the school board only. Over

37 percent considered themselves chief negotiators. 21.4 percent with

/n ■
full authority, and 15.8 oercent with 1 urn ted autnorvty. "

Many authorities s o i <:i the superintendent should be at the

negotiating table as adviser to the board or as advisor to the board

and the teachers,42 The Illinois Association of School Boards stated

that "The superintendent shall be responsible for the collective bar-

as i?neci prcceou

,4':;

ssConnecticnr fduc-'cion Asscciatien '^^Jl^Sr^L^^-.S-l
Co-. I ,n c b'; " alt f bl^lotl a fJonz V:c\der " . ;'7"^'""]Ha7tf orci : Connec ti cut Ecu-
catTbn'o^ cited, in Evans, "The Super-

intendent's bileiiili'la," p. 11 .

"'^Lvans. 'The Superintendent's Dilemma," p. 12.

'•'"The Senerlntendeni 's Role in Negotiation," Najtjc_nal ^J^t^i'™.
Association Res ^r.^L^l]JJ:^A ^ (October 1967): 84. " '

4215^^..,,. ^,,1,,,.^ iiy!UJ Superintendent and Decision Making in Negotia-
tions/' bni Helta Kappan t><"f (December '972): ?.?,).

'''^Whr-n Cn-rrds Heoridatc or ee. r.;oive. AS'-ecdation of Illinois School

Gcards/^5777'a's'"'cT'beo ifrtdartt ""''1 lib' "S./pev intendent !s Role in !'ro-

iessionai Negotiations," p, /0.

3/

The American Association of Schco! Administrators, in 1967,.
stated that the superintendent !s role was shaped by a p.t-m.oe *- of
factors: (1) the superintendent's own ■ philosophy and personal
preference: (2) the fail ine of the hoard of edueat ion in the matter;
(3) the lav/ in existence in the state; (4} the current cl imate of
teacher-adnrinistratcr relations; and (5} the degree to which influ-
ence froiii teacher organ, [zai ions at the stain and national levels is
exerted upon local oraanieaf io;;:.; for a cpvtairi pattern of negotiations
procedure.

Clark suggested that, the superintendent should be in charge of
the negotiating process for the board. He did not suggest that
the superintendent, conduct collective bargaining. His suggestion was
that the superintendent was in charge of instruction and the budget,
but epi.p'loyoo' others to conduct those activities and should do the
seme for collective bargaining if he chose to do so.

According to Martin, geography made a difference as to how

superintendents reacted to collective bargaining.

Most superintendents in California, Ohio,
Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana function as
chief negotiators for their boards. But,
in Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, hew Jersey, Pew York, Washington,
arid Wisconsin, you'll find them just one of
the troops rathe*" than the official board
.spokesman. Meanwhile, in Kansas, Missouri,
and Pennsylvania, most superintendents

M,. . ...... , . . . , . . . „ ...

School Administrators fWash inoton , D.C. : American Association of

iclioo! Adnrini st raters, "! 967 )■, p. 11 , as cited in Clark, ''Tire Superin-
;endent's ko'le in Professional Negotiations ," p. 71.

/fL'Clar!u "The Superintendent's Pole in Professional Negotiations,"

01)

fill the: bill a r, foci; finders or media-
tors.^-

District size and length of service also made a difference in
the :u.!per 'ntendent's collective bargaining role. In districts uuder
'i 0,000 pupil0,, supev-intendents often worked with teachers and boards
prior to table negotiations. However, in large suburban and urban
districts, superintendents aligned themselves with boards prior to
and throughout negotiations.^7 Superintendents who worked with boards
less than five years were firmly on the side of the board, while those
with snort than five years' experience with a single board exhibited
greater empathy for the professional staff .

The most influential factor in role choice in a collective bar-
paining situation was experience and the second most influential fac-
tor v.'as a directive from the board. ''9

Evans suggested that the most appropriate role for the superinten-
dent should be that, of negotiator for the board.0-1 A study conducted
in 197? at the University of Wisconsin examined the manner in which
superintendents functioned in the collective bargaining process.
Approximately 13 percent of the sample said they were negotiators for
the board, 65 percent said they were at the negotiating table but not

~rDJamos A. Martin,. "Before You Bargain, Make Sure Your Super-
intendent Is On 'Your Side," The _An^r jean School Board Journal 159
(July 1972): 31. " ' "~ "~" ~~

43.1 bid.

SOEvans, "The Superintendent's Dilemma/' p. 12.

the; negotiator j, f>;:d 17 percent; sa id .they -were not at the negotiating
table in any capacity,0'

Proeschcldt found that (!) superintendents v/ere being phased out
as chief negotiators for boards In Minnesota, (2) superintendent? were.
not making use of their principals In the formulation of counter pro-
posals, and (3) superintendents viewed their role. in collective bar-
gaining as advisors to their boards of O'-lucateon,""

Eastman, in a study of eighteen urban -school .systems ivith full-
time chief negotiators, found that (1) the superintendents had not
been active participants in actual negotiating proceedings, (2)
superintendents had not been bypassed in any way, but had been closely
involved behind the scenes in col iective bargainings -

Superintendent Strategies .

The trend appeared to be that the ambivalence of the superinten-
dent's negotiation role would polarize in the direction of "agent
for the hoard51., not of "professional educator."^ A national sample
of 675 public school superintendents in forty states indicated that
51 percent of superintendents thought of themselves as direct agents
of the beard during the data gathering stage of collective bargaining;

5'Weber, "Superintendent and Decision Making, h n. 281.

-^Paul Proeschcldt... The Prepar^LiPAij"^
Neoot i a ti on s hy_ Board s of Ed u cat fo n j_n_the _twfn__C_i td es_Mef ro po 1J tan
AreaT""p'i^202A.'

^Robert. Eastman, The_JTir;era i^ng Position of Chief Negoti ■■;■ tor _in
trie Public School Superjnt^idoncy (Id.D. "diss". , Bali State Univer-
VITyV ""iWi'Y. "Ijfss'erta'tiop Abstrocts_ Jiitej'i'niJenaJ_ 32 (bcbruar.y 1972):
*2'/&A. " "

^fuvern L. Cunninghan;, "Collective Negotiations and the
Principalship," Theory Jnto_ Practice 7 (April "• 968 ; : [i73-:';>.

f>9.2 percent considered themselves aligned with the board, arid 43.1
percent assumed the stance of an independent third party providi ng
facts and figures to both sides and,: tunc VI or. inn as a neutral.^ The
superintendent was no longer the instructional 'lender in more than half
of the sample districts. He had become an agent of the board, while
organization, leaders hod become the teacher leaders.

Hoi ■■-!;!, b5 Trenholm,*? Fjeran,bb Powell /'^ and MartV"i!-' suggested a
neutral dual role for the superintendent in which he acted as a
resource person to both the board and teacher collective bargaining

^Martin, "Before You Bargain Make Sure Your Superintendent Is
on Your Side,1' p. 31 .

^Kax 0. Heirrn, A_ Study of What Selected Respondents Jhjrvk_tbe
Role of the Superintendent "S"h~ou1d be in the Negotiating Process
(Ed . P . d i s s . , l.l n i v e r s i t y o f Ka n s a s , 1967"). Disser "fra_L_i o n_A bs tracts
International 28 (May 1958): 441! A.

^Ronald 8. Trenhohn, Il^_^peil;ri;ej2dent'sJ^^e j\n_Teadje_r
Neqoti at i ons _a_s_ Per cei v_ed_ by_Sc hool _ Boa rd_ _Ci sai r:?.e_M_a nd _ Rn pr e_s £nta -
fives of 'Tea-c[ier"3il2Pui^5 l!".d.D.""diss. ,"Co'ioVade State College, 1968).
DTs s erf at i c^r'Ahs'trac tfj nterna t i ona j 29 (October 1968): 1Q95A.

%nn B. Fieran, Role Expectations of the Superintendent
jn '[eacher i«eq^itj^[:j_c5ns ( Ed". D. diss. '," University of Oregon, 1958).
DTssertatTon Abstracts "international 29 (January 1969): 2008A.

S-'James R. Powell , The Role of the Superintendent jjl.^oJlec-
tjve negotiations Between Tc'achers and Boards of__Lducat_i_o_n (f'.d A).
diss. /feiiip'le"" University, 1968). "Tl'issertaff cjn" Abstracts Inter-
rurtional 30 (September 1969): 956A7 ~ " ~ "" " ~

^David C. Hart! , An_ Analysis of_ the__Opini_ons_ of .j^h '[).') .il ton
State School Board Cha irmen and ^^'peVintendents^Regaro^ing Statirt^jrv
Pro'vTs""fon"s for"The Role" qT^the "" Super ijitendent_ instates vnjJ]j^re—
'ljTs7Ton£r¥^ fFXDVdTss. , WashiTigton" State University,

VJTfJT" Pi s'sertation Abstracts I nternati gnal 32 (November 1971):
2345A.

unervnenoenl

an agent:

teams. _ CornneDi . and McDonald^ .viewed, t
of the board in collective hnroai ?i=i

What strategies are open to the superintendent? Lor; i rally, he
has five from which to choose. They eve (1) nonpart.ioipant, in whic
he serves as a communication Tin'- for both the teachers and- the boat
but does not aciviso or negotiate fcr either party; (2) negotiator to
the teachers; (.3) advisor to the teachers; (4) adviser to the board;
and (5) negotiator for the board. &•' The emerging strategy appeared
be the role in which the superintendent provided leadership for the
board and the board's team, without sitting at the bargaining table.

to

What Should Be the Role of the Pjl'i*oJ pa J_
ln Jd?XLe£-tJj^ bargaining?

Pr i no'lna I sh io Issues

The status of middle management was one of the most controversial

areas in public school collective bargaining. Its role was o maior

issue for a number of years.

State legislation either excluded middle manage-
meat from ipegotiatir.g rights, provided it with
negotiating rights in separate negotiation units,
or authorized negotiating uni ts to include all
profess •one! staffs up to the level of the
superintendent. &'*

^'Dean L. Conine, The_Jiffcct _of _Coljective_ NcgotiM;ions_oi'! the
^'IPJl..^]" SMP^ of JSix'^lFcted'"Xo'ior'ad(j SenooV

Districts [ i:d. 0/ diss.", Colorado' ".Stat e" roiYeg~erT%^) • ^
^^S^±J^n}^llui)«±3S (April 1970): 4175A.

b2Ri!dy.L. McDonald, Ajf igacMys fr of the Role_of the JJup or intend 2n_t
of Schools in_ Pror\~s ■; on! N^co!;7< Mens dn"Tj-'xas"_Schoo is (td.D. diss . ,
u-'iv^rJUV 'of "l-io; ■-■»":■ .7, 1 97T; ) ^ L)i.,se, , atioi'i "Abstract's Tnternationa;
31 {Mdrcir 19/1}: 44fdA. "' - -' " - —

S-'Lvans, "The Superintendent's Dilemma," pp. 10-13.
j;'Liebei'ii;,';.r , "Negotiations; host, Present and Future," n. 15.

42

In a 1970 study conducted by Nunley, zhe majority of building
principals had not had a personal experience with teacher negotia-
tions and were uncertain regarding their role when negotiations •
became a reality in their districts. 65 They were poorly informed
on what transpired during negotiations and had not made up their
minds as to their proper roles in collective bargaining.

From the point of view of collective bargaining, the positions
of boards and teachers have been relatively clear. Each was a, repre-
sentative body given the task of protecting interests which.it
represented. The positions of administrators in relation to collec-
tive bargaining were not clear and, as a result, a growing frustration
was found among administrators who saw negotiations going-on around
them, but rarely with them.

When teachers decided to bargain directly with boards of educa- .
tion, the traditional role of school administrators being the official
spokesmen for teacher interests was disrupted.66 3y their actions,,
teachers rejected administrators as their representatives to the board
of education. At the same time, boards of education and superintendents
were ignoring principals during bargaining sessions. As a result,
concessions were made in bargaining which. placed serious limitations
on effective administration by the principal.67

66Charles E.. Nunley, The Role Perception of the Public School
Building ^Principal in Teacher Negotiation in. Ohio jEd.D. diss.,
The University of Akron, 1970). Dissertation Abstracts International
31 (May 1971): 5722A-5723A. : ~~

66Lester W. Anderson, "The Management Team and Negotiations,"
National Association of Secondary School Principals Bulletin. 53
{October 196S): 107.

67

Ibid., pp. 108-109.

d '•■

hd^ci; , "■ - Anderson,0-* ounn'inqoam.' *■■ xeort

n^VKinc,/''2 Henley,"?

Bell ,•''•': Murphy, 75 and Eiche-'C all pointed pi.:t thai; principals teM
that they had been left out of negotiat 'ons end wanted more involve-
ment in the tots! process.

Smith found !;hat 49.3 percent of 231 principals surveyed had
not been involved in the negotiation process, 27.7 percent of the
respondents .had served as consultants for the board, and two groups

68jprr-,nce r Hatch, "The Principal's Role in Collective Negotia-
tions." Nat i o n a 1 A s sociation of S e c o n a a r y School Principals Bulletin
55 (December T97T)T'2'8. " "" "": " ' "

'^Anderson, "Management Team Versus Collective Bargaining for
Principals ," p. 171 .

''-'Luvern L, Cunningham, "Collective Negotiations end the Principal-
ship," Theory Into Practice 7 (April 1963): G2.

7 i Geo roe £• P.edfern, "Negotiation Chances Principal -Teacher
Relet ions hips," IijpJ!aJr]ojjjrj_^ 47 (April 1953): 22.

^Jarnes C. King, "New Directions for Collective Negotiation,1'
;rhe__Nation/;l Elementary principal 47 (September 1967): 45.

73;,

•'unley, The Roip "exception of the Public School Building

■'4 Harry H. Bell, Jr., The Role of th»- !iioh_ School Principal
l?:..Sy ■' J ficl!:J "°_^£j'° l: ' ?-!! °i' s_ ? ^ Peixe'i yed"Tiy "PrTnc f pa "1 T Whose/ So hcol
Syptepo__H,i.ve_ Bec:^ ' "'r/jj/eo_Jn thd" PVr /Vsv_"(T7i.r". o >ss~ 7 iTfdiaria"
University, 1962). .^L^yd/tptpW A¥sJ:racTrs_Jn^rri^Vi£!v?._l 30 (May

'^dack W. Murphy. A Survey, to Jcientjjfy the_Prosrart "!19__Fi{ti,'re
^IdliLftfJ-^ Er'ncipaj Jli'TegotTatTons "{'r'a.r/7 d issT," "Soli thorn IlTThois
University y 19/T)7 ""DlsOev-taticrr Abstracts International 32 (March
1972): dC-ydA. """ .'" "

'^Milo L. Eiche„ A _Study of the Effects _of Col Tecti ve _Nego- :

t"[_at_i_ons Uoon idle Punctionaj Role -of_' Selected" Secondary- SrdlooT ~

Pr i nci oa j s~ '( EcT. D'." dTss ,/,"' "! ncn /, n,t Pe i vers ;"« f y , '"1 9"?T j" ~ Dp ~s_sf. Jat ion
Ab^truj::!:/. International 32 (i-'ebruary 1972): 4276A.

44

of' 11. .2 percent had served as active participants for boards and as
consultants for both boards and teachers. Of that group, 45.88
percent felt that they- should nave been involved in the negotiation
process as consultants for the board and 32.03 percent felt that they
should have been consultants in the negotiations process for both
boards and teachers. ^8

The principal was unhappy because he had been largely ignored
in the negotiation process. The general effect of collective bar-
gaining was to bring about a principal-staff situation characterized ' '_
by a strained, more formalized, and less open relationship. °

In a 1968 study conducted among school board members, superin-
tendents, principals, and teachers concerning the probable effect on
the role of the principal in teacher collective bargaining, Thompson
found that 70 percent of the respondents reported that principals were
not involved. °^ Principals felt they should be on the board's team,
but board members and teachers were opposed to principal membership.

Many principals were concerned about how they were to be repre-
sented. Some were included in the teacher unit; others were excluded
deliberately either by teachers, by the law, or by state regulating
agencies.

7?Stanley S. 'Smith, Some Effects of Collective Negotiations
on Principal-Staff Relationships as Perceived by the Secondary School
Principals in Illinois (Ed.D. diss., University of Illinois at
Urbana Champaign, 1970) . Dissertation Abstracts International 31
(March 1971): 4434A-4435A.

78lbid.

79lbid.

SOjof-m a. Thompson, The Role of the Principal in Collective
Negotiations (Ph.D. diss., The University of Wisconsin, 1968).
Dissertation Abstracts International 29 (September 1968): 788A-789A.

45

Table 2 shows the .results of the NEA Research Division study

that asked a representative sample of the country's teachers, in

the spring of 1968, and again in the spring of .1.97.1, if. teachers and

administrators should be in the same unit.

In 1968, -teachers were evenly divided, between
those who favored the same negotiating unit
and those who favored separate units. Four
teachers in TO expressed their preference for
each type of unit; one teacher in ten had no
opinion, and less than one teacher in 20 did
not believe in the negotiation process. How-
ever, in the three years from 1968 to 1971 ,
opinion has occurred from the same negotiation
unit for teachers and administrators, to
separate units. There were no significant
changes in percentages who held no opinion
and the percentages not believing in the
negotiation process. 8V

TABLE 2

TEACHER PREFERENCE FOR ADMINISTRATORS AND
TEACHERS IN THE SAME BARGAINING UNIT

1968 1969

Same Unit

Separate Units

No Opinion

Do "Not Believe" In Negotiation

42,6%

38.2%

41.4

45.8

12.2

11.6

3.8

4.4

100.0% 100.0%

Source: "Teachers and Administrators: Same or Separate Negotiating
Units," by NEA Research Division, NEA Research Bulletin 49
(October 1971): 77. —.._-■- . - ■ .

81 "Teachers and Administrators: Same or Separate Negotiating
Units," NEA Research Bulletin 49 (October 1971 ): 77.

How collective bargaining affected the principal hinged primarily
on factors at the local level. Comments from principals who have
worked. in systems under contract, ranged from the Brooklyn principal ,
who was confined to a master contract about which he was not consulted
and which gave him very little leeway to. administer his school, to
the Michigan principal who felt that collective bargaining had been a
strengthening influence in his district.82 :

Traditionally, the principalship has been an extension of. the . -.-■
administrative arm of the school system. In operational terms, the
principal implemented administrative policies at the local school level;
he interpreted the objectives and purposes of the school system; and he
expedited and coordinated the ongoing program of the educational enter-
prise.83

Cunningham concluded that, while feelings about what was happening

to the role of the principal were consistent, (among principals) the

reactions— the ideas of what to do about it—were quite different.84

Though principals expressed a variety of reactions to teacher militancy,:

they tended to reflect beliefs toward collective bargaining at the

extremes of complete rejection or complete acceptance. Many who rejected

collective bargaining felt threatened by it; the few who accepted it ^

felt.it would expand their roles and. help routinize some tasks.

Reality dictates that principals and other
administrators would be wise to accommodate
themselves to changes in working relation-
ships. The reallocation of power in educa-
tional decision making more properly means

82King, "New Directions for Collective Negotiations," p. 45.

OJRedfern, "Negotiation Changes Principal -Teacher Relationships,"
p. 20.

84Cunningham, "Collective Negotiations and the Principalship," p. 65.

47

a mere effect ive ciiv is ion -of :'£ii''0!:^oi i ": I'-y

and aUi'.hO':"'i"''.y OP'OiiO tOAC'iOrS s 0:' !!'!f:i 03 I S ,

other administrators , ■■?. nd supervisors. It.
is the application of r.i.u: oc ■■ t expertise
available to a given ;:vol j:l e;;. . gomoMmes
teachers will be ii; the best position to
supply tint expert knowledge and ski! i . On
other occasions, it may be the p'fincipcVi
or the- scocrvisor who can provide: toe most
information and expertness in making the
necessary ctst.ermi nation. The el location
of more power to teachers does not neces-
sarily mesr. a sii^rrr:•t■:•e^, of a like amount

tu the other components in the deoisior:--
i • '■! h

niaK'!:'tCj prOCOSS.^-?

Many principals believed that their decision making roles were
reduced by collective bargaining. However, collective bargaining
brought complex problems which demanded greater talents among principals.
The issue for the principal ship was one of adjustment and realloca-
tion of responsibilities, not a reduction of leaders-hip importance.

Alignment _chnioes_ for_ pjmncjp_als. There, has been a struggle
since collective bargaining began in education on the issue as to
whether principals should remain in the same unit with teachers, o>-
whether they should be in a separate unit, or whether they should
bargain at all .

In 1967-63, the Nt'A Research Division conducted a nationwide
survey and determined that

The bargaining units in school systems which
recognise only one teacher organization
represented the following categories of
personnel: 62.1 percent; represent classroom
teacher:; only; Z2>.9 percent are all-inclusive
units, 3.7 nercent represent classroom teach-
ers and building administrators; 0.3 percent
represent classroom teachers and central
office personnel . °°

^Redfenm, "Negotiation Changes Principal -Teacher Relationships," p.

Si?,:;Vre Principals Represented in Bargaining Units?" lifiLBt'.li^Lcf1.}.
Bulletin <1G (October 19G8): 85.

In 19>?.:. principals h-:-d the r igh*. to ba^ai.': i n . A'i a s ka , Ca'!i~
f'cnria, Conneceicu!. , bawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Mvchigaru Minnesota > Montana, Nevada, Mew Jersey, New Yorh
North Pakota , Oklahoma;, Oregon, South Dakota. Vermont, Was hi r;n tor; .

and Wi scene-

..•v Of •.!!■,

ile the negotiations s La lutes in Michigan avid

Wisconsin did not exclude supervisory personnel , the labor boards
in those states determined thai; supervisors were agents of the employer
and, therefore, could net re included in the same bargaining units
v/ith other enniloyees,^'

Principals' agreements were in effect in New Yen;, Washington,

D.C.. Cleveland. Baltimore, Newark, Boston, Milwaukee,. Detroit,

p q
and Portland. Most were umbroila documents that combined adminis-

trativa-suwervisory staff rather than principals exclusively.

The Massachusetts labor board took a different approach to rhe

bargaining unit issue.. That board determined that supervisors had

the same representation and negotiation rights under the law as

other employees. While supervisory personnel constituted a unit

separate from other personnel, the majority in each unit determined

their representative oraanizations bv secret ballot. 50

°/,:S;;rvey of Teaohor/Sd

oo ; "oard collective neqcimafior

.etjl:

lion," Compact (dune l!T/7): i'b-33

88>

Are Principals Represented in Darqa initio Units?" n. 86.

«*,

tenjam,

.to-n. ''Princ ioais : An Orcanized Force for Leader

ship,1

:r. i!kj\o!w

9, 5( -pu.i:ber i97d}, p.

90Cii.y of Pittsfwald, Pitt sf io'ld Schord beo.u sment and Pitts-
field Teachers Association and Pittsfield reocratioii or Teachers .,
Local Idle; Case Hv . MOR-18, May 17, 5966, as ei'.ed in "Are Prin-
cipals Represented in barriainine Units?'1 p. 86.

49

The Minnesota secondary principals considered their negotiation
rights to be submerged in the teachers' association under the bargain-
ing statute enacted by the Minnesota Legislature; they found their
position untenable and have tried during each legislative session since
1969 to amend the Taw.91 As a result, they have hired an /executive
secretary, increased dues, and become a political force in the Minnesota
legislature.

Principals who bargained for a school district in negotiations
were classified as managerial under the 1971 amendments to. the Taylor
Law in New York State if they belonged to no bargaining unit and served
on the board's negotiating committee. ^2 On theother hand, principals
who belonged to recognized teacher bargaining units were not managerial.

Because Massachusetts state collective bargaining statutes did
not exclude supervisors, the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission
determined that it had the authority to decide whether persons were
supervisors and whether they should be included in a unit with non-
supervisory employees. Supervisory employees were: included in the
nonmanagement bargaining units with which they had a community of
interest. 93

The New Jersey Public Employees Relations Commission dismissed
a petition from the West Patterson Board of Education seeking to
exclude principals from the West Patterson Education Association •-

91 Terra nee E. Hatch, "The Principal 's Role in Collective Nego-
tiations," National Association of Secondary School Principals
Bulletin 55 (December 1971): 29.

92Negotiations Research Digest 7 (September 1973): 8.
^Negotiations Research Digest 7 (December 1973):. 8.

50

bargaining ui.it and the New York Public Employees Relations Sourei
dismissed a petition of the New York City hoard of Education for
designation of 1,200 principals as managerial employees.--

Anderson identified weaknesses in the collective bargaining ap-
proach for principals:

Better salaries, improved welfare provisions,
and resolutions of short-term grievances can
be achieved, but a high level of satisfaction
with one's job performance is unlikely to be
accomplished. Cooperative working relation--
shins can become so disrupted that the morale
oir the entire organization may deteriorate
substantially. -5

Although some agreements permitted a merging of administrative
and teaching personnel into a single unit with the board of education,
a more radical cleavage between "labor" (teachers) and "management"
(administrators) seemed to be emerging. The precedents in big city
AFT contracts, along with the growing sensitivity of the NEA to
charges of being a "company union", nvj.de the principal's position
within the local teachers organization tenuous at best.90 Thus, in
many bargaining agreements, principals, department chairmen, and
guidance counselors were excluded from the employees5 bargaining team.
When Carr was Executive Secretory of the NEA, his views probably
reflected the views of the National Education Association at that
time. He suggested that:

97

^"Negotiations Research Digest; 7 (January 1974): 9.

^Anderson, ""Management Team Versus Collective Bargaining for
Principals, p. </<-.

^Gcunnin'.iham, "Collective Negotiations and the Principalship," p. 63.

S7Rr>bprt. E. Dcherty, "Documents," Ind_as trjal_and j-^or .Relations
Review (duly 1966) as cited in Cunningham, "Collective negotiations and
tlie'Trinci pal ship," p. 63.

Principals covA'i not be .spectator? v/nen deci-
sions were made about the course of education
'in their communities. They belonged wit Si their
colleagues, in then- professional associations.
Inaction and ci is interest, separated and alienated
teachers and principals as surely ?.s open hos-
tility, ''B

Carr disagreed with -the contention that principals could not
belong to local education associations and could not. participate in
negotiations as part of a united team. He said it could be done*
it had been done, and it was being done in hundreds of school systems
throughout the nation. 9-

The National Education Association suggested that principals
functioned with the local, state, and national association without
conflict. However, the matter of including or excluding principals
from membership in local associations was considered to be a matter
of local opt i on J '^

Arguments for inclusion were:

(i) administrative and faculty concerns cannot
rationally be separated; (2) a common sense
approach to problems avoids coercion. (3) the
process democratizes and actually strengthens
administrative authority; {A} both principals
and teachers are agents of the board of edu-
cation; and., (5) involving principals assurer,
that their major needs will be considered. '01

Several points of view were expressed about the role of the

principal in collective bargaining during 1965-66. The views extended

-''••W'ilnam G. Carr, "The Principal's Pvole in Professional Nego-
tiation," Ne^York_ State_Lduca_riori. 53 (April 1966}: 25.

9 9 {hid o. "/L

1 C0«i ng , "New Directions for Collective Negotiations/1 p. 45.

101 Ibid., p. 46.

to \'fli" ia Piers bctw

si.'oq:."-: ■;:«;. o that

i » '0!:i c-pe ■ ; • i. ;••.• - ■■

principals withdraw fro;.'. 3 loca'i teachers organization and avoid all

109

relations with 'he recognized teacher collective bargaining unit.

However', Anderson contended thai", there was a conflict of interest
between the a. d ) ;ri n i s r r a t ■:.• • ' £'. responsibility to direct Iris staff and
ins active membership in the o Hi;- nidation.1'03 Districts -which had
American Federation of Teachers' groups as bargaining agents left no
room for speculation; the teacher organisation denied the principal
any role on the teacher's side. Approximately 50 percent of the local
professional associations did likewise and the percentage was rapidly
growing
team included

'^ Arguments against including the principal on the teachers

(1) a fear of administrative coercion; (2) an
apparent or assumed conflict of interests; (3)
a weakening of the teacher position n the
interests of the principal are considered; (4)
"suspect" attitude toward the principal as the
superintendent's agent; and i.5) a feeling that
the principal's role as a member of the teachers'
group is incompatible with his role as the
first rung of the administrative ladder in all
grievance procedures . 10n

If principals were to project their expertise into the negotia-
tors process in the most effective manner, Lhey should not hold

^Georyp W. Con.be, dr. . ''Hew bo Minimize Teacher vs. Boards
Conflicts Over Collective Bargain ing," American School Bea>-u
Journal 153 (August 1966): 5T.

Iv°!iernard 0. Donovan and Arvid Anderson, "Collective Bar-
gaining vs. Professional Negotiations," School. Management: 9
(November 19G5): 11.

101 1

53

membership in the same negotiating unit ts teeners. ^ They should ■
identify with the beard of education's administrative tear,! due tc
the frequency of their beiny cast in the rose of management. Prin-
cipal s perceived of themselves as management in the structure of the
school system.^07 Elementary principals were most satisfied with
negotiations when they were involved in the negotiation process. The
elementary principal preferred serving as a consultant, to the board ..,
of education when th^ board negotiated -with teachers ,'u;-

Jameson took a strong stand and stated that schoo' boards must
make quite clear that school administrators can no longer equivocate
as to where they stand in relationship to their role as cjents to
the board and that failure to perforin in this manner or to accept
this responsibility should result in" the early termination or their
services. ,u-

"^'Ronzel It. Minney, An /^ial_y_s_is nf the_ T^c^i oj\s jj_f -_t hie__PuJflj_q
SchooT_Pri_ncH)?«ls i n Col 1 ecITve"~i\etjoti^'i:To"ns Trocedl/r'es. '[Ph.D.
u'i s s . » "Oh i o "0 n i" v er s i t y s 1970)"." p fsse rf a t i_on_Abs tr_act s_I nt srnat i oj£l_
31 (February 197!): 3830A.

'^''Prancin D. King, ^udj ajid J\h a ly_s.ij;_qf_th e^
Principal's Perception o_f" !fi's "Role jn._£rofessjon_aj_J^j^.jaJ^ij^ns_
'{"E'dT'D" ~d i'' s'sTr "West T'TnilTfi^rUnTversity /T9/Y) . Diss ertcrti o n_ _/U>
s tracts InternatiqnaJ 33 (October 1972): 1365A.

10.8ib.i,j.;

I09j3nrieson5 "The Board's Positive Approach," p. 16.

54

Principalship Strategies •

Hatch,1'0 Redfern,111 King J"12 and Smith113 indicated that the
profession vms. unable to reach complete agreement on strategies that
were available for use with principals in collective bargaining.

Redfern recomnended direct participation by principals in nego-
tiations as follows:

(A) review teacher demands carefully, advise
the superintendent on the implications of each
item as it may affect the operation of his
school, and point out the pros and cons of
agreeing to the demand; (B) the principal
should serve on the administrative team as
an active member or as a consultant; (C) he
must be a direct participator in the implemen-
tation of ttie agreement that fs developed. 114

King suggested four strategies which were available for use with

principals in collective bargaining:

(1) A joint review with principals (or prin-
cipals' representatives in large cities) sit-
ting with the superintendent and/or the board
to cooperatively review, analyze, and evaluate
the demands of teacher negotiators in terms of
the positive or negative effects on school
management and quality of education. This
joint review becomes the basis for the boa rd-
; : superintendent response in negotiations. (2)
Representatives of a principal -supervisor
team may be permitted. full -fledged membership
on the board's negotiating team. (3) Repre-
sentatives of a principal-supervisor team may

31

p. 22

110Hatch, "The Principal 's Role in Collective Negotiations," p.

1 ^ 1 Redfern , "Negoti ati on Changes Pri nci pal -Teacher Rel ati onshi ps ,"

11?

King, "New Directions for Collective Negotiations," p. 45.

113Dayid C-. Smith, "Professional Negotiations and the Principal,"
National Elementary Principal 52 (January 1973): 84.

114Redfern, "Negotiation Changes Principal-Teacher-Relationships,"
p.. 23.

55

sit in on three-party conferences with board and ;
teachers. (4) A series of teacher-administrator
negotiating units may work -on various areas and
transmit conclusions to superintendent or board
to be worked out with the teacher negotiators. 115

Hatch identified three strageties for principal representation.
They were (1) In many systems, principals were still represented by -
the teachers' bargaining team which negotiated with the board of edu-
cation; (2) The second way that principals could be represented in
negotiations was by being members of the negotiations team which repre-
sented the board of education; (3) A third way that principals could
be presented in negotiations was by being consultants to the board J^6

Anderson suggested three alternatives for principals to gain
involvement in policy formulation. They were (1) Organize a separate
bargaining unit for principals and demand a' voice through collective
bargaining; (2) Organize -an- internal structure within the school sys-
tem which will provide representation of all administrators within the
system; (3) Organize both a formal collective bargaining unit for
principals and an internal representative structure. -

Several approaches have been presented to insure principals
representation in a school system. Keller identified three as follows:
0 ) The management team with the principals reviewing teacher pro-
posals and making recommendations to the board's negotiating team
regarding them; (2) The informal negotiations approach with a fully
organized administrative group negotiating with the superintendent

''^King, "New Directions for Collective Negotiations," p. 45.

116Hatch, "The Principal 's Role in Collective Negotiations,"
p. 32.

'"Anderson, "The Management Team and Negotiations," pp. 110-11.

5«

and/or board; (3) Formal nfKiotiar.ions with representation elections
and formal recognition procedures.1'-'

For the purposes of coliectivevrregotiatio:), principals may be
represented by an all-inclusive unr!;b or by a separate administrators'
unit, or they may not be represented at oil'! --it depend?, on state
negotiations statutes^ 'labor and other public board rulings, or local
determinations by the administrators' or teachers' groups. Nielsen
suggested that principals should resist measures which- would reduce
their authority and should not be members of the teacher's negotiating
..team.115'

In cases where the superintendent was committed to a philosophy
of participatory management, an internal structure was generally
adopted that was characterized by open communication in preparing
policy recommendations and in planning procedures for the system as
a whole. The- crucial factors in implementing a strategy of a manage-
ment team concept were (1) the acceptance by the superintendent of
the; desirability o1" involving all sub-administrators in administrative
planning and in policy formulation and. (?) the adoption of a. formal
structure which assured a system of open communication with all admin-
istrators.120

1 "Edward Keller, "Principals Wonder: What is Our RoleV Michi_gan_
I?!.^.ilv J PIL JournaJ 46 (October 19G8): ly. "

'•"'Roy L. Niolson, Kpje_F->j:'ecta_tions for J^rincjpal s _ir» Adiir^nis^
Ir^l'JPP.^Jl^JJlJ^Jj? Js^erceTved "pyll<epjise>r^ativ_t;s_

j^ Sei ecU^(d_ UrbaVSchooj "Areas"'TW'.D. dissT, Utah State University, ~
jDhuaT>rl*T/'27/""Dfj.'sj;r^at^ 32 (January 1972) :

3627A. " "' " """" ;

'•^Anderson, "Management Team Versus Collective Bargaining for
Principals," p. 175.

Anderson pointed .out that an essential ingredient in the ./i!ar:ag-a^--:.
meou .tfaifi concept was a coifimi tinerit.. to ..involving people in the process
of policy foncjlaf ion. ' ~1 However.;, if the "management te-:iir. concept
was v-i<<V'ZG-as only informal coiiTuuni cation,. Anderson thought 11: was
inadequate in fulfilling the expectations of principals. Deterr.iina-
tier; of policy must reir.ain as the exclusive prerogative of the board
of oducatioa, but all administrators should have the opportunity to
■ rrflueiice eol icy development.

. Redfen: suggested that the principal ship ,' as customarily con-
ceived, wvT be markedly altered and eventually supplanted by some
other: form of administrative control . Strong control from a central
office, transmitted through an administrative chain of command, was
waning. Greater autonomy was found In local school committees dominat
bv teachers,"--

1%'.. ..%02.li1. Lle. In5j.ijde_d on_ the
Board's Darqalnino fe-nin?

Barq3 i n/i ng__Te_a;n_ Is s u es

Mitchell stated that "the primary object of selecting the board's .
bargaining team is to bring administrative knowledge and experience to
the bargaining table.""'" The team should be able to discuss accurately
and intel 1 igently all relevant problesiis which nicy arise in the meeting.

il-/ 'Anderson, "The Management Team and Negotiations 5" p. 109.

'-2-Redfern, "Negotiation Changes Princinal-Teacher Relationships,'
p. 22. '

^-23"i:abor Relations Handbook for 'School Boards and Suoerinten--
dents" (MF-A, 1966) as cited in Donald P. Mitchell, "Negotiations:
improve the Process," educational Leadershjp 30 (February 1973}:

The selection of a negotiations team wss considered to be one
of t he most important decisions that either of the parties had to
make.'<-"f The approach adopted by the team often established the
operational tone for the district. The agreement, reached by the teems
often determined the quality of the educational program for the time
span of the agreement. Either side was in a position to "win the
battle and lose the war," thereby severely hampering the educational
program of the district.

Sarthory, in a study on the effect of the makeup of negotiating
teams on the outcome of the negotiations, found the following: (1)
teacher teams composed of a majority of secondary teachers were more
likely to reach agreement with the board team; (?) reaching agreement
was more difficult when members of teacher teams had over ten years'
experience; (3) the composition of the board team was not significantly
related to the outcome of negotiations; (4) the involvement of lawyers
in negotiations was more likely to lead to impasse; and (5) the role
of the superintendent and the status of the building principal in
negotiations was not significantly related to the outcome of .negotia-

4 • l?n-
tions. ]C-

Board members iiil_jjil_ba^£^;L?l^irA!IL Attitudes and practices

relating to board representation have changed since the early stage?

of collective bargaining. At first, whole boards or individual members

12/|Donald C. Kilgras, Administration as an Adversary Role:
^ircJai'ilL!13.__~ Collective Negb ij a l;Tons~TEugeJie, Oregon: Colfege of
Education, University of Oregon, 1973), p. 19.

1 ^Joseph A. Sarthory, "Structural Characteristics and the Out-
come of Collective Negotiations, " Educational ^dnjjji_lstij'.t^s__C^raj;U^lj
7 (Autumn 1971): 7J3-8S.

" 59

were involved ir. bargaining. As boards became more aware of the com-
plexities of the process, they tended to have bargaining carried out
by the superintendent or a staff specialist. Most parties changed
from large negotiating teams tc either small groups or a single
spokesman. In many districts, professional negotiators or lawyers
served both groups. I26

Koerner and Parker warned against having school board members
on the team J2? j^g board was the highest authority on school mat-
ters in the community. When it did its own bargaining, nothing remained
in reserve for settling disputes. Teachers bargaining with board
members assumed that statements made by board members were official
and binding on the board and, since that was not the case, friction
was likely to develop. Lieberman also suggested strongly that board
members not be on the bargaining team because they could not refuse
to ratify an agreement they had approved at the table. "*

Lieberman and Moskow suggested that practice might differ in
relation to the size of the district.129 In Targe districts, it was
perhaps feasible to have personnel" experienced in collective bargain-
ing negotiate for the board, while in small districts, due to the -
lack of experienced personnel, it was more reasonable to expect board
members to negotiate.

i?fi

'^"Kilgras, Administration as an Adversary Role: Bargaining -

Collective Negotiations, p. 20.

^Thomas F. Koerner and Clyde Parker, "How to Pick a Bargaining.
Team and What to Teach It," American School Board Journal 156 (May
1969): 20, ~~ " - . ~~ ~ .

1 ^Lieberman, "Forming Your Negotiations Team," p. 31.

'29Myron Lieberman and flichaeT H. Moskow, Collective Negotiations
for Teachers: An Approach to Schoo 1 Administration (Chicago: Rand
McNally and Company, 19o5), pp. 249~-50.

60

Giiroy et al. were more specific arid stated that:

Nevertheless , the board should not become involved
in negotiations unless the board's confidence in
its admovistrafc! s if, shaken. The board's chief
role is to provide po I icy -guidelines to the admin-
istrators prior to negotiations in order thr=t the
administrator lias a reference point to guide him
through the sessions . • -C

This statement clearly implied that the board negotiating team should
have been composed of members of the district's administrative staff.
Manning contended that because much time will be required in negotia-
tions, corporation boards of directors do not send their boards to
the negotiating table, and the superintendent would be placed in an
almost untenable -role in terms of compromising his leadership in mat-
ters of administrative authority and professional expertise, boards
should not go to the table. ,-i'

The number of boards and board members who negotiate directly
with employee organisations has declined substantially since the mid-
dle sixties. In 1966 67, 33 percent of board negotiating teams were
made up, exclusively, of board members; by 1971-72, the number had
dropped to 14.7 percent.1-^ More and more board members recognized that
their personal participation at the negotiating table required an
excessive amount of time, involved the legal risks of losing the right
to refuse to ratify, and frequently pitted inexperienced personnel

130Thomas P. Gi'lroy, Anthony V. Sirmcropi,, Frederic!: D. Stone,
and Ted R. Urich, Educator j; s oniric to Collective Negotiations
(Co ! umbus , Ohi o : ChaT!es~"E7>ferrelT^ , p .

34.

'^'Manning, "i-Jeqotiat ions : Ihc Process in Collective Bargaining,"
p. 15.

,J"Li overman, Negotiations: l-'ast. Present, and future," p. 16.

on the management: side again.-:;; experienced, full-time negotiators
for teachers .

The supCTirA^enden !;_•::■:-■. ;-.- mernbj;r__of the bargaining team. Different
author;; have viewed the situation differently, but the date that
articles were-' written appeared to influence their thinking. Articles
in the middle sixties often suggested that superintendents should
serve in. s. dual role advising beards and principals and teachers in
the same bargaining units. By the end of the sixties and early
seventies, authors had changed and were suggesting management roles
for bo!.h superintendents and principals.

A key decision to be made at the beginning of collective bar-
gaining is the role to be played by the superintendent. Manning believed
that the superintendent. -should assume a dual role in collective bar-
gaining. ^V His job was to mediate problems between the board and
teacher organization and stand on principles of what was best for
children and youth.

Lieberman said the superintendent should not be on the negotiat-
ing team J3^ He should be informed and available to provide direction
to the team within guidelines set by the board.

One of the recurring contentions was that the superintendent was
not adequately prepared for the process; the following statement illus-
trates this problem:

The advent of legal bargaining in Michigan, in
1965, found most school districts and their
administrators wholly unprepared. During the
first years, many superintendents negotiated

William R. Manning, "Negotiations: I he Process in Collec-
tive Bargaining," Schooj Board Journal 153 (August 1965): 15.

■ '^'Lieberm-in, "Forming Your Negotiations Team," p. 31.

62

personally and. directly with teacher representa-
tives. Superintendents were ill orepared by
academic training or temperament for this task.
The values, judgments, and even competence of
school executives were challenged by their
teaching staffs J 35

Superintendents have abandoned the neutral posture that many tried
to adopt in the 1960s.

In about 75 percent of all districts where
negotiation takes place, the superintendent is
either a member of the board negotiating team
or serves it exclusively as an advisor. In
1966-67, he was advisor to both board and teacher
negotiators; by 1971-72, only 14 percent served"
in this dual capacity. Somewhat surprisingly,
although the proportion who served as "neutral
resource persons" dropped from 6.8 percent to
4.6 percent, the number who were nonpartici pants
increased from one percent to five percent. '36

In summary, superintendents have become overwhelmingly active
on the management side, and nonparticipation has replaced neutrality
as the other major role of superintendents. The increase in non-
participating superintendents probably can be attributed to situations
in which the board had lost confidence in the superintendent's ability
to handle the negotiations.

Principals on the bargaining team. The literature was not com-
pletely clear on the role of the principal in collective bargaining.
If any role was emerging, it was that principals were management and
should be represented on board teams and be excluded from teacher

135Erickson, "New Management Figures in Michigan School Admin-
istration," p. 426.

136Lieberman, "Negotiations: Past, Present, and Future," p.
1 6 .

fiS

tt'artlS. Th"i3 WdS CSpOUScd by Ooherty, '' OonOV&i'l 'en dl., "' H rid. AFT

leaders. The Ni-A promoted a different view that all certified employees
should be under the same umbrella. ,-

A current trend of the withdrawal of administrators' organiza-
tion.'; from teachers' groups would seem to indicate a move to the board

1 0:>
side. v" Ihe actual makeup of the teams varied greatly and included

such individuals as consultants, legal counsel, and various members
of the teacher and administrative staffs, Koerner and Parker sug-
gested that principals from high schools and elementary schools,
assistant principals, department chairmen, and the personnel super-
visor should be on the -board's negotiation team along with the super-
intended.140

_S e Vec _^; i _oj "■. of the chief negotiator. The importance of selecting
the chief negotiator cannot be overemphasized. According to Lieberman,
if boards do not have staff' members in their organizations with nego-
tiating skill and experience, they would be well advised to consider
bringing in outside consultants to bead up their negotiating teams. '4!

'-"'Robert t . Doherty, "Negotiations: Impact of Teacher Organiza-
tions Upon Setting School Policies,'1 Clearing House 40 (May 1966):

5 —

1 oo

Bernard i". Donovan, Arvid Anderson, Charles Cogen, and
Albert W. Wolpcrt, ''Collective Bargaining Versus Professional Nego-
tiations," School Manigement 9 (November 1965): 68-75.

*' ^9

' " Donald C, Ki! eras, Administration as an Adversary Role: Bar-

Mil:i!^L~_.Ji2.11.?>:''ive J'J e.Si? "L'^J-J ° !!?"» P- ^Tb

' -"i-'oorncr and Parker, "How to Pick a bargaining Team and What,
to- Teach It," pp. 28-30.

'''' 'Lieberman, "Avoid These Costly Bargaining Mistakes," p. 37.

64

Small school "districts which lacked the financial means to
employ competent staff v/ere particularly hard hit and vulnerable
to financially motivated operators. Universities were slow to
develop programs for training school administrators in collective
bargaining. '^. Thus, many districts had to fall back on persons
with little or no professional background to conduct collective bar-
gaining.

Lieberman said:

The chief negotiator must have a "feel" for
negotiating. The qualities required are
almost subliminal in nature. In addition
to being diplomatic, patient, tough, flex-
ible, and so on, the ideal negotiator must ,.
be extraordinarily good at reading signals. '43

Negotiators should be selected carefully and objectively. A

sense of humor was considered to be essential and negotiators should

display calm, accurate logic, alert responsiveness, and cool headed-

144
ness.

Proescholdt, in a study undertaken to determine how boards pre-
pared for collective negotiations, determined that:

(1) spokesmen for . boards of education in
negotiations have not been selected because
of their skill or training in the art of
negotiating; (2) school superintendents are
being phased out as chief negotiators for
boards.145

i42Erickson, "New Management Figures in Michigan School Admin-
istration, " p.. 426.

^3Lieberman, "Avoid These Costly Bargaining Mistakes," p. 38.

^^Koerner and Parker, "How to Pick a Bargaining Team and What
to Teach It," p. 30.

145proesc^lo]c|t, The Preparation Process for Coll ective Nego-
tiations by" Boards of Education in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area,
p. 4202A. " "~ :

fi5

'.!.;; the larger districts, many ^upevintendeirts empl oyed full -time
executive assistants to handle the total spectrum of employee rela-
lions under their guidance. Their duties included collective bar-
gaining, supervision of grievance processing, and the daily responsi-
bilities of administering the master agreement, judging by the relative
absence of rancor and turmoil, these practices were evidently successful.

Eastman's study to determine working relationships between full-
time chief negotiators, superintendents of schools, members of the
negotiating team, and- school- boards, found that:

(1) Full-time chief negotiators have, with few
exceptions, reported directly to the superin-
tendent of schools. (2) Board teams have usually
included, in addition to a full-time chief nego- ,.,'..
tiator, at least one member with major responsi-
bilities for instructional and/or personnel
matters. (3) The chief negotiator, with few
exceptions, has been chairman of the board nego-
tiating team and has been charged with responsi-
bility for setting strategy and directing the
progress of negotiations. (4) The full-time
chief negotiator h3S ordinarily served as the
only spokesman for the school board during nego-
tiation sessions. (5) Most superintendents felt
the establishment of the position of full-time
chief negotiator was beneficial and essential to
the functioning of their school systems. (6)
Superintendents and chief negotiators, as a
general rule, attended all school board execu-
tive sessions. dealing with negotiation matters
and made recommendations to the board. 147-

The education and experiential backgrounds cf professional

negotiators were similar- in states with a negotiation law and states

withc.it a law. Responsibilities of professional negotiators were

' °Erickson.. "New Management Fiqures in Michigan School Admin-
istration," p. 427.

Eas tman , The_Emerg_i pq _Pc>sJ * i on °^ Chief Negotiator in the
Public School Supe>in tendency". p.TlTbk'." ' —- -

66

much the same in both groups of states. Sealey found that factors
which led to the appointment of a professional negotiator to .repre-
sent school boards were not influenced by the size of the districts,
nor by the makeup of the districts J 48 ... .

Some of the personal qualities that the chief spokesman should
have were:

(a) command respect and confidence, (b) have
patience and a sense of humor, (c) be a good
listener, (d) know how to sell the board's
proposals, (e) have the ability to organize
his thoughts and speak well, (f) be able to
say "no" effectively, (g) have physical and
mental stamina, and (h) above all, have a
keen sense of timing.'49

Employment of attorneys. The degree to which lawyers should be

involved in negotiations in education was also subject to differing

opinions. Sarthory. indicated that some had great fear that, as lawyers

become more heavily involved, the legal precedents with which they were

familiar— namely, the labor-management conflict model from the private

sphere— would become the educational model J50 Most agreed that the

system's counsel should be a member, particularly during the initial

stages when so many legal questions were being raised and certainly

in the preparation of the contract. Some people advocated that the

attorney should be the chief spokesman. This was difficult to accept,

'^Robert D. Sealey, The Emerging Role of the Professional
Negotiator in. Public School Education (Ed. P. diss. , University of
Northern Colorado, 1970). Dissertation Abstracts International 31
(February 1971): 3840A. : ~ ~

149

Donald P. Mitchell, "Negotiations: Improve the Process,"

Educational Leadership .30 (February 1973): 476.

'50Joseph A. Sarthory, "Structural Characteristics and the
Outcome of Collective Negotiations," Educational Administrators
Quarterly 7 (Autumn 1971): 80. ...........

57

because most. of the problems and /disagreements that have to be resolved

■are ■ educational , not legal, i:i nature. .'-"'.

As superintendents withdrew from tabic bargaining in Michigan,

■ labor attorneys- or- consul -cants were employed.

The eagerness of the outside entrepreneur-to-
display his ability to "save the district money,"
coupled with a general teacher antagonism, to-
ward 'attorneys and consultants ignorant of the
education process-. . has set the scene for some .
of .Mich loan's 'most turbulent and hitter teacher
strikes. A subtle side effect has been. a severe
erosion of traditional 'authority for superinten-
dents."^

Advantages in employing outside . . P.rojFe_s_s K;naT_s_. Several advantages

have been presented to support hiring outside professionals to do the

negotiating for the board:

(1) collective bargaining was time consuming;

(2) professional negotiators. ware knowledgeable
about collective bargaining;" (3) their knowhow
and anonymity commanded greater -respect, from
teachers; and, (4) their use ail owed the board
to remain as the final authority J 5-

Lieberman added the following advantages to the list:

(1) it was easier to change outside negotiators
than to replace staff members if tiiere was dis-
satisfaction with performance; (2) the outsider
on an hourly or per diem basis posed fewer
problems -than. a full-time employee utilized
as chiei negotiator. 1 54

^Manning,' "Negotiations: The Process in Collective Bargain-
ing," p. 15.

'^Erickson, "New Management. Figures in Michigan School Adminis-
tration," p. A?.b.

"*' "3Koerner and Parker, "How to Pick a Bargaining Team and What
to Teach It," p. 29.

^Lieberman, ''Forming Your Negotiating Team," p. 32.

66

Disadvantaged in Wnpinyf^g outride professional^ Disadvantages

to hiring Drcfessional negotiators for the board's team include the

following:

(1) Outride negotiators were expensive -a-nd they
did not. have an int"im?»te knowledge of the school
system. (2) No amount of advanced study can
prepare outside negotiators for the subtleties
and sensitivities that exist within school
system?. (3) Teachers often got the idea that
hiring outside negotiators meant that the
board [members] didn't consider negotiations
important enough to command their time. (4)
Hiring outside professionals may have limited
the in-district training efforts toward develop-
ing staff negotiators J j5

Other disadvantages were that the outsider was not around to administer
the agreement and that he may agree to clauses which would be unaccept-
able to a person who had to live with the agreement en a daily basis.
Also, outsiders may have a tendency to seek spectacular results to
add to their reputations and business and some consultants may desire
to make themselves indispensable so that they can stay on the payroll.

Team size. Lieberman suggested a team of two or three adminis-
trators, headed by a person who reported directly to the superintendent
of schools J'-^ The number of persons suggested for a negotiating team
varied according to the size of the school system and the nature of the
problems negotiated. Generally, the team should have three to five
members.

^!>Koerner and Parker, "How to Pick a Bargaining Team and What
to Teach It," p. 29.

'-'-■Lieberman, 'Terming Your Negotiating Team," p. 35.

^Manning> "Negotiations: The' Process in Collective Bargaining,"
p. 15.

m

Bowers found that larger districts were more likely to be

(1 } engaged in negotiations that are expected
to result in formally ratified and binding
agreement^;' (2) engaged in. exclusive recogni-
tion procedures; and (3) engaged in impasse
prccedureSj-qrievance procedures and master
contracts. !^

At the same time, smaller school districts were more likely to have

independent local teacher organizations and receive fewer teacher

proposals.

The smaller the team, the easier it was to reach agreement, both
•within the team and with the teacher team, and it was also easier to
make serious mistakes in collective bargaining.'^ There was no way
to cover all the procedural variations that may occur in a school sys-
tem by adding representatives to the team; reasonableness must prevail.
Obviously, all principals cannot be on the team.

Liberman suggested five-person teams for systems employing up

to 1 ,000 teachers. He felt that administration teams tended to be

larger than necessary.'™ Lieberman and Moskow indicated that the

size of negotiating teams is an important structural factor when they

noted :

On the other hand, larger negotiating groups
find it more difficult to make concessions and
are less 1 ike'iy to respect the confidences
that are frequently essential to effective
negotiations. Furthermore, large negotiating

ICO

""'toward L. Bowers, The Development and Utilization of a Classify
PA^.iPI! -Vs ten) for ! )e s c ri b i n :\ _th e 5 tatu s of Teacher Grou p_- S choo 1
Boa vd. Negot i a t i ons 1 n fridla na (Td.D. diss., Indiana University, 7971).
Disser'ta'r.ion Abr'ti acts International 32 (December 1971): 2936A.

•^Liebei'-man, "Forming Your Negotiating Team," p. 30.

150Ibid., p. 31.

70

■coiRiirttees make . it more difficult '.--.for ..the chief
spokesman to control the neoot iat ionsJ6»

Team Select ion Strategy ' .,:y

Koerner and Parker suggest- -that" three approaches were most common,

(.1 } First, school board members themselves —
either as a committee of the whole or as a
.,-subconKittee---can negotiate with the repre-
sentatives of the teachers. (2) The second
'way for a board to bargain is to hire pro-
fessionals in the field- of negotiations;
-..■■.individuals usually not associated with the
school system. (3) The third method of
selecting a bargaining team for the board —
the one that seems best to use--is using the
school system's administrative staff -J 62

Mitchell, in a 1969 Michigan study, found that:

(1) Most teams have five or less members.
(2; The superintendent or a central office
administrator was the chief spokesman in 72
percent of the districts. (3) The school
board determined who would be the chief
spokesman 100 percent of the time. (4)
Only half the school districts had an organ-
izational structure supporting the negotiat-
ing team. (51 Membership of the teams usually
included representatives of the central office,
secondary principals, and elementary prin-
cipals . (6) Very seldom did the board mem-
bers enter directly into bargaining other
than by observation or caucus. (7) The school
attorney was generally used to give only
opinions on legal ■matters .and check the
"language of the contract. '63

10 'Myron Li'eberman and Michael H. Moskow. Oollective Nege-
ti at ions for Teachers: _An Approach to School Adminis_trati_Oi"i
TChieagoT Ra ruTMc NoTTy and" Company ,""1965 j 7 p. 253.""

'^^Koerner and Parker, "!-!ow to Pick a Bargaining Team and What
to Teach It," p. 30.

' 63f li tchel i , An Eyal uation of the Compos i t i o n and S e 1 ec t i on
of _Neuqtiatij]_q T>ai;is_foj]_Publ"ic_ School Boards of Education, p.
2659Ar

71

Eastman concluded ths* the chairman of the board's negotiating
team should be an employee of the school system with wide system
knowledge and close contact bud identification with the superinten-
dent and board.. He suggested that the chief negotiators should report
directly to the superintendent and that superintendents would lose no
status under this arrangement. 164

How ShouH Baj^aining Tgajns_Prgpare for Negotiations

auq'llhat" Strategies Were Used to Get Proposals

^j^; Negotiating Table.?.

Issues on Preparation^

The success of productive collective bargaining can be directly
related to the thoroughness of advanced preparation.165 According
to Lieberman and Moskow, one of the most important factors to be
emphasized in preparation was adequate time.166 School administrators
and teachers often under-estimated the amount of time needed for nego-
tiations. The teacher group had to submit its proposals in time to
permit adequate bargaining to take place before the budget submission
date. Wollett suggested that a reasonable time schedule "would call
for the initiation o'vWgotiations at least ninety days in advance
of the time when final action on the budget must occur."

164Eastman, Th e_. Etw?r o, i n g Position of Chief Negotiator in the
Pubhc _S^oo^_>jjj^n^JndW^y, p. 427d7\.

165Sta!i'!ev M. Elan," Myron Lieberman, and Michael H. Moskow,
Readinos" on Collective •Nogot.T-ntions_ in Public Education (Chicago:
RaTid^ic1lalTy'"and Compiy/T9bT), p. 390.

1,66Lieberman and Moskow, CoVlecvb ive_ Negotiat ions for Teachers:

167 Dona Id \\. Wnlfett, Readings on Collective Nejotiajtionsin
Public Education, ed. Stanley^!. Elam", Myron HeBenhan, and Michael
ITn&skowTChiTacio: Rand McNally and Company, 19o7), p. 374.

72

According to Ashby, McGinnis, and Persihg, "the most important
of all preparations for negotiations is that of building a -heal thy
climate of relationships between board and staff. !,'!S8 Collective
bargaining cannot be removed fret; the total set of relationships in
the school system. If the board and staff have developed procedures
whereby a partnership exists, there will be less tendency to put
everything into « formal negotiations agreement J69

As s emb lino Bargaining Data

Factual data must be collected ana assembled for each issue.1'*''
The inore facts prepared for each issue, "the simpler the less emo-
tional will be negotiations," 71 Some of the data needed by the board's
team for collective bargaining we^-e salaries in neighboring districts
and in comparable districts nationally, costs or savings of -pro-
posed changes, the board's ability to pay. national, regional, and
local economic conditions, agreements recently negotiated in compar-
able communities, working conditions in the school district, and
related items. '^

168|_iuyci w. Ashby, dames E, McGinnis, and Thomas E. Persing.
Common Sense in Negotiations in Public Education (Danville, Illinois:
The Interstate Printers and I PidTnsr.e^s , Inc. fT972) , p. 25.

l^Ibid.

170John Metzler, The Col ^ctive_Djje;;iMia:_ Neyqtiat_ions jn
Education, ed. Patrick" irTaFi ton and" Harold" lT'«bbdv.'inTWorthington,
Ohio: Charles A. .Jones Publishing Company, 1969), p. 99.

Wollett, ReadjjK)S_o_n Collective Negotiations In Public 'Edu-
cation, p. 39?;. " " ""■ ""'" ~ *

'72l.ieberman and Moskow, Collective Negotiations for Teachers:
iHL^SJE^Sh. .tg_J>_chocl Admi ni sfrat i on , "p. Yb't .

73

Lieberman indicated that the interests of the parties determine

what data will be collected. Teacher groups have selected data

emphasizing their interests end administrative groups have sought

data supporting their interests.

Since one can never be sure whether a particular
hoard or organization will be influenced -by data,
the sensible thing to do is to be fully prepared
for any development, including the eventuality
that relevant data will be ignored. 174

Data preparation doesn't reduce the possibility of differences

developing between the teams since controversy "develops ever what

IT

the 'facts' are, let alone what interpretations to give them.""**
However, factual considerations cannot be ignored in a mature relation-
ship as costs must -be known before proposals can realistically be con-
sidered.

The board's team inust devote substantial time to pre-negotiating
meetings. The administrative units must be consulted to establish
administrative priorities, establish or review policies on known or
anticipated issues, and prepare proposals and fallback positions.176
Important factors winch should he considered have been missed unless
all groups were consulted in preparing for collective bargaining. The
administration must thoroughly consult with its representatives in the
schools or it will have difficulties in -Implementing the agreement. '

l73Ibid. , p. 255.
174Ibid.
175Ibid.
176!bid., p. 255.

177

Ibid.

74

Biscqssjcn_j^ith Top__Man»qemcnt

An essential part of collective bargaining preparation is dis-
cussion between the spokesman of the, board's bargaining team and the
superintendent J7° This discussion should occur prior to a meeting
with the board for "clarifying the latitude of negotiations. The chief
negotiator can out"! ire the expected outcome of collective bargaining
for the chief executive. '"^ The session should include the superin-
tendent and his top staff and is designed to -identify concerns before
management's package is submitted to the board.

A final task in the preparation for negotiations is the develop-
ment of a model agreement. Though neither party will come away from
the table with an ideal agreement, the model agreement will serve as
a goal for which the chief negotiator can aim; it also serves as his
principal negotiating tool. 'c}0 The language in the idea"! agreement
should be well reasoned and thus should be done away from the pressures
of the negotiating table.

Clarifying latitude for negotiations. When the probable areas of
negotiations have been identified by the total administrative team
and data have been collected, a meeting should be held with the board
to investigate the latitude available for negotiations. 1S1 At that
point, the superintendent and chief negotiator must present the

'■''-El am, Lieberman, and Moskow, Readings on Collective Negotia-
tions in Pub] i c Educat i on , p. 394. ' ' "*"

179Ibid.

'^''Charles T. Schmidt, Jr.. Hyman Parker, and. Bob. Repas. .A Guide
to Collective Negotiations in Eciucatjqn (East Lansing, Michigan":
Michigan Ytate* Tin i vers ity, "19G7), "p. Vf.

'8'Wollett, Readings on Collective Negotiations in Public Edu-
cation, p. 3S2. "~ ~" " "~ ' "w" "

75

prepared data and proposals to the board. In addition to pertinent

internal financial data, it is "advisable to study the personnel

practices of other agencies and private employers in the area."^'-

The board should review the data and proposals and provide guidelines

for the Learn on money and non-money items. In establish! ncj direction,

the board should consider the limitations imposed by the law, state

board regulations, and the general public. ^

The whole purpose of this phase is to prepare the negotiating

team and to give them specific guidelines to use at the negotiating

sessions.

Very specific goals are established: e.g.,
What do you want to achieve during the • -

course of negotiations? What. do you want
to maintain? What are vou willing to con-
cede?'' 84

Probably the most important decision that the board must make in

establishing these guidelines is to set a specific economic package

within which the negotiators must operate. ^ The package should apply

to salaries and also to the dollar cost of fringe benefits. This

preparation gives the management team flexibility and a tactical

"I QC

advantage in adjusting to developments during the bargaining sessions.

182ibid.

183Ibid.

■° 'Schmidt, Jr. et a!., A Guide to Collective Negotiations in
Education, p. :>J.

uoiDid. , p. t>l .

1&6Ibid.

What Strategies _$houud _Bc- jJsed jj}_Jfj;j^^>±'{!^.l

Negotiations have no set pattern because each is a product or a

'particular employment "relationship.'" Schmidt et al. categorized -the

general types as follows:

Type I. The normal negotiations follow a -pattern-.
The employee organization presents its demands,
and the board makes counter-proposals; reduced
demands are followed by additional counter-
proposals,- and .eventually ''an agreement results.

Type IT. A. variation of Type I is caused by the
introduction into 'negotiations of board demands
upon the employee organization. This variation
--■wi IT probably, become increasingly .frequent because
of tiie need to hold costs to a minimum and to meet
educational objectives.

Type III. The beard presents its entire true
proposals at the beginning and will not move from
that position unless its, "facts''1. '.cap. be disproven.
This approach requires intensive preparation and-
most important-a 'long history of successful public
relations work with the employees and their com-
munities. Moreover, it should not be adopted
lightly, since to some observers,,! t is the anti-
thesis of collective bargaining.

Type !V. The ''war" approach con be ."ftp pi ied when
each side distrusts the ether and throws ultima- •
turn after ultimatum at one another.- Merely to
mention this way of bargaining- is sufficient to
show its uselessness. Nothing constructive can
be accomplished this way. Experienced negotia-
tors cannot afford to act inimnLureiyJ8-'

Wollett identified the following three basic methods for getting

proposals into table consideration: (T) The teachers' association

presents its proposals to the board or a board committee with the

superintendent present-, two or three questions may be asked and

answered, or maybe- there won't be any questions. The meeting is close*.

'^'Schmidt,, Jr. et al., A Guide to Collective Negotiations in

77

one- the board takes action shortly thereafter which bears little
resemblance to what the teachers proposed. (2) The teachers' associa-
tion presents proposals and supports them with data and argument. The
board discusses the proposals, their wisdom, and their feasibil ity,
and advises the teachers' representatives of the reasons why they are
probably not acceptable. (3) The teachers' association presents pro-
posals, again supported by argument, evidence, and data. This is
followed by an exchange of specific counter-proposals made by board
representatives and by counter-counter-proposals from the teachers'
association. Through this process of give and take, areas of dis-
agreement are narrowed and finally eliminated. Or, alternatively--
and this may happen, despite many meetings and good faith and earnest
efforts to reconcile differences-areas of disagreement remain and the
parties come to an impasse with neither willing to make an additional

188
concession. ■•■•.-■

The first process has been called the "white cane" approach which
was predicated on the notion thst the school board, overcome with pity
for the plight of -1 Vs underprivileged teachers, "put something in the
cup"; the second approach came closer to collective bargaining, but
it still ended wi • -n a unilateral decision; the third procedure was the
only one that ooul'a be colled collective bargaining.183

Metzler sugc.:e;-.ted that the board bargaining team agree on its
own proposals, prepare counter-proposals to the teachers' demands, and

1 e8Wbl 1 ett , Readings on Collective Negoti .^.o/js^Lil^yi?^^"
Cjition, pp. 3 64 -to.

109Ibid., p.366.

78

■set forth the rati cna.lc vn. each issue.'. He strenuously emphasized
that the board's team initiate its own proposals anc! not come to the
table merely to respond.

Teachers have special competencies which enable them to contribute
sigrnrir.ar.tiy to educational aspects in the school situation. ■■ Mech-
anisms'may be established through which the board, administration, and
staff, consult. regularly -on what is good education for the district.
According, to f-'etzier, such sessions can occur in an informal setting
and can result in improved education, better board-edministrator-staff .
relationships and school community morale, and no formalized agreement
'is signed. '

Those engaged in. preparation must anticipate what some of the
demands of the employees may be. Too often an employer, either private
cr public, will simply sit back and receive the employee's demands,

1 no

revise them, and later reject some cr all. ° According to Schmidt
et al., taking the offense with a list of demands was a legitimate
move in collective bargaining; otherwise, the board was tied to a
defensive position. ,y •

The board team should prepare proposals to be submitted to
employee groups. The contention of AshT.y et al . was that proposals

'-Hletzier: The Collective Dilemma: Negotiations in Education,

p. 98. " ~* ' ' "~~ ' "

■» oi

'Ibid.

jDiu.

'^Schmidt., Jr. et al., A Guide to Collective Negotiations in
Education, p. 50. " " ■ " ■"■"■■ """■ " : ■-■

194Ibid.

79

should !.!?• huilr*?srra:r:d the fhor<!;;: "What are we ooing to yet fbr added
expenditures ., over a no b-yond those neces-.airy for keeoino. pace with
1 ' v ' r: y costs?" ',v> That approach was logical durinq a per too v/bes;
boaros unci tesohc-rs were askeri to account for rising costs. lt>. all
fairness, board and teacher proposal's should bo exchanged at the first
neat mo, ' -'-.

What Should Be the Scope of Codl active
Bargaining in Public Education?

Issues _or- jlavoainiaq Scope

Boards and administrators preparing for ncootiations are normally
concerned about what they can, should, or most bargain about. The
problem increased because of the political nato^e of the broad detar-
m" nations of salaries and frituje benefits. Some boards o<k\ some-
teacher associations were fairly cunfideot that managerial preroga-
tives and hargair.able items could be identified.

However, th^ history of col i active baryalninu in the private

sector has clearly demonstrated the need for an ever- increasing scope

c • • i 1 a~

"i or onion act". on aim concerns. The public sector, undoubtedly,

v.'ill follow the same route.

Boards have re-cognized tha f'^ct thai: the i r.ter-r.al politics of v-

any union enoeged in collective bargaining demands that the employee

orysreuaiiou cone i noons ly expand the scone of issues on which, it seers

■ 'Ash by t-t ;?"; . , Common Sense- J a _Neqotiajri ons _i n Pob! ic_ Education,
p. 24. "" " ■' " " "~ ~"~

ly6Ibid.

'-'"'Wes'lyy A. Wi Idr.ir. , :iUe].s! Asp-acts of Teacher Collective Action,"
Theory Into Practice 3 irahr,:,-^/ VW$): 5u.

action.'98 The lack of definitive legislative and- judicial guidelines;

and precedent on bargainable subject matter in education have made it.

more' difficult for 'boards to resist the rapid growth of issues which

become fair game for the power plays of collective bargaining. State

statutes have addressed. the question of bargaining subject matter in

a variety of ways. Many employed different forms of the private sectov

definition of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions Of employ-
's oq
ment.-^-. Tne important question revolved around what was and was not

included in wages, salary, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment. In seme states, statutes referred to "all terms and con-
ditions of employment," but others, such as Nevada and Michigan, re-
ferred to "terms and conditions of employment" and left out the word,
"all.1 u That was an important omission. "Conditions of employ-
ment" was subjected to interpretation and the courts gave it an ever-
broadening interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court stated that subject
matter pertaining to bargaining may be grouped into:
T. Matters which must be bargained about.

2. Matters which can be bargained about if the
parties wish to do so.

3. Matters which cannot be bargained^ bout
because it would be illegal to do so. 201

■."^Patrick W. Carlton and Harold T.Goodwin, eds., The Collec-
tive Dilemma: Negotiations in Education (Worthington, Ohio: Charles
A*. Jones Publishing Company, 1969), p. 236."

,39Wcsley'A. Wildman, "What's Negotiable?" The School Board
Journal 155 (November 1967): 9. -"■*.'

- ^'SDa-vid C. Smith, "what's Negotiable?" The National Elementary
Principal 53 (March-April 1974): 74.

-Reynold C. Seitz, ''Collective Bargaining- Can Help Achieve
Reasonable; Agreement," The American School Beard Journal 47 (November
1966): 53.

81

'in 1366, Metier zuMeyirt ':£/' presidents of local teacher associa-
tions to identify areas that were being negotiated at that time and
areas that wore net being negotiated. He found that they were nego-
tiating:

(1) Deter ii;i rati on of tear. her v/crk losd. (?) Dis-
cipline of professional staff. (3) Standards for
new professional staff oositions. (4) Duties of
professional staff members. (5) Facilities for
personal health ?n(' comfori. of the staff. (6)
Basis and levels of salary schedules. (?) Fringe
benefits. (6) Leave programs. (9). Length of
contracts, (10) Practices of pupil control. (11)
The school calendar. (12) The curriculum content
and quality of 'the instructional program. 202

Boards were refusing to negotiate:

(I) Determination of the size and qualifications of
the administrative staff. (?) Responsibilities of
the. administrative staff. (3) Building and main-
tenance program. (4) Promotion and rentention of
professional personnel. (B) Standards for sub-
stitute teachers. (6) /Assignments of teachers.

(7) Selection and recommendation of professional
personnel. (8) Guidance program. (9) Construc-
tion 2nd remodeling. (10) Supervisory prugram.

(II) Kind and amount of expense money. ^ (12)
Length of professional contracts. (13) Standards
for professional staff positions. (14) Fees and
fines charged students. (IB) Justification end
presentation of the budget. (16) Discipline of
professional staff. (17) Kind and size of summer
program. (18) Auxiliary servicer, offered by the
school. (19) Community service. (20) Teacher
load. 2»3

Some local association presidents agreed thut. all matters were
negotiable; others contended that negotiable items should be restricted
to salaries, benefits, and working conditions. The American Associa-
tion of School Administrators (AASA) found the reasoning for a rather

202Uichr.»\1 H. hosier. "What Is Negotiable?" School .J^jwaeniant^
10 (September 1966): 163.

'■'^IbieL

82

broadly construed concept of neyotfat ions most persuasive.*- ■ The
selection. .of. a specific textbook, a curricular sequence, or educa-
tional materiel s for a specific class would not be negotiable; how-
ever, the process by which these basic decisions were made could have
been the subject -for negotiation. The AASA believed that negotiation,
in (jood faith, might well encompass all or some aspects of policy
governing such items as:

curriculum, in-service education, personnel poli-
cies, teaching assignments, transfers and pro-
motion, recruitment of teachers, discharge and
discipline of teachers, provision of physical
facilities for teachers, grievance procedures,
recognition of the negotiating team, lunch and
rest periods, salaries a no' wages, welfare bene-
fits, class size, leaves of absence, expiration '
date of negotiation agreement and other .mutually
agreed-upon matters which directly affect the
quality of the educational program. 205

Crane, in a study conducted in New Jersey among school board,
teacher, and superintendent, groups,. determined 'that the most important
bargaining areas were salaries, grievance, and impasse procedures.
Personnel policies, fringe benefits, and teaching conditions were
second in order of importance. Instruction and organizational rights
were perceived as having relatively little importance.

Kalish found that state legislation was not significantly
related to the scope of negotiated items, but a relationship was found

'"'^"School Administrators View Professional Negotiations,11
Illinois Education F.5 (January 19C7): 197.

205Ibid.

' uuDoM(.ild C. Crane, The_ Relative Importance of Negotiable Issues
aj?_jJeree!ved bv'Bcard_, teacher ,_j\nci Administrative^ leaders Jj]_New
Jersey Schools (Kd.O. diss., Rutqers Utii >'^~:. i ty . 1959)" Pissertation
/\!l£t)^c^s_77rterria_M cma}_ .51 (September lf)7i}): 95?A. ' "

83

between the- number of items negotiated and the number of years nego-

t'iatiofis •h.'.tci .occurred in the district. c-' Long lists of items were

pre so-p ted n': the beginning of « collective bargaining relationship,

but, as the relationship matured over the years, lists became shorter.

The following issues may be found in the articles of a substantive

agreement:

grievance policy, class size, teaching hours and
work load, work year, holidays and storm days,
after school meetings, non -teaching duties, spe-
cialists, teaching assignments, transfers and
promotions, teacher facilities, textbooks, sub-
stitute teachers, summer school program, pro-
tection, sick leave and personal injury benefits,
leaves of absence, professional development and
educational improvement, salaries and fringe
benefits, annuity plans, duration of agreement,
dues deduction, and salary schedules for various
assignments of certificated employees. 208

Shannon identified conditions, which restricted the scope of

negotiations and another set which expanded the scope of negotiations:

An adversary relationship between the negotiat-
ing parties, plus absence of state law, plus
definite 'school board mind-set, plus high de-
gree cf board independence yields the most
re-l_vu:ted scope of negotiations possible under
the formula. A nonadversary relationship, plus
state law defining anything as negotiable, plus
absence of mind-set, plus board independence
constricted by veto power of another govern-
mental entity over district budget yields the
most ex£ansn'_e scope. 209

! nomas F. Kalish. The Scope of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments i n _Sel ec ted _S_chuo_2 DTI trj cts "_"' n tTTinoTs ancT WTsconsIn "(Ph . D .
d is s , '.',' ' U ni V e rs i Vy of W i s c b : i si n j 1 968) . Dissertation "Abstracts
Jn^national 29 (August 1!?58): 440A.

pfjO

Ronald 0. Daly; "Me1.. Direction for Professional Negotia-
tions,11 N',A_J_ouiTial; :5b (September 1966): 28.

•^-Thomas. A, Shannon, "Formula Gives Negotiations More Meaning,"
The American School bco.rd -Jour;i3l 15b (June 1968): 13.

84

Under the restricted scope of negotiations, salaries, -fringe
benefits, a -grievance procedure;, and other narrowly -defined working
conditions were r.f'got->ated. The most expansive scope included
salary, fringe benefits, curriculum, inservice education, recruitment,
pi axemen t, ass ignr.-i'-ort, transfers, promotions, and class size.

f>tra tog 1 c^_on_ t'o < 'qa 1 o i ng See pt£

Koskow stated that a study was needed to develop- guidelines -to

determine what- topics should be negotiated with a teacher organization

21 P

and what subjects sncrld be decided by some other mechanism. J Boards

avA administrators I'el t. that certain areas were administrative pre-
rogatives and, as s^ch, were considered non- negotiable. At the same
time, teacher groups attempted to move into the non-negotiable areas
in collective bargaining.

The AASA believed that seme i coins were r.ot negotiable and that
school boards could refuse to bargain about them without violating
agreements to negotiate in good faith.

Items shoufc! not be negotiated which violate
state laws or codes of ethics. The selection
of board legal counsel, determination of finan-
cial and pupil accounting systems, and selec-
tion cm the superintendent were other non-
negotiable items." ! '

Agreements, b^t ween teacher groups and boards of education made

inroads into arras traditional .'iy considered management prerogatives.

Textbook selection., class size, student suspension, prohibition on

'- •''Michael H. Moskow, Te-iChers_jind JJnions_ (fin 1 dt ! ohia : Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, !06G)',' pTTbT. ' """ ""

^'^ "School Administrators V-1ew Professional Negotiations,'1
Illinois Mural, ion bo (January 1967}: 107.

85

teaching condition .changes, determination of the length of teaching
day, and appointment of curriculum committees were considered manage-
ment prerogatives. cll>

One right that management attempted to hold inviolate was the right ^
to assign worse. ,v Tins right was carefully guarded, as small con-
cessions often led to very far-reaching consequences. Smith contended
that curriculum content, curriculum revision, and textbook selection
were central to. the purpose for which schools exist.

Wholesome and meaningful decisions involve students,
parents, teachers, professional administrators, and
the community; and decisions on these matters should
be made under circumstances in which all may partic-
ipate—not at the negotiating table, where some of
the parties directly effected are only indirectly
represented. 214

Lieberman said that the right of management to evaluate teachers .•■/"
should not be negotiated.'-'^ Collective agreements should spell out
the criteria for personnel evaluation, but management must interpret
arid apply the criteria. He stated that, if management and teacher
peer evaluations differed, management could not win, for it would be
charged with bias when it evaluated negatively and charged with recom-
mending -incompetent teachers when it evaluated positively.

Donovan suggested that it was most unfortunate when boards
of education agreed to put into contracts either average or specific

'Joan R. Eener and Kenneth Lane, "Collective Bargaining and
Administrative Prerogatives ," Pea body Journal of Education 46
(November 19G8); l-i2--43. '' *" "" ~~ "' "

213Smith, "What's Negotiable?" p. 74.

21-hbid.

noMyroii Lieberman, "Should Teachers Evaluate Other Teachers?"
School Management It (June 1 9 7 ^ } ; 29.

- 86

class sizes." '' No one objected to unreasonable maximums, but the
thought to determining class size through collective bargaining was
repugnant;. Classes had to depend upon the type of pupil, the subject;
and the physical .faci 1 i ties -within which each class was to be con-
ducted.

On October 14, 1971 , the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
ruled on -the ■■"■1'cng- standing issue of scope of bargaining under Act
915, dealing specifically with the State College Area School District

case. The to-la^'s1 organization brought twenty-one issues before

v'1 ■ •■■■'■"•'-'••
the Board. li:';th;,-v;preceder:t-setting case, the first attempt to

determine wti«lf yas^.brrgainable under the Act, the Labor Board ruled

that all twenty- one items were.poncy items on. .which employers were .

not required to bargain. The effect of this ruling was that all

school districts.- -and all other pu.pl ic employers- -no longer needed to

be "hung up" i.p. .negotiations by employee groups on the issues covered

in this ruling-.'' iiHhe employee group attempted to negotiate one of

these issues, the employer should immediately file an unfair labor

practice cftor*i>Vv; ';,-.' -v-sve such issue removed as a possible basis for

impasse. >k:r.K;on-.-bargainable items were:

(T);.-T;.r;;:;)Si. and adequate classroom instructional
printed 'material ; (2) time during the school day
forU'^-T.-:. planning; (3) timely notice of teaching
t-r,i • ; L frr the coming year; (4) separate
desl.s- ,\.-':;j .lockable drawer space for each teacher;
(!3).'"'..-ri:;,;/::! va for teachers; (6) eliminating non-
tefev-i-'it" duties such as, but not limited to, hall
duty, I;';.; V:\iuty, lunch duty, study hall, and parking

^^'Berna-d F. -Oonovcin, "Negotiations: Ten Years Later," Trie
National Assbortr'.-n of Jieco_nJary_ School_ ^•"Jj^il£^JL-!iillJlJ^.ilL
(i)ecetriber 1 '??&) : -4'.; .

^'NenotlntitV's Guid^nnps h'uraberj^-lj^TJ-^g, Pennsylvania
School Eoarcfs. -Association, p. 1.

lot duties; (7) eliminating the requirement that
teachers teach or .supervise two. consecutive per-
iods in two different buildings; (8} eliminating
the requirement that teachers substitute for- other
teachers during planning periods and teaching ir:
non-certificated subject areas; (9) eliminating
the requirement that teachers chaperons athletic
activities; (10) eliminating the requirement that
teachers unpack, store, check or otherwise handle
supplies; (11) cne night each week free for Asso-
ciation meetings; (12) teacher will, without prior
notice, have free access to his personnel file;
(13) teacher to leave the building any time during
the school day unless he has a teaching assign-
ment; (14) providing special teachers with pre-
paration time equal to that provided for other
staff members; (15) provision for maximum class
sizes; (16) Association will be consulted in
determining the school calendar; (17) school will
officially close at noon of the last day of
classes for Thanksgiving, Christmas s Spring and
Summer vacation: (18) at least one half of the
time requested for staff meetings be held during
the school day; (19) teachers not be required to
be in the school more than 10 minutes prior to
the time students are required to be in attendance
and not more than 10 minutes after students are
dismissed (withdrawn); (20) Tuesday afternoon
conference with parents be abolished and teachers
hold conferences with parents by appointment at
a mutually convenient time; and (21) secondary
teachers not be required to teach more than 25
periods per week, and have at least one planning
period per day. 2! ••>

Increasingly, contracts provided for teacher organizations'
involvement in curricular, textbook, and educational policy decision-
making by affording organisation representatives the right to confer
on such, matters "with board and administrative personnel during the
term of the contract away from the collective bargaining table.
Liebersnan stated:

If teachers want, to be equal partners in formu-
lating educational policy, then they should
give up any right to teacher tenure if they

21 ii

Ibid.

are going to make- educational policy en live san-e
level as the schorsl beard because, -in a democratic
society, we ouuT;t to have the right to change our
policymakers.-'^

Many suneriritendents have voluntarily -given teachers an opporfnn-
ity to participate iin the development of staff personnel politics.^0
However, this procedure has not been universally practiced. The
American -Association of School Administrators has suggested that.
teachers should be- given the opportunity to make recommendations on
textbooks and inaterial s , propose curriculum changes, advocate innova-
tive practices, and propose other policies through a medium different
from the negotiating process.-''

The development: of the democratic concept in school administra-

tior. was spelled out by the Educational Policies Ccr.'missioiJ in 1938.

To indicate the place of leadership in all
good administration is not to deny the large
part to be played in the development of poli-
cy by all professional workers. . . . It is
sound procedure to provide for the active
participation oi* teachers^in the development
of administrative policy. ^~-

-'' 'Myron Lieberman. "Teacher Negotiations," ScjtooI Boards:
bSl^l'}y^J2I}^-> Proceedings of the' 1967 GonventTon bfthe~~'~
Natiun-il School Boards Association, p. 76 as cited in Wesley A.
Wildmcuu "What's Negotiable?" The School Board Journal 155 (Novem-
ber 1967) ; 3.

0 01}

" • . M. Stinnett, dark H. KleinmaniK and Martha I... Ware,

fiI^!JlfIA0JiaJ_'N'l-l:5ptij)ti?iL in Public Education (Mew York: The Mac-
mil Ian Company, 1966)", "p."~T"£tr.'

001

~ \-?S:h9:Dl..M!!:X^\lt\y{iQrf> View Professional Negotiations
(Washington, D.C.: American Association "of SchnoT^AdliiiriTst'ra tors ,
I960), p. 39.

oyo„ . - .

'-".-.tiinnett, Kic.nmann, and Ware, ^ifssjcnal ■ Negotiation'-
in Publ ic Ediicat ion, p. 19. " " " ~* -— — -

av

Wildman suggested that:

Those responsible for board strategy and tactics
in collective negotiations should read widely in
the field and ttfke ad vent ago of available train-
ing opportunities so that they may be constantly
aware cf experiences and best practices in school
districts throughout the country. 223

The approach to negotiations that may offer the best prospects
for the future is to limit discussions at the negotiating table as
much as possible to salary items a fid basic conditions of employment
and to provide for year-round study committees of teachers and
administrators to consider such professional problems as curriculum,
textbooks, and teaching techniques-.224

The "What is negotiable?" issue has emphasized the need for a
strong management's rights clause/2b This has helped to establish
the position that the board has rights which are non-negotiable. In
addition to protecting their own rights., boards of education must
avoid negotiating provisions into teacher agreements that will unduly
restrict their administrators.

Seitz suggested that:

School boards should be liberal about the
topic:, they will bargain about. They should
not attempt to draw too narrow a line defining
"conditions of employment." It is not sug-
gested that school boards should bargain about
everything uM^r the sun that is not illegal;
it seems wise, though, that they bargain about
a great many things. Forward looking

223Wndman, "What's Negotiable?" p. 10.

^■Aloan R. Egner and Kenneth Lane. "Collective Bargaining and
Administrative Prerogatives," Peabody_0ourr.a1 of Education 46
(November li'bB): 1<;;;-<1S. ' ' ":~" "" ~ "~ '" " ""

22f,5r.rith, "What's .Meqoti-?.ble?" p. 74.

90

industrialists follow this principle. On the
premise that, collective bargaining helps attain
a harMonious relationship, the^e should be no
disposition to give coo narrgy a definition to
'"conditions of employment."2''''

In negotiating on work rules, the adverse consequences of giving

up discretion ever a dee is ion made only once in several years may be

much more important than the adverse consequences of relinquishing

control over decisions made e/ery day.

Should Col lective Bargaining Involve
Curriculum and Instruction?

Curriculum and Instruction [ssues '

A major issue in education, in the literature, lies been whether
curricrlnin and instruction should be included in the scope of collec-
tive bargaining. Curriculum matters have been judged to be negotiable
by both the NEA and the AFT.228

Historically, the bargaining process has followed an interesting
cycle with respect to curriculum end instruction. In the early and
middle sixties, when teachers were bargaining for wages and fringe
benefits, many boards charged that teachers were unprofessional to
bargain for wages and fringe benefits and suggested that teachers

should concern themselves with instructional arid curriculum matters.

22S

"-^Reynold C. Seitz, "Collective Bargaining Can Help Achieve Reason-
able Agreement 3!i The American School Board Journal "7 (November 1966): 53.

"^ Myron L. ieberman, "Hauaaeriai Discretions in Negotiations ,"
Sqjippj|___^ana£^erit 1 5 (April 1971): 6,

2'-^!. "! oyd \\. Ashby, James E. McGinnis, and Thomas F. Persing, Com-
mon Sense in negotiations in public Education (Danville. Illinois: 1 he
Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1972), p. 49.

■ dack H. d'Jeinmann. :| Curriculum Negotiation: How? 'io What Eno?"
.^Lu£? t IPd1 5 1 L c- a d e r s h i_p 2 9 ( A p r i I 1 9 7 7 ) ; 5 7 3 .

9':

However, teachers were preoccupied, at that point in time, with secur-

.ing. basic bargaining rights. Iv, the early seventies, when teacher

attitudes changed toward concern for curriculum and instruction, boards

referred to those areas as manageriient prerogatives.

Kleinmann said that:

Since curriculum is what teachers do, arid
instruction is how they do it, it follows
that curriculum and instruction are essen-
tial elements of their daily working con-
ditions and, thus, are appropriate subjects
for the bargaining table, ^30

One of the major issues since the advent of negotiations hes been
the question of what is negotiable. Most state 'laws were clear and
some were tested in court. In 1971, school boards in New Jersey, which
had bargained with their staffs fo; years, had to be forced by the
courts to negotiate curriculum and •instructional matters.^"' By an
American Arbitration Association decision, Trenton, New Jersey was
forced to reduce all class sizes in which enrollment was above thirty.-'^

The "bargainable subject matter" problem in private sector nego-
tiations has become highly complex and designation of an issue as
"bargainable" cr "non-hargainabie" under federal labor- law has been
fraught with significance for both management and the union. ^'3 Bishop
predicted, "Once wages, hours, benefits, and rights are established,

^oJKlein;nann, "Curriculum Negotiation: How? To What. End?"
p. 573.

^3 « Ibid.

23?T

Ibid.

t3jPatrick W. Carlton and Harold I. Goodwill, ods., The_Collec-
.t-iyr-JLUrlll1^.-..^^^--!^10"!5 IJl Fducat.vor- (Worthington, Ohio: ' CliarTes
A. Jones' PublisTvTng" 'CbmpTnyT 1%9}"; p. "£'35.

92

curriculum and instruction will become the next logical area in which
to move. "234

Singer claimed that the second phase of negotiations after "the
period of narrow economic interests, would be characterized by a
period of maturity and interest in curriculum development.235 The
second phase is a definite indication that school districts can benefit
from negotiations and the benefits which will, accrue are needed.236
Regardless of the reasons, curriculum and instruction were considered
important in collective bargaining.237

Ziemer and Thompson reviewed a number of studies and concluded
that AFT affiliated contracts included a greater number of curriculum
and instruction components and that AFT affiliated groups rated a
greater number of contract components as being of primary importance
to negotiations.238 It could be concluded that AFT affiliates placed
a greater emphasis in negotiations on items which affected the cur-
riculum and instructional programs than did NEA affiliates.

The National Education Association examined 398 comprehensive
agreements which were in force for the 1966-67 school year. The

lum

234Leslie J. Bishop, Collective Negotiations in Curriculi,,..
and Instruction: -questions and Concerns (Washington, b.C: ATsoc i a •
tion for Supervision, and Curriculum Development, .1967) , p. 4.

235David A. Singer, Jr. , "New Frontiers for Professional
Negotiations," School and Society 97 (October 1969): 371.

236Ibid/

237Russell H. Ziemer and A. Gray Thompson, "Negotiations and
Curriculum: NEA vs. AFT," Educational Leadership 30 (November
1 973 } : - 1 05 . ' - ~

238lbid, , pp. 104-5.

93

most frequently included curriculum and instruction components in
these contracts were:

(A) transfers; (B) school calendar or year;

(C) teaching assignment in subject areas;

(D) procedure for teacher, ova luation; (E)
pupil ratio and class size; (F) duty-free
periods for planning, etc.; (G) teaching
hours or day; (H) instructional aids which
rire available for the teachers' use in the
development planning and teaching in the
classroom; (I) educational conference leave;
and (J) selection and distribution of text-
books. ^39

Young suggested that experts claimed that the criterion for
determining a good master contract was whether or not the contract
was mutually unsatisfactory ro both sides; he then asked, "Should
this be the fate of curriculum?"^0

The Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development was

opposed to negotiating curriculum development for two major reasons,

First, negotiation tactics have led to a
"splintering" and a "polarization" of the
various groups involved in the educational
enterprise. A "we-they" attitude permeates
relationships among groups which are organ-
ized around "centers of interest."

Second, decisions on matters of curriculum
and instruction are made in the context of
a negotiating process which systematically
excludes supervisors and curriculum workers.
Supervisory input is not brought' to bear on
these decisions which profoundly affect the
educational program of the school. 241

'-3*NLA, "What's Negotiable?" h'FA Research Bulletin --16 (May
19C8): <i;.\ -~ — " -

vW.iMiam l\ Young, "Curriculum Nooct i /it ion: How? To What
Extent?" EducatioiiaJJ^eadersino 29 (April 1972): 6/6.

/241"lhe Supervisor's Role in Negotiations," William F. Young,
ed, (Washington, B.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum
Development, 1969), p. 40.

94

Various writers have referred to the process of negotiation cur-

OAO

riculum as self-defeating. HC This represents an attempt to use the
industrial model for collective bargaining in education even though it
has not been used for that purpose in industry. The industrial model
was developed, primarily, to deal with money; matters in the industrial
and commerical world.

To improve instruction, staff members should function as co-
professionals, rather than as adversaries.243 A professional- approach
need not involve adversary relationships or lend itself to collective
bargaining tactics; it should allow for a free, open contest of ideas.
Curriculum collective bargaining proponents have argued that collective
bargaining is a free, open contest of ideas. In such a process, no
obligations of organizational loyalty should interpose between men
and ideas.244

Strategies for Curriculum Development

Ashby et al . suggested that:

"Curriculum should not be negotiated, but the
procedures for curriculum development are legit-
imate items for bargaining."245

.- William F. Young, "Curriculum Negotiations: Present
Status — Future Trends," Educational Leadership 26 (January
1969) as cited in Lloyd W. Ashby, James C. McGinnis, and Thomas
E. Persing, Common Sense in Negotiations in Public Education,

p. 48. ■ "~ ~ — — — — — —

243Young, "Curriculum Negotiation: How? To What Extent?"
p. 577.

244Ashby, McGinnis,. and Persing, Common Sense in Negotia-
tions in Public Education, p. .49. ."." ''"'_.....

245Ibl-d;

UO

Sm 'it!) said that districts shoir 1 d have a committee to develop
curriculum, but that committee should be outside the adversary setting
of the bargaining table.^"

Many collective bargs inv.-ig agreements have guaranteed staff

participation in curriculum development. The structure has ranged

from joint teacher-administrator committees to develop policy on

matters of common concern, to committees directed, specifically, to

curriculum decision-making.

Of the 978 comprehensive agreements effective
during the 1968-69 school year, in school
systems of 1,000 or more, 451 (46.1 percent)
contained one or more provisions directly or
indirectly affecting the curriculum decision-
making process. In 279 agreements (28.5 per-
cent), at least one general or professional
joint committee (regular or ad hoc) provided
teachers with an^ opportunity to discuss cur-
riculum matters . 247

Another approach to collective bargaining and curriculum develop-
ment has been through some form of curriculum review.

Negotiated provisions directly related to
curriculum review were found in 172 agree-
ments (17.6 percent). Of these, 93 pro-
visions established specific joint committees
primarily for the purpose of reviewing and
recommending curriculum proposals. 248

A number of contracts included identifying specific individuals

who were responsible for directing the curriculum review program,

designating participants, determining the frequency of meetings,

fixing compensation for participants, making final decisions on the

completed report, wcl implementing curriculum change:

""David C, Smith, "The Impact of Negotiations on Instruction."
i%t.i.^!1^LJl^:i^l^::y^PL'ij1£ir:^l 53 (May- June 19/4): 67.

247.,- • - n •

curriculum Review in Negotiation Agreements,'1 NE'A Research
Bullet;:.!: . 4K (December 1970): 106.

248 <:■;,<

96

The entire professional staff was responsible
for changing and improving the curriculum in
• * 28 provisions; unidentified curriculum commit-
tees or councils were given this responsibility
in 20 provisions. In 22 provisions, the direc-
tor or coordinator of curriculum discussions
was a school administrator; three of these pro-
visions established a staff position of coordi-
nator of curriculum. Ten provisions designated
as the participants in curriculum review pro-
grams the entire staff through in-service staff
meetings; 11 provisions designated volunteers
only; 3 provisions, volunteers appointed by the
superintendent; 4 provisions, elected members;
and 3 provisions, staff members selected through
a posting procedure. 249

The frequency of meetings, scheduling procedures, and compensa-
tion were identified in some collective bargaining agreements. Of
the 451 agreements, mentioning curriculum development, twelve discussed
frequency of meetings and scheduling procedures and eleven identified
methods of compensating teachers for being involved in collective
bargaining.250 The major emphasis in 1968-69 was upon teacher involve-
ment in curriculum- decisions.

Young suggested the establishment of a negotiation group to deal

with curriculum issues, and problems; its membership should include

representatives of the total professional staff .

The curriculum negotiation group should restrict
its agreements to the process and design for
seeking solutions. The agreements should clearly
specify who is to be involved, the decision-
making procedures, realistic timetables for
completion of tasks, time for staff members
to work on the tasks, the controls necessary
to ensure continued progress, provisions for
evaluation, and provisions for accountability. '

249Ibid., d. 107.

p. 577.

250Ibid., p. 108.

d Young, "Curriculum 'Negotiations: How? To What Extent?1'

97
Kleinrnann's method tor cwrric::!^ improvement was through cur-
riculum and educational development, councils, joint committees, and
professional study committees. He stressed bilateral decisions on
curriculum development: and pointed out that the process would be a
dismal failure if the council was seen as advisory to the superinten-
dent of schools. '^

Should _Compu Is or^ Unionism ^Required in

Compu_l_sory Unionism Issue

In 1975, the agency shop was negotiable in some states and non-
negotiable in others. It became the common form of compulsory union-
ism in public education.253 Teachers were forced either to pay a
monthly "service fee" within a specified time or be fired. They did
not have to join the association, but they had to pay the service
fee.

The two other forms of compulsory unionism were called "union
shop" and "maintenance of membership," Union shop required union
membership within a specified time period after being hired. Main-
tenance of membership did not require union membership, but indivi-
duals who joined had to remain member? through the life of the con-
tract.

or o

;_uKieinmann, "Curriculum Negotiations: How? To What End?"

2b^-eed tarson, "Are You Making it. Hard for Your Teacher-,
(fll.Th l'cyS-u c510!,?" I^J^il^lL^ 159

p. 57 ;
253

The compulsory agency shop was widespread among school districts

in Michigan. Michigan State Law was si Sent on the agency .shop issue,

but teacher unions interpreted the silence as assent and the issue

was challenged in court. In one case, An eighteen-year employee was

fired for refusal to pay dues under 'an agency shop contract.25" The

court reinstated the teacher and the union appealed. The judge said:

T find it a little difficult to square the con-
cept that you hove tenure status as a result 0f
training, experience, and so forth, but on the
other -hand, because, philosophically, you choose
not. tc„belong to a particular qroup", you may not
teach. "^

Public employee bargaining statutes were amended to permit
negotiations of agency shop clauses for public employees in Minnesota,
Michigan, Rhode Island, and Oregon. 2S(] Washington amended its law to
permit classified state' employees to negotiate agency shop clauses. 257
The courts and state pufal ic employment boards were also involved with
the agency shop issue. The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that
agency shop fees were deductible from all public employees including
classified civil service employees.258 The New York Supreme Court
ruled that agency shop provisions were illegal and non-negotiable.259
The Hawaii Public Employee Relations Board approved a 45 percent

ZMIb'id. , p. 59.
255Ibid.

';LoIi?^!ll'L^L^^^..»liiast 7 (October 1973): 10.

2*/'^2^[-::i^L*2Ml?rchD^^i7 (September 1973): 10.

2B8^i9.y ^^jD^^^^iLJ^JS!^ 7 (January 1974): /j-5.

2^^^'!:l^l!r^U^searcJiJ)igej-t 7 (Fet^uary 1974): 3.

99

'increase from $97 to $"i'Vi a years in the "service" or agency shop fee
for teachers who did not belong to the Hawaii State Teachers Assoc i a-
lion

260

Amplifying the "right to work" .provision of Florida's Constitu-
tion, the Florida Attorney General interpreted the statute as excluding
negotiation of agency shop clauses in union contracts.2^ This ruling
made it a violation to be engaged in any coercive at tempt to force a
workman either to remain in or to join a labor organization or to
require a non-member tc pay agency fees, dues, assessments, fines, or
other charges to a labor organization.

The union siiop in public employment has the
potential of becoming a neat mutual back- - -

scratching mechanism, whereby public employee
representatives and politicians each reinforce
the other's interest and domain, with the
individual public employee and the individual
citizen left to look on, while his employment
conditions and his tax rate and public poli-
cies generally are being decided by entrenched
and mutually supportive government officials
and collective bargaining representatives over
whom the public has diminishing control. 262

Compuls o ry JJn • on i s m _S t r ateg_y

The political strategy for boards was to lobby for a ''right to
work" law thrown strong state and local associations. Such a law
made compulsory unionism illegal in the State of Florida.263

^^ISPJii^.).:!0!.^ J^eseaj^oh Digest 7 (danuary 1974): 8.

261 J bid.

'-"^ Larson, ,;-Vre You Making it Hard tor Your Teachers Not to Join

<t Union?" p. 6

'— ^ileejot ic t ion Research Digest 7 (January 19//!): 8.

The- .collective oa'-yatmng approach wo s for the management team

to insist on contract language that orec'h;0ed all forms of compulsory

unionism. For example:

It is agreed that employees in tile unit defined
herein she'll have and shall be protected in the
exercise of the right, freely and without ia-ir
of penalty or reprisal, to join and assist the
-.association or to refrain from any and all such

iCtlV'U.}'

, 2G<1

How Shou1d_ Impasses in Col iective /•> «. '" n/=_LL' JJ? j

in Public education De Resolved':'

Impass e_ J sr- u_es

There were times, despite good-faith efforts to arrive at
equitable solutions to common problems, when persistent disagreements
could not be resolved by the parties in the collective bargaining
process. When that occurred, the groups/were at an impasse. Accord-
ing to Lieberman, over a three-year negotiating period, there was a
much better than even chance that any particular board of education
would be involved in impasse procedures.'-1^

An impasse occurred only when negotiations halted or appeared
fruitless on every item.256 Impasse was not reached so long as the
teams were negotiating on any items. The most difficult impasses were
those resit! r.i rig _ from honest differences cf opinion or from basic

^'"■'Larson. "Are You Making it Hard for Your Teachers Not to
Join a Union?" i>, 61 .

265f,iyv.on Uoborman, "What to Expect in Fact Finding," School_
Management 16 (February 1972): 6

26f)Myp0n Lieberman, "What to Do When the Talks Break Down,"
School ''anaqement (April 1969): 25.

101

conflicts in fr<e needs- one! iitteresv.s ;y'> the parties. ~^-; Lieberman and
Moskow pointed out id;.:.;, en ''';m;;assoi; was extremely difficult to define
and negotiators did net array:., kr;ow when an impasse had been reached. <-68

Before an impasse was reached, collective bargaining sessions
ranged from zero to seventy- five., out the average wcr> eight sessions
over a three- month period/0"

Typically, impasse resolution progressed through threo stages.
Those stages were (1) the conciliatory-mediation stage. (^} the fact-
finding stage, and (3) the arbitration stage. -/C) Some states provided
for binding arbitration in the last stage, and other states provided
for advisory arbitration.

Sarthor/ stated that, "The factor which appeared to be the most
strongly related to the occurrence of impasse was the composition of
the teacher negotiating tsam."^^1 In nine out of ten districts which
went to "impasse, teacher teams were composed of members from ail grade
levels. A preponderance of secondary teachers on the teacher teams
seemed to be related to successful negotiations without the occurrence
of an iinpasse;

267:

>68,

•ron hieberman and Michael Moskow, Collective Negotiations

l2r_l£fi£!?.1TA (Chicago: Rand McNa'lly and CompTiTy7T9T67rT~^~
•-L'^i. ieberman, ''What to Fxoect in Fact Finding." p. 6.

'•/UM. Chester Noltc. Status and Scope of Collective Bargain-
in 9 _ j Jl_ ]^_J j\l "j_c}_ r_ci i_; c_3 f 1 c>n (tugent:, Oregon: University "of Oregon,
trie Clearuigi'Ou'se'eTdidLicational Administration, 1970). p. 30.

'-• '.Joseph A. Sarr.hory, "Structural Characteristics and the
Outcome cf Collectl";.' [■•;egc-Liations.',: Educatio:v;l Admin istra to rs_
Quarter iv 7 {Autumn id?'!): 83. "" .---..-.-

102

.The composition of the beard tear,; did not appear to be signifi-
cantly related to the outcome or negotiations. In the study, the
size of the board team and its compos! tic;-: In terms of different
administrative representatives fail ec! to contribute to discrimination
between impasse and non-impasse districts. ^

The. number of years of teaching experience of members of the
.teacher team v/as also related to the outcome of negotiations:

In ten impasse districts, 55 percent of teacher
team members had 11 plus years of experience,
while only 37 percent of teacher team members
in non- impasse districts had that much experi-
ence, The chi-square of 5.07 is significant at
the .10 level and approaches significance at
the .05 level of probability.^

Toe frequency of negotiating sessions appeared to be related to
agreement or the occurrence of impasse. The more frequent the sessions,
the more likely was the possibility of reaching agreement internally.
Conversely, less frequent sessions tended to be associated with the
occurrence of impasse.^''* Also associated with the occurrence of
impasse was the use of legal assistance by at least one of the teams
during the course of negotiations.2^

IliillLll^rj'y. !:,^cLi .Itiojl- Mediation was a process by which a third
party attempted to assist negotiators to reach an agreement. The media-
tor's role was advisory and some preferred to meet privately with each
group, while others preferred to meet jointly with the parties, A

^''Se.rthory, "Structural Characteristics and the Outcome of
Collective Negotiations," p. 85.

27 3 1 bio. , p. 84.

-7'Mbid. , n. 85.
27$Ji>id., o. M.

i 03

mediator came into a collect i ve bargaining impasse and. attempted, .
through oiscu;.; io:!? to QO"t; the parties to "each an agreement,
lieberman h r?t ' tloskow preferred joint rmmetings between the parties
to get o more, real i site picture of the issues and avoid being misled.

Mediation usually was requested by either the employee organi?.a-
tion or both parties; it was scldum requested solely by the employer, f
Mediation, before fact finding, was usually perceived as an ineffec-
tive process. However, mediation served to reduce the number of issnes
in question prior to fact finding and helped clarify them.^'k

Experienced mediators did not attempt to place unreasonable pres-
sures on either team, for they were effective only so long as they
retained the confidence ov both parties. They conferred with the
parties separately to learn their private positions. A good mediator
learned how far the teams were willing tu move and then was in a
position to suggest terms that were satisfactory to both.

School boards were aware of taxpayer concerns about negotiations
and realized that third party recommendations were usually safe
political moves. Often, the function of impartial third parties was

to recommend, publicly, what the parties had already agreed to pri-

, - ?79
vateiy.

2'7>n. ie'oermau and Moskow, Collective Negotiations for Teachers,
p. 314.

'-' 'Liebermar. ., "What to Expect in Fact Finding," p. 6.

2 ' c ■ R u s s e 1 1 A 1 1 e n , 1967 S c n o o 1_ Hi s p u t es_ Jji _M i c h i n an ( Via s h i n c t o n ,
!J.C: Bureau of National Affairs", T9687fp- 73 7 as" ci ted in Paul D.
Staudohar., "fact Finding for Settlement of Teacher Labor Disputes.,"
^J^lRjr;r.PM 51 (April 1970): 425.

^-•'L.ieberman,, :!what to Do When the Talks Break Down," p, 26.

Third party iaci: f^!idn;g. Faci; finders entered the scene after
collective bargaining failed arid mediation was exhausted. . Fact find-
ing attempted to provide accept a tie a iter vn> Lives to the use of economic
and political force in resolving disputes between employers and
employees." Lach team identified issues a <id facts surrounding those
issue? in a dispute to a neutral party. The impartial third party
investigated the issues and. generally, recommended a solution to the
negotiating parties. However, recommended solutions -were optional to
the teams and never binding. The two teams,, armed ■ v?i th information
from the fact finder, were then to return to the table and seek a
satisfactory solution within the framework suggested by the fact finder.

Of the two types of fact finding assignments, the o^e least fre-
quently used involved a grievance by one party under a collective bar-
gaining agreement already in force."6 The second, called ''interest
fact finding,1' concerned the settlement of basic contract issues..

If fact finding machinery was used too often, the public did not react

90-5
strongly; it lost its effectiveness. J

One of the recurring issues in impasse proceedings was whether

fact finding should follow or precede mediation or be independent of

it.'-lJ'"' Should the fact finder attempt to get the parties to agree, or

should he confine his efforts to fact finding?

■'.)pn

Si^udohar, "Fact Finding for Settlement of Teacher Labor
Disputes,1' p. 4?:?.

""George T, Roumell , Jr., "Fact Finding Can Unblock Bargaining
Impasse," JHe Jn! a_U 0 n_l_s_ Sc j 10 01^; 8b (March 1970): 77.

- ^- Ibid .

m,

:'Liebermari and Moskow. "Collective Negotiations for Teachers," p. 317,
iebenna;i, "What to Fxpecf in Fact Finding," p. 6.

uf t!

sienificant resniis of the Yaffe and Geldblot

study was that fact finders usually attempted to mediate the dis~
putes. ■•"■• :-ac.-c i moors spent aoout half their time in mediation.
rather thai; fact finding, and those mediation efforts tended to ho
more successful than the mediation which too!' place before fact find-
ing.

Another important issue in feet finding was whether resorting
to fact finding affected negotiations. Did the parties refuse to
make concessions out of fear that the fact finder would merely add
concessions to the final offer at the negotiating table? Fact find-
ing was not regarded as a primary weans of achieving settlement; issues
were to be resolved at the table and not automatically delayed, hoping
for a better deal through fact, finding. That approach resulted in
unnecessary impasse proceedings and abused the intent of the fact
finding mechanism. The fact finder was a semi-judicial official who
was appointed to review circumstances and data surrounding specific
issues.

On the average, the parties participated in two hearings with a
duration of six hours each; hearings ranged from two to twelve hours

and issues under discussion ranged from one to 231

286

Employer:

were represented by counsel in 51 percent of the cases, while
employee organizations were represented in 21 percent of the cases. ^'

OQr

c'jDB. Yaffe and H. Goidbiott, "Factfinding in Public Employ-
ment Disputes in New York State" (Institute of Labor Relations,'
Cornell University, June 1971) as cited in Lieberman, "What to
Expect in Fact Finding,'' p. 6.

2p6

" Liebennan, "What to Expect in Fact Finding," p. 6.

^87Ibid.

'j u:

Employers used labor relations consultants more frequently than
the employee organization;;. Evidently, nubnc employers, like their
counterparts; in the private sector., . wens better able to pay for
experienced representation in labor relations matters.

Instigation of fact finding. Laws generally permitted either
party to instigate fact finding, but it was the employee orgarri2ation
which usually made the requests.^8 The number of fact finders
generally ranged from one to three and they were most often appointed
by state agencies. In some situations, parties were permitted to
make their own selections. Where the parties selected their own fact
finders, the best arrangement was to permit each party to select one
arbiter, afeer which the two fact finders chose a third. If the
original fact finders were unable to agree on a third, the American
Arbitration Association was called in to name the individual.
Acceptability of the recommendation was improved when both parties
were involved in the selection process. JJ

Fact, finding had a positive effect on the bargaining process
and served to prevent strikes by teachers; it was successful in 42
percent cf the eases studied in New York State, 70 percent of the
cases studied in Wisconsin, and in 50 percent of the cases studied
in Michigan.^-'-! !-;:L'l ic pressure appeared to be the main reason for

flM.-lir

13

'-^'Staiidohar , "Fact Finding for Settlement of Teacher Labor
Disputes," p.- 42 Jv

289Tbid. '*>-
^l>Ibio\ •■■

ZL9JlL9illLi:'iiLjL?£t.iJ;^"llLiL' -f^-? strike? were prohibited,
teachers' organizations wet?, in no position to reject fact finder
recommendations. At the same time.. the public employer accepted or
rejected the recommendations with relative impunity. On the other
hand, public pressures resi.il ting from fact finding recommendations
could hardly be ignored by elected school board members.

Costs of fact finding. Costs of well qualified persons were
high and were allocated to the parties on an equal basis. Equal
sharing tended to discourage delay, favoritism, and indiscriminate
use of the procedure.291

The median fact finder fee in twenty-seven cases in Wisconsin,
in 1965, was $500.00, with a low of $300.00, and a high of $1 [5,000.0c.292
Other expenses, such as preparation of the parties, rental fees, dv,a
attorneys' fees were not included.

rdlt^LiAJL?2!....4§£isA^nl- Criteria used by fact finders to make
d e c i ~. i o n s we r e :

(A) wages and hours in local industry; (B)
conditions in employment with similar skills
and working conditions; (C) comparison with
other schools or departments of comparable
size; (D) public interest and welfare; (E)
job hazards in other industries; (F) educa-
te i o n a 1 o r m e 1 1 1 a 1 ,i o b q u a 1 i f i c a t ions; and ( G )
job training ski lis. 293

Most fact finding cases appeared to deal with the issues of wages
end benefits and the criteria most often included comparisons with

291

292

Ibid,

bid.

'—-^Edward B. Krinsky, "Public Employment Fact Finder in Fourteen
States," Labor Law Journal ( September 1955): 539-10, as cited in
Sfaedonar, 'V-of FinriirTg'Ter Settlement of Teacher Labor Disputes."
p. 423.

103

teachers iii ether d istrictsv cost of living, ability to pay, and,

to a lesser extent, productivity and wage- price guideposts.

Before mating a recommendation, a fact finder had to carefully

consider the following:

(A) history of bargaining: (P.) substitution
for a strike: (C) ability to pay; (D) com-
parisons; (IE) supply ang. Remand: and (F)
economics of community.1--"'

In many states : agencies were formed and given authority to
determine whether disputes should go to fact finding. In some states,
the agency did the fact finding itself, v.'ithout any preliminary investi-
gation. 2"K'' In other states, agencies attempted to mediate the dis-
pute while -making the investigation; still other agencies made an
investigation, either through formal or informal hearings. These
agencies were generally called Public Employee Relations Commissions
(PlRC), or Public employee- Relations Boards (PERB).

Third party arbitration. There were two kinds of arbitration:
advisory and binding. An arbitrator came into a collective bargaining
impasse and made decisions upon the issues in question/- b His
decisions, depending on the law or the agreement, were either advisory
or binding. Advisory arbitration generally took place as the final
step in an impasse during collective bargaining. Generally, legis-
latures have been reluctant to grant public employees binding arbitra-
tion during the collective bargaining process; a major reason has been

p. 79.

'-'^Roumell , Jr., "Fact Finding Can Unblock Bargaining Impasse,'

29 b

U enema r

;;-id Moskow, Collective Negotiations for Teachers,

316

"%Roumeil , Jr., ,:Fact Finding Can Unblock Bargaining Impasse,"

■JQQ

that boards were empowered by law to mske policy dicisior»:i . However,
once decisions were made end ^.tifiec! by the board en those items
which were included in the contract,. legislators had little reluc-
tance to impose third party binding arbitration on the board. Binding
arbitration; in grievance procedures, gave boards much difficulty
because most of management's attention was focused on the negotia-
tion process and little attention was paid to the odtnini strati on of
the contract. -;,/ Paying inadequate attention to contract administra-
tion has been as disastrous as any failure in negotiating the collec-
tive agreement.

One of the major issues in contract administration has been how
to determine if an item should be resolved within the district or
should go to binding arbitration.298 There was always a risk in
going to arbitration, since a human process was involved, and that
risk often extended beyond the issue at hand. An adverse decision
by an arbitrator often established a precedent, thereby damaging
administrative prestige and authority.

^trjux^gi_es_to_Avojj:^j£njjasse

Before the board's team has made its final offer to try to end
an impasse, it had to consider all of the possibilities for a satis-
factory settlement. Sometimes, changing the duration of an agreement

or the willingness to establish a benefit the second year, instead of

r>ao
the first, resolved difficult issues.' If legitimate demands could

?-a7M.yron Lieberman, "Arbitration— To Go or Not to Go,i: School
Jtenaj&roejrt 14 (October 1970): 11.

'-■"-ibid. , p. o4.

^l.ieborman., "What to bo When 'the Talks Break Down/1 p. 26.

VI 0

not be met-, some wore approached througn committees away from the

table, and others were resolved t.lvrouyii joint agreements to address ... .

the issue fir-it during the next bargaining year, A knowledge of the

situation and considerable experience was necessary for the negotiator

to find solutions that had not occurred to others.

It was extremely important to know what underlay the possible

impasse. Lieberman suggested :

If teacher negotiators feared a rival organiza-
tion, and;: the board didn't want an organizational
battle, vlj'offered certain organizational security
clauses . *■'>■'!-•

If the teacher team did not appear to be sufficiently militant to
membership, the board team acted as if the teacher team won everything
to create an impression; however, a careful balance had to be main-
tained to prevent a. taxpayers' revolt.

Successful negotiators avoided early hangups oy identifying and
briefly discussing areas of disagreement and then moving on to more
acceptable areas.301 The major point was to avoid freezing positions
in the early stages^ of bargaining so that a general pattern of agree-
ment might be established at the table. A second way to avoid an
impasse was to tieunoalatable proposals to proposals which teachers
wanted very badly;, thereby making refusal more difficult.

As a rule,- when considerable publicity was accorded a position
during collective .bargaining, i t became more difficult to persuade a
party to modify 'He- .position. The best policy was to make it as easy
as possible for 'the-' parties' to -"each agreement.

300LieberSaf!.; !What to Do When the Talks Break Down," p. 26.

^0'lieberman,and Mosk'ow, C o j } ovs t i_y e N e g o t i a t i o n s f o r T e a c her s ,
p. 316.

11

Strategy or medial, lori. The primary function;; of good mediators
were to clarify issues and char.:':'-1! co;ir.m.i!vi Lotions. They moved back
and forth between the*. parties Jut:"! they wore confident that their
recommendations woelu be accepted by the parties,

Lieberman and He-drew suggested that:

(1) the p-'-v'eees" 'should decide who will mediate and
w licit his .role will be; (2) mod is tors should never
be cal'iec'vtV long as there is a possibility of con-
tinued negotiations; (3) the mediator should be
thoroughly Icnowledgable about mediation; (4) both
pat-ties mp-st-Jiavc confidence in the mediator; (5)
mediatiordee-eefid be requested by both parties, but
this is r;>'' adways possible; arvMG)- mediation
should be- \: ,:•••■.■ sue ted privately. 302

When sessions were- open to the public, teams were reluctant to
divulge their dree positions and motivations. Therefore, mediation
was most effective, in executive sessions; the mediator would meet
with the perries Mrstvevr separate meetings and later in joint session::

.re^r^'Sy..0^'^.^ ^i'l'.'i'jS- ''"lG majority of public employees were
prohibited from striding and, therefore, resorted to neutral third
parties in an effort to gain more favorable settlements in collective
bargaining.01'- Mos.t/.state laws on the subject called for extensive
use of mediation arte -fedrt finding to insure fair treatment for public
employees. r„- '■'.:

According to R-r-e.kal . the fact finder determined his strategy
by examining the data, presented by the parties on each issue as

follows- "*;.■' v:

("I) Impaee on the ..educational program. (2)
Equity. ■■■(J.p Practicality. (1) Comparative

on •;

J '"Lieberman a-ed dioskow. Collective Negotiations for Teachers,
pp .315-16, . ■ . ,. : ■ "*" '

10 ^

Lieberman, "What to F.xpect in Fact finding," p. 6.

standards.
Ability i<

ruiure •:T:-,p1 -'tuitions. (6)
(7'i (;omp''omise.3C<'i

Situations in a school district where fact finding may be help-
ful were:

(1.) When militant teachers insist on unreal-
istic demands. (2) When a school board refuses
to make a realistic offer. (3) When teacher
. . "leadership needs help in convincing union
membership that they have a fair agreement.
(4) When school administrators need help in
convincing the board that they have a fair
agreement. (5) When citizens will net believe
that a board needs additional funds to pay
competitive teacher salaries. 305

Fact finders made recommendations, primarily, on the basis of
the information submitted by the parties, so it was gooci strategy to
prepare carefully and never permit damaging assertions to go un-
crial lenged.

On occasion, when concessions were not made at the table out
of fear. th?y would be added by the fact finder to the parties' final
offers. Usually., either both parties held back, or neither did.307
In other words, if one group believed the other was holding something
back, the other' was more likely to do so itself.

To eliminate the problem of a lack of experience among fact
finders, the creation of permanent fact finding panels for local
school districts was recommended with experienced individuals avail-
able to handle all cases. University professors, lawyers, economists,

OA/;

"'"Robert R. Bickal, "Facts About Fact Finding," New York State
Ed "cat ion 56 (January m;69): 12. ' ~ ~~

'-'Roumel 1 , Jr., "Fact Finding Can Unblock bargaining Impasse,"
pp- /7-'/3.

•"Lienerman, "rtego hating With Teachers," p. 28.

°-"LicL:er-iiian, "What to Expect: in tact Finding," p. 6.

<ii'!C peroaps lay ci tizens were potential m-mbers , oind selection was a
joint process involving the schac"' b-j-rrd rind leather organizations. 3G3
I- act finders should be required to prepare a written report which
should include the issues in guest ion., findings of facts arid conclu-
sions, recommend a rions for settlement, of tho dispute, and reasoning
behind the decision. The report should be clear and concise, no more
than five to ten pages ir length, and be made public if the parties do
not accept the dec is ion. ^

'™iriLsJr!lji^ The contract adminis-

trator for the board determined if the issues at hand should be settled
within the district or be reviewed by a third party under binding
arbitration. Specific criteria which the administrator had to con-
sider included the toll owing:

{i\) reviei; the initial statement of the grievance
and its history at ecch level with the time limit
of' the step before the final decision had to be
made, (B) determine if tiie statement of grievance
went tn grievance precisely the same as the ori-
ginal statement; and (C) examine differences
carefully as i'.hey provided important clues to the
merits of the grievance. -*'>0

If the grievance could not be sustained upon the basis of the original

submission, the administrator muse make sure the teacher organization

was not relying upon a clause in the contract different from the one

originally relied upon.

experienced negotiators did not overlook any argument that the

teacher organization might use even if it had overlooked the argument

308

Staudohar, "Fact Finding for Settlement of Teacher Labor
spates," p. 425.

309Ihid., p. 424.,

'■uLieberman, "Arbitral ion--To F.o or Not to Go," p. 11.

i'M

cvi precedi ;"••{} occasions. If .^adverse decision posed risks that could
be avoided by an acceptable concession -by management, concession could
be made, but. pointed cot in writing that Lite board's fiction was not to
be construed as a precedent .•''' :

Hr,iir.ge;!>;:r:t should avoid giving the impression that it will act
positively on. grievances only if a contract violation is involved or
if considerable pressure is brought to bear on it. bach grievance
should be reviewed on its merits and approved if considered good for
education, even though not sustainable under the contract.-1'

Arbitration Strategy

Administrative negotiators should study other arbitration awards
before deciding to go to arbitration and review those awards for case
support, The American Arbitration Association and the Bureau of
National Affairs have published arbitration awards of a systematic
basis with indexes. "Arbitration in the Schools," prepared by the
American Arbitration Association, has been devoted exclusively to
arbitration awards in education. "

Lieberman suggested that there was not much general support for
arbitration because:

(1) Reliance upon third party arbitration weakens
the incentive to agree at the bargaining table.
(?) Arbitration tends to weaken the status of local
school boards - a third party would be replacing
responsible public officials in making crucial
decisions of public policy. (3) There is normally
no way for an arbitrator to enforce his decision -•
how can an arbitrator force a school board to spend

■>' ; ibid., p. 34.

^Ibic:.

313Lieberman. "What to Do Wb.«

falks. Break Down," p. 2.8.

11!

'• re rot i 1 '.('•
then;.-'*

i';Oci(-o 'is willing to spend? - boards
' to cici eg a !:e such authority to arb'i-
c "I eg i slat ores likely to give It to

Sir-.co it has not been to the teachers' advantage to reach ar:
agreemo'il before the :ic:3<J1 "ine, an Inherent tendency has been toward
impasse in negotiations. :>|D Waiting arid going to arbitration appeared
to be [iiC'C: profitable. However ; if the parlies miscalculated on what
was to be gained by waiting, they had an impasse.

Johnson and Pruitt identified a contradicting strategy:

Negotiators faced with a binding decision from
a. third party behaved in a more conciliatory
fa si'i ion and were snore likely to reach agreement
than these faced with <?. n jo- binding decision.
This was particularly true for the union nego-
tiators. 3!6

:l!]£^i!J:M_i!:rJ.!^L J?e_i[sefi.A.sL. a Labor
Weapon in Public Education?

Strike Issues

Prior to the 1 970s „ teacher strikes were universally regarded as
•illegal, even in the absence of any statutory prohibitions of thein.^1'
The general assumption was that teacher strikes endangered .public health
or- safety. In 1357. statutes in fifteen states prohibited some public
employees from striking, and no stature cave the teachers the richt to

Ji'1 livid,

OK.

-,K\'ibid., p. 16.

^''■'Douglas F. .Johnson and Dean B. Pruitt, ''Pi'eintervention
Effects of Ked'iation Versiis Arbitration," Journal of Applied
r^yjahojog)' So ( r-'ebruary 1972): 1.

-1 ^Lieberman, "Negotiations: Past, Present and Future, ''' p.

116

strike."'"' The judicial view ../as that poblic employees did not have
the right to strike.

Through the 1960s, when a hoard of education sought a court order
to enjoin teacher1;, from participating in a work stoppers, the principle
ot "board infal 1 lb 11 ity" whs recognizer! by the courts. Courts issued
injunctions when sought by boards of education in all cases- which
dealt with work stoppages, regardless of the conduct or efforts of
the board in the negotiating process. ' J

The fact that courts viewed -teachers strikes as illegal did not
prevent teachers from striking. In September 19G7, more than 1.5
million children were deprived of the opportunity to start school
because their teachers were on strike.-3-^

When teachers were unhappy with the way bargaining was being

conducted, they tried a "sword rattling" show to get maximum publicity

and intimidate the board. Informational picketing was the first stage.

It was carried en during non-school hours. A variety of slowdowns

followed which included:

(A) teachers arriving and leaving exactly at their
appointed times; (13) boycotting extracurricular
activities; (C) not" serving as inschcol substitutes;
and (D) not completing administrative reports.-^2'

318,

School Administrators View Professional Negotiations,"

nijnois Education 55 (January 1967j- 198.

-''•Ylorris 0. Andrews and Robert D. Burgess, "Current Status
of Professional Negotiations ," Illinois Educ/jtijjn 32 (February
1970): 2hl. " '" "

320F, pilpy Casey, "Legal Problems of Negotiations," The Scnhoej_
Board Journal 195 (November 1967): 18.

■^'Thomas r. Koerner d\v.\ Clyde Parker, "What to Do When the
Baroaioir.o does Sour." The School Koard j.Tour:i?'l 157 (August 1969):
21."

117

When the:-:.-, strategies did not work, teachers absridoned the table in

favor of labor's uHlmate w-epon, the strike.

T (eschar strikes have recurved all over the United States; but

seven states, Ca'i i form' a , Illinois, fli chig^n . New Jersey.. New York,

Ohio, and Pennsyi va oi a , -recounted for 74 percent of aV! the strikes

duri'nq the decade of I960 through 1 970. -^^ There were six statewide

strikes in Florida. Indiana, Pennsylvania, 2nd Utah,- and two in

Kentucky.

Teacher strikes, which numbered only three
duriiu; the 1960-61 school year, rose to 100
ciuri :•.;■; the 19fi9-7C school year and totaled
500 for the 10-year period. More than 500,000
teachers participated in the decade's strike
activity and more than 5 million man-days of
instruction were involved. Nearly half of the
strikes took place in September and May. Dur-
ing the 10 years, 33 states and the District
of Columbia experienced at least one teacher
strike. 323

Of the strikes, the majority was conducted by organized teacher
groups, two-thirds affiliated with the National Education Association,
and .jest, ever one-fourth affiliated with the American Federation of
Teachers. ND'\ af fi: uwes called 331 strikes and AFT affil Hates
called 13b.324

School boards, administrators, and teachers did not behave well
in these situations. Without disparaging the great number of school
districts which were conscientiously and wisely sett liny their dif-
ferences amicably without fanfare, the overall picture was not
encouraging. According to Wynn:

3 2 2!^ ^._i^-.-lf^f; :Sll_i^ill.fi.y.1 Li. 4 G (October 1970):

323Ii.nd., p. 59.

324Ibici.

118

In \\)elW!- Go schuo 1 yc^r. 163,000 public school
teachers (about ,>-i o?vi. percent of the nation's
total) in I'M school districts, in 21 states were
enuaged in son::- kirns of work stoppage for an
average of, eight days and a total of 1.5 million
man days . *-''-;;

From 1965 through 19/0, except 19G6, the MFA Research Division's

Teacnor Opinion Pell included a question on attitude toward strikes.

The results indicated a rise in teacher acceptance of strikes.

The total percentage of teachers who approved
of strikes under some or any circumstances,
in 1970, was 73 percent, an increase of nearly
20 percentage points since the first poll was
taken. Of the teachers approving strikes, 10
percent now believe that teachers should have
the same right to strike as do employees in
other occupations; 63 percent, believe that .

teachers should strike, but only under extreme
tjenditi oris and the' remaining 6 percent are un-
decided. Concomitantly, there was a. decrease
of almost 17 percentage points From the number
of teachers in 1954-C5 who believed that teachers
should never strike. -''20

According to Casey, teachers' unions were not in the mood for any

type of amicable discussion. They indicated a willingness to use what

327

force they deemed most suitable to obtain the ends they sought,

Lieberman indicated that:

Teacher strikes '-hewed no signs of diminishing
in 1 972-73. As of January, 1973, there were
106 strikes- in the 1972-73 school years whereas
there had been only 89 during tl-.e_ent.ire 1971-72
school year. Unquestionably, a significant
number of strikes in 1972-73 took place in
Pennsylvania, which was resolved only after the
intervention of a federal official upon request

/.,-.-. M • TOO

of i- res mem: Nixon, 3<io

-25Ri chard Wvnn. "Collective Bargaining," Phi Delta Kappa n 51
(April 1970): 415.

32%.;A Research BuVletin 43 (October 1970): 72.

^'-''Casey, "Legal Problems of Negotiations," p. 18.

^-'Vieberman, "Negotiations: Past, Present and Future," p. 18.

119

The .number of teacher strikes increased G3 percent ever the

provunrs school y":;;-, 'inures re 'itched by tlie Research Division of

the National Education As social ion, durinc; the NEA's 1973 convention

in- Portland. Oregon , indies ted that:

More than 76,000 persons and 1.1 million man-days
were involved in the strikes. Of the 146 teacher
strikes suffered last school year by the nation's
school districts, 112 wove called by NEA locals,
23 by AFT locals arid the remainder by merged NEA-
AFT unions,

Teacher strikes were recorded for the first time
in Delaware. Hawaii, Kansas d-Ad Oregon. For the
third successive year, Pennsylvania suffered the
largest number of teacher strikes. 329

Accord ii';ij to Hertling and Get?., teacher strikes were caused by:

(A), a ]:<ck of school funding: (B) archaic tax
structure- (C) NEA/AFT rivalry; (D) militance
(if teachers; and (F.) inadequate legislation
governing public employee strikes ,330

A lack of understanding and sophistication on the part of both

teacher groups and school boards contributed directly to many of

the strikes which occurred throughout the country. 331

In 1969/ a federal bill introduced to Congress was designed to

permit teacher strikes and force collective bargaining in all states. -^2

The bill drew strong support from the National Education Association

^-'^'"Aore Strikes," The American School Board Journal 160
(September 1973): 10.

JOuJames £. Hertling and Howard G„ Getor, "Negotiations: Cure

or Cause of Teacher Strikes?" School and Community 56 (April 1970):

001 Ibid,

3^41. Chester holte, "New Law Would Legalize Teacher Strikes

and Make Collective bargaining a Must in all States," The American

School Board uourual 157 (duly 1969): 20.

120

3!:;.' the ■ ■.American Fec^r;: tHHi o-" To iChe: a . asvj opposition v:'-om the
National School Boards Asscc-mm. ion. The National School Boards
Association suggested that teacher negotiation legislation be left
up to the state. The National tduemtion Association suggested that
the legislation was designed to reduce the incidence of striker
"by providing. a Iterna Live means of resolving teacher-school board
disputes,". such as mediation, fact finding, and arbitration.333

The 1970s presented a different picture to boards around the
country. Several states enacted legislation, by 1973, which legalized
teacher strikes under certain conditions. They were Vermont. Hawaii.
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming.0^

The 1 971 : Publ ic Employees Collective Bargaining Act, in Minnesota,
was amended to grant strike rights to non-essential employees.33- The
right was granted only when an employer refused to submit to binding
arbii-.raricw or to adhere to a binding award. Oregon's Public employee
Collective Bargaining Act became effective in October 1973. 336 Strikes
were permitted when thirty days had elapsed since a fact, finder's,
report, and when at least ten days' prior notice had been given to the
employer.

In Pennsylvania, when all dispute settlement procedures had been
exhausted and no _ clear danger or threat to public health, safety, or

-5 -"Ibid.

■^4Do!ia!d C. Kilgras, "Administration as an Adversary Role:
Bdrgainiug-Collecidve Negotiations," Oregon School Study Council
RuM;Oti.n 8 (April 1 9 73)- 21-' "*" "

^ 3 '>N^SJjtjat.i.-2i!5_l\" ?..:13 re h__D i cLost_ 7 (October 1973): 10.

33fnbid., p. n.

121

welfare was created., a teachers • strike was ''egai under conditions

detailed in the ''970 Feb lie unpl oyeo Relations Act.^

Th;; coiirf-tr began to deoiae khs: strike issue on the basis of the

actual -impact of the- strike instead of on ideal ogicsl or legal pre-

concept"; oil about it. The outcome was to deny injunctive relief until

there was evidence that the strike was causing irreparable damage.

A Colorado District Court. Judge refused to issue
a restraining order against striking teachers,
maintaining that denial of "that one weapon
which they have at their disposal ", would vetioce
them to "second-class citizenry.'1-^8

The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania refused
to order the Northern Cambria School District
to lengthen the school year and make up instruc-
tional days lost during a. legal strike' staged by • ■
the Northern Cambria Education Association!^

The teachers struck for thirty days and demanded that the days be added

to the calendar in order that they would not lose thirty days' pay.

Since teachers were under annual contracts and state laws required

that schools be open a certain number of days per year, striking teacher

have not suffered the same economic losses as have strikers in other

industries.340 Therefore, the strike has become an attractive weapon

for teachers. They had recourse to legislatures which are always

sensitive to pressure. Teachers were spared the effects of lockouts

because laws obligated school boards to keep schools open.

° "^ ' il5:5^l^i.L?12S Ji?JiJ^dd3dJ_.[JJ' S^sJ; 7 (November 1973): 5.
"'^ 0i^;t2er.i^Liilrl^ Irtl^rJCii!1 J'^ ^es - - (February 1974); 11.

o *"> n

3oJl!n<-;... p S.

^'Oiicvrold V. Webb, "The Case for Keening the Federal Government
Out of Board-Teacher Negotiations," The Ameilican^^Sdioo 1_ Boa r_d__J our rial

Ycl.

The victims, in the- ;;a->e of a strike? by teachers, were school
childran and. fkorr par ants. Ironical iy, federal leqislatien would
pr-rirnr teachers to strike in or.ler to bar-jain or to protect their
own education, policy prarooyt ivos. -^' The beard's only option was
to cut back on educational services. Since the genera"! public wanted
its cir: idren in school , and board members wore closer ann more responsi-
ble to public pressure, boards were extr.sra.ly vulnerable to striking
teachers.3^

Strike Strateay in education

bee a us t

how so

0 G: c s i 0 '"

s t rater

boards

strike.

:schar strikes tended to be successful in the 1960s, partly
. they wave so unexpected and school districts did not know
handle ikem. Ry 1973, there was loss tendency to r.iske con-
s merely as a result of a strike or strike threat.,
ticulous planning by the administration yum an often-mentioned
y to prepare for strikes. Keernar and Parker pointed out that
had to plan carefully in the event oh the oossibiMtv of a

A letter, signed either by the board president
or the superintendent, should be prepared for
distribution by registered mail to every teacher
in the system. It should outline the law. the
teachers' responsibility. to the children and the
community, arxl what the hoard will do with absent
teachers; and, above all. it should never bluff.
Put nothing into wri ting 'that yon don't intend
to carrv out. 3 43

01 ' lb ia.
3'l2lbid.

•^koarner and barker
nir,M n. 21'.

'■'rai; to Dm When the Bargaining Go

"12-

Koerner and Parker suggos U>;\ i.nat the letter had to be specific. ■
indicating whetner :; ;.:;!: call eould bo accented or nct.3''^

When employers paid for strikes, S'r;!,03 reoccurred. The super-
intendents had the r^sponslb i 1 i ky To (ieteHiiru? whether staff members
were avail able to operate the schools if a strike occurred. The
principals' role was checking the availability of substitutes and
determining if other employee:: would. cross the picket lines, kffee-
. live superintendents advised parents of the procedures to follow in
case of a strike. At the same time, they were careful not to give Ti-
to unreasonable, community pressure croups teachers may have enlisted
to support their demands. Even if strikes against school districts
were defensible, there should be some provision permitting the school
board to call upon qualified members of the community to take ever
classes until the di-pute is resolved. According to webb, illegal
strikes could be punishable by:

(a) forfeiture of the striking organization's
status as bargaining agent along with its dues
checkoff privileges; (b) imposition of fines;
and, (c) teacher suspension, loss of tenure,
personal monetary damages and, where indicated,
the full penalty of the law, including appro-
priate punishment. 345

Teachers have taken up labor's ultimate weapon, the strike. But,
school boards have not utilized management's retaliatory. weapon, the
lockout. 3«

344Ib,d.

"'•°Webb, "The Case for Keeping the Federal Government Out of
Board-Teacher Negotiations," p. ?0.

■wtJF.. M. Hickey, "Your Teachers Striking? Here Are Reasons for
Responding With a Lockout," The American School Hoard Journal 153
(January 1971): .'31 . """" "~ '" ~ "~

124

In dSaling with teacher strikes, the strategy throughout the
country has been to keep the schools open. The principal arbiter
and source of pressure in any strike has been the public, and the
school board has had to assure itself that its position on the strike
issue was defensible.

Hickey suggested eleven advantages for "lockout" strategy for
management:

(1) a lockout can avoid the issue of turning teacher
against teacher by obviating the need for teachers
to "take" sides1' as strikers or non-strikers; (2) a
lockout can generate internal pressure by teachers
upon their own leadership to move quickly to settle-
ment; (3) a lockout can minimize the negative effect
of a strike on student attitudes; (4) a lockout can
permit the -focusing of a district's resources on
resolution of the dispute; (5) a lockout can dis-
courage use of any means other than negotiations to
reach accord; (6) a lockout can force public concern
for the central issues of the dispute, resulting in
pressure to reach agreement; (7) a lockout can eli-
minate the undesirable aspects of what is learned in
a classroom during a strike; (8) a lockout can
minimize the possibility of violence and property
damage; (9) a lockout shifts, to a large extent,
the responsibility for security onto civil -authorities;
(10) a lockout forces representatives of the public
media to obtain relevant facts from the central public
information officer; and, (1.1 ) a lockout can strengthen
the board's bargaining position. 347

Legislatures throughout the nation have contributed to teacher
strikes by confining negotiations to brief periods during, the year
with automatic strike provisions. Industry changed from a confronta-
tion collective bargaining model to. an integrative approach where
both parties sit down together to determine common probl ems. 348 Under

347lbid.

°^°Hertling and Getz, "Negotiations: Cure or Cause of Teacher

this at-ranyein?:-.!:;.:, v,.- \so r.\ hi ■':■,,, ■:, have occi:r;vo throughout the year as
c<n on-o'cing p roc esc.

School boards, like 0T.!'i•v,, while o-vip layers, have been more re-
st rie ted tnan .,:•: vate einp'f oy-rs -in the kinds of concessions they
could legally make to an employee organization.3^9 ^any 0f t-jie ■; imita-
tions were based on the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
prohibited states from denying any person the equal protection of the
laws. Boards were unable to pick and choose among -illegally striking
teachers, the one who should be retained and those who should be dis-
missed. The public employer was obliged to treat all striking
empl oyees eoual 1 v. °50

The announcement chat a strike. was settled should be made jointly
by the teacher organization and the school board. 301 [\ joint state-
ment of agreement gave both the school board and the teacher crganiza-
"i;.icf: so. opportunity to "save Pace" with their respective constituents.

•''"-'Myron Lieberman, "The Real Differences Between Public and
Private Negotiations/' Sch ool J;<ari^enieirt 15 (10) (October 1971): 4-5.

350Ibid.

351 Ibid., p. 5.

rHAPTCR IJ'I

aSCUSSIOM OF FINUTNGS FROM T!!F LITERATURE
ON ISSUES AND STRATEGIES

A review of: the literature on collective bargaining In education
between 1965 end 1974 revealed ten issues which surfaced repeatedly
during that period. Those issues viere:

'i . What strategy should the school board adopt in determining
its role ir: collective bargaining?

2. What r.. tr elegy should the superintendent adopt in collective
bargaining?

3. What strategy should the r-ri r?c i pa ! adopt in co • leetive bar -
gaining?

4. What stretoqv should be used in determining the school board's
table bargaining team?

5. What strategy should be used to get the necessary proposals
to the bargaining table?

6. What strategy should be used to determine the scope of collec-
tive Iv.rtpiri'inci?

7. what strategy should be used for curriculum and instruction
i n col 1 ecti ve !;><i r ga i ni ng?

8. What strategy should be used for dealing vn'th ooir.nulso>y
unionisiii in oducairional collective bargaining?

y, What strategy should be used by the school system in
reso! ving an impasse?

126

i 27

w'hac ;. i"i\;j i'.eoy should be need by the school board 'in deadline.1
with st.i-.es in collective bargadiing?

What Strategy^ SbouT
Deternmung it" hob

be hoe'i _ hoa_rq'_ Adont_ in

Trad it ioiici "i 1 y , school board::; have exercised conipleto antheri
in making dp-: i slons regarding education. They 'lost some of their

•-.>

flexibility and the right to make unilateral decisions u?-;::
entered into collective bo vyai i.i;,g with teachers.

In the middle '60s, many board members were conduct in-:] collec-
tive bargamvng, hut the practice h-d declined considerably s-iccr- that
period. Participation required excessive time, some expertise in the
collective bargaining process, and Joss of the right to refuse to
ratify the contract.

By 1974, the strategy for school boards was fairly consistent.
Boards in large districts had moved away from the barga-ining table-
However, there wore still some small and medium-sized districts where
boards were conducting collective bargaining. Two of the challenges
confronting the board were to insure that bargaining was conducted
by competent personnel and to establish guidelines and limits for
the bargaining team and give the team authority to act within those
limits.

Good communications were identified as an absolute necessity
during the bargaining process. The board had to insure that com-
munications were adequate to maintain board authority on the one
hand and provide for sufficient team authority on the other hand.
The board's primary strategy was to provide clear policy guidelines

128

to, the negco.iaicr and .super ietendHot h-fore cc: lective bargaining
follow the course of b^rga f r:i ng closely through, the media and bar-
gaining team -memos, make policy decision-:; from alternatives when
necessary, and- ratify the contract if it was within the limits
previously established.

.!iLVlJL_yiL'.aJi?.9y Jill1™. !.' < T.h je Su pLe i- 'in t. e nd e rrf
Adij_2_t_ _i_ri_ Co'i j^'-^tj v>v: barjjaijvi ng?

The superintendent's role changed during the period studied
from being a neutral adviser to teachers, and board, to being chief
negotiator for the board, and subsequently to being in a leadership
role away from the table for the board. The changes which occurred
over the period strained the long standing teacher-superintendent
relationship.

District size and the superintendent's length of district service
increased- or decreased the time period during which the changes in
the superintendent' s role occurred. In districts under 10,000 pupils,
changes in the superinter.dency were slower in coming. In 1974, some
districts still ned superintendents' who were attempting to play
neutral teles in collective bargaining, but the numbers were steadily
decreasing. Superintendents with more than five years' service within
a district exhibited greater empathy for teachers and were apt to
agree with collective bargaining as a process.

The superintendent had five strategies from which to choose.
They were (')) non-participant, where he served as a communication
link for both teachers and boards but did not advise or negotiate
for either party; (2) negotiator for the teachers; (3) advisor to

1 29

the teachers- 'v') advisor to the boarc;. riu! [b) negotiator for the
board.

LI Leramrro' f ir-dirigs suggested that 'ho ambivalence of the
superintendent's role would result in ft shift in the direction of agent
for the board/ He would no longer be "the professions! educator and
instructional :ieader" in the district.

Wrat__Str<v; eq) Should__the_ P r i j] c Jj ■ j 1

Ad o p t 'i n C o i 1 o c f ; v e B a r -j a i n "i n g ?

The statps of the princinalshin lias been one of the most con-
troversial areas in public school collective bargaining. The principal-
ship has been through an evolutionary process of three distinct stages,
lie was ignored by teachers and boards in the first stage, included in
teacher bargaining units in the second stage, and either formed his
own units or moved to the management team in the third stage. District
size, district;; location, and district history have been important fac-
tors in determining direction at the third stage. In many oT the
larger urban districts in industrialized areas, principals have estab-
lished bargaining units for themselves. In the smaller suburban and
rural districts, principals have slowly moved to the management team.
The literature, findings suggested that there was still much confusion
within the profession on collective bargaining strategies for principals

One popular' arid emerging strategy was that the principal was a
member of the --management team. As a team member, the principal re-
viewed the present agreement' and teacher proposals and advised the
superintendent on the implications of proposals as they related to
his school, lie served on the administrative team as a consultant
and implemented the contract after it was signed.

130

A second strategy '.vis m>r or I ncd pa Is to fonn thfin own bargain-

inq units end bargain with boards on t ev mis and conditions of employ- -
moot. This strategy has been adopted in many large urban school
districts.

A third strategy was for principals, supervisors, and other
admimmstra tors to organize a "less formal "internal structure end- to -
meet and confer on items oF concern. Principals in a i:meet and con-
fer" approach generally have confined their concerns to salary and
fringe benefits and remained as members of the management team for
bargaining with teachers. However, the "meet .end .confer" approach
must not be confused with bar ujairei :?g . Concerns were discussed and
differences settled by the superintendent. There were no impasse
procedures connected with "meet and confer."

A fourth strategy was where principals were represented by teach;-
bargaining units. This practice has been unacceptable to the America:
Federation of Teachers, and it has been rejected increasingly by the
National Llduoatior. Association. The difficulty has arisen when a
teacher has filed :■ grievance against a principal who was in- the same
bargaining unit. Which person would the association support, the
teacher or principal?

Who Should J.'e Included on the Board '_s
Table Bargaining Team?

The board team makeup has changed over the years in both types
of people and numbers. At first, whole boards or board members were
involved in bargaining. As boards became aware of the complexifies
and time demands of bargaining., they involved the superintendent and
he then involved staff specialists or outside negotiators. Teams

131

have chsngeo :\\ rr':<? from large ba; ■■"■■>. -wring teams to either small groups
or a. siugle.a.pohesiiien. Li lOrature strategies ranged from full board
parvwci natron, through district employee participation, to outside
■expert, participation.

The first strategy suggested was that boards or board committees
conduct collective bargaining. The problems with hoard teams were
many, Bargaining was time consuming, statements msde by single members
were not binding on the beard, and board members could not refuse to
ratify an agreement they had just approved at the table.

The second strategy available to the board for selecting a bar-
gaining team was to select the team from the school system's adminis-
trative staff. Tin's strategy was difficult for small systems with
limited admirm strati ve staffs.

The third strategy was that school boards should select a bar-
gaining team of professional negotiators. Advantages of that practice
were (1) bargaining was time consuming; (2) professional negotiators
were knowledgable about bargaining; and (3} the board retained final
authority. Disadvantages were (1) outside negotiators were expensive;
{?.) they did not have a Knowledge of the school system; and (3) hiring
outside negotiators removed the need for in-dlstrict training of
negotiators.

i^t^rateqy^rmaujlc^jie Used _tq-_Get Jthe Neces_sar.y
J-t£RILS<3ls to" the_Ba7gafnfng fab'JV?"

In the "literature, preparation for bargaining was emphasized.
If a team nreparec! tliorough'ly 5 its chances for success were greater.
Appropriate preparation for the board's team included the development

3Z

of a healthy^] imate of re urU cases us be -ve on. two individuals, the .
one responsible for coll or;; ivo bargaining for the board and the
super intenOcnt's staff arid the one rescues ible for bargaining for the
classroom teachers' .association.. That relationship can only be
developed over a period of time when tests of credibility have been
met and passed. Needed data included costs or savings of proposed
changes; the -board's ability to pay, national, regional, and local
economic conditions; agreements recently negotiated in comparable
districts; and working conditions in the school district.

After a set of proposals has been prepared by the board's team,
superintendent, and administrative staff working together, these
proposals along with district, state, and national economic data should
be presented to the board. The superintendent and chief negotiator
should make the presentation to the board. It may take one meeting
or several, but before bargaining can begin, the board must establish
guidel ines and 1 imifs.

Following the. establishment of guidelines and limits by the board,
how do the proposals; get to the bargaining table to be considered by
the teams? Several,. strategies were advanced in the literature. No
set pattern was found, for each was a product of a particular relation-
ship.

One stratea,/ tbat was routinely followed in many school systems
over the United.;$.t.ates in 1974 was that the employee organization
presented its proposals; then, the board accepted those proposals and
prepared counterproposals from them.

A second strategy was for both teams to exchange proposals during
the first .meeting. This approach was occurring more often in

133

educational collective bargaining where cost? had to be reduced or
held down.

A third strategy was for the board to present its entire "true"
package at the beginning of bargaining and not to move from that
point unless its facts could be disproven. This approach has never
won popular support and many have chavged that it was the antithesis
of collective bargaining.

What Strategy Should Be Used to Determine
the Scope of Collective Bargaining?

The issue of what can, should, or must be bargained about has
been one of the major problems in both private sector and educational
collective bargaining. The scope has continued to expand in the
private sector and there is every indication that it will continue to
do so in the public sector.

The basic question is what topics should be subject to negotia-
tion and what subjects should.be decided by some other mechanism.
Boards have wanted a narrow scope and employee groups a broad scope.
In 1968, the strategy was that textbook selection, class size, student
suspension, determination of the length of day, and appointment of ~
curriculum committees were considered management prerogatives. As
a result, many boards refused to negotiate those areas.

Another strategy suggested by the literature -was that the right
to assign work must never be negotiated away. That right was carefully
guarded by management in the private sector and many have suggested
that it should not be included in the scope of educational bargaining;

The area of personnel evaluation has gained attention in the
literature. The strategy for evaluation suggested that the criteria

for personnel .evaluation v;or-f ; . i-r?cjoti ab.« ;>.„ bot management had 'to
interpret arid apply these criteria,.

Increasingly, contracts f^sve provided .-for teacher organization
involvement In ourricular, textbook^ arc! educational policy decision-
making. Organization representatives have been given the right to
confer on such matters with board and a/bid ni strati ve -personnel curine
the tenii of the contract away from the table.

Another suggested strategy was to limit discussions at the table
to such items as salaries and basic conditions of employment and
develop year-round study coiTir.vi ttees of teachers and administrators .
Those committees could study curriculum, textbooks, and teaching
techniques away from the adversary position of the bargaining table.

lt'iiy.ykkvt^ Cujjjculuin

and ■instruction in Collective Raroaininq?

In the early and middle sixties, little attention v/as given to
the curriculum and instruction issue. Teacher groups were more con-
cerned wHh gaining -basic bargaining rights during that time. When
groups became relatively secure with bargaining rights, they began to
look for a way to broaden collective bargaining. Curriculum and
instruction were legitimate areas for bargaining according to the
National Education /vsociation and the American Federation of Teachers.

One strategy ^suggested strongly by the literature was that
curriculum and instruction, not be bargained at the table. Procedures
to insure staff.- participation were legitimate subjects for collective
bargaining. They procedures ranged from joint. teacher-administrator
committees to develop" policy on matters of common concern to committees
when specific responsibility was curriculum decision-making.

135

Another strategy was i: • i .-. I. cur;-i>.;:.- !■.;::■ review committees should be
established through collective bargaining to review instruction away
from the adversary setting of collective bargaining. Expertise in
curriculum and instruction has beer: notably absent at the bargaining
table.

A number of contracts have included provisions for specific
individuals to be responsible for directing curriculum development,
designating participants, determining the frequency of meetings,
fixing compensation for participants, and implementing curriculum
change. ''.'■'.'.: major emphasis was upon teacher involvement in curriculum
decisions.

The role of collective bargaining changed curriculum and instruc-
tion from a uni lateral exercise to a bilateral exercise. The approach
used most often for curriculum improvement has been to form curriculum
and educational development councils, joint committees, and professional
study committees.

What_5trn tegy_ „S!ioiglcl Be_Ujs^^

tyimpu i;'.rv,;y_ ilu l-uisin in r._due:';j iotr j_
Col 1 ect. i ve Ba rqa i n i nq ?

The three majov forms of compulsory unionism in education in 1974
were agency shop, union shop, and maintenance of membership. Agency
shop required a monthly service fee, but did not require union member-
ship. Union shop required union membership within a specified time
period after employment. Maintenance of membership did not. require
union membership., but did require individuals who joined to remain
durinc: the life of the contract.

136

The first approach was a political strategy, for under this
strategy boards were to lobby for a."riGh.t to work" law.

A second strategy was. to develop contract language that pre-
cluded all forms of compulsory unionism. The clause should guarantee
all employees the right to join a union or refrain from joining a
union without fear of penalty or reprisal.

What Strategy Should Be Used by the School
System in Resolving an Impasse?

There were times, despite good faith efforts to arrive at agree-
ments to common problems, when persistent disagreements could not
be resolved by the parties in the collective bargaining process. When
that occurred, the teams were at an impasse. Impasse resolution gen-
erally passed through three stages as follows: (1) the conciliatory
mediation stage, (2) the fact finding stage, and (3) the arbitration
stage. Arbitration may be advisory or binding, depending on the state
law.

Mediation

The purposes of mediation were to clarify issues and channel
communications; the literature suggested avoiding mediation as long
as there was a possibility of continued bargaining. The strategy
was to meet with parties first in separate meetings and later in
joint sessions. Writers were in general agreement that mediation ,
should be conducted in executive sessions.

Fact Finding

Since fact finders make decisions based on the information sub-
mitted by the parties, the board strategy must be to insure that

preparation is careful 'I y m-nie. Damag i ik assertions must not go
unchallenged.

Another strategy suggested was: to create permanent fact, find inn
panels for local school districts to el i;;ri note a lock of experience
among fact tinders. Fact finder!:- should bo ^ftioird to prepare a

written report which includes the if. sees in question.

find inns of

facts and conclusions; recommendations for settlement, of the dispute,
and reasoning behind the decision, The report should be made public
if the parties do not accept the recommendations.

Arbitration

One strategy recommended by the literature was to study other
arbitration awards on the issue before deciding on arbitration.
Arbitration iias not been popular with boards because (1) reliance
on arbitration weakens the incentive to agree at the table; [?.) it
weakens the status of local boards; and (3) there is generally no
way for an arbitrator to enforce his decisions.

!#^.i^_Strategy_Should Be_ Used_ by tire Jchool_
Board in 'deal inn with Strikes?

Prior to the 1970s, teacher strikes were regarded as illegal.
The feeling was .that teacher strikes endangered public health or
safety and the courts felt that public employees did not have the
right to strike. Injunctions were issued upon board request regard-
less of the conduct of the board.

However, teachers engaged in many work stoppages during the
period between 1965 and 1970 and there were six statewide strikes.
Teacher groups were not in the mood for amicable discussions and they

were wulmq to use whoever force necessary to gain their ends, Strike'
were successful because boards did not know what strategies to use to ■
combat them.

The strategy mention-cd rr-osl often in ^literature tor boards
was liioticulous planning by the adMiin.i strati on. Thai: planning included
mailing a registered lector to each teacher in the system outlining the...
lav/, the teacher's responsibil ity to the children and the community,
and the action that the board will take against absent teachers.

A second strategy was to keep .schools open to keep pressure on
the teacher group. The board should have a plan for calling upon
qualified members of" the community to take over classes until the
dispute is resolved. The source of pressure in the strike was the
public s but the board's position had to be defensible.

The lockout was another strategy mentioned in the literature for
dealing with strikes. It had the advantage of avoiding turning teacher,
against teacher and generated much internal pressure against the teach-
er leadership to move to settlement.

A fourth strategy suggested in the literature was to work
politically with legislatures to remove automatic impasse procedures.
This would encourage bargaining teams to go for longer periods of
time and perhaps provide more incentive to reach, agreement.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND
TEACHER NEGOTIATOR SURVEYS

A review of the literature on collective bargaining in educa-
tion between 1065 and 1974 revealed ten issues which surfaced repeat-
edly during that, period. The writer concluded that the issues which
gained more attention in the literature during the period were the
most important issues. Those issues were:

i. What strategy should the school board adopt in determining

its role in collective, bargaining?
s. What strategy should the superintendent adopt in collective
bargaining?

3. What strategy should the principal use in collective bar-
gaining?

4. Who should be included on the school board's table bargain-
ing team?

5. What strar.egy should be used to get the necessary proposals
to the bargaining table?

b. What strategy should be used to determine the scope of
collect! v e b a r g a i n i n g ?

7. What strategy should be used for curriculum and instruction
in collective bargaining?

8. What strategy should be used for dealing with compulsory
unionism ■;.■, educational collective bargaining?

9. What strategy should be used by the school system in resolv-
ing an impasse?
10. What strategy, should bo used by the school board in dealing
v.'ith strikes in collective bargaining?

The writer sent out a survey form (Appendix 1} to each county in
the State of Florida to determine if the school system had been in-
volved in collective bargaining, the number of years the district
had been involved in collective bargaining, and the names and addresses
of the administrative negotiators and the teacher negotiators involved
with the school system. A total of sixty- seven survey forms were
sent out and fifty-four were returned (Appendix 2), Of the fifty-
four returnee, twenty-four counties had been involved in collective
bargaining, and experience ranged from one to six years. There were
nine counties with one year of bargaining experience, four counties
with two years of experience, four countries with four years of experi-.
ence, five counties with five years of experience, and two counties
with six years of experience in collective bargaining.

The writer conducted interviews with experienced administrative
negotiators and experienced teacher negotiators, in six counties with
five or more years of collective bargaining experience.

The eounfi.es -in which experienced administrative negotiators
were interviewed included counties with large pupil populations .
medium pupil eolations, and small pupil populations in Florida.
The counties selected were identified as either urban or rural
counties, with some counties having large urban-rural areas witrrin
their boundaries. (Sea Table 3.)

NAMLS OF SELECTS) COUNTIES, SOCIO -DEMOGRAPHIC
TYPE, ANO ''0/3-73 ENOOELOENT

Florida Counto,

Collier

Dad »

Duval
Polk
Sumter
Volusia

fype

Enrollment 1972-73

Rural

Urban

Urban

Urban/Rural

Rural

Urban/ Rural

13,239

251.011

121,855

03,841

4,869

38_,G31_

Dotal 503^36

Source: ]i['orjj_es_ p_f_Flori_da School Districts, Tallahassee , Florida:
State Department of Education Publication, March 1974.

Four strategies found in the literature were listed under each
issue oil the interview guide. Each experienced administrative nego-
tiator and each experienced teacher negotiator were asked to select
'the strategy believed to be the most beneficial to the school system.
Each was also told at the beginning of the interview to feel free to
suggest any additional strategies thought to be the most or least
beneficial to the school system. After the negotiators made their
selections, they were asked \<hy they had chosen a particular strategy
to bo most beneficial or least beneficial.

Issue Number One

1. What strategy should the school board ariopr in determining its
role in collective bargaining'"'

A. The school board shocld. select its bargaining team, establisl
guidelines and limits, ano uive the team authority to ~cf.

142

B. The. beard should conduct: collective bargaining.

C. The board should assign a board momher to the team as an
3 o v i s c r .

D. The board should assign, a board member as chief negot iator.

TABLE A

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO INTURVIi
FOR ISSUE NUMBER OWE

Strateoies

Most Beneficial
Least Beneficia'

Total

' 6
6

Administrative; Response to Issue One

All of the administrators interviewed selected Strategy "A'! from
the interview guide as the most beneficia1 for the school system. They
emphasized that the school board should select its bargaining team,
establish guidelines and limits, and give the team authority to act.

When asked why the board should adopt that approach, each adminis-
trator made some, common!, about the board not getting involved in table
bargaining. According to Wilson, chief negotiator for Polk County.
Florida, the board should not get involved because members do not know
enough about the school system to negotiate witii teachers who under-
stand the system. Administrators selected Strategy "B;| under Issue
One as the least beneficial to the school system. Strategy "B" sug-
gested that the board should conduct collective bargaining.

14:

TFACbER RM5PC!
FOR T.SW

ES TO INTERVIEWS
NUMBER ONE

Strategic

Most Beneficial
[.east Beneficial

iota!

5
6

Teacher Res£caises_ to X5^1^ j^lG

The teacher negotiators selected the same strategies for the
board's role in collective bargaining as had the administrative nego-
tiators. The board should select its team, establish guidelines and
limits, and give the team authority to act and the board should not
conduct collective bargaining.

Phelan., from the Volusia Education Association in Volusia County,
Florida, suggested two points relative to board members not being
involved in collective bargaining. Board members with authority to
ratify should not be involved in table bargaining. Another point was
that board members at the table could not forget that they were
politicians. They looked for opportunities to bring the press into
the situation and made negotiations more public than it should have
been.

Exloy, President of the Duval Flc»"rda "feaohers Unired, suggested
that fie: boa »'d "dici roi; understand district procedures well enough to
sit at the table. I: !ie would be happy to negotiate with the board but
felt it would be that least beneficial strategy to the school system.

fACl.E fi

TOTAL RESPONSES TO TNi Ei< VIEWS
TO ISSUE NUMBER ONE

Strategies A E C D Total

Most Beneficial 12 12

Loo st Beneficial 12 12

Summary of Respo_nses_ to Issue Number One

Both groups surveyed selected Strategy "A" as the board role most
beneficial to the school system. Experienced administrative and
experienced teacher negotiators in Florida responded that boards should
select the bargaining team, establish guidelines and limits, and give
the team authority to act.

Experienced administrative negotiators and experienced teacher
negotiators in the counties represented indicated that it would be
least beneficial for school systems if boards adopted the strategy
of bargaining *.t the table. This feeling was unanimous among the
administrators'- and teachers interviewed.

J_ssue^ Nuinlier Two

2, What strategy should the superintendent adopt in collective bar-
gaining' -

A. The superintendent should act as a liaison between both teacher
and lizard teams offering advice and direction to both.

145

B. The superintendent should work a-; executive: officer to the
board working closely with and providing direction to the
board's team.

C. The superintendent should act as chief negotiator for the
board's team.

i-'. The superintendent should be completely removed from collee
tive bargaining to preserve his leadership r0le to both the
board end iho teachers by assuming a neutral posture.

TABLE

fSTRATJVE RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER TWO

Strategies

Most Beneficial
Least Beneficial

Total

6
6

Issue number Uo focused on the role of the superintendent in
coli-tlv& ^gaining. ATI of the administrators selected "Ir as the
slrafcoy which would be most beneficial to the school system. The
strategy was eie-f the super! >e cedent should work as executive officer
to the hoard and ^ovide drrescwm in the board's team.

Sang, Associate Saner intenderit for Personnel and chief negotiator

for tOr-- Hi-' vol Co''-r;\ 'Vh.->r.i (v,-, ■» ,-.^i i (1 i,,|.,.,„,„.ii . t-i -j • ,.

J — -! '"-" l------ ■-> in ■j<tohs::rsvi i ie, i- lor ~ da, 'indicated

that. i;;e super! ni.endonl was ti.e executive officer for t,he school board

and he could not act as a l^bor advisor for teacher groups. O'Brien,
Assistant Superintendent f or Employee Relations and chief negotiator
Tor the Dade County School Rcsrd in Miami, Florida, suggested that
when supcrmitendents assume the role of negotiator, the focus of
bargaining is switched to "political grievance
toe cme!" executive officer.'1

•s and posturing auainsl

me experiences administrative negotiators d:\6. not agree on the
least beneficial strategy for the school system. Four members felt
vf. vvo:i;<-i be :eo-,t bepef-icial for the superintendent to act as a liaison
nctwoen the boarO arm.; teacher teams and two felt it would be least
beneficial to the system to piece the superintendent in the chief
negotiator role.

Decisions were made prematurely when the superintendent was in-
volved as chief negotiator according to McDermott, Assistant Superin-
tendent tor Personnel and Services and chief negotiator in Volusia
County, Florida. According to Wilson, Associate Superintendent for
Employee Relations, Polk County, Florida, the superintendent cannot
act us a liaison capacity between teacher and board teams, for he
"carrot be on both sides of the fence at once. . . . The teachers
placed themselves on the other side of the fence and Florida Statute
47.100 clearly places the superintendent with the board.1'

l-a^i1£!''.J.v^.-:i-:;iA^s_jo_ Issue Two

issue numoer two Ocalf with the role of the superintendent in
collective bargaining. Three experienced teacher negotiators inter-
^ewed o^roeci with the administrative negotiators on the most bene-
ticial strategy- -the superintendent should work as executive officer

147

to the board working closely with and providing direction to the
board's team. Two other teacher negotiators selected the strategy
that had the superintendent acting as liaison between both teacher
and board foams and offering advice and direction to both. Or.e experi-
enced teacher negotiator "suggested that the superintendent should act
as chief negotiator for 'tiie board's team.

rABLE 8

'EACHB*. RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
hOR "ISSUE NUMiiER TWO

Strategies A B . C D Total

Most Beneficial 2 .. 3 1 6

Least Beneficial 1 2 3.6

Torni'ilo suggested that the superintendent should be deeply in-
volved in the bargainirin-'proeoss as a part of the management team from
an "input or directive ■point of view," He said:

The superintendent is not a friend of tiie teachers;
he is a part of management. This is not a game,
but ;}.,\<ery serious business. This may be difficult
for the average superintendent to accept. I am the
teacher leao'eTi'T'h Hade County, not Dr. Whigham [cur-
rent superintendent j . '

A nasi; superintendent in Volusia County, Florida, was chief

negotiator for the board :s team. Prior to being elected superintendent.

Vat Torni'ilo, Executive Vice-President,, thai ted Teachers of Dade
County, Florida. Tape:.- interview,. March 23, 1975, Tampa, Florida.

he had been President of the Volusia ["ducat ion Association. The
Volusia teacher negotiator felt relations were better when the super-
intendent acted as chief negotiator. Phelan said negotiations were
"most successful ■when the superintendent was chief negot.iot.or."

Phelan complained that the board : s team must' now "cheek regularly
with the superintendent before making decisions." This caused the
Volusia Education Association to lose confidence in the board's team.

The least beneficial strategy selected by three experienced teacher
negotiators was that the superintendent should be completely removed
from collective bargaining to preserve his leadership role to both
the board and the teachers. Two suggested that the least beneficial
strategy was when the superintendent acted as chief negotiator and
one experienced teacher negotiator indicated that, the least beneficial
strategy was the situation where the superintendent acted as a liaison
between teacher and board teams.

TABLE 9

rOTAL RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE' NUMBtK TWO

Strategies A B C 0 Total

Most Beneficial 2 9 1 12

Least Denel icial 5 4 3 12

149

Nine out of twelve experienced administrative and teacher nego-
tiators selected "in1 as the most beneficial strategy for the school
system. Strategy "B" suggested thai the suoerintenderd, function as
execi' live officer to the board and provide direction to the board :s
team. Two thought the superintendent should act en liaison between
the board and teacher teams and one suggested that the superintendent
should act as chief negotiator.

The thinking of the experts was not as clear under the least
beneficial category. Five felt it would be the least beneficial for
the school system if the superintendent acted in a liaison capacity
between the teacher and board teams. Four experienced negotiators
contended thai: the least beneficial strategy for the school system
would he where the superintendent, was chief negotiator. Three experi-
enced negotiators indicated the least beneficial strategy was where
the superintendent was completely removed from collective bargaining
to preserve his leadership role tc both the board and the teacher
arouns.

Issue Number three

Weal: strategy should the principal use in collective bargaining?
A. The orineinal should not get involved in collective bargain-
ing; since he must work closely with the superintendent and

f. The erica ipai should align himself with the board's team

as a:; arm of management and sit with that team in an advisory

150

C. The principal should organize -hi:; own, bargaining unit and
bargain with the board.

D. The; principal should be actively involved in the organiza-
tions which are bargaining with boards to guard his place
as an instructional leader.

TABLE 10

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER THREE

Strategies

Host Beneficial

Least beneficial

Total

Adj)ijm_f,tr_ati_ve_ Re sponscs to Issue Three

Issue number three related to the role of the principal in col-
lective bargaining. All of the experienced administrative negotiator:
suggested that the principal should align himself with the board's
team as an arm of management and sit with that team in an advisory,
capacity. The experienced administrative negotiators were evenly
divided on the least beneficial strategies. Half selected Strategy
'7\'; and half selected Strategy "D". Strategy "A" was thai: the prin-
cipal .should not get involved in collective bargaining and Strategy
"D" was that he should he actively involved with organizations which
?.re bargaining in order to guard his place as an instructional
leader.

151

According to O'Brien in Dade County, Florida, t.hc strategy for

the principal is directly related to the size of the district...

The size of the district charges Lite principal's
function and the way he is perceived. In a
small district, the principal is perceived as 5
major administrative officer. In a large county,
they are not perceived as major administrative
officers as there are other senior administrative-
officials. 2

Wilson, from Polk County, Florida, stated that the principal

would have to police the agreement and. therefore;, should be an arm

of management and should not involve himself actively in opposition

to management. Edwards., in Sumter County, Florida, suggested that

the principal had to align himself with management because of his

roi

ievance procedure.

TABLE 11

TEACHER RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER THREE

St rates:

lost Beneficial
-east Renefici.il

Total

6
6

.I-i;iir: ,o.eGP°: -f F.5. l<L.Ls £-.■.?_ Xtyj"

Four ::;:per;':e;'i-.ed teacher negotiators suggested that the principal
should form his own bargaining team. A single experienced teacher

-Gavin O'Brien, Assistant Supc
Employee Relations , Dade County, i:!
1975, Tampa, Florida.

01 tenderer for Legislation and
"!(ia. Taped interview, April 10.

1!

negotiator suggested that the principal align himself with management
and be a insniber of the management team as an advisor. The other
experienced teacher negotiator suggested that the principal should
not qet involved with collective bargaining since he must work
closely with the superintendent and teacher teams at the same time.

Four experienced teacher negotiators suggested that the least
beneficial strategy for the school system was for the principal to
align himself with the board end sit with the board's team in an
advisory capacity, Pnelan, a teacher negotiator in Volusia County,
Florida, said principals should not be on trie board's team because
that forces art adversary relationship that, is "more psychological
than actual." -In the delicate balance of things, the "cooperative
model''1 should be stressed. Mercer, the Polk County Education Associa-
tion negotiator in Polk County, Florida, echoed the same thought.
"Putting principals on the team automatically increases the risk of
strained relations between the board and teachers."

Tornillo., of the Dade Teachers United, suggested that if middle
management 'people decide to bargain, "they are going to be in con-
flict with top management more often than if they are an arm of
management." They will have to bargain their special interests "which
may be in conflict with teacher groups and also top management."

Of the other two experienced teacher negotiators^ one selected
strategies where the principal should not get involved in collective
bargaining since he must work with both the superintendent and teachers
at the same time and the other chose the opposite strategy where the
principal should he actively involved to guard his place as an
instrv.etior.al leader.

T'M-Li: \?.

.. '-:e3i:'0:\:elta TO !!•■:'.' !.;RV J Dv

:os jssi-.v. f-:u;-iB:;R n-no-h

Stv

Total

!--ost henenci.r 1

Least: be-ofic-bai 5

IZ

12

Sumniary of jlespornas _to Issue Three_

Issue ritrcber three dealt with the role- of the principal in collec-
tive bargaining in public education. A majority of experts selected
the strategy where the principal aliens hi:,, self with the board's team
ai an arm" of management and sits with that i'.eain in an advisory capacity
as the rest beneficial for the school system. However, there eas a
clear difference between administrative negotiators' thinking and
teacher negotiators' opinions in selecting the most beneficial strategy.
A majority of the experienced teacher negotiators thought that it
would :■;: nero beneficial for the school system if the principal organ-
ized !ws own bargaining unit.

A the ec-way tie emerge; mane experienced administrative negotia-
tors :<rv} exprrrw;ed teacher negotiators in selecting the least bene-
ficial strategy for the school system. Four suggested that the principal
not get involved in bargaining, four then-air that he should get involved
on the board's tear, ok four- contended that he should gci. involved in
teacher organi vat '. caw. to guard his place as an instructional leader.

154

Issue Number Four

4. Who should be included on the school board's table bargaining
team?

A. The board's table team should include the superintendent,
selected staff, and' principals."
. B. The board's table team should include board members and
county office personnel.

C. The board's table team should include county office personnel
without the superintendent, principals in an advisory capacity,
and an outside expert if expertise is unavailable in the
county.

D. The board's table team should include board members and an
attorney who has bargaining experience.

TABLE 13

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER FOUR

Strategies A B. C D Total

Most Beneficial 6 6

Least Beneficial 1 5 6

Administrative Responses to Issue Four

Issue number four dealt with the individuals who should be in-
cluded on the board's table bargaining team. The. most beneficial

strategy, according to experienced admini strati ve negotiators. was
that the hoard's tear:! should include county office personnel without
the superintendent, principals in an advisory capacity > and an outsio<:
export if expertise is unavailable in the. county.

The least beneficial strategy for a school system in determining
the board's team would be to select a team of board members and an
attorney. Five of the six experienced administrative negotiators
opposed that strategy. Another administrator thought that a team
■composed of the superintendent, selected staff, and principals was
least beneficial ,

Wilson j administrative negotiator from Polk County, Florida4 and
O'Brien, administrator from Dade County, Florida, both suggested that
the teanj should not include board members. According to McDermott,
administrator from Volusia. County, Florida, the board would "give
away the store and not be aware of it."

McDermott from Volusia County, Florida, said that the makeup of
the team was verv important and identified a further caution. If the
team is composed of the superintendent and the majority of the ver-y
top staff, the distinct possibility exists that the team may make too
many concessions too early at the table because they are "used to
making district decisions , " He further contended that, on the other
hand, if an assistant superintendent works with some lower level

aters, ti

''ess inclined to act prematurely.

Teacher Responses to J s sue Four

Issue number four was related to the makeup of the board's bar-
gaining team. Vovx- teacher negotiators felt that the board's, team

should include com^y office personnel without the superintendent,
pr inc. :i pa 1 s iii an advisory capacity, and an outside expert if expertise
is unavailable in the county. One experienced teacher negotiator felt
that the most beneficial strategy for the district was to have the
board's team include the superintendent, selected staff, and principals-,
and another felt the best strategy should be to appoint a team composed
of board members and county office personnel .

TABLE 14

TEACHER RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER FOUR

Strategies A B 0 D Total

Most Beneficial 1 1 4 6

Least Beneficial 11 2 2 6

Mercer, an experienced teacher negotiator from Polk County, Florida
said that county office personnel "have the expertise and system knowl-
edge to be involved in, bargaining, but people who work directly with
teachers have no business bargaining against teachers." She said,
"There must be a high level of trust in an educational system."

The experienced teacher negotiators did not agree on the least
beneficial strategy Tor selecting the board's bargaining team. Two
selected the team of board members and attorney; two selected the
team of county office personnel without the superintendent, principals
as advisors, and an outside expect if one was necessary. One selected

157

.a team composed of board members and county office personnel and
another chose the superintendent, selected staff, and principals as
the least beneficial strategy for the school system.

TABLE 15

TOTAL RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER FOUR

Strategies

Most Beneficial
Least Beneficial

10
2

Total

12
12

Summary of Responses to Issue Four

Ten of the twelve experienced administrative and experienced
teacher negotiators selected Strategy "C"as the most beneficial for
the school system. Strategy "C" was that the board's table team should
include county office personnel without the superintendent, principals
in an advisory capacity, and an outside expert if expertise is un-
available in the county.

Seven of the twelve experienced administrative and experienced
teacher negotiators selected Strategy "D" as the least beneficial
strategy for the school system. That strategy was that the board's
table team should include board members and an attorney who has
bargaining experience.

1 5ft

Issue Number Five

5. What strategy should be used to get the necessary proposals to
the bargaining table?

A. The teacher team should present a list of proposals to the
board's teain and the board's team should respond with counter-
proposals during bargaining.

B. Both teams should exchange proposals at the beginning of
collective bargaining.

C. Neither team should present a list of proposals to the other
at any time. Both should work from the existing agreement.

D. The board's team should consult with principals to determine
what rules need modification. The teachers' team should con-
sult with a representative body of teachers to determine what
changes would be desirable. Both teams then prepare proposals
from the recommendations and exchange those proposals.

TABLE 16

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER FIVE

Strategies 'A B C D Total

Most Beneficial 1 1 4 6

Least Beneficial 1 5 6

159

Administrative Responses to Issue Five

four experienced administrative negotiators selected Strategy "D"
as the most beneficial for issue number five. Issue number five dealt
with the procedure for getting the proposals to the bargaining table
and Strategy "D" suggested that both teams meet with the people who
make up their groups to determine v.'hat changes are desirable. Both
teams would then prepare proposals from those recommendations and
exchange proposals at the table.

One experienced administrative negotiator selected Strategy "A"
which stated that the teachers' team should present a list of pro-
posals to the board's team and the board's team would respond with
counterproposals during bargaining. Sang, an experienced administra-
tive negotiator from 'Duval County, Florida, stated that the board has
all the "rights, authority, and responsibility" and, therefore, "does
not need to bring in" its own proposals.

McDermott, an experienced administrative negotiator from Volusia
County j, Florida, only offered "counterproposals in the past", but will
change for the 1975-76 school year to "exchanging proposals." He
felt that the new Florida Public Employees Relations Act forced him
to put his concerns on the table during bargaining in order to have
the issue resolved by the local board. His contract had several areas
which needed tc be changed.

A second experienced administrative negotiator selected Strategy
"8" as the most beneficial strategy for the board. That strategy was
that both teams should exchange proposals at the beginning of collec-
tive bargaining.

160

Five of six experienced administrative negotiators selected
Strategy "C!' as the least beneficial to the board for issue five.
Strategy "C" was that neither team should present proposals to the
other and both would work from an existing agreement.

One experienced administrative negotiator contended that both
teams exchanging proposals at the beginning would be least beneficial
for the board. O'Brien, an experienced administrative negotiator
from Dade County, Florida, suggested that he could modify his counter
offers "with little risk of showing his hand" if he was not forced to
exchange proposals at the beginning of collective bargaining.

TABLE 17

iEACHER RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER FIVE

Strategies A B C D Total

Most Beneficial 2 3 16

Least Beneficial 5 16

Teacher Responses to Issue Five

Three of six experienced teacher negotiators selected Strategy
"B" as the most beneficial for the school system. That strategy was
that both teams exchange proposals at the beginning of collective
bargaining. According to. Phelan, an experienced teacher negotiator
in Volusia County, Florida, the teams have increasingly exchanged

161

packages as the ''relationship has matured." The board has found that,
collective bargaining is not a "threatening thing."

Two experienced teacher negotiators selected Strategy "A" as the
most beneficial; the strategy was that the teacher team should present
a list of propose! 3 and Use board team should offer only counter-
proposals. This position was taken by E/ley, an experienced teacher -
negotiator from Duval County, Florida and 'Wilson, an experienced teacher
negotiator in Sumter County, Florid?..

A single experienced teacher negotiator felt that :'D" was the
most beneficial strategy for the district. That strategy was that
teacher and board teams should check with teachers and principals
respectively, prepare proposals from those recommendations and exchange
those proposals.

As to the least beneficial strategy for the school system to employ
for issue Fives five out of six experienced teacher negotiators selected
Strategy "C". That strategy, if employed, would mean that neither the
board team nor the teacher team would present a list of proposals to
the other at any time; both teams should -work from the existing agree-
ment. One experienced teacher negotiator felt that consultation by
the board's team with principals and consultation by the teachers' team
with a representative body of teachers, as outlined in Strategy "D",
would be the least beneficial to the school system for Issue Five.
Strategy "D" suggests that proposals be drawn from recommendations of
the two groups and exchanged by both teams.

162
"[ABLE IS

TOTAL RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER FIVE'

Strategies A B C D Total

Host Beneficial 3 4 5 12

Least Beneficial 1 10 1 12

Summary of Responses to Issue Five

Five of the twelve experienced administrative negotiators and
experienced teacher negotiators selected Strategy "D" as the most
beneficial strategy for the school system for getting proposals to the
bargaining table, That strategy suggested that the teams consult with
their respective groups, prepare proposals from group recommendations,
and exchange those proposals. Four experienced negotiators suggested
that the most beneficial strategy for the beard was to exchange pro-
posals at the beginning of collective bargaining. Three experienced
negotiators suggested that the most beneficial approach was for the
teachers' team to present a list of proposals to the board's team with
the board's -team responding with counterproposals during bargaining.

Ten of the twelve experienced negotiators felt the least bene-
ficial approach was for both teams to work from the existing agree-
ment. One of twelve experienced negotiators felt that "B" was the
least beneficial strategy for the school system. That strategy was
that both teams exchange proposals at the beginning of collective
bargaining. One of the twelve experienced negotiators suggested that

163

the 'least, beneficial' strategy was where the board's team consulted
with principals and the teachers' team consulted with teacher repre-
sentatives to 'determine what changes were needed. Following this
consultation, both teams would prepare proposals from the recommenda-
tions and exchange those proposals.

Issue Number Six

6. What strategy should be used to determine the scope of collective
bargaining?

A. The best strategy in determining scope should be to have a
narrow interpretation confined to salary and fringe benefits.

B. The best strategy in determining scope should be to have a
narrow interpretation confined to salary and fringe benefits

at the table with a plan for broad and active committee involve-
ment with teachers in all aspects of policy development away
from the table.

C. The best strategy in determining scope should be to have a
strong management's rights clause to establish the position
that the board has rights which are non-negotiable.

D. The best strategy in determining scope should be to have a
broad interpretation of "conditions of employment" with dis-
cussions ,of concerns throughout the year.

Ad mi n isjt ra tive Responses to Issu e__S ix

Issue number- six was related to the scope of collective bargain-
ing. O'Brien, f'(n experienced administrative negotiator from Dade
County, Florida-; indicated that the scope will be the major issue for
"districts going into bargaining for the first time because it be-
comes a political issue."

TABLE 19

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER SIX

164

Strategies

Total

Most Beneficial
Least Beneficial

Three experienced administrative negotiators chose "B" as the most
beneficial strategy; this strategy was the selection of a narrow scope
confined to salary and fringe benefits at the table with a plan for
broad committee involvement in all aspects of policy development away
from the table. Edwards, an experienced administrative negotiator
from Sumter County, Florida, contended that the scope should be
"limited as much -as possible."

Though- a majority of experienced administrative negotiators selected
a narrow strategy, their taped comments reflected a different view.
O'Brien, an experienced administrative negotiator from Dade County,
Florida,- suggested that the use of a broad scope is a "lesser under-
stood strategy of collective bargaining." The process "contains the
conflict within the constraints of the collective bargaining procedure."
Wilson, an experienced administrative negotiator from Polk County,
Florida, suggested that there is "no way under our law and in this
day and age that a board negotiator can maintain a narrow scope. "
According to Sang, an experienced administrative negotiator from Duval
County, Florida, bargaining can no longer be confined to a narrow scope.

165

Two experienced administrative negotiators chose the following
strategy; as the most ■beneficial --a strong management's right clause
to establish the position that the board has rights which are non-
negotiable. One experienced administrative negotiator thought that
it was most beneficial where conditions of employment are interpreted
broadly with discussions of concern throughout the year.

Four of the experienced administrative negotiators contended that
the least beneficial strategy was "D", where conditions of employment
were interpreted broadly with discussions of concern through the year.
One experienced administrative negotiator selected "A" and another
selected "C" as the least beneficial strategy. Strategy "A" suggested
a narrow interpretation confined to salary and fringe benefits.
Strategy "C" suggested a strong management's right clause to make it
clear that the board has non-negotiable rights.

V ■- ■■- TABLE 20

TEACHER RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER SIX

Strategies A B C D Total

Most Beneficial 6 6

Least Beneficial 3 3 6

Teacher Responses to Issue Six

Issue number six dealt with the scope of collective bargaining.
All of the experienced teacher negotiators selected as the most

166

beneficial tor the school system, Strategy "D", a broad interpretation
of conditions of employment with discussions of concern throughout the
year. Tcrnillc; an experienced teacher negotiator- from Dade County,
Florida, said thcit "the scope of bargaining is the major issue in
collective bargaining in education today." TorriiTlo further suggested
he "could not o^c any significant decisions made by management that do
not have a significant impact on terms and conditions of employment.
That is the test that scope must meet under the Florida law."

Phelen, an^experienced teacher negotiator from Volusia County,
Florida, felt fe scope should be broad. She argued that "the more
things which coSi under negotiations, the more things that both sides

are forced to be committed to." She went on to say that collective

bargaining is a "legitimate face-saving device for both" and a way
to "force commit cations" with reluctant boards.

Under the .least beneficial strategies relating to scope of col-
lective bargaining, the experienced teacher negotiators split their
choices between Strategies "A" and "C". Strategy "A" suggested a
narrow scope cr-fefined to salary and fringe benefits. Strategy "C"
suggested that 'iMe board's team develop a strong management's rights
clause to estal^-'-sn reasoning that the board has rights which are
non~negctiable.#,,:,. :

^MD.!!!ill^._2LJi?:y''9!?;ies_',:o Jj> sJje _Si_x

Issue six»;ifc:j!t with the scope of collective bargaining. The
experienced negotiators had to determine if a broad or narrow bargain-
ing scope was more beneficial to the school system. Seven experienced
negotiators fraii a total of twelve contended that a broad interpreta-
tion of conditions of employment with discussions of concern throughout

1 6?

the year was the men beneficial, strategy,, so they chose Strategy
"D\

TABLE -21

TOTAL RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER SIX

Strategies

Total

Most Beneficial ■ i ? 7 ,0

Least Beneficial 4 4 4 12

Three of the twelve experienced Florida negotiators selected
Strategy "Bi; as the most beneficial for the school system. Strategy
"3" suggested a narrow interpretation at the bargaining table with
broad committee involvement away from the table throughout the year.

Two of the twelve experienced Florida negotiators chose Strategy
"C" as the most beneficial for the school system. Strategy "G" re-
ferred to the development of a strong management's rights clause to
establish a position that the board has rights which are non-negotiable.

Four oi the twelve experienced negotiators viewed Strategy "A" as
the least beneficial, four selected Strategy "C" as the least bene-
ficial, and four chose Strategy "D" as the least beneficial for the
school system. Strategy "A" was a narrow interpretation confined to
salary and fringe benefits. Strategy "C" referred to a strong manage-
ment's rights clause to establish a position that the board has non-
negotiable rights. Strategy «D», under Issue Six, supported a broad

168

interpretation of conditions of employment with discussions of concern
continuing throughout the year.

Issue Number Seven

7. What strategy is most beneficial for "curriculum and instruction
in collective bargaining?
A. '■ Curriculum and instruction should not be negotiated but the

procedures for curriculum- development, are legitimate items

for bargaining.

B. Curriculum and instruction should be dealt with by a joint
committee of administrators and teachers outside the adversary
setting of bargaining.

C. The collective bargaining process should include the estab-
lishment of curriculum review committees.

D. Curriculum and instruction provisions should be negotiated at
the table.

TABLE 22

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER SEVEN

Strategies A B CD Total

Most Beneficial 1 5 6

Least Beneficial 6 6

169

Admin/is tra t j_ve_ ^22l!J}^-J^Ll?^lJ^l^l

Issue seven was concerned with curriculum and instruction. Five
of six experienced administrative negotiators stated that Strategy "B"
was most beneficial for the school '/system. Strategy "B" was that
curriculum ond instruction should be dealt with by a joint committee
of teachers and administrators outside the adversary setting of bar-
gaining.

Sang, an experienced administrative negotiator from Duval County,
Florida, said "curriculum and instruction have no place at the table,"
but we .should still work in a "colleague type" situation since "teachers
are professionals." Wilson, an experienced administrative negotiator
from Polk County, Florida, contended that administrators and teachers
should get together to discuss curriculum and instruction !iin a
situation where they don't feel they have chosen sides." There must
be "give and take in collective bargaining and there is no room for
compromise in curriculum and instruction. " Wilson stated further that
the "range of instructional expertise is limited at the table." Few
people there "have the slightest idea of what should be occurring
daily in the classroom."

McDermott, an experienced administrative negotiator from Volusia
County, Florida, suggested that there is limited curriculum and instruc-
tion, skill on the teacher bargaining team. He said, "The people on
the negotiating team are activists who are generally not too involved
with instruction." He said, "If you were selecting a committee to
work on instructional improvement, the negotiators would probably not
be included.

170

_A single experienced administrative negotiator chose Strategy "A"
as tilt? most beneficial for the school system. That strategy was that
curriculum and instruction shocld not he negotiated but the procedures
for curriculum development pre legitimate items for bargaining. ' .

ATI six experienced administrative negotiators selected Strategy
"D" as the least, beneficial strategy for curriculum and instruction as
they relate to collective bargaining. Strategy "D" was that curriculum
and instruction should be negotiated at the bargaining table.

TABLE 23

TEACHER RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER SEVFN

Strategies A B C D Total

Most Beneficial 3 12 G

Least Beneficial 4 2 6

Teacher Responses to Issue Seven

Issue seven dealt with curriculum and instruction. Three of six
experienced teacher negotiators suggested that curriculum and instruc-
tion should not be negotiated, but the procedures for curriculum develop-
ment were viewed as legitimate items for bargaining, Phelan, an
experienced teacher negotiator from Volusia County, Florida, stated
that the purpose of collective bargaining "is to insure employees
input into decision making and bargaining the procedures for curricu-
lum and instruction insures input." Tonrvllo, an experienced teacher

71

negotiator from Deuit County, Florida, suggested that, "working wi i:h a
cumcuh'i-i committee is no gocd: it is just lip service for the super-
intendent. "

Two of six experienced teacher negotiators selected r,D" as the
most beneficial strategy for dealing with curriculum and instruction
as they relate to collective bargaining. Strategy !,D" was that cur-
riculum and instruction provisions should be negotiated at the table.
Exley, an experienced teacher negotiator from Duval County, Florida,
said, "If the teacher claims to be a professional, curriculum and
instruction would be most proper subjects for collective bargaining."

One of six experienced teacher negotiators chose Strategy "C"
as the most beneficial strategy in collective bargaining for curricu-
lum and instruction. That strategy was that collective bargaining
should include the establishment of a curriculum review committee.

Tour experienced teacher negotiators viewed Strategy "B" as the
least beneficial for the school system in dealing with collective
bargaining. Strategy "B'! was that curriculum and instruction should
be dealt with by a joint committee of administrators and teachers
away from the collective bargaining table.

Two experienced teacher negotiators selected Strategy "D" as
the least beneficial strategy for the school system. Strategy "D"
was that curriculum and instruction should be negotiated at the table.

£H!I!!™DlJiLJ^ Seven

Issue seven dealt with curriculum and instruction as they relate
to collective bargaining. Five out of twelve experienced Florida
negotiators contended that curriculum and instruction should be dealt

172

with by cTvjoirrt committee of administrators and teachers outside the
adversary setter:.-] of bargaining.

TABLE 24

TOTAL RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER SEVEN

Strategies A

C D Total

Most Beneficial",'' 4 5 -|
Least Beneficial &

12
12

Four out of twelve experienced Florida negotiators thought that
"A" was the mos^beneficial strategy for the school system. Strategy
"A" was that curriculum and instruction should not be negotiated but
the procedures .for curriculum development are legitimate items for
bargaining.

Two out of.; twelve experienced Florida negotiators contended that
negotiation of .p-o-arl urn and instruction at the table was the most
beneficial strategy for the school system.

One out of vtwel.ue experienced Florida negotiators selected "C"
as the most ben*.fj,&ia] strategy for the school system. Strategy "C"
was that collective bargaining should include the establishment of
currtcul urn rev law- .commi ttees .

Eight out *f ti-lve experienced Florida negotiators chose
Strategy "D!l as..,the least beneficial strategy for the school system.
Strategy "D". provided that curriculum and instruction provisions should

173

be negotiated at the table . The remaining four chose Strategy "8"
as the least beneficial strategy for tria school s.ystem. That strategy
would, result in the employment of a joint committee of administrators
and teachers to deal with curriculum and Instruction outside the
adversary setting of bargaining.

Issue Number Eight

0. What is the best strategy for dealing with compulsory unionism in
educational collective bargaining?

A. The school board should lobby for a strong right to work lav/.

B. The school board should insist on contract language that pre-
cludes nil forms of compulsory unionism.

C. The school board should lobby to keep any mention of com-
pulsory unionism out of the state law.

D. The board should insist the compulsory unionism is non-
negotiable.

TABLE 25

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER EIGHT

Strategies A B f, 0 Total

Most Beneficial 5 1 6

Least Beneficial 3 3 6

174
Administrative Response's to !'ss«e Fight

J s sue number eight focused 0:1 compul wry unionism in educational
collective bargaining. Five of the six experienced administrative
negotiators selected Strategy "A" as the must beneficial strategy for
the- -School -system. Strategy ."A" was that the school board lobby for
a strong right to work lav/. O'Brien., an experienced administrative
negotiator from Dade County, Florida, said, "A political prohibition
is the best strategy through lobbying for a strong right to. work law."
Sang, an experienced administrative negotiator from Duval County,
Florid?, said, "A right to work law is essential for keeping compulsory
unionism out of the contract." Edwards, an experienced administrative
negotiator in Sumter County, Florida, said, "You must do everything
possible to keep compulsory unionism out of the law."

One of six experienced administrative negotiators chose Strategy
,:D" as the must beneficial strategy for keeping compulsory unionism
out of school systems. Strategy "D" was tfiat the board should insist
that, compulsory unionism is non-negotiable. Wilson, an experienced
administrative negotiator from Polk County. Florida, said, "Compulsory
unionism is non-negotiable." O'Brien, an experienced administrative
negotiator from Dade County, Florida, disagreed. He said, "The
least effective way is saying that compulsory unionism is non-negotiable,
... You have the right to make no concessions but you can't say it's
non-negotiable. . . . The Public Employees Relations Commission deter-
mines what is negotiable."

Three experienced administrative negotiators selected "C" as the
least beneficial strategy to the school system and three chose Strategy
"D" as least beneficial to the school system. Strategy "C" was that

the 'school board loD'oy to i-eep compulsory unionism out of the state
law and Strategy "D" was that the board insist that compulsory
unionism is nun- negotiable.

Sang, c?n experienced administrative negotiator from Duval County,
Florida, and Schmidt, an experienced administrative negotiator from
Collier County, Florida, pointed out that keeping sometning out of the
law does net prevent it from turning up in collective bargaining.

TABLE 26

TEACHER RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER EIGHT

Strategies

A B C D Total

Most Beneficial 3 1 4

Least Beneficial 1 2 3 6

Teacher Res ponses to Issue .JLJgJvt

Issue number eight dealt with compulsory unionism in collective
bargaining in public education. Three experienced teacher negotiators
selected Strategy "A" as the most beneficial for the school system.
Strategy "A" was that the school board lobby for a strong right to

work law.

Phelon, an experienced teacher negotiator from Volusia County,
Florida, suggested that "boards have the right to protect themselves
from compulsory unionism." However, she pointed out that "boards

i/6

should be prepared to accept language t iicit protects individual teachers
from di scrim ir.atorv management practices."

Two experienced teacher negotiators added a new strategy as most
beneficial to the school system. Ex ley, an experienced teacher nego-
tiator from Duval County, Florida, added agency shop to the list. He
suggested that agency shop is a good ■ "compromise", since "membership
in the union is not required, but payment for services and benefits
is required." Wilson, an experienced teacher negotiator from Sumter
County, Florida, suggested that compulsory unionism is the most bene-
ficial strategy for the school system.

One of the six experienced teacher negotiators selected Strategy
"B" as the most beneficial strategy for the school system. Strategy
"B" suggests that the school board insist on contract language that
precludes all forms of compulsory unionism. Mercer, an experienced
teacher negotiator from Polk County, Florida, said that compulsory
unionism "doesn't fit. the union model."

Three experienced teacher negotiators chose Strategy "D" as the
least beneficial for the school system. Strategy "D" was that the
board should insist that compulsory unionism is non-negotiable.
Tornillo, an experienced teacher negotiator from Dade County, Florida,
stated that "the. Public Employees Relations Commission will determine
what is negotiable, not the local school board."

Two experienced teacher negotiators selected Strategy "C" as the-
least beneficial strategy for. the school system. Strategy "C" was
that the school board lobby to keep any mention of compulsory unionism
out of the state law.

177

One of six experienced teacher negotiators viewed Strategy "A"
as the least beneficial strategy for the school system. Strategy "A"
was that the school board lobby for a strong right to work law.

TABLE 21

I'OTAL RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER EIGHT

Strategies A B C D Tota'

Most Beneficial 8 1 1 10

Least Beneficial 1 5 6 12

Summary of Responses to Iss u e__E i_gh t_

Eight of twelve experienced Florida negotiators thought that the
school board lobbying for a strong right to work law was the most
beneficial strategy for boards for avoiding compulsory unionism.

Two of twelve experienced negotiators proposed a new strategy
as the most beneficial for school systems. That new strategy was
that compulsory unionism was the most beneficial approach for school
systems.. Exley, an experienced teacher negotiator, was critical of
the right to work law. He suggested that "the right to work was the
right to frecload."

One of twelve experienced negotiators selected Strategy "B" as
the most beneficial strategy for the school system. Strategy "B"
was that the school board should insist on contract language that
preel s.'des all forms of compulsory unionism.

1 78

'■Another of tin; twelve experienced Florida negotiators chose
Strategy .:,.i)" as the most. benef'icia'1 strategy for the school system
in ^voiding compulsory urv'aivism. Strategy "D" was that the board
insist that compulsory ..unionism- be non-negotiable.

Six. of twelve experienced Florida negotiators viewed Strategy
"D" as the lease beneficial strategy for the school system in avoid-
ing compulsory unionism. Strategy "D" was that the board insist that
compulsory unionism is non-negotiable.

Five of twelve experienced negotiators selected Strategy "C" as
least beneficial in avoiding compulsory unionism and one selected
Strategy "A" as least beneficial to the system in avoiding compulsory
unionism. Under Strategy "C", the school board should lobby to keep -
any mention of compulsory unionism out of the state lav/. Strategy "A"
suggests that the school board lobby for a strong right to work law.

Issue Number Nine

9. What strategy is most beneficial for the school system in resolving
an impasse?

A. Binding arbitration.

B. Advisory arbitration.

C. Fact finding with mediation.
0. Mediation.

Administrative Responses to Issue Nine

Issue number nine dealt 'with the strategy for resolving an impasse.
Four experienced administrative negotiators selected Strategy "B" as
the most beneficial for the school system for resolving an impasse.
Strategy "B" was advisory arbitration. Sang, an experienced administrative

179

negotiator f'roiv: Duval County, Florida, felt that advisory arbitration
was the most beneficial for the school system because the process
resulted in a non- binding recommendation to the board from a neutral
third party. Schmidt, an experienced administrative negotiator from
Collier County, Florida, observed that Florida negotiators appeared
•"reluctant" to go to arbitration, but it could be an "excellent tech-
nique for getting the monkey off the board's back." He suggested
that there were times "when pressures were "equally strong" from op-
posite directions for boards and, at those times, they often welcomed
a forceful recommendation from an outside party.

TABLE 23

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER NINE

Strategies

Most Beneficial
Least Beneficial

Total

6

6

Two of six experienced administrative negotiators viewed Strategy
"D" as the most beneficial for school systems in dealing with the
impasse issue. The strategy for "D" was mediation. O'Brien, an
experienced administrative negotiator from Dade County, Florida, stated
that mediation was the most beneficial for the school system because
"it. was the least restrictive." He said you can always tell a media-
tor, "forget it., Charlie," and since most mediation is in private,

180

you would- 'be "under no additional public pressure" to set i-n a certain
way.

Four of six experienced administrative negotiators chose Strategy
"A" as the least beneficial for the, school system in dealing with an
impasse. Strategy "A" called for resolving an impasse through bind-
ing arbitration. Several of the experienced administrative negotiators
spoke of the board's policy-making authority and warned that binding
arbitration could negate their authority.

Two of the six experienced administrative negotiators thought
that mediation was the least beneficial strategy for resolving an
impasse. Schmidt, an experienced administrative negotiator from
Collier County, Florida, suggested that "mediation never resolved
anything."

TABLE 29

TEACHER RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER NINE

Strategies A 6 CD Total

Most Beneficial 2 12 5*

Least Beneficial 3 1 2 6

*Exley» an experienced teacher negotiator from Duval County,
Florida, added work stoppage to the most beneficial strategy list.

J.?^£-:--L Responses to Issue Nine

Two experienced teacher negotiators selected Strategy "A" as the
most, beneficial to the school system in resolving an impasse. Strategy

181

"/V was binding arbitration. Phe'lan, an experienced teacher negotia-
tor from Volusia County, Florida, suggested that "binding arbitration
should be the final 'step in collective bargaining." Tornillo, an
experienced teacher negotiator from Dade County, Florida, stated that
"if issues cannot be resolved at the table, overt action must be taken
through binding arbitration or strike."

ExTey, an experienced teacher negotiator from Duval County,
Florida, added work stoppage as another strategy under the most
beneficial to the board. He said that "he was out of step with the
other teacher negotiators in Florida, for he did not believe in bind-
ing arbitration." He said that bargainers who know they have that
escape hatch will posture, not bargain.

A single experienced teacher negotiator viewed Strategy "C" as the
most beneficial for the school system in resolving an impasse. That
strategy was to employ fact finding with mediation.

Two experienced teacher negotiators chose Strategy "D" as the
most beneficial to the school system-, this strategy was to employ
mediation.

When asked to identify strategies which would be considered least
beneficial to school systems in resolving an impasse, three experienced
teacher negotiators selected Strategy "A"— binding arbitration.

Two of six experienced teacher negotiators thought that Strategy
"D" would be the least beneficial to the school system. Strategy
"D" was mediation.

One experienced teacher negotiator stated that advisory arbitra-
tion was the ieat beneficial for the school system and selected
Strategy ,!B". Wilson, on experienced teacher negotiator from Sumter

182

County., Florida, said "Advisory arbitration is least acceptable be-
cause that's what, we are doing now and it hasn't worked in Sumter
County."

TABLE 30

TOTAL RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER NINE

Strategies A B CD Total

Most Beneficial 2 4 1 4 .11*
Least Beneficial 7 1 4 12

♦Exley, an experienced teacher negotiator from Duval County,
Florida, added work stoppage to the most beneficial strategy list.

Summary of Responses to Issue Nine

Issue nine dealt with resolving an impasse. There was no clear
direction for the most beneficial strategy for the school system in
resolving an impasse. All of the strategies were selected at least
once and an experienced teacher negotiator added work stoppage to the

list.

Four of the twelve experienced negotiators chose Strategy "B" and
four viewed Strategy "D" as the most beneficial for the school system
in dealing with the impasse issue. Strategy "B" was advisory arbitra-
tion and Strategy "D" was mediation.

Two of the twelve experienced negotiators selected Strategy "A" as
the most beneficial strategy for the school system. Strategy "A" was
binding arbitration.

133

One of the twelve experienced Florida negotiators chose Strategy
"C" and one suggested a new strategy as the most beneficial for the
school system. Strategy "C" was fact finding with mediation and the
new strategy selected was work stoppage. The individual who selected
work stoppage refused to view the question from what was most bene-
ficial for the school system, lie stated that .his decisions were made
on the basis of "what was best for his union."

Seven of the twelve experienced negotiators chose Strategy "A",
binding arbitration, as the least beneficial strategy for the school
system in resolving an impasse. Four administrators and three teacher:
selected that strategy.

Four of twelve experienced negotiators viewed "D,! as the least
beneficial strategy for dealing with an impasse. Strategy "D" was
mediation. Two teachers and two administrators selected that strategy-
One of twelve experienced Florida negotiators thought "B!! to be
the least beneficial strategy which was advisory arbitration.

Issue Number Ten

10. What strategy would be most beneficial to the school board in
dealing with strikes in collective bargaining?

A. The board should send a registered letter to each teacher
in the system outlining the law, the teacher's responsi-
bility to pupils and community, and the action the board
will take against absent teachers.

B. The board should make every effort l:o keep the schools open
by calling upon qualified members of the community to take
over classes until the dispute is resolved.

184

C. The board should keep schools open by using district, admin-
istrative and supervisory personnel.

D. The board should use the ■lockout against striking groups.

TA'dLE 31

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER TEN

Strategies A. BCD Total

Most Beneficial 1 4 1 6 ■

Least Beneficial 1 1 4 6

Admin is tra t ive Responses te_J s_s ue Ten

Issue ten was concerned with the most beneficial approach for the
board to take when a strike is called by the employee group. Four of
six experienced administrative negotiators chose Strategy "B,!, Strat-
egy "B" was that the board make every effort to keep the schools open
by calling upon qualified members of the community to take over classes
until the dispute is settled.

Edwards, an experienced administrative negotiator from Sumter
County, Florida, suggested that the board "call on qualified members
of the community because there wouldn't be enough administrators employed
to man the classrooms." Schmidt, an experienced administrative nego-
tiator from Collier County, Florida, pointed out that the "strike
strategy must be to maintain pressure on the other group." He said

185

"open schools put pressure orr the - teat her group" ; therefore, a strategy --
that "keeps schools open is the best strategy."

One of six experienced administrative negotiators selected
Strategy "A" as the most beneficial strategy for the school system
during a strike. Strategy "A" v/as that a registered letter be sent
by the board to each teacher in the system outlining the law, the
teacher's responsibility to pupils and community, and the action the
board will take against absent teachers.

One of six experienced administrative negotiators viewed Strategy
"D" as the most beneficial for the school system during a strike.
O'Brien, an experienced administrative negotiator from Dade County,
Florida, suggested that the board use a "lockout" against the teachers.
He said, "It is the most effective way to mount counter pressure against
the union. The longer kids stay home, the more severe the community
pressure will be to have teachers go back to work."

Four of six experienced administrative negotiators chose Strategy
"D" as the least beneficial for the school system during a strike.
Strategy "D" was a lockout against teachers.

One of six experienced administrative negotiators viewed Strategy
"A" as the least beneficial strategy for the school system and another .
selected Strategy "C" as the least beneficial for the school system.
Strategy "A" involved sending a registered letter to each teacher in
the school system outlining the law, the teacher's responsibility to
pupils and community, and the action the board will take against
absent teachers. Strategy "C" was that the board should keep schools
open by using district administrative and supervisory personnel to
man classrooms.

136

TABLE 32

TEACHER RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER TEN

Strategies A B C D Total

Most Beneficial 3 3 6

Lea-it Beneficial 1 5 6

Teacher Responses to Issue Ten

Issue ten referred to work stoppage. Three of six experienced
teacher negotiators selected Strategy "A" as the most beneficial
strategy in dealing with a teacher strike. Strategy :,A" was that the
board send a registered letter to each teacher in the system outlining
the law, the teacher's responsibility to pupils and community, and the
action the board will take against absent teachers.

Mercer, an experienced teacher negotiator from Polk County,
Florida, selected Strategy "A" as the most beneficial "because that
would tend to keep schools open." She pointed out that a work stoppage
"creates many hard feelings in the community because schools belong to
the people."

Three of six experienced teacher negotiators chose Strategy "B"
as the most beneficial for the school system. Strategy "B" was that
the board make every effort to keep the schools open by calling upon
qualified members of the community to take over classes until the dis-
pute is resolved. Phelan, an experienced teacher negotiator from
Volusia County, Florida, thought that Strategy "B" was the most

beneficial for the school system, in dealing with strikes but urged
"everyone to do everything possible to get back to the bargaining
table."

Five of six experienced teacher negotiators chose Strategy ,!D". .... .

as. the least benficia'i for the school system in dealing with teacher
strikes. Strategy "D" was that the board use the lockout against
striking groups, fix ley, an experienced, teacher negotiator from Duval
County, Florida, wanted private sector bargaining procedures in "every-
thing but lockout strategy." He said, "Stopping the process is one
thing, but a lockout is unacceptable strategy in dealing with the
public schools."

One of six experienced teacher negotiators viewed Strategy "B"
as the least beneficial for the school system in dealing with a strike.
Strategy "B" was to keep the schools open by calling on qualified mem-
bers of the community to take over classes until the dispute is resolved
Exley, an experienced teacher negotiator from Duval County, Florida,
said that "management really hurts the situation in a work stoppage
when it persists in keeping the schools going because the quality of
instruction is reduced and children suffer."

TABLE 33

TOTAL RESPONSES TO INTERVIEWS
FOR ISSUE NUMBER TEN

Strategies A • B C D Total

Most fiensficiol 4 7 1 VI

Least Beneficial 1 I 1 9 12

188

Summary of Responses to Issue Ten

Issue ten was concerned with work stoppage in the public schools.
Seven of twelve experienced Florida negotiators chose Strategy "B" as
the most beneficial strategy for the school system when faced with a
work stoppage. Strategy "B" was that the board make every effort to
keep schools open by calling upon qualified members of the community
to take over classes until the dispute is resolved.

Four of twelve experienced Florida negotiators selected Strategy
"A" as the most beneficial strategy for dealing with a work stoppage
in the public schools. Under Strategy "A", the board would send a
registered letter to each teacher in the system outlining the law, the
teacher's responsibility to pupils and community, and the action the
board will take against absent teachers.

One of twelve experienced Florida negotiators viewed Strategy "D"
as the most beneficial for school systems in dealing with striking
teachers. Under Strategy "D", the lockout would be used in dealing
with a strike in public education.

On the other hand, nine of twelve experienced Florida negotiators
selected Strategy "D" as the least beneficial strategy for s_chool
systems. in dealing with strikes in public education. Strategy "D"
was that boards should use lockouts against striking groups.

One of twelve experienced Florida negotiators chose Strategy "A",
one selected Strategy "B", and one supported Strategy "C" as the
least beneficial strategies for school systems in dealing with strikes.
Strategy "A" proposed that the board send letters to all teachers in
the system outlining the law, the teacher's responsibil ity to pupils
arid community 5 arid the action the board will take against absent

iC9

.teachers. Under Strategy "ii", the board would, make every effort to.
keep the schools open by calling upon qualified members of the com-
munity to take over classes until the dispute is resolved. Strategy
"C" -was that the board keep schools open by using district administra-
tive and supervisory personnel.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

Summary - .

The problem of this study was to identify issues in the collec-
tive bargaining process in public elementary and secondary education,
referred to in this study as public education, and alternative strat-
egies for dealing with those issues from the school board's perspective.
Answers were sought to the following questions:

1. What were the issues and alternative strategies most frequently
cited in the literature and research relative to collective
bargaining in public education from 1965 through 1974?

2. From among the alternatives identified, which strategies
were most beneficial to the total educational program accord-
ing to the experienced administrative negotiators and experi-
enced teacher negotiators? Why were the selected strategies
most beneficial to the total educational program?

3. From among the alternatives identified, which strategies
were the least beneficial to the total educational program
according to the experienced administrative negotiators and
experienced teacher negotiators? Why were selected strat-
egies least beneficial to the total educational program?

4v From among the alternatives identified, what differences .
- and/or similarities existed between the most beneficial to

190

191

the educational program and the -least beneficial alternative
strategies selected by experienced administrative negotiators
and experienced teacher- negotiators in public education?
5. What, were some of the most important observations that, may

be made as a result of the interviews?
To identify issues and alternative strategies, a review was made
of literature concerned with collective bargaining in education
written between 1965 and 1974. That literature was used to develop
an interview guide that contained major issues and some of the alterna-
tive strategies for dealing with those issues.

Florida county school systems were surveyed to determine how long
the district had been engaged in collective bargaining, the names and
addresses of individuals responsible for negotiating for Florida school
boards, and the names and addresses of individuals negotiating for
Florida teacher organizations. Seven Florida counties had five or
more years of experience. They were Collier County, Dade County, Duval
County, Hillsborough County, Polk County, Sumter County, and Volusia
County. Since the writer came from Hillsborough County, those data
were not used. The other six counties represented large, medium, and
small pupil populations and urban and rural settings. For purposes
of validating the strategies and the issues, experienced administra-
tive negotiators and experienced teacher negotiators were interviewed
in those counties.

Implications J'o r _ the J heory and
Practice of Negotiations

The issues which emerged from the literature were those addressed
most frequently during the period studied. -Recommended strategies

192

were identified" through the review and firm lysis of the literature and
through an analysis of the interviews conducted among experienced
Florida --'negotiators. These sources were used to formulate the follow-
ing propositions which should serve as basic guidelines 'in the nego-
tiations process. In each instance, an issue is presented followed
by the recommended strategy or strategies.

1. What strategy should the school board adopt in determining
its ro'ie in collective bargaining?

The school board should select its bargaining team, establish
guidelines and limits, and give the team authority to act. Its chief
role is to provide policy guidelines to the superintendent and chief
negotiator.

The major caution found in the literature and interviews was that
boards should remain away from the table both as participants and, as
observers during the bargaining process. The practice of boards con-
ducting bargaining has declined since the middle 60s. Participation
required excessive time, some knowledge and expertise in the bargaining
process, and loss of the right to refuse to ratify the contract. Board
members were often embarrassed by experts in the field of collective
bargaining employed by teacher groups to conduct bargaining.

2. What strategy should the superintendent adopt in collective
bargaining?

The superintendent should function as executive officer to the
board, working closely with and providing direction to the board's
team. He should not represent both board and teacher teams, act as
chief negotiator for the board's tea;:'!, o>- assume a neutral posture
in collective bargaining.

■■■■■I ' 193

It is often necessary to slow the pace of bargaining to be sure
the proposed changes will be acceptable arid, further , that they can be
funded. The board's team can legitimately delay the proceedings to
"talk the issue over with the superintendent" if he is not at the table.
If the superintendent is at the table, a skillful teacher negotiator
will point out that his position as superintendent makes him the
executive officer for the board and there is no need for any delay.

3. What strategy should the principal use in collective bar-
gaining?

The principal should align himself with the board's team as. an
arm of management and sit with that team at or near the table in an
advisory capacity. He should not assume a neutral role, join the
teachers' bargaining group, or organize his own bargaining unit.

As an arm of management, the principal's input into the negotiat-
ing process is absolutely essential. If he accepts any of the other
options, he removes himself from participating in district policy
development. The result, where bargaining is concerned, may be a
policy with features that may be unworkable in the daily administra-
tion of a local school.

4. Who should be included on the school board's table bargaining
team?

The board's table team should include county office personnel
without the superintendent, principals in an advisory capacity, and
an outside expert if expertise in unavailable in the county. The
table team should not include board members, superintendents, or
attorneys. However, attorneys should be available for legal con-
sul tot ion when needed.

A problem exists'if the board's- -team is- composed of board mem- - -. .
bers, superintendents, and people at the very top level of district
management. Normally, 'these individuals are unaware of the routine-
procedures that comprise the daily operatic:-, of the school system. Pro-
cedural changes associated with concerns of this nature will be of
major interest to the tochers' team. In addition, the teachers'
team will have a thorough knowledge of the daily operation of the
school program. For this reason, the management team should include
someone close to the superintendent and board, someone with an under-
standing of district finances, and someone with the principal's knowl-
edge of the day-to-day operations.

5. What strategy should be used to get the necessary proposals -
to the bargaining table?

The board's team should consult with, principals to determine what
portions of the contract need modification. The teacher team should
consult with a representative body of teachers to determine what
changes would be desirable. Both teams should prepare proposals from
the recommendations and exchange those proposals during the first
bargaining session. The teams should not work from the existing agree-
ment nor should the board team work exclusively from counterproposals.

Exchanging proposals at the beginning of the bargaining session
gives the board's team the opportunity to take a position on changes
in present working conditions it feels are necessary. Placing a pro-
posed item on the table at the beginning of bargaining is the only way
the board's team may be assured that the item will be considered dur-
ing bargaining.

Working through counterproposals is acceptable for the first
year or two of a new bargaining relationship because the teachers'
team does not have a contract and the teachers' team will attempt to
change existing policy. Before the contract, policies and procedures
should reflect board needs and desires, but after the first contract
an offensive position by the board is essential.

6. What strategy should be used to determine the scope of col-
lective bargaining';'

The best strategy for determining scone should be a broad inter-
pretation of "conditions of employment" with discussions of concern
throughout the year. The scope should not be confined to salary and
fringe benefits.

State laws and courts have broadened the interpretation of con-
ditions of employment to the point where an attempt to restrict the
scope will increase the board and teacher conflict and provide unneces
sary negative publicity. The bargaining machinery should provide the
route to positive changes in education by developing procedures for
on-going program review during collective bargaining. The procedures
developed in bargaining would then be implemented throughout the year
away from the bargaining table.

7. What strategy should be used for curriculum and instruction

in collective bargaining?
Curriculum and instruction should be dealt with by a joint com-
mittee of administrators and teachers away from the adversary setting
of collective bargaining. However, the procedures for establishing
the joint committee, numbers of meetings, times of meetings, and

196

compensation for participants are legitimate -items tor bargaining.
Curriculum and instruction should not be bargained at the table.

Normally, neither administrative nor teacher bargaining teams
have boon noted for curriculum and instruction expertise. Teachers'
teams have consisted of teacher activists with a high priority for
salary concerns. Boards, have responded with -individuals who were
involved with district finances,

As bargaining has expanded its total scope in the early seventies,
more attention has been given to the curriculum and instruction area.
There was general agreement that teachers should participate in cur-
riculum and instruction but that participation should be away from the
adversary setting of bargaining. ... - .

8. What strategy should be used for dealing with compulsory
unionism in educational collective bargaining?

The school board should lobby the state legislature for a strong
right to work law. If compulsory unionism is not mentioned in the law,
there is a strong probability that it will become an issue in bargain-
ing. The board should not insist that it is non-negotiable, for most
states have regulatory agencies for determining what is negotiable.
The board's team should refuse to concede on the issue, but not refuse
to bargain it.

The ''right to work" laws have provided that teachers may either
join or refuse to join a union or association. In the absence of a
"right to work" law, similar language in the contract would have the
same result.

9. What strategy should be used by the school system in resolv-
ing an impasse in collective bargaining?

197

A single strategy or direction did not emerge in the interviews
for resolving an impasse. Mediation and advisory arbitration were
selected an equal number of times.- However, trie literature suggested
mediation and fact finding as most beneficial for boards. Boards
should avoid binding or advisory arbitration when possible.

Mediation and fact finding have been more acceptable to boards
because of the absence of pressure on boards under those strategies.
Normally, mediation is held in private and its purposes are to clarify
issues and improve communications. No recommendations d.re written
afterward and, therefore, boards have not been pressured to take a
particular action. Fact finding has been similar to mediation in that
no strong recommendations are made and boards are not pressured to take
action against what they consider to be their bests interests. Fact
finders base decisions on the information submitted by the teams, so
information should be carefully prepared and damaging assentations by
the other party must not go unchallenged.

10. What strategy should be used by the school board in dealing
with strikes in collective bargaining?

Trie board should make every effort to keep schools open by calling
upon qualified members of the community to take over classes until the
dispute is resolved. Teachers should be informed by registered mail
of the law, the teacher's responsibility to pupils and community, and
the action the board will take against absenteeism. The board should
not use the lockout against striking groups.

The strategy mentioned most often in i;ke literature was careful
planning by the district administration. The strike issue had implica-
tions for the entire community, for community pressures often determined

the strike -outcome. One st; i k e strategy was to apply pressures against
the teacher association that would reduce the level of public sympathy
for teachers and create pros sures from within the unit to go back to
work.. Using oud 1 i f ;i ed members of the community to keep schools open
was one way of increasing pressures on the teachers' association.

The lockout would have the opposite effect. Parents, who had to
keen children out of school might first support the board, but later
would transfer their concerns to the board for closing schools.

Substant i ve Conc'l usi ons

This study represented an attempt to identify some of the
important issuer, and strategies which have been used by. school boards
in dealing with collective bargaining between 1965 and 1974. Strat-
egies which have proved most beneficial and least beneficial were
identified and the differences as perceived by experienced negotiators
reported.

£o les _of _th e__Sc hoo 1 Boa rd_a lid! Superintendent

The roles of the school board and superintendent were vital in
determining the success of collective bargaining in education. Adjust-
ment from unilateral to bilateral decision making has been, a difficult
change and many 'boards and superintendents have not fully accepted their
new roles. The board should maintain its legislative and policy making
function in the collective bargaining process. Neither the board as
a body nor individual members should engage in table bargaining. The
board should limit its role to approving the team, establishing guide-
lines and limits, and ratifying the agreement.

The superintendent should become more kncwiedgable about collec-
tive bargaining in education, for it has become a major issue on the
education scene. He should reconcile the chancing role he must play
in dealing with teachers, for they ,;o"s looking for guidance and leader-
ship from union and association leaders. He should remain away from
the table during collective bargaining but close enough to caucus with
the board's team on short notice. As an agent of the board , the super-
intendent should work closely with the board's team in developing
strategies and direction.

.5pJl-s of the Principal

If principals are to be members of the management camp, efforts
must be made to develop a participatory management team approach. That
approach should include an internal structure characterized by open
communications in preparing policy recommendations and in planning
procedures for the system as a whole. Otherwise, principals in large
systems will gravitate toward their own bargaining units. The litera-
ture suggested some confusion among principals, and that confusion is
evident in the State of Florida. Principals in the largest Florida
system have formed their own bargaining unit and principals in several
other large districts are attempting to gain recognition from their
boards. In at least one county in Florida, principals are included
in the teacher unit,

Fven though principals may achieve some gains through their own
collective bargaininq units, their losses, and the losses to educa-
tion, will be significant. Principals who bargain with boards may not
turn around and sit with those same boards to bargain with teachers.

200

Teachers will, be quick, to. fire an unfair' labor pract ice complaint and,
under those circumstances, they will win.

Principals who have their own bargaining units will be unable to
provide the input to the board which is so necessary for successful
collective bargaining. Much that occurs at the bargaining table
influences the way the principal operates; consequently, the principal
ship may be damaged because of the lack of a spokesman.

Therefore, the principal should align himself with management
and sit with the board's team at the table in an advisory capacity.
He should not assume a neutral role, join the teachers' bargaining
group > or organize his own bargaining unit.

Composition _of the Board ' s Team

With the principal, in an advisory capacity, the board team
should include county office- personnel without the superintendent,
and an outside expert if expertise is unavailable in the district.
The board should be extremely careful in selecting an outside expert
and that course should be taken only as a last resort.

A more satisfactory option may be to select an experienced
administrator in the school system and send him to one of the train-
ing programs sponsored by the American Association of School Adminis-
trators or the Education Research Service. He will be familiar with
district policy and available after the contract is signed to assist
with contract administration. Since he must live with the contract
after it is signed, in all likelihood, he will be more cautious durinc
bargaining.

Study findings suggested that tiie beard's table bargaining team
should include:

201

1. A chief negotiator who is an emp loyee of the school system
with wide system knowledge and in close contact with the
superintendent and hoard.

2. An attorney for legal consultation who does not sit at tin-;
table during each session.

3. An individual thoroughly familiar with district personnel
policies.

4. An individual from the system business office who has an
intimate knowledge of all aspects of finance.

Pre pa ration for Jabl_e Bargaining

Much preparation is required before table bargaining may begin.
One of the most important aspects of proposal preparation is involve-
ment of the total administrative team. Principals administer the
agreement on a daily basis and are familiar with the areas which may
need modification. The individuals who work closely with grievances
will also know areas in the contract which should be modified. The
board's team working as a committee should receive the recommendations
which come in from the various principal and supervisory groups and
the recommendations are then put into proposals for board review. The
board should review the package in an executive session, establish
guidelines and limits, and approve the package for bargaining. Those
proposals are then exchanged with the association representing teachers
during the first bargaining session.

The reasons for exchanging proposals rather 'than simply reacting
to the teacher association's proposals is simple logic. If management
wants to modify an existing item which is clearly a condition of employment
it must place that item on the table or trust that the teachers'

202

association will place it on the table. Chances are, if management
feels the need to change an item, the teachers'association will be
satisfied with it in the present form and, therefore, will not place
it in their list of proposals. To avoid playing a defensive game
throughout bargaining, management should exchange proposals with the
teachers' association during the first session.

Scope of Bargaining

Should the scope, of bargaining be limited to salary, and fringe
benefits, or should "terms and conditions of employment" be interpreted
broadly? This question has been troubling school boards since the
early sixties. Boards have promoted a narrow interpretation of" scope
and teacher groups have called for a broad interpretation of scope.

For a union or association to remain in business, it must expand
the items that are- bargained. Otherwise, the people who pay dues to
keep the union or association in business will select another associa-
tion to represent them and the new spokesmen will seek to expand the
scope. The courts have assisted unions by constantly expanding the
interpretation of "other terms and conditions of employment."

The literature revealed that relationships within districts between
teachers and boards have changed as bargaining has continued- over a .
period of years from a fragile, demanding relationship, to a 'more-
mature. relationship. Long lists of items were presented during the
first few years and, as the. relationships matured, the lists grew
shorter but the 'scope often .broadened. Study findings indicated that '..
terms and conditions of employment should be interpreted broadly with
discussions of concern throughout the year. Although "discussions of
■concern- throughoi-t. the year" were not defined in the interview; most

2QS

of the experienced negotiators interpreted it to sugars that discussions
were held informally away from the bargaining table when a concern
surfaced during the year.

Most authors agreed on the need for broad teacher participation
in. areas sue!) as curriculum and instruction, but did not agree on the
medium for participation. The majority, however, did agree that col-
lective bargaining was not the way to improve curriculum and instruc-
tion. Curriculum and instruction should be dealt with by a joint,
committee of administrators and teachers outside the adversary setting
of bargaining. However, the procedures for involving teaching personnel
in curriculum development were legitimate items for bargaining.

Compulsory unionism

A strong right to work law was suggested in the literature as
the best way to avoid compulsory unionism. Placing language in the
contract that precludes all forms of compulsory unionism was a second
strategy reported.

Keeping any mention of compulsory unionism out of the law or
insisting that compulsory unionism in non-negotiable has not been a
deterrent. States where it was not mentioned in the law have been
plagued with compulsory unionism.

Resjmrtioi'i_of J np asses

The interview results supported the literature findings on all
issues except the issue on resolving an impasse. The strategies on
the interview guide and the implications of each were not well under-
stood by the majority of the experienced negotiators. Most had never
been involved in an impasse situation and selected advisory arbitration

because they have read the Florida Pub] ic [employees- Relations Act and
they know that the law calls for advisory arbitration on contract
impasse issues.

The literature suggested that the best strategies for resolving
impasses for boards were mediation and fact finding. Those two
strategies apply the least pressure. to boards because both occur with;
the teams in private and neither requires a third party recommendation.
The most pressure that can occur in fact finding is when the facts are
made public, usually after a specified period of time.

Boards normally have been reluctant to go to arbitration because
an arbitrator always makes a recommendation and his recommendation is
designed to put pressure on both groups to move toward a settlement.

■The strike- -issue -has continued to be a serious problem in educa-
tion. During a strike, both teams have attempted to transfer pressure
to the other group. Keeping schools open has kept pressure on the
teacher -association and closing schools has transferred the pressure
to the board. Study findings suggested that the most beneficial
strategy for the board was to keep schools open by calling upon qualified
members of the community to take over classes until the dispute was
resolved.

The least beneficial strategy for the board was the lockout; under
this device, schools are closed by the board and teachers and children
are unable to enter school buildings. Though this strategy lias been
used extensively in private industry, it has never been popular as a
strike counter strategy in education.

20S

Procedure 1_ Concj us ions

The following procedural conclusions appear to be justified by

the study.

1. The body of literature on collective bargaining in education
was sufficient to provide ample material for the identifica-
tion of issues and alternative strategies for coping with
each issue.

2. Issues have remained relatively constant over time, but the
strategies for coping with the issues appeared to be evolving.

3. When queried concerning the validity and relevance of the
issues and strategies, negotiators for administrators and
teachers had a high level of agreement except in certain
isolated instances.

1 Rip 1 i c a tip n s _fo r F urth er_ Research

The results of this study indicate that more research the area of
educations! collective bargaining is needed. Among the areas needing
further investigation are the following:

1. The changing role of the school board as a result of collec-
tive bargaining.

2. The changing role of the superintendent as a result of col-
lective bargaining.

3. The changing relationship between boards and principals when
principals form their own bargaining units.

4. The changing relationship between principals and the super-
intendent when principals form their own bargaining units.

206

5. The implications of employing an cut-side negotiator to con-
duct negotiations.

6. The changes in school staff perceptions of principals v/ho
engage in bargaining as a pari: of the management team.

7. The implications of compulsory unionism in public education.

8. The legal significance of binding arbitration in contract
disputes with elected officials.

9. The implications of grievances brought by teachers against
principals who are in the same bargaining unit.

APPENDIX 1

PRELIMINARY LETTER AND SURVEY

208

8304 W. Pocahontas Street
Tampa, Florida 33615
December, 1974

Dear Superintendent:

I am doing a study on collective bargaining and need some pre-
liminary information which can only be gained from county office
records. Would you please pass "this on to an individual in your
office v/ho -could complete and return- it to me? I will contact the
negotiator directly for any additional information needed in the
future. Thank you.

I plan to share the results of the study with Florida school
systems when it has been completed.

Sincerely,

Wa'l ter L. Sickles
Administrative Assistant
to the Superintendent

1. Was your county school system involved in collective bargaining
with teachers during recent years?

Yes No

2. Please indicate the number of years your county has been involved
in collective bargaining with teacher's.

Number cf Years

3. Please identify by name, title, and business address, the person
who will be the sdiooJ_system chief negotiator:

Name:

Ti tl e :

Business Address:

4. Please identify by name, title, and business address, the individual
who will be the tejt_c!iejr negotiator:

Name : ; _L1__

Title:

Business Address:

5. Signature of individual who completed this form:

6. County responding:

APPENDIX

SURVEY RESULTS TO DETERMINE YEARS OF BARGAINING
IN FLORIDA BY COUNTY

Count

Return

Alachua

2a !;<;)••

Bay

Bradford

Srevard

['•rev/arc!

Calhoun

Charlotte

Ci trus

Clay

Collier

Columbia

Dade

De Soto

Pixie

Duval

Fsea:nbio

Flagler

Franklin

Gadsden

Gi'rhrist

Glades

Gulf

H-nn»i 1 ton

Hendry
Hernando
Highlands
Hillsborcuah
Hoi uses

Indian River
Jackson
Jefferson

Collective

1972-73

Bargaining

Pupil

Experience

Enrol 1 inert"

24,233

G

3,196

1

20.413

0

4,100

0

57,931

0

142,804

0

2,249

3,861

0

6,541

2

12,816

5

13,239

7,649

5

261,011

0

3,568

1,817

5

121,855

6

51 ,829

1,513

0

2,063

10,497

0

1 ,363

0

1,158

0

3,038

0

2 ,398

1

4*728

1

4,022

1

5,911

7,817

6

117 ,432

3,475

0

9,781

8,595

0

2 4 664

?f!'-'l

APPENDIX ?. (Continued)

210

County

Lafayette

La k.e

Lee

Leon

Levy

Liberty

Madison

Manatee

Mac ion

Martin

Monroe

Nassau

Okaloasa

Okeechobee

Orange

Osceola

Palm Beach

Pasco

Pinal las

Pol k

Putnam

St. Johns

St. Lucie

Santa Rosa

Sarasota

Seminole

Suiiiter

Siii/annee

To.y 1 or

Union

Volusia

Wakulla

Walton

Washington

Return

Collective
Bargaining
Experience

1972-

73

Pupil

Enrol

1 merit*

832

18,

885

26,

795

22,

852

4,

296

1,

053

3,

873

20

331

22

1 57

o

316

12

172

7.

391

29

971

4

416

.95

359

8

057

75

222

20

597

99

936

63

841

11

407

8

187

12

973

12

,206

24

465

30

754

4

,869

4

,889

3

983

1

567

38

,681

2

196

4

,453

3

,459

♦Source : Prof i 1 es of _ Fl ojykla_JcJrjool_ JV
State iXepartinent of Exkic.atioi

itrict.s, Tallahassee, Florida:
PuBTTcation, March 1974.

APPENDIX 3

INTERVIEW GUIDE

The interviov; guide was mailed to selected experienced adminis-
trative nogot iators and experienced teacher negotiators in selected
Florida counties with a 'letter advising the negotiators that they
would be called for an appointment within the week. They were cr/Hed
and each was interviewed.

]NTTRVIT3[^U1DE_

SURVEY OF ISSUES AND STRATEGIES IN" COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

tie nuvpo'j

ose of this study was to identify some of the major issues

/hich have surfaced in collective bargaining in public
;■(! 195b and 1974. Would you please review these issues

eoueauun oe

and strategies d\vi be prepared to identify the strategies you feel would
be most beneficial and least beneficial with the issues identified.
Also, pi esse be prepared to indicate why you selected a certain strategy
as the most beneficial or the least beneficial in a particular situation.

jf none of the strategies listed would be the most beneficial with
a particular issue and you have found another strategy to work best in
that situation, please be prepared to explain that strategy.

1. What strategy should the school board adopt in determining its role
in collective bargaining?

A. The school board should select its bargaining team, establish
quidelines and limits, and give the team authority to act.

!1. fne board should conduct collective bargaining.

C.. The hoard should assign a board member to the team as an
advisor.

!). The board should assign a board member as chief negotiator.

2. What strategy should the superintendent adopt in coiiective
bargaining?

A.. The superintendent should act as a liaison between both teacher
and board teams offering advise and direction to both.

211

212

B. The superintendent should work as executive officer to the
board working closely with and providing direction to the

. board's team.

C. The superintendent should act as chief negotiator for the
board's team. ''

D. The superintendent should be completely removed from collec-
tive bargaining •fn order to preserve his leadership role to
both the~board"and the teachers by assuming a neutral posture.

3. What strategy should. the principal use in collective bargaining?

A. The principal should not get involved in ..collective bargaining
since he must work closely with the superintendent and teachers
at the same time.

B. The principal should align himself with the board's team as an
arm of management and sit with that team in an advisory capacity

C. The principal should organize his own bargaining unit and bar-
gain with the board.

D. the principal should be actively involved in the organizations
which are bargaining with boards to guard his place as an
instructional leader.

4. Who should be included or. the school board's table bargaining team?

A. The board's table team should include the superintendent, ......

selected staff, and principals.

B. The board's table team should include board members and county
office personnel .

C. The board's table team should include county office personnel
without the superintendent, principals in an advisory capacity,
and an outside expert if expertise is unavailable in the county.

D. The board's table team should include board members and an
attorney who has bargaining experience.

5. What strategy should be used to get the necessary proposals to the
bargaining table?

A. The teacher team should present a list of proposals to' the
board's team and the board's team should respond with counter-
proposals during bargaining.

B. Both teams should exchange proposals at the beginning of col-
lective bargaining.

C. Neither team should present a list of proposals to the other
at any time. Both should work, from the existing agreement.

0. The board's team should consult with principals to determine
what rules need modification. The teachers' team should con-
sult with a representative' body of teachers, to determine what
changes would be desirable. Both teams then prepare proposals
from the recommendations and exchange those proposals.

6. What strategy should be used to determine the scope of collective
bargaining?

A. The best, strategy in determining scope should' be a narrow
interpretation confined to salary and fringe benefits.

B. The best strategy in determining scope should be a narrow
interpretation oonf"ir:ed to salary anci fringe benefits at the
table with a plan for brood and active commit let- involvement
with teachers in all aspects of policy development away from
the table.

C. The best strategy in determining scope should be a strong
management's rights clause to establish the position that the
board hod rights which were. non-negotiable.

D. The best strategy in determining scope should be a broad
interpretation of "conditions of employment" with discussions
of concerns throughout the year.

7. What strategy should be used for curriculum and instruction in col-
lective bargaining?

A. Curriculum and instruction should not be negotiated but the
procedures for curriculum development are legitimate items
for bargaining.

B. Curriculum and instruction should be dealt with by a joint
committee of administrators and teachers outside the adversary
setting of bargaining.

C. The collective bargaining process should include the estab-
lishment of curriculum review committees, - '

D. Curriculum and instruction provisions should be negotiated at
the table.

8. What strategy should be used for dealing with compulsory unionism
in collective bargaining?

A. The school board should lobby for a strong right to work law.

B. The school board should insist on contract language that pre-
cludes all forms of compulsory unionism.

C. The school board should lobby to keep any mention of compulsory
unionism out of the state law.

D. The board should insist that compulsory unionism is non-
negotiable.

9. What strategy should be used by the school system in resolving an
impasse?

A. Binding arbitration.

B . Adv i sory arbi trati on .

C. Fact finding with mediation.
[). Media tide.

10. What strategy should be used by the school board in dealing with
strih.es in collective bargaining?

A. The board should send a registered letter to each teacher in
the system outlining- the law, the teacher's responsibility to
pupils d.wt community, and the action the board will take
against absent teachers.

B. The board should make every effort to keep the schools open by
calling upon qualified members of the community to take over
classes until the dispute is resolved.

C. The board should keep schools open by using district adminis-
trative and supervisory personnel.

D. The board should use the lockout against striking groups.

APPENDIX 4

The foVlowina 'letter Wc.s sent to selected experienced adminis-
trative one! selected experienced teacher negotiators in Florida.

Dear :

As a part of my doctoral research I am conducting a study of
issues and alternative strategies in collective bargaining in public
education. The dissertation is under the direction of Dr. K. Forhis
Jordan.. Professor of Educational Administration at the University of
Florida. I am attempting to arrange interviews with negotiators in
Florida who have had table bargaining expedience.

Please review the enclosed material and I shall contact you within
the next week to arrange an appointment at your convenience to dis-
cuss the information on the questionnaire. The meeting will. take less
than thirty minutes.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Waiter L. Sickles

215

APPENDIX E>

EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATORS INTERVIEWED

The following experienced negotiators were interviewed to vali-
date the research.

Adnri£r[sj^^i^Jlejotij^or_5_

1 . James Edwards

Director of Ad mini strati on
Sumter County, Florida

2. Robert McDoni:ott
Assistant Superintendent
for Personnel and Services
Volusia County, Florida

3. Gavin O'Brien

As sis '".ant Superintendent
Division of Legislation and
Employee Relations
Dade County, Florida

4. Herbert Sang

Associ ate Superi ntendent:

for Personnel

Duval County, Florida

5. Max Schmidt

E x e c u t i v e A s s i s t an t t o
the Superintendent
Collier County, Florida

6. David Wilson

Associate Superintendent for
Employee Relations
Polk County, Florida

Bargaining
ExpericjiCe

8 years

8 years

20 years

11 years

5 years

1 ye^sr

Darcaiainu ExnerienC'

vears

T ea c hev _ Nevjojri a tor±

1. Vincent Exley
President of Jacksonville
Federation of Teacners
Vice President of. American
Federation of Teachers
Duval County, Florida

2. Char1, a Mercer

Chief Negotiator Polk
Education Association and
Classroom Teacher'
Polk County. Florida

3. Roger Often
President Colli er Con nty
Education Association
Collier County, Florida

4. Ruth Phelan

Chief Negotiator Volusia
Education Association
Volusia County, Florida

5. Pat Tornillo
Executive Vice President
Dade United Teachers
Dade County, Florida

6. Leroy Wilson
President Sumter County
Education Association
Sumter County, Florida

Bargaining
E^£eri^enc£

7 years

3 years

7 years

7 years

1 i years

b years

Bargaining Experience -- 40 years

BIOGRAPHICAL. SKETCH

Halter Lee Sickles was born on June 9, 1934, in New Eagle,
Pennsylvania. He was graduated from Rostraver High School in Belle
Vernon, Pennsylvania in 1952. lie spent two years in the U.S. Army,
lie received a Bachelor of Science degree at California State College
in California, Pennsylvania, and a Master of Science degree from the
University of Pennsylvania "in Educational Administration and Super-
vision in 1962 and a Specialist in Education degree in Educational
Administration from the University of Florida in August 1974.

ivh\ Sickles is married to the former Janet Laughner of hit.
Lebanon, Pennsylvania and has three children, Lisa, Laurie, and
Matthew. He taught four years in Pennsylvania and New Jersey s was an
assistant, principal for one year in New Jersey, held principal ships
for five years in New Jersey and Virginia, directed a Title 1 pro-
gram in Hew Jersey, and was assistant superintendent for elementary
education for three years in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. He has served
as the Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent of the Hills-
borough County Schools in Tampa, Florida since November 1969, His
primary responsibility is chief negotiator for the Hillsborough County
School Beard. He has served as i> consultant for collective bargain-
ing for the Florida School Boards Association, The Florida Educational
Research and Development Council, The Florida Association of District
Superintendents, The American Association of School Administrators, and
several Florida school districts.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it
conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is
fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy.

K. florbis Jordan, Chairman
Professor of Education

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it
conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is
fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy.

Ralph B. Kimbrough
Professor of Education

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it
conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is
fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy.

Arthur J. Lewis-7
Professor of Education

This dissertation was submitted to the Dean of the College of Education
and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August 1975

Dean, College1' of Education

Dean, Graduate School

3 1262 08552 7751