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SUBVERSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NATIONAL CONVENTION

PART 2

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETIETH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 2 AND 3, 1968

(INCLUDING INDEX)

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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

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(90th Congress, 2d Session)

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The House Committee on Un-American Activities is a standing committee of the House of Representatives, constituted as such by the rules of the House, adopted pursuant to Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States which authorizes the House to determine the rules of its proceedings.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 90TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 7, January 10, 1967, as amended April 3, 1968, by House Resolution 1099

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Eighty-ninth Congress, together with all applicable provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended, be, and they are hereby, adopted as the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Ninetieth Congress * * *

* * * * *

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,

* * * * *

(s) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.

* * * * *

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

19. Committee on Un-American Activities.

(a) Un-American activities.

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member resigned by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

28. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee: and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

* * * * *

SUBVERSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NATIONAL CONVENTION

Part 2

MONDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1968

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Richard H. Ichord (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

(Subcommittee members: Representatives Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri, chairman; John M. Ashbrook, of Ohio; and Albert W. Watson, of South Carolina.)

Subcommittee members present: Representatives Ichord and Ashbrook.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank Conley, special counsel; Chester D. Smith, general counsel; Alfred M. Nittle, counsel; and Herbert Romerstein, investigator.

Mr. ICHORD. There will be order in the hearing room.

The committee will come to order.

These hearings are a continuation of the hearings which began on October 1 and adjourned on October 4, until today, December 2.

At the outset of the hearings, the Chair read into the record the resolution authorizing this investigation. There will be no need to repeat the same at this time.

It is my understanding that there are several reporters covering this hearing who did not cover the first 3 days of the hearing. Therefore, for their benefit, we will aid them in reporting the hearings.

I think I should briefly explain the purpose of the hearing and, also, the rules under which the hearings are conducted.

The purpose of the hearing is to investigate and determine the nature and extent of Communist and subversive participation in the organization and the instigation of the disturbances that occurred during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago and the connections, if any, of certain leaders of the demonstration with foreign powers.

And, as I stated in the hearings, there are several collateral issues which might arise that are not the subject of the hearings. There have been charges that the police overreacted; there have been charges that

the police underreacted. Those charges are collateral to these hearings. There have also been charges that national TV did not accurately report what happened in Chicago. That is not the purpose of these hearings. The purposes are as stated.

Now these are legislative hearings, a legislative investigation conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which is one of the standing committees of Congress. These are not trial proceedings. No one is on trial here. The committee seeks to punish no witness for conduct outside this hearing room.

The rules governing these proceedings are obviously different than the procedures used in a court of law, because the purposes are different, as I have stated.

The rules governing the proceedings—the primary rule is Rule XI, section 26, subsection (k), which reads as follows:

Witnesses at investigative hearings may be accompanied by their own counsel for the purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional rights.

On October 18, 1966, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Honorable John McCormack, ruled that this privilege of being represented by counsel, unlike advocacy in a court, does not as a matter of right entitle the attorney to present argument, make motions, or make demands on the committee.

Further rules governing the conduct of counsel and the witnesses are in the rules of the committee, Rule No. VII, ADVICE OF COUNSEL:

A—At every hearing, public or executive, every witness shall be accorded the privilege of having counsel of his own choosing.

B—The participation of counsel during the course of any hearing and while the witness is testifying shall be limited to advising said witness as to his legal rights. Counsel shall not be permitted to engage in oral argument with the Committee, but shall confine his activity to the area of legal advice to his client.

Rule VIII—CONDUCT OF COUNSEL:

Counsel for a witness shall conduct himself in a professional, ethical, and proper manner. His failure to do so shall, upon a finding to that effect by a majority of the Committee or Subcommittee before which the witness is appearing, subject such counsel to disciplinary action which may include warning, censure, removal of counsel from the hearing room, or a recommendation of contempt proceedings.

Now, due to experiences in the past, it has been necessary to take certain security precautions. The experience of the past shows to us that there are certain persons who would seek admission to this room for the purpose of disturbing and disrupting the committee hearings. Therefore, the Chair has taken the responsibility of having the security precautions being placed in effect.

For those who are guests of the committee—and you are welcome—I feel that I must read section 6, if there are any who would seek to disrupt the committee hearings—section 6 of Public Law 90-108, which reads as follows: “It shall be unlawful for any person or group of persons—”

[Subsection] (4) to utter loud, threatening, or abusive language, or to engage in any disorderly or disruptive conduct, at any place upon the United States Capitol Grounds or within any of the Capitol Buildings with intent to impede, disrupt, or disturb the orderly conduct of any session of the Congress or either House thereof, or the orderly conduct within any such building of any hearing before, or any deliberations of, any committee or subcommittee of the Congress or either House thereof;

The law goes on to proscribe such activity as a misdemeanor.

I read these rules and the law not for the purposes of making any threats. I appeal to the sense of decorum of all of those present in the room. I hope that the Chair does not have to invoke any of those rules or the statute, but there must be order maintained in the hearing room.

During the last hearings, despite repeated admonitions of the Chair, there were disruptions, particularly from the audience. I hope that this does not occur again and I want to state that the failure of the Chair to invoke any of these rules or the statute does not mean acquiescence in the conduct.

With that statement out of the way, Mr. Counsel—prior to recognizing you, however, I think I should read a communication into the record from the Honorable Edwin E. Willis, chairman of the full committee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, dated November 25, 1968, reconstituting this subcommittee. It reads as follows:

To: MR. FRANCIS J. McNAMARA,
Director, Committee on Un-American Activities.

Pursuant to the provisions of the law and the Rules of this Committee, I hereby appoint a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities, consisting of Honorable Richard Ichord, as Chairman, and Honorable John M. Ashbrook and Honorable Albert W. Watson, as associate members, to conduct hearings in Washington, D.C., commencing on or about December 2, 1968, and/or at such other times thereafter and places as said subcommittee shall determine, as contemplated by the resolution adopted by the Committee on the 12th day of September, 1968, authorizing hearings concerning Communist activities within the United States, with particular reference to the extent to which, and the manner in which the incidents and acts of force and violence which occurred in the City of Chicago, Illinois, during the week of August 25, 1968, were planned, instigated, incited, or supported by Communist and other subversive organizations and individuals, and other matters under investigation by the Committee.

Please make this action a matter of Committee record.

If any member indicates his inability to serve, please notify me.

Given under my hand this 25th day of November, 1968.

/s/ Edwin E. Willis,
EDWIN E. WILLIS,

Chairman, Committee on Un-American Activities.

Mr. Counsel, it was my understanding that the first witness to be called today was Mr. Abbie Hoffman. Is Mr. Abbie Hoffman present?

Mr. DI SUVERO. Mr. Chairman, I have a communication—

Mr. ICHORD. Will you come forward, sir, and identify yourself?

Mr. DI SUVERO. My name is di Suvero, and I am representing Thomas Hayden. I received a call last night from Mr. Gerald Lefcourt, who is representing Abbie Hoffman. He told me that he had been in communication, I believe, with Mr. McNamara and has advised Mr. McNamara that Mr. Hoffman had taken ill last week, was under doctor's care. Mr. McNamara asked that a letter be forwarded, and the doctor is sending the letter today, and it will be in the hands of the committee.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, then, the subpoena will be continued, with those facts in mind.

Thank you very much, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. DI SUVERO. Thank you.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel, call your next witness.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call Mr. Thomas Hayden.

Mr. ICHORD. Is Mr. Hayden present in the room?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. ICHORD. Will the witness please be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HAYDEN. I do.

Mr. DI SUVERO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce Mr. Hayden's cocounsel, Leonard Weinglass, a member of the New Jersey bar.

Mr. ICHORD. How do you spell that name, sir?

Mr. WEINGLASS. W-e-i-n-g-l-a-s-s.

Mr. ICHORD. And the first name is Leonard?

Mr. WEINGLASS. Leonard.

Mr. ICHORD. And what bar are you a member of, sir?

Mr. WEINGLASS. New Jersey.

Mr. ICHORD. And Mr. di Suvero, you are of the New York bar?

Mr. DI SUVERO. And California.

There was one matter that was left open by the committee chairman during the last hearings, and that was the matter under our point 11, which the committee chairman reserved decision on.

Point 11 referred to the fact that Mr. Hayden was under pending State criminal prosecutions in the State court of Illinois. What we asked at that time was that the committee not make inquiry, on the basis that such inquiry would violate Mr. Hayden's due process rights, as well as violate the separation of powers, insofar as J. Campbell has ordered an inquiry by the Federal grand jury.

And I would like to know what the committee's decision has been on that ruling.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel, could you explain to the Chair the nature of the prosecution?

Mr. DI SUVERO. Well, the State prosecutions are five counts. One is obstructing a police officer, two of disorderly conduct, and two of resisting arrest. The Federal prosecution, to which we have been advised Mr. Hayden is a target of that prosecution, is a prosecution under the Federal antiriot law.

Mr. ICHORD. Has there been an indictment?

Mr. DI SUVERO. There has not been an indictment.

Mr. ICHORD. If I may direct a question to the counsel of the committee, Mr. Counsel, do you propose to ask this witness any questions concerning the charges pending against him in the city of Chicago?

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Chairman, we do not contemplate any questions directed to his specific activities out of which these arrests apparently arose.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair is aware of Supreme Court decisions to the effect that if legislative hearings are conducted for the purpose of aiding the State in the prosecution of the case, Mr. Counsel, they would not be permissible, but this is not the purpose of these hearings.

The purposes are as I stated in my opening statement. Therefore, the Chair will have to specifically overrule point 11 of the motion filed by the attorneys, and the Chair would specifically instruct the counsel not to question this witness on any of the specifics contained in the charge of disorderly conduct and the other counts which the attorney has stated.

Mr. DI SUVERO. And that direction, I take it, Mr. Chairman, does not extend to any subject matter which might be the inquiry of a Federal grand jury.

Mr. ICHORD. Of course, the gentleman has not been indicted by the Federal grand jury. The Chair has been advised that the witness is in possession of certain facts which should be inquired into by this committee, and I would specifically rule that the pending grand jury proceedings would not prohibit this committee from examining the witness.

Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

**TESTIMONY OF THOMAS EMMETT HAYDEN, ACCOMPANIED BY
COUNSEL, LEONARD WEINGLASS AND HENRY M. DI SUVERO**

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, would you state your full name and address?

Mr. HAYDEN. My full name is Thomas Emmett Hayden, and my address is 6000 Broadway, Oakland, California.

Mr. CONLEY. And, Mr. Hayden, do you appear here today in response to a subpoena that was served on you on or about the 23d day of September?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. CONLEY. And was that subpoena served by Mr. William Wheeler, an investigator for this committee?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, sir, it was.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, would you give—

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel, can you bring the mike a little closer? I don't know whether you can be heard. I think people are having difficulty hearing you in the back of the room.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, would you give us a brief résumé of your educational background, please?

Mr. HAYDEN. You mean the colleges I attended?

Mr. CONLEY. High school and college, please.

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes; I attended Royal Oak Dondero High School in Royal Oak, Michigan, from 1954 to 1957. I attended the University of Michigan, 1957 to 1961. I returned to the University of Michigan 1962 through part of 1964 as a graduate student and as an instructor, and I taught political science at Rutgers University in 1967.

Mr. CONLEY. I don't believe you mentioned it. Did you get a degree from the University of Michigan?

Mr. HAYDEN. I did not complete my graduate studies.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you get a bachelor's?

Mr. HAYDEN. I got a bachelor's degree in 1961.

Mr. CONLEY. Was this in English?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, since your completion of your education, what particular positions have you held, since you completed your education?

Mr. HAYDEN. What do you mean by "positions"?

Mr. CONLEY. What jobs have you held, sir?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, as I said—you mean, jobs in the sense of how I get money?

Mr. CONLEY. Well, let us start with that; yes.

Mr. HAYDEN. Or political positions, or what?

Mr. CONLEY. Let us start with the jobs that you held where you get money.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, I have done some teaching, as I said, at Rutgers University. I have been paid as an author and lecturer, published two books, one by New American Library-Signet, on North Vietnam, and another on the conditions in Newark at the time of the rebellion of July 1967, which was published by Random House.

Mr. CONLEY. Excuse me. Was this book *Rebellion in Newark*?

Mr. HAYDEN. Right. And I remain under contract, writing another book on Vietnam for the same publishing house.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now have you, in connection with your book-writing, also written the preface to a book called *Mission to Hanoi*?

Mr. HAYDEN. You mean the book by Communist Party theoretician Herbert Aptheker.

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, I traveled—I was a fellow traveler to Hanoi with Herbert Aptheker in 1965 and I did write an introduction to his book, before I proceeded to write a book giving my own political views.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now then, these are the jobs that you have held where you received pay, as I understand.

Mr. HAYDEN. As far as I can recall.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, what jobs have you held in the political area, as you define it?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, I consider myself an organizer of a movement to put you and your committee out of power, because I think you represent racist philosophy—

Mr. CONLEY. Well, what group is that, sir?

Mr. HAYDEN. —that has no meaning any more in the 20th century.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, what group do you refer to that you represent?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, I have worked for many groups. As you know, I worked very hard for several years for Students for a Democratic Society. I worked—

Mr. CONLEY. Were you president of that group from June of '62 to '63?

Mr. HAYDEN. I was president of SDS, yes, during the time that you designate.

Mr. CONLEY. And were you the author of—

Mr. HAYDEN. But before that I was an organizer of it, and afterward I remained affiliated with it for some time.

Mr. CONLEY. Were you the author of the Port Huron statement?

Mr. HAYDEN. I wish that I was, but I was merely a drafter of the original document, and the author of the document was the convention itself that met in Port Huron.

Mr. CONLEY. You assisted, then, in the preparation of the document which was adopted by the convention?

Mr. HAYDEN. I was probably the major author of the original draft.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Was it materially changed by the convention?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes. It had a better position on the American capitalism. I was not too clear about the problems of American society, and the convention straightened me out by deciding that the profit system that you represent is a fundamental thing to be moved aside so that the country can move ahead.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, a minute ago, in con-

nection with your books, you mentioned that you had written a book about Vietnam. Was this book *The Other Side*?

Mr. HAYDEN. Right.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you collaborate on this book with the traveler that went with you, Mr. Lynd?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, I did.

Mr. CONLEY. And you coauthored this book together?

Mr. HAYDEN. Right.

Mr. CONLEY. And did I understand you correctly that this book came out subsequent to your preface to *Mission to Hanoi*?

Mr. HAYDEN. As far as I can recall, Herbert Aptheker's book came out rather quickly after the trip, and the book that I wrote with Staughton came out some time later.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, moving to another area, and that is the National Mobilization Committee, were you the coproject director with Mr. Davis for the National Mobilization Committee's efforts in Chicago?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, I was.

Mr. CONLEY. When were you appointed to this position?

Mr. HAYDEN. When?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't recall the exact date. I suppose it was in the very early—in the early spring.

Mr. CONLEY. Could you be specific in terms of months, sir?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't think I could, but I would guess at March or April.

Mr. CONLEY. March or April. By whom were you appointed?

Mr. HAYDEN. By the Mobilization, which has a structure for making such appointments, consisting of an administrative committee and a steering committee and a set of officers.

Mr. CONLEY. Were you a part of the steering committee or the officers or the—

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. In other words, you were appointed by this group. How many people are represented by this group?

Mr. HAYDEN. The Mobilization has representatives from nearly a hundred organizations, most of whom are active around particular subjects like the organization of the demonstration.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, did 100 people meet to decide to appoint you?

Mr. HAYDEN. I can't really recall. If you will allow me 1 minute to go talk to Rennie Davis, who has more of an organizational mind than I do, I am sure I could straighten it all out, but the Mobilization, through its normal processes, appointed me in the spring of the year to be a project director with Rennie Davis, and I went to Chicago for that purpose.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you receive this appointment in writing, or was it just verbal?

Mr. HAYDEN. Oh, no, that's not the way we work.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you recall who actually told you that you had been appointed?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I just knew that I had been appointed. I presume it was, if anyone told me that I was appointed, it was Dave Dellinger, who as you know is the chairman of the Mobilization.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, when did you go to Chicago and begin working full time for the committee?

Mr. HAYDEN. I went to Chicago at the beginning of the summer. Again, the exact date is something I would have to check, but it was late May or early June.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. And did you work out of the 407 South Dearborn Street address?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, I did.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, at the time that you started to work for the committee, were you paid any type of a salary?

Mr. HAYDEN. No. I didn't take a salary. I lived from my normal income.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you, during any of the time that you worked with the National Mobilization Committee, receive any salary or compensation?

Mr. HAYDEN. Not that I know. I don't—I think they allocated some funds for the office staff, and those probably were in Rennie Davis' name. But I wasn't too close to that end of the organization, and my services were basically volunteer services.

Again, there are ways, I think, if you—if Mr. Davis is here and he is listening to your questions, he can come before you with some more concrete answers to such questions.

Mr. CONLEY. Then, sir, is it your testimony that you received no compensation, either by check or by cash, for your activities in Chicago?

Mr. HAYDEN. As best as I can recall, I lived from my own income, but you see, I would—the way we live, I mean, I give Rennie some money, and he might give it back to me. And in that sense, it may have gone through the Mobilization at one time or another, but basically, I always lived on my own income.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, sir, I can understand with cash that this might be true, but do you have any specific recollection of having received any checks in any way that were earmarked as moneys for you as compensation for working with the National Mobilization Committee?

Mr. HAYDEN. There might have been some during the summer, but if there were they were a pittance. Maybe \$200.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. I can check that in my bank account. I just don't have the information here.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. You stated that you continued to live on your outside income. What was your outside income during the summer of 1968?

Mr. HAYDEN. How much money did I carry around, or what?

Mr. CONLEY. No, sir, what was the source of your income?

Mr. HAYDEN. Source of it? Speaking, based on the notoriety that people like you and the mass media have given me.

Mr. CONLEY. Your speaking appearances, then, were what you were able to derive your income from?

Mr. HAYDEN. And writing.

Mr. CONLEY. What particular articles were you writing at that time?

Mr. HAYDEN. This summer? Well, as I said, I was at work on the contractual basis with Random House on a new book on Vietnam.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, Mr. Davis worked with you in the Chicago office; did he not?

Mr. HAYDEN. He primarily ran the office.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you consider him your boss?

Mr. HAYDEN. No. He was my brother.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. How many other full-time employees did you have in the Chicago office?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't know, because we don't operate on that basis. As the convention approached, we had more and more people working out of the office on a multitude of problems.

Mr. CONLEY. Starting in June, how many people did you have there in June?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. HAYDEN. You see, because we have different views of the world, it sometimes may seem to you that I don't answer your questions, but that is primarily because I don't live in a world of jobs, money, and so forth.

Mr. CONLEY. No, sir; you have answered my question very nicely. I am just asking you—

Mr. HAYDEN. There is a number, I mean, I don't know how many people worked in the Chicago office in June. Probably 10 or 15.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. And then in July, do you have any statement as to how large the staff had grown to at that time?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. A guesstimate?

Mr. HAYDEN. More.

Mr. CONLEY. More than—

Mr. HAYDEN. Twenty, twenty-five.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir, and then during the first 2 weeks of August, what had the staff grown to?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't really know. It was larger, but see, it was organized not in terms of numbers; but we were organizing a legal panel to handle our suit against Mayor Daley, seeking to get permits for our demonstrations and rallies, and I don't know if you would consider those lawyers part of the Mobilization staff.

We were organizing doctors to prepare first aid stations, because we expected that, what with the announcement that 20,000 troops would be brought into the city, some people were going to get hurt. And we didn't want Mayor Daley's hospitals to be the only thing that we could go to if people were hit over the head. But I don't know if you would consider those doctors part of the Mobilization staff.

Mr. CONLEY. You considered them part of the Mobilization staff, didn't you?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, that is the doctors' group. We considered our responsibility was to make sure that sympathetic public health students, medical students, and doctors would get themselves together and stay in touch with us about our programmatic needs, and the same with lawyers, so the question of staff involves a lot of blurred lines. That is all I am saying.

Out of the central office, Room 315, 407 South Dearborn, as I say, there was always a nucleus of 10 to 30 people doing the normal central office work, answering the phone and sending out mailings and protecting the doors from people who might want to come in and shoot

the place up. That sort of thing occupied most of the people in the office. And as the convention approached, more and more people came to the office, at least to get some information about what was happening and where to go in the city. So it got to be a very large office situation by the time of the convention.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, you, then—do I understand it that it is your testimony you did not consider the lawyers, then, and the doctors, who were part of the overall plan, as a part of the Mobilization Committee?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, we don't think in those terms.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, you are the one that raised question that I might think in those terms, and I am asking you what you thought?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes; they didn't have to accept the Mobilization structure or follow its—I mean, they were not integral parts of it in the sense of groups that would abide by all the day-to-day decisions or general policy decisions. They were more cooperating groups, cooperating groups of doctors and cooperating groups of lawyers.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now after the convention was over, Mr. Hayden, did you then leave the Chicago area and go to the West Coast?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. And have you continued to remain on the West Coast, basically, since that time?

Mr. HAYDEN. Basically, since that time, yes.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. And did you consider—did you continue to receive in any way any compensation after the convention from the National Mobilization Committee?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. To your knowledge, you have not received any?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I haven't received it.

Mr. CONLEY. Now when you initially went to the Oakland area, did you not in fact live with Robert Scheer?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. You did not stay at his residence?

Mr. HAYDEN. I stayed at several residences, including his.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, you did stay at his residence at one time, then, since the convention and prior to this time?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, you are now living at what was it, 6000?

Mr. HAYDEN. 6000 Broadway, in Oakland.

Mr. CONLEY. In Oakland. All right.

Mr. Hayden, in the early months of 1968 numerous items that your National Mobilization Committee put out referred to you and Rennie Davis as coproject directors of the Chicago organization. You are familiar with the articles that I am taking about?

Mr. HAYDEN. Right—no, I am not, but I am familiar with the titles.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, your literature carried at the bottom of it you and Rennie Davis as coproject directors.

Mr. HAYDEN. Right.

Mr. CONLEY. Then a letter came out on August 10, 1968, on the stationery of the National Mobilization Committee and signed by Dave Dellinger, and it refers to Rennie Davis as project director and makes no mention of yourself.

Were you no longer a coproject director as of August 10?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I don't know the letter you are referring to, but from all that I recall we were always the coproject directors.

Mr. CONLEY. This is the letter, sir.

(Document handed to witness.)

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, this only refers to Rennie Davis as project director because Rennie would be—as I said, he was the managerial person in the office, and the section of the letter you refer to indicates that people should call the Chicago office and talk with Paul Potter, Vernon Grizzard, or Rennie Davis. And that makes sense to me because Rennie was the one who operated the office, but that doesn't imply that I was not a coproject director, even though I can understand how you might come to that conclusion.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, I just wanted to clear it up. Okay?

Mr. HAYDEN. Is it clear?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir. Now, Mr. Hayden, did you remain in Chicago from the time you arrived there in June until the Democratic Convention in August?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, I did, basically.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you leave there on at least one occasion, though, and go overseas?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes; I went to Paris to try to do some writing about the peace talks and to have discussions with Ambassador Harriman and with North Vietnamese officials.

Mr. CONLEY. Now was this trip made in July of 1968?

Mr. HAYDEN. To the best of my recollection.

Mr. CONLEY. And did you meet, when you were in Paris, with the North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, and U.S. representatives, including Mr. Harriman?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes; although I don't recall meeting with South Vietnamese representatives, or Viet Cong as you call them. I think—

Mr. CONLEY. Just—

Mr. HAYDEN. I passed them briefly at a reception.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Counsel, he answered "yes." You did meet with Mr. Harriman?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, of course.

Mr. CONLEY. Now do you recall specifically when in July these visits occurred?

Mr. HAYDEN. It was the beginning of July. I remember because I was there on the Fourth of July, and we had a Fourth of July celebration with all the Americans in Paris who wanted to come. We had a sort of a rally and a discussion with Vietnamese people and we showed films, and so on.

Mr. CONLEY. Now when you had these contacts with the North Vietnamese in Paris, did you discuss with them a meeting between U.S. and Vietnamese youth to be held in Budapest, Hungary, in September of this year?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I did not.

Mr. CONLEY. You had no discussion with them at all about that meeting in September?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. Prior to making this trip, did you consult with Robert Greenblatt? Specifically with reference to this trip?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. You had no discussion with Mr. Greenblatt, then, prior to making the trip to Paris?

Mr. HAYDEN. Of course I have had discussions with Mr. Greenblatt.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, let me finish.

Mr. HAYDEN. Prior to the trip.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, let me finish my question; I will try to let you finish your answer.

You had no discussion with Mr. Greenblatt specifically dealing with your making the trip to Paris or what you were going to do in Paris?

Mr. HAYDEN. I probably did. It was not a very significant or important meeting, but since he was around the Mobilization office, he was aware that I would be going on my way to Paris. And to the best of my recollection, I probably did not speak to Greenblatt because the trip to Paris was decided upon rather suddenly and I didn't stop in New York on my way out.

I am just trying to indicate that I may have talked to Greenblatt at some point before the trip; and if you would ask something more specific, I might be able to answer more specifically.

Mr. CONLEY. All right; well, it is a fact, is it not, that Mr. Greenblatt and Dave Dellinger had been in Prague earlier this summer at a meeting with the Vietnamese representatives?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, I believe that is true.

Mr. CONLEY. All right; now had you had any discussion with them with reference to this earlier meeting?

Mr. HAYDEN. What earlier meeting? Their meeting?

Mr. CONLEY. Their meeting in Prague.

Mr. HAYDEN. Not very extensive discussion, but I was aware that they had discussed in Prague a potential conference between Americans and Vietnamese, not unlike the conference that I had organized in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, in September of 1967. But I was working on the Chicago project, and conferences with the Vietnamese in the fall were not particularly on my mind. That is all I am saying. My responsibility was to work on Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Would you say that you had made this trip to Paris as an emissary for David Dellinger, who had been in Europe earlier this summer? Were you responsible for transmitting any messages for Mr. Dellinger?

Mr. HAYDEN. It is not clear. Are you referring again to the Budapest business, or what?

Mr. CONLEY. No; I am referring to your trip, sir. Your trip was to Paris.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, not an emissary of David Dellinger. He is the chairman of the Mobilization, and I am a close associate of his, and, but I didn't—

Mr. CONLEY. Well, sir, I will use your words. Did you make your trip as a "close associate" of Mr. Dellinger—

Mr. HAYDEN. Of course.

Mr. CONLEY. —for the purpose of communication of messages from Mr. Dellinger to the group in Paris?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, I think Mr. Dellinger was aware of what I was doing, and we sort of think alike, so I wasn't communicating his message to Paris so much as just communicating our own message.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Which would be both your messages, then, I take it, if you think alike.

Mr. HAYDEN. I think that is a safe conclusion.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Now Mr. Vernon Grizzard has stated that he attended the Budapest meeting. And did you, before you left for Paris, discuss with Grizzard, who was in charge of the marshals in Chicago, the possibility of his going to the Budapest meeting with the Viet Cong?

Mr. HAYDEN. Not that I recall; no.

Mr. CONLEY. You recall no conversations?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't think that Vernon was ever definite about whether he was going to Budapest or not. I think that that was a rather late decision, but you would have to call him and ask him.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Now while you were in Paris in July, did you have occasion to meet with Colonel Ha Van Lau?

Mr. HAYDEN. I met him briefly at a reception. I know Colonel Lau from my trips to North Vietnam.

Mr. CONLEY. You had met with him previously; in '65, was it not?

Mr. HAYDEN. I was there December of '65, January '66, and October '67. And on those two occasions I had extensive discussions with Ha Van Lau, because he is a very important spokesman, as you know, for the North Vietnamese. He is, in addition to being a major member of their delegation in the Paris peace talks, he was the—he was a part of their delegation to Geneva in 1953-54. I believe that he was a member of the delegation in the 1962 settlement—in conference to settle the Laotian situation.

He was the liaison between the North Vietnamese people's armed forces and the International Control Commission, which was set up by the Geneva agreements. He was the secretary-general of the North Vietnamese commission to investigate United States war crimes in Vietnam¹ and very instrumental in the [Bertrand Russell] tribunal² that found the United States guilty of genocide.

Mr. CONLEY. What was his title in July of this year, when you met with him?

Mr. HAYDEN. He was probably still all of those things. I don't know. But he was basically functioning as a member of the North Vietnamese delegation.

But don't misconstrue it. I didn't meet with him. I saw him by chance at a reception and shook his hand and didn't even exchange comments with him.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you recall who else you might have met with from the North Vietnamese delegation there in Paris?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes. I met with Vietnamese, again, whom I had known from North Vietnam.

Mr. CONLEY. Yes; their names, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. You want their names?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. Nguyen Minh Vy and Xuan Oanh, which I am sure you racists will be able to pronounce. If you want the spelling, I can submit it.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you have the spelling for the reporter?

Mr. HAYDEN. I will write it down and pass it.

Mr. CONLEY. Does this individual hold any official—

¹ Democratic Republic of Vietnam Commission for Investigation on the American Imperialist War Crimes in Vietnam.

² International War Crimes Tribunal.

Mr. HAYDEN. That is two people.

Mr. CONLEY. I am sorry, sir. The first one. Let us go back to the first one.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, they are members of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris. It is currently involved in discussions with the United States Government about ending the war. I don't know whether they have titles, as such, within the delegation.

Mr. CONLEY. Now did you also just meet these people at a reception?

Mr. HAYDEN. No; I had very extensive discussions with them, just as I did with Ambassador Harriman.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now did you in your discussions with them discuss the forthcoming Democratic Convention and the National Mobilization Committee's role in the Chicago convention?

(At this point Mr. Watson entered the hearing room.)

Mr. HAYDEN. I told them that what they were reading in the American papers was true, that we were involved very heavily in planning for that, but that wasn't the purpose of my visits with them.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. What was their reaction when you told them that what they were reading in the American newspapers was true, that you were heavily involved in the planning for the convention?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, they hoped very much that the American public will be able to make its desire for the war in Vietnam to end; they hope that that public opinion would make itself felt on the Government of the United States; and, as you know, they certainly think that a peace movement is in the interests not only of the people of Vietnam, but the people of the United States.

So they are always very interested in demonstrations or activities in the United States against the war, although they believe that the reason there is a peace movement is because the United States has been defeated in Vietnam.

They would never say that they could utilize public opinion in the United States, as some people apparently believe, to bring the war to an end. They believe the war will only be brought to an end in Vietnam itself when the United States is stymied.

Mr. CONLEY. Were they pleased at the focusing that your committee was having on the people in the United States? Did they have any reaction to this, the methods being taken?

Mr. HAYDEN. They would never meddle in other people's affairs, contrary to your theories of aggression in an infiltration, and so forth. They believe that the people—

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, I am not interested in what—

Mr. HAYDEN. People who have a problem—

Mr. CONLEY. Just a minute, now. My question requires a yes or no answer.

Mr. HAYDEN. I am—

Mr. CONLEY. My question requires a yes or a no, and then you can give your explanation.

Mr. WEINGLASS. Mr. Chairman, at one point—

Mr. ICHORD. Let us suspend for just a minute.

Mr. WEINGLASS. At one point, counsel asked the witness to give him an opportunity to complete his question. I think that courtesy washes both ways, and the witness should be given an opportunity to complete his answer.

Mr. CONLEY. Let us proceed. There was a give-and-take here.

Mr. HAYDEN. I will give better than a yes or no. I mean, I am not going to equivocate before this committee.

Mr. ICHORD. Let the witness proceed. We are going along very well here.

Mr. HAYDEN. If you want to state your question again, I will go at it more bluntly, or I will reduce it and make it simpler for you.

Mr. CONLEY. Was the North Vietnamese delegation pleased or did they have any reaction to the fact that your National Mobilization Committee was serving as a focal point for bringing this issue to the attention of the American people through the Democratic Convention?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, they are pleased at any kind of peace activity or any sign that people are beginning to come to their senses about Vietnam. So, of course, they are pleased about whatever the antiwar movement is trying to do in the United States—including demonstrations at the convention, including resistance to the draft, including traveling and speaking around the country on college campuses. Whatever we do for peace in Vietnam that we think is in our interest is obviously in their interest, because they want peace in Vietnam.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, moving to another area and taking you back, if I may, to about February of this year, back to February 11, 1968, actually, this is apparently when the first meeting of the National Mobilization Committee in relation to the Democratic Convention in Chicago was held, apparently this meeting was cochaired by Rennie Davis and Carlos Russell.

Mr. HAYDEN. What was the date of that again?

Mr. CONLEY. February 11, 1968.

Mr. HAYDEN. In Chicago?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes. It was held in Chicago on February 11, 1968.

Mr. HAYDEN. At 407 South Dearborn?

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, I don't know the address.

Mr. HAYDEN. Is that the meeting that I think this fellow here—

Mr. CONLEY. If you will let me complete the question, I think you will know what meeting I mean.

The meeting was cochaired by Rennie Davis and Carlos Russell and established an interim committee composed of yourself, Rennie Davis, Dave Dellinger, Robert Greenblatt, Earl Durham, Corky Gonzalez, Carolyn Black, Lincoln Lynch, Sue Munaker, and Carlos Russell, which was for the purpose of continuing the organization and planning of the project in Chicago.

Now my question, sir, is, Did you attend that meeting?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, I did.

Mr. CONLEY. And the address is 407 South Dearborn?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONLEY. Now do you recall who invited you to take part in that meeting?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. Whether it was by a verbal invitation, by written notification? You do not recall?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, I wanted the meeting to happen and just assumed that I would be there. I was among the people who probably organized for the meeting, although I wasn't living in Chicago at the time.

Mr. CONLEY. Besides yourself, who else would have organized for the meeting?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't know. It was probably primarily myself and Rennie.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, was it prior to or subsequent to this meeting that you and Rennie Davis coauthored the document, "MOVEMENT CAMPAIGN 1968: AN ELECTION YEAR OFFENSIVE," which was dated March 1968 and marked "*Not for Publication*"? [Hayden Exhibit No. 1. See pages 2562-2583.]

Mr. HAYDEN. Is it before or after?

(Voice from the floor.)

Mr. HAYDEN. I think that it was after. I think that we sort of took into account a lot of opinions expressed at that meeting, and then we wrote the document. To the best of my recollection, that is what I will testify to now.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. And Davis can correct me later if it turns out that I am being incorrect.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Now, did you and Rennie Davis also prepare another document for the National Mobilization Committee entitled "DISCUSSION ON THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CHALLENGE," and this document likewise was marked "*not for circulation or publication*," but was addressed to the Chicago organizers? [Hayden Exhibit No. 2. See pages 2556-2559.]

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't know. I don't remember such a document. If you will show it to me, I can easily tell you who wrote it.

(Document handed to witness.)

Mr. HAYDEN. Is this—this is it? This?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, of course, we authored it. It says we did. I just didn't remember the title. See, it is not really a title. It just says "DISCUSSION ON THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CHALLENGE." I think that was kind of a warmup for the later paper.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, now do you recall when this particular document was prepared?

Mr. HAYDEN. Oh, yes, it was—it was prepared sometime between January and February.

Mr. CONLEY. In other words, was this document prepared prior to the February 11 meeting?

Mr. HAYDEN. I think that it was, but again my recollection is kind of vague on that.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, now I believe this document is marked to the "Chicago organizers."

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I don't see that. Oh, yes. "National Mobilization." I can't read it. "To: National Mobilization Staff; Chicago organizers."

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir. Now who were the Chicago organizers to whom this document was directed?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, I don't think it was directed to Chicago organizers any more than anybody else, so I don't know. You see, I didn't type this and I don't know what that particularly refers to. But it probably, when the term "Chicago organizers" is used, that probably means that this document was circulated among active people throughout the city who organized tenant unions, rent strikes against slum

landlords, organize black people in the ghetto, organize draft resisters, organize students on campuses; you know, organizers.

Rennie was a Chicago organizer, as you know, for some time, working with poorer working-class white people on the North Side of Chicago, and he probably means by this that this memorandum was sent out to other organizers around the city.

That is a very revealing document in terms of what our intentions were. I hope that it is in your record, because it indicates that our intention was never to disrupt the convention or engage in violence.

Mr. ICHORD. That is part of the record, is it not, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. And I hope that also part of the record is the fact that we had a vote, according to this document that you gave me, on what kind of demonstration we wanted to have. This was at this February meeting you are referring to, when we voted against the view of disruption, which you have marked here, or someone has marked here, where it says:

One view * * * holds that the movement should prevent the Convention from assembling [sic]. * * * The movement should do everything possible to disrupt its deliberations in August.

And as part of the record, we voted against that view, in favor of another view.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, going back to the meeting of February 11, you have stated that you were present at that meeting that occurred.

Mr. HAYDEN. I must have been.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, did you hear Communist Party official Donald Hamerquist, and I quote as follows:

What we must do is make concrete demands on the Convention which the Convention cannot respond to. * * *

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, that would be a typical Communist Party position. Based on the idea that you have to organize people where they are at, and realize that your authorities will never give them even the smallest reward, so it wouldn't surprise me if Hamerquist said that.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you recall him saying that, sir?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I don't recall it. But it wouldn't surprise me in the least.

Mr. CONLEY. All right.

Mr. HAYDEN. By that he would mean, if you organize to demand housing for everybody in America, they will find out that you people never give housing to everybody in America.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, and then, Mr. Hayden, were you present when Communist Party member Jack Spiegel stated, "We can't call to"——

Mr. HAYDEN. By the way, I don't know if any of these people are members of the Communist Party. This is your committee and your tape recorders and you can go right ahead, but it is not my designations.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, sir, I hand you back the "Convention Notes." (Document handed to witness.)

Mr. HAYDEN. Jack Spiegel is designated as a Communist Party member?

Mr. CONLEY. I don't know what "CP" stands for, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. Chicago Peace Council, Jack Spiegel.

Mr. CONLEY. Look at Hamerquist, please.

Mr. HAYDEN. You didn't ask me about Hamerquist. When you said "Communist Party member Jack Spiegel," I interrupted you; when you said "Communist Party member Hamerquist," I didn't interrupt, because everybody knows he is a member of the Communist Party. It is listed.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Moving on to Mr. Spiegel.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Counsel, is it listed on that book?

Mr. HAYDEN. It just says, "CP." I assume that means "Communist Party." But Jack Spiegel is listed as Chicago Peace Council.

Mr. CONLEY. All right; Mr. Spiegel's quote as follows: "We can't"—

Mr. HAYDEN. What are you reading from? Some stolen notes, or what?

Mr. CONLEY. From your February 11th, page 4, column 2.

Mr. HAYDEN. Just give me the page, and you won't have to read it. Okay, what is it?

Mr. CONLEY. All right, the quote is:

We can't call 200,000 people to Chicago and then disassociate ourselves from violence. Disruption and violence will occur. It's going to happen and we'll have to deal with that fact.

Now, were you present when this statement was made by Mr. Spiegel?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, you haven't read it, of course. But I was present during the meeting. I don't remember him saying it, but if you will read the whole statement, I think you will find it is very interesting.

Mr. Spiegel does not mean that—

Mr. CONLEY. Now, sir, I am not interested in what—

Mr. HAYDEN. Just a minute.

Mr. CONLEY. That isn't responsive to my question, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. I was present, but I think it is fair for you to read all of Mr. Spiegel's statement, and I will read it for you, if you won't read it.

Mr. CONLEY. I am just asking you if Mr. Spiegel made this statement.

Mr. HAYDEN. Then I have to say I don't know, but I will go further and say that you haven't read his entire statement.

Mr. CONLEY. I am asking you, sir, though, did he make this statement?

Mr. HAYDEN. You had better call him and ask him.

Mr. CONLEY. I am asking you if you heard him make that statement.

Mr. HAYDEN. I can't remember him saying it, but here it is in the notes, so I assume he said something like that. What is the big deal that you are uncovering by reading from a note? I mean obviously he said something like that, or it wouldn't be in the notes. But the main problem is you haven't read his entire statement, which tries to point out that we are going to have to organize an alternative to violence.

Mr. ICHORD. The entire statement is a matter of record, is it not, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. Not for the press in this room, who are listening to your slander of Mr. Spiegel.

Mr. CONLEY. It has been previously introduced as Grubisic Exhibit 4¹ at the earlier hearings.

¹ See pt. 1, pp. 2293-2298, of Oct. 1, 1968, hearings.

Mr. ICHORD. Proceed with the witness.

Let the Chair declare a 5-minute recess.

(Brief recess.)

(Subcommittee members present at the time of recess and when hearings resumed: Representatives Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.)

Mr. ICHORD. The committee will come to order.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, directing your attention to page 4, column 1, of your "Convention Notes," the document prepared as a result of the February 11 meeting?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. There appears there a statement, which apparently is attributed to you, beginning at the top of the page:

As organization develops to challenge the Democratic Party, it must project a non-violent, legal face. We cannot call for violence, although violence is a major method of change in this society. * * *

Did you make this statement, sir?

Mr. HAYDEN. I made a statement to that effect. But again, you haven't read up my entire statement, which is typical of a witch hunt.

Mr. ICHORD. You wish the entire statement read?

Mr. HAYDEN. Either that, or if you would let me tell you why I think violence is a major tool of change, I would be glad to do that.

Mr. ICHORD. I think the question permits such an answer. Go ahead.

Mr. HAYDEN. Fine. I believe that violence should never be ruled out as a method of change; especially, I believe that a country that is burning up Vietnam has no right to lecture people to be nonviolent. However, I believe also that—I always believed that Chicago was no place for a violent confrontation, because you have a disciplined, armed force of 20,000 men waiting for you there, and you have unarmed demonstrators straggling in, 19- and 20-year-old kids from all around the country, who don't know each other, and they would be wiped out. They almost were wiped out in Chicago, simply for existing.

So I wanted to make a distinction in that meeting between the fact that I believe that at some point there may be increased violence in American society on the one hand and/or, on the other hand, I didn't believe that violence should be part of the planning or preparation or conception of Chicago.

I thought that what we were doing in Chicago was trying to sort of bring the kind of people who are the rank and file of the Democratic Party—decent, middle-class Americans of all ages and classes and races who believe in peace and social justice—to come and protest the abandoning of those ideals by the Government of the United States.

And I know very well that, for that kind of purpose, violence or the threat of violence only scares people away. And that is what I think Mayor Daley and President Johnson were engaged in by their buildup, military buildup; they were trying to scare people away from coming to the convention.

So I make no secret of the fact that I am not nonviolent, but often people who are not nonviolent can be the most nonviolent, because they know what they are doing and they want to make sure that the means suit the ends. And the means in this case for me was a mass mobilization of a peaceful kind. It became a violent situation because

of the Chicago Police Department, of which this committee is, I believe, an extension.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Counsel, could I ask a question at that point?

I think your statement regarding your preference that there not be a confrontation at that time would certainly be borne out by what you have said in the past. But isn't it also true that you probably, on the basis of your other statements, would prefer urban guerrilla type of activity, rather than a direct confrontation with 20,000 policemen?

I note from your interview in the *National Guardian* on July 1, 1967, page 4, where you say, I quote:

Urban guerrillas are the only realistic alternative at this time to electoral politics or mass armed resistance.

Mr. HAYDEN. I am glad you brought that up. I have been meaning to settle that score with the *National Guardian* for some time. What I said was that we have to function as "political guerrillas." I didn't say "urban guerrillas."

A political guerrilla is a person who uses the political concepts of guerrilla warfare without the weapons or the guns. The political concept of guerrilla warfare is to make yourself at one with the people you are trying to organize, be among them, go through their day-to-day existence, live on the same budget as they do, and organize them into a political force.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Sort of American Viet Cong?

Mr. HAYDEN. It would not be an American Viet Cong, until the day we started taking your guns from your police stations and turning them on you, and as far as I know, that hasn't happened, so you are making an extremely mistaken generalization that is merely meant to kind of paint the antiwar movement, the movement which is for peace in Vietnam, as somehow being an aggressive, violent movement. It is a case of the criminal calling the victim the criminal.

Mr. ASHBROOK. It is your position, when you said "urban guerrillas," you were not referring to urban guerrillas in the general context that most of us would think of urban guerrillas?

Mr. HAYDEN. I gave a speech saying that I believed that parliamentary means would be blocked in this society as we saw at the convention, the parliamentary efforts of Senators McGovern and McCarthy were blocked. And I felt that violent revolution was also not possible in the kind of society that we had; that, therefore, we had to find some kind of alternative to the traditional concepts of social change, which on the one hand are overthrow the government, and on the other hand are elect yourself president.

We have to find another way, and the way that I think is to organize a movement of people who are very strong minded and organized on local levels around their own grievances and are able to win more and more people to their side against the landlords and the tax collectors and the generals and the draft boards, who are sort of raping them.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Maybe I didn't make my question clear, but, specifically, when you, or at least when the reference attributed to you to urban guerrillas was used, you were not referring to the RAM type of urban guerrilla, snipers, and so forth?

Mr. HAYDEN. Oh, no; I was not referring to warfare in a military sense, and it was a misquote that I am sorry about, and have always had some problems of interpretation because of that statement.

Mr. ICHORD. I think you said "political guerrillas" instead of "urban guerrillas"?

Mr. HAYDEN. I said a lot more than that, but I said "political guerrillas."

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, since we have interrupted the continuity of counsel's questions, did I understand you earlier to say that you make no secret of the fact that you are nonviolent?

Mr. HAYDEN. I am not nonviolent is what I said.

Mr. WATSON. You are not nonviolent. Now am I to construe, then, you believe in violence?

Mr. HAYDEN. No more than you do. Probably less than you do.

Mr. WATSON. Is that right? Now one further—

Mr. HAYDEN. Especially given your political background in South Carolina, I believe that to be the case.

Mr. WATSON. Well, fortunately, I believe the gentleman is not as well read about South Carolina activities as he may be about some others, because we have been—

Mr. HAYDEN. I just read about all that disenfranchisement.

Mr. WATSON. —relatively free of that down there. Of course, we could debate that back and forth, and you are far less knowledgeable than others around you. When you stated earlier that you did not advocate violence in Chicago, your position was based upon the fact that there was an overwhelming force of some 20,000 policemen who would annihilate you, virtually, that's what you said.

Mr. HAYDEN. No; my basic reason was that I really wanted all along for the largest possible number of people to come, and that includes people with families, people bringing babies, and they would have to be guaranteed some safety coming to Chicago.

They are afraid of Chicago because of what they have heard about Chicago, and so we fought, throughout the spring and summer, with Chicago officials to try to get permits so that this number of people could come into Chicago safe and sound, and go out. And my own interpretation of why the city refused us permits is because they didn't want all those people to come and they knew perfectly well that the average person, like yourself, with family, would not go somewhere if he is afraid that he might be locked up or get hit over the head, because people can't take those kind of chances. There were babies, and even so, in Grant Park, when the tear gas came. Tear gas can kill a baby.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, your position is that we have these things without the provocation by such groups as you represent?

Mr. HAYDEN. I didn't understand that.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, your position is that we have such brutality as you alleged without the provocations by such groups as you represent?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, there is no question that we are a provocation to you. But why? It is only because we exist. Since when is obscenity, for example, a reason for a policeman to hit you over the head?

Mr. WATSON. In other words, you as an individual would welcome anyone to use any obscene language, in cursing you, or anything else, and you would just stand back quietly and fold your hands and say, "Thank you"?

Mr. HAYDEN. If I was a public servant engaged in protecting the law and order, I would not see obscenity as a threat to law and order.

Mr. WATSON. Oh, in other words, now we put you and the other citizens in a different category from a public official? A public official, in your estimation, is to take all types of abuse, whereas you or I or others, who are not public officials, do not have to be so restrained. Is that your position? I guess basically it is.

Mr. HAYDEN. What do we pay taxes to our Government for if it is not to have a professional government that is capable of having police force to—

Mr. WATSON. To suffer all types of abuse and profanity and obscenity? That is your basic position, isn't it? You enjoy a safe position, whereas the policeman, by virtue of his office, should expect abuse from organizations and individuals such as you?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, I pity the policemen, frankly. You haven't asked me enough—

Mr. WATSON. I certainly do when confronted with individuals like you.

Mr. HAYDEN. You haven't asked me enough about what I think to draw your conclusions.

Mr. WATSON. Let's reduce it to its simplest common denominator.

Mr. HAYDEN. What is that, Mr. Watson?

Mr. WATSON. You expect the policeman to accept, by virtue of his position, all types of abuse against him, whereas you as an individual would not accept such abuse without retaliation?

Mr. HAYDEN. Why don't you ask me why policemen are sworn at sometimes? I mean you don't just get mad at a person like this fellow here. I have nothing obscene to say to him, because he is not doing anything to me. His uniform doesn't disturb me any more than your suit disturbs me. Even the fact that he has a gun doesn't disturb me, if he has a gun. He hasn't done anything. I am not being obscene to him.

Now why do you think somebody suddenly screams profanity at a policeman? Why do you think he does it? I would say it is because he has seen the policeman charge into a crowd and beat somebody. And especially when it is at the order of Mayor Daley. I mean, a lot of abuse has been heaped on the Chicago police, and it is not really their fault. They were obeying the orders of Mayor Daley and people higher up, because when we went to jail, they didn't beat us in jail; they didn't act like irrational monsters in jail.

But what they did on the streets, they did in a highly disciplined way. They charged into crowds, they hit people in a disciplined way, they were carrying out orders. And when people are doing that to you, then you—at the very least—have a right to think obscene thoughts about their behavior.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Hayden—

Mr. HAYDEN. Especially if Mayor Daley can say on television what he said to Abraham Ribicoff, which goes far beyond anything said to a policeman, as you will find out, when it is revealed next week. He made an anti-Semitic remark; he used all the language to Ribicoff that he accused us of using. He is still the mayor of Chicago. He has not been called before you. He is not going to jail like we probably are. So let's put the cart before the horse, Mr. Watson.

Mr. WATSON. Now, getting back to the basic question I asked you, the policeman, in your judgment—

Mr. HAYDEN. We have handled that question.

Mr. WATSON. The policeman, in your judgment, is expected by virtue of his position to accept all of the verbal abuse, but you as an individual are not expected—

Mr. HAYDEN. Verbal abuse does not come out of thin air. Verbal abuse comes from an initial abuse, and abuse on the part of a police officer, which is very evident, which is evident in this enormous report, which I would like to introduce into the evidence. I have it here, it has got 1,400 witnesses to police brutality in the city of Chicago. It is not going to be printed by any other Government agency, and so my lawyers plan to introduce it today, so that at least some Government agency will publish it with all of its obscene words and all the rest of it, and you can see for yourself who transgressed first.

Mr. WATSON. One final question.

Mr. HAYDEN. The other major thing I want to say in answer to your question is simply again that I believe that even if someone verbally abuses a police officer, a good, solid professional police officer has no reason to act as jury, judge, and executioner towards the person who used profane language against him.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, he is to stand there and accept it, quietly fold his hands, even—

Mr. HAYDEN. If a person has violated the law, the duty of the police officer is to arrest the person, not to engage in profanity with the person, not to engage in brutality with the person, but simply to carry out the law, and these policemen know that.

Mr. WATSON. May I ask you one final question, then?

Mr. HAYDEN. It is an insult to police to think that, you know, that they have to—that they somehow are incapable of controlling themselves when abused. I think they are capable of it. I think that they were ordered into action by Mayor Daley. It was not the taunts of the demonstrators, it was not these bags of urine, it was nothing like that; it was the fact that they were ordered by Mayor Daley to get these Yippies out of the streets, because a person like Mayor Daley does not believe that we have a right to exist.

That's our crime, that we exist; we have long hair, we smoke dope, we are opposed to the war in Vietnam, and so we shouldn't exist.

Mr. WATSON. So the preparation of the bags of urine and other things, they were just in the normal routine?

Mr. HAYDEN. I didn't see the bags of urine. I said these supposed bags of urine.

Mr. WATSON. Let me ask you one other thing. You say you have 1,400 affidavits there?

Mr. HAYDEN. Let's see the *New York Times*, and I will tell you. It is the whole report which I am interested in.

Mr. WATSON. How many demonstrators do you estimate that you had out there?

Mr. HAYDEN. The police—

Mr. WATSON. All told?

Mr. HAYDEN. The police figure for Grant Park on August 28 was 15,000. That was the largest official figure, or journalistic figure given, and everybody agrees that—

Mr. WATSON. So you had a minimum of at least 15,000 demonstrators?

Mr. HAYDEN. Oh, no. The police said 15. Everybody—

Mr. WATSON. How many do you think?

Mr. HAYDEN. Everybody agreed that that was the largest number, August 28. That was the largest number for that peaceful rally in Grant Park. Before that, I think it was far less.

Mr. WATSON. So you had—

Mr. HAYDEN. We were outnumbered by the forces of law and order, so to speak, by about 5 to 1, I would say.

Mr. WATSON. I see. If it had been equal, perhaps you really would have made a challenge at that time?

Mr. HAYDEN. Hardly. Hardly.

Mr. WATSON. One final thing.

Mr. HAYDEN. Unless you think in man-to-man combat without weapons I can somehow handle this fellow officer here. I don't think I can.

Mr. WATSON. But you have some 1,400 or 1,600 affidavits?

Mr. HAYDEN. Not affidavits, just—

Mr. WATSON. Statements.

Mr. HAYDEN. There is a report that has been published that consists of testimony taken by an authorized task force of the National Commission to seek inquiry into the causes of violence,¹ and I think they have something like 1,400 witnesses, and I hope that—

Mr. ICHORD. Are these statements under oath, Mr. Hayden?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't know. Why don't you call these witnesses in? They will tell you about police brutality, under oath.

Mr. WATSON. Were they affidavits?

Mr. HAYDEN. I simply want to introduce it to you. Are you saying that this other Government Commission's study is invalid?

Mr. WATSON. I am simply asking, Are these affidavits or are they just statements?

Mr. HAYDEN. It is the report of the Commission, which is an authorized Government task force, which made the preposterous number of interviews to come to the conclusion that anyone could come to by watching television.

Mr. WATSON. But you never intended to cause violence at all?

Mr. HAYDEN. Absolutely not.

Mr. WATSON. Absolutely not; so all of the preparation, the training in the park—

Mr. HAYDEN. What preparation, Mr. Watson?

Mr. WATSON. Well, I assumed that you had to make a little preparation.

Mr. HAYDEN. What preparations?

Mr. WATSON. Having these bags of urine and the sticks and the razor blades and the stones and the nails in the golf balls, and so forth.

Mr. HAYDEN. That is quite a joke.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, your position is you deny that any of these things were there or used by the demonstrators?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I do not deny that.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you. That's all.

Mr. HAYDEN. But I deny that preparations were made.

Mr. WATSON. Do you allege that these things were used or prepared by the police? Someone had to prepare them.

¹ National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.

Mr. HAYDEN. Oh, well, they use—you mean the tear gas and the Mace?

Mr. WATSON. Oh, no; the bags of urine and golf balls.

Mr. HAYDEN. Would you rather be hit by a bag of urine or by Mace? Let's get first things first. Even if there were bags of urine, and I didn't see any, Mr. Watson—I didn't see any—I would still rather be hit by a bag of urine than be hit by Mace. That may be because you have never been hit by Mace; you have never been hit by your own cattle prods in South Carolina.

Mr. WATSON. Frankly, the reference to cattle prods in my State is ridiculous and irrelevant, and I've never done anything to require Mace being used against me. But I will assure you of one thing—

Mr. HAYDEN. What would you do?

Mr. WATSON. I would not sit by and quietly fold my hands and do nothing if bags of urine were thrown on me.

Mr. HAYDEN. You would break the law?

Mr. WATSON. Let me assure you—

Mr. HAYDEN. You would throw a bag of urine? What would you do?

Mr. WATSON. Well, I can assure you of one thing, that I would not sit back quietly and do nothing if the acts you committed against the police were done to me.

Mr. HAYDEN. Would you swear? Would you swear at the person who did it to you? Or you only do that at home?

Mr. WATSON. You are being interrogated, not I, and I have restated my position that were I a policeman, Congressman, or what have you, anyone who would throw a bag of urine on me would think twice before he did it again!

Mr. HAYDEN. Look, this is your hearing, not mine. I am not really interrogating you.

Mr. ICHORD. Gentlemen.

Mr. HAYDEN. I would like to redirect the question back to Paris, though, because I think incomplete testimony was given there, and you tried to imply something about the meetings in Paris that I want to correct, and go back there and tell you what really was being done in Paris. So at some point, when you find it feasible, let's go back to that so that the record will be absolutely clear.

Mr. ICHORD. We can get into that later on.

Mr. CONLEY. I think we will get back to Paris. Let's go back to February 11, 1968.

The first meeting that was held in the national organizers, the National Mobilization Committee to organize for Chicago, Mr. Hayden, were you aware at the time of your attendance at that meeting on February 11 that the following persons were in attendance at that meeting who were identified as members of the Communist Party?

Mr. HAYDEN. Identified by whom?

Mr. CONLEY. By this committee, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't pay any attention to your committee.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Well—

Mr. HAYDEN. I would have no—I mean, you identify almost everybody in the United States as a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. CONLEY. Kendra Alexander?

Mr. HAYDEN. Now what is the question? Was I aware she was there?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes.

Mr. HAYDEN. Or was I aware that she was identified by your committee as a Communist, or what?

Mr. CONLEY. My question was: Were you aware that she was there and identified as a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. You were not aware that she was there then?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, I was aware she was there.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir.

Earl Durham?

Mr. HAYDEN. I was aware he was there.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. You have these names underlined. What is that for?

Mr. CONLEY. Don Hamerquist?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, he was there.

Mr. CONLEY. Charlene Mitchell?

Mr. HAYDEN. She was there.

Mr. CONLEY. Jack Spiegel?

Mr. HAYDEN. And he was there. I mean, I don't exactly remember, but I assume they were there.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Were you aware that Charlene Mitchell, mentioned previously, was the presidential candidate for the Communist Party, U.S.A., during the 1968 campaign?

Mr. HAYDEN. That came as an interesting and pleasant surprise later. I think it is good that a black woman run for President of the United States. I think it is good that Communists are back entering American politics, even though I don't agree with their political program. But I doubt that even she knew that she would be a candidate for President of the United States at the time. And that was the first time that I had met her and I probably didn't even know her name.

Mr. CONLEY. Now if I may, again, you said that you did not know that Kendra Alexander had been identified as a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't pay any attention to who you identify.

Mr. CONLEY. All right.

Mr. HAYDEN. If I had to read all your reports——

Mr. CONLEY. Earl Durham?

Mr. HAYDEN. Earl Durham what? Was I aware that he had been identified by you? No.

Mr. CONLEY. Don Hamerquist?

Mr. HAYDEN. Same question?

Mr. CONLEY. Well, you can look at your own document, though.

Mr. HAYDEN. Is he identified by your group as a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CONLEY. I will restate the question to Mr. Hayden.

Mr. HAYDEN. What is it you want to know? Everyone knows that there are——

Mr. ICHORD. The reporter is having difficulty following the exchange. It is very fast. Let's ask the question again.

Mr. CONLEY. Let's go back and pick up the last question, and then move forward. Were you aware, from examining your own document, that Don Hamerquist was identified by your group as a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HAYDEN. You know, the Communist Party and anybody else opposed to the war in Vietnam can participate in the Mobilization. So

what? I mean, I don't understand why you are continuing the tradition of trying to point at these individuals, if you have pointed at them before.

I would be only too happy to discuss a general question, but I don't understand what you are saying.

Mr. CONLEY. As I understand your answer to an earlier question, Charlene Mitchell's candidacy for President on the Communist Party was not known to you at that time?

Mr. HAYDEN. No. I didn't know anything about her.

Mr. CONLEY. You learned that sometime later?

Mr. HAYDEN. I learned from the papers.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you recall when, approximately, you learned that?

Mr. HAYDEN. When it was announced in the papers.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you have any estimate as to when that was, sir?

Mr. HAYDEN. No. I am sure you do.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Mr. Hayden, these ones that are not identified by your document, which are identified by this committee—

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. —do you have any knowledge yourself that they are members of the Communist Party. That would be—

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I don't.

Mr. CONLEY. All right.

Mr. HAYDEN. Except, of course, Mrs. Mitchell, from what I read in the papers.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, referring back to your document, "MOVEMENT CAMPAIGN 1968—AN ELECTION YEAR OFFENSIVE."

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes. Do you have a copy of that?

Mr. CONLEY. Did you describe this document as follows, quote:

This paper proposes an election year campaign against a political system that has brought the United States into a crisis of war, racism, and social disintegration. We outline a possible strategy for this campaign. * * *

Mr. HAYDEN. I notice that your hand is shaking as you read those stated purposes.

Mr. ICHORD. That is not being responsive to the question, Mr. Hayden.

Mr. HAYDEN. I think Rennie wrote that. It is on the first page. It is kind of a description of what is inside.

Mr. CONLEY. You say that Mr. Davis wrote that particular—

Mr. HAYDEN. I think so. But, again, when he gets up here I am sure you can find out more clearly.

Mr. CONLEY. All right.

Mr. HAYDEN. This is just a little taste of what is to come, you know. It is just a cover.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, moving to page 15 of that document, did you make the following statements on that page, quote:

Black Rebellions: In our view, summer organizers working in the white community should discuss plans in each training school for support and parallel activity during black ghetto rebellions. * * *

Mr. HAYDEN. I wrote that.

Mr. CONLEY. "Whites should sit-in at Democratic Mayor's offices"?

Mr. HAYDEN. I wrote that.

Mr. CONLEY. "Organize medical and legal support"?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. "Pull together diversionary demonstrations outside the ghetto"?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes; that even happened.

Mr. CONLEY. "To draw off police and find ways to focus public blame for what happens on the powerful white interests"?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes; you should talk to Rennie about this, also, because he did just that with a lot of white people in Chicago in April. He organized demonstrations against the presence of National Guard in the city with a lot of other Chicago groups, and those people were bayoneted for carrying flowers, I believe, and gassed.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, getting back to this particular statement, is what you meant by that statement that whenever a race riot broke out in a ghetto area that you were desirous that the white community engage in simultaneous violent action in other parts of the community? Is this what you meant?

Mr. HAYDEN. No; you see, it is because you don't understand revolution. You can't start a revolution in your little suburb or on your campus just because the blacks over here started one. You don't do something because of something that is happening somewhere else. You don't do, you don't try to do the same thing.

What this means is that, you see, we felt that white people who are sympathetic on these questions have been sort of paralyzed by the situation in which there were these ghetto rebellions, the police could come in, and like in Newark, they killed 24 black people in 5 days, wounded hundreds, put a couple of thousand in jail; and sympathetic whites could find no way to react except by feeling paralyzed, watching television, and so on. And we thought that the—this had to end and we had to show that not all white people favored the brutal suppression of justified rebellion, and so we wanted white people to conduct demonstrations in the suburbs and at the police stations and at the mayors' offices and, if necessary, place ourselves nonviolently in front of the National Guardsmen.

Mr. CONLEY. Simultaneously?

Mr. HAYDEN. Sure, at the time that it is happening. Like in Boston.

Mr. CONLEY. And in the same community?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, not necessarily. In Boston this spring there was the threat of an outbreak in the ghetto. It started one night, and the next day a local group there organized a big rally of white people against bringing in troops to suppress those people, and 20,000 white people came, and there were speeches. And I think that had a small political effect in sort of cooling the situation and keeping the troops out.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, Mr. Hayden, in your statement you say to "pull together diversionary demonstrations outside the ghetto to draw off police." My question was: Did you mean in the same community? You are not suggesting, sir, that if there were a black rebellion in Newark, New Jersey, that a white demonstration in Los Angeles would pull off any police, are you?

Mr. HAYDEN. That would be very good, even though it wouldn't pull off Newark police. I think a better place would be to go have a big demonstration at the temple where the landlords go to worship and another big demonstration at the Roman Catholic Church where the police go to worship, and raise questions about what they are doing in

uniform, carrying the machine guns and automatic weapons down into the ghetto.

Mr. CONLEY. In Los Angeles or in Newark?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, right in the suburbs outside of Newark.

Mr. CONLEY. That's what I am trying to get at, sir. That's what we have been trying to get at, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. Do you get it?

Mr. CONLEY. I think we are getting it.

Mr. HAYDEN. Okay.

Mr. CONLEY. Are all landlords Jewish?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. I misunderstood your statement.

Mr. HAYDEN. But that's where most landlords tend to go, and most policemen tend to go to Roman Catholic Church, and that's where their conscience is, and that's where we should try to raise the question of how far they have strayed from their conscience. I certainly meant no ethnic slur. I meant there is a profound breakdown of religion in our country, as you know, in which people are not carrying out the basic teachings of morality or religion, unless those are carried out with tear gas and Mace.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, getting back to the document again, in this document you describe a series or a wave of activities, which included the following, surrounding—

Mr. HAYDEN. Page, please?

Mr. CONLEY. Page 18, sir—which included surrounding the Conrad Hilton, a Chicago hotel—

Mr. HAYDEN. I am sorry. Page what?

Yes, go ahead.

Mr. CONLEY. Are you with me, sir?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY.—which included surrounding the Conrad Hilton, a downtown hotel. And this was in fact done during the convention, was it not?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes. Where is that? What line? I don't see it. Page 18?

Mr. CONLEY. I am sorry, sir. I identified the wrong page. It starts on 17.

Mr. HAYDEN. Give me the first line there.

Mr. CONLEY. I am just generally paraphrasing, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. All right. Okay, but let's read it. I know what that is; it is beautiful, but I hope you read it into the record, and let the press hear what you are reading from, instead of distorting again, as you just did.

Mr. ICHORD. Go ahead, read, Mr. Hayden. You have it before you. Read it.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, we are giving examples of how we wanted to bring the question of poverty to the surface, because we didn't think that poverty and hunger would be dealt with by the Democratic Convention. And we were giving suggestions rather than instructions, as you can see from the use of the verb "might." We are trying to give suggestions of what might happen to dramatize what we wanted and we said:

To dramatize the demand and the urban condition, protests could focus on hundreds of the major institutions that irresponsibly contribute to urban breakdown; welfare offices, urban renewal departments, police stations, day-labor hiring halls, large slum landlords, schools and city hall. Different organizations would come to Chicago prepared to carry out a specific action program. The Mississippi Freedom Democrats might want to focus attention on their lack of representation or on the failure to deal with poverty across the country. Or a coalition of "poverty rights" organizations in one region might surround the Conrad Hilton, a downtown Chicago hotel, on the morning of the 26th to greet the delegates with leaflets demanding \$15 billion to end poverty and a breakfast menu totaling 15 cents, the amount allotted under welfare. At 10:00 a.m., the recipients might march from the Hilton to 318 West Adams to join with delegations coming from the other downtown hotels in a massive demonstration at the welfare office headquarters of Chicago. In the evening, the recipients might again return to the hotels to invite the delegates to spend the night with them in the ghetto rather than in luxurious hotels. * * *

Mr. ICHORD. This is suggested strategy of demonstration?

Mr. HAYDEN. This is something that we thought might be a good idea. It was a way to sort of clarify what we thought would be a good kind of protest.

Mr. ICHORD. What was your question?

Mr. HAYDEN. The question was, Didn't we surround the Hilton? In fact, obviously, we didn't, because the welfare mothers chose the road of going before the platform committee. And, in fact, the ones that I was in touch with felt it would be too dangerous to go stand in front of the Conrad Hilton, with all the police out there, so they confined their protest to speaking out forcefully before the platform committee, and they did not surround the Conrad Hilton and they did not invite the delegates to live in the ghetto, and so forth.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, is it your testimony, then, that no group did in fact surround the Conrad Hilton?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. "No," that is not your testimony, or "No, no group did"?

Mr. HAYDEN. No one ever surrounded the Conrad Hilton, but obviously people massed in front of it.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. The police surrounded it. I am sorry.

Mr. CONLEY. The word "surrounded," though, does appear in your treatise; does it not?

Mr. HAYDEN. Treatise?

Mr. CONLEY. Advocating that the Conrad Hilton be surrounded?

Mr. HAYDEN. No; it is a matter of describing a scenario of what might be a good thing to happen. We thought it might be very good to think about welfare mothers standing all the way around, surrounding the Conrad Hilton.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, you used the word "surround," is what I am getting at.

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, but what is wrong with picketing and surrounding a building?

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, I am not asking if there is anything wrong with it. I am just asking whether then, in fact, it did occur?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, it didn't.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. The only thing that did occur was a mobilization in front of the Conrad Hilton?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, no; much more than that occurred in front of the

Conrad Hilton, more brutality unleashed there than I have ever seen in one night in my life. I was almost killed there.

Mr. CONLEY. Now moving on with your document, did you not also suggest that actions could concentrate, or might concentrate, on dozens of war targets across the city?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, Chicago draft boards, the downtown induction centers, the Illinois Institute of Technology, which is the Nation's center for chemical biological warfare research, and major war corporations like Dow Chemical.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now were any of these things—was there any demonstration or any type of activities in connection with any of these particular suggestions?

Mr. HAYDEN. There probably were a few, but I was not aware of them because of the pressing needs to survive the police.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, did you not also suggest that a march be held on the International Amphitheatre immediately after the first ballot, the Amphitheatre being the site of the Democratic National Convention?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes; August 28 would be the fifth anniversary of the march on Washington, which you will recall, for jobs and justice. 1963. And since—

Mr. ICHORD. Are you referring to the march of unrepresented people, Mr. Hayden?

Mr. HAYDEN. No; the march sponsored by the late Reverend Martin Luther King and other figures, and they never got their jobs or justice. We thought that it would be appropriate and symbolic on August 28, 1968, 5 years later, with more unemployment in the country and the black community than ever, it might be good to, as we say, and I quote:

[August 28] might begin with a massive "Democratic Assembly," perhaps in Grant Park, and climax in a "funeral march" on the International Amphitheater immediately after the first ballot. Such a march could be led by retired generals, admirals and Vietnam veterans. The funeral procession might be organized by constituencies: blacks followed by clergy followed by women followed by farmers and faculty and workers and resisters and so on. This funeral would speak for those who say that the elections represent no choice and a complete breakdown of democracy, and those who pledge to use the fall election to expand the resistance into all sections of the American public: professors engaged in war research; people who pay war taxes; recipients who let themselves be pushed around * * *

And so forth, and so forth, and so forth. [Continues reading:]

While Johnson accepts the nomination—

You see, we believed that Johnson was still in there—

a half-million people in the largest protest in the history of the country carry caskets—

Not filled with arms and weapons, like the Viet Cong did in Saigon—carry caskets symbolizing the Democratic Party into the Convention area and bury them in Chicago's stock yards beside the Amphitheater.

That was certainly our hope, but this was a premature document. We didn't know what people would be for and we wrote it as a way of sort of suggesting what we thought would be a great protest.

Mr. ICHORD. What was your immediate objective, Mr. Hayden, to influence the choice of the Democratic Convention?

Mr. HAYDEN. No; we knew in advance that it would be a 1964 deal all over again, where the people would be fooled into believing they had a choice and that Vietnam war would be brought to an end, but in fact you would get a duplication of 1964, where as soon as the elections were over the war would be escalated. So we calculated in advance that the Democratic Convention would be the perfect time to expose the hypocrisy and chicanery of your politicians, who always are engaged in promising peace to people, while killing their sons.

And none of you Congressmen's sons are in Vietnam, but a lot of other people's sons are in Vietnam, and we thought that at the time of the——

Mr. ICHORD. One moment, Mr. Hayden. If you will examine the record——

Mr. HAYDEN. We want to draw that out.

Mr. ICHORD. —you will find that you are in error. There are Congressmen's sons in Vietnam.

Mr. HAYDEN. I think there are two or three, possibly, and I stand corrected—out of 500.

Mr. ICHORD. Proceed.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, referring back to the earlier document that we talked about earlier, which is the "Democratic Convention Challenge," do you have a copy of this document there?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't believe so. The one you gave me before?

(Document handed to witness.)

Mr. CONLEY. Now referring your attention to the top of page 3, did you not say in this document:

A massive confrontation with our government—the Democratic Party—as it holds its convention in Chicago this summer is being organized. * * *

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, that is no secret.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, you are the one that headed——

Mr. HAYDEN. We organized it. He and I were project directors. We tried to organize a massive confrontation, but your confusion is the press's confusion in believing that confrontation can only be military. This document spells out a political confrontation in great detail.

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir; I am just asking you if you made the statement, if it is properly attributable to you?

Mr. HAYDEN. To myself and Rennie.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Did you not further suggest that the Chicago demonstrations be used, and I quote you again——

to dramatize to the world the large numbers of people who feel unrepresented, and in fact disgraced and used, by our government's policies * * *.

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't see that, but that is certainly the way I feel about it.

Mr. CONLEY. If that statement appears there, would it be attributable to you?

Mr. HANLEY. Yes; I just don't know where it is, but I certainly take credit for that kind of viewpoint.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now turning to page 4 of that same document, sir, did you not also suggest that the local coordinating committees develop a plan to attack the Democratic Convention and did you not further suggest that——

Mr. HAYDEN. Where is this word "attack"? And what context? Page 4?

Mr. CONLEY. Pages 3 and 4.

Mr. HAYDEN. I will just read it until we come to it. I don't know—the summer should become a period of intense organizing, education and demonstration. As local coordinating committees develop to plan the attack [sic]—

Oh, yes—

the attack on the Democratic Convention, they should initiate recruiting and training programs for summer organizers—several thousand should be the objective—who build high school draft resistance unions, organize challenges to corrupt delegates, talk with teachers, doctors, veterans and welfare recipients about confronting the Convention on a particular day, gather intelligence on delegates who will be continuously confronted and talked to during their entire stay in Chicago, speak to hundreds of local trade unions about the war and racism, build pressure in the ghetto for the removal of all Democratic Party headquarters, and hold local war crime tribunals to expose prominent Democrats who manufacture antipersonnel bombs, poison gases or other weapons banned by international agreement.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, in the word "attack"—after you have read the paragraph, the word "attack" is your word. It is not mine, is it?

Mr. HAYDEN. It is your meaning. It is my word.

Mr. CONLEY. I haven't put any meaning on it, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. Of course not.

Mr. CONLEY. Now what did you mean in this statement, and I quote specifically, "build pressure in the ghetto for the removal of all Democratic Party headquarters"?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, we don't—you see, this was at a time when we were having a dialogue with sections of the black movement who were interested in the Democratic Party and building an alternative political party independent of it. And we don't think that the Democratic Party has much of a right any longer to conduct the kind of campaigns that it has in the ghetto, so we thought that it shouldn't even have headquarters there.

Mr. CONLEY. My question, sir, isn't what you thought. My question is: What did you mean by "build pressure in the ghetto"? How did you propose to build this pressure?

Mr. HAYDEN. We didn't. We didn't ever propose how to do it and we didn't ever try to do it.

Mr. CONLEY. What did you mean by it, then?

Mr. HAYDEN. What is "pressure"? Pressure, you organize people to go to Democrats and say—

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir; I am asking you now for your interpretation; don't let me put mine on it.

Mr. HAYDEN. You organize pressure, pressure is people, people going to local political hacks and telling them to deliver or get out. What could be clearer?

Mr. CONLEY. You mean you are suggesting that the pressure you were talking about was for Negroes within the ghetto to go to the political hacks, as you describe them, and tell them to get out?

Mr. HAYDEN. Deliver or get out. Stop campaigning and not delivering. Something like that. I mean, we never developed it programmatically.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, this statement doesn't give an alternative, sir. It merely says, "pressure in the ghetto."

Mr. HAYDEN. You see, the statement does not say get them out. The statement says, "build pressure in the ghetto for the removal of all Democratic Party headquarters."

Mr. CONLEY. It doesn't say, "If they don't deliver." It says, to remove—

Mr. HAYDEN. I was trying to interpret it further. But the main point is that very little of this happened, and I don't even have knowledge of whether it happened. So all of this is very suggestive, and we weren't committed to any of these strategies, like organizing high school unions. We didn't speak before hundreds of trade union locals and we didn't organize pressure in the ghetto to have Democratic Party headquarters removed.

Mr. CONLEY. Now directing your attention to page 4 and the first full paragraph on that page, did you not also suggest, Mr. Hayden, that—the summer should be capped by a week of demonstrations, disruptions and marches at the Democratic National Convention, clogging the streets of Chicago * * *.

Mr. HAYDEN [reads].

—clogging the streets of Chicago with people demanding peace, justice and participation in government. This should be a period in which the movement projects a series of broad, but concrete demands—demands which the vast majority of people can identify with, but which the Democratic Party is shown to be unable to meet.

The movement must not play into Johnson's hands by attempting to prevent the Convention from assembling, a position few Americans would accept or understand. Rather the action should build steadily through the Convention week, each day escalating the demands and the tactics, building for a massive confrontation at the time of Johnson's nomination. The initial challenges and activities might involve 50,000 to 100,000 people. The final funeral [sic] march on the Democratic Convention, beginning as the first ballot is taken, should bring a half million—people demanding a choice on the issues of peace and justice; citizens who have come to "make the democratic process work" by pinning the delegates in the International Amphetheatre [sic] until a choice is presented to the American people.

A well planned, educational build-up would precede [sic] the final days of militancy: for example, alternative platform committee hearings; challenges inside the Convention as well as outside; continuous "lobbying" with every delegate: outdoor rallies; daily press conferences—

And so on and so forth.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, what did you mean by the use of the word "militancy"?

Mr. HAYDEN. Oh, come on. I mean, I did not mean violence. I have put on the record, over and over, I did not mean that. And there are statements in this other document that you have read from which say that our protests should be nonviolent and legal. If you will give me the other document, I will read that to you.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, let me ask you another question in that vein.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel, at that point, it is now 3 minutes after 12. I assume there are still many questions to propound to Mr. Hayden. Perhaps it would be convenient to adjourn at this time until 2 o'clock.

The committee will reconvene at 2 p.m.

(Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., Monday, December 2, 1968, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.)

(Subcommittee members present at the time of recess: Representatives Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.)

AFTERNOON SESSION—MONDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1968

(The subcommittee reconvened at 2 p.m., Hon. Richard H. Ichord, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.)

(Subcommittee members present: Representatives Ichord and Ashbrook.)

Mr. ICHORD. The committee will come to order in the hearing room. A quorum again being present, the committee will resume its hearings at the point we left off prior to recess.

Mr. Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS EMMETT HAYDEN—Resumed

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, I think at the time of the recess you had been asked a question about a quote attributable to you which appeared in this publication, "DISCUSSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CHALLENGE."

I think the last question that we asked you was. Is there in fact a quotation in there, words to the effect, on page 4 in the first full paragraph, that—

the summer should be capped by a week of demonstrations, disruptions and marches at the Democratic National Convention, clogging the streets of Chicago * * *.

Mr. HAYDEN. No, that would be a total erroneous understanding.

Mr. CONLEY. Are those words in that?

Mr. HAYDEN. They're some of the words you have taken out of the sentence, out of the paragraph, and out of the document. You have done it in such a way as to totally alter the meaning.

Mr. CONLEY. I have not asked you what the meaning was. I have asked you if the words appear.

Mr. HAYDEN. I was putting my point in your reference.

Mr. CONLEY. Do the words, "demonstrations, disruptions and marches at the Democratic National Convention, clogging the streets of Chicago," do those words appear in that article?

Mr. HAYDEN. They appear, but not as a sentence.

Mr. CONLEY. They do appear?

Mr. HAYDEN. They appear in the context of a sentence.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, sir, I will be pleased to hear your explanation.

Mr. HAYDEN. I have already gone into that.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Then we will move on if we may. On the same page does not the following statement appear, that one of your policies or plans was "pinning the delegates in the International Amphetheatre [sic] until a choice is presented to the American people"?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, I read that to you before.

Mr. CONLEY. This does appear.

Mr. HAYDEN. As part of the sentence. I read the entire sentence before.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair has the paper before him. What page is that on?

Mr. CONLEY. Page 4, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAYDEN. The third full paragraph.

Mr. CONLEY. The third full paragraph on the page, I believe.

Mr. ASHBROOK. This, I assume, is nonviolently and peacefully you would pin them in there. How is this done?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't want to bore you, but I think I read to you an extensive description of the funeral march on the Democratic Convention before.

Mr. ASHBROOK. You don't pin people in a funeral march, do you?

Mr. HAYDEN. In effect, by coming down there to bury the coffins in the stockyard, the convention hall would be surrounded. Obviously, we would not be able to literally pin or literally prevent the convention people from coming and going, because obviously they have access that the police can allow for them.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Do you think all the people who were there knew that?

Mr. HAYDEN. In our permits, which we submitted in writing over and over again, which are public documents, we indicated what we meant by this. We indicated with maps and with descriptions where we wanted to go to the Amphitheatre, where we wanted our rally to be held. At no time did we submit plans or organize on the sort of preposterous basis of literally being able to pin or enclose people in a place.

Mr. CONLEY. Then, sir, is not the use of the word "pin" a poor choice of words?

Mr. HAYDEN. You may think so.

Mr. CONLEY. I am asking you.

Mr. HAYDEN. I think that our meaning is conveyed in this document adequately. I will defend the use of this word or any other word.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, another question in the same area. This is the only paragraph that I read in this particular article that we have been reading from today where it is not couched in the terms "might" or a proposal. It is couched in a more specific, almost to the point of saying "shall." I don't know whether you actually used the word "shall" in there, but it is not suggested as a possibility, at least this particular paragraph does not read as a possibility, as some of the other paragraphs do. It reads as a position.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, it says at the beginning—you see, we divided into spring, summer, and convention time. We said that the summer should be capped by a week of demonstrations, et cetera.

What we were saying here is that we prefer this thing that we write about to come about.

Mr. CONLEY. But you didn't say the summer "might" be capped by, you said the summer "should" be capped by.

Mr. HAYDEN. So what.

Mr. DI SUVERO. Mr. Chairman, could he finish his answer?

Mr. HAYDEN. I obviously said that. All I am saying is, that is exactly what you want me to say. It is what Mr. Davis and I proposed should happen, but I just want you to keep in mind that since this was written in January or February it was really meant to provoke discussion. Our own concept of what should be done and how it should be done changed over the next several months several times, depending on what the new situation was in the country.

Mr. CONLEY. Weren't these actions which you proposed, Mr. Hayden, actually planned to disrupt the convention?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. Was this the purpose?

Mr. HAYDEN. No. If you will let me give an extended answer, having

said "no," I will be glad to try to clear that up. I don't want to go over past grounds, but I have said several times, and shown you in documents that you have in your possession, that our purpose was political.

None of us thought that our purpose would be served by violence. We wanted the largest number of people to come to Chicago possible. We knew that the threat of violence would keep people away. Faced with what we considered to be the violence, the lack of permits, we decided we had to go to Chicago anyway and take our chances.

But at no time did we want that to happen for a very serious political reason. I think that most people in this country respect the right of the Democratic Party or any other party to hold a convention and decide on its candidates and decide on its policies. We are not questioning their right to do that. We are questioning their authority, their legitimacy, their status in our eyes, and, essentially, the morality of what they are doing. That is the point. If it was going to be disrupted, as I have said in speeches and in writing, in fact during convention week, I always believed that the disruption would occur by the military machinery turning against itself.

You see, you had a situation where an agent from one agency was arresting another agent. I mean they were spying on each other, arresting each other. I remember one day in Lincoln Park an officer from one agency arrested another fellow who was taking a picture, because he thought it was a demonstrator taking a picture of himself. It turned out there were just two people from different agencies spying on each other.

As you saw that momentum build up, due to the presence of so many troops in the city not exactly knowing what they were there for, and you saw the methods practiced inside the convention hall, in which a substantial minority of the delegates felt—whether you agree with them or not, a substantial minority of the delegates felt that the entire operation was being manipulated and controlled undemocratically by the Johnson administration, there were times inside the convention, on the floor of the convention, that mass violence almost broke out as a result of what one television broadcaster called the thugs who seemed to be on the convention floor. There were times when the chairman of the delegation moved that the convention stop and leave town. One U.S. Senator discussed from the podium the gestapo tactics outside and was attacked in obscene language by Mayor Daley.

Mr. ICHORD. Were you inside the convention, Mr. Hayden?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. ICHORD. You are testifying from hearsay?

Mr. HAYDEN. I am testifying from what I saw on television. I thought there were points during that week in which the convention would simply fold up. I saw the Democratic Party eating itself, because there is no security in this kind of military defense that the United States and that the convention had. You cannot secure yourself from people by building more and more barbed wire and getting more spies and infiltrators and more sophisticated weapons. All you do is make yourself fundamentally insecure. That is how I thought the convention would disrupt itself.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden—

Mr. HAYDEN. And it almost did. It almost ended before it came to the nominations.

Mr. CONLEY. In that vein I am sure you are familiar with the article which appeared in the December issue of *Esquire* dealing with you, Tom Hayden, "Will he overcome?" or something to that effect.¹

Mr. HAYDEN. You are probably far more familiar with it.

Mr. CONLEY. There is a paragraph in it. I am not attributing this as a quote to you, but apparently it is an assessment of the reporters talking with you. It appears on the last page of this article. In the third column it says:

This is the real point of Chicago. Hayden saw it as an ideal opportunity to provoke a confrontation with the police in full view of television cameras. Enough bloody heads and some people might get mad enough to cross over the line and put themselves in opposition, to become "radicalized." * * *

(At this point Mr. Watson entered the hearing room.)

Mr. HAYDEN. I am sorry, did you have something further to ask, or what?

Mr. CONLEY. I am asking you, in view of your answer here that you were not intending to disrupt the convention, if this impression you created with this reporter at least would indicate otherwise.

Mr. HAYDEN. I never talked to this reporter during or very far before the convention. His opinion about me is quite similar to yours. I can't help that, but I would like to read to you my own statement about the subject, which appeared in the *RAT*.

The *RAT* is a publication—

Mr. CONLEY. I don't mind your reading the statement if you will answer my original question. You say this is not a fair assessment.

Mr. HAYDEN. Of course, it is not a fair assessment. It is contradictory to everything I have said to you all day.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden—

Mr. HAYDEN. Let me tell you my position.

Mr. CONLEY. Just a second. Let me ask you this.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair is not going to require the witness to comment on the assessment by the reporter. If he wishes to do so, I will recognize him for the purpose of doing so.

Mr. HAYDEN. I would like to read a couple of things that I wrote, which were distributed in the closest thing to an official statement of what organizers of the demonstration were planning. In one article about the police preparations for the convention I said the following:

The main thrust of their schemes revealed the mentality of the bully, attempting to win by force what persuasion has failed to do: acceptance of a rigged political decision. The strategy is to frighten people into surrendering their right to dissent, to demonstrate, to take to the streets. [Bold face in original.]

Jack Mabley of the Chicago American wrote July 25 that Chicago has established the reputation of being "an uptight city, with tough police." This has achieved a "sobering effect" [he said] on potential peace demonstrators "who are willing to risk a slight bump on the head or a twisted arm or a night in the cooler in New York or San Francisco but not a skull fracture in Chicago." * * *

The purpose therefore, according to Mabley, of the police preparation was—

to develop a "strong movement . . . to warn young hippies and yippies away from Chicago."

¹ Steven V. Roberts, "Will Tom Hayden Overcome?" *Esquire*, December 1968.

Then I said the following:

The sadistic and provocative element, of course, is represented by the Chicago police department. They are expected to use their clubs especially at night against small groups of peaceniks. The NMC [Mobilization Committee] has asked the Justice Department to investigate the existence of a rightwing conspiracy within the Police Department to take advantage of the demonstrations to provoke violence. * * *

The Justice Department has refused to make such an investigation.

Then I go on to say:

The strategic problems of the establishment are immense, consisting of contradictions between the need for security and the need for political image. Security demands that they militarize Chicago and ring the Amphitheatre [sic] with troops. Too great a military presence threatens to alienate young people, McCarthy supporters, undermine confidence in the US government everywhere, and open the Administration to the ridicule of all its critics. Thus on the strategic level the government already is working from a political disadvantage.

Then I go on and on and on and I say:

The Mobilization has asked for the withdrawal of all military forces from the vicinity of our demonstrations. They can carry on routine functions but the Mobilization wants none of their "protection" which inevitably means police provocation and brutality.

However, if the authorities insist on ringing demonstrations everywhere with menacing troops, then they will be creating a full military occupation of Chicago. Thus, even peaceful and orderly demonstrations will be dramatic experiences and will show the widening gap between the people with grievances and their supposed political representatives. When not demonstrating, we can laugh from beaches and turn to more serious topics while they protect their government and [private] property.

In making Chicago safe for their "democracy," they will show others that this "democracy" is unsafe for human beings.¹

Again:

We understand that if violence occurs, it will be because of the negligence and brutality of national and local authorities. They have called us "disrupters"; refused us marching permits; bluffed through shows-of-strength-; refused to clean out the vigilante-reactionaries operating within the police forces; and, above all, resisted all peaceful pressures for change.

We do not welcome the beating or killing of even a single member of our movement. We do not reduce individuals to cannon-fodder as the warmakers do. We do not risk our people to "radicalize" others. But we know that serious struggle cannot begin without each individual preparing to accept jail or suffering as the price. We will not be intimidated into surrendering our rights to protest. We cannot allow an unjust law and order to be imposed by police methods.² [Bold face in original.]

Mr. ICHORD. This is the writing of yours, Mr. Hayden, which served as a basis of the reporter's assessment?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't know the basis of his assessment. I am saying that what I have just read is from the convention document of the *RAT*. It was the closest thing to a semiofficial position by myself and other organizers. I tried to point out that the convention was in danger of disrupting itself because of its security preparations, not because of us. These preparations can't go hand in hand with a peaceful convention. I tried to indicate that I don't really believe in this theory that the *Esquire* magazine article ascribes to me, that somehow you move people to the left or radicalize them by letting them get beat over the head by policemen.

All through the year—

¹ "the cops and the convention." *RAT CONVENTION SPECIAL*, p. 2.

² "DEMOCRACY IS . . . IN THE STREETS," *RAT CONVENTION SPECIAL*, p. 5.

Mr. ICHORD. You don't feel that pinning the delegates in the Amphitheatre would help to alleviate the undesirable conditions which you attribute to the convention?

Mr. HAYDEN. In our proposals which began in late spring and early summer in the city of Chicago, which I can bring out to you complete with maps, we can show how it was possible and how we proposed to the city how they could station whatever number of troops they wanted around the Amphitheatre, guarantee coming and going to all the delegates, and still allow a march to come to the Amphitheatre—which was the site of what we thought was a national tragedy—and have the marchers go around the Amphitheatre and have an enormous rally outside of it.

It would be possible to both have a convention and have such a demonstration. In other words, the collision between the riots of the conventioners, you folks, and our riots, did not have to come off.

Mr. ASHBROOK. If they played it your way?

Mr. HAYDEN. Right. Do you really think that the hippies and Yippies and people like myself are coming to Chicago, with the kind of composition of our movement that we have, that we seriously planned to take on the police department, charge through the doors, and tear up the convention?

That is ridiculous. That is what I tried to say earlier about why I didn't think violence was meaningful in Chicago. I don't believe in this sort of throwing around the concept of violence loosely. And I did not believe, and I never believed, that it would be possible, quite apart from whether it was desirable—I didn't think it was desirable either—but I knew from the beginning it was not possible to carry through on some kind of concept of invading or disrupting the convention.

What I wanted to know is why with all your police force, intelligence agencies, you weren't as smart as we were. I think you are as smart as we were so you turn the thing into a gigantic myth. Anybody knows that LSD in the water is not a real threat; it cannot work.

A little consultation with the doctor or scientist would straighten you out. With the Pentagon and State and local troops on the scene to figure things out for months in advance, I cannot understand why you thought it was possible, with minimum police protection, why it was possible for us to somehow enter and turn the convention upside down. I cannot understand it. Therefore, I think someone somewhere decided that it would be a good political thing to have all those troops in Chicago.

Mr. ICHORD. You are saying "you," Mr. Hayden. I think you have to remember that Mr. Ashbrook is a member of the Republican Party.

Mr. HAYDEN. Right. I was trying to draw him out.

Mr. ICHORD. Proceed with the next question.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, in this same vein let me ask you about something which appeared in *Granma*, the official organ of the central committee of the Communist Party of C. in its issue of September 8, 1968, page 12. [Hayden Exhibit No. 5. See page 2585.]

Mr. HAYDEN. Do you have that?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes. I will give it to you in just a moment. They published the text of an August 28 telephone interview with Michael Klonsky, national secretary of SDS. My first question would be, Do you know Michael Klonsky?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. This interview was apparently held with Mr. Klonsky by telephone from Havana to Chicago during the course of the convention. Mr. Klonsky was asked this question: "What can you tell us about the present situation in Chicago?"

Mr. Klonsky's answer was as follows:

We have been fighting in the streets for four days. Many of our people have been beaten up, and many of them are in jail, but we are winning. We pushed the police out of Grant Park, and the people were still in the streets. They are going to be in the streets all night, and we are going to do anything we can to stop this farce (the Democratic National Convention) which is taking place in Chicago. The people are committed to carry on this fight not only in Chicago but throughout the United States. We are going to go back to the hotel (The Conrad Hilton) and down to the park again, and are going to carry on the fight all night until the Convention is over. The police have been very brutal, and a lot of people have been shot and a lot of people have been beaten up, but the young people have committed themselves to fight, and they are fighting very bravely.

Now, Mr. Hayden—

Mr. HAYDEN. What was the date of this? When was this interview?

Mr. CONLEY. The interview was on August 28.

Mr. HAYDEN. How could that be? I see it is on the 28th. Then there is something curious about the interview, because on that day the convention was virtually ended.

Mr. ICHORD. The date of the convention was the 26th through the 29th, was it not?

Mr. HAYDEN. The nominations and the real finish was the night of the 28th. There was no demonstration or activity on the 29th.

Mr. CONLEY. This is in reference to the 28th.

Mr. HAYDEN. All right. What is your point?

Mr. CONLEY. My question is, Did you have any conversations with Mr. Klonsky in Chicago at the time of this interview?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. You know nothing about what he told them?

Mr. HAYDEN. What he told the Cubans?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes.

Mr. HAYDEN. No. This is the first I knew about this. I knew that a very funny thing happened. A Cuban radio called up the Mobilization office in the middle of the convention and asked what was happening, and Dellinger picked up the phone. That is the only time I knew about it. I think somebody else called from some other foreign country.

Mr. CONLEY. This particular answer to the question would indicate that whoever Mr. Klonsky was speaking for had no intention of letting the Democratic Convention be completed.

Don't you read it that way?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't quite read it that way.

Mr. CONLEY. "We have no intention of letting this convention finish" or "this farce"? I think he calls it "the farce."

Mr. HAYDEN. "We are going to do anything we can to stop this farce * * * which is taking place in Chicago." "Stop the farce," does that mean to you invasion of the convention? What does it mean? Certainly by that time it did not mean invasion of the convention, August 28.

Mr. CONLEY. He says you "are going to do anything."

Mr. HAYDEN. What does that mean?

Mr. CONLEY. That gives you a lot of options. That is what I am asking you, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. A lot or none. We have the reports on what was done according to the Chicago Police Department. As far as I know a lot of things were not done, there were no weapons confiscated. There were one or two. There was a McCarthy card among the weapons, there was a bag of urine or some sticks.

In terms of those realities I think this phrase, "We are going to do anything we can," should be judged in terms of the actual facts of the matter. You saw what they did. So I don't know what your point is.

Mr. CONLEY. My point is, sir, that he indicates in that interview that he was willing to do anything to stop the farce.

Mr. HAYDEN. Did he?

Mr. CONLEY. I asked you if that is not what the interview said.

Mr. HAYDEN. Obviously he must have decided there were things he should not do.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel, was the witness present at the interview?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't even know if it is a correct interview.

Mr. CONLEY. I am asking if that is what appears in the interview. That it all I am concerned with, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAYDEN. He certainly didn't indicate the convention would be stopped. He said we are going to carry on the fight all night until the convention is over, from the thing you have underlined.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, do you of your own knowledge know of anyone who was shot?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, killed.

Mr. CONLEY. In Chicago?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Who?

Mr. HAYDEN. An American Indian from one of the Dakotas whose name appears in the document. I can't remember his name. He was described in the Chicago papers as a Yippie-clad person alleged to have—he was shot and killed about the 24th, 23d or 24th, something like that. Allegedly he had pulled a gun out of his bag and shot at pointblank range at the officer, plainclothes officer, I believe, who had him; that is like 2 feet away.

Mr. ICHORD. Were you there?

Mr. HAYDEN. No. This is the report of the police. Somehow it missed this policeman.

Mr. CONLEY. Was this at the convention?

Mr. HAYDEN. At the beginning; just when people were coming to town. It threw extreme fear into people around the country. We had a lot of phone calls. The news went out around the country there had been the first clash between a hippie and policeman.

This younger person, I can read to you from page 83.

One incident which contributed to the week's uncertainty and the demonstrators' edginess was the August 22 killing of a 17-year-old American Indian, Jerome Johnson. Johnson, from Sioux Falls, South Dakota, was shot to death by police at North Avenue and Wells Street, just a few blocks southwest of the park. Police detectives said they fired their guns when the fleeing youth, identified as a Yippie, fired a .32 caliber revolver at them. The shooting caused one of the marshal trainers to say:

"We don't want to go overboard in ascribing malevolent intentions to the police, but obviously things are going to be getting very rough here. We've got to be prepared."

That is the only person that I know of that was killed in connection with the Chicago convention. But I know a lot of shots were fired over people's heads and that the situation was one in which some people could have been killed very easily.

Mr. CONLEY. Let me direct your attention back to the right column, the top of the same page of the Havana interview, wherein Mr. Klonsky apparently relates—

Mr. HAYDEN. He writes, "Some people were killed already several nights ago." I don't know whether Klonsky said that or whether the Cubans made it up. All I know is what it says here. It is reproduced and apparently was said on August 28.

Again, I don't understand your point except that this statement of his is in error, whether it is a Cuban error or Klonsky error.

Mr. CONLEY. Or an SDS error?

Mr. HAYDEN. SDS error? SDS does not make errors. We don't have such an organization. It is not capable of making any kind of decision.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, were you at a meeting held in Chicago by the National Mobilization Committee on August 4 of this year?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't know. Explain the meeting, and I will try to answer.

Mr. CONLEY. Maybe I can refresh your memory. Was it suggested at that meeting, if you were there—

Mr. HAYDEN. Where was it and who was at it?

Mr. CONLEY. 407 South Dearborn. It was suggested at that meeting by Rennie Davis, speaking for the steering committee of which you are a member, that on the day of the nomination, Wednesday, the 28th of August, you would have a massive march to the Amphitheatre.

Mr. HAYDEN. There was always the proposal of not simply Rennie Davis, but all the officers of the Mobilization, that we were going to march to the Amphitheatre.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis was speaking for the steering committee, was he not?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't know whether he was speaking for the steering committee or simply speaking for a project director.

Mr. CONLEY. This did, in fact, occur then?

Mr. HAYDEN. Let me see what you are reading from here. It will just take a second.¹

All I see, sir, is the following:

The discussion moved to the massive march proposal, analyzing the various routes to the Amphitheatre and the length of the different routes. Dave—

That is Dellinger—

pointed out that calling for an action not relating to the Amphitheatre on the 28th was ignoring the natural magnetism of the place, that the media would be at the Amphitheatre, and that the necessity [sic] of having the military surround masses of people at a democratic convention would lend political content to the action. There was a discussion on the possibility of proceeding in the face of a curfew threat or denial of a permit.

Mr. CONLEY. Go ahead and read. That is all right.

Mr. HAYDEN [continues reading].

¹"Summary of Administrative Meeting Held in Chicago on Aug. 4, Chaired by Dave Dellinger." See Grubisic Exhibit No. 25, pt. 1, pp. 2348-2352, of Oct. 1, 1968, hearings.

It was pointed out that the Mob[ilization] has rallied people before without a permit, and that insistence on fulfilling an announced aim made a strong bargaining position in negotiating a permit. * * *

I am trying to find what you say Rennie said. I don't find that. I will read everything, but—

Mr. CONLEY. If you are on page 2 this is all said by Mr. Davis.

Mr. HAYDEN. That is what I can't understand.

Mr. CONLEY. Mine says, "PROPOSED SCENARIO AS RECOMMENDED BY THE STEERING COMMITTEE, PRESENTED BY RENNIE DAVIS."

Mr. HAYDEN. That is absurd the way you are reading it. The "scenario," under where it says "proposed scenario," then the rest are notes from the meeting, from the discussion, made by whoever the secretary was.

Here it is:

The day of the nomination, Wednesday, the 28th, will see the massive march. At about 3 PM, marchers will gather north of the Loop, proceed through the central downtown business area to the Amphitheatre. In a specified one-mile area along Halstead neighboring to the Amphitheatre, the demonstrators can hold a vigil, picket, create theatre or rally for as long as the convention lasts; and when it concludes the marchers will leave as a unit to the Grant Park bandshell where they will disperse. This event, which will be aided by experienced marshals, will include a teach-in for the troops stressing our differences are not with them.

That was the proposal.

Mr. ICHORD. The proposal made after the application for the march to the Amphitheatre was applied for?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes. This was in the course of our negotiations with the city, if you want to call them negotiations. I would say it was sort of a one-way monologue, with the city listening to us but not responding until a couple of days before the convention.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, in connection with the paragraph that you were reading a while ago and directing your attention specifically to the top of page 4—

Mr. HAYDEN. What is the first word on 4, I don't have a number.

Mr. CONLEY. "Insistence."

Mr. HAYDEN. I saw that wink in your eye. You want me to read down there?

Mr. CONLEY. No; I just want to know did there not occur the possibility that the city of Chicago would not permit a march against the Democratic Convention and was it not suggested by the persons in attendance that you would make this march on the Democratic Convention whether or not a permit was issued?

Mr. HAYDEN. It was always our position, stated over and over in the media—you don't need a House committee to investigate this question—that we thought that we were within our legal rights to march to the Amphitheatre; that a parade permit was merely a technical instrument that a city is supposed to use to allow people to conduct legal activities, but this parade permit was being stalled and held back by the city authorities because they did not want people to come to Chicago.

They never negotiated with us in good faith. Many people high in the Democratic Party know that. They were the losers. At the last moment they came through; after we had taken them to court they

came through with some proposals which did not meet the substance of our request at all.

A judge, who was Mayor Daley's law partner, Judge Lynch, very nicely named, denied our application and said that we could not have a permit. We said at that point that we would march, regardless, to the Amphitheatre. We knew that it was in violation of this judge's ruling. We were prepared to accept whatever consequence came from that.

We obviously knew that this would certainly not interrupt the Democratic Convention. In fact, we knew that we would not even get out of downtown without permit, and we didn't on the 28th. The police simply made it clear that they would block all arteries leading south to the Amphitheatre, and they did. We were bottled up in Grant Park for the whole day. We attempted to march, led by Dave Dellinger. We got to the police lines and stopped.

MR. CONLEY. Specifically, was it not Mr. Robert Greenblatt who made the statement that if the curfew were imposed it should be disobeyed?

MR. HAYDEN. It could very well have been Greenblatt. I don't recall exactly. Greenblatt is a responsible officer of the organization.

MR. CONLEY. I will ask you to refer to the minutes.

MR. HAYDEN. The minutes do say Greenblatt. I will say it myself, Dellinger said it himself. Davis said it. Everybody agreed on that. As you read the notes you will see it was passed.

MR. CONLEY. Was it not at this meeting of August 4 that it was agreed Vernon Grizzard would be in charge of the marshals?

MR. HAYDEN. Yes, we wanted Vernon to be in charge of the marshals. Yes, you are right; in the minutes it was accepted.

It is interesting that you don't mention the other names, because obviously you are interested in this Budapest conference that Vernon traveled to. I want to get back to this business in Paris with the Vietnamese, as soon as possible, to set the record straight about what our relations are with the Vietnamese and what Vernon was doing.

MR. CONLEY. Let us get back to something else first, Mr. Hayden, because you brought it up, *RAT*. You were reading from this a moment ago. Would you be kind enough to explain to the committee what *RAT* is?

MR. HAYDEN. Well, it is self-evident. It is an underground newspaper. It is published in New York and it is called the *RAT*.

MR. ICHORD. Published by whom, Mr. Hayden?

MR. HAYDEN. The *RAT* staff. Editor, Jeffrey Shero; hero workers, Jeff Gerth, Marta Kusic; office guru, Sybil Dryden; maps, Michael Klare; graphics—hobo graphics, Rick Meyerwitz; advertising manager, Marvin Grafton.

MR. ICHORD. Is this the official publication of any organization?

MR. HAYDEN. Published biweekly by R.A.T. Publication, Inc., 201 East Fourth Street, New York, New York.

Application for mail at second-class postage rates, et cetera, member of Liberation News Service and Underground Press Syndicate.

MR. CONLEY. Is *RAT* not in fact an organ of the SDS, Students for a Democratic Society?

MR. HAYDEN. No. SDS has an organ called *New Left Notes*.

Mr. CONLEY. I am aware of that, but is not also *RAT* an organ of the same society?

Mr. HAYDEN. You will have to ask the society. As far as I know it never has been.

Mr. CONLEY. Since you had previously been an officer of that society, I thought you might be able to shed some light on the question.

Mr. HAYDEN. I have. Whether you like it or not that is the light that is shed. It is not connected to SDS.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, was this particular issue also known as the demonstrators' guidebook or handbook?

Mr. HAYDEN. It says "CONVENTION SPECIAL," "LYNDON'S BIRTHDAY FOLLIES," "INSIDE: Maps & Muck." I will tell you about it.

Mr. CONLEY. I am not interested in it.

Mr. HAYDEN. Rennie Davis and I wrote several articles explaining our political philosophy and information for people that we thought they should have if they were to come to demonstrate at Chicago. But it was not an official organ of SDS or the Mobilization or anyone else. That is what I said before, this is the closest thing to a sort of official recording of the views of myself and Rennie as project directors of the Mobilization.

It includes maps of the Chicago Loop and different targets where you can demonstrate in the city of Chicago. The maps are introduced by the following statement:

In order to avoid unnecessary violence and bloodshed it will be crucial to hold demonstrations at locations other than the International Amphitheatre where the concentration of police and national guard is very high. The following maps contain information about possible alternate demonstration sites throughout Chicago. Such information should enhance our mobility and assist in the formation and execution of relatively safe demonstration strategies by different groups.

Then it has where all the rulers of America are located in the city, different buildings that they have, banks, insurance companies, that sort of thing. And it has a map of the Amphitheatre area as well. It has an article on Mayor Daley, not very flattering.

Mr. CONLEY. Was it stated at the meeting on August 4 that a hundred thousand copies of this special edition of *RAT* would be available?

Mr. HAYDEN. It might have been, but we decided on a smaller number. I think it was 30,000.

Mr. CONLEY. I will refer you to your notes again, on page 3.

Mr. HAYDEN. Whatever the notes say I am sure you are reading them correctly, we came out with 30,000 instead of a hundred thousand.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, if we may move on, in connection with the National Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam, is it not a fact that the following people whom I am going to name were also invited to attend meetings of the administrative committee or the steering committee of the National Mobilization Committee—

Mr. HAYDEN. Excuse me. Would it be possible for Mr. Davis to come up just to be a consultant to me on these questions of past meetings?

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair realizes, Mr. Hayden, that no one's memory is perfect. If you do not recall—

Mr. HAYDEN. As long as it is understood that I am not trying to hide

anything under a bed, I will be glad to tell you when I can't remember things.

Mr. CONLEY. Okay. Did you want to have him come up?

Mr. HAYDEN. I would like him to come up. If the Chair thinks it is unnecessary—

Mr. ICHORD. If he feels he wants to consult with him, I think Mr. Davis is close enough there. If you feel you have to consult with him, feel free to do so.

Mr. CONLEY. In order that I can make this as short as possible, you see the general tenor of my questions, sir.

Other people invited to attend meetings of the planning committee of the National Mobilization Committee other than yourself: Mr. Herbert Bleich.

Mr. HAYDEN. Are you reading from some list that I have also?

Mr. CONLEY. It is from a composite list.

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't know who Herbert Bleich is.

Mr. ICHORD. The witness stated he did not know who Herbert Bleich is.

Mr. HAYDEN. As far as I know, I don't know unless you are mispronouncing the name.

Mr. CONLEY. That is why I am spelling it for you, sir, B-l-e-i-c-h.

Mr. HAYDEN. As far as I know, I have never met such a person.

Mr. CONLEY. He has been identified by this committee as being affiliated with the Progressive Labor Party, if that helps you in any way.

Mr. HAYDEN. No, that does not clear up anything.

Mr. CONLEY. The second name, Stokely Carmichael, black power advocate, who is now involved with the Black Panther organization.

Mr. HAYDEN. What was the question, was he attending meetings?

Mr. CONLEY. Was he invited to attend meetings and did he attend meetings?

Mr. HAYDEN. He may have been invited. He did not attend.

Mr. CONLEY. Any of the meetings you attended?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. Kipp Dawson of the Socialist Workers Party?

Mr. HAYDEN. He may have, but I don't know him. I don't know whether he was at a meeting.

Mr. CONLEY. I have been told that Kipp Dawson is a female rather than a male.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, that shows I don't know him.

Mr. CONLEY. Abe Feinglass of the Communist Party?

Mr. HAYDEN. Abe Feinglass of the Communist Party? Is he listed as such? I have heard the name. I think he is a trade unionist. Whether he is a member of the Communist Party, I don't know. I don't know if he attended any meetings.

Mr. CONLEY. Paul Friedman, New York State youth director of the Communist Party.

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't know him.

Mr. CONLEY. Jesse Gray.

Mr. HAYDEN. As far as I know, Jesse Gray never attended meetings. I do know Jesse Gray somewhat.

Mr. CONLEY. Fred Halstead of the Socialist Workers Party.

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, Fred attended some meetings. I think he is an officer of the Mobilization anyway.

Mr. CONLEY. Lew Jones of the Young Socialist Alliance.

Mr. HAYDEN. He was present at some meetings. I forget which ones. You see, they didn't go for the action because they have a Trotskyist outlook. They don't believe the Democratic Party is legitimate at all, so they didn't want any demonstration whatsoever in the city of Chicago. So they did not participate very heavy in our planning.

Mr. CONLEY. Bettina Aptheker of the Communist Party.

Mr. HAYDEN. I know Bettina just a little bit. I know her daddy better. I don't believe she was involved in the meetings.

Mr. CONLEY. Her daddy, I take it, is Herbert?

Mr. HAYDEN. You guessed it.

Mr. CONLEY. Sam Marcy, also known as Sam Ballan, Trotskyist Workers World Party.

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't know—my saying I don't know these people does not prove anything. They may be around my bed. They may have been at meetings.

Mr. CONLEY. I understand.

Jack O'Dell, also known as Hunter Pitts O'Dell, of the Communist Party.

Mr. HAYDEN. No idea.

Mr. CONLEY. Harry Ring of the Socialist Workers Party.

Mr. HAYDEN. Harry Ring I met in Cuba once. He may have attended a Mobilization meeting. But as I said, these people, the Trotskyists, were against the action. So he couldn't have participated very heavy.

Mr. ICHORD. Is the Trotskyite against—

Mr. HAYDEN. For the reason I said, they don't believe—you see, if you demonstrate outside the convention, they think this assumes you believe in the validity of the two-party system and they don't believe in its validity. So they didn't think there should be any demonstration there because it would be misleading the American people. I'm not a Trotskyist myself, but I may have done injustice to their position.

Mr. CONLEY. Jose Ristorucci.

Mr. HAYDEN. No idea.

Mr. CONLEY. Jack Spiegel.

Mr. HAYDEN. Spiegel, yes; Spiegel was in Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. Arnold Johnson of the Communist Party.

Mr. HAYDEN. Arnold Johnson I know slightly. He was at least at one meeting representing the Communist Party. Other than that I don't remember. I don't even know if he was in Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, is it not a fact that you have made trips to foreign countries to meet with foreign Communist officials?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you not sign up as a delegate to attend the Soviet-controlled Communist World Youth Festival held in Helsinki, Finland, in 1962?

Mr. HAYDEN. I'm glad you brought that up.

Mr. CONLEY. Remember, all I have asked you is did you sign up.

Mr. HAYDEN. Just read it again. That is beautiful.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you sign up to make that trip?

Mr. HAYDEN. Say the whole question as you said it.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you not sign up as a delegate to attend the Soviet-controlled Communist World Youth Festival held in Helsinki, Finland, in 1962?

Mr. HAYDEN. This is an occasion where I was a dupe of the CIA, which controlled the National Student Association at the time. I was enticed by them to go to Helsinki as part of a little anti-Communist group that would try to make trouble for the Communists. I thought it would be a good trip, nice to have my way paid by whoever was paying it, probably the State Department or the CIA. Only at the last moment other problems here in this country prevented me from going. But I was going to carry Old Glory right into the heart of communism at that time. Now that can be proven by any number of CIA agents, former student leaders, organizers of the trip, or what have you.

Mr. CONLEY. My question was, Did you originally sign up to go?

Mr. HAYDEN. I signed up not to go as a delegate, I don't think. I signed up to go as sort of a Radio Free America, or whatever we thought we were doing. We were going to go over there. I was a member of the group of Americans who were going to put out a little newspaper to tell the truth to all the Communists.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, although you did not go and you have offered us an explanation as to why you did not go, is it not a fact that you have since that time indicated that you wished you had had the opportunity to attend that festival?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, I would have liked to have seen it, but I was accused of being a Communist here and had to fight that one out. That was when the parent organization of SDS threw SDS out back in 1962. That is in the history books.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, in December of 1965 did you not travel to North Vietnam, together with Staughton Lynd and Herbert Aptheker, to attend meetings with such Communist officials as Premier Pham Van Dong?

Mr. HAYDEN. Right. But the purpose was not to attend meetings with the Premier of North Vietnam in particular. The purpose was—

Mr. CONLEY. My question was "with such Communist officials."

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes. I was trying to answer the question. The purpose was to try to understand the outlook on peace and war that the other side held. We wanted to interview a variety of people in North Vietnam.

Mr. CONLEY. On that trip in December 1965, did you meet with Colonel Ha Van Lau, who was mentioned here earlier this morning, who at that time, I believe, was liaison officer of the North Vietnamese on the International Control Commission?

Mr. HAYDEN. He was the liaison, I believe, between the North Vietnamese Army and the International Control Commission, which was established by the Geneva agreements. We heard from him a detailed analysis of their negotiating position and their view of the Geneva agreements, both in the past and in the future. We printed that interview in a book which we published, *The Other Side*, in 1966.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, with regard to this trip were you not aware of the fact that Herbert Aptheker, a National Committee member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., received the original invitation from the North Vietnamese and was told to bring two persons with him?

Mr. HAYDEN. That is the first time I have heard that version of it, but I am getting used to these kinds of doctored versions. I tell you

what happened. Herbert Aptheker, whom I had not met before I took in a debate, attended a conference in Helsinki in the summer of 1965 or early fall, which was one of the first conferences in Europe that I believe a North Vietnamese delegation came to since the beginning of the bombing in early 1965.

They asked Aptheker if he would like to visit North Vietnam, which is a Communist country, he being a Communist Party official of the United States. He said he would be interested. They said they would like to also have acquaintance and contact with people in the emerging peace movement in the United States who were not in the Communist Party, who were not Communists. So he came back to do that. He contacted Professor Staughton Lynd, whom he knew slightly, but who at that time was one of the most widely acknowledged leaders of the protest against war. Professor Lynd thought it over and decided he would like to see North Vietnam and Professor Lynd asked if he could select a third person, and he selected myself. We had been friends in Atlanta and lived in the same community and have sort of been in contact for a couple of years. So we went with Dr. Aptheker, as you say, in December.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, it is not your understanding then that Mr. Aptheker in fact initially invited Carl Oglesby of the SDS, as well as leaders of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, to make this trip before he extended the invitation to Professor Lynd and yourself?

Mr. HAYDEN. Not that I know of, but you can ask him. I'm sure that other people were considered, but I don't know who they were.

Mr. CONLEY. Let me ask you this: Do you recall having a conversation with a reporter from *the village Voice*, a newspaper reporter by the name of Jack Newfield?

Mr. HAYDEN. I recall more than one conversation.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you recall a conversation with him where you indicated these were the facts, that Oglesby and somebody from SNCC were invited initially and they were not willing to go?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't remember who was invited. I was not particularly involved in that. You will have to ask somebody else. Even if it were true I would be glad to acknowledge it. I just don't know whether it is true.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you recall in this conversation with Mr. Newfield that he advised you to contact the *New York Times*?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I don't recall.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you contact the *New York Times*?

Mr. HAYDEN. Before going to Hanoi?

Mr. CONLEY. Before or after you got back.

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you make a proposal to them to give them an exclusive story on your trip to Hanoi on the condition they play up the role of Staughton Lynd and down the role of Communist Party official Herbert Aptheker?

Mr. HAYDEN. That is a joke.

Mr. CONLEY. I am asking the question.

Mr. HAYDEN. I answered it. Do you think the *New York Times* would agree to such a bargain?

Mr. CONLEY. That is not the question, sir, whether they agreed to it. The question is, Did you propose it?

Mr. HAYDEN. There never was such a proposal. We would not be insane enough to think that the *New York Times* was, you know, capable of that kind of reasoning. I think we had the following problem. There was going to be a critical problem of publicity. We were aware that a story might break at any time, especially when we were away from the United States, and we would not be able to talk to the press. We would be in China or Vietnam or somewhere out of contact with the American press. So we decided to leave behind separate statements, each of us. And after much debate we decided that we would agree on the strategy of telling the reporter from the *New York Times* essentially what was happening, with the understanding that if the story was about to break he could break it. He just wrote whatever he wanted to write. The idea that they were boosting Staughton Lynd and downplaying Herbert Aptheker I cannot understand.

Mr. CONLEY. My question was not, Did the *Times* do this; my question was, Did you propose this to the *Times*?

Mr. HAYDEN. Of course not.

Mr. CONLEY. You have no knowledge of any of the other two people who made the trip making such a proposal?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, who paid for your trip to North Vietnam in December 1965?

Mr. HAYDEN. Most of the financing outside of our free world was by the North Vietnamese over much protest, because we would have liked to have answered the question by saying we paid for our own way because we know the very deeply felt value that you should always pay your own way, and if somebody pays for you then you are not an independent judge.

I think I can be an independent judge no matter who pays for me. I have taken your money to fly here to talk to you, and so forth. But there is another factor. The North Vietnamese insisted that since they are in a state of war, and they were a different nation, if they were going to bring Americans into North Vietnam they would come in as guests of the government and not have to pay for the use of facilities that the government had or had access to. So, after we got through to Czechoslovakia we did not have to pay the rest of the trip and did not have to pay the food and lodging expenses in Hanoi.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you pay personally for the trip—

Mr. HAYDEN. I paid a round trip to Czechoslovakia.

Mr. CONLEY. From the United States?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Out of your own personal funds, sir?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, or whatever I raised from friends. It was my money. I can check it for you and write a letter or something. The second trip to North Vietnam, by the way, I paid for altogether out of my own funds.

Mr. CONLEY. Then the North Vietnamese, as I understand you, from Czechoslovakia to North Vietnam paid your round-trip fare; is that correct?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't believe they paid, because they do not believe in money exactly the same way. The United States paid my way back.

Mr. CONLEY. The North Vietnamese Government either paid or took

care of your transportation from Czechoslovakia to North Vietnam and back to Czechoslovakia?

Mr. HAYDEN. Maybe back to Moscow. I think we came back from Hanoi, Peking, Moscow, New York, or something like that. This is all recorded elsewhere, sir.

Mr. CONLEY. In connection with your stay in North Vietnam, were you a guest of the Vietnam Peace Committee?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, I would say they were sort of our hosts. They were responsible for our welfare and safety because of the American bombing. They provided us with interpreters.

Mr. ICHORD. Talking of the last visit, Mr. Hayden?

Mr. HAYDEN. On both visits, as a matter of fact.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you know whether the Vietnam Peace Committee has any official standing in the North Vietnamese Government?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I'm not sure exactly how they are funded. I'm sure it is some kind of government funding. I'm not sure. I think if you read our book we have some explanation of it, but I can't recall the nature of the organization.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, I have asked you earlier whether you met Colonel Lau on this trip to North Vietnam in December 1965, and you have indicated you did. Have you had occasion since that time to maintain contact with Colonel Lau?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, I saw Colonel Lau the second time I went to North Vietnam in October of last year. As I said before, I saw Colonel Lau momentarily in Paris when I was carrying out that mission that I want to explain to you and discuss.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, I want to show you a letter—

Mr. HAYDEN. I know this letter.

Mr. CONLEY. Dated June 4, 1968. It bears the signature of Tom Hayden, does it not? [Hayden Exhibit No. 4. See page 2586.]

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Is that your signature?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes. This whole letter I will take complete credit for.

Mr. CONLEY. In other words, this letter which has been previously offered as an exhibit—

Mr. HAYDEN. It is a stolen letter. You collaborated with police agencies to take this out of somebody's briefcase. It is not a secret letter, although I object to the method by which you obtained it.

Mr. CONLEY. You indicate that this letter, which has been previously offered as an exhibit in these hearings,¹ is in fact a letter which you prepared the original of, and of which I have handed you a photocopy?

Mr. HAYDEN. As far as I know.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you give the original copy of this letter to Mr. Robert Greenblatt?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you recall the day you give it to him?

Mr. HAYDEN. No. I think that he was going to somewhere in Europe to some kind of conference. He was expecting to be able to stop on the way back through Paris, because we wanted to understand what the situation was in the peace talks that were going on. I gave him an introductory note to Colonel Lau, which I will be glad to read to you.

¹ See pt. 1, p. 2476, Oct. 4, 1968, hearings. Letter read in full, but not made an exhibit.

Mr. CONLEY. No. I think the letter has already been read into the record, Mr. Hayden. You did give this letter to Mr. Greenblatt then at his request?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't remember whether it was Greenblatt's request. I may have just proposed that he should stop in Paris and try to get some information on what the state of the talks was.

Mr. CONLEY. May I have the letter back?

Mr. HAYDEN. I would like to write some things from it, since I never expected to see it again.

Mr. ICHORD. We will prepare a copy for you.

Mr. HAYDEN. I will just scribble one thing. That this should be taken at the Canadian border under a false search and seizure process should be known to the press in this room.

Mr. ICHORD. I guess that has already been brought out by other witnesses.

Mr. HAYDEN. I just wanted to repeat that.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, in order that I understand your last answer completely, Mr. Greenblatt may have asked you for this letter or you may have been aware of the fact he was going to Paris?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't know where he was going. He may have been going to Europe.

Mr. CONLEY. I wondered what prompted you to write a letter to Colonel Lau.

Mr. HAYDEN. Colonel Lau is one of the people that I know in the North Vietnamese delegation. I thought that it would be possible for Greenblatt to have a discussion with him and required an introductory note. At that time I was very enthusiastic about the situation. I was under the illusion temporarily that the war might be ending. But we wanted to know very much what the Paris talks were accomplishing, and several of us were in Paris on several occasions talking to both State Department officials, North Vietnamese officials, trying to get a picture.

I have written my own picture of what was going on in Paris in *Ramparts* magazine. Anyone these days who is going to Paris from the peace movement I will be glad to give a letter to so that they can go try to see the North Vietnamese, who don't trust Americans for some reason.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Do they trust you?

Mr. HAYDEN. They trust me enough to have a conversation. I doubt, Mr. Ashbrook, that they would see you.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I doubt that I would want to see them.

Mr. HAYDEN. You would not want to see them? You would not want to talk to them?

Mr. ASHBROOK. I have no reason to.

Mr. HAYDEN. I didn't think you would. That is quite a peaceful attitude.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, directing your attention specifically to this letter, it is addressed to Colonel Lau; is it not? It is written to Colonel Lau?

Mr. HAYDEN. It is an introductory note for Greenblatt.

Mr. CONLEY. I specifically read to you from the next to the last paragraph which says, "We hope that the current Paris discussions go well for you." This is implying, as I read the note, that you are

hoping they go well for Colonel Lau, or for the North Vietnamese people. Is that not correct?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, it is correct. It is literally correct. I was very hopeful that at last the thing was winding up and, after the agony of 25 years of war which involved many fruitless attempts at negotiation, that this finally was it, people were getting together at the table and that it would be possible for the bombing to be ended and the American troops to be withdrawn from South Vietnam.

Mr. CONLEY. As I read this particular sentence, it is not wishing the Vietnamese people, it is wishing a particular group within Vietnam.

Mr. HAYDEN. My views are well known on that. In a war you can only decide one side is right and the other side is wrong. My Government, which I don't think represents me, is wrong in Vietnam. There is only one other group to say it is right and that is the people of Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front in the South and the North Vietnamese Government. They are right in wanting the United States out of Vietnam. We have no business in Vietnam. They're right in wanting the bombing to end, and so forth. I have always said that.

Mr. CONLEY. Are you saying that you support the North Vietnamese, then, in their efforts?

Mr. HAYDEN. I support their position. Their position is that the United States should get out of Vietnam. That is also the position of Communists, non-Communists, anti-Communists, the world over. Do you support the proposition the United States should stay in? There are only two things you can stand for on this, out or in.

Mr. CONLEY. You are the witness, I am the counsel.

Mr. HAYDEN. Okay.

Mr. CONLEY. It also says here, "The news from South Vietnam seems very good indeed."

Mr. HAYDEN. It looked like the war was winding up.

Mr. CONLEY. What about the second Tet offensive which was in the process of occurring at that time? Is that what you had reference to?

Mr. HAYDEN. No; the entire situation in the country was improved immensely, I thought, because of the beginning of the Paris talks, and the news from Vietnam was just good.

Mr. CONLEY. The news from South Vietnam at that particular time was the second Tet offensive.

Mr. HAYDEN. That was 2 months before the letter was written. The second Tet offensive was early May.

Mr. CONLEY. This was early June. I say the Tet offensive was just winding up.

Mr. HAYDEN. No, it was not just winding up. Actually, it never stopped if you want to get into the reality of the defeat, the tragic defeat of the United States troops there.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, you conclude the letter with the closing, "Good fortune! Victory!"

Mr. HAYDEN. Right.

Mr. CONLEY. What do you mean by the words "good fortune"?

Mr. HAYDEN. I hope it is all over, I hope peace can be restored at last. This country has been massacred by so many countries for so many years that it just made me terribly happy to think that at last the possibility of peace in Vietnam was being a real possibility. I wished them every luck in the world. I think we owe them tremendous respect

for the struggle they have endured at the hands of politicians in Washington, particularly President Johnson, and that is the meaning of the statement. I hope they win their independence and hope they keep it. I think they should be an independent country. Whether Communist or not it is their business, not Rusk's or President Johnson's.

Mr. CONLEY. You did not send it to the Vietnamese people. You sent it to a particular officer within a particular segment of the country of Vietnam.

Mr. HAYDEN. To me the Vietnamese people, insofar as they are organized, are organized in the united way against the United States. The other Vietnamese are fictional characters invented to make us believe at home that we are somehow supporting the government there. But we are not supporting the government there. It would fall in a minute of its own corruption if it were not for the United States military. It is like saying the American Revolution, the American people were the American Revolutionaries. Surely there were some Americans working for the British, just as there were Vietnamese working for the French and now work for the Americans. But when you said the Americans versus the British, there was no question you were talking about the American Revolutionaries.

Mr. CONLEY. Are you saying the North Vietnamese are the only government you recognize yourself as existing in Vietnam?

Mr. HAYDEN. No. The North Vietnamese Government by virtue of the fact that the Geneva agreements were never implemented is a de facto government of the 17th parallel. South of the 17th parallel the de facto government, in my opinion as an objective observer as much as I can be, the only real government in South Vietnam is the National Liberation Front. The Americans admit that when they say that their whole zone of South Vietnam has been under Viet Cong control for the last 20 years.

We forget that the Vietnamese succeeded in liberating all of the Vietnam from the French in 1945. Ho Chi Minh's administration stretched to the south down to the Ca Mau Peninsula. The attempt by the French, and now the Americans ever since, has been to kind of roll back that revolutionary victory, roll back that nationalist revolution. It still remains in South Vietnam. The Viet Minh, who now are the Viet Cong, are still there and they function, they collect taxes, they have an army, they have schools, they have hospitals, they have all of the things which you and I would say governments have.

Mr. WATSON. May I ask, Counsel, at this point in order to establish your objectivity, have you visited South Vietnam?

Mr. HAYDEN. No; I would like to very much, but I am sure I would be killed.

Mr. WATSON. Have you visited South Vietnam?

Mr. HAYDEN. I cannot because it is too dangerous, with the Americans there, to visit if you have been in Hanoi.

Mr. WATSON. I could appreciate that fact, but I just wanted—

Mr. HAYDEN. I am sure you could.

Mr. WATSON. I was trying to ascertain your objectivity in assessing the various governments.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, one other question: The letter concludes with the word "Victory!" Am I to imply from that that you are wishing victory to Colonel Lau and his people?

Mr. HAYDEN. No. When I say "victory" I mean that the end of the war in Vietnam and the withdrawal of the American troops would be the greatest victory possible for the people of this country and for the people of Vietnam, including Colonel Lau, a victory over the people like Rusk and Johnson and other old men who have been dominating foreign policy with whacko conceptions of communism the last 20 years, a victory over the draft boards in the United States, whose average age is 58 years old.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Particularly over the American servicemen there?

Mr. HAYDEN. No; we are the closest friends the American servicemen have, I think. We want them out of Vietnam. We are not the reason that they are being killed. We are finding that it is more and more possible to organize within the Armed Forces and around Army bases. We believe that the GIs in Vietnam are increasingly against the war and think that they are merely cannon fodder for Washington, while elections are settled and prestige is traded around.

Mr. WATSON. In fact, Mr. Hayden, you are encouraging direct action on the part of military men of America to go AWOL and refuse to serve in Vietnam.

Mr. HAYDEN. What is your evidence for that, Mr. Watson?

Mr. WATSON. So far as your special publication of SDS and other newspapers directed at servicemen.

Mr. HAYDEN. I am not connected with any of those newspapers. My position on servicemen is that they should be—

Mr. WATSON. You are aware of that activity, aren't you?

Mr. HAYDEN. I'm aware of the activity.

Mr. WATSON. That is all I want to know, thank you.

Mr. HAYDEN. What does that have to do with what I think should be done? I would like to explain to you what I think of servicemen. I respect those who have deserted. I think it is a very brave thing. I think it would be better, if possible, to stay in the Armed Forces, not shoot any Vietnamese, and come home alive. I think a lot of them will. I think the revolt is going on clearly by soldiers in South Vietnam against their commanding officers and especially against Johnson.

Mr. ICHORD. On what do you base that?

Mr. HAYDEN. Riots in the prison camps, widespread interviews published in various magazines, letters I have seen from GIs who are fed up with this way. They don't like peaceniks because they think we are not fighters and we are taking an easy way out. That is their business, that is their opinion, but I identify with them. I think young men like myself are over there and I think there has to be good relations in the future between those young American men who fought in Vietnam and those young American men who oppose the war in Vietnam, and that is what we are working towards.

I think that the reason, the very fundamental reason, if you inquire in your committees and in your secret investigations, the reason the war is getting harder and harder to fight is that the American GIs cannot be pushed out there to continue fighting it because they don't think it is worth it. That is a factor that a general has to take into account.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Do you think you are talking for 500,000 servicemen?

Mr. HAYDEN. It is just becoming clear that servicemen over there don't want to fight this war.

Mr. ASHBROOK. What numbers indicate that?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't know what numbers. What numbers do you think, Mr. Ashbrook?

Mr. ASHBROOK. I don't agree with you. It is your allegation. You say increasing numbers of servicemen, and pretty soon you are talking about all servicemen. Roughly there are 500,000 servicemen there. How many do you think will identify with what you are saying is the new wave among servicemen?

Mr. HAYDEN. I think most servicemen would not identify with me or my position, but would identify with the idea that this war stinks and that they should be home and if Johnson wants to go to Vietnam or you want to go to Vietnam, you Congressmen, to fight, that is all well and good, but that is not the place for young Americans.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Hayden, I was in South Vietnam in June 1967 and talked to well over a thousand enlisted men individually.

Mr. HAYDEN. Talked to a thousand enlisted, individually?

Mr. ICHORD. Talked to a thousand enlisted men individually. My impression was that their morale was surprisingly high.

Mr. HAYDEN. I'm afraid you were brainwashed.

Mr. ICHORD. By the enlisted men?

Mr. HAYDEN. By the people who organized your trip. Probably the generals that Governor Romney spoke about.

Mr. ICHORD. I will state to you that the enlisted men whom I interviewed on an individual basis and in groups of 50 or 60 were not picked by anybody. I picked them myself. But that is a matter of assessment. You haven't been there—

Mr. HAYDEN. Did you talk to veterans of Khe Sanh?

Mr. ICHORD. As a matter of fact, I was in Khe Sanh.

Mr. HAYDEN. While it was the chief thing that we had to hold forever, or while it was something we had to evacuate?

Mr. ICHORD. Of course the siege of Khe Sanh had not occurred. That occurred subsequent to June 1967. But we have gone far afield here.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may say one further word.

Mr. Hayden is correct, although earlier he didn't seem to know too much about this publication directed toward the military urging them to desert; apparently now you do recall something about it. But they run periodically some letters in this publication, most of them anonymous letters, allegedly from veterans of Vietnam, or people in Vietnam who are against war.

Mr. HAYDEN. I have letters.

Mr. WATSON. No doubt he has some letters.

Mr. HAYDEN. I would like to discuss what I did in Paris. It is curious to me I haven't been asked.

Mr. ICHORD. We are going to get to Paris.

Mr. CONLEY. We will get to Paris.

Mr. Hayden, I cannot help but note that you have again, for the fourth time as I count it, given a different meaning to the word "victory" as you have with the words "guerrilla," "militant," and "attack." Perhaps it is just a question of semantics between you and me that we are unable to define these words or give the same meaning to them.

Mr. HAYDEN. What about deeds? Let's try deeds.

Mr. CONLEY. I don't recall your using the word "deeds."

Mr. HAYDEN. If you can't understand my words, I would like to

know what it is about my actions that you have in mind. What have I attacked?

Mr. CONLEY. I said there were three words that we have had trouble with today, the word "guerrilla," the word "militant," and the word "attack." Perhaps you did not hear what I said.

Mr. HAYDEN. What was the trouble? I explained what I meant by the words.

Mr. CONLEY. Yes; and your explanation would not, I think, be the common sensible explanation for the meaning of those particular words any more than your explanation for the word "victory," meaning by victory "bringing the soldiers home."

Mr. DI SUVERO. Could we go on, Mr. Chairman, because I think the counsel is being argumentative.

Mr. ICHORD. Just a minute. We are following the rules pretty well thus far. We are dealing in semantics here.

Mr. HAYDEN. We are also dealing with things I have written in dozens of places. It is unnecessary to go over them here as far as I can see.

Mr. ICHORD. Certainly, Mr. Hayden, I would say these words that you have written will have a different meaning to many people. It apparently has a different meaning to you than the ordinary connotation that I would accept. That is one of the reasons for the question.

Mr. ASHEROOK. Not only that, but also the word "pinned." I think everybody has some common understanding of what is meant when you are going to "pin" delegates in a convention. The other is, "anything to stop this farce," and of course to him "anything" would not mean what it would normally mean to others. The words "guerrilla," "attack," and "victory"—

Mr. HAYDEN. Before the joking goes further, aren't you embarrassed and discomfited by the existence of this gigantic report, which goes over in much greater detail than you could, because you don't have the funds, thank God, or the staff to do it—everything, I mean meetings, all the things that you have been asking about are listed in here. These investigators didn't have too much difficulty understanding what our position was, what we were planning to do, what our applications for permits meant, what happened in meetings.

Maybe because you don't have the staff or the machinery to collect the information that these people collected, but they have not raised the questions that you are raising about whether—

Mr. ASHEROOK. Maybe this is why we are raising them.

Mr. HAYDEN. So you are not embarrassed by this, but you sort of disagree with its conclusions or analysis.

Mr. CONLEY. I think we need to make it clear that that document to which you refer carries neither the approval or disapproval of that particular Commission, but is merely one of three task force reports.

Mr. HAYDEN. Beautiful. That is what I said, though.

Mr. ICHORD. We should make it clear it is a staff report.

Mr. HAYDEN. I said it was done by an authorized task force three or four times earlier today.

Mr. ASHEROOK. Which has neither been accepted or rejected by the Commission?

Mr. HAYDEN. Is that your last refuge? Obviously, it is not going to be accepted by the committee, Milton Eisenhower and those people.

But they have been done in by their own staff. Their own staff went out and looked at the situation and could not come to any conclusions than the ones they came to.

Mr. ICHORD. The committee will have the opportunity to read the staff report.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, if I may belabor you one moment further on this particular letter that you wrote for Mr. Greenblatt, I notice in here the last sentence in the first paragraph, "He works closely with myself and Dave Dellinger, and has just returned from Hanoi."

You don't need the letter?

Mr. HAYDEN. I heard your statement.

Mr. CONLEY. What was the significance of mentioning that Mr. Greenblatt works closely with yourself and with Dave Dellinger?

Mr. HAYDEN. We wanted to identify this person as a person who is active in the Mobilization and the way to do that would be to identify him with two people, myself and Dave Dellinger, who visited North Vietnam and who are known to the North Vietnamese.

Mr. CONLEY. Both you and Mr. Dellinger had previously met with Colonel Lau, had you not?

Mr. HAYDEN. You mean together?

Mr. CONLEY. Not together, but you have both met Colonel Lau; have you not?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes. I said I have met him, and Dave Dellinger is a member of the tribunal that found the United States guilty of genocide. Colonel Lau was the North Vietnamese person in charge of marshaling the evidence for the North Vietnamese case. So he would know Colonel Lau through the examination of mutilated and napalmed Vietnamese bodies.

Mr. CONLEY. If we may move back to one other question that came up earlier, you were asked, I believe, whether you were aware of the fact whether *RAT* was or was not a publication of SDS.

Mr. HAYDEN. I said it was not.

Mr. CONLEY. I do call to your attention the fact that in the publication *vocations for social change*—are you aware of this publication?

Mr. HAYDEN. Hayward, California?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir. The October 1968 issue advises people who want a job with *RAT* to apply as follows.

Mr. HAYDEN. "THE *RAT* c/o SDS, 131 Prince Street, New York, New York."

It gives the phone number; "Contact Jeff Shero." That could mean anything, but what it does not mean is that the *RAT* is an SDS publication. SDS, 131 Prince Street could be a New York chapter of SDS. I don't know what it is. It may be a temporary office of the *RAT*, it may not. But it is not an official SDS publication.

The SDS publication is *New Left Notes*. But Jeffrey Shero is a former officer of some kind of SDS, I mean some kind in SDS, and he is the editor and founder of the *RAT*. A lot of SDS people active in New York City just as there are other movement groups in New York City and they all identify very closely with the *RAT*. But the *RAT* is an independent publication published by these five or six people, as far as I know.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, in September 1967 did you attend a meeting in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, with representatives of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes. That is another thing that is available.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, in a document sent out under the signature of Dave Dellinger appears the following quotation:

The Prague conference is intended to create solidarity and mutual understanding between revolutionaries from Vietnam and their American supporters who are trying to change the United States. * * *

Mr. Hayden, my question to you, sir, would be, Did you receive a copy of this particular document? Have you seen it before today?

Mr. HAYDEN. I must have seen it. I had a hand in preparing this document. I was one of the people who helped to write the agenda and work out an agenda for the conference.

What you read from is a true statement of one of the purposes of the conference.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, let me ask you this question, if I may, sir, with reference to that statement: Are you, sir, one of the American supporters of the "revolutionaries" mentioned there in Vietnam?

Mr. HAYDEN. I have already said I am.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. Very few people in the world are not.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, while you were in Czechoslovakia at this conference in September of 1967, were you asked by the Viet Cong representatives to go to the capital of Cambodia to receive three American war prisoners?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, this is a very delicate area. I'm glad to get into it, but I will have to listen to your questions very carefully. So if you will restate that.

Mr. CONLEY. I will read it again to you.

While you were in Czechoslovakia did the Viet Cong representatives ask you to go to the capital of Cambodia to take custody of three American prisoners of war?

Mr. HAYDEN. Not exactly. I, as you know, have been involved in the release of American prisoners on three occasions—well, several occasions—and totaling altogether three American prisoners from South Vietnam and six American pilots from North Vietnam, all of whom are here in the United States now.

The way in which these releases were effected is very complicated and delicate. I will be very happy to speak as frankly as I can about it, but I want us to be very careful because the implication that you are making, that somehow the link-up between the peace movement, people like myself, and Hanoi, is bad, is the kind of thing that is going to go out around the world as an item of news. And it is going to appear, whether you like it or not, it is going to appear as sort of an official United States Government committee condemning these operations which have resulted in the release of prisoners. And I am very concerned about the welfare of those prisoners, not that I think the Vietnamese would do anything to them, but the possibility of any American being released is always useful, helpful, and basically good. So we have to discuss it in a way that respects the situation.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, I think you read more malice in my question than I intended.

Mr. HAYDEN. I was trying to set the groundwork.

Mr. CONLEY. My question was simple, Were you asked to go to the

capital of Cambodia? I am not asking you to go into a detailed explanation of anything.

Mr. HAYDEN. The literal answer to your literal question is no.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir.

Now, then, in connection with that same general proposition, did you not in fact in November 1967 go to Hanoi and from there to the capital of Cambodia, where you took custody of three United States sergeants who had been held as prisoners of war?

Mr. HAYDEN. Incorrect again.

Mr. CONLEY. Would you like to explain?

Mr. HAYDEN. I would prefer not to explain more than I have explained in many publications and statements. I was involved in the release of these prisoners. It did not quite exactly happen according to the geographic route you described.

Mr. CONLEY. Are you quarreling with going from Hanoi to Cambodia? Is that it?

Mr. HAYDEN. That and going from Czechoslovakia to Cambodia, and so forth.

Mr. CONLEY. I never suggested you went from Czechoslovakia to Cambodia.

Mr. HAYDEN. I thought the first question was, did I go from that conference to Cambodia.

Mr. CONLEY. No, sir. My question was, Were you approached at the conference in Czechoslovakia and asked if you would go to the capital of Cambodia?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. ASHBROOK. May I change that question, because as I recall his answer he said literally that was not correct. Was the conference at Czechoslovakia the place at which you learned that you could take custody of these servicemen if you were to be in Cambodia?

Mr. HAYDEN. Not exactly. There had been discussions ever since our first trip to Vietnam about the worries that American families have about prisoners there. We had always stressed that while we did not feel that the North Vietnamese had any legal or other kind of responsibility to release the prisoners, we thought it would be a highly humane and important act that could contribute to making peace easier to negotiate.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Not for propagand purposes?

Mr. HAYDEN. Propaganda works both ways. Every time the Vietnamese have released prisoners, the United States releases prisoners and announces it although the actions are not reciprocal. Neither side recognizes that the other has done it, and so forth.

It was at this conference in Bratislava during the discussions with the Vietnamese about the state of American prisoners that some Vietnamese approached myself and said that they were contemplating the possible release of some prisoners from South Vietnam. They were not sure how to do it technically. They had a lot of problems. Contrary to public opinion, people do not run up and down from North to South Vietnam on the Ho Chi Minh trail. These prisoners were deep in South Vietnam.

A way had to be found for them to be released without the National Liberation Front having to hand them directly over to the Americans because they did not recognize each other. The problem was never

solved in the first discussions, but I said that I was ready at any point to participate in such a release if I could be of value and service. Some time later, not too much later, I think a month or month and a half, the word did come that such a thing was possible. I happened to be in Paris at the time and at that time I went to Cambodia to work out the arrangements.

Mr. CONLEY. You did not then go to Hanoi and from there to Cambodia?

Mr. HAYDEN. I went to Hanoi, but not particularly related to prisoners. I went to Hanoi to see what 2 years of bombing had done in the way of destruction.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you go to Hanoi prior to going to Cambodia?

Mr. HAYDEN. I went to Cambodia and to Hanoi and back to Cambodia because that is the way you go, and then to France and back to Cambodia and back to New York. It was not all related.

Mr. CONLEY. Had you been to Hanoi before you went to Cambodia and took custody of these three prisoners?

Mr. HAYDEN. I had been to Hanoi twice by then.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden—

Mr. HAYDEN. The prisoners were from South Vietnam, not related to North Vietnam.

Mr. ICHORD. Were they held by North Vietnamese?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, NLF.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, directing your attention to January of this year, did you make a trip to Havana, Cuba?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. To take part in the International Cultural Congress, which was a gathering of Communists and other revolutionaries whose aim is to destroy the non-Communist governments of the world?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't remember those aims being enunciated in quite that way. But then there are no more people like yourself in Cuba. It was essentially a meeting of intellectuals, who are not strong enough to pick up a gun and were film-makers, painters, but these intellectuals supported—

Mr. CONLEY. Do I have the title right, the "International Cultural Congress"?

Mr. HAYDEN. It was a cultural congress in Havana. I don't know if it was called the International Cultural Congress.

Mr. CONLEY. This was held during January of this year?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Counsel, the witness is not implying that there are not some intellectuals who are fighting for this country? You are not implying that, are you?

Mr. HAYDEN. Oh, no.

Mr. WATSON. You said earlier that they were not strong enough to lift a gun.

Mr. HAYDEN. I was replying to the suggestion that this was a meeting of armed revolutionaries, which was implied although not exactly stated by the question. I wanted to indicate that it was a meeting of intellectuals.

Mr. WATSON. Do you consider yourself an intellectual?

Mr. HAYDEN. I never thought about it.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you. Excuse me, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, how long were you in Cuba attending this conference?

Mr. HAYDEN. About 10 days to 15 days.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you leave and return to the United States?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Would you describe briefly, if you can, exactly what you did at the conference?

Mr. HAYDEN. Nothing.

Mr. CONLEY. I did not mean you as an individual. I mean what was done at the conference? Was it a discussion?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Discussion group.

Mr. ICHORD. Would you say it was not a very productive conference?

Mr. HAYDEN. I got a lot of things I wanted to get. I talked to a lot of people. I wanted to see what Cuba was like. But I went as a journalist through a strange deal with the Department of State, who would not allow me a passport to go as a delegate. So I didn't participate, I didn't have any official status in the conference, I did not speak, I did not operate as a delegate.

Around the site of the conference I was able to meet and talk with people from Latin America, the Middle East, Western Europe. There were Vietnamese people there. I just took advantage of the occasion to talk to as many people as I could.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, is it a fair statement to say that the congress closed with an appeal to the intellectuals to boycott United States academic and cultural programs?

Mr. HAYDEN. There was such an appeal. It had more to it than that.

Mr. CONLEY. You participated—

Mr. HAYDEN. I did not participate in the drafting of the appeal, although I agree with the appeal.

Mr. CONLEY. What particular publication did you represent at this conference?

Mr. HAYDEN. I just went as a writer. I didn't have to represent a publication.

Mr. CONLEY. I thought you indicated that you did, though, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. Perhaps I misunderstood you.

Mr. HAYDEN. No. I can check it in my documents, but I think I just agreed not to go as a delegate.

Mr. CONLEY. You did not represent any particular newspaper or magazine then.

Mr. HAYDEN. I think I may have gone as an editor or associate editor of *Liberation*, which is a pacifist magazine edited by Dave Dellinger with which I had ties for a while, but I haven't been active with them for some time. But I went in the capacity of—

Mr. CONLEY. When was the last time you were active with *Liberation* magazine?

Mr. HAYDEN. I never was very active. That is why I decided to not have my name on the masthead.

Mr. CONLEY. Was any of the material related to the Havana conference published in the *Liberation* magazine?

Mr. HAYDEN. It was published by Dellinger.

Mr. CONLEY. Written by you, sir?

Mr. HAYDEN. No. I certainly had talks with Dellinger relating to the article he finally wrote.

Mr. ICHORD. Counsel has advised me that there would be no opportunity to conclude the questioning of Mr. Hayden by 5 o'clock. Give-and-take has been quite active. I think we could very well at this point adjourn the hearings until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., Monday, December 2, 1968, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, December 3, 1968.)

(Subcommittee members present at time of recess: Representatives Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.)

HAYDEN EXHIBIT No. 2

To: National Mobilization Staff: Chicago organizers

not for circulation or publication.

From: Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden.

DISCUSSION ON THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CHALLENGE

The Purpose

American society is being destroyed by its unrepresentative government. The politicians who control the White House and Congress do not respond to glaring social needs or to the outcries of millions of people. Democracy is reduced to the sorry event of people trooping to the polls every four years to [sic] vote for candidates who offer no serious choice.

Our taxes, blood and national honor are being poured out in the hopeless Vietnam war, while the violence in our cities exposes the real depth of our unsolved problems at home. Faced with a world wide cry for human rights, from Vietnam to our nation's slums, top American politicians seem able to reply only with negative and self-defeating violence. But the violence of suppression solves nothing. The problems cannot be avoided or bombed away.

In 1960 and especially in 1964, the American voters supported peace in Vietnam and social reform at home. Since then leading scholars, religious figures, artists, even certain generals and businessmen have protested the war; the Senate leadership of both parties has criticized the President; opinion surveys show a large minority opposed to the fighting; nearly all of America's allies have registered their opposition; world public opinion condemns the US as the aggressor in Vietnam. Yet the warmakers continue to escalate. Their domination of policy grows.

For a century American society has endorsed racial equality. But in 1968 a virtual race war is in the making. Since open rebellions broke out nearly four years ago, no social and economic answer has been put forward. The basic response of the government has been to violently suppress the rebellions then let evil conditions go on as before. Rotten housing, schools and jobs are the continuous lot of black Americans. Neither hard work in the cotton fields, nor politics, nor labor organizations, nor nonviolent demonstrations have made the American promise become a reality.

The problems of Vietnam and racism affect all Americans. Our country's future peace and honor depend on a successful resolution of these two problems. Hatreds and divisions are being created which will take generations to end. America is becoming an ugly and insecure place to live. The country lacks the commitment to deal with racism, and cannot afford to anyway because of its preoccupation with Vietnam. Because our social imagination is blighted by these investments in violence, our life as a whole is degraded in countless ways. Cities are unlivable. Television is a wasteland. Medical needs are not met. Mental problems go unattended.

The political parties, especially the governing Democratic Party, fail completely to perform their function of solving social problems peacefully. The Democratic Party is bound to the demands of Southern racists who control key committee positions through seniority gained by generations of Negro disenfranchisement. These politicians are not only racists. They are old and out of touch with changes in our country and the world. They are believers in the use of force to maintain the status quo. The northern Democrats, though traditionally seeming more liberal and flexible than their southern allies, now are exposed to be fully

as corrupt. Their power rests on urban machines which have failed to solve the problems of their largely Negro and working class constituencies. Elections in the North tend to be personality contests, or battles between competing ethnic groups, or competitions in which candidates out-promise each other. Nothing changes but the faces.

Above and behind this useless structure of petty politics have arisen huge [sic] bureaucracies with enormous power over the life and death of America's people. These include the military which commands three-fourths of the taxpayer's money and an equal percentage of all research and development; and large corporations which make their fortunes in the midst of urban squalor and world poverty. Where these giants cannot influence politicians, they simply buy them, and where they cannot buy them, they threaten to withdraw support of all kinds.

Against these conditions there is mounting resistance and revolt. The summer of 1968 will see the greatest outpouring of dissent ever witnessed in this country. Anger with police and rats, Vietnam and the draft is now massive and cannot be quieted with "better police methods." This summer will bring a more determined and powerful movement for change. At the same time established solutions to the foreign and domestic crisis will harden and the democratic process will visibly close itself to any viable alternative. The axis of the Democratic Party—the blacks, the workers, the intellectuals—will experience a new consciousness of unrepresentation. Nixon, not Rockefeller, will be the Presidential candidate of the Republican convention. And Johnson, not McCarthy or Kennedy, will become the "alternative" for the liberals. To the average Democrat who wants a say on the widening war, high taxes, and urban squalor the "choice" will appear desperate. Many, for the first time, will wake up to the fact that in the wheeling and dealing of the democratic process the average person does not count. He is expected to participate in politics in about the same way that he goes to the movies. His choices are limited to which of the stars he least dislikes. This summer, millions of anxious Democrats will ask, what now?

The strategy of the anti-war and black movements in this period may help to answer this question. We may either take the initiative in laying the foundation for a new political force in the United States or be driven into isolation from average Americans. What we do now, how we prepare the country for the Democratic Convention, and how we respond to that Convention may well determine whether we bury the Democratic Party or set the conditions for Johnson to bury the movement.

A Proposal

A massive confrontation with our government—the Democratic Party—as it holds its convention in Chicago this summer is being organized. Given the right strategic perspective, this challenge could help transform the politics of the country. Since the New Deal, the Democratic Party's electoral strength has depended upon the support of the politically conscious people in trade unions, black communities and the professions. Now major sections of this base are in opposition to the policies of the Democratic Party. At the same time, the country's official leadership is determined to hold to the status quo. Every political sign points towards this conflict of interest coming to hammer blows at the August Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Our task must be to prepare the country to meet this political crisis by supporting and strengthening a people's movement and a people's force which the politicians cannot avoid or resist.

This proposal suggests several ways to build for a massive action in Chicago over a period of months; to use the Chicago demonstration to dramatize to the world the large numbers of people who feel unrepresented, and in fact disgraced and used, by our government's policies on the crisis of Vietnam and racism and the mockery that democracy has become; and to unfold the Democratic Convention challenge in such a way that all of America and the world can look on and judge whether Lyndon Johnson or the demonstrators are better representatives of America's tradition of democracy and social justice.

Specifically, the proposal is that events unfold in three major periods of activity.

First, from April 21 to April 30, the spring days of resistance. Where possible, the anti-war and black movements should focus on the Democratic Party. The undemocratic method of choosing delegates—through money and "pull"—should be exposed and opposed. The names of Democratic contributors who profit from war and racism should be revealed and their private comfort disturbed. Mayors who head local Democratic Parties should become the recipients of draft cards. State chairman should be burned in effigy for their support to Johnson, to the

war and repression. The movement's demands on the Democratic National Convention should be widely distributed and interpreted. Where appropriate, the positions of Dodd, Jackson and Symington should be protested. Englehard's tie to Johnson should be attacked [sic]. The Texas construction companies which profit off Vietnam should be exposed, etc.

Second, the summer should become a period of intense organizing, education and demonstration. As local coordinating committees develop to plan the attack [sic] on the Democratic Convention, they should initiate recruiting and training programs for summer organizers—several thousand should be the objective—who build high school draft resistance unions, organize challenges to corrupt delegates, talk with teachers, doctors, veterans and welfare recipients about confronting the Convention on a particular day, gather intelligence on delegates who will be continuously confronted and talked to during their entire stay in Chicago, speak to hundreds of local trade unions about the war and racism, build pressure in the ghetto for the removal of all Democratic Party headquarters, and hold local war crime tribunals to expose prominent Democrats who manufacture anti-personnel bombs, poison gases or other weapons banned by international agreement.

Third, the summer should be capped by a week of demonstrations, disruptions and marches at the Democratic National Convention, clogging the streets of Chicago with people demanding peace, justice and participation in government. This should be a period in which the movement projects a series of broad, but concrete demands—demands which the vast majority of people can identify with, but which the Democratic Party is shown to be unable to meet.

The movement must not play into Johnson's hands by attempting to prevent the Convention from assembling, a position few Americans would accept or understand. Rather the action should build steadily through the Convention week, each day escalating the demands and the tactics, building for a massive confrontation at the time of Johnson's nomination. The initial challenges and activities might involve 50,000 to 100,000 people. The final funeral [sic] march on the Democratic Convention, beginning as the first ballot is taken, should bring a half million—people demanding a choice on the issues of peace and justice; citizens who have come to "make the democratic process work" by pinning the delegates in the International Amphitheatre [sic] until a choice is presented to the American people.

A well planned, educational build-up would precede [sic] the final days of militancy; for example, alternative platform committee hearings; challenges inside the Convention as well as outside; continuous "lobbying" with every delegate; outdoor rallies; daily press conferences of our own making; and actions which project a series of concrete demands and grievances. A people's platform hearing might be highlighted by Garrison testifying on the Kennedy assassination. Satre [sic] on US war crimes in Vietnam and Carmaichael [sic] on the causes of riots. For the mass media, our hearings should be able to compete with the Democratic Convention platform hearings.

Daily demonstrations should be organized so they do not become a massive blending of movement forces competing for TV coverage. Machinery is needed that permits demonstrations to clarify demands, not confuse the public. Perhaps each day of the Convention could be matched with each of the major demands of the anti-war and black movements. A schedule of demonstrations could be projected: one day for education; one for poverty; one for the draft; etc. Each day would be utilized to dramatize a single demand. Each day, actions all across Chicago would share a common issue focus.

For example, on August 26, a coalition of poverty rights organizations might surround the Conrad Hilton Hotel to wake the delegates with the demand for \$20 billion to end poverty. Throughout the day, press conferences, disruptions and pickets would dramatize this demand. In the evening, poor whites, Spanish and black Chicagoans could march on the troops protecting the Convention to invite the delegates to spend the night with them in the ghetto instead of the Conrad Hilton and Palmer House. While the world looks on, the invitation is greeted with police clubs, brutality and arrests since the President's injunction against all demonstrations at the Convention has just been violated. The following day, August 27, actions might focus on the draft, organized by a radical student coalition. The actions would be slightly more militant than the preceding [sic] day with young people pinning draft cards on soldier's bayonets or burning them on Mayor Daley's lawn which is in the community beside the International Amphitheatre [sic].

A day by day focus on national grievances not only can clarify movement demands for the general public but allow for diversity in forms of protest, militancy and rhetoric. Such diversity is possible, indeed desirable, if there is agreement on the general strategic framework: to allow people who presently represent forces within the Democratic Party to clarify for themselves the limits of the present two party system; and to offer an alternative perspective and program to those millions who agree that a Johnson-Nixon contest is no contest at all. The objective of the movement should be to compete with the Democratic Party for people's allegiance, by undermining its ideological and organizational base during this crisis period.

The Tasks

In addition to creating immediate discussions among movement organizations and activists across the country about the Convention confrontation, machinery must be built now to prepare for the spring, summer and August activities. For the February 24 National Mobilization conference in Chicago, drafts of alternative demands should be prepared. A pamphlet on "What Is the Democratic Party" which implies clear targets [sic] for the spring actions should be written and distributed. A black and white staff should be organized in Chicago. State by state, groups should form to research local Democratic Party corruption and develop delegate lists which can be forwarded to the National Mobilization office in Chicago. Regional coordinating committees that launch summer organizing projects and assume organizational responsibility for different days of demonstrations should be created. A lawyers conference must be scheduled [sic] to build the legal defense and support. Preparations for medical stations attended by doctors should begin. Housing for 50,000 people must be found in Chicago. Fifteen large meeting halls are also needed. Educational and interpretative materials should be written. Research and organization for an alternative platform committee hearing must be started. A national press service should be established. A speakers program on the Democratic Party should be launched. *And* finally, funds are needed to support this program and the countless, creative activities that will develop as we approach the time when the President finds it necessary to employ troops from Vietnam or the ghetto to secure [sic] his nomination and the breakdown of representative and meaningful government in American [sic] becomes an historic admission to all.

SUBVERSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NATIONAL CONVENTION

Part 2

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1968

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Richard H. Ichord (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

(Subcommittee members: Representatives Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri, chairman; John M. Ashbrook, of Ohio; and Albert W. Watson, of South Carolina.)

Subcommittee members present: Representatives Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank Conley, special counsel; Chester D. Smith, general counsel; Alfred M. Nittle, counsel; and Herbert Romerstein, investigator.

Mr. ICHORD. The committee will come to order.

The photographers will please retire.

At the close of the hearings yesterday, the witness, Mr. Hayden, was continuing his testimony.

Mr. di Suvero, Mr. Weinglass is not with you today?

Mr. DI SUVERO. He is not going to be here today.

Mr. ICHORD. The counsel will resume the interrogation of the witness. The witness, of course, will again be reminded that he is under oath.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS EMMETT HAYDEN, ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL, HENRY M. DI SUVERO—Resumed

Mr. CONLEY. At this time, Mr. Chairman, we would like to request the following documents to be entered into the record. As Exhibit 1, the brochure, "MOVEMENT CAMPAIGN 1968: AN ELECTION YEAR OFFENSIVE." This was the subject of some testimony yesterday.

As Exhibit 2, the document entitled—

Mr. ICHORD. Let the brochure, read at length, in part by you and by Mr. Hayden, written by Mr. Hayden, be inserted. There being no objection from the members of the committee, it will be incorporated in the record.

(Document marked "Hayden Exhibit No. 1." See pages 2562-2583.)

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1

MOVEMENT CAMPAIGN 1968: AN ELECTION YEAR OFFENSIVE

Rennie Davis
Tom Hayden

This paper proposes an election year campaign against a political system that has brought the United States into a crisis of war, racism, and social disintegration. We outline a possible strategy for this campaign. For purposes of discussion, we have made our proposals concrete. But we will fail if you consider them final. The suggestions are merely our own, intended only to provoke discussion. The decisions and planning for an election year program must be made by the different organizations whose vital interests are at stake.

Not for Publication

March, 1968

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

Introduction

Election year 1968 will be a fateful one for American democracy. Millions of Americans want an end to the Vietnam war, liberation from racism, and new steps toward a more humane society. But the last several years of war, racism and social decay have raised the question of whether the U.S. government has the capacity to find meaningful solutions to problems facing people. The crisis, on the surface, is the credibility gap between words and deeds: between the talk of "peace" and "equality" and the reality of burning villages and red-bitten babies. But the deeper crisis is the failure of democratic and representative government to work. [The Democratic Party is not "the party of the people." It is an instrument for the use of corporation executives and their lawyers, the military brass, segregationists, machine politicians, and the old narrow-minded preservers of an "American Way of Life."] The 1968 elections will represent a sad culmination of the failure of our political institutions. People are being asked to spend their taxes and blood supporting a government in which, it becomes clearer day by day, they have little voice. The supreme insult will be the "choice" between two candidates supporting identical policies which are destroying our country's potential for decency. The fraudulence of this choice must be exposed and opposed by a movement of people determined to see their needs attended and their voices heard.

We are proposing a Movement Campaign--an election year program of organizing and protest against the failure of the government, particularly the failure of the governing Democratic Party. We see the creation of a loose national coalition to carry out a program in stages:

- ✓--a spring in which various local protest movements consolidate regionally to become a political force confronting and attacking the politics of both parties,
- ✓--a summer of stepped-up resistance, community organization and independent electoral politics in which local groups expand their visibility and base of support,
- ✓--a series of massive demonstrations at the Democratic Convention to dramatize the social needs which are unmet and the large numbers of people unrepresented by the Party and Administration,

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

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 ↙ a campaign of exposure and opposition through the November elections which offers concrete independent political activity and organization as an alternative to Johnson-Nixon electioneering.

The general purpose of this program is to provide opportunities for expression to the people who feel they have no choice and no voice in 1968. The protest should focus on the failure of the government to deal with the racial and Vietnam crises, and the mockery of a democratic process which the Democratic Convention represents.

A Campaign Against Undemocratic Power

A movement election year campaign should reflect the growing understanding that both racism and US policies in Vietnam flow from the same corrupt power structure at home. The continuation of these policies makes an even greater mockery of democracy in the US. The government becomes more repressive. Policy already is dominated by a "national security complex" whose decisions are subject to only the most feeble democratic review. The war atmosphere permits their domination to become enlarged; it also requires an increasing distortion of democratic processes. Deliberate lying about events in Vietnam, escalation of the draft, intimidation and repression of dissent are only the clearest trends flowing from this tightening control. A declaration of war, now a real possibility, would give qualitatively greater powers to these decision-makers.

This consolidation of undemocratic power is accompanied by the abandoning of any attempt to provide political and economic answers to social problems. Riot control is the main domestic priority of the government. Ghetto poverty, air and water pollution, glutted cities and highways, inadequate health programs, all are inevitable in a commercial system using military means to keep an unjust peace. Private interests run rampant--even in Johnson's cabinet--while social needs are left unattended.

A Campaign for Self-Determination

We should base our campaign on the right of people to know the truth, to control their own government, to use politics to solve their problems. We should demand self-determina-

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

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tion in Vietnam, the ghettos, and in the boring, insecure life of the ordinary white citizen who pays taxes and blood to a political system that shuts him out of meaningful participation. Our campaign is against the system of repressive authority which gives rise to the crises of racism and war in the first place.

A Campaign to Reach Average Democrats

These two political patterns--repression and neglect--open the opportunity to organize and reach new people whose dissatisfaction is rising. We can hasten the death of the traditional Democratic coalition by working among the constituencies with past loyalties to the Party: black people, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, the young, suburban liberals, trade unionists, the students and intellectuals. As Johnson abandons welfare and "great society" programs, we should be prepared to organize among people who increasingly feel the bite of the war into domestic priorities. This will mean hard work among people with deep conservative tendencies, especially in lower-middle and working class sections, but we are convinced that real opportunities exist because of taxes, inflation, the draft and the pervasive sense of confusion about the state of society. Our hope is that 1968 will find many people developing a critical and independent political sense, expressed through a variety of forms.

A Campaign Against Repression

We must recognize that thousands of people, especially black militants and draft resisters, will be struggling for survival against an increasingly repressive government machinery. While our campaign should seek to be far broader than these militant movements, we must work in solidarity and coordination with those facing police violence, intimidation and jail. We must help give political expression to their demands: the right of individuals to refuse to fight in unjust wars, the right of black people to control their own communities, the right of rebellion against oppression. Our campaign should build the widest possible understanding and support for these demands. We are convinced this is the most effective deterrent to the repression which inevitably is growing. The tendency to intensify militancy without organizing wide political support is self-defeating. But so is the tendency to draw away from militancy into milder and more conventional forms of protest.

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

The problem is to build the broadest coalition which can give political support and interpretation to the militancy. As the government makes it clear that its only response to revolution abroad and resistance at home is violence and suppression, the movement must either reach out for new support or be eroded away.

On Disruption in Chicago

The campaign should not plan violence and disruption against the Democratic National Convention. It should be non-violent and legal. The right to rebellion is hardly exercised in an effective way by assembling 300,000 people to charge into 30,000 paratroopers. In fact, any plan of deliberate disruption will drive away people who are worried about arrests or violence, and thus sharply diminish the size and political effect of the mobilization. Little would be served, except perhaps the political hopes of Johnson, Nixon and Wallace, by a Chicago action that would be seen (as Max Lerner sees it in his fantasy already) as a gathering of "every crackpot group, protest group, every disruptive, violent force in American society that thinks it has the pipeline to absolute truth." We must demonstrate the opposite, that the government is the real source of crackpot thinking and violence. We have no illusions about the distortions which are inevitable from Time magazine and the rest of the mass media. However, we believe the country is so divided that even within the mass media there are possibilities for reporting based on a degree of respect and objectivity. We must make an absolutely clear commitment to nonviolent tactics, develop a simple and clear political message that large numbers of Americans can understand, carry out effective local organizing which can interpret the national program and, finally, mobilize an assembly of people too large to be considered the lunatic fringe. The planning for this program should begin now, while there is enough time to develop a sophisticated nationwide staff with experience in both local organizing and demonstrations. This staff would be not only the nucleus of local activities, but the key to carrying out an orderly, highly-coordinated series of actions at the convention. We believe the demonstrations can be orderly and directed. Certainly, there will be police crackdowns and various incidents of violence, but they need not change the overall character of the convention protest.

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

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Immediate Impact of the Campaign

On the War: An immediate effect of such a campaign should be to increase the pressure on the US government to end the war in Vietnam. The government will be forced from its Vietnam commitment when the costs of that commitment become too great, when the commitment becomes untenable. The costs are many: billions of dollars, inflation and rising taxes, thousands of casualties, a worsening US image abroad, shortage of resources to deal with other crises, and discontent and disillusionment at home. We can increase pressure against the main powers needed to prosecute the war: the powers to mobilize an army, to tax, and to remain in political office. We must continually show that the anti-war movement is increasing in militancy and numbers. We can show the establishment that deeper social conflict at home will result from the Vietnam crisis. We can accelerate the breakdown of confidence in the government and military by stressing that the decisions which led to the Vietnam war were rigged in the same way and by the same people who are rigging the convention and elections in 1968. The probable use of troops to protect his own nomination will further expose the authoritarian character of Johnson's government.

On Racism: A second immediate effect should be on the racial conflict. We can expect major voter revulsion in the black communities with the traditional Democratic machines. Cuts in anti-poverty, education and welfare funds, in addition to the ruthless police treatment of rebellious, should guarantee that this revulsion will be at a new high during the summer and fall. It is time for whites to stop being shocked spectators or vicarious participants in black rebellions and begin to find activities which can be of direct value to the black power movement. One obvious need in an election year is for whites to attack politically city halls and the federal government for oppressive policies. Whether this is done through angry telegrams, sit ins, or formation of committees to supply financial, legal and medical aid to ghetto residents, the effect is to create divisions between "hawks" and "doves" in the establishment. As in the case of Vietnam, the existence of these divisions gives certain legitimacy to protest, and slows or dilutes repressive tendencies. The presence of hundreds of thousands of whites filling the streets of Chicago is a way to demonstrate the government's inability to completely unite the majority and the futility of its

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

attempt to be policemen everywhere. Whatever the form of black participation in the challenge—and that will be decided by black organizations—it will constitute a significant and dramatic movement coming at the end of the summer and on the fifth anniversary of the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Justice.

On International Relations: The challenge also can be important in increasing international pressure on the United States. The global operations of the US partially depend on confidence, good will and cooperation from many governments. Already, most governments even in the West oppose the Vietnam war, and many peoples are worried about racism, the Kennedy assassination and the imperial thrust of the US into their own economies. We must internationalize our battle, encouraging further opposition to US policies in these countries. The protest of the 1968 elections will sound a worldwide alarm and increase opposition to the American power structure. (The 1968 campaign will be televised by satellite in Europe.)

Our goal should be to brand the US an outlaw power in the international community as long as it continues its racist and imperialist policies.

What Kind of Coalition?

We must build a real coalition, one involving connections between the insurgent forces across the country. This requires respect for different positions and outlooks. Political disagreements and discussions should be carried on intensely, but within an understanding that the coalition generally represents the forces which, however divided at the moment, must be developed in unity to achieve radical social change. People should be able to maintain their own views without advancing them in a sectarian way that forces others to drop out. The goal is to unite and radicalize a movement, not to purge it of its "right" or "left" wings.

The need for a coordinated effort does not imply that the groups involved conform to a specific or narrow program. Our political point is that many diverse groups are suffering from the government's policies. Black people, school teachers, social workers, hippies, draft resisters, soldiers and veterans, and ordinary tax-paying people with gripes should have the opportunity to express their particular concerns in their own ways. The overall

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

organization ⁷ not speak for everyone except in the most general sense; its basic task is not to represent everyone, but to structure opportunities for communication and coordination. We are finding that neither the methods of "hierarchy" (in which committees of leaders meet continually but with no real relation to what will actually happen at the demonstration), nor the more spontaneous method of "doing your own thing" are satisfactory organizational concepts. We seek a new organizational form based on both coordination and spontaneous action, effective leadership and active participation. [The problem is to create a staff and structure rooted in local areas, skilled in demonstrations and community organizing, aware of the nature of the party system conscious of the layout of Chicago, experienced in working together, and able to have the confidence of the people coming for one or two days of demonstrations at the convention.] Such a staff would serve a genuine coalition structure, built in stages, allowing for full and equal participation by groups entering at different times, and providing a connection between the wide variety of movements involved in the protest.

This kind of broad coalition should include insurgent Democrats while, of course, making it clear that our strategy is to build political organizations of our own rather than to "reform" the Democratic Party. Insurgencies within the Democratic Party should be seen as related to the overall movement campaign, however. For instance, challenges to the credentials of state party machines--especially when made by black organizations or anti-war groups--help to expose the top-down way in which decisions are made in the Party. Criticism of Party policy or structure before the Platform Committee can be equally valuable as a means of exposure. The "dump Johnson," pre-McCarthy or pre-Kennedy Democrats also are important objectively because of the issues they sharpen. We should keep our organizational ranks open so some of these dissidents can join with us in the streets or in independent organizations when their hopes are blocked at the convention.

At the same time, we must be arguing that the Democratic Party and the limits of the electoral system itself are what we oppose. The focus of our hopes is not a McCarthy (or Kennedy) candidacy. These candidates are not alternatives to the power structure, they are only alternatives within it. We believe that the party system cannot be reformed, as

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

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Kennedy and McCarthy do, because it contains intransigent elements committed to maintaining the status quo at all costs. A vote is at best an organizing tool; it secures nothing by itself. What we want to create is a greater consciousness that organizations of protest, resistance, and independent politics, under the control of the actual people with grievances, are more important than casting a vote or working for the "better" of two conventional candidates.

Local Organizing Versus National Demonstrations

Within the anti-war and black liberation movements, there have been two broad organizing emphases. One aims at dramatizing massive popular dissent against established policies by "mobilizing" people for a single day of protest and demonstration. The other seeks to build "permanent" bases of independent power by organizing locally around people's felt grievances. Which organizing approach is "correct" has been an issue of considerable dispute within the movement.

For this problem, we propose a solution that will differ from previous national mobilizations against the war. This campaign is aimed at deepening the roots of local organizations. We are not envisioning a one-shot, two-day affair in which thousands of dollars are spent and energy evaporated with little effect on the local level. For previous mobilizations, local committees spent much of their energy in advertising the event and arranging the buses. The events were often without any relation to local activities, the dates were arbitrarily chosen, and so on.

We propose an organizational experiment they may fail, but one that we believe should be attempted. A national coalition should be organized which is dominated by people with a local organizing perspective, people responsible to local constituencies. Any national demonstration in Chicago should be part of a program that has stressed local organizing during the spring and summer and can support community base-building in the fall.

We recognize that in some parts of the country there will be tension between local organizers and this campaign. But, in general, this program could be of great value in

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

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developing lasting organizations on the local level. We view the election year as opening up an immense chance for expansion of the numbers of people interested in a new political movement. Also, opportunities to build regional coalitions will increase as a variety of groups see a mutual interest in attacking a common enemy: the entrenched and repressive political establishment. In numerous ways, there will exist the opportunity for organizers to come together in a region for a common purpose: the Peace and Freedom Party in California is one example of what we mean; the union of white organizers in Chicago is another.

In addition to the common enemy, this movement campaign creates another useful dynamic: a sense of urgency because of the timetable. Of course, timetables, especially those which are set by the US government, can force a local movement to stress superficial methods to get quick results rather than other organizing methods which might in the long run yield stronger grass-roots activity. But in this case, the timetable forces people to both consolidate and expand priorities which are of immediate importance to most insurgent groups. Facing possible repressions on the one hand and tremendous organizing opportunities among newly-discontented groups on the other, local organizing has to accelerate everywhere or be lost.

If the campaign coalition, particularly at the regional level, is dominated by people with a commitment to local organizing work, then the resources and momentum that a national challenge of this kind can generate can be used in a new way. For example, organizer-training schools could be supported by the national coalition rather than New York Times advertisements. Such Schools could focus not only on the mechanics of the Democratic Convention challenge, but on organizing methods, the immediate issues of the draft, or on the promotion of permanent organizing projects among white workers.

* * * * *

Finally, we should not become so trapped in debates about the abstract merits or problems of this project that we miss its historical and dramatic potential. There is a growing sense everywhere that the country is cracking up, and this feeling is sure to deepen with the summer rebellions and the next escalation in Vietnam. There is an interest in new answers, a distrust of the established ones. There is a sense that Johnson has brought

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

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American politics to an awful and total bankruptcy, reflecting a deep sickness in the whole society. There is a feeling that this sickness must somehow be stopped. Certainly, we cannot stop Johnson or the government at the Convention, nor can we do it on any single similar occasion. But there are times, or turning points, when dying ideas can be declared dead and new ideas announced in their place. We can accomplish that at the Convention by exposing and defying the nauseating emptiness of our political leaders, and we can use this election year to create and advance many centers of local power which contain the seeds for a new order.

#

We propose a program that would unfold in three phases: the spring, the summer, and late August at the Democratic National Convention. A second paper will follow this one, discussing possible activities and program during the fall election period.

The Spring (April-June)

These spring months should bring wide public attention to a serious challenge against the Democratic Party in cities and towns across the country. The objectives of the spring months would be: (1) the formation of local coordinating structures composed of various movement organizations in 12 to 15 regions of the country. These regional committees would provide the political direction for the movement election year campaign in local areas; (2) a public call by local coalition committees for a specific summer organizing program related to the Democratic Party challenge; (3) immediate activity which tends to put the Democratic Party on the defensive or publicly embarrasses or exposes Party officialdom.

A number of beginning projects could be suggested which move toward this initial objective. For example:

Research and Exposure: Organizers need hard information and intelligence on the people who hold power locally. A research center, based on a campus or in an organization, with no more than several people, can help fill this need while gathering intelligence for the local movement campaign. The undemocratic method of choosing delegates--through money

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

11

and "pull"--should be exposed and fought. The names of Democratic Party contributors who profit from Pentagon contracts should be revealed. The political, business and personal biographies of the ten most powerful people in each state might be circulated on a "most wanted" list. For research suggestions, Lee Webb has written a useful paper entitled "How to Expose and Fight the Democratic Party in Your Community;" it is available by writing to 407 South Dearborn, Room 315, Chicago. Other articles and documents on the Democrats and electoral politics are being prepared for publication in major magazines.

77 Legal: Regional committees might interest local lawyers in preparing legal challenges to the credentials of national delegates. In all states that elect delegates behind the closed doors of state conventions, legal challenges should be organized. Any irregularities in the selection or voting procedures for delegates should be documented. Hopefully, numerous challenges to the credentials of state delegates can face the credentials committees at the opening of the convention. At the same time or earlier, we would hope for a federal court suit seeking to enjoin the convention from assembling on the grounds that it is undemocratically established. Lawyers who work on credentials challenges are also needed in the legal defense of those who may be arrested in Chicago at the time of the convention.

78 National Teach-In: For many disgusted Democrats, the idea of exposing the Democratic Party and building local independent organization will not be immediately apparent. A national teach-in on the Democratic Party, modeled along the lines of the Vietnam teach-ins and piped into hundreds of colleges and organizations could help create a popular focus on the Democratic Party. A national teach-in might cover: (1) the historic failure of the Democratic Party and the New Deal; (2) who really controls the Democratic Party and the government; (3) the failure of policy from the Democratic Party; and (4) the need to organize political forces independent of the two major political parties.

79 Direct Action: The spring months should see a broader new expression of opposition to the draft because of Johnson's selective service orders. Coming from rather conventional backgrounds, the new recruits to the anti-draft movement will tend to seek a political object of protest. They may be joined by more and more respectable members of the academic

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

community, including college administrations. By April 3, the next national day of resistance, we may find a much greater outbreak of anti-draft action. After the counter-comencements planned this spring to protest the war and the draft and to reject the degree as a ticket into American society, these people might become a greater nucleus of draft resistance organizers. The government and Democratic Party might become the felt enemies of this broadened resistance. One organization on Chicago's Northside recently submitted draft cards to the Democratic Party office which they regarded as the local representatives of the war.

During the SDS "Ten Days of Resistance" (April 21-30), attention might be given to Democratic Party targets. Pickets at Party fund-raising affairs, actions at state Democratic conventions where delegates are chosen behind closed doors, local Democratic Party teach-ins on the campuses, are examples. In Chicago, the April Ten Days will begin with several campuses holding teach-ins on the Democratic Party and the War. On April 24, students across the city will demonstrate at IIT, the university which conducts the largest research program on chemical-biological warfare research in the country. On April 25, Johnson is scheduled to speak at a Democratic Party fund raising affair, which the movement will disrupt. On April 26, some campuses will participate in a student strike to protest the war, called by the Student Mobilization. On April 27, 25,000 people are expected to march on city hall demanding that Mayor Daley, host to the Democratic Convention, support a program for peace.

Primary Campaigns: McCarthy organizations will be supporting their candidate delegates to the national convention. The decision whether, how and on what terms to give support to such campaigns should be left up to the local coalition organizations. However, contact of some kind should be arranged with a view toward bringing some of the McCarthy supporters into the overall campaign against the convention and election choice. At the same time, more radical organizations with electoral programs might be forming, such as the California Peace and Freedom Party. These independent, anti-war and anti-racist electoral campaigns are building a consciousness critical of traditional party politics. It

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

should be natural for them to find allies in the overall coalition. They may even want to use the coalition machinery to promote similar parties in other states. 13

30 People's Platform Hearing: During the spring, the platform committee of the Democratic Party is expected to receive testimony for its 1968 platform in several cities. People's platform hearings could be announced in these cities at the same time, which can publicly focus on the Democratic Party's whitewash of the double crisis of the cities and foreign policy. People's hearings would receive testimony from returning Vietnam veterans, welfare recipients, lawyers and workers. Hearings would continue through the summer, as a way of directing attention in dozens of communities on the nation's real difficulties. The hearings would conclude in Chicago when a final report from a panel of prestigious Americans would indict the Democratic Party and the government for their failure to seek serious answers to the nation's crisis.

Planning Summer Program: Finally, an important task of each regional campaign committee will be to develop a coherent, relevant summer program that can help expand and strengthen the existing base of the movement in the local area. The program for summer work should be widely circulated. If possible, a training school for orientation of summer volunteers would be developed.

31 The Summer (June-August)

For the reasons that hundreds of thousands will come to Chicago in late August to express their disgust and anger about the election alternatives, many more Americans will willingly work in communities this summer if offered concrete things to do. The objectives of the movement campaign during the summer period would include: (1) a massive organizing drive affecting hundreds of local areas--towns, counties and cities--and involving thousands of new people in independent movement activity; (2) a national training program for summer and full-time volunteers organized by regions, which could provide meaningful orientation and establish specific work for the organizers; (3) local preparations for a Chicago demonstration in late August, with organizations planning their own actions, "Democratic Assemblies" for people to formulate demands and develop tactics for the

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

Convention, the training of cadres in demonstration tactics, and the education of local communities, particularly Chicago, about the purpose of the demonstration.

32 Local Organizing: The movement campaign 1968 should center around the work of local organizers this summer--several thousand should be the objective--who build high school draft resistance groups; organize anti-war committees among teachers, doctors, veterans and clergy; speak to every trade union in a city about the war, tax and high prices; reach women isolated in the suburbs; support peace and freedom party campaigns or move into white working class communities in Cincinnati, Richmond or Lexington to live and stay for the long haul. The national program should find support for those organizers who see their task to be slow, patient political work in one section of one community, requiring several years to establish an independent political base, and those resisters who organize a summer caravan to travel across the country, reaching hundreds and hundreds of young people on the issues of the war and the draft. Local coordinating committees associated with the national movement campaign would define and organize their own summer program. It is not the intent of this campaign to push any single organizational approach, though it is expected that each region might develop its own specific political emphasis. Nationally, several organizational forms, such as training schools, might be stressed.

33 Training Schools: Summer "projects" frequently fail to achieve their expected purpose because short-term objectives are not carefully defined and communicated to the summer participants. There is now considerable organizing experience in a variety of communities that can be drawn upon in developing and guiding a summer program. We believe this experience should be summarized and analyzed in a series of materials that are circulated among all participating regional campaign committees and presented in a systematic fashion at the beginning of the summer to volunteers. Perhaps two weeks of "training" would be sufficient, perhaps more. Some formal orientation to the summer work, in whatever form, is essential, however. Furthermore, there will be a need for continuing organizers' workshops to make preparation for the challenges at the convention.

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

15

The workshops could cover a variety of areas: (1) information on demonstration tactics from experience in this country and abroad; (2) background on the Democratic Party--who owns and runs it, how does it work, the mechanics of its Convention, the failures of its promise and policies; (3) discussion of our movement, its history, its problems, and its direction; (4) consideration of various philosophies and techniques of community organizing. "Techniques" of community organizing will vary of course, depending on the political emphasis of the regional campaign committee. In California, organizing for the Peace and Freedom Party would probably represent the important training focus. In Boston, community-based draft resistance could be emphasized. In Chicago, white working class organizing might be most important.

34 "Democratic Assemblies": Organizers working with people coming to Chicago in August might consider "open forums" to discuss and develop demands on the Convention or plan specific tactics for Chicago. Where possible, people coming to Chicago should be familiar with the overall strategy of the Convention challenge and be prepared to implement their own plans of action. Broad representational assemblies or smaller constituency meetings in dozens of communities before August should be one aim of the summer.

35 Black Rebellions: In our view, summer organizers working in the white community should discuss plans in each training school for support and parallel activity during black ghetto rebellions. Whites should sit-in at Democratic Mayor's offices, organize medical and legal support, pull together diversionary demonstrations outside the ghetto to draw off police and find ways to focus public blame for what happens on the powerful white interests.

36 Chicago Demonstration Leadership: One goal of the summer should be to develop groups of people who can provide street leadership during the Chicago action. The specific tactics for Chicago should be developed and implemented by these groups should/come to Chicago during the summer to familiarize themselves with streets and targets and the demonstration communication system. From each summer organizing program, cadres should develop who take responsibility for specific parts of the Chicago demonstration. Doctors and lawyers should also be organized to observe, report and aid at the time of the demonstrations.

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

16

National Convention Mobilization (August 24-28)

The summer would be capped by three days of sustained, organized protests at the Democratic National Convention, clogging the streets of Chicago with people demanding peace, justice and self-determination for all people. The Chicago challenge must convey a broad but concrete critique of the Democratic Party and its failure to meet the crisis of our cities and the war. It must say to the world that Johnson represents the wealth, the military and the politically corrupt of America, not ordinary people. It must attempt to delegitimize the Democratic Party while building support for an independent people's movement during the 1968 elections.

We propose a general outline of a demonstration strategy for Chicago, as a way of suggesting what is possible during this period. The outline is divided into four periods:

(1) pre-Convention publicity, education and legal offensives; This would include a challenge to the Constitutionality of the Convention, challenges to several state delegations and a citizen's indictment of the Democratic Party and the government; (2) an initial Convention challenge related to the crisis of poverty and the cities, with emphasis on the conditions of black Americans; (3) a second wave of demonstrations and protests related to the crisis of the war and America's foreign policy; (4) a final, massive protest against the institution of the Democratic Party and its fraudulent, undemocratic Convention.

Pre-Convention Activity (August 24-25): After a summer of gathering testimony from hundreds of citizens on direct experiences with the conditions of racism, urban neglect, Democratic Party corruption, and the wars in Vietnam, Laos and Thailand, the "People's Platform Hearings" would receive summary testimony in Chicago as the Democratic Party was holding its own platform hearings. The People's Platform Hearings might be highlighted by testimony on the conditions of Mississippi, on America's welfare system, on the Kennedy assassination, on US war crimes in Vietnam and on the causes of riots. Following the public people's hearings, a final report would be announced and released for the opening day of the Convention. Prominent Americans with moral and political authority would present a citizen's indictment of the government and the Democratic Party and demand that the Demo-

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

17

cratic National Convention suspend all rules and all business to take up the challenges of the indictment. The citizen's indictment would be made politically serious if the full power of the demonstration was then put behind this demand,

In addition, numerous legal challenges to the credentials of delegates or entire state delegations would be made during this early Convention period. A federal court suit would seek to enjoin the Convention from assembling until the method of delegate selection followed the one man-one vote principle. The citizen's indictment would be presented at the same time that the Democratic credentials committee was publicly denying several dozen charges of undemocratic rules and fraudulent procedures.

31 First Wave: Poverty and the Cities (August 26): Following the demand that the Convention take up the challenge of the citizen's indictment, on the first day of the Convention, actions might demand that the Democratic Party deal with the crisis of the cities and poverty. To dramatize the demand and the urban condition, protests could focus on hundreds of the major institutions that irresponsibly contribute to urban breakdown; welfare offices, urban renewal departments, police stations, day-labor hiring halls, large slum landlords, schools and city hall. Different organizations would come to Chicago prepared to carry out a specific action program. The Mississippi Freedom Democrats might want to focus attention on their lack of representation or on the failure to deal with poverty across the country. Or a coalition of "poverty rights" organizations in one region might surround the Conrad Hilton, a downtown Chicago hotel, on the morning of the 26th to greet the delegates with leaflets demanding \$15 billion to end poverty and a breakfast menu totaling 15¢, the amount allotted under welfare. At 10:00 a.m., the recipients might march from the Hilton to 318 West Adams to join with delegations coming from the other downtown hotels in a massive demonstration at the welfare office headquarters of Chicago. In the evening, the recipients might again return to the hotels to invite the delegates to spend the night with them in the ghetto rather than in luxurious hotels. Hopefully, many organizations would come to Chicago with specific plans of action that together cover many issues, many targets, but dramatize a common theme.

HAYDEN EXHIBIT No. 1--Continued

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38 Second Wave: The War (August 27): The indictment dramatized on the second day would regard the imperialist role of the United States in the world. Actions would concentrate on dozens of war targets across the city: Chicago draft boards, the downtown induction center, Illinois Institute of Technology (the nation's center for chemical-biological warfare research), and major war corporations like Dow Chemical. The second day might see a memorial service for black people killed in Vietnam and the ghettos, held in one of Chicago's large parks, with services conducted by America's most prominent black ministers. August 27 might be declared a national day of resistance, with draft cards turned in to the Convention and a serious teach-in for soldiers protecting Johnson's convention. This array of protests would stand in stark contrast to the silence of the Convention regarding the Vietnam war.

39 Final Wave: A Funeral March on the Democratic Party: A major call for Americans to register their opposition to the Democratic Party should be issued for August 28, the day of the Presidential nomination and the fifth anniversary of the March on Washington for Jobs and Justice. August 28 might begin with a massive "Democratic Assembly," perhaps in Grant Park, and climax in a "funeral march" on the International Amphitheater immediately after the first ballot. Such a march could be led by retired generals, admirals and Vietnam veterans. The funeral procession might be organized by constituencies: blacks followed by clergy followed by women followed by farmers and faculty and workers and registers and so on. This funeral would speak for those who say that the elections represent no choice and a complete breakdown of democracy, and those who pledge to use the fall election to expand the resistance into all sections of the American public: professors engaged in war research; people who pay war taxes; recipients who let themselves be pushed around by caseworkers; workers who "go along" with their unions on racism and the war; college graduates faced with the draft; suburban women conditioned to "stay in their place"; etc. While Johnson accepts the nomination, a half-million people in the largest protest in the history of the country carry caskets symbolizing the Democratic Party into the Convention area and bury them in Chicago's stock yards beside the Amphitheater.

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

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The Organization of the Campaign:

The program suggested is broad, demanding and difficult to implement. Already, time is short. Organization must be created at many levels, in many sections of the country. People, community organizations and coalitions must define their relation to the program according to their own interest and needs and in their own time. The national coalition organization must be representative of many interests and constituencies, yet be able to move forward and accomplish tasks. Support can only come in stages, yet where support exists, work must proceed if anything is to happen. Understandably, the anti-war and black liberation movements will stress different emphases. Organization must allow for separate approaches while remaining open to cooperation.

Therefore, we suggest that the national coalition organization be set up in stages and be open to new groupings that wish to participate until the end of August. Decisions and program development should be decentralized as much as possible to regional coalition committees. The black liberation and anti-war movements should consider parallel organizations that allow for communication and cooperation where political interests merge. And an administrative committee should be created that is responsible to the coalition organization. It can allow flexibility and efficiency in directing staff. The organization for the movement campaign might proceed in this way:


From parallel national conferences called for March 22-24, inviting some 250 representatives from different anti-war and black organizations across the nation, a tentative structure could be established. The conference participants might elect two coalition boards, representing different interests in the anti-war and black movements. These two boards, in our opinion, should be empowered to add membership, as new constituencies decide they wish to participate in the challenge coalition. The boards would be responsible for the broad policy and direction of the two parallel coalitions.

The elected boards would then select administrative committees to direct the staff. The administrative committees would include two representatives from the East, South, Mid-West and West regions. The two administrative committees might meet together on matters of

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

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concern common to the anti-war and black coalitions. The committees would hire separate staff. The staffs would then begin to develop programs in white and black communities. The structure might look like this:



Finally, the coalition boards might consider including a representative of each major project developing around the Convention challenge. Many projects will be organized on an independent or semi-independent basis to the coalition organization, but may want to participate in the coalition. Such projects might include:

Legal--Offense and Defense: Organization of lawyers is needed to prepare challenges to the credentials of delegates and the Constitutionality of the Convention. Injunctions, high bails, and vague multi-state and municipal charges need legal opposition. And those arrested in Chicago, for whatever reason, require legal defense.

People's Platform Hearings: A panel of prominent people to receive testimony and develop a report on America must be assembled. Research must be gathered, witnesses with pertinent information found, hearings organized, etc. Preparations for Chicago facilities for the final hearings should begin soon.

Research and Education: A stream of papers and educational materials exposing the Democratic Party should pour out of the coalition organization. A list of research priorities should be developed nationally and locally and support from people with research-

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 1—Continued

skills found. Groups that gather specific intelligence on national delegates should be organized locally. Papers that can assist summer organizing, spring teach-in and other educational work should be circulated. 21

Regional Training Schools: The curriculum of each school will vary, reflecting the political emphasis of the local campaign coalition. Nevertheless, it could be helpful if a national training project" were established to assist regional schools in developing materials, recruiting, fund-raising, etc.

National Teach-In: Considerable preparation is required to develop background materials and speakers for the national teach-in on the Democratic Party. The technical arrangements are considerable. While preparations have begun in California for such a project, they will need national support.

Convention Paper: A newspaper that circulates in Chicago during the demonstrations and informs participants of inside and outside activities is an essential project.

National Press Service: Attention should be given to informing the media about the specific objectives of the challenge and keeping the press informed as events in Chicago unfold.

Yippee Festival: A large-scale convocation of hippies, rock bands, etc., will occur in Chicago at the same time as the Convention, seeking to contrast the celebration of life with the death-producing rituals of the politicians.

International Protest: A group should be formed to approach delegations at the United Nations about increasing pressures on the United States. We should call for demonstrations in many countries and send representatives to speak and organize in those countries. We should invite international representatives to join our "people's platform hearings" and march with us on the Convention.

Mr. CONLEY. As Exhibit 2, the document entitled "DISCUSSION ON THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CHALLENGE," signed by Rennie Davis and Tom Hayden, also the subject of some testimony yesterday.

Mr. ICHORD. Is there any objection? Members?

If not, the document will be incorporated into the record.

(Document marked "Hayden Exhibit No. 2." See pages 2556-2559.)

Mr. CONLEY. As Exhibit 3, the clipping from the Cuban Communist paper entitled *Granma*, dated September 8, 1968, specifically page 12, entitled "Michael Klonsky denounces police brutality during Chicago incidents."

Mr. ICHORD. I thought, Mr. Counsel, that was already in as part of the record.

Mr. CONLEY. I don't believe so.

Mr. ICHORD. If there be no objection, that will be incorporated.

(Document marked "Hayden Exhibit No. 3." See page 2585.)

Mr. CONLEY. As Exhibit 4, a letter dated June 4, 1968, addressed "Dear Col. Lao"¹ and signed "Tom Hayden" and also the subject of some testimony yesterday.

Mr. ICHORD. This has been read into the record.

Mr. CONLEY. But not formally offered, I don't believe.

Mr. ICHORD. No objection, so admitted.

(Document marked "Hayden Exhibit No. 4." See page 2586.)

Mr. ICHORD. Counsel is recognized to proceed.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, I believe when we concluded the hearings yesterday, we were talking about the trip that you took to Cuba in December—or January 1968. And you were asked in what capacity you went, I believe, to summarize and get us back where we were, and you indicated that you went as a journalist for *Liberation* magazine.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel, can you pull the mike just a little closer to you?

Mr. CONLEY. Is this not substantially where we were yesterday?

All right, I would ask you, sir, and directing your attention specifically to a news item which appeared in the *National Guardian* of December 30, 1967, under the byline of Lionel Martin, and I am reading specifically from the fourth paragraph, which I will be glad to hand you in just a moment, which reads as follows:

Those who to date have expressed their intention to participate in the congress from the U.S. are anti-war activist Dave Dellinger; Tom Hayden, community organizer in Newark, N.J.; and Conor Cruise O'Brien, professor of humanities at New York University. Many others are expected to attend from the U.S.

(Document handed to witness.)

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, my question to you would be this, sir: This article would indicate that you were attending as a participant. In fact, I believe it uses that word.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. HAYDEN. I am sorry. Did you ask a question?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. I thought you just made a statement.

Mr. ICHORD. Repeat the question.

Mr. CONLEY. My question was, sir, that the article says that you attended as a participant. Is this correct?

¹ Correct spelling "Lau."

TELEPHONE INTERVIEW

Gramma

12

News. September 8, 1968

Michael Klonsky denounces police brutality during Chicago incidents



MICHAEL Klonsky, National Secretary of SDS (Students for a Democratic Society), was interviewed by telephone by Radio Havana Cuba on August 28 during the incidents in Chicago.

Considerable attention has already been called to the fact that the police used the butts of their rifles, tear gas and MACE in their attacks on the thousands of persons protesting the Yankee war of aggression in Vietnam at the very moment when Hubert Humphrey was being nominated presidential candidate at the Democratic Convention.

Klonsky spoke of these incidents in his telephone interview which we present here in full:

What can you tell us about the present situation in Chicago?

We have been fighting in the streets for four days. Many of our people have been beaten up, and many of them are in jail, but we are winning. We pushed the police out of Grant Park, and the people were still in the streets. They are going to be in the streets all night, and we are going to do anything we can to stop this farce (the Democratic National Convention) which is taking place in Chicago. The people are committed to carry on this fight not only in Chicago but throughout the United States. We are going to go back to the hotel (The Conrad Hilton) and down to the park again, and are going to carry on the fight all night until the Convention is over. The police have been very brutal, and a lot of people have been shot and a lot of people have been beaten up, but the young people have committed themselves to fight, and they are fighting very bravely.

The police and the National Guard have been very brutal. They have beaten people up at random; they have been tear-gassing us. I think there are at least 300 hurt tonight (Wednesday); a lot of policemen have been hurt, too. We have set up medical units, and I think we are winning. They have the guns and the gas and the clubs. We have been outmaneuvering and outfighting them. We have nothing but sticks and stones. All I can say is that the people have fought very well and have been very brave. It's just that they outnumber us so badly, and they have much better weapons. We are just putting up the best fight we can.

The Yankee news agencies say that the police used MACE, and you know that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare of the U.S. Government — a scientific committee of the department — said recently that MACE could be very dangerous to the eyes and cause temporary blindness.

That is correct. Many people have been MACE'd in the eyes, and many people have been shot with shotguns. Some people were killed already several nights ago. People were MACE'd tonight; we were all tear-gassed, all gassed, and many people were beaten up.

(The message from the delegates of SDS in Cuba in which they urge their comrades to continue the struggle and create two, three, many Chicagos in the United States is read to Klonsky and he is asked to give his opinion on it.)

That's beautiful. That's very beautiful. That encourages us. What can I say but that we are all very excited and ready to go back to the streets again.

What is your opinion on the platform approved by the Democratic Convention?

We think it is irrelevant. It is not important. It is only important because a lot of the young people who were supporting McCarthy have now come to understand that the Democratic Convention was rigged, was phony, and are now joining us in the streets. Many, many McCarthy people are coming over because of the platform today.

We knew what was happening all along, and we knew that the people who control the Convention would not allow a peace platform to win in the Convention. It went just as we expected, and we are very enthusiastic about the response of the young people in Chicago. We think that the young people in America are going to turn the power structure upside down.

Michael, what are your immediate plans now? To go back to the streets. That's what we are going to do.

June 4 1968

Dear Col. Lao;

This note is to introduce to you Mr. Robert Greenblatt, the coordinator of the National Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam. He works closely with myself and Dave Dellinger, and has just returned from Hanoi.

If there are any pressing questions you wish to discuss, Mr. Greenblatt will be in Paris for a few days.

We hope that the current Paris discussions go well for you. The news from South Vietnam seems very good indeed.

We hope to see you this summer in Paris or at a later time.

Good fortune!
Victory!

Tom Hayden
Tom Hayden

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, you didn't even read the article, then.

Mr. CONLEY. I am reading to you the paragraph that deals specifically with you, going to that conference.

Mr. HAYDEN. But your own testimony here, sir, is that I went to the congress in January, and the article is dated December 30.

Mr. CONLEY. This article was obviously written prior to the—read the paragraph that I have reference to, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, it is an article that says what you read, but—

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel, instead of asking the witness about what the article says, ask him—

Mr. HAYDEN. Are you saying that it does say that?

Mr. ICHORD. Ask him whether or not he was a participant.

Mr. HAYDEN. We already testified that.

Mr. CONLEY. This article, Mr. Hayden, was written prior to the conference.

Mr. HAYDEN. So what?

Mr. CONLEY. Is Mr. Martin mistaken, or did he make a false statement in that article, to say that you were going to be a participant?

Mr. DI SUVERO. He doesn't say that.

Mr. HAYDEN. That is between you and Mr. Martin.

Mr. DI SUVERO. Would the counsel point out where that is stated?

Mr. ICHORD. Let us have order. The witness is saying that he testified that he was not a participant?

Mr. HAYDEN. I testified—in fact, you know what I testified.

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir, you have testified that you did not participate?

Mr. HAYDEN. Of course.

Mr. CONLEY. But this article, let me read it again to you, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. You didn't read it.

Mr. CONLEY. "Those who to date have expressed their intention to participate in the congress from the U.S. are" as follows.

Mr. HAYDEN. So what?

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now the word "participate," perhaps we are getting hung up again on what words mean.

Mr. HAYDEN. Perhaps you are, my friend, but I don't believe everything I read in the newspapers. It is a matter of record that I did not participate as a delegate in that congress.

Mr. CONLEY. Then, sir, my question—

Mr. HAYDEN. It is a matter of record, as I said yesterday, that I went in my capacity as an editor of *Liberation* magazine, but the main problem is I don't understand what you are uptight about.

Mr. ICHORD. The record will stand as made, Mr. Counsel.

Proceed with the next question.

Mr. CONLEY. The next question is—

Mr. ICHORD. I don't always agree with or believe what I read in the newspapers.

Mr. CONLEY. The next question, then, is that Mr. Martin is mistaken?

Mr. HAYDEN. That is between you and Mr. Martin. You have my testimony.

Mr. CONLEY. I am asking you, sir, is this article correct as far as it pertains—

Mr. HAYDEN. You have my testimony.

Mr. ICHORD. We have his testimony, Mr. Counsel. Proceed to the next question.

Mr. HAYDEN. It is ridiculous.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, now directing your attention to another article in the *National Guardian*, dated January 27, 1968, and written again by Mr. Lionel Martin, *Guardian* staff correspondent, bylined Havana, "Participants"—and I am reading from the paragraph. The first paragraph to introduce the article says:

The International Cultural Congress closed here with an appeal to intellectuals to boycott U.S. academic and cultural programs.

Moving down in the article, there is a subheadline which says, "Participants from U.S.":

The congress was attended by some 500 delegates and observers from 70 countries, and more than 100 journalists. Participating from the U.S. were antiwar leader Dave Dellinger, community organizer Tom Hayden, moviemakers Dick Moore and Saul Landau, writer Jose Iglesias, cartoonist Jules Feiffer And on and on and on.

Again, the editor or the reporter, after the conference, says that you participated in the conference.

Mr. HAYDEN. So what? I have testified that I did not.

Mr. CONLEY. And I am asking you, sir, I put to you the question now—

Mr. HAYDEN. Put it.

Mr. CONLEY. —Is this reporter in error when he says that you participated?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, he is in error.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir. And he is a reporter for the *National Guardian*?

Mr. HAYDEN. That is the first time I ever heard you fellows believe the *National Guardian*. I can even give you my press badge for one of

your exhibits. That was made in Cuba, and it might not be valid to bring it into the United States.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, directing your attention to another subject, some time ago Captain Charles Kinney of the Newark Police Department testified before this committee.

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Would you like to say something else?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, no, go ahead.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Testified before this committee in connection with the riots which occurred in Newark in the summer of 1967, and during the testimony of Captain Kinney, with reference to these particular riots, he quoted from an article which appeared in the *New York Times*, under date of December 17, 1967, in which you are quoted as follows: "a case can be made for violence in the peace movement," and:

It's not as if violence in the slums and in Vietnam appeared in a vacuum [sic]. It came only after the failure of democratic methods. When I participate in violence it was out of that failure—not as an expression of psychological self-hatred.

Mr. Hayden, would you please advise us as to what circumstances you are willing to participate in violence?

Mr. HAYDEN. Advise you?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, I have already testified about that question as it pertains to the subject of these hearings, and I went on at considerable length trying to educate you yesterday as to my beliefs in that area, and I think it would be redundant to go over them.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, I am reading particularly again from this account, which is attributed to you: "When I participate in violence it was out of that failure—not as an expression of psychological self-hatred."

Now, when I read that quotation, and perhaps I am putting the wrong emphasis on it, you are implying that you have participated in violence, and I am asking you under what conditions do you participate in violence?

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel, I think perhaps you should lay the proper foundation and first ask the witness whether he made that statement or not.

Mr. HAYDEN. What is the quotation from?

Mr. ICHORD. If that is a correct quotation—

Mr. HAYDEN. Every quotation that you gave me yesterday you read out of context, so I would like to have the full quotation that you are now reading.

Mr. ICHORD. Show the witness the quotation—

Mr. HAYDEN. Where is the—

Mr. ICHORD.—Mr. Counsel, and then ask him if that is a correct quote of his statement.

Mr. HAYDEN. Where is the full statement?

What is the date of it?

Mr. CONLEY. December 17. I don't have the clipping here.

Mr. HAYDEN. Of what year?

Mr. CONLEY. 1967.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, I certainly would answer at a later time, but

given your way of handling quotations yesterday, when I had a chance to look at the full quotation, and given the fact that I had to read into the record extensively the context of statements that you had lifted, I would not now want to comment on something that you attribute to me, because I am sure that in part it is taken out of context.

Furthermore, I have discussed violence ad nauseam before this committee in reference to almost every subject that you are supposedly considering under your very vague mandate.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, gentlemen, the record will stand as made. The question will be in the record.

If you read the full statement, Mr. Hayden, that will also be in the record.

I think, Mr. Counsel, first of all, you should ask the witness if he made such a statement, to lay the proper foundation.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Chairman, I believe we have asked that question, and he said he would have to see the article. I do not have the article here.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, did you make—was that a correct quotation, Mr. Hayden?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, not as far as I know.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you remember making a statement to that particular reporter?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't remember making a statement to the *New York Times* in December of 1967, though it is conceivable that I did.

Mr. ICHORD. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, moving on to another subject, and one with which I am sure you are quite familiar, your book, *Rebellion in Newark*, are you familiar with that book, sir?

Mr. HAYDEN. More familiar than you.

Mr. CONLEY. I am sure that you are, sir, and I want to direct your attention specifically to pages 70-71 of that book.

Mr. HAYDEN. Could I have a copy of the book?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir. Wherein appears the following, starting on page 70:

The role of organized violence is now being carefully considered. During a riot, for instance, a conscious guerrilla can participate in pulling police away from the path of people engaged in attacking stores. He can create disorder in new areas the police think are secure. He can carry the torch, if not all the people, to white neighborhoods and downtown business districts. If necessary, he can successfully shoot to kill.

And the quotation continues. That is not the end of the quotation.

Now, sir, I will ask you whether that quotation appears in your book, *Rebellion in Newark*, on pages 70-71?

Mr. HAYDEN. On page 70.

Mr. DI SUVERO. I think the best evidence as to whether it appears is the book itself. I don't think the witness needs to testify to that.

Mr. ICHORD. You have the book there. Proceed and rephrase your question, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, with reference to that particular quotation that appears in that book, is that not similar to the recommendations that you made in your position papers before the Chicago demonstrations, urging that white revolutionaries organ-

ize diversionary activities to pull the police out of the black areas during the rioting, looting, and burning?

Do you recall the testimony yesterday, sir?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Now is this not a similar position?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. Would you explain the difference, please?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes; the difference is that I am discussing here on page 70 what possibly is being considered, or possibly might be carried out, by black people in the ghettos.

In the quotation that you spoke about yesterday, I was not referring particularly to black people.

Mr. CONLEY. Is this the only distinction that you make as between the fact that, in one instance, it involves black people going from the ghetto to the white neighborhoods and, in the other situation, white people rising up in the white neighborhoods?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, if you imply that from the statement that you read yesterday—that that statement implies that people are going to pull police away from the path of people engaged in attacking stores, that is unlikely, since I talked about the suburbs, which are nowhere near these stores. Creating disorder in new areas, carrying the torch, shooting to kill. I tried to make clear yesterday what I meant by diversionary demonstrations, and it is quite different from what I say here.

In fact, what is said here is—

Mr. ASHBROOK. What do you say here?

Mr. HAYDEN. What do I say here?

Mr. ASHBROOK. You have a different meaning for everything that is said.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, you are struggling because you can't get anything on me and you keep hoping that there is something, a sinister meaning, but the words only mean one thing.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Hayden, at that point, what we are trying to do is—

Mr. HAYDEN [reads]. "The role of organized violence is now being carefully considered." Clear?

Mr. ASHBROOK. Clear.

Mr. ICHORD. I don't understand—

Mr. HAYDEN. What ambiguous meaning is there, then?

Mr. ICHORD. Let there be order.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I was waiting for your—

Mr. ICHORD. Gentlemen, let us get back on the track. I don't quite understand, Mr. Hayden, your explanation.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, read it.

Mr. ICHORD. You say you are not advocating shoot to kill, but you set this up as a possibility of a solution? Is that your distinction?

Mr. HAYDEN. Sir.

Mr. ICHORD. Those are your words.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, there is a kind of a brainless way of analyzing going on here, or there is an attempt to find something that is not there. This is a book that analyzes what will follow from the series of rebellions in ghettos that occurred from 1964 to 1968, and if necessary I will read into the record the entire last chapter.

Mr. ICHORD. We can have the entire chapter placed in the record.

Mr. HAYDEN. All right, then please place it there. In the meantime, I would like to read to you the full last two pages.

(The chapter was received for the record and marked "Hayden Exhibit No. 5." See pages 2592-2601.)

Mr. HAYDEN [reads].

The roll of organized violence is now being carefully considered. During a riot, for instance, a conscious guerrilla can participate in pulling police away from the path of people engaged in attacking stores. He can create disorder in new areas the police think are secure. He can carry the torch, if not all the people, to white neighborhoods and downtown business districts. If necessary, he can successfully shoot to kill.

The guerrilla can employ violence effectively during times of apparent "peace," too. He can attack, in the suburbs or slums, with paint or bullets, symbols of racial oppression. He can get away with it. If he can force the oppressive power to be passive and defensive at the point where it is administered—by the case-worker, landlord, storeowner, or policeman—he can build people's confidence in their ability to demand change. Persistent, accurately-aimed attacks which need not be on human life to be effective, might disrupt the administration of the ghetto to a crisis point where a new system would have to be considered.

These tactics of disorder will be defined by the authorities as criminal anarchy. But it may be that disruption will create possibilities of meaningful change. This depends on whether the leaders of ghetto struggles can be more successful in building strong organization than they have been so far. Violence can contribute to shattering the status quo, but only politics and organization can transform it. The ghetto still needs the power to decide its destiny on such matters as urban renewal and housing, social services, policing, and taxation. Tenants still need concrete rights against landlords in public and private housing, or a new system of tenant-controlled living conditions. Welfare clients still need a livable income. Consumers still need to control the quality of merchandise and service in the stores where they shop. Citizens still need effective control over those who police their community. Political structures belonging to the community are needed to bargain for, and maintain control over, funds from government or private sources. In order to build a more decent community while resisting racist power, more than violence is required. People need to create self-government. We are at a point where democracy—the idea and practice of people controlling their lives—is a revolutionary issue in the United States.

Now I think that that is a clear statement. It is my own view, as much today as it was when I wrote the book. I think that what happened in American ghettos since the book was written indicates that the book was accurate in predicting what would happen. If you look at any daily paper, you see that violence is breaking out in the urban areas, wherever people have no organized opportunities for democratic participation in resolving their problems, period.

And I think that under those conditions, violence is oftentimes defensible.

That is absolutely separate, as I have said many times, here and other places, from the situation in Chicago. Chicago demonstrators were from out of town. They were not living in oppressive ghetto situation. They were coming into town for 2, 3, or perhaps 4 days to conduct a demonstration, and the purpose of that demonstration was to be political.

The attempt to link the statements made in a book on ghetto rebellions with what happened in Chicago misses an awful lot of the differences between a demonstration and a rebellion by people living in their own community—differences between the situation of black people in the United States and the situation of white students, and so on and so forth.

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 5
[*Rebellion in Newark* by Tom Hayden]



From Riot to Revolution?

THIS COUNTRY is experiencing its fourth year of urban revolt, yet the message from Newark is that America has learned almost nothing since Watts.

Of primary importance is the fact that no national program exists to deal with the social and economic questions black people are raising. Despite exhaustive hearings over the last five years on problems of manpower and unemployment, anti-poverty programs and the urban crisis, there is no apparent commitment from national power centers to do something constructive.

During the height of the rioting in Newark and Detroit, Congress discussed gun-control laws, voted down with chuckles a bill for rat extermination, and President Johnson set up a commission to do more investigating of the crisis. The main emphasis of governmental remedial programs seems likely to be on

HAYDEN EXHIBIT No. 5—Continued

Rebellion in Newark

ending the riots rather than dealing with the racial and economic problem. President Johnson made this clear in his televised July 28 address on the “deeper questions” about the riots:

Explanations may be offered, but nothing can excuse what [the rioters] have done. There will be attempts to interpret the events of the past few days, but when violence strikes, then those in public responsibility have an immediate and a very different job: *not to analyse but to end disorder.*

When it moves past riot-control to discussion of social programs, Congress is likely to lament the failure of past civil rights, welfare, and anti-poverty programs, rather than focus on the need for new ones. As with foreign aid, white politicians (and their voters) tend to view aid to Negroes as a form of “charity” to be trimmed wherever possible, or as a means of eliminating surplus food, or a way to enlarge urban patronage roles. Negroes more than likely will be instructed to “help themselves.”

But unlike the Italians, Irish, and Jews, black Americans have always faced a shrinking structure of economic opportunity in which to “help themselves.” If sheer effort were the answer, the black people who chopped cotton from dawn to sunset would today be millionaire suburban homeowners. Self-help does not build housing, hospitals, and schools. The cost of making cities livable and institutions responsive is greater than any sum this country has ever been willing to spend on domestic reform. In addition, the very

HAYDEN EXHIBIT No. 5—Continued

From Riot to Revolution

act of spending such money would disrupt much of the status quo. Private interests, from the real estate lobby and the construction unions to the social work profession, would be threatened. Urban political machines would have to make space for black political power. Good intentions tend to collapse when faced with the necessity for massive spending and structural change.

This political bankruptcy leads directly to the use of military force. When citizens have no political way to deal with revolution, they become counter-revolutionary. The race issue becomes defined exclusively as one of maintaining white society. Holding this view forces the white community to adopt the "jungle attitudes" that they fear the Negroes hold. "Go kill them niggers," white crowds shouted to Guardsmen at 7 o'clock Friday morning as they rode into Newark. During the riot, a *New York Times* reporter was stopped at 2:30 A.M. in Mayor Addonizio's west side neighborhood by a pipe-smoking gentleman carrying (illegally) a shotgun. He explained that a protection society was formed in case "they" should come into the neighborhood. Rifle stores in white neighborhoods all over the east coast are selling out. In such way, the society becomes militarized.

A police "takeover" of local government is not necessary to declare war on Negroes. All that is necessary is to instill in the white citizens the idea that only military force stands between them and black savages. The civilians merely turn over the problem to the troops, who define the problem in terms of

HAYDEN EXHIBIT No. 5—Continued

Rebellion in Newark

using arms to maintain the racial status quo. A typical military attitude in the wake of the riots was offered in the July 29th *Times* by the commander of the New York State National Guard, who said that a greater commitment of force might have prevented rioting around the country. He recommended the use of heavy weapons including hand grenades, recoilless rifles and bazookas. He blamed indecisive civilian authority for making National Guard units operate "with one hand behind their backs" in riot areas.

This military orientation means that outright killing of people is condoned where those people cannot accept law and order as defined by the majority. The country is not moved by the deaths of twenty-five Negro "rioters."

News of a Negro's death is received at most as a tragedy, the inevitable result of looting and lawlessness. When a picture appears of a policeman over a fallen victim, the typical reaction is framed in the terms set by the majority: the dead man is a sniper, a looter, a burner, a criminal. If history is any guide, it is a foregone conclusion that no white policeman will be punished for murder in Newark.

Even many white sympathizers with the Negro cause, and Negro leaders themselves, believe that disorder must be stopped so that, in Roy Wilkins' words, "society can proceed." The question they do not ask is: whose society? They say that Negro rioting will create a backlash suppressing the liberties needed to organize for change. But this accurate

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 5—Continued

From Riot to Revolution

prediction overlooks the fact that those very civil liberties have meant little protection for civil rights workers and ordinary black people in the South, and nearly as little for people in the ghettos of the North. The freedoms that middle-class people correctly feel are real to themselves have very little day-to-day meaning in the ghetto, which is more like a concentration camp than an open society for a large number of its residents. But in order to protect these liberties, many civil rights leaders take part in condemning the ghetto to brutal occupation. Even where "excessive force" is deplored, as Roy Wilkins deplored it in Newark, the assumption still remains that there is a "proper" degree of force that should be used to maintain the status quo. Top officials welcome this liberal support, and agree that any "excessive" force is regrettable and will be investigated. Thus most of the society becomes involved in organizing and protecting murder.

However, the use of force can do nothing but create a demand for greater force. The Newark riot shows that troops cannot make a people surrender. The police had several advantages over the community, particularly in firepower and mechanical mobility. Their pent-up racism gave them a certain amount of energy and morale as well. But as events in the riot showed, the troops could not apply their methods to urban conditions. The problem of precision shooting—for example, at a sniper in a building with forty windows and escape routes through

HAYDEN EXHIBIT No. 5—Continued

Rebellion in Newark

rooftop, alley, and doorway—is nearly as difficult in the urban jungle as precision bombing is in Vietnam. There is a lack of safe cover. There is no front line and no rear, no way to cordon an area completely. A block that is quiet when the troops are present can be the scene of an outbreak the moment the troops leave.

At the same time, the morale fueled by racism soon turns into anxiety. Because of racism, the troops are unfamiliar with both the people and structure of the ghetto. Patrol duty after dark becomes a frightening and exhausting experience, especially for men who want to return alive to their families and homes. A psychology of desperation leads to careless and indiscriminate violence toward the community, including reprisal killing, which inflames the people whom the troops were sent to pacify.

The situation thus contains certain built-in advantages for black people. The community is theirs. They know faces, corners, rooms, alleys. They know whom to trust and whom not to trust. They can switch in seconds from a fighting to a passive posture. It is impressive that state and local officials could not get takers for their offer of money and clemency to anyone turning in a sniper.

This is not a time for radical illusions about “revolution.” Stagnancy and conservatism are essential facts of ghetto life. It undoubtedly is true that most Negroes desire the comforts and security that white people possess. There is little revolutionary con-

HAYDEN EXHIBIT No. 5—Continued

From Riot to Revolution

sciousness or commitment to violence *per se* in the ghetto. Most people in the Newark riot were afraid, unorganized, and helpless when directly facing the automatic weapons. But the actions of white America toward the ghetto are showing black people, especially the young, that they must prepare to fight back.

The conditions slowly are being created for an American form of guerrilla warfare based in the slums. The riot represents a signal of this fundamental change.

To the conservative mind the riot is essentially revolution against civilization. To the liberal mind it is an expression of helpless frustration. While the conservative is hostile and the liberal generous toward those who riot, both assume that the riot is a form of lawless, mob behavior. The liberal will turn conservative if polite methods fail to stem disorder. Against these two fundamentally similar concepts, a third one must be asserted, the concept that a riot represents people making history.

The riot is certainly an awkward, even primitive, form of history-making. But if people are barred from using the sophisticated instruments of the established order for their ends, they will find another way. Rocks and bottles are only a beginning, but they cause more attention than all the reports in Washington. To the people involved, the riot is far less lawless and far more representative than the system of arbitrary rules and prescribed channels which they confront every day. The riot is not a

HAYDEN EXHIBIT No. 5—Continued

Rebellion in Newark

beautiful and romantic experience, but neither is the day-to-day slum life from which the riot springs. Riots will not go away if ignored, and will not be cordoned off. They will only disappear when their energy is absorbed into a more decisive and effective form of history-making.

Men are now appearing in the ghettos who might turn the energy of the riot to a more organized and continuous revolutionary direction. Middle-class Negro intellectuals (especially students) and Negroes of the ghetto are joining forces. They have found channels closed, the rules of the game stacked, and American democracy a system that excludes them. They understand that the institutions of the white community are unreliable in the absence of black community power. They recognize that national civil-rights leaders will not secure the kind of change that is needed. They assume that disobedience, disorder, and even violence must be risked as the only alternative to continuing slavery.

The role of organized violence is now being carefully considered. During a riot, for instance, a conscious guerrilla can participate in pulling police away from the path of people engaged in attacking stores. He can create disorder in new areas the police think are secure. He can carry the torch, if not all the people, to white neighborhoods and downtown business districts. If necessary, he can successfully shoot to kill.

The guerrilla can employ violence effectively dur-

HAYDEN EXHIBIT NO. 5—Continued

From Riot to Revolution

ing times of apparent "peace," too. He can attack, in the suburbs or slums, with paint or bullets, symbols of racial oppression. He can get away with it. If he can force the oppressive power to be passive and defensive at the point where it is administered—by the caseworker, landlord, storeowner, or policeman—he can build people's confidence in their ability to demand change. Persistent, accurately-aimed attacks, which need not be on human life to be effective, might disrupt the administration of the ghetto to a crisis point where a new system would have to be considered.

These tactics of disorder will be defined by the authorities as criminal anarchy. But it may be that disruption will create possibilities of meaningful change. This depends on whether the leaders of ghetto struggles can be more successful in building strong organization than they have been so far. Violence can contribute to shattering the status quo, but only politics and organization can transform it. The ghetto still needs the power to decide its destiny on such matters as urban renewal and housing, social services, policing, and taxation. Tenants still need concrete rights against landlords in public and private housing, or a new system of tenant-controlled living conditions. Welfare clients still need a livable income. Consumers still need to control the quality of merchandise and service in the stores where they shop. Citizens still need effective control over those who police their community. Political structures belonging

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to the community are needed to bargain for, and maintain control over, funds from government or private sources. In order to build a more decent community while resisting racist power, more than violence is required. People need to create self-government. We are at a point where democracy—the idea and practise of people controlling their lives—is a revolutionary issue in the United States.

Now what is there left to say? I will be glad to repeat again what I just said. I think I said it yesterday. I am on public record as having said it other times and other places. And again I feel that the discussion is becoming redundant.

Mr. ICHORD. The record will stand as made.

Mr. CONLEY. All right.

Mr. Hayden, my specific question is—now that you have the book in front of you and the particular paragraph on page 70, I hand you back what has previously been marked as an exhibit before this committee, which is your “MOVEMENT CAMPAIGN 1968.”

I invite your attention to page 15, under the subtitle “*Black Rebellions*,” and my question is still what it was some minutes ago: Is there not a striking similarity between what is expressed in the book on page 70 and what is expressed on page 15 of that particular handbook for the convention?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, there is not, again—

Mr. CONLEY. Would you be kind enough—

Mr. HAYDEN. I believe increasingly that it is impossible to educate you or to speak with you, and this will be the last time, and then we will move to another kind of discussion. This will be the last time.

I said yesterday, both in general and through examples, what was meant by this statement and I will say it now in another way.

After the outbreak of rebellions in more than 100 cities after the assassination of Martin Luther King this spring, I helped to organize a meeting in Washington of white people from around the country who are increasingly concerned with how to work within the white community directly against racism. These are people from Detroit, from Boston, from New Jersey, places where rebellions had occurred either the previous year or that year, and we discussed the variety of things that could be done, and the main things that we felt could be done were essentially political things.

For example, when the Roxbury riots seemed to be precipitated this spring, the Boston people organized in a group called People Against

Racism, organized a rally in downtown Boston, prior to the eruption and expanding, in which they called for no troops being brought in. And there were 20,000 people attended the rally, and I believe that being able to bring that number of white people into downtown area of the city got them out of their usual fear which keeps them at home when they think there is going to be racial trouble. It had a political impact on the mayor of the city, whose observers were there, and I think he himself attended and I think that it had an effect in cooling that situation.

And I gave a number of other examples, but at no time did I advocate or carry into practice the shooting or disruptions or whatever—

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, I haven't asked you that question. I think you are belaboring the issue.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, I know you better than you know you, then, because I know what you are after. I am just trying to get it out on the table, and as long as you haven't asked me it, then we can put it off the table, but then don't imply it. Don't bring it up; I don't want to hear anything about it; it is out of order.

Mr. CONLEY. Let us answer the question. The question is—

Mr. HAYDEN. No, they are not similar.

Mr. CONLEY. Could you be kind enough—

Mr. HAYDEN. I will not be kind enough to tell you why they are not similar; no.

Mr. CONLEY. In other words, you would prefer to make a speech.

Mr. HAYDEN. I would prefer to forget any attempt to be civil, or have a dialogue with you, at this point. Because I have been here for 6, 7, 8 hours. No witness in the history of your silly committee has ever granted you a fuller statement of his philosophy or his views or allowed himself to be subjected to more insane questioning without taking offense to it, without complaining about it, and now I am going to begin, because I am tired of you—

Mr. ICHORD. Let the questions be put.

Mr. HAYDEN. —pulling out of your folder—

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will decide on whether the questions shall be admissible.

Mr. HAYDEN. —newspapers published, asking me if what is said in those newspapers is true—

Mr. ICHORD. Let there be order here.

Mr. HAYDEN. There is no order. That is what I am getting at, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will decide whether the question is or is not to be answered.

Proceed with another point.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Could I ask a question at this point?

Mr. ICHORD. Yes.

Mr. ASHBROOK. So long as we are straightening up the record and you say, "I never urged that," is the committee also to understand that *U.S. News & World Report* of September 9, 1968, is wrong?

Mr. HAYDEN. You know it is wrong.

Mr. ASHBROOK. No, I don't know it is wrong; I am asking you, in your statement that you said in addressing a rally in Grant Park, and I quote:

If they want blood to flow from our heads, the blood will flow from a lot of other heads around this city and around the country. We must take to the streets, for the streets belong to the people. . . . It may well be that the era—

Mr. HAYDEN. Sir, I have already stated, over and over, what I feel about that.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Now wait a minute. Let me finish.

Mr. ICHORD. I don't think the question has been asked.

Mr. ASHBROOK [continues reading].

It may well be that the era of organized, peaceful and orderly demonstrations is coming to an end and that other methods will be needed.

This is attributed to you. I say "attributed," as a direct quote, in a *U.S. News & World Report* of September 9. Now following up on your statement which you just made, that you never at any time urged that, this type of action, did you say this, or is the *U.S. News & World Report* story wrong?

As I say, it indicates that you addressed a rally in Grant Park.

Mr. HAYDEN. You see, there is a kind of a—there is, maybe there is a brainlessness here.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I don't have any trouble understanding it.

Mr. HAYDEN. You do have trouble. You do have trouble understanding it.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I have no trouble—

Mr. ICHORD. I think the question is very pertinent. Is this a misquotation of your statement?

Mr. HAYDEN. No; it is what I have been virtually saying in exactly the same words for 2 days before you. That if you are attacked by somebody and your head is split, that I believe that it is within your legislative rights to, at least moral rights, to hit back.

Mr. ASHBROOK. That is a very—

Mr. HAYDEN. That is very different from what we have just got done reading, because out there in the suburbs, when a rebellion is going on over here, you are standing there, you are not being aggressed upon, no one is attacking you, you are not being shot at, you are not being tear gassed. And it is further true, as Chicago demonstrates, that we are now in a situation where the possibility of having a peaceful demonstration is continually jeopardized, and the era of peaceful demonstrations symbolized by 1961 to 1968 may very well be at an end. But that you can get from picking up the morning paper and looking at Ocean Hill-Brownsville; you don't have to have me here to point that out to you.

Mr. ICHORD. There is still an unanswered element, Mr. Hayden.

We don't know whether the statements are correctly—that they are correct quotes of your statement, and that was the question directed to you.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Yes; I brought up this point because my recollection of what he said was that he had never said anything of that type, and now, of course, under this circumstance—

Mr. HAYDEN. Those are not things of the same type. There is a difference. Oh, forget it.

Mr. ICHORD. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, in line with this same inquiry, if I may direct your attention to your appearance before the President's Com-

mission, in which I had a copy of a task force report, particularly want to direct your attention to pages 1777, 1778, and 1779.

Page 1777 you and Mr. Jaworski, I believe, engaged in some dialogue about who was responsible for violence in draft board affairs. That is the background of the particular questions that I wish to ask you, sir.

Then, starting on page 1778, appears the following question by Mr. Jaworski: "This is not in line with this policy, your movement, these acts of violence?"

Mr. Hayden's answer: "No."

And I take it that this is your answer, is it not, at that time?

Mr. HAYDEN. Ask your question, and give me the transcript.

Mr. CONLEY. Let me go on and read the remainder of these questions.

Mr. ICHORD. And then hand him the transcript.

Mr. CONLEY. Then Mr. Jaworski asked:

You don't approve of any of them yourself, do you?

Mr. HAYDEN. I will say this, I would not morally condemn a person who engages in such sabotage because I understand the way he feels, I think that a lot of people understand the way he feels. I think it is a counter-productive tactic. If he was involved in killing the poor secretaries who work in draft boards, then, I would morally object and try to find ways to intervene. But so long as the damage is to private property, I would not morally condemn it while I do not think it is a useful tactic, although it has become fairly useful for the labor movement.

(Document handed to witness.)

Mr. CONLEY. I ask you if that is an accurate transcript of what occurred between you and Mr. Jaworski.

Mr. HAYDEN. I had the same problem with Jaworski that I am having with you. We went over this and over this.

Now what you have just read seems to me perfectly clear, and it seems to me I have already testified over and over.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, I haven't asked you what it meant. What I have asked you is, Is this an accurate copy of the testimony?

Mr. HAYDEN. This is an accurate copy of the transcript.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. In which I say that I do not believe that acts of sabotage or terror are effective or meaningful in this particular time. But if such acts are carried out, for instance, the napalming of the records of—

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, I hate to interrupt, but I haven't asked you that. I have just asked you if this was an accurate transcript. Please, Mr. Chairman, I think he has answered that question.

Mr. ICHORD. He has answered the question of whether it was an accurate transcript. Proceed.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, if I may have the transcript again, I want to ask you one or two other questions, and then if you want to make any explanation, you certainly may.

Moving on down to the bottom of page 1778, Mr. Jaworski put this question to you:

Do you either espouse or condone those practices?

And your answer:

I thought I answered that. I will not object to that practice of destruction of private property on moral grounds. I do not prescribe it or advocate it, and I know of no organization that does prescribe or advocate it.

And Mr. Jaworski said:

You are in sympathy with it, that is what you are trying to say to us?

And then you answered:

I am in sympathy with Senators who stand on the floor and denounce the war in Vietnam.

Mr. JAWORSKI. I am not talking about the war in Vietnam.

Mr. HAYDEN. I am in sympathy with anybody who is opposed to the war.

Mr. JAWORSKI. We are talking about destruction. These acts that you have described to us, are you in sympathy with them?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, I morally sympathize with people who feel that way. I don't think it is tactically or strategically effective.

Mr. JAWORSKI. That is all.

I will ask you again, sir, if that is an accurate——

Mr. HAYDEN. That is true.

Mr. CONLEY. —if that is an accurate transcript of your testimony before the President's Commission?

Mr. HAYDEN. It is relatively accurate.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, are there any errors in the transcript?

Mr. HAYDEN. I haven't gone over the transcript.

Mr. CONLEY. Would you be kind enough to?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't object to anything that you have read, being, you know, credited to me.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. And sir, let me ask you this, and now this gives you your opportunity for your explanation, if you care: Is this your conviction with reference to violence as you have set it forth here in the report?

Mr. HAYDEN. Of course.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Hayden, in connection with the testimony of Captain Kinney this past spring in the Newark riots, he mentioned that a number of persons were associated with you in the Newark area prior to these particular riots, and among the people that he mentioned were a Carol Glassman, a Constance Brown, and a Corinna Fales. Were these people not also with you during the demonstrations which occurred in Chicago?

Mr. HAYDEN. Depends what you mean by with me. They were in Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. They were not with me.

Mr. CONLEY. And, Mr. Hayden, is it not also a fact that the communication center for the National Mobilization in Chicago during the demonstrations and disturbances was manned by Carol Glassman?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. Miss Glassman was not——

Mr. HAYDEN. She was one of a good number of people who worked in the communications center.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir. And she is also the same Carol Glassman that attended the conference with you at Bratislava, Czech-slovakia; is she not?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir. Now, Mr. Hayden, is it not also true that two of your other associates, Constance Brown and Corinna Fales, were in Chicago and charged with pouring some type of acid on the lobby of a hotel there in Chicago?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. HAYDEN. They were so arrested.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. As far as I know. I mean, I wasn't able to be around at the time.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, I have not asked you if you saw the act occur. I asked you if you were aware of the fact that they were——

Mr. HAYDEN. I wasn't even able to be anywhere in the city of Chicago because of the police.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, Mr. Hayden, at the time of her arrest on this particular charge of dispensing acid, or whatever it was, on the floor of the hotel, Connie Brown had in her possession a paper containing the following words, quote:

hunting slingshot, ball bearings—buy at sports shop. Jacks w[ith] points on all sides, cans of lighter fluid, cans of spray paint, pieces of garden hose, cherry bombs, fire crackers

Mr. Hayden, I hand you a photocopy of that particular document and ask you if you have ever seen that before?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I never have.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you recognize the handwriting on the document, sir?

Mr. HAYDEN. It is possible that I do, but I would not want to try to identify the handwriting.

Mr. CONLEY. Is the handwriting similar to the handwriting of Constance Brown?

Mr. HAYDEN. It could be. Why don't you ask her?

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, was this type of information which is contained in this document in any way given to the people who participated in the demonstrations in Chicago by you or any other members of the steering committee of the National Mobilization Committee?

Mr. HAYDEN. I told you that I didn't even know about this so-called document. It sounds like something Mayor Daley wrote, because it lists the kind of weapons that he said the demonstrators carried. I have already said that, or at least I guess in general I have already said that no such things were advocated officially or unofficially by anyone connected with the Mobilization.

Mr. CONLEY. My question to you——

Mr. HAYDEN. But what is your meaning?

Mr. CONLEY. My question to you, and I will repeat the question, because I think again you are reading more into my questions than I intend for you to read——

Mr. HAYDEN. I am just trying to speed the hearing up.

Mr. CONLEY. If you will speed it up but listening to the question. The question again was, To your knowledge did any member of National Mobilization Steering Committee or National Mobilization's staff put out information of this type?

Mr. HAYDEN. Didn't I just answer that?

Mr. CONLEY. I didn't ask you if you put out this document.

Mr. HAYDEN. No, the answer is no.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir; to your knowledge did you hear any member of National Mobilization Committee advocating the purchase of or procuring of these type objects?

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir. Mr. Hayden, the *Chicago Tribune* on May 22d of 1968 featured——

Mr. HAYDEN. I am sorry. The date, please?

Mr. CONLEY. May 22, 1968, in an interview with you by their reporter, Michael Kilian—and this interview occurred in the offices of the National Mobilization Committee, 407 South Dearborn, Chicago—Mr. Kilian quoted you as saying to him, quote, “What we are seeking is instability.”

And he stated that he overheard you taking a telephone call from New Jersey, in which you were overheard to say, quote: “Fine, send them on out. We’ll start the revolution now. Do they want to fight?”

Mr. HAYDEN, are these quotations correct?

Mr. HAYDEN. Not that I know of, sir. Kilian, I believe, is an agent of the Chicago Police Department.

Mr. ICHORD. You are saying you are not correctly quoted, Mr. Hayden?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don’t believe that I said that. But I will tell you what the conversation was about. And again it is an example of your extraordinary inability to think.

Mr. ICHORD. I don’t see anything extraordinary about it at all, Mr. Hayden. It is very pertinent.

Mr. HAYDEN. I will be glad to explain to you why I was seeking instability.

Mr. Kilian dropped by, and we talked, had a little interview for 5 or 10 minutes, in which Mr. Kilian asked me my views about universities and whether they would shut down in the fall. And I said that I thought that there was a tremendous showdown coming on college campuses, for example, in California, between regents and businessmen and State legislatures on the one hand, and students and, increasingly, faculty on the other hand, and that this would lead to a crisis for the administration of the universities, to force them to side either with the tradition of the university or side with the State and business interests that control universities.

So you would have a situation in which one university administrator after another would either be fired or be retired, and I think that that is highly desirable. Until the university situation straightens itself out, and that certainly is happening today at San Fran State; it has happened at the University of California; it has happened at other universities. University administrators, university presidents, are being forced to choose what kind of university they want. One that serves business, or one that serves the traditions of academic freedom.

And this instability of university administrations is a very important sign that times are changing.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden——

Mr. HAYDEN. And I would like to further point out, since I recall the conversation from memory, that the article again is an example of your extraordinary manipulation of information.

You choose the word “instability.” “What we are seeking is instability,” in the context of a 14- or 15-inch article, which states pretty much exactly what I just said. But you didn’t say that it referred to college presidents, that it referred to college campuses, that it referred to anything but instability, as if instability was an end in itself.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, Mr. Hayden, we didn't ever infer that it referred to the Democratic Convention, did we?

Mr. HAYDEN. Not yet.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir.

Mr. DI SUVERO. May we have this marked in evidence?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes.

(Document marked "Hayden Exhibit No. 6." See page 2609.)

Mr. CONLEY. Let us go back.

You say that the quotes are not accurate; that Mr. Kilian has not properly quoted you or not properly related what occurred, so the quotation, then, "What we are seeking is instability," taken, as you put it, from a larger contention, that is not an accurate quote?

Mr. HAYDEN. It is not an accurate quote, but the context is right there in the story. It is not Kilian's fault, it is your fault.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, what about the second quotations which have been attributed to you?

Mr. HAYDEN. Those are an unbelievable joke.

Mr. CONLEY. Are you saying that Mr. Kilian, representing the *Chicago Tribune*, has misquoted you specifically—

Mr. HAYDEN. Would you think that I would say in front of a *Chicago Tribune* reporter what was ascribed to me, unless it was said with a sense of humor right in front of his face, which could have been possible?

Mr. CONLEY. Are you saying that you could have said this, then?

Mr. HAYDEN. I certainly could have said it, but my question to you is what you think I meant by it.

Mr. ICHORD. The question is being put to you, Mr. Hayden.

Mr. CONLEY. The question is a very simple one, Did you or did you not say it?

Mr. HAYDEN. To the best of my knowledge, I did not, but I could have.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, and if you could have, which means you really don't know whether you did or didn't?

Mr. HAYDEN. To the best of my knowledge I did not, but I could have.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Mr. Hayden, in executive session, the 1st of October of this year, this committee received testimony from an individual identified as J. Herbert Rees.

Mr. DI SUVERO. How do you spell that?

Mr. CONLEY. The last name?

Mr. DI SUVERO. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. R-e-e-s.

Mr. DI SUVERO. That was what date?

Mr. CONLEY. October 2d.

* * * * *

Mr. DI SUVERO. Mr. Chairman, may I have a moment?

Mr. ICHORD. Just a moment.

(Discussion off the record.)

(Witness' counsel confers with chairman and then with his client.)

Mr. ICHORD. There is some question as to whether the question, Mr. Counsel, is admissible. The committee will be in recess. I want to be completely fair with the witness, whether the question is admissible

¹ Question stricken from record by order of chairman. See p. 2610.

2 - Section 1A **

CHICAGO TRIBUNE, WEDNESDAY, MAY 22, 1968

TELLS COLLEGE REBELS' GOAL: FULL CONTROL

Leader Threatens to Close Universities

BY MICHAEL KILIAN

The goal of the recent student rebellions is to make the administrations of all colleges and universities subordinate to the student body and faculty, a new left student leader declared yesterday.

In an interview, Thomas Hayden, 28, a founder of the militant Students for a Democratic Society, said that, rather than ending the war in Viet Nam or furthering civil rights, the true aim of the rebellions has been student control of universities. Hayden, an anti-war activist, is now operating in the Chicago area but he still has no permanent address here.

Includes All Colleges

"The universities are dominated by the conservative and middle class establishment, and do not serve the intellectual work of the students," he charged.

He extended this allegation to all educational institutions, including several liberal universities in the east.

He said if college administrators do not make themselves subordinate to students, "we will close them (the colleges) all down."

Hayden, who was a participant in the recent seige at Co-



Thomas Hayden

lumbia university, said universities will in effect "close themselves down" by resisting student protest.

Tells Goal: 'Instability'

"They will be caught in the middle," he said. "Between the students and the establishment. More and more administrators will resign. What we are seeking is instability."

In public statements earlier this week, Hayden said it wouldn't matter much if universities are shut down because "the students who go there are not learning very much anyway."

He claimed that repressive measures against rebellious students will only further the student cause.

"If you want to bring the system down," he said, "then start locking all of us up. If they send police, then you become revolutionaries."

Plan U. S. O.'s for Peace

Hayden is working out of an office at 407 S. Dearborn st., where youth groups are trying to organize U. S. O.'s for Peace, a system of coffee shops outside army bases where soldiers are invited to attend free folk music shows, hear anti-war lectures, and use

libraries where peace literature is available.

The interview was conducted in a room off the main Dearborn st. office. Curtailing the interview after a few minutes, Hayden went into the next room to take a phone call from New Jersey.

He was overheard by this reporter to say: "Fine, send them on out. We'll start the revolution now. Do they want to fight?"

Recall Newark Testimony

Appearing before the House committee on un-American activities in April, Capt. Charles E. Kinnedy of the Newark police department described Hayden's group as "honeycombed with subversives and communist characters" who moved into Newark in 1964 and exploited every possible situation they could encounter.

Hayden returned to Chicago last week from Newark, where he had been doing research on the July, 1967, riots.

His passport was ordered revoked by the state department in 1966 after he accompanied Staughton Lynd, a history professor, now in Chicago, on an unauthorized trip to North Viet Nam.

Civil Rights Fighter

Born in Royal Oak, Mich., in 1940, Hayden graduated from the University of Michigan in 1961, where he was editor of the Michigan Daily.

An early organizer of the Student Non-violent Coordinating committee, which now has been taken over by black power militants, Hayden traveled with his wife, Casey, throuout the country on behalf of civil rights causes. He helped in the formation of the S. D. S. in 1962, and with Staughton Lynd, authored the book "The Other Side," following their travels to North Viet Nam.

Hayden and his wife have since separated.

under the rules, and the committee will be in recess for a few minutes while the Chair examines the rules.

Mr. DI SUVERO. Thank you.

(A brief recess was taken from 11 to 11:04 a.m. Subcommittee members present at time of recess and when hearings resumed: Representatives Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.)

Mr. ICHORD. The committee will come to order.

This, Mr. Counsel, is a very close question under the rules, and the Chair, as a member of the Congress and having the responsibility as chairman of this subcommittee, is bound by the rules. Rule 26(m) reads as follows:

If the committee determines that evidence or testimony at an investigative hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any person, it shall—

- (1) receive such evidence or testimony in executive session;
- (2) afford such person an opportunity voluntarily to appear as a witness; and
- (3) receive and dispose of requests from such person to subpoena additional witnesses.

The answer to the question would possibly incriminate the individual. The counsel for the witness has come forward and raised that as an objection.

The Chair will rule under rule 26(m) that the question is out of order.

Proceed with the next question.

Mr. DI SUVERO. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to set the record straight that I did not make the objection on the basis that the statement would incriminate the witness, and that was not the basis.

I do appreciate the Chair's ruling, however, and its respect for its own rules. And I therefore request that the full question be stricken from the record as being improperly advanced by counsel.

Mr. ICHORD. There may be a proper way of asking the question, but the counsel has not chosen that way at this time. The Chair will strike the question from the record.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, I will ask you if you are familiar with a publication known as *Challenge*.

Mr. HAYDEN. Somewhat familiar, yes.

Mr. CONLEY. On page 1B of the September 1968 *Challenge*, appears the following quote, attributed to you, sir.

Hayden said in Grant Park on Wednesday, "This city and the military machinery it has aimed at us won't permit us to protest in an organized fashion. Therefore we must move out of this park in groups throughout the city and turn this overheated military machine against itself. Let us make sure that if blood flows, it flows all over this city; if they use gas against us, let's make sure they use gas against their own citizens."

Mr. Hayden, my question is, Did you make that statement on August 28 in Grant Park, at the bandshell, at approximately 2 p.m.?

Mr. HAYDEN. I made a statement similar to that, somewhat longer, at approximately that time, just after the police brought down the American flag, charged the crowd, and split Rennie Davis' scalp and surrounded the demonstrators who were trying to nonviolently begin to march to the Amphitheatre, led by David Dellinger.

At that time with National Guardsmen standing on the roof of the museum, with gas coming down all over the park, with women and children trying to flee, I thought that we were in a cul de sac, surrounded by police. And my advice to the crowd was that it would be

probably futile to expect to be able to march even as far as the Conrad Hilton, and so people should separate into groups of their friends, keep track of each other, because it was a very dangerous situation, and get out of the bandshell area and go back to the area of the Conrad Hilton and the Loop, where we had been demonstrating for the previous 3 or 4 days.

And about the overheated military machinery and the blood and the gas, I think I spoke at great length about that yesterday. My feeling all along was that the excessive military preparations would lead to a state of insecurity for the city itself and perhaps close the convention.

The convention would disrupt itself, not that we would invade it, but it would disrupt itself. And the thing that I did not want to happen on August 28 was for all of these demonstrators to be trapped down by the bandshell and wiped out by the police.

If they were going to be wiped out, if the convention was going to end with mass arrests or with mass gassing or with mass bloodshed, my feeling was that it should take place in front of the Conrad Hilton or in the Loop. And I hoped that if I was going to pass out from the gas that it would waft its way into the 15th floor suite of Hubert Humphrey as well, which it did, and make him get the real sweet smell of democracy in Chicago, himself.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, if I may move back to something that we touched on earlier, and that is the article which appeared in the *Chicago Tribune* under date of May 22, as I reread this article, you mentioned that you would be a fool to have made such a statement as was attributed to you in that article in the presence of a reporter for the *Tribune*.

As I read that article—

Mr. HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CONLEY. Looking back through it, it appears that perhaps you left the room and went to another room, and that the reporter overheard your telephone conversation. Is that not what you read in that article?

Mr. HAYDEN. Listen, we are the most open organization you will ever investigate. That is why you can't catch us. We allowed any reporter or any spy from your committee or anywhere else to—

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Hayden, let me explain to you. We are not trying to trap you, we are trying to find out the facts. You are not called before this committee to be punished or to be tried for any crime.

Mr. HAYDEN. That is a matter of interpretation.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, proceed, sir.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Just a minute. On the matter of interpretation, I have listened very carefully to your very articulate defense of what you said or what you believe. Up to now you have talked about violence in the sense that, to use your words, I believe, it might be defensible; in other cases, it might be the type of thing you would acquiesce in. But now, to be quite honest and frank, don't these words sound a little bit more like exhortations to violence than mere defensibility of violence or acquiescence in violence?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, sir; you have to have been there to understand what I was talking about. I was speaking while people, including myself, were gagging on tear gas, people were being carried off on stretchers, mobile hospitals were being set up before our eyes, police

were being moved in in columns, and the violence was already around us.

It was hardly exhortation, except exhortation to move this whole situation over to the Hilton and try to escape for as long as possible the obvious attack that was accelerating against us right before our eyes.

This is on film. I am sure my speech is tape recorded. You don't have to go into executive session to listen to it. And that is the kind of exhortation that it was, and I stand by it.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, moving to another subject, did you attend a meeting in Washington, D.C., on September 14 of this year, where further plans were made by the National Mobilization Committee in connection with the upcoming elections? Did you attend such a meeting?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes, I went to such a meeting. I naturally don't remember the exact date, but it was in Washington, about that time.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Reading from the minutes of that meeting, and I will, if you do not have a copy, supply them to you as soon as I finish reading them—

Mr. HAYDEN. Please.

Mr. CONLEY. It says, paragraph:

Tom Hayden explained that the removal of Johnson to silence the anti-war sentiment underscores the strategic relationship of the war to the election and the candidates. He felt the outlined Davis proposal would successfully surface anti-war, anti-racist sentiment, would allow moderates to participate in the rallies and permit more militant action for the youth. He explained that working classes wouldn't be changed by "cooling it" or by educational statements, but that the work with the armed forces during GI week would prepare new ground. He argued against the conservative tone being injected into the meeting.

Mr. Hayden, this is the copy of those notes. I will ask you if that is substantially what you said at that time.

(Document handed to witness.)¹

Mr. HAYDEN. That is a fairly—substantially my position at that time.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Now, isn't it a fact that at that particular meeting three individuals, whom we will identify as pacifists, suggested that a nonviolent stance be assumed by the Mobilization Committee, and isn't it also true that you stood up and disagreed with this particular position? And I refer you specifically to your words in that, which are a "more militant action for the youth."

Mr. HAYDEN. No, that doesn't mean that. That doesn't mean more militant in a sense, higher degree of militance, but continuing militance. More militant. It provides another, a further militant action for youth as a followthrough from Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. To me, sir, the better choice of words would have been "continuing militance."

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, you weren't the secretary; and we didn't expect HUAC, with its double and triple meanings, to examine the notes. But I would be glad to explain at great length, right now, everything that is meant by each and every word.

¹ Previously marked "Grubisic Exhibit No. 26." See pt. 1, pp. 2358-2365, of Oct. 1, 1968, hearings.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Counsel, at this point—when you advocate more militancy, granted, I am not of such a nature as to construe that in other than its simplest terms, and that means, to me, “more militant.”

The question I would like to know, since you are giving different interpretations now to such terms that you have used as “carry the torch,” “shoot to kill,” “more militancy,” did you explain at that time what you meant by these terms?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. That they were not to be construed in the usual sense of their meaning?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, that is a joke, the way you put the question.

Mr. WATSON. Well, you are giving them different meanings now, and all I am asking you is whether or not you explained, at that time, to those that you were urging to carry out these particular activities, that you did not mean them to be literally taken, as an average person would construe them. That is—

Mr. HAYDEN. I think that people at the meeting could understand my terms. I argued that the elections should not be disrupted; that there should not be violence around polling places; that there should be demonstrations everywhere in the country against the fraudulent choice put forward to the voters, of Nixon, Humphrey, and Wallace; that those people who don't feel represented—either because they can't agree with any of these three law-and-order candidates, or because they do not have the right to vote, which is true of most young people—should vote with their feet in the streets, should vote by having educational rallies on their campuses, and should try to again show the incoming President that he will be in the same hot water that Lyndon Johnson could only get out of by retiring from office, unless the Vietnam war is ended forthwith, period.

Mr. WATSON. Now I will try one more time to ask you the question and see whether or not I can get an answer.

Mr. HAYDEN. I just answered your question.

Mr. WATSON. Did you, at the time that you made the statement advocating more militancy on the part of youth, explain to those who were listening to you that you did not mean for those words to be taken literally, but you had an intellectual interpretation?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I can't answer your question, because it is a loaded question. I said to those people—

Mr. WATSON. Yes, because I am trying to get the truth.

Mr. HAYDEN. I said to those people—the truth is what I just said, is what I said to those people.

Mr. WATSON. You did not explain to them.

Mr. HAYDEN. I just explained very clearly—

Mr. WATSON. Thank you.

Mr. HAYDEN.—what the meaning of “militancy” was. That this kind of action was the only way that you could get moderate people, people with families and jobs, together with the younger, more militant people, and it was a way to provide opportunities for more militant action of the kind that had been developing throughout the year, period.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, in addition to yourself at that meeting and Mr. Dellinger and Mr. Davis—and I am referring to the meeting in September in this city—was not also Mr. Harry Ring of the Socialist Workers Party present?

Mr. HAYDEN. I believe he was. He came back. He was in disagreement. He is the Trotskyist I was telling you about. He came back to see what we were going to do next.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, and was Mr. Lew Jones, of the Young Socialist Alliance?

Mr. HAYDEN. I believe that he was.

Mr. CONLEY. And Mr. Arnold Johnson, of the Communist Party?

Mr. HAYDEN. I believe that he was. And the other people who were there, according to your list, were: Gerald Schwinn, Tim McCarthy, Richard Ochs, Rod Robinson, Ken Katz, Irving Beinin, Emily Sack, Lenny Brody, Karl Baker, Tom Hayden, Alan Gross, Bob Kowollik, Judith Simmons, Dave Dellinger, Rennie Davis, Betty Hellman, Harry Ring, Lew Jones, Susan La Mont, Mike Maggi, Larry Seigle, Pat Grogan, John Tillman, Walter Reeves, John Wilson, Willy Louvallen, Irwin Gladstone, Josh Brown, Marcia Kallen, Abe Bloom, John Benson, Leland Sommers, Thomas L. Hayes, Gabrielle Edgcomb, Walter Schneir, Arnold Johnson, Marc Bedner, Richie Lesnik, Eric Weinberger, Bill Ayers, Terry Robbins, Joan Campbell, Marilyn Lerch, Barbara Deming, Sidney Lens, Bradford Lyttle, Louis Kampf, Allan Brick, Trudi Schutz, Ron Young, Marty Teitel, Josie Teitel, Sandy Lutz, Arthur Waskow, Donna Gripe, Lee Webb, Jim Estes, Bernice Smith, Barbara Bick, Tibi Texler, Nona Stanton, Greg Sandow, Terry Gross, Ted Yarow, Helen Gurewitz, Richard M. Gold, and Edward Henderson.

Now what is the meaning of your selecting those three individuals? Why didn't you ask whether the members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation were there or members from the Institutes for Policy Studies there or representatives of the clergy?

Mr. ICHORD. Now, to the question, the witness is not being responsive. What is your question?

Mr. CONLEY. He has answered my question, Mr. Chairman. It is his dialogue.

Mr. ICHORD. It will be handed to the reporter, then.

Mr. CONLEY. He has identified who I wanted him to identify.

Mr. Hayden, my next question to you is, Did you attend a meeting of the National Lawyers Guild, 5 Beekman Street, New York City, on January 26, 1968?

Mr. HAYDEN. I attended a meeting in their offices. I am not sure there was a guild meeting and I don't know if that was exactly the date, but your informer who wrote up the crazy notes would probably at least be accurate about the date.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Now directing your attention to the minutes of that meeting, which I will be glad to supply to you—

Mr. HAYDEN. Minutes?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, the minutes that were taken at that meeting. The minutes of a meeting to discuss setting up a legal committee for Chicago, January 26, 7:30 p.m., National Lawyers Guild Office, New York City.

My question, sir, is that the minutes taken at that meeting and distributed to the persons in attendance indicate that you said the following, quote—

should have people organized who can fight the police, people who are willing to get arrested. No question that there will be a lot of arrests. My thinking is not to leave the initiative to the police. * * *¹

Sir, did you make that statement?

Mr. DI SUVERO. May we see?

Mr. HAYDEN. That statement, I did not make, although I will elaborate the meaning of the statement, because I made one that was strikingly similar, in your terms. And since it appeared today in *LIFE* magazine, also, I have to set the record that your informer has created straight. And I want to point out that this statement was made by an informer and is not part of minutes.

Now, the meaning of this statement that I made at the time was that we had to have legal and medical committees far in advance. We could not take, if we were responsible organizers of the Chicago action, we could not assume—or we could not avoid the problem of possible mass arrests and possible police brutality and possible injunctions to keep us out of the city even before the convention started. And so it seemed necessary that we begin early in the year organizing at least lawyers and doctors, and I did not say that we should organize people to fight the police. We did not organize people to fight the police. I have always said that if you are attacked by a police officer, however, it is certainly your right, whether it is a legal right or not, to try to get away from him, to protect yourself, to exercise self-defense. But I have said that at least 10 times.

Mr. ICHORD. You mean, even if a person is violating the law and a policeman is enforcing the law?

Mr. HAYDEN. If a policeman is enforcing the law, he did not do it with a billy club. If a policeman is making an arrest, as is his responsibility, that is responsible exercise of his function—unless it is a false arrest, of course—but what happened in Chicago was that there were more beatings than arrests.

There was a policy, in my opinion, to emphasize the beatings, rather than get bogged down by huge mass arrests, filling the jails, having to feed everybody, having to set up all the special courts, and the rest of it. And in that kind of situation the policeman becomes the prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner on the spot; and in that case crime in the streets is being carried on by the policeman.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, back to the original statement, did you or did you not make words to that effect?

Mr. HAYDEN. No. No, your informer missed.

Mr. WATSON. Now he did say that he made a statement strikingly similar to that.

Mr. HAYDEN. I was preempting what you would believe.

Mr. WATSON. Well, did you make a statement strikingly similar?

Mr. HAYDEN. I made a statement almost exactly of the nature that I just got through making. It—

Mr. WATSON. I see.

Mr. HAYDEN. It is for you to judge whether that is strikingly similar.

Mr. WATSON. I see. Well, perhaps you did use the terminology "strikingly similar." I ask you again; at that time did you explain

¹ Previously marked "Grubisic Exhibit No. 3." See pt. 1, pp. 2284-2291 of Oct. 1, 1968, hearings.

to those that you were urging to take such action against the police that you didn't literally mean them to do that?

Mr. HAYDEN. No; I said to them——

Mr. WATSON. Since you are giving moral interpretations?

Mr. HAYDEN. I said to them roughly what I just said.

Mr. WATSON. But did you explain to them that you didn't literally mean them to do that?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I didn't explain anything as paternalistic and panderingly ridiculous and childish as that to grownup organizers, lawyers, and activists.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, you knew that they would not accept your words in the common understanding?

Mr. HAYDEN. You don't even know what you are talking about, Mr. Watson, because I didn't use the words——

Mr. WATSON. Well, I will agree with you that if most of them are like you, they will be speaking in foreign tongues and the interpretations indeed would be other than what a normal person would make under the circumstances.

Mr. DI SUVERO. Is the Congressman testifying now?

Mr. ICHORD. Let us proceed with the next question.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, in the *Esquire* magazine, December 1968 edition, appears an article, "Will Tom Hayden Overcome?" Referring you specifically——

Mr. HAYDEN. It is a good question.

Mr. CONLEY. Referring you specifically to the first page and to the second column and approximately one-half of the way down on that column, the following quotation, attributed to you, appears, quote:

"It would be terrible," he said with an unerring sense of his own vincibility, "if the revolution actually started and I was driving across the country."

Now, first of all, I will ask you if the quotation is accurate.

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't know, but again you haven't read the entire thing, which he is trying to demonstrate what a great sense of humor I have, I gather. And he uses this, which didn't exactly tickle your sensibility, I noticed, so I guess I don't have a very good sense of humor. And since I don't remember offhand hilarious comments that I make from time to time, I don't know whether I said that or whether it is an invention of *Esquire*.

Mr. ICHORD. The witness has answered the question. Go ahead, Mr. Counsel. Next question.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Hayden, the national council of SDS, of which you were formerly president, held a meeting at Boulder, Colorado, on October 10th through the 12th of this year. A report of the major developments of that meeting was published in the SDS newspaper, *New Left Notes*, issue of October 18. And I quote to you from page 3 of that particular newspaper:

Much of the plenary discussion focused on the National Mobilization Committee, and our relations to that group. Many persons felt that we should avoid any alliances with the MOB (GI Week is a Mobilization proposal, and some of the regional demonstrations would be planned in conjunction with them) especially in light of the disastrous leadership provided by the Mobilization in Chicago. In addition to discussing the Mob's politics, people also pointed out that marching to Washington would be just another march which would accomplish nothing. * * *

Now, Mr. Hayden, I ask you whether or not this was a slap at the leadership provided to National Mobilization by Mr. Dellinger, Mr. Davis, and yourself, by the SDS organization?

Mr. HAYDEN. I was not at the meeting, but I am sure it was—it sounds like the Progressive Labor line. But I am sure that one of your experts on the varieties of leftism in America could supply you with a report about factional difficulties within SDS, within the Mobilization, and so forth. I was not at the meeting. This is the first time that this statement was brought to my attention.

Mr. ICHORD. Are you still active in SDS, Mr. Hayden?

Mr. HAYDEN. I am not an officer of SDS. I remain in, and I speak on campuses often before SDS chapters and I go perhaps to a meeting a year, or a meeting every 2 years, and I remain in somewhat frequent contact with their national office.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, you have previously testified that you wrote the preface to a book, *Mission to Hanoi*, which was published by Herbert Aptheker, a member of the Communist Party, and is it also not a fact that in 1966 you served as an initial sponsor of the campaign committee for the same Herbert Aptheker to run for Congress as a Communist in the 12th Congressional District, Brooklyn?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes. I thought that it was important. I didn't even support Aptheker. But I thought it was important that he be put on the ballot. I think it would be a good thing if members of the Communist Party or any other party could legally participate in the American electoral system. It would then be less of a fraud.

Mr. ICHORD. You acted as his manager to get him on the ticket and then didn't support him?

Mr. HAYDEN. I supported the idea that he should be on the ticket and allowed to run, but I didn't support him for Congress, because I am not personally that attracted to electoral politics, as you probably know from any previous testimony.

Mr. WATSON. No wonder he lost, if his manager didn't support him.

Mr. ICHORD. That is one of the difficult things I have in understanding you. How do you propose to elect a President, Mr. Hayden, by working out demonstrations to that effect?

Mr. HAYDEN. I never proposed to elect a President. Never proposed to elect a President.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, were you not also a speaker at May Day Rally, 1968, Los Angeles, California, sponsored by the Youth Section of the Communist Party, U.S.A.?

Mr. HAYDEN. I agreed to speak, but then I did not. I did not go to California at that time.

Mr. CONLEY. And in addition to these other groups that I have indicated, have you not also worked with the Movement for the Independence of Puerto Rico, a violence-oriented Castroite group active in Puerto Rico and New York City?

Mr. DI SUVERO. Is the counsel testifying at the moment?

Mr. ICHORD. What was the question, Mr. Counsel? Read the question.

Mr. CONLEY. Has he worked with the Movement for the Independence of Puerto Rico.

Mr. ICHORD. That is the question.

Mr. HAYDEN. I have been in Puerto Rico once, at their invitation, and appeared, but did not speak, at a rally given by their leader, Juan Mari Bras, and though I am not that closely—I don't know that much

in detail about the politics of the Puerto Rican Independence Movement, I would be proud to say that I supported the struggle of the people in Puerto Rico against the draft, against the Vietnam war, and for the development of Puerto Rico as an independent country. And I support organizations that work for that end, and as far as I know the Movement for Puerto Rican Independence is the leading organization of that kind.

It is not clear to me that it was a violent or violence-oriented organization, as you put it, but obviously they are sympathetic to the Cuban revolution, and obviously I am sympathetic to the Cuban revolution.

Mr. CONLEY. This trip that you made to Puerto Rico was in April of 1967, was it not?

Mr. HAYDEN. I don't remember the exact date, but it was in the spring, 1967, for about a week or 5 days.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, is it your present aim to seek the destruction of the present American democratic system?

Mr. HAYDEN. That is a joke.

Mr. CONLEY. I am asking you, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, I don't believe the present American democratic system exists. That is why we can't get together to straighten things out. I mean, I believe that you have destroyed the American democratic system by the existence of a committee of this kind.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, let us use the word "system," then. Let us take the words "American" and "democratic" out of it and let us just call it the system. Is it your aim to destroy the present system?

Mr. HAYDEN. What do you mean by "destroy"?

Mr. CONLEY. To overturn it.

Mr. HAYDEN. What do you mean by "overturn it"?

Mr. CONLEY. To do away with it.

Mr. HAYDEN. What do you mean by "do away with it"? By what means?

Mr. CONLEY. I am asking you, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. No, you asked me whether it was my aim.

Mr. CONLEY. I am asking you if that is your aim, sir.

Mr. HAYDEN. The question is too ambiguous.

Mr. ICHORD. We are getting into the field of political philosophy. The witness has testified at length as to his philosophy, Mr. Counsel. But it would be very difficult for the Chair to direct an answer to the question.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Hayden, I have one final question for you.

Ambrose Bierce, in his *Devil's Dictionary*, defines a conspirator as someone who finds it necessary to write down everything for his enemy to find.

Mr. Hayden, you were clever enough not to be carrying any names or addresses on your person, or any slips of paper, at the time of the events in Chicago. However, in the purse of Miss Constance Brown was a complete list of names and addresses which were purportedly prepared by you.

And I would ask you, sir, don't you think that the young people who follow you in these various movements should take a second look at you before they place their lives and their responsibilities in the hands of you?

Mr. HAYDEN. - - - .

Mr. ICHORD. The witness will please be seated.

Mr. HAYDEN. I thought that was the final question.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair directs the witness to be seated.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, may I make this point?

I know there are advocates of free speech, and the witness is one of them, but I happen to be one who will not tolerate any such language as that. We have ladies in this room, and I shall not tolerate it, and if it is necessary for me to ask the police to arrest a man for such disorderly language as that, I shall do so. I am not going to tolerate language such as that in the presence of ladies.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, will you tolerate—

Mr. ICHORD. The witness—

Mr. HAYDEN. —tolerate a question of the indecent kind that was just made by your own counsel?

Mr. ICHORD. Let us continue with the hearings, and the committee will let stand the record and take that under advisement at the proper time.

Let the witness be admonished that this is a committee of Congress, consisting of duly elected members, that this committee is a legislative arm of Congress, and there are ways of enforcing proper order before the committee.

There is such a thing, as I have stated to the witness before and to his attorney, as contempt.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. ICHORD. Let us proceed with the questioning again. We have gotten along very well thus far. The witness has testified, relatively freely, compared to other witnesses appearing before the committee.

Rephrase your question, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Chairman, that completes our questioning.

Mr. DI SUVERO. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to move that the question be stricken as being irrelevant to any inquiry under the mandate the chairman has initially stated. I think it asks for an opinion, and not for testimony. I think it has no relevance to anything that has been developed.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will take that under advisement.

Are there any further questions of the witness?

Mr. ASHBROOK. Yes, I have several, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Ashbrook.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Hayden, I have listened very intently to your description of the events in Chicago, your opinions on that, and I would admit one area is not completely clear.

Sometimes I get the impression that you indicate what happened in Chicago was unfortunate, a travesty, and so forth. Other times, I get the indication you believe—at least it comes through in what you say—that Chicago was valuable, in that it demonstrated certain things, brought to the surface what you consider to be unfair treatment, some of the wrongs of the political processes.

There is somewhat of a dilemma here. I would like to have for the record whether you think now, looking back to the Chicago convention, what happened was good, bad, or helpful to your movement.

You have talked kind of from both sides. I would like to know which is your honest point of view.

Mr. HAYDEN. I have talked both sides, because we are going to win either way, Mr. Ashbrook. We would have won if it would have been

safe and secure for 200,000 rank-and-file people, ordinary people, to come to Chicago and protest. That would have had a profoundly discrediting effect on the Democratic Party as it ratified the war in Vietnam and nominated Hubert Humphrey, and would have defeated the Democratic Party by the alienation of its grassroots base.

Since that was not allowed because of the failure of the city to grant permits, since that was not allowed because there was too much jeopardy facing anybody with a family or job, and since they didn't come to Chicago, we won in a different way, by exposing the brute nature that underlies the supposedly democratic two-party system.

I would have preferred to win the first way, but the second way was a tremendous victory of a kind for the young people in this country, people who are not voters, people who are never polled by Gallup or Harris, but people who watch on television and do not identify with young people like the young Nixon girls and David Eisenhower, but identify with the young people who are in the streets of Chicago, and watch very carefully.

If you think that you have had militant people before you in these hearings, you have yet to see what the 7- and 8-year-olds are going to bring you over the next 5 or 10 years.

You have taught them very well to have no respect for your authority by what has happened in the city of Chicago. And that is a victory in the sense that committees like yourselves are now through. You exist only formally; you exist officially, but you have lost all authority. And when a group of people who have power lose their authority, then they have lost. You have lost, period.

That is why I have been quiet. That is why these hearings aren't disrupted, that is why no one comes to these hearings to picket any more, because the job has been done against HUAC and the job has virtually been done against politicians.

Mr. ICHORD. And you say you are eventually going to do the job against the whole United States?

Mr. HAYDEN. Politicians of the kind like Dean Rusk, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Hubert Humphrey, these people are in a sense already finished, because they can't exercise any authority; they have no respect from wide sections of the American people.

Richard Nixon does not even believe that Beatles' albums should be played. He believes that drugs are the curse of American youth.

Mr. ICHORD. Of course, Mr. Hayden, you are very fortunate to have the protection of the first amendment rights. Do you think that if you had performed the acts that you have performed and said such things that you have said in North Vietnam, in behalf of America, that you wouldn't be shot on the spot? Do you think you would be given the same amount of liberty, guarantees of first amendment rights, which you have been given?

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. Ichord, I don't consider that I have that much freedom. Is it freedom to sit here and, under penalty of going to jail if I don't talk to you and express my opinions over and over in a committee chamber of this sort, knowing full well that the opinions are hot air, they have no effect on your ears, they will not change a thing? If that is freedom, that is a very inadequate definition of freedom.

Mr. ICHORD. You have indeed a very strange philosophy, sir. You say that you don't care about electing a President. You don't care about a President at all. What kind of government do you want?

Mr. HAYDEN. I want a democratic government. My views on that are spelled out in the—not so very well, perhaps, certainly not in my opinion, but they are spelled out in exhaustive detail in all kinds of things that I have written, which I would be glad to submit to you, but I think that the question at this point would be a little bit redundant.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Ashbrook, continue.

Mr. ASHBROOK. If I could possibly crystallize what you have said, and going back to the original question, it would be, as I understand it from your point of view, that you would have preferred to have another approach in Chicago. And from your point of view, this was pushed upon you but, once it happened, it did pinpoint some of your criticisms of the democratic process and, as such, probably helped in the overall situation. I gather this is what you are saying.

But from what you are saying about the democratic processes, you are reasonably clear, from what you say—at least it comes through to me—that this was not good for the democratic processes in this country, at least from your point of view, but would be good from the point of view of those who think the democratic processes are in an establishment, white majority, et cetera, and won't work.

Would that be a reasonable summation of what you have said? Trying to differentiate between your point of view and our point of view. What happened in Chicago did not help the democratic process in this country?

Mr. HAYDEN. From your point of view.

Mr. ASHBROOK. From our point of view.

Mr. HAYDEN. From my point of view, it did.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Well, then, maybe that is why I have a hard time understanding your statement, which is made in the *New York Times*, on September 1, 1968, from Downers Grove, Illinois, where it quoted you directly as saying, by John Kifner, their reporter, "We're going to create little Chicagos everywhere the candidates appear."

If what happened in Chicago was bad—and, of course, some of what you have said indicates that it was bad—it should be avoided; it was unfortunate; and, once happening, you had to derive some benefit for those who want change. Now you are in a position of saying that, nevertheless, you want little Chicagos, 200, 300 Chicagos throughout the country. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. HAYDEN. Yes. I wanted, and many of us wanted, the energy and momentum of the Chicago demonstration to be carried back to the communities where the demonstrators came from, and the criticism of the Democratic Party, criticism of the false choices in the elections, criticism of the fact that there was no way to vote for peace in the 1968 elections, to be made very clear in these local communities. And I wanted the people to go back from Chicago and interpret what happened in Chicago to students in high schools and colleges and their neighbors, and I wanted demonstrations to occur whenever candidates came to speak, and there were some demonstrations around the country when candidates came to speak, and we wanted election-day demonstrations, and there were some election-day demonstrations.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Well, then I would be wrong in assuming, when you

say you wanted to create little Chicagos in the country, you are talking from the standpoint of demonstration, where I guess I was thinking you meant that you wanted the police to be hitting people on the head, and that kind of thing.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, it takes two to do that. It takes an initiator, and I think that police learned from Chicago to temporarily pull back, in some local situations, because they wanted to get Hubert Humphrey elected President.

Mr. ASHBROOK. The police wanted to?

Mr. HAYDEN. No, not the police, but the people who order the police. Certainly the police didn't want Hubert Humphrey elected President.

Mr. ASHBROOK. On one other point, I think it is very important, because we are looking at all the statements in the context of what you have said, what your meaning is to what you have said, and I think you pointed out very articulately that you do have some different meaning than what many of us might think would come from that; that is a good example there. But from your own words—and I know quite often you have been misquoted; I can understand that, everybody is misquoted—but from your own words, on June 15, 1968, issue of *Ramparts*, page 40, where it says, "Two, Three, Many Columbias," that is the heading, it says, "By Tom Hayden," you state the following—you are going to say I take it out of context. I will suggest the whole article be placed in the record. But you say :

Columbia opened a new tactical stage in the resistance movement which began last fall: from the overnight occupation of buildings to permanent occupation; from mill-ins to the creation of revolutionary committees; from symbolic civil disobedience to barricaded resistance. Not only are these tactics already being duplicated on other campuses, but they are sure to be surpassed by even more militant tactics. In the future it is conceivable that students will threaten destruction of buildings as a last deterrent to police attacks. Many of the tactics learned can also be applied in smaller hit-and-run operations between strikes: raids on the offices of professors doing weapons research could win substantial support among students while making the university more blatantly repressive.

End of your direct quote.

I would have to say, when I observe this and other statements you have made, most of the tenor that I get out of them is a call to more militant action. I know you have defined what you mean by "militant."

Here you are talking about taking over buildings; you are talking about hit-and-run operations between strikes, raids on offices, maybe we get back to the old semantic argument we had yesterday, of what "attack" means, of what "pinning delegates in the convention" means, what the statement "anything to stop this farce" means, of what "guerrillas" means, but it seems to me that this sets the stage or sets the atmosphere for the confrontations with the police, a confrontation with the authority everywhere, which many of us feel might have happened in Chicago and might have been one of the causes.

Now I hand you the whole article. I assure you I didn't take it out of context, because I have read it three or four times, and those words that you state, isn't it fair for any reasonable person, possibly even a Member of Congress, to feel that you are advocating more militant action, up to and including illegal action?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, we would disagree on whether it is illegal action.

(Document marked "Hayden Exhibit No. 7." See page 2623.)

Mr. ASHBROOK. To take over a building?

HAYDEN EXHIBIT No. 7
[Ramparts, June 15, 1968]

[Politics]

"Two, Three, Many Columbias"

By Tom Hayden

THE GOAL WRITTEN on the university walls was "Create two, three, many Columbias"; it meant expand the strike so that the U.S. must either change or send its troops to occupy American campuses.

At this point the goal seems realistic; an explosive mix is present on dozens of campuses where demands for attention to student views are being disregarded by university administrators.

The American student movement has continued to swell for nearly a decade: during the semi-peace of the early '60s as well as during Vietnam; during the token liberalism of John Kennedy as well as during the bankrupt racism of Lyndon Johnson. Students have responded most directly to the black movement of the '60s: from Mississippi Summer to the Free Speech Movement; from "Black Power" to "Student Power"; from the seizure of Howard University to the seizure of Hamilton Hall. As the racial crisis deepens so will the campus crisis. But the student protest is not just an offshoot of the black protest—it is based on authentic opposition to the middle-class world of manipulation, channeling and careerism. The students are in opposition to the fundamental institutions of society.

The students' protest constantly escalates by building on its achievements and legends. The issues being considered by seventeen-year-old freshmen at Columbia University would not have been within the imagination of most "veteran" student activists five years ago.

Columbia opened a new tactical stage in the resistance movement which began last fall: from the overnight occupation of buildings to permanent occupation; from mill-ins to the creation of revolutionary committees; from symbolic civil disobedience to barricaded resistance. Not only are these tactics already being duplicated on other campuses, but they are sure to be surpassed by even more

militant tactics. In the future it is conceivable that students will threaten destruction of buildings as a last deterrent to police attacks. Many of the tactics learned can also be applied in smaller bit-and-run operations between strikes: raids on the offices of professors doing weapons research could win substantial support among students while making the university more blatantly repressive.

In the buildings occupied at Columbia, the students created what they called a "new society" or "liberated area" or "commune," a society in which decent values would be lived out even though university officials might cut short the communes through use of police. The students had fun, they sang and danced and wisecracked, but there was continual tension. There was no question of their constant awareness of the seriousness of their acts. Though there were a few violent arguments about tactics, the discourse was more in the form of endless meetings convened to explore the outside political situation, defense tactics, maintenance and morale problems within the group. Debating and then determining what leaders should do were alternatives to the remote and authoritarian decision-making of Columbia's trustees.

The Columbia strike represented more than a new tactical movement, however. There was a political message as well. The striking students were not holding onto a narrow conception of students as a privileged class asking for inclusion in the university as it now exists. This kind of demand could easily be met by administrators by opening minor opportunities for "student rights" while cracking down on campus radicals. The Columbia students were instead taking an internationalist and revolutionary view of themselves in opposition to the imperialism of the very institutions in which they have been groomed and educated. They did not even want to be included in the decision-making circles of

the military-industrial complex that runs Columbia: *they want to be included only if their inclusion is a step toward transforming the university. They want a new and independent university standing against the mainstream of American society, or they want no university at all. They are, in Fidel Castro's words, "guerillas in the field of culture."*

How many other schools can be considered ripe for such confrontations? The question is hard to answer, but it is clear that the demands of black students for cultural recognition rather than paternalistic tolerance, and radical white students' awareness of the sinister paramilitary activities carried on in secret by the faculty on many campuses, are hardly confined to Columbia. Columbia's problem is the American problem in miniature—the inability to provide answers to widespread social needs and the use of the military to protect the authorities against the people. This process can only lead to greater unity in the movement.

Support from outside the university communities can be counted on in many large cities. A crisis is foreseeable that would be too massive for police to handle. It can happen; whether or not it will be necessary is a question which only time will answer. What is certain is that we are moving toward power—the power to stop the machine if it cannot be made to serve humane ends.

American educators are fond of telling their students that barricades are part of the romantic past, that social change today can only come about through the processes of negotiation. But the students at Columbia discovered that barricades are only the beginning of what they call "bringing the war home."

Mr. Hayden, a founder of SDS, wrote Rebellion in Newark and is co-author with Staughton Lynd of The Other Side. He spent four days in Mathematics Hall at Columbia with the sit-in.

Mr. HAYDEN. I think it is unconstitutional for the Columbia board of trustees to be appointed for life.

Mr. ASHBROOK. But not to prevent students from going to class?

Mr. HAYDEN. I think it is illegal and unconstitutional for scientists to make weapons which are banned by Geneva agreements and other international treaties and to make them on university campuses.

I think that, in the whole area of student riots and welfare, students are threatened in a way that gives them less actual legal civil rights than convicts in a penitentiary have.

My views on this are extremely thoroughly written down. I don't believe that there is a democratic machinery on the campus; I don't believe the draft represents democratic machinery. And as long as there is no democratic machinery, then young people will either have to capitulate in the status quo, or have to find ways to resist it, and I don't really advise that people find illegal ways to resist it because I think that the authorities are going to start putting people away.

Most of my friends are on their way to jail, for one thing or another. Most of the young leaders in this country in the movements—many of them unknown to you, many of them unknown to me—are facing prison sentences already, so I beg to differ with the idea that I advocate illegal action. But I do advocate action that could bring a university to a halt, as the actions of the students and faculty at San Fran State have brought that university to a halt, to try to straighten the university out.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Hayden, maybe we would disagree on the term, but it seemed to me from what you have said that that comes very close to anarchy.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, we are living in a state of anarchy when a young man is faced by a draft board—the average age of its members is 58, one-fifth of those members are 73 years old—there is no mechanism for that young person to avoid intolerable choices, either of fighting in a war that he doesn't want to fight in, or copping out and letting some Puerto Rican or young black person or poor working-class person fight for him, then isn't that a state of anarchy facing that individual, rather than a state of law? He has no recourse; he has no machinery. And that is the situation facing all young people in this country, and it is a situation that I could describe in great detail in other spheres besides the draft.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ICHORD. Any questions, Mr. Watson?

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Hayden, I believe you stated in summation that we are going to lose, referring to the present generation, the establishment.

Mr. HAYDEN. No, I just meant HUAC has lost its authority. That is why no one pickets here any more.

Mr. WATSON. I see. Of course, perhaps some of us may assign other reasons as to why they no longer picket, but—

Mr. HAYDEN. I hope you don't think it is the police.

Mr. WATSON. Oh, of course not. You have demonstrated that you have no fear or respect for police authority. But did I not understand—

Mr. HAYDEN. Not when it is used in the way that you are using it to protect your so-called democracy.

Mr. WATSON. Did I understand you to say that the system, or whatever it is, this generation, we are going to lose?

Mr. HAYDEN. I think that politicians like Dean Rusk, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Hubert Humphrey, and anybody else I might have listed before and now forgotten have lost their authority with wide sections of the American people. I said that. I said that HUAC has lost its authority.

Mr. WATSON. And that you—

Mr. HAYDEN. And that you can't retain it by having a younger chairman or being more reasonable, because that doesn't deal with the fundamental questions.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Hayden, some of the newspaper columnists have stated that you and your group were very instrumental in the election of Richard Nixon. Doesn't that somewhat frustrate you, with your feeling toward Richard Nixon, if those columnists are accurate in their assessment?

Mr. HAYDEN. No. I think that the election of Richard Nixon, in a sense, is—shows that the country will continue to run down until people decide to straighten it out. You know, it doesn't really matter to me whether Hubert Humphrey or Richard Nixon is President of the United States.

Mr. ICHORD. Go ahead, Mr. Watson.

Mr. WATSON. You didn't say earlier that you and those of your thinking were going to ultimately win?

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, I think we will at least outlive you. [Laughter.] Probably much of our time will be spent in penitentiaries. I think that we are more than an existential or romantic movement, however. I think we are a calculating movement, a political movement, and we are trying to make this country a better country and we expect that—we have every reason to believe that we have some chance to be successful in that effort.

Mr. WATSON. So your ultimate objective is to make this country a better country. You made that statement.

Mr. HAYDEN. Well, yes; I just made that statement.

Mr. WATSON. And you have, I believe, a lot of, or several comments in support of the so-called Walker Report.

Mr. HAYDEN. Not quite. I don't quite agree with the Walker Report.

Mr. WATSON. You don't quite. But some parts of it, you do. As I recall earlier, you said that it condemned this—

Mr. HAYDEN. It has a lot of evidence of what happened in Chicago between the police and demonstrators that I think is accurate evidence, solid evidence.

Mr. WATSON. Well, from this report, on page 49. I would like to read a paragraph. The report says it is a typical Yippie flyer, and it reads as follows, quote:

. . . Who says that rich white Americans can tell the Chinese what is best? How dare you tell the poor that their poverty is deserved? - - - nuns—

And you know what I mean.

Mr. HAYDEN. What do you mean, Mr. Watson?

Mr. WATSON [continues reading]:

laugh at professors—

Mr. HAYDEN. What do you mean, Mr. Watson?

Mr. WATSON. I will give you credit for being intelligent enough to arrive at an interpretation yourself. [Continues reading:]

disobey your parents: burn your money: you know life is a dream and all of our institutions are man-made illusions effective because YOU take the dream for reality. . . . Break down the family, church, nation, city, economy: turn life into an art form, a theatre of the soul and a theatre of the future; the revolutionary is the only artist. . . . What's needed is a generation of people who are freaky, crazy, irrational, sexy, angry, irreligious, childish and mad: people who burn draft cards, burn high school and college degrees: people who say: "To hell with your goals!"; people who lure the youth with music, pot and acid: people who re-define the normal; people who break with the status-role-title-consumer game; people who have nothing material to lose but their flesh. . . .

And finally:

The white youth of America have more in common with Indians plundered, than they do with their own parents. Burn their houses down, and you will be free.

End quote.

That is a typical Yippie flyer. Those associated with you in this movement in Chicago and this, in your judgment, is the way to have a better America?

Mr. HAYDEN. I think that beautiful sentiments are expressed in that statement, and I wish that you could understand them, Mr. Watson.

Mr. WATSON. Fine, that wraps it up real well. Thank you.

Mr. ICHORD. The gentlemen of the committee will have a special meeting of the committee in regard to other business immediately upon the recess of the committee.

The committee will be in recess.

Mr. DI SUVERO. Mr. Chairman, could we have copies of all the exhibits?

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will take that under advisement.

Mr. DI SUVERO. Is there any reason why the Chair would depart from its previous ruling?

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair is taking it under advisement. There is no reason that the Chair knows at this time, but this is within the prerogatives of the Chair, and I exercise that prerogative.

The meeting will be in recess until 1:30, gentlemen, until 1:30 p.m., at which time the counsel will call the next witness.

Mr. DI SUVERO. Is the witness excused?

Mr. ICHORD. The witness is excused.

Mr. DI SUVERO. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., Tuesday, December 3, 1968, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m. the same day.)

(Subcommittee members present at time of recess: Representatives Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.)

AFTERNOON SESSION—TUESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1968

(The subcommittee reconvened at 1:30 p.m., Hon. Richard H. Ichord, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.)

(Subcommittee members present: Representatives Ichord and Watson.)

Mr. ICHORD. The committee will come to order. A quorum is present. The hearings will resume.

Mr. Counsel, do you wish to come forward? Who is your next witness, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Rennie Davis.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Davis, would you please come forward?

Will the photographers please retire?

Raise your hand, please, and be sworn, sir.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DAVIS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF RENNARD CORDON DAVIS, ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL, MICHAEL KENNEDY

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel, your name is Michael Kennedy; is that not correct?

Mr. KENNEDY. That is correct.

Mr. ICHORD. Of the New York bar?

Mr. KENNEDY. I am a member of the California bar.

Mr. ICHORD. Would the witness please be seated?

Mr. KENNEDY. May I take up one brief thing, please?

Mr. ICHORD. Do you wish to come forward?

Mr. KENNEDY. It is merely to request a daily transcript of the previous testimony on behalf of the witness and myself, as counsel.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will advise the attorney that it is a tremendous burden upon the staff to reproduce these documents. Actually, there are provisions for reproducing them and sending them out—

Mr. KENNEDY. I am more concerned about the transcript.

Mr. ICHORD. I think you can buy the transcript. As soon as the transcript is prepared, you can have it.

Mr. KENNEDY. Can we have it on a daily basis? It is understood it will be at our expense.

Mr. ICHORD. The staff has difficulty in reproducing the documents, but the transcript can be readily reproduced.

Mr. KENNEDY. May I assume that in time we will have copies of the documents?

Mr. ICHORD. Yes, the Chair has instructed the staff members to get the hearing records printed promptly, and they will be included in the hearing record and will be available to everyone.¹

Mr. Counsel, you are recognized and may proceed.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Ichord, I begin with a very brief statement.

Mr. ICHORD. It has always been the custom of the committee to permit a statement, and I would advise the witness that, under this procedure, you are recognized for the purpose of making objections to the jurisdiction of the committee, the validity of the subpoenas, compliance with the rules, and the subject of the hearing. The Chair will not permit, as has been done in the past, harassment or abuse of the members of the committee or committees of the Congress, and you are recognized for that purpose at this time.

Mr. DAVIS. I would like to give the customary background and information on myself essentially. I think it will speed up things.

¹All documents used in the hearings are not reproduced. However, those not reproduced are available in committee files.

Mr. ICHORD. I think it would be better if that could be done on the record, and you can elaborate on it. We want to have those questions in the record, of your residence, your employment. After we get those in the record, if you want to elaborate on your background you may do so, but I think we can proceed better if we proceed this way.

Go ahead and ask the usual identification questions, Mr. Counsel, and then you will be recognized for that purpose if you want to elaborate.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, would you state your full name and address for the record.

Mr. DAVIS. My full name is Rennard Cordon Davis.

Mr. CONLEY. Spell the first name.

Mr. DAVIS. R-e-n-n-a-r-d. My friends call me Rennie. Police and people who are upset by what I represent call me Mr. Davis or simply Davis.

My address that I would suggest that you use is 5 Beekman Street, New York, New York. I am in the process of possibly moving to Washington in response to President-elect Nixon's call to come to the inauguration and I may take up residence here in Washington, D.C. But for the time being I can receive all mail at 5 Beekman Street in New York City.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, are you represented here by counsel today?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, I am.

Mr. CONLEY. Is it Mr. Kennedy who earlier identified himself?

Mr. DAVIS. That is correct.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, are you appearing here today in response to a subpoena served on you by United States deputy marshal John Brophy on September 26, 1968, at 25 East 26th Street, New York, New York?

Mr. DAVIS. I don't remember the exact time that I was subpoenaed, but that is certainly the only reason that I would appear before a committee such as this.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, where were you born, please?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I was born in Lansing, Michigan.

Mr. CONLEY. The date?

Mr. DAVIS. May 23, 1940.

Mr. CONLEY. Would you be kind enough to give the committee a brief résumé of your education, high school and college?

Mr. DAVIS. I grew up in the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia. I am a southerner. I feel that I am. I went to a small rural school just outside—about 65 miles southwest of Washington, called Clarke County High School. It borders right on the property of Senator Harry Byrd, who owns the largest singly owned apple orchard in the country. I attended Oberlin College in Oberlin, Ohio, and received a B.A. degree. I did graduate work—

Mr. CONLEY. May I interrupt you?

Mr. DAVIS. Of course.

Mr. CONLEY. Was that degree in 1962?

Mr. DAVIS. That is correct.

Mr. CONLEY. In political science?

Mr. DAVIS. Right again.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Go ahead.

Mr. DAVIS. I went to graduate schools at the University of Illinois,

the University of Michigan, and the University of Chicago after graduating from Oberlin College.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you attend these schools in 1964, 1965, and 1966, respectively?

Mr. DAVIS. That is correct.

Mr. CONLEY. Have you received any advanced degrees as a result of this graduate work?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I can't seem to finish any of my degrees.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, what is your employment background since high school? What type of employment have you held?

Mr. DAVIS. Essentially I have been employed by what we have been calling loosely this morning the movement since early 1960. And I think it is misleading to talk about my formal education as being the important education. My education came from having a cigarette ground out in the back of my neck in the South, trying to get a hamburger with a black man. My education came with working with people from Kentucky, West Virginia, Alabama, and South Carolina who moved to Chicago thinking they could get a better deal there, only to find they were confronted with railroads who wanted to steal rents and fix up apartments in no way at all or caseworkers who live in the suburbs and made literally life-and-death decisions over their lives, and they had no recourse in making those decisions.

You know my background, and essentially my work has been in neighborhoods, in communities in this country, trying to work around those kinds of grievances. That has been the basic employment of the past, and I hope for the future.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, to be specific, if I may for a moment, in the years 1964-1965, were you director of SDS Economic Research and Action Project?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes. Let me run through the whole list.

In 1964 Students for a Democratic Society established a community organizing program that was aimed at trying to bring people into black and poor white communities, to develop new political centers of power that could allow individuals who are victims of police brutality or welfare bureaucracy or slum landlords or loan sharks to have an organization that they could use for their own rights and their own grievances.

We established some 10 organizing projects in 1964. That was the same year that some 800 students went to Mississippi to work in that State against racism.

Then in 1965 I moved to Chicago, Illinois, where I became a member of an organization called JOIN Community Union.

Mr. CONLEY. That is J-O-I-N?

Mr. DAVIS. That is correct. The purpose of JOIN was to attempt to see if the kinds of people that Mr. Watson claims to represent and that Wallace claimed to speak for could, in fact, if organized around their own grievances and their own problems, begin to understand that they have a relationship to the black community and the problems of the black community and that, in fact, it is the movement that has begun in the black community that makes the most sense as an ultimate solution, power solution to the problems of poor whites in this country.

I had the privilege to work for nearly 3 years with residents of Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky in this organization.

In 1967, I believe it was, I became director of a research project that was aimed at supplying intelligence and information to various community groups across Chicago that would be useful in making their challenge to an incredibly corrupt from top down political machine represented publicly by Mayor Daley. Through information that would assist them in their local community activity—the name of this organization was called the Center for Radical Research.

In late 1967—

Mr. ICHORD. Is that with headquarters in Chicago?

Mr. DAVIS. That is right. In late 1967 I was invited to a conference in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, along with 40 other people who represented the black movement, people who represented the clergy, the lawyers, reporters, women, and others who shared at least in common a desire to end the bloodshed and slaughter in Vietnam.

At that conference, invitation was extended to me to see firsthand what had been talked about at Bratislava through a trip to North Vietnam. I went essentially at that time, October 1967, to North Vietnam to try to document, if I could, the widespread use of antipersonnel weapons or cluster bomb units in that country.

As you know, in 1967 the United States Air Force was claiming it was hitting only steel and concrete in North Vietnam. What I discovered in cities like Nam Dinh or Son Tay or Hanoi, in the populated civilian areas, was the use of a weapon that sprays small steel pellets in every direction, splintering the bodies, splintering the bones, creating deep rips within the internal organs, and most people facing a death that amounts to a slow, painful bleeding to death.

If such a bomb were to explode in this room, I think you—everyone here would die. But as quickly as the bodies could be removed from this room, we could have another session of Un-American Activities.

Mr. ICHORD. Are you an expert on bombs, Mr. Davis?

Mr. DAVIS. I have studied this particular weapon in great detail, because in 1967 one out of every two bombs dropped in North Vietnam was a cluster bomb unit. So, I attempted to go to study bomb damage and the type of experimental weapons used in Hanoi to bring that information back to the United States, since the United States military—and through the press—was patently lying about what was happening in that country.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Davis, on that point, have you yourself physically examined one of these bombs?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, just outside of Nam Dinh, about 65 miles south of Saigon, it was a city that was reduced to about 30,000 from 65,000. An early morning raid of F-105's came across and dropped CBU's on this city. Immediately after the plane left, we immediately went into the city. One of the bomblets—there are bomblets inside the cluster bomb unit that contain the pellets, and when they hit, they then explode some 300 steel pellets in the air—an old-fashioned hand grenade has about 80 pieces of shrapnel. One of the bomblets did not detonate, did not explode, and it was deactivated. And a peasant woman who had just lost two of her own children that morning presented me with this bomblet and asked that I take it back to America, where it belongs.

She was standing in front of a schoolhouse at the time, and the whole wall was just splintered with these pellets, and it stuck in the wall or chipped the wall.

Mr. ASHBROOK. You don't know that the bomb could have been planted and used for propaganda?

Mr. DAVIS. If the bomb was planted, then the North Vietnamese are spending perhaps a million man-hours a month putting little pellets in doors in Hanoi and hospitals and schools, and everywhere you go this camouflage of propaganda has been created over what I traveled, literally hundreds of miles, particularly for essentially rural area, what amounts to the industrial or city or populated areas.

So, I would judge that that was not the case, though there are Americans who would believe that the Vietnamese are so vicious they would go to any extreme to create that impression.

Coming back from Hanoi, and I would like to talk much more about the use of experimental weapons of our military in that country and my purposes in going there, if you are interested in my connections with the Vietnamese, as I am sure you are.

Mr. ICHORD. We are getting far afield from the identification.

Mr. DAVIS. I am sorry. I will try to speed up.

I was essentially a traveler and speaker about the war until the mid part of—the spring of 1968. At that time I became quite involved in the organization of soldiers—

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, I don't mean to interrupt you or cut you off, but if we do get some other information we have already gone into, we could get to that.

Mr. DAVIS. I thought I would talk about Summer Support, which I was formerly involved in, and it was the project that helped to set up antiwar coffeehouses around the country.

Mr. CONLEY. We will get that, but if we can take it in a little different order—

Mr. DAVIS. Fine—any way you want.

Mr. CONLEY. In connection with your jobs, as I understand it, you were director of SDS Economic Research and Action Project, the director of the JOIN Community Union.

Mr. DAVIS. No, I was never director of JOIN.

Mr. CONLEY. You were just a part of that.

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, I worked for the organization.

Mr. CONLEY. Were you the director of the Center for Radical Research? Did I misunderstand you on that?

Mr. DAVIS. No, that is correct.

Mr. CONLEY. In connection with those three particular employments or jobs that you held, did you receive any compensation?

Mr. DAVIS. Do you mean from those organizations?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. No, don't be silly. They have no money.

Mr. CONLEY. In other words, you were not paid in any way for your work with SDS or with the other two organizations, JOIN or the Center for Radical Research?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I never received a paycheck from any of those organizations, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. CONLEY. In connection with your work with the Center for Radical Research, did not this group undertake to investigate the Chicago Police Department for the purpose of identifying the plain-clothes officers that worked within that department this past year?

Mr. DAVIS. I don't remember the time that we worked on that proj-

ect; but, as you know through your association with this committee, many of the organizations that are trying to change this country are continuously infiltrated and undermined by Federal and local police agents.

One of the concerns of people who are trying to build a democratic society in this country is how to operate democratically when your meetings are infiltrated and reports are written that distort your purposes and then used against you. It seemed to us that the first step in dealing with this problem was to identify who those agents might be.

My recollection is that we did have some young people connected with the research center who tried to develop that information for Chicago community groups.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, moving to your involvement with the National Mobilization Committee, I would ask you if you were not in Chicago during the Democratic Convention in August of this year.

Mr. DAVIS. I have a big scar on my head to demonstrate that I was in Chicago at that time.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you not, in fact, serve as codirector with Tom Hayden for the Mobilization Committee's activities in Chicago?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes. I wonder if I could speed it up by saying I associate myself with every statement that Mr. Hayden made in the last day and a half.

I find the substance of that statement to be essentially correct, and all questions that were put to him, I would respond to essentially in the same way. I think that he demonstrated that beautifully, what he means by being a political guerrilla. I think he attacked you—he pinned you against the wall. I think his testimony was the best kind of example—

Mr. ICHORD. What is your definition?

Mr. DAVIS. I would take as an example and a definition Mr. Hayden's—Tom's—testimony because I think that essentially it made this committee what it is, which is irrelevant to our movement.

Mr. ICHORD. I think we could speed up, Mr. Davis, if we would let the record show that you have the same contempt for the committee and the other institutions of Congress and our Government—

Mr. DAVIS. No, let the record not show that. That would distort my position.

Mr. ICHORD. Let's proceed with the questioning, then.

Mr. DAVIS. What I was going to suggest, because I am very anxious to get out of here as soon as I can, as I am sure you are, that Mr. Hayden's testimony stand is my testimony as well, and maybe we could now zero in on the questions which remain, such as how we get our money, how we organize ourselves, whatever you like.

Mr. ICHORD. May I ask that you answer the questions counsel asks. It might prove helpful to know that you do agree with the statements made by Mr. Hayden, but we will have to wait until the questions are put, and the Chair will rule.

Mr. DAVIS. All right; I thought that would help.

Mr. CONLEY. I do have to ask you these questions, because, as I recall Mr. Hayden's questions, he said you were in a better position to answer these next few questions than he was. The last question was, Did you serve as a coproject director? Is your answer "yes" to that?

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Hayden said I was. That is what I was trying to get to. We could cut through the things he already said.

Mr. CONLEY. When were you appointed to this position, Mr. Davis?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, appointments don't come in some kind of mechanical way in our movement. I was interested in a demonstration at the Democratic Convention as early as October of 1967 and began to go to various meetings to raise that possibility as early as December of 1967. I think it was largely because of my interest in focusing on the Democratic Convention, which at the beginning, at least, appeared almost certain to renominate Lyndon Johnson for another 4 years of slaughter in Vietnam.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, was it in January, February? Was it along in there when the letterhead first began using your name? I certainly don't intend to lead you, but I think we are getting far afield again.

Mr. DAVIS. I would say in the spring of 1968 I became coproject director of the National Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam.

Mr. CONLEY. When did you first go to Chicago to work full time in the office setup on South Dearborn?

Mr. DAVIS. I lived in Chicago all the time, so I never went there; I was always there.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you recall when the office was opened? I am referring to Room 315, 407 South Dearborn.

Mr. DAVIS. The office was opened in late January or early February.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you start working out of the office at that time?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Was that office being operated at that time as a part of National Mobilization?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I don't think that would be essentially correct. The Mobilization was one of the organizations that was discussing the possibilities of a demonstration in Chicago. The Chicago office was a group of people in Chicago who were attempting to relate to a variety of organizations, not all of whom were represented by the National Mobilization coalition.

It was only in May, I would guess, of 1968 that the office in some sense became formally connected with the National Mobilization.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, in connection with your duties as codirector or coproject director, whatever you choose to call it, did you receive any type of compensation, salary, any type of remuneration for your duties?

Mr. DAVIS. I recall that there was a period in which the Mobilization did pay me a subsistence salary that I generally gave away.

Mr. CONLEY. Was this by check or by cash?

Mr. DAVIS. It would always have been by check if such money was given.

Mr. CONLEY. May I ask you, sir, who was authorized to write checks and deliver checks to you?

Mr. DAVIS. From the National Mobilization?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. Eric Weinberger is our treasurer.

Mr. CONLEY. Spell his last name.

Mr. DAVIS. W-e-i-n-b-e-r-g-e-r.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you recall on what banks these checks were drawn?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I don't.

Mr. CONLEY. Was it a Chicago bank or out-of-city bank?

Mr. DAVIS. The Mobilization account is in New York City.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, in some of Mr. Hayden's testimony here yesterday, I believe, he indicated that you actually were the principal administrator of the Chicago office of the National Mobilization Committee; that you more or less had the overall responsibility for the office. Is this a fair statement? I hope I am not misquoting the impression that he gave to me, which was that you were the one who basically made the decisions in the Chicago office, how many people were needed and what were they going to do. Is this a fair statement?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes; but again it does not do justice to the way people work. People don't work in a kind of—one person gives the directions and the other people carry them out. We generally sit down and talk about what the problems are—how do we get housing for maybe 5,000 people and who is best at working up a letter to explain our purposes or getting some students to go out and talk about that, and whoever is the best at that or figures they can do it—you know, they just say, "Okay, I will do that." It is not like I figure there has to be housing for this number of people and then make an assignment. If you did that, you would be immediately—people would not work with you if you worked that way.

How do you explain the fact that people work for no money and live on peanut butter sandwiches and take orders? It just does not work out that way. We just got together, divided it up, and I was there like everybody else.

Mr. CONLEY. At the time you started running this office as a National Mobilization office, which I understand was in approximately May of 1968, about how many people did you have employed there full time?

Mr. DAVIS. What do you mean by "employed"?

Mr. CONLEY. "Employed" to me would mean people you were paying. If you had none, I presume your answer would be none.

Mr. DAVIS. When somebody needed some money we would try to go out and get someone to give some money so they could get through the next week, but I don't believe that anybody actually received a formal salary, so I guess the answer to your question would be none.

Mr. CONLEY. Let me ask you if actually, to your knowledge, if no one did receive a salary, how many people were working in the office in May, on a voluntary basis, on up to the time of the convention?

Mr. DAVIS. The people worked 12 to 16 hours a day. In May I would guess maybe 12 to 15. By late July I would guess we had 20 to 25. Through the week of the convention our staff numbered approximately 200.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, during the period that you took over—I will withdraw the use of the words "took over"—during the time you were affiliated with the National Mobilization at 407 South Dearborn, you did have occasion to attend meetings prior to the Democratic Convention, did you not, that dealt with the specific problems, what were you going to do at the convention and in connection with the convention?

Mr. DAVIS. I think that is self-evident.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, did you and Mr. Hayden prepare two documents prior to the Democratic Convention, one entitled "MOVEMENT CAMPAIGN 1968: AN ELECTION YEAR OFFENSIVE," another one which is a "DISCUSSION ON THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CHALLENGE," also marked "not for publication"? [Hayden Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2. See pages 2562-2583 and 2556-2559.]

Mr. DAVIS. I can't recall whether they had those limitations on them, but those documents were prepared as Tom said earlier.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, directing your attention specifically to the paper entitled "MOVEMENT CAMPAIGN 1968," was this document not described by you and Mr. Hayden on the preface:

This paper proposes an election year campaign against a political system that has brought the United States into a crisis of war, racism, and social disintegration.

That is not the end of the prelude, I do not believe, but it is a part of what appears on the first page of that document, is it not?

Mr. DAVIS. You should read on because it is important. It says:

For purpose of discussion, we have made our proposals concrete. But we will fail if you consider them final. The suggestions are merely our own, intended only to provoke discussion. * * *

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, this particular document has been received by the committee in its entirety.

Mr. DAVIS. How did you get this document?

Mr. ICHORD. It is part of the record, is it not?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir, it was offered this morning.

Mr. DAVIS. What was the procedure of how this document was obtained?

Mr. ICHORD. The witness is out of order.

Mr. DAVIS. I would think the Chair would be very interested in how the document was secured.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you know?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I am asking you. I wondered if it was secured by one of your undercover agents.

Mr. ICHORD. You are out of order. Proceed with the questioning, Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. May I have the document back for a moment for the next question?

Mr. Davis, directing your attention to what has been marked as page 15 and the paragraph which has been bracketed, does not the language read: "*Black Rebellions*: In our view, summer organizers working in the white community should discuss plans * * *."

This has previously been read. Do you see where I am referring to?

Mr. DAVIS. Where it has been marked in red and outlined and underlined.

Mr. CONLEY. It starts with "*Black Rebellions*: In our view, summer organizers working in the white community * * *."

Do you see where I have reference?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, I do see.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, I ask you: Do you mean by this statement that you hoped that white young people would engage in violent actions?

Mr. DAVIS. Let me read the statement.

Mr. CONLEY. The statement is—

Mr. DAVIS. I agree. I don't know why you asked it. As I said, Tom answered this question perhaps 2 hours totally of his testimony. And as I have already said, I associate myself with all he said. If you would like me to repeat what he said.

Mr. ICHORD. This is no procedure to incorporate Mr. Hayden's answers to the questions. You are the person who is now being questioned. Go ahead and elaborate.

Mr. DAVIS. I think it speaks for itself.

Mr. CONLEY. I will put my question to you again, sir, if I may: Did you mean by that statement that you hoped or desired that young white people would engage in violent reactions or actions?

Mr. DAVIS. No; the statement reads:

In our view, summer organizers working in the white community should discuss plans in each training school for support and parallel activity during black ghetto rebellions. Whites should sit-in at Democratic Mayor's offices, organize medical and legal support, pull together diversionary demonstrations outside the ghetto to draw off police and find ways to focus public blame for what happens on the powerful white interests.

I did not mean that we should organize violence in white communities at the time of black rebellions.

Mr. CONLEY. I said: Did you mean that you hoped that young white people would engage in violent actions? I did not put the question to you, sir, that you intended to organize anyone to do anything. Was it your hope that the young white people would engage in certain violent actions?

Mr. DAVIS. No, that was not my hope.

Mr. CONLEY. What did you mean by the statement:

Whites should sit-in at Democratic Mayor's offices, organize medical and legal support, pull together diversionary demonstrations outside the ghetto to draw off police and find ways to focus public blame for what happens on the powerful white interests.

What did you mean for the whites to do then?

Mr. DAVIS. As you know, our movement in the early 1960's was born out of the idea of nonviolent sit-ins, first at restaurants that discriminated against black people. We thought there were absolutely no channels through which one could redress the grievances of racism; that a nonviolent sit-in tactic was a way of raising the moral issue into public consciousness.

I think that we are very familiar in the country now with people going into public offices or private institutions that are undemocratic or racist or represent forces that really do not operate through any kind of democratic channels to try to find or bring about the understanding that new channels have to be created. I think that "sit-in" is almost synonymous with "nonviolence." Organized medical and legal support speaks for itself. That is, in a black rebellion police come in, as they did in Chicago, and shoot black people down; many of them innocent people in the streets.

Mayor Daley suggested people who were engaged in what he called arson or looting be shot to kill, or "we shoot to kill." The police carry out that kind of order. When you have a public official suggesting that black people be shot down in the streets of their own community, obviously, citizens have to organize medical help for the victims of police brutality.

Similarly, wholesale pickups occur during rebellions. Police move in and pick up everybody right or wrong, whatever is happening, and the crimes that go on in the courtrooms and the jailhouses of this country, particularly during black rebellions, are enough to turn anybody's stomach.

It seems to me the least white people can do in that kind of situation is bring the legal resources they are in contact with in that situation to help it along. I think the statement speaks for itself.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, at the risk of lifting out of context, I read purposely the entire portion there dealing with whites, but the part that concerns me is the part that says, "pull together diversionary demonstrations outside the ghetto to draw off police."

I will grant you, you could probably have a very peaceable demonstration somewhere outside the ghetto, but I wonder if that would accomplish what this is apparently desirous of doing, which is to pull the police out. Are you not in fact suggesting as an alternative, or possibility, that this demonstration might become violent?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I guess if the questions are going to be speeches, then I should make speeches, too. I prefer not to.

Tom gave the example in the spring of 1968 after the tragic assassination of Dr. King of some 20,000 whites holding a rally in downtown Boston as a way of essentially dramatizing attention, focusing attention on the conditions that had sparked the black revolts that were being triggered across the country at that time, and demonstrating solidarity with black people who face day to day extremely oppressive conditions.

I think that he explained very eloquently the political thinking behind that particular demonstration, and that kind of demonstration is precisely what we meant when we talked about white people having diversionary demonstrations at the time of black rebellions.

Mr. CONLEY. But you did not view these, as I understand it, as possibly of a violent nature.

Mr. DAVIS. It might be that National Guard troops or police would come into such a demonstration and crush heads or use Mace, as they did in such a demonstration in Chicago. There was a white demonstration, more or less, at the time of the Boston demonstration, spring 1968, which attempted to pass out leaflets to National Guard troops explaining that they were going through a very difficult situation. They were confronted with orders that no man should have to be confronted with, that we sympathized with their situation, but we urged them not to shoot down black people in Chicago's black community.

We went armed with leaflets and flowers, and the Chicago police moved into the Armory and announced that 5,000 people were storming the Armory and that the National Guard troops should get ready with bayonets out, and sidewalks were cleared and women were clubbed and tear gas was popped off, and there was police violence.

We were very sorry that happened—very sorry—it was not at all the situation that was called for, but it was a situation that was created by police. I felt that it was a very important demonstration, nevertheless, and focusing attention at that time on the fact that there were white people who were very sympathetic with the terrible police situation that black people were confronting at that time, in the spring of 1968 in Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, in connection with that same paragraph, this is a document, to keep it in perspective, is it not, that was written prior to the convention by you and Mr. Hayden, and this particular section deals with black rebellion.

Mr. DAVIS. This has nothing to do with the Democratic Convention. This is a whole program that talks about a program from the spring into the summer and into the fall. One aspect of this is to focus on the Democratic Convention. What you are referring to here is activity we had in mind during the spring and summer and had no relationship at all to activity around the Democratic Convention. So that is quite incorrect to suggest that the particular section on page 15 that you are reading from has any relationship to our proposals, specifically proposals for the Democratic Convention.

Mr. CONLEY. I didn't say that, you did.

Mr. DAVIS. I thought you suggested that.

Mr. CONLEY. I said this was written prior to the Democratic Convention. It has in the statement in here under this particular paragraph, "and parallel activity"—I am lifting out of context, but I don't think it is necessary to read the whole thing to get at it—"and parallel activity during black ghetto rebellions."

Isn't this an assumption on your part that there will be, in fact, these rebellions?

Mr. DAVIS. I think that is a fairly safe presumption as long as we continue to elect to high office candidates like Mayor Daley and President-elect Nixon.

Mr. ICHORD. I take it your view is that authorities have no authority to restrict demonstrations and require permits to be issued for demonstrations before they can be held.

Mr. DAVIS. A city administration has no right to use its administrative control over permits to destroy first amendment rights; that the administrative power that is granted has to do with problems of traffic control and other things that are essentially technical. In Chicago at least, the control over permits is continuously used in a political way. That is, the Shriners can march down Michigan Avenue 50,000 strong, but 5,000 peace demonstrators cannot march down Michigan Avenue. That is what we object to. We consider that totally unconstitutional.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you believe the freedom of assembly, of the first amendment constitutional right, is absolute and is not subject to restriction?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, that is my position, Mr. Ichord.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, in this same connection—and now perhaps I am moving into the area you were challenging a moment ago—was it your assumption that there would be "black ghetto rebellions," to use your words, please, during or prior to the Democratic Convention in Chicago?

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook left the hearing room.)

Mr. DAVIS. My assumption is as long as slum landlords go unchecked, as long as loan sharks continue to be the major banks for black communities, as long as welfare bureaucracies continue to straddle black people, black people will object to oppressive conditions; and until this country deals with the race problems that exist in every community in the United States, then we will see more black rebellions.

Mr. CONLEY. The fact that the Democratic Convention was going

to be held in Chicago was going to be grounds for trying everything—what you referred to as a black ghetto rebellion?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I never assumed that.

Mr. CONLEY. In this same document, do you not also advocate a march on the convention hall, the International Amphitheatre?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Mr. KENNEDY. Do you want to tell us what page it is on?

Mr. CONLEY. If you give me the document, I will.

Mr. DAVIS. It does not matter what we propose. It is a matter of public record. We proposed an assembly on the east side of the International Amphitheatre, Halsted Street from 39th in the north to 47th on the south, that was to constitute a gigantic citizens' or public hearing at the time of the Democratic nomination.

Our hope was that we would bring to that hearing Vietnam veterans, welfare recipients, university people, young people facing the draft, and others who in some sense represented the victims of the Johnson policies and that, while Johnson or Humphrey were being nominated inside, tens of thousands of people on the outside would conduct this gigantic citizens' hearing.

At the same time they were to symbolically bury the coffins that stood for death of the Democratic Party. That was essentially our idea, in one form or another, from the beginning.

Now, in order to have that citizens' assembly on the outside of course required that we move people to the Amphitheatre. It was for that reason that we requested from the city of Chicago permits to hold a march or parade from the downtown Chicago area to the International Amphitheatre at 43d and Halsted.

Mr. WATSON. Basically, Mr. Davis, it is your contention that you and those who subscribe to your thinking should have or do have the right to assemble anywhere you wish on the outside of the Amphitheatre without interference from the authorities, but yet you would not grant that same right to the delegates who were assembling on the inside. Is that your basic position?

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Watson, I think you know that is not my basic position.

Mr. WATSON. That is what you are advocating.

Mr. DAVIS. When did I advocate that?

Mr. WATSON. You wanted to have a mass demonstration against the convention. You wanted, according to all of your preliminary publicity, to disrupt the whole convention. So you feel you should have the right to move unimpeded, but the convention does not have the right to proceed.

That is your basic presumption?

Mr. DAVIS. I wonder if we could take a 2-hour recess so Mr. Watson could read our literature, because none of our literature calls for the projection he thinks we called for, and the contrary.

Mr. WATSON. You never advocated disrupting the convention?

Mr. DAVIS. We said before television, to reporters, in meetings, in the infamous Room 315, and all over the country that we were not coming to Chicago to disrupt the convention or confront the International Amphitheatre. We were not coming to Chicago to fight police or National Guard troops. Our confrontation was a political confrontation. We did not seek violence. We did not seek disruption of the convention proceedings in any way whatsoever.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, the preconvention publicity by the Yippie spokesmen and various publications relative to "turning the city upside down"—

Mr. DAVIS. What does that mean, Mr. Watson?

Mr. WATSON. I guess you could give us a definition.

Mr. DAVIS. You mean you take a city and do that?

Mr. WATSON. I guess that is exactly what you meant by that.

Mr. DAVIS. How would one go about doing that?

Mr. WATSON. You suggest various ways—

Mr. ICHORD. Just a minute, Mr. Watson—

Mr. DAVIS. It was proposed that the Pentagon be levitated by certain spokesmen—

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair would admonish the audience that you are guests of the committee. One outbreak might call for another one, so let's remain in order.

Mr. WATSON. If you would like to know specific places in which you enumerated the ways in which you planned to "turn the city upside down," some of them I refer to are on page 49 of the so-called Walker Report—

Mr. DAVIS. That is the Walker Report.

Mr. WATSON. "Dynamite," "hallucinating drugs," and so on, "slip into the convention hall"; "to stage a mass stall-in of old jalopies," and on and on.

Mr. DAVIS. Does that mean that you are endorsing this report by using it as one of your sources?

Mr. WATSON. I asked you the question whether or not there were statements by Yippie leaders and statements made in many of the publications of the so-called New Left or Mobilization Committee aiming at such disruption as that.

Mr. DAVIS. If you want to find out what the Yippie leaders—and that is your term, not mine, or theirs—said, then you have the power to bring them here to ask them yourself. The National Mobilization Committee, the coalition for which I was coproject director, never issued any official document that called for the disruption of the Democratic National Convention, nor in any public statement that I ever made, to the best of my knowledge, did I ever call for the disruption, the physical disruption of the Democratic National Convention.

Mr. WATSON. Perhaps the evidence a little later on would shed some light.

Mr. DAVIS. I would hope you would bring it out.

Mr. CONLEY. *THE MOVEMENT*, issue of February 1968, pages 4 and 11, featured an interview with you and, according to the text of this interview you were asked the following question: "What do you see happening at the Democratic Convention?"

There is a rather long answer—we are intending to offer this entire document for reception by the committee, but the part of the answer that I think is significant is this part—you are answering what you think will happen at the Democratic National Convention, and I pick up—in lifting out of context again, if you please, sir, "turning the delegates back into the amphitheater as they attempt to leave, demanding that the American people be given a choice, demanding that they reconsider a decision not in the national interest," and then it goes on down after going through some of this about the funeral, and so forth, "and [a] giant showdown in Washington to prevent the

inauguration next January." But the part I particularly call your attention to is, "turning the delegates back into the amphitheater as they attempt to leave."

Sir, you indicated you did not plan to disrupt the convention. I ask you, first of all, is this an accurate quote from you?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DAVIS. The statement in its entirety says—this is a question: "What do you see happening at the Democratic Convention?" Understand, this was written in February 1968 and many events changed.

(Document marked "Davis Exhibit No. 1." See pages 2642-1648.)

Mr. CONLEY. Do you accept this as an accurate quotation from you? If you don't accept it, there is no point in reading it all.

Mr. DAVIS. I believe it is essentially correct. I don't recall whether I used the exact expression "turning the delegates back into the amphitheater," but I think when you read the whole context it is quite clear that the emphasis here is on the funeral march, the emphasis is on the fact that the Democratic Convention is going to essentially produce an undemocratic choice. And what we are trying to do in our actions is to focus on the unrepresentative nature of the Democratic Convention. It does not, in my opinion, imply disruption. It certainly does not mean disruption, physical disruption—

Mr. CONLEY. "Turning the delegates back into the * * * [convention]" does not imply something physical?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I think the idea we had at this stage, before the shoot-to-kill order of Mayor Daley, before the announcement that demonstrators would be placed in underground caverns by Sheriff Woods, before the announcement that the 12,000-man police force was going to be mobilized in 12-hour shifts against us, before the special issuance of 8,000 cannisters of Mace to be used against the demonstrators, before the announcement that 6,000 Guard troops were going to be brought in to be used against demonstrators, before the announcement that soldiers at Fort Hood were being trained in the use of nauseating gas to be used against demonstrators—before all of that environment was created by the political officials in Chicago with the support of the Democratic Party, we hoped there would be a massive walkout of the delegates at the time of the Democratic Convention.

The symbol we used was a funeral march to go to the Amphitheatre and there essentially to say the decisions that were made inside that Amphitheatre did not represent the rank and file of that party and ordinary Americans.

I mean I think that the record, Mr. Conley, and the things that we had said again and again before the press, out of our meetings, to public officials in Chicago, made it absolutely clear that the organizations represented by the National Mobilization Committee never sought a physical confrontation of the Democratic National Convention.

Mr. CONLEY. After you said all that, my question is, How did you propose to turn back the delegates into the Amphitheatre, as is stated there. It is a very simple question.

Mr. DAVIS. I never proposed to keep the delegates physically jailed in the International Amphitheatre. But I think it is quite easy to manage a hundred thousand people at the International Amphitheatre essentially rejecting the decision of the delegates and by their demanding that the Democratic decision or change on the war essentially be made.

DAVIS EXHIBIT No. 1

THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

A CHALLENGE TO ORGANIZERS

Rennie Davis, one of the founders of SDS, was in the Bay Area last month. The Movement took that opportunity to talk to him about the new mood in the country and the direction of the movement in the coming year. Davis was once the director of ERAP and an organizer for JOIN until late in 1966. Since then he has been the director for the Center for Radical Research. He recently returned from a trip to North Vietnam.

THE MOVEMENT: What do you think the major concerns of the movement are? Where do you see the movement going? There seems to be a "new mood" in the white movement. How do you see that?

DAVIS: A "new mood" in the country and the movement is evident, extending in my opinion, significantly beyond Oakland, Madison and White hall, beyond the mobile, half-organized, half-spontaneous white demonstrators who in the last four months have made it plain to anyone who reads a paper that some at least are getting damn serious. Behind the people who may be comprising a kind of front line, a more general mood exists, fed by the deep public insecurity about the war and the cities. It's mostly young, mostly immature politically, mostly representing, in my view, a mass surfacing of radical instincts. I've met recently some of its representatives--in Iowa; Champaign, Illinois; Williamsburg, Virginia--and have several impressions. Johnson, not us, is the organizer and to a considerable extent the political educator of these people. And the relationship of the organized movement to the human beings who shape the "new mood" is both tenuous and limited. We plug in with them at national peace rumbles like the October mobilization, then we unplug.

Now you ask about the major concerns and direction of the movement. My concern is how does the conscious, organized part of our movement, the people who for the past four years have become comfortable in a language alien to most Americans, the people who have consolidated radical organizations, developed their "lines", and engaged themselves seriously in debate about the relative radicalness of organizing around the draft versus organizing around welfare or con-

DAVIS EXHIBIT No. 1--Continued

fronting centers of imperialism versus centers of induction, how do these radicals now open themselves to the potential of the "new mood".

I believe this question should help guide our direction as a movement.

THE MOVEMENT: Could you be more specific about the direction you see?

DAVIS: Among radicals, there have been two major emphases of activity--that which supports and works for massive demonstrations and confrontations of the Establishment; and that which supports and works for the creation of permanent, radical organization, organization built on a day-to-day basis, generally around people's self interest issues, generally from the bottom-up. The argument about which emphasis one should make is of great importance and must and will be considered again and again. But this polarity of tendencies has tended to limit close cooperation between organizations and people acting out the two emphases and thereby limit the possibility of a cooperative strategy, which I believe we must have if the movement is to provide direction to those hundreds of thousands who are getting their liberal philosophies rubbed raw by Johnson's open application of that philosophy's darker principals.

I believe it would be helpful to define specific national objectives and a national strategy of work for the movement for given periods of time--a perspective that represents the composite programs of the significant left organizations and includes national calls for both local organizing and national confrontations, a national program that could be more widely communicated than any single communications network could now manage. It would require a new willingness to push each other's thing and a new openness among people with different emphases of work.

Until the Inauguration

The dozen months from now until the Presidential inauguration is one such period that could be filled in with a national program. The shape or outline

of such a program is already beginning to form, I think. There will be several evaluative conferences and planning meetings in the anti-war movement at the beginning of the year. These gatherings might begin by compromise on a specific period of days for the "international days of resistance, 10 days to shake the Empire", etc. The spring resistance will be followed by several calls for local organizing drives in the early Summer. The summer organizing activity, for many people, will be capped by the Chicago Democratic Convention demonstration--the most massive confrontation of the war-makers yet. The fall will see a new wave of local organizing--in anti-Johnson, anti-Nixon campaigns, around local war crimes tribunals, in working class black and white communities, on the campus for the resistance etc. If the two candidates get through the campaign and the election is actually held, I feel certain that the movement will greet the new President in Washington with a special inaugural message of our own.

As I say, these five or six events or programs represent only a shadowy outline of what can be seen coming. What I consider to be our task is the sharpening of such an outline, making it as specific as possible, making it absolutely clear how one participates, and finding new means of communicating its content to the young people of this country. It requires that we define ways that the organizers of mass confrontations can assist in the recruitment of people who will join local organizing projects. It demands that we develop a political relationship among people active at the two levels of work, so as to make possible a new interpretation to Americans of the road we are following in the next period, a strategy specific enough that "uninvolved radicals" might see ways to get on that road and stay on that road.

Organizing More Relevant

Now between the two emphases of the movement, I have always seen local organizing as the more relevant. The most difficult work, though in my view the most important, is the organization of specific

DAVIS EXHIBIT No. 1--Continued

constituencies that can offer a community radical political education, power to combat effectively certain self-interest issues, a forum for people seeking new definitions for their lives and their work, and a method for relating the specific constituency to other parts of the movement. I have tended to regard national demonstrations as relatively insignificant in comparison to the task of creating permanent local organization. I see us moving from strong local projects to regional structures to some kind of functional equivalent to a radical national party. That scenario is a whole interview in itself.

Those of us who have held this view and made this emphasis in our work, however, should recognize that demonstrations, especially in the past four to five months, have exhibited in several instances a new power for radicalizing those involved and terrorizing those against whom the power is directed. Both the militancy and the new tactics make the acts tremendously important to Vietnam and other people's movements around the world, useful in changing the image of blacks toward white students, important for the education and consciousness of the participants, and appealing to certain--not all--segments of the American population. This last by-product--who we appeal to and whom we alienate--is important and, as I suggested before, should give direction to our strategy. It should guide our thinking, for example, at the Democratic Convention this August.

Democratic Convention

THE MOVEMENT: What do you see happening at the Democratic Convention?

DAVIS: For this particular action, I believe we will be guided in part by Establishment events and political factors not yet known. There is every indication today that Nixon, the Republican frontrunner, will keep his lead and sail through the Republican Convention. McCarthy's candidacy has little chance of catching fire.

And Kennedy seemingly has no primary strategy at all. We shall see. If the Republicans give Americans no "choice" on the issue of the war, and the Democrats, whose convention follows the Republican's, go to Chicago with Johnson fully in control, millions of people are going to feel doors closing on their high school conception of American democracy, millions are going to be asking, what now? The question of what the movement says to such people at this time should guide our planning for the confrontation, in my view.

I think we can do better than attempting to prevent the convention from taking place, as some have suggested by closing down the city on the first day of pre-convention activity. The delegates should be allowed to come to Chicago, so long as they give their support to a policy of ending racism and the war. I favor letting the delegates meet in the International Amphitheater and making our demands and the actions behind those demands escalate in militancy as the Convention proceeds and as the TV's drum into everyone's home that we're moving towards a Johnson-Nixon "choice". I would like to see us be able to carry our incredible, imaginative actions even against Chicago's blanket injunction that will prohibit all demonstrations. Even against the two US Army regiments that will be "protecting" the convention, I would like to see the delegates confronted by masses of people each day, organized perhaps by that constituency which leads a particular struggle--one day for education, one for welfare, one for women, one for black people, and so on.

Sophisticated Movement

There should be elbow room in Chicago for a national youth festival, a women's army marching on the US troops, several thousand people who call "their" delegate promptly at 7:00 am and midnight to ask to meet him to discuss the issues of war and race, doctors who march on the troops demanding to speak to the delegates about the children of Vietnam, etc.,

DAVIS EXHIBIT No. 1—Continued

etc. I would like, in other words, for us to create a more sophisticated movement machinery for this late August meeting than we have previously had and which we need as we enter this new period. I would hope that this machinery would be used by the widest possible political forces opposed to the war, that it would be used to appeal broadly to the American people, not just to ourselves, but that it be used in the end to release the real power of our many forces in a new and significant way at the time that John-

son is nominated, turning the delegates back into the amphitheater as they attempt to leave, demanding that the American people be given a choice, demanding that they reconsider a decision not in the national interest, a decision that can only lead to the funeral of the democratic policies that support racism and the war, should carry not only us, but thousands of Americans into an active boycott of the elections and giant showdown in Washington to prevent the inauguration next January.



Priorities

THE MOVEMENT: Do you feel that national confrontations such as you envision for the Democratic Convention detract from your own priority of organizing locally?

DAVIS: Yes, in part. The Democratic Convention will have mixed results for local building. Since most people in the movement are not organizers, it is said that a national action allows non-organizers to find a role. I believe it also reinforces the idea that one's role is to go to demonstrations rather than build radical organizations day-to-day. And pressure mounts among the actual day-to-day organizers to respond to the call and fit their local needs into the national strategy of the moment.

THE MOVEMENT: Why then do you actively support building the machinery you called for in preparation for the Democratic Convention confrontation?

DAVIS: The confrontation will have mixed results for local organizing and highly important consequences in other ways. I believe it is important for what we can say to Americans at this time. I believe it is very important to Vietnam. And frankly I see it as a possible turning point for the country and the movement.

If the Convention confrontation can be placed in a broader strategy, it can perhaps induce many people to take up organizing positions. Can the Democratic Convention focus have a relationship to an over-all white organizing drive beginning in the summer? Can SDS, the Student Mobilization, the Resistance, the Young Christian Movement provide the network for recruitment and the resources for training and direction to make possible new white projects in dozens of communities leading up to the Democratic Convention and then continuing beyond it. Can the anti-war movement, identified publicly as people who organize national days of resistance, or Washington marches

or bank accounts for NY Times advertisements, become associated more directly with efforts to build power locally?

I'm interested personally in working for the Democratic Convention challenge because it's being held in Chicago--a really arrogant thing for Daley to do--and because I want to work more directly with the anti-war movement as an organizer, and this offers me a way to do just that. One of the challenges to organizers is how the enormous energy and numbers of people who are opposed to the Vietnam war can be directed towards building organization which has permanency, power and radical posture long after Vietnam.

Beyond Vietnam

THE MOVEMENT: How does the Vietnam issue become the issue of imperialism and how should the anti-war movement organize to outlast the Vietnam war?

DAVIS: SNCC, SDS and the people who make up the Resistance have been fairly successful. Perhaps they offer approaches to the problem. I would add, as a way to expand into the constituencies which perhaps these people are not reaching, the idea of "localizing the anti-war movement." Since returning from North Vietnam, and speaking to more diverse groups than I am accustomed, I have been struck by the militancy of suburban groups, newly organized student committees and clergy peace associations on the issue of the war. People are willing to work as organizers, as well as support the Resistance, etc., if they believe it will help build pressure to end the war. These same groups become angry, bored or generally turned off if they are bombarded with words like imperialism, neo-colonialism, or tightly drawn analysis too thick with Marxist or left slogans.

Not everyone who comes in the front door of the JOIN office in Chicago is opposed to the Democratic Party, the machine and the war in Vietnam. It may

DAVIS EXHIBIT No. 1--Continued

only be the policeman who beat their head or the case-worker who is threatening to cut off support which provides the will to consider a political act. For the organizer the problem is to search with that individual for the process which is the most liberating and radicalizing, as the immediate political act is thought through and carried out, a process which can connect that individual to a larger organization and more radical program.

If the radicals in the movement are to give leadership to the anti-war movement in its broadest sense, it will not be because we joined the National Mobilization to fight for "our politics" or demanded a focus on "imperialist targets". We will have to suggest programs and organize work which allow people new to the movement to learn from experience who holds power, how decisions are made, the relationship of the war effort to corporations which operate in every major city. There are numerous examples of such an approach. Let me suggest only one.

Discovering the War Makers

In those regions of the country where the movement is strong in the ghettos, I would like to see organizers develop programs that recruit people basically concerned about the napping children or the use of indiscriminate US fire power against the civilian population of Vietnam -- the people regarded by some in the movement as too apolitical or too humanitarian to work with. The program might begin by helping people learn about the experimental weapons being used in Vietnam: the Shrike guided missile, the electron bomb, the cluster bombs, the cylinder fragmentation bomb and the long line of incendiary weapons, toxic chemicals and poison gases. Then research could begin on who makes these weapons in the local community--what corporations are involved, who sits on the board, where do they live, what positions of influence in the community do they hold? The program would urge people to look into the kinds of weapons that are actually being

used in Vietnam only to learn that the people who manufacture these weapons that have been banned by international agreement are the very people who sit on the Board of Education and the Mayor's Committees in their own cities. This process, I suspect, would radically expand people's consciousness and the scope of possible activity. Suddenly the war makers become real people, the same people, if the ghetto movement is strong, who are being attacked by the blacks or poor whites because of rotten schools or urban renewal. War crime tribunals that put these individuals on public trial for complicity in US war crimes might represent still another dimension of a process that begins with simple moral concerns but allows "nice" people to grow politically through their own work and experience.

I believe anti-war activity of this sort -- and there are many other examples--begins to suggest to various movement constituencies in a city new kinds of political relationships we have not seen significantly at a local level.

Repression

THE MOVEMENT: We've been reading reports coming into our office of people subpoenaed, arrested or investigated all over the country. It appears there is a coordinated effort to intimidate and infiltrate every protest organization. In fact, it appears that the Administration is extremely afraid for its convention next summer and will be making moves to repress those involved in the convention strategy. How should the movement respond to these events?

DAVIS: While the movement is still small and generally overly preoccupied with talking to itself, these limitations every

DAVIS EXHIBIT No. 1—Continued

day are breaking down, as new people, fed up and disgusted, turn to us for direction and work, or ignore us and create exciting political communities of their own. It seems to me that there is every reason to believe that conditions are with those who want the movement to be vastly broadened.

The Viet Cong believe that the United States has been militarily defeated in South Vietnam and that the question of NLF victory is a question of time. Johnson—or for that matter all public candidates for President—appear unprepared to accept a military defeat, at least for some time. So, as sickening as it is, every sign points to a long war and greater and greater loss of American lives. Thus far, the only response of the Administration to the black ghetto revolts has been to improve police tactics, training and manpower. So, every sign points towards more intense black-police warfare in our cities. And finally the reports from the inner circles of international finance capitalism point with horror to the softening of currency, the new protective tariffs in the US and the rising US price level, signs which even conservative economists now claim point toward economic slump or worse in this country. It seems the very conditions we deplore harbor the potential for a vast swelling of our movement and our power, as the war, riots

and recession converge on ordinary people.

Need Positive View

This reading of conditions makes it imperative, I believe, that we develop a fresh and positive view of the role we may play in this country and the world. We are not the Communist Party in the middle part of this century. We must not face repression by taking the defensive, by sending large numbers of people underground or seeking to protect ourselves by denying what we stand for at our public trials. I believe we must turn every trial into a trial of the system, that we should fight off paranoia as much as possible as repression comes and that we should seek the widest support for our actions and for our right to hold and express our convictions. I'm calling not only for a political strategy of openness, but among ourselves for a psychological framework that allows us to turn outward rather than inward as the going gets rough. The escalation of the war in Vietnam has only strengthened the Vietnamese struggle as they turn each stage of the escalation into a new response to their own people. The escalation of the war of repression in the United States might be seen as that kind of organizing possibility for us.

I don't think that the presence of those numbers or the symbol of a funeral march at all suggests disruption. If it suggests disruption to you, let me make it quite clear to you that we did not plan disruption at the Democratic Convention. It did not call for disruption; and everything we did—including the training of our marshals, how we organized, how we recruited—led toward a nonviolent demonstration at the time of the nomination on August 28.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. DAVIS, I find a striking similarity between this expression and the expression, "pinning the delegates in the Amphitheatre."

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, we went through that this morning.

Mr. CONLEY. Yesterday afternoon.

Mr. DAVIS. Whenever it was, and it was mixed together.

Mr. CONLEY. We have the same basic understanding—

Mr. DAVIS. Do you understand what I said? That is the only question before this committee and this country.

Mr. ICHORD. If you are going to be turning back the delegates, though, Mr. Witness, you are going to be restricting their liberty; are you not? Perhaps some of the delegates would want to leave the Amphitheatre. You would be restricting their liberty.

Mr. DAVIS. I think it is quite possible to go down to a meeting of the city council that is about to pass a \$2 million project that intends to disrupt the entire community of poor people with the destruction of their homes and with replacement of homes that only the upper- or middle-income can afford. And imagine a situation where that community would come down and say this decision does not represent us and we demand that you stay here and make a decision that does represent us.

Then there might be quite an exchange in which it would be clear that the local city council was hopelessly tied to the entrenched political and business interests of the downtown community, and the like, to the suburbs, and hopelessly unwilling to deal with the problems of the black community. And there could be a political confrontation, but that is different. I mean, I could imagine myself running around the community recruiting and saying, "We are going to hold those people in there until they make it right," and going around and nobody would think by that that we are going to hold a gun at a city councilman's head or physically shut the building down until everybody came out right, but the people would go down there and have a political confrontation, a confrontation on life-and-death decisions that affect them.

Mr. ICHORD. This is where your right to demonstrate rubs up against the rights of other people.

Mr. DAVIS. If you plan a demonstration that disrupts a public meeting, that creates physical harm to local officials, whatever, I agree that such people would be arrested in this country, but to call for a massive demonstration at the International Amphitheatre, demanding that the people make a decision that is consistent with 80 percent of the electorate voters who voted in Democratic primaries, which is for new direction and new leadership in 1968, and to say in all of your publications that you are not coming to Chicago to disrupt the

convention, but to raise a serious political issue that faces this country, I just think that that is crystal clear what you have in mind. I hope that it is clear.

Mr. WATSON. And you said that the activities of the Democratic Convention were undemocratic? Is that your statement? I have heard that repeatedly, that the activities of the Democratic Convention were undemocratic.

Mr. DAVIS. Isn't that terrible.

Mr. WATSON. Did you make that statement?

Mr. DAVIS. I believe I made that statement; and if I did not, I make it now.

Mr. WATSON. So your interpretation of what is true democratic action is, when duly elected delegates to a convention do not do what you or your associates believe that the real democratic way to do it is, for you to get out and force the duly elected delegates to adhere to your belief. That is the real democratic process.

Mr. DAVIS. Do you mean duly elected like you, Mr. Watson, like a racist out of a congressional district which has been cited by the 1965 civil rights law—

Mr. WATSON. Bear this in mind, and you made reference to the State of South Carolina earlier. How long have you lived in South Carolina, Mr. Davis?

Mr. DAVIS. I never lived there. I visited there; I know many people from South Carolina. We have a little coffeehouse that is supporting soldiers at Fort Jackson in Columbia, South Carolina, and I have—know something about the kinds of people who come from South Carolina. What distresses me is the politicians that come from South Carolina.

Mr. WATSON. I am sure of that.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair again admonishes the audience we must have order in the hearing. You are guests of the committee. You are entitled to be here if you keep in order; otherwise the Chair will have to ask you to leave.

Mr. DAVIS. Let me just say on the substance of your question, Mr. Watson, that 80 percent of the people voting in Democratic primaries in 1968 voted against the Johnson-Humphrey policies and 20 percent voted for those policies, and yet at the Democratic National Convention where at the time public opinion polls and primaries and every conceivable measure that we have around the issue of the war in Vietnam was overturned by the people in control of that convention. That convention, I think by anybody's standards, was fraudulent and undemocratic.

Mr. ICHORD. I think you are making a misstatement of the polls there. My memory, as I recall, showed Humphrey far ahead of McCarthy, if that is what you are referring to, prior to the convention.

Mr. DAVIS. I'm talking about the electorate that voted in the primaries and the general feeling going into the convention about the need to get out of Vietnam.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may ask him again, first let me make one general statement in reference to your comments concerning the State that I am honored to represent. I have been living there 46 years; and if you will come down and live in South Carolina just, say a tenth of that time, then perhaps you will be in a position to

discuss the situation in South Carolina in a reasonably intelligent fashion.

Let me get back to one basic question: If the convention at Chicago had adopted your platform in reference to Vietnam, in your judgment it would have been a democratic process?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I think the Democratic Party is essentially controlled by Southern conservatives, reactionary trade union fat men—

Mr. WATSON. I ask you one simple statement—

Mr. DAVIS. —big city machines like Chicago.

Mr. WATSON. If they adopted your principle, would it have been a democratic process?

Mr. DAVIS. I think the Democratic Party is hopelessly tied to the interests of the military and the bankers and the Southern racists like yourself.

Mr. ICHORD. We will take a 5-minute recess.

(Brief recess.)

Mr. ICHORD. The committee will again come to order.

The witness will resume the chair.

Mr. WATSON. So that we might wrap that dialogue up that we started a moment ago, let me just conclude by saying apparently nothing could have been done at the Democratic Convention which would have met the qualifications of the witness' term of "democratically conceived" or "democratically passed."

Mr. DAVIS. No, Mr. Watson. I think it would have been a very good thing for this country had there been a resolution passed at the Democratic Convention that recognized that we have no business directing the affairs of another country 10,000 miles away.

Had the Democratic Party supported a peace plank, had the Democratic Convention seen it necessarily consistent with American interests to withdraw American forces from that country, I, and I think millions of other Americans, would have applauded that decision. I would have continued to work to try to make this a more democratic country, to try to find a way in your own district to get black people represented in that district. I would have continued to try to find a way to get welfare recipients and people who live in slum apartment buildings and students and others who essentially have no effective way to influence the decisions that operate in the day-to-day way in their own lives so that there would be the beginnings of more democratic channels in this country.

That is the essence of this movement, but I certainly would have applauded and supported any decision that moved us closer to peace in Vietnam coming from the Democratic Convention in August.

Mr. WATSON. If your statement relative to the black people of my district is for political purposes, to adversely effect my reelection, the election is over, and I suggest you make those statements before the next election.

Mr. DAVIS. The reason you were elected again is because those black people didn't have a chance. If we can get those people a vote, you will not be back here again, Mr. Watson.

Mr. WATSON. We won't pursue it, but no less authority than the president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People made the statement several years ago at a State convention of

that organization in Charleston, South Carolina, that they had no problem in that regard in my State. And we have never had any difficulty, and I believe that he is a better authority, so far as the rights and so far as the opportunities given those people, than is the gentleman now speaking, or the witness now in the chair, so let's proceed.

Mr. ICHORD. We have gotten somewhat afield from the inquiry. Let's proceed, Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you on or about November 20, 1967, make a statement substantially to this effect: that if President Johnson was nominated for reelection at the convention in Chicago, anyone who voted to nominate him would not be allowed to leave the convention hall?

Mr. DAVIS. Could you give me the document you are using?

Mr. CONLEY. I am asking you if you made such a statement on November 20, 1967, or thereabouts.

Mr. DAVIS. I can't recall making any such statement, but if you could refer to when it was made and the context of it, perhaps I could talk further to it.

Mr. CONLEY. I will ask you further: On March 6, 1967, in connection with the question of urban renewal, if you made the following statement and words to this effect, "If you can't stop urban renewal, you may have to burn the buildings down."

Mr. DAVIS. What was the context in which this alleged statement was made?

Mr. CONLEY. I believe it was made by you at the meeting of the Englewood Action Committee.

Mr. KENNEDY. You have the the document before you. Why don't you show it to him, if you are interested in showing the truth?

Mr. CONLEY. These are simply notes I have here.

I am asking you, sir, if you made that statement. If you don't recall it, just say you don't recall it.

Mr. DAVIS. It is not that. It would be inconsistent with my position, that people should burn down the buildings they live in. People should do all that they can to stop the demolition of their communities in the interest of business and real estate forces that want to change that community into middle- or upper-income and destroy the community of the poor.

I have worked a long time along those lines. I think that one of the clearest examples of the issue of democracy in America is the way in which the administrative programs that were launched out of the New Deal 1930's philosophy, programs and visions that had, as their basis at least, the rendering of justice to people who were unemployed and lived in slum communities, and instead created the administrative operations that came increasingly under the control of forces that were not in tune with the interests of poor people of the United States. Welfare is one example, schools is another example, and urban renewal is a classic example.

The movement is attempting to find new channels so that people who are victims of an administrative operation or bureaucracy can begin to have control over those administrative operations.

You can't vote in that kind of change, as we see it, that is, you can't vote in a changed urban renewal program. You have to get the residents in a community to begin to exercise power over their urban renewal program, directly, and welfare recipients and students in schools, and so on.

In that context, I don't believe I would advocate as a tactic for creating a new political base for more democratic urban renewal programs burning down buildings.

I don't believe I would ever do that, so I am sorry to take long, but I wanted to say what my context would be, and then go on to say I don't recall being at the Englewood Action Committee on November—whatever it was, 1967, of having made that statement.

Mr. CONLEY. In March. Mr. Davis, taking you back again to the newspaper, *THE MOVEMENT*, and the February edition you had a moment ago, in the same column where the question appears from the reporter, "What do you see happening at the Democratic Convention?" And I quote your reply as follows:

I think we can do better than attempting to prevent the convention from taking place, as some have suggested by closing down the city on the first day of pre-convention activity. The delegates should be allowed to come to Chicago, so long as they give their support to a policy of ending racism and the war. * * *

Did you make that statement, and has *MOVEMENT* adequately quoted the statement which I just read to you?

Mr. DAVIS. It might be helpful to read into the record the entire statement again. My position was that we should not disrupt the convention or prevent the convention from carrying out its business.

Our political business in Chicago was to have a political confrontation on the issues of the war and racism in America.

It seems to me that perhaps if you read the whole statement, or even if you don't, it is implied there that what I am suggesting—

Mr. ICHORD. The statement has been made a part of the record?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. It will be shown in the record.

Mr. DAVIS. Our purpose was not to prevent the convention, or to prevent people from entering the International Amphitheatre during convention week. Our purpose was to, as dramatically as we could to double the agenda facing the Government and the Nation at this time, the war in Vietnam and racism in our communities, coast to coast.

Mr. CONLEY. I still come back to the specific sentence:

The delegates should be allowed to come to Chicago, so long as they give their support to a policy of ending racism and the war.

That particular sentence troubles me, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Do you mean if they don't end it, then they should be prevented?

Mr. CONLEY. You seem to place an option. All may come, if they subscribe to these two philosophies.

I am not arguing the merit of the philosophy. I am asking if this does not attach a condition to a delegate coming to the convention, reading that sentence.

Mr. DAVIS. I don't think it does.

Mr. CONLEY. "The delegates should be allowed to come, so long as they give their support." What does that mean to you?

Mr. DAVIS. What I just said that it meant, that is, that we do not seek to prevent the delegates from coming to Chicago or to the Democratic Convention.

Mr. CONLEY. Why didn't you say that?

Mr. DAVIS. Give me the whole statement again, and I will find for you a sentence that says that clearly.

Mr. ICHORD. Hand him the statement.

Mr. CONLEY. Why didn't you just say the delegates should be allowed to come to Chicago?

Mr. DAVIS. I have said that in hundreds of places and I am sure you have it before you.

The February 11 meeting that you brought up with Mr. Hayden, in which we put into our minutes our position against disruption of the Democratic Convention, not because it was an issue that was live and bubbling among young people and others who were planning to come to Chicago, but because the media had essentially created this issue from the beginning, and we wanted to be on record publicly and with ourselves that we were not seeking a confrontation or a physical disruption of the convention.

I don't know how many times it was said publicly to the press and in our minutes, and it seems to me it is said here, as well.

You know, you may be able to, in the millions of words that were said about the Democratic Convention, find three that to you represent what you already believe. But I think if you will study the context of any statement that is made and if you will basically absorb the message that came out of the Mobilization at every level, it will be crystal clear that we came to Chicago not to confront or disrupt, but to raise the issues before this Government and the American people.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, I submit to you, had somebody in Chicago put to your group a proposal you will be permitted to come to Chicago so long as you remain peaceable and quiet, sitting on the sidewalk and causing no demonstration, no parades whatsoever, that you would not have found that acceptable. You would have considered that as a blackjack over your head, wouldn't you?

Mr. DAVIS. I say in this very article:

I favor letting the delegates meet in the International Amphitheater and making our demands and the actions behind those demands escalate in militancy—

Mr. CONLEY. Let's stop there. We both know what "escalate" means, don't we?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Because that is what we have been talking about for the last 4 or 5 years. What is the next word?

Mr. DAVIS. That very bad word, "militancy."

Mr. CONLEY. What does that word "militancy" mean to you?

Mr. DAVIS. It means when people feel the democratic process has broken down, when they have no choice between law and order and procandidates—in every conceivable way they have been working to try to end this terrible war in Vietnam—that they have to do what they can to undercut, to prevent this authority from continuing in the way that it has.

Essentially, the movement of the last 8 years has been a movement that tries to bring about a change in consciousness of both the people who run this country and the general population. I think that we have demonstrated our moralism and nonviolence and our willingness to go to jail for our convictions, our refusal to go into the draft, our non-violent sit-ins, where we subject ourselves to all kinds of abuse in an effort to try to make this country face up to what it is doing, not only in the black and poor communities of the Nation, but all over the world.

I think that militancy is an appropriate term for a movement that is angry, that wants change, that is trying to reach more and more people to understand what we are doing to human lives all over the world. I think militancy is a word that is appropriate to young people and black people and concerned Americans facing the kinds of opposition, the kinds of oppression, and the kinds of war policies that this Government stands for.

Mr. CONLEY. I think we both recognize that militant, or militancy, whatever you choose to call it, means exactly the same thing to both of us. It means a very firm position.

Mr. DAVIS. That is right.

Mr. CONLEY. It means, if necessary, the use of force.

Mr. DAVIS. Well, what kind of force? That is the kind, you see.

Mr. CONLEY. I will not belabor with you on that one.

Mr. DAVIS. That is the key issue.

Mr. CONLEY. I will let you cop out to that.

Mr. DAVIS. Every time we use "militancy," we mean "get our guns" or "pin the delegates in" or "don't let them out." And what I am saying is that our statements, public and private, throughout the events leading up to Chicago were absolutely clear that we wanted a nonviolent peace demonstration at the time of the Democratic Convention.

Mr. CONLEY. I go back on the word "militant" or "militancy" to the word "militia." I think they spring from the same area.

Mr. DAVIS. I think they do.

Mr. ICHORD. Let's get away from semantics.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, I ask you if the first organizational meeting for the demonstrations in Chicago was not in fact held on February 11, 1968, at 407 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, and that you and Mr. Carlos Russell chaired that meeting.

Mr. DAVIS. The first organizational meeting for what?

Mr. CONLEY. For the demonstrations in Chicago, or the events which occurred in Chicago, however you choose to put it, took place on February 11.

Mr. DAVIS. No; there were many meetings before the February 11 meeting to discuss the convention.

Mr. CONLEY. Was there a meeting on February 11?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, there was.

Mr. CONLEY. Was it chaired by you and Mr. Carlos Russell?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, it was.

Mr. CONLEY. Now I will ask you if, in fact, did not the question of necessity for violence come up for discussion in that meeting on February 11?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes; in preparing an agenda for that meeting, the press particularly was speculating publicly at that time that the convention would be disrupted.

Mr. CONLEY. We are wandering. You are talking about the press. I am asking, Did the question of violence come up? Not what the press said.

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook returned to the hearing room.)

Mr. DAVIS. The reason in large part it came up was because I wanted very explicitly to have a discussion of whether or not the convention should be disrupted, precisely so we could clarify publicly the position

of the overwhelming numbers of groups, I think all the groups who were affiliated with the National Mobilization, and were thinking or discussing at least the idea of an antiwar demonstration at the time of the convention.

In other words, the position of disruption was one of four positions that was put forward so that we could make crystal clear to everyone that this position had been advanced, since it was being talked about in the press, and had been rejected by this meeting, as it was.

Mr. CONLEY. Specifically, Mr. Davis, didn't Jack Spiegel make a statement there at this particular meeting that dealt with the question of violence?

Mr. DAVIS. A number of people raised the question of whether there would be violence—

Mr. CONLEY. Did Mr. Spiegel make the following statement, or words to this effect:

We can't call 200,000 people to Chicago and then disassociate ourselves from violence. Disruption and violence will occur. It's going to happen and we'll have to deal with that fact.¹

Wasn't a statement of this type made?

Mr. DAVIS. It may or may not have been made. It turned out to be a quite accurate statement, that is, that police violence, or what the Walker Report calls a police riot, did develop, and Mr. Spiegel was quite accurate in saying we would have to deal with that problem. And the way we dealt with it, or tried to get ready for it, was doing all we could to secure permits and demand that the Justice Department investigate the possibility of police violence during the Democratic Convention, and to make public statements that announced the military buildup in the city of Chicago and to organize marshals who could implement a nonviolent demonstration if we were ever allowed to have one, which we were not.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you hear a Lincoln Lynch make the following statement:

How are we going to discredit Daley and show him to be a liar? How will we present challenges to the Convention?

Was this statement made by Mr. Lynch?

Mr. KENNEDY. It is a question, not a statement.

Mr. DAVIS. I think Lincoln might have said something along those lines. It seems to me a question he might have said, but I can't recall that he said that exactly.

Does that statement mean anything to you, Mr. Conley?

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Davis, I show you a copy of a letter, or the letterhead of the National Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam, which was mailed during August of 1968. This letter identifies you and Tom Hayden as coproject directors and states that you were greatly aided by the Chicago Peace Council.²

Is that true?

(Witness examines document and confers with counsel.)

Mr. DAVIS. This appears to be a stolen letter signed by Dave Delinger and Bob Greenblatt that I think is essentially correct.

¹ See Grubisic Exhibit No. 4, pt. 1, pp. 2293-2298, of Oct. 1, 1968, hearings.

² Document introduced as Grubisic Exhibit No. 6 and retained in committee files. See pt. 1, p. 2305, of Oct. 1, 1968, hearings.

The Chicago Peace Council did have staff in Chicago that assisted us with legal help and getting housing for people. One of their officers worked with us closely in trying to secure permits from the city of Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, did you issue a press release on March 25, 1968, in which you described a meeting that was held March 22-24 at a camp outside of Chicago to make plans for disrupting the Democratic Convention, and did you state that an interim committee was established to carry out those plans, which consisted of yourself, Dave Dellinger, and Vernon Grizzard?

Mr. DAVIS. No, that would be absolutely incorrect. As I said, I never publicly called for disruption of the Democratic National Convention.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, did you have an interim committee consisting of yourself, Dellinger, and Grizzard?

Mr. DAVIS. Let's start and end with that.

It is this constant reading into the record this word of "disruption" that I am objecting to.

Yes, there was a committee that was set up to essentially consult with people around the country about a possible action at the time of the Democratic National Convention.

Mr. CONLEY. You have as much trouble with the word "disrupt" as I do with the word "militant," don't you?

Mr. DAVIS. "Militant" and "disrupt" are both perfectly clear to me, and apparently not so clear to you.

Mr. CONLEY. Would you examine this particular document that we are referring to, the press release of March 25, and I will ask you if in fact that was the release that was made on that date.

(Witness examines document.)

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, that appears to be the press release that was issued.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the committee receive this particular document as Davis Exhibit No. 2.

Mr. ICHORD. Without objection from members of the committee, the document will be received and incorporated in the record.

(Document marked "Davis Exhibit No. 2." See pages 2658 and 2659.)

Mr. DAVIS. What is this "attachment 8A"?

Mr. CONLEY. Written in the yellow crayon?

Mr. DAVIS. You have No. 8 in red or yellow, here—

Mr. CONLEY. That is to key it to my question to you, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Why is my name underlined in red?

Mr. ICHORD. Let's get back to the issue at hand.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you prefer yellow?

Mr. DAVIS, on August 18, 1968, did you attend a meeting of the Chicago Peace Council at which you were one of the featured speakers and at that time did you introduce other speakers?

Mr. DAVIS. What was the date?

Mr. CONLEY. August 18, 1968, approximately 6 or 7 days before the convention.

Mr. DAVIS. Why don't you go ahead? I really don't recall.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you recall whether a Sylvia Kushner was present at that particular meeting, collecting money at the door from persons entering the meeting? Do you know a Sylvia Kushner?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, I do.

Mr. CONLEY. Are you aware of the fact that Sylvia Kushner is the wife of a long-time Communist Party member, Sam Kushner?

2658 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

DAVIS EXHIBIT No. 2

for immediate release
March 25, 1968 10:00 am

contact: Rennie Davis
407 S. Dearborn, Chicago
939-2666

⑧
inter
com. file
pg. 2
attachment is
9-8

A major, representative conference of anti-war, student and black liberation forces across the United States meeting outside Chicago has called for an "election year organizing campaign throughout the country" and affirmed its intention to hold demonstrations at the time of the Democratic National Convention. The Conference, meeting at camp Ravenswood, was united in its conviction that neither the Democratic or Republican parties could solve the basic problems that this country faces at home or abroad. The strategy developed by the Conference will be to underscore through action organization the real issues this country must face. Those issues are the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, the right of the Vietnamese people to national independence and self-determination, the end of American attempts to control and direct the future of the underdeveloped areas of the world for its own economic and political interests, an immediate end to the draft and the virtual military occupation of Black Communities and the recognition of the right of Black People to control their own lives and determine their own future in this country.

A national campaign committee is being established by the 250 representatives at the weekend conference. This campaign is committed to an extensive program of support to local organizing activity against the draft, the war, the undemocratic interests in the ~~Republic~~ Republican and Democratic parties, racism and poverty. Several thousand volunteers are expected to join this campaign during the

100
Equal rights for all

The conference selected a three man interim committee to function during the next few weeks while national and regional student and anti-war organizations are selecting representatives to the national campaign committee. Members of the interim committee are Rennie Davis, Chicago; Dave Dellinger, New York; and Vernon Grizzard, Boston.

Mr. DAVIS. I think that is completely irrelevant, who she marries.

Mr. CONLEY. I am just asking you. Are you aware of the fact?

Mr. DAVIS. No; but whoever she married is quite beautiful.

Mr. ICHORD. You are not acquainted with her husband?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I have not had the good fortune to meet her husband.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, just prior to the convention, several days, did you have a conversation with one Abbie Hoffman, and Mr. Hoffman stated to you he had stolen a book from NBC, and this book contained a floor plan of all of the hotels in which the Democratic delegates would be staying, as well as a detailed floor plan of the Amphitheatre, and this convention floor plan was printed in only 50 copies?

Mr. DAVIS. He is known by the name Abbie, and we talked on several occasions before and during the convention, but frankly, I can't recall this particular conversation, but since he has been subpoenaed by this committee, I would recommend that you ask him the question.

Mr. CONLEY. You have no recollection of having any such discussion with him?

Mr. DAVIS. I can't recall, but it is possible.

Mr. CONLEY. I will ask you whether at the time, or at some other time in the general neighborhood, you told Hoffman that you had located the frequency of the secret police radio so you could monitor their signals?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I can't ever remember saying that to Abbie.

Mr. CONLEY. You are quite sure you never made such a statement to him or to anyone else?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I can't ever recall making such a statement.

Mr. CONLEY. Is the fact, then, untrue, the question I put to you, sir?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DAVIS. My recollection is that there were a lot of radios around Chicago that picked up continuously the police calls. It is one of the ways that we have to document the fact that police orders continuously were issued and violated by the men in the field. But I don't recall ever discussing with people that information or those radios, how they got the radios or who they were or what their involvement was.

Mr. CONLEY. My question was not what they had gotten. My question was, Did you make the statement to Hoffman or to some other person that you had located the frequency of the secret police radio so that you could monitor their signals?

Mr. DAVIS. No; I am sure I had not made such a statement since I had not located such a secret police frequency.

Mr. CONLEY. Then this statement would be false?

Mr. DAVIS. Unless I just made it up, it would be false.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you just make it up?

Mr. DAVIS. I don't believe I would.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, I want to direct your attention to a meeting that occurred on August 21 in Lincoln Park, which you as well as Mr. Hoffman attended.

Was there not in fact a demonstration given on crowd control and also training on how to attack the police?

Mr. DAVIS. I don't remember August 21 in Lincoln Park, but I could explain to you that we tried to organize in Chicago some 200 marshals in nonviolent demonstration techniques that were of two kinds.

One was a fairly traditional monitoring operation, in the hope that at the 11th hour the mayor would come to his senses and grant us a permit to go from Lincoln Park to the International Amphitheatre.

A part of our training with marshals was designed to organize a committee of people that could provide communication to a large parade and direction that would seek to end in a people's assembly outside the International Amphitheatre.

The other part of our training essentially was designed to assist people in the eventuality of police attacks or police brutality.

At that time, August 21, we had not been granted permits. The military preparations were well known publicly, and the police and other secret security and military forces were in or on their way to the city. It did appear that demonstrators might be attacked by police, as was the case.

So we tried to also acquaint our marshals with what to do in the eventuality of tear gas or Mace or broken limbs or bleeding heads. We also tried to get marshals to understand ways in which they could move large numbers of people out of a situation in the eventuality of police confrontation or police attack.

So, those were the two focuses in our training of marshals, one for nonviolent demonstration and the other for self-defense of crowds in the eventuality of police attack.

Mr. CONLEY. Wasn't there some training, sir, at this particular meeting I am talking about, involving the use of the snake dance?

Mr. DAVIS. A part of the—

Mr. CONLEY. That is just a simple question.

Mr. DAVIS. It is not a simple question.

Mr. CONLEY. Was there training on the use of the snake dance?

Mr. DAVIS. There was training that tried to bring people together that could allow people in a crowd situation to quickly organize and move out of the situation. Some of the newsmen and others called this a snake dance.

Snake dance demonstrations, which has been used widely in Japan—

Mr. CONLEY. It isn't used in Japan to move a crowd out quickly.

Mr. DAVIS. That is why it is not a simple question at all, and I wouldn't let you imply what you are now describing as a snake dance in any way was used in Chicago for offensive purposes, or in any way

that our training program was used for offensive or confrontation purposes.

I think anyone who is involved in that training, or any of the newsmen with whom we spoke who were there at the time of the training, will testify that we made it very clear that we were extremely concerned at that time about crowds being attacked. And we were trying to see if there was a way in which people could be organized to move out of an area very rapidly without trampling each other, and it seemed this might possibly be a demonstration technique that could be used in eventuality. It was never used, as you know, in Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, why don't you describe to us how a snake dance works to show how we get rid of people real quick?

Mr. DAVIS. Do you want me to stand up?

Mr. CONLEY. You can describe it in words.

Mr. DAVIS. Essentially, it is a way of organizing a group by linking arms and moving out of an area in formation. That is the simplest way to describe it.

Mr. CONLEY. Can you move more quickly?

Mr. DAVIS. You can move at a very fast pace, yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Faster than you can move by yourself?

Mr. DAVIS. The advantage is that it keeps you from stampeding over your friends. It allows people to move together, instead of trampling each other.

It is a terrible thing we have to discuss what to do in a demonstration that has called for a peace march and citizens' assembly at the International Amphitheatre. The fact that young people have to discuss how to defend themselves against public officials when they have asked for a legal permit is a dreadful indictment of what this country is coming to.

Mr. CONLEY. On August 23 of this year, did you in the company of Mr. David Dellinger and Mr. Sidney Peck wait to see Mayor Daley, and did you not after half an hour see the mayor's assistant, Mr. David Stahl?

Mr. DAVIS. What was the date, again?

Mr. CONLEY. August 23.

Mr. DAVIS. I can't recall if that is the exact date, but I believe a meeting around that time did take place.

Mr. CONLEY. Are these facts substantially correct, that you waited half an hour to see Mayor Daley, could not see him, and requested to see Mr. Stahl, and could not see him?

Mr. DAVIS. That is correct. We finally wound up seeing their secretary, who explained neither man would be available to us at the very time when permits were desperately needed. The mayor closed his door to the officials of the National Mobilization.

Mr. CONLEY. Is it not a fact that at that time Mr. Stahl's secretary indicated to you he would see representatives of your group on August 26? Did that occur, that they indicated that they would see you on I guess 2 or 3 days later?

Mr. DAVIS. We had been meeting with David Stahl for 7 weeks, at that point, and we had made every possible effort to try to meet with somebody in that government who could give us the straight story on whether or not constitutional rights would be protected during the Democratic National Convention, and David Stahl, like Judge Lynch, was appropriately named.

We only got the stall, and we felt that on the 23d that it was essential to meet with the mayor himself or with John Bailey, the chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

I believe, following the meeting with Mr. Stahl's secretary, that I did talk briefly with John Bailey and I pleaded with him to appeal to the mayor of the city of Chicago to meet with us and issue permits to prevent a police riot in the city of Chicago. We felt one more meeting on August 26 with essentially a staff person, rather than with the person who really made the decisions, was ludicrous.

Mr. ICHORD. There were permits issued for demonstrations at certain places, were there not?

Mr. DAVIS. There was a permit issued on the afternoon of August 28 for the use of the bandshell, but the essential permit for a citizens' assembly outside the International Amphitheatre was not granted, and the essential right to use the park, which would have prevented the skull fractures and the bloodshed that we saw on television, were never granted. The use of Soldier Field that would have prevented what happened in Chicago was never availed.

Mr. ICHORD. Was the permit to which you referred the only permit issued?

Mr. DAVIS. That is right, for any group that was granted.

Mr. CONLEY. After you were told you could not see Mr. Stahl until August 26, were you present when Mr. Dellinger made the following statement: If Mayor Daley would not see him now, he—implying Mayor Daley—would be responsible for any bloodshed that took place in Chicago.

Were you present when that statement was made, or words to that effect?

Mr. DAVIS. I don't believe I overheard that exact statement, but that certainly is a statement that I believe that all of us felt very strongly at that time, and if Dave Dellinger had not made it, I think I would have.

Mr. CONLEY. Whose blood did you plan to shed in Chicago?

Mr. DAVIS. We didn't plan to shed anybody's blood. The plan was announced months ago, and we were seeking permits so we could have a legal, peaceful assembly, and that right to assemble was being crushed by the officials of Chicago.

We felt that this kind of blatant disregard of the Constitution and the military buildup that was occurring in Chicago could only mean that Chicago officials were interested in a police riot and the destruction of any possibility or opportunity to have a peaceful assembly. As we know, that is exactly what happened.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, besides yourself, Mr. Dellinger, and Mr. Peck, were not Linda Morse, Stanley Bass, Irving Beinin, and James O'Brien of *Ramparts* magazine present at this meeting we have been talking about, if you recall?

Mr. DAVIS. I recall some of them being present, but not all of them.

Mr. CONLEY. Yesterday Mr. Hayden was asked about what the word "victory" meant to him, and a number of things.

I put to you this question, sir: Would you like to see the North Vietnamese victorious in this war that is occurring in Southeast Asia?

Mr. DAVIS. The victory for me would be for American military presence in Vietnam to withdraw. That would be an enormous victory for the American people, and that is the victory I seek.

Mr. CONLEY. In other words, you do not subscribe to Mr. Hayden's statement as of yesterday. You do not wish to adopt what he said on that particular point?

Mr. DAVIS. I think it is irrelevant, you see, to say that as an American I want to figure out or dictate the ways in which Vietnam will be governed. The only thing that is relevant to me, as an American, is allowing Vietnam to determine its own affairs.

It is quite clear to me that the forces in the struggle in Vietnam are essentially forces that are organized around the DRV and the National Liberation Front. It is clear to me that it is those forces that have essentially united the nationalist interests in Vietnam.

But my political position, as an American, is simply to insist that this country come to its senses and withdraw its troops. It has always been my position, and it will continue to be my position.

Mr. CONLEY. In this connection, Mr. Davis, we are moving into the area of the military, now, I suppose. You at least bear the credit for it, if not the responsibility, for having been a part of an organization which has called itself the Summer of Support.

Would you be kind enough to tell us what the purpose of this organization, "Summer of Support," are, and I have given you a big, broad field to talk in now.

Mr. DAVIS. As a young person myself, I feel a particular sympathy for those Americans who have been drafted into the Armed Forces and given orders to fight and die in a war that, in the interests of this country, cannot be tolerated or supported. I happen to believe that as someone who is very committed to peace in that country that I represent a major ally of the average GI. I think that our own movement, however, based largely on—

Mr. CONLEY. May I interrupt you a moment? I am not sure I followed what you meant by that last remark. Would you elaborate on what you meant by "ally"?

Mr. DAVIS. I think the best thing we can do to support our American soldiers is to work to bring them home, to return them safely to their families.

Mr. CONLEY. Who is the ally you are mentioning—the age group you are representing?

Mr. DAVIS. Young people and others in this country who have organized and worked and raised the issue of the war in public arenas from coast to coast. In other words, the peace movement, it seems to me, not the Congressmen who sit here, who are for the war, represent the major supporters of American fighting men, and Summer Support was essentially a program to dramatize and focus in a very specific way the support of the peace movement for American soldiers.

Mr. CONLEY. Let's stay on this one point for just a minute. How old are you?

Mr. DAVIS. I am 28.

Mr. CONLEY. You are 28 years old. How old is the average serviceman?

Mr. DAVIS. The average serviceman is 20.

Mr. CONLEY. So there is some 8 years between you and him, is there not?

Mr. DAVIS. That is right, although a lot of people who work in Summer Support are 18, 19, 20. As a matter of fact, some of the people

that are supporting soldiers are 50 and 60. I don't think it is strictly the case that people who support soldiers have to be old, bigoted, repressive, sick, patriotic in the worst sense, rather than the best sense.

I think the symbols of patriotism have been stolen by the right, and they have to be regained by those people who are working to make freedom and peace in this country consistent with American interests.

Mr. CONLEY. Let me ask you if this Summer of Support actually has as one of its objectives to encourage disaffection and desertion from the Army?

Mr. DAVIS. You may use those words. We know exactly what they are, in law. We do not urge any young soldier to take any action that would put him in legal jeopardy with the United States military, nor do we in any of our coffeehouses counsel young men to desert. Our purpose is to try to provide a place for the young man who has given his body to Uncle Sam so that he does not have to give his mind. Our place is to provide rest and relaxation for basic trainees who around the 5th week of their basic training learn to kill. He has something to escape to, other than the whore houses and saloons that make up these small towns, like in Waynesville or Queens, Texas, where there are people who generally care about him and are not trying to extract or steal his body for prostitution purposes. There are people who want to keep his mind alive, and not be totally sold out to the military machine. There are people there who essentially say, "I am from the peace movement because I care about the hell you are going through."

That is the essential idea of the coffeehouse—pretty good.

Mr. CONLEY. I want to be specific about this, though. You do encourage the people between themselves—I use "among soldiers" not between the peace movement and the soldiers; I use the term "among soldiers." I do see a distinction. Do you?

Mr. DAVIS. I see your distinction. If GIs decide to organize themselves to do whatever they feel they want to do, we may counsel them very strongly about the legal problems they may face if they take certain actions.

Mr. CONLEY. And you use the coffeehouse, perhaps, as a catalyst for them or focusing point—

Mr. DAVIS. No, the coffeehouse is a place where they can somehow keep their sanity, sort of offering an antidote to the spirit of the bayonet, which is what the Government represents.

Mr. CONLEY. I am familiar with at least one of your coffeehouses, because it is from part of the country I represent. And you do have posters in the coffeehouses, do you not?

Mr. DAVIS. We have all kinds of posters, posters of pretty girls, posters of Stokely Carmichael—

Mr. CONLEY. You have posters there which indicate that the war in Vietnam is immoral, or however you choose to put it; do you not?

Mr. DAVIS. One poster in Mad Anthony's is a big kind of picture of a cruiser plane of a—

Mr. CONLEY. Of a what?

Mr. DAVIS. Of a huge plane going off in the distance, and it says, "This summer spend your vacation in beautiful Vietnam." That is a kind of an antiwar poster, I guess. I don't know. GIs really like it.

Mr. ICHORD. Did you not close down Mad Anthony's?

Mr. DAVIS. We hope very much to open at Fort Leonard Wood, but the combination of the official and unofficial harassment, including the breaking of windows and other terror that came from the military and the police, forced that particular coffeehouse to temporarily close. It was too bad, but the GIs on the whole were very supportive of it and liked it, but the officers don't think too well of it.

Mr. ICHORD. How many coffeehouses do you have throughout the United States?

Mr. DAVIS. I think the first thing to say about your question is we feel the coffeehouses do not somehow belong to us. They somehow belong to American soldiers, but the number of coffeehouses near military bases that I am acquainted with at least I think number six.

Mr. CONLEY. I am going to show you a letter dated April 30, 1968, signed by "Rennie," addressed to "Dear Bob," concerning the operation of the coffeehouses. The following statement is made in this cover letter:

Enclosed is a recruiting letter to be shown to trustworthy people who are seriously interested in working in one of the army base coffee houses this summer.

Since security is a problem, please be careful to whom this letter is shown.

I will ask you, sir, if you did not in fact prepare the original of that letter, if the "Rennie" referred to is not you and the "Bob" referred to there is not Robert Greenblatt?

Mr. DAVIS. How was this letter stolen, Mr. Conley?

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, I didn't know that it was stolen.

Mr. DAVIS. The handwriting is not mine, so I really can't identify this letter. Why don't you go into it, and we will see?

Mr. CONLEY. I will ask you, sir, if you prepared a letter of that type on or about April 30, 1968, containing that language.

Mr. DAVIS. I really, honestly, don't know.

Mr. CONLEY. You don't have any recollection?

Mr. DAVIS. At that time we were very actively engaged in recruiting for a new project.

(Document marked "Davis Exhibit No. 3" and retained in committee files.)

Mr. CONLEY. Do you know of anyone else involved in the Summer of Support Army coffeehouse movement whose name perhaps is Rennie?

Mr. DAVIS. No; that is the only person who has that name.

Mr. CONLEY. Attached to that letter is a rather voluminous piece of material—

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. ICHORD. Let the record show that counsel has handed the material to the witness.

Mr. DAVIS [reads].

The coffee houses represent * * * a new way of reaching soldiers without haranguing them.

The coffee-houses come on as strictly commercial ventures—

Mr. CONLEY. I don't think it is necessary to read the letter.

I ask you if you recognize the letter. Do you recognize the letter, Mr. Davis?

(Witness examines document and confers with counsel.)

Mr. DAVIS. The first part of this letter, Mr. Conley—

Mr. CONLEY. Are you describing by that the first and second pages?

Mr. DAVIS. The first two pages, that is correct.

Mr. KENNEDY. The other stuff is secret, and they want it back.

Mr. CONLEY. We didn't mark it secret.

(Witness examines document and confers with counsel.)

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Conley, are you going to put all of this in the record?

Mr. CONLEY. No, sir; we are only interested in the first two pages there.

(Document marked "Davis Exhibit No. 4." See pages 2667 and 2668.)

Mr. DAVIS. I am very interested in the other five pages. It has a lot of useful information about the attitude of many young men in the Army—

Mr. CONLEY. Have you ever seen that document before—

Mr. DAVIS. —who feel that this war is very unjust.

Mr. ICHORD. The question is, Have you ever seen the document?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I haven't.

Mr. CONLEY. It is moot—

Mr. KENNEDY. I don't think it is moot. You yourself have indicated—

Mr. ICHORD. Let's be in order. Mr. Counsel, I remind you of the rules.

Mr. KENNEDY. This is evidence from your own committee. All you want to see is a stinking letter.

Mr. ICHORD. I remind the counsel again that he is in violation of the rules.

Mr. DAVIS. It is useful; it says on February 21 and 22 many GIs refused to jump out of helicopters. U.S. commanders—it goes on for five pages with information about that.

Mr. ICHORD. The witness said he does not recognize it.

Mr. DAVIS. Anyway, the first two pages are mine, Mr. Conley.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Davis, do you state you have never seen this document before?

Mr. DAVIS. That is right. To the best of my knowledge, I have never seen it before.

Mr. ICHORD. Proceed with your next question.

Mr. CONLEY. I take it you cannot identify either document?

Mr. DAVIS. No; the first two pages I recognize as a document that I was involved in writing. I don't think the full text of that letter is mine, but parts of it are.

Mr. ASHBROOK. He said he didn't recognize it.

Mr. ICHORD. He said he recognized the first letter. Is that not right?

Mr. CONLEY. Let's make it real clear. The short letter dated April 30—

Mr. DAVIS. I don't recognize that letter.

Mr. CONLEY. You have no recollection of ever having written that letter?

Mr. DAVIS. That is right.

Mr. CONLEY. But the second letter, which deals with the coffeehouses, specifically two pages in length, you do recognize, although you maintain it is not a complete—

Mr. DAVIS. I will take credit for that letter.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, in this same connection, dealing with the question of the Summer of Support, is it not a fact that, as far back as November 1967, you organized an operation to make tape recordings

DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 2667

DAVIS EXHIBIT No. 4

Dear

This letter is to be shown only to those trustworthy individuals who have expressed interest in staffing one of the coffee-houses in army base parasite towns.

The coffee houses represent an attempt to work out a new way of reaching soldiers without haranguing them.

The coffee-houses come on as strictly commercial ventures--- 'psychedelic' painting on the windows, personality posters on the walls, flashing colored lights, folk singers, or a hi-fi playing with Judy Collins, The Mothers, etc., and outlandish prices for a cup of coffee --- in which any explicit proselytizing by movement people who worked there would be inappropriate and even threatening to the coffee-houses' continued existence.

The coffee-houses are not designed to organize soldiers; they are designed to provide soldiers with a resource institution through which they can organize themselves, when they are ready. The qualities needed in coffee house staff are not those of a political activist; they are those of friend and soda-jerk. Warmth, friendliness, openness, and a willingness to listen are the qualities needed to make soldiers feel at home and unthreatened in the coffee house. The coffee houses give movement people an opportunity to make their rhetoric of fraternity real --- but nothing more.

The first step in any political process is to try to find that fraction who are most ready to move. A coffee house in an Army town, amidst the bars, whorehouses, loansharks and sterile servicemen's clubs, works as a selective magnet to attract this crowd. Because of the cultural and class basis of our movement with which we are already familiar, those soldiers most likely to be turned off the army are also those most likely to be turned off the bars and whorehouses; most likely to welcome a coffee house. This ten percent of the army are those guys who, before the coffee houses, stayed in their barracks and left their weekend passes unused.

The coffee houses, therefore, by their very existence, offer soldiers an opportunity to draw support from each other simply by meeting each other in a friendly, non-military atmosphere, with open young people around who are sympathetic and willing to make an ear available to those who want to bend it. On the base, these soldiers are usually isolated from one another, lost among 30,000 other men, probably unaware of each other's existence. Just by learning that there are people of similar sensibilities, they begin to see problems as common which they had previously perceived as individual. They gain support for acts they have been contemplating; and, more important, begin to explore possibilities of common action.

2668 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

DAVIS EXHIBIT No. 4--Continued

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This is all to say that we have undertaken a very limited, technical job that hasn't involved urging anyone to oppose the war in Vietnam. Soldiers don't have to be urged; they are the first group (for very obvious reasons) to oppose the war in their hearts. But expecting soldiers to take the enormous risks of doing something about it is unrealistic at this point; for us to ask soldiers to risk defection is, to put it kindly, arrogant.

This will be even more true, come June, when there will be a high percentage of college grads in basic training. These guys will not need to be proselytized to an anti-war position; we've been doing that for three years now and most likely, quite a bit has sunk in. What these soldiers will need, however, is a humane and familiar environment in which they can meet like minded guys and talk in a non-military atmosphere.

Let me sum up by quoting from the letter written by the originator of these coffee-houses, a former GI himself:

As movement people begin to distinguish between the unhappy conscript and the marine sgt who actually digs burning down huts with his zippo lighter, a sympathy will probably inform their attitude toward American soldiers in training. It may also become clear that the movement has long made strident and impossible demands on soldiers: Go to jail; Go into exile; Risk lifelong ostracism and unemployment; etc. Movement people may even begin to see GIs as a likely constituency. They're the same age; after all, speak the same language, like the same music. Soldiers have immediate problems that can be eased and, someday solved. They form the segment of our society that pays most heavily for the iron-heel foreign policy. ...Finally, soldiers aren't powerless, and can change the situation if a significant fraction become articulate and willing to act on their anti-war outlook.

...Expecting mass refusals to fight in Vietnam would be like thinking American workers could have forced through the Wagner Act in 1870. Only after soldiers have found it possible, on some level, to change their situation, might they think of pressing demands which now seem outlandish, such as the right to decline assignment to a given duty station (i.e., refuse to fight in Bolivia). The immediate changes they could fight for might include the removal of particularly sadistic NCOs from positions of authority; or doctors might demand a guaranteed 8 hours sleep for trainees at posts where meningitis is endemic...

We in the movement will not organize these things. But we can begin to provide a service institution for soldiers who are beginning to move on their own. Without the establishment and preservation of this institution, the movement may not be possible.

which could be broadcast to GIs, with the objective of breaking down morale and causing disaffection among U.S. Army personnel?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I never organized such an operation.

Mr. CONLEY. Were you ever involved in such an operation, as a participant, not as an organizer, bearing in mind the distinction?

Mr. DAVIS. Do you mean did I make tapes to encourage disaffection among the troops?

Mr. CONLEY. To make tape recordings which could be broadcast to GIs?

Mr. DAVIS. I would certainly make tapes, if they could be broadcast to GIs, which would express my point of view.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you make any tapes?

Mr. DAVIS. I make a lot of speeches that are taped that may have been used on radio, or even may have been made available to GIs. If that happened, that is good. But I never participated in any organized way for that purpose.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. DAVIS, I ask you: Why, then—you said you would make tapes for the GIs; for what purpose would you make them?

Mr. DAVIS. To explain my point of view, that I support them, that I am upset by what they have to go through, while the politicians haggle over how to save face, and they fight and die in that senseless war.

We are doing all we can to try to end that war. We very much want to involve them, when they return from Vietnam, in campus activities. There are some 400,000 Vietnam veterans on the campus today, and we think they have the best account of what happened over there and we would like them to share their experience in this war with other people.

I mean I have a whole range of feelings about soldiers that essentially line up to be, one, that we want to do all that we can as a movement to underscore our support for American fighting men and their right to come home, and, two, encourage them to hang on to their minds during this incredible 2-year experience.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. DAVIS, let me ask you this: The committee has information that you did have such a plan, that is, the making of tapes for the GI—

Mr. DAVIS. Bring it out.

Mr. CONLEY. —which you had when you returned after your trip to Hanoi in November of 1967.

Did you discuss this plan with any North Vietnamese civil or army officials?

Mr. KENNEDY. Before we proceed, if we are going to encounter questions with respect to information taken in executive session, and I am not aware that such information was taken, then the chairman should be aware of his own procedures here.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will have to rule that counsel has informed the Chair that it was not taken in executive session.

Perhaps, Mr. Reporter, you could read the question back to Mr. Davis.

(The question referred to was read by the reporter.)

Mr. ICHORD. I think the question is proper, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. I am very anxious to talk about soldiers.

I am not at all sure what the relevance is to Chicago or your legislative purposes, but I welcome this opportunity.

To the best of my knowledge, I never discussed with North Vietnamese officials the making of tapes to be broadcast to troops to encourage disaffection.

There have been many discussions that I have been involved in, in general ways, that we can try to communicate with soldiers.

One meeting that I recall, for example, discussed the idea of trying to put together some programs that we would take to the United States Government and suggest that they broadcast over their own Saigon-controlled radio stations to troops, that would try to get the other side of this war out to American soldiers.

To the best of my knowledge, those discussions never materialized into any specific activity or tape development. I wish that they had. I think it would be very good if more soldiers knew that the long-haired people and the short-haired people really ought to be getting together, because they are saying a lot of the same things.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Counsel, on that point, Mr. Davis, is it your testimony you never discussed making tapes for the purpose of encouraging disaffection, or I guess it is your terminology. We will stop at this point. Did you discuss anything like that with the Vietnamese?

You say you never discussed tapes of this nature. What about tapes in general, putting across your views?

Mr. DAVIS. I did visit the radio station Voice of Vietnam when I was in North Vietnam, as I visited numerous agencies and programs across that country, as a part of a general mission to try to learn about the enemy as it has been defined by the United States Government.

At the Voice of Vietnam radio station, I indicated to them that I thought that much of their broadcasts were essentially irrelevant and unreal to American soldiers. I was critical of the message that they were trying to get across on that radio station. To the best of my knowledge, that was the only conversation about tapes in North Vietnam.

Mr. ASHBROOK. It would be your testimony that the tapes, or any discussions, would be as to their broadcasts, and not as to any possible information or tapes that you would supply yourself?

Mr. DAVIS. That is right.

Mr. WATSON. You say you were critical of Hanoi broadcasts as directed at American soldiers and you thought they were very unreal?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. What do you mean by that, that they were not effective in bringing about disenchantment?

Mr. DAVIS. They are essentially as out of touch with young people as you are, Mr. Watson. They could not communicate at all. I said, "You are very much out of touch with the mentality of the young people in America."

Mr. WATSON. You were in the hopes that Hanoi's messages would be more in line with persuading the disenchantment on the part of the American GIs?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I never said that, in Vietnam or elsewhere.

Mr. WATSON. Why would you say they were unreal?

Mr. DAVIS. It was just my feelings. They were out of touch with what GIs feel.

Mr. WATSON. You felt it should be so designed to be in touch?

Mr. DAVIS. I didn't propose anything. I just made that critical statement to them.

Mr. WATSON. Why were you critical to them?

Mr. DAVIS. I made comments all over North Vietnam—my reactions, that's all.

Mr. WATSON. Why were you critical of their broadcasts—because, in your language, they were “unreal”?

Mr. DAVIS. Because it was, pure and simple.

Mr. WATSON. You would certainly be hopeful that they would make their broadcasts more in tune with the thinking of the GI?

Mr. DAVIS. I don't think they are capable of that. I think their culture and their understanding of American young people is like the culture and understanding of many old people who run this country—just as out of touch. I sort of write off any possibility of their being able to make tapes that would appeal to American soldiers. Besides that, I don't think that that is something that I want to address myself to.

My concern, as an American, is how to demonstrate my support of American soldiers and to work with every muscle in me to try to get those soldiers home safe to their families. That is my only concern.

Mr. WATSON. Since you were critical of these broadcasts for being unreal and out of touch, Mr. Davis, is it not correct that the Hanoi broadcasts aimed at the American soldiers are designed to bring about desertions and disenchantment of the American position in Vietnam?

Mr. DAVIS. I don't know whether they take that position. I was critical of their playing music that was from the 1950's, like Guy Lombardo.

I think they get their programs from the USO. They don't play Judy Collins, they don't play the Fugs, Country Joe and the Fish, the music that is popular with today's young people.

Mr. WATSON. Are the Hanoi radio broadcasts aimed at American soldiers designed to encourage their loyalty to the American Army, or to encourage disloyalty?

That is a simple question.

Mr. DAVIS. I would assume that they want the GIs to do everything possible to be disloyal to the policies of the United States military.

Mr. WATSON. Your assessment was they were not so composed as to be successful in their venture in doing that?

Mr. DAVIS. No, not that. They were not communicating with GIs, whatever their political purpose. That is all I am saying. I don't read into it more than that, because there is not any more than that.

Mr. WATSON. You made no suggestions at all as to how they might improve their programming?

Mr. DAVIS. I think I did suggest they get a Judy Collins record. I believe I did say that.

Mr. WATSON. As to how they might be more effective in bringing about their purpose as it relates to the American GI?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I didn't say that. You said that.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you want to provide them with better music, Mr. Davis?

Mr. DAVIS. The music that comes out of the USO is so terrible; if it comes out of North Vietnam, maybe it is better, and maybe the GI would dig that.

The whole point is not to link me with the very bad propaganda of North Vietnam, because that is not, Mr. Watson, what I am about.

Mr. WATSON. I am sure if you were directing it, it would be far more successful. We will agree on that.

Let's turn it around. Your criticism of the Hanoi broadcasts aimed at the American soldier was because the music was out of date?

Mr. DAVIS. I said that; yes.

Mr. WATSON. That was exclusively your criticism?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you. We are just getting into music now.

Mr. DAVIS. You got it, Mr. Watson.

Mr. WATSON. The purpose of the Hanoi broadcast is strictly to give musical entertainment to the American GI, according to your interpretation.

Mr. CONLEY. I ask you if after your return from Hanoi you visited with Dr. Quentin Young and discussed with him your trip to Vietnam.

Mr. DAVIS. No; I borrowed a thousand dollars from him, by phone. That was his crime.

Mr. CONLEY. I am talking about in November of 1967. I am not talking about the spring of 1968.

Mr. DAVIS. I really can't recall the date.

I know Quentin. I think he is both a marvelous doctor and a marvelous person, and he is active in many of the concerns I have in Chicago.

It is quite possible I met with him in November, because he is a friend, and we worked together on various activities in Chicago from time to time. It is possible, but I can't remember the exact date.

Mr. CONLEY. As you probably know, if you were here, Dr. Young did testify before this committee in October that he lent you \$1,000 to help pay the rent for the National Mobilization Committee offices, 407 South Dearborn, beginning April 1968. Was that testimony correct?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, he did loan me a thousand dollars—very generous.

Mr. CONLEY. Would you describe the circumstances of this loan? Did you call Dr. Young? Did you tell him of your need, if he would help you out? How did you go about asking for the \$1,000?

Mr. DAVIS. My recollection is I got a frantic call from the staff at the Mobilization office in Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. Weren't you at that office?

Mr. DAVIS. No; I was in New York.

The caller said the landlord expected his rent right away—like landlords are apt to do. Being in New York at the time, and not being able to send immediately the money that was required, I thought of various people who might on very short notice be able to advance that money, and we would try to raise it later and repay it. I called Quentin, and he said that he could do it if it could be repaid in several days. He did give the money for the rent.

Mr. CONLEY. Did this check actually come to you, and I have reference to what has been previously introduced as an exhibit here.¹ Was this check sent to you? Did you see this particular check?

Mr. DAVIS. No; I was in New York. That was the whole point.

Mr. CONLEY. Then I take it you did not see the check.

Mr. DAVIS. No.

Mr. CONLEY. Was Dr. Young the first individual whom you contacted for the purpose of this loan?

Mr. DAVIS. Do you mean for this specific loan? I mean, I borrow

¹ See Young Exhibit No. 1, pt. 1, p. 2430, of Oct. 3, 1968, hearings.

money every day. I got money problems all over the place, just like every other American.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will again admonish the audience that you are guests of the committee. I am sorry, but since you are guests of the committee, we will have to have order, and that covers laughter and emotional outbursts or any other kind of disturbance.

Let's proceed and try to finish up today, if we possibly can.

Mr. DAVIS. Good. To the best of my knowledge, Quentin D. Young, trustee, was the only person I contacted for this loan.

Mr. CONLEY. Dr. Young testified here, first of all, when he was asked about this transaction, that his loan to you for \$1,000—reflected by that photocopy there—and to use his words, "promptly paid back in cash over a 2-day period." That was his testimony. He later said in his testimony that same day that he thought you paid him by check.

How did you pay him back, by cash or check?

Mr. DAVIS. I can't recall. You can subpoena our books and see whether or not a check was written to Quentin Young, or our full account will indicate whether it was in cash. But I can't remember whether it was cash or check.

What relevance does it have to my activities in Chicago, or my connections with the Communist world and disruption, or whatever you are investigating?

Mr. ICHORD. Your financial transactions are pertinent.

Mr. CONLEY. You say your financial records will reflect that. Who keeps your records?

Mr. DAVIS. Eric Weinberger of the National Mobilization Committee.

Mr. CONLEY. Is he also the treasurer of that committee?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. And the only person authorized to write checks for the committee?

Mr. DAVIS. No. We had a special Chicago account for the project in Chicago. I was authorized to write and sign checks on this account.

Mr. CONLEY. This was the Chicago account?

Mr. DAVIS. It was a project of the National Mobilization.

Mr. CONLEY. Did it have a particular name?

Mr. DAVIS. I believe it was called National Mobilization.

Mr. CONLEY. This is separate and distinct from the other accounts of National Mobilization?

Mr. DAVIS. That is correct.

Mr. CONLEY. As I understood your earlier testimony, National Mobilization maintains a bank account in New York.

Mr. DAVIS. Our organizational account is in New York. We set up a checking account in Chicago to write checks for that particular project, and then the records were sent to New York, so that committees like yours that wanted to see whether or not we get all our money from Cuba, Peking, and Moscow would find out in fact that most of it comes in nickels and dimes and small contributions from people all over the country; that generally the funding of a national action of this kind comes out of the people who come to the action; and that the lavish accounts you suspect we live on in fact turn out to be pitiful budgets of people trying to eke along day to day on peanut butter and jelly sandwiches.

All of that is on the record, and I would be glad to bring all that down here and make that information clear.

Mr. CONLEY. What bank did you have your account with in Chicago at that time?

Mr. DAVIS. My recollection is that our account was with the Amalgamated Trust and Savings, or something like that.

Mr. CONLEY. You indicated you had authority to draw on that account. Did anyone else have authority to draw on that account?

Mr. DAVIS. I think during—

Mr. CONLEY. I am speaking of the Chicago account now.

Mr. DAVIS. Up until August 28 I think I was the only signer.

Mr. CONLEY. After August 28 did anyone else take responsibility for signing checks on that account?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes; Donna Gripe, G-r-i-p-e.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you recall ever writing a check for \$1,000 to Dr. Quentin Young?

Mr. DAVIS. I know I paid him back.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you have any recollection for ever having written a check for \$1,000?

Mr. DAVIS. I don't recall.

Mr. CONLEY. You pointed out \$1,000 loans trouble us all and you have no recollection of having written a check?

Mr. DAVIS. No. I borrowed about \$15,000 for Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you have any recollection of writing any checks for \$1,000 in the month of April or May, regardless of whether it was to Dr. Quentin Young or not?

Mr. DAVIS. I can't recall whether Quentin was paid in cash or check. I suspect—

If you could throw some light on the subject, why don't you?

Mr. ICHORD. We are asking you to, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I just can't remember. That is a long time ago. You can remember that. There is nothing hidden here.

Mr. CONLEY. Did this \$1,000 check or loan from Dr. Young cover the full cost of rent of this particular building, or this office?

Mr. DAVIS. I think we gave this poor landlord a little bit of money to hold it for a while, what they call a deposit, and then I believe the \$1,000 paid our rent through the end of August. That is my recollection.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you recall whether there was not in fact an additional \$500 that was paid on rent on these particular offices?

Mr. DAVIS. There might have been, but that seems inconsistent with the way I generally work. I know that committees like this come traipsing around a landlord and ask, "Don't you know about the people in that building," and put a lot of pressure on him to throw us out, so I generally try to get the bills paid up far in advance, to stop that kind of harassment.

I might have done it the other way, if we were short of the money.

We get a lot of problems with FBI, police, and committees like this.

Mr. CONLEY. Let's not rely on a newspaper or FBI or this committee or police. There is a newspaper account which appeared in *The Shreveport Journal* of September 13 of this year, which is apparently a story prepared by the *Chicago Tribune* and syndicated—

Mr. DAVIS. That is a good paper.

Mr. CONLEY. The last paragraph of this story dealing with this rent on this building says:

The remaining \$500 due on the rent was paid by a near Northside financial supporter of black power and other militant groups. * * *

Does this help you in any way to recall whether there was in fact a total rent of \$1,500?

Mr. KENNEDY. Might we see that article?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes.

(Witness and counsel examine document.)

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Conley, these questions are so irrelevant, just like this committee. I can't understand what you are trying to do. But I am sorry to say I cannot recall whether I got \$500 from a supporter of a black power or militant group.

Mr. CONLEY. Does the name Lucy Montgomery help you?

Mr. DAVIS. I know her. From time to time she has given money. She is a hard-working, upper middle-income woman who is committed to peace and freedom—peace and freedom, Mr. Conley. If she gave me the money, that is very nice.

Mr. ICHORD. Did she give you the \$500?

Mr. DAVIS. I can't recall.

Mr. ICHORD. You state that operations like the Mobilization Committee operate—in your terms, as I recall them—"on peanuts." What do you mean by "peanuts"? How much is "peanuts"?

The reason why I ask this question, here we have a \$1,000 repayment not remembered, and \$1,000 to me is a pretty good sum of money, so I would think you might have a higher figure in mind than normally would be the connotation when you say "peanuts."

Mr. DAVIS. Look at it this way: We had, from January until August, a full-time staff on an average of 15 people up until July and 25 people beyond that, and some 200 people for 3 weeks around the action itself. We are a coalition of organizations that number about 125 groups. We distribute mailings in the tens of thousands. We had to pay, I think, \$250 a month, or something like that, for rent for a large office for our staff. We had three phone lines with a terrible phone bill. The total of that kind of organization operating for that period of time came to roughly \$15,000. That sounds like a lot of money to me, too, and I think it is a lot of money, but not for the enormous operation that was going on.

As I say, most of that \$15,000 was secured in loans going into the demonstration and then most of it was repaid by selling buttons to the people who would come to Chicago, for \$1 each.

Mr. ICHORD. You stated previously that you had borrowed \$15,000 to finance your operation. Was that the total cost of your operation? Did you borrow the entire sum?

Mr. DAVIS. I am not sure what proportion that breaks down to, but probably the largest amount was borrowed; yes. As I say, if I had known that you wanted all the specifics on the moneys, we could have brought our books or you could have subpoenaed, because you would have to do that to get them. But we generally have to borrow a lot of money and then we try to repay it by selling buttons for 50 cents or a dollar when people come together. And getting that \$1 out of someone who does not have any income is a hard thing for them to do, but they recognize that we don't have big money supporters from

around the country; that the money has to come out of the people who are committed to ending the war and committed to trying to raise in America consciousness these issues which we feel are so vital to this Nation.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, directing your attention to another document, and it concerns a meeting held near Chicago March 22 to March 24, I would ask you if you would examine that document, please [Davis Exhibit No. 5].

You will note that it carries a National Mobilization Committee heading and a date of March 7, 1968. Have you seen this document or a document similar to it in connection with that meeting?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DAVIS. This is signed by Father Daniel Berrigan, Carl Davidson, Don Duncan, Al Evanoff, Richard Flacks, Vernon Grizzard, Steve Hollowell, Clark Kissinger, Sidney Lens, Marya Levenson, Linda Morse, Sidney Peck, William Pepper, Monsignor Charles Rice, Franz Shurmann, Cora Weiss, Dagmar Wilson, Dr. Quentin Young, Leni Zeiger, and Howard Zinn.

Also the temporary administrative committee: Rennie Davis, Dave Dellinger, Tom Hayden, Bob Greenblatt, and Sue Munaker.¹

I could read my whole address book right into the record if you want it. I have about 1,500 names. I think we put this letter out. I should stress, just for the record, that this meeting, as it says, was initiated by the National Mobilization Committee. It was not an official meeting of the National Mobilization Committee.

Mr. CONLEY. When you say we put this out, you mean National Mobilization put this letter out?

Mr. DAVIS. No; this meeting was initiated by the National Mobilization. The people responsible essentially for this meeting were the five people I mentioned, the temporary administrative people.

Mr. CONLEY. Who put the letter out?

Mr. DAVIS. The people who signed it.

Mr. CONLEY. They put out this letter?

Mr. DAVIS. They take the responsibility for the text of the letter.

Mr. CONLEY. And all of them take the responsibility for the text of the letter so far as you know?

Mr. DAVIS. I would hope so. Their names are on it.

Mr. CONLEY. You have not had anyone come to you and say, "I do not want my name to appear on this letter and I want you to repudiate that it is on there."

Mr. DAVIS. No one has come to me about it, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, in connection with this letter there is a distinction made between conference sponsors and temporary administrative committee of which it lists Davis, Dellinger, Hayden, Greenblatt, and Munaker. What is the distinction to be drawn from conference sponsors and temporary administrative committee?

Mr. DAVIS. It is simple. One group, the conference sponsors, want to lend their name to the meeting to demonstrate the kinds of people and organizations that we hope to involve in the meeting. The second group is a group that is responsible for putting the meeting together,

¹ Spelled "Munacker" in this document.

finding a place, getting some money, circulating announcements about the meeting, doing the work.

Mr. CONLEY. In other words, the temporary administrative committee is probably the one that put the letter out and used the names that appear above as the sponsors of the meeting. Is that a fair way of putting it? The sponsors are people who are willing to lend their names—

Mr. DAVIS. That is right.

Mr. CONLEY. I presume you contacted these people and they were agreeable to it?

Mr. DAVIS. I hope so.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Davis, do you think I could prevail upon you to hand me back some of my exhibits?

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, you can have them all back.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir.

I would like, if I may, to direct your attention to a statement that appears in the *Guardian* of September 7, 1968, issue, page 3. There are actually two paragraphs that I wish to call to your attention if I may. The first one is a statement by Mr. Dick Gregory, which is as follows: "Gregory said it is 'your duty to overthrow this government.'"

Then there is a statement attributed to Rennie Davis, which is as follows:

Rennie Davis called for the building of an NLF in the U.S., proposed that Humphrey and Nixon not be permitted to campaign, and announced plans for a national G.I. week this fall to let the troops know "we support your right to return to civilian life."

Do you recall these statements? They were supposed to have been made on Thursday morning, August 29, or thereabouts.

(Document handed to witness.)

Mr. CONLEY. The question I put to you at this time is, Did you in fact call for the formation of an NLF in the United States?

Mr. DAVIS. Let me, if I may, describe to the best of my recollection what I did say. This was Thursday, after the terrible police riot Wednesday night in front of the Conrad Hilton. Hubert Humphrey was the nominee of the Democratic National Convention. I said something to the effect that Hubert's notorious promise to export the great society to South Vietnam was turning this to its reverse; Vietnam was coming home.

We saw it in the barbed wire, bayonets, the troops that had been brought into Chicago to protect the Democratic Convention from its own citizens; that Hubert Humphrey had been nominated in the International Amphitheatre, but outside the Conrad Hilton standing on a garbage can, which was our platform, we announced our own political campaign for the people who felt that there had been a total breakdown of the democratic process, when Vietnam—which had been the central issue of this campaign, and perhaps the major issue, as important as the issue of slavery for this country—had now been buried under the slogan, "law and order"; and that we announced at our platform, which is appropriately a garbage can, that we intended to do all that we could in this campaign to focus on the central issue facing the American people in the election in 1968, which is how do we—suggested that in fact with Vietnam coming in America, what was

perhaps needed more desperately before was a liberation movement in the United States; and that in this election what we had to do was vote and support American soldiers in their right to return to civilian life.

I suggested we do it by holding love-ins at military bases around the country; that we do it by leaflets and by word indicating our support for American soldiers; that those people who feel they are the real patriots in this country will stand up against the fraudulence of this country and help to bring home the American boys in 1968.

Mr. CONLEY. Then do I take it you have not said what is attributed to you?

Mr. DAVIS. No; I think I mentioned I believed we needed a liberation movement in the United States. I don't know if I used "national liberation front" or not, but certainly the meaning that I intended was what I just described.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Davis, directing your attention to something else, back in January of this year at a meeting held in New York, the Lawyers Guild, were you at that meeting?

Mr. DAVIS. Is that the same meeting you talked to Tom about?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir, I was at that meeting.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, apparently in connection with that meeting, you made some remarks about the manner of setting up law students—I believe your words were to the effect that Chicago operations should find subsistence for 50 law students, the guild should handle recruiting, and Chicago should handle the research in Illinois law.

Right after you made this statement, Ken Cloke—is that the way you pronounce the gentleman's name?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. —made the statement: "Affirmative suits should be referred to Kunstler and Kinoy. Bail problems should be referred to Detroit."

Do you recall this statement having been made by Mr. Cloke?

Mr. DAVIS. It does not make any sense so I assume that he did not make it, since Ken generally makes sense.

Mr. CONLEY. Can you enlighten this committee as to why the statement was made, that it suggested that bail problems should be referred to Detroit?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I don't think we made that statement.

Mr. CONLEY. You have never made a statement similar to that, where bail was a problem that you should contact Detroit?

Mr. DAVIS. Bail—

Mr. CONLEY. I understand bail is a problem, but I am asking in connection with the city of Detroit.

Mr. DAVIS. No; that statement makes no sense at all to me.

Mr. CONLEY. You do not recall that statement, or one of similar import having been made?

Mr. DAVIS. No; I think whoever took the minutes for you messed up.

Mr. CONLEY. These are not our minutes.

Mr. DAVIS. They must be your minutes because they are wrong from beginning to end, everything you read. You brought that up with somebody else—Bob Greenblatt—about that meeting—not a very important meeting, Mr. Conley, in the whole picture.

Mr. ICHORD. What was the purpose of the meeting?

Mr. DAVIS. To discuss with lawyers who had assisted the Mobilization in other national actions, particularly on permit negotiations, ways we could handle whatever legal problems might be anticipated in Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Chairman, I believe those are all the questions I desire to ask at this time.

Mr. ICHORD. Thank you, Mr. Conley.

Mr. Ashbrook, do you have any questions of Mr. Davis?

Mr. ASHBROOK. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WATSON. Inasmuch as we have one of the so-called coffeehouses in Columbia, my hometown, and since you acknowledge some recollection of having written a letter similar to the first two pages of the so-called secret letter sent out to those prospective workers for the coffeehouses—do you remember that letter?

Mr. DAVIS. I don't remember it being so secret, Mr. Watson.

Mr. WATSON. But you say you sent it out, or are familiar with it?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. What is the purpose of the coffeehouse?

Mr. DAVIS. The purpose especially is to provide a kind of an oasis for soldiers who, in many cases, feel that they are involved, or are about to be involved, in a very unjust war, and where they can essentially come together to talk about whatever is on their mind, where we can hopefully bring good entertainment, and kind of provide an antidote to the virus of the USO, with its old ladies and scaggs and very bad music, and essentially let the GI—

Mr. WATSON. Have you been in the service yourself?

Mr. DAVIS. No, I haven't been.

Mr. WATSON. So, in making such a categorical statement, which has been typical of the testimony, you would not be able to say they have not had some fine young ladies in the USO across this Nation of ours.

Mr. DAVIS. They have had some young ladies in the USO. They have also had them in whore houses and prostitution halls in the Army towns. We would like to provide something better.

Mr. WATSON. Didn't you suggest your movement would suggest love-ins and—

Mr. DAVIS. Love is what is very much needed in the United States.

Mr. WATSON. What is a love-in? You said you are against so-called prostitution, but you are going to suggest a national liberation program providing love-ins at military bases.

Let's hear your explanation of a love-in.

Mr. DAVIS. Love is the antidote to the spirit of the bayonet.

Mr. WATSON. What is a love-in?

Mr. DAVIS. That is where people can get together and relax and talk about whatever is on their mind and listen to good music and feel they are not going to be harassed or threatened by military officers, which represent the authority they get in the Army and out of the Army.

Love-in is a symbol of the youth culture that we are trying to create, that we hope some day will replace the sterile plastic culture that we think you represent, Mr. Watson.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you.

And the purpose of the coffeehouse was not to bring about desertions, AWOLs, or any outward refusal on the part of a soldier, especially

the recruits, since most of these are located in or are adjacent to recruiting bases or basic training stations—it was not to cause any AWOL or desertions or anything like that?

Mr. DAVIS. It is the first time in 2 days, Mr. Watson, that you have gotten something absolutely right.

Mr. WATSON. It was to encourage AWOLs?

Mr. DAVIS. You messed up again. I thought you had it, but you don't. And that is the problem with this committee—

Mr. WATSON. That is the problem in talking to a gentleman like you. I thought if we had a meaning of the word—

Mr. DAVIS. We strained here this morning and the day before, I think, to try to attempt to understand each other, and I think it didn't work so well. But I think that young people, as you subpoena them and bring them here, will continue to talk this way, more or less. You will not find the kind of format you had earlier.

Mr. ICHORD. Remember, Mr. Davis, you are not so young any more; you are 28.

Mr. WATSON. Now I ask you the question again, Was it not a purpose of the coffeehouse to cause AWOLs, desertions, among military personnel, primarily basic trainees?

Mr. DAVIS. Hell no.

Mr. WATSON. You have made it very emphatic.

Mr. DAVIS. That is right.

Mr. WATSON. It was not?

Mr. DAVIS. That is right.

Mr. WATSON. In this two-page letter, which you agreed you had a part in its preparation, in the fourth paragraph, I read this sentence:

Because of the cultural and class basis of our movement with which we are already familiar, those soldiers most likely to be turned off the army are also those * * * most likely to welcome a coffee house.

What do you mean by the terminology "turned off"? Does that mean to support the Army?

Mr. DAVIS. No; it is an expression that is very popular from barracks stateside to Vietnam.

I would like to, at this time, quote that expression that almost every GI that I talked to, particularly those going through basic training or facing orders for Vietnam, immediately understands, that expression is "— — — it." And I think that it is that feeling that is sweeping young people who are in the military and outside the military across this Nation. And the reason that there is developing that attitude is because Congressmen like you are forcing us to feel more and more that the military of this country is something for which we cannot be proud.

Mr. WATSON. Then what is the meaning of the words "turned off"?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, Mr. Watson, have you ever been turned on?

Mr. WATSON. I have turned on a light and I have turned off a light.

Mr. DAVIS. That is the problem.

Mr. WATSON. By the common terminology or interpretation, the interpretation of the language, or the understanding of the language, would be to cause someone to become disenchanted to the point of losing all interest in the Army, even to the point of AWOL or desertion, but that is not your meaning?

Mr. DAVIS. I think a lot of young men are losing interest in the Army and "turn off" is the opposite of "turn on."

Mr. ICHORD. Is it synonymous with "cop out"?

Mr. DAVIS. You are getting close to it, Mr. Ichord. Let's see if we can understand it. I think, to begin, to feel that you do not have to give up your soul, your life, your beliefs because a sergeant yells at you to fall in or fall out, to carry a bayonet and learn the spirit, which is to kill, to understand that your body may be given to Uncle Sam, but not necessarily your mind; that as an American citizen you have certain rights, even within the military, to express your point of view to say that this war is immoral and unjust, that you feel you have to somehow be heard on whether or not you will be forced to commit acts of genocide against another people, and to generally let it be known through your own deeds and through the actions of people in the military that there are vast segments of men in the Army today who want peace, who want out of Vietnam and want an end to the kind of policies that the United States military policy carries out throughout the world.

To feel that and express that is not automatically to go AWOL or desert. I happen to believe young men should go into the Army and organize in the Army to keep thoughts going, to increase this discussion, to make it possible for more and more young to let the American public know that there are big segments of the Army that oppose this war, and to generally get the idea across that being against the Army is not unpatriotic; that in this day and age it is one of the most patriotic things you can do for this country and one of the most important things you can do for this country.

Mr. WATSON. I am sure we will never get a better interpretation of the meaning of the words "turned off," but I want to ask one final question with which you and I might agree.

One thing, of course, you have nothing but contempt for this committee. That is fair, isn't it?

Mr. DAVIS. You men are interesting. I have not found this a complete drag.

Mr. WATSON. You have nothing but contempt for this committee, for the President, Secretary Rusk, and everything else?

Mr. DAVIS. No, not everything else. I don't have contempt for—

Mr. WATSON. Love-ins—

Mr. DAVIS. I don't have contempt for American soldiers. I don't have contempt for black people, for poor people, for welfare mothers, for university people trying to open up democratic channels. I don't have contempt for people trying to earn a living. I don't have contempt for humanity and decency. People believe in democratic processes and want to bring the democratic values and processes into this society. There are many things, Mr. Watson, for which I do not have contempt.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, those things for which you and your organization stand for, you have no contempt for. I think we can be in accord with this: So far as what happened in Chicago, your part in it, you absolutely did nothing wrong, said nothing wrong, the whole blame is to be placed at the feet of Mayor Daley and the police department?

Mr. DAVIS. The whole blame is to be placed on a society or a government that is increasingly out of touch with the young people in this country and with what the real interests of this country are.

Chicago is a kind of watershed event, I think. In August of 1963, you know—Tom mentioned this—some 250,000 people marched for jobs and justice in the city. Exactly 5 years later, another demonstration that was trying to mount its concern about peace in Vietnam was clubbed and brutally suppressed by police in a general military environment that had been created by officials of Chicago.

During those 5 years we dropped more bombs in Vietnam than we did in World War II. We spent three times as much in riot control as was spent on poverty. We saw scores of cities go up in smoke out of rebellion to the conditions in those communities. We saw thousands of young people face prison rather than fight in a war they considered unjust.

I think Chicago really has to be seen in the context of a society or a government that increasingly resorts to military and police force rather than consensus for insuring its policies.

Well, at the same time more and more American citizens are joining in a movement to create some kind of a new basis, just basis, humane basis on which this country can operate.

Mr. ICHORD. If I may interrupt, Mr. Watson, at that point, do you feel they have a democratic society in North Vietnam?

Mr. DAVIS. I was not in North Vietnam to say very much about them. What I would say is that the American people are deluded if they believe there is a small group of people at the top that terrorize, a whole group of people at top to resist American aggression against them.

My general impression was in the countryside and cities—the Vietnamese people are united in trying to stop the bombing and the aggression of that country and that, in general, they feel that their own interests for freedom and independence and freedom is consistent with a struggle that has been going on for 25 years in that country and consistent with the positions of the recognized leaders of that country. But that to me is an irrelevant question, whether or not we have any business being there. We have no right deciding the fate and destinies of a country 25,000 miles away, and that is why I say American forces should be withdrawn from there.

Mr. WATSON. One final question: Earlier to establish the objectivity of Mr. Hayden, I asked him, in view of his visits to North Vietnam, as to how many visits he had made to South Vietnam. How many visits have you made to South Vietnam?

Mr. DAVIS. I have not had the opportunity to be in South Vietnam. I would like very much to go.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I have one final question. I think it ties in what you said about North Vietnam.

I would like to make this a part of the record. Hanoi radio broadcast of September 14, 1968, said, and I condense it:

The South Vietnamese people's committee for solidarity with the American people has sent a letter to the national mobilization committee to end the war in Vietnam thanking the progressive American people of all strata for their seething, resolute, and courageous struggle conducted last month * * *.

• * * * *
we are daily and hourly following with great enthusiasm your persistent and valiant struggle.

Your recent actions in Chicago, as well as throughout the United States, against the U.S. policy of aggression in Vietnam have strongly stimulated our

people in South Vietnam who are conducting the powerful general offensive and widespread uprisings throughout South Vietnam with the resolve to wrest back at all costs our sacred right—

et cetera.

You were somewhat critical of broadcasts emanating from Vietnam. Would a broadcast of this type be the type that you could more identify yourself, consistent with what you just said?

Mr. DAVIS. I think it is totally within American interests to work in the way I am working for a withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. And, secondly, the forces for independence in that country are clearly lined up against American penetration of that country. I don't consider the Vietnamese struggle to be at all inconsistent with the American interests in getting our troops home safe to their families.

(Document marked "Davis Exhibit No. 6." The complete text of the broadcast follows:)

DAVIS EXHIBIT No. 6

PARTICIPANTS IN CHICAGO STRUGGLE THANKED

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 0221 GMT 14 Sep 68 B

[Text] Hanoi—The South Vietnamese people's committee for solidarity with the American people has sent a letter to the national mobilization committee to end the war in Vietnam thanking the progressive American people of all strata for their seething, resolute, and courageous struggle conducted last month when the convention of the Democratic Party was meeting to select a candidate to the presidency, according to LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY.

Despite the huge, barbarous repression machinery unleashed by Johnson, Humphrey, and their ilk, you have come down into the streets for demonstrations and shouted slogans demanding an end to the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam, cessation of the bombing of the whole territory of the DRV, and withdrawal of troops of the United States and of its allied countries in the Vietnam war. By your activities you have raised the just voice of the United States, a country with a traditional love for freedom and justice.

We express to you our deep sympathy and ask you to convey to the American people our heartfelt thanks for their participation in or support of the recent action in Chicago. We also voice the high indignation of our people at the news that, on orders from Johnson and Humphrey, policemen repelled the demonstration by using tear gas and truncheons and firing at them, as a result of which hundreds of people were wounded and hundreds of others were arrested or jailed.

You have shed your blood for the honor of the United States and for the sake of your loved ones, whom you do not want to die a useless death for the ravenous ambitions of the capitalists and gun dealers. You have shed your blood in defense of the Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, which is being flouted by the American aggressors, and of the peace in Southeast Asia and in the world now being trampled underfoot by the U.S. warmongers.

Terror and repression by the U.S. Government, however, cannot hamper your activities. On the contrary, they will cause the antiwar movement to spread to the length and breadth of the United States.

In this South Vietnam under fire and sword, though having to overcome great difficulties and hardships, we are daily and hourly following with great enthusiasm your persistent and valiant struggle.

Your recent actions in Chicago, as well as throughout the United States, against the U.S. policy of aggression in Vietnam have strongly stimulated our people in South Vietnam who are conducting the powerful general offensive and widespread uprisings throughout South Vietnam with the resolve to wrest back at all costs our sacred right to national independence.

We wish you to convey our best wishes to our American friends who were wounded or arrested during the recent demonstrations.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Talking about the North Vietnamese interests, I gather from this—and you can answer yes or no or not—I gather from this the North Vietnamese feel they gained great benefit from what transpired in Chicago, the efforts of the National Mobiliza-

tion Committee, the response to the police, the general Chicago situation. Would it be your impression that this Chicago fiasco, whoever is at fault, did help the Vietnamese?

Mr. DAVIS. I think Chicago as well as other peace demonstrations help to convey to Vietnam, but to the people around the world, that there is a significant section of the American people who would like to see us return to some of the democratic ideals for which our Revolution stood. To the extent that we project to the people of Vietnam or to the people of Asia or Latin America that there is in fact a movement of hope in this country and the country is not run as they see it as those who would impose; to give hope to other nations, I think, is beautiful.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Getting back to the GIs with whom you supposedly identify, the GI about whom you express great concern. Isn't it difficult to get across to the GI that he is your friend, when the enemy he is fighting in Vietnam is gaining great heart and encouragement from your work in Chicago? How can you identify with a GI or how are you going to get through the communication barrier when he hears broadcasts from Hanoi as to what great work, in effect, you are doing in Chicago?

Mr. DAVIS. I think the way that we get through to the GI is, our essential work is to rebuild this country, to make this country something other than the people's policeman of the world.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Do we do it through a peaceful process?

Mr. DAVIS. It depends on you. This committee, this Congress, and this Government generally is so unresponsive to what people are saying in this country, particularly the young, that it becomes more and more difficult for us to find any channel through which we can operate.

As I said, that demonstration in August of 1963 was ignored. We petitioned the Government. We met with President Kennedy, and 5 years later the two Kennedys were assassinated. The spiritual leader of the civil rights movement, Dr. King, was assassinated, and the horrors at both abroad and home had been reaped on people by the Johnson administration.

I think in some ways the best thing would be for you to get off of the committee and join us in the streets of this country trying to figure out the answer to this problem.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you for your advice.

Mr. WATSON. One final question. You state the Government and the American people—the old fuddy-duddys as I and others—are unresponsive to the young. You made that statement.

Mr. DAVIS. There are some young people that are growing up like you.

Mr. WATSON. Do you speak for all young Americans?

Mr. DAVIS. No; I speak for myself.

Mr. WATSON. You speak for a small fraction of them. Most young Americans are responsible citizens. They want to help bring a better America and not help bring about an anarchy, as you and your associates wish. And the record should show you represent only a small fraction of America.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Watson, you had better watch out.

Mr. ICHORD. What are you going to do?

Mr. DAVIS. If you have children —

Mr. WATSON. I have three children. I assure you I will teach them responsibility and not irresponsibility.

Mr. DAVIS. And you keep that up, Mr. Watson, and right in your own house there will be trouble. Young people are not going to be whipped into an unjust society. The hope that we have is that the young people at least have the advantage of opening their eyes and seeing what this country is doing. We do not claim to speak for or represent all young people in the United States, but we do say that there are many people who more and more understand that it is people like you that are destroying America and that the hope of America is in the people who will stand up to people like you and make it right.

Mr. ICHORD. It is the understanding of the Chair that counsel has one document which he wishes to introduce.

Mr. CONLEY. I would request permission to introduce Davis Exhibit No. 5, which is a letter dated March 7. I would call the committee chairman's attention specifically to the fact that this is the letter repudiated by Dr. Quentin Young as to its authenticity at an earlier hearing. Mr. Davis said he prepared this.

Mr. ICHORD. Without objection from the committee members, the document will be incorporated in the record.

Mr. DAVIS. Beautiful.

(Document marked "Davis Exhibit No. 5." See pages 2686 and 2687.)

Mr. ICHORD. The witness will be excused and the committee will be adjourned until 1:30 tomorrow afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., Tuesday, December 3, 1968, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m., Wednesday, December 4, 1968.)

(Subcommittee members present at time of recess: Representatives Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.)

2686 DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

DAVIS EXHIBIT No. 5

Room 315
407 South Dearborn Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60605 ✓
Phone: 312 939-2666
March 7, 1968

Dear Friend:

Election year 1968 holds fateful signs: widening war and greater slaughter for Vietnam; "improved" police techniques for the ghettos; more cutbacks in welfare and anti-poverty measures; repression on a wider scale; and a Johnson-Nixon Presidential "choice." Across the country, anti-war and black liberation organizations are soberly assessing the drift of the country and making plans for the next period.

We believe a national gathering of movement activists is needed to assess this period and consider strategies for the election year. We envision a working meeting of representatives from anti-war, student, women, community, and independent electoral organizations. Our purpose is to hear and develop plans for an election year program, giving special attention to the Democratic National Convention.

We have made arrangements for a meeting on March 22-24 in Chicago.

This conference will climax several weeks of discussion initiated by the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam. After two meetings among various anti-war, student and black power leaders, and after consultation with many other individuals, plans to call a March 22-24 conference were made. A temporary administrative committee, whose members are listed below, was established to organize the gathering.

The two major purposes of the March conference are, first, to consider and adopt general proposals for an election year strategy, including possible actions in Chicago at the time of the Democratic National Convention and, second, to set up the administrative machinery which can cooperate with other organizations in carrying out the program.

The meeting will encourage an open discussion of a wide variety of proposals. The goal will be to look for a common ground of action while recognizing there will be different levels of interest and approach. A committee of black liberation organizers is calling a parallel conference on March 22-24 in Chicago (at an adjacent site) with the goal of creating a parallel organizational structure in which white and black people operate from a basis of separate and equal strength.

We encourage local and regional meetings to discuss the different ideas about the August Democratic Convention, and we encourage working papers detailing different concerns. We have opened an office at Room 315, 407 South Dearborn, Chicago, telephone 939-2666.

The conference will be held in a quiet winter camp overlooking a large lake near Chicago. On Friday evening, March 22, shuttle service from O'Hare Airport

DAVIS EXHIBIT NO. 5—Continued

... it contains intransigent elements committed to...
... vote is at best an organizing tool; it secures nothing...
... consciousness that organization...
will be provided hourly from the United Airlines information counter. For those arriving by bus, train or car and those living in Chicago, transportation will be provided from 407 South Dearborn, room 315. Please let us know whether you plan to attend and the approximate time you will arrive in Chicago. The enclosed card should be returned immediately.


We are convinced that a national election year program, though still undefined and problematic, could be of tremendous importance in deepening the challenge to the corrupt, racist and imperialistic politics of the established order. We hope you agree and that you will join us in Chicago.

... massive popular dissent against...
... of protest and demonstration. The effect...

Conference Sponsors:

- Father Daniel Berrigan
- Carl Davidson
- Don Duncan
- Al Evanoff
- Richard Flacks
- Vernon Grizzard
- Steve Hollowell
- Clark Kissinger
- Sidney Lens
- Marya Levenson
- Linda Morse
- Sidney Peck
- William Pepper
- Monseigneur Charles Rice
- Franz Shurmann
- Cora Weisa
- Dagmar Wilson
- Dr. Quentin Young
- Leni Zeiger
- Howard Zinn

... that power by organizing locally around...
... which is "correct" has been an issue of...
... a resolution that will differ from previous...
... is aimed at deepening the roots...
... t, two-day affair in which thousands of...
... with little effect on the local level. For previous...
... of their energy in advertising the event...
... often without any relation to local activities, the...
...
... commitment they may fail, but one that...



Temporary Administrative Committee

- Rennie Davis
- Dave Dellinger
- Tom Hayden
- Bob Greenblatt
- Sue Munacker

... should be organized which is dominated by...
... people responsible to local constituencies. Any...
... of a program that has stressed local organizing...
... local support community base-building in the fall.

... parts of the... there will be tension between local...
... in general, this program could be of great value...

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