

7

U.S. Gov. P. 711

**SUBVERSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN DISRUPTION OF 1968
DEMOCRATIC PARTY NATIONAL CONVENTION
PART 3**

HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY
DEPOSITED BY THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
AUG 1 1969

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETIETH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 4 AND 5, 1968
(INCLUDING INDEX)

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Internal Security



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1968

21-706

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(90th Congress, 2d Session)

EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana, *Chairman*

WILLIAM M. TUCK, Virginia
RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri
JOHN C. CULVER, Iowa

JOHN M. ASHBROOK, Ohio
DEL CLAWSON, California
RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH, Indiana
ALBERT W. WATSON, South Carolina

FRANCIS J. MCNAMARA, *Director*
CHESTER D. SMITH, *General Counsel*
ALFRED M. NITTLE, *Counsel*

COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(91st Congress, 1st Session)

RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri, *Chairman*

CLAUDE PEPPER, Florida
EDWIN W. EDWARDS, Louisiana
RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina
LOUIS STOKES, Ohio

JOHN M. ASHBROOK, Ohio
RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH, Indiana
ALBERT W. WATSON, South Carolina
WILLIAM J. SCHERLE, Iowa

DONALD G. SANDERS, *Chief Counsel*
GLENN DAVIS, *Editorial Director*
ALFRED M. NITTLE, *Counsel*

CONTENTS

December 4, 1968 : Testimony of—	Page
David Dellinger-----	2690
December 5, 1968 : Testimony of—	
David Dellinger (resumed)-----	2746
Afternoon session :	
David Dellinger (resumed)-----	2777

The House Committee on Un-American Activities is a standing committee of the House of Representatives, constituted as such by the rules of the House, adopted pursuant to Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States which authorizes the House to determine the rules of its proceedings.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 90TH CONGRESS

House Resolution 7, January 10, 1967, as amended April 3, 1968, by House Resolution 1099

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Eighty-ninth Congress, together with all applicable provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended, be, and they are hereby, adopted as the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Ninetieth Congress * * *

* * * * *

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,
* * * * *
(s) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.
* * * * *

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

19. Committee on Un-American Activities.

(a) Un-American activities.

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

28. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

* * * * *

SUBVERSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NATIONAL CONVENTION

Part 3

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1968

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, at 1:40 p.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Richard H. Ichord (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

(Subcommittee members: Representatives Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri, chairman; John M. Ashbrook, of Ohio; and Albert W. Watson, of South Carolina.)

Subcommittee members present: Representatives Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank Conley, special counsel; Chester D. Smith, general counsel; Alfred M. Nittle, counsel; and Herbert Romerstein, investigator.

Mr. ICHORD. The committee will come to order, a quorum being present.

At the last meeting of the committee yesterday, the committee was recessed until 1:30 p.m. today. We had just concluded hearing the witness, Mr. Rennie Davis.

Mr. Counsel, a quorum being present, will you please call your next witness?

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Chairman, we would call David Dellinger.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Dellinger, are you present?

Will you please come forward, sir?

Will the witness first please be sworn.

Mr. DELLINGER. I am sorry. I try to tell the truth on all occasions, so I don't swear.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, of course, it is the practice of the committee that all witnesses appearing before an investigative committee such as this, Mr. Dellinger, would be sworn.

Will you raise your right hand, sir? Do you solemnly—

Mr. DELLINGER. I am sorry. I will assure you—

Mr. ICHORD. Do you wish to affirm, sir?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I will affirm.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you solemnly affirm that the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't like formulas which imply that sometimes I don't tell the truth.

Mr. ICHORD. It is the understanding that the witness is affirming. This is a practice before the committee.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, without the ritual, I affirm.

Mr. ICHORD. The witness may be seated.

TESTIMONY OF DAVID DELLINGER, ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL,
JEREMIAH S. GUTMAN

Mr. GUTMAN. First of all—

Mr. ICHORD. Just a minute, Mr. Counsel.

First of all, I would ask that the counsel identify himself for the record.

Mr. GUTMAN. Jeremiah. J-e-r-e-m-i-a-h S. G-u-t-m-a-n, 363 Seventh Avenue, New York City.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Gutman, if you have something to say to the Chair, would you please come forward?

Mr. GUTMAN. Surely.

(Off the record.)

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel, the Chair has just received a message from Mr. Gutman relaying a request of Mr. Rubin to be permitted into the hearing room. The Chair will announce that he has been informed that Mr. Rubin is attired in a Santa Claus costume. It is not the purpose of the Chair to direct that Mr. Rubin attire himself in a certain manner or take other actions in regard to his body, but it is a responsibility of the Chair to maintain order in these hearings. The Chair has exercised its prerogative of excluding, and I have so instructed the police to exclude, Mr. Rubin from the hearing room because it is the determination of the Chair that such a dress could only add to the possibilities of disorder. And in view of the antics of Mr. Rubin during the past hearing, the Chair has no alternative except to exclude him.

First of all, Mr. Counsel, before you begin the questioning of the witness, the Chair has been advised, Mr. Dellinger, that you have recently undergone an operation. The Chair has been advised by the director of the committee that your doctor has informed him that you would be able to testify. I know that the operation is a very recent event. Perhaps the witness will tire. I would like to ask the witness, Do you feel that you are physically able to testify at this time?

Mr. DELLINGER. Thank you very much, sir. Yes, I am anxious to tell the information and talk about the incidents in Chicago, and I expect to be—I feel a little weak, but I expect to be able to proceed without problems.

Mr. ICHORD. Let me say this to the witness: that if you do tire, will you please so advise the Chair and we can declare a recess for you to rest somewhat.

Mr. DELLINGER. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. Or if you feel that you are not able to go on, why, please advise the Chair of that. I know the operation has been very recent.

Mr. DELLINGER. Thank you.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel.

Mr. GUTMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I may. I want to revert to the—

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Gutman, you know the role of an attorney before the committee. I have repeatedly advised counsel of the rules prevailing in this committee and, as far as that is concerned, that prevail in every legislative domain, and that is that the role of the attorney is to advise the client of his constitutional rights. I think it is readily apparent why different rules prevail here, rather than in a court proceeding, because the functions of the bodies are completely different. No one is on trial here and no one is sought to be punished.

I also appreciate the zeal of an attorney, as an attorney myself, in representing the interests of his clients, but the Chair has no other alternative except to enforce the rules and carry out the responsibility of the Chair in the way that he interprets. Perhaps we can work this out. I am not asking the attorney to testify, but I would insist on the rules.

(Off the record.)

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Gutman, the attorney for Mr. Dellinger, has just approached the Chair and asked that the record show an objection on behalf of Mr. Rubin of the exclusion of Mr. Rubin from the hearing room and, also, that the record show a renewal of the motions and the objections which were previously filed on behalf of Mr. Dellinger with regard to his appearance here. The record will so show both requests. And, Mr. Gutman, before ruling on the request, I have already ruled on the request of Mr. Rubin in my announcement of the exclusion, but before ruling on the motions again, the renewal of the motions, Mr. Dellinger has not been indicted?

Mr. GUTMAN. No, sir, but we understand from an announcement made by the Federal grand jury in Chicago that within 2 weeks indictments are expected of a group of people who have been described as "the leaders of the demonstration."

Since Mr. Dellinger regards himself and the country regards him as one of the leaders of the demonstration on behalf of Mobilization in Chicago during the affected time, we believe it reasonable to assume that there is a substantial likelihood that he may be indicted.

Mr. ICHORD. Then let the record show the Chair overrules the request for the reasons stated in the rulings on the motions when they were originally filed.

Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, would you please state your full name and address for the record?

Mr. DELLINGER. My name is David Dellinger. My office address is 5 Beekman Street, Manhattan, New York City.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, do you have a home address?

Mr. DELLINGER. I have a home, but since I have received a number of death threats and attacks, including receiving grenades and bombs in the mail, which only by what the Army demolition experts called a miracle did not kill my entire family, I prefer not to give my home address publicly.

Mr. CONLEY. Very well, Mr. Dellinger.

Mr. DELLINGER. For their safety and security.

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir, I appreciate that.

Is it fair to say that your home address is also New York City?

Mr. DELLINGER. At the present—

Mr. CONLEY. Without going into the street address?

Mr. DELLINGER. At the present time, yes.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir, thank you.

And now for the record, you are represented by counsel, are you not?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. Mr. Gutman.

Mr. CONLEY. Now Mr. Dellinger, are you appearing here today in response to a subpoena served on you by United States [Deputy] Marshal John Brophy on September 23, 1968, at 68 Charles Street, New York City, which was made a continuing subpoena from October until this time?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I don't remember the name of the gentleman who either signed it or gave it to me, whichever it was, but I did receive a subpoena and I considered not coming because I think that one does not have to obey illegal and immoral orders. However, since I am anxious to tell everything that I know involving myself, the plans, the actions, and so forth, at Chicago, and since I consider the committee largely ineffective, I am perfectly happy to be here and to discuss with you everything that I can about myself. So it is without necessarily recognizing the validity of the subpoena, the procedures under which it was issued, I come in response and of my own volition.

Mr. ICHORD. At that point, Mr. Dellinger, I think you have adequately expressed your contempt for the committee, and we will let the record show that, and in order to expedite things—

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't know what your word "contempt"—

Mr. ICHORD. —if you want to express contempt against anybody else, go ahead.

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't know where the word "contempt" is: I certainly did not use it. I consider it undemocratic for a man to represent a congressional district in which 60 percent of the residents are black, and by the last figures I saw only 6 percent of the black people vote. That is the type of thing that I mean.

Mr. ICHORD. Of course, Mr. Dellinger, I don't want to argue with you, but you said the immoral acts, referring to the subpoena, and that was an act of this committee, but if the record will show that, perhaps we can get down to the meat of the matter and proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir.

Mr. Dellinger, in order to get some identification, where were you born, sir, and when?

Mr. DELLINGER. I was born in Wakefield, Massachusetts, on August 22, 1915.

Mr. CONLEY. And would you be kind enough to give us your educational background, formal education?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, roughly, I graduated from high school; I graduated from Yale University in 1936; I studied for a year at New College, Oxford, on a Henry Fellowship.

I returned to Yale where, while working for the University Christian Association, known as Dwight Hall, I took some courses at Yale Divinity School.

I then went to Union Theological Seminary in New York City for a year and had begun my second year when I declined my exemption from the draft and publicly refused to register and, therefore,

left the seminary to go to prison—where I got the best and most thorough education of all, although I think that the combination was—I am glad I had all the elements.

Mr. CONLEY. When you mentioned prison, was this during the Second World War, sir?

Mr. DELLINGER. It was before the Second World War. It was in 1940, when the first peacetime draft law was passed, and since I am a pacifist, but since I did not want to hide behind a clerical exemption, I publicly refused to register.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, what have been your major employments since 1953?

Mr. DELLINGER. '53—beginning before 1953, I worked and lived at what is sometimes called an intentional community, somewhat in the Utopian community tradition, where we had an—

Mr. CONLEY. Well, Mr. Dellinger, can we get the date so we can fix this? You say before '53?

Mr. DELLINGER. I will have to warn you that particularly on things that I don't have documents my memory may be faulty.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair would advise the witness we don't expect you to recall all these dates.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, but approximately 1946.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir.

Mr. DELLINGER. I would say I helped organize and was a part of a producer's cooperative called the Libertarian Press, which both wrote and edited and printed art work, political material, cultural and intellectual. We did not write everything that we printed; we were commercial printers, but we also participated in editing and writing.

Mr. CONLEY. Was this business based out of New York City, sir?

Mr. DELLINGER. Not entirely, by any means. We did a certain amount of local—no, it was located in New Jersey, in Glen Gardner, New Jersey. And we did printing for people all over the country, in many cases books and other publications, pamphlets.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. And what particular title did you hold with this venture at that time?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, in most circumstances, if I remember correctly, we listed myself and others as partners.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, have you worked for—

Mr. DELLINGER. There may have been occasions when I could have been listed as director or something of that kind, but basically we operated on an equal basis.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir.

Now coming forward from that venture, what was the next employment or business that you engaged in?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, in the winter of 1956 I was one of four or five people, including A. J. Muste, Bayard Rustin, and Roy Finch, and I think for a short period Charles Walker, who founded a magazine called *Liberation*, and in the early years we printed the magazine and did a great deal of the editing at the producer's cooperative.

Later I began to work for pay, you might say, as an editor, first for 2 days a week, and then perhaps about 2 or 3 years ago I became a full-time editor.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, now the *Liberation* magazine to which you are making reference now is still in existence, still publishes?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, it is in its 12th year, I believe.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir, and has this been the source of your employment since approximately 1956?

Mr. DELLINGER. No.

Mr. CONLEY. The publishing of this magazine?

Mr. DELLINGER. No. It—I didn't draw any income from it until a period approximately—this is why I am just not very good, but I would say about 3 years ago.

Mr. CONLEY. Now my question wasn't, Was this your source of income.

Mr. DELLINGER. I beg your pardon.

Mr. CONLEY. I wasn't asking about any income. I was asking you, Is this basically the employment that you have held since 1956?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I really—my employment was directly with the Libertarian Press.

Mr. CONLEY. Yes.

Mr. DELLINGER. And I was a voluntary editor for *Liberation* until this more recent period.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Now, Mr. Dellinger—

Mr. ICHORD. Now just a minute, Mr. Counsel, the witness wishes to confer with his counsel. Give him a chance to do so.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DELLINGER. If I may answer my counsel's question, I am not employed by the National Mobilization Committee. I am an officer. I am a chairman of the National Mobilization Committee.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, I don't believe I asked you that.

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't know if it is all right for me to answer my counsel, but just to be completely clear on where my employment is.

Mr. ICHORD. Feel completely free to confer with your counsel.

Mr. DELLINGER. Thank you.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, now directing your attention to the National Mobilization Committee and particularly to the events preceding and occurring in Chicago, you were in Chicago, were you not, during the period of the Democratic Party Convention of August 26 to 29?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. I was there prior to that, also.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Now were you not there in your capacity as chairman of the National Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam, which was one of the prime organizers of the demonstrations which took place in Chicago?

Mr. DELLINGER. You say in my capacity as chairman? Is that right?

Mr. CONLEY. Were you not there in your capacity as chairman of the National Mobilization Committee?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, in part, but you see, my approach to journalism from way back when we started Libertarian Press has been what is sometimes called an engaged journalism. That is, to write on many occasions about a movement or events in which the editors and the other writers, but including myself, are actively involved. So when I am active in the Mobilization, I am also active as an editor of *Liberation*, which is the place where I draw my income.

Mr. CONLEY. Well then, sir, would it be a fairer statement for me to

then say that you were in Chicago as chairman of National Mobilization as an editor of *Liberation* magazine?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, it would.

Mr. ICHORD. Gentlemen, I think at that point that some of the people in the back of the room are having difficulty hearing you.

Mr. Dellinger, would you pull the mike a little closer?

Mr. DELLINGER. Sorry.

Mr. CONLEY. You almost have to lean into it, sir.

Mr. DELLINGER. Sorry. Well, leaning forward is what I am not good at right now.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Dellinger, how long have you been chairman of the National Mobilization Committee, which I also understand is referred to as Mob and possibly as Mo?

Mr. DELLINGER. I didn't hear the two distinctions.

Mr. CONLEY. Mob, M-o-b.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well—

Mr. CONLEY. I have heard it abbreviated that way.

Mr. DELLINGER. Some of the commercial press, I think, has called it that. Sometimes it is called, for short, Mobe, but I would think that would be spelled with an "e."

Mr. CONLEY. All right. How long have you been chairman of National Mobilization?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, if I remember correctly, I was a cochairman, no, not from its founding because I was not present when it was founded. I was—for a healthy man, I have to say I was ill at the first conference, at which I think it was founded, and then I was out of the country during the first couple of months of its existence. But I would say that either in December of '66 or early in the year of 1967 I became a cochairman. Later, and this I would only be able to approximate, but perhaps July—in July of '67, sometime 1 to 3—I will try to be cautious—1 to 4 months prior to the Pentagon demonstration, I was elected chairman.

Mr. CONLEY. Chairman by—you are sole chairman of the institution?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, we had a—I was made chairman, and there were cochairmen. Our founding chairman, the Reverend A. J. Muste, had died in February of 1968.

Mr. ICHORD. Is chairman an elective position, Mr. Dellinger?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I was elected at a meeting of the administrative committee. We are not a membership organization, but we have an administrative committee which is roughly representative of the various constituencies. And, to the best of my knowledge, all officers and important staff posts have been elected or approved at a meeting of the administrative committee.

Mr. CONLEY. And I take it from your earlier answers just now that you apparently were designated as chairman of the committee in the summer of 1967 by the administrative committee?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you recall who composed that committee, how large it was at that time?

Mr. DELLINGER. Oh, the administrative committee consists of over a hundred people, and the meetings vary greatly, but I would say we rarely hold a meeting that is under 50 or 60, and often the meetings—

we are very informal, and often the meetings grow to a hundred or—well, 150 when something important is happening. And as I say, we are very informal in the sense that people can come to meetings as observers or something of that kind.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, how is your administrative committee selected? I use that word because I am not sure whether you nominate, elect, what you do. How do you select your administrative committee from which you make these various appointments?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. Well, the original administrative committee was elected at a conference which was considered to be roughly representative of the antiwar movement, many different types of attitudes.

Mr. CONLEY. I see.

Mr. DELLINGER. And if I remember correctly, certain positions on the administrative committee were filled at that time, and the committee or the officers were given the power to expand it in order to bring in other constituencies who might not have been present.

Now it has been revised on a number of occasions since then to try to incorporate either new regional groups that have developed or new organizations that have sprung up, or to reflect the fact that perhaps some organizations have become less active or possibly even ceased to exist.

Mr. CONLEY. I see. Now, prior to your election as chairman, I think you have mentioned this, but did you not occupy a position with National Mobilization as either vice chairman or cochairman?

I think you alluded to the fact that you were cochairman.

Mr. DELLINGER. I said cochairman, but I do believe that at the very beginning what are now called the cochairmen were called vice chairmen. I think probably that was my original title. One of, you know, a group of six or eight probably.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, now, Mr. Dellinger, is it a fair statement to say that what is now known as National Mobilization Committee came out of what was earlier known as the Spring Mobilization Committee?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. As a matter of fact, when I spoke about the earlier conferences and the setting up, the name was not strictly National Mobilization Committee.

In preparing for major action in New York and San Francisco on April 15, 1967, it was called the Spring Mobilization Committee. It is even possible that in preparing for actions in the previous December, the period when I was out of the country, it may have even had a—I'm sure it did have another name, other than Spring Mobilization, because it was fall actions, but I can't remember, don't know what the name was. But clearly there was an organic, but, as I say, somewhat informal process which began approximately—began in the summer of '66 and expanded through these actions, and the name changed at various stages, but it was basically the same group, growing and developing.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, carrying it back one step further, perhaps, sir, was it not in fact known in '66 as the November 8 Mobilization Committee?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, even when you refresh my memory, I literally do not know. I was out of the country and I do not know.

Mr. CONLEY. All right.

Mr. Dellinger, do you have any recollection as to how long you served as vice chairman of what was known as the Spring Mobilization?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, if you put the two dates which I guessed at earlier together, that would tell. Roughly from either December of '66 or January or February of '67, between then and whenever it was in the late spring or summer of '67.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. A period of months, anyway.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Thank you.

Now, Mr. Dellinger, if I may hand you a piece of literature—and I must apologize to you for the reproduction of the copy—but if you would examine that for me a moment, this purports to be a piece of literature prepared by the National Mobilization Committee and, from a reading of same, appears to have been distributed shortly before the Chicago convention.

(Document handed to witness.)

Mr. DELLINGER. The dates—is it blocked out? I don't know what these black—

Mr. CONLEY. I think maybe at the conclusion of the letter, or in the body of the letter itself, it indicates that it is a letter that was signed by you and Mr. Greenblatt. And what I want to, if I may, particularly direct your attention to is to the right margin of the letter, where the officers and directors perhaps appear, in connection with the National Mobilization Committee.

I want to ask you, if I may, sir, whether those people shown there were in fact the officers at the time of that letter.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, it is entirely possible that there are some inaccuracies, and I would have to—first, I haven't had time to read the letter now; I will, if you wish, and there is no date. But sometimes when we made minor changes in the officers, literature would go out on the letterhead and not reflect, for example, the addition of a new cochairman or the inactivity, perhaps, of somebody. I would have to—I can read this and see the approximate date, if there is a point to it.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Well, this is what I am getting to. If you will also look at the letterhead, you will note that it gives a street address for the National Mobilization Committee.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. 857 Broadway, New York City. There is also an identical letter, and I think you can compare the two letters.

(Document handed to witness.)

Mr. CONLEY. One is perhaps a somewhat better copy, and if you would examine the signatures on the second page. Do they both appear to be your signatures?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I can't tell whether they are my signature. First of all, it is obviously scratched, and not very successfully, onto a stencil and, secondly, I do often authorize my secretary or somebody else by mail, if they read me something, to sign it. It is not my typical writing, but I don't know whether it is because I was scratching on a stencil, or not. If I am in fact, however, if I did authorize the letter, I certainly wouldn't use this as a pretext for not taking the responsibility for it.

Mr. CONLEY. The only thing I am—

Mr. DELLINGER. I still haven't had time to read it, so I won't say.

Mr. CONLEY. I understand, sir. The only thing that I am raising inquiry about, the letters do—I hope you will accept my word for it—the two letters do read identically, the content of the two letters is identical and the only exception that is noted is that one carries an address 5 Beekman Place, and one carries an address 857 Broadway.

Would you be kind enough, if you did in fact maintain offices at 857 Broadway, to indicate when the change occurred?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, we have sometimes, we often have had more than one office. Now again, I don't know if we are losing time by this, but because there is no date apparently on either letter, I am a little confused about whether at this time we did have two offices or not. Obviously, I mean it is entirely possible, as I said. Sometimes letter-heads were used which were not completely up to date, and it is not at all impossible that somebody would have made a mistake and put out, you know, used the second address, at a time that we weren't using it, but I am just trying—I apologize for being bad at this.

For all the times I have been there, there are two offices very close together, one is of the Fifth Avenue Parade Committee, of which I am coordinator, and one was of the Mobilization Committee. They are about half a block apart, and I think this was—this had to be the Mobilization office.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir.

Mr. DELLINGER. So it is quite likely that we had moved out of this office at that time and that that was, you know, an administrative error, to use that number, but hopefully replies were forwarded.

Mr. CONLEY. Now let me ask you—

Mr. DELLINGER. It certainly wasn't an attempt to conceal our whereabouts or locality.

Mr. CONLEY. No, I understand. Now with reference to the letter that carries No. 5 Beekman as the address on it, that is the last address of National Mobilization in New York City; is it not?

Mr. DELLINGER. It is the current address.

Mr. CONLEY. That is what I mean. The last and present address of National Mobilization.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, and perhaps if I could just clarify. I am not sure it is of any importance, but, you see, I was chairman and my office is in 5 Beekman Street. Also, we often held meetings there, and it has kind of been a peace center, or center for peace organizations, so it would not be amiss for us to use that address even at a time when we might not have had our office equipment or personnel entirely concentrated on the Mobilization, but in that address.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Now is the No. 5 Beekman Place also—

Mr. DELLINGER. Street.

Mr. CONLEY. Street. I am sorry—also the address of *Liberation* magazine?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, it is.

Mr. CONLEY. And do National Mobilization and *Liberation* actually occupy the same office space?

Mr. DELLINGER. No. We have an arrangement, or have had until recently—I think it is coming to an end—whereby the entire 10th floor, with the exception, I believe, of one office, is leased. I mean there is one lease, and then it is sublet to a number of organizations. The War

Resisters League, *Liberation*, and the National Mobilization are amongst the people who have offices, so that actually *Liberation*, the specific rooms used by *Liberation* and used by the National Mobilization Committee are contiguous, but they are separate.

Mr. CONLEY. And under separate leases?

Mr. DELLINGER. Although we share—no, I am saying it is one lease and subleases.

Mr. CONLEY. That is what I mean, which would be separate leases, would they not?

Mr. DELLINGER. Not vis-a-vis the building owner, because *Liberation*, if I could tell better from the office manager, but *Liberation* collects the rent from Mobilization.

In other words, *Liberation* is responsible for at least half the floor and collects the rent for the people that are there.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, let's get at it this way: Does *Liberation* actually have the general lease with the building or the 10th floor, except one office?

Mr. DELLINGER. To the best of my knowledge, the lease is actually held by the War Resisters League, not by *Liberation*, but I could be wrong. It is one of the two, but I think the way it is, that the lease was signed by the War Resisters League; *Liberation* has taken the responsibility for half of the floor, collects the rent and makes the arrangements there, turns it over to the War Resisters League, who then turns it over to the landlord. I think that is it, but I am not the business manager and I am not positive.

Mr. CONLEY. Okay. Now I am sure there is a written lease between either the War Resistance League and/or *Liberation* magazine and the owner of the building.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; as a matter of fact I remember that I think I myself did sign some kind of a lease, so *Liberation* must be on there.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now do you know whether there are actually in existence leases—subleases, I think we should call them—between either War Resistance League and/or *Liberation* and these other tenants?

Mr. DELLINGER. I am sorry, you know, I have done my best to try to tell you what I know, but there is a real danger that I will mislead you because I am just—this isn't one of my points of concentration, and I really don't know.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Now directing your attention back to National Mobilization, if we may, do you receive a salary as chairman of National Mobilization?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, I do not.

Mr. CONLEY. Have you in the past, at any time that you recall?

Mr. DELLINGER. I have never received a salary from National Mobilization Committee.

Mr. CONLEY. Or any type of compensation from National Mobilization?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, it is my poor secretary—or associate's, really my partner in *Liberation*—it is her difficult task to try to figure out from time to time which trips are, you know, were caused by Mobilization work primarily or by *Liberation*, and to try, you know, if it is clearly chargeable to Mobilization, to charge it to Mobilization, or if it is clearly chargeable to *Liberation*, to charge it to *Liberation*. But

basically, as I say, wherever I go, I am sort of both, and so it is very difficult and, again, very informal.

Also, I raise money for both organizations and have often suggested that people direct their money in one direction or the other, according to which is the worst in debt at the moment.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, sir, I take it from what you are saying that actually the only thing then that you would receive from National Mobilization might be your expenses?

Mr. DELLINGER. Expenses, right.

Mr. CONLEY. You did not receive any type of compensation, profit to you, in other words?

Mr. DELLINGER. I receive no salary.

Mr. ICHORD. Expenses on a reimbursable basis?

Mr. DELLINGER. I beg your pardon?

Mr. ICHORD. Are the expenses paid to you on a reimbursable basis?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well —

Mr. ICHORD. Do you have a fixed allowance for expenses, or is it a reimbursable basis?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, no, if I—you know, if the Mobilization decides to send me or we decide that I will go to some city to make a speech, you know, fly in and out in one flight, and strictly for the Mobilization, then the bill will be turned over to Mobilization, but it is not—it is only, the limitation on it is our very poor finance. But there is no set amount.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, how many other persons are regularly employed by the National Mobilization?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, remember that you—you say how many others are regularly employed. I have made clear I am not employed.

Mr. CONLEY. I am sorry. How many other persons are employed?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, this is a very changing thing. And since I have been out of commission, in the hospital, beginning just about the time of the elections, in which the Mobilization had an active organization, urging people not to vote for any of the prowar candidates, and since I have not yet been back to the office, although I have done some consulting on the phone, I literally do not know the size of the staff now.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, let me ask you this, sir, if I may: Let's go back and say, take January of this last year, the beginning of the year.

Mr. DELLINGER. January?

Mr. CONLEY. January 1968. Approximately how many employees did you have at that time?

Mr. DELLINGER. Oh, very few because we were in a very transitional period between the events at the Pentagon, when we had had a swollen staff and uncertainty and planning, and so forth, as to what actions, if any, we would have next.

You also should understand that we try to operate on a subsistence basis and that we may—for example, I mean one figure that does come to mind, which I think is relatively accurate, is that in September, or possibly early October, we had a staff of about—what we called a staff—of about 20 people.

Mr. CONLEY. You are referring to September or October?

Mr. DELLINGER. Of this year.

Mr. CONLEY. Of this year.

Mr. DELLINGER. And yet our total outlay for what might laughingly be called salaries or wages, well, we didn't pay it. We paid subsistence, which meant that some people took \$10 a week for which, you know, maybe to eat sandwiches or what-have-you, or other people—I think that the highest that was paid, well, 50 or perhaps 60 dollars, \$60 to a woman who had a dependent or two.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, Mr. Dellinger —

Mr. DELLINGER. In other words, we pay according to need. We are not a salaried organization.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Then 20 possible people that were working for you in September of this year, were they all based out of a New York office, or were part of these numbers that you are mentioning in the Chicago 407 Dearborn Street?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, the lease on the Chicago office expired almost simultaneously with the end of the convention, and it was unfortunate because it would have been better for us to have maintained an office for at least a few weeks afterward, but we had no office in Chicago, other than perhaps in a mail drop, and of course we had an active office and committee members there, but no real Mobilization office in Chicago in September.

Mr. CONLEY. All right.

Now, Mr. Dellinger, with reference to the Chicago office and to the convention, did Tom Hayden and Rennie Davis act as coproject directors for the National Mobilization Committee in connection with the activities in Chicago?

Mr. DELLINGER. During the period prior to the convention—

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELLINGER. —they were coproject directors.

Might I just make a little statement at this point, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. ICHORD. To explain?

Mr. DELLINGER. It is just that I am willing and even anxious to tell anything about myself or anything that I know. In view of the climate of repression and the type of thing that happened to me with the bombs that were sent to me and destruction of the press and the linotype at Libertarian Press that I referred to, along with the receipt of a death threat at that time, it is not my intention to talk about other people.

Also, I think that other people can basically speak best for themselves and express their views. However, within that approach, which I believe is covered by the first amendment—but which I would take anyway, whether it was or not—within that approach I would be happy, you know, in obvious cases of this kind, people who are already publicly identified, and so forth, to say yes.

Mr. ICHORD. Of course, we will have to rule on that when those questions arise, but certainly, if we abided by that request, it would certainly limit your testimony to what you merely wanted to testify about because this could be construed quite broadly by you. But let's proceed, and as those matters come up, the Chair will rule.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; well, obviously I think I could spend my time better than going over details of which offices, and so forth. I mean, there are many positive things I could be doing to try to stop the war and to organize people. So it is not really limiting it to questions chosen by me or the use of time that I would prefer.

Mr. ICHORD. These questions are pertinent. The background and operations of your committee, of which you are chairman, and of your own activity, these are pertinent.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I have been happy to cooperate, but I just want to point this out about other individuals.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will have to rule on those questions as they arise.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, again dealing with the National Mobilization Committee, on the average, what are the total overhead and salary costs of the National Mobilization Committee, say on a monthly basis? Can you give us just an average?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I have tried to explore, give you the best of my recollection of the answers to questions or of information that you have solicited that I am really not an expert on and that I am in danger of misleading you. And I have to say that in this area I am really not competent, and we do have a treasurer and we normally have a fine committee who have this information, both in many cases in writing in the books or are familiar with it. I have to say that whenever I write an appeal letter, I buzz the office, if I am in *Liberation*, and I say, "What is our weekly overhead now?"

And they tell me, and I put it in the letter, and undoubtedly, since many of our private letters are in your hands, you have some of those letters which tell at that time what the budget was, but I am not in a position to estimate. I would just mislead you if I tried to come up with such a figure, but it is very variable, according to whether we are approaching a major action or not and/or according to whether it is a period like January of '68 when we had almost no staff, I am sure.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, let the Chair advise you, Mr. Dellinger, that you are not going to be required to testify as to matters beyond your recollection. We don't expect you to recall each and every event or each and every date and we realize that there are some activities outside of the committee, outside your knowledge, and just so advise the counsel in your reply.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, it is outside of my knowledge. If I had known ahead of time, I could have looked up and told you, but I didn't know and I don't remember.

Mr. ICHORD. All right, Mr. Dellinger, what are National Mobilization's basic or major sources of income?

In other words, where do you expect to get your income from and where do you get it from?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, we get our income from different types of sources. We ask participating organizations to contribute either directly or indirectly. There is rarely an administrative—

Mr. CONLEY. Now, sir, I don't mean to interrupt, but what do you mean when you say "directly or indirectly"?

Mr. DELLINGER. I was just going to explain, but there is rarely an administrative committee meeting at which I don't say, "We are this much in debt. The phone is in danger of being shut off," or whatever it is, "Which organizations can pledge some money?" And so forth. That is the direct.

Indirectly, often if we prepare literature and an organization will take copies of the literature and mail it out to its membership or its lists—in other words, taking the cost of the stamps and perhaps of the envelopes and the running them off—although it is apt to be volun-

tary, on some occasions, when they can do it, we ask them to pay us the cost of the leaflet, or whatever it is. If they can't, why, we don't. That is the first source.

The second source is—second source comes from fundraising letters or personal contacts.

The third source is occasional fundraising benefits that we hold. For example, if somebody has just come back from a trip to North Vietnam, helping in the release of prisoners, or from Paris, where they may have talked with the American and the Vietnamese negotiators, we will hold a little invitation event at which he makes a report, and people are asked to contribute.

The fourth source or method is whenever possible at major events, which range all the way from public meetings—although I mean, you know, like speeches at a hall, although often they clear very little or don't clear all the expenses—to wherever possible, collections or pledges, at events such as the rally at the Lincoln Memorial in October.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Mr. Dellinger, what are some of the organizations? You mentioned that organizations contribute to National, member organizations I believe is the way you described it. What are some of these organizations that you have reference to that do contribute financially?

Mr. DELLINGER. It would be very unfair of me, I think, to select out anyone's, and again it would be hard for me to be sure that I was being accurate. But if you look at the administrative committee list and the list of the cooperating organizations, you can be sure that every one of them has been dunned on many occasions and that some of them at least have actually contributed money or have, most of them have mailed out things, have contributed indirectly.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, on some of your letterheads, or notes of your meetings, appears a list of people who attended the meetings. I think you are familiar with what I am referring to. And they are named by their name, their city, and the particular group that they represent. I don't happen to have one of them in front of me at the moment, but are these the type of groups that you are referring to, sir?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. All right.

Do you maintain lists of these groups that supply moneys to you? I mean, are they within the records of National Mobilization?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, we try. I am afraid we are not always as efficient as we should be. But we try to keep a record of contributors, both individual and organizational, and it may even occasionally be in the minutes, that after a request from the chairman or from the treasurer, that X organization agreed to send in a hundred dollars within the next week. We try to keep records of this kind of a thing, yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, would you be willing to supply those records to this committee, showing the sources of income, the groups that contributed?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I remember something that Averell Harri-man said on TV the other night, that he had never turned down yet a job that he hadn't been offered, and I think that if such a request was made then I would have to deal with it, and I imagine—I mean, I have to see the terms in which it was made, and so forth. I imagine that I

would want to have a meeting of the administrative committee to discuss this. We try to pool our insights and knowledge and then we would come to some kind of a decision at that time, collectively. I myself as chairman would not feel that on that, you know, I am imagining—that kind of a request it might be, but some kind of formal request. I imagine, that I would not decide on my own because, as I say, I think it is important that we not subject individuals who may have sent money in, to subject them to receiving bombs in the mail or having perhaps a fire set in their building, which has happened to us on occasion. This type of thing.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, let me ask you this: Do you have in your possession and with you in Washington today a list of these organizations that are affiliated with National Mobilization?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, I don't. And maybe I could make a little explanation there, too, because I'm anxious that you understand the way we work, and it should be helpful to any, you know, legitimate inquiry that you have.

We are very fluid and informal. As I indicated earlier, we do not have—people don't fill our membership cards, and people and organizations tend to drop in and out, according to what activity is being planned at the time and whether they either support it, are enthusiastic about it, have other activities which they may think more important or less important at that time, so it actually is a constantly shifting affiliation.

In this connection, also, we do not operate basically by votes or by parliamentary procedure. We operate on the basis of some kind of consensus, so that when we plan an action or consider an action, we try to get everybody that we can that is at all interested in supporting the war to come, you know, representing an organization or a constituency.

We discuss it, and if there is enough of a consensus amongst enough groups that this is a worthwhile and positive action to undertake, and if the other groups did not raise major objections, saying, "Well, you know, this is positively wrong and harmful," we will probably proceed with it. But, you see, there is no constant affiliation or membership in the traditional sense, either of the old left or the political establishment.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, now, in—

Mr. JENNINGS. You are talking about politics inside your organization?

Mr. DELLINGER. I am talking about that, yes.

Mr. JENNINGS. You are talking about politics in your organization?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, yes. Right, and it differs somewhat from the style of the old left or, as I say, of the establishment or more traditional groups.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in that same connection, I presume that you do maintain bank accounts or a bank account for National Mobilization?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Where is the principal account for National Mobilization maintained?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I am sure if I tried to tell you the name of the bank, I would get it wrong. To be absolutely honest, I know, I even sign checks on occasion, but I—this is in New York and, you

know, there are people who know, but it is not the kind of information that I carry around in the top of my head, and I am apt to give you two names which actually come from two different banks. I am apt to make the wrong combination.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you have a treasurer that actually maintains this bank account?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, we do.

Mr. CONLEY. Would you identify him, please, by name?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, since his name is on the letterhead, which is information which I am sure you already have—

Mr. CONLEY. That is what I have reference to.

Mr. DELLINGER. —or should, anyway, on some of the things, his name is Eric Weinberger.

Mr. CONLEY. It does appear on the correspondence that you have in front of you, I believe, doesn't it?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, it is not along the side here, but some of our letterheads do have it. I still haven't read this letter. It may very well refer to him. It is no secret.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, now in that connection is Mr. Weinberger—Weinberg?

Mr. DELLINGER. Weinberger.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir, is he authorized to draw checks on this account and to make deposits in the account?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, we have a deposit procedure which basically he oversees, but actually we generally have somebody in the office who does the sometimes tedious work—because we get many small checks instead of large ones—of, you know, opening the mail and sorting out the deposits. I am not even sure that he sees every deposit. He oversees the books very carefully and scrupulously, and all checks, however, must be signed by at least two people.

Mr. CONLEY. Now is he—

Mr. DELLINGER. And he is one of the ones who is authorized to sign them.

Again, the list of the signees has varied, or signers has varied, you know, from period to period, but he is, to the best of my knowledge, he has been treasurer from very early in the existence, and has always been one of the signers. I have, for a long time, been a cosigner, but there are others.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, if I understand what you are saying, to make it clear here, he does not necessarily have to sign a check. You and somebody else who has check authority could sign a check.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, if you want to know the truth, we keep the checkbook locked in a safe, to which Eric Weinberger is the only person who has the key, so it is extremely difficult for anybody else to get hold of a check and to find two signers without his knowledge.

Mr. CONLEY. All right.

Now—

Mr. DELLINGER. That's our normal procedure, anyway.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, is this bank account maintained in the name of National Mobilization Committee? I mean, is that the way it is?

Mr. DELLINGER. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you maintain bank accounts in any other banks in the New York area for National Mobilization Committee?

Mr. DELLINGER. To the best of my knowledge, no, but you know for one thing, as I say, I have been out of touch for over a month.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now—

Mr. DELLINGER. And, you know, I am not sworn to be—to know. Or to remember.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you all have a bank account operational in Chicago, a separate account from the New York account, in connection with the activities that occurred in Chicago?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, there was a bank account in Chicago also during that period.

Mr. CONLEY. During the period that you maintained an office?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, were you authorized to draw on that bank account?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, I was not in Chicago, except as an occasional visitor, and to the best of my—you know, actually I signed checks for a number of organizations, although it is largely formal and I rarely do it, but I am practically certain that I never signed a form—you know, you sign these little things giving you the right to, and I don't believe I ever signed a form in connection with the Chicago bank account and I certainly do not remember ever having signed a check on that account.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, either Mr. Hayden or Mr. Davis—and I must apologize for not recalling which one that said this—indicated that Mr. Weinberger was authorized to sign on the Chicago account as well and that one or the other of them—and again I don't recall which one it was—was authorized to sign on that account. Is that your understanding of the way the Chicago bank account was handled?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I know that Mr. Weinberger, who has done a very good job, not only for the Mobilization but also for the [Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace] Parade Committee in terms of supervising the finances and the books, met with the person in charge of the Chicago office to go over bookkeeping procedures to try to be sure that they were informative and accurate and kept up to date, and so forth, so I know that he supervised.

In fact, I myself made the arrangements for that meeting. I know that he had some kind of general supervisory relationship to the Chicago account, although you must remember that he was, like myself, only periodically in Chicago.

I am sorry, but I literally do not know whether this included the right for him to sign checks or not.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, Mr. Dellinger, in connection with the bank accounts in New York, you indicated that you were hesitant because you weren't sure that you wouldn't get two names backward.

Mr. DELLINGER. I might give you half the *Liberation* bank and half the Mobilization.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir, would you be willing, if an investigator from this committee contacted you next week, to supply to that man the name of the bank?

Mr. DELLINGER. The name of the bank?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELLINGER. I believe I would.

Mr. GUTMAN. I will save you the trouble. I will write a letter to the committee and inform them.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, Mr. Gutman.

Now, Mr. Dellinger, in connection with the project undertaken by National Mobilization in Chicago, do you have an approximate cost as to what this ran into, in terms of dollars and cents, to—

Mr. DELLINGER. In Chicago?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir. An estimate on your part, if you have one.

Mr. DELLINGER. You know, I am sorry, but first of all, you see, the complicated nature of our financing—we try to decentralize the expenses as much as possible, and I already mentioned, for an example, to get organizations to mail out our literature and to take the costs themselves. Also, for example, when we hold an administrative meeting, most people come in, they either pay for the travel out of their own expenses or in a number of cases they get the money from the organization which they represent.

So, first of all, if we knew how much money went through the National Mobilization Committee bank accounts in New York and Chicago, that would not tell us the whole picture.

Secondly, I will have to plead ignorance again and to say that there are competent people within the Mobilization. It is not an evasion on my part, but particularly after having been out of touch for a month, but even a month ago I might not have been able to—

Mr. CONLEY. Perhaps I read the wrong thing into what you just said, sir, but you indicated that if you knew how much money had come into the account and how much had gone out, that would not tell the whole story.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Do I imply or infer from that, that there must be a deficit, as a result of what occurred in Chicago, at the present time?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I wasn't making any reference either to a deficit or a surplus. I was saying that we try to decentralize everything.

Mr. CONLEY. Let me ask you, sir—

Mr. DELLINGER. Including the expenses and, therefore, other organizations incurred expenses in connection with recruiting people for Chicago, going there themselves, or expenses in Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you have a deficit as a result of the Chicago project?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I am afraid we have a considerable deficit.

Mr. CONLEY. Do you have any estimate as to the size of that deficit? Understanding that we don't intend to hold you to the dollars and cents.

Mr. DELLINGER. No, I understand, but I just—I wouldn't dare estimate at this point. I plead delinquency, but due to the fact that I have been away for a month—I literally, I don't remember what it was and I don't know what it is now.

Mr. CONLEY. Would it be in terms of a thousand, or in terms of thousands?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, it would be, I am sure that it is at least several thousand.

Mr. CONLEY. All right.

Mr. ICHORD. At that point we have been testifying for an hour and 15 minutes. Would you gentlemen like a brief break?

Mr. DELLINGER. I really feel fine.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. ICHORD. Let's proceed. Let there be order in the hearing room.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in some of the earlier literature and

newspaper accounts dealing with the movement of the National Mobilization Committee to Chicago, there were statements by many that there would be thousands of people who would converge on Chicago as a result of the efforts of National Mobilization.

In fact, some of the statements may have been hundreds of thousands. I think I recall one press account that said National Mobilization was hoping that they would mass perhaps 500,000 in Chicago during the week of the convention.

I wanted to hand you—

Mr. DELLINGER. We should get rid of whoever said that.

Mr. CONLEY. I want to hand to you—

Mr. ICHORD. Just a minute.

Officer, will you inform the people outside that there is too much disorder or noise in the hall? They are making it more difficult for the Chair to hear the questions and the answers.

Mr. CONLEY. I want to hand a letter, Mr. Dellinger, dated August 10, [1968], which purports to carry your signature and in which you pared down your estimates, or at least your estimates were as follows, and I refer you specifically, if I may, sir, to the second page. It has been underlined near the middle of the paragraph at the top of the page. Quote:

We expect and need thousands of persons to be in Chicago from August 23rd and 24th on. We expect and need tens of thousands on August 28th and 29th. * * *

Mr. Dellinger, my question to you is this: To the best of your knowledge, approximately how many persons actually went to Chicago as a result of the urging, the agitation, the propagandizing, the information that was disseminated from National Mobilization? Do you have an estimate as to how many were there?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, let me say two things about that: First of all, one of the things I have learned in the last 3 years of being involved in mass mobilizations of one kind or another is that there is never any agreement on the numbers. And it is my general impression that all mass events, whether of the left, the right, or the center, tend to be overestimated in terms of the numbers.

Where we have tried to make a count, it generally has turned out somewhat less than we thought were there. But, on the other hand, other events that I have attended, and when I compare the numbers with other events, whether it is even the crowd leaving a football stadium or a baseball stadium, I find they are also overestimated. So I find that, in other words, the science of counting crowds is very inaccurate.

In the Chicago situation it was particularly difficult because many people were there in many different capacities. They might, during part of the time, be on the convention floor and, during part, in the Hilton or one of the other hotels and, during part of the time, they might be in Lincoln Park or Grant Park.

Also, because of the nature of the police assaults upon the demonstrators, it was dangerous to be involved in either extreme, either to be isolated, where you could be attacked and beaten, or in very large crowds, which might also provoke an attack. So the result was that from this and another factor which I should mention, namely, the diversity of the people there and the diversity of their interests, and the

decentralized nature of the program, even of the Mobilization, which was not the sole group there—that is, we organized movement centers for workshops and for, out of which individual decentralized actions would be planned. As a result, the crowd that was there was scattered throughout the city a great deal of the time, and, finally, as to this business about how many we might have brought, again it is hard to say.

Mr. CONLEY. I don't want to say that you brought, but that you directly, through National Mobilization, were able to say that you would attribute their being there to the efforts of National Mobilization.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, it would be too hazardous to say whether a 20-year-old kid or a 50-year-old housewife who came, to what extent did she come because she wanted to hear the rock bands promised by the Yippies, she wanted to march to the convention hall to call for an end to the war, or because she was hoping to lobby one of the delegates. There were just such a variety of motives and a crossover in actions amongst many of the people, anyway.

The Mobilization just is not in a position—we seek, we have no desire to claim credit for everybody that was there. For us, you see, it is credit, not discredit, but I just would have to leave it open that way.

Mr. CONLEY. Well —

Mr. DELLINGER. We did our best to bring as many people as we could.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will state that being there in Chicago, I agree with the witness: it would be an almost impossible task to estimate how many people were there.

Mr. DELLINGER. This particular letter was written in the hopes that we would get more people there than at that time appeared to be prepared to come.

Incidentally, on the estimates, I never, to the best of my memory, have ever estimated there would be X number of thousands at an event. Because, as I say, even after it, you can't tell whether it was right or not, and I have tried to indicate the massive nature of what we expected by saying thousands or tens of thousands, but I have never myself either made or condoned an estimate on specifics like saying a hundred thousand or five hundred thousand.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may move to something else, on August 15 of this year, August 15, 1968, just before the opening of the Democratic Party's Convention in Chicago, Havana radio broadcast in mixed English and Spanish what it claimed was a telephone interview with you.

I will read excerpts from this interview and ask whether the broadcast is an accurate recording of your words at that time.

Mr. DELLINGER. Are you going to translate the Spanish, or read it in Spanish?

Mr. CONLEY. It has been translated for me. I can't give it to you in Spanish, sir.

According to the broadcast, you were asked this by the interviewer:

Your organization has announced a protest demonstration to be held in Chicago during the Democratic Party's national convention. Could you tell us the aims of such action and what the action will consist of?

Now, your answer in part was as follows, and I read this as—

Mr. DELLINGER. Do you have that written out so I will be able to look at it afterwards without taking notes?

Mr. ICHORD. Yes, the document will be handed to the witness.

Mr. GUTMAN. Will you have another copy of it? It would make it so much easier if we had a copy to follow as you read.

(Document handed to witness.)

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Quote: "the demonstration will take place during some 6 days"—

Mr. DELLINGER. Excuse me. Where is this; it is not at the beginning. I just want to find it.

Mr. CONLEY. Could you show him where it is?

Mr. GUTMAN. What page is it? Oh, I see it.

Mr. CONLEY. Third paragraph. I believe, sir, on the first page.

Mr. GUTMAN. In the middle of the second line, right? Leaving out part of it? Okay.

Mr. CONLEY. Yes. Quote—

the demonstration will take place during some 6 days—from 24 to 29 August. Through it, we will try to show the people of the United States and the Democratic Party that there cannot be peace and tranquillity in the United States while the government's current foreign policy continues * * *.

And the transmission does go on, but this is the particular part that I wish to ask you about. Are those words an accurate reflection of what you said in that particular interview?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, do you mind if I just finish the sentence? [Continues reading:]

that regardless of who the candidate is or what his platform is, we will keep up our active resistance in the streets until all U.S. soldiers return from Vietnam and the current policy of repression against the Negro community is halted.

I certainly endorse those statements, those sentiments. That was my attitude on August 15. It is my attitude today. I can't vouch, of course, for the words, you know, if it was translated into Spanish and then back again, but that is an accurate representation of my aims and views.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. We were going to get to the remainder of it. I didn't want you to think we weren't.

Mr. DELLINGER. Right.

Mr. CONLEY. I was breaking it down into two parts, if I might.

With reference to that first part, which concludes with "the government's current foreign policy continues." I want to ask you specifically what you meant by the words, "we will try to show * * * that there cannot be peace and tranquillity in the United States while * * *"?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. Well, maybe even somewhere later in this transcript—I haven't read it—but first of all let me say that I, to the best of my—

Mr. ICHORD. Do you wish to have the opportunity to read it before commenting?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, it is not necessary yet. Thank you.

But to the best of my ability, I give basically the same interview or express the same sentiments. I may change the language a little, whether it is an educated or, you know, young or an old audience, but I express the same sentiments to any press and during this period I, for example, expressed similar sentiments to the press at least from

England, France, Belgium, Holland, West Germany, Canada, United States, as well as Havana.

Now, what I have tried to do during that period, and it is something that I still believe very deeply, is that we in the United States, because we are a little smoother and more, quote, "civilized" on the surface than Nazi Germany, we must not be able to continue business as usual, making it possible for the American people to napalm people and to uproot people and commit genocide in Vietnam, or in the black community at home, which is referred to in this section, or in Latin America or throughout the world.

We must not be able to do this and people think, "Well, everything is smooth and tranquil here," and, you know, really there are fanatics who are worried about it. But, you know, it is no more real to the American people than the death camps were to the German people.

So although I am, by conviction and politics and philosophy and religion, a pacifist and myself only take part in and advocate non-violent actions, I believe that within the nonviolent framework, and also, of course, within others who in one way or another do not share all of that philosophy, that it is tremendously important that we confront the American people. Not just the political figures who might be deemed by some to be responsible, but I believe the responsibility goes to us all. We confront them with the reality of the situation and make it impossible for us to gorge ourselves on our high standard of living and our consumer culture and to dismiss this death of American boys and Vietnamese men, women, and children which is going on daily as long as the war continues. And it is my intention, it was my intention then and it is my intention today, to do everything I can to assure the— to make it impossible for the American people to sink back into that kind of apathy and acquiescence.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Dellinger—

Mr. DELLINGER. And that is what I mean by no peace and tranquillity.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Dellinger, the Chair last night read an editorial in which it was stated that we often forget the activities of terrorist Viet Cong, who, since the beginning of 1968, have killed 12,000 South Vietnamese civilians and abducted about 25 a day.

My question is: In these interviews, do you speak out against those kinds of atrocities, too?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I try very hard not to fall into the trap of equating the violence of the Viet Cong or the National Liberation Front and the vast majority of the Vietnamese people, try not to equate that with the aggressive violence of the invader. I myself—

Mr. ICHORD. Is terrorist activity not aggressive?

Mr. DELLINGER. I beg your pardon?

Mr. ICHORD. Is terrorist activity directed against South Vietnamese civilians not aggressive?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, you see, I make a comparison between the Vietnamese people who feel that there is no other way to defend the independence and the sanctity of their homeland than by the use of violence. I compare them to the American patriots under George Washington and of the time of the American Revolution, who also used violence—and the word "terror" is a tough one, you know, what constitutes "terror," but who applied methods similar to those of the

NLF against the British and also, by the way, against American Tories.

Although I myself advocate nonviolence, I do not feel that I as an American have the right to try to be self-righteous, or could be self-righteous, about the methods employed by the Vietnamese who are certainly fighting for the freedom and independence of the Vietnamese people.

Mr. ICHORD. I take it as a pacifist, then, you do justify violence under certain circumstances?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, as a pacifist I understand people, including the American patriots, including the Vietnamese patriots, including the Cuban patriots, including the black patriots, our internal colony, people who feel that it is necessary to resort to violence in order to throw off an oppressive force. And I do make a distinction between, as I say, an imperialist country like the United States, which has its tentacles all over the world and has the highest standard of living in the world, based upon the fact that it bleeds those countries and keeps them underdeveloped and is now, as I see it, fighting a war of example in Vietnam. They can afford to lose the resources of Vietnam, but they feel that they can't afford to have the underdeveloped and underprivileged people of the world get it into their head that they can win their freedom and independence.

Mr. ICHORD. Do I understand you to say that you believe such terrorist activity to be justified under the circumstances?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, as I say, I draw a distinction. I did not condemn my brother, who during World War II went overseas. Well, actually he was in the medical battalion, but as part of the war. But I myself, partly because of—despite the fact that I had been very active in the anti-Nazi movement as a kid and not that good at it, or anything, I myself, partly because of the method and partly because of the imperialist system which was backing the American war effort, I myself did not bear arms.

As I say, I went to jail rather than hide behind the clerical exemption, but I do not criticize my brother.

I think these are individual decisions that people have to make, and particularly when faced with a menace like Hitlerism in the thirties or like the American imperialist aggression throughout the world today. I have a great deal of sympathy for people who resort to violence in order to overthrow this kind of thing, but it is not my position, and when I was in Hanoi I had no difficulties of a certain kind of understanding with the Vietnamese. But I pointed out to them that Norman Morrison, who was a national hero in Vietnam because he had burned himself in front of the Pentagon in order to bring home to the American people what they were doing to Vietnamese men, women, and children, that Norman Morrison was ready to give up his own life that way, but that he would not even shoot down a plane that was coming overhead.

And I pointed out that I, that Staughton Lynd and A. J. Muste, whom the Vietnamese all knew, that none of us would engage in violent activity, but I did not feel that in my heart or in my politics to condemn or criticize them for their use of violence.

Mr. ICHORD. I had the experience, Mr. Dellinger, the other day, of meeting a woman who had two sons, one of whom had volunteered for the Army and volunteered for Vietnam to fight for what he thought

was right, and the other son, she said, was a pacifist and had stated that he was going to violate the draft laws.

It is rather difficult to give a mother advice. What kind of advice could you have given her?

I apologize for interrupting the counsel.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, but it is very helpful. It helps because the point is, I hold strong convictions, and from a lecture platform or in an article or in a general way I will always present those positions as forcefully as I can, but I do not believe in indoctrinating people or giving them advice and I did not—for example, my brother was a little younger than I, and when I came out of jail the first time he came to me a little bit in anguish because he also was suspicious of the American economic and political system which had supported Hitler earlier and had not helped the Jews, would not let them in, and now was going into this holy war. But on the other hand, he felt that it was necessary and if he in a sense came to me for advice, and I wouldn't give it to him because I think that things that people wrestle with in their own conscience, and I hope to be part of what they wrestle with by what I write and demonstrate and act, but I never advise anybody to register or not to register, to go into the Army or leave the Army, to bear arms or not to bear arms.

Mr. ICHORD. Go ahead with your questions, Counsel.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I have one question on that point.

I was listening very intently and of course I can respect your views and your principles, but I note in talking about nazism and talking about what you termed American aggressive imperialism that you did not say anything in condemnation of Communist aggressive imperialism. Was this an oversight or do you in fact think that there is not a problem of Communist aggressive imperialism?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I was a little distressed that when we were at Chicago, and it was immediately following the period and during the period in which the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia—

Mr. ASHBROOK. This was to stabilize the situation, though.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, but let me finish because it answers your question. I was a little distressed that, although I made a number of public statements to the press and in other places condemning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in as strong terms as I could, that normally this was not picked up. I am not saying that this was, you know, indirect censorship or anything, but it would have been helpful, I think, if at that time it could have been made clear what our attitude was, because I think that in the cold war atmosphere, and certainly in the past this atmosphere has been encouraged and developed by this committee—and that's one of my deep reasons for deep opposition to this committee—people think automatically, or some people think that automatically that people like myself are one-sided about this. I don't believe that the situation—

Mr. ASHBROOK. You still haven't said whether you think there is a threat or whether you have the same condemnation of Communist aggressive imperialism as that you have charged the United States with.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I thought I indicated that I condemned, and I have signed public statements as well as made public speeches condemning, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. I think that it has not ended up at the present stage in the kind of genocide that has been

going on for years in Vietnam, but I think that this relates to the peculiar conditions there.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Genocide? You mean the white races and others weren't suffering from genocide?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, this seems a little silly to me because I am indicating that I oppose aggression, including Soviet aggression, and somehow or other you seem unwilling to give up the idea that I don't.

Mr. ASHBROOK. No, you have now stated, but at first I didn't think you had stated.

Mr. DELLINGER. Now, it so happens that I do not, however, believe that the—well, in most cases the opinions that come out in the press are a little superficial, and I think that much as I condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, I do not think that the Americans should wash their hands of the responsibility they play in the situation because of the fact that the CIA and other Government agencies are organizing subversion and the overthrow of government and direct and indirect invasion and aggression in all of these countries. And although I do not believe that this justifies the Soviet invasion—as I say, I oppose it—nonetheless, the rightwing in this country and the liberal center wing, which has been in the administration, actually makes it easier for the Soviet people, Soviet Government to fool its people because they can say, "Look, the CIA has overthrown this government and that government."

I mean such as the bloodbath in Indonesia, as an example, and they can therefore more easily persuade their people that the CIA and the United States and West Germany, which has never been thoroughly denazified, that these countries are about to invade Czechoslovakia. But still, my solidarity is with people like Mrs. Daniel and the others who protested in Moscow, and one of the organizations to which I belong actually sent people to Moscow and Prague and Warsaw where they protested against the Soviet invasion and were arrested and in some cases beaten up for it.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Dellinger, may I ask you a question in that regard? If apparently you do condemn the aggressive Communist activities equally with the so-called American imperialistic activities, I wonder why you do not spend at least a part of your time in articulating that condemnation?

Apparently this is the first time that I have heard of it right here. I wonder why you don't give at least a little time during your lectures and your Libertarian Press, and so forth? I wonder why you wouldn't devote just a little column on one of the pages to a condemnation of that?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, you see—

Mr. WATSON. Or perhaps you have, and if so—

Mr. DELLINGER. I think that in part that is an indication of how out of touch your committee and its staff, its research staff is.

Mr. WATSON. Maybe you can put it in touch with it. Have you done that?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I indicated that I, first of all, I made statements in Chicago and helped organize—

Mr. ICHORD. Have those been reported in the press?

Mr. DELLINGER. I complained that they had not been adequately reported. Even I helped organize and signed a statement endorsing

a protest action at the—if I remember, it was the Polish, or the only available Communist country office in Chicago, where the protest took place.

Mr. WATSON. I am not—

Mr. DELLINGER. I have written, we have articles in *Liberation* magazine condemning it. I, as a member of the War Crimes Tribunal, which I believe rightly found the United States guilty of war crimes, contrary to the Nuremberg charter and contrary to humanity, in Vietnam, I, as a member of that tribunal, was one of an overwhelming majority of the tribunal who signed the public statement condemning the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. WATSON. I personally would find it interesting if you could supply the committee with some of your public pronouncements condemning Soviet aggressiveness in your various publications.

And one final question in this regard: Did I understand you correctly to say that it is not your business to give advice to people?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I tried to make that very clear. I said that I give a certain type of advice all the time, that is, I will speak generally. I myself, for example, think that American soldiers should refuse to commit war crimes in Vietnam.

Mr. WATSON. Oh, certainly.

Mr. DELLINGER. And I will say that publicly. I think that young men should refuse to go into the Armed Forces and I will say that publicly.

Mr. WATSON. And you urge them to do that?

Mr. DELLINGER. But I never to an individual, even when I am sought out by an individual, and they say "Should I do this or that?" I never say, because first of all the price they pay, you know, whatever they do, they have to accept themselves and, also, if people take actions without having come to what I will call spiritually and psychologically and mentally, intellectually, to an understanding of why they do it, or at least why it becomes very difficult for them. I saw men crack in prison because they were there on a more shallow emotion than was able to sustain them. And so I never advise anybody and say, "You drop out of the Army," or, "You refuse to register for the draft," or, "You lay down your arms," but obviously that's my general position, and I try to shout that from the housetops.

Mr. WATSON. But you advise everybody to do that. You advise everyone to do that, but to understand you correctly, you do not give individuals that advice?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DELLINGER. Are you trying to—

Mr. WATSON. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. DELLINGER. It seems to me you are trying to—excuse me, I don't mean to impute evil motives, but you seem to be obscuring what I am saying. I make very clear that I do not advise individuals. I—

Mr. WATSON. But you advise everyone generally?

Mr. DELLINGER. I extol the virtues of this position because I believe that if the United States does not bring a halt to its aggression and if it does not do this through methods of power, which means denying the military-industrial complex the methods, the means, the manpower, money and manpower, to build a war machine and to use it in Santo Domingo and use it in Bolivia and use it in Paraguay and use it in

Vietnam—unless we do that, why I see a very terrible future. There is already a terrible present.

So I make that very clear; but if you come to me and say, "Now I am wondering," I might be tempted to suggest you resign from the House Un-American Activities Committee, but I would rather call for its abolition; but if you come to me and say, "Shall I or shall I not go into the Army?" there comes a point when I have to say, "You have to wrestle with your own conscience; you have to decide what you are prepared to do, what you believe is effective and right."

Mr. WATSON. Of course, it wouldn't be difficult for you to suggest that I resign from this committee; would it?

Mr. DELLINGER. I say that might be a temptation, but I think even that, I—

Mr. WATSON. I believe I would agree with you, it would be a temptation.

Mr. ICHORD. Let's proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. DELLINGER. But what I would rather do, you see, is to have South Carolina turned into a democracy, which would elect people with all the citizens' votes. [Applause.]

Mr. ICHORD. Now, ladies and gentlemen of the audience, the Chair will have to admonish you that you are guests of the committee. The business of this committee is the people's business and you are certainly welcome. But the Chair has the duty of maintaining order, and outbursts, applause, or any kind of disturbing activity just can't be permitted. So I would appeal to your sense of propriety and ask that you abide by the rules, not only of the House, but of this committee.

Proceed.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, if I might make just one statement in reference to the outburst, apparently against my State and me personally, down home we have an old saying whereby people are judged not only by their friends but by their enemies, and it is a compliment down my way to be opposed by certain individuals, so I take no personal offense to the outcry against me.

Mr. ICHORD. Let's proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, one other question in this same line, if I may. I notice that you indicated that you were a pacifist during the Second World War, or, specifically, with reference to Germany. And you indicate, as I understand it, and I certainly do not wish to put words in your mouth, that you still maintain a posture of being a pacifist. Is this a fair statement today?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I advocate and practice nonviolent methods, and even during World War II, or before World War II when I was put in jail, I used often to object to the word "pacifist" or "conscientious objector." I am not theological by nature and I don't like things being set up in a way that people who have peculiar beliefs are pacifists and oppose war, and others. I believe that the adoption of non-violence is a necessity for the world and for the American people, and so when I, for example, went to prison during World War II, I refused to call myself—or before World War II—a conscientious objector because that seemed to make it some special thing or special people. I called myself a war objector.

Having made that little modification, my views are essentially basically the same today as they were then. I believe I am opposed to the use of military methods in an attempt to solve problems.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. My question then is a very simple one, sir: You maintain that you are opposed to war, do you not?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, and I am also opposed to imperialism.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Now my question to you, sir, is this: If you are opposed to war, you make no judgment in the World War II matter, other than to say you were opposed to war?

Mr. DELLINGER. I did make a judgment. I was actively anti-Nazi. I picketed to try to have the United States lower—picketed and other public demonstrations to have the United States lower its immigration barriers and allow Jews to come in, in order to save their lives. But the United States would not do that, and I always, before it was popular to do so in this country or in England, where I spent a year in 1936 to '37, I condemned Hitler and Hitlerism. But on the other hand, I myself was unwilling to adopt the methods which culminated in the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Mr. CONLEY. My question has nothing to do with whether you were willing to adopt or not. My question has to do with, you did not, from the background material—let me finish my question.

Mr. DELLINGER. I am sorry. I beg your pardon.

Mr. CONLEY. From the background material which has been made available to me, I do not find you speaking out with quite the fervor in the World War II situation that you have adopted in the present Vietnam situation. What I am putting to you, sir, is that you did not, with the same fervor, make a judgment as to who was right and who was wrong in World War II as you have now.

Mr. DELLINGER. With the same fervor, I drew a moral distinction between the Fascist forces and particularly the popular forces, such as the resistance forces, in France and Italy and Yugoslavia and other places, who were fighting against fascism. My endorsement of the United States Government was less enthusiastic because I felt that I could not trust how a government elected and run in a largely undemocratic way dominated by large corporations and military-industrial interests, I did not feel confident to what outcome and to what purpose they would fight a war which seemingly was against fascism. And although I found that a very difficult matter, as I say, I never condemned anybody who bore arms and I was in some ways ambivalent about it.

Nonetheless, I think that much of my point was justified or verified when the United States first, for example, burned half a million people alive in Tokyo with fire bombs and then dropped—unnecessarily dropped—the atom bomb in Nagasaki and Hiroshima in order to improve their power position after World War II and also prepared the climate which led to the McCarthy period and the foundation of committees like this, the repression of democracies in the—or the partial repression of democracies in the United States.

I believe that the self-righteous unity of the American people in World War II, even behind a good cause, namely, antifascism, helped produce the assault upon the people of Korea and helped produce the war in Vietnam.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. If I may move you back to the Havana broadcast, the transcript of which you have in front of you—

Mr. DELLINGER. We got a long way from it; yes.

Mr. CONLEY. The next question that you were asked, Mr. Dellinger,

in this broadcast was about the National Mobilization Committee's view of the peace talks which were presently under way in Paris. I am referring to the interview that you had with a Havana radio on about August 15, and your answer, and I quote—

the U.S. delegation is trying to carry out a fraud. * * * in reality, the U.S. Government is escalating the conflict. * * *

Mr. DELLINGER. Just a second, because you skipped so much; I have to find where you skipped to.

Mr. GUTMAN. Where is this?

Mr. DELLINGER. I see the part about "the U.S. delegation is trying to carry out a fraud."

Mr. GUTMAN. Then he jumps down to the middle of the next paragraph.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, I want to give you all of these clauses, sir, and I assure you, you can offer any explanation. I think it will make it much quicker for us if we do:

in reality, the U.S. Government is escalating the conflict. * * * We think that in reality the United States—

Mr. GUTMAN. Where are you now?

Mr. DELLINGER. I am sorry. I am trying to follow you.

Mr. GUTMAN. You skipped the rest of that paragraph and you are down in the following paragraph. Where? Where? How many lines into the next paragraph?

Mr. CONLEY. The beginning of the next paragraph.

Mr. DELLINGER. The next is number what?

Mr. GUTMAN. You know, Mr. Romerstein, if you have a marked copy—Okay.

Mr. ICHORD. Let the witness examine the document.

Mr. GUTMAN. You see, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. DELLINGER [reads].

But in reality, the U.S. Government is escalating the conflict. * * *

Mr. GUTMAN. Then he skips three or four sentences and he goes down—

Mr. DELLINGER. What comes next?

Mr. CONLEY [reads].

We think that in reality the United States has escalated the war * * *.

Mr. DELLINGER. I say next:

There are more soldiers in Vietnam now than when President Johnson made his speech on the eve of "April Fool"—

And then they have added—

a North American festivity similar to the "Day of the Innocents." Every week the North American planes drop more tons of bombs on the Vietnamese people. * * * more and more bombing missions. * * *

Mr. ICHORD. Is the whole document already in the record? Mr. Counsel?

Mr. CONLEY. No, but we intend to offer it into the record.

Mr. ICHORD. The entire document will be made a part of the record. (Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 1" and retained in committee files.)

Mr. DELLINGER [reads].

We think that in reality the United States has escalated the war and it is using the Paris talks as a pretext to make one believe that it has not escalated the war and that it wants peace.

I subscribe to those sentiments.

Mr. CONLEY. Just a minute, and there is one more, "One of the motives"—

Mr. GUTMAN. Where are you reading now? Next page?

Mr. DELLINGER. I mentioned that Johnson's speech of March 31 coincided with a proposal made by Herman Kahn, who was willing to have—

Mr. CONLEY. Third full paragraph.

Mr. DELLINGER.—to have 200 or 300 million people die in a nuclear war, that he made the Johnson program—he made it as a proposal under the title 2 of the program for victory in Vietnam—that it would be possible to concentrate on the bombing on the narrow panhandle, supported with shelling from ships like the *Jersey*, and pretend or convince the American people and some of world opinion that this was a peace move, whereas actually from a military point of view it would help the United States.

Yes, I subscribe to that statement.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, the next one is the third paragraph on the following page:

One of the motives for the demonstration in Chicago is to lay bare the hypocrisy—

Mr. GUTMAN. Just a moment. Let's see what you skipped before we get to that.

Mr. ICHORD. The entire document will be in the record.

Mr. CONLEY. I will certainly let you go back and make any comment that you want about what I skipped.

The third paragraph down.

Mr. DELLINGER. All right. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY [reads].

One of the motives for the demonstration in Chicago is to lay bare the hypocrisy and fraud of the Democratic Party's political machinery, which talks of peace while escalating the war.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, absolutely.

Mr. CONLEY. Now these three quotations which are lifted from different portions of this interview, are these all accurate? As best you recall?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I subscribe to the general sentiments expressed, yes—absolutely. I would like to stress that.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. All right, sir.

Now, if I may move you to the next question, which is as follows:

Next Sunday marks the third anniversary of the Negro rebellion in the city of Watts. Mr. Dellinger, what can you tell us in this respect?

Do you find the question, sir?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. And the answer, both.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now I would like to read to you this portion of your answer.

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook left the hearing room.)

Mr. CONLEY. And then you certainly may supply anything that you wish to add to it:

Right now there is intensive repression of U.S. Negro leaders—

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY [continues reading].

This month, there has been a well-planned * * *—

And a word is indistinct, I believe, there—

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY [continues reading].

to liquidate Negro leaders, the leaders who are capable of heading the struggle for Negro liberation, but this is nothing new. We all know what happened to Malcolm X, who was assassinated when he became a threat to the established system * * *—

And again there is an indication that some more words are indistinct. [Continues reading:]

that the federal government and the state governments are carrying out a joint effort to eliminate many other youthful leaders who are less well known, leaders who get more and more popular support and who are actively organizing popular resistance. To cite an example, there is now a trial in progress against Huey Newton in Oakland, California, and the authorities are determined to wipe out the leaders. So too, another leader Eldridge Cleaver, is threatened with being sentenced to a long prison term. Newton is in jail and is fighting for his life in the trial.

Now my question, Mr. Dellinger, is this an accurate reporting of what you said in this particular interview?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I am not sure about one or two words, in view of the fact that this apparently was translated back from the Spanish to the English, and I am not sure whether I used the word, for example, "liquidate," "to liquidate Negro leaders." However, I think that I subscribe to the general statements, including the fact that there is an attempt to eliminate the Black Panthers and many youthful leaders, and this came, this statement was made shortly after the police in Oakland, I believe it was, attacked a group of Black Panthers who were in a house, came out without arms and with their hands up, and actually did shoot and kill an 18-year-old Black Panther by the name of Bobby Hutton and did wound Eldridge Cleaver, and because of that—

Mr. ICHORD. Did wound whom?

Mr. DELLINGER. Eldridge Cleaver; and because of his having been attacked in this way by the police, his parole was revoked. Meanwhile, Huey Newton that I refer to, as I say, was in jail and was fighting for his life in a trial, and it was clear to me—I won't pretend to be in the position of the Supreme Court at that point, but it seemed, I have not read everything, but it seemed to come through pretty clearly that there was not clearcut evidence to convict Huey Newton of what he was charged, and that the jury realized this, but so they gave some other charge of manslaughter, or some finding of manslaughter, which was completely irrelevant; either he attacked the police or he didn't. It wasn't a case of manslaughter. And he is now in jail.

And so I support this general thinking and I think it is similarly about Malcolm X. The CIA has been assassinating people throughout the world for too many years now, and it is my belief that we can't maintain the geographical boundaries indefinitely and that a government that thinks it is morally and politically sound to assassinate op-

position political leaders abroad, whether it is the Dominican Republic or Cuba or Bolivia or South Vietnam or where, that that government and some of those agencies will not hesitate to assassinate political leaders in this country.

And I think that it would be very useful if we had a real inquiry, for example, into the actual events surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy, who was no radical, but obviously was killed under circumstances far different from those implied or stated by the Warren Commission report.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, Mr. Dellinger, you make reference in here to Malcolm X, and I do want to talk with you a moment about that, if I may. The expression that is used here is:

We all know what happened to Malcolm X, who was assassinated when he became a threat to the established system. * * * that the federal government and the state governments are carrying out a joint effort to eliminate many other youthful leaders * * *.

Now, Mr. Dellinger—

Mr. DELLINGER. You skipped a little, I think, but words are indistinct.

Mr. CONLEY. There were some indistinct words.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. Now my question to you is this: At the time that you made that statement or a statement similar to that, Mr. Dellinger, did you or were you or are you aware of the fact that two of the three assassins of Malcolm X were members of an organization he had formerly been a leader of, the Black Muslims?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, first of all, I don't believe that that is necessarily true.

Secondly, it is not beyond the CIA or the New York Police Department to use such people, or, I am sorry, I don't mean to impugn the New York Police Department as a totality, but elements within it or within some other agencies, to use former members of such an association.

The fact is that Malcolm X was exerting a tremendous influence upon the black community.

(At this point Mr. Ashbrook returned to the hearing room.)

Mr. DELLINGER. He had traveled abroad and had come back after his experiences in Algeria, saying that he supported revolutionists, whatever their color. He was obviously a very charismatic and growing person, a person of great political insight and leadership and he was causing tremendous embarrassment to the United States in the U.N. and elsewhere. And, obviously, I am not going to—I am not in a position to name the killers, and the reason I raise the question about the word "liquidate," which may very well not have been the original text, was that I never try to go beyond what I know, you know, in imputing actual physical assassination or guilt to groups that I do not know. And that's why I made it clear that the time will come—whether it has come yet or not, we don't know—when the CIA, which assassinates all over the world—this has been even revealed in the Senate by Senator Young of Ohio in relation to Vietnam, where he speaks of assassination teams which pose as Viet Cong and commit acts of murder, arson, and rape—

Mr. ASHBROOK. Wait a second. He rejected that. That doesn't stand as a statement of Senator Young.

Mr. DELLINGER. He asked me to supply you with some things, and I would be happy to supply.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Senator Young did reject that.

Mr. DELLINGER. I thought that after the pressure was on he spoke rather cautiously, but never retracted the statement. Anyway, it is a known fact, whether Senator Young can be cited as an authority or not.

Mr. ICHORD. Are you saying that Senator Young is the type of man that can be pressured?

Mr. DELLINGER. What I tried to say was that my memory was that he resisted the pressure, but, anyway, I could cite Donald Duncan, who helped organize such assassination teams and who has testified so.

So, anyway, what I said was that we can't do that abroad without sooner or later doing it at home. I am not about to say that the CIA assassinated President Kennedy, because I don't know whether it did or not. But it is a question which all American people ought to ask themselves, and so the least they can do is to bring the CIA, for example, under control. So the same way when it comes to Malcolm.

Mr. CONLEY. Let's start, though, with first things first. You jumped to the assumption that the CIA—

Mr. DELLINGER. I do not jump to it. I say it is a question I want to ask you and the American people.

Mr. CONLEY. No, sir, it is a part of a two-part question, and let's get the first part of it out of the way first and then move on to whether they were CIA.

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't know whether they were CIA or not. I know that the CIA does that kind of thing.

Mr. ASHBROOK. The point is that just as valid a question, if you raise the question, a Cuban Communist might have killed President Kennedy. It is just as valid a question.

Mr. DELLINGER. One can ask all of those questions, but all of the evidence that I have read, if we are speaking about President Kennedy—

Mr. ASHBROOK. Yes.

Mr. DELLINGER. —goes in the other direction.

Mr. ICHORD. You repudiate the finding of Chief Justice Warren and his tribunal?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I do, absolutely. I consider that a snow job to try to pacify the American people. And I think it is a shame that a man like Chief Justice Warren, who in many ways seems to be a fine man, although I don't agree with his politics, I think it is a shame that he apparently lent himself to that kind of a job.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Dellinger, offhand could you think of any possible activity being engaged in by a Communist in the United States that might be illegal or wrong?

Mr. DELLINGER. I am sorry. I didn't hear it all and I really want to.

Mr. WATSON. Since apparently you assign all of these things to the CIA and to the establishment, and so forth, I was just wondering if possibly you might think of anything that a Communist might be doing in this country that you might consider illegal or immoral?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, it took place in Mexico, but I believe that the government of Josef Stalin—

Mr. WATSON. You mean the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. DELLINGER. Oh, the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. WATSON. I notice you never see anything wrong—

Mr. DELLINGER. I was going to say that one of the reasons that I could never be a member of the Communist Party, for example, is that in their past history, at least, and, well, in their past history they have used acts of this kind, including the assassination of Leon Trotsky in Mexico.

Mr. WATSON. Yes.

Mr. DELLINGER. And undoubtedly others that I am not aware of. To the best of my reading, the Soviet Union did not stand to profit from the assassination of President Kennedy. There were other people in this country who very obviously profited with it, and they should be examined and thought about.

Mr. WATSON. My question is a simple one as to whether or not you could think of anything which a Communist possibly could have done in this country which was illegal or immoral, since apparently you have suspicioned that President Kennedy may have been killed by the CIA, or Malcolm X—it was some matter with the CIA. I am just asking you whether you possibly could think of anything that they may have done wrong in this country.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, if I couldn't think of anything that they had done wrong, I would have joined the Communist Party, and obviously I never have and never wanted to.

Mr. WATSON. I just noticed you never cast any suspicion on them; it is always on the Government.

Mr. DELLINGER. Mr. Watson, it would be nice to communicate. I know it is hard because I am very critical, for example, of your election and of other things, and we have serious political differences, but I—

Mr. WATSON. Obviously you have political differences with Republicans, Democrats, and everybody.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, with the Republican and Democratic establishment, yes.

Mr. WATSON. You think everything is wrong except what you are doing.

Mr. DELLINGER. No, not except what I am doing. Not—

Mr. WATSON. You were against the Democrats and the Republicans, weren't you?

Mr. DELLINGER. I am against the program and the presidential candidates of both the Republicans and the Democrats, yes. I believe there are many obvious reasons for that, but I would like you to know that the National Mobilization Committee, when it is at its fullest, has over a hundred different groups, many of whom have different political and other views. It is a very heterogeneous group. But they are united on wanting an end to American aggression in Vietnam.

Mr. WATSON. Yes; and of course you would agree with the statement that Mr. Hayden earlier made, that he welcomed the support of anyone, Communist or anybody else, if they agreed with his objectives?

Mr. DELLINGER. Mr. Watson, if you would come out on our next demonstration, I would be happy to walk side by side with you, protesting the war and calling for withdrawal of the American troops.

Mr. WATSON. So the answer to my question—

Mr. DELLINGER. But you might get hit with a club.

Mr. WATSON. You mean to tell me your people might hit me with a club?

Mr. DELLINGER. No; our people don't carry clubs.

Mr. WATSON. Oh, they don't? I see. So the answer to my question is you do welcome the support, active and otherwise, financial, of the Communists?

Mr. DELLINGER. I will work with anybody who I think will help bring the war to an end. Now, at the points where I differ from him I will not work. I made a trip to Paris in which I talked for hours with Averell Harriman, more briefly with Cyrus Vance, and also for hours with the North Vietnamese negotiators. I will talk with anybody across the board if I think it will help save the lives of the—what shall we guess—the 150 to 250 American boys who will be killed next week in Vietnam and the several thousand Vietnamese who will be killed. I will work together with anybody for that objective, but without pretending, for example, to adopt the views of Averell Harriman on our corporate structure, or the views of the Communist Party people on the Soviet Union.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you.

Mr. ICHORD. Proceed with the questions, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, getting back to Malcolm X, if I may, I would like to go back to the first part of your answer and my first question to you on this subject, which was: Are you aware of the fact that two of the three assassins charged and convicted of killing Malcolm X were former members or members of an organization he had formerly operated?

Now let's forget about whether they were hired by CIA to do it. Are you aware of the fact that two of the three people who were tried and convicted were members of the Black Muslims?

Mr. DELLINGER. I have read that fact, seen—

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you.

Mr. DELLINGER. May I complete my answer? I have seen it stated in the press. I have also read a study by Eric Norden, a journalist in New York who has done work for *Liberation*. He did a study called "American Atrocities in Vietnam." He made an exhaustive research into the circumstances of the assassination of Malcolm X. It was published in *The Realist* magazine. I can't give you the date. But I think anybody who reads that and tries to be open to its message comes out of there with a very strong suspicion that some quasi-governmental or governmental agencies had something to do with the assassination of Malcolm.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, Mr. Dellinger, in that same vein, you have also indicated that Malcolm X was, as I took your words, a rather knowledgeable individual. Is that a fair appraisal of your appraisal of him?

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't remember using the word. He was a man with whom I did not totally agree. I knew him personally and I had some differences with him, particularly in his earlier days, but he was a man who had gone through the worst, almost, of what our society imposes upon black people growing up in the ghetto. Like Eldridge Cleaver, he had been in prison and had all kinds of experiences and had himself, you know—

Mr. CONLEY. Do you feel that he knew what his movement was about?

Mr. DELLINGER. I believe that he was a person who had tremendous insight and, unlike so many political people, was able to grow as he discovered new truths and new insights.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now my question, sir, is this: Are you aware of the fact that before Malcolm X's death he wrote in his own autobiography that the Black Muslims had placed a death sentence on his head?

Are you aware of that fact?

Mr. DELLINGER. I have seen that stated.

Mr. CONLEY. And are you aware of the fact that Malcolm X himself employed bodyguards to protect himself and, for instance, when I visited Chicago on one occasion, there were newspaper accounts of the city of Chicago assigning a tremendous number of police officers to protect him from the possibility of an assassination?

Now, Mr. —

Mr. DELLINGER. Let me—

Mr. CONLEY. Just a minute, Mr Dellinger.

Mr. DELLINGER. Sorry. Finish; you asked two questions.

Mr. CONLEY. Now my question, though, on this is this: You have indicated that there is a possibility that some nefarious influence, the CIA or somebody in some form of government, had something to do with this assassination. If, sir, you have any information or evidence of that type, have you taken it to any agency and made it available to them?

I will ask you: Do you have any direct evidence?

Mr. DELLINGER. Now, since I think you did ask about three questions, let me try to start at the beginning as best I can.

First of all, I have heard the statements—well, first of all, let me say I did not come down here bringing my resource materials on the assassination of Malcolm X. I am therefore trying to give a sort of a general attitude in which I say that there should be deep suspicions on this score and I tried to put it into context.

Let me say that although I have seen statements attributed to Malcolm X where he said he feared assassination by the Muslims, there is also evidence that the day before Malcolm's assassination he told people that he was frightened of the New York Police Department, that they were not providing him protection, and that he feared that they intended to assassinate him.

Now, as I say, I really don't want to go too far into this material because I can supply to you, if you want—I have already given you the reference—one of the many articles on this subject. I don't want to make these things appear more simple than they are, and that has been my slight quarrel with Congressman Watson because I think there are very basic questions that the American people ought to ask themselves and ought to investigate. I am not prepared to supply the answers or think I am in a position to supply the answer, either on the assassination of President Kennedy or on the assassination of Malcolm X. But there are very disturbing aspects to both of these questions, which I believe the Government has basically tried to sweep under the rug, and I think they ought to be brought out into the open.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, Mr. Dellinger, after making those statements,

I am very disappointed that you don't have some evidence to offer this committee. Let me assure you that this is one Member of Congress that doesn't fear the CIA or any other organization in this country, and I think it should be your duty to give this to the Government.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I have a suggestion. I appreciate your interest and, as a matter of fact, I think a lot of people, you know, are not aware of these things and are shielded from them.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, I certainly am not aware of them. I would like to have the evidence.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; I would like to suggest, Congressman Ichord, that I mail to you, registered, some of the material on the assassination of President Kennedy and on the assassination of Malcolm X: and on the assassination of Malcolm X, I will specifically send the article by Eric Norden from *The Realist* that I mentioned and I would like to ask you, in turn, to insert these into the *Congressional Record*.

Mr. ICHORD. Let's take a brief recess.

(A brief recess was taken from 3:50 to 3:58 p.m.)

Mr. ICHORD. The committee will come to order.

The photographers will please retire.

At the time of the recess, Mr. Dellinger, we were talking about an alleged assassination of certain Negro leaders by the CIA, and you had asked me to put certain evidence that you might provide in the *Record*. Let me advise you that I have some of my closest friends to request me to put things in the *Record* that I often turn down. I would have to look at the material. But if you do, again, if you do have any evidence, I would appreciate your giving it to this committee at this time.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; I want it made very clear that I did not allege that the CIA committed these assassinations. I said the circumstances were very suspicious, CIA does commit assassinations all over the world, and that sooner or later, and perhaps already, this method will be used in the United States as well. And I said that I thought that you and the American people, everybody who is concerned for the welfare and future of this country and the world, should ask themselves this question and should read a great deal of the material.

I did offer to send to you Eric Norden's article on the assassination of Malcolm X and I did hope that, when you read it, you would feel moved to insert it in the *Congressional Record* so that it could receive a wider audience and people could read it and take it from there.

Mr. ICHORD. Proceed with the questioning, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. DELLINGER. And excuse me, I didn't mean to interrupt, but could I ask that this article be put in the record of this hearing, since we have made many references to it?

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will take that under advisement, and you can forward the article to the Chair.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in this same connection, the testimony here, to me, would at least indicate that you have certainly, or perhaps, some suspicions about how Malcolm X met his death, but apparently you have no definite evidence, other than suspicions.

Perhaps other people have suspicions the other way, and the thing that concerns me at this point is why would you make these statements.

which have been attributed to you, to Havana radio with no more basis in fact than you have apparently indicated.

Was it done with the intention of inflaming those people in Cuba?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I think it is clear that I have gone into much greater detail and have been much more specific here in this country than I was in that broadcast. So it is not something peculiar to going to the Havana radio.

As I indicated earlier, I don't have any double standard of what I say. I say the same thing basically to you, to the American press, to the foreign press, whether within the Communist countries or not.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you ever say some things you wish you hadn't said?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I often don't say things clearly enough or well enough or I change my mind, my opinion, later.

One thing in that respect that occurred to me in connection with Congressman Watson's question about Communist imperialism, which I think I didn't make clear right now, so I would like to make it clearer.

If you stop to think of it, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia involved two Communist countries, so it is a little artificial, if this was meant to be implied, and certainly some people think of it that way—it is certainly a little artificial to identify this as an example of Communist aggression because it was also an example of a Communist victim.

And I think one has to be a little more careful than to attribute every wrongful act that takes place in a Communist country, and of course there are many and have been many historically as well, to attribute that somehow to all Communists, all Communist countries, or all periods of communism.

Mr. ICHORD. You are not saying that you would justify aggression by one Communist against another Communist?

Mr. DELLINGER. No; I am just saying that it is really, in this case, not a question of Communist aggression. It is in part, but it is also a question, to complete the picture, of a Communist victim, so this has something to do with the nature of the politics and internal problems of the Soviet Union.

And one of the faults of the United States in relation to Vietnam has been that it has tried to build up an artificial picture of communism in terms of the worst period of Stalinism and without reference to the fact that even during that period the Soviet Union had been attacked by the United States and other countries.

And to take it out of context and say, "This is the nature of the beast; this is the way all Communist countries are," and so when an underdeveloped country like Vietnam begins to introduce land reform and cooperatives and literacy and medicine and to introduce what I prefer to call economic democracy, a certain form of communism within Vietnam, people hold it up and say this is—they will act and they are like it—like Stalin in his worst day.

Mr. WATSON. Now, am I to understand, since you brought the question back up, that you are now modifying your condemnation of the Communist aggression against Czechoslovakia?

Mr. DELLINGER. It is really hard for me not to be unkind, but I will try not to be.

Mr. WATSON. Well, you are condemning——

Mr. DELLINGER. Is that the best you could get out of what I said?

Mr. WATSON. Are you condemning it or are you not?

Mr. DELLINGER. I am condemning the Soviet, the invasion of Soviet Russia.

Mr. WATSON. But you —

Mr. DELLINGER. A Communist country.

Mr. WATSON. Against another Communist country.

Mr. DELLINGER. Against Czechoslovakia, another Communist country.

Mr. WATSON. Oh, so your condemnation, then, is because the aggression was against another Communist country?

Mr. DELLINGER. I am sorry.

Mr. WATSON. That's an unfair question.

Mr. DELLINGER. I am sorry. I didn't hear what you said at the end.

Mr. WATSON. Well, if you want to confer with counsel, I think counsel might know what I am going to ask next.

Go ahead.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DELLINGER. We have finished.

Mr. GUTMAN. Let me guess.

You are right, Congressman, it was a nonsensical question.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you have a question you wish to ask?

Mr. WATSON. In other words, your condemnation of the Soviet's activities in Czechoslovakia, then, would in no way be affected by the fact that Czechoslovakia was a Communist country and the aggression was against a Communist country?

Mr. DELLINGER. I would have been opposed to that, whatever the nature of the Czechoslovakian Government.

I certainly in no way, however, condemn the handful, I guess, up until now, the handful of Czechoslovakian people who fell victim to the Soviet guns, which weren't used very much because of the nature of the situation, or would in no way condemn the Czechoslovakian people who fell victim to the suppression of freedom.

Mr. WATSON. Of course, you recall this came up in the context of our discussion of whether or not you had been active in condemning aggressive communism.

You had been very vocal in condemning imperialistic Americanism, and so that's when the question came up, and so if you can—and, really, in some of the publications that I have seen from your Libertarian Press, I have failed to see very much defense, or criticism, rather, of the communism—and so if you could supply us with some of the issues in which you have condemned aggressive communism, either against Czechoslovakia or Hungary or any place else, it might be helpful, and then I could say that really this man might have a little modicum of objectivity in his writing.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. When the Soviet Union was invading Hungary, I helped organize and spoke at a mass protest rally, and although I think that very often the attacks upon the Soviet Union from this country are prejudicial and do not reflect the facts accurately, nonetheless, whenever the Soviet Union or any other Communist country employs totalitarian methods or invades another country, I speak up against it.

I have signed petitions and sent them to Moscow and I have spoken

in Moscow itself against the imprisonment, for example, of the Soviet intellectuals.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Judging from what you said, then, wouldn't one exception be, at least what I figure, with the aggression from North Korea and South Korea?

I notice you specifically exempted that when you were talking earlier.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't know how far you want to go into Korea, but let me say—

Mr. ASHBROOK. No, I just note you specifically used that—

Mr. DELLINGER. I consider that the American people, and I suppose in a sense it begins with historians, but should delve back into the history of the Korean war.

I think that that war took place at a time when the American people were subjecting—were suffering from the brainwashing and the political fears and fanaticism associated with the McCarthy period and the cold war, and I think that they assumed, all too readily and without sufficient evidence, that North Korea was the aggressor and that the United States was somehow not fighting in Korea the kind of war that most people now know it has been fighting in Vietnam.

I think that there were some differences between the war in Korea and the war in Vietnam, but basically they represent the same phenomenon, the attempt of American imperialism to control the lives and societies of Asia and to control them for the profits and for the sincere self-righteousness and fanatical missionary purposes of the American people.

To try to say all that in a summary form, but I think that the assumption that North Korea invaded ignores such things as the visits of Secretary of State Dulles to Seoul immediately before the invasion; it ignores a whole lot of evidence. And in this case, amongst other things, I would recommend that you read I. F. Stone's book on the history of Korea, which was published in 1952—I forget the title—by Monthly Review Press, and I would be happy to send you a copy if you would read it.

Mr. ICHORD. Am I to understand, Mr. Dellinger, that you feel that if North Korea were to invade South Korea, the United States would have no right to intervene in behalf of South Korea?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, we are getting "iffy," again, but I am opposed to military invasions of one country by another. I think I have made that clear. I think, however, that I have also made clear that I do not think it behooves me, as a member of the privileged imperialist society of the United States, to stand in judgment of the methods that the victims used to try to throw off that imperialism.

I think the United States has driven a wedge through two countries in Asia, besides infiltrating and overthrowing governments and assassinating, and so forth, that I talked about in other countries. But in Vietnam and in Korea it has taken a country and driven a line across it, the same as if the Soviet Union or China or anybody else would draw a line right across the United States and say, "Half of it we are going to control because our system is better and because we have the best interests, and the other half you can control."

And I think that in that kind of a situation I understand why the

people of Korea want to throw off the corrupt dictatorship of Park, just like they wanted to throw off the corrupt dictatorship of Syngman Rhee. I understand why they want to have the American military and industrial interests withdraw so that they can run their own country in their own way, and I am not—although I will speak, as I said, in a general way for nonviolence and in certain circumstances I will discuss it with people from Korea or Vietnam, if I am talking with them—I don't feel that I have the moral or the political right to tell them in their conditions what methods they should use to try to get rid of American imperialism.

Mr. ICHORD. Proceed with the questions, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, a moment ago you made a statement that you speak both in the American press as well as in the foreign press on these various and sundry subjects.

I put to you the question, sir: Have you at any time over Havana radio, which we have established you do communicate with, have you at any time ever delivered a statement over the Havana radio, or an interview, in opposition to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I did.

Mr. CONLEY. And would you give me the date, sir?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I can't give you the date. You apparently have better records than I do, or keep them, but when I was in Chicago, in the midst of the police riot, I ducked into the office at 407 South Dearborn Street, was intending to be there about 15 minutes to take care of some business or other and go out into action again, and somebody said, "There is a long distance call for you." And I picked it up, and it was Havana radio and they asked me some questions, and I can't give you the exact words—you undoubtedly already have them, or at least in a version that went from English to Spanish to English and was picked up, accurately or inaccurately, by somebody, but anyway, in the course of that speech, whatever you want to call it, that interview with Havana radio, I mentioned the fact that Chicago had become the Prague of the United States, or the Prague of the Midwest, and I don't remember what else, but I clearly indicated my opposition to the Soviet, or implied—I don't want to exaggerate; I think I made it quite clear that I was opposed to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and that we were comparing the actions of Daley, Daley and Humphrey's and Johnson's and Bailey's police, with the actions of the Soviet troops.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, directing your attention to this broadcast further, you were also asked the following question.

Mr. GUTMAN. Do you have a copy of that, sir?

Mr. DELLINGER. This is the same one.

Mr. GUTMAN. Back to the same one. I am sorry.

Mr. CONLEY. At the bottom of the page:

Mr. Dellinger, How do you view the possibility of a united struggle by militant black and white elements on common bases?

And, again, according to the broadcast, you replied in part as follows, and I am extracting from your reply certain paragraphs—and you certainly are at liberty to add, if you wish to, but I do want to establish these particular paragraphs—the first paragraph being the last full paragraph on the bottom of the page:

I entirely favor the creation of a common front, a common goal, and unified action. * * *

Then turning to the next page, sir.

Mr. DELLINGER. In this case, I would have to ask that the next sentence be read, because it is part of it:

But it is encouraging to see the black people developing their own strength, their own sense of dignity, and confidence in their own strength.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Now, on the next page, starting at the beginning, the first paragraph:

Because they suffer more directly and openly than the whites, the black population is more advanced and nearer a revolutionary position. This is why they have made themselves the natural leaders of the people—

And if I may move on to the last paragraph—

Mr. DELLINGER. I would like to add the part, “and this is deepening both the blacks’”—excuse me—

deepening both the blacks’ and whites’ political awareness—

Mr. CONLEY [continues reading].

although there is some holding back in white communities.

As a white citizen, I think our immediate responsibility is to raise the white segment’s political awareness, thereby making ourselves better comrades of the black community. * * *

And finishing up the paragraph—

and try to be better qualified to serve as comrades and allies with the black community.

Now, Mr. Dellinger, I will ask you if those three particular paragraphs which I have read to you from the transmission are substantially statements which you did make on August 15.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, the words don’t seem to be mine all the way. I am not accustomed to using the word “comrade.” I might, you know, to my lawyer or somebody in a certain very informal sense, but politically the term has been, you know, it was overused and misused and a lot of things, and I just don’t ordinarily speak in those terms.

This could have been entirely innocent, either in going from English to Spanish or back, or in the hearing on the shortwave. I don’t know. But the general essence of the statements, I subscribe to, yes.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. I have no concern with the particular use of the word “comrade.” What I am wishing to ask you about is this: What did you mean when you stated in these paragraphs that the black population, being nearer a revolutionary position is, quote, to use your words, “more advanced”?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I have tried to make clear, publicly and privately, at least since I spent 3 years in the Federal prison, that I believe we need a revolutionary change in this country and I consider myself a nonviolent revolutionist.

Now, leaving aside for the moment the question of nonviolence, I believe that the United States gave great hope to the world with documents and aspirations such as those expressed in the Declaration of Independence in 1776, but there were two fatal flaws. One of them was that this document did not apply to the natives of the country, the Indians, and it did not apply to the black people who were being brought over here as slaves.

But there was also a flaw in that we introduced the highest form of political democracy known in the 18th century, but we did not introduce economic democracy. In fact, far the opposite.

We introduced a very complex document which Adam Smith, amongst others, enunciated mainly, and he was a very religious man. He thought that that was—you know, he was sincere about it. He said, "If everybody works basically for his own selfish interests, through economic and other competition, the invisible hand of God will make things turn out best for the community and the society as a whole."

I believe that this was totally, a hundred percent wrong, and I believe that our failure to introduce economic democracy, together with our failure to extend political democracy to all people, with or without property, with white skins, black skins, red skins, or what—our failure to do that has corrupted and led our society and our system astray.

It doesn't mean that there don't remain to this day many good aspects and many good impulses and many sincere aspirations and many people who, even soldiers, who have gone to Vietnam and dropped napalm, thinking they were doing it for a better society—although I think they were tragically wrong—but I believe that our society, particularly now, there has been the industrial revolution, the electronic revolution; we have the giant corporations. We have the—how many million dollars was it that Nixon and Humphrey had to spend to run for President? We have all of the economic aristocracy and economic concentration of power which makes democracy an illusion and a failure in this country.

And so I am for revolutionary change and I think that the black people who have suffered from the worst aspects of our failure to be genuinely democratic are therefore more sensitive to some of the hypocrisy or some of the illusions involved in our system, and, therefore, they are more apt to adopt a genuinely revolutionary position than most of us. And I use the term "revolutionary" in the sense of drastic or basic. I do not use it in the sense of meaning that I should go out and kill you, or you should go out and kill me. In fact, one of the things that I am opposed to is a seizure of power.

I believe that what we need to do is to decentralize and democratize power, both politically and in terms of the economic institutions of the country.

So I am a revolutionist in that sense, and in that and in other senses, because there is no monolithic approach to these things.

The black people, in fact, in ways that I and others can learn from, have revolutionary instincts and instincts for justice and for freedom that we are not so apt to have. So I look for some kind of united struggle between those who feel in general as I do, those who are upset over the failure of our system, the failure of us, for instance, to be able to hold a democratic presidential election. We haven't voted on the issues; we voted on personalities who have avoided the issues.

So people who are upset over that, or upset over the persistence of poverty, people who feel as I do, that the war in Vietnam was not the accident of a bad man in office, but feel that it grew out of these beginnings even in American history in which we have advanced steadily across the continent, picking up parts of Mexico and islands that don't belong to us, like Cuba and Puerto Rico and the Philippines and Hawaii, and then have gotten to Vietnam.

The people who are a little bit, at least, aware of that are horrified by the napalm.

I hate to put it just on the atrocities, but still it makes it more real in terms of human flesh, but also by the spiritual indignity imposed upon the Vietnamese people.

Even now, flying reconnaissance planes over their country when we say we are, you know, moving toward peace.

The people who feel that way, I believe, have a right and a responsibility and obligation to unite with black people who have suffered the things that the black people have suffered and to try, together, to work to make the original promise of America and the aspiration which many hold to this day, to make it a reality, to have a genuine society in which all men and women and children are equal and have freedom and the kind of economic security and well-being which certainly our technology makes possible.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, moving your attention, if I may, to another radio broadcast with Havana, Cuba, directing your attention specifically to August 29, the day after the convention ended—

Mr. DELLINGER. That is the date on which I spoke about the Soviet invasion.

Mr. CONLEY. All right. Havana radio summarized another telephone interview it said it had with you, and this is not a literal translation, as I understand it, of your words. It is a summary by Havana radio, which they broadcast, which we picked up and which has been retranslated again, and if I may read this to you and then ask you if it substantially states what you said at that time:

U.S. PACIFIST LEADER DAVID DELLINGER declared in Chicago that the heroic fight of the Cuban people today serves as an inspiration to those who fight in the United States to put an end to the criminal hand of the Government of Washington. Dellinger granted RADIO HABANA a telephonic interview in connection with the demonstrations in Chicago that aim at halting the U.S. aggression in Vietnam.

He added that the demonstrators had been brutally treated by tens of thousands of policemen and soldiers mobilized in Chicago. The U.S. leader also said that millions of his fellow-citizens had lost their faith in the so-called U.S. democratic system and that they have decided to fight to end the war and to do away with poverty, exploitation, and racism in their home country.

Dellinger who is president of the National Committee of Mobilization against the War in Vietnam and publisher of the magazine "LIBERATION" said that the official position of the Yankee Government in the Paris talks is false and hypocritical. You cannot ask the victim and the aggressor to reduce their military operations at the same time, said David Dellinger, and he added: the one side is fighting for its home country and for its liberation and the other side is trying to curb the aspirations of that people.

After pointing out that people in the United States are becoming aware of what is really happening in Cuba, the prominent U.S. pacifist stated: If one appreciates both the heroism and the dynamism of the peoples of Vietnam and Cuba, one draws from two sources of enormous capacity.

David Dellinger concluded his statements made by phone to RADIO HABANA CUBA with these words: We, Americans, are determined to liberate our country in the same way: may we also assure you of our solidarity.

Is this a fair account of what you said to Radio Havana, which was transmitted back by them, and I am sure editorialized upon by them, or whatever way they wrote their story, and then was retranslated in this country?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, first of all, I think you have very fairly indicated, you know, the process that took place, and obviously, you know, there are some phrases, again, which are not my phrases.

I have accused the United States of war crimes in Vietnam, con-

trary to the Nuremberg and other judgments. But I don't ordinarily speak of the criminal hands.

It is not important. I think the Walker Commission, as well as the evidence at the time, has clearly demonstrated, made clear, that the demonstrators were brutally treated.

It is true that millions have lost faith in, I don't remember the exact phrase, but in the way our "democracy," in quotes, is now operating.

I think it is clear that, well, according to some estimates, perhaps as many as 5 million people who normally in the past would have voted, did not vote in the past election or, in the case of a minority of those four or five million, voted for other candidates, selectively, but not for President.

I wouldn't use the phrase "Yankee Government," but that is no abuse on their part. That is simply, you know, semantics.

I do have here at this time stated that I think that one side in Vietnam is trying to fight for its homeland and its independence and its own self-determination, and the other side, the United States side, is trying to suppress their aspirations even though, as I have stated, many people who, particularly in the early days, did this, did it quite sincerely, out of illusions, I do believe—and these sound almost like my exact words—that Cuba and Vietnam have provided a heroic and dynamic—

Mr. CONLEY. "Heroism" and "dynamism."

Mr. DELLINGER. Heroism and dynamism which has been an inspiration to many Americans in this country because, although it is easy for people to be disillusioned with our commercialism and our facade of democracy, which doesn't really extend deep enough into everyday life, it is very hard for people to get the energy and to have the dynamics to fight for something better or even to dare hope that there might be something better. And although there are things in both of those societies which are not of the best and although I think every people, including the American people, must solve their own problems and develop their own indigenous institutions and not import from any foreign country, nonetheless, the attempt, the heroic and dynamic attempt of the Vietnamese and Cuban people to build a world of brotherhood and a world of human equality, I think that that offers some inspiration and also offers us some concrete examples of methods to look into.

So I certainly—and I hope that the American people will liberate themselves in a way similar. That is, I hope that the American people will work out ways of getting rid of the undemocratic influence of institutions like the United Fruit Company, which, for example, prevented democracy in Cuba and prevents it now in most of Latin America. I think we should free ourselves from the tyrannical and antidemocratic power of corporations of that kind.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, then, am I correct, Mr. Dellinger, that you, that the statement, and particularly I am reading, "We, Americans, are determined to liberate our country in the same way; may we also assure you of our solidarity." Is that a fair statement of what you said?

Mr. DELLINGER. Not—I am sure that this was undoubtedly innocent on their part, or maybe it is not even necessary to say that because you must put that in the context that they continually referred to me as a pacifist.

So, obviously, when I said whatever they summarized that way, I was not suggesting that we should go into the Grand Canyon or the Rockies and organize a guerrilla force which would attempt to overthrow the United States Government. It is contrary to my beliefs. It is contrary to the practical possibilities for anybody who might even be willing if they thought it would work.

So, clearly, as a pacifist leader, and this, I think, makes quite clear that in Cuba, as in Vietnam, I have always identified myself as a pacifist, and in that context, yes, I believe that the American people should liberate themselves from the evils of corporations and of an inadequate democracy which gives the illusion that people have control over their lives, which they don't really have.

Mr. CONLEY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Counsel, in that regard, Mr. Dellinger, obviously this broadcast is in error in one part, that it omitted your earlier alleged condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. I saw no reference to that, so it is in error that they omitted that.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; and as a matter of fact, when I talk next to my Cuban friends, who will not necessarily be Radio Havana, but I will certainly, as a matter of interest, ask if they have a transcript of what exactly was broadcast because I realize there are two possibilities here: one, that whoever picked it up on the shortwave either missed that, missed that, either intentionally or unintentionally. I mean, it could have been broadcast and not added on in this.

The other possibility is that somebody in Radio Havana who disagreed with my views left that out.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you ever have any of your statements edited?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. It happens in this country. It happens elsewhere.

Mr. ICHORD. I have had that happen.

Mr. ASHBROOK. We wouldn't say Cuba is the only one that does that.

Mr. DELLINGER. But obviously it is interesting to me because I never heard the broadcast. And I wouldn't make it a major effort, but I will inquire and see if I can find out how it happened, or what happened.

Mr. ICHORD. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, directing your attention specifically to August 26, Chicago, Illinois, early in the morning of August 26 in Chicago, the police, according to reports, cleared out of Lincoln Park some 1,000 people who had determined that they would spend the night in the park, even though they had been denied a permit which was in violation of the city ordinances, and there apparently was some free-for-all there in the park and there was fighting and there were injuries sustained.

Mr. DELLINGER. This is the morning?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes. Early morning hours, actually, of August 26.

Mr. DELLINGER. Oh, maybe like after midnight, 12 to 1, or something.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, were you aware, to begin with, that this ordinance which denies a person the right to remain in the park was not an ordinance of recent vintage in the city of Chicago, that this ordinance had been in effect in Chicago, as it is in many other cities in the United States, for a number of years, that closes parks at a particular time in the evening?

Mr. DELLINGER. I was aware that this ordinance was, I believe, administrative. Anyway, somebody had the power to suspend it because on a number of occasions, ranging from the National Guard to, if I remember correctly, the Shriners—if not the Shriners, some group of that kind—had had the ordinance suspended and had been able to use the park after 11 o'clock.

So I was aware that this really was in the discretion of the city administration and I continually took the position and I was never able to get to see Mayor Daley himself. But to his assistant and to a corporation counsel and other people, I continually said that a city that in the midst of a cruel war that was killing off hundreds of Americans and thousands of Vietnamese every week, a city who invited the war party, the administration which was conducting that war, to hold its political convention, had to assume that along with that convention would come thousands of protesters, and that just like the city had a responsibility to provide traffic policemen and, oh, sanitary facilities, if necessary, and first aid to accommodate a major football game or a World Series or something of that kind, so, when it invited in a convention and, automatically, protesters, it had a responsibility to provide the facilities for sleeping, for first aid, for all of the various things that would both make it possible for those people to express their democratic rights meaningfully and also protect whatever citizens of Chicago or convention delegates or other people who were in the city at that time.

Now, I was a little nervous about people sleeping in the park. I didn't think it was my right to tell anybody whether they should sleep there or not, but the Mobilization made a very serious attempt to rent from the city Soldier Field or, we said, if that was unavailable, any comparable facility.

We even offered—and at that time, I can tell you, we were in debt I would guess at least \$10,000—but we offered to rent Soldier Field and to pay \$1,500 a night for it so people could have a place where they could sleep and meet and gather and eat sandwiches or what have you and not either be an interference with the other convention delegates and other facilities or run into some of the exaggerated risks which the city of Chicago was claiming would follow from the demonstrators being there.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Dellinger, at that point Mr. Hayden, I believe, in response to one of my questions, indicated that he entertained a constitutional view that the first amendment right of freedom of assembly was absolute and not subject to restrictions.

You indicated some concern about the existing ordinance and whether it was effective or not.

I am wondering if you entertain the same view as to the first amendment right of freedom of assembly.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well—

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. ICHORD. There is no trick to the question.

Mr. DELLINGER. No, that's all right. I am not worried.

Naturally, I have not read the transcript, or anyway I have not had an opportunity to read the transcript of what Mr. Hayden said.

Mr. ICHORD. I understand.

Mr. DELLINGER. So I would like to make my own statement, without reference to what he may or may not have said.

First of all, I think that the right of people to assembly and to protest for redress of grievances is extremely strong under the Constitution. But anyway, at a time when, as I keep saying, people are being killed, people are being oppressed, people are being drafted, all this kind of thing, there is a tremendous urgency, which, as I indicated earlier, means that I think we should set aside business as usual and that there must be some inconvenience and some problems.

Now, within that, in other words, I am not interested in the movement which has the token right to dissent, the token right to express a differing opinion than that of the administration, but allows the war to go on and these people to be killed and maimed and all the rest.

I am interested in a movement which will stop the war and which will liberate the American people, as well as allow the Vietnamese people to be liberated. And I think that one has a tremendous moral and political obligation to act, to be effective, and to be successful, and not just to express dissent.

Now, again within that framework, it has been my view that the kind of liberation that I am talking about, and that in general the movement stands for, is a humanist liberation.

I don't want to punish Congressman Watson. I want to give him an opportunity to live a better life, a life in which you can enjoy, and I hate—I don't mean to sound patronizing; I am afraid maybe it does—but anyway, for all people.

Mr. WATSON. You can punish—

Mr. DELLINGER. A life in which people can find the joys and the satisfactions of brotherhood and peace, and not of boasting that they have the highest consumer standard of living in the world, but of boasting that they are the most honest and just and egalitarian country in the world.

Now, within this framework, it applies to a lot of little things, because I think big things grow out of little things, and it was not my desire in Chicago or anywhere else, for example, artificially and unnecessarily to interfere with the rights and the liberties and the normal lives of other people. I wanted to challenge them; I wanted to bring everything out into the open and have them have to face up to it one way or another. But both in that interest and in the interests of the Yippies, who were the most interested in sleeping in Lincoln Park, but also a lot of other young people, I thought it would be better to let them sleep in Soldier Field or somewhere of that kind.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Dellinger, you and an earlier witness have equated your request to use this part with that of the Shriners.

I don't happen to be a Shriner, but I applaud their effort and I believe that any objective person would conclude that their objectives and their activities are 180 degrees from that of your organization.

But to get specifically to the point, do you know of any occasion when a Shrine group has either requested or been granted permission to sleep in Grant Park?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, first of all, let me say I am not very familiar with the Shriners.

Mr. WATSON. Well, you mean you make the accusation, you and others. Do you know of any time where they have either requested or been granted permission to sleep in Grant Park?

Mr. DELLINGER. Mr. Watson, I don't like you to—

Mr. WATSON. To ask these rather interesting questions?

Mr. DELLINGER. No. I am glad for the question. But I don't like you to attribute views to me, or statements, that I didn't make.

I don't think I accused the Shriners of anything. I am not very familiar with the Shriners.

Mr. WATSON. Well, you made a reference earlier.

Mr. DELLINGER. What I said was that the city of Chicago had suspended the ordinance and had allowed groups, including the National Guard and including either the Shriners or some groups similar to that, to use the park after the closing hours.

Now, I do not remember the full details, as I say. It could have been somebody else, but I believe the Shriners. But this information was even volunteered to us, or I was going to say by the assistant mayor of Chicago. It is possible that it was first brought out by one of our lawyers who did some research, and then assented to or, in other words, the deputy mayor agreed that this had happened. But I was not making any accusations and I was trying to be very precise.

I do not know whether they stayed there all night or what, but even if nobody had done it before, we have never had a war before which had the majority of the population as aroused against it as this one. And there is an obligation of the city to provide facilities and make it possible for the protesters, who are an inevitable accompaniment of the convention, to make it possible for them to be there without being subjected to beating, gassing, and other attacks, whether sporadic or organized.

Mr. ICHORD. Well, I think your point is, then, Mr. Dellinger, you had heard that it was used by the Shriners and you thought that it should also be used by your organization.

Mr. DELLINGER. I thought it should be used by us, by those demonstrators who wanted to use it, before I heard that it had been used by some other group.

But in response to the question, it was clear that this ordinance was not absolute, that it was within the discretion of the city to suspend that.

Mr. ICHORD. I don't care whether the ordinance was absolute or not, but if there were no provisions in the ordinance for suspension, though I happen to be a Shriner, I will say they should be enforced against the Shriners just as much as they should be enforced against any other group.

But go ahead. I don't think this is too relevant to our inquiry.

Let's proceed.

Mr. DELLINGER. Just one summary sentence.

It seems to me that such an ordinance would yield to making the first amendment rights effective in that situation.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may, in connection with what we started out here about the incidents in Lincoln Park, and I think perhaps we will now get to the quotation that you had reference to, about the Prague of the Middle West, later that morning you purportedly held a press conference, that is, the morning of August 26 you held this press conference in Chicago, and it was reported in the Chicago newspapers. Now, whether this was also reported in Havana, Cuba, I have no way of knowing. But this is what you said, quote:

We have achieved a tragic victory. We have forced the city of Chicago and Mayor (Richard J.) Daley to bring out into the open the machinery of repressions which makes this city the Prague of the Middle West.

Now, I have no information that indicates that Radio Havana ever broadcast this. This statement was made, and it was made in the United States to American reporters and was reported in the American press.

Mr. DELLINGER. That is, as near as I can tell, an accurate presentation and that is substantially what I said at the relevant point in the interview with Havana, also.

Mr. CONLEY. Well, my question, anyway, is that, in view of this statement, this quotation from you to the reporters in Chicago, and in view of your statements which you had made to Radio Havana, which we have talked about earlier here, those made earlier, that it was your intent in Chicago to organize, to foment, and bring about violations of the law and refusals of demonstrators to obey lawful orders of the police, thereby compelling the police to use physical force to implement the law—

Mr. DELLINGER. You are reading that from something?

I don't quite—I lost it.

Mr. CONLEY. My question, sir—I will repeat it to you.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, please. I am sorry.

Mr. CONLEY. I want to read it to you specifically.

Mr. DELLINGER. In other words, you have moved from my statement now to a written question? Right?

Thank you.

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

In light of this statement which you made to the newspapers in Chicago, in light of your earlier statements to Radio Havana, isn't it a fact that it was your intent in Chicago to organize, to foment, and to bring about violations of the law and refusal of demonstrators to obey lawful orders of the police, thereby compelling the police to use physical force to implement the law?

Mr. DELLINGER. May I use an analogy?

If you asked me, in view of what you tried to explain earlier about being a nonviolent revolutionist, "Am I to conclude that you support the suppression by Stalin of political opposition during the 1920's and the 1930's," I would have to say you are off in another field.

That's not my language. I don't speak about fomenting. I don't believe people can foment. I think that is an illusion, and one of the problems that a committee like this has to think about.

That I could decide that, you know, if I were that kind of a person, that I was going to foment all kinds of things, but if the people didn't have grievances and the people didn't believe that they had something to be gained by going on strike, or whatever it would be, nobody would listen to me.

And many, many, many years ago, starting, I guess, with the fact that I didn't want anybody to, quote, "foment" me, that is, for anybody to tell me what to do, and so forth, I never wanted to tell anybody else what to do.

Where people don't know the facts about the war in Vietnam, I will try to bring them to their attention. Where they have opposition and want to figure out ways of opposing, I will sit down with them and try to plan and join and work together with them.

But I never in my life tried to foment anything. This word, to me, implies artificial introduction of unreal grievances and unreal problems in order to get people in trouble, and I am not interested in that.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, we are off the subject, that—

Mr. DELLINGER. That's your question. The answer is, "No," to the question.

Mr. CONLEY. No, no, that's not my question, I don't think.

I will put the question to you a different way, if I may.

We are not talking about the war in Vietnam right now. We are talking about a simple question: Did the people who had been denied a permit to be in Lincoln Park that night have the right to go into that park, and in violation of the ordinance?

Now, that's the basic question. Did they?

That hasn't got anything to do with the war in Vietnam.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DELLINGER. No, you see that's—

Mr. GUTMAN. Can we confer just a moment?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DELLINGER. All right. So first of all, I have to respectfully disagree, that I think the war in Vietnam has everything to do with it. And I am sorry that even in the Walker Commission Report, which, you know, points out some of the realities which, as I say, people were attempting to sweep under the rug—I am sorry that it exists—almost in abstraction from the war in Vietnam.

I shouldn't say that about the whole report. I haven't read it all, but the sections that I have, excerpted from the discussion in the paper, because I don't want to go to Chicago, nobody wanted to go to Chicago in order to prove that in the American democracy you could demonstrate without being beaten and gassed and assaulted. We wanted to go there to create pressures to stop the war in Vietnam and to put an end to black oppression, put an end to the murder of people like Bobby Hutton, the Black Panther I referred to.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, that's not what you said.

Mr. DELLINGER. But except within that context, you can't understand why people wanted to march down the street or why they wanted to sleep in Lincoln Park or anything else, and on the legal question about their right to stay in the park or not, I have already said that I think—first of all, I am not a lawyer and I will defer that to somebody else, except to say that I think such ordinances are subsidiary to the first amendment rights, particularly in a time of national emergency, such as this war, which is today still being fought in Vietnam.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, you make the statement, though, "We have achieved a tragic victory," alluding back to what occurred in Lincoln Park.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. "We have forced"—"forced"—

Mr. DELLINGER. Now, are you quoting me now, or are you quoting yourself?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir, I am quoting you.

Mr. DELLINGER. All right, go ahead, including it all.

Mr. CONLEY [reads].

We have forced the city of Chicago and Mayor (Richard J.) Daley to bring out into the open the machinery of repressions which makes this city the Prague of the Middle West.

Mr. GUTMAN. Let's see the whole statement.

Mr. ASHBROOK. He had previously acknowledged it.

That was the point I make.

Mr. DELLINGER. It is from the press. Right?

Mr. CONLEY. It is from the Baltimore *Sun*,¹ if you want to make an identification of where it is from.

Mr. DELLINGER. Right.

Mr. ASHBROOK. It was in his preceding question before this one, his acknowledgement.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, now, first of all, I believe that this is quite accurate, and I may have indicated this before, quite accurate quotation. Certainly I would not fault it.

I would like, since you are interested in, you know, investigating these events, to perhaps explain it a little bit and to put it into context. That is, if I thought that our going to Chicago caused the United States to develop methods of repression of democracy, I would think that I would be sorry about this. I would be disappointed.

And even within this context, I called it a tragic victory. That is, it is my conviction that this repressive machinery already existed, is being used far more severely and with far less pretense, in Vietnam against the Vietnamese people, is used in the black communities of this country, and since this repressive machinery exists and is used in emergencies, I thought that there was a certain healthy educational effect that at least I hoped we could draw from it.

I would have preferred—and I fought in every way I could with the city authorities and talked with the Justice Department officials and everybody else—I would have preferred for us to have the rights to march peacefully down those streets.

I did not want myself or anybody else to have his head bashed in or poisoned—well, not poison gas, I beg your pardon; there are poisonous aspects to it—anyway, the kind of gasses they used, tear gas and other chemicals used. I didn't want any of that to happen.

We pleaded with the city. I said it was an emergency and asked that this kind of thing be avoided. But since they brought it out, then there was a certain tragic educational value in knowing, in white middle-class Americans knowing that this is what black people face, this is what Vietnamese people face, this is what noncollege poor people face, if they try to assert their rights and try to act as equals in this country or with Americans in Vietnam.

Mr. CONLEY. Is this what you are saying, then, that the tragic victory is for these kids to get beaten, and so forth, to demonstrate to the remainder of the American people that which is wrong?

Mr. DELLINGER. No. It is like, you know, people say, "Well, you staged these things for television, didn't you?" So people would think, you know, see them, and the implication being that they get some false opinion.

The fact is, I would never stage anything of that kind. I told you, explained to you, my life has been devoted to opposition to violence, even violence on the side of causes that I agree with and support, so obviously I would not want any unnecessary violence to take place.

In fact, in one confrontation—more than one, but I think one particularly in the worst afternoon—we appealed to the policemen, something that some people think is, you know, romantic, but we appealed to them to understand that we were not trying to provoke violence or

¹ "Police Boosting Response To Protesters In Chicago," Aug. 27, 1968, issue.

to cause violence and that we wanted simply to assert our democratic rights and that we wanted an end to the war in Vietnam, that they were not our enemies. So obviously, I would not want to provoke—

Mr. ASHBROOK. What about an appeal to the followers, Mr. Dellinger?

Mr. DELLINGER. And, of course, appeals to followers.

When the police brutally and viciously attacked the crowd in Lincoln Park, you know, it is not easy to know how you do, because also there is an element of self-respect and solidarity with one's fellows who are being attacked, and so in many people's minds there was a question: Should the demonstrators counterattack the police or not?

Now, it was my judgment and my conviction that they should not, and from the platform—I was chairing the meeting—I appealed to people. And it was for that reason that we had organized marshals, to handle situations of that kind. And our marshals, again told from the platform of what was happening and using their own loud speakers, a line of marshals went and got between the police and the demonstrators in order to minimize or stop the violence, in order to stand as a protective shield between the police and the demonstrators, and also to be sure that if, as happened in a number of occasions in Chicago, police agents tried to get our people to attack in what I considered would have been a suicidal mission and a mission which would have confused and interfered with the presentation of what we stood for, would have made everybody forget about the war in Vietnam, if police agents tried to get that to happen, our marshals were in between.

So to our own followers and to the police, my position consistently has been to avoid violence and to avoid provocation.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Let me say, maybe—

Mr. ICHORD. Gentlemen, I think at this point it would be a convenient place to stop.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I would like to ask one more question.

I guess the point we can't seem to get together on, it would seem to me a fairminded, rational person reading or hearing your statement, "We have forced the city of Chicago" to do, et cetera, et cetera, would be led to believe, as I truly am led to believe, that you in fact did follow a course of action, the end result of which brought about what happened, to your satisfaction.

You say, "We have forced" them to do something. I don't think it is unreasonable to take the point of view: we followed this course of action: this course of action succeeded because it forced the police to do this, which resulted in a tragic victory. And I think that's what—

Mr. DELLINGER. I can understand—

Mr. ASHBROOK. This certainly isn't an unreasonable interpretation.

I think that's what the average citizen would think when you say, "We have forced the city of Chicago" to do these things.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I can understand that confusion, or, you know, as to just what I had in mind.

I would like, maybe, to give an example.

It is as if you have a lily-white community—and we know there are many of them in this country—where, by a number of intimidatory methods, black people are discouraged from ever moving in and living in the neighborhood. And for years nothing is ever done about it and people congratulate themselves in this lily-white neighborhood, or

often it is—in the past and still in the present—it has been an all-Christian neighborhood which excludes Jews.

People have congratulated themselves on living in a democracy and a society of human brotherhood, and so forth; but de facto, black people or Jews or both, or sometimes Catholics, can't live in this kind of community.

Now, if somebody decides, however, to go to that community—a black person, a Jew, a Catholic—and to buy a house or to rent or to live with his friends, and the community comes out and takes action against it, I consider that tragic. And that is what I meant by tragic, there, but I also consider it the beginning of education and the beginning of a process which may correct that situation because people have been made aware that in effect black people, Jews, or Catholics, or whatever it is, are excluded from that community.

Now, I apply that to the situation in Chicago. I think Mayor Daley—and Mayor Daley is not untypical of how most of our big cities are run—I think he runs that city with a police force which, on many, many, many occasions, just as a daily fact, does not hesitate to suppress the rights of black people, suppress the rights of people who may look poorly dressed or have long hair or what have you, or people that they think are Communists or what have you. There is a lot of clubbing that goes on. There is a lot of suppression of rights.

In addition, in the context of the war in Vietnam, where, after all, many of the people used in times of civil disturbances of this country are people who have been trained, and they get either sent to Vietnam or they get sent to Detroit, in the black community, for example, or they come back from Vietnam and go there, so there is also this ever-present threat, as well as daily practice of repression.

Now, to bring that out in the open so that people can see what the cancer is and to begin to deal with it and face up to it—it is tragic that the cancer exists, but it is also necessary, sometimes, to bring it out in the open.

Mr. ASHBROOK. But it would seem to me that, of course, you are talking on a high plane; you are talking on a very high plane—

Mr. DELLINGER. It is the plane on which I try to operate.

Mr. ASHBROOK. We are not—you are at least addressing yourself on what I would consider a very high plane, but, also, the facts indicate that the confrontation was brought about to some extent by those who cursed, shouted obscenities, threw things, did things which I am sure you don't condone. And what you are saying, in effect, is you did not follow a course of action, the obscenities, the stone-throwing, et cetera, to bring this about, and yet that is one of the factors that helped bring it about.

That isn't what you mean when you say, "We forced the police."

Mr. DELLINGER. Not forced them by any of those methods.

Mr. ASHBROOK. By using your own group, whatever you meant by it?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, by the fact—

Mr. ASHBROOK. You have to admit that was a part of it.

Mr. DELLINGER. By the fact that at last, you got—not entirely, because there were more whites, because there were more black people there than is sometimes noted, but at last you got the students and some of the white middle class, middle-aged community so opposed to the war and so insistent that it be stopped that they were no longer

content to play this role of meaningless dissent that I referred to, or relatively meaningless dissent, but actually wanted to stop the war, actually wanted to save the lives of the American soldiers and Vietnamese people.

This was an accomplishment.

Now, when any movement gets serious about changing the existing social structure, as not all of our movements, but large elements are becoming increasingly serious about it, then they face the danger of the kind of repression which ordinarily falls, and still falls heaviest on black people, poor people, and various others.

Could I make—I know I would like to say one thing to clear up a misunderstanding.

I have tried, as I said, to speak for myself and to be very clear about my own attitudes, convictions, and so forth.

I would not want to give the impression—it would not be fair to them—that our movement is, for example, the Mobilization is a pacifist organization. It is not. It is a coalition of many different types. I already said that.

Almost, well, in most occasions, a leading role is played by veterans, veterans of World War II, veterans of the Korean war, veterans of the war in Vietnam. Obviously, many of those people do not share my views, whether it is about World War II or even Korea, so I have tried to be clear about myself. But I am not trying to give a picture that our movement is a universally pacifist movement.

Mr. ICHORD. Gentlemen, we can resume the testimony tomorrow morning.

The Chair at this time will declare an adjournment until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5 p.m., Wednesday, December 4, 1968, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, December 5, 1968.)

(Subcommittee members present at time of recess: Representatives Ichord, Ashbrook, and Watson.)

SUBVERSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN DISRUPTION OF 1968 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NATIONAL CONVENTION

Part 3

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1968

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Richard H. Ichord (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

(Subcommittee members: Representatives Richard H. Ichord, of Missouri, chairman; John M. Ashbrook, of Ohio; and Albert W. Watson, of South Carolina.)

Subcommittee members present: Representatives Ichord and Watson.

Staff members present: Francis J. McNamara, director; Frank Conley, special counsel; Chester D. Smith, general counsel; Alfred M. Nittle, counsel; and Herbert Romerstein, investigator.

MR. ICHORD. The committee will come to order, a quorum being present.

At the conclusion of the hearing yesterday, we were in the midst of taking the testimony from the witness in the chair, Mr. David Dellinger.

The witness will be reminded that the affirmation continues. Now, the Chair will again admonish—I do not mean this for all the members of the audience, but there may be some who might be intent on causing distraction or attempting to disrupt the hearing. The Chair cannot tolerate any disturbances, such as boisterous conduct or any activity that would distract the committee and the witnesses and the counsel involved in these hearings. The Chair will admonish the audience that he will require strict adherence to the rules and that order be maintained. Otherwise, the Chair will have to use his authority of asking that you leave the room. If you do not comply with the request, then the officers will have to be directed to escort you from the room.

With that admonition, Mr. Counsel, will you resume questioning of the witness.

**TESTIMONY OF DAVID DELLINGER, ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL,
JEREMIAH S. GUTMAN—Resumed**

Mr. GUTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to put on the record we continue with the same objections with which we prefaced our testimony yesterday. I also would like to repeat on the record the request I made of counsel yesterday, which I think got on the record, and that is that we be provided with copies of all documents from which readings have been made, whether or not they have been introduced in the record.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair thought, perhaps in connection with another witness, that he did state that the transcript would be printed as quickly as possible, and, of course, the transcript will be available to you.

Mr. GUTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What I had reference to was the document from which the counsel was reading yesterday while he questioned the witness and from which extracts were read into the record.

Mr. ICHORD. Of course, the counsel, I am sure, prepares his own notes, Mr. Gutman. Some of them would be his own notes.

Mr. GUTMAN. I don't expect to receive his notes. But he was reading from a transcript of a Havana radio broadcast. Two separate broadcasts. He was reading from news articles, from letters allegedly signed by Mr. Dellinger. I would like to have copies of all those documents. Some of them I saw and were taken away from me. Some I have not even seen.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel, will you come forward, please, both counsel.

(Chairman and counsel confer.)

Mr. ICHORD. Let the record show that the request made by the attorney for furnishing copies of all of the documents which the attorney might use is denied for the reason that it does constitute, in the Chair's opinion, an undue burden on the staff of the committee.

Mr. GUTMAN. If I can borrow them for 10 minutes, I can Xerox them and give them back.

Mr. ICHORD. Let us have order, Mr. Counsel.

These documents, the Chair has been informed, are newspaper accounts and also refer to transcripts from Radio Havana. I am sure they are available to counsel by other means. The Chair considers the request unreasonable and will deny it, and we will let the record show that.

Proceed, gentlemen.

Mr. DELLINGER. May I ask a question? When the documents are used and parts are read, will the entire document appear in the transcript? I would like to have the whole evidence in.

Mr. ICHORD. Those documents that have been admitted in the record will appear in the transcript.

Mr. GUTMAN. The documents I have reference to have not been marked in evidence, so far as I know. I request that they be marked in evidence so that they can appear.

Mr. ICHORD. The counsel refers to the documents. The record will stand as made. Let us proceed, Counsel.

Mr. GUTMAN. I most respectfully except.

Mr. ICHORD. The record will show the request is denied. Let us abide

by the rules. We got along very well yesterday. Let us see if we cannot do the same today.

Mr. GUTMAN. We will get along fine as long as I don't assert my constitutional rights.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will admonish the attorney that we are functioning under the rules of the House and the rules of this committee. The Chair will point out that the rights of the counsel, constitutional rights, are not being infringed upon.

Mr. GUTMAN. Of the witness, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. And of the witness and of the counsel. The Chair has read many times the rules governing this procedure. I point out, I did not think it was necessary, but I shall point out again—

Mr. GUTMAN. I waive the reading of that, sir. I am familiar with the rule.

Mr. ICHORD. I think it is necessary in view of what has proceeded here. It has been read to the counsel many times.

This is not a criminal proceeding. This is a proceeding to gather facts. We have gotten along very well. The witness is not on trial: he is not sought to be punished. The Chair does not intend to use this committee, and I will state that the Chair does not even have the authority to punish the witness for any activity of his outside of this hearing room, and it is not the intent of the Chair, and I shall never use this committee or any other committee which I might be chairman of for that purpose.

Now, the rules have been read. I think they have been very clear. The rules of court procedure do not prevail in this body and for good reason. The purposes, the objectives, are completely different. Now, let us proceed, Mr. Counsel, and let us have order.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may direct your attention back to about June 29 of last year, and basing the present questions on certain articles which appeared in the *Washington Post* of June 30, the articles in the *Post* of June 30 indicate that a press conference was held by you and other members of the National Mobilization Committee in New York City on June 29, and at that time you revealed some of your plans and goals in connection with the Democratic Party Convention in Chicago.

First of all, let me ask you, Do you remember this particular press conference back on the 29th of June?

Mr. DELLINGER. Not as yet. I don't remember the date or the occasion. We sought to make our views publicly known as often and as much as possible, but I don't remember that specific date.

Mr. CONLEY. Perhaps if I give you a specific quote from that conference it will recall it to your mind.

At that particular conference, according to the report published in the *Washington Post* under date of June 30, 1968, you stated as follows: That your activities in Chicago would consist of, and I use the quotes from the article, a "period of several days of escalating actions climaxed by a massive mobilization at the time of the nomination."

Do you recall this particular statement?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you also state at that time that the tactics to be used, and I again quote from the article, "will be fixed as events unfold" and that "massive direct action" would be one of them.

Mr. GUTMAN. Are you reading from an article, sir? Do you have a copy of that?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. GUTMAN. May we keep this copy?

Mr. CONLEY. No, sir. That is the only copy I have, sir.

(Document handed to witness and counsel.)

Mr. DELLINGER. In reading this I find it incorporates the correction that I was going to make. If I understand you, and I hope the record will show this, you said that "events would include massive direct action."

What it says is that "'massive direct action' could include picket lines, sit-ins, roving sound trucks and street performances by theater and rock music groups."

Obviously, a very small part of this is in direct quotes, and it is not a direct statement by me. But in general it describes the kind of action which we envision, with the emphasis upon the fact that tactics will be fixed as events unfold. That is my general approach, that we are not doctrinaire and we are not stereotyped and that we interact with other people who are present and with events.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, the first part of it, of course, dealt with the "period of several days of escalating actions climaxed by a massive mobilization at the time of the nomination."

Do you find that? It is a little earlier in the same article.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I find that. I would like to see activities to stop the war escalate from now until the war is stopped. Certainly those are my sentiments and they were my sentiments at that time. I advocated then, and I advocate now, massive actions and small actions, too, and escalating as much as possible until the war is stopped and the lives of the Americans and Vietnamese who are being needlessly killed are saved, until every American soldier is brought home.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, let me ask you this in connection with those two remarks which you have indicated were made and placed your own interpretation on them: Isn't it a fact that as early as June 1968, at this particular press conference in New York City, you certainly, at least in the back of your mind, considered as a possibility that violence would occur as a result of these proceedings which were going to occur in Chicago; did you not?

Mr. GUTMAN. Just a moment.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir—

Mr. ICHORD. Let the witness confer with his attorney.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DELLINGER. Of course, you have made a complete non sequitur there because I called for escalating actions to stop the war in Vietnam and to end oppression of the black community.

You have made some connection that I expected or wanted violence. The fact is that I called for this kind of action long before June.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, my question did not say you were calling for violence. My question was, and I will repeat it: Didn't you at least consider that there was a possibility that there would be violence stemming from these demonstrations in Chicago? I don't think you need to read more into the question than what I have asked you.

Mr. DELLINGER. It was more than a possibility that the United States Government would commit violence against people trying to

assert their democratic rights, whether in this country or in Vietnam, because they were already imposing that violence upon the people of Vietnam, upon the black community.

They had imposed it upon me and other objectors before. So I would be a fool to think that we could assert our democratic rights in this country and we could work against war and for peace and justice without running the risk of the kind of police riot which the Humphrey-Johnson-Bailey-Daley forces unleashed at Chicago.

This is one of the risks of the game, but we are unwilling to be silent and to protect ourselves while Americans and Vietnamese and black people are suffering.

Mr. CONLEY. You have admitted the fact that you, then, considered the possibility that there would be governmental violence, if I may use a broad term. Don't you also admit that there was also a possibility that some of the people involved in your movement might be involved in violence themselves?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, our movement does not plan or provoke or organize violence.

Mr. CONLEY. I appreciate that your movement does not. My question, though, is: Did you not anticipate or foresee the possibility that some of the people participating in your movement would or could engage in violence in connection with the Chicago demonstrations?

Mr. DELLINGER. My concern about violence at Chicago was that the police and the Federal authorities would employ violence. That was the major danger and the major cause.

Mr. CONLEY. You never considered the possibility that some group affiliated with you in this effort or some individual affiliated with you in this effort might not himself, or themselves, engage in acts of violence?

Mr. DELLINGER. In any action there is always the possibility that somebody will engage in acts of violence. But I have had enough experience with our movement, and particularly coming up to Chicago, to know that historically and in terms of probability the threat of violence comes from the authorities and not from the demonstrators.

Mr. CONLEY. History tells you this, that it comes from the authorities and not from the demonstrators?

Mr. DELLINGER. The history of my participation in the antiwar movement has been that when we seek to assert our rights, when we seek to try to stop injustice or war or violence, that the authorities on many occasions, in one way or another, directly or indirectly, use violence.

Mr. CONLEY. We have spent much time here now on these questions answering that the authorities used violence. There are a number of reports that would indicate that the police did over or under, or whatever they did, react. We are not asking you about this.

I am asking you about the people that you felt—I hesitate to use the word—responsible for. Did you consider that some of these people would use violence? It is a very simple question.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. I think you should hesitate to use the word "responsible" because ours is not the kind of movement in which some individual or small group controls the others. We created a framework and we issued a call and we did our best to organize and invite people to come. But we do not exercise a strong talk-down leadership.

Mr. CONLEY. Still, as a person very definitely committed to this movement, did you as an individual or as part of the steering committee consider the possibilities that people from within your movement or affiliated with your movement would engage in acts of violence in Chicago?

Mr. DELLINGER. But whenever we come up to an action of any kind, naturally, in my own thoughts and sometimes in discussions with others, I try to consider all of the possibilities.

Mr. CONLEY. Are you saying, sir, then, that you did consider this as a possibility?

Mr. DELLINGER. I will say—I haven't said yet—but as we approached Chicago and as I considered all of the possibilities, the thing that weighed heaviest on my mind and the thing that I was most concerned about in the area of violence was that the Chicago police would act as they did and that the political authorities would not have the courage to stop this, as they could have stopped it in advance.

In fact, the political authorities, going all the way to the White House and the State Department, might very well have wished to have this kind of violence, either in order to seize the initiative on the law and order issue from the opposition or in order to intimidate the growing antiwar sentiment by picking on what I will call the more militant and more active group at Chicago, indicate to other people that even though they might not like the war they had better not speak up too much and they had better not stick their necks out too much.

I think this organized and intended political violence on the part of the Government could very well be a complement or supplement to such political trials as the Spock-Coffin-Raskin-Goodman trial in Boston.

Obviously this was a very unpopular war. People were becoming disillusioned with American foreign policy. Obviously people were unwilling to have their sons killed in Vietnam, and obviously the Government was making a determined effort in a variety of ways to intimidate people and to prevent them or discourage them from exercising their conscientious and democratic obligations.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in this same area, if I may take you back to March 26 of this same year, the *New York Times* published a rather lengthy account of a press conference held by you and other planners of the Chicago convention.

You held it at a camp near Chicago on March 23 and 24. Do you recall the meeting to which I refer?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I do.

Mr. CONLEY. You apparently held a press conference, or it was at least reported by the *Times* on the 26th of March, page 23—

Mr. GUTMAN. Do you have a copy of that, sir?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Particularly, I want to direct your attention to a statement—it is not in quotes—in the article. It is apparently the judgment of the *Times* reporter, based upon what you said:

Mr. Dellinger said the coalition would not try to impose peaceful demonstration tactics on other groups demonstrating at the convention.

Now, did you make a statement of that type to a reporter from the *New York Times*?

Mr. DELLINGER. First, may I call your attention—since you called attention to the interpretation of the reporter—to the two headlines. The main headline is “PEACEFUL PROTEST IN CHICAGO VOWED,” which is a strong word. Secondly, the “Group Says It Doesn’t Plan to Disrupt Convention.”

However, if you remember, Mayor Daley and the authorities continually used the claim that we had announced we were going to disrupt the convention as a basis for denying us ordinary permits, for threatening all kinds of violent action against people who came to Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. Let us go down those specific—

Mr. DELLINGER. Now, when it comes to your quote, not a quote—

Mr. GUTMAN. About 20 paragraphs down the article.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. Perhaps I should just glance briefly at the rest of it—

they attacked Mayor Richard J. Daley, charging him with planning unconstitutional repression * * *.

This was as early as March 26, and yet the Federal Government—

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, I don’t object to your going ahead and explaining your answer. Let us answer the question first.

Mr. ICHORD. Let us have order. Let us start over again. Put the question.

Mr. CONLEY. The question is, Did you make a statement similar to the one I have read :

Mr. Dellinger said the coalition would not try to impose peaceful demonstration tactics on other groups demonstrating at the convention.

Let us get to that and then to yours.

Mr. DELLINGER. Since I had a lengthy meeting with a reporter, which was then summarized here, I think that it is important to try to establish the context and the overall impact of what I was trying to say.

I have already indicated that the headline and the early sections make clear our emphasis upon a peaceful protest and our attempt to warn the Federal authorities and the American people of the repression planned by Mayor Daley. I certainly will answer your question about this paragraph, but I would like to put it in context. It is at least 6 or 7 or 8 inches down the story.

I do object somewhat to your taking it out of context. I will skip over things I could comment on in between 8 inches. I will point out early we warned against the dangers of oppression. The Federal authorities took no overt action. Mayor Daley, who certainly is not independent—he is interrelated with the whole Democratic Party and the whole administration—certainly did not proceed entirely on his own.

I want to bring this out because it is very important in terms of the Walker Commission Report which has come out now. As someone points out, the worse things get in the United States, the better the reports in the post factum analyses get.

I think it is very important that the American people be not deceived in thinking that this problem of protection of constitutional rights and resistance to unlawful exercise of police authority has been taken care of by the fact that first they had the evil and then afterwards there is a report which seeks to tell at least some of the truth about it.

Now, when it comes to this—well, just one final comment on the preceding thing. Our prediction was that, basically, if there was violence and if there was repression, it would come from the authorities and not from the movement.

Now when it gets down here it says:

Mr. Dellinger said the coalition would not try to impose peaceful demonstration tactics on other groups demonstrating at the convention.

Well, that is part of my very strong and our very strong democratic conception, namely, that we do not own the movement. We do not dictate the tactics which other people employ. Perhaps when we select a date, as we selected the date of October 21 and 22, 1967, to protest at the Pentagon, we controlled most, if not all, of the conditions—well, most of the conditions would be a fairer way—and we exercised more control, or tried to exercise more control over the nature of what takes place.

But in a national event such as a Democratic Convention, the convention of the ruling war party, it would be presumptuous of anybody to say we have staked off this event in this city and we are going to control everything that happens there.

We could not control the McCarthy delegates, the Humphrey delegates, the Ted Kennedy people who were working in conjunction with Mayor Daley to try to get a draft for him. We could not control any other people who might be coming to Chicago.

We simply indicated that if some other group was carrying out whatever form of activity that it believed in and wanted to participate in, whether inside the convention, such as some of the groups I have mentioned, or in one of the hotels or in the streets or anywhere else, it was not our responsibility or our concern or our right to dictate to them what they should do.

Mr. CONLEY. So this, then, is a fair and attributable statement to you, then?

Mr. DELLINGER. I think the statement I have just made is a fair and attributable statement. That is an expression of my views. The other is an expression of a reporter's attempt to summarize in one sentence something that I have explained more fully. And I would like what I have said to stand as my views, rather than what the reporter said.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Dellinger, at that point you have stated, as I understood you, that you did have control of the Pentagon demonstration. Do you mean by that, that the Mobilization Committee was the only group that participated in the Pentagon demonstration?

Mr. DELLINGER. No; what I said was that when we select a target and date and call for a demonstration, obviously we take on more responsibility than in an event such as the Chicago Democratic Convention.

However, even there, the Pentagon and the ground surrounding it are public property, and we do not have either the right or the power to control everybody who decides to come at that time. In that case, because we did select the date and issued the call, if we heard of other people who were planning to participate, I mean planning to come, we made a determined effort to contact

them to find out what their plans were and to attempt to coordinate our activities.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, with your explanation of this statement in this article, I will put to you this question, which I think is answerable with a rather specific answer. Did you, at the time you made this statement which you have elaborated on for our benefit here this morning, have any particular groups in mind, which were a part of the coalition or who would become a part of the coalition, who might possibly be motivated towards acts of violence?

Mr. DELLINGER. No. In my elaboration of the reporter's statement, I have referred to the McCarthy people, the Ted Kennedy people. Obviously there were other groups, many of whom we would not even know.

To the best of my recollection, remembering that this was, what, last March, and this is a reporter's summary of, of a meeting with him, I certainly have no recollection of any particular groups of the kind you are talking about.

Mr. CONLEY. Are you saying that you suspected that possibly the Kennedy or the McCarthy people might be prone to violence?

Mr. DELLINGER. As a matter of fact, most of them do believe in violence. They enforce the American Armed Forces, and Senator McCarthy has said that he thinks our commitment to Taiwan is very important. And he supports NATO and has criticized the President, not for having maintained NATO, but for having not handled the situation in a way that would make it possible for France to stay in.

Of course, the people running for the Presidency of the United States on the major tickets are all endorsers of the imperialist violence that the United States does impose on the world. In terms of my concern with violence, and, as I said, this is the major violence that our society has to face—

Mr. CONLEY. Let us relate the violence to Chicago, not the world situation.

Mr. DELLINGER. Chicago was taking place in context. We were going to Chicago because we liked to march up and down the street even without getting beaten over the head. That is the main issue, the fact that the U.S. Government is promoting violence and practicing violence all over the world. That is what brought us to Chicago and also in the ghetto.

Mr. CONLEY. We are concerned with what, if any, violence occurred in Chicago. I would like for us to be using the term in that sense.

Mr. DELLINGER. I just want you to put it in this context because that is the important violence. This is the case of—what is it from the Bible—of looking at the moat in the other fellow's eye and not observing the beam in your own eye.

For the U.S. Government to be upset over the fact that some people might be so opposed to the war or so horrified about it that they might, in self-defense or some other way, engage in some act that they might consider violence, is perhaps one of the greatest obscenities of our age.

I am sure that future historians will consider this a subject for satire and tragic humor.

Mr. CONLEY. Besides the McCarthy and Kennedy people, whom you have identified as groups you thought possibly could engage in acts of violence, what other groups do you have reference to?

Mr. DELLINGER. I try to be very precise about these things because there are a lot of subtleties, and I did not talk about the McCarthy and Kennedy groups engaging in violence in Chicago. I talked about their endorsing violence abroad.

Now, as it happened, I think that in some cases they either endorsed or acquiesced in the violence of the Chicago police against us. Certainly, even Senator McCarthy did not speak out until after 3 or 4 days of brutality. It was not until the end of the convention, and his own headquarters had been invaded and his own supporters bloodied, that he made some mild statement against it.

Certainly one of the disappointments of the time was that a man who wanted to be an idealistic leader of youth, or at least was described as such, had nothing to say during the violence. I didn't say I expected them to take part directly in the violence themselves.

Mr. CONLEY. Are there any other groups that you did anticipate, foresee, suspect, or contemplate might engage in acts of violence, other than those groups that you have already identified?

Mr. DELLINGER. Like the National Guard and the U.S. Army and the police and the undercover agents.

Mr. CONLEY. Groups who would be there generally with the same purposes as your group or as part of your coalition?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, I really don't have any particular memory of such groups.

Mr. CONLEY. Why would you make a statement, or a statement generally attributable to you, like this, that you would not try to impose peaceful demonstration tactics on other groups? There must have been something brought to your mind.

Mr. DELLINGER. I just spent about 5 minutes explaining the nature of the occasion and the nature of our approach to it and why we did not seek to dictate to other groups—this wide spectrum of people who might be in Chicago—dictate how they would act. This whole business, I simply refuse to speculate about the possible motives and the possible methods and actions of the wide spectrum of American people.

Mr. CONLEY. You did speculate in this statement that has been attributable to you. You did speculate?

Mr. DELLINGER. You are really going a long way on the basis of one sentence by a reporter, which is not even a direct quote.

Mr. CONLEY. If we may move on, sir, to August 4, 1968. This is administrative meeting of the National Mobilization Committee held in the city of Chicago. The document I am about to read from is a document which has been previously testified to in these hearings by Lieutenant Healy of the Chicago Police Department.

Mr. GUTMAN. May we have a copy of it, please?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir, just as soon as I get through with it.

This document, I believe, has been made a part of the exhibits of this hearing.¹ I particularly direct your attention to page 3, the last paragraph: "The discussion moved to the massive march"—

Mr. GUTMAN. Hold it; let us see what it is.

This is a summary of administrative meeting held—

Mr. ICHORD. Let us abide by the rules.

¹ Previously marked "Grubistic Exhibit No. 25." See pt. 1, pp. 2348-2352, of Oct. 1, 1968, hearings.

Give the attorney and his client the opportunity to examine the document.

(Witness and counsel examine document.)

Mr. DELLINGER. It was quite long, but I have finished it.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, sir, to get us back where we were a moment ago, as I say, this document has been previously offered and received by the committee. The entire document is in evidence and is part of the transcript, I believe.

It is a document that was testified to earlier in these proceedings by Lieutenant Healy of the Chicago Police Department. I want, if I may, to direct your attention specifically to the last paragraph, beginning on page 3, which reads as follows:

The discussion moved to the massive march proposal, analyzing the various routes to the Amphitheatre and the length of the different routes. Dave pointed out that calling for an action not relating to the Amphitheatre on the 28th was ignoring the natural magnetism of the place, that the media would [sic] be at the Amphitheatre, and that the necessity [sic] of having the military surround masses of people at a democratic convention would lend political content to the action. There was a discussion on the possibility of proceeding in the face of a curfew threat or denial of a permit. It was pointed out that Mob has rallied people before without a permit, and that insistence on fulfilling an announced aim made a strong bargaining position in negotiating a permit. A curfew according to Bob Greenbatt, would be clearly an oppressive measure to be disobeyed. If a curfew is imposed, Otto Liljenstolpe suggested volunteers be urged to disobey in order to force the city into the predicament of mass arrests.

Now, sir, my question, after reading to you that quotation, is: Are you the Dave mentioned in that paragraph?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I assume that I am.

Mr. CONLEY. Does the paragraph accurately summarize one of the discussions at the meeting, indicating, as it does, that you apparently strongly urged that there be a march on the Amphitheatre?

Mr. DELLINGER. I certainly, before that time, at that time, and after that time, strongly urged that there be a massive march to the Amphitheatre. I changed your word "on" to "to."

Mr. CONLEY. Now, quoting from the same document, directing your attention to the paragraph on the top of page 5 of the same document:

When the nonviolent line was questioned, Dave explained that Mob included groups whose beliefs ranged from pacifism to militant self defense. While our aim is not to physically disrupt the convention nor to advocate violence, Mob has never repudiated the actions of its constituents. It will be stressed, in addition, that it is well known that Chicago police are responsible for violence. * * *

Now, does that quotation, Mr. Dellinger, also accurately reflect a discussion at the meeting and your role in that particular discussion?

Mr. DELLINGER. Obviously it is a very pithy summary of the discussion which, if I remember correctly, took at least or about half an hour. I think that what is clear there—well, even in this report, which I am glad I took an opportunity to read earlier, there is a specific reference to the very great violence employed by the Chicago police on April 27, the peace march in Chicago, which was under the sponsorship of the Chicago Peace Council and the National Mobilization Committee.

So there was nothing artificial. This plus reports that we had of many oppressive police actions against the black residents of Chicago, against hippies and other groups. So the reference to the violence of the Chicago police was not abstract. It was in this kind of context. I

pointed out yesterday, after making clear my adherence to the total nonviolence, that I pointed out that the movement as a whole includes many diverse groups and, as a matter of fact, the activities are often led by veterans, veterans of World War II, veterans of the Korean war, and even veterans of the war in Vietnam.

So this is the kind of thing I was pointing out in this diverse group, that although for tactical reasons and practical reasons of where we were operating and how, the entire group advocated nonviolence, nonetheless, our constituency included people like veterans and many others who do believe in militant self-defense.

Militant self-defense was, on some occasions, employed on the actual scene in Chicago, and true to this statement—and I think quite properly—neither I nor any other pacifist I know of has repudiated acts of self-defense, even though we ourselves might not have participated in them.

Mr. ICHORD. Even you as a pacifist believe in the right of self-defense?

Mr. DELLINGER. There are various forms of self-defense.

Mr. ICHORD. I don't want to get into the discussion of various jurisdictions on laws of self-defense.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I have been attacked by police and others without striking back. I believe it is possible to maintain a militant and noncooperative posture in such a situation without choosing the method of combat adopted by the police. This happens to be the view of probably a minority within our movement, but this is the distinction which was being made here because there were, for example, I remember some Quakers and pacifists who had come from some distance to this meeting who do not adopt methods of physical self-defense when attacked, as I do not.

And there were others who feel that the more manly and successful and militant thing to do, if you are attacked by the police, is to resist physically.

We were trying to show that our movement comprised both groups, and it was not—and that neither need repudiate the other and that, given the practical situation in Chicago, we could all work together for a united impact.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, moving back in this article and, again, like that earlier article that we had the small quote from, reading specifically from the interior of this article:

While our aim is—

Mr. ICHORD. The article, Mr. Counsel, or the minutes?

Mr. CONLEY. The minutes, I am sorry, page 5:

While our aim is not to physically disrupt the convention nor to advocate violence, Mob has never repudiated the actions of its constituents.

This is a sentence drawn from within this larger statement. The statement starts out saying you do not advocate violence, as I understand it, but it says you do not repudiate the actions of your constituents?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. I made clear yesterday that I do not repudiate the actions of the Vietnamese or the Cubans in fighting for the liberty and advancement of their country, and in the same way I do not repudiate, in fact I try to support in a variety of ways the Black Pan-

thers, who, in their dilemma and the injustices they suffer, do not take a pacifist position. And in the same way in Chicago, although I myself would not and did not throw stones, for example, against charging police, I can understand and I have a great deal of sympathy with some of my colleagues who feel that when the police viciously attack a crowd of people and are advancing that way, that the moral position is to resist them, including by physical means.

This kind of self-defense—as I say, the Mobilization includes both approaches to that, and sometimes it leads to some tensions or problems that have to be worked out. But we have never repudiated either the pacifists, who, in the face of a charging police, will perhaps lie down or sit down or do something else, but not try to fight them off, or the other group, who may on occasion try to defend themselves with their fists or whatever other instruments are handy.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, does this not mean really, then, that you do not condone violence on the part of persons participating with you in a demonstration?

Mr. DELLINGER. Do not condone it?

Mr. CONLEY. Do not condone or do condone. Which do you choose, sir?

Mr. DELLINGER. I choose what really runs all the way through this. I think you are straining at one point here which for one thing—I stand by this statement that you are excerpting, but all the way through the emphasis is on planning and organizing and conducting nonviolent actions.

That was our plan. There were people there who think there is a time when nonviolence is inadequate, but who felt, in the situation at Chicago, for tactical reasons it was necessary to be nonviolent because, otherwise, people would be unnecessarily brutalized and the issues would be obscured and we would not focus on what we were there for.

I won't give all of their reasons.

Mr. CONLEY. You do, then, condone violence on the part of people participating with you, do you not? You do not repudiate it.

Mr. DELLINGER. Is it better that my views be expressed in my words or yours? I have expressed them at great length, I think. I am a little embarrassed to keep repeating my sentiments. I would rather not have my views put in one sentence by you with your choice of words. I find these matters very complicated.

Mr. ICHORD. We are dealing, Mr. Dellinger, with very subtle distinctions.

Mr. DELLINGER. Right.

Mr. ICHORD. As I understood, for example, on desertions by the military, you stated that you did not advocate desertion by the military. I don't know what your words were, but you approved desertion or you condoned desertion.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. If I had the opportunity tonight at a public meeting, I would say that I think American soldiers should not commit war crimes and that I will support anybody who decides either to refuse orders to go to Vietnam or decides to turn in his uniform or decides to take political asylum in Sweden or Canada or anywhere else, in the reversal of the process by which our country began, to come here to get asylum from militarism. I will support that.

What I made clear was that I will not say to any individual that you ought to do this or you ought to do that.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger—

Mr. DELLINGER. Incidentally, I will be very happy if my statement on desertion, for example, were published by the press because I think this is the kind of thing that the American people have open and part of the alternatives which are presented to them, part of the challenge presented to them.

Mr. CONLEY. I would like to move you to another event occurring on August 28, the rally which was held, under a permit granted by the city of Chicago, in Grant Park. I want to hand you what purports to be a flyer, which is captioned, "Let the People Speak," and it concludes with "Let the People Be Heard, National Mobilization Committee."

I will ask you, sir, if this is a flyer or document published by your organization and distributed, urging attendance at this particular rally.

Mr. ICHORD. Give the witness time to examine the document.

(Witness and counsel examine document.)

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; this was issued by the National Mobilization Committee. I would like to respectfully request that it be entered into the record so that people who read the record may know what our views were. I could read it out loud, but it is not necessary.

Mr. ICHORD. There being no objection from Mr. Watson, the document will be admitted and printed in the record.

(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 2" follows.)

Let the People Speak

Demonstrate Your Opposition to the Vietnam War

Grant Park

Wednesday August 28th

1 P.M. to 4 P.M.

The majority of the American people want the United States to stop the bombing and get out of Vietnam. The politicians are in Chicago threatening to continue the war and to suppress opposition. This is the only demonstration for which the city has issued a permit despite repeated requests by many groups.

The political bosses at the Democratic Convention, and the political boss of Chicago, Richard J. Daley, are obviously afraid to hear what the people want. They have turned Chicago into an armed camp and have tried to scuttle free speech so that they wouldn't have to listen to the innumerable Americans **WHO WANT THE UNITED STATES TO GET OUT OF VIETNAM.**

The people of this country have been grossly deceived and misrepresented by the Johnson-Humphrey-Daley team. These are the men who promised peace in 1964, then escalated the war to the point where 200,000 American boys (and countless Vietnamese) have been killed or wounded. These are the men who evidently believe that the American people have no rights, that only government bureaucrats can decide whether we live or die.

This totalitarian mentality, which goes hand in hand with the illegal war in Vietnam, must not go unchallenged. If we would reassert our right to be free citizens, we must show our determination to stop the slaughter in Vietnam.

We urge all Chicagoans to join with the thousands coming from across the country in a massive antiwar demonstration at Grant Park, Wednesday from 1 p.m. to 4 p.m.

Let the People Be Heard

National Mobilization Committee
Room 315, 407 S. Dearborn 939-2666

Mr. CONLEY. In connection with this rally to which this flyer speaks there was a rally held in Grant Park and there was a permit issued by the city of Chicago for that purpose, was there not?

Mr. DELLINGER. It was never clear whether we had a permit or not because we received assurances—well, I don't want to be wrong about the time, but at least 24 hours, probably 48 or 72 hours beforehand, perhaps on the Monday before Wednesday—we were told that a permit would be granted.

However, at approximately 5:30 in the afternoon, Tuesday, before the rally planned for Wednesday noon, I received a letter from the city of Chicago—I forget whether it was the mayor's office; I think it was the mayor's office—the letter saying that we would be permitted to rally, but that we would not be allowed to distribute any literature, that we must have an insurance policy of from \$300,000 to \$500,000 indemnity, I guess is the word, and that we must promise or undertake to pay all the costs incurred by the city of Chicago because of the holding of the rally.

Obviously, we could not and would not accept these terms, and it was, from all points of view, impossible at 5:30 on Tuesday afternoon, for example, to secure that kind of insurance if we had been willing to.

Therefore, it was never clear whether we really had a permit or not or whether this was another method of intimidation; whether if we attempted, as we did attempt to assert our constitutional rights and our moral obligations by going there, whether we would be declared illegal and subject to abuse.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Dellinger, if you contend it is not clear as to whether or not you had a permit—you, as you have always contended, a man who always speaks the truth—why did you put in this document the statement, "This is the only demonstration for which the city has issued a permit * * *"?

It does not ring true to me that you would put that in one of these documents. You would accuse us of dishonesty, but not yourself?

Mr. DELLINGER. I do not remember accusing you of dishonesty. I have accused you of many political crimes, but I don't remember accusing you of personal dishonesty. I certainly don't want you to have that impression. I have no basis for thinking such.

However, I think I just pointed out that the city had told us that the rally would be permitted. Ordinarily, under those circumstances, I take people to be men of their words, and that if the deputy mayor says this be permitted—or the assistant corporation counsel, whoever it was, I think it was both—we assumed that it is permitted. Since the city of Chicago was obviously trying to keep people away from the assertion of their democratic rights and of their moral obligation to oppose the war, first of all by a series of threats, all the way from Mayor Daley's shoot to kill and shoot to maim statement of April or May to a variety of other things I won't go into now, and also by delaying permits so that people who did want to face arrest or brutalization would not have time to get to the city.

As soon as we were told by the deputy mayor and the assistant corporation counsel that we did have the permit and that it would be legally granted, we informed people as rapidly as we could.

However, this was limited to distribution in the Chicago area. There

was not time to reach people in outlying districts except by a few selective phone calls.

Mr. ICHORD. What was the procedure used in issuing permits? Does the city of Chicago follow the practice of issuing written permits, which are given to the permittee?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. As far as I know—and I think I remember this accurately—on the occasion of the April 27 peace march, which was, however, brutally assaulted, they had delivered a written permit. So it was our belief that this would happen.

However, it was clear that after we had been told—and I believe that the meeting was on Monday before the Wednesday of the rally—after we had been told that the permit would be granted, we didn't expect to sit in the office and have it all written out and handed to us at that time. In fact, the deputy mayor explained that he had to contact various authorities, the park authorities, and so forth.

Mr. WATSON. Really it made no difference whether you had the permit. You would have held the rally anyway. You did not recognize that authority?

Mr. DELLINGER. No. I am in favor, as it came out in the other document. In the document we said that we would and should march and rally with or without the permit, that we had done this before.

Mr. WATSON. So the permit was inconsequential after all?

Mr. DELLINGER. It is not inconsequential because it is in violation of constitutional rights when the authorities refuse to give a permit.

Mr. WATSON. The point is that you would have had the demonstration with or without a permit?

Mr. DELLINGER. At the time of the Chicago convention, in the nature of two or three hundred Americans and many thousands of Vietnamese were being killed every week. And if the mayor of the city of Chicago, in his totalitarian method, was to say to us, "You are not allowed to protest against the war by holding a peaceful march and rally," I was not about to say, "Well, I am sorry, my brothers in Vietnam, of both nationalities, all nationalities. I am sorry I cannot do anything for you because the mayor of Chicago will not permit it."

Mr. WATSON. So the permit was of no consequence at all.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, you did hold the rally, did you not?

Mr. DELLINGER. We held a very hectic and very often interrupted rally by attacks by the police.

Mr. CONLEY. The rally in Grant Park?

Mr. DELLINGER. I am referring to in Grant Park at the bandshell.

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir. In that connection I hand you what purports to be a flyer published by the Chicago Police Department, which was distributed, according to earlier testimony, in Grant Park on August 28 by that police department.

Are you familiar with that document?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. This was handed to me on the platform when I was chairing the meeting.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Chairman, I will ask leave at this time to read this particular document into the record.

Mr. ICHORD. Go ahead.

Mr. CONLEY. The document is captioned "PLEASE COOPERATE," "28 August 1968":

PLEASE COOPERATE WITH THE POLICE DEPARTMENT

In the interests of free speech and assembly, this portion of Grant Park has been set aside for a rally. You are permitted to conduct this assembly and rally and will be protected.

In order to aid traffic control efforts and assist in maintaining the security of the Democratic National Convention, no rally or assembly will be permitted at or near the International Amphitheatre.

No authorization for a parade, march or procession has been issued. Any attempts to conduct or participate in a parade or march will subject each and every participant to arrest. We earnestly request your cooperation so that the rights of dissent and protest will be properly safeguarded as well as the rights of all others including those delegates at the Democratic National Convention.

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT,

James B. Conlisk, Jr.,

Superintendent of Police.

Now you were familiar, were you not, Mr. Dellinger, with the contents of this document, which I have just read, on August 28?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. You were also aware prior to August 28, were you not, that your organization, that is Mobe, had been denied a permit to march on the International Amphitheatre or to hold any rally near it?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. I might point out in that connection that we were also denied a permit in the District of Columbia, the city of Washington, to hold a legal and constitutional and politically necessary rally at Lincoln Memorial on the march to the Pentagon.

For some time we were informed absolutely that we would not get this permit, but we decided—we knew that we did not want to see a police state created by default. We knew that already too many of our liberties and rights and powers had been taken away from us, so we decided to assert these rights at whatever cost.

After having made this decision and made clear that there would be thousands of people here, then we received a permit. We hoped—and I continually said to the press and in many other ways—we hoped that the city of Chicago, which was attempting to suppress our rights just as the Federal authorities attempted to suppress our rights and to impede the development of an effective antiwar movement in October, we hoped that the city of Chicago would come to its senses and would reverse its position. We held this hope right up until the very last moment.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in connection with the rally held in Grant Park at the bandshell, is it not true, sir, as has been reported in numerous newspaper accounts—and I have before me specifically the *Baltimore Sun* of August 29, directing your attention to page 10—that you, at this rally, in view of the massive show of police strength which did appear as your rally ended about 5 or 5:30 p.m., advised the crowd to do one of the following things: One, to form in lines eight abreast for a march towards the Amphitheatre that was sure to end in arrest.

Mr. DELLINGER. Excuse me. That would be inaccurate because I never say anything is sure. I say you must be prepared to be arrested.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir.

Two, to filter out of the park into the street so as to tie up motor and pedestrian traffic in the Loop area, advising clergymen and those with children particularly to follow this procedure.

And three, to remain sitting in the park.

Now, this is the Baltimore *Sun* account of the reporter who was there and who has indicated that these were the three alternatives proposed by you to those meeting in the bandshell.

Are these fair statements of what you did in fact propose?

Mr. ICHORD. Give the witness time to examine the three alternatives. (Witness and counsel examine document.)

Mr. DELLINGER. I would like to respond. First of all, as usual by putting it into context and saying it was a very hectic situation and an atmosphere of police intimidation and violence, and therefore I do not blame the reporter for what I would consider some inaccuracies in my position.

It speaks here of: "Thousands of Chicago police and Illinois National Guardsmen chased and clubbed thousands of youthful anti-war demonstrators * * * smell of tear gas hung in the air * * *."

Mr. CONLEY. Are they inaccurate on that?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, they are not. I am explaining the context, both in which I made the statement and in which the reporter unwittingly did not get them completely accurate. "Scores of youths were arrested and scores more were beaten on the head, chest and shoulders * * *."

Mr. CONLEY. Was the reporter inaccurate on that?

Mr. DELLINGER. He might have underestimated the number, but the general picture is certainly accurate. "Mayor Richard J. Daley and the city's police force behaved tonight very much like the 'fascist, imperialist' force that the mobilization leaders have charged them with being all along."

Mr. CONLEY. Was the Baltimore *Sun* reporter inaccurate on that?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, I believe he was accurate. He goes on to say that this "vindicated the radicals' arguments." Then he speaks of the tense atmosphere.

Mr. CONLEY. Was he accurate on that?

Mr. DELLINGER. He was accurate in all of this.

Mr. CONLEY. He only, then, as I understand it, is inaccurate on the part that is attributable to you?

Mr. DELLINGER. I think he didn't do a bad job there. I presented three alternatives. Given the tenseness of the situation, which these quotations have indicated, and given the confusion on the platform and the attempts we were making to get people taken to the hospital and this kind of thing, I think he did a relatively good job of it.

But the three alternatives that I presented were, the first one, as he says, to form in lines eight abreast for the march, which I indicated they should be prepared to face arrest if they chose that alternative.

I also said that this was to be a strictly nonviolent march and anybody who felt he could not react to police attack nonviolently should do something else, should not take part in this march. This led to the second alternative.

Mr. CONLEY. The reporter was inaccurate in not including that?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, it would have been a fuller and more accurate report if he had mentioned that because this was clearly emphasized and clearly followed, that as we started the march, through the portable loudspeaker I kept repeating that and saying it was not a matter of, you know, the superiority of one group over another or anything of that kind, but there was a division of labor. We only wanted people there who could clearly respond to police violence by nonviolence and not by using militant self-defense.

Mr. CONLEY. All right.

Mr. DELLINGER. I asked those who either felt they could not respond in a crisis nonviolently or who did not think that a march was at this point called for, to take one of two other alternatives.

One was to simply stay in the park and to wait until the atmosphere was clear as possible since, given the attitude of the Chicago police and the practice of the last few days, women and children and others who did not face brutality could not feel safe in leaving at this time.

Then for others who wished to protest in other places or in other ways and did not want to take part in the nonviolent march, that they should leave in small groups and carry out their own activities.

Now it is entirely possible that somebody referred to pedestrians, and so forth, going into the Loop area. I have no recollection of saying that myself. I think the reference to tying up pedestrians and motor traffic was not that we should go out to do it, but that if the Chicago police were going to attack us—this was the second alternative—people should be in the streets or near the Hilton or somewhere where their violence would be partially restrained and where it would be visible for the whole world to see.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, then, as I take it, it is a generally fair and accurate statement that we can attribute to the reporter from the Baltimore *Sun*, with those corrections which you have made?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. It is obviously an attempt, and fairly successful attempt, to write a fair report of what happened.

Mr. CONLEY. Subsequent to making these proposals, did you not, in fact, lead people out of the park eight abreast?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. In advancing what I would presume would be your position one, to form in lines eight abreast for a march toward the Amphitheatre?

Mr. DELLINGER. Right.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Dellinger, when you started this march eight abreast, you were aware of the fact that you did not have any permit for a parade or a procession. So you were doing this in a deliberate attempt to violate the law?

Mr. DELLINGER. Not in a deliberate attempt to violate the law. We were doing it in a deliberate attempt to get to the Amphitheatre and to hold a rally at which Vietnam veterans and others could speak against the war and could urge the American people to resist the war. That was what we were attempting to do.

The Chicago police were attempting to prevent us from doing that. Therefore, we knew that we had to face the possibility of brutal attack or arrest. We were not interested in demonstrating either peacefully or with violent attack for its own sake. We were interested in trying to move beyond the stage of token dissent to a position where the antiwar movement could have enough power and enough numbers to stop the war.

Mr. CONLEY. But you were making a deliberate violation of the law, were you not, sir? Whether you agreed with the law or not, it was a deliberate violation of the law?

Mr. DELLINGER. It happens that I agreed with the Constitution, which said I had the right and other people had the right to make this march.

Mr. CONLEY. But you were also aware of the fact that the city of Chicago had a law—

Mr. DELLINGER. I am also aware of the fact that Federal, State, and local authorities often violate the rights of our citizens, contrary to the Constitution and contrary to any sound ethical and political practice, and that if people do not resist this, willing to take the consequences upon themselves—

Mr. CONLEY. —of violating the law. You have to violate the law to take the consequence.

Mr. DELLINGER. Are you making the statement, or am I?

Mr. CONLEY. I am asking you, sir.

Mr. DELLINGER. I think I have made clear that if the authorities, in this case Mayor Daley, are violating the Constitution and probably violating the laws of Illinois as well, then I am not going to obey his illegal orders. It is of little consequence to me whether he decides, whether what he thinks I do is illegal or not.

I am not opposed to breaking laws in order to try to bring about a more just and humane society and to bring about an end to the war. I have many times violated laws. I expect to have to do so in the future. Otherwise, one reduces himself to the position of token dissenter.

Mr. CONLEY. One question here—and it has been a very simple question—was: Did you violate a law by marching in this demonstration?

Mr. DELLINGER. Mayor Daley violated the law by sending out his police, and the National Guard violated the law by sending out their machine guns and tanks—well, tanks I am not sure of, I will withdraw that—their machine guns and their various devices to prevent us from exercising our constitutional rights.

They violated the law, and we, to the best of our feeble ability, resisted their illegal act.

Mr. CONLEY. This law I am talking about, which requires a parade permit or a processional permit, this was not a law that was enacted to keep you from making a march that day, was it, to your knowledge?

Mr. DELLINGER. Repression is not a new thing in this country. There have been illegal laws and suppression of democratic rights throughout our history and a constant struggle by the people to overcome these illegal and unconstitutional and antidemocratic acts.

I would not be so presumptuous as to think all the repressive legislation in the U.S. was enacted in order to prevent the Mobilization from exercising its functions. In some cases new laws have been passed in relation to our activities, but basically these laws have existed in the past.

Mr. CONLEY. With reference to this particular law, to your knowledge it was not passed for the purpose of harassing you?

Mr. DELLINGER. It was not even a law. There is no law that I know of in Chicago that says that people cannot assert their constitutional rights. This was a ruling by a tyrannical mayor who is one of the top officials, not only the mayor of the second or third largest city in the country, but also a leading figure in the Democratic administration.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Dellinger, as I understand it, you believe that the constitutional right which you had to move out eight abreast superseded any so-called municipal ordinance or anything else?

Mr. DELLINGER. That is a clear statement of my views.

Mr. WATSON. Let me ask you about this. Since you have that consti-

tutional right and no one can deny you or your group that right, what is your position on the right of people to traverse the streets and sidewalks of Chicago in a normal fashion? How do you relate your right to their rights, or do they have any rights?

Mr. DELLINGER. I think they do. I have written and spoke publicly on this and I have also acted.

Mr. WATSON. They can't traverse the streets when you are marching eight abreast. What do they do? Do they lose their rights or do they run over you?

Mr. DELLINGER. My dear Mr. Watson, when the Chicago Bears hold a football game, I myself have been held up from being able to cross the streets or held up in a traffic jam because of this. Obviously, we live in a complicated society in which the rights of people impinge upon the rights of other people, and there have to be many interactions. I do not believe that at a time, to use my repeated phrase, when hundreds of Americans and thousands of Vietnamese are being killed every week and when the black people of this country are being oppressed and subjected to bitter violence and economic provocations, that at such a time it is a proper sense of proportion to allow streets to be tied up for Shriners' parades, for prowar parades, for football games, for World Series, for the arrival of a movie star, all kinds of things which are inevitable, but to allow that kind of thing to interfere with the normal movement of people through the street, but to say to people who want to bring an end to the war and oppression, "You can't use the streets because if you do this particular street will be tied up or somebody may be delayed on his way home."

My position is, however, that we should attempt to minimize imposing penalties upon people who do not agree with us, who are not in our march. It is for that reason—that was one of the reasons we went to the mayor's office and tried to get a permit and offered, in the course of our discussions on many occasions, to adjust the route so that it would not interfere with the rights of other people.

We could never get to the point where we could have that kind of discussion. What we would not accept is being moved so far away from the Amphitheatre or so far away from where people are that our march would be taking place in isolation.

We were perfectly willing to try to work out the ground rules so that the rights of other people would not be violated or imposed upon.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, you wanted to exercise your rights in close proximity to others who were trying to exercise their rights so as to disrupt the others?

Mr. DELLINGER. That is the opposite of what I said.

Mr. WATSON. It is?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. I did not understand you correctly. I thought you said you did not want your demonstration to be in isolation, but you wanted to move to where the action was.

Mr. DELLINGER. You see, in real life there are always many factors that one has to weigh and adjust, and so forth. In real life in Chicago, as in New York, as in Washington, what we were attempting to do was to prevent the authorities from putting us so far away that we could not be seen and that the people would have the sense of marching through a wasteland.

That was one of the factors.

Another factor was to attempt not to interfere with the rights of other people who were in the city for other reasons or who lived there. It was a matter of trying to weigh these.

We offered to try to work out this problem with the Chicago authorities, but they refused to recognize our right even to discuss the problem.

Mr. WATSON. Finally, sir, will you not agree that we would actually have a confused, if not a chaotic, condition if any group at its own wish were able to move out and march up and down the streets without some coordination or clearance or control by the municipal authorities?

I recognize the fact that you generally do not recognize civil authority. But would you not agree that it would be a rather confused and chaotic condition if your principle were followed?

Mr. DELLINGER. I think we would have worse than a confused and chaotic condition because of the conditions imposed upon black people, because of the draft of American youth to be slaughtered and to commit war crimes in Vietnam.

Mr. WATSON. You know you have spoken of veterans in the lead of this movement. You are not a veteran are you?

Mr. DELLINGER. I am not.

Mr. WATSON. I don't believe Mr. Hayden was or Mr. Davis.

Mr. GUTMAN. Do you want us to swap war stories, Congressman, to show some wounds and medals? They are on many veterans, including myself, who have honorably served, been wounded, been decorated in combat, who think we are committing war crimes in Vietnam.

Mr. WATSON. I am sure I am aware of counsel's position.

I am just making the observation. I have heard repeated statements that in this group are veterans of World War II and Korea and Vietnam, and so forth. As of yet I have not seen many of them—

Mr. GUTMAN. I am. Here is one right in front of you, Congressman Watson.

Mr. WATSON. Did I understand you to say you are one of the leaders of the march and demonstration in Chicago?

Mr. GUTMAN. No.

Mr. ICHORD. Gentlemen, let us be in order.

Counsel has not been called to testify. Just wait a minute and then we will have a question.

Mr. GUTMAN. I am prepared to swap war stories with the Congressman.

Mr. ICHORD. Proceed, Counsel.

Mr. DELLINGER. I want to say that the Congressman is way off the point because the antiwar movement, as I have indicated, includes a tremendous spread of occupations, ages, political attitude, religious attitude, and also of personal histories and experiences in relation to war.

I have expounded as clearly as I could my own belief in nonviolence, which extends even to wars in which I think one side is clearly more right than the other. But it would be wrong for you to think that in this particular respect I am typical of the movement because I am sure a vast majority of our members either have served in past wars or would have if they had been of the proper age and sex.

Mr. WATSON. Of course, my last question is whether or not we would have a confused, at least, if not a chaotic, condition if any group could

move as it wished throughout any city in America without having some coordination by the municipal authorities.

Would you not agree that is the proper situation?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. I myself tried to coordinate and to work out such arrangements to minimize confusion. However, I have full sympathy with those who on occasion—and there could very well be occasion myself when I would feel that the disruption to ordinary civilian life and the confusion that would result, for example, from sitting down in a public place or tying up a street—that this disruption would be justified in terms of the necessity of bringing home to the American people the genocide that they are committing.

So I am not making an absolute statement against that type of activity in this type of mass mobilization which the Mobilization Committee has organized—April 15 in New York and San Fran, October 21 and 22 here, the attempted demonstrations at Chicago.

We felt that on these occasions it was important to coordinate our activities with the authorities to try to avoid this kind of unnecessary confusion and conflict of rights.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in that connection, when you started out with this group eight abreast, you certainly had no hopes that you were going to alter or change, had you been able to reach the International Amphitheatre, the convictions or the voting of the delegates or their choice for President, did you?

Mr. DELLINGER. Again, let me say that the Mobilization is a coalition, and there were people who wanted to march to the Amphitheatre who undoubtedly harbored the hope that this would change the votes of the delegates.

Mr. CONLEY. My question is directed to you.

Mr. DELLINGER. I myself, no, because I did not expect that any outcome of the Democratic Nominating Convention would be the major influence to determine whether we went to war or not.

I myself believed that it was to arouse the concern of the American people expressed by a variety of other methods, including active resistance, draft resistance, the resistance against military operations, the kind of thing which a number of Catholic clergymen have done when they have taken draft card files and destroyed them saying there is some kind of property, such as draft card files for Vietnam and crematorium in Nazi Germany, which have no right to exist.

I have more faith in this kind of thing and, although I am very happy when any public figure or politician speaks out against the war.

I have found that the program of all of the candidates for the Democratic nomination was inadequate and unsatisfactory to me, and it did not matter that much to me which one was selected.

Mr. ICHORD. At that point, if I may intervene, Mr. Counsel, have you been active in Mr. Davis' coffeehouse, what do you call it, coffeehouse operation?

Mr. DELLINGER. I have supported that program, endorsed it, worked with it some. I have only made one brief visit to the coffeehouse, but I do everything I can to—which I believe was in Congressman Watson's district in Columbia, South Carolina. I think they are doing very fine work.

I think it is very important that the people who are drafted into the Army not be completely brainwashed and intimidated by the

military mind and the military interpretation of events, and at the very least they have this kind of place where they can go for a much more mature and self-creative type of activity.

Also, of course, as I want to make very clear, I believe that one of the evils in the United States is that after people are drafted it has been assumed that they lose their constitutional rights, not only in terms of some of the trials and imposition of penalties, but in terms of access to free speech, free assembly, and so forth.

I have always felt that it is very important that the soldiers who are being asked to go to Vietnam and to commit war crimes and to risk their lives and limbs, that they be enabled to hear the full story against the war and be given all of the information on both sides, which will make it possible to make up their own minds as to what course of action they should take.

Mr. CONLEY. Then, sir, as I understand it, you did not hope, yourself, when you led this march toward the Amphitheatre, to alter the conduct of either the delegates or their selection for President?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, I did not. I wanted to appeal to the American people. We wanted to contrast the statement by the Vietnam war veterans outside the Amphitheatre with the ludicrous statements in the Democratic platform and the programs and statements of the nominees or the prospective nominees.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, moving to another area, when Lieutenant Healy was here in October from the Chicago Police Department, he testified concerning certain events which occurred in Lincoln Park, which was the practicing of the so-called Japanese snake dance.

He also produced photographs, which I believe were received by the committee, of individuals practicing this particular form of athletic endeavor.

Mr. Dellinger, I put to you, sir, the question: Were you aware of these practice sessions which were going on in the Lincoln Park during the days leading up to August 28?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I was aware of them. Although I knew of our general plans, I first read of them in the newspaper when I was on a plane on the way to Chicago. I later visited Lincoln Park and witnessed at least one or two of these sessions.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, let me ask you this: Did you at any time object to or take any concrete position indicating that you felt this wasn't a desirable thing for the people involved to do?

Mr. DELLINGER. I had some discussions with my fellow committee members in order to find out more about the nature and purpose of this and was convinced that this, on the whole, was a legitimate preparation for self-defense on the part of those who felt it important to react to police brutality by defending themselves collectively as well as individually.

I did feel that, on the whole, the amount of training possible in such a situation would not make a great deal of difference. It mainly gave the people some sense of morale. In my very first discussion with the marshals and the others who were working on this, it was made clear that the Japanese snake dance as such was not intended to be used. It was something which required a great deal of training, much longer than was available to our people; closely coordinated group, and for one thing our group was not even that united in using it as a tactic. I want to make very clear that my discussions along this line

were not in the nature of objections, but a simple attempt to clarify and discuss and evaluate.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in that connection, almost anybody who has any familiarity at all with the Japanese snake dance knows historically where it comes from and knows the purpose for which it is used, which is to break through police lines.

Is that not a fair statement?

Mr. DELLINGER. I think, if I understand it correctly, first of all it has emerged as a form of resistance to U.S. attempts to rearm and remilitarize Japan, including the sending of—the gross obscenity of sending nuclear submarines to the area, besides using the former Japanese territory of Okinawa as a base from which to attack first Korea and now Vietnam.

Now, I really am not an expert; although I have visited Japan and met with various members of the Japanese antiwar movement, I really am not an expert. I have never seen it used, and all of my information is secondhand.

I have the impression that it is used for two things. The one you mentioned, to break through restraining police lines, similar to the policy of Mayor Daley's people being kept away from places where they feel they have a right to be. And secondly, to protect themselves, as they march down the street, from being attacked or from the results of being attacked or assaulted.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, when you got to Chicago it was not the first time that you had some indication or awareness of the fact that the Japanese snake dance was being considered as a possibility, is it?

Mr. DELLINGER. I have heard of the Japanese snake dance for many years.

Mr. CONLEY. I mean with specific reference to Chicago, to its use or its contemplated use in the city of Chicago.

Mr. GUTMAN. The witness already answered. He said he read about it on the plane to Chicago.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will give the counsel time to advise with the witness.

Mr. DELLINGER. It is not impossible that on the telephone or in some prior conversation it had been mentioned that some people were interested in this. I really cannot recollect. It was not a big deal either way.

I remember in my conscious memory that the thing came to my attention particularly when I read an article in the newspaper. I am not sure it was on my last trip to Chicago before the convention or perhaps the week earlier. At any rate, en route to Chicago.

Mr. CONLEY. Let me refer to the *Liberation* magazine, November 1967, "Gandhi and Guerrilla" by Arthur Waskow. Reading from this: "Can we do better at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago? What if we use snake dances? And so on. Points to remember"—and it goes on into some other things.

In other words, in that magazine published by you or your group, you are talking about the Japanese snake dance, as early as the November edition 1967, to be used specifically at the Democratic Convention in the following August.

Mr. DELLINGER. I wouldn't be surprised, if we search through the 12 years of *Liberation*, if we could find prior references to the Japanese snake dance. I indicated I had been aware of it for several years.

This particular article was published in a month when we had not decided yet even whether we were going to go to Chicago. Immediately following the activity at the Pentagon, we began to discuss together—many different groups and people—both informally and formally, about where did the movement go from here, how could we be the most effective in stopping the war.

We raised questions probably before the Pentagon on the possibility of going to the Democratic Convention. Would it be valid or not; would it be effective or not. This particular article was written—I am simply trying to be accurate—was written before we had decided whether we would go or not.

The author, if I remember the article, was speculating as part of his general exploration and discussion.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Dellinger, the Chair has never seen a Japanese snake dance, but as it has been described to me I cannot understand how it is a defensive tactic. It appears to me that it can only be an offensive or counteroffensive tactic.

Mr. DELLINGER. I am not an expert on it. But when I described my understanding of it, I think I said that I believe that on occasion in Japan it is used as a method of breaking through police lines, or an attempted method to break through police lines, when people are being kept from places where they think they have a right to be.

There are a lot of very perplexing and difficult problems that anybody who, as I say, wants to move beyond token dissent to actual accomplishment of ending the war and some of the injustice, problems that he has to wrestle with.

If one limits himself first of all to matters which the authorities declare are legal, obviously he will end up in a form of token dissent, or the movement is limited to those. Similarly, to the extent that the police interfere with our right to protest effectively, it is only natural, and I support exploration and analysis and thought about proper methods of not allowing ourselves to be boxed in and protest made ineffective.

I think the discussion of the snake dance is a perfectly proper discussion in a serious movement, even though my own initial instinct and analysis would lead me not to favor it, and I have never taken part in it or encouraged it. But I think within the scope of our movement it is a legitimate method, at least worthy of consideration.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask leave, since I did not want to read this out of context, to read this entire paragraph from which these remarks were taken, which were the subject of the last questions.

Mr. ICHORD. Has that document been made part of the record?

Mr. CONLEY. This particular document, no, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. You wish it to be made part of the record?

Mr. CONLEY. We wish to offer this part of the document dealing on this particular point.

Mr. ICHORD. Why not put the entire document in the record?

Mr. CONLEY. Very well, we will offer it.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you have any objection, Mr. Watson?

Mr. WATSON. No.

Mr. ICHORD. Hearing none, the document will be incorporated into the record. That is from the publication *Liberation*, as I understood it.

Mr. GUTMAN. It is the first page of the Waskow article, right?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 3" follows:)

Gandhi and Guerrilla

ARTHUR WASKOW

The Pentagon siege can be treated as a tactical event to be analyzed and criticized as one possible model for future physical confrontations. This is a necessary process: there will be more occasions for physical confrontations and they ought to be much better planned than the Pentagon was. Can we do better at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago? What if we use those dances? And so on. Points to remember:

- (1) Tactically rather than politically speaking, the Pentagon was a bad choice for resistance—if by that we mean events like the siege, not simply symbolic arrests. The Pentagon is a fort, the Potomac its moat. Urban settings should be more vulnerable.
- (2) Simple logistical preparation—blankets, canteens, etc.—would have helped.
- (3) So would knowledge of stress psychology—such as the despondency characteristic of the last hour before dawn, and how to combat it.
- (4) Although physical confrontations may have to be commanded at the last moment by a previously selected “college of generals,” this ought not to push the Movement toward letting a small elite take over decision-making before or after the confrontation itself. If not guarded against, this could happen fairly easily—especially if physical confrontations play a larger and larger role in the life of the movement.

But the siege can also be seen as a microcosm of the *political* situation; and this seems much more important to me.

The siege was a crude, unplanned mixture of Gandhi and guerrilla. That mixture is what made it a success. Neither the Gandhism (à la Dave Dellinger's teach-in and early arrest) nor the guerrilla-style hostility (à la the efforts of the Revolutionary Contingent to charge the troops) worked or could have worked either morally or politically—if used alone by one or another group of the demonstrators. We now ought to examine the rough guerrilla-Gandhi mixture and try to develop a true synthesis of the two approaches. (I don't know myself, yet, what that means; but I feel a need for not throwing away either side of what we did on the Mall.)

What I mean by the mixture: people half walked through, half charged through the outer troop lines and frequently went around them—through the bushes. They did not wait to convert or convince or use soul-force upon those troops.

Yet once they reached the Mall they established their empathy with the troops, made clear they saw The Enemy as generals and presidents rather than soldiers, and set a crowd discipline that prevented the use of violence even when U.S. marshals beat demonstrators in full sight of the crowd. (One group of sit-downers even refused to move to a tactically more useful spot because they said they had established a warm emotional connection with “their” soldiers, and would not leave them.) And since it became possible to express and use the Gandhian commitment effectively only once people had got up to the Mall, I am saying that on Saturday evening the guerrilla approach was the correct fulfillment of Gandhian intentions.

On the other hand, I think it was a mistake on Sunday morning to follow guerrilla modes of thought with the same rigidity as the majority did when it decided to leave the Mall at 6 o'clock. The decision was urged and justified by some of the S.D.S. leadership as returning the initiative to the Movement rather than the Pentagon and exemplifying the guerrilla tactic of strike-retreat-and-strike-again. But the results were that six hundred to a thousand people, who probably could have been kept together till the sunrise restored their morale, were instead encouraged to retreat (though in fairly good order) and that the S.D.S. national leadership did not go to jail, which in *this* particular case—given that jail meant two to five days rather than two to five years—was a political as well as moral error. Staying out of jail separated the leaders from some of the Movement during days when they could have carried on important political education and re-established moral solidarity. Furthermore, the country was not forced to address the meaning of a really massive two-day occupation of the Mall, followed by large-scale arrests and perhaps a jail-to-bail movement. In short, I am saying that on Sunday morning the Gandhian approach would have been the wisest guerrilla tactic to use, for those who thought in political guerrilla terms, as well as the morally correct one for those who thought in essentially religious terms.

More generally, I would argue that in the present state of the Movement and the country, precisely because large parts of our movement are moving to resistance, with its guerrilla overtones, it is important for us not to forget the central meaning of the Gandhian approach: that those we most oppose are not The Enemy. Certainly this is true as regards the “great center” of American society, whether or not it is true of the “power elite.” If it is these large numbers of the unconvinced whom we must transform if we are to end

... those we must oppose are not The Enemy. . . . It is the unconvinced whom we must transform . . . remake their ideas of what legitimate behavior is. . . .

the war and make any more such wars impossible, then we cannot treat them as our enemies. We must get through to them **what we mean**: we must be able to remake their ideas of what legitimate behavior is so that what we do—and what the police and the President do—is felt to be legitimate.

I emphasize this because I have talked with some people who took part in the Pentagon siege who bitterly reacted to the press distortions of the siege. They felt that if efforts to build community with the soldiers could be described as "taunts" and if the demonstrators' fantastic restraint in the face of police violence could be described as initiating violence, then there was no point to trying so hard—that "America" would define what we do as illegitimate regardless of what it is we do. I do not agree with this. I think that if we stay inside truly legitimate bounds (based on our own moral sense), we will be able to bring the press and the country to join us. Not in one go-round, of course; naturally the press would define as "violence" the most direct challenge Americans have made to the legitimacy of their own government since South Carolina fired on Ft. Sumter, even though we were *not* firing on the Pentagon. But just as those who once condemned mass marches for withdrawal as "irresponsible" now applaud them as "moderate," so those who now are horrified by resistance will come to understand it.

What is Legitimate?

The real problem is, what do *we* feel is legitimate? And here we falter. There are a few of us who feel July 6, 1775, has already arrived and a "Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms" well justified. A few of us feel that July 6 can never arrive in that sense, because the taking up of arms is never wholly justified (though perhaps defensible). And more of us are not certain what to think; but we are *acting* as if violence were not legitimate.

(If one rereads the declarations both of 1775 and 1776 with these moral and political dilemmas on one's mind, they come alive in some new ways. People who have struggled with whether to "support the National Liberation Front" and what that means, can understand why the Declaration of Independence specifies that the colonies may make alliances with foreign powers: imagine the emotional strain on Englishmen born and bred of deciding whether to commit treason in the company of the hereditary enemy, France! And it is important to see that even in the moment of rebellion, the colonists did not treat all Britain as The Enemy or dismiss the possibility of making themselves seem legitimate to their opponents. Instead they specified the King as enemy, and carefully wrote the Declaration to explain and justify their acts and to claim legitimacy for themselves.)

What might we put in a Declaration on the Causes and Necessity of Resistance? I would identify three levels of resistance: withdrawal, challenge and coercion, and I would endorse the first two while rejecting the third. Here is why:



"... the majority ... will decide that if killing Vietnamese requires beating and arresting Americans, the killing of Vietnamese should end."

On *withdrawal*: simply, it is a crime to fight in the American war against Vietnam; therefore it is no crime to refuse the draft. It is a crime to pay for that war; therefore it cannot be a crime to refuse taxes.

On *challenge*: when we attempt to block the Pentagon with our bodies, or interfere with an induction center or a napalm plant or a campus recruiting booth, we are saying something very special—so long as we do not initiate violence in the process. We are saying: "We will not literally force you to stop the Pentagon, but we will force you to use violence on us in order to keep the Pentagon going—just as you use violence on the Vietnamese. We believe that, confronted with such a direct challenge from ever-growing numbers (though a minority) of Americans, the majority will decide to stop: will decide that if killing Vietnamese requires beating and arresting Americans, the killing of Vietnamese should end." It should be noted that even if these challenges are carried on with the greatest toughness and energy—like the Pentagon siege, and more—they are still basically a tactic of persuasion. They are built on the assumption that it is legitimate to be arrested if one violates what seems to be the law, though of course the validity of the law should then be challenged in court.

Another Chance

Finally, what about *coercion*? Here I would draw the line—not necessarily forever, but for now. Given a clear and deliberate decision by the majority of the American people to commit major crimes against another people (or part of its own people), it might become legitimate for a minority to try to prevent such crimes from taking place. But that is not our case. On the last occasion the American people had a chance to decide on war or peace—in 1964—they decided for peace. If they get a chance to make that decision again, in 1968, and decide to support war criminals; or if they decide to end war crimes but their decision is ignored as their last one was; or if they are denied, and cannot create, a way to make a decision on those issues—then this last issue will have to be rethought. (Why give the system another chance? Because any body politic is liable to be tricked and defrauded once; if it allows this to happen twice, it has abandoned the effort to restore democracy. If it deliberately chooses war crimes, then its democraticness is irrelevant.)

But there is every evidence that the American people, confronted with the overwhelming facts that their government is perpetrating war crimes and that a rising proportion of their compatriots are prepared to resist those crimes, are now trying to reinvent the democratic process. They are patriots, and it helps to know that the resisters are patriots too. And if our commitment to our country sometimes becomes unclear to them, it is *our* job to illuminate it—as we did instinctively on the Pentagon Mall when we sang "America the Beautiful."

This determined effort to restore representative democ-

acy and get it to end the war is being honorably expressed (though some of us may think its premises short-sighted and its means ineffectual) in the various "damp-Johnson" organizations. It seems very likely that the liberals who have in two Mobilizations marched alongside those committed to resistance will now be moving out of the "protest-march" syndrome into political action. (It is not only the resistance people who have concluded that protest is not enough.) Our attitude toward these people will be important—to them and to us. It is almost certainly a mistake to try to keep an organized coalition with them; indeed, the worst errors of the direct-action part of the Mobilization were probably a result of the agonizing negotiations over a period of months between people who wanted direct action and people who didn't. The hauling and shoving prevented a careful and detailed working-out of how to make the direct action fully effective. Now that both wings of the Mobilization are clearly moving forward in different directions (both politics and resistance are "forward" from protest), the old coalition will be even more difficult and even less relevant. But a warm and open-ended communication is much more important than ever.

We may find that we meet each other again in Chicago—not at a New Politics convention this time, but at the Democratic National Convention, because the tactical situation will be good and the Convention is a crucial point in the process by which Johnson might again take power. (The black movement may join us too.) What should the terms of this meeting be? If there are 100,000 people on the streets, prepared to do civil disobedience, what should their demands be? To most antiwar Americans, the Democratic Party probably does not seem to be intrinsically evil, like the Pentagon; so an unconditional effort simply to block it would seem unreasonable. But what about a demand that the Convention adjourn in favor of an emergency national primary to nominate the Democratic candidates and vote for or against a peace platform? (The demand will seem especially reasonable if Johnson has lost a number of primaries but is about to be nominated by the machine anyway.) What about a demand that delegations from each state have a proportion of black people equal to the proportion of the Democratic vote cast by blacks in those states? These notions are only initial speculations; the point is that some way should be sought to keep the hopes and demands of the resistance and the political movements reasonably complementary to each other.

To this point I have assumed that the resistance movement will stay mostly on the campus. But there might be conditions under which the liberal middle class would join it. The chief of these is the possibility of a major escalation of the war—the use of nuclear weapons, a land invasion of the North or an attack on China. The Consultation on the Church and Society held in Detroit October 23-26, for example, proposed that the National Council of Churches call a national general strike if any of those three escalations occur (and start preparing now for the possibility). If the middle class does move toward resistance, it will probably be in nonphysical ways: tax refusal, phone-ins to the New York Stock Exchange or the White House, etc. That likelihood makes even sharper the necessity of viewing the Pentagon siege as a political, not merely a tactical, model from which to learn and advance.

Mr. CONLEY. The paragraph I have specific reference to, sir, is:

The Pentagon seige can be treated as a tactical event to be analyzed and criticized as one possible model for future physical confrontations. This is a necessary process: there will be more occasions for physical confrontations and they ought to be much better planned than the Pentagon was. Can we do better at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago? What if we use snake dances? And so on. * * *

Now, in connection with the reference made, Mr. Dellinger, to the Pentagon demonstration, and still on this particular subject of the snake dances, I want to read to you and then ask you to examine, if you will, a document dated Washington, D.C., October 21. This was a document published in connection with the Pentagon demonstrations.

It is captioned "Another demonstration":

Up until now the peace movement has been operating within the rules of the system, cooperating with establishment restrictions and predictable, controllable demonstrations, paying lip service to the myth that these mass protests will change U.S. policies.

The mounting frustration in the peace movement is caused not only by the fact that the war has not been stopped, but also by the growing identification with liberation struggles in the world today.

A radical new form of protest is needed as a next step in the U.S. peace movement. One example of this type of protest is the Snake Dance, used in Japan by the Zengakuren (student organization), which enables the protesters to take over the streets and control their own demonstration.

The *Snake Dance* is made up of successive rows of about fifteen people abreast, with arms linked. Once in action it weaves and sways, maintaining a running pace. It is an easily learned formation which is difficult to break up because of its speed and tightness, and because the Snake Dance can change direction spontaneously and immediately. It was this kind of demonstration which was used in preventing President Eisenhower from visiting Japan in 1960.

All independents and groups interested in a militant form of protest will gather at the Reflecting Pool, by the Lincoln Memorial, under the following symbol:

And there is a symbol which I take to be the snake.

Mr. Dellinger, reading from that particular release—I believe that was released by the Revolutionary Contingent based out of New York City, and it was released in connection with the October 21 demonstrations a year ago—they make mention that this type of formation was used to prevent someone from coming somewhere. This does not appear to me, sir, to be a defensive tactic.

Mr. DELLINGER. First of all, there are a number of points I would like to make.

First of all, I consider it preposterous that a representative of the U.S. Government, which is wedded to violence and is imposing violence on people throughout the world, should be so morally offended by people who are trying to stop the war contemplating or using a method such as the snake dance, which apparently had the terrible effect when used by the Japanese, for whom obviously I take no responsibility, but of making President Eisenhower—if I remember correctly, it says it prevented him from visiting Japan, making him decide he would stay away.

I think it would be much better if the United States would stop interfering in the internal affairs of such nations. The poor Japanese people passed a constitution, actually encouraged by MacArthur, renouncing war, and ever since the U.S. has been involving them in the cold war and trying to remilitarize them.

Secondly, I am curious about how you know so well who put this out. I am only interested in making clear, first of all, it is unsigned, it is not a Mobilization document. I have never seen it before.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, I have not attributed it to you.

Mr. DELLINGER. You have attributed it to somebody else.

Mr. CONLEY. I was very careful to keep it away from your organization; that is correct.

Mr. DELLINGER. It is up to you or them to protest or to inquire. Maybe they don't want to protest.

Since it is unsigned, I am curious about how you identified it with a particular group. But I am willing to pass over that.

Now I want to say further in this context, though, that the title of the Waskow article in which you have introduced the subject, if I remember correctly, "Gandhi and Guerrilla," and I myself believe that the traditional nonviolent movement has been much too passive and much too ineffective and I am not interested in the purity of the movement. I am interested in social effectiveness from back in World War II, when I had much more sympathy with the resistance movement of Europe in their fight against Hitler and Hitlerism than I did with the U.S. Government, which is distrusted and, I think, with reasons that have been proven somewhat accurate. But from those days I myself have always contemplated and tried in various ways to experiment with some kind of new development which might be a synthesis of Gandhi and guerrilla or synthesis of the partisan and resistance-type activity.

I think this is fascinating. I am quite willing to discuss my views, including things that are unclear to me. But I also would like to say it is a very strange concern of the U.S. Government to go into such detail over my views on these subjects. I am not sure what legislative purpose it has.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in this same connection, regardless of its purpose, and I now hand you what has previously been marked Exhibit 15¹ before this committee in connection with earlier testimony, which is a closeup of some of these people practicing the Japanese snake dance in the Lincoln Park, and I ask you, sir, if they are not holding some object, a group of them, across the front row there?

Mr. DELLINGER. They seem to be grasping a pole.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you have occasion when you were watching them practicing the Japanese snake dance to see them holding onto a pole such as this?

Mr. DELLINGER. To the best of my memory, I didn't.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you at any time see any such poles with these groups?

Mr. DELLINGER. No. When I was in Lincoln Park there were a number of groups practicing in different places and practicing different methods. I, to the best of my knowledge, I never saw any physical objects such as poles being used. That is not to say there could not have been. What I am very clear about is that during the entire time of the protest and of convention week that I never saw any pole of that kind in anybody's hands.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may move you to something else—

Mr. ICHORD. At this point, Mr. Counsel, if you are moving to an-

¹ Previously marked "Grubisic Exhibit No. 15-B." See pt. 1, p. 2323, of Oct. 1, 1968, hearings.

other subject, it is now 7 minutes after 12. I think this would be a convenient place to declare an adjournment.

The Chair will declare that the committee is in adjournment until 1:30 p.m.

(Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., Thursday, December 5, 1968, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m. the same day. Subcommittee members present at time of recess: Representatives Ichord and Watson.)

AFTERNOON SESSION—THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1968

(The subcommittee reconvened at 1:45 p.m., Hon. Richard H. Ichord, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.)

(Subcommittee members present: Representatives Ichord and Watson.)

Mr. ICHORD. The committee will come to order. Let there be order in the hearing room.

I mentioned yesterday, Mr. Dellinger, of the Chair's knowledge of the fact that you recently had an operation. How are you feeling today? Do you think we are going to be able to finish the hearings?

Mr. DELLINGER. Oh, yes. I feel better today than yesterday. I am sorry to be late getting back. My slowness had something to do with that. I do move slowly.

Mr. ICHORD. The examination of Mr. Dellinger will continue with the observation that the affirmation continues.

Proceed.

TESTIMONY OF DAVID DELLINGER—Resumed

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may, I would like to direct your attention to Havana, Cuba, this year. Did you have occasion in January of 1968 to attend the International Cultural Congress which was held in Havana, Cuba?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; I have made two trips to Havana, Cuba, this year. One of them was in January when I went—although I considered the State Department in violation of the Constitution, again I nonetheless asked and received State Department validation as a journalist. I only regret that a number of intellectuals, American intellectuals, who had also been invited were unable to attend because they were not full-time practicing journalists.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, I detected that you indicated you had been in Cuba twice this year.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. When was the other occasion you were in Cuba?

Mr. DELLINGER. I went to Havana on November 1st.

Mr. CONLEY. How long did you remain there at that time?

Mr. DELLINGER. I had my operation in Cuba and I have just returned.

Mr. CONLEY. Now in connection with your trip to Cuba of 1968, the first trip this year, while you were in Havana, did you have occasion to grant an interview to the Cuban newspaper *El Mundo*?

Mr. DELLINGER. Quite probably, yes. I remember speaking with a journalist who I think was identified as a freelance journalist, but who quite likely may have—I never saw the interview, but quite likely

might have placed it in *El Mundo* since in Havana itself there are just two dailies.

Mr. CONLEY. If I may, I would like to read you some excerpts from a Havana radio broadcast of February 5, 1968, this radio broadcast dealing with your *El Mundo* interview. Understanding that these are not purporting to be your words—it is the radio station engaging in whatever editorializing they might do, I am sure—if I may, I would like to read you some excerpts and then ask you some questions.

Mr. GUTMAN. Do you have a copy that you could put in front of us?

Mr. ICHORD. Let the witness have a copy.

Mr. GUTMAN. Thank you.

Mr. CONLEY. Reading from the broadcast:

Among the guests at the Havana Cultural Congress, the North American David Dellinger represents the curious paradox of being a fighter for nonviolence who favors violence. Dellinger does not object to the just violence of the Cuban revolution against imperialism or the violence of the Vietnamese against the same evil; he reasons that "Vietnam and Cuba are very important for the development of a new movement in the United States which will gradually turn into an anti-imperialist movement."

Mr. Dellinger, is this substantially in accordance with what you told the reporter for *El Mundo*?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, you can be sure that since probably between this date and January and now—well, I don't know, but I might even have had more than a hundred or several hundred press interviews or conversations of this kind. I cannot remember what I said to him. This was in the lobby of the Havana Libre Hotel, when I was on my way to somewhere else, and I spoke to him briefly.

However, I think I made very clear, to the best of my ability I have made clear in the last 2 days my attitude toward the relationship between violence and nonviolence. Although this is a very elliptical version and it goes on in very short order to combine two rather separate ideas, I certainly can see where he may have drawn this. And as you indicated it went all the way from the newspaper to Havana radio, so there were two stages or three stages involved.

I think, as I said earlier about the Baltimore *Sun* article, I would consider this an example of honest journalism. But I wouldn't want at this point to have those two sentences, particularly as juxtaposed, to be fully representative of my views.

Just to be perfectly clear, it goes on from the discussion of violence and nonviolence—I beg your pardon—no, it is two sentences. Anyway, it goes on from that to talk about the importance of Cuba and Vietnam to the development of new movements in the United States. These are separate ideas I hold. I favor nonviolence. I advocate nonviolence. I practice nonviolence, but I do not repudiate or oppose what I sometimes call the violence of the victims, which in this case includes Vietnam and Cuba, as well as the black people in this country.

Then, as a completely separate idea, I believe that the Cuban and Vietnamese movements for independence and to do away with really what amounts to the imperialist stranglehold on their country, control of their country by foreigners who build up the highest standard of living at home and promote illiteracy and lack of medicine and poverty in Vietnam and Cuba, that the struggle of these two peoples has certainly been an inspiration to me. And I think it has been a challenge to many Americans; it helps speed up the process of evaluation

that goes on in this country. However, I do not consider from my own point of view that the inspiration and the value is inevitably a product of the violence.

Mr. CONLEY. If I may move on to the third paragraph:

The pacifist David Dellinger understands that it is impossible to coexist with the great enemy, and he combats it. He has been to Cuba three times, first in 1960, then in 1964, and now for the Cultural Congress.

Do you recall whether you did or did not make that statement to the reporter for *El Mundo*?

Mr. DELLINGER. By the way, there is even the fourth stage of this meeting with the reporter in the lobby of the Havana Libre Hotel: in English, he to his newspaper; the newspaper to the radio; and the second stage of that from English to Spanish; and then finally back from Spanish to English. So I am quite prepared to talk about all of my views here, including my very vigorous and determined opposition to American imperialism, which he may be referring to as the enemy, but this is not a good way to find out my views.

Mr. ICHORD. May I inquire at this time, Mr. Dellinger, as to whether all of these interviews that you had in Cuba with Havana radio or representatives of Havana radio were in English?

Mr. DELLINGER. I was always speaking in English. The other interviews earlier were on the telephone, where I was one time in New York and one time in Chicago. In all the cases I spoke in English.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you speak Spanish?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; my last trip was a great asset that way. The last trip I was there, I spoke only Spanish and was interviewed in Spanish.

Mr. CONLEY. I think, Mr. Dellinger, this is the reason for our asking you specifically about these, to ask you whether they are a fair quote. If they are not, I think you should indicate they are not.

Mr. DELLINGER. As I said about the Baltimore *Sun* article, this gives me the general impression of being an honest journalistic attempt. I don't think it is completely accurate, as in a couple of points the Baltimore *Sun* article was not. I think I indicated why, because it went through four processes, including condensation. It does not mean a lot to me, this particular sentence you quoted. I would be very happy to discuss who I think the great enemy is, although I think there are many enemies. It is hardly a way of discovering my views.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir, if I may ask you what the great enemy is, as the interpretation you would put on those words.

Mr. DELLINGER. I cannot, out of context here, know for sure whom they were referring to. I would be happy to tell you who I think the enemies of the American people are, the enemies of world peace. They range all the way from the military-industrial complex to the system in which property is considered to be of more value than human beings, in which people are encouraged to work for private profit instead of for social well-being and the good of the community.

I also consider any reliance on violence, even by people I associate with and am willing to work with in certain ways, I consider this reliance on violence to be an enemy and I try to work away from this as much as I can.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, a moment ago I think you used as an illustration of a great enemy, and I thought perhaps this is what

you were alluding to since it does appear in the first paragraph, that perhaps imperialism in itself was the enemy.

Mr. DELLINGER. I consider imperialism—except I don't like to turn these things into stereotypes and slogans, but I think the system of private ownership and control and profitmaking, basically known as the capitalist system in the United States, I think is a violation of economic democracy and the brotherhood of man. I think as it reaches out and spreads its tentacles into Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and so forth, and in that sense at least I always think of imperialism as being the foreign expression of this selfish, competitive profitseeking, nonhumanist, antihuman form of economics, I always identify the foreign expression as being imperialism. I certainly consider that to be the major enemy in terms of anybody who is concerned with economic equality, economic brotherhood, freedom, bringing, as I say, making it possible for people like the Vietnamese and the Cubans to have hospitals, free medical care, wipe out illiteracy, narrow the gap between the very rich and the very poor, raise the level of the standard of living of the people—I consider imperialism to have proven itself unfortunately to be the major enemy, though I don't think that most American people realize this. I think there is a great gap; people quite sincerely think somehow or other they are helping these foreign countries and bringing them freedom or democracy, but I am convinced that the history of the American influence in Dominican Republic, Cuba, Puerto Rico, in entire Latin America and Asia has not been one to bring freedom and justice.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may move you now to the fourth paragraph of this same article, and I quote as follows:

Dellinger says that "Cuba is the only country in the world where this congress—

and I presume this means the Cultural Congress—

where this congress could be held, with such diversity of delegates having different views—all united by a basic sympathy for Cuba and antipathy toward imperialism. The only other country would have been Vietnam, except for the inconvenience of the bombings." He notes that the word "inconvenience" should be in quotes; the bombings are more than that; they are a crime. He says that in Cuba, "intellectuals could avoid the vices and sectarianism and excessive individualism ruining past meetings of this nature."

This, concluding with the words, "except for the inconvenience of the bombings"—is this basically in accord with what you said to the reporter?

Mr. DELLINGER. As I said, not only do I really not remember at all what I said to him on this occasion, but it went through four stages. At the beginning of it, it certainly is a germ of an idea that I believe in and would be happy to express to you or maybe explain to you. That is, that this particular congress, due to the prestige of Vietnam and the prestige of Cuba amongst the world intellectuals and among humanitarians of many varieties, it was possible to bring together delegates from countries and from political groups which are in very serious opposition to each other.

Of course, the Soviet's Czechoslovakia invasion had not taken place at that time. That is an example. There were delegates from Czechoslovakia and from the Soviet Union. But there were also delegations from the traditional Communist parties, which, by the way, the Cubans are very much in conflict with. There were delegates from

liberal and anti-Communist groups. There were delegates from Franco Spain. It was a situation in which there were several occasions on which the congress could have broken down with some kind of violent antipathy.

When it came close to reaching this point, when, for example, delegates from several countries attacked the Soviet Union very strongly for being bureaucratic for having taken on the nature of some imperialist aspects, and when obviously delegates from the Soviet Union and from the traditional Communist Party very much resented this. However, as I say, not entirely but to a great extent through the leadership and the moral authority of the Cubans and the Vietnamese, the people were able to express these differences and still not fly off into many splinters. The other factor is that a number of the people who were attending that conference, I know from my own personal experience, had been denied visas to enter the United States.

I think particularly of Jean-Pierre Vigier, who is a military expert in France who had testified before the War Crimes Tribunal on the type of weaponry being employed by the United States in Vietnam. As to the pattern of the attacks, for example, he had, through very elaborate and conscientious studies, established that the United States had concentrated its bombing on Catholic villages in Vietnam because it assumed apparently that the Catholics would be the first to revolt and therefore they should be hit the hardest, and this would undermine the morale and unity of Vietnam.

When I heard him and noticed his very objective and scientific approach to these things, the devastating nature of his research and findings, I became interested in having him appear on an American television program so that the American people could hear these things and thought that it would be appropriate for him to testify or appear on television and have somebody from the Pentagon or whoever disagreed with him, and who supposedly had information, to answer him. And in that way the American people could hear both sides and decide. However, neither did the Pentagon nor the State Department answer. He was unable to obtain a visa to enter this country. However, he did get a visa to go to Cuba.

As I say, there were a number of factors that would be behind the germ of the idea that is summarized here.

Mr. CONLEY. Maybe I look at things with too much simplicity, but the germ of the idea I see here is simply that Cuba or Vietnam, "except for the inconvenience of the bombings," are the two countries geographically—I think of it more geographically than politically—that could hold this type of conference.

Have I reduced it to too much simplicity?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I think you have. And again—sometimes I wonder if I take too long in my answers, but I answered at some length what I would have in mind. I somewhat disassociate myself from this article because of the number of stages it went through. I would rather, again, have my own words stand rather than yours.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, in connection with this conference which was held in Havana, was a man by the name of David Siqueiros a delegate to this conference?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. He was not only a delegate. If you don't mind, I would like to give him as an example of what I was indicating before.

Because at the conference there were other people, not only artists like himself, but in some cases nonartists, who were very hostile to David Siqueiros on the belief that he was involved in the execution of Leon Trotsky. So there was very great personal tension and political tension between Siqueiros and a number of people, and it threatened to lead to all kinds of situations.

As I say, basically the Cubans, with an assist from Vietnam, managed to put on a conference in which people like Siqueiros and people who hate Siqueiros were able to take part.

It is fascinating to me also because the State Department denied a number of people who had come to mind, Robert Lowell, the poet, a number of people like that, Dwight Macdonald, I believe, the critic, a number of people who had been active in the Congress for Cultural Freedom, had been very anti-Communist—and to this day, so far as I know, tend to be that way—a number of those people had been invited to the congress, applied to the State Department to go, but were told that this was a monolithic political show and therefore it was not a legitimate cultural congress for them to go to.

When I got there, I discovered this kind of differentiation and difference and heterogeneity.

Mr. ICHORD. Was David Siqueiros a delegate from the Soviet Union?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, he was a delegate from Mexico. I don't presume to know all of his history or enough to say it.

Mr. CONLEY. Some of his history is that he is supposed to have been involved in an attempt to murder Leon Trotsky.

Mr. DELLINGER. I believe that is right. He is considered to have been a Stalinist who supported or took part in some of the violence of the Communists of that period. He was very much resented and even hated by a number of the other delegates. There was an occasion when it almost came to blows.

Mr. ICHORD. He was never prosecuted for attempted assassination?

Mr. DELLINGER. It is a little vague in my memory as to exactly what he did or didn't do.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Dellinger, before we leave this Havana radio broadcast of February 5, earlier you made a number of comments about our inability to communicate with one another. Do you find it rather disconcerting that your friend down in Havana, Cuba, made this statement, that you represent "the curious paradox of being a fighter for nonviolence who favors violence"?

Would you find it rather disconcerting that even your friends down in Cuba would find you equally paradoxical, as perhaps some members of this committee would find you?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, I think there is a paradox involved.

Mr. WATSON. In fact, everyone, even your friends, finds it very difficult to understand you?

Mr. DELLINGER. I didn't say that.

Mr. WATSON. It does not disturb you that he referred to you as a curious paradox?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, I don't feel disturbed about this. If I had been there at the time, I would have tried to expatiate on it. As I say, I think it is a difficult thing about people who believe in nonviolence, who believe that violence tends to become corrupting and self-defeating and yet are unwilling to be assigned to a token position of

dissent and are struggling for some method in which the humanist and other values of nonviolence can be preserved and yet can be politically effective.

I spoke about my own interest in the possibility of some kind of combination of what Arthur Waskow called Gandhi and Guerrilla, what I thought earlier of traditional pacifism and resistance activities of World War II. I don't know what the exact answer is. I am experimenting. A lot of other people are. It is not surprising to me, particularly since we have no clear-cut doctrinaire position on it; it confuses a number of people.

Mr. WATSON. So the major thrust of my question was that since the journalist in Cuba, whom you described as making an honest effort at journalism, describes you as a curious paradox—in other words, he found you at least difficult to understand so far as being non-violent but favoring violence—you must conclude that it would be difficult for some of us to understand how you can be both for and against the same thing at the same time. That is the only point I am trying to make, if you will perhaps make that concession, which I am sure you will not. Thank you.

Mr. GUTMAN. Let the record show that the Congressman is correct, the concession is not made.

Mr. ICHORD. Let us be in order.

Mr. DELLINGER. No, I don't object to the fact that this is a difficult idea to understand. I am quite ready to concede that to you or anybody else, including many people I work with. I would not want to include in that some of the other things that we have discussed, that is all.

Mr. WATSON. May I ask you one other question?

I asked it of the other gentleman. When you make these statements, which obviously now you do not mean to be taken in their normal and literal meaning and interpretation, do you explain to those to whom you articulate these positions that you really don't mean for them to be taken and accepted in the normal manner?

Mr. DELLINGER. I am quite confused by what you mean by that.

Mr. WATSON. I wanted to confuse the question purposely with the thought it might get through to you. I have been making my questions simple, and you accused me of simplicity. I wanted to make the question complicated.

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't know what statements you are referring to. I want to make clear that I do not have a double standard of what I say or where. My views I try to say as openly whether it is you or Averell Harriman or somebody from the Soviet Union or Vietnam.

Mr. ICHORD. Proceed with the questioning.

Mr. CONLEY. Directing your attention to June 1968, were you in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on June 16, 1968?

Mr. DELLINGER. Approximately that time I had a very brief stop-over in Prague, yes, on a trip to Prague. I don't know if that is the exact date.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you at that time meet with Tran Van Anh and Phan Van Chuong, the Viet Cong representatives in Prague? Please excuse my pronunciation, sir.

Mr. DELLINGER. With that reservation, yes.

Mr. CONLEY. What other Americans were present at that meeting?

Mr. DELLINGER. As I said earlier, I really don't care to discuss the

activities of other people. As a matter of fact, I am just thinking about this out loud, but since I know you already know who was there; in fact as I think it was testified before this committee—

Mr. CONLEY. That was going to be my next question, sir.

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't think I am involving anybody in a public way that might lead to attack and danger that he is not already subject to.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Robert Greenblatt?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, Mr. Greenblatt.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir.

Mr. DELLINGER. Now maybe before you proceed with this line of questioning, if I could just make a little statement.

I have had intimate contacts with both the NLF and representatives from North Vietnam, including both Xuan Thuy, who is head of the DRV delegation in Paris, and Madam Binh, who is head of the NLF delegation. Now the sole purpose of these has not been, I will try to say that right, the sole purpose has not been to secure the release of American prisoners, but this has been a very important aspect of my contacts with these people. It is a very touchy and delicate area, as I am sure you recognize. And we have been successful in playing a part at least in the release, I would have to stop to count them up, but in at least, well, a number of prisoners, some by the NLF and some by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

In addition to my reservations I said about involving other people who can better speak for themselves, in this particular area I am very anxious not to do anything which might conceivably jeopardize future releases and complicate those relations.

Mr. ICHORD. I think the questions will be connected with the Chicago demonstration.

Mr. CONLEY. I think you are anticipating again malice in my heart.

Mr. DELLINGER. I wanted to remind you of the delicacy of this.

Mr. CONLEY. Were there any other Americans besides you and Robert Greenblatt, bearing in mind I have not asked you to identify those persons? I simply ask you, Were there other Americans present?

Mr. DELLINGER. To the best of my memory, no.

Mr. CONLEY. You were the only two Americans present?

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't want to give a wrong answer. I can't remember anybody else present. I am trying to think if there could have been, since you are asking.

Mr. CONLEY. At this meeting did you discuss with the Viet Cong the meeting which was to be held in September 1968 in Budapest between American, Viet Cong, and North Vietnamese activities?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; I always favor face-to-face contacts, as I say, whether it is Averell Harriman or Vietnamese, although I place more faith and hope in the contacts between the American antiwar movement and the Vietnamese. I have always attempted to encourage first-hand contact and firsthand information.

On this occasion we discussed the possibility of some kind of meeting between Americans and the National Liberation Front and representatives from North Vietnam.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, bearing in mind that we are still talking about June 16 or thereabouts in Prague, Czechoslovakia, at this meeting did not the Viet Cong recommend only, and using the exact quotes, if I

may, "those politically most advanced" should be invited from the United States?

MR. DELLINGER. Well, it is interesting to me about direct quotes. I happen to know that the U.S. Government illegally seized Mr. Greenblatt's papers, and undoubtedly there are notes of his which can be given as direct quotes. The fact is that in these kinds of conversations, you know, one jots down a suggestion to remember something. However, I have no objection to describing exactly how I interpret what that note meant and what the facts were. I helped to arrange—

MR. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, I don't want to mislead you into believing that this quote is based upon a note that was seized from some person. I don't want to lead you down that primrose path. But you go ahead and answer.

MR. DELLINGER. Well, the devious methods of the police state in which telephone conversations, private meetings, are bugged and recorded and which undercover agents who pose as something which they are not and pry into the private affairs and guaranteed political associations of the American people, as well as all over the world—these methods elude me. However, I consider it extremely unlikely that at this particular time somebody in the meeting could give you a direct quote. Perhaps you have been violating the internal democracy of Czechoslovakia, along with that of the United States, and perhaps the room in which we met was bugged. I know about these methods, in general, and I am certainly willing to deal with the question, although I must say I have scorn for these methods and consider them to be self-defeating.

MR. CONLEY. May we get back to the question, which was "those politically most advanced." Did they not, in fact, indicate to you or recommend that these are the persons that should be invited from the United States?

MR. DELLINGER. Let me tell you what did happen in our conversations. I am not trying to pin down the exact month, but earlier, beginning in Hanoi, where I had proposed that they should, within the limits possible under the very heavy bombing that Vietnam was suffering, they should give visas to American reporters and television people and to many others so as to have face-to-face contact and accurate information, beginning then and through a series of conversations we arranged a meeting which took place in Bratislava approximately 1 year earlier, and at that meeting—

MR. CONLEY. Let us not go into Bratislava.

MR. DELLINGER. It is the contrast that is involved.

MR. CONLEY. We are going to get to Bratislava in a little while.

MR. DELLINGER. In this context it would be better if I set up the contrast. What we decided was that this was a conference in Bratislava at which it would be valuable to have a wide range of people of a variety of political views and attitudes, including some people who might not even be sure that they were against war, but who were tending in that direction. It would be a healthy thing to have a face-to-face contact in conference among people of this kind.

In Budapest a year later we felt, partly because this other conference had taken place, but partly also because of the growth in numbers and intensity of the antiwar movement, that it would be more useful to have people who were clearly part of the active movement to have

this experience of meeting face to face and holding protracted discussions with the Vietnamese. That is what was meant by whatever the phrase that came from, or at least my understanding of what might have been meant by the phrase "politically most advanced," or whatever you said.

Mr. CONLEY. Is not another way to put that, and again I am engaged in being simple, "to leave the dupes at home"?

Mr. DELLINGER. I really don't think in terms of "dupes." I never have. It is public knowledge that some of the types of people we invited to Bratislava were not actively involved in the antiwar movement, but just as I encouraged Hanoi to invite people from the mass media to come and see the bombing and report to the American people, similarly it would be useful to have people who had suspicions or hostilities, even, to the NLF who had been brainwashed, if I could put it that way, by a diet of American propaganda about terrorists, and so forth, I thought there would be some benefits from having them sit down together with the NLF.

At that meeting many people, including myself, tried to ask searching questions of them and to express our own viewpoint. There was no question of dupes or nondupes.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may, was not another item on the proposed agenda discussions that were had between the Viet Cong who were experienced in attempting to cause disaffection among U.S. soldiers and Americans who were engaging in the same type activity?

Mr. DELLINGER. First of all, I just prefer to call them the National Liberation Front. Viet Cong is a little bit like the term "nigger" or "Polack" or something of that kind. Now, what was planned and envisioned was that there would be a discussion of all forms of antiwar activity. Now, these would include, for example—in fact, at our earlier meeting the first item of the report from the NLF was a report on the military situation. However, this was not interpreted and did not mean that the Americans would go home and organize a military campaign against the American Government.

In much the same kind of context, it is quite possible, although I don't remember specifically, that there would have been planned—I did not attend this meeting by the way because I thought other people should have the opportunity—but it is quite possible amongst the Vietnamese reports, besides reports of the military situation, would be reports on disaffection within the Armed Forces because this is something which has always interested me. There are rumors about groups of soldiers in Vietnam who refused to go into battle or who desert and hide out in Saigon. Even I read some things about people going over to the other side. On the other hand, there is a very sharp and strong military censorship which often even denies things after they have been made public and are known basically to be true.

Mr. ICHORD. Of course, that works on both sides. There are a number of Viet Cong or NLF or North Vietnamese who come over to the American and South Vietnamese side, too.

Mr. DELLINGER. That is correct. In any event, I myself certainly have interest in any information that anybody, whether Vietnamese from the South—I asked questions of this kind when I was in Saigon on an early visit—Vietnamese from the South or Vietnamese from

the National Liberation Front, what have you, any information they might have about this would certainly be of interest to me.

Mr. CONLEY. Being specific in this area, did not the Viet Cong, the National Liberation Front, or the North Vietnamese specifically ask for, and I quote, sir, "competent people to discuss work among soldiers since a major item is exchange of experience and coordination of activities"?

Mr. DELLINGER. That does not sound quite kosher to me. I did not have the benefit of a tape recorder, and I have had many, many conversations before and since with the Vietnamese and others. It does not sound quite like the way they talk or the way I talk when I am with them. I volunteered here, as I will anywhere, my great interest in the coffeehouse program, my great interest in bringing the facts about the war to American soldiers, my support in general of desertion, of refusal to commit war crimes, of any acts which will bring the war to an end and save the lives of Vietnamese and Americans.

I certainly, in talking to the Vietnamese tomorrow, would tell them that one of the things we are doing is carrying out this coffeehouse program. However, I have always made clear and specifically at the earlier conference when I made an opening speech—if I remember correctly, it was an opening speech—a great deal of my emphasis was on the fact that, as the Vietnamese seemed to themselves emphasize, every people had to work out their own problems and develop their own indigenous movement and, in my view, a whole generation of idealists had been led astray because they had, perhaps for understandable reasons, been subservient to a foreign power, namely, Moscow, and that the present movement in the United States was not that kind of movement.

I wanted to make it very clear to the Vietnamese that we were indigenous and patriotic Americans who were opposed to imperialism and certain other forms of our society; that they must understand from the beginning we would have differences from them as well as agreements with them. It is in this context we have always operated. Therefore the words you read to me don't sound quite correct.

Mr. CONLEY. You don't think they wanted competent people?

Mr. DELLINGER. I am trying not to make a game of it. It sounds like you are.

Mr. CONLEY. I am trying not to.

Mr. DELLINGER. Obviously they want competent people.

Mr. CONLEY. To discuss work among soldiers?

Mr. DELLINGER. What I have tried to indicate is that I think they want competent people, including people who work in draft resistance, teach-ins, anything else; they would like to have some sense of what is going on here, although it is quite clear to me that they realize the issue will be resolved on the battlefield and not basically by the American movement.

Mr. ICHORD. In that connection, Mr. Dellinger, do you consider propaganda distributed on the battlefield to American soldiers in South Vietnam, such as one document that I picked up when I was last in South Vietnam, saying, "Yankee, go home," to be not part of the war effort on the part of the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese?

Mr. DELLINGER. I think it is. My understanding is that in almost all wars both sides, one way or another, try to communicate, nowadays

broadcast, to the other side pointing out that their side is unjust and they should lay down their arms.

Mr. ICHORD. This paper said, "Yankee, go home, do not die here." You would have to interpret that as trying to destroy the morale of the soldiers.

Mr. DELLINGER. I know they have broadcast, and similarly the United States drops leaflets on the other side. I consider this a very difficult area. For myself, although I made very clear I hope that every American boy will refuse to go to Vietnam and refuse to take part in other imperialist ventures, I have some simple reservations in terms of when a person is actually on the scene. It is not that I don't want him to be able responsibly and in the proper way, my idea of the proper way or his, to be able to leave, but I would be very slow to say something to somebody as he was going into battle, you know, at that very moment, because obviously it can lead to all kinds of difficulties and problems for him. So, I myself, as it happens, have never engaged in this kind of activity, although I do my best to encourage everybody to refuse to serve in the Armed Forces.

Mr. WATSON. You encourage everybody to refuse to serve in the Armed Forces?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; particularly at the present time.

Mr. WATSON. Does that extend to encouragement or at least being delighted with those who would desert the military forces?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. I think I indicated on several occasions I support those who have taken political asylum in Sweden, France, Holland, and so forth. I am fascinated by the fact that originally we provided asylum in the United States to people who opposed militarism and aggression.

Mr. WATSON. It is evident from your earlier statement that you do everything that you can to assist or carry out your beliefs.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, it would be interesting to look back. Did I say "to assist"? I think I said "to encourage."

Mr. WATSON. You agreed that you would do everything you can to carry out your beliefs and your desires?

Mr. DELLINGER. I am trying to be very candid because I believe in my beliefs and I believe in my actions.

Mr. WATSON. Try it on this one, yes or no.

Mr. DELLINGER. The way you phrased it, I think I have to exercise some reservations because there are things that some people might think might assist in this case which I wouldn't undertake for a variety of reasons. Without really going into it very well, I have explained that I consider it a complex problem. If a group of soldiers is going back in battle, I would be very slow to do something at that moment to demoralize them or to make them feel spiritually ill at ease when they went out. This is a very difficult question that I don't have to face because I am not ordinarily in that situation.

Mr. WATSON. You are not concerned about any spiritual aspects of the matter, are you, Mr. Dellinger?

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't know where you draw that conclusion. I just used the word.

Mr. WATSON. You just used the word.

Mr. DELLINGER. I was not playing a game when I used it.

Mr. WATSON. You are not really concerned about that, are you? Do you, in your youth movement, encourage people to attend church?

Mr. DELLINGER. Unfortunately it is my own view, although I did study for the Christian ministry. And again I am not sure, I am always happy to expound my views, but this seems quite remote; unfortunately I believe, speaking generally of the organized church, it is not a force that has opposed war, stood for justice, or really been for the greatest spiritual advancement of the people. I would like to distinguish that there are obviously great numbers of individual clergymen, individual Christians, individual Jews, adherents of various religions, who are very sincere and try to carry through this way.

In my own life and my own belief, I believe the institutions, in general, tend to interfere with the very goals that they purport to serve.

Mr. WATSON. In any instance, anything which tends to restrict the individualism of a person—

Mr. DELLINGER. Again I haven't said such a thing because I do believe in a combination of what might be called individualism and social solidarity. I have indicated that in a number of areas. I am opposed to the form of individualism which is expressed under capitalism, where people work for their own selfish economic interest instead of working for the common good.

Mr. WATSON. You are against the profit motive?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I am.

Mr. WATSON. I don't want again to get you in a paradox here, but you are against the Government. Of course, we understand that.

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't know if I got into that.

Mr. WATSON. But you are. That is a fair assumption? You don't like the established Government, do you?

Mr. DELLINGER. I do not.

Mr. WATSON. If you are against profit and the people running the business, you would have to turn it over to the Government. You are against the Government who would run it. Would you be satisfied if you and the Mobilization Committee ran it?

Mr. DELLINGER. Again, I find it difficult to accept your summary of my views. I generally don't make blanket indictments of quite that kind. I happen to advocate some kind of combination of political democracy and economic democracy, some kind of communal solidarity and equality, with maximum possible decentralization and individual responsibility.

Mr. WATSON. You used the word "communal." Am I to interpret that in the usual meaning, or do you have a different interpretation?

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't know. I used the word "communal"—

Mr. WATSON. Everybody is to live—

Mr. DELLINGER. In my own life and interest, my first major interest in this was at the time that I was an active church member, when I was very impressed by the early disciples of Jesus, who abandoned all private ownership and, as it says in the Bible, there was neither rich nor poor among them.

Mr. WATSON. The Bible says that you shall always have the poor with you. I am concerned with this aspect because I have a relation to it, I have a twin brother who is a minister. We won't pursue it further. Obviously he is of the category you condemn, he is of the established church.

Mr. DELLINGER. I would not want to condemn sight unseen. I have a great deal of respect for the established church, both clergy and laity.

Mr. ICHORD. Let us proceed with the questioning.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if I may—again reminding you that we are talking about your visit to Prague, Czechoslovakia, in June 1968—put to you, sir, was not a code worked out for telegrams to be sent between you and the Viet Cong office in Prague so that, for example, the word “Harry” in a telegram would be “Hungary” and the word “Peter” would mean “Poland”? Was such a code worked out by you and the representatives of the North Vietnam Government?

Mr. DELLINGER. Absolutely. I do everything I can—although I myself am public about just about everything I do and believe, in preparing for something of that kind, I would certainly attempt to maintain the privacy of communication, which I think is our right and which I think the Government constantly violates. Now this is a very unimportant matter. As a matter of fact, I wouldn't have had enough interest to do this, but I am quite willing to use this kind of very simple code, as I think all businesses do—I mean businesses even use that code if they are going to announce a new model or new price.

Mr. CONLEY. Who did propose the idea of the code then?

Mr. DELLINGER. It emerged from our discussions of four people.

Mr. CONLEY. You and Mr. Greenblatt and two others?

Mr. DELLINGER. The two others you mentioned, Tran Van Anh and Phan Van Chuong.

Mr. CONLEY. We may assume from your remarks it was not your idea, but one of the other three?

Mr. DELLINGER. Not necessarily. You see, it is the same as going to Bratislava. We did not hold any press conference or make any press announcement beforehand because we wanted to be able to meet without being harassed by CIA agents and reporters. It was difficult enough bringing together people from these three different groups, that is, the two Vietnamese and the American, and we didn't want to be meeting in a goldfish bowl. Although we made no elaborate attempts to keep it secret, nonetheless we were relatively quiet about it. As soon as the meeting was over, we were quite prepared to give all and any information. The same way here. There was also another factor. For example, a captain in the Army, who served in Vietnam and is opposed to the war, was part of a group which we were having go to Sweden to visit deserters to find out what the reason for their desertion was, to give factual reports to the American people.

This was not kept secret because we did not use the code. Because one of your informers discovered the information, he was denied a passport by the State Department and was unable to make the trip. So, you know, there are certain practical considerations which would motivate me. So although, in general, I don't bother with such things, I could very well have been the one to suggest it just to keep it quiet a little bit and to prevent the State Department from denying passports or visas to some of the people who were going, that we keep it a little bit quiet, also, so they might not bug the room in Hungary, as they may have well bugged the room in Prague.

Mr. CONLEY. Were there others at the meeting—Mr. Greenblatt—during this trip?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; Mr. Greenblatt accompanied me on at least two visits to Averell Harriman and one to Cyrus Vance and on perhaps three visits, two or three visits, with the North Vietnamese delegation, including Xuan Thuy, the head of the delegation, and Colonel Ha Van Lau and a number of others.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Greenblatt also met with Ambassador Harriman, did he not?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, he did——

Mr. CONLEY. Were you aware——

Mr. DELLINGER.—to the best of my memory.

Mr. CONLEY. Were you aware, sir, that a Mr. Wilfred Burchett briefed Robert Greenblatt before his meeting with Harriman?

Mr. DELLINGER. The occasion you are referring to is probably one in which I called up Wilfred Burchett, whom I originally met in his home in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, some years ago. I knew he was in Paris. He is a journalist and a correspondent, and I consider him to be a very honest journalist and very helpful. I don't remember that Mr. Greenblatt knew him before. The way I remember it is that I called Wilfred and suggested that we meet and have a drink and talk about things and that Mr. Greenblatt and I met with Mr. Burchett on not one, but at least two, occasions.

I don't look at this as briefing. I look at this as exchange of ideas and information since none of us follow party lines or receive orders from anybody.

Mr. CONLEY. This is the same Wilfred Burchett, is it not, who was a participant in the Communist brainwashing campaign against American prisoners of war during the Korean war?

Mr. DELLINGER. Do you expect me to consider that a serious question and answer it?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. DELLINGER. Repeat it, please, and I will do my best.

Mr. CONLEY. Were you not aware that Wilfred Burchett was a participant in the Communist brainwashing campaign against American prisoners of war in Korea?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, I have no knowledge of that. In fact, I am not an expert on that phase of the Korean war. You know, as a layman and from a distance, there were some things about the whole treatment of the prisoners, on both sides, by the way, which made me a little uneasy. As I say, I was not in a position, for a variety of reasons, to really explore this very thoroughly.

My chief concern, since I have been in Vietnam, was to try to investigate whether the Vietnamese were doing the kind of brainwashing, which I don't know whether the Koreans did or not, but of which they were accused, but I did investigate that and felt convinced that they were not brainwashing anybody.

On the other hand, I found out that one of the bars to the release of more American prisoners is that when arrangements have been made and the prisoners are on their way home, the Army, the State Department—and on one occasion the prisoners were told the word came right from the White House—put pressure on the released prisoners to go to the base in Thailand from which Vietnam was being bombed and there to “debrief” them before they were allowed to speak to the press.

In other words, I think there is at least some suspicion of brainwashing on the American authorities' part. I am against brainwashing, whoever does it.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, I have in my hand here an extract from the Subcommittee on the Korean War Atrocities of the Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 83d Congress, December 4, 1953, wherein appears the sworn testimony of former prisoner of war Lieutenant Colonel Robert Abbott of the United States Infantry, wherein he identifies this Wilfred Burchett as a person who visited prisoner-of-war camps in an effort to sway the prisoners and to get statements from them and to create unrest.

Now, sir, in the light of that testimony which is in our possession, do you still say that you were not aware that Mr. Burchett had previously participated in the Communist brainwashing campaign against American prisoners of war?

Mr. DELLINGER. First of all, I never saw that statement before. Secondly, I would have to consider it quite likely it could be as unreliable as some of the statements made by the committee, the present committee, particularly in its October sessions, when the staff and witnesses told a number of fanciful and untrue things.

Mr. CONLEY. Sir, I have to assume, as I do with you, sir, that a man who takes the oath intends to tell the truth.

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, you can assume that, and I don't know any of the people involved. I am not going to challenge their veracity, but I don't automatically believe it because you have read it to me from that committee. I will tell you very frankly that when I went to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 1966, I had some suspicions about the accuracy of Wilfred Burchett as a correspondent. I myself am quite aware of how partisans on both sides of a controversy tend to distort the truth.

I think the record of Communist journalists during the twenties and thirties and later includes many, many instances of distortion and propaganda which later was exposed not to be true.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you think the record is pretty good today? You only mentioned the thirties and twenties.

Mr. DELLINGER. I was thinking this was the period of the slave labor camps and the executions, and so on. I think there has been a modification in a healthy direction. There has been some liberalization process which has taken place, but the record is not one that I consider satisfactory today.

The journalistic covering of the Soviet-Czechoslovakian invasion is an example. Anyway I did not know Wilfred Burchett. Because he had access to information and also had insights which many other people did not. he is occasionally quoted in the American press. Because of the kind of pressures that exist in this society. I never saw him quoted without being referred to in some invidious way. To the very least, as the Australian Communist journalist, which is a way, you know, of discrediting him. I had no idea whether he would turn out to be an honest journalist or dishonest journalist.

I will say I spent considerable time with him in Cambodia on both occasions before I visited North Vietnam. I talked with him at length about what he had seen and what the realities were. I had far more opportunity to check these things out during my visit than he. I am sure, anticipated because it involved the kind of traveling under intense bombardment which nobody else had been permitted to do during that time, with the exception of himself.

I found out that he was utterly reliable. There might be something

that I would interpret differently, but I found as a journalist he was utterly reliable and honest. I have a great deal of respect for him. If I wanted to find out facts about something, I would certainly take advantage of the opportunity of meeting with him in Paris so as to have whatever up-to-date knowledge I could before meeting either with the Vietnamese or the Americans.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Dellinger, you made the statement that you understood that partisans on both sides would tend to distort the truth.

Mr. DELLINGER. Often do; not all times.

Mr. WATSON. Of course, you are partisan. Would that apply to you?

Mr. DELLINGER. I try not to, but obviously I have my own biases and beliefs. I think nobody is a completely objective observer. But I have learned through the years that to exaggerate or distort—first of all that one may do it unconsciously. And that is bad enough. But to stretch the truth a little bit or the facts in order to gain a temporary advantage is self-defeating and corrupting, and I try to avoid it.

Mr. WATSON. If a report were to reach you that could be construed as pro- or anti-American, your first inclination would be to construe it anti-American?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, first of all—

Mr. WATSON. In reference to the war in Vietnam?

Mr. DELLINGER. No. I think there is a glorious American tradition of belief in self-determination and of struggling and striving for democracy even though that has been greatly frustrated. Therefore, to me I think it is the most pro-American thing I know and the greatest hope in the country that so many people, particularly young people, are speaking up for the truth as they see it and are able to get away from the very stupid and wrong concept of "my country, right or wrong" or "Whatever my country does is right."

If a Communist country adopts that position, I oppose it. If a capitalist country adopts that position, I oppose it. My own country or somebody else's country, I don't believe in it.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, you do believe that might be pro-American in reference to our position in Vietnam?

Mr. DELLINGER. I did not say that.

Mr. WATSON. Then the answer to my earlier question is simply, if you heard a report which could either be construed pro- or anti-American in reference to Vietnam, your construction would be anti-American?

Mr. DELLINGER. No; I, for example, heard a report—

Mr. WATSON. Tell us something good that America has done.

Mr. DELLINGER. This is not good, but let me give you an example.

Mr. WATSON. Tell me one good thing that we have done over there.

Mr. DELLINGER. That is pretty hard. You are asking a difficult question. I think many sincere people have thought they were doing something good when they tried to, well—

Mr. WATSON. You can think offhand of nothing good, not one single good thing?

Mr. DELLINGER. I didn't say that. I think many people have gone over there, for example, to bring medical aid. I know people personally who have done educational and other constructive work in Vietnam. However, as in the well-known case of, I forget his name—anyway a number of the leading people, also unknown people, have gone over

there and have worked for a few months and a few years in the American aid program and on the constructive side have felt in the end that the purpose of this and the success of this was completely defeated by the, first of all, by the American militarism which was going on at the same time and, secondly, because of the fact that when a country is trying to impose its will upon another country, then even the good things that that country does turn to ashes in the people's mouths.

I would certainly give every credit to many, many individuals, some of whom I know and some of whom I don't, who have gone over to Vietnam with that kind of aim. I would like to withdraw all American troops and end American attempts to dominate Vietnamese life so that this kind of constructive relationship could take place between American people and Vietnamese people, which I very much believe in.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, are you not the author of the introduction to Mr. Burchett's forthcoming book on Vietnam?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. I was going to mention that earlier.

Mr. CONLEY. Are you also not planning to address a rally tonight, the *Guardian* rally in New York City, with Mr. Burchett?

Mr. DELLINGER. Not that I know of. I was earlier asked if I could come, but because of my operation I indicated that I did not expect to be able to come there.

I did expect to speak with Mr. Burchett at a conference in Montreal last weekend. I also had to cancel out on that. I will be happy to appear on any platform anywhere with Mr. Burchett, even though we might have differences of interpretation.

Mr. CONLEY. May I suggest, on your next occasion of visiting with him, you make inquiry about the question I put to you about the Communist brainwashing campaign in Korea several years ago.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

I think I should come to his defense a little bit on that, because I discussed with him the question of possible Vietnamese brainwashing of Americans. First of all, I became assured, insofar as it was possible, that this is not taking place. Also that the prisoners released have made this pretty clear—the first release of NLF prisoners, the men were whisked away to Okinawa and kept incommunicado for months and had not been released until they had been threatened and intimidated so that they did not speak.

From these conversations with Mr. Burchett, I feel convinced that he is opposed to brainwashing and would neither support it nor take part in it, even though I have to plead ignorance of the history or the information that has been adduced on both sides in the Korean war.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, moving to another area, the participation by you in the Bratislava conference, I wish to hand to you at this time a copy of a letter. It is addressed, "Dear friend." It is dated August 22, 1967, which solicits participation in a conference then scheduled for Prague.

I ask you to advise the committee as to the identity of those people to whom this letter was sent.

Mr. DELLINGER. We sent out a number of communications. Apparently this went, as near as I can tell from the way it reads in the context, it went to people who were part of the delegation. I think most of their names have appeared. Most of them wrote re-

ports of the visit when they came back, and others were mentioned, I remember, in *Newsweek* and *Time*.

Mr. CONLEY. Would you identify those that you recall?

Mr. DELLINGER. I really can't go through the business of, because I am sure it would be incomplete and, as I have indicated, spotty. That is not the main reason. As I indicated earlier, I myself have received deadly bombs and grenades through the mail, which only by a miracle failed to kill my children, who got the mail.

According to the post office inspectors, on at least two previous occasions, bombs which were intended for me blew up in the post office when they were being handled.

It is that delicate. Yet my children at that time normally picked up the mail and walked a mile with it to my country home. It was by accident I picked it up in the car, and it is a miracle when I opened it, it did not explode, because I was a little suspicious and opened it cautiously.

Under those circumstances, I refuse. I think it is unwise for me at this point to name people who met with the NLF and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Bratislava. To the best of my knowledge, they have all themselves written and talked about this. But in case there is anybody who, because of his home situation, felt that he did not want this made public because of the safety of his family, I certainly don't want to be in a position to make this public.

Mr. ICHORD. May I see the letter, Mr. Counsel?

Are you going to have other questions about the meeting?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, may I see that letter for one moment?

Before we leave this letter, I believe you did acknowledge that you had sent this letter out, but you would not divulge the names of the persons to whom it was sent. This is your letter?

Mr. DELLINGER. The photostat runs off the page. I think my name is near the bottom, is it not?

Mr. WATSON. Yes; but you did acknowledge the letter.

Mr. DELLINGER. It looks like a letter that I sent out. I certainly send many letters of that kind.

Mr. WATSON. I notice item 5 in this letter states that there would be a limitation of 44 pounds for luggage: "HOWEVER, please only pack 39 pounds, saving 5 pounds for literature to take to the Vietnamese."

What was the form of that literature?

Mr. DELLINGER. It would vary; but naturally, I being editor of *Liberation*, what would first come to mind would be that we would send over issues of *Liberation*.

Mr. WATSON. It would be anti-American literature?

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't consider *Liberation* to be anti-American. I consider the House Un-American Activity to be anti-American.

There are two Americas, you know. I think I speak for the best interests of the best America.

Mr. ICHORD. Let us describe the type of literature which you anticipated being taken.

Mr. DELLINGER. The type?

Mr. ICHORD. Yes.

Mr. DELLINGER. As I said, *Liberation* is the first thing that comes

to mind, but just a scattering of materials of various kinds that could be books and magazines, weekly publications.

Yes, I would bring back copies of the *Vietnam Courier*; and I would take to them copies of *Liberation*, *Guardian*, who knows, maybe an interesting magazine section of the *New York Times*. Anything which would—

Mr. WATSON. Anything which would be of encouragement to the North Vietnamese would be included in that?

Mr. DELLINGER. Not necessarily, because I don't believe in encouraging contrary to the facts. For instance, on my first trip to Vietnam, I have been so brainwashed by the American press that I thought the Vietnamese were overemphasizing the value to them of the demonstrations in this country. One of the things I had in mind was to say to them, "Listen, the antiwar movement is not that strong, the demonstrators are not all that big, and we are not powerful enough to stop the war in the United States. Don't think that we are."

But that was independent of whether it would encourage or discourage. That was to simply tell them the truth. When I got over there, I found out that the press had a false idea of the emphasis.

Since that time, the antiwar sentiment has grown. Now it is the most unpopular war in American history.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, this suggests to me that of this reserve 5 pounds for literature, you would want this committee to believe that a part was to be some proper American literature.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, truthful literature, which I consider to be the most proper American literature, to the best interest of America, the proper American of the antiwar movement, who does not want our country to be dragged into the mud and to be a war criminal and does not want his children slaughtered.

Mr. WATSON. Basically, it would be that type literature which would be of encouragement or help to the North Vietnamese?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, you can put your own interpretation on it. As I say, I am sure we included *Liberation*. I am sure we included the *Guardian*. I am sure we included some things from the *New York Times* that might be of interest to them.

Mr. ICHORD. Continue.

Mr. DELLINGER. I believe in the free dissemination of ideas and literature everywhere, including ideas that I disagree with. Nothing would have stopped me from bringing things that I disagreed with.

Mr. WATSON. At your meetings do you distribute proper American positions on Vietnam? Do you distribute leaflets—

Mr. DELLINGER. I have already indicated that I think Mobilization represents the proper American position on Vietnam.

Mr. WATSON. Do you distribute literature of the position opposite to yours?

Mr. DELLINGER. I myself take the position that if somebody comes up and distributes anti-American literature, in other words, literature supporting the war in Vietnam, I would be perfectly happy to have them do that. I always am happy for people to hear both sides.

On a number of occasions, when I was scheduled to debate with representatives of the State Department or of the Pentagon or various governmental agencies, they pulled out when they learned I was to be the opponent, because they knew I had been to Vietnam and had

perhaps more facts than that particular individual felt competent to deal with. On other occasions, I have debated such people. I have always believed in fair presentation on both sides, including sides whose ideas I disagree with.

Mr. WATSON. You yourself have never made any distribution or you yourself have never articulated the position opposite to that which you now describe as "proper American"?

Mr. DELLINGER. My position is constantly developing. There is a certain core of constancy to it, but it is constantly developing.

Mr. WATSON. Hardening, or developing?

Mr. DELLINGER. I think it is becoming more militantly anti-imperialist through the years, but I don't think it is hardening; it is developing.

Mr. WATSON. Is your meaning of the term "more militant" the same as we have heard described by some of the other witnesses, or should we construe that in the normal interpretation of more militant?

Mr. DELLINGER. I have not heard the other witnesses. I have tried to make my own position clear. I have tried to summarize it by saying a position which would go beyond token dissent to effective changing of policy.

Mr. WATSON. Militant is generally described as the opposite of peaceful, is it not?

Mr. DELLINGER. Not in my vocabulary. I certainly do not mean it that way.

Mr. WATSON. You do not?

Mr. DELLINGER. No. I am a nonviolent militant.

Mr. WATSON. I guess that is just like being a Catholic-Jew.

Mr. GUTMAN. I can be verbally aggressive, just as I am now to you, Congressman.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel, let us abide by the rules. You have not been called to testify. We have gotten along very well today. Let us proceed with the questioning.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, I hand you now what is captioned "Purposes and Proposed Agenda of the Prague Conference," and ask you if you recognize this and whether you did, in fact, prepare it.

(Witness and counsel examine document.)

Mr. DELLINGER. I have read this.

Mr. CONLEY. The question was: Did you prepare it and do you recognize it as something you prepared?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I imagine I did. Some of the wording seems like mine. I literally cannot remember whether I worked on it jointly with somebody else. There is nothing in here that I want to repudiate, but I don't remember whether it is all mine or not.

You only have one copy?

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir. I would like to use it for a moment, if I may.

Mr. DELLINGER. All right. Maybe you can give it back to me for my response.

Mr. CONLEY. Yes, sir, I will be glad to.

In this particular document, Mr. Dellinger, appears a "POSSIBLE AGENDA." I read from that agenda the proposed topics:

- A. *The Anti-War Movement*
- B. *The Student Movement*
- C. *The Civil Rights and Black Power Movement*
- D. *The Labor Movement*

- E. *American Politics: 1968*
- F. *Business and the War*
- G. *America's Global Situation.*

Are these basically the topics which were the proposed or possible agenda for that meeting?

Mr. DELLINGER. I think it makes clear in here that the Vietnamese were preparing a proposed agenda, and we were preparing a proposed agenda, and then a smaller committee would meet before the conference and work this out so that the conference would hopefully be mutually satisfactory.

This was a proposed agenda which I, perhaps working with others, drew up, first of all for the reactions of the American delegates, and after those were taken and absorbed, leading to whatever changes then would be presented to the Vietnamese.

I can assure you that, unfortunately, we did not cover adequately all of these subjects. The time was too short.

Mr. CONLEY. Are you acquainted with an individual by the name of Steven S. Schwarzschild?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes.

Mr. CONLEY. Now, Mr. Schwarzschild has apparently done some writing, Mr. Dellinger, in a magazine referred to as *DISSENT*, I believe, and has indicated in this magazine that he attended this particular conference.

I say that to you in order that you will not feel like, in connection with my next question, that you are identifying someone who has not been already publicly identified.

Mr. GUTMAN. Just a moment. I have a word for my client.

Mr. ICHORD. Give the counsel time to confer with his witness.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, my next question is: Was Steven Schwarzschild, in fact, at this conference held in Bratislava between September 6 and 12, 1967?

Mr. DELLINGER. He was at part of it. He was in very great personal conflict, I think, over this. I myself had luncheon with him and his family, discussing the advisability of his going. He was under a lot of pressure from some members of his family about going. In addition to the usual concerns that families might have about that, if he went, he might be called before the House Un-American Activities Committee or otherwise persecuted.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you think you have been persecuted?

Mr. DELLINGER. I think you have been very fair in the manner of this. I think a lot of the questions have no legislative purpose.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will be the judge of those questions, if and when that question arises.

Mr. DELLINGER. I think it is clear the history of the committee is that it has not been one which I consider honorable.

I think one realizes that, in a sense, one is persecuted just by being here, because it takes one away from his work and because he constantly runs the danger of being cited for contempt if he makes any slight wrong step, or witnesses whose honesty is not necessarily—

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will assume that you will abide by your affirmation, Mr. Dellinger.

Mr. DELLINGER. Anyway, in addition, Steven Schwarzschild is a rabbi, and this was shortly after the death of an American in Czecho-

slovakia by the name of Jordan, if I remember correctly, in which there were overtones of anti-Semitism. There was a great deal of emotion, both Jewish and other concerns, over this whole incident. Steven Schwarzschild was very much torn about whether he should go or not.

I encouraged him to go, on the line I have always taken and expressed here. I thought this would give him the opportunity to express his concerns, including about Czechoslovakia and anti-Semitism, and to investigate.

Anyway, as a result of the internal conflict, and perhaps due to the fact he was trying to do some of these things, I think Steven Schwarzschild attended less of the conference than anybody else. In one sense he might be said to have never quite participated; he was around the edges of it.

The conference did not take place in Prague, as you remember, but in Bratislava. During at least part of the conference, he was in Prague instead of in Bratislava.

Mr. CONLEY. You will concede with me, then, that he was at least there physically, whether he participated or not?

Mr. DELLINGER. He was a delegate and he was there during part of it and he participated in part of it.

Mr. CONLEY. Bearing this in mind and referring specifically to this magazine, *DISSENT*, the January-February 1968 issue, I read to you, sir, a portion of an article, the introduction to an article which he wrote, entitled "The New Left Meets The Real Thing." It goes as follows:

DURING THEIR VISITS TO HANOI David Dellinger (editor of *Liberation*), Tom Hayden, and Nick Egleston (recent chairman of SDS) were invited to gather a group of about 40 American radicals in order to arrange a meeting with a group of Vietnamese. The Americans were expected not only to oppose the war in Vietnam but also to favor, on balance, an NLF victory. Such a group did in fact meet with their Vietnamese counterparts last September in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. Their hosts were the Czechoslovak and Slovak Peace Committees * * *.

It goes on into who defrayed their expenses, and so forth.

Sir, is this a fair statement by Mr. Schwarzschild, that "The Americans were expected not only to oppose the war in Vietnam but also to favor, on balance, an NLF victory"?

Mr. DELLINGER. Without meaning to reflect on Rabbi Schwarzschild's honesty, because I do believe he is an honest person, I would have to say that I consider this to be an inaccurate summary.

First of all, Tom Hayden was not involved in meetings in Hanoi, which originated the idea or made plans for this conference, and his error at this point is indicative, perhaps, of other errors. Secondly, I cannot remember or recognize discussion at any point that the delegation would be expected, on balance, to favor an NLF victory.

If you look at the agenda we drew up and if you remember my earlier remarks about the nature of this group, this just wasn't in our minds.

The very presence of Rabbi Schwarzschild, who was not, in my mind, for all my respect for him, I would not consider him a radical, and for a number of the other people I should indicate that fact.

Mr. CONLEY. May I have our other document back?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes. By the way, in there, since you have it, I won't

read it exactly, but it stresses about we expect to have a variety of viewpoints amongst the Americans, a variety of attitudes.

I would like it, if it is used, Mr. Chairman, if possible, that the entire document be put in the record.

Mr. ICHORD. Has the document been admitted as part of the record?

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Chairman, which document are you referring to?

We will offer the proposed agenda.

Mr. ICHORD. There being no objection, it will be placed in the record.

Mr. DELLINGER. I simply refer the reader to the section on variety. It was expected of the American delegation.

(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 4" follows:)

DELLINGER EXHIBIT No. 4

Purposes and Proposed Agenda of the Prague Conference

I. The Prague Conference is intended to create solidarity and mutual understanding between revolutionaries from Vietnam and their American supporters who are trying to change the United States. The Vietnamese hope not only to create this climate of mutual confidence, but to take back a clear understanding of the United States based on personal contact with radical American activists. The American organizers of the conference hope that the U.S. delegates take back an understanding of Vietnam which will stimulate the guide their work. This is not contemplated as a meeting where good wishes are expressed in ritual terms, resolutions are passed, debates carried on over the current line, etc. The significance of the event lies in the fact that the delegates are chosen not on the basis of their political affiliations with a particular radical organization, but on the basis of their proven effectiveness in radical activity. We are trying to create an international solidarity which cuts across organizational lines to base itself on contact and dialogue among many active people.

II. Each American delegate must have considerable basic knowledge about the Vietnamese revolution and American reaction. This means a concrete familiarity with: a history of the nationalist, religious and left-wing movements in Vietnam, the role and legacy of the French, dynamics of the first independence war, the Geneva Agreements, land reform, education and government in the North, the rise of insurgency and the NLF in the South, the stages of American involvement since 1949, the state of the war (bombing, ground fighting, "pacification," South Vietnamese political crises), and the solutions proposed by various parties. While the conference is not intended for academic experts, it should not be bogged down in discussing subjects the Americans can inform themselves of at home. When you arrive in New York September 3, you will receive bound volumes of *Viet-Report* and several copies of a Hanoi publication, *Vietnamese Studies*. In the meantime you should read: Kahin and Lewis, *The United States in Vietnam*; Burchett, *Vietnam North*; Hayden and Lynd, *The Other Side*.

III. Problems of people relating well at the conference are crucial. There will be an information gap, a language barrier, and a profound difference in experiences between the Americans and Vietnamese. Achieving communication will be a major task. It will be possible only if the American delegation itself is alert, informed, and sensitive. Among the Americans there may be pressures, disagreements, tensions. Since there will be no "official spokesmen", no imposed conformity to a single line, the Americans will have to discipline themselves. Every effort must be made to struggle through this experience staying together, resolving and harmonizing different feelings so that a variety of ideas are set forth to the Vietnamese with a minimum of difficulty.

IV. All these problems quite clearly arise when the problem of an agenda is considered. When Dave, Nick and the Vietnamese first discussed this conference, the exact Agenda was left open. Since that time word was received from Hanoi that the Vietnamese are preparing with great interest, but we have no word of their hopes for the agenda. It can be assumed that they will arrive with definite ideas, experts on a variety of subjects, and probably even some working papers. If at all possible we will arrange a pre-conference meeting in Prague to work out a mutually satisfactory agenda. In the meantime, the American delegation's business is to think concretely about what would be the most useful way to spend the week in Prague. The following are some simply-

written notes on a possible agenda to be thought over by the people who are considering going. Responses are requested by mail or phone, and probably a discussion of the agenda can be held at our get-together September 3-4.

POSSIBLE AGENDA

I. Reports and Discussions: Part of the conference time will be spent in panel-style or individual reports to the whole body, part of the time in smaller workshops. In either form, the subjects of discussion will be the same or very similar, the likely difference being that the statements to the whole group may seem authoritative and general while the smaller discussions will produce insights into important details. The American delegation will have a first responsibility to report in depth on the state of American society in the context of the Vietnam war. This will mean written or carefully-prepared oral reports on something like the following:

A. The Anti-War Movement: the strands of draft resistance, civil disobedience and protest marches, electoral action for peace, community organization and education campaigns. The degree and kind of anti-war activity among different social groups: the intellectuals and students, the Negro community, the churches, labor, political parties. The differences in approach among different movements: the relative importance of disobedience, education and politics in achieving change, which groups use "withdrawal," "negotiations now" or other demands; the role of moderate opinion, whether the anti-war issue should be related to other domestic and foreign policy questions. A careful analysis of existing organizations or groupings and their role in the anti-war movement.

B. The Student Movement: in addition to the role played by students in the anti-war movement itself, a thorough analysis should be presented on students as a social force in America. The origins and developments of the student movement since 1959-60. The role of students in civil rights, educational reform and other issues. The numbers of students actually involved in protest activity. Their real and potential significance as a critical group in the society.

C. The Civil Rights and Black Power Movement: as in the case of the student movement, this subject should be treated not only as part of the Vietnam protest but as an independent force for social change which can be examined and measured. An in-depth analysis of the rise of the civil rights movement in 1956, the involvement of students in direct action in the South, the beginning of voter registration and community organization, political experiments in Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia, nationalism in the ghetto, rebellions and violence from 1964-67, employment of urban guerrilla warfare, reaction of white community, government, business. How does this struggle affect the U.S. ability to fight in Vietnam?

D. The Labor Movement: Not because it is involved in anti-war protest, and not because it represents a positive force such as the students and Negroes, but because of its importance and potential in our view and especially in the view of the Vietnamese, the labor movement should be analysed in depth. The state of the industrial unions, differences between the Reuther and Meany wings of the movement, pressures caused by inflation, war economy and Negro revolt. Must there be organized working class protest for the Vietnam war to end? What are the real prospects for this protest?

E. American Politics: 1968: an analysis of the spectrum of political positions being staked out as the 1968 elections approach. Explanation of the different economic, ethnic and regional factions in the Democratic and Republican parties. Identification of the positions and prospects for Johnson, Romney, Kennedy, Reagan, Nixon, Rockefeller, Percy, other Senate "doves." How meaningful are elections as guides to power and opinion in America? Does it matter for Vietnam who is elected President in 1968?

F. Business and the War: analysis of the divisions appearing between different sectors of the business community over the war. How are the different economic judgements expressed in national politics? Whose economic interests are primarily served by the war? Is the war "healthy" for American business? or is it causing deterioration and worsening for business elites?

G. America's Global Situation: What are the military and para-military policies of the U.S. in other parts of the world? What are the limits on America's ability to wage counter-revolution by force? Can the U.S. meet

the challenge of "more Vietnams in Latin America?" Can the U.S. indefinitely expand the war throughout Southeast Asia and into China? Is the U.S. suffering on diplomatic fronts in Europe, the United Nations, the Third World?

II. The Americans will probably want to hear similar *reports in depth about the situation as the Vietnamese see it*. Subjects on which the Vietnamese are most expert would include:

- A. The military situation in the South and North
- B. Economic and social situation
- C. U.S. war crimes
- D. Estimate of U.S. military-diplomatic intentions
- E. Possible scenarios for ending the war
- F. Role of People's Revolutionary Party (Communist) in NLF, role of other groups
- G. Position on interim (coalition) government, elections in the South, relations with the North, relations with other "camps," relations with U.S. protest movement "after the war"
- H. Analysis of world situation, revolutionary strategies: guerrilla war, armed propaganda, self-defense, labor and political organization

III. Other *joint activities* should be included besides discussions and reports. These might include Vietnamese-American speaking appearances before Czech audiences or meetings with Czech, East European, Russian, Chinese or other groups located in Prague. Evenings of entertainment, perhaps sponsored by the Czechs, would also be useful. The showing and exchange of Vietnamese and American protest films could be done as well. Tours of Prague and other parts of Czechoslovakia might be included.

IV. *Preparation of materials beforehand* by the American delegation should be required. Because of the shortage of time, it probably is impossible to prepare adequate working papers on any of the above subjects before leaving. But it is possible to pull together a number of relevant articles and books which have been produced in the last several months, and make sure these get into Vietnamese hands. It also is possible to bring films, photographs and other paraphernalia [sic] from America in which the Vietnamese are interested.

These are some of the proposed ingredients for making a successful conference. Detailed arrangements will have to be worked out on the spot. But if you have any general comments or amendments about this agenda-formula, please make them right away.

SEE YOU ON SEPTEMBER 3RD, 1967.

Mr. GUTMAN. For the record, Mr. Chairman, I believe it is most important that this be in the record.

Mr. ICHORD. It has already been admitted.

Mr. GUTMAN. No. This is another point. Rabbi Steven Schwarzschild is a client of mine in other connections. I wish the record to reflect it at this point.

Mr. ICHORD. I don't know what materiality it has.

Mr. WATSON. So far as you know, he is an honorable, honest man?

Mr. GUTMAN. I have always felt so and would continue to feel so.

Mr. WATSON. And would not deliberately make a false statement about anyone or any event?

Mr. GUTMAN. So far as I know, Congressman Watson, neither would you.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, moving on, in this article prepared by Rabbi Schwarzschild appears the following, which I would like to read you and then ask a question, if I may:

YET OUT OF THESE QUASI-OFFICIAL reports no "hard news" whatever emerged. Even someone like myself who knows nothing about Vietnam but what he reads in the newspapers and in a few supplementary sources heard nothing that I had not known beforehand. It was, furthermore, absolutely impossible, even in private conversation, to break through the official propaganda line to which all of the Vietnamese rigorously adhered. This was especially annoying since the Americans had, after all, been selected because they supported the cause

of their Vietnamese counterparts—and yet they were addressed as if they had to be indoctrinated from scratch with the crudest tools of persuasion. * * *

Mr. Dellinger, I put to you, sir: Is Rabbi Schwarzschild's observation as to the way the group was treated by the Vietnamese an accurate one?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, I would not consider that an accurate description at all.

I would say Mr. Schwarzschild, who did not come to Bratislava until late and who, as I say, was somewhat on the fringes of the conference and also was, I would feel, internally torn and under great pressure from his anti-Communist associates, was probably not able to be an objective judge at that point, and perhaps himself set up some of the barriers that existed between him and the Vietnamese.

I have found that with all political groups that is a problem, of a tendency toward doctrinaire positions. I found that the Vietnamese, who are intensely involved in the defense of their homeland and have suffered incalculable casualties, have, on a number of occasions when I have been present, tended to start off with a rather, what should I say, a rather formal presentation of the official Vietnamese point of view, which I, on a number of occasions, have not found extremely helpful. I have discussed this with them and certainly on every occasion when I have been present I try to get beyond this as soon as possible.

In considering the suspicions which they are almost bound to have of Americans, considering the ability of committees like yours and the CIA and others to infiltrate all of these groups, considering the very loose procedures that we had for incorporating this group, I can see where they were perhaps a little standoffish at first.

If I remember correctly, the first reports, although of value, were a little more stereotyped and a little less valuable than I had hoped. But this very quickly broke down, and we ate in the same dining room together at tables that sat four, most of them, and I think the experience of all the Americans was that these conversations were very frank and informal, and not doctrinaire and not propaganda.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, again dealing with this same article and again dealing with this conference held in Czechoslovakia, Rabbi Schwarzschild, toward the end of this article, deals with what he described as the propaganda films on guerrilla tactics exhibited to the Americans by an NLF military expert.

Apparently, from reading the article, I deduce there were some motion picture films shown of guerrilla tactics. He wrote the following, and I quote:

The most one can say of these methods is that they possibly may be necessary, if not desirable, in defense against at least equally brutal and politically even less justified foreign invaders. One might even be prepared to go so far as to say that the Vietnamese who had to practice them might, in order to be able to live with themselves, have to get some kind of personal satisfaction out of these tactics. While some of these blood-curdling tactics were being described, I made it my business not to look at the speaker but to study the American listeners. I am sorry to have to say that, with the exception of some of the members of pacifist, especially Quaker, organizations who maintained straight faces, there was nothing but approval to be seen in any facial expressions, and there were even a few audible chuckles. So far as I know, not a word was ever said about this afterwards.

Mr. Dellinger, were you present at these events which Rabbi Schwarzschild is describing, the description of the guerrilla tactics?

Mr. DELLINGER. I want to be very clear about this. Obviously, the

NLF is engaged in guerrilla warfare so, obviously, it is possible that such a session took place. But as you read this my jaw dropped, and I have been searching my mind and my memory to try to remember what it could be that he is referring to. I literally cannot remember any such occasion. I remember reports of battles—as I say, it was a military report, and I think this was one of the first times that the Vietnamese began to say that they were winning the war or had won the war or were about to win the war. I don't remember any such session. I do remember there were movies.

As I remember the Vietnamese movies, they showed bombs dropping; they showed peasants being rounded up; they showed peasants being tortured, kicked, hit with guns, dragged behind tanks, American tanks, this kind of thing.

Forgive me if I am wrong.

There are two possibilities: either that it took place when I wasn't there, or that it didn't take place and this is a somewhat liberal interpretation of his of one of these movies or of the descriptions of battles.

Mr. CONLEY. In other words, you are saying that either you were not there, or Rabbi Schwarzschild could be mistaken in what he thought he saw?

Mr. DELLINGER. To the best of my knowledge, I was present at the entire conference.

There were some times when we met in small groups. Perhaps there was one small group he attended from which he has written this description, but nothing in that coincides with anything of my own experience there.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Chairman, we are going to offer as a part of the record an article ["The New Left Meets the Real Thing"] from the magazine *DISSENT*, dated January–February 1968.

Mr. ICHORD. That is the document I thought I had a while ago, instead of the agenda document.

There being no objection, it will be admitted.

Mr. DELLINGER. May I make a comment?

I think this article indicates that we did, in fact, have a variety of people there. There were many different interpretations, most of them quite friendly, believing the conference was very valuable, but several of them registering criticisms of dissatisfaction.

It is the opposite of the hard-line plot approach.

(Document marked "Dellinger Exhibit No. 5" follows:)

DELLINGER EXHIBIT NO. 5
 [*Dissent*—January–February 1968, pp. 78–81]

NOTEBOOK

Stephen S. Schwartzschild

**The New Left Meets
 The Real Thing**

DURING THEIR VISITS TO HANOI David Dellinger (editor of *Liberation*), Tom Hayden, and Nick Egleston (recent chairman of SDS) were invited to gather a group of about 40 American radicals in order to arrange a meeting with a group of Vietnamese. The Americans were expected not only to oppose the war in Vietnam but also to favor, on balance, an NLF victory. Such a group did in fact meet with their Vietnamese counterparts last September in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. Their hosts were the Czechoslovak and Slovak Peace Committees—though it should be made clear that the American participants defrayed all other expenses out of their own pockets or through their respective organizations at home.

Extremely little, if anything, that is new or significant emerged from the meeting. My own opposition to the American war in Vietnam continues to be as complete as it had been before—I still see no viable alternative to a victory of the Vietnamese Communists (all other possible alternatives having been polarized out of existence by the ruthless American war) and prefer it immeasurably to the brutal American policy now being pursued. All this, however, not because of what I witnessed in Bratislava but *despite* it.

Apart from the original organizers, the American contingent consisted in about equal measure of a few religious radicals from the American Friends' Service Committee (AFSC), other Quakers, the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), and one or two off-beat clergymen; young academicians; representatives of the Black Power movement; young community organizers and student organizers of the New Left; a few writers, most of them associated with Left periodicals. This group, in which there were very few trained political technicians or Vietnam experts, was confronted by two Vietnamese delegations who had brought along their own experts in all areas under discussion and their own translators. It soon became clear that the Vietnamese were from very high echelons. At least one of them mentioned in passing that he had been a member of the Vietnamese delegation to the Geneva Convention in 1954; all spoke with governmental authority. They were highly disciplined and in their way very competent.

The contrast between the two groups was striking. The Americans represented small factions—in some respects at odds with one another—of a movement on the outermost periphery of American society—whereas the Vietnamese were representatives of an effective government in one area and of a para-government in another.

The first day of the conference was set aside for reports from the Americans about the struggle against the war and the conditions for social revolution in this country; the second day for reports from South Vietnam; the third for North Vietnam; the remaining time for smaller group discussions about special aspects of the Vietnam situation. The American reports were multitudinous, relatively brief, mostly extemporaneous, quite subjective, and sometimes in conflict with one another. The Vietnamese reports were well-prepared. Each subject was assigned to a single expert. These reports were often written out and mimeographed beforehand and extremely lengthy. (Madame Binh, head of the South Vietnamese delegation, took all of one afternoon and most of the next morning for her opening statement.) They were clearly formulated as quasi-official, diplomatic documents.

YET OUT OF THESE QUASI-OFFICIAL reports no "hard news" whatever emerged. Even someone like myself who knows nothing about Vietnam but what he reads in the newspapers and in a few supplementary sources heard nothing that I had not known beforehand. It was, furthermore, absolutely impossible, even in private conversation, to break through the official propaganda line to which all of the Vietnamese rigorously adhered. This was especially annoying since the Americans had, after all, been selected because they supported the cause of their Vietnamese counterparts—and yet they were addressed as if they had to be indoctrinated from scratch with the crudest tools of persuasion. Two evenings, for example, were set aside for a series of North and South Vietnamese propaganda films that might be effective with Asian or African peasants but surely could not be expected to be persuasive with an even slightly sophisticated group.

Along with some AFSC and FOR people, I

DELLINGER EXHIBIT No. 5—Continued

NOTEBOOK

spent a long afternoon with the official Buddhist representative of the NLF. We plied him with questions about religious and cultural trends in his country, "third force" personalities known to us, and the facts concerning religious groups in his organization. It was, however, entirely impossible to come to grips with such problems: he insisted, first, on giving us what was in effect a two-hour filibuster, reviewing rudimentary knowledge and views obviously perfectly familiar to us. Anything that did not fit into his picture was either disregarded, condemned as treason and called untypical of the Vietnamese people, or treated as still an open question that could be answered only after the Front had ruled upon it.

In a private conversation, I probed the attitude of this gentleman and that of the head of the North Vietnamese lawyers' guild toward the Roman Catholic church. It is perfectly obvious that the church is virtually identified with the American cause in Vietnam. To admit this, however, would be tantamount to a contradiction of the official propaganda line that "all of the Vietnamese people" are arraigned with the NLF and that theirs is a "neutral, popular front." I could not, therefore, extract an anti-Roman-Catholic opinion from either of them. Indeed, the Buddhist representative insisted that a Roman Catholic priest, whom he named, was a member of the NLF Central Committee.

"Is he recognized by Rome?" "Yes, he has been ordained by a bishop and officiates at a church." "Is he still recognized by Rome?" "Yes, he still says mass." "Is his saying of mass still recognized by official Roman Catholic authorities as licit?" "Well"—this after half-an-hour's involved, translated give-and-take—"the priest is right now temporarily not recognized by the Vatican."

Several sessions were devoted to explore possibilities of dissuading Americans from participating in the war. The prominent role of black men in the army was discussed. One of the American blacks asked the relevant question: how many black soldiers had defected to the NLF? It took a long time to explain that question. Finally, the answer came forth that all the Vietnamese present were from the North and that they, therefore, did not have such information. "Could we ask some people from the NLF?" "Yes, they'll come in the after-

noon."

In the afternoon again much time was spent in making the question clear. Ultimately, of course, it had to be conceded that there was no record of American defections, black or white. (On the other hand, the numbers of South Vietnamese defectors are, of course, vast—to the point where the NLF people claim, with considerable credibility, that they train some of their officers by letting them be inducted into Ky's army and having them instructed under U.S. auspices.)

AS FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA, the situation in that country, even as revealed during such a visit of little more than a week, struck me as much

more oppressive and frightening than the descriptions we have been getting in the press. At the very beginning I had heard a few of the Americans express relief at finally being in a "socialist" country and no volunteered critical observations. I feared, therefore, that this representation of the New Left was buying the Czech party line completely. As the week drew on, however, my initial fear turned out to be unjustified. With no exception that I know of, the Americans became aware of the mindless and repressive society in which we found ourselves. At least within the confines of the American caucus, phrases such as "fascist," "paranoiac," "get out of here with my life," "totalitarian," etc. became quite frequent. Yet, to my knowledge at least, no one but myself confronted any Czech with articulated criticism.

There was, however a considerable amount of nonverbal criticism. At first, the Czechs tried to keep us together in supervised places. But American, or New Left, anarchy soon took over. Many of us dispersed through Bratislava in so many directions at the same time that it would have been extremely difficult to keep track of all of us. A black man, a minister, and a student actually conducted a flower-power demonstration off the central square of the city. Still, in discussing possible future press relations, the Americans stressed that one should mute one's criticism of the Czechs in order to prevent undesirable consequences for the Vietnamese and for future American-Vietnamese contacts—a rather eloquent expression of the stance of New Left people toward Com-

DELLINGER EXHIBIT No. 5—Continued

NOTEBOOK

munists.

This is precisely the main point about the encounter between the New Left and the real Communists in power. The question whether criticism of the Vietnamese should be muted never came up. It was apparently assumed that there was none. Certainly, none was expressed. The unspoken premise was that the Vietnamese were effectively fighting America as it is—and "*pas d'ennemis à la gauche combattante.*" *Newsweek* quoted an anonymous reporter for *Ramparts* as having heard Tom Hayden exclaim: "Now we're all Vietcong." I did not hear such an announcement—but this certainly was the mood of the gathering.

There were some nasty manifestations of this total identification with the Vietnamese Communists. The NLF military expert gave a long presentation of the situation in the field as he saw it and some of the informal and quite brutal guerrilla tactics that had to be used in combating the American aggressors. (This had, the previous evening, been illustrated in one of the propaganda films.) The most one can say of these methods is that they possibly may be necessary, if not desirable, in defense against at least equally brutal and politically even less justified foreign invaders. One might even be prepared to go so far as to say that the Vietnamese who had to practice them might, in order to be able to live with themselves, have to get some kind of personal satisfaction out of these tactics. While some of these blood-curdling tactics were being described, I made it my business not to look at the speaker but to study the American listeners. I am sorry to have to say that, with the exception of some of the members of pacifist, especially Quaker, organizations who maintained straight faces, there was nothing but approval to be seen in any facial expressions, and there were even a few audible chuckles. So far as I know, not a word was ever said about this afterwards.

The American reaction to the Vietnamese ranged all the way from calculated political "popular frontism" to naive to wilfully blind to literally sick to craven. There were, no doubt, some who actually had no idea of what a Communist is. There were surely some who did not want to know and regarded every enemy of American imperialism as a comrade. They

inclined, thus, to interpret the new NLF program as if it were an "agrarian reform" document. There was certainly a representation of the sick, who outraged one or the other Czech puritan Communist by talking, mostly in the language of "shit," about nonmarital sex relations and the abortions of girl friends. What most of the Americans had in common was the belief that anyone who batters the American Establishment effectively makes a contribution to the defeat of capitalist imperialism and he may not be criticized in any way, for fear of detracting from his effectiveness.

I, for one, can draw only one ideological conclusion: radicalism at this point can consist only of a radically realistic view of the utterly hopeless situation in which we find ourselves: American capitalist imperialism is flooding much of the world with blood and vulgarity, while neither "coalition politics," nor "old-style socialism," nor the New Left have any relationship to the real world or hold out any hope for political effectiveness—and "the socialist blocs" not only exhibit no significant gaining of humane or humanist values but are, in fact, widening the destructive circle. Still, because this is the only way we know to be human, we try to embody and to advocate radically libertarian social ideals.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, one other question dealing with this particular conference, if I may.

Did you have occasion, or did any of the members of the American delegation have occasion, while at this conference to be presented with a ring which you were informed had been made from a part of an American airplane that had been shot down?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I consider this entirely possible because the Vietnamese make combs and rings, to the best of my knowledge, from planes that have been shot down.

Mary McCarthy has written in the *New York Review of Books* about being tendered such a ring and her own reluctance to wear it. I myself, if I remember correctly, was given a comb and a ring in Vietnam, but explained that I was not interested in wearing such a ring.

Mr. CONLEY. If I may, sir, I have another article, taken from *WVA*, volume III, No. 17, under October 16, 1967, captioned "REPORT FROM BRATISLAVA," by Eric Weinberger, which would indicate, I suppose, from a reading of it, that Mr. Weinberger was also at this conference, and would you hesitate to identify him?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, he was there.

Mr. CONLEY. If I may, sir, put to you this question from this article. In this article Mr. Weinberger states that, prior to a year or two before his article, he had been persuaded and, to quote him exactly, "by A. J. Muste and Dave Dellinger, to come off it on the condemn-violence-on-both-sides-equally-bit."

Do you recall the quotation?

Mr. DELLINGER. I think I do now, and that is my position, as I indicated yesterday, that the violence of the richest, most powerful nation in the world invading a little, undeveloped country of Asia should not be compared to the violence used in self-defense by that country.

Mr. CONLEY. As I understand it, sir, Mr. Weinberger, up until you and Mr. Muste were able to prevail on him to come off of it, was taking the position that violence was wrong on both sides, or was equally wrong.

As I understand it, is it your position as a pacifist only certain violence is wrong?

Mr. DELLINGER. No. We have discussed this at great length here already. At the beginning of the war in Vietnam, the traditional pacifist tended to say, "A plague on both your houses, we are against all violence, and there is violence being used on both sides."

I myself—just as I believe that the violence of George Washington and of the American patriots was obviously different morally and practically from the violence of Adolf Hitler during World War II—I have myself made distinctions in violence without, however, advocating violence.

It was not hard for me, I guess—I don't remember my own history in relation to the war in Vietnam, but it was not hard for me to believe in the beginning that there was distinction between aggressive violence of the United States and the violence of the patriotic forces of Vietnam. I certainly wrote this and said this on many occasions.

Mr. CONLEY. In connection with this particular conference, I want to read to you a list of names, and will rather anticipate your answer, but I do have to do this, sir, for the record, if you will bear with me.

Mr. DELLINGER. Could I ask you, for the record, if you might consider whether it is worth reading all of these names, in case there are people who might receive the kind of package in the mail that I have talked about? Why not show us the list?

Mr. GUTMAN. Why not show us the list, and then ask us questions about them by numbers?

Mr. ICHORD. Let the Chair inquire. Will you please come forward, Mr. Counsel, and let me see what you have?

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, my question is: Were the following persons present at this conference with you: Robert L. Allen, Jr., Malcolm Boyd, Carol D. Brightman, Reverend John Pairman Brown, Bronson Pettibone Clark, Robert Merten Cook, Stoney Cooks, Renard Cordon Davis, David Dellinger, Elizabeth P. Dellinger, Thorne Webb Dreyer, Nicholas Egleson, Richard Flacks, John Ross Flanagan, Norman David Fruchter, Tom Gardner, Carol Glassman, Thomas Hayden, Steven E. Halliwell, Christopher Jencks, Walter Russell Johnson, Carole Yvonne King, Andrew David Kopkind, Bob Kramer, Carol Cohen McEldowney, Leon Morse, Linda Morse, Raymond A. Mungo, Douglas Craig Norberg, Vivian Emma Rothstein, Steven S. Schwarzschild, Sol Stern, Dennis Sweeney, John P. Tillman, Jr., Barbara Webster, Eric Weinberger, Henry William Werner, John Augusta Wilson, Willie T. Wright, and Ron Young?

Mr. GUTMAN. May I ask the legislative purpose of this question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will advise the counsel that, in view of the fact that this was a meeting with the North Vietnamese and other allies, friendly nations with the North Vietnamese, in view of the purview of these hearings and that the witness was a leader in the Chicago demonstration and he has so testified, that it is a pertinent question and within the subject of inquiry.

Mr. GUTMAN. I fail to see the pertinency, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ICHORD. These are individuals who attended the conference with the gentleman. The counsel has advised me that they have been so identified in the newspapers. The witness was there, and the Chair will have to rule that it is a proper question.

Mr. GUTMAN. Mr. Chairman, since you have just stated—

Mr. ICHORD. You have the right to advise with your witness if you desire, but you haven't been called to testify, Mr. Gutman.

Mr. GUTMAN. I understand. We are talking on the question of relevancy. If I advise him on the question what to say, on the legal point of relevancy, he is merely going to have to parrot what I suggest to him.

Mr. ICHORD. I think we will have to abide by the rules. Go ahead.

You will be given time to confer with your client.

Mr. DELLINGER. If that is the way you want it.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DELLINGER. To the best of my knowledge, from listening carefully to the list, I would have to say that, no, that is not an accurate list of the people who attended the conference; definitely not.

Mr. CONLEY. Did the people named attend that conference?

Mr. DELLINGER. Some of the people named did, some did not. Some of the names appear to be inaccurate combinations.

Mr. CONLEY. Are any names missing who attended the conference?

Mr. DELLINGER. I have not any idea. As you read off those names,

I thought, "Oh, yes, I remember him, he was there." Other names, I thought, "Who is he? I never heard of him."

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, if you may let us move on to an administrative committee meeting of the National Mobilization Committee which was held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on October 13 of this year. Was there, in fact, a meeting held on that date in Cambridge, Massachusetts, of your National Mobilization Committee?

Mr. DELLINGER. Is that a Saturday or Sunday? This fall there was a meeting in Cambridge. That is undoubtedly a correct date.

Mr. CONLEY. Did you attend that meeting?

Mr. DELLINGER. I believe I attended and presided at that meeting.

Mr. CONLEY. All right, sir. I will ask you, Mr. Dellinger, if those attending this meeting discussed this committee's investigative hearings, the grand jury investigation of the disturbances in Chicago, and the hearing of the President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, I recollect that these subjects were discussed there.

I would like to point out that one of the concerns expressed was whether or not some of the people present would be indicted. Since it has been reported in the newspapers that indictments are being prepared, that might influence how we proceed from here, because I don't want to say anything involving people indicted or about to be indicted.

Mr. CONLEY. Again, sir, I think you are reading more into the question than what I intended.

Mr. DELLINGER. I am only trying to communicate and establish some understanding here.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, was it decided at this meeting at Cambridge that in view of these activities, that is, the meeting of this committee, the grand jury investigation, and the President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, that the persons involved in the Chicago disturbance, the demonstrators, and so forth, should be urged not to cooperate with any request received for an interview by the FBI or any other investigative agency?

Mr. DELLINGER. No, this was not the decision. There were a number of different viewpoints expressed. Rennie Davis and I reported that we had already had an interview with a representative of the subcommittee of the President's Commission on Violence.

Everybody was aware of the fact that some of the FBI investigation had been very partial and unfair. In fact, when the FBI approached me, I told them that I was very busy and asked them what the purpose was. They made very clear to me that the purpose of talking to me was to find out if I knew about any violations of law on the part of the demonstrators, but it was clearly demonstrated to me that they were not interested in any violations of law by anybody other than demonstrators.

I reported this fact at the meeting. It was a very complicated discussion, in which there were probably four or five points of view, as to some advocating virtually total cooperation, because the truth was certainly in our favor and we had nothing to hide; some people advocating virtual noncooperation, because whatever we said might be

twisted and distorted and used against us unfairly or used to involve other people; and there were a variety of positions in between.

If my memory is correct, a subcommittee, of which I was a member, was instructed to work with the legal committee and to get out a memorandum discussing the various dangers and difficulties, but not taking a hard line as to whether people should speak or not.

As I say, we are not a talk-down organization. We are heterogeneous and under no circumstances would we issue too hard a line anyway. But I think we did want people to be aware of what happened in a number of FBI interviews and also to be aware of what their rights were; that they had the right to refuse to testify if they wanted to.

Mr. CONLEY. Was it not also decided at this meeting in Cambridge that the minutes of all future administrative committee meetings would continue to list those in attendance, but would leave out home addresses, and while they would summarize issues and decisions, they would not attribute specific remarks to specific individuals?

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. DELLINGER. I think it is very important for me to point out here that I consider this to be an example of the kind of illegal persecution that I have referred to, that unfortunately has too often characterized the history of this committee.

This was a private meeting, protected under the first and fourth amendments of the Constitution. It is as if you were to get me up here and to say, "Did you vote for so-and-so in your secret ballot?"

I think that would be an obvious intrusion.

Mr. CONLEY. Nobody has put that question to you.

Mr. DELLINGER. You have asked about decisions and statements of a private meeting, which is protected by the first and fourth amendments. I consider this a violation of privacy.

Now, having registered that objection and used that as an example of the type of thing to which I object in this committee, I will proceed to answer the question, or at least in a way that will not involve other people. But I will volunteer the information, although I think you don't have the right to ask it.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, isn't it a fact that you yourself actually gave the report to this Cambridge meeting on this committee's investigation? Are you not the one that actually made the report?

Mr. DELLINGER. That is quite possible. If I did, I am sure that others supplemented it. It was not a very flattering report. I remember using the example that you tried to connect people back to Lee Harvey Oswald, to the Rosenbergs, to people out of the 1930's, and make connections that one of our representatives in Chicago had an office which was in a building which belonged to somebody who had run for office as a Communist, if I remember correctly, in 1941. Maybe it was 1945.

I said that while I was listening to this in the audience I had the feeling, and of course my name was brought into this, that I was being analyzed to see if I was $\frac{1}{32}$ Jew, or $\frac{1}{64}$ Jew, or $\frac{1}{128}$ Jew.

Mr. ICHORD. Some of the testimony does get far afield, just as your testimony making Lee Harvey Oswald a pretty good guy, as well as somebody else.

Mr. DELLINGER. No. I say there was testimony attempting to link us to Lee Harvey Oswald, that someone he approached to be an attorney

had also been an attorney for somebody in the movement. If one took a lawyer and followed him through all his clients and tried to associate each person with the other people he had defended, I think it would be as ludicrous as this example I am giving of the committee's work in October.

If I remember correctly, I reported that kind of thing to the Mobilization administrative committee. If I didn't, I was delinquent in my duty.

Mr. CONLEY. I call to your attention that perhaps your memory does not serve you well. Yesterday it was you, not us, that brought up the name Lee Harvey Oswald. I believe it was you.

Mr. DELLINGER. It is possible I did, in this connection.

Mr. CONLEY. I think we were talking about Malcolm X.

Mr. ICHORD. Let us get back on the subject of the inquiry, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. DELLINGER. I would like to point out that you brought up the question of the assassination of Malcolm X.

Although I wondered what the pertinency was to your inquiry, I certainly did express my opinion on some of the assassinations, including raising some questions about the way the assassination of one of our Presidents was handled.

Mr. ICHORD. Sometimes the exchanges have been quite free, Mr. Dellinger.

Let us proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. CONLEY. Mr. Dellinger, I put to you this question: Since the meeting in Cambridge on October 13, isn't it true that the Mobilization Committee has made a mailing of a "Dear Friend" letter, bringing attention to the various investigations of your Chicago demonstration and advising that any—I use the quote from the letter—"any further cooperation," that is, with investigating agencies—

runs the risk of lending a legitimacy to governmental abuse of investigatory power for the purpose of harrassing [sic], intimidating, and repressing political opposition. * * * our experience has shown that any interview, given in the best of faith to the most liberal minded body, can find its way into the hands of prosecuting attorneys, FBI files and Huac smear campaigns.

* * * * *

We bring this matter to your attention as a matter of urgency. * * * hundreds of people have already been asked for interviews by FBI agents. Since there is no obligation to grant any interviews or give any testimony unless a subpoena has been served, most people refuse these requests. We support those who select this course of non-cooperation. If you are approached by any investigatory agency please keep us informed and feel free to discuss with us the manner in which you intend to respond.

Mr. DELLINGER. Is that the entire document?

Mr. CONLEY. Is that a fair reading of those portions of that document?

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Counsel, the Chair can't see the pertinency of that question. Let us go on to something else.

Mr. GUTMAN. Mr. Chairman, you requested we close at 4. I wonder if we are going to make it.

Mr. CONLEY. That concludes our questions, sir.

Mr. ICHORD. I thought you had one other question you wanted to ask.

Mr. Watson, do you have any questions?

Mr. GUTMAN. Does the missing question begin, "Are you now, or have you ever been?"—

Mr. ICHORD. Counsel will be in order.

Mr. DELLINGER. Mr. Chairman, while he is thinking, could I make a comment relevant to that area?

Mr. ICHORD. You mean you want to answer the question when I ruled the question out of order?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I won't go into the document because that would take time to study it, and I am not sure, it did not appear to be signed—

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair saw no purpose.

Mr. DELLINGER. I want to tell one thing from my own experience, that when I agreed to make a lengthy tape for the subcommittee investigating the Chicago disorder, the subcommission of the President's Commission on Violence, I was told that it was—absolutely none of that material would be turned over to the grand jury or to any other body, including HUAC.

Now, I heard on television last night an interview with the judge presiding over the grand jury investigation in Illinois, who said that he was anxious to see the material on which the report was based. And the impression I got from the then response of Chairman Walker was that this material would be made available if requested.

Now, I give this as an example of the kind of problem that people face.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Dellinger, I will state that the Chair has no jurisdiction whatsoever over the Presidential Riot Commission or the grand jury proceedings in Chicago.

As I stated at the outset of the hearing, we were not interested in the grand jury proceeding. We were interested in proceeding to search out the facts, look into the charges that have been made relative to subversives participating in the organization, in the planning, of the riots and what connections the leaders had with foreign powers.

It is the duty of the Chair to keep the hearings in these bounds. That is the way I interpret my duty as chairman.

I have no jurisdiction over Mr. Walker or the judge in Chicago or any of the commissions. They are separate, distinct arms of Government.

Mr. DELLINGER. I am simply trying to indicate any additional reason for my reluctance to mention the names or affairs of other people who might then proceed on to some other body which might use them additionally and in a negative way.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Watson.

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Dellinger, I am interested in the article that was written by Rabbi Schwarzschild, a friend of yours and a friend of your good counsel there. Obviously the article or the author, either or both, were considered reliable enough that they would be included in the publication *DISSENT*, which I assume would be one fairly recognized by the left movement.

Is that not a correct statement?

Mr. DELLINGER. First of all, Rabbi Schwarzschild is not an intimate friend of mine. I have had very limited contact with him, but I indicated, you know, my positive response.

Secondly, there are many variations within the left, and I think,

if you want my own opinion, *DISSENT* has been a little bit sick with anticommunism. It has many valuable articles in it; but a lot of people are intellectuals who I think have been victimized by the cold war and perhaps in some cases, because of the positions that they hold and the respectability that they covet—I am sorry to be imputing motivation—but for a variety of reasons really have been very wrong in the things they write. At least I very much disagree with the kind of virulent anticommunism which seeps into *DISSENT* magazine and always the lofty and patronizing attitude towards young people, who may not be able to write as well as some of the editors of *DISSENT*, but who very often are closer to the struggle for social justice and human liberation.

Mr. WATSON. We still get back to the basic proposition, as you stated earlier, that certainly Rabbi Schwarzschild would not deliberately distort the truth.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes, that is my estimate.

Mr. WATSON. You disagree with him because he does not take your exact line, and naturally you would be in disagreement, but in his article he makes the statement, on page 80, that a reporter for *Ramparts*—again, *Ramparts* is not necessarily a rightwing publication, is it?

Mr. DELLINGER. It is not a rightwing magazine.

Mr. WATSON. It is considered a left?

Mr. DELLINGER. It is not part of the Mobilization Committee.

Mr. WATSON. But it would be considered farther left?

Mr. DELLINGER. I really don't want to get into the business of ranking the various magazines and expressing my areas of agreement and disagreement with them, although I did partially in the case of *DISSENT*.

Mr. WATSON. This statement is attributed by a reporter for *Ramparts* to Tom Hayden, and this occurred at the conference in Czechoslovakia: "Now we're all Vietcong." The rabbi was fair enough to say, "I did not hear such an announcement—but this certainly was the mood of the gathering."

Is that a fair statement? And you were there.

Mr. DELLINGER. No, that is not a fair statement. That is a single sentence torn out of context and not giving at all an accurate impression of either the general nature of the conference or even of that particular scene.

Mr. WATSON. Here is another article, written by Ray Mungo, who I understand was at the conference, in *THE east village OTHER* magazine, and I believe this is headed up "LIBERATION News Service." I believe you said you are editor of that.

Mr. DELLINGER. No. I am editor of *Liberation* magazine. LIBERATION News Service is an independent news-gathering agency with which I have no connection.

Mr. WATSON. Ray Mungo is listed as the writer or author of this article. He makes this statement:

"Lyndon Johnson will have a nightmare when he hears about this meeting," * * *. "He will have a nightmare because he has sent 500,000 men to your land to find the Vietcong."

"We will tell him he'd better leave some men at home. Because, like Spartacus, whose fellow slaves in Rome protected his hiding-place by each claiming to be Spartacus himself, I am the Vietcong. We are everywhere! We are all the Vietcong!"

Is Mr. Mungo wrong in that statement?

Mr. DELLINGER. That still is incomplete, but it is a much more accurate presentation than the earlier one, because it gives some of the context. I think President Johnson did have a nightmare when he thought about running for the Presidency again, against the opposition of the antiwar movement.

For myself, although I did not make that statement, just as I appreciate the people in England at the time of George III who stood for the independence of the American Colonies and tried to pressure England to withdraw its colonial aspirations from the Colonies, and there is a certain solidarity between them and the forces of George Washington in the same way there is an obvious solidarity amongst some of the people opposed to the war and the people who were fighting for their independence.

It was in that direction that I believe the incident was moving, although Mr. Hayden is perfectly capable of speaking for himself.

Mr. WATSON. That is right.

So that the record might be clear, I may have attributed that quotation to Mungo. Mungo was the author or the writer, and he was supposedly quoting Mr. Hayden.

Mr. DELLINGER. Right.

Mr. WATSON. You agree in substance that that was correct?

Mr. DELLINGER. Again, it is a summary of a long and complex statement of Mr. Hayden's. It tells more of the truth than the earlier article. If you are really interested in what Mr. Hayden's views are on that, I guess you would have to ask him.

Mr. WATSON. You brought up the matter of the Presidency. Obviously, President Johnson did have a nightmare.

Of course, I am a Republican. I am not privy to the motivations of the Democrats, but did we have a peace candidate in this past election who espoused the general line of your position? Did we not have one?

Mr. DELLINGER. The important thing—

Mr. WATSON. That is a simple question. Did we have one or not?

Mr. DELLINGER. I did not vote in the past election.

Mr. WATSON. I am not asking you whether you voted, how you voted, or anything else.

Mr. DELLINGER. I did not support the candidacy—

Mr. WATSON. Did we not have a peace candidate?

Mr. DELLINGER. There were a number of people who ran on their own interpretation of a peace candidacy.

Mr. WATSON. They certainly espoused your philosophy and your position completely, did they not?

Mr. DELLINGER. I am not able to answer that question intelligently.

Mr. WATSON. You know Eldridge Cleaver, don't you?

Mr. DELLINGER. There were a number of people running, including Eldridge Cleaver and Dick Gregory, at least, who came closer to my views in relation to the war in Vietnam than other candidates. But I never conferred with any of them about their platform; I never studied their platforms at length. I would be unable to say in what areas I disagreed or agreed with their platform, because I was not interested in their candidacy.

Mr. WATSON. Their platform and their position, as you say, were certainly far closer to your position than any other candidate.

Mr. DELLINGER. Than that of George Wallace, Richard Nixon, or Hubert Humphrey.

Mr. WATSON. Fine.

In one of the flyers that your National Mobilization Committee circulated in Chicago, it is headed up, "Let the People Speak," at the bottom, again, "Let the People Be Heard."

It starts out in bold letters, "**The majority of the American people want the United States to stop the bombing and get out of Vietnam.** * * *"

That is your contention.

How did those who espoused your philosophy fare in the last election?

You contended there that the majority of the American people espoused your position. How did your candidates fare in the last election?

Mr. DELLINGER. First of all, I explained that I had no candidate and the Mobilization had no candidate.

Mr. WATSON. The ones who came closest to espousing your position, how did they fare?

Mr. DELLINGER. Mr. Watson, you see, if we are running a foot race and you are holding a chess contest, and you ask me how did your candidates make out in the chess contest, I have no way of answering.

Mr. WATSON. This is a political contest.

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; and in my conception of politics, we are trying to organize the American people and encourage them to take grass-roots, democratic action to develop popular forces of resistance and popular forces which will incorporate the kind of ideas and attitudes that we favor in counterinstitutions today.

It is a whole program, but relying on the people, rather than relying on the present kind of fraudulent elections, in which the candidacies are rigged, the conventions are rigged, and in which it is necessary to be a millionaire or to have access to millions of dollars in order to get the organization and the coverage on TV in order to run. I consider the last election to have been a denial of democracy. The American people were given no opportunity to vote on the issues or to have—well, I will leave it at that, to vote on the issues.

Mr. WATSON. Since you contend this was a fraudulent election, what, under your standards, would be a so-called democratic election?

Mr. DELLINGER. The first thing that I think would have to happen is that we have to have—

Mr. WATSON. Get rid of people like me?

Mr. DELLINGER. No; I made very clear that I would be happy if there was some kind of honorable and useful work which you could perform. I would be happy for you.

Mr. WATSON. At least you give us credit for making one honorable attempt by giving you an opportunity to articulate your position before this committee. Have you ever thought about that? But go ahead.

Mr. DELLINGER. I think, as I indicated earlier, that political democracy really cannot function effectively and properly in a society which does not have economic democracy, a society in which the public airwaves, for instance, are owned by millionaire corporations and are sold at exorbitant prices—the use of the airwaves sold at exorbitant prices

which are beyond the capacity of ordinary poor people, black people, and other minority groups. That is only one instance.

I don't remember exactly, but I remember, I think, the acknowledged election expenses of Mr. Nixon or Mr. Humphrey was \$12 million.

It is clear that some method has to be found whereby the people have a chance to vote without the outcome being determined by, in the first place, political conventions similar to the Democratic Convention, which went against the votes of the primaries, secondly, without its requiring millions of dollars in order to make an effective campaign.

Mr. WATSON. Being one of very limited means, I can agree with you that the costs of an election are, well, astronomical, to say the least.

One final thing. It has caused me some concern. You are a 50-year-old man. You have spoken here at length, and I have tried not to interrupt too much. You have stated, or at least inferred, that you would like to have both sides of the question presented so that the people can make the decision for themselves.

You must agree that primarily you are dealing in your movement with young people, are you not, the bulk of them, the overwhelming majority of them are young people, even teenagers?

Mr. DELLINGER. I think if you take any age group that there is obviously a higher percentage of teenagers than of any other age group. I think it would be fair to say teenage and 20's. I would not be sure.

Mr. WATSON. Most of them are young?

Mr. DELLINGER. Who are actively opposed to the war in Vietnam. I obviously have a number of associations with people who are in their 20's or 30's or in their teens.

Mr. WATSON. Well, before the Vietnam war, I am sure you have not confined your activity only to the Vietnam war. You have been critical of the American institutions all along?

Mr. DELLINGER. I have been critical of capitalism, imperialism. I have been critical of the invasion of Puerto Rico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala.

Mr. WATSON. And if the Japanese war were to begin today, you would still be critical of the U.S., its religious institutions, and all its institutions, basically, would you not?

Mr. DELLINGER. I don't want to leave a misimpression on the earlier question. It probably is fair to say that at least half, or the majority, of my own time and work is with people closer to my own age, although I work with individuals a good deal younger.

If the United States withdraws from Vietnam and the war ends, I hope, myself, to continue fighting against American imperialism. I would like to see Puerto Rico a free and independent country, rather than to have to suffer culturally and cultural genocide. I would like to see the Green Berets withdrawn from Bolivia, Guatemala, and the other Latin American countries. I would like to see the American air bases withdrawn from Okinawa and Okinawa able to have some kind of peaceful and democratic society. I would like to see the vast power of the American corporations over the American people eliminated so that we could have a real democracy here. I would like to see the black people win their liberation and full equality.

Mr. WATSON. It is fair to say that your program against America will continue?

Mr. DELLINGER. My program for America will continue, and for the American people.

Mr. WATSON. Did it ever occur to you, as a 50-year-old man, that to the young people whom you rally to these various causes you might suggest there might be some virtue in going out and working hard in order to improve their lot in life? Have you ever urged that upon them?

Have you ever pointed out to them that there might be some value in attending school and completing their education in order that their lot might be improved in life and help them improve the lives of others? Have you ever encouraged that line?

Mr. DELLINGER. I believe in hard work and self-discipline, a lot of the old-fashioned virtues. However, I do not believe in people improving their lot at the expense of other people. I am opposed to the kind of atomized and individualistic method of trying to move to the top.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, everyone must be absolutely economically equal? That is your philosophy?

Mr. DELLINGER. As a matter of fact, I probably believe more in economic equality than a Communist country like the Soviet Union does, where they have greater gaps in income, more difference between rich and poor, than I think is healthiest and best. However, I do not believe in a monolithic, sterile society in which everybody is the same.

Mr. WATSON. If they are in your status, how could it be otherwise than sterile?

Mr. DELLINGER. In the richest country in the world, we have an infant mortality rate which, if I remember correctly, is 17th in the world. In other words, there are 16 countries poorer than us that have a better infant mortality rate than we do.

I do not consider that it would be imposing on the individuality or the full creative development of a father and a mother or a child if we achieved the kind of availability of medical resources and of diet and of healthy conditions, freedom from rats, freedom from slums, freedom from other privations, which would eliminate that kind of infant mortality.

I think one might extend this into many other areas, I think for everybody, for example, to be able to have the advantages of a higher education, but not a higher education which is a training for the American corporate empire, but a higher education which is a training to be useful and to be equal. For everybody to have that would not impose on their individuality, not impose a dull conformity.

Mr. WATSON. In other words, we would have individualism of total economic equality. Is that your interpretation of true freedom?

Mr. DELLINGER. Again, I would rather let my words stand for my opinion.

Mr. WATSON. One final thing. Earlier, you stated you have encouraged young people to go out and work hard, to stay in school—

Mr. DELLINGER. No. I did not say that.

Mr. WATSON. Oh, you have not urged them to do that?

Mr. DELLINGER. I didn't say that, either. I said that I do believe in hard work.

Mr. WATSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. ICHORD. One more question, before the meeting is adjourned.

The Chair has been handed a copy of the *National Guardian* of September 9, 1967. On page 5 there is an article by Mary Hamilton, entitled "SNCC leader asks for guns."

I will hand the article to you, but as a preface for my question, I will read to you the opening paragraph:

RAP BROWN'S MESSAGE to white radicals: "Buy us some guns or do what John Brown did—pick up your gun and go out and shoot our enemy." To blacks he said: "Brother, you better get your guns."

At the bottom of the same column this is written:

Dave Dellinger, a leader of the Mobilization Committee and a pacifist, told his audience that "as a white person I do not believe it is up to me to tell black people what method to use."

Did you attend that meeting on August 29 in New York's Village Theatre?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; I was chairman and one of the speakers at that meeting at which Rap Brown also spoke.

Mr. ICHORD. Didn't you feel constrained to advocate your position of nonviolence which you have taken in the anti-Vietnam war movement in regard to this problem?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; part of what I said that night, which may or may not be reported in that article, did include an advocacy of nonviolence. But a statement similar to one I made many times here, about a certain reluctance on my part, who not having had to suffer what the North Vietnamese or the black people or the Puerto Ricans suffered, to be self-righteous about the method they use. That does not mean that I do not enter into dialogue with Rap Brown or others. I happen to have a great deal of respect for Rap Brown, who I think has been presented very inaccurately in the American press.

Mr. ICHORD. You don't believe that the problems of the Negro in the ghettos will be solved by taking up guns, do you?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, I am perfectly willing to discuss that with you at some other time, or with Rap Brown or others, but I myself have not picked up a gun. I am not about to stand in judgment of black people who are assaulted and attacked and who feel that carrying a gun sometimes will save their lives or save the lives of their children.

Mr. ICHORD. There being no other questions, the Chair—

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may make one more statement.

You said you visited the coffeehouse in Columbia, South Carolina?

Mr. DELLINGER. Yes; I did.

Mr. WATSON. That is my home. You went in and out without any difficulty at all, and no one tried to give you any trouble. Is that correct?

Mr. DELLINGER. Well, perhaps I should say that I arrived after dark one evening and left while it was still dark and that, while I was there, I conferred with some people who had just gotten out of jail, had been picked up illegally, and there were a number of different incidents. Some were framed on marijuana charges, although they did not smoke or possess marijuana. Others were picked up on technical violations of going through red lights.

Mr. WATSON. Of course, you only talked with them. You did not talk with the other side?

Mr. DELLINGER. It is fair for you to bring that out.

I talked with people who told me that, and had given the history of some of the persecution of radicals, black people, hippies, antiwar people, in your State.

I don't consider it impossible that this may have happened, but I certainly am not in a position to render a judgment on it, or state dogmatically that it did.

Mr. GUTMAN. Mr. Chairman, before you drop the gavel, if I may, assuming that we are finished with Mr. Dellinger, Mr. Rubin has been directed to appear tomorrow morning at 10 in executive session. As you know—I think you have a copy—he handed out a release here, and I will hand a copy in and ask that it be marked in the record, if I may, on his behalf, because it sets forth his position.

Mr. ICHORD. Do you represent Mr. Rubin?

Mr. GUTMAN. Yes.

Mr. ICHORD. I thought Mr. Kunstler was representing him.

Mr. GUTMAN. I am associated with Mr. Kunstler.

Mr. ICHORD. The Chair will take this under advisement.

The Chair will declare the meeting in adjournment until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, at which time the subcommittee will meet in executive session.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., Thursday, December 5, 1968, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene in executive session at 10 a.m., Friday, December 6, 1968.)

INDEX

INDIVIDUALS

A

	Page
Abbott, Robert-----	2792
Allen, Robert L., Jr.-----	2909

B

Bailey, John-----	2730, 2749
Ballan, Sam. (<i>See</i> Marcy, Sam.)	
Binh-----	2754, 2805
Boyd, Malcolm-----	2809
Brightman, Carol D.-----	2809
Brophy, John-----	2692
Brown, John Pairman-----	2809
Brown, H. Rap-----	2819
Burchett, Wilfred-----	2791, 2792, 2794, 2800

C

Clark, Bronson Pettibone-----	2809
Cleaver, Eldridge-----	2720, 2724, 2815
Coffin (William Sloane, Jr.)-----	2750
Conlisk, James B., Jr.-----	2762
Cook, Robert Merten-----	2809
Cooks, Stoney-----	2809

D

Daley, Richard J.-----	2730,
2736, 2738, 2740, 2743, 2749, 2751, 2759, 2760, 2763, 2765, 2770	
Daniel (Larissa)-----	2714
Davis, Rennard Cordon (Rennie)-----	2689, 2701, 2706, 2767, 2768, 2809, 2810
Dellinger, David-----	2689,
2690-2745 (testimony), 2746-2820 (testimony), 2772, 2805	
Dellinger, Elizabeth P.-----	2809
Dreyer, Thorne Webb-----	2809
Dulles (John Foster)-----	2729
Duncan, Donald-----	2722

E

Egleson, Nick-----	2799, ¹ 2800, 2809
Eisenhower (Dwight D.)-----	2775

F

Finch, Roy-----	2693
Flacks, Richard-----	2809
Flanagan, John Ross-----	2809
Fruchter, Norman David-----	2809

G

Gandhi (Mahatma)-----	2772, 2776, 2783
Gardner, Tom-----	2809
Glassman, Carol-----	2809
Goodman (Mitchell)-----	2750
Greenblatt, Bob (Robert)-----	2690, 2755, 2784, 2785, 2790, 2791

¹ Incorrectly spelled "Egleston" in this reference.

	Page
Gregory, Dick-----	2815
Gutman, Jeremiah S.-----	2690, 2691, 2710, 2718 2719, 2728, 2740, 2746-2748, 2750, 2751, 2754, 2767, 2770, 2771, 2778, 2783, 2797, 2798, 2802, 2809, 2812, 2813, 2820

H

Ha Van Lau-----	2790
Halliewell, Steven E.-----	2809
Hamilton, Mary-----	2819
Harriman, Averell-----	2703, 2724, 2783, 2784, 2790, 2791
Hayden, Thomas-----	2701, 2706, 2723, 2736, 2767, 2799, 2800, 2807, 2809, 2814, 2815
Healy (Joseph J.)-----	2754, 2755, 2769
Hitler, Adolf-----	2776, 2808
Humphrey, Hubert (Horatio)-----	2730, 2749, 2752, 2816, 2817
Hutton, Bobby-----	2720, 2740

J

Jencks, Christopher-----	2809
Johnson, Lyndon (Baines)-----	2718, 2719, 2730, 2749, 2774, 2801, 2814, 2815
Johnson, Walter Russell-----	2809
Jordan (Charles H.)-----	2799

K

Kahin (George M.)-----	2800
Kahn, Herman-----	2719
Kennedy, Ted (Edward M.)-----	2752-2754
Kennedy (John Fitzgerald)-----	2721-2723, 2725, 2726
Kennedy (Robert F.)-----	2801
King, Carole Yvonne-----	2809
Kopkind, Andrew David-----	2809
Kramer, Robert (Bob)-----	2809
Kunstler (William M.)-----	2820
Ky. (See Nguyen Cao Ky.)	

L

Lewis (John W.)-----	2800
Liljenstople, Otto-----	2755
Lowell, Robert-----	2782
Lynd, Staughton-----	2712, 2800

M

MacArthur (Douglas)-----	2775
Macdonald, Dwight-----	2782
Malcolm X-----	2720-2724, 2726, 2811
McCarthy (Eugene)-----	2752-2754
McCarthy (Joseph)-----	2718, 2729
McCarthy, Mary-----	2808
McEldowney, Carol Cohen-----	2809
Meany (George)-----	2801
Morrison, Norman-----	2712
Morse, Leon-----	2809
Mungo, Raymond A. (Ray)-----	2809, 2814, 2815
Muste, A. J.-----	2693, 2695, 2712, 2808

N

Newton, Huey (P.)-----	2720
(Nguyen Cao) Ky-----	2806
Nixon (Richard M.)-----	2732, 2801, 2816, 2817
Norberg, Douglas Craig-----	2809
Norden, Eric-----	2724, 2726

O

	Page
Oswald, Lee Harvey-----	2811, 2812

P

Park (Chung Hee)-----	2730
Percy (Charles H.)-----	2801
Phan Van Chuoung-----	2783, 2790

R

Raskin (Marcus)-----	2750
Reagan (Ronald)-----	2801
Reuther (Walter P.)-----	2801
Rockefeller (Nelson)-----	2801
Romney (George)-----	2801
Rosenberg (Ethel)-----	2811
Rosenberg (Julius)-----	2811
Rothstein, Vivian Emma-----	2809
Rubin (Jerry)-----	2690, 2691, 2820
Rustin, Bayard-----	2693

S

Schwarzschild, Steven Samuel-----	2798, 2799, 2802-2805, 2809, 2813, 2814
Siqueiros, David-----	2781, 2782
Smith, Adam-----	2732
Spock (Benjamin)-----	2750
Stalin, Josef-----	2722, 2727, 2739
Stern, Sol-----	2809
Stone, I. F.-----	2829
Sweeney, Dennis-----	2809
Syngman Rhee-----	2730

T

Tillman, John P., Jr.-----	2809
Tran Van Anh-----	2783, 2790
Trotsky, Leon-----	2723, 2782

V

Vance, Cyrus-----	2724, 2790
Vigier, Jean-Pierre-----	2781

W

Walker, Charles-----	2693
Walker (Daniel)-----	2734, 2740, 2751, 2813
Wallace, George (C.)-----	2816
Warren (Earl)-----	2722
Waskow, Arthur-----	2770, 2771, 2776, 2783
Webster, Barbara-----	2809
Weinberger, Eric-----	2705, 2706, 2808, 2809
Werner, Henry William-----	2809
Wilson, John Augusta-----	2809
Wright, Willie T.-----	2809

X

Xuan Thuy-----	2784, 2790
----------------	------------

Y

Young, Ron-----	2809
Young (Stephen M.)-----	2721, 2722

November 8 Mobilization Committee for Peace in Vietnam, for Human Rights, and for Economic Justice (predecessor to Spring Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam) (<i>see also</i> National Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam)-----	Page 2696
---	--------------

P

President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. (<i>See</i> National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.)	
--	--

R

Radio Havana-----	2733, 2735, 2739, 2746
Religious Society of Friends: American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)-----	2805
Revolutionary Contingent (RC)-----	2772, 2775

S

SNCC. (<i>See</i> Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.)	
Shriners. (<i>See</i> Ancient Arabic Order of the Nobles of the Mystic Shrine.)	
Slovak Peace Committee-----	2799, 2805
Spring Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam (formerly known as November 8 Mobilization Committee for Peace in Vietnam, for Human Rights, and for Economic Justice) (<i>see also</i> National Mobilization Committee To End the War in Vietnam)-----	2696, 2697
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)-----	2819
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)-----	2799

U

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Government of-----	2714, 2818
United States Government: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-----	2714
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-----	2810
University Christian Association (also known as Dwight Hall)-----	2692

W

Walker Commission. (<i>See</i> National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.)	
War Crimes Tribunal-----	2715, 2781
War Resisters League-----	2698

Y

YIP. (<i>See</i> Youth International Party.) (also known as Yippies)	
Yippies. (<i>See</i> Youth International Party) (YIP)	
Youth International Party (YIP) (also known as Yippies)-----	2709

Z

Zengakuren -----	2775
------------------	------

PUBLICATIONS

D

Dissent (magazine) -----	2799, 2804, 2813, 2814
--------------------------	------------------------

E

El Mundo (newspaper)-----	2777-2779
---------------------------	-----------

G

Guardian -----	2796
----------------	------

L

Liberation -----	2693-2715, 2724, 2733, 2770, 2795, 2799
------------------	---

O

Other Side, The (book) (Thomas Hayden and Staughton Lynd)-----	2800
--	------

R		Page
Ramparts (magazine) -----		2814
Realist, The (magazine)-----		2724, 2726
U		
United States in Vietnam, The (book) (George M. Kahin and John W. Lewis)-----		2800
V		
Vietnam Courier -----		2796
Vietnam North (book) (Wilfred Burchett)-----		2800
Vietnamese Studies -----		2800
Viet-Report -----		2800
W		
Walker Commission Report (Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.)-----		2740, 2753



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY



3 9999 05706 3032

