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
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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

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F. INNOCENTIUS APAP, O.P., S.T.M.,
CENSOR. THEOL.

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THE
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OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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MARIÆ IMMACULATÆ

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ENCYCLICAL LETTER

OF

OUR HOLY FATHER

BY DIVINE PROVIDENCE

POPE LEO XIII.

ON

THE RESTORATION OF CHRISTIAN
PHILOSOPHY,

ACCORDING TO THE MIND OF

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE ANGELIC DOCTOR

*To His Venerable Brethren, all the Patriarchs, Primates,
Archbishops, and Bishops of the Catholic World, in
favour and communion with the Apostolic See,*

POPE LEO XIII.

VENERABLE BRETHREN,

Health and Apostolic Benediction.

The Only-begotten Son of the Eternal Father appeared on earth to bring salvation and the light of the wisdom of God to the human race. As He was ascending to Heaven He bestowed on the world a blessing, truly great and wondrous, when, commanding His Apostles to 'go and teach all nations,'* He left a Church, founded by Himself, as the universal and supreme mistress of all people. Man, whom the truth had set free, was to be kept safe by the truth. Indeed, the fruits of heavenly doctrine, by which salvation was gained for man, could not have endured for long unless Christ our Lord had set up a perpetual teaching authority (*magisterium*) for the instruction of souls in the faith. This Church, then, not only built on the promises of its Divine Author, but following in His love, has kept His commands. She has always looked to one end, and desired it with great desire; that is, to teach the true religion and wage ceaseless war with error. For this there have been the watchful labours of Bishops, each in his own place; and for this Councils have made laws and decrees. More than all, for this there has been the daily anxiety of the Roman Pontiffs. They are the successors of Blessed Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, in his Primacy, and therefore it is their right and

* Matt. xxviii. 19.

their duty to teach the brethren, and confirm them in the faith.

Now, the Apostle warns us that the faithful of Christ are often deceived in mind 'by philosophy and vain deceit,'* and that thus the sincerity of faith is corrupted in men. For this reason the Supreme Pastors of the Church have always held that it is part of their office to advance, with all their power, knowledge truly so called ; but at the same time to watch with the greatest care that all human learning shall be imparted according to the rule of the Catholic faith. Especially is this true of 'philosophy,' on which the right treatment of other sciences depends in great measure. We Ourselves spoke to you shortly of this, among other things, Venerable Brothers, when first We addressed you all by an Encyclical Letter. Now, by the importance of this matter, and by the state of the times, We are forced again to write to you, that you may so organize the course of philosophical studies as to insure their perfect correspondence with the gift of Faith, and also their agreement with the dignity of human knowledge.

If anyone look carefully at the bitterness of our times, and if, further, he consider earnestly the cause of those things that are done in public and in private, he will discover with certainty the fruitful root of the evils which are now overwhelming us, and of the evils which we greatly fear. The cause he will find to consist in this—evil teaching about things, human and divine, has come forth from the schools of philosophers ; it has crept into all the orders of the State ; and it has been received with the common applause of very many. Now, it has been implanted in man by Nature to follow reason as the guide of his actions, and therefore, if the understanding go wrong in anything, the will easily follows. Hence it comes about that wicked opinions in the understanding, flow into human actions and make them bad. On the other hand, if the mind of man be healthy, and strongly grounded in solid and true principles, it will assuredly be the source of great blessings,

* Col. ii. 8.

both as regards the good of individuals and as regards the common weal.

We do not, indeed, attribute to human philosophy such force and authority as to judge it sufficient for the utter shutting out and uprooting of all errors. When the Christian religion was first established by the wondrous light of Faith shed abroad, 'not in the persuasive words of human wisdom,* but in showing of the Spirit and power,' the whole world was restored to its primeval dignity. So also now, chiefly from the almighty power and help of God, we may hope that the darkness of error will be taken away from the minds of men, and that they will repent. But we must not despise or undervalue those natural helps which are given to man by the kindness and wisdom of God, Who strongly and sweetly orders all things; and it stands to reason that a right use of philosophy is the greatest of these helps. For God did not give the light of reason in vain to the soul of man, nor does the superadded light of Faith quench, or even lessen, the strength of the understanding. Its effect is far from this. It perfects the understanding, gives it new strength, and makes it fit for greater works. The very nature of the providence of God Himself, therefore, makes it needful for us to seek a safeguard in human knowledge when we strive to bring back the people to Faith and salvation. The records of antiquity bear witness that this method, both probable and wise, was used habitually by the most illustrious Fathers of the Church. They, in truth, were wont to give to reason offices neither few nor small; and these the great Augustine has summed up very shortly: 'Attributing to this science . . . that by which the life-giving Faith . . . is begotten, nourished, guarded, and strengthened.'

In the first place, then, if philosophy be rightly and wisely used, it is able in a certain measure to pave and to guard the road to the true Faith; and is able, also, to prepare the minds of its followers in a fitting way for the receiving of revelation. Hence it has not untruly been called by the

* 1 Cor. ii. 4.

ancients 'an education leading to the Christian Faith,' 'a prelude and help of Christianity,' 'a schoolmaster for the Gospel.'

In truth, the loving-kindness of God, with regard to the things concerning Himself, has not only made known by the light of Faith many truths beyond the reach of the human understanding, but has also revealed some which are not altogether beyond the power of reason to find out. Such truths, when the authority of God is thus added, become known to all both at once and without any mixture of error. This being so, certain truths, either divinely revealed to us for our belief, or bound up closely with the doctrine of the Faith, were known to wise men among the Gentiles, who were guided only by the light of natural reason. By fitting arguments they vindicated and demonstrated these truths. St. Paul says : 'The invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made ; His eternal power also and divinity.' Again : 'The Gentiles, who have not the law,' nevertheless 'show the work of the law written in their hearts.'

It is opportune, therefore, in a high degree to use, for the good and the advantage of revealed truth, these other truths that were known even to wise heathens ; for thus human wisdom, and the very testimony of the adversaries, give their witness to the Catholic Faith. Further, it is plain that this way of treating the question is not a thing newly devised, but an ancient way very much used by the holy Fathers of the Church. Moreover, these venerable witnesses and guardians of holy traditions see a kind of form of this, and almost a type of it, in one action of the Hebrews ; who, as they were going out of Egypt, were commanded to take with them vessels of silver and of gold, with precious garments of the Egyptians. This was done that, by a use suddenly changed, the riches which had ministered to superstition and to rites of ignominy might be dedicated to the service of the true God. Gregory of Neocæsaræa praises Origen for this very reason, that, skilfully gathering together

much of the teaching of the Gentiles for the defence of Christian wisdom, and for the destruction of superstition, he used these things as weapons taken from the enemy, and with wondrous power hurled them back. Both Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa approve and praise this manner of teaching in Basil the Great. So also Jerome greatly commends the same thing in Quadratus, a disciple of the Apostles ; in Aristides, in Justin, in Irenæus, and in very many others. Augustine also says : ‘ Do we not see how Cyprian, that doctor of great sweetness and that martyr of great blessedness, was laden with gold and silver and raiment when he went forth from Egypt ? Was it not so with Lactantius, with Victorinus, Optatus, and Hilary ? Not to speak of the living, was it not so with countless Greeks ? ’ If, then, natural reason produced so rich a crop of learning as this before it was fertilized by the power and working of Christ, much more abundant will be its harvests now, when the grace of the Saviour renews and increases the inborn powers of the mind of man. Is there, indeed, anyone who does not see that a plain and easy road is opened to the Faith by philosophy such as this ?

The usefulness, however, which springs from such a way of studying philosophy is not confined within these limits ; for in truth severe reproof is given, in the words of the wisdom of God, to the foolishness of those men who, ‘ by these good things that are seen, could not understand Him that is ; neither, by attending to the works, have acknowledged (Him) who was the workman.’

In the first place, then, this great and glorious fruit is gathered from human reason—namely, that it demonstrates the existence of God : ‘ By the greatness of the beauty and of the creature the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby.’

In the next place, reason shows that God, in a way belonging only to Himself, excels by the sum of all perfections—that is, by an infinite wisdom, from which nothing can be hidden ; and also by a supreme justice which no

affection of evil can touch. Hence reason proves that God is not only true, but the very Truth itself, which cannot deceive or be deceived. Further, it is a clear consequence from this that the human reason obtains for the word of God full belief and authority.

In like manner reason declares that the evangelical doctrine has shone as the light from its very beginning, by signs and miracles which are infallible proofs of infallible truth; and that therefore they who receive the Faith by the Gospel do not act rashly, as if they had 'followed cunningly devised fables,' but, by an obedience that is altogether reasonable, submit their understanding and their judgment to the authority of God.

Further, not less than these things in value is it that reason clearly shows us the truth about the Church instituted by Christ. That Church, as the Vatican Synod decreed—'because of the wonderful way in which it spreads; because of its great holiness and inexhaustible fruitfulness in all places; because of its Catholic unity and invincible stability—is in itself a great and perpetual motive of credibility, and an unanswerable argument for its own Divine legation.'

The foundations, then, having been laid in the most solid way, there is needed, further, a use of philosophy, both perpetual and manifold, in order that Sacred Theology may assume and put on the nature, habit, and character of true science. For in this noblest kind of learning it is above everything necessary that the parts of heavenly doctrine, being many and different, should be gathered together, as it were, into one body. Thus they are united by a union of harmony among themselves, all the parts being fittingly arranged, and derived from their own proper principles. Lastly, all of these parts, and each of them, must be strengthened by unanswerable arguments suited to each case.

Nor must we pass by in silence, or reckon of little account, that fuller knowledge of our belief, and, as far as may be, that clearer understanding of the mysteries of the faith

which Augustine and other Fathers praised, and laboured to attain, and which the Vatican Synod itself decreed to be very fruitful. Such knowledge and understanding are certainly acquired more fully and more easily by those who, to integrity of life and study of the faith, join a mind that has been disciplined by philosophical culture. Specially is this so since the same Vatican Synod teaches that we ought to seek for understanding of holy dogmas of that kind 'both from the analogy of the things which naturally are known, and also from the way in which the mysteries themselves are related to one another, and also to the last end of man.'

Lastly, it pertains to philosophical discipline to guard with religious care all truths that come to us by Divine tradition, and to resist those who dare to attack them. Now, as regards this point, the praise of philosophy is great, in that it is reckoned a bulwark of the faith, and as a strong defence of religion. 'The doctrine of our Saviour,' as Clement of Alexandria bears witness, 'is indeed perfect in itself, and has need of nothing, forasmuch as it is the power and the wisdom of God. But Greek philosophy, though it does not by its approach make the truth more powerful, has yet been called a fit hedge and ditch for the vineyard, because it weakens the arguments of sophists against the truth, and wards off the crafty tricks of those by whom the truth is attacked.'

In fact, as the enemies of the Catholic name borrow their warlike preparations from philosophic method, when they begin their attacks on religion, so the defenders of the science of God borrow many weapons from the stores of philosophy, by which to defend the dogmas of revelation. Again, we must count it no small victory for the Christian Faith, that human reason powerfully and promptly wards off those very weapons of the enemy which have been got together by the skill of the same human reason for purposes of harm. St. Jerome, writing to Magnus, shows how the Apostle of the Gentiles himself adopted this kind of argument. 'Paul, the leader of the Christian army and the unanswered speaker,

pleading a cause for Christ, turns skilfully even a chance inscription into an argument for the faith. From the true David he had learnt indeed how to pluck the weapon from the hands of his enemies, and how to cut off the head of Goliath in his greatest pride with his own sword.'

Nay, more ; the Church herself not only advises Christian teachers, but commands them to draw this safeguard from philosophy. For the fifth Lateran Council decreed that 'every assertion contrary to a truth of enlightened faith is altogether false, because the truth cannot possibly contradict the truth': and then it commands doctors of philosophy to apply themselves studiously to the refutation of fallacious arguments ; for St. Augustine says : 'If any reason be given against the authority of the Holy Scriptures, then, however subtle it may be, it deceives by its likeness to the truth ; for true it cannot possibly be.'

But if philosophy has to be found equal to the work of bringing forth such precious fruits as We have mentioned, it must, above everything, take care never to wander from the path trodden by the venerable antiquity of the Fathers, and approved in the Vatican Synod by the solemn suffrage of authority. It is plainly seen that we must accept many truths in the supernatural order which far surpass the power of any intellect. The human reason, therefore, conscious of its own weakness, must not dare to handle things greater than itself ; nor to deny these truths. Again, it must not measure them by its own strength, or interpret them at its own will. Rather let it receive them in the fulness and humility of Faith ; reckoning this its greatest honour, that by the goodness of God it is allowed as a handmaid and servant to be busied about heavenly doctrines, and in a certain measure to reach them.

In those heads of doctrine, however, which the human understanding naturally can take in, it is clearly just that philosophy should use its own method, its own principles, and its own arguments : yet not so as to seem to draw itself away with audacity from the authority of God. So, also, when it is plain that things known to us by revelation are

most certainly true, and that the arguments brought against the Faith are not in accord with right reason, the Catholic philosopher should bear in mind that he will violate the rights both of Faith and reason, if he embrace any conclusion which he understands to be contrary to revealed doctrine.

We know indeed that there are to be found men who, exalting too highly the powers of human nature, contend that the understanding of man falls from its native dignity when it becomes subject to Divine authority, and that being thus bound, as it were, in a yoke of slavery, it is greatly retarded and hindered from reaching the heights of truth and excellence. Such teaching as that is full of error and falsehood. The end of it is that men, in the height of folly and sinful thanklessness, reject all higher truths. They deliberately cast away the Divine blessings of faith, from which the streams of all good flow, even to civil society. Now, the mind of man is shut up and held in certain bounds, and narrow enough those boundaries are. The consequence is that it falls into many mistakes and is ignorant of many things. On the other hand, the Christian Faith, resting as it does on the authority of God, is the certain teacher of truth. He who follows this guidance is neither entangled in the nets of error nor tossed about on the waves of doubt. Hence the best philosophers are they who join philosophical study with the obedience of the Christian Faith. Then the brightness of Christian truths falls on the mind, and by that brightness the understanding itself is helped. This takes nothing from the dignity of the reason ; nay, rather, it adds to the reason a great deal of grandeur and subtlety and strength.

Worthily and most fruitfully do we use the keenness of the understanding when we set ourselves to refute opinions against the Faith, and to prove those things which agree with it. For in disproving errors we ascertain their causes, and then show the falsity of the arguments by which they are bolstered up ; while in proving truths we use the force of the reasons by which they are demonstrated with certainty, and by which all prudent men are persuaded. If,

then, anyone deny that the riches of the mind are increased and its powers extended by studies and arguments such as these, he must of necessity contend absurdly that the discrimination of truth and falsehood does not in any way help towards intellectual advancement. Rightly, therefore, does the Vatican Synod mention in the following words the great benefits which are received by Faith from reason : ' Faith frees the reason from error, and guards it, and instructs it with a manifold knowledge.' If, then, man were wise, he would not blame Faith as being hostile to reason and natural truths. Rather he would give hearty thanks to God and rejoice greatly that, among so many causes of ignorance and in the midst of such floods of error, the most holy Faith shines brightly on him ; for, like a friendly star, that Faith points out to him the harbour of truth, so that he can have no fear of going out of his course.

If, then, Venerable Brothers, you look back at the history of philosophy, you will see that all the words which We have spoken are approved by the facts. Certainly, among the ancient philosophers, living without the Faith, they who were reckoned the wisest erred most harmfully in many things. Though they taught the truth about some things, yet you know how often they taught that which was false and absurd. You know how many uncertain things and doubtful things they handed down about the true nature of the Godhead, the first beginning of creation, the government of the world, God's knowledge of the future, the cause and principle of evil, the last end of man, everlasting beatitude, virtues and vices, as also about other subjects, of which a true and certain knowledge is above everything necessary for man.

On the other hand, the first Fathers and Doctors of the Church understood clearly from the counsel of the will of God that the restorer of human knowledge is Christ, who is the ' power of God and the wisdom of God,' and ' in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.' They undertook to examine thoroughly the books

of these wise men of old, and to compare their opinions with the teaching of Revelation. With prudent choice they accepted all the true words and wise thoughts with which they met ; but the rest they either set right or cast utterly away. As God, in His careful foresight for the defence of His Church against the rage of tyrants, raised up the martyrs, very strong and lavish of their mighty souls ; so against philosophers, falsely so called, and against heretics, He raised up men great in wisdom to defend even by the help of human reason the treasure of revealed truth. From the very beginning of the Church, indeed, Catholic doctrine has found enemies most hostile to it, who have derided the dogmas and teachings of Christians. They have laid down such doctrines as these : That there are many gods ; that the matter of which the world is made has neither beginning nor cause ; that the course of events is governed by a certain blind force and inevitable necessity ; and that it is not ruled by the counsel of the providence of God. Wise men, whom we call Apologists, have in due course attacked these teachers of insane doctrine, and, with Faith for their guide, have drawn arguments from human wisdom itself. They have in this way proved that one God, highest in every kind of perfection, is to be worshipped ; that all things have been made out of nothing by His almighty power ; that they are all sustained by His wisdom ; and that each one is directed and moved towards its own end.

Among these, St. Justin Martyr claims for himself the first place. Having frequented the most celebrated schools of learning among the Greeks that he might try what they were, he learned, as he himself acknowledges, that he could drink in the truth with full mouth only from revealed doctrines. These he embraced with all the eagerness of his soul ; stripped off the calumnies that hung round them ; defended them vigorously and fully before the Roman Emperors ; and reconciled with them many sayings of the Greek philosophers. In that time the same work was also done exceedingly well by Quadratus, Aristides, Hermias, and Athenagoras. In the same cause glory not less than

theirs was gained by the Bishop of Lyons, Irenæus, the invincible martyr. He refuted with power the wicked teaching of the Easterns, scattered as it was by the help of the Gnostics throughout the bounds of the Roman Empire. St. Jerome says of him: 'He explained . . . the beginnings of heresies one by one, and pointed out from what fountains of the philosophers they flowed.'

Again, there is no one who does not know the disputations of Clement of Alexandria, which the same St. Jerome thus mentions with honour: 'Is there anything that is not learned in them? Is there anything not drawn from the depth of philosophy?' He himself also wrote books of an incredible variety, which are of the greatest use in building up a history of philosophy, in rightly exercising the art of dialectics, and in establishing the harmony that exists between reason and faith. Origen followed him, renowned among the teachers of the Alexandrine school, and deeply learned in the doctrine of the Greeks and the Easterns. He wrote a very great number of books, and spent much labour upon them. Wondrously, just at the right time, they explained the Holy Scriptures, and threw light on our sacred dogmas. It is true that these books, at least in their present state, are not altogether free from errors; yet they embrace great force of teaching, by which natural truths are increased in number and in strength. Tertullian, too, fights against the heretics by the authority of Scripture. Then changing his weapons, he fights against the philosophers with arguments of philosophy. With so much acuteness and learning does he refute them, that he answers them openly and confidently: 'Neither about science nor about learning are we, as you think, on an equal footing.' Arnobius also in his books against the Gentiles, and Lactantius in his Institutions especially, strive earnestly with like eloquence and strength to persuade men to accept the dogmas and commands of Catholic wisdom. They do not overthrow philosophy, according to the way of the Academy; but partly by their own weapons, and partly by weapons taken from the agreement of philosophers

among themselves, they convince them. The great Athanasius and Chrysostom, first of preachers, have left writings about the soul of man, about the Attributes of God, and other questions of the greatest moment. These in the judgment of all are so excellent that it seems as if scarcely anything could be added to their subtlety and exhaustiveness. Not to be too prolix in mentioning them one by one, we add to the number of these most illustrious men of whom we have spoken the great Basil and the two Gregories. From Athens, then the home of the highest culture, they went forth equipped with the panoply of philosophy. Having acquired all their riches of learning by most ardent study, they used them to refute the heretic, and to build up the faithful.

But it is Augustine who seems to have borne away the palm from all. With a towering intellect, and a mind full to overflowing of sacred and profane learning, he fought resolutely against all the errors of his age, with the greatest faith and equal knowledge. What teaching of philosophy did he pass over? Nay, what was there into which he did not search thoroughly? Did he not do this when he was explaining to believers the deepest mysteries of the Faith, and defending them against the furious attacks of the adversaries? or when, after destroying the fictions of Academics and Manichæans, he made safe the foundations of human knowledge and their certainty, searching out also to the furthest point the reason and origin and causes of those evils by which man is oppressed? With what copiousness and with what subtlety did he write about the angels, and the soul, and the human mind; about the will and free-will; about religion and the blessed life; about time and eternity; about the nature of all changeable bodies! Afterwards, among the Easterns, John of Damascus followed in the footsteps of Basil and Gregory Nazianzen; while in the West, Boethius and Anselm, setting forth the doctrines of Augustine, greatly enriched the domain of philosophy.

Then the Doctors of the Middle Ages, whom we call Scholastics, set themselves to do a work of very great

magnitude. There are rich and fruitful crops of doctrine scattered everywhere in the mighty volumes of the Holy Fathers. The aim of the Scholastics was to gather these together diligently, and to store them up, as it were, in one place, for the use and convenience of those that come after.

What the origin of the Scholastic discipline was, what were also its characteristics and its value, it will be well, Venerable Brothers, to set forth more fully here in the words of a man of the greatest wisdom—our predecessor Sixtus V. : 'By the Divine gift of Him, Who alone gives the spirit of knowledge and wisdom and understanding, and Who, through the ages, according to her needs, enriches His Church with new gifts, and surrounds her with new safeguards, our ancestors, being men exceedingly wise, developed the study of Scholastic Theology. There were especially two glorious Doctors, teachers of this famous science—that is, the angelic St. Thomas, and the seraphic St. Bonaventure. With surpassing abilities, with ceaseless study, with laborious toil and long watchings, they worked it out and adorned it. They arranged it in the very best way, unfolded it brilliantly in many methods, and then handed it on to their successors.'

The knowledge and the exercise of this science of salvation have certainly always brought the very greatest help to the Church; whether it be for the right understanding and interpretation of Scripture, or for reading and expounding the Fathers with greater safety and profit, or for laying bare and answering different errors and heresies. This doctrine flows from the brimming fountain of the Sacred Scriptures, of the Supreme Pontiffs, and of Holy Fathers and Councils. Now, indeed, in these last days, it is in the highest degree necessary to refute heresies and confirm the dogmas of the Catholic faith. For now have come those dangerous times of which the Apostle speaks. Now men, blasphemous, proud, deceivers, go from bad to worse, wandering from the truth themselves and leading others into error. These words might seem to embrace only the

Scholastic Theology ; but it is plain that they are also to be taken in reference to philosophy and its praise.

Scholastic Theology has splendid gifts, which make it very formidable to enemies of the truth ; as the same Pontiff tells us. ' It has,' he says, ' an apt coherence of facts and causes, connected with one another ; an order and arrangement, like soldiers drawn up in battle array ; definitions and distinctions very lucid ; unanswerableness of argument and acute disputations. By these the light is divided from the darkness, and truth from falsehood. The lies of heretics, wrapped up in many wiles and fallacies, being stripped of their coverings, are bared and laid open.' But these great and wondrous gifts can only be found in a right use of that philosophy which the masters of Scholasticism, of set purpose and with wise counsel, were everywhere accustomed to use even in their theological disputations.'

Moreover, it is the proper and singular gift of Scholastic theologians to bind together human knowledge and Divine knowledge in the very closest bonds. For this reason, truly the theology in which they excelled could never have gained so much honour and praise from the judgment of men as it did, if they had used a system of philosophy which was maimed, or imperfect, or shallow.

Now far above all other Scholastic Doctors towers Thomas Aquinas, their master and prince. Cajetan says truly of him : ' So great was his veneration for the ancient and sacred Doctors that he may be said to have gained a perfect understanding of them all.' Thomas gathered together their doctrines like the scattered limbs of a body, and moulded them into a whole. He arranged them in so wonderful an order, and increased them with such great additions, that rightly and deservedly he is reckoned a singular safeguard and glory of the Catholic Church. His intellect was docile and subtle ; his memory was ready and tenacious ; his life was most holy ; and he loved the truth alone. Greatly enriched as he was with the science of God and the science of man, he is likened to the sun ; for he warmed the whole earth with the fire of his holiness, and

filled the whole earth with the splendour of his teaching. There is no part of philosophy which he did not handle with acuteness and solidity. He wrote about the laws of reasoning ; about God and incorporeal substances ; about man and other things of sense ; and about human acts and their principles. What is more, he wrote on these subjects in such a way that in him not one of the following perfections is wanting : a full selection of subjects ; a beautiful arrangement of their divisions ; the best method of treating them ; certainty of principles ; strength of argument ; perspicuity and propriety in language ; and the power of explaining deep mysteries.

Beside these questions and the like, the Angelic Doctor, in his speculations, drew certain philosophical conclusions as to the reasons and principles of created things. These conclusions have the very widest reach, and contain, as it were, in their bosom the seeds of truths wellnigh infinite in number. These have to be unfolded with most abundant fruits in their own time by the teachers who come after him. As he used his method of philosophizing, not only in teaching the truth, but also in refuting error, he has gained this prerogative for himself. With his own hand he vanquished all errors of ancient times ; and still he supplies an armoury of weapons which brings us certain victory in the conflict with falsehoods ever springing up in the course of years.

Moreover, carefully distinguishing reason from Faith, as is right, and yet joining them together in a harmony of friendship, he so guarded the rights of each, and so watched over the dignity of each, that, as far as man is concerned, reason can now hardly rise higher than she rose, borne up in the flight of Thomas ; and Faith can hardly gain more helps and greater helps from reason than those which Thomas gave her.

For these causes, especially in former days, men of the greatest learning and worthy of the highest praise both in theology and philosophy, having sought out with incredible diligence the immortal writings of Thomas, surrendered

themselves to his angelic wisdom, not so much to be taught by his words, as to be altogether nourished by them. It is plain also that nearly all founders and lawgivers of religious Orders have bidden their children study the doctrines of Thomas, and very religiously adhere to them, giving a caution that it will be allowed to none to deviate ever so little from the footsteps of so great a man. To pass by the Dominican family which, as it were, by a right of its own, glories in this greatest of teachers, the statutes of each Order testify that Benedictines, Carmelites, Augustinians, the Society of Jesus, and many other holy Orders, are bound by this law.

Now our mind flies with great delight to those very celebrated universities and schools which formerly flourished in Europe: such as Paris, Salamanca, Alcalá, Douai, Toulouse, Louvain, Padua, Bologna, Naples, Coimbra, and very many others. No one is ignorant that the reputation of these universities grew by age; that their opinions were asked when weighty issues were at stake; and that those opinions had great influence everywhere. But it is also well known that, in those illustrious abodes of human learning, Thomas reigned as a ruler in his own kingdom. The minds of all, both teachers and hearers, with wondrous consent found rest in the guidance and authority of one Angelic Doctor.

But further—and this is of greater importance—the Roman Pontiffs, our predecessors, bore witness to the wisdom of Thomas Aquinas with praises singularly strong, and with most abundant testimonies. Clement VI., Nicholas V., Benedict XIII., and others, testify that the whole Church was enlightened by his admirable teaching. Pius V. acknowledges that heresies are confounded and exposed and scattered by his doctrine, and that by it the whole world is daily freed from pestilent errors. Others, with Clement XII., say that most fruitful blessings have flowed from his writings on the whole Church. They affirm also that the same honour has to be given to him as to the greatest Doctors of the Church, such as Gregory and Am-

brose, and Augustine and Jerome. Others did not hesitate to set forth St. Thomas as a standard and teacher to universities and great schools of learning, saying that they might safely follow him. On this point the words of Blessed Urban V. to the University of Toulouse seem to be most worthy of mention: 'It is our will, and by the authority of these letters we enjoin on you, that you follow the doctrine of Blessed Thomas as true and Catholic, and strive to unfold it with your whole strength.' This example of Urban was followed by Innocent XII. in the University of Louvain, and by Benedict XIV. in the Dionysian College of Granada. To these judgments of the Pontiffs about Thomas there is added, as a crown, the testimony of Innocent VI.: 'His doctrine above all other doctrine, with the one exception of the Holy Scriptures, has such a propriety of words, such a method of explanation, such a truth of opinions, that no one who holds it will ever be found to have strayed from the path of truth; whereas anyone who has attacked it has always been suspected as to the truth.'

Moreover, Œcumenical Councils, made glorious by the flower of wisdom gathered from the whole world, always strove with great care to give singular honour to Thomas Aquinas. In the Councils of Lyons, of Vienne, of Florence, of the Vatican, you may say that Thomas was present at the deliberations and decrees of the Fathers, and almost that he presided at them, contending against the errors of Greeks and heretics and rationalists, with a power from which there was no escape, and with a most auspicious result.

But we now come to the greatest glory of Thomas—a glory which is altogether his own, and shared with no other Catholic Doctor. In the midst of the Council of Trent, the assembled Fathers so willing it, the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas lay open on the altar, with the Holy Scriptures and the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, that from it might be sought counsel and reasons and answers.

Lastly, another crown seems to have been kept for this peerless man—that is, the way in which he extorts homage,

praise, and admiration even from the enemies of the Catholic name. It is well known that there have not been wanting heresiarchs who openly said that, if the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas could only be got rid of, they could 'easily give battle to other Catholic Doctors, and overcome them, and so scatter the Church.' A vain hope indeed, but no vain testimony !

For these reasons, Venerable Brothers, so often as We look at the goodness, the force, and the exceedingly great usefulness of that philosophical doctrine in which our fathers took such delight, We judge that it has been rashly done when this doctrine has not always, and everywhere, been held in its own rightful honour. Especially do We judge this to be the case, since it is plain that long use and the judgment of the greatest men, and, what is more than all, the consent of the Church, have favoured the Scholastic method. Here and there a certain new kind of philosophy has taken the place of the old doctrine ; and because of this, men have not gathered those desirable and wholesome fruits which the Church and civil society itself could have wished. The aggressive innovators of the sixteenth century have not hesitated to philosophize without any regard whatever to the Faith, asking, and conceding in return, the right to invent anything that they can think of, and anything that they please. From this it quickly followed, of course, that systems of philosophy were multiplied beyond all reason, and that there sprang up conflicting opinions and diverse opinions even about some of the chief things which are within human knowledge. From a multitude of opinions men very often pass to uncertainty and doubt ; while there is no one who does not see how easily their minds glide from doubt into error.

But, since man is drawn by imitation, we have seen these novelties lay hold of the minds of some Catholic philosophers, who, undervaluing the inheritance of ancient wisdom, have chosen rather to invent new things than to extend and perfect the old by new truths, and that certainly with unwise counsel, and not without loss to science ; for such a manifold

kind of doctrine has only a shifting foundation, resting as it does on the authority and will of individual teachers. For this reason it does not make philosophy firm and strong and solid, like the old philosophy, but, on the contrary, makes it weak and shallow.

When We say this, however, We do not condemn those learned and able men who bring their industry and their knowledge, and the riches of new discoveries, to the aid of philosophy; for We clearly see that such a course tends to the increase of learning. But with great care we must guard against spending the whole of our attention, or even the chief part of it, on such studies as these, and on such instruction.

Let the same judgment be formed about Sacred Theology. This may well be aided and illustrated by many helps of erudition; but it is altogether necessary that it should be treated in the weighty manner of the Scholastics, in order that it may continue to be the 'unassailable bulwark of the faith,' by the forces of reason and revelation thus united in it.

Students of philosophy, therefore, not a few, giving their minds lately to the task of setting philosophy on a surer footing, have done their utmost, and are doing their utmost, to restore to its place the glorious teaching of Thomas Aquinas, and to win for it again its former renown.

That many of your order, Venerable Brothers, are with like will following promptly and cheerfully in the same path, We know to the great gladness of Our heart. While We praise these much, We exhort them to go on in the way that they have begun. To the rest of you, one by one, We give this word of counsel: there is nothing which We have longer wished for and desired than that you should give largely and abundantly to youths engaged in study the pure streams of wisdom which flow from the Angelic Doctor as from a perennial and copious spring.

Our reasons for wishing this so earnestly as We do are many.

First, in our times, the Christian Faith is commonly

opposed by the wiles and craft of a certain deceitful kind of wisdom. All young men, therefore, and especially those who are growing up as the hope of the Church, ought to be fed with healthful and strong food of doctrine. Thus, being mighty in strength, and possessing an armoury in which all needful weapons may be found, they will learn by experience to treat the cause of religion with power and wisdom, according to the admonition of the Apostle, 'being ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope which is in you': and being 'able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers.'

Next, there are many who, with minds alienated from the Faith, hate all Catholic teaching, and say that reason alone is their teacher and guide. To heal these men of their unbelief, and to bring them to grace and the Catholic Faith, We think that nothing, after the supernatural help of God, can be more useful in these days than the solid doctrine of the Fathers and the Scholastics. They teach firm foundations of Faith, its Divine origin, its certain truth, the arguments by which it is commended to men, the benefits that it has conferred on the human race, and its perfect harmony with reason. They teach all such truths with a weight of evidence and a force that may well persuade even minds unwilling and hostile in the highest degree.

Again, we all see the great dangers which threaten family life, and even civil society itself, because of the pestilence of perverse opinions. Truly all civil society would be much more tranquil and much safer if healthier teaching were given in universities and schools; a doctrine more in unison with the perpetual teaching office (*magisterium*) of the Church, such as is contained in the volumes of Thomas Aquinas. He disputes about the true nature of liberty, which, in these days, is passing into lawlessness; about the Divine origin of all authority; about laws and their binding force; about the paternal and just government of sovereign princes, with our obedience to higher powers, and the common love that should be among all. The words of Thomas about these things, and others of a like nature, have

the greatest strength, indeed a resistless strength, to overthrow the principles of this new jurisprudence, which is manifestly dangerous to the peaceful order of society and to public safety.

Lastly, from the restoration of philosophical teaching as it has been set forth by Us, all human sciences ought to gather hope of improvement, and the promise of a very great safeguard. For from philosophy, as from a guiding wisdom, the beneficent arts have hitherto derived a healthy method and a right measure. They have, moreover, drunk a vital spirit from it as from a common fountain of life. It is proved by fact and constant experience that the liberal arts have been most flourishing when the honour of philosophy has stood inviolate, and when its judgment has been held for wisdom : but that they have lain neglected and almost obliterated when declining philosophy has been enveloped in errors and absurdities.

Hence, also, the physical sciences, which now are held in so much repute, and everywhere draw to themselves a singular admiration, because of the many wonderful discoveries made in them, would not only take no harm from a restoration of the philosophy of the ancients, but would derive great protection from it. For the fruitful exercise and increase of these sciences it is not enough that we consider facts and contemplate Nature. When the facts are well known we must rise higher, and give our thoughts with great care to understanding the nature of corporeal things, as well as to the investigation of the laws which they obey, and of the principles from which spring their order, their unity in variety, and their common likeness in diversity. It is marvellous what power and light and help are given to these investigations by Scholastic philosophy, if it be wisely used.

On this point it is well to call one thing to your minds. It is only by the highest injustice that any jealousy of the progress and increase of natural sciences is laid, as a fault, at the door of that philosophy. When the Scholastics, following the teaching of the Holy Fathers, everywhere taught through-

out their anthropology that the human understanding can only rise to the knowledge of immaterial things by things of sense, nothing could be more useful for the philosopher than to investigate carefully the secrets of Nature, and to be conversant, long and laboriously, with the study of physical science. Indeed, they themselves prove this by their works. Thomas, and Blessed Albert the Great, and other princes of the Scholastics, did not so give themselves up to the study of philosophy, as to have little care for the knowledge of natural things. Nay, on this matter there are not a few of their words and discoveries which modern teachers approve and acknowledge to be in harmony with truth. Besides, in this very age, many distinguished teachers of physical sciences openly bear witness that there is no contradiction, truly so called, between the certain and proved conclusions of recent physics, and the philosophical principles of the Schools.

We, therefore, while We declare that everything wisely said should be received with willing and glad mind, as well as everything profitably discovered or thought out, exhort all of you, Venerable Brothers, with the greatest earnestness to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to spread it as far as you can, for the safety and glory of the Catholic Faith, for the good of society, and for the increase of all the sciences. We say the wisdom of St. Thomas ; for it is not by any means in our mind to set before this age, as a standard, those things which may have been inquired into by Scholastic Doctors with too great subtlety ; or anything taught by them with too little consideration, not agreeing with the investigations of a later age ; or, lastly, anything that is not probable.

Let, then, teachers carefully chosen by you do their best to instil the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas into the minds of their hearers ; and let them clearly point out its solidity and excellence above all other teaching. Let this doctrine be the light of all places of learning which you may have already opened, or may hereafter open. Let it be used for the refutation of errors that are gaining ground.

But lest the false should be drunk instead of the true ; or lest that which is unwholesome should be drunk instead of that which is pure ; take care that the wisdom of Thomas be drawn from his own fountain, or at any rate from those streams which, in the certain and unanimous opinion of learned men, yet flow whole and untainted, inasmuch as they are led from the fountain itself. Take care, moreover, that the minds of the young be kept from streams which are said to have flowed from thence, but in reality have been fed by unhealthy waters from other springs.

Well do we know that all our work will be vain, unless, Venerable Brothers, He bless our common efforts, Who in the Divine Scriptures is called the 'God of all knowledge.' By those same Scriptures we are warned, that 'every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights.' Again, 'If any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God, who giveth to all men abundantly and upbraideth not ; and it shall be given him.'

In this matter, then, let us follow the example of the Angelic Doctor, who never began to read or to write without seeking for God's help by prayer ; and who in simplicity acknowledged that all his learning had come to him, not so much from his own study and toil, as immediately from God. With humble and united prayer, therefore, let us all together beseech God fervently to pour out the spirit of knowledge and understanding on the sons of the Church, and to open their minds to the understanding of wisdom.

Also, that we may receive more abundant fruits of the goodness of God, use that patronage which is most powerful with Him ; that is, the patronage of the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is called the Seat of Wisdom. Secure also, as intercessors, Blessed Joseph, the pure Spouse of the Virgin ; and Peter and Paul, the chiefs of the Apostles, who renewed the whole world with truth, when it was corrupted by the uncleanness and the contagion of errors, and who filled it with the light of the wisdom which is from Heaven.

Lastly, in hope, trusting to the help of God and relying on your pastoral zeal, to all of you, Venerable Brothers, to all the clergy, and all the people committed to the care of

each, we give, with great love in the Lord, our Apostolical blessing, the earnest of heavenly gifts, and the witness of our special goodwill.

Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, this 4th day of August, 1879, in the second year of our Pontificate. LEO, PP. XIII.

THE NEW CODEX OF CANON LAW.

ISSUED BY AUTHORITY OF POPE BENEDICT XV., 1917.

Canon 589: Religious who have already studied their humanities should devote themselves for two years at least to philosophy and for four years to theology, following the teaching of S. Thomas (*cf.* Canon 1366, § 2) in accordance with the instructions of the Holy See.

Canon 1366, § 2: The study of philosophy and theology and the teaching of these sciences to their students must be accurately carried out by Professors [in seminaries, etc.] according to the arguments, doctrine, and principles of S. Thomas which they are inviolately to hold.

THE LEONINE EDITION.

IN the year 1879 Pope Leo XIII. addressed a letter, dated October 15, to Cardinal de Luca, Prefect of the Congregation of Studies, to found the Academy of St. Thomas. In this letter the Pope mentions his intention of bringing out a new edition of all the Saint's works. He speaks of it as an edition, 'quæ cuncta omnino Sancti Doctoris scripta complectatur optimis quoad fieri potest formis litterarum expressa accurataque emendata; iis etiam adhibitis codicum manuscriptorum subsidiis, quæ ætate hac nostra in lucem et usum prolata sunt. Conjunctim vero edendas curabimus clarissimorum ejus interpretum, ut Thomæ de Vio Cardinali Cajetani et Ferrariensis, lucubrationes per quas, tanquam per uberes riviculos, tanti viri doctrina decurrit.'

The *Motu Proprio* for the new edition appeared January 18, 1880. In this it was ordered that the new edition should be reserved to the Propaganda Press. The edition was

confided to Cardinal de Luca, Cardinal Simeoni, and Cardinal Zigliara. With the works of St. Thomas they were directed to edit Cajetan on the 'Summa Theologica,' and Ferrariensis on the 'Contra Gentiles.'

Cardinal Zigliara, in the Preface to the first Volume, says that, in obedience to the command of His Holiness, 'Magister Generalis Ordinis Prædicatorum cui demandata est a Leone XIII., cura hujus editionis operum Sti. Thomæ, quosdam religiosos in scientiis simul et arte paleographica eruditos designavit, qui bibliothecas perlustrant, codices optimæ notæ inquirunt, scripta S. Thomæ inedita diligenter investigant, atque omnia scripta notata aliis religiosis Romæ degentibus et novam hanc editionem curantibus transmittant.'

The groundwork of the new edition is that of St. Pius V. (1570). Little is known of the history of this edition. Several learned Dominicans were employed in it, and among them Remigius Nanni, Cardinal Justiniani, and Thomas Marriques, S.P.A. Magister. It is the best of all the editions of the 'Opera Omnia' published up to the time of Leo XIII. As the Pope says in his letter to Cardinal de Luca: 'Cœtera enim, cum veteres tum recentiores, partim quod non omnia S. Thomæ scripta exhibent, partim quod optimorum, ejus interpretum atque explanatorum careant commentariis, partim quod minus diligenter adornatæ sint, non omnia tulisse punctum videntur.'

This Piana, or Roman, Edition, however, seems to have been made with the help of earlier editions rather than of the manuscripts.

The first Volume of the Leonine Edition comprises the 'Dissertation of De Rubeis on the Life and Writings of St. Thomas,' also the 'Commentaries of the Saint on Aristotle's Works,' 'Peri Hermenias,' and 'Posteriora Analytica.' As St. Thomas's Commentaries on the former terminate at the end of the Second Book, Cajetan's Commentary on the remainder has been given.

The Greek text of Aristotle (Didot's edition) has been inserted in place of the second Latin version given by the Piana, synopses of each lesson and copious notes being added.

The second Volume gives the Commentaries on the eight books of Aristotle's 'Physics,' and the third Volume contains those on the treatises, 'De Cœlo et Mundo,' 'De Generatione et Corruptione,' and the 'Meteorologia.'

It is worthy of note that up to the time when the new edition was undertaken, the Commentary on both of the books, 'De Generatione et Corruptione,' was looked upon as genuine work of St. Thomas ; but by means of the manuscripts, as well as from internal evidence and discovery of their origin and source, it has been proved in the Preface to the third Volume, that only the first seventeen lessons of the Commentary on the First Book are by St. Thomas, the remainder on the First Book, and all on the Second, being drawn from Albertus Magnus.

Discoveries were also made concerning the Commentary on the books of the 'Meteorologia,' as may be seen in the Preface. That on the Third and Fourth were known to be spurious. That on the Third Book is taken from Peter of Alvernia ; that in the Leonine Edition, the Commentary on the last lesson of the Second Book, is also shown to be taken from Albertus Magnus.

On the publication of the third Volume, the Pope addressed a Letter to Cardinals Simeoni and Zigliara (Cardinal de Luca had died), dated October 11, 1886, expressing his wish that the 'Summa Theologica' and 'Summa Contra Gentes' should be the next edited and published.

Of the former, up to this time (1906) nine volumes have been published, containing almost all that St. Thomas wrote before his death. With these appears the Commentary of Cajetan. The text of St. Thomas has been compared with manuscripts and early editions ; quotations have been verified. Each manuscript used in the edition has been read through, and when it differs from the Piana, a note is made of the variant. In composing the second Volume no less than 20,000 variants were marked.

The printing of the work was done at the Propaganda Press. The work was confided wholly to the Dominican Order by Pope Leo XIII. before his death.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.

†	SCRIPTURE.	THEOLOGY.	APOLOGETICS.	PHILOSOPHY.	PHILOSOPHICO-THEOLOGICAL.	CANON LAW—SERMONS—LITURGY.
1254	—	1254-56. <i>Comm. in Sen.</i>	—	—	—	Collationes Domini- niales (1254-64)
1255	—	—	—	De Principiis Naturæ	—	Sermones Quad- rarg. (* †)
1256	1256-59.* <i>In Matt., Mark, Luke, John</i> In Matt. (36)	—	—	De Ente et Essentia	Q. Q. de Vestate (1256-59)	—
1257	—	1258 (?). In Boet. de Trin.	Contra impug- nati- onem Dei cultum CONTRA GEN- TILES	1258 (?). In 1 Boetii de Hebdom.	—	—
1258	—	—	—	—	—	—
1259	1259-61. <i>Isaias</i>	c. 1259. In Dion. de Div. Nom. Com. Theol.	—	—	Q. Q. de Potentia (1259-63)	In 1 ^m et 2 ^m De- cretal
1260	—	—	—	—	—	—
1261	1261-64. <i>Job</i> 1261-62. <i>Catena Aurea in Matt.</i>	1261-68. De Ar- ticulis Fidei	1261-68. De Rationibus Fidei	—	—	—
1262	—	—	—	—	—	—
1263	—	—	Cont. Errores Græcorum	De Emptione et Vendi- tione	Q. Q. de Malo (1263-68)	OFFICIUM . COR- PORIS . CHRISTI
1264	1264-68. <i>Jeremias Cant. Cantic.</i>	—	—	—	R ^y de Art. CVIII.	—
1265	1265-67. <i>Catena Aurea in Mark, Luke, John</i>	In 1 ^m Sentent.	—	1265-66. De Reg. Princ. 1265-68. In VIII. lib. Physic. In XII. lib. Metaphy. In III. lib. de Anima In L. de Sensuet In L. de Memoria et Reminisc.	—	—
1266	—	—	—	—	—	—
1267	—	—	—	—	—	—

CHRONOLOGY OF THE LIFE OF ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, O.P.

1212	—	Frederic II., Emperor	}	ROCCA SICCA.
1216	—			
		HONORIUS III.		
1224-25 (?)	—	St. Thomas, born at Rocca Sicca, near Aquino	}	ROCCA SICCA.
		GREGORY IX.		
1227	—	St. Louis, King. St. Francis of Assisi dies. Sinnebald, kinsman of St. Thomas, Abbot of Monte Cassino		
1228	—	Gregory IX. invades Naples. The Aquinos and Abbot of Monte Cassino resist papal troops		
1229	—	Papal troops, under John of Brienne, ravage Naples. Council of Toulouse		
—	Nov.	Frederic II. takes Monte Cassino		
1230	Aug.	Gregory IX. and Frederic II. make 'Peace of San Germano' (through B. Gualo, O.P. St. Thomas offered at Monte Cassino		
1231	June 1	Sunday. Lightning kills sister of St. Thomas. 'Collectio of the Laws of Sicily,' by Peter de Vineis		
1234	—	St. Raymund of Pennafort, O.P., by command of Gregory IX., publishes the 'Decretales'		
—	Sep. 5	Gregory IX. driven from Rome		
1236	—	Abbot Sinnebald dies		
1237	—	Frederic II. fights Lombard League. Is defeated at Cortenuova. St. Raymund Pennafort, O.P., Master-General		
1239	Mar. 20	Palm Sunday. Gregory IX. excommunicates Frederic II. Monte Cassino taken by Frederic II. St. Thomas stays with his family at Loreti. Miracle of Roses		
—	Autumn	St. Thomas goes to University of Naples		
1241	—	Frederic II. attacks Rome	}	NAPLES.
—	Sep.	Gregory IX. dies.		
		CELESTINE IV. <i>Fifteen days.</i>		
—	—	Cardinals fly to Anagni. B. John, the Teutonic Master-General. Frederic II. writes to the General Chapter		

INNOCENT IV.			
1244	April (end)	St. Thomas takes the habit of a Friar Preacher at Naples	} NAPLES.
—	May	On his way to Paris, St. Thomas is taken prisoner at Aquapendente, where Frederic II. with his Court and Army imprisoned in his own home at Rocca Sicca	
1244	—	Innocent leaves Rome	} ROCCA SICCA.
COUNCIL OF LYONS			
1245	Jan.	General Chapter at Cologne	} PARIS.
—	Autumn	St. Thomas set free. Goes to Paris. Studies under B. Albert the Great, O.P.	
1248	—	General Chapter orders five Studia Generalia (Paris, Montpellier, Oxford, Cologne, Bologna)	} COLOGNE.
—	Summer	St. Thomas goes with B. Albert the Great, O.P., to Cologne. Conrad of Hochstaden lays first stone of Cathedral	
1250	—	Frederic II. dies. Innocent IV. at war with Conrad IV. and Manfred. Brothers of St. Thomas side with Pope. Conrad IV. takes Rocca Sicca. Aquino destroyed. Raynal, brother of St. Thomas, starved in prison. Mother already dead. St. Peter Martyr, O.P., martyred	} PARIS.
1252	Feb.	University Masters of Paris denounce regulars	
—	Summer	St. Thomas at Paris	
1254	—	B. Humbert, O.P., Master-General	
—	Feb.	Masters at Paris write against regulars	
—	April	Masters strike	
—	Oct.	Innocent IV. at Naples. Manfred revolts	
—	Nov. 21	'Etsi ANIMARUM' against regulars	
—	Dec. 2	Manfred defeats Pope at Monte Foggio	
—	Dec. 7	Innocent IV. dies	
ALEXANDER IV.			
—	Dec. 21	Alexander IV. annuls 'Etsi Animarum'	} PARIS.
1255	—	Wm. of St. Amour, 'De Periculis Novissimis,' 'Evangelium Æternum'	
—	Mar. 9	University of Paris orders teaching of Aristotle	
1256	Spring	Chancellor Emeric licenses St. Thomas. St. Thomas is made Master of Theology	
1256	—	Alexander IV. at Anagni. B. Humbert, O.P., Master-General, also there. Alexander IV. sends for St. Bonaventure, O.F.M. B. Albert the Great, O.P., teaches a year at Anagni	
—	Sep.	St. Thomas teaches as Master in the Schools of the Friar Preachers at Paris	

1256	Oct. 5	Alexander IV. condemns 'De Periculis Novissimis' and 'Evangelium Æternum.' B. Albert the Great, O.P., writes 'De Unitate Intellectus contra Avensen' at request of Alexander IV.	PARIS.
1259	—	Palm. St. Thomas preaching in Paris is interrupted.	
—	June	St. Thomas at General Chapter at Valencienne. St. Thomas, B. Albert, Peter of Tarentarsi, Bonhomme, and Florent, draw up rules for study. St. Thomas leaves Paris for Anagni. St. Thomas teaches at Anagni, where Papal Court resides	ANAGNI.
—	Sep. 24	William of St. Amour condemned	
1261	May	Alexander IV. dies	
URBAIN IV. (Patriarch of Jerusalem.)			
—	—	Urbain IV. sends for St. Thomas to write for Reunion with Greeks. St. Thomas preaches in St. Peter's. Attached to Papal Court. St. Thomas teaches at Anagni	ORVIETO.
1262	—	Writes Epitaph of St. Peter, Martyr, O.P., at Milan	
1263	Jan. 13	Urbain IV. renews decree of Gregory IX. forbidding Aristotle. General Chapter at London. B. Humbert, O.P., resigns	
—	Mar. 19	Cardinal Hugh of St. Cher, O.P., dies with Pope at Orvieto	
1264	July 2	Urbain IV. gives privileges to Arino, brother of St. Thomas	
—	Oct. 2	Urbain IV. dies at Perugia	VITERBO.
1265	Feb.	Viterbo	
CLEMENT IV. (Legate in England.)			
—	—	Clement IV. gives Naples to Charles of Anjou, brother of St. Louis	ROME.
1267	June 5	Bologna (Whit Sunday). St. Thomas present at Translation of St. Dominic at Bologna. Seger of Brabant appears	
—	Autumn	Clement IV. calls St. Thomas to Viterbo	VITERBO.
1268	May 18	Moerbeke, O.P., publishes translation of 'Elementatis Theologica' of Produ	
—	Nov.	Clement IV. dies. Buried in Dominican Church, Viterbo	
—	Nov.	St. Thomas sent to teach at Paris	PARIS.
—	Jan.	St. Thomas arrives in Paris.	
1269	May	General Chapter at Paris. With Kilwardy as judge of 'Cases of Conscience.' St. Louis asks St. Thomas to teach Theology at St. Jacques	

1270	July 20	Third Sunday after SS. Peter and Paul. St. Thomas preaches before University against Avenvists	} PARIS.
—	Aug. 10	St. Louis dies	
—	Dec. 28	Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, condemns thirteen propositions	
1271	April	Bishop of Paris forbids Masters and Bachelors of Arts to discuss theology	
1271	Sep. 1	GREGORY X.	
1272	After Easter	St. Thomas leaves Paris. Octave of Pentecost. St. Thomas at General Chapter of Florence	} NAPLES.
—	Aug. 2	St. Thomas at death of brother-in-law, Roger dell Aquila, Count of Traetto	
—	Oct. 15	St. Thomas at Naples begins to teach. Charles V. pays pension for St. Thomas	
1273	Dec. 6	Vision	} FOSSANOVA.
1274	Jan.	Leaves Naples for General Council of Lyons	
—	Mar. 7	St. Thomas dies in the Cistercian Abbey of Fossanova	

(N.B.—We have to offer our thanks to Pere Mandonnet, O.P., who has kindly placed at our disposal an original article on the life and works of St. Thomas. Almost all the material of both chronologies has been taken from the results of his research.)

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PROLOGUE

BECAUSE the doctor of catholic truth ought not only to teach the proficient, but also to instruct beginners (according to the Apostle: *As unto little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat*—I Cor. iii. 1, 2), we purpose in this book to treat of whatever belongs to the Christian religion, in such a way as may tend to the instruction of beginners. We have considered that students in this doctrine have not seldom been hampered by what they have found written by other authors, partly on account of the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments, partly also because those things that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the order of the subject-matter, but according as the plan of the book might require, or the occasion of the argument offer, partly, too, because frequent repetition brought weariness and confusion to the minds of the readers.

Endeavouring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by God's help, to set forth whatever is included in this sacred doctrine as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow.

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

FIRST PART.

QUESTION I.

THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE.

(In Ten Articles.)

To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavour to investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning this there are ten points of inquiry:—

(1) Whether it is necessary? (2) Whether it is a science? (3) Whether it is one or many? (4) Whether it is speculative or practical? (5) How it is compared with other sciences? (6) Whether it is the same as wisdom? (7) Whether God is its subject-matter? (8) Whether it is a matter of argument? (9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes? (10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded in different senses?]

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER, BESIDES PHILOSOPHY, ANY FURTHER DOCTRINE IS REQUIRED?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above reason: *Seek not the things that are too high for thee* (Ecclus. iii. 22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science.

Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous.

Obj. 2. Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science—even God Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the divine science, as Aristotle has proved (*Metaph.* vi.). Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further knowledge.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. iii. 16): *All Scripture inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice.* Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science there should be other knowledge—*i.e.*, inspired of God.

I answer that, It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God, besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason; *The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee* (Isa. lxiv. 4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore neces-

sary that, besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learnt through revelation.

Reply Obj. 1. Although those things which are beyond man's knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason, nevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by faith. Hence the sacred text continues, *For many things are shown to thee above the understanding of man* (Ecclus. iii. 25). And in this the sacred science consists.

Reply Obj. 2. Sciences are differentiated according to the various means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion—that the earth, for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (*i.e.*, abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself. Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learnt from philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A SCIENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine proceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident, since their truth is not admitted by all: *For all men have not faith* (2 Thess. iii. 2). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

Obj. 2. Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv. 1), *to this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten,*

nourished, protected, and strengthened. But this can be said of no science except sacred doctrine. Therefore sacred doctrine is a science.

I answer that, Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of the intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God.

Reply Obj. 1. The principles of any science are either in themselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a higher science; and such, as we have said, are the principles of sacred doctrine.

Reply Obj. 2. Individual facts are treated of in sacred doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally: but they are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as in moral sciences), and in order to establish the authority of those men through whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scripture or doctrine is based, has come down to us.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS ONE SCIENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science; for according to the Philosopher (*Poster. i.*) *that science is one which treats only of one class of subjects.* But the creator and the creature, both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine, cannot be grouped together under one

class of subjects. Therefore sacred doctrine is not one science.

Obj. 2. Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal creatures, and human morality. But these belong to separate philosophical sciences. Therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one science.

On the contrary, Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science: *Wisdom gave him the knowledge [scientiam] of holy things* (Wisd. x. 10).

I answer that, sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object. For example, man, ass, stone, agree in the one precise formality of being coloured; and colour is the formal object of sight. Therefore, because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science; and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one science.

Reply Obj. 1. Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and creatures equally, but of God primarily; and of creatures only so far as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the unity of this science is not impaired.

Reply Obj. 2. Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher faculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit regards the object in its more universal formality, as the object of the *common sense* is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore, whatever is visible or audible. Hence the *common sense*, although one faculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses. Similarly, objects which are the subject-matter of different philosophical sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science under one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation. So that in this way sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of the divine science, which is one and simple, yet extends to everything.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A PRACTICAL SCIENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science; for a practical science is that which ends in action according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* ii.). But sacred doctrine is ordained to action; *Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only* (Jas. i. 22). Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science. ^{or 2}

Obj. 2. Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the New Law. But law implies a moral science, which is a practical science. Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.

On the contrary, Every practical science is concerned with human operations; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and architecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a practical but a speculative science.

I answer that, Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which belong to different philosophical sciences, because it considers in each the same formal aspect, namely so far as they can be known through divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical, because it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God, in which consists eternal bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the Objections.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS NOBLER THAN OTHER SCIENCES ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other sciences; for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude it establishes. But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine; for its principles—namely, articles of faith—can be doubted. Therefore other sciences seem to be nobler.

Obj. 2. Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon a higher; as music depends upon arithmetic. But sacred doctrine does in a sense depend upon the philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in his Epistle to Magnus, that *the ancient doctors so enriched their books with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou knowest not what more to admire in them, their profane erudition or their scriptural learning.* Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to other sciences.

On the contrary, Other sciences are called the handmaidens of this one: *Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower* (Prov. ix. 3).

I answer that, Since this science is partly speculative and partly practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by reason of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of its subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses other speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the light of the divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth of its subject-matter, because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while other sciences consider only those things which are within reason's grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained

to a further purpose, as political science is nobler than military science; for the good of the army is directed to the good of the State. But the purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every standpoint it is nobler than other sciences.

Reply Obj. 1. It may well happen that what is in itself the more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the weakness of our intelligence, "which is dazzled by the clearest objects of nature; as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun" (*Metaph. ii., lect. i.*). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths, but to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things, as is said in *de Animalibus xi.*

Reply Obj. 2. This science can in a sense depend upon the philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its principles not from other sciences; but immediately from God, by revelation. Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as handmaidens: even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that supply their materials, as political of military science. That it thus uses them is not due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the defect of our intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known through natural reason (from which proceed the other sciences), to that which is above reason, such as are the teachings of this science.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS DOCTRINE IS THE SAME AS WISDOM ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom. For no doctrine which borrows its principles

is worthy of the name of wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed (*Metaph.* i.). But this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore this science is not wisdom.

Obj. 2. Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles of other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is clear in *Ethic* vi. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of other sciences. Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.

Obj. 3. Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas wisdom is acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit (*Isa.* xi. 2). Therefore this doctrine is not the same as wisdom.

On the contrary, It is written (*Deut.* iv. 6): *This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations.*

I answer that, This doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus in the order of building he who plans the form of the house is called wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior labourers who trim the wood and make ready the stones: *As a wise architect I have laid the foundation* (*I Cor.* iii. 10). Again, in the order of all human life, the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a fitting end: *Wisdom is prudence to a man* (*Prov.* x. 23). Therefore he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe, namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii. 14). But sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest cause—not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew Him—*That which is known of God is manifest in them* (*Rom.* i. 19)—but also so far as He is known to Himself alone and revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom.

Reply Obj. 1. Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from any human knowledge, but from the divine

knowledge, through which, as through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.

Reply Obj. 2. The principles of other sciences either are evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes through revelation, and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of this science, must be condemned as false: *Destroying counsels and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God* (2 Cor. x. 4, 5).

Reply Obj. 3. Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost: *The spiritual man judgeth all things* (1 Cor. ii. 15). And Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* ii.): *Hierotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by experience of divine things.* The second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine, which is acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by revelation.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS THE OBJECT OF THIS SCIENCE?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not the object of this science. For in every science the nature of its object is presupposed. But this science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* I iv.):

It is impossible to define the essence of God. Therefore God is not the object of this science.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science must be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many other things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is not the object of this science.

On the contrary, The object of the science is that of which it principally treats. But in this science the treatment is mainly about God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is the object of this science.

I answer that, God is the object of this science. The relation between a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object. Now properly speaking the object of a faculty or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight in that they are coloured. Hence coloured things are the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science all things are treated of under the aspect of God; either because they are God Himself; or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however, looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to be something other than God—that is, either things and signs; or the works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as they have reference to God.

Reply Obj. 1. Although we cannot know in what consists the essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a

definition, in regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause.

Reply Obj. 2. Whatever other conclusions are reached in this sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or accidents, but as in some way related to Him.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER SACRED DOCTRINE IS A MATTER OF ARGUMENT?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For Ambrose says (*De Fide*, 1): *Put arguments aside where faith is sought.* But in this doctrine faith especially is sought: *But these things are written that you may believe* (John xx. 31). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.

Obj. 2. Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it seems unbecoming its dignity, for the proof from authority is the weakest form of proof. But if from reason, this is unbecoming its end, because, according to Gregory (*Homil.* 26), *faith has no merit in those things of which human reason brings its own experience.* Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.

On the contrary, The Scripture says that a bishop should embrace that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers (Tit. i. 9).

I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. xv.). However, it

is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz., metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of faith we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his objections—if he has any—against faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered.

Reply Obj. 1. Although arguments from human reason cannot avail to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless this doctrine argues from articles of faith to other truths.

Reply Obj. 2. This doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation: thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity.

Hence the Apostle says: *Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ* (2 Cor. x. 5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus: *As some also of your own poets said; For we are also His offspring* (Acts xvii. 28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets, who wrote the canonical books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors. Hence Augustine says (*Epist. ad Hieron. xix. 1.*): *Only those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learnt to hold in such honour as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem anything in their works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning.*

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER HOLY SCRIPTURE SHOULD USE METAPHORS ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors. For that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science should make use of such similitudes.

Obj. 2. Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: *They that explain me shall have life everlasting* (Ecclus. xxiv. 31). But by such similitudes truth is ob-

scured. Therefore to put forward divine truths by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science.

Obj. 3. Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they approach to the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken to represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the higher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is often found in the Scriptures.

On the contrary, It is written (Osee xii. 10): *I have multiplied visions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets.* But to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use metaphors. Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors.

I answer that, It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy Writ spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things. This is what Dionysius says (*Cælest. Hierarch. i.*): *We cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within the covering of many sacred veils.* It is also befitting Holy Writ, which is proposed to all without distinction of persons—*To the wise and to the unwise I am a debtor* (Rom. i. 14)—that spiritual truths be expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things may be able to understand it.

Reply Obj. 1. Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a representation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with representations. But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both necessary and useful.

Reply Obj. 2. The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says (*Cælest. Hierarch. i.*); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in the metaphors,

but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through those to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive instruction in these matters. Hence those things that are taught metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught more openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the exercise of thoughtful minds, and as a defence against the ridicule of the impious, according to the words *Give not that which is holy to dogs* (Matth. vii. 6).

Reply Obj. 3. As Dionysius says, (*loc. cit.*) it is more fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of less noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly, because thereby men's minds are the better preserved from error. For then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who could think of nothing nobler than bodies. Secondly, because this is more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For what He is not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes drawn from things farthest away from God form within us a truer estimate that God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him. Thirdly, because thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the unworthy.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN HOLY SCRIPTURE A WORD MAY HAVE SEVERAL SENSES?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several senses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and anagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion and deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument, but only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to state the

truth without any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to a word.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De util. cred. iii.*) that *the Old Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy, and allegory.* Now these four seem altogether different from the four divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four different senses mentioned above.

Obj. 3. Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical, which is not one of these four.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral. xx., 1*): *Holy Writ by the manner of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery.*

I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are signified by words, this science has the property, that the things signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby things signified by words have themselves also a signification is called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For as the Apostle says (*Heb. x. 1*) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, and Dionysius says (*Cæl. Hier i.*) *the New Law itself is a figure of future glory.* Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy

Writ is God, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as Augustine says (*Confess.* xii.), if, even according to the literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.

Reply Obj. 1. The multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things; but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the senses are founded on one—the literal—from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as Augustine says (*Epist.* xlvi.) Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.

Reply Obj. 2. These three—history, etiology, analogy—are grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as Augustine expounds (*loc. cit.*), whenever anything is simply related; it is called etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives—namely, on account of the hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever the truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another. Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses. Thus Hugh of S. Victor (*Sacram.* iv. 4 *Prolog.*) includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying down three senses only—the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.

Reply Obj. 3. The parabolical sense is contained in the literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely, operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.

QUESTION II.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

(*In Three Articles.*)

BECAUSE the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavour to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God: (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards God: (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.

In treating of God there will be a threefold division:—

For we shall consider (1) whatever concerns the Divine Essence. (2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons. (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.

Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider:—

(1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is *not* the manner of His existence. (3) Whatever concerns His operations—namely, His knowledge, will, power.

Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:—

(1) Whether the proposition 'God exists' is self-evident? (2) Whether it is demonstrable? (3) Whether God exists?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IS SELF-EVIDENT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as

we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* i. 1, 3), *the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all.* Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.

Obj. 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 *Poster.* iii.) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word 'God' is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word 'God' is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition 'God exists' is self-evident.

Obj. 3. Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition 'Truth does not exist' is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: *I am the way, the truth, and the life* (John xiv. 6). Therefore 'God exists' is self-evident.

On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (*Metaph.* iv., lect. vi.) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition 'God is' can be mentally admitted: *The fool said in his heart, There is no God* (Ps. lii. 1). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways; on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as 'Man is an animal,' for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore,

the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and suchlike. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (*Hebdom., the title of which is: 'Whether all that is, is good'*), 'that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space.' Therefore I say that this proposition, 'God exists,' of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject; because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (Q. III., A. 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature—namely, by effects.

Reply Obj. 1. To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.

Reply Obj. 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word 'God' understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word 'God' is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what

the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

Reply Obj. 3. The existence of truth in general is self-evident. but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT GOD EXISTS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. xi. 1). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.

Obj. 2. Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* i. 4.). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.

Obj. 3. Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: *The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made* (Rom. i. 20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we must know of anything is, whether it exists.

I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called *a priori*, and this

is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration *a posteriori*; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.

Reply Obj. 1. The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.

Reply Obj. 2. When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word 'God.'

Reply Obj. 3. From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD EXISTS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word 'God' means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.

Obj. 2. Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle, which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle, which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.

On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: *I am Who am* (Exod. iii. 14).

I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same

respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, *i.e.*, that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. ✓

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. (2)
 In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, (3) and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and

to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be, at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the like. But 'more' and 'less' are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest, and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in *Metaph.* ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world.

We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (*Enchir. xi.*): *Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.* This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

Reply Obj. 2. Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change and fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the *Article*.

QUESTION III.

OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD.

(In Eight Articles.)

WHEN the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not.

Therefore, we must consider (1) How He is not: (2) How He is known by us: (3) How He is named.

Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying of Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him—viz., composition, motion, and the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him: and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection: (3) His infinity: (4) His immutability: (5) His unity.

Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is a body? (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form? (3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject? (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence? (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference? (6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident? (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple? (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS A BODY ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written: *He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea* (Job xi. 8, 9). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 2. Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it is written: *Let us make man to our image and likeness* (Gen. i. 26). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: *Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure i.e., the image of His substance* (Heb. i. 3). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. *Hast thou an arm like God?* (Job xl. 4); and *The eyes of the Lord are upon the just* (Ps. xxxiii. 16); and *The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength* (Ps. cxvii. 16). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 4. Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: *I saw the Lord sitting* (Isa. vi. 1), and *He standeth up to judge* (Isa. iii. 13). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 5. Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term *wherfrom* or *whereto*. But in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term *whereto*, according to the words, *Come ye to Him and be enlightened* (Ps. xxxiii. 6), and as a term *wherfrom*: *All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth* (Jer. xvii. 13). Therefore God is a body.

On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (iv. 24): *God is a spirit.*

I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body;

and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved (Q. ii., A. 3), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality, because the continuous, as such is divisible to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.

Reply Obj. 1. As we have said above (Q. i., A. 9.), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* ix.), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility of His essence, by length, the procession of His all-pervading power, by

breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection.

Reply Obj. 2. Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said, *Let us make man to our image and likeness*, it is added, *And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea* (Gen. i. 26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of God.

Reply Obj. 3. Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with the other parts.

Reply Obj. 4. Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.

Reply Obj. 5. We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (x. 38), where God says: *But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul.* Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 2. Further, anger, joy, and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: *The Lord was exceeding angry with His people* (Ps. cv. 40). Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 3. Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of matter and form.

On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a body as proved in the preceding *Article*; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.

I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (Q. ii., A. 3) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the best—viz. God—is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.

Reply Obj. 1. A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.

Reply Obj. 2. Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.

Reply Obj. 3. Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS THE SAME AS HIS ESSENCE OR NATURE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of God—*i.e.*, the Godhead—is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.

Obj. 2. Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the *suppositum* is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.

On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: *I am the way, the truth, and the life* (John xiv. 6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead.

I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the *suppositum*, because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species.

For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is a man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter—that is to say, to *this* matter—the very forms being individualized of themselves,—it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting *supposita*. Therefore *suppositum* and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.

Reply Obj. 1. We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore, in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in God.

Reply Obj. 2. The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently composition is accidental to them, and therefore in them *suppositum* is not the same as nature.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE ARE THE SAME
IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: *For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood* (Wisd. xiv. 21). Therefore God's existence is not His essence.

Obj. 2. Further, we can know *whether* God exists as said above (Q. II., A. 2); but we cannot know *what* He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence—that is, as His quiddity or nature.

On the contrary, Hilary says (*Trin.* vii.): *In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth.* Therefore what subsists in God is His existence.

I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species—as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man—and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent,—as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call

God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore, existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above (A. 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above (A. 3); if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be the first being—which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.

Reply Obj. 1. A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense.

Reply Obj. 2. *To be* can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking *to be* in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say *God is*, is true; and this we know from His effects (Q. II., A. 2).

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS CONTAINED IN A GENUS ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of God. Therefore God is in the genus of substance.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (*Metaph. x.*). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.

On the contrary, In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is not in any genus.

I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence of God is His

essence, if God were in any genus, He would be in the genus 'being,' because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (*Metaph.* iii.) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and quiddity—*i.e.*, essence—must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.

Reply Obj. 1. The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself—for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way—namely, of existing of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.

Reply Obj. 2. This objection turns upon proportionate measure; which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as it resembles Him.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN GOD THERE ARE ANY ACCIDENTS?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (*Physic. i.*). Therefore that which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God there are accidents.

Obj. 2. Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are many *genera* of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than God—which is absurd.

On the contrary, Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for *no simple form can be a subject*, as Boethius says (*De Trinit.*). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.

I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown Q. II., A. 3. Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (*De Hebdom.*), although every essence may have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now there can be

nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God as there are in us.

Reply Obj. 2. Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all being, outside of every genus.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS ALTOGETHER SIMPLE ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether simple.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple; thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God is altogether simple.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv. 6, 7): *God is truly and absolutely simple.*

I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of form and matter; nor does His nature differ from His *suppositum*; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is

nowise composite, but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown above (Q. II., A. 3). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (*loc. cit.*), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has a form, viz., that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (*De Trin.* vii.): *God, Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim.*

Reply Obj. 1. Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing caused to be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (Q. IV. A. 3).

Reply Obj. 2. With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness

cannot be found in one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing (QQ. IV., A. 1, and VI., A. 2).

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD ENTERS INTO THE COMPOSITION OF OTHER THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says (*Cæl. Hier.* iv.): *The being of all things is that which is above being—the Godhead.* But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the composition of other things.

Obj. 2. Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (*De Verb. Dom.**) that, *the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated form.* But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition of things. Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor—whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each other.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* ii.): *There can be no touching Him, i.e., God, nor any other union with Him by mingling part with part.*

Further, the first cause rules all things without comingling with them, as the Philosopher says (*De Causis*).

I answer that, On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (*De Civit. Dei* vii. 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have said that God is

* *Serm.* xxxviii.

the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings—not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear from the foregoing (Q. III., A. 1): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being (Q. II., A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1. The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.

Reply Obj. 2. The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound.

Reply Obj. 3. Simple things do not differ by added differences,—for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from

each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (*Metaph. x.*), *things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are different differ by something.* Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very being diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.

QUESTION IV.

THE PERFECTION OF GOD.

(*In Three Articles.*)

HAVING considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness.

Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:—

(1) Whether God is perfect? (2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things? (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS PERFECT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.

Obj. 2. Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.

Obj. 3. Further, as shown above (Q. III., A. 4), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is imperfect.

On the contrary, It is written: *Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect* (Matt. v. 48).

I answer that, As the Philosopher relates (*Metaph.* xii.),

some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans, and Leucippus, did not predicate *best* and *most perfect* of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.

Reply Obj. 1. As Gregory says (*Moral. v, 26, 29*): *Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God.* For that which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are brought into actuality, this word *perfect* signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection, or not.

Reply Obj. 2. The material principle which with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from which it came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into act by some being already actual.

Reply Obj. 3. Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the

existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PERFECTIONS OF ALL THINGS ARE IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above (Q. III., A. 7); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God.

Obj. 2. Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its specific difference. But the differences by which *genera* are divided, and *species* constituted, are opposed to each other. Therefore, because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are not in God.

Obj. 3. Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore, life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has not the perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* v.) that *God in His one existence prepossesses all things.*

I answer that, All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator, *Metaph.* v.) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent—as when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent—thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient

cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of God (*Div. Nom. v.*): *It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all.* Secondly; from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (Q. III., A. 4). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (*loc. cit.*), when he says that, *God exists not in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly;* and afterwards he adds that, *He is the very existence to subsisting things.*

Reply Obj. 1. Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, *loc. cit.*), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; *a fortiori* should all things in a kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity.

This suffices for the *Reply to the Second Objection.*

Reply Obj. 3. The same Dionysius says (*loc. cit.*) that,

although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things also exist, and intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY CREATURE CAN BE LIKE GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is written (Ps. lxxxv. 8): *There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord.* But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called by participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like to God.

Obj. 2. Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different *genus*. Therefore neither can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same *genus* as God: since God is in no *genus*, as shown above (Q. III., A. 5). Therefore no creature is like God.

Obj. 3. Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone, essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.

Obj. 4. Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: *To whom have you likened God?* (xl. 18).

On the contrary, It is written: *Let us make man to our image and likeness* (Gen. i. 26), and: *When He shall appear we shall be like to Him* (1 John iii. 2).

I answer that, Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If however the agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any *genus*, its effects will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being.

Reply Obj. 1. As Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. ix.*), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean

to deny all likeness to Him. For, *the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause, not merely in intensity and remission, as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.*

Reply Obj. 2. God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different *genus*, but as transcending every *genus*, and as the principle of all *genera*.

Reply Obj. 3. Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.

Reply Obj. 4. Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures; because, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. ix.*): *A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between a cause and that which is caused.* For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.

QUESTION V.

OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE next consider goodness :—

First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:—

- (1) Whether goodness and being are the same really ?
- (2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought ?
- (3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good ?
- (4) To what cause should goodness be reduced ?
- (5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order ?
- (6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant ?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOODNESS DIFFERS REALLY FROM BEING ?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (*De Hebdom.*): *I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing: that they are is another.* Therefore goodness and being really differ.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing can be its own form. *But that is called good which has the form of being,* according to the commentary on *De Causis.* Therefore goodness differs really from being.

Obj. 3. Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* i. 42) that, *inasmuch as we exist we are good.*

I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i.): *Goodness is what all desire.* Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing (Q. III., A. 4; Q. IV., A. 1). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.

Reply Obj. 1. Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (*i.e.*, substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (*i.e.*, in so far as it has being), but viewed in its complete

actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (*loc. cit.*), *I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing, that they are is another*, is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply—in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.

Reply Obj. 2. Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality.

Reply Obj. 3. Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or virtue.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOODNESS IS PRIOR IN IDEA TO BEING ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iii.) assigned the first place, amongst other names of God, to His goodness rather than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius notes (*loc. cit.* v.), *goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone*. Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.

Obj. 3. Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas: *It were better for him, if that man had not been born* (Matt. xxvi. 24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.

Obj. 4. Further, not only is existence desirable, but life,

knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.

On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle (*De Causis*) that *the first of created things is being.*

I answer that, In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.

Reply Obj. 1. Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (*Div. Nom. i., iii.*) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation, said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that *goodness extends to non-existence* (*loc. cit. Obj. 2*).

Reply Obj. 2. The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, not so far as it can be predicated

of them, but so far as it can cause them—if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which tend even those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual.

Reply Obj. 3. Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively—*i.e.*, inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as relatively good.

Reply Obj. 4. Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence in each one of them some sort of being is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is good except being.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERY BEING IS GOOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from A. 1. But whatever is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 2. Further, no evil is good: *Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil* (Isa. v. 20). But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 3. Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather

that which desires. Therefore primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 4. Further, the Philosopher notes (*Metaph. iii.*) that in *mathematics goodness does not exist*. But mathematics are entities; otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.

On the contrary, Every being that is not God, is God's creature. Now every creature of God is good (1 Tim. iv. 4): and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good.

I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from A. 1. Hence it follows that every being as such is good.

Reply Obj. 1. Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.

Reply Obj. 2. No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well.

Reply Obj. 3. As primary matter has only potential being, so is it only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain extent in goodness, viz., by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to desire.

Reply Obj. 4. Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there

should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, as was said in the preceding article.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOODNESS HAS THE ASPECT OF A FINAL CAUSE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*), *Goodness is praised as beauty.* But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.

Obj. 2. Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (*loc. cit.*) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ. i. 31*) that *we exist, because God is good.* But we owe our existence to God as the efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Physic. ii.*) that *that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which something is.* Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause.

I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, *e.g.*, heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence

in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (*Meteor.* iv.); thirdly, there follows the formality of goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.

Reply Obj. 1. Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind—because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now, since knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.

Reply Obj. 2. Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move.

Reply Obj. 3. He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying, *we exist because God is good* has reference to the final cause.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOODNESS CONSISTS IN MODE,
SPECIES, AND ORDER ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species, and order. For goodness

and being differ logically. But mode, species, and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: *Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight* (Wis. xi. 21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode, and order, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. iv. 3*): *Measure fixes the mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it rest and stability.* Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Obj. 2. Further, mode, species, and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species, and order, then every mode must have its own mode, species, and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.

Obj. 3. Further, evil is the privation of mode, species, and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Obj. 4. Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species, and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Obj. 5. Further, mode, species, and order are caused by weight, number, and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But not every good thing has weight, number, and measure; for Ambrose says (*Hexam. i. 9*): *It is of the nature of light not to have been created in number, weight, and measure.* Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species, and order.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Nat. Boni iii.*): *These three—mode, species, order—as common good things, are in everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do not exist at all, there can be nothing good.* But this would not be unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the essence of goodness consists in mode, species, and order.

I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown

above, AA. 1, 3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* x.); for as a unit added to, or taken from, a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from, a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species, and order.

Reply Obj. 1. These three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.

Reply Obj. 2. Mode, species, and order, are said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because it is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object that is white.

Reply Obj. 3. Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has a mode, species, and order, as a

man; and another mode, species, and order, as he is white, virtuous, learned, and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species, and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight.

Reply Obj. 4. Augustine says (*De Nat. Boni* xxiii.), *Every mode, as mode, is good* (and the same can be said of species and order). *But an evil mode, species, and order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that to which they ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous.*

Reply Obj. 5. The nature of light is spoken of as being without number, weight, and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body that causes change, *i.e.*, the heavens.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOODNESS IS RIGHTLY DIVIDED INTO THE VIRTUOUS,* THE USEFUL, AND THE PLEASANT?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i.). But the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant can be found under one predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.

Obj. 2. Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (*De Offic.* ii.). Therefore this division is incorrect.

* *Bonum honestum* is the virtuous good considered as fitting Cf. ii-ii., Q. CXLI., A. 3: Q. CXLV.

Obj. 3. Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to be divided against the pleasant and the virtuous.

On the contrary, Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (*De Offic.* i. 9).

I answer that, This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of the movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, *e.g.*, a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called the pleasant.

Reply Obj. 1. Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according to its proper formality.

Reply Obj. 2. This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other formality under which they

are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in themselves.

Reply Obj. 3. Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.

QUESTION VI.

THE GOODNESS OF GOD.

(In Four Articles.)

WE next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether goodness belongs to God? (2) Whether God is the supreme good? (3) Whether He alone is essentially good? (4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS GOOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species, and order. But these do not seem to belong to God; since God is immense; and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.

Obj. 2. Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.

On the contrary, It is written (Lam. iii. 25): *The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him.*

I answer that, To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its like-

ness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv.) attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good *as by Whom all things subsist*.

Reply Obj. 1. To have mode, species, and order, belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs to Him to impose mode, species, and order on others; wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.

Reply Obj. 2. All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said above (Q. IV., A. 3). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him, as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature: others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge: others, have a natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS THE SUPREME GOOD ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is compound. But God is supremely simple; as was shown above (Q. III., A. 7). Therefore God is not the supreme good.

Obj. 2. Further, *Good is what all desire*, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* i. 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said (Luke xviii. 19): *None is good but God alone*. But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as, *e.g.*, supreme heat

is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good.

Obj. 3. Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly called greater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above (QQ. III., A. 5; IV., A. 3) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* ii.) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is the supreme good, discerned by purified minds.

I answer that, God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above (Q. IV. A., 2); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.

Reply Obj. 1. The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are deficient in comparison with it.

Reply Obj. 2. When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all; but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is said, *None is good but God*

alone, this is to be understood of essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.

Reply Obj. 3. Things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that He is in any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO BE ESSENTIALLY GOOD BELONGS TO GOD ALONE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as *one* is convertible with *being*, so is *good*; as we said above (Q. V., A. 1). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (*Metaph.* iv.); therefore every being is good essentially.

Obj. 2. Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good. But everything is a being essentially: therefore every being is good essentially.

Obj. 3. Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially it is necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.

On the contrary, Boethius says (*De Hebdom.*), that *all things but God are good by participation*. Therefore they are not good essentially.

I answer that, God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now per-

fection of a thing is threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise, and the like, as appears from what is stated above (Q. III., A. 6); and He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially.

Reply Obj. 1. One does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compound things are undivided only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above.

Reply Obj. 2. Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does not follow that a creature is good essentially.

Reply Obj. 3. The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being through something else: hence for this reason is it called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself has some other goodness whereby it is good.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE GOOD BY THE DIVINE GOODNESS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (*De Trin.* viii.), *This and that are good ; take away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst ; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good.* But everything is good by its own good: therefore everything is good by that very good which is God.

Obj. 2. Further, as Boethius says (*De Hebdom.*), all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by reason of the divine goodness: therefore all things are good by the divine goodness.

On the contrary, All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their own being: therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness.

I answer that, As regards relative things, we may admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated *placed* from *place*, and *measured* from *measure*. But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (Q. LXXXIV., A. 4) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse; so likewise he laid down separate ideas of *being* and of *one*, and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation of these everything was called *being* or *one*; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by way of participation.

Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves—as Aristotle argues in many ways—still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above (Q. II., A. 3), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears from the above (Q. IV., A. 3).

Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.

This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.

QUESTION VII.

THE INFINITY OF GOD.

(*In Four Articles.*)

AFTER considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.

Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is infinite? (2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence? (3) Whether anything can be infinite in magnitude? (4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS INFINITE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and matter, as is said in *Physic.* iii. But God is most perfect: therefore He is not infinite.

Obj. 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (*Physic.* i.), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for He is not a body, as was shown above (Q. III., A. 1). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.

Obj. 3. Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.

On the contrary, Damascene says (*De Fide Orth.* = i. 4) that, *God is infinite and eternal, and boundless.*

I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (*Physic.* iii.), and with reason; for they considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity, to the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things.

We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown above (Q. IV., A. 1, *Obj.* 3). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was shown above (Q. III., A. 4), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.

From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2. Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of

infinite cannot be attributed to God; as was said above, in this article.

Reply Obj. 3. The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing in a subject.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYTHING BUT GOD CAN BE ESSENTIALLY INFINITE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the extent of a power is known by its effect.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is infinite.

Obj. 3. Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above (Q. III., A. 8). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite.

On the contrary, The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in *Physic.* iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.

I answer that, Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter, considered as existing under

some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, what is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If however any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with the angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.

Reply Obj. 1. It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created being; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite.

Reply Obj. 2. The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.

Reply Obj. 3. Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively, because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN ACTUALLY INFINITE MAGNITUDE CAN EXIST ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since *there is no lie in things abstract*, as the Philosopher says (*Physic.* ii.). But mathematics use the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in his demonstrations says, *Let this line be infinite*. Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.

Obj. 2. Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite.

Obj. 3. Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear from *Physic.* iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase is opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.

Obj. 4. Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in *Physic.* iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.

On the contrary, Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.

I answer that, It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a

body exists infinite in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premisses that no creature is infinite in essence, it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude.

We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.

Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other.

The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such is

figure, such a body must have some figure, and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.

Reply Obj. 1. A geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species of it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude is infinite.

Reply Obj. 3. The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.

Reply Obj. 4. Movement and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it agrees with the totality of time or movement: for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AN INFINITE MULTITUDE CAN EXIST?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist.

Obj. 2. Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the species of figures are

infinite. Therefore an infinite number of actual figures is possible.

Obj. 3. Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.

On the contrary, It is written, *Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight* (Wis. xi. 21).

I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium.

A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.

This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is

multitude measured by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition of multitude.

Reply Obj. 1. Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity.

Reply Obj. 2. Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.

QUESTION VIII.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS.

(*In Four Articles.*)

SINCE it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is in all things? (2) Whether God is everywhere? (3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence? (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS IN ALL THINGS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm (cxii. 4), *The Lord is high above all nations*, etc. Therefore God is not in all things.

Obj. 2. Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore God is not in things; but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (*Octog. Tri. Quæst. qu. 20*), that *in Him things are, rather than He is in any place*.

Obj. 3. Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things.

Obj. 4. Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Cor. vi. 14). Therefore God is not in all things.

On the contrary, A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to Isa. xxvi. 12, *Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg., for] us.* Therefore God is in all things.

I answer that, God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident; but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately, and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in *Physic.* vii. that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (Q. VII., A. 1). Hence it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly.

Reply Obj. 1. God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all things; as was shown above in this article.

Reply Obj. 2. Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless spiritual things contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things as containing them: nevertheless by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.

Reply Obj. 3. No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He acts

immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own nature.

Reply Obj. 4. In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, *inasmuch as they are beings*. But in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS EVERYWHERE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for *incorporeal things*, as Boethius says (*De Hebdom.*), *are not in a place*. Therefore God is not everywhere.

Obj. 2. Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every place. Now the divine being is not successive, but permanent. Therefore God is not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.

Obj. 3. Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere.

On the contrary, It is written, *I fill heaven and earth* (Jer. xxiii. 24).

I answer that, Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things—*i.e.*, as one thing is said to be in another no

matter how ; and thus the accidents of a place are in place ; or by a way proper to place ; and thus things placed are in place. Now in both these senses in some way God is in every place ; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in all things as giving them being, power, and operation ; so He is in every place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place ; and God fills every place ; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body ; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it ; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every place. He Himself fills every place.

Reply Obj. 1. Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are, but by contact of power.

Reply Obj. 2. The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous ; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession ; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, or in many places ; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous ; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel, and soul, are called indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power ; hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places, and in a small or large place.

Reply Obj. 3. A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part is twofold : viz., a part of the essence, as the form and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity, into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity,

cannot be outside of that place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms, which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS EVERYWHERE BY ESSENCE, PRESENCE,
AND POWER ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence, and power. For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence, and power.

Obj. 2. Further, to be present to anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by his essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence, and power.

Obj. 3. Further, as God by His power is the principle of

all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power.

Obj. 4. Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special mode of God's existence in things.

On the contrary, A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles, v., says that, *God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power, and substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace.**

I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in another way He is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature, which knows and loves Him actually or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later (Q. XII.), He is said to be thus in the saints by grace.

But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the

* The quotation is from S. Gregory (*Hom. viii. in Ezech.*)

power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.

But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, *He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our things* * (Job xxii. 14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His presence.

Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things by His essence.

Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.

Reply Obj. 1. God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being.

Reply Obj. 2. A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz., by essence, and by presence.

Reply Obj. 3. Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to another.

* Vulg., *He doth not consider . . . and He walketh*, etc.

Reply Obj. 4. No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (Part III.).

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO BE EVERYWHERE BELONGS TO GOD
ALONE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (*Poster. i.*), is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is said above (Q. III.). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

Obj. 2. Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom (xi. 21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere.

Obj. 3. Further, the universe is a kind of a whole perfect body (*Cæl. et Mund. i.*). But the whole universe is everywhere, because there is no place outside of it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

Obj. 4. Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.

Obj. 5. Further, the soul, as Augustine says (*De Trin. vi. 6.*), is *whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts.* Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

Obj. 6. Further, as Augustine says (*Ep. cxxxvii.*), *The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives.*

But the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Spir. Sanct.* i. 7): *Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?*

I answer that, To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely, belongs to God, and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to His very self.

Reply Obj. 1. The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.

Reply Obj. 2. Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.

Reply Obj. 3. The whole body of the universe is every-

where, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would not be in them.

Reply Obj. 4. If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts.

Reply Obj. 5. Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but accidentally.

Reply Obj. 6. When it is said that the soul sees, anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb *anywhere* determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere.

QUESTION IX.

THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD.

(In Two Articles.)

WE next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability.

On the immutability of God there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is altogether immutable? (2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS ALTOGETHER IMMUTABLE?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. viii. 20*), *The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place.* Therefore God is in some way mutable.

Obj. 2. Further, it is said of Wisdom, that *it is more mobile than all things active—Vulg. mobilior.* (*Wisd. vii. 24*). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.

Obj. 3. Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, *Draw nigh to God, and He will draw nigh to you* (*James iv. 8*). Therefore God is mutable.

On the contrary, It is written, *I am the Lord, and I change not* (*Mal. iii. 6*).

I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the

① admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. ② Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown above (Q. III. A. 7.) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. ③ Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle was immovable.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.

Reply Obj. 2. Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of

procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (*Cæl. Hier.* i.) expounds the matter, that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light.

Reply Obj. 3. These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, or decline from Him.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO BE IMMUTABLE BELONGS TO GOD ALONE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (*Metaph* ii.), that *matter is in everything which is moved*. But, according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be immutable does not belong to God alone.

Obj. 2. Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.

Obj. 3. Further, everything which is mutable, is variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said (*Sex Princip.* i.) that *form is essence consisting of the simple and invariable*. Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Nat. Boni.* i.), *God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable*.

I answer that, God alone is altogether immutable; whereas, every creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed by another. For

all creatures before they existed, were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* iv. 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed in themselves; so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In this way therefore, by the power of another—namely, of God—they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence.

If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with privation of accident; as, for example, this subject *man* can exist with *not-whiteness*, and can therefore be changed from white to not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject, then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation of form, because the form perfects the whole

potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place. On the other hand incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*), that *intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances*. Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (*De Fide, ii. 3, 4*); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places—which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was shown above (Q. VIII. A. 2.).

Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to divers objects, as is the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such movement.

Reply Obj. 2. The good angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.

Reply Obj. 3. Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation ; but they are subject to variation because by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though they were the subject of being, but because through them something has being.

QUESTION X.

THE ETERNITY OF GOD.

(*In Six Articles.*)

WE must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry: (1) What is eternity? (2) Whether God is eternal? (3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone? (4) Whether eternity differs from time? (5) The difference of æviterernity and of time. (6) Whether there is only one æviterernity, as there is one time, and one eternity?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS IS A GOOD DEFINITION OF ETERNITY, 'THE SIMULTANEOUSLY-WHOLE AND PERFECT POSSESSION OF INTERMINABLE LIFE'?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (*De Consol.* v.) is not a good one: 'Eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life.' For the word *interminable* is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word *interminable* ought not to be found.

Obj. 2. Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word *life* ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word *existence*.

Obj. 3. Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity, which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be *whole*.

Obj. 4. Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity days and times are in the plural, for it is said, *His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity* (Mic. v. 2); and also it is said, *According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity* (Rom. xvi. 25). Therefore eternity is not omniscient.

Obj. 5. Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is *whole*, it is superfluously described as *perfect*.

Obj. 6. Further, duration does not imply *possession*. But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.

I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so we must reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by *before* and *after*. For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of movement, which is always the same, there is no before and after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.

Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.

Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable—that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole.

Reply Obj. 1. Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as 'a point is that which has no parts.' Yet this is not to be taken as if the negation belonged to their

essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the composite.

Reply Obj. 2. What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.

Reply Obj. 3. Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.

Reply Obj. 4. As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession.

Reply Obj. 5. Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the *now* of time, which is imperfect. Hence the expression *simultaneously-whole* is used to remove the idea of time, and the word *perfect* is used to exclude the *now* of time.

Reply Obj. 6. Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we use the word *possession*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS ETERNAL ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God. But eternity is a thing made; for Boethius says (*De Trin.* iv.) that, *The now that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity*; and Augustine says (*Octog. Tri. Quæst. qu. 28*) that *God is the author of eternity*. Therefore God is not eternal.

Obj. 2. Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (*De Caus.*), *God is before eternity and He is after eternity*: for it is written that *the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond* * (*Exod. xv. 18*). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.

* Douay,—*for ever and ever.*

Obj. 3. Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.

Obj. 4. Further, in eternity there is no present, past, nor future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article. But words denoting present, past, and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.

On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: *The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal.*

I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence, as He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity.

Reply Obj. 1. The *now* that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the *now*; so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the *now* standing still. When Augustine says that *God is the author of eternity*, this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates His immutability.

Reply Obj. 2. From this appears the answer to the second objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that *intelligence is equal to eternity*. In the words of Exodus, *The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond*, eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus, it is said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, that is, beyond every kind of given duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book *De Cælo* i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be

taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously whole.

Reply Obj. 3. Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone.

Reply Obj. 4. Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered through present, past, and future.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO BE ETERNAL BELONGS TO GOD ALONE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written, that *those who instruct many to justice, shall be as stars unto perpetual eternities* * (Dan. xii. 3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written, *Depart, ye cursed, into eternal (Douay, everlasting) fire* (Matt. xxv. 41). Therefore God is not the only eternal.

Obj. 3. Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration, and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal.

On the contrary, Jerome says (*Ep. ad Damasum*, xv.) that *God is the only one who has no beginning*. Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.

I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above (Q. IX. A. 1). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from

* Douay,—for all eternity.

Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, that *it standeth for ever* (Eccl. i. 4). Again some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. lxxv. 5) the hills are called *eternal*, and we read *of the fruits of the eternal hills* (Deut. xxxiii. 15). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because *as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints*, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv.). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, *This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God*, etc. (John xvii. 3).

Reply Obj. 1. There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.

Reply Obj. 2. The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according to the words, *To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters* (Job xxiv. 19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm, *Their time will be for ever* (Ps. lxxx. 16).

Reply Obj. 3. Necessary means a certain mode of truth: and truth, according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* vi.), is in the mind. Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ETERNITY DIFFERS FROM TIME ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the other; for instance two days or two

hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day and an hour are together, considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.

Obj. 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (*Physic. iv.*), the *now* of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the *now* of time. But the *now* of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different from time.

Obj. 3. Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in *Physic. iv.*, it thus appears that the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being—that is, of the divine being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either eternity, or is a part of eternity.

On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a before and an after. Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing.

I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference; because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says (*De Consol. v.*), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is the measure of movement. ✓
Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be con-

sidered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time.

Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts:—thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day, or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.

Reply Obj. 1. Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity.

Reply Obj. 2. The *now* of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its *now* corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but differs in aspect as being here and there; and such alternation is movement. Likewise the flow of the *now* as alternating in aspect, is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the *now* of time.

Reply Obj. 3. As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things

actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures movement, but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

THE DIFFERENCE OF ÆVITERNITY AND TIME.

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Obj. 1. It seems that æviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (*Gen. ad. lit. viii. 20, 22, 23*), that *God moves the spiritual creature through time*. But æviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as æviternity.

Obj. 2. Further, it is essential to time to have before and after; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, as was shown above in the first article. Now æviternity is not eternity; for it is written (*Ecclus. i. 1*), that eternal *Wisdom is before age*. Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has before and after; and thus it is the same as time.

Obj. 3. Further, if there is no before and after in æviternity, it follows that in æviternal things there is no difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for æviternal things not to have been, it follows that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.

Obj. 4. Further, since the duration of æviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if æviternity is simultaneously whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore æviternity does not differ from time.

On the contrary, Boethius says (*De. Consol. iii*), *Who commandest time to be separate from æviternity*.

I answer that, Æviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, æviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference,

however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if æviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, æviternity would still be distinguished from eternity, and from time.

Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that eternity has no before and after; but that time has both, together with innovation and veneration; and that æviternity has before and after without innovation and veneration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation and veneration be referred to the measure itself. For since before and after of duration cannot exist together, if æviternity has before and after, it must follow that with the receding of the first part of æviternity, the after part of æviternity must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in æviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to the things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows before and after in the measure, as is clear from *Physic.* iv. Therefore the fact that an æviternal thing is neither inveterable, nor subject to innovation, comes from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain before and after. We say then that since eternity is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually, or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of which is unchangeable;

and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who have an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections, and of places, in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by æviternity, which is a mean between eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this way time has before and after; æviternity in itself has no before and after, which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has neither before nor after, nor is it compatible with such at all.

Reply Obj. 1. Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences, are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (*ibid.*), that to be moved through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are measured by æviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity.

Reply Obj. 2. Æviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because before and after are compatible with it.

Reply Obj. 3. In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental changes. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been.

Reply Obj. 4. The duration of æviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE ÆVITERNITY ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there is not only one æviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: *Majesty and power of ages are with Thee, O Lord.*

Obj. 2. Further, different genera have different measures. But some æviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as the angels. Therefore there is not only one æviternity.

Obj. 3. Further, since æviternity is a term of duration, where there is one æviternity, there is also one duration. But not all æviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore there is not only one æviternity.

Obj. 4. Further, things not dependent on each other, do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But æviternal things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only one æviternity.

On the contrary, Æviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is æviternity one only.

I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one æviternity; others that there are many æviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual things.

Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number, according to the Philosopher (*Physic. iv.*). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would

not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but is different for different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured.

This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (*Peri Archon.* i.); or at least many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (*Cæl. Hier.* x.) seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle, and the last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many æviternties, as there are many æviterntial things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one æviterntity only; because since each thing is measured by the most

simple element of its genus, it must be that the existence of all æviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first æviternal thing, which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is the truer, as will be shown later (Q. XLVII. A. 2); we concede at present that there is only one æviternity.

Reply Obj. 1. Æviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many æviternities when we mean ages.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless being, and are thus measured by æviternity.

Reply Obj. 3. All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured by time; and thus all æviternal things have one æviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.

Reply Obj. 4. For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple than the rest.

QUESTION XI.

THE UNITY OF GOD.

(*In Four Articles.*)

AFTER the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether *one* adds anything to *being*? (2) Whether *one* and *many* are opposed to each other? (3) Whether God is one? (4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE ADDS ANYTHING TO BEING?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that *one* adds something to *being*. For everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates all *genera*. But *one* is in a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore *one* adds something to *being*.

Obj. 2. Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But *being* is divided by *one* and by *many*. Therefore one is an addition to being.

Obj. 3. Further, if *one* is not an addition to *being*, *one* and *being* must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to call *being* by the name of *being*: therefore it would be equally so to call being *one*. Now this is false. Therefore *one* is an addition to *being*.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. V, ult.*): *Nothing which exists is not in some way one*, which would be false if *one* were an addition to *being*, in the sense of limiting it. Therefore *one* is not an addition to *being*.

I answer that, *One* does not add any reality to *being*; but

is only a negation of division: for *one* means undivided *being*. This is the very reason why *one* is the same as *being*. Now every being is either simple, or compound. But what is simple, is undivided, both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision; and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being.

Reply Obj. 1. Some, thinking that the *one* convertible with *being* is the same as the *one* which is the principle of number, were divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the *one* convertible with *being* did not add any reality to *being*, but signified the substance of *being* as undivided, thought that the same applied to the *one* which is the principle of number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that *one* which is the principle of number, added a reality to the substance of being (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought that the *one* convertible with *being* added a reality to the substance of beings; as *white* to *man*. This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is *one* by its substance. For if a thing were *one* by anything else but by its substance, since this again would be *one*, supposing it were again *one* by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the *one* which is convertible with *being*, does not add a reality to being; but that the *one* which is the principle of number, does add a reality to *being*, belonging to the genus of quantity.

Reply Obj. 2. There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way *one*, and in another way *many*. Still, if it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it

may be divided as regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents; or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is *one* in the whole, and is *many* in parts; in such a case a thing will be *one* absolutely, and *many* accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be *many* absolutely, and *one* accidentally; as what are *many* in number, and *one* in species, or *one* in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided by *one*, and by *many*; as it were by *one* absolutely, and by *many* accidentally. For multitude itself would not be contained under *being*, unless it were in some way contained under *one*. Thus Dionysius says (*Div. Nom., cap. ult.*) that *there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle.*

Reply Obj. 3. It does not follow that it is nugatory to say *being* is *one*; forasmuch as *one* adds an idea to *being*.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ONE AND MANY ARE OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that *one* and *many* are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every *multitude* is in a certain way *one*, as appears from the preceding article. Therefore *one* is not opposed to *multitude*.

Obj. 2. Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But *multitude* is constituted by *one*. Therefore it is not opposed to *multitude*.

Obj. 3. Further, *one* is opposed to *one*. But the idea of *few* is opposed to *many*. Therefore *one* is not opposed to *many*.

Obj. 4. Further, if *one* is opposed to *multitude*, it is

opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that *one* comes after *multitude*, and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary, *multitude* is defined by *one*. Hence there would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore *one* and *many* are not opposed.

On the contrary, Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of *one* consists in indivisibility; and the idea of *multitude* contains division. Therefore *one* and *many* are opposed to each other.

I answer that, *One* is opposed to *many*, but in various ways. The *one* which is the principle of number, is opposed to *multitude* which is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For *one* implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is *multitude* measured by *one*, as is clear from *Metaph.* x. But the *one* which is convertible with *being* is opposed to *multitude* by way of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided.

Reply Obj. 1. No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means *negation in the subject*, according to the Philosopher (*Categor.* viii.). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness, and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that *multitude* is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, *i.e.*, actually; or what is absolute being in the genus of substance, is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good is absolutely bad, or *vice versa*;

likewise, what is absolutely *one* is relatively *many*, and *vice versa*.

Reply Obj. 2. A *whole* is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance, every part of water is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole; as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of whole. Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not houses.

Reply Obj. 3. *Many* is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to *one*: in another way as importing some kind of excess, in which sense it is opposed to *few*: hence in the first sense two are many; but not in the second sense.

Reply Obj. 4. *One* is opposed to *many* privatively, inasmuch as the idea of *many* involves division. Hence division must be prior to unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and hence we define a point to be, *what has no part*, or *the beginning of a line*. *Multitude* also, in idea, follows on *one*; because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence *one* is placed in the definition of *multitude*; but *multitude* is not placed in the definition of *one*. But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so what first comes to the mind is being; secondly,

that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS ONE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not one. For it is written, *For there be many gods and many lords* (1 Cor. viii. 5).

Obj. 2. Further, *one*, as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise, neither can *one* which is convertible with *being* be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.

On the contrary, It is written, *Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord* (Deut. vi. 4).

I answer that, It can be shown from three sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is *this particular thing* is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above (Q. III. A. 3). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.

Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (Q. IV. A. 2) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one, which did not

belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle.

Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the *per se* cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, and is so *per se* and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this one is God.

Reply Obj. 1. Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: *Our God is one*, etc.

Reply Obj. 2. *One* which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For *one* the principle of number belongs to the *genus* of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But *one* which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity, and does not depend on matter, in its being. And although in God there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal, and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS SUPREMEPLY ONE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not supremely *one*. For *one* is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore God is not more *one* than other things which are called *one*.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point, and unity. But a thing is said to be more *one* according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more *one* than unity is *one* and a point is *one*.

Obj. 3. Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore, what is essentially *one* is supremely *one*. But every being is essentially *one*, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* iv.). Therefore every being is supremely *one*; and therefore God is not *one* more than any other being is *one*.

On the contrary, Bernard says (*De Consid.* v.): *Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place.*

I answer that, Since *one* is an undivided being, if anything is supremely *one* it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually, nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as was shown above (Q. III. A. 7). Hence it is manifest that God is *one* in the supreme degree.

Reply Obj. 1. Although privation considered in itself is not susceptible of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to more and less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore, according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible, either less or not

at all, in that degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, *one*.

Reply Obj. 2. A point, and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely *one*. For as a subject cannot be supremely *one*, because of the difference within it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.

Reply Obj. 3. Although every being is *one* by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance of some things is compound, and of others simple.

QUESTION XII.

HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US.

(*In Thirteen Articles.*)

As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry. (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God? (2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image? (3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye? (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God? (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God? (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another? (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God? (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it? (9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes? (10) Whether the created intellect knows all at once what it sees in God? (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God? (12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life? (13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY CREATED INTELLECT CAN SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (*Hom. xiv. in Joan*) com-

menting on John i. 18, *No man hath seen God at any time, says: Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is increatable?* Dionysius also says (*Div. Nom. i.*), speaking of God: *Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him.*

Obj. 2. Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above (Q. VII. A. 1). Therefore in Himself He is unknown.

Obj. 3. Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*). Therefore God is not intelligible; but above all intellect.

Obj. 4. Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God.

On the contrary, It is written: *We shall see Him as He is* (1 John iii. 2).

I answer that, Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light.

Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of the intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection

of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void.

Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.

Reply Obj. 1. Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited, *He is universally to all incomprehensible*, etc. Chrysostom, likewise after the words quoted, says: *He says this of the most certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son.*

Reply Obj. 2. The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as appears from what was said above (Q. VII. A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3. God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which means that He is not comprehended.

Reply Obj. 4. Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble, and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect to its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOD IS SEEN BY THE CREATED INTELLECT THROUGH AN IMAGE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: *We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and (Vulg., because) we shall see Him as He is* (1 John iii. 2).

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Trin.* v.): *When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us.*

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some similitude.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv.), that when the Apostle says, 'We see through a glass and in an enigma,'* *by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God.* But to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude.

I answer that, Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision—viz., power of sight, and union of the thing seen with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing.

* Douay,—*in a dark manner.*

Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellectual power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness of Him who is the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it were, derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* i.), *by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known*; as by the likeness of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above (Q. III. A. 4), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself supereminently whatever can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness; for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false.

Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the Psalm (xxxv. 10), *In Thy light we shall see light*. The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the divine essence itself as it really is.

Reply Obj. 1. That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.

Reply Obj. 3. The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of itself.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF GOD CAN BE SEEN WITH THE BODILY EYE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written (Job xix. 26): *In my flesh I shall see . . . God*, and (*ibid.* xlii. 5), *With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee.*

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xxix. 29): *Those eyes [namely of the glorified] will therefore have a greater power of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things.* Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God.

Obj. 3. Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: *I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne*, etc. (Isa. vi. 1). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen by a vision of sense.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Vid. Deum*, Ep. cxlvii): *No one has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life, as visible things are seen by corporeal vision.*

I answer that, It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later (Q. LXXVIII.). Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above (Q. III. A. 1). Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. The words, *In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour*, do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of flesh, but that man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, *Now my eye seeth Thee*, are to be understood of the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: *May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart may be enlightened* (Eph. i. 17, 18).

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: *Therefore they will have an altogether different power [viz., the glorified eyes], if they shall see that incorporeal nature;* and afterwards he explains this, saying: *It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it.* Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal things, happens from two causes—viz., from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused into the body after its renovation.

Reply Obj. 3. The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God according to some mode of similitude; as in divine Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY CREATED INTELLECT BY ITS NATURAL POWERS
CAN SEE THE DIVINE ESSENCE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that a created intellect can see the divine essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*): *An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God.* But if a reflection is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore, since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it seems that by his own natural power he understands the divine essence.

Obj. 2. Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power, much more can he understand God.

Obj. 3. Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above (A. 1). Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the divine essence.

On the contrary, It is written : *The grace of God is life everlasting* (Rom. vi. 23). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the divine essence, according to the words: *This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God,* etc.

(John xvii. 3). Therefore, to see the essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature.

I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of that object is above the nature of the knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own existence, but receive it: and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent being. Therefore, what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects as universal; and this is beyond the power of sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the body. It follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond the natural power of any created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot

see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect, as an object made intelligible to it.

Reply Obj. 1. This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel—namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above (A. 2). Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.

Reply Obj. 2. The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought to have. But if defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it does not possess the excellence which is in God.

Reply Obj. 3. The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE CREATED INTELLECT NEEDS ANY CREATED LIGHT IN ORDER TO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by the means of any created light.

Obj. 2. Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.

Obj. 3. Further, what is created can be natural to some creature. Therefore, if the essence of God is seen through any created light, such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see God; which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the essence of God.

On the contrary, It is written: *In Thy light we shall see light* (Ps. xxxv. 10).

I answer that, Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the

power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light or illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the Apocalypse (xxi. 23). *The glory of God hath enlightened it*—viz., the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are made *deiform*—that is, like to God, according to the saying: *When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg., because] we shall see Him as He is* (1 John iii. 2).

Reply Obj. 1. The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act. Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible of colour.

Reply Obj. 2. This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God.

Reply Obj. 3. The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is made *deiform*, as is said in this article.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER OF THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD, ONE SEES MORE PERFECTLY THAN ANOTHER ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than another. For

it is written (1 John iii. 2): *We shall see Him as He is.* But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.

Obj. 2. Further, as Augustine says (*Octog. Trium Quest.: qu. xxxii.*): *One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than another.* But all who see the essence of God, understand the divine essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was shown above (A. 3). Therefore, of those who see the divine essence, one does not see more clearly than another.

Obj. 3. Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does not apply to the present question, for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of a similitude, but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is the higher, will see Him the more clearly; and this is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude.

On the contrary, Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according to John xvii. 3: *This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God,* etc. Therefore, if all saw the essence of God equally in eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle: *Star differs from star in glory* (1 Cor. xv. 41).

I answer that, Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another,

The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of *deiformity*, as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article.

Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.

Reply Obj. 1. In the words, *We shall see Him as He is*, the conjunction *as* determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God's existence.

Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is, does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the understanding of another.

Reply Obj. 3. The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all—viz., the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD
COMPREHEND HIM ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says (Phil. iii. 12): *But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend* (Douay, *apprehend*). But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. ix. 26): *I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty*. Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way others also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: *So run that you may comprehend*.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Vid. Deum*, Ep. cxlvii.): *That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is hidden from the seer*. But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple. Therefore, whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.

Obj. 3. Further, if we say that He is seen as a *whole*, but *not wholly*, it may be contrarily urged that *wholly* refers either to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer be meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the divine essence. Therefore all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.

On the contrary, It is written: *O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought* (Jer. xxxii. 18, 19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.

I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet *for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great beatitude*, as Augustine says (*De Verb. Dom.*, Serm. xxxviii.).

In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probable proof, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears—Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above (Q. VII.), is infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the divine essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.

Reply Obj. 1. *Comprehension* is twofold: in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense *comprehension* is taken more largely as opposed to *non-attainment*; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him. And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, *I held him, and I will not let him go* (Cant. iii. 4); in this sense also are to be under-

stood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way *comprehension* is one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing him, possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire.

Reply Obj. 2. God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by a probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained.

Reply Obj. 3. The word *wholly* denotes a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore, he who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD SEE ALL
IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (*Dialog. iv.*): *What do they not see, who see Him Who sees all things ?* But God sees all things. Therefore, those who see God see all things.

Obj. 2. Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore, whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.

Obj. 3. Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the least, as is said in *De Anima iii.* But all that God does, or can do, are less than His essence. Therefore, whoever understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do.

Obj. 4. Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore, if in seeing God it does not know all things, its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore, he who sees God knows all things.

On the contrary, The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know all things. For, as Dionysius says (*Cæl. Hier. vii.*), *the inferior angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels.* Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore, whosoever sees the essence of God, does not know all things.

I answer that, The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all things are seen

in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above (A. 7). Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it sees God.

Reply Obj. 1. Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.

Reply Obj. 2. It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror itself.

Reply Obj. 3. Although it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in this article that the more things are known in God according as He is seen more or less perfectly.

Reply Obj. 4. The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely, the species and genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the divine essence will see in God. But to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things that exist not as

yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (*Confess. v.*): *Unhappy the man who knoweth all these (that is, all creatures) and knoweth not Thee ! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone.*

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WHAT IS SEEN IN GOD, BY THOSE WHO SEE THE DIVINE ESSENCE, IS SEEN THROUGH ANY SIMILITUDE ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude of colour. Therefore, if the intellect of one who sees the divine essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their similitudes.

Obj. 2. Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see the divine essence, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. xii. 28, 34*), remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he said: I have *heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter* (2 Cor. xii. 4). Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the same way, when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.

On the contrary, A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror. Therefore, if God Himself is not

seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or ideas.

I answer that, Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things which are like to one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles the object; and in this way the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other similitudes but by the divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God Himself is seen.

Reply Obj. 1. The created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the divine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.

Reply Obj. 2. Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God, by the very vision of the divine essence, can form

in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THOSE WHO SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD SEE ALL THEY SEE IN IT AT THE SAME TIME ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For, according to the Philosopher (*Topic. ii.*): *It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood.* But what is seen in God, is understood; for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in Him at the same time.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. viii. 22, 23*), *God moves the spiritual creature according to time*—that is, by intelligence and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel, who sees God. Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively; for time means succession.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. xvi.*): *Our thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall see all we know at one glance.*

I answer that, What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many things all at once, forasmuch as we understand many things by means of many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas if all are under-

stood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not successively.

Reply Obj. 1. We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand *animal* and *rational*; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof.

Reply Obj. 2. As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God, they see all at the same time.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYONE IN THIS LIFE CAN SEE THE ESSENCE OF GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that one can in this life see the divine essence. For Jacob said: *I have seen God face to face* (Gen. xxxii. 30). But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: *We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face* (1 Cor. xiii. 12). Therefore God can be seen in this life in His essence.

Obj. 2. Further, the Lord said of Moses: *I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord* (Num. xii. 8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in this life.

Obj. 3. Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (*Confess. viii.*): *If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in*

the very incommutable truth itself above our minds. He also says (*De Vera Relig.* xxx.) that, *We judge of all things according to the divine truth ;* and (*De Trin.* xii.) that, *it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas ; which unless they were above the mind, could not be incommutable.* Therefore even in this life we see God Himself.

Obj. 4. Further, according to Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.* xii. 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also says (*ibid.*). Therefore, since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.

On the contrary, It is written, *Man shall not see Me, and live* (*Exod.* xxxiii. 20), and a gloss upon this says: *In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own nature.*

I answer that, God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is, because, as was said above (A. 4), the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it is evident that the divine essence cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above (AA. 2, 9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, that is, to the divine essence.

Reply Obj. 1. According to Dionysius (*Cæl. Hier.* iv.), a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, *I have seen God face to face*, this does not mean the divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as will later be explained (II. II., Q. CLXXIV.) in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.

Reply Obj. 2. As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xii. 26, 27, 28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of rapture (II. II., Q. CLXXV.).

Reply Obj. 3. All things are said to be seen in God, and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light we know and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, that is, by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says (*Soliloq.* i. 8), *The lessons of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun*, namely God. As therefore in order to see a sensible object it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God.

Reply Obj. 4. Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect. And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence, and power.

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN BE KNOWN IN THIS LIFE BY NATURAL REASON ?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (*De Consol.* v.) that *reason does not grasp simple form.* But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above (Q. III. A. 7): Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.

Obj. 2. Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge.

Obj. 3. Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (*De Trin.* i.): *The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith.* Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. i. 19), *That which is known of God, namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, is manifest in them.*

I answer that, Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God *whether He exists,* and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.

Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so

far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all.

Reply Obj. 1. Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know *what it is*; but it can know *whether it is*.

Reply Obj. 2. God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects.

Reply Obj. 3. As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (*Retract. i.*), retracting what he had said before: *I do not approve what I said in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.' For it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths, that is, by natural reason.*

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER BY GRACE A HIGHER KNOWLEDGE OF GOD CAN BE OBTAINED THAN BY NATURAL REASON?

We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (*De Mystica Theol. i.*), that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him *what He is*, comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to us by grace than by natural reason.

Obj. 2. Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (*Cæl. Hier. i.*) that *it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as screened round about*

by the many coloured sacred veils. Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.

Obj. 3. Further, our intellect adheres to God by the grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (*Homil. xxvi. in Ev.*) that *things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge.* Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of God by grace.

On the contrary, The Apostle says that *God hath revealed to us by His Spirit, what none of the princes of this world knew* (1 Cor. ii. 10), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.

I answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions.

Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, *This is My beloved Son* (Matt: iii. 17).

Reply Obj. 1. Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God *what He is*, and thus are united to Him as to one unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and One.

Reply Obj. 2. From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the more excellent intellectual knowledge,

the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light.

Reply Obj. 3. Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus, as far as faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles.

QUESTION XIII.

THE NAMES OF GOD.

(*In Twelve Articles.*)

AFTER the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.

Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry. (1) Whether God can be named by us? (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially? (3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically? (4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous? (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally? (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures? (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time? (8) Whether this name *God* is a name of nature, or of the operation? (9) Whether this name *God* is a communicable name? (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion? (11) Whether this name, *Who is*, is the supremely appropriate name of God? (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER A NAME CAN BE GIVEN TO GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. i.*) that, *Of Him there is*

neither name, nor can one be found of Him ; and it is written: What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest ? (Prov. xxx. 4).

Obj. 2. Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.

Obj. 3. Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us.

On the contrary, It is written (Exod. xv. 3): *The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name.*

I answer that, Since according to the Philosopher (*Periherm. i.*), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above (Q. XII., AA. 11, 12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name *man* expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by the name is the definition.

Reply Obj. 1. The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand about God and signify in word.

Reply Obj. 2. Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His subsistence and perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as He is.

Reply Obj. 3. To signify substance with quality is to signify the *suppositum* with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative pronouns.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY NAME CAN BE APPLIED TO GOD]
SUBSTANTIALLY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* i. 9): *Everything said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not ; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation.*

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* i.): *You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthy the divine processions in the denominations of God.* Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.

Obj. 3. Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi.): *The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified.*

Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance.

I answer that, Negative names applied to God or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.

But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as *good, wise,* and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless

have been brought into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, *God is good*, we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other names.

Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the words *God is good*, signified no more than, *God is the cause of good things*, it might in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say that He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.

Therefore we must hold a different doctrine—viz., that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it was shown above (Q. IV. A. 2) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is

like Him so far as it possesses some perfection: yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (Q. IV. A. 3.), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, *God is good*, the meaning is not, *God is the cause of goodness*, or, *God is not evil*; but the meaning is, *Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God*, and in a more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (*De Doctr. Christ.* i. 32), *Because He is good, we are*.

Reply Obj. 1. Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.

Reply Obj. 2. In the signification of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance this name *stone (lapis)* is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot (*lædit pedem*), but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone.* So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the processions themselves, as if when we say *God*

* This refers to the Latin etymology of the word *lapis*, which has no place in English.

lives, the sense were, *life proceeds from Him* ; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.

Reply Obj. 3. We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY NAME CAN BE APPLIED TO GOD IN ITS LITERAL SENSE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained above (A. 1). But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

Obj. 2. Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such names as *good*, *wise*, and the like, are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; as appears from what Dionysius says (*Cæl. Hier. ii.*). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense.

Obj. 3. Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Fide ii.*), *Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude.* Therefore not all names are applied to

God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense.

I answer that, According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God, there are two things to be considered—viz., the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, life, and the like, and their mode of signification. As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.

Reply Obj. 1. There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself, as *stone* signifies a material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their signification, as the words *being, good, living,* and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God.

Reply Obj. 2. Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and all life.

Reply Obj. 3. These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their mode of signification: whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER NAMES APPLIED TO GOD ARE SYNONYMOUS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.

Obj. 2. Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are vain notions.

Obj. 3. Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.

On the contrary, All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, *vesture clothing*. Therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous, we cannot properly say *good God*, or the like, and yet it is written, *O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy name* (Jer. xxxii. 18).

I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above (A. 2), that these names signify the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name.

But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received, divided and multiplied. As, therefore, to the different perfections of creatures there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore, although the names applied to God signify one thing, still because they signify that thing under many and different aspects, they are not synonymous.

Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify different aspects of one thing, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.

Reply Obj. 2. The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.

Reply Obj. 3. The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things represent Him.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER WHAT IS SAID OF GOD AND OF CREATURES IS UNIVOCALLY PREDICATED OF THEM ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one: for if

the name *dog* be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally—viz., of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is predicated univocally.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the word of Genesis (i. 26), *Let us make man to our image and likeness*, it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally.

Obj. 3. Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures.

On the contrary, Whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.

Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.

I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect

which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by the exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus, when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by this term *wise* applied to a man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply it to God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term *wise* applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term *wise* is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.

Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: *The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made* (Rom. i. 20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an *analogous* sense, that is, according to proportion.

Now names are thus used in two ways: either according

as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example *healthy* is predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus *healthy* is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (A. 1). Thus, whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus *healthy* applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.

Reply Obj. 1. Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not an univocal agent: and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal analogical predication, which is being.

Reply Obj. 2. The likeness of the creature to God is

imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing (Q. IV. A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3. God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the same genus.

The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER NAMES PREDICATED OF GOD ARE PREDICATED
PRIMARILY OF CREATURES ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since *names*, as the Philosopher says, *are signs of ideas*. But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. i.*): *We name God from creatures*. But names transferred from creatures to God, are said primarily of creatures rather than of God, as *lion, stone*, and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God.

Obj. 3. Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (*De Myst. Theol.*). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily; for *healthy* is primarily predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.

On the contrary, It is written, *I bow my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named* (Eph. iii. 14, 15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures.

I answer that, In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* iv.), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for instance, *healthy* applied to animals comes into the definition of *healthy* applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of *healthy* which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus, all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as *smiling* applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like to the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of *lion* applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, *God is good*, it would then only mean, *God is the cause of the creature's goodness*; thus the term *good* applied to God would include in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence *good* would apply primarily to creatures rather than God. But as was shown above (A. 2), these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, *God is good*, or *wise*, signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures

which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above (A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1. This objection refers to the imposition of the name.

Reply Obj. 2. The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as *healthy* is applied to medicine.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER NAMES WHICH IMPLY RELATION TO CREATURES
ARE PREDICATED OF GOD TEMPORALLY ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose says (*De Fide* i.) that this name *Lord* is a name of power, which is the divine substance; and *Creator* signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally.

Obj. 2. Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to be made does not apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally.

Obj. 3. Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: *I have loved thee with an everlasting love* (Jer. xxxi. 3). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as *Lord* and *Creator*, are applied to God from eternity.

Obj. 4. Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the

creature only. But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called *Lord* from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally.

Obj. 5. Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.

Obj. 6. Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (*Prædic. v.*). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names, *Lord* and *Creator*, are predicated of God from eternity, and not temporally.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. v.*), that this relative appellation *Lord* is applied to God temporally.

I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.

To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only be between things in the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing *the same as itself*. For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between *being* and *non-being* formed by reason, apprehending *non-being* as

an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.

Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.

Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only: and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intelligible existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence, the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* v.) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, *on the right* is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.

Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the

right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.

Reply Obj. 1. Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as *master* and *servant*, *father* and *son*, and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental (*secundum esse*). But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental (*secundum dici*). Thus, there is the same twofold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as *Lord*, and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as *Saviour*, *Creator*, and such-like; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are said of God temporally so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly.

Reply Obj. 2. As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, *to become*, or *to be made* are applied to God only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, *Lord, Thou art become* [Douay, *hast been*] *our refuge* (Ps. lxxxix. 1).

Reply Obj. 3. The operation of the intellect and will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as *Saviour*, *Creator*, and the like.

Reply Obj. 4. Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite

relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* v.) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it.

Reply Obj. 5. Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.

Reply Obj. 6. To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary to consider the order of things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and *vice versa*, then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not *vice versa*, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and *vice versa*, these two relative terms, *Lord* and *servant*, are simultaneous by nature. Hence God was not *Lord* until He had a creature subject to Himself.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS NAME *GOD* IS A NAME OF THE NATURE?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that this name, *God*, is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* i.) that *God* (Θεός) is so called from θεεῖν which means to take care

of, and to cherish all things; or from *αἴθειν*, that is, to burn, for our God is a fire consuming all malice; or from *θεᾶσθαι*, which means to consider all things. But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name *God* signifies His operation and not His nature.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name *God* does not signify the divine nature.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Fide* i.) that *God* is a name of the nature.

I answer that, Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes from its operation, or its property: *e.g.*, we name the substance of a stone from its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot (*lædit pedem*); but still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness, and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same.

Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we can name Him from these, as said in A. 1; hence this name *God* is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising providence over all: hence Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* xii.), *The Deity watches over all with perfect providence and goodness.* But taken from this operation, this name *God* is imposed to signify the divine nature.

Reply Obj. 1. All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name *God*.

Reply Obj. 2. We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can know what stone is in itself from its property, this name *stone* signifies the nature of stone in itself; for it signifies the definition of stone, by

which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in *Metaph.* iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above (Q. XII. A. 12). Thus the name *God* signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, the principle of all things, and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS NAME GOD IS COMMUNICABLE ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that this name *God* is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name *God* signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, *He hath given us great [Vulg., most great] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg., ye] may be made partakers of the divine nature* (2 Pet. i. 4). Therefore this name *God* can be communicated to others.

Obj. 2. Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name *God* is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, *I have said, You are gods* (Ps. lxxxii. 6). Therefore this name *God* is communicable.

Obj. 3. Further, this name *God* comes from operation, as explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable; as *good, wise, and the like*. Therefore this name *God* is communicable.

On the contrary, It is written: *They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones* (Wis. xiv. 21), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name *God* is incommunicable.

I answer that, A name is communicable in two ways, properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to

many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance this name *lion* is properly communicated to all things of the same nature as *lion*; by similitude it is communicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea: for the plurality of this individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called *Achilles* metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any *suppositum*, but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some *suppositum*. Hence, so far as concerns

names, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given by us to signify simple subsisting natures.

Since, then, this name *God* is given to signify the divine nature as stated above (A. 8), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (Q. XI. A. 3), it follows that this name *God* is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name *sun* would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: *You served them who by nature are not gods* (Gal. iv. 8), and a gloss adds, *Gods not in nature, but in human opinion*. Nevertheless this name *God* is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, *I have said, You are gods* (Ps. lxxxi. 6).

But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His *suppositum*, accordingly as He is considered as *this something*, that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrews; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.

Reply Obj. 1. The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude.

Reply Obj. 2. This name *God* is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name *sun*.

Reply Obj. 3. These names *good*, *wise*, and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But this name *God* is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine nature.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS NAME *GOD* IS APPLIED TO GOD UNIVOCALLY,
BY NATURE, BY PARTICIPATION, AND ACCORDING TO
OPINION ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this name *God* is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who says: *An idol is not God*, contradicts a pagan who says: *An idol is God*. Therefore *God* in both senses is spoken of univocally.

Obj. 2. Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not in truth. But this name *eatitude* is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this name *God* is applied univocally to the true God; and to God also in opinion.

Obj. 3. Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: *There is one God*, he understands by the name of God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: *An idol is God*. Therefore this name *God* is applied univocally to both.

On the contrary, The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in *Periherm.* i. But the word *animal* applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name *God* applied to the true God and to God in opinion, is applied equivocally.

Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, a Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says there is one God. Therefore this name *God* is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion.

I answer that, This name *God* in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent from this reason:—Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, *being* which is applied to *substance* is placed in the definition of being as applied to *accident*; and *healthy* applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.

The same applies to the question at issue. For this name *God*, as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.

Reply Obj. 1. The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name *man*, of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name *man* we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name *man* what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name *God* to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in that sense, as in the Psalm, *All the gods of the Gentiles are demons* (Ps. xciv. 5).

The same remark applies to the second and third Objections. For those reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations.

Reply Obj. 4. The term *animal* applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of different predicaments.

Reply Obj. 5. Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (Q. XII. A. 12). So a pagan can take this name *God* in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use names the meaning of which we know not.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THIS NAME, *HE WHO IS*, IS THE MOST PROPER NAME OF GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that this name *HE WHO IS* is not the most proper name of God. For this name *God* is an incommunicable name. But this name '*HE WHO IS*, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name *HE WHO IS* is not the most proper name of God.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iii.) that *the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God*. But it especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name *good* is supremely proper to God, and not this name *HE WHO IS*.

Obj. 3. Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this name *HE WHO IS*, imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name *HE WHO IS*, is not the most applicable to God.

On the contrary, It is written that when Moses asked, *If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?* the Lord answered him, *Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you* (Exod. iii. 13, 14). Therefore this name, *HE WHO IS*, most properly belongs to God.

I answer that, This name, *HE WHO IS*, is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:—

First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (Q. III. A. 4), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.

Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, the more properly are they applied to God. Hence Damascene says (*De Fid. Orth.* i.) that, *HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance*. Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name *HE WHO IS*, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the *infinite ocean of substance*.

Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* v.).

Reply Obj. 1. This name *HE WHO IS*, is the name of God more properly than this name *God*, as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification

and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name *God* is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular.

Reply Obj. 2. This name *good* is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of cause.

Reply Obj. 3. It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, *HE WHO IS*.

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER AFFIRMATIVE PROPOSITIONS CAN BE FORMED
ABOUT GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (*CæL. Hier. ii.*) that *negations about God are true; but affirmations are vague.*

Obj. 2. Further, Boethius says (*De Trin. ii.*), that *a simple form cannot be a subject.* But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Q. III.): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.

Obj. 3. Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown above (Q. iii. A. 7). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.

On the contrary, What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is

Three and One; and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God.

I answer that, True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that *man* and *white* are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, *man is an animal*; since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same *suppositum* there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to *suppositum*, but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the *suppositum* what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the *suppositum*; according to the saying that *predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially*. To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.

God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.

Reply Obj. 1. Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, *incongruous*, inasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.

Reply Obj. 2. Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and attributes something else to it.

Reply Obj. 3. This proposition, *The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false*, can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb *otherwise* determines the word *understanding* on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.

QUESTION XIV.

OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE.

(In Sixteen Articles.)

HAVING considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider the divine life. And as knowledge concerns truth, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas.

Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry: (1) Whether there is knowledge in God? (2) Whether God understands Himself? (3) Whether He comprehends Himself? (4) Whether His understanding is His substance? (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself? (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them? (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive? (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things? (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things? (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil? (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things? (12) Whether He knows the infinite? (13) Whether He knows future contingent things? (14) Whether He knows enunciable

things? (15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?
 (16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS KNOWLEDGE* IN GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.

Obj. 2. Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God.

Obj. 3. Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal nor particular (Q. III., A. 5). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.

On the contrary, The Apostle says, *O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God* (Rom. xi. 33).

I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that *the soul is in a sense all things*. Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (Q. VII., A. 1) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence, it is said in *De Anima* ii. that plants do

* *Scientia.*

not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed, as said in *De Anima* iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above (Q. VII., A. 1), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1. Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself (Q. IV., A. 2), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality in God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.

Reply Obj. 2. Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (Q. XIII., A. 4). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of his knowledge. He has *intelligence* as regards the knowledge of principles; he has *science* as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has *wisdom*, according as he knows the highest cause; he has *counsel* or *prudence*, according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown (A. 7). Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so far as they enter into the divine predication, everything that savours of imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, *With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding* (Job xii. 13).

Reply Obj. 3. Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD UNDERSTANDS HIMSELF ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (*De Causis*), *Every knower who knows his own essence, returns completely to his own essence.* But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.

Obj. 2. Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima iii.*); and knowledge also is a kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made perfect by itself, *nor*, as Hilary says (*De Trin. iii.*), *is a thing its own likeness.* Therefore God does not understand Himself.

Obj. 3. Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad. lit. vi.*). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in *De Anima iii.* Therefore God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things.

On the contrary, It is written: *The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God (I Cor. ii. 11).*

I answer that, God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (*De Anima iii.*), that *the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act.* For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible

species. And because of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality.

Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God understands Himself through Himself.

Reply Obj. 1. Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know themselves; hence it is said in *De Causis* that, *whoever knows his essence returns to it*. Now it supremely belongs to God to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.

Reply Obj. 2. Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as stated in *De Anima* iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, *i. e.*, is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by

act. On the other hand the divine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own perfection, and its own intelligible object.

Reply Obj. 3. Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD COMPREHENDS HIMSELF ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (*Octog. Tri. Quæst. xv.*), that *whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself*. But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.

Obj. 2. If it be said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is against what was laid down above (Q. VII., A. 1). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*ibid.*), *Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself*. But God understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.

I answer that, God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it is in actuality, as said in *Metaph.* ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above (AA. 1 and 2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.

Reply Obj. 1. The strict meaning of *comprehension* signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (*De Vid. Dcum. ep. cxii.*), *The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer.*

Reply Obj. 2. When it is said, *God is finite to Himself,* this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ACT OF GOD'S INTELLECT IS HIS
SUBSTANCE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance.

Obj. 2. Further, To understand one's act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not be something great.

Obj. 3. Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands, and that He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin.* vii.), *In God to be is the same as to be wise.* But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above (Q. III., A. 4). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance.

I answer that, It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* xii.), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding

is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how this is. As was laid down above (A. 2), to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above (Q. III.). Hence as His essence itself is also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence.

Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence, when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance.

Reply Obj. 1. To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in him.

Reply Obj. 2. When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.

Thus appears the *Reply to Obj. 3.* For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD KNOWS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says (*Octog. Tri. Quæst., qu. xlvi.*) that *God does not behold anything out of Himself.* Therefore He does not know things other than Himself.

Obj. 2. Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands

other things besides Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible.

Obj. 3. Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself.

On the contrary, It is written: *All things are naked and open to His eyes* (Heb. iv. 13).

I answer that, God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (Q. II., A. 3), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the very existence of the first efficient cause—viz., God—is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.

Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole

by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.

So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.

Reply Obj. 1. The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God *sees nothing outside Himself* is not to be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 2. The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in *De Anima* iii. For *a stone is not in the soul, but its image*. Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the divine intellect other than the divine essence.

Reply Obj. 3. The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD KNOWS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF
BY PROPER KNOWLEDGE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown (A. 5.), God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge.

Obj. 2. Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Q. XII., A. 2.). Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence, so as to know *what it is*, which is to have proper knowledge of it.

Obj. 3. Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.

On the contrary, To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches *even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the*

marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible in His sight (Heb. iv. 12, 13).

I answer that, Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew itself as the principle of heat, would know the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.

But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge of it. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from *Physic. i.* If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above (Q. IV., A. 1). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know all colours.

Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colours is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity of the lines is caused by their different position.

Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above (Q. IV., A. 2) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures—viz. being—belongs to their perfection, but also what makes them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of God is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.

As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly, unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest; that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each other.

Reply Obj. 1. So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb *so*, imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb *so* be understood to import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of knowledge.

We must say therefore that God not only knows that things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.

Reply Obj. 2. The created essence is compared to the essence of God, as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse.

Reply Obj. 3. The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper ratio of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in, and imitate it.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS DISCURSIVE ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the Philosopher says (*Topic. ii.*): *The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a time.* Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (AA. 2, 5), it seems that He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another.

Obj. 2. Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.

Obj. 3. Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. xv.*), *God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there; but He sees all things together at once.*

I answer that, In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion; one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Him-

self. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term of discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in Himself as in their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.

Reply Obj. 1. Although there is only one act of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium), as shown above.

Reply Obj. 2. God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.

Reply Obj. 3. God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His knowledge is not discursive.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on Rom. viii. 30., *Whom He called, them He also justified, etc.: A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists.*

Obj. 2. Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.

Obj. 3. Further, *The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure*, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph. x.*). But what is posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. xv.*), *Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are.*

I answer that, The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph. ix.*). Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the *knowledge of approbation*.

Reply Obj. 1. Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above.

But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.

Reply Obj. 2. The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.

Reply Obj. 3. Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD HAS KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS THAT ARE NOT ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But *truth* and *being* are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not.

Obj. 2. Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God.

Obj. 3. Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: *Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are* (Rom. iv. 17).

I answer that, God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.

Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have the knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.

Reply Obj. 1. Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by God.

Reply Obj. 2. Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act.

Reply Obj. 3. The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what

ever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not that they be, but that they be possible.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD KNOWS EVIL THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (*De Anima* iii.) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation. But *evil is the privation of good*, as Augustine says (*Confess.* iii. 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 2), it seems that God does not know evil things.

Obj. 2. Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things.

Obj. 3. Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 5). Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xii.). Therefore God does not know evil things.

Obj. 4. Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God through itself, otherwise evil would be in God; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. xv. 11), *Hell and destruction are before God* (Vulg., *the Lord*).

I answer that, Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some

good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence, since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the very fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* vii.): *God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through light.*

Reply Obj. 1. The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he had said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially: for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.

Reply Obj. 2. The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.

Reply Obj. 3. Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.

Reply Obj. 4. To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except by good.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD KNOWS SINGULAR THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than

the human intellect. Now the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii.), *reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things*. Therefore God does not know singular things.

Obj. 2. Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things.

Obj. 3. Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.

On the contrary, It is written (*Prov.* xvi. 2), *All the ways of a man are open to His eyes*.

I answer that, God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing (Q. IV., A. 2). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (*De Anima* i. and *Metaph.* iii.) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.

Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This,

however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know singular things in their singularity.

On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above (A. 8), His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (Q. XLIV., A. 2), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.

Reply Obj. 1. Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the

principles which enter into the composition of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also singular things.

Reply Obj. 2. Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things.

Reply Obj. 3. Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN KNOW INFINITE THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, to those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured, as the Philosopher says (*Physic. iii.*). Moreover, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei xii.*) that *whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower.* Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of God.

Obj. 2. Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in *Physic. iii.* But the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in *Physic. vi.* Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in God's knowledge, which is infinite.

Obj. 3. Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii.), Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds.

I answer that, Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above (A. 9), and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever.

The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficient likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.

Reply Obj. 1. The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (*Physic. i.*). But the idea of

quantity implies the order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above (A. 7). Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.

Reply Obj. 2. Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence, it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as if it were traversable.

Reply Obj. 3. The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of God.

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS OF FUTURE
CONTINGENT THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause pro-

ceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above (A. 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.

Obj. 2. Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary, must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in *Poster. i.* But this is a true conditional proposition, *If God knew that this thing will be, it will be*, for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.

Obj. 3. Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent thing must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by God.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xxxii. 15), *He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works*, that is, of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.

I answer that, Since as was shown above (A. 9), God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and the creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.

In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined

to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do; but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (Q. X., A. 2). Hence, all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.

Reply Obj. 2. Some say that this antecedent, *God knew this contingent to be future*, is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it;

for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent, *Socrates is a white man*. But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, *God knew this contingent to be future*, contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, *if the sun moves, the grass will grow*.

Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, *What the soul understands is immaterial*; this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, *If God knew anything, it will be*, the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, that is, as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: *for everything that is, while it is, must necessarily be*, as the Philosopher says in *Periherm. i.*

Reply Obj. 3. Things reduced to act in time, are known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but

(they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, *Everything known by God must necessarily be*, is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided, and false; for the sense is, *Everything which God knows is necessary*. If understood of the saying it is composite and true; for the sense is, *This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary*.

Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, *It is possible for a white thing to be black*, it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, *a white thing is black*, can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, *A black crow can be white*; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be not known. This objection, however, would hold if these words *that which is known* implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.

FOURTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD KNOWS ENUNCIABLE THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourteenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not know enunciabile things. For to know enunciabile things belongs to our intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciabile things.

Obj. 2. Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciabile things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciabile things.

On the contrary, It is written: *The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men* (Ps. xciii. 11). But enunciabile things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciabile things.

I answer that, Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above (A. 9), it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.

Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciabile things not after the manner of enunciabile things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand as separated,

we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.

Reply Obj. 1. This objection would avail if God knew enunciabile things after the manner of enunciabile things.

Reply Obj. 2. Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.

FIFTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS VARIABLE ?

We proceed thus to the Fifteenth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the variation of creatures.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.

Obj. 3. Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.

On the contrary, It is said, that in God *there is no change nor shadow of alteration* (James. i. 17).

I answer that, Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 4), just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (Q. IX., A. 1), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.

Reply Obj. 1. *Lord, Creator*, and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that *Lord, Creator*, and the like, import the relations consequent upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But *knowledge* and *love*, and the like, import relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable manner.

Reply Obj. 2. God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew.

Reply Obj. 3. The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say *Christ is born* and *wil be born*, and *was born*; because the same thing is signified by these three—viz., the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows,

they said, that whatever God knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (*Categor.* iii.) when he says that this sentence, *Socrates sits*, is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, *Whatever God knew He knows*, if referred to enunciative propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God is variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciative proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciative things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of which can be in God.

SIXTEENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD HAS A SPECULATIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Sixteenth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above (A. 8). But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.

Obj. 2. Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstrac-

tion from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.

On the contrary, Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of *Metaph.* Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.

I answer that, Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine things. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing—as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; *for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative*, as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative consideration as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.

In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable.

But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.

Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, accordingly as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.

Reply Obj. 1. The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is, of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can make, and which nevertheless are never made.

Reply Obj. 2. The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as it is human.

In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, He possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.

QUESTION XV.

OF IDEAS.

(*In Three Articles.*)

AFTER considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are ideas? (2) Whether they are many, or one only? (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE IDEAS?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* vii.), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas.

Obj. 2. Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (Q. XIV., A. 5). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.

Obj. 3. Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Octog. Tri. Quæst.; qu. xlvi.*), *Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood.*

I answer that, It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word 'Iδέα is in Latin *Forma*. Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing

apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends; either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:

In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (Q. XLVI., A. 1), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.

Reply Obj. 1. God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (*Metaph.* ix.) rejects the opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.

Reply Obj. 3. God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IDEAS ARE MANY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea.

Obj. 2. Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.

Obj. 3. Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.

Obj. 4. Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* i. 10), who says, in God all things are one, except *ingenerability, generation, and procession*. Ideas therefore are not many.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Octog. Tri. Quæst.*; qu. xlvii.), *Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can arise or decay, and all that actually does so.*

I answer that, It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the

principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in *Metaph.* xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (*Octog. Tri. Quæst.; qu. xlvi.*), *that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it*, from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures

according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature: and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of many things, and these are many ideas.

Reply Obj. 1. The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.

Reply Obj. 2. By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or the idea of the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.

Reply Obj. 3. Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.

Reply Obj. 4. Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE IDEAS OF ALL THINGS THAT GOD KNOWS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.

Obj. 2. Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above (A. 9). But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. v.*): *Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things.* Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by him.

Obj. 3. Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.

Obj. 4. Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are no ideas of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (*Octog. Tri. Quæst.; qu. xlvi.*). Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.

On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (*ibid.*). But God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.

I answer that, As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an *exemplar*, and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a *type*, and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known

by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.

Reply Obj. 1. Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an *exemplar*, nor as a *type*.

Reply Obj. 2. God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an *exemplar*, but only in so far as it denotes a *type*.

Reply Obj. 3. Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.

Reply Obj. 4. Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an *exemplar*; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of the species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals, as will be shown later (Q:XXII., A. 3).

QUESTION XVI.

OF TRUTH.

(*In Eight Articles.*)

SINCE knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect? (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing? (3) On the comparison of the true to being. (4) On the comparison of the true to the good. (5) Whether God is truth? (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many? (7) On the eternity of truth. (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER TRUTH RESIDES ONLY IN THE INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (*Soliloq.* ii. 5) condemns this definition of truth, *That is true which is seen*; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, *That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know*, for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: *That is true which is*. It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is

the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories can be true at the same time, since contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.

Obj. 3. Further, *that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so*, as is evident from the Philosopher (*Poster. i.*). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (*Prædicam. iii.*). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Metaph. vi.*), *The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect.*

I answer that, As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite—and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.

Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accident-

ally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true as being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (*De Vera Relig.* xxxvi.), *Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is*; and Hilary says (*De Trin.* v.) that *Truth makes being clear and evident*: and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (*loc. cit.*), *Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle*: also Anselm's definition (*De Verit.* xii.), *Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone*; for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (*Metaph.* viii. 6), *The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it*. The definition that *Truth is the equation of thought and thing* is applicable to it under either aspect.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.

Reply Obj. 2. The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From

this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (*Metaph.* iv.). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect.

Reply Obj. 3. Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or word is true *from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true.*

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER TRUTH RESIDES ONLY IN THE INTELLECT COMPOSING AND DIVIDING ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (*De Anima* iii.) that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards *what a thing is*. Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing *what a thing is*. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.

Obj. 2. Further, Isaac says in his book *On Definitions* that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* vi.) that with regard to simple things and *what a thing is*, truth is found neither in the intellect nor in things.

I answer that, As stated before, truth resides, in its primary

aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing *what a thing is*. When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows *what a thing is*; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing *what a thing is*, as in anything that is true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word *truth*; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing *what a thing is*.

And thus the Objections given are solved.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE TRUE AND BEING ARE CONVERTIBLE TERMS ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the

intellect, as stated (A. 1); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.

Obj. 2. Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.

Obj. 3. Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (*Metaph. ii.*) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.

I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in *De Anima iii.* that *the soul is in some manner all things*, through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before (A. 1). But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already (*ibid.*). It may, however, be said, that being also is in things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in the intellect, while being is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.

Reply Obj. 2. Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.

Reply Obj. 3. When it is said that being cannot be appre-

hended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOOD IS LOGICALLY PRIOR TO THE TRUE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from *Physic.* i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true.

Obj. 2. Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing, as said before (A. 2). But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.

Obj. 3. Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from *Ethic.* iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (*De Lib. Arbit.* ii. 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.

On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.

I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ

logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good.

Reply Obj. 1. The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse is the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2. A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.

Reply Obj. 3. The virtue which is called *truth* is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to *life* is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfils in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things (A. 1). Whereas the truth of *justice* is found in man as he fulfils his duty to his neighbour, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS TRUTH?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.

Obj. 2. Further, truth, according to Augustine (*De Vera Relig.* xxxvi.), is a *likeness to the principle*. But in God there is no likeness to a principle, Therefore in God there is not truth.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.

On the contrary, Our Lord says, *I am the Way, the Truth and the Life* (John xiv. 6).

I answer that, As said above (A. 1), truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that is truth in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.

Reply Obj. 1. Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things

from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: *the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another*. Similarly, the divine truth can be called a *likeness to the principle*, inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect.

Reply Obj. 3. Not-being, and privation, have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement,—*that a person commits fornication is true*, is entirely from God. But to argue, *Therefore that this person fornicates is from God*, is a fallacy of Accident.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE TRUTH, ACCORDING TO WHICH ALL THINGS ARE TRUE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (*De Trin.* xv. 1), *nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God*. Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God.

Obj. 2. Further, Anselm says (*De Verit.* xiv.), that, *as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things*. But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.

On the contrary, it is written (Ps. xi. 2), *Truths are decayed from among the children of men*.

I answer that, In one sense truth, whereby all things are true is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said (A. 1) that truth resides primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on Ps. xi. 2, *Truths are decayed from among the children of men*, says: *As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth.* But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.

Reply Obj. 1. The soul does not judge of all things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a

certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.

Reply Obj. 2. The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER CREATED TRUTH IS ETERNAL ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :--

Objection 1. It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (*De Lib. Arbit.* ii. 8), *Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five.* But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.

Obj. 2. Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most universal.

Obj. 3. Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.

Obj. 4. Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciabiles is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal.

On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down before (Q. X., A. 3).

I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the

intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciative truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already (A. 5).

Reply Obj. 1. The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.

Reply Obj. 2. That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, as man is one by the unity of one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.

Reply Obj. 3. That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.

Reply Obj. 4. Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciative propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before

such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has no truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER TRUTH IS IMMUTABLE ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (*De Lib. Arbit.* ii. 12), that *Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is.*

Obj. 2. Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore, truth is immutable.

Obj. 3. Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm (*De Verit.* viii.), is a certain rightness in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition *Socrates sits*, receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit. Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.

Obj. 4. Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions, *Socrates sits, will sit, sat.* Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other

of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xi. 2), *Truths are decayed from among the children of men.*

I answer that, Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before (A. 1); but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said before (Q. XIV., A. 15). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking of divine truth.

Reply Obj. 2. The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in *Physic. i.*, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before.

Reply Obj. 3. A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect

concerning them; but it is said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, *Socrates sits*, is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.

Reply Obj. 4. The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, *Socrates sits*, has not the same meaning when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains invariable.

QUESTION XVII.

CONCERNING FALSITY.

(In Four Articles.)

WE next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether falsity exists in things? (2) Whether it exists in the sense? (3) Whether it exists in the intellect? (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER FALSITY EXISTS IN THINGS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (*Soliloq. ii. 8*), *If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary.*

Obj. 2. Further, false is derived from *fallere* (to deceive). But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (*De vera relig. 33*), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things.

Obj. 3. Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above (Q. XVI.). But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*ibid. 34*): *Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity.* But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.

I answer that, Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must

needs seek falsity, where primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it *per se*, but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared *per se*; but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper operation of his art.

In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, *Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?* (Ps. iv. 3): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the *truth of life* as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, *He that doth truth, cometh to the light* (John iii. 21).

But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* v. 34). So, too, Augustine says (*Soliloq.* ii. 10): *The true tragedian is a false Hector*: even as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to

that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause—and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to judge of things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (*ibid.* 6): *We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:* and the Philosopher says (*loc. cit.*): *Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not.* In this way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in *Metaph.* v. 34.

Reply Obj. 1. A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. Hence, *The true tragedian is a false Hector,* as stated in *Soliloq.* ii. (*loc. cit.*). As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.

Reply Obj. 2. Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are not.

Reply Obj. 3. Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.

To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in the majority of instances.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS FALSITY IN THE SENSES ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (*De vera relig.* 33): *If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them.* Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* iv. 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.

Obj. 3. Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Soliloq.* ii. 6), *It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes.*

I answer that, Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (Q. XVI., A. 2), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really are.

The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colours, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly, neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the coloured object to be a man.

Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of

the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.

Reply Obj. 1. The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erroneously by its object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.

Reply Obj. 2. Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, *Sense, about its proper object, is never false.* Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason the Philosopher (*Metaph.* v. 34) says that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER FALSITY IS IN THE INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (*Qq.* lxxxiii. 32), *Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived.* But falsity

is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (*De anima* iii. 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the intellect.

On the contrary, It is said in *De anima* iii. 21, 22 that *where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood.* But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.

I answer that, Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said (A. 2), that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (Q. XVI., A. 2), that falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the knowledge of the intellect is false, but because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above (A. 2).

But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as 'a reasonable four-footed animal' would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as 'some reasonable animals are four-footed' is false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at all.

Reply Obj. 1. Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine's words must be understood, *that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived*; and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER TRUE AND FALSE ARE CONTRARIES?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to

that which is not; for *truth*, as Augustine says (*Soliloq.* ii. 5), *is that which is*. But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.

Obj. 2. Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (*Soliloq.* ii. 10), *A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian*. Therefore true and false are not contraries.

Obj. 3. Further, in God there is no contrariety, for *nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance*, as Augustine says (*De civ. Dei*, xii. 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, *They have laid hold on lying* (*Jer.* viii. 5), that is to say, *an idol*, as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*Periherm.* ii.), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.

I answer that, True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is *negation in a subject*, as stated in *Metaph.* iv. 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of colour. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* iv. 27), inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.

Reply Obj. 1. What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the Philosopher proves,

(*Periherm.* ii.), the contrary of this statement *good is good* is, *good is not good*.

Reply Obj. 2. Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth.

Reply Obj. 3. Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.

QUESTION XVIII.

THE LIFE OF GOD.

(*In Four Articles.*)

SINCE to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise: (1) To whom does it belong to live? (2) What is life? (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God? (4) Whether all things in God are life?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER TO LIVE BELONGS TO ALL NATURAL THINGS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (*Phys. viii. 1*) that *Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in nature.* But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake in life.

Obj. 2. Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they have in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (*ibid.*, 56, 57). Since, then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.

Obj. 3. Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of 'living waters.' Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. vi. 1*) that

The last echo of life is heard in the plants, whereby it is inferred that their life is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.

I answer that, We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to animals, for it is said in *De Vegetab.* i.* that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long is it considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect thing, *i.e.*, of a thing in potentiality, is called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude.

Reply Obj. 1. These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its

* *De Plantis* i. 1.

movement came from an intrinsic moving force, as some in fact have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.

Reply Obj. 2. To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living bodies.

Reply Obj. 3. Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIFE IS AN OPERATION ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (*De anima* ii. 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely nourishment, sensation, local movement, and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.

Obj. 2. Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only

distinguished from the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.

Obj. 3. Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of John xviii. 3, *Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God.* Therefore life is an operation.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (*De anima* ii. 37), *In living things to live is to be.*

I answer that, As is clear from what has been said (Q. XVII., A. 3), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (Q. XIII. A. 1), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word *body* is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the dimensions themselves; in which sense *body* is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word *running* denotes *to run* in the abstract.

Hence *living* is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ix. 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher here takes *to live* to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence, and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (*Ethic. ix. 9*) that to live is to sense or to understand—in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.

Reply Obj. 2. By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead a life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.

Wherefore the Reply to the third objection is clear.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER LIFE IS PROPERLY ATTRIBUTED TO GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move

themselves, as previously stated (A. 2). But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life.

Obj. 2. Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (*De anima* ii. 4) that *the soul is the cause and principle of the living body*. But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.

Obj. 3. Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. lxxxiii. 3): *My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God*.

I answer that, Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved a threefold order is found. In the first place the end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.

Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the

sense of touch, as shellfish, move only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligent beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, *i.e.*, the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.

But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (*Metaph.* xii. 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.

Reply Obj. 1. As stated in *Metaph.* ix. 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense, and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in *De anima* iii. 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.

Reply Obj. 2. As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has no principle of life.

Reply Obj. 3. Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold good with incorruptible natures.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL THINGS ARE LIFE IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said (Acts xvii. 28), *In Him we live, and move, and be.* But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.

Obj. 2. Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since,

then, not all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God.

Obj. 3. Further, as Augustine says (*De vera relig.* 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than in themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.

Obj. 4. Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but that never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.

On the contrary (John i. 3, 4), It is said, *What was made, in Him was life.* But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God.

I answer that, In God to live is to understand, as before stated (A. 3). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.

Reply Obj. 1. Creatures are said to be in God in a two-fold sense. In one way, so far as they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, *In Him we live, and move, and be;* since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence

is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life.

Reply Obj. 2. The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.

Reply Obj. 3. If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the *separate* man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or a horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.

Reply Obj. 4. Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far as life implies a principle of operation.

QUESTION XIX.

THE WILL OF GOD.

(*In Twelve Articles.*)

AFTER considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is will in God? (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself? (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily? (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things? (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will? (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled? (7) Whether the will of God is mutable? (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed? (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil? (10) Whether God has free will? (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God? (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS WILL IN GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is not will in God.

Obj. 2. Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfec-

tion, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.

Obj. 3. Further, according to the Philosopher (*De anima* iii. 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in *Phys.* viii. 49. Therefore there is not will in God.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. xii. 2): *That you may prove what is the will of God.*

I answer that, There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude to good as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His will.

Reply Obj. 1. Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (Q. VI., A. 3): for the end has the aspect of good.

Reply Obj. 2. Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but also the loving and delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence.

Reply Obj. 3. A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another: but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His

essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD WILLS THINGS APART FROM HIMSELF ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.

Obj. 2. Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in *De anima* iii. 54. If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible.

Obj. 3. Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.

Obj. 4. Further, acts of the will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. iv. 3): *This is the will of God, your sanctification.*

I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above (A. 1). For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It

pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others, as much as is possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein.

Reply Obj. 1. The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has been already said (Q. XIII., A. 4). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.

Reply Obj. 2. In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.

Reply Obj. 3. From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect,

though its perfection consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things.

Reply Obj. 4. As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER WHATEVER GOD WILLS HE WILLS NECESSARILY ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.

Obj. 2. Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (Q. II., A. 3). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in *Metaph.* v. 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.

Obj. 4. Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.

Obj. 5. Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it

is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator* says on *Phys.* ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.

Obj. 6. Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. i. 11): *Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.* Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills.

I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to colour, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the

* Averroës.

end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.

Reply Obj. 1. From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition.

Reply Obj. 2. Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things.

Reply Obj. 3. It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.

Reply Obj. 4. Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.

Reply Obj. 5. A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.

Reply Obj. 6. As the divine existence is necessary of

itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He knows, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv. 1): *As our sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of its goodness upon everything that exists.* But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things.

Obj. 2. Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is the cause of anything, through being *such* a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (*De Doct. Christ.* i. 32), *Because God is good, we exist.* Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.

Obj. 4. Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the cause of created things is the knowledge of God, as

said before (Q. XIV., A. 8). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.

On the contrary, It is said (Wis. xi. 26), *How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?*

I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.

This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in *Phys.* ii. 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as, the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He must act by intellect and will.

This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way, unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (Q. VII., A. 2). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.

Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the

mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.

Reply Obj. 1. Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain beings, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.

Reply Obj. 2. Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and will.

Reply Obj. 3. Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, *Because God is good, we exist*, are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A. 2, *ad 2*).

Reply Obj. 4. Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God all these things are one.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANY CAUSE CAN BE ASSIGNED TO THE DIVINE WILL ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (*Qq. lxxxiii. 46*): *Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?* But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause.

Obj. 2. Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown (A. 4). If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will.

Obj. 3. Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Qq. lxxxiii. 28*): *Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected.* But nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.

I answer that, In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is a cause of the will in the person that wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.

Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another

act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.

Reply Obj. 1. The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another.

Reply Obj. 2. Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (*De Trin.* iii. 2): *Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly unable to perceive the cause that is above all others, the will of God.*

Reply Obj. 3. Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS ALWAYS FULFILLED ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. ii. 4): *God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.* But this does not happen. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.

Obj. 2. Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.

Obj. 3. Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. cxiii. 11): *God hath done all things, whatsoever He would.*

I answer that, The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is

included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen. For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.

Reply Obj. 1. The words of the Apostle, *God will have all men to be saved*, etc., can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (*De præd. sanct. i. 8: Enchir. 103*), *God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will.* Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (*De Fide Orth. ii. 29*), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.

To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered.

But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.

Reply Obj. 2. An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetitive faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.

Reply Obj. 3. A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said above.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IS CHANGEABLE ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (Gen. vi. 7): *It repenteth Me that I have*

made man. But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a changeable will.

Obj. 2. Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: *I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them* (Jer. xviii. 7, 8). Therefore God has a changeable will.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.

Obj. 4. Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before (A. 3). Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable; as that which can exist and not exist is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will.

On the contrary, It is said: *God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed* (Num. xxili. 19).

I answer that, The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before: hence we take

counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (QQ. IX. A. 1; XIV. A. 15). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.

Reply Obj. 1. These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom He had made.

Reply Obj. 2. The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only at inferior causes might have said: *Lazarus will not rise again*; but looking at the divine first cause might have said: *Lazarus will rise again*. And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: *Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live* (Isa. xxxviii. 1). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (*Moral. xvi. 5*): *The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel*—that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, *I also will repent*, His words must be

understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent, when they do not fulfil what they have threatened.

Reply Obj. 3. It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.

Reply Obj. 4. Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above (A. 3).

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL OF GOD IMPOSES NECESSITY ON
THE THINGS WILLED ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (*Enchir.* 103): *No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be.*

Obj. 2. Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says: (*Phys.* ii. 84) *Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it.* But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Rom. ix. 19): *Who resisteth His will?* Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass: and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is necessary absolutely.

On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it

follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.

I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.

This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God has prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.

Reply Obj. 1. By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not abso-

lute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.

Reply Obj. 2. From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.

Reply Obj. 3. Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD WILLS EVILS ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (*Enchir. 95*): *Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things.* Therefore God wills evil things.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv. 23*): *Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything, i.e., the universe.* And Augustine says (*Enchir. 10, 11*): *Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good the more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil.* But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.

Obj. 3. Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. LXXXIII. 3): *No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse: and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it.* Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.

I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (Q. V. A. 1), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.

Reply Obj. 1. Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in them-

selves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words *that evil should be or be done*. This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.

Reply Obj. 2. Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (*ad 1*). Therefore Dionysius in saying that *evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe*, draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.

Reply Obj. 3. The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.

TENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD HAS FREE-WILL ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son*: *God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side.*

Obj. 2. Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said (A. 9). Therefore there is not free-will in God.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (*De Fide* ii. 3): *The Holy*

* *Ep.* 146, *ad Damas.*

Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity.

I answer that, We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor by natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above (A. 3), He has free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will.

Reply Obj. 1. Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (*l.c.*), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.

ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL OF EXPRESSION IS TO BE
DISTINGUISHED IN GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.

Obj. 2. Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.

On the contrary, The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many,

as in the words of Ps. cx. 2: *Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills.* Therefore, sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.

I answer that, Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (Q. XIII. A. 3). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: *Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven* (Matth. vi. 10). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.

Reply Obj. 1. Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.

Reply Obj. 2. Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.

TWELFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER FIVE EXPRESSIONS OF WILL ARE RIGHTLY
ASSIGNED TO THE DIVINE WILL ?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that five expressions of will—namely, *prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission*—are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.

Obj. 2. Further, God works nothing unless He will it, as the Scripture says (Wis. xi. 26). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.

Obj. 3. Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.

Obj. 4. Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since *good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways*, as declared by the Philosopher (*Ethic* ii. 6), and Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv. 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil—namely, prohibition—and two—namely, counsel and precept—in the case of good.

I answer that, By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for what removes an impediment is called

an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of Matth. vi. 10: *Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.* That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (*Enchir.* 95), who says: *Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it.*

Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.

Reply Obj. 1. There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is no reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.

Reply Obj. 2. As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.

Reply Obj. 3. Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the

divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.

Reply Obj. 4. All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.

QUESTION XX.

GOD'S LOVE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

WE next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude, and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly his justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether love exists in God? (2) Whether He loves all things? (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another? (4) Whether He loves more the better things?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER LOVE EXISTS IN GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God.

Obj. 2. Further, love, anger, sorrow, and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.

Obj. 3. Further, Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. iv.*): *Love is a uniting and binding force.* But this cannot take place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.

On the contrary, It is written: *God is love* (1 John iv. 16).

I answer that, We must needs assert that in God there is

love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other appetitive movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved; nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love. Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (Q. XIX., A. 1), and hence we must attribute love to Him.

Reply Obj. 1. The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in *De anima* iii. 58, 75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive-

force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (*De part. animal.* ii. 1; iii. 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight are passions, in so far as they denote acts of the sensitive appetite; but in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (*Ethic* vii.): *God rejoices by an operation that is one and simple*, and for the same reason He loves without passion.

Reply Obj. 2. In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element—namely, the bodily change—and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (*De anima* iii. 15, 63, 64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (*ad* 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already shown (QQ. III., A. 2, *ad* 2 and XIX., A. 11). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, as said before (Q. XIX., A. 11).

Reply Obj. 3. An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish

ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as above shown (Q. VI., AA. 1, 3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in God.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD LOVES ALL THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* iv. 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.

Obj. 2. Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than Himself.

Obj. 3. Further, love is twofold—the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (*Ethic.* viii. 2). Therefore God does not love all things.

Obj. 4. Further, it is written (Ps. v. 7): *Thou hatest all*

the workers of iniquity. Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things.

On the contrary, It is said (Wis. xi. 25): *Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made.*

I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (Q. XIX., A. 4) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.

Reply Obj. 1. A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (*l.c.*): *On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things.*

Reply Obj. 2. Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves.

Reply Obj. 3. Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.

Reply Obj. 4. Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence, and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD LOVES ALL THINGS EQUALLY ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: *He hath equally care of all* (Wis. vi. 8). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally.

Obj. 2. Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not therefore love some things more than others.

Obj. 3. Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things more than others; nor to will one thing

more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Tract. in Joan. cx.*): *God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son; and much more than all, His only-begotten Son Himself.*

I answer that, Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said (A. 2), no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.

Reply Obj. 1. God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness.

Reply Obj. 2. This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.

Reply Obj. 3. To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD ALWAYS LOVES MORE THE BETTER THINGS ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: *He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all* (Rom. viii. 32). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Obj. 2. Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: *Thou hast made him a little less than the angels* (Ps. viii. 6). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: *Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold* (Heb. ii. 16). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Obj. 3. Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: '*Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?*' Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, '*Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?*' *By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest.* Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Obj. 4. Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 *in Isa.*), *a second plank after shipwreck.* But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said; *I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance* (Luke xv. 7). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Obj. 5. Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the

predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

On the contrary, Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (Ecclus. xiii. 19): *Every beast loveth its like*. Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more loved by God.

I answer that, It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things. For it has been shown (AA. 2, 3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things.

Reply Obj. 1. God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him *a name that is above all names*, in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror: *The government was placed upon His shoulder*, according to Isa. ix. 6.

Reply Obj. 2. God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to Apoc. xxi. 17, the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a

sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health.

Reply Obj. 3. This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine (*l.c.*) interprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.

Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervour; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and the more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since *the Lord* and no other, *is the weigher of spirits* (Prov. xvi. 2).

Reply Obj. 4. The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and the better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to rejoice

more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (*Hom. xxxiv. in Ev.*) says that, *In battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed.*

Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds (*marcæ*) are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king.

Reply Obj. 5. Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by the divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is the better; although according to some other time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.

QUESTION XXI.

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD.

(*In Four Articles.*)

AFTER considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is justice in God? (2) Whether His justice can be called truth? (3) Whether there is mercy in God? (4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS JUSTICE IN GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God: neither therefore does justice.

Obj. 2. Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: *God worketh all things according to the counsel of his will* (Ephes. i. 11). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.

Obj. 3. Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.

Obj. 4. Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (*De Hebdom.*): *Good regards the essence; justice the act.* Therefore justice does not belong to God.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. x. 8): *The Lord is just, and hath loved justice.*

I answer that, There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (*Ethic.* v. 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and the intercourse of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: *Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?* (Rom. xi. 35). The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* viii. 4): *We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of each; and preserves the nature of each one in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it.*

Reply Obj. 1. Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (Q. XX., A. 1), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* iii. 10), the subject of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* x. 8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.

Reply Obj. 2. Since good as perceived by the intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does according to His will

He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power God is a law unto Himself.

Reply Obj. 3. To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is directed to another, as the parts to the whole, accident to substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. In this respect God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is not directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (*Prosolog.* 10): *When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness.*

Reply Obj. 4. Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which

is of the essence of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (*ibid.*), that the good is related to the just, as the general to the special.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE JUSTICE OF GOD IS TRUTH ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (*Dial. Verit.* 13), it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* vi. 8: *Ethic.* vi. 2, 6). Therefore justice does not appertain to truth.

Obj. 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* iv. 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain to the idea of justice.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. lxxxiv. 11): *Mercy and truth have met each other*: where truth stands for justice.

I answer that, Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above (Q. XVI., A. 1). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure: whereas the converse is the case with the mind, that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art.

Now as works of art are related to the art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His

justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.

Reply Obj. 1. Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed according to the law, it resides in the will.

Reply Obj. 2. The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its cause and rule; as has been said regarding the truth of justice.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER MERCY CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (*De Fide Orth.* ii. 14). But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.

Obj. 2. Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2 Tim. ii. 13): *If we believe not, He continueth faithful : He cannot deny Himself.* But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. cx. 4): *He is a merciful and gracious Lord.*

I answer that, Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful (*misericors*), as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart (*miserum cor*); being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavours to dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God;

but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness: and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (Q. VI., A. 4). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown above (Q. VI., AA. 1, 4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already said (A. 1); in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by God expel defects, it belongs to mercy.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion.

Reply Obj. 2. God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: *Forgive one another, as Christ has forgiven you* (Eph. iv. 32). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: *Mercy exalteth itself above judgment* (Jas. ii. 13)

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN EVERY WORK OF GOD THERE ARE MERCY
AND JUSTICE ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: *Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy* (Jas. ii. 13). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (Rom. xv.). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.

Obj. 3. Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.

Obj. 4. Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. xxiv. 10): *All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth.*

I answer that, Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that anything

is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine will—which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this reason does God out of the abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion.

Reply Obj. 1. Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.

In the justification of the ungodly justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: *Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much* (Luke vii. 47).

Reply Obj. 2. God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of

justice appears in the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account of the promises made to the fathers.

Reply Obj. 3. Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says: (*Moral. xxvi. 9*): *The evils that press on us in this world force us to go to God.*

Reply Obj. 4. Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence.

QUESTION XXII.

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD.

(*In Four Articles.*)

HAVING considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong. Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God? (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence? (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things? (4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER PROVIDENCE CAN SUITABLY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (*De Invent.* ii.), is a part of prudence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 5, 9, 18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that are not eternal, according to Damascene (*De Fide Orthod.* ii. 29). Therefore there is no providence in God.

Obj. 3. Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.

On the contrary, It is said (Wis. xiv. 3): *But Thou, Father, governeth all things by providence.**

I answer that, It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was shown above (Q. VI., A. 4). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (Q. XXI., A. 4). This good of order existing in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behoves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (Q. XIX., A. 4), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence. to which two other parts are directed—namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 12), to direct other things towards an end, whether in regard to oneself—as, for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life—or in regard to others subject to him, in a family, city, or kingdom; in which sense it is said (Matth. xxiv. 45), *a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over*

* Vulg., *But Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.*

his family. In this way prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type of the order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (*De Consol.* iv. 6) that *Providence is the divine type itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things:* which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole.

Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 9, 10), *Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'eubulia' has rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged.** Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to God, according to Ps. cxlviii. 6: *He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away.* In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: *Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will* (Eph. i. 11).

Reply Obj. 2. Two things pertain to the care of providence—namely, the *reason of order*, which is called providence and disposition; and the *execution of order*, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal.

Reply Obj. 3. Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with

* Cf. I.-II., Q. LVII., A. 6.

the divine will and Intellect equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect are one and the same thing, as we have said above (Q. XIX.).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER EVERYTHING IS SUBJECT TO THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.

Obj. 2. Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* vi. 5, 9, 10, 11): *Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice.* Since, then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence.

Obj. 4. Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God, in accordance with the words: *God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel* (Ecclus. xv. 14). And particularly in reference to the wicked: *I let them go according to the desires of their heart* (Ps. lxxx. 13). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine providence.

Obj. 5. Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. ix. 9): *God doth not care for oxen**: and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence.

* Vulg.,—*Doth God take care for oxen ?*

On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wisdom: *She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly* (Wis. viii. 1).

I answer that, Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence, and corruptible things not in their individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job xxii. 14): *The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven.* Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others.

We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual selves. This is made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to the constituent principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: *Those things that are of God are well ordered** (Rom. xiii. 1). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as

* Vulg.,—*Those powers that are, are ordained of God:—Quæ autem sunt, a Deo ordinatæ sunt.* St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: *Quæ a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.*

they participate existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also been shown (Q. XIV., AA. 6, 11) that God knows all things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art.

Reply Obj. 1. There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since, then, all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent them to meet at the one place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other.

Reply Obj. 2. It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in

existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (*Enchir. ii.*): *Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil.* It would appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things—*e.g.*, casual and evil things—as removed from the care of divine providence.

Reply Obj. 3. Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and others of the ancients.

Reply Obj. 4. When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: *In the hand of his own counsel.* But since the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God, however,

extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For *to them that love God, all things work together unto good* (Rom. viii. 28). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel.

Reply Obj. 5. Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (Q. XIX., A. 10), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD HAS IMMEDIATE PROVIDENCE OVER EVERYTHING ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things.

Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a

cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (*Enchir. 17*) that, *It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile things*: and the Philosopher says the same (*Metaph. xii. 51*). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things.

On the contrary, It is said (*Job xxxiv. 13*): *What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?* On which passage Gregory says (*Moral. xxiv. 20*): *Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made.*

I answer that, Two things belong to providence—namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because he has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (*De provid. viii. 3*), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence, over human affairs, he

assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (*De Civ. Dei* ix. 1, 2: viii. 14).

Reply Obj. 1. It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.

Reply Obj. 2. God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said above (Q. XIX., AA. 5, 8).

Reply Obj. 3. It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; and because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PROVIDENCE IMPOSES ANY NECESSITY ON THINGS FORESEEN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a *per se* cause, either present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (*Metaph.* vi. 7). But the providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.

Obj. 2. Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns the stability of necessity to things provided.

Obj. 3. Further, Boethius says (*De Consol.* iv. 6): *Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes by the indissoluble connexion of causes.* It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.

On the contrary, Dionysius says that (*Div. Nom.* iv. 23) *to corrupt nature is not the work of providence.* But it is in the nature of some things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.

I answer that, Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes.

Reply Obj. 1. The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.

Reply Obj. 2. The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency.

Reply Obj. 3. That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that properly speaking

necessary and *contingent* are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.

QUESTION XXIII.
OF PREDESTINATION.
(*In Eight Articles.*)

AFTER the consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God? (2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined? (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men? (4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen? (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election? (6) Of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved? (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain? (8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MEN ARE PREDESTINED BY GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (*De Fide Orthod.* ii. 30): *It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all.* But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free-will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done away.

Obj. 2. Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (Q. XXII., AA. 1, 2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.

Obj. 3. Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was any unhappiness (*miseria*); for predestination, as Augustine says (*De prædest. sanct.* 17), is the *purpose to take pity (miserendi)**. Therefore men are not predestined.

Obj. 4. Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. ii. 12): *Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given us from God.* Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. viii. 30): *Whom He predestined, them He also called.*

I answer that, It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (Q. XXII., A. 2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (Q. XXII., AA. 1, 2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (Q. XII., 4). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God;

* See Q. XXII. A. 3.

as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.

Reply Obj. 1. Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: *He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue.* Whence predestination is not excluded by him.

Reply Obj. 2. Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.

Reply Obj. 3. Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take its species from the term *wherfrom*, but from the term *whereto*. Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow, or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously (Q. XXI., AA. 3, 4).

Reply Obj. 4. Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PREDESTINATION PLACES ANYTHING IN THE
PREDESTINED ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined.

Obj. 2. Further, Origen says on the text, *He who was predestined*, etc. (Rom. i. 4): *Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is.* And Augustine says (*De Præd. Sanct.*): *What is predestination but the destination of one who is?* Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something in the predestined.

Obj. 3. Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine says (*De Præd. Sanct.* ii. 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined.

Obj. 4. Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*ibid.*) that *predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits.* But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined.

I answer that, Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (Q. XXII., A. 1.). But the execution of providence

which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Rom. viii. 30): *Whom He predestinated, them He also called; and whom He called, them He also magnified* (Vulg., *justified*).

Reply Obj. 1. Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion—for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (QQ. XIV., A. 2.; XVIII., A. 3, *ad 1*). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things, has an effect in them.

Reply Obj. 2. Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar *determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life* (2 Mac. vi. 20). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.

Reply Obj. 3. Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared and of the agent, to action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.

Reply Obj. 4. Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD REPROBATES ANY MAN ?

We proceed thus to the third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (Wis. xi. 25): *Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made.* Therefore God reprobates no man.

Obj. 2. Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobate as predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this is false. For it is said (Osee xiii. 9): *Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me.* God does not, then, reprobate any man.

Obj. 3. Further, to no one ought anything to be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said (Eccl. vii. 14): *Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised.* Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.

On the contrary, It is said (Malach. i. 2, 3): *I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.*

I answer that, God does reprobate some. For it was said above (A. 1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (Q. XXII., A. 2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is

part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (Q. XXII., A. 1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.

Reply Obj. 1. God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good—namely, eternal life—He is said to hate or reprobate them.

Reply Obj. 2. Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined—namely, glory—and of what is received in this life—namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present—namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future—namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way the word of the prophet is true—namely, *Destruction is thy own, O Israel.*

Reply Obj. 3. Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility; but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (Q. XIX., A. 3), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet by a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt:

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PREDESTINED ARE CHOSEN BY GOD ?*

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv. 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination.

Obj. 2. Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election.

Obj. 3. Further, election implies some discrimination. Now *God wills all men to be saved* (1 Tim. ii. 4). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.

On the contrary, It is said (Ephes. i. 4): *He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world.*

I answer that, Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above (A. 1), is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above (Q. XXII., A. 2). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:—love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (Q. XX., AA. 2, 3.):—election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above (A. 3.) Election and love, however, are

* *Eligantur.*

differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.

Reply Obj. 1. If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (Q. VI., A. 4.) But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied.

Reply Obj. 2. When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (Q. XX., A. 2.). Thus, as Augustine says (*De Verb. Ap. Sermon. 11*): *Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice.*

Reply Obj. 3. God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF MERITS IS THE
CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 29): *Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated.* Again a gloss of

Ambrose on Rom. ix. 15: *I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy* says: *I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart.* Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.

Obj. 2. Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is *the purpose to have mercy*, as Augustine says (*De Præd. Sanct.* ii. 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause or reason of predestination.

Obj. 3. Further, *There is no injustice in God* (Rom. ix. 14). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Tit. iii. 5): *Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us.* But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.

I answer that, Since predestination includes will, as was said above (A. 4), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above (Q. XIX., A. 5.), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.

Accordingly there were some who held that the effect

of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united to the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (Rom. ix. 11, 12): *For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil, . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said to her: The elder shall serve the younger.*

Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. iii. 5), that *we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves.* Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.

And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will be outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is

of predestination; as there is no distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (Q. XXII., A. 3). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light—in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God preordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He preordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. v. 21): *Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.* Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.

Reply Obj. 1. The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was explained above.

Reply Obj. 2. Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated.

Reply Obj. 3. The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through

His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (Q. XXII. A. 2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, in sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Rom. ix. 22, 23): *What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory* (Rom. ix. 22, 23): and (2 Tim. ii. 20): *But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honour, but some unto dishonour.* Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (*Tract. xxvi. in Joan.*): *Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.* Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in this part of the wall, and that

in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: *Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?* (Matth. xx. 14, 15).

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PREDESTINATION IS CERTAIN ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words *Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown* (Apoc. iii. 11), Augustine says (*De Corr. et Grat.* 15): *Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it.* Hence the crown which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain.

Obj. 2. Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined—*e.g.*, Peter—may sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This, then, is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain.

On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. viii. 29: *Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated,* says: *Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed.*

I answer that, Predestination most certainly and infallibly

takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above (A. 1), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above (Q. XXII., A. 4). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will (QQ. XIV., A. 13, and XIX., A. 4) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are most certain and infallible.

Reply Obj. 1. The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others; according to Job xxxiv. 24: *He shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead.* Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by others.

Reply Obj. 2. Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed, that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect.

Reply Obj. 3. Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above (A. 4): and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills,

on account of the immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, though, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE NUMBER OF THE PREDESTINED IS CERTAIN ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain. But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written (Deut. i. 11): *The Lord God adds to this number many thousands, and a gloss adds, fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him.* Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.

Obj. 2. Further, no reason can be assigned why God preordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved preordained by God cannot be certain.

Obj. 3. Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Matth. vii. 13, 14: *For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are that find it!* Therefore the number of those preordained by God to be saved is not certain.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Corr. et Grat.* 13): *The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished.*

I answer that, The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above (A. 6). Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not only by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the infinite (Q. VII., AA. 2, 3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally, but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number *per se*; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and the roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He preordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and what number would befit the essential parts of that universe—that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo cor-

ruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies, and such-like, is not preordained by God *per se*; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal preordination.

It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be preordained by God for the good of the elect, in whose regard *all things work together unto good* (Rom. viii. 28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels who fell, added to that of all the angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, *to God alone is known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness.**

Reply Obj. 1. These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined.

Reply Obj. 2. The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part to the whole. Thus in God the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe.

Reply Obj. 3. The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the

* From the secret prayer in the missal, *pro vivis et defunctis*.

common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall short.

EIGHTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER PREDESTINATION CAN BE FURTHERED BY THE PRAYERS OF THE SAINTS ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints.

Obj. 2. Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is no need of help except through defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: *Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord ?* Or who hath been His counsellor ?* (Rom. xi. 34). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints.

Obj. 3. Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be

* Vulg.; *Who hath known the mind of the Lord ?*

hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it cannot be furthered by anything.

On the contrary, It is said that *Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard Him and made Rebecca to conceive* (Gen. xxv. 21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints.

I answer that, Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.

Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have been the opinion of the Egyptians, who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: *But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance* (1 Kings xv. 29); and that *the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance* (Rom. xi. 29).

Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered—namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are

directed to bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers, or those of another; or other good works, and suchlike, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: *Labour the more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election* (2 Pet. i. 10).

Reply Obj. 1. This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.

Reply Obj. 2. One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, *Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?* In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. iii. 9: *We are God's coadjutors.* Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.

Reply Obj. 3. Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above (Q. XIX., A. 6), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.

QUESTION XXIV.

THE BOOK OF LIFE.

(*In Three Articles.*)

WE now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry: (1) What is the book of life? (2) Of what life is it the book? (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BOOK OF LIFE IS THE SAME AS
PREDESTINATION?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as predestination. For it is said, *All these things are the book of life* (Ecclus. xxiv. 32)—i.e. *the Old and New Testament* according to a gloss. This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not predestination.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xx. 14) that *the book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory.* But divine energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination.

Obj. 3. Further, Reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be a book of death, as there is a book of life.

On the contrary, It is said in a gloss upon Ps. lxxviii. 29, *Let them be blotted out of the book of the living: This book is the*

knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew.

I answer that, The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly were called *conscript* fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding (Q. XXIII., A. 4) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory, according to Prov. (iii. 3): *Forget not My law, and let thy heart keep My commandments,* and further on, *Write them in the tables of thy heart.* For things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to 2 Tim. ii. 19: *The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His.*

Reply Obj. 1. The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testaments are called a book of life; or of things already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.

Hence the solution of the *Second Objection* is clear.

Reply Obj. 3. It is the custom to inscribe, not those who

are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.

Reply Obj. 4. Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE BOOK OF LIFE REGARDS ONLY THE LIFE OF GLORY OF THE PREDESTINED ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined.

Obj. 2. Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called.

Obj. 3. Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as is clear from what is said: *Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?* (John vi. 71). But the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.

On the contrary, The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above (*ibid.*). But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life therefore is only so called in regard to the life of glory.

I answer that, The book of life, as stated above (*ibid.*), implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not

belong to him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armour, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as said above (Q. XXIII., A. 1). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory.

Reply Obj. 1. The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are consequent on nature.

From this we gather the *Reply* to the *Second Objection*. For there is no election, nor a book of life as regards the life of nature.

Reply Obj. 3. The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ANYONE MAY BE BLOTTED OUT OF THE BOOK OF LIFE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei*, xx. 15): *God's foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived, is the book of life.* But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is in a thing, is in it according

to the disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably and indelibly.

Obj. 3. Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither therefore can he be blotted out.

On the contrary, It is said, *Let them be blotted out from the book of the living* (Ps. lxxviii. 29).

I answer that, Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: *Let them be blotted out of the book of the living.* But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just, according to the text, *He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out of the book of life* (Apoc. iii. 5) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because some are directed, by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because they are written therein

to have eternal life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who are ordained to eternal life, not through the divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of life not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace.

Reply Obj. 1. The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.

Reply Obj. 2. Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of the book of life refers.

Reply Obj. 3. The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew; either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included in the knowledge of God, although not anew.

QUESTION XXV.

THE POWER OF GOD.

(*In Six Articles.*)

AFTER considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God. About this are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is power in God? (2) Whether His power is infinite? (3) Whether He is almighty? (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been? (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does? (6) Whether what He makes He could make better?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS POWER IN GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent—namely, God—is devoid of power.

Obj. 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* vi. 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown above (Q. III., A. 3). Therefore, there is no power in God.

Obj. 3. Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God.

Obj. 4. Further, it was shown above (QQ. XIV., A. 8; XIX., A. 4) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.

On the contrary, It is said: *Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee* (Ps. lxxxviii. 9).

I answer that, Power is twofold—namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above (QQ. III., A. 2; IV., AA. 1, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else, as the Philosopher says (*Metaph.* v. 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the highest degree.

Reply Obj. 1. Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only active power.

Reply Obj. 2. Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in God nobler than His power.

Reply Obj. 3. In creatures, power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an

effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence, which precontains in itself all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of a *suppositum* possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle of an effect.

Reply Obj. 4. Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE POWER OF GOD IS INFINITE ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher (*Phys.* iii. 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite.

Obj. 2. Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher proves (*Phys.* viii. 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal creature in place and time, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* 20, 22, 23). Therefore, His power is not infinite.

On the contrary, Hilary says (*De Trin.* viii.), that God's power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty One. Now everything that is immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine essence (Q. VII., A. 1). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the greater power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above (*l.c.*), it follows that His power likewise is infinite.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above (*l.c.*); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.

Reply Obj. 2. The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above (QQ. III., A. 5, and IV., A. 3). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not be

ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it.

Reply Obj. 3. The Philosopher (*Phys.* viii. 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS OMNIPOTENT ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for He is immovable, as was said above (Q. II., A. 3). Therefore He is not omnipotent.

Obj. 2. Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor *deny Himself*, as it is said 2 Tim. ii. 13. Therefore He is not omnipotent.

Obj. 3. Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence *especially by sparing and having mercy*.* Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater,

* *Collect*, tenth Sunday after Pentecost.

however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.

Obj. 4. Further, upon the text, *God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world* (1 Cor. i. 20), a gloss says: *God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish,* by showing those things to be possible which it judges to be impossible.* Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore, impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.

On the contrary, It is said: *No word shall be impossible with God* (Luke i. 37).

I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be a doubt as to the precise meaning of the word "all" when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, *God can do all things*, is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (*Metaph.* v. 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there

* Vulg., *Hath not God*; etc!

would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able to do.

It remains, therefore, that God is called omnipotent because he can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.

It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot

be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: *No word shall be impossible with God.* For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.

Reply Obj. 1. God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above (A. 1). Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence.

Reply Obj. 2. To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (*Top.* iv. 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible—as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: *If man is a donkey, he has four feet.* Or he may be understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.

Reply Obj. 3. God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (Q. XXI., A. 4), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence

is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the first foundation of all good things.

Reply Obj. 4. The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which it belongs to God alone to do immediately—as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like—are said to be possible in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above (Q. XIV., A. 1, *ad 2*). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN MAKE THE PAST NOT TO HAVE BEEN ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been.

Obj. 2. Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that he should not run.

Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run.

Obj. 3. Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt.

On the contrary, Jerome says (*Ep. 22 ad Eustoch.*): *Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted.* Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been.

I answer that, As was said above (Q. VII., A. 2), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says (*Contra Faust. xxix. 5*): *Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact that it is true, be false: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi. 2): Of this one thing alone is God deprived—namely, to make undone the things that have been done.*

Reply Obj. 1. Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power.

Reply Obj. 2. As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.

Reply Obj. 3. God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or of having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN DO WHAT HE DOES NOT ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and preordained that He would do. But He neither foreknew nor preordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.

Obj. 2. Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what he does.

Obj. 3. Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does.

On the contrary, It is said: *Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?* (Matth. xxvi. 53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not.

I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place—as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above (Q. XIX., A. 3) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice, without which God does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as said above (Q. XXI., A. 2), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done.

Reply Obj. 1. In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from justice, there can be some-

thing in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above (Q. XIX., A. 3), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has placed in things. Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above (A. 3). What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by His absolute power than those He has foreknown and preordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not preordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge and preordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.

Reply Obj. 2. God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words *befitting* and *just* may be understood in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb *is*; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is

false; for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the verb *can* (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with *is*, the present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: *God cannot do anything except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just.*

Reply Obj. 3. Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them another order.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD CAN DO BETTER THAN WHAT HE DOES ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine thus argues (*Contra Maximin. iii. 8*): *If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been envious.* For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better than He does.

Obj. 3. Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine says (*Enchir. 10*), *each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe.* Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God.

Obj. 4. Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth,

and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus could not be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made them.

On the contrary, It is said (Eph. iii. 20): *God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand.*

I answer that, The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it—thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is after the manner of the addition of unity in numbers (*Metaph.* viii. 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him.

Reply Obj. 1. When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if *better* is taken substantively, this proposition is true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, *better* is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the substance.

Reply Obj. 2. It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But

it is not of the nature of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe.

Reply Obj. 4. The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything better than God.

QUESTION XXVI.

OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE.

(*In Four Articles.*)

AFTER considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God? (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect? (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed? (4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER BEATITUDE BELONGS TO GOD?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (*De consol.* iv.) is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things. But aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude does not belong to God.

Obj. 2. Further, Beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (*Ethic.* i. 9). But reward does not apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: *Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords* (1 Tim. vi. 15).

I answer that, Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the perfect good of an intellectual

nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God—namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.

Reply Obj. 1. Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures are manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (QQ. IV., A. 2; XIII., A. 4), in simplicity and unity.

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS CALLED BLESSED IN RESPECT OF HIS INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God is not called blessed in respect of His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius (*De hebdom.*). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect.

On the contrary, Gregory says (*Moral. xxxii. 7*): *He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise.* To be in glory, however, is the same as to be blessed.

Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect of our intellect, because *vision is the whole of the reward*, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xxii.), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect.

I answer that, Beatitude, as stated above (A. 1), is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blessed (*beati*) by reason of the assimilation to His beatitude.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER GOD IS THE BEATITUDE OF EACH OF THE BLESSED ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (Q. VI., AA. 2, 4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (Q. XI., A. 3). Therefore, since

it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God Himself.

Obj. 2. Further, Beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.

On the contrary, The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to 1 Cor. xv. 41: *Star differeth from star in glory.* But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God.

I answer that, The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things—namely, the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself, which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance with the saying of Augustine (*Conf. v. 4*): *Blessed is he who knoweth Thee, though he know nought else.* But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.

Reply Obj. 1. Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate.

Reply Obj. 2. End is twofold namely, *objective* and *subjective*, as the Philosopher says (*Greater Ethics, i. 3*), namely, the *thing itself* and *its use*. Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER ALL OTHER BEATITUDE IS INCLUDED IN THE
BEATITUDE OF GOD ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article :—

Objection 1. It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.

Obj. 2. Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.

On the contrary, Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above (Q. IV., A. 2.). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes.

I answer that, Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things else; and as to that which is active, he has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (*De Consol.* iii. 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures.

Reply Obj. 1. A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.

Reply Obj. 2. The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.

We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.

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